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******************************************************DOMENIC CAMMAROTAv. ANTHONYM. GUERRERA (AC 34521)
Beach, Bear and Keller, Js. Argued September 18, 2013—officially released March 18, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Radcliffe, J.)
John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).Dennis J. Kokenos, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion BEACH, J. The plaintiff, Domenic Cammarota, appeals following thejudgment ofthe trial court directing a verdict in favor of the defendant, Anthony M. Guerrera. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the counts of his complaint alleging (1) professional negligence and (2) breach of fiduciary duty.1 We agree with his first claim and disagree with his second claim.
Evidence introduced at trial includes the following relevant facts, which we construe in the light most favorabletotheplaintiff. See Curranv.Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 855–56, 37 A.3d 700 (2012). The plaintiff and his brother, Alfonso Cammarota, were involved in the development ofreal property. They retained the defendant as counsel, and the defendant prepared an agreement that was agreed to by the plaintiff and by Alfonso Cammarota, who signed it both individually and on behalf of Bella Investors, LLC, his construction company, in December, 2004. The agreement conveyed real estate known as 3404 Madison Avenue in Bridgeport (property), inwhichthe plaintiffandAlfonso Cammarota each owned a 50 percent interest, to 3404 MadisonAvenue, Inc. Theplaintiffwaspresident, secretary and treasurer ofthe stock corporation, 3404 Madison Avenue, Inc.; the plaintiff and Alfonso Cammarota each owned 50 percent of the shares of stock in 3404 Madison Avenue, Inc. The agreement further provided that Bella Investors, LLC, would construct six condominiumunits onthepropertyandthat ‘‘thenetproceeds of the first three units nearest Madison Avenue would belongto [theplaintiff] andthenetproceedsofthethree units further from the street shall belong to [Alfonso Cammarota].’’ The agreementprovidedforthe payment of construction costs. Following the construction of the condominium units, a check for $215,000 payable to the plaintiff was handed to Alfonso Cammarota by either the defendant
or an employee in the defendant’s law office. Three checks payable to 3404 Madison Avenue, Inc., in the amounts of $269,003.68, $12,558.41, and $189,005.48, respectively, were also delivered to Alfonso Cammarota. The check payable to the plaintiff was deposited, without proper endorsement, into the account of Alfonso Cammarota in May, 2005. The plaintiff’s action isbasedonthesuppositionthatthe defendanttortiously delivered the plaintiff’s check to Alfonso Cammarota.
The plaintiff testified that he had had ‘‘concern[s] about [Alfonso Cammarota] which I expressed to [the defendant].’’2 The plaintiff did not discover that the checks had been given to Alfonso Cammarota until he went to the defendant’s office to collect his share of the proceeds, where the defendant informed him that he hadpreviously handed the checks, includingthe onepayable to the plaintiff, to his brother.
The plaintiffinitiated an action against the defendant alleging legal malpractice,3 conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. At a jury trial, the plaintiff’s counsel offered evidence through the testimony ofthe plaintiff, the defendant, and Vincent Longo, an employee at the bank where the check was deposited. Afterthe plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict
as to all three counts of the plaintiff’s complaint. The court granted the motion. This appeal followed. ‘‘Whetherthe evidence presented bythe plaintiffwas sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict is a question of law, over which our review is plenary.

. . . Directed verdicts are not favored.

. . . A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably and legally have reached any other conclusion.

. . . In reviewing the trial court’s decision to directaverdictinfavorofadefendantwemustconsider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

. . . Although it is thejury’s right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven

. . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation.

. . . A directed verdict is justified if

. . . the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the courttosetasideaverdictrenderedforthe otherparty.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curran v. Kroll, supra, 303 Conn. 855–56. ‘‘A verdict may be directed

. . . where the claim is that there is insufficient evidence to sustain afavorable verdict.

. . . [T]o establish a prima facie case, the proponentmustsubmit evidencewhich, ifcredited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove.

. . . [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff’s] favor.

