1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re K.W.-1, K.W.-2, and K.R.

No. 21-0917 (Kanawha County 20-JA-616, 20-JA-617, and 20-JA-618)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother T.R., by counsel Sandra K. Bullman, appeals the Circuit Court of

Kanawha County’s October 12, 2021, order terminating her parental rights to K.W.-1, K.W.-2, 

and K.R.

1 The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by

counsel Patrick Morrisey and Katherine A. Campbell, filed a response in support of the circuit

court’s order. The guardian ad litem, J. Rudy Martin, filed a response on the children’s behalf in 

support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by 

terminating her parental rights without first granting her an improvement period.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In December of 2020, the DHHR filed a child abuse and neglect petition alleging that the 

school issued iPads of then-eight-year-old K.R. and then six-year-old K.W.-2 contained videos 

of those children “attempting sexual behaviors.” The DHHR interviewed petitioner who reported 

that she was unaware of the existence of the videos. The children were also interviewed 

regarding the videos but they provided no additional information. However, both K.R. and K.W.-

2 disclosed significant domestic violence in the home. K.R. reported that petitioner and her 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.

Va. 254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419

(2013); State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles

L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). Additionally, as two of the children share the same 

initials, we refer to them as K.W.-1 and K.W.-2, respectively, throughout this memorandum 

decision.

FILED

April 14, 2022

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2

boyfriend, C.F., “hit each other when they fight” and that she tried to stop them from fighting on 

two different occasions. K.W.-2 also reported that when petitioner and C.F. fought, C.F. “hits 

[petitioner] hard.” K.W.-2 witnessed C.F. punch petitioner “with a closed hand” and petitioner 

crying afterwards. K.W.-2 reported that he was afraid of C.F. due to the fighting he witnessed. 

Additionally, both children reported being “whipped with a belt” by petitioner and C.F. as a form 

of discipline. K.W.-1 was two years old at the time and was not interviewed due to her age. In 

January of 2021, the circuit court ratified the emergency removal of the children from 

petitioner’s care, and petitioner moved for reunification services, which were granted. 

The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing in May of 2021. The DHHR presented 

evidence consistent with the allegations in the petition. According to the DHHR worker, K.R.

stated that petitioner and C.F. fought “six or seven times” and the child “tried to stop them from

physically fighting” by yelling “[s]top, you’re going to hurt each other.” The DHHR worker also 

testified that the children repeated their disclosures of domestic violence during forensic 

interviews. K.R. also described petitioner and C.F. smoking marijuana. Petitioner testified on her 

own behalf and denied the allegations of domestic violence between herself and C.F. She 

suggested that the children witnessed domestic violence between petitioner and her former 

spouse and that C.F. was not involved. Petitioner further testified that she was nine-weeks

pregnant, and C.F. was the father of her unborn child.

2 Petitioner then admitted that she tested 

positive for methamphetamine on April 6, 2021, approximately four weeks earlier. The circuit 

court found that the DHHR presented clear and convincing evidence that petitioner had exposed 

the children to domestic violence. The court adjudicated the children as abused and neglected 

children and petitioner as an abusing parent.

In October of 2021, the circuit court held the final dispositional hearing and considered

petitioner’s previously filed motion for an improvement period. A DHHR case worker testified 

that petitioner was complying with court-ordered services but not benefiting from those services. 

The worker explained that petitioner had not implemented the instruction from the parenting 

classes and, therefore, “enhanced” visitation could not be recommended. Additionally, the 

worker testified that petitioner continued to deny the children’s disclosures of abuse and 

domestic violence in the home. One of petitioner’s service providers testified that she supervised 

visitation and taught parenting and adult life skills to petitioner. She explained that petitioner had 

not improved in her parenting and discipline of the children and, even more critically, denied 

abuse and domestic violence in her most recent relationship with C.F. Finally, petitioner’s 

domestic violence counselor testified that petitioner was still dependent on C.F. and denied 

domestic violence and abuse in their relationship.

2

This child is not at issue in this appeal. However, while it is unclear from the record 

whether this child was born prior to the final dispositional hearing, we remind the DHHR of its 

statutory duty to “file or join in a petition . . . to terminate parental rights” when “the parental 

rights of the parent to another child have been terminated involuntarily.” W. Va. Code § 49-4-

605(a)(3).
3

During her testimony, petitioner again denied that any domestic violence occurred in her 

relationship with C.F. Further, she testified that she ended her relationship with C.F., although 

the circuit court heard evidence that C.F. was observed in the hallway outside of the courtroom 

immediately before the hearing. 

Ultimately, the circuit court found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the 

conditions of neglect and abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future because 

petitioner continued to deny the circumstances which led to the filing of the petition. The court 

found that termination of petitioner’s parental rights was necessary for the welfare of the 

children. Accordingly, the circuit court denied petitioner’s motion for an improvement period 

and terminated her parental rights to the children by its October 12, 2021, order. Petitioner now 

appeals that order.3

The Court has previously held:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights 

without first granting her an improvement period. According to petitioner, she presented clear 

and convincing evidence that she was likely to fully participate in an improvement period. 

Petitioner was compliant in services, had appropriate housing, was employed and testified that 

she was no longer in a relationship with C.F. She argues that “[t]he biggest complaint against

[her] was that she continued to deny any domestic violence between her and [C.F.]” and 

concedes that on cross-examination, she denied domestic abuse in her relationship. We find 

petitioner is entitled to no relief on appeal.

3

The individual fathers’ parental rights were also terminated below. According to the 

parties, the permanency plan for the children is adoption in their respective foster placements.
4

In order to be granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period under West Virginia Code 

§ 49-4-610(2)(B), the parent must first “demonstrate[], by clear and convincing evidence, that 

the [parent] is likely to fully participate in the improvement period and the court further makes a 

finding, on the record, of the terms of the improvement period.” “West Virginia law allows the 

circuit court discretion in deciding whether to grant a parent an improvement period.” In re

M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015); see also In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 

443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002) (holding that a circuit court has the discretion to deny a

motion for an improvement period when no improvement is likely). Further, this Court has held

that

[i]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be 

acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth 

of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the 

perpetrator of said abuse and neglect, results in making the problem untreatable 

and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s 

expense.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (citation omitted).

Critical to petitioner’s argument, the circuit court found that petitioner denied the 

conditions of abuse and neglect, i.e., the domestic violence and abuse that the children disclosed.

Indeed, at every opportunity, petitioner denied that there was any domestic violence in the home

despite the children independently telling the DHHR worker that such domestic violence took 

place in their presence. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion for 

an improvement period. Granting an improvement period would have been an exercise in futility.

Furthermore, we find no error in the circuit court’s termination of petitioner’s parental 

rights. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), a circuit court may terminate a parent’s 

parental rights upon finding that “there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect 

or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future” and that termination is necessary for 

the welfare of the child. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) provides that there is no reasonable

likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected when the abusing 

adult has “demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on 

their own or with help.” As set forth above, petitioner’s failure to acknowledge the conditions of 

abuse and neglect leaves no hope that she will improve those conditions. Petitioner does not 

challenge the circuit court’s finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions 

could be corrected in the near future, and we find no error in that finding upon our review.

Finally,

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604] . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less 

restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood 

under [West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)] . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse 

can be substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 

266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).
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Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). The circuit court was well 

within its discretion to terminate petitioner’s parental rights based on the findings below.

Accordingly, we find no error.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its

October 12, 2021, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 14, 2022

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice Alan D. Moats sitting by temporary assignment