alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-4905

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SHARON LEE NECESSARY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Chief

District Judge. (5-05-cr-00033)

Submitted: February 22, 2007 Decided: February 27, 2007

Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Patricia A. Kurelac, KURELAC LAW OFFICES, Moundsville, West

Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney,

Charleston, West Virginia, John L. File, Assistant United States

Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Sharon Lee Necessary pled guilty to conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and was

sentenced to a term of seventy months imprisonment. Necessary

appeals her sentence, contending that her Sixth Amendment rights

were violated by the district court’s fact findings concerning the

drug amount and the applicability of a weapon enhancement. U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2004). We affirm.

In the district court, Necessary contested the drug

amount and the firearm enhancement on factual grounds, but did not

raise a Sixth Amendment claim. On appeal, relying on United

States v. Milam, 443 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2006), Necessary argues

that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the sentencing court may consider only

such facts pertinent to the sentence that were proved to a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt or were admitted by the defendant, even

when the sentencing guidelines are applied as advisory. We review

her claim for plain error, see United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d

540, 547-48 (4th Cir. 2005), and conclude that it is without merit.

Milam addressed sentences that were imposed under a mandatory

guideline scheme. When a defendant is sentenced under the

post-Booker advisory guideline scheme, the district court may make

factual findings about sentencing factors without violating the

Sixth Amendment, as long as the sentence does not exceed the
- 3 -

statutory maximum sentence for the offense of conviction. United

States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir. 2005). Necessary’s

seventy-eight-month sentence did not exceed the twenty-year

statutory maximum sentence applicable to the offense to which she

pled guilty. No error occurred.

We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, filed pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, of Cadence Financial Corporation (the Corporation) for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Richard T. Haston, the Chief
Financial Officer of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Richard T. HastonName:

Richard T. HastonTitle:

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:

May 12, 2010


A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Cadence Financial Corporation and will be retained by Cadence Financial Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



51
EXHIBIT 99.1
                                                                    ------------


                           SECTION 906 CERTIFICATIONS
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and
(b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of Westbank Corporation (the "Corporation") does hereby
certify to such officer's knowledge that:


     The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003 of
     the Corporation fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in
     the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
     condition and results of operations of the Corporation.



Date: May 8, 2003                          /s/ Donald R. Chase
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Donald R. Chase
                                          President and Chief Executive Officer


Date: May 8, 2003                          /s/ John M. Lilly
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          John M. Lilly
                                          Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 99.2


Certification of the principal accounting officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the
                          Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

In connection with this quarterly  report on Form 10-Q (the "report") of Options
Talent Group (the "Company"). I, Robert Alberty, Corporate Controller (principal
accounting  officer)  of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

     Date:  December 23, 2002



                                   /s/    ROBERT ALBERTY
                                   ---------------------
                                   Robert Alberty
                                   Corporate Controller (principal accounting
                                   officer)
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04

- 19

- 00505

- CV
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP O F HORTENCIA T. VARA, AN INCAPACITATED PE RSON Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
PER CURIAM Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Delivered and Filed: August 7, 2019
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED On June 20, 2018, Mi g uel Vara initiated the underlying guardianship proceeding by filing an application for appointment as the temporary guardian of the person and estate of Hortencia T.
Vara . That application is apparently still pending. On June 27, 2018, Paul J. Tarski was appointed attorney ad litem for Ms. Vara. On July 25, 2019, a ttorney Joshua L. Carpenter filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this court in which he states he represents Ms. Vara. In the petition, Mr. Carpenter asserts the trial court has abused i t s discretion by not dismissing the guardianship proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Carpenter asks this court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the respondent to vacate all void orders and dismiss the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 14

- 19

- 00474

- V, styled In the Guardianship of Hortencia T. Vara, An Incapacitated Person , pending in the County Court, Uvalde County, Texas, the Honorable William R. Mitchell presiding.04

- 19

- 00505

- CV

- 2

- The mandamus record does not contain an order by the trial court denying any motion to dismiss. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 52.3(k)(1)(A) (“The appendix must contain: (A) a certified or sworn copy of any order complained of, or any other document showing the matter c omplained of .

. . .”);
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.7 (a) (“ Relator must file with the petition : (1) a certified or sworn copy of every document that is material to the relator ’ s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying proceeding; and (2) a properly au thenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding, including any exhibits offered in evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced in connection with the matter complained. ”). Because t he mandamus record is not suffi cient for this court to