. . . [W]hether the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case is a question of law, over which our review is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins

. Co., 110 Conn. App. 736, 739, 955 A.2d 1241, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955, 961 A.2d 421 (2008).
I
The plaintifffirst claims that the court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the count of the complaint alleging professional negligence or legal malpractice. The plaintiffraises two reasons why in his viewthe court erred in dismissing this count. The court erred, he argues, in dismissingthe claim onthe grounds that expert testimony, required in most professional negligence or legal malpractice actions, was lacking and any delict on the part of the defendant did not proximately cause harm to the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff.A
The plaintiff argues that the court erred in holding that he was required to present expert testimony to prove his claim of professional negligence. We agree. First, it is not at all clear that the count actually soundedinprofessionalnegligence. In orderforaclaim to sound in professional negligence, it must be alleged that (1) the defendant is sued in his or her capacity
as a professional, (2) the alleged negligence is of a specialized professional nature that arises out of the professionalrelationship, and (3) theallegednegligence is substantially related to the professional conduct and involvedthe exercise ofprofessionaljudgment. See Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, 61 Conn. App. 353, 358, 764 A.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 258 Conn. 711, 784 A.2d 889 (2001).4
The plaintiff alleged legal malpractice, but the labeling of the claim is not necessarily dispositive. ‘‘[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court

. . . . Our review ofthe trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.

. . . Furthermore, in determining the nature of a pleading filed by a party, we are not bound by the label affixed tothatpleadingbytheparty.’’ (Citationomitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Selimoglu v. Phimvongsa, 119 Conn. App. 645, 651–52, 989 A.2d 121, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d 1103 (2010).
The count alleged that the defendant prepared contractual documents outliningthe plans for construction ofthe condominium units and distribution ofthe eventual proceeds. Assets from the sale of the units were deposited in the defendant’s trust account. Certain amounts were due to the plaintiffindividually. Without right, the defendant delivered all proceeds to Alfonso Cammarota. The plaintiffclaimed that this behavior on the part of the defendant was negligent and fell below the minimum standard of care. The evidence in dispute at trial did not involve an arcane issue implicatingprofessionaljudgment. Rather, evidence was introduced to show that the defendant prepared a check payable to the plaintiff, but handed ittoAlfonso Cammarota, whoarrangedtohaveitdeposited in a bank account not belonging to the plaintiff. Although the language in the complaint could reasonably be construed to describe the exercise of professional judgment—such as contract interpretation and professional obligations—the evidence, also consistent with the complaint, suggested a more straightforward scenario easily understandable by one not versed in the law.
There may be some ambiguity, then, as to whether the action realistically sounded in professional negligence or in ordinary negligence. If the case ultimately required resolution of the question of whether thedefendant committed professional negligence, then ordinarily expert testimony would be required to prove the applicable standard of care and, perhaps, deviation from the standard of care. ‘‘The determination of whether expert testimony is needed to support a claim of legal malpractice presents a question of law.

. . . Accordingly, our review is plenary.

. . . Generally, to prevail on a legal malpractice claim, in Connecticut, a plaintiffmust present expert testimony to establish the standard of proper professional skill or care.

. . . Not only must the plaintiffs establish the standard of care, but they must also establish that the defendant’s conduct legally caused the injury ofwhich they complain.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Crone, 114 Conn. App. 443, 446, 970 A.2d 757 (2009). If, on the other hand, the case realistically required resolution of an issue of ordinary negligence, then the usual rule is that expert testimony is not required, but rather thejury is to apply the standard of the reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances. See, e.g.,Marfyakv.NewEngland Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 48, 179 A. 9 (1935). Even in
cases clearlyallegingprofessionalnegligence, however, expert testimony is not required ifthe issues in dispute
are not beyond the knowledge of the ordinary juror. ‘‘[Legal] malpractice claims do not necessarily require experttestimony.Althoughacourtrequiresexperttestimony to establish the relevant standard ofcare in most
cases

. . . [s]ome aspects of a [legal] malpractice action are considered to be within the realm of ajury’s knowledge

