J-S21032-17

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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KERRIE LEI GUIRLEO,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1334 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 31, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001292-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, DUBOW, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JUNE 16, 2017

Kerrie Lei Guirleo (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on August 31, 2016, after she was found guilty of one count of 

persons not to possess firearms. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the factual history as follows.

On July 15, 2015, Trooper David Vinkler of the 

Pennsylvania State Police was dispatched to Iris Street in 

Connellsville, Fayette County, Pennsylvania for a matter 

unrelated to this case. As part of police protocol, Trooper Vinkler 

attempted to interview residents of the neighborhood. It was 

through this process that Trooper Vinkler came into contact with 

Appellant. Adjacent to the residence that Trooper Vinkler was 

dispatched to was Appellant’s residence, at 435 Iris Street. 

As Trooper Vinkler approached Appellant’s residence, 

Appellant was standing in the entranceway of her open door. 

Appellant invited Trooper Vinkler inside after he asked if he could 

talk to her.2 Once Trooper Vinkler entered the residence, he 

noticed a 410 shotgun laying across the arms of a recliner chair 

situated in the living room. Determining the shotgun to be 
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unloaded, Trooper Vinkler removed the firearm from the 

residence and placed it outside of the main entrance door.

Trooper Vinkler then located additional firearms in a locked 

gun case in a bedroom and a loaded [.]44 Caliber Ruger Pistol 

(“Ruger”) underneath a pillow on the couch in the living room. 

After locating the firearms, Trooper Vinkler escorted Appellant 

outside the house towards his patrol vehicle where he locked the 

Ruger in his trunk. With regards to the other firearms, Trooper 

Vinkler contacted a relative of Appellant to take possession and 

remove them from the house. Trooper Vinkler concluded his 

investigation by placing Appellant under arrest when he 

confirmed she was not permitted to possess a firearm.3

Appellant testified at trial. Appellant testified that she 

lived with her husband and son. She testified that she did not 

know any guns were in the gun cabinets and she did not know 

that the Ruger was under a pillow in the living room. She later 

testified that the Ruger was her mother’s firearm, who was at 

the residence earlier that day. 

______

2 Appellant testified that Trooper Vinkler just walked into 

her house but she did not tell him he could not come inside. 

3

 This [c]ourt read to the jury a stipulation agreed to by 

the parties that Appellant was prohibited from possessing or 

controlling a firearm due to a prior conviction and she was 

prohibited from possessing or controlling a firearm on a date 

more than sixty days from July 15, 2015.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/4/2016, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

After being charged with the aforementioned crime, Appellant filed an 

omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence. Specifically, Appellant 

argued, inter alia, that Trooper Vinkler, the arresting officer, (1) entered her 

home without a search warrant or probable cause; (2) lacked reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause to search her residence; and (3) obtained 
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statements from Appellant without reading her Miranda1 warnings. The 

suppression court held a hearing at which testimony from Trooper Vinkler 

was presented. Appellant was not present at the hearing.2 The suppression 

court made the following findings of fact on the record at the hearing. 

[O]n July 15, 2015, Trooper Vinkler was investigating a burglary 

that had been reported at the home of [Appellant’s mother,] 

Helen Newcomer[,] who resides at 433 Irish Street in 

Connellsville, Fayette County, Pennsylvania. In the course of his 

investigation he proceeded [next door] to 435 Irish Street in 

Connellsville which is the residence of [Appellant.] [Appellant] 

permitted Trooper Vinkler into her home and for his safety he 

made inquiry as to whether there were any firearms in the 

immediate area after first noticing a 410 shotgun across the arm 

of a chair. The trooper properly asked, to protect his own safety 

upon seeing the shotgun, if there were other weapons in the 

immediate area and it was then that [Appellant] reported that 

she had a loaded [.]44 [caliber firearm] under a pillow on her 

couch, which the trooper then removed from the immediate 

area. [Appellant] acknowledged that the guns were registered 

to her and Trooper Vinkler determined that she is not entitled to 

possess firearms in that she pled guilty to a felony offense which 

occurred in April of 1998. 

N.T., 11/17/2015, at 15-16. Following the hearing, the suppression court 

denied Appellant’s motion. Order, 11/18/2015.

A jury trial was held on August 1, 2016, and Appellant was found 

guilty of the aforementioned charge. On August 31, 2016, Appellant was 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 Appellant’s whereabouts were unknown at the time of the hearing, but her 

counsel agreed to proceed because counsel did not plan to present 

testimony from Appellant. N.T., 11/17/2015, at 3.
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sentenced to three and a half to seven years of incarceration. Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal.3

On appeal, Appellant raises two issues.

[1] Did the [suppression] court err in denying Appellant’s 

omnibus pretrial motion to suppress evidence?

[2] Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to 

introduce testimony regarding multiple “firearms” where the 

Commonwealth information charged Appellant with being in 

possession of a single “firearm”? 

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

We consider the following regarding Appellant’s first issue.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial

court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining

whether the factual findings are supported by the record and

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are

correct. [W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression 

court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the 

court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the 

facts.

 

3 Appellant filed a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 challenging the 

suppression’s court ruling as well as an evidentiary ruling made at trial. The 

trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing the evidentiary issue. 

However, we note that while the suppression court stated its factual findings 

on the record at the suppression hearing prior to issuing its ruling and made 

a passing reference to officer safety, it did not issue specific “conclusions of 

law as to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s 

rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute,” as is required by 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). 

