NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUCIA MARIA JOSE,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19

- 70500 Agency No. A209

- 389

- 597

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted May 4, 2021 Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and DONATO, * * District Judge. Lucia Maria Jose, a native and citizen of Mozambique , p etitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals ’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

FEB 17 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

removal , and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdic tion under section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the Government met its burden of rebutting the presumption of future persecution arising f rom the IJ’s finding that Jose suffered past persecution at the hands of her parents and the local Muslim community due to her conversion to Christianity. The Government demonstrated that there had been a fundamental change in
circumstances since Jose end ured public shaming instigated by her Muslim parents in 2000, when she was 14. Both parents have been deceased since 2013. And before they passed, according to Jose, she became friends with them and “resolved their differences.” Further, though Jose rem ained in Mozambique through 2016,
there is no evidence that she suffered any religion

- related harm from 2013 to 2016. As for her local community, Jose testified that “everything is ok” with her congregation and that she would not be harmed in the future b ecause of her religion. Jose’s reliance on Muhu r v. Ashcroft , 355 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2004) is thus misplaced, as her admission that she does not fear future persecution on the basis of religion did not rest on her concealing her religious beliefs. See 35 5 F.3d at
960

– 61.3

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Jose failed to demonstrate a nexus between Fernando’s attempt to kill her and subsequent harassment and her religion. Jose testified she did not know why Fernando was
after her and “to this day” she does not “have any clue.” Asylum applicants must offer “some evidence” of a persecutor ’ s motive. INS v. Elias

- Zacari a s , 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). Rather, the record indicates that Fernando did not attempt to kill
her because of her rel igious beliefs, but that he was contracted to kill her, and “just doing his job.” Similarly, Jose’s assertions that she was sexually assaulted by two older neighborhood boys following her public shaming, that she received menacing calls for several years, and that she was the victim of home break

- ins that worsened after her parents’ deaths, bear no nexus to her Ch ristian faith. Thus, to the extent that these acts rise to the level of persecution, Jose failed to demonstrate that her religion is the “ one central reason” or even part of the reason motivating these acts.
See Barajas

- Romero v. Lynch , 846 F.3d 351, 359

– 60 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Jose failed to meet the lesser burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, she necessarily failed to meet the more stringent “clear probability”4

standard for withholding of removal. 1 Navas v. INS , 217 F.3d 646, 663 (9th Ci r. 2000).
2. The BIA did not err in concluding that Jose’s due process rights were not violated by the stipulated agreement to follow the procedures set forth in Grava
v. INS , 205 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2000) , and by reliance on her revised declaration,
rath er than taking her oral testimony. It was Jose’s own counsel who stipulated to
the Grava procedures in exchange for deeming Jose’s testimony credible, and Jose has failed to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at any point in these lengthy pr oceedings. Nor has she complied with the procedural requirements for doing so. See Matter of Lozada , 19 I

. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988)

. In Grava , we held that an “applicant need not testify on his or her own
behal f .

. . and may rest on the applicatio n alone, subject to INS examination at the hearing.” Grava , 205 F.3d at 1180. Here, the IJ properly asked Jose to verify that her application was complete and correct. Though at one point the IJ remarked that Jose “seemed confused,” the IJ subsequently explained the verification process, and repeatedly questioned Jose as to whether her application was “true and correct and up

- to

- date.” This stands in star k contrast to the proceeding in

1 Jose waived review of her claim for CAT protection by failing to discuss it in her opening brief. Although Jose referred to the claim in the statement of facts section of her brief, “an issue referred to in the appel lant ’ s statement of the case but not discussed in the body of the opening brief is deemed waived.” Martinez

Serrano v. INS , 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).5

Colm en a r v. INS , 210 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2000), where the IJ began th e hearing by announcing “he had already judged Colm en a r ’s claim , ” and precluded Colmenar from testifying about who had “thrown the Molotov cocktail at him” or “about anything that was included in his written application.” 210 F.3d at 971.
DENIED.