. . . and, thus, do not require expert testimony.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, supra, 61 Conn. App. 360; see also Ciarlelli v. Romeo, 46 Conn. App. 277, 283, 699 A.2d 217 (1997) (‘‘[w]hile expert testimony is permitted in a great many instances, it is required only when the question involved goes beyond the field of ordinary knowledge and experience of judges and jurors’’ [emphasis omitted]).
The question ofwhether experttestimony is required is not resolved by characterizing the case as sounding in legal malpractice or ordinary negligence, but rather by determining whether the issue, unaided by expert testimony, iswithintherealmofajury’sordinaryknowledge. Thus, professional negligence claims do not necessarily require expert testimony, and claims of ordinary negligence may require expert testimony. The appropriatequestioniswhethertheissuecanbereliably decided by ajury without the assistance ofexpert testimony. The court reasoned that expert testimony was requiredbecause the act ofgivingthe checks toAlfonso Cammarotaproperlywasviewed inthe context ofcomplicatedtransactionsinwhichthe defendanthadalongstanding relationship with both parties. The defendant had drafted the agreement and the documents ofincor-poration, and Alfonso Cammarota’s role included obtaining and paying subcontractors.5 If resolution of the matter depended on the interpretation of complex contractual language or the application of standards peculiar to the practice of the legal profession, then expert testimony may well be required if the plaintiff is to prevail.
Viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, however, this
case presented asimple matter ofthe defendant’s handing a person a check, payable to someone else, after the defendant had been warned6 about that person. Although the jury may well not have made inferences
nor drawn conclusions favorable to the plaintiff had the case reached thejury, the scenario was one which, in the light viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, was comprehensible by an ordinary juror. The question of whether handing a check to the wrong person constitutes negligence is within the common experience of the jury and does not require the use of peculiar or specialized knowledge. See Hatchett v. W2X , Inc., 993 N.E.2d 944, 965–67 (Ill. App. 2013) (expert testimony notneededinclaimoflegalmalpracticewhereattorney, inter alia, gave to third party sale proceeds check payable to client), cert. denied, 996 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. 2013); Asphalt Engineers v. Galusha, 160 Ariz. 134, 135–36, 770 P.2d 1180 (App. 1989) (negligence obvious so as nottorequireexperttestimonywhere complaintalleged that attorney failed to follow instructions to deliver client’s check owed to third party but rather put check in file with ‘‘void’’ written on it); see also 7 Am. Jur. 2d 273, Attorneys at Law § 225 (2007) (‘‘[t]he most appropriate application of the common knowledge doctrine regarding the necessity of expert testimony in a legal malpractice action involves situations where the carelessness of the defendant attorney is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience’’).
Aspreviously discussed, the courtviewedthe case as one involving more complex issues notreadilyresolved without the assistance of expert testimony. A court is not to grant a motion for a directed verdict, however, unless the jury could not reasonably have reached a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, under the construction of the case most favoring the plaintiff. Because one construction ofthe case, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, did not require expert testimony, the court erred in directing a verdict as to the legal malpractice count on the ground that the plaintiff failed to present expert testimony.7
B
The plaintiffnext arguesthatthe court erredin granting the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as to the count ofprofessional negligence on the ground that the plaintiff had not presented evidence of proximate
cause as a matter of law. We agree.As stated previously, ‘‘[w]hether the evidence presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict is a question of law, over which our review is plenary.’’ Curran v. Kroll, supra, 303 Conn. 855.
The court concluded that granting the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as to the count alleging legalmalpractice orprofessionalnegligence was appropriate forthe additionalreasonthattheplaintiffhadnot presented sufficient evidence to establish proximate
cause. The court stated that there was no evidence that the defendant knew orhadreasonto knowthatAlfonso Cammarota would create a separate bank account and would deposit the checks, including the check payable to the plaintiff, inthat account. The court reasonedthat exhibit58 demonstratedthatitwasthe action ofAlfonso Cammarota, perhaps in concert with Vincent Longo, a bank employee who deposited the plaintiff’s check into Alfonso Cammarota’s account without a proper endorsement, that caused harm to the plaintiff, rather than any action of the defendant. ‘‘To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct legally caused the injuries

. . . . The first component of legal cause is causation in fact

. . . . The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor’s conduct.

. . . The second component of legal cause is proximate cause

. . . . [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries.

. . . Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that tied his injuries to the [defendant’s conduct].

. . . The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection.

. . . This causal connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 24–26, 734 A.2d 85 (1999). Proximate cause has been defined in case law as ‘‘[a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm

. . . . The proximate
cause requirement tempers the expansive view of causation [in fact]

. . . by the pragmatic

. . . shaping [of] ruleswhich are feasibleto administer, andyieldaworkable degree of certainty.

. . . Remote or trivial [actual]
causesaregenerallyrejectedbecausethedetermination of the responsibility for another’s injury is much too important to be distracted by explorations for obscure consequences or inconsequential causes.

. . . In determining proximate cause, the point beyond which the law declines to trace a series of events that exist along a chain signifying actual causation is a matter of fair judgment and a rough sense ofjustice

. . . Thisdefinition of proximate cause implicitly includes

. . . [a limitation on] the defendant’s liability to foreseeable bounds.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 441 n.17, 820 A.2d 258 (2003). ‘‘The question of proximate causation

. . . belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a factual issue.