 
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Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 530 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26–27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en 

banc)).

Appellant argues that because Trooper Vinkler had neither a search 

warrant nor probable cause to enter her home, any testimony regarding 

firearms recovered from the home should have been suppressed. 

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. She further argues that Trooper Vinkler 

questioned her and obtained incriminating statements without administering 

required Miranda warnings. Id. at 10-11. 

Appellant’s argument in her brief regarding Trooper Vinkler’s entry into 

her home is cursory, underdeveloped, and lacks citation to pertinent case 

law.4 It is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently 

developed for our review. Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). This Court will not act as counsel and develop arguments on 

behalf of an appellant. Id. Therefore, Appellant has waived this issue. 

Even if Appellant had not waived this issue, it would have no merit. 

While the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a 

person’s home, the prohibition does not apply to situations in which 

voluntary consent has been obtained. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 

 

4 We also note with disapproval that Appellant’s statement of the case fails 

to include “[a] closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative form, 

of all the facts which are necessary to be known in order to determine the 

points in controversy, with an appropriate reference in each instance to the 

place in the record where the evidence substantiating the fact relied on may 

be found.” Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4).
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181 (1990). Based upon Trooper Vinkler’s testimony that Appellant invited 

him into her home, the suppression court found that Trooper Vinkler entered 

Appellant’s home with her permission. N.T., 11/17/2015, at 7, 15-16.

Similar to her argument regarding entry into the home, Appellant’s 

argument concerning the lack of Miranda warnings is also underdeveloped. 

Other than noting that she was a suspect in a burglary investigation, she 

fails to describe why she was entitled to the warnings. While Appellant cites 

to general case law regarding Miranda warnings, she fails to analyze the 

issue by applying the facts of her case to the law. Therefore, she has 

waived this issue as well.

Again, however, even if Appellant had not waived this issue, it would 

merit no relief. Miranda safeguards only attach once a person is in custody 

and subjected to “express questioning or its functional equivalent.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 30 (Pa. Super. 2008). To 

constitute an interrogation, the words or actions of the police must be 

“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. 

“[I]n evaluating whether Miranda warnings were necessary, a court must 

consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id.

Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes 

depends on whether the person is physically denied of [his or 

her] freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a 

situation in which [he or she] reasonably believes that [his or 

her] freedom of action or movement is restricted by the 

interrogation. Moreover, the test for custodial interrogation does 

not depend upon the subjective intent of the law enforcement 

officer interrogator. Rather, the test focuses on whether the 
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individual being interrogated reasonably believes [his or her] 

freedom of action is being restricted.

Under the totality of the circumstances approach, the 

following factors are relevant to whether a detention has become 

so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of a formal 

arrest: the basis for the detention; its length; its location; 

whether the suspect was transported against his or her will, how 

far, and why; whether restraints were used; whether the law 

enforcement officer showed, threatened or used force; and the 

investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions. 

Id. at 30-31 (citations and quotations omitted).

Here, at the time Appellant made statements regarding the presence 

and ownership of guns in her home, she was not in custody, even if Trooper 

Vinkler’s burglary investigation focused upon Appellant.5 “The fact that a 

police investigation has focused on a particular individual does not 

automatically trigger ‘custody,’ thus requiring Miranda warnings.” 

Commonealth v. Witmayer, 144 A.3d 939, 948 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

Appellant could not have reasonably believed that her freedom of action was 

restricted. As noted above, Appellant invited Trooper Vinkler into her home. 

Trooper Vinkler noticed a shotgun in plain sight upon entering the residence. 

N.T., 11/17/2015, at 7-8. He asked Appellant’s permission to place the gun 

outside, which she granted. Id. All of Trooper Vinkler’s questioning 

regarding firearms occurred in the immediate aftermath of his entry into the 

 

5 Appellant’s mother, who lived next door to Appellant, alleged that Appellant 

had kicked in the back door of her residence and stolen all of her food. 

Appellant was charged with burglary but the charge was dismissed at the 

magistrate’s level. N.T., 11/17/2015, at 5-6, 10. 
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home, so their interaction was not of a long duration. There are no 

indications that Trooper Vinkler showed, threatened or used force. 

Appellant’s remaining claim of error is that the trial court should have 

prohibited the Commonwealth from introducing testimony regarding multiple 

firearms at trial because the criminal information referenced “a firearm.” 

Upon our review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant 

law, we conclude that the opinion of the Honorable Joseph M. George, Jr. 

thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes of that issue and 

supporting arguments and evidences no abuse of discretion or errors of law. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/2016, at 3-6. We agree with the trial court’s 

analysis that the information tracked the wording of the statute and 

Appellant’s argument would require reading the information in an overly 

technical manner. Id. at 4-5. Moreover, Appellant had ample notice of the 

testimony regarding multiple firearms due to Trooper Vinkler’s testimony at 

the suppression hearing. Id. at 5-6. 

Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s opinion, filed on October 3, 

2016, as our own and hold, based upon the reasons stated therein, that the 

trial court committed neither an error of law nor an abuse of discretion in 

allowing the Commonwealth to present evidence of multiple firearms. The 

parties shall attach a copy of the trial court’s October 3, 2016 opinion to this 

memorandum in the event of future proceedings. 

Judgement of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/16/2017

 
Circulated 06/02/2017 11:30 AM