COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Overton 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MICHAEL ANTHONY BOTTOMS 

v. Record No. 0551-95-4 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA APRIL 30, 1996 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

Frank A. Hoss, Jr., Judge 

 Vernon H. Miles, Sr. (Ronald W. Fahy, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from his conviction of attempted capital murder, 

Michael Anthony Bottoms contends (1) that the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) that the trial court 

erred in admitting evidence of other crimes, and (3) that the 

trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. We find 

no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 On May 15, 1994, at 6:10 a.m., Bottoms was driving south on 

Interstate 95 in Prince William County. He passed Trooper 

Campbell, who was parked on the right shoulder, with his blue 

emergency lights flashing, issuing a citation. Bottoms drove by, 

made a U-turn seventy-five feet away, drove north in the southbound lane, made another U-turn, and pulled up beside the patrol 

car. 

 Bottoms asked Campbell whether he was driving in the right 
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direction to reach Savannah, Georgia. Campbell told him to park 

and wait in front of the car receiving the ticket. Bottoms did 

as Campbell directed, but then got out of his car and approached 

the patrol car. Campbell exited the patrol car and told Bottoms 

to return to his car. 

 When Campbell finished issuing the citation, he approached 

Bottoms' car. He stood at the rear of the vehicle and asked 

Bottoms for his license and registration. Bottoms had neither 

and told several different stories concerning ownership of the 

car. Bottoms attempted several times to lure Campbell to the 

driver's window. However, Campbell was suspicious and refused to 

approach. He could see only Bottoms' left hand. Campbell 

directed Bottoms to exit the car. After Bottoms got out of the 

car, Campbell searched him for weapons and finding none, put him 

in the patrol car. When Campbell called in the information 

Bottoms gave concerning his driver's license, he learned that 

Bottoms had a valid South Carolina license. A DMV check on the 

license plates on Bottoms' car revealed that they belonged to a 

Buick, not a Renault, the make of car that Bottoms was driving. 

 After another officer arrived, Campbell spoke to the two 

female passengers in Bottoms' car. He then ran a vehicle 

identification number check on the car and discovered that it had 

been stolen the night before in Pennsylvania. Campbell then 

arrested Bottoms and the two passengers. 

 The car was searched and a Taurus .38 caliber revolver was 
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found in the glove compartment. The revolver contained three 

live rounds and two expended cartridges. 

 In his patrol car on Interstate 95, Campbell read Bottoms 

his rights and Special Agent Scott read those rights to Bottoms 

again at the Adult Detention Center in Manassas. Bottoms 

acknowledged both times that he understood his rights. Bottoms 

confessed that he had attempted to lure Campbell into shooting 

range, intending to kill him. He said that he was holding the 

loaded revolver between the seats with the hammer cocked, and 

that he did not shoot Campbell while he stood at the rear of the 

car because he saw that Campbell was wearing a bulletproof vest 

and would be able to return fire if shot at that distance. 

 Andrea Ross, one of the passengers in Bottoms' car, 

testified that Bottoms intended to kill Campbell, that he had the 

revolver in his hand while he was talking to Campbell, and that 

he attempted to get Campbell to approach his window so that he 

could shoot him. 

 I. 

 Bottoms first contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

sustain his conviction of attempted capital murder. "To sustain 

a conviction for attempted murder, the evidence must establish 

both a specific intent to kill the victim and an overt but 

ineffectual act committed in furtherance of the criminal 

purpose." Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 

193, 198 (1987). An overt act must go beyond mere preparation to 
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commit the crime. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 337, 

340, 423 S.E.2d 371, 374 (1992). Bottoms does not contest the 

sufficiency of the evidence to prove his intent to kill Campbell. 

 Rather, he argues that because he did not point the gun at 

Campbell, he committed no overt act toward the commission of 

murder. 

 "Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal, the court must consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, giving to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Brown v. Commonwealth, 5 

Va. App. 489, 491, 364 S.E.2d 773, 774 (1988). 

