UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

GLACIER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee,

v. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA, a Connecticut corporation, Defendant-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant. Nos. 12-1503 & 12-1514 (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-01911-RPM) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PHILLIPS , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 20, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Glacier Construction Co. (Glacier) a ppeals the district court’s order on summary judgment limiting its recovery under a builder’s ri sk insurance policy (Policy) issued by Travelers Property Casualty Co. (Travelers). Glacier also appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Travelers on its claim for bad-faith denial of insurance coverage, as well as the cour t’s jury instruction on the nature and scope of damages recoverable under the Policy. Tr avelers has filed a cr oss appeal asserting that none of Glacier’s claimed da mages were covered by the Policy. 1 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291 and affirm. I. BACKGROUND In early 2009, Glacier contracted with the City of Auro ra, Colorado, to construct a new wastewater pumping facil ity. Before constr uction could begin, excess water had to be removed from the si te by a process called “dewatering.” To accomplish the necessary de watering, Glacier installed four submersible wells and pumps (referred to herein as the original wells/pumps), which performed as designed and expected until May and June 2009, when above-average rainfall caused them to fail. Soil got into the orig inal wells/pumps due to the t ype of soil and the amount of

1 Glacier originally filed suit in Colo rado state court. Travelers removed the case to federal cour t, invoking diversit y jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(b), 1446.- 3 - erosion and sediment. As a result, Glacier developed a second dewatering plan that included replacement wells/pum ps, and added shoring, e ngineering tie-backs, and a well-point system. Glacier made a claim on the Policy for the additional costs it incurred to dewater the site , which Travelers denied. The relevant Policy terms provided cove rage for “direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property from any of the Covered Caus es of Loss.” Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 50. “Covered Causes of Loss” were defined as “RISKS OF DIRECT
PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE.” Id. “Covered Property” was defined as “Builders’ Risk,” id. , which was, in turn, defined as:

a. Buildings or structures including temporary structures while being constructed, erected, or fa bricated at the “job site,” b. Property that will become part of a permanent part of the buildings or structures at the “job site:” (1) While in transit to the “job si te” or at a temporary storage location; (2) While at the “job site” or at a temporary storage location; “Builders’ Risk” does not include:

a. Contraband, or property in the cour se of illegal transit or trade; b. Buildings or structures that exis ted at the “job site” prior to the inception of this policy;

c. Land (including land on which the pr operty is located) or water.- 4 - Id. at 61-62.- 5 - The Policy also provided coverage for “‘ Builders’ Risk’ Site Preparation” as follows: If: (1) The cost of excavation, site preparat ion, land grading and similar work is included in the “Basic Limit of Insu rance” for the “job s ite” shown in the Declarations; and (2) You incur expenses to reexcavate the site, reprepare the site, regrade the land, or reperform simila r work because of loss of or damage to Covered Property by a Covered Cause of Loss, you may extend the applicable Limit of Insurance for that “job site” to pay for such expense. Id. at 51. Glacier filed suit to recover from Trav elers all of the co sts for the second dewatering plan. The parties eventually f iled cross-motions for summary judgment. Travelers argued that the Policy did not co ver any of the expenses Glacier incurred due to the failure of the original wells/ pumps. The district court rejected that argument, however, and ruled that the Po licy covered the “cos t of repairing and reworking [the original] four wells and pumps. [Glacier’s ] claim is limited to those
costs.” Id. Vol. 2 at 279. Based on that ruling, Travelers asserted that the covered costs totaled $9,142.25, while Glacier claimed that its c overed costs were $473,884.31.- 6 - In a separate order, the district c ourt granted summary judgment to Travelers on Glacier’s claim that Travelers denied c overage in bad faith. The case proceeded to a jury trial to determine the amount of the covered costs. The jury returned a verdict in Glacier’s favor in the amount of $9,142.25 plus post-ju dgment interest and

