[Cite as Greater Cleveland Metroparks v. Ismail, 2017-Ohio-5570.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104412 

GREATER CLEVELAND METROPARKS 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs.

THERESA A. ISMAIL

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Parma Municipal Court 

Case No. 15 TRD 10936 

BEFORE: Jones, J., Stewart, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 29, 2017 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Christina Brueck 

Brueck Law Firm 

333 Babbit Road, Suite 301 

Euclid, Ohio 44123 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Anne Eisenhower 

Cleveland Metroparks 

4600 Valley Parkway 

Fairview Park, Ohio 44126 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Theresa Ismail appeals her speeding conviction, which 

was rendered in the Parma Municipal Court after a bench trial. We affirm. 

{¶2} At trial, plaintiff-appellee Greater Cleveland Metroparks (“Metroparks”) 

presented the testimony of Julie Dollard (“Ranger Dollard”), the ranger who issued a 

speeding ticket to Ismail. Ranger Dollard testified that on the date of the incident she 

was pulled over on a “pull off” between State Road and Broadview Road in the 

Brecksville Reservation portion of the Metroparks. Her ranger vehicle was stationary 

and she was “running the radar,” which was a “Python Series II.” The posted speed 

limit in that portion of the Metroparks was 30 m.p.h. 

{¶3} Ranger Dollard testified that she saw the car being driven by Ismail and 

visually estimated that it was going over 50 m.p.h. She then clocked the speed with the 

radar; the car was traveling at 56 m.p.h. The ranger pulled Ismail over and issued her a 

speeding ticket. The citation stated that the car was going 47 m.p.h., which Ranger 

Dollard testified was the speed Ismail slowed down to. 

{¶4} Ranger Dollard testified that she had been trained in running radar, and that 

the training entailed classroom course work, field training, and an examination. The 

field training included doing visual estimations of a car’s speed, which would then be 

compared to the speed as recorded by the radar for accuracy determinations. Upon 

completion of the training, the ranger was certified as a radar operator. Her certificate of 

completion was entered into evidence. 
{¶5} Further, the ranger testified that she conducted a “tuning test” prior to the 

start of her shift on the day in question, and after each ticket that she issued. The test 

confirmed that the radar was calibrated. She also testified as to the last time the radar 

was calibrated, and the certificate demonstrating that calibration was entered into 

evidence. 

{¶6} Ismail also testified. According to Ismail, Ranger Dollard was following her 

as she was driving less than 25 m.p.h., and then pulled her over. Ismail asked the ranger 

to see her radar device, to which Ranger Dollard responded, “no, I don’t need radar.” 

Ismail testified that she was looking at her speedometer the entire time, and so the speeds 

the ranger clocked her at and cited her for were “impossible,” because at the most, she 

was going approximately 32 m.p.h. She told the court that she drives that way numerous 

times a day and never exceeds 32 m.p.h. 

{¶7} On this evidence, the trial court found Ismail guilty of speeding. The court 

imposed a $100 fine, with $50 suspended, and court costs. The sentence was stayed 

pending this appeal, in which Ismail raises the following assignment of error for our 

review: “The trial court erred in finding that the evidence presented at trial was 

sufficient to find the defendant-appellant guilty of speeding.” 

{¶8} Ismail raises two issues in this appeal: (1) the reliability of the radar device 

and (2) the admissibility of Ranger Dollard’s visual-estimation testimony, which we 

consider in turn. 

The Reliability of the Radar Device 
{¶9} Ismail contends that the radar device measurement was insufficient without 

expert testimony establishing its reliability.1

 We disagree. 

{¶10} In order to convict Ismail of speeding, Metroparks was required to show that 

(1) the radar device’s speed measurements were reliable, (2) the specific radar unit was in 

good working condition, and (3) Ranger Dollard was qualified to use the radar device. 

E. Cleveland v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 301, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958). 

{¶11} In Ferell, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether evidence of speed 

obtained from a radar speed meter was insufficient evidence to sustain a speeding 

conviction when there was no expert testimony at trial regarding the meter’s construction 

and method of operation. The court held no, stating that “readings of a radar speed 

meter may be accepted in evidence, just as we accept photographs, x-rays, 

electroencephalographs, speedometer readings, and the like, without the necessity of 

offering expert testimony as to the scientific principles underlying them.” Id. at 303. 

Thus, “[t]here remains, then, only a determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence 

concerning the accuracy of the particular speed meter involved * * * and the 

qualifications of the person using it.” Id. 

{¶12} Some appellate courts, however, have held that Ferell’s holding is limited to 

 1

In a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry, appellate courts do not assess whether the 

prosecution’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence supports the 

conviction. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 79-80 

(evaluation of witness credibility not proper on review for sufficiency of evidence). Further, the 

“testimony of one witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction.” State v. Strong, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-874, 2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42. 
stationary radar devices, as opposed to moving radar devices. For example, in State v. 