. . . It becomes a conclusion oflaw only when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; ifthere is roomforareasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Turrell v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 144 Conn. App. 834, 845, 73 A.3d 872, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 930, 78 A.3d 857 (2013).
The plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant
or one ofthe defendant’s employees gave a check payable to the plaintiffto Alfonso Cammarota, that a bank employee let him deposit it without a proper endorsement, and that the plaintiff in some manner warned the defendant about Alfonso Cammarota. Whether the defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in the check being placed in Alfonso Cammarota’s bank account without a proper endorsement, as tempered by the concept of foreseeability; see Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 441 n.17; is a questionproperlyforthejury.9The defendant’s handing the checktoAlfonso Cammarotarather obviouslysatisfied the ‘‘but for’’ test for causation. The further issue of proximate cause was appropriately one for the jury to decide. We conclude that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
as to the claim sounding in professional negligence.
II
The plaintifflast claims that the court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to his claim of breach of fiduciary duty. We disagree.
The court reasoned that granting the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as to the count alleging breach offiduciary duty was proper because there was no evidence offraud, self-dealing or conflict ofinterest
on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff argues that the courterredindeterminingthattherewasno conflict of interest. He contends that the following evidence presented was sufficient for a jury to conclude that there was a breach of fiduciary duty: there was an attorney-client relationship in which the plaintiff entrustedhisaffairstothe defendant, andthe defendant delivered checks payable to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s corporation to Alfonso Cammarota, despite being
on notice ofa financial conflict ofinterest between the plaintiffandAlfonso Cammarota. Theplaintiffacknowledges in his brief that not every breach of duty in the context of an attorney-client relationship is a breachof fiduciary duty. ‘‘Professional negligence implicates
a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary duty implicates a duty ofloyalty and honesty.’’BeverlyHills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff& Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 57, 717 A.2d 724 (1998). ‘‘[A] fiduciary or confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one ofwhom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other.

. . . The universe of fiduciary relationships is not static. Rather than attempt to define a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner to exclude new situations, we have instead chosen to leave the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority and influence on the other.

. . . [A]lthough we have not expressly limited the application of

. . . traditional principles of fiduciary duty to cases involving only fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest, the cases in whichwe have invokedthem have involvedsuchdeviations.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internalquotationmarks omitted.)Di Teresi

v. Stamford Health System, Inc., 142 Conn. App. 72, 94, 63 A.3d 1011 (2013). A ‘‘breach of a fiduciary duty implicates a duty ofloyalty and honesty.’’ BeverlyHills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff& Kotkin, supra, 247 Conn. 57.
The first component of a breach of fiduciary duty is present in this case because an attorney-client relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the attorney. See Matzav.Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 184, 627A.2d414 (1993). With regard to the second component, the court properly determined that, as a matter of law, there was no conflict of interest in a traditional sense.10
The plaintiff does not indicate what specific type of conflict ofinterestwas presented bythe evidence,11 but in his brief he seems to refer to a concurrent conflict ofinterestbasedonadualrepresentationoftheplaintiff and Alfonso Cammarota. Rule 1.7 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct12 provides: ‘‘Except as provided in subsection (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation ofone client will be directly adverse to anotherclient; or(2) thereisasignificantriskthatthe representation ofone or more clients will be materially limitedbythelawyer’sresponsibilitiesto anotherclient,
aformerclientorathirdpersonorbyapersonalinterest ofthe lawyer.’’ ‘‘Loyalty and independentjudgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former clientorathirdpersonorfromthelawyer’sowninterests.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, commentary. Rule 1.7 ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct ‘‘concerns con-flicts ofinterest that may arise when an attorney represents a client and such representation will be directly adversetoanotherclient.’’ Cheveriev.Ashcraft& Gerel, 65 Conn. App. 425, 434, 783 A.2d 474, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 932, 785 A.2d 228 (2001).
The plaintiff did not submit evidence that the defendant’s representation of him was directly adverse to that of Alfonso Cammarota, nor can it logically be inferred that any misplaced loyalty motivated the handling ofthe check. There simplywasnothinginthe legal representation of them that presented a professional conflict of interest. Rather, the plaintiff presented evidencethathewarnedthe defendantaboutAlfonso Cammarota and that the defendant or someone in his office gave the four checks—including one made out to the plaintiff—to Alfonso Cammarota. There has been no suggestion that the defendant intended to benefit Alfonso Cammarota at the expense ofthe plaintiff. Any construction of a scenario involving divided loyalty or adverse interests would be, on the evidence presented in this case, a product of unmitigated speculation and conjecture, which is an impermissible basis on which to deny a motion for a directed verdict. See Curran v. Kroll, supra, 303 Conn. 856. On the evidence presented, the defendant’s actingivingthe checkstoAlfonso Cammarota may have presented a jury question regarding negligence, in that there perhaps may have been a breach of a duty to exercise ordinary care, but did not demonstrate a breach ofthe duty ofloyalty or honesty. Negligence alone is insufficient to support a claim of
a breach of fiduciary duty. ‘‘Professional negligence alone

. . . does not give rise automatically to a claim forbreach offiduciaryduty. Althoughanattorney-client relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the attorney

. . . not every instance of professional negligence results in a breach of that fiduciary duty.