costs. On appeal, Glacier challenges (1) th e district court’s ruling limiting its damages to the cost of repairing and rewo rking the original we lls/pumps, (2) a jury instruction it claims imprope rly limited the amount of dama ges, and (3) the summary judgment in Travelers’ favor on its claim fo r bad-faith denial of insurance coverage. Travelers cross appeals, arguing that the di strict court erred in ruling that any of Glacier’s costs were covered by the Policy or, in the alternativ e, that Glacier’s recovery is limited to th e jury award of $9,142.25. II. LEGAL STANDARDS “We review the district cour t’s grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same legal standard used by the district court. We also review the district court’s interpretation of th e insurance policies de novo .” Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Durango Air Serv., Inc. , 283 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Colorado law applies to this dispute because “Color ado has the most significant relationship to- 7 - the insuring transaction and to the parties.” Id. at 1226 n.6. Furt her, both parties agree that Colorado law applies. See id. “Builder’s risk policies t ypically indemnify a contractor against the loss of, or damage to, a building the cont ractor is constructing.” Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Indus. Sys., Inc. , 208 P.3d 692, 694 n.7 (Colo. 2009) (en banc ). “Under Colorado law, in the absence of an ambiguity, an insurance contr act must be given effect according to the ordinary and accepted se nse of the terms contained therein.” Old Republic Ins. Co. , 283 F.3d at 1226 (citing In re Estate of Daigle , 634 P.2d 71, 79 (Colo. 1981) (en banc)). 2 If the insured shows that th e loss is covered by the policy, “the insurance carrier has the burden of prov ing that the proximate cause of the loss was excluded by the policy language.” Leprino Foods Co. v. Fa ctory Mut. Ins. Co. , 453 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Ci r. 2006) (internal quotati on marks omitted) (construing an all-risk policy; applying Colorado law). The insuran ce carrier has the burden “to establish the applicability of an exclusi on from coverage. Any exclusion must be clear and specific to be enforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). III. POLICY COVERAGE