 Although an overt act must go beyond mere preparation, "[i]t 

need not be the last proximate act to the consummation of the 

crime in contemplation, but it is sufficient if it be an act 

apparently adapted to produce the result intended." Granberry v. 

Commonwealth, 184 Va. 674, 678, 36 S.E.2d 547, 548 (1946). 

Bottoms made two U-turns on Interstate 95 in order to approach 

Campbell. He intended to shoot Campbell. He held the loaded .38 

caliber revolver, with the hammer cocked, in his right hand out 

of Campbell's view. He repeatedly tried to lure Campbell to the 

driver's window so that he could shoot him at close range. This 

active conduct, aimed at the accomplishment of the crime, 

constituted an overt act "adapted to produce" the commission of 

murder. 

 II. 
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 Bottoms next contends that the trial court erred in allowing 

the Commonwealth to present evidence that he had committed a 

carjacking in South Carolina and a robbery and larceny of a car 

in Pennsylvania. As a general rule, other crimes evidence is 

inadmissible. Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 

S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). Bottoms' pretrial motion in limine, 

seeking suppression of the portions of his confession dealing 

with the alleged prior offenses, was granted. He argues that 

this ruling became the law of the case and was binding on the 

judge who conducted the trial. Such is not the law. Trial 

judges are required to rule on issues as they develop at trial. 

If the development of the case requires reversal of an earlier 

ruling, it is the trial judge's duty to order that reversal. The 

court's evidentiary rulings must be based on the case as it 

actually develops, not as it may be supposed prospectively that 

it will develop. "A trial court is empowered to change a legal 

determination as long as it retains jurisdiction over the 

proceedings before it." Turner v. Sheldon D. Wexler, D.P.M., 

P.C., 244 Va. 124, 128, 418 S.E.2d 886, 888 (1992). 

 Bottoms argues that the prejudicial effect of proof of his 

prior offenses outweighed its probative value. We disagree. 

That proof disclosed a continuing course of criminal conduct and 

explained Bottoms' motive in stopping and attempting to kill 

Trooper Campbell during Bottoms' crime spree. Its probative 

value was significant. The trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion in finding that the probative value outweighed any 

incidental prejudice to Bottoms. 

 "The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Blain v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988). 

"While evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible due to 

its prejudicial nature, it is admissible 'in cases where the 

motive, intent or knowledge of the accused is involved, or where 

the evidence is connected with or leads up to the offense for 

which the accused is on trial.'" Curtis v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. 

App. 622, 625, 414 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1992) (en banc). We find no 

abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting evidence of 

Bottoms' previous offenses for the limited purpose of 

demonstrating his motive for attempting to kill Campbell. 

 III. 

 Finally, Bottoms contends that the trial court erred in 

refusing to grant a mistrial when the Commonwealth referred to 

his prior unadjudicated crimes during the sentencing phase of the 

trial. He argues that the trial court's instruction to the jury 

to disregard those unadjudicated offenses was insufficient to 

overcome the resulting prejudice. We disagree. 

 "On appeal the denial of a motion for a mistrial will not be 

overruled unless there exists a manifest probability that the 

denial of a mistrial was prejudicial." Tomlinson v. 
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Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 218, 223, 380 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1989) 

(quoting Harward v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 468, 478, 364 S.E.2d 

511, 516 (1988)). Evidence of both the South Carolina carjacking 

and the Pennsylvania robbery and auto larceny was admitted during 

the guilt phase of the trial. "[T]he jury, at the sentencing 

phase, 'would necessarily have access to the evidence presented 

in the guilt phase of the trial.'" Gilley v. Commonwealth, 21 

Va. App. 740, 744, 467 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1996) (citations 

omitted). The trial court's cautionary instruction properly and 

sufficiently guided the jury's consideration of this evidence. 

We find no error in its denial of Bottoms' motion for a mistrial. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.