. . . Professionalnegligenceimplicatesadutyofcare, whilebreach of a fiduciary duty implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, supra, 247 Conn. 56–57. Because the duty of loyalty and honesty is not implicatedbythefactsviewedmostfavorablytotheplaintiff, the court acted properly in granting the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict with respect to the count of the complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
Thejudgment is reversed as to the legal malpractice count, andthe case isremandedforfurtherproceedings according to law. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The court also directed a verdict as to the final count ofthe three count complaint, which alleged conversion. The court’sjudgment as to this count has not been challenged on appeal.

2 See footnote 6 of this opinion.
3 This count alleged that ‘‘the defendant was negligent in his handling of the plaintiff’s affairs and fell below the minimum standard of care for anattorney in the practice of his profession.’’ For convenience, we use the terms ‘‘legal malpractice’’ and ‘‘professional negligence’’ interchangeably.

4 Trimel arose in the context ofa claim ofmedical, not legal, malpractice. The considerations as to what sorts of activities implicate professional judgment, and thus what sorts of claims aptly fall into the category of professional negligence, are the same.
5 Alfonso Cammarota was the contractor on the project. The plaintiff testified that he did not attend any of the closings.
6 The evidence regarding the ‘‘warning’’ was not precise. The evidence, however, must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. On direct examination, the plaintiff was asked, ‘‘[D]id you explain to the defendant your desire that your financial interest should be protected in this transaction?’’ The plaintiffresponded ‘‘yes’’ and elaborated, ‘‘I said how do I know

. . . that I’m gonna end up with my share, and [the defendant] said, it’s in the contract.’’ The defendant’s counsel asked on cross-examination if the plaintiff had the opinion that Alfonso Cammarota was ‘‘a crook’’ when he ‘‘started this transaction.’’ The plaintiff responded, ‘‘[a] little bit, yeah.’’ The defendant’s counsel questioned whether the plaintiff had ever told the defendant that he ‘‘should not trust [Alfonso Cammarota].’’ The plaintiff answered, ‘‘Not in those words. I had questioned the contract.’’ The following colloquy subsequently occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant’s counsel: ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: And

. . . you’ve already testified that you didn’t tell [the defendant] that

. . . he had to be aware of [Alfonso Cammarota]? ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I did. I actually

. . . I thought I did. ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Youalreadysaidinsum [Alfonso Cammarota]

was a crook. ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I didn’t say—no. I

. . . didn’t say that he was a crook. I have concern[s] about my brother which I expressed to [the defendant]. I didn’t use that word, ‘‘crook,’’ no.’’

7 If consideration of the case had required resolution of a legal question, such as whether the defendant exercised acceptable legal judgment in determining to whom the check ought to be payable, the result may have been different.
8 Exhibit 5 was a memo to Vincent Longo, a bank employee, indicating that bank policies had not been followed when the check payable to the plaintiff was deposited into Alfonso Cammarota’s bank account without proper endorsement.
9 We note that wrongful depositing of a check may be within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by negligently transferring the check. See Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 441 n.17.
10 There also was no evidence presented of fraud or self-dealing. The plaintiff does not contest the court’s conclusion in this regard.

11 Inadditionto ‘‘whereanattorney’sowninterestconflictswithhisclient’s best interest; see Phillips v. Warden, 220 Conn. 112, 137–40, 595 A.2d 1356 (1991); a nonexhaustive list of recognized conflicts of interest include the following: representation of codefendants by a single attorney; see State v. Williams, 203 Conn. 159, 167, 523 A.2d 1284 (1987); where interests of an attorney’s client conflict with interests of a former client of the attorney;

see State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 652, 522 A.2d 795 (1987); and where

an attorney may be a necessary witness. See State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665, 684, 684 n.14, 718 A.2d 925 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1125, 119 S. Ct 911, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999); see also generally Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 through 1.11.’’ Abrams v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn. App. 414, 419 n.4, 987 A.2d 370, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 920, 991 A.2d 564 (2010).

12 ‘‘[A] violation of a rule of professional conduct does not give rise to a
cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 636 n.17, 850 A.2d 145 (2004); see also Rules of Professional Conduct, scope. The code, however, is useful in describing conflicts.