2 In this case neither party claims the Policy is ambiguous.- 8 - We first address the cro ss appeal, wherein Travelers argues that none of the costs incurred by Glacier following the failu re of the original wells/pumps was covered by the Policy. Travelers reli es on the policy language quoted above providing coverage for “direc t physical loss of or damage to Covered Property from any of the Covered Causes of Loss.” Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 50. Travelers contends that the district court erred in concluding that the origin al wells/pumps were Covered Property, that they sustained physical damage, and that the damage was from a Covered Cause of Loss. “Covered Property” refers to “[b]uildi ngs or structures including temporary structures while being constr ucted, erected, or fabricat ed at the ‘job site,’ [and] “[p]roperty that will become a permanent part of the build ings or structures at the ‘job site.’” Id. at 61. Travelers maintains that the original wells/pumps were not “structures” and did not become a permanent part of the wastewat er facility; rather, they were removed after dewatering wa s complete. But th e Policy covered “temporary structures.” Id. Moreover, the original wells /pumps did not fall within the Policy exclusions. Conseque ntly, we agree with the distri ct court that the original wells/pumps “were temporary structur es constituting covered property.” Id. Vol. 2 at 279.- 9 - Travelers next asserts that the origin al wells/pumps did not sustain physical damage from a covered cause of loss. According to Traveler s, to be covered the loss had to be caused by a “casualty, catastrophe, or disaster,” Aplee. Principal Br. at 44, although Travelers does not point to a Po licy clause requiring this. Travelers contends that the rainfall did not qualify because for the period May through August the rains were only 10% above average. But Glacier presente d evidence that the damage was caused by above-ave rage rain that fell in surges, so averaging the rainfall over a several-month period was not re levant. We conclude that heavy rains were within the Policy coverage. An “occu rrence sufficient to trigger coverage . . . need not be sudden, but must be a specific accident or happening . . . . A long term exposure to a harmful condition that resu lts in damage or injury may be an
occurrence.” Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am. , 149 P.3d 798, 802 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (citation omit ted) (construing an “occurrence” policy). Travelers next argues that the discovery of site conditions different from those planned for (more groundwater and different soils) was not covered because it was not a catastrophic event that caused physical loss or damage. Travelers claims that the original dewatering plan should have taken these conditions into account and that the discovery of the different conditions wa s not a covered cause of loss. But the evidence showed that it was the surging rain th at caused the soil to erode and get into- 10 - the original wells/pumps, causi ng them to fail. As stated above, the heavy rains were within the Policy coverage. Travelers further argues that the or iginal wells/pumps did not require repair due to a covered event, but rather, they required only maintenance due to normal wear and tear, an expense not covered by the Policy. But the witnesses, including Travelers’ expert witness, discussed the necessary repairs to the original wells/pumps caused by the surg ing rains and eroding soil. See, e.g., Aplt. App. Vol. 4 at 696-97. Thus, we reject this argument. Lastly, Travelers asserts that the damage to the original wells/pumps was caused by the faulty or negligen t soils report. Glacier stated that part of the need for repairs to the original wells/pumps was ca used by the discovery of soils different from those identified in the so ils report. Therefore, Trav elers argues th at the soils report, not the rains or other events, wa s responsible for the damage. Travelers invokes a Policy exclusion for loss or da mage caused by “[o]mission in, or faulty, inadequate or defective . . . [p]lanning, zoning, development, surveying, siting, design or specifications.” Aplt. App. Vo l. 1 at 56-57. But Travelers’ mere assumption that the soils repor t was faulty or negligent, without evidence to support this assumption, is insufficien t to carry its burden to establ ish the applicability of the exclusion from coverage. See Leprino Foods Co. , 453 F.3d at 1287.- 11 - IV. SCOPE OF COVERAGE Having determined that the Policy c overed the damage to the original wells/pumps, we address Glacie r’s claim that the district court improperly limited the scope of its recovery. Glacier relies on the Site Preparation clause , which it contends covered its costs to design a new dewatering plan and to insta ll a shoring system, engineering tie-backs, and a well-point system. The relevant Policy clause covered co sts necessary to re -excavate the site, re-prepare the site, re-grade the land, or re-perform similar work. The ordinary and accepted sense of the Policy term s limited coverage to corr ection of work previously done. It did not cover the expense of a new dewatering desi gn and the costs to implement that design. Construing the Po licy as Glacier advocates would encourage a builder to economize on an initial dewateri ng plan and later require the insurer to pay for a more elaborate plan. This would misallocate the construction expense between the construction co mpany and the insurer. Cf. MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 558 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding insurance all-risk policy did not cover routine main tenance of covered property because doing so would shift ordinary cost of doing busin ess from insured to insurer). Therefore, we hold as a matter of law that the Policy coverage was limited to the repair and reworking of the original wells/pumps, as determined by the di strict court.- 12 - V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS Glacier’s next issue on appeal is closely related to the first. Glacier challenges a jury instruction it claims improper ly limited the amount of damages. We review de novo whether a dist rict court’s jury instructions correctly stated the governing law. We review the district court’s decision about whether to give a pa rticular instruction for abuse of discretion. Under federal law, a party is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if it is supporte d by competent evidence. In making this determination, we review the ev idence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Pratt v. Petelin , 733 F.3d 1006, 1009 (10th Cir. 201 3) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).- 13 - The jury instruction at issue is as follows: The four dewatering wells and submersible pumps installed by Glacier in May 2009 were temporary structures that constitute property covered by the Travelers insurance po licy. Damage to these structures from the intrusion of water and so il or sand is a covered loss. Accordingly, Travelers mu st pay for the cost of repairing and reworking those four wells and pumps. What is in dispute in this case is whether the plaintiff is seeking to rec over costs that go beyond what was necessary for such repair and rework ing of those structures. Travelers did not insure for the cost of achiev ing an effective dewatering system. Aplt. App. Vol. 5 at 823-24 (emphasis adde d). Glacier objected to the emphasized language on the ground that it directed the jury to adopt Travelers’ theory of the case, which was that most of the costs Glacier sought were not incu rred to repair and rework the original wells/pumps, but inst ead were above and beyond the necessary repairs and thus were not recoverable. Glacier argues that the challenged instru ction improperly limited the scope of covered costs and “effectively precluded th e jury from considering costs covered under the ‘Builder’s Risk’ Site Preparation portion of the Policy,” Aplt. Reply Br.
at 46. 3 Glacier proposed language instructin g the jury to determine what was