Wilcox, 40 Ohio App.2d 380, 319 N.E.2d 615 (10th Dist.1974), the Tenth Appellate 

District, after acknowledging Ferell, held as follows: 

However, we feel that a defendant may not be convicted of speeding solely 

upon evidence obtained from a radar speed meter device mounted in a 

moving patrol car in the absence of expert testimony with respect to the 

construction of the device and its method of operation with respect to its 

ability to differentiate the speed of a vehicle approaching the moving patrol 

car from the opposite direction from the combined speed at which they are 

moving toward each other. 

(Emphasis added.) Wilcox at 384. 

{¶13} Citing Wilcox, Ismail contends that her conviction was not supported by 

sufficient evidence because Metroparks did not present expert testimony to establish the 

radar’s reliability. According to Ismail, Ranger Dollard clocked her speed while the 

ranger was moving in her vehicle. Ismail further relies on State v. Everett, 3d Dist. 

Wyandot No. 16-09-10, 2009-Ohio-6714, in support of her contention. In Everett, a 

state trooper used the same radar model — the Python Series II — that Ranger Dollard 

used here. Both law enforcement officials in Wilcox and Everett were in moving 

vehicles at the time they operated their radar devices. 

{¶14} Here, however, Ranger Dollard testified that she was stationary, not moving, 

when she clocked Ismail’s speed. Although Ismail testified otherwise, Metroparks 

presented evidence that, if believed, was sufficient to support the conviction as to the 

radar’s reliability needed for a speeding conviction. Thus, Wilcox and Everett are both 

distinguishable from this case. 
{¶15} The “good working condition” requirement was satisfied by Ranger 

Dollard’s testimony that she checked the calibration on the device at the beginning of her 

shift and after each ticket she wrote to ensure that it was functioning properly. 

Metroparks also presented sufficient evidence as to the third element of speeding — that 

Ranger Dollard was qualified to use the device. Specifically, the ranger testified that she 

was certified to use that particular radar, and her certification was entered into evidence. 

{¶16} On this record, Metroparks presented sufficient evidence to sustain Ismail’s 

speeding conviction. 

Visual-Estimation Testimony 

{¶17} Ismail also contends that, because Metroparks did not present sufficient 

evidence relative to the radar, and a speeding conviction based on visual estimation is 

insufficient, her conviction should be overturned. She is correct that the law in Ohio 

currently provides that visual estimation alone is insufficient evidence to sustain a 

speeding conviction. See R.C. 4511.091(C)(1).2

 But as discussed, this case did not 

turn solely on visual estimation. Rather, Metroparks presented sufficient evidence that 

Ismail was speeding through testimony relating to the radar that clocked her speed. 

{¶18} In light of the above, there is no merit to Ismail’s assignment of error and it 

is overruled. 

 2

“No person shall be arrested, charged, or convicted of a violation of any provision of 

divisions (B) to (O) of section 4511.21 or section 4511.211 of the Revised Code or a substantially 

similar municipal ordinance based on a peace officer’s unaided visual estimation of the speed of a 

motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar.” R.C. 4511.091(C)(1). 
{¶19} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Parma 

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE

MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., CONCURS; 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS WITH 

SEPARATE OPINION

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURRING: 

{¶20} I concur fully with the majority decision, but write separately to address my 

concerns raised nearly ten years ago in Cleveland v. Tisdale, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

89877, 2008-Ohio-2807, that our legal analysis of the reliability of speed-measuring 

devices has fallen far short of the current speed-measuring technology. The lead opinion 

properly lays out the historical review of reliability and the now decades-old 

distinguishing factors between stationary and moving radar systems. At this point, all 
radar measuring systems have stood the test of time, and the general reliability should be 

common knowledge to all. Requiring expert testimony for moving systems is absurd. 

The same can be said for laser devices, which have an even greater level of accuracy and 

reliability. 

{¶21} To think the Supreme Court last weighed in on the reliability question in E. 

Cleveland v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958), nearly 60 years ago is 

remarkable. 

{¶22} In Tisdale, we noted that 

[t]here is a compelling view that the same trust and reliability the Ohio 

Supreme Court placed in stationary radar devices in Ferell should now, 50 

years later, be extended to other speed measuring devices that have arguably 

withstood the test of time. Authority from other states supports the view 

that the principles of Ferell should be extended to other radar and laser 

speed measuring devices that have stood the test of time in terms of their 

scientific reliability. 

Id. at ¶ 15. 
KEYWORDS 

#104412 

Speed; radar reliability; admissibility of testimony. Appellant’s conviction for speeding 

was proper. The park ranger established that she was qualified to operate the radar 

device; that the device had been properly calibrated before operating it; that the device 

was in good working condition; and its speed measurements were reliable. Expert 

testimony to the reliability of the radar device was not required.