3 Travelers asserts that Glacier did not base its objection to the proposed instruction on the Policy language of the Site Preparation clause, and thereby waived the argument. But Glacier challenged the pr oposed instruction on the ground that it did not instruct the jury to consider all of the necessary repair costs. We conclude that this objection sufficiently preserved the issue.- 14 - necessary to repair and rework the orig inal wells/pumps. In addition, Glacier requested an instruction that the jury should award the costs it incurred to repair nondefective work that was ne cessary for the repair and reworking of the original wells/pumps. For this ar gument, Glacier relies on Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. , 317 P.3d 1262 (Colo. App. 2012), cert. granted , No. 12SC1000, 2013 WL 4714283 (Colo. Se pt. 3, 2013). There, the dispute was whether the commercial general liability policy covered repairs to nondefective property that was damaged during the corre ction of “the builder’s own faulty workmanship.” Id. at 1266, 1271. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the cost of repairing and replacing the insured’s def ective work was not covered, but the cost of repairing damage to nondefective work th at occurred in the course of repairing the defective work was covered. Id. at 1271. The district court rejected Glacier’s pr offered instructions for two reasons: first, the instructions did not comport with the interpreta tion of the Policy previously determined by the court; and second, Glaci er produced no evidence of damage to other work. Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 373. Gl acier argues that its ev idence of damage to other work was testimony that obtaining the second dewatering plan, re-casing and excavating around the original wells/pum ps, installing additional pumps, and installing the well-point system were nece ssary to reach and re pair the original- 15 - wells/pumps. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 45-46. Cons equently, Glacier contends that under Colorado Pool Systems it was entitled to have the ju ry instructed that the costs of obtaining the second dewatering plan , the additional excavating, and the installation of additional equipm ent were covered expenses. Glacier’s reliance on Colorado Pool Systems is misplaced primarily because the relevant policy language at issue in that case, which involved a commercial general liability policy, is not similar to the builder’s risk po licy language at issue here. See Colo. Pool Systems , 317 P.3d at 1268. Mo reover, in contrast to Colorado Pool Systems , Glacier does not assert that a ny property was damaged by “the builder’s own faulty workmanship,” see id. at 1266, or that the original wells/pumps were damaged during the re pair of faulty work, see id. at 1271. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’ s decision not to give Glacier’s requested Colorado Pool Systems instruction. Furthermore, given our holding above that the scope of the Policy coverage was limited to repairing and reworking the original wells/pumps, we conclude th at the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury as it did. VI. BAD-FAITH DENIAL OF COVERAGE Finally, we address Glacie r’s claim that Travelers de nied its claim for Policy coverage in bad faith. Glacier avers th at Travelers is lia ble under both Colorado- 16 - common law and Colorado statutes. It argue s that Travelers’ bad faith extended to (1) its delay in making the initial claims decision, (2 ) its failure to request information or clarification from Glacier during its investig ation, (3) it s decision not to entertain Glacier’s request to reconsider the claim denial , and (4) its refusal to pay the claim even after the dist rict court ruled that the original wells/pumps were covered property. As set forth above, we review de novo th e district court’s entry of summary judgment in Travelers’ favor. Under Colo rado common law, all insurance contracts “contain[] an implied duty of go od faith and fair dealing.” Goodson v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. , 89 P.3d 409, 414 (Colo. 2004) (en banc ). “[A] separate action in tort [arises] when the insurer breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen , 102 P.3d 333, 342 (Colo. 2004) (en banc). In a first-party insurance contract such as this one, to esta blish a bad-faith claim, the insured “must prov[e] that the insurer acted unreasonably under the circumstances [and] that the insurer either knowingly or recklessly disr egarded the validity of the insured’s claim.” Goodson , 89 P.3d at 415. The insu rer’s conduct is evaluated objectively to determine whether a “reasona ble person would find that the insurer’s justification for denying or delaying payment of a claim was ‘fairly de batable’ (i.e., if reasonable minds could disagree as to the coverage-d etermining facts or law).”- 17 - Sanderson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 251 P.3d 1213, 1217 (Colo. App. 2010). Moreover, “resort to a judicial forum does not necessarily evince bad faith or unfair dealing, regardless of the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. Even a mistaken belief about whether a claim is compensable can “be within the scope of permissible challenge.” Id. Glacier’s statutory claim is based on Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 & 10-3-1116, which provide for a cause of action against an insurer that has unreasonably delayed or denied a claim. Such a civil ac tion “is in addition to, and does not limit or affect, other actions available by statute or common law.” Vaccaro v. Am Family Ins. Grp. , 275 P.3d 750, 756 (Colo. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “statutory claim requires only that a fi rst-party claim be denied without a reasonable basis. Thus, the sta ndard contained in § 1115 arguably is less onerous on the insured, and the remedies contained in § 1116 ar e more financially threatening to the insure r than a traditional common law bad faith claim.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitt ed). In a statutor y claim, “the only element at issue . . . is wh ether an insurer denied be nefits without a reasonable- 18 - basis.” Id. at 760. And as with a common law clai m, “it is reasonab le for an insurer to challenge claims that are ‘fairly debatable.’” Id. at 759. 4 Glacier correctly points out that a “fairl y debatable” showing, standing alone, is insufficient to support summary judgment for the insurer under both the statutes and the common law. See id. at 759-60 (statutory claim); Sanderson , 251 P.3d at 1217-18 (common law claim). This does not, however, preclude summary judgment where “there are no genuine issues of ma terial fact [and] re asonableness may be decided as a matter of law.” Schuessler v. Wolter , 310 P.3d 151, 162 (Colo. App. 2012) (internal quotati on marks omitted). The chronology of relevant events is as follows:

 July 30, 2009 Glacier tende red its claim to Travelers

 Aug. 26, 2009 Travelers apprised Gl acier that photos of the job site would be taken and reque sted additional information from Glacier

4 Glacier also invokes Colorado Divisi on of Insurance Regulation 5-1-14, which states that the insurer’s deci sion should be made within sixt y days after receipt of the claim, “unless there is a reasonable dis pute between the part ies concerning such claim.” Colo. Div. of Ins. Reg. § 5-1-14(4)(A)(1)(a); see also id. § 5-1-14(4)(A)(2)(b) (identifying relevant reasonable disputes as “[c]overage under the policy for the loss claimed has not been determined; . . . [i]ndicators are present in the application or submission of th e claim and additional investigation is necessary; [or] [l]itigation is commenced on the claim”). The regulation directs the insurer to act reasonably; therefore, our discussion a nd conclusions on Glacier’s statutory and common law claims al so apply to the regulation.- 19 -  Sept. 16, 2009 Glacier sent Tr avelers a summary of damages

 Oct. 14, 2009 Travelers informed Glacier that it was investigating the claim and had a ssigned a claim adjuster

 Oct. 22, 2009 The claim adjust er met with Glacier personnel at the job site and requested further documents, which were provided forthwith

 Nov. 3, 2009 Glacier sent add itional information to Travelers

 Dec. 2, 2009 Travelers denied the claim

 Feb. 16, 2010 Glacier’s attorn eys requested reconsideration

 Mar. 24, 2010 Travelers reitera ted its denial of the claim

 July 15, 2010 Glacier fi led suit against Travelers

 Sept. 22, 2011 District court ru led that the Policy covered the costs of repairing and reworking the original wells/pumps

 Oct. 2011 Travelers hired an expert to evaluate Glacier’s expenses that fell within the district court’s order

 Mar. 14, 2012 Travelers’ expert prepared an interim report

 Apr. 30, 2012 Travelers informed Glacier that it was continuing to investigate the clai m and requested cost backup documents

 May 3, 2012 Glacier provide d the cost backup documents

 July 26, 2012 Travelers’ expert issued his final cost analysis- 20 -  Aug. 15, 2012 Travelers’ proffe red to Glacier its coverage determination of $9,142.25 Glacier argues that Travelers’ bad fa ith was demonstrated by the four-month interval between Glacier’s claim submission and Travel ers’ decision to deny the claim. Glacier asserts that Travelers’ claim-processing c onduct was unreasonable because Travelers did not request additional information or request to inspect the job site between the claim filing on July 30, 20 09, and the claim denial on December 2, 2009. Aplt. Opening Br. at 29. This asse rtion is belied by the record, which includes an email from Travelers to Glacier dated August 26, 2009, seeking to arrange an inspection of the job site a nd requesting additional informat ion. Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 46 (attachment to the parties’ “Stipulated Facts”). In addition, the record reflects that on October 22, 2009, the claim adjuster met with Glaci er personnel at the job site and requested further documents. Id. Vol. 2 at 304-05, 329-30. 5 Following its receipt of additional documen ts in early November 2009, Travelers made the claim decision on December 2, 2009. Based on th e undisputed facts, summary judgment was appropriate because no reasonable ju ry could have found that Travelers

5 We recognize Glacier’s argument that Glac ier, not Travelers, initiated some of the claim-processing communications, wh ich Glacier conte nds demonstrates Travelers’ failure to proces s the claim in a ti mely fashion. Bu t Glacier cites no authority for its position that the insurance company must request information before the insured provides it or risk a finding of bad fa ith. We decline to adopt such a rule.- 21 - unreasonably delayed or denied processing Glacier’s claim, a determination that is fatal to both the statutor y and common law claims. Glacier also contends that Travelers’ bad faith was demonstrated by Travelers’ decision not to reconsider its initial deni al of the claim and its delay in tendering payment even after the district court ruled that the origin al wells/pumps were covered by the Policy. “Th[e] duty of good faith and fair dealing con tinues unabated during the life of an insure r-insured relationship, including th rough a lawsuit or arbitration between the insured and the insurer, although the adve rsarial nature of such proceedings may suspend the in surer’s obligation to negotia te as a reflection of good faith.” Sanderson , 251 P.3d at 1217. Glacier avers that Travelers acted unreasonably by denyi ng reconsideration without further investigation or discussion and that Traveler s’ refusal to ascertain and tender “the undisputed amount owed” until just before trial was in bad faith, Aplt. Opening Br. at 33. 6 But Travelers did not merely refuse Glacier’s reconsideration

6 Glacier relies on its expert’s opi nion “that Travelers had continued to unreasonably delay[] payment of the claim af ter receipt of the C ourt’s order [holding that the Policy covered the repair and rework ing of the original wells/pumps].” Aplt. Opening Br. at 29. But this conclusory opi nion does not establis h a genuine issue of material fact. See Zolman v. Pinnacol Assurance , 261 P.3d 490, 500 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting that expert’s “affidavit and report simply state his conclusory opinions that [the insurer] acted in bad faith without establishing any genuin e issue of material fact”).- 22 - request; rather, Travelers enga ged an expert, informed Glaci er of the expert’s interim report, and requested add itional documentation. Moreover, the amount owed was disputed throughout the trial. Accordingl y, applying the approp riate standards, we conclude that no reasonable jury could ha ve found on the evidence presented that Travelers’ post-claim-denial conduct unreasonably delayed or denied Glacier’s claim. Again, this determination is fatal to both the statutory and common law claims. Summary judgment in Travelers’ favor was therefore appropriate on Glacier’s bad-faith claims. VII. CONCLUSION The judgment of the distri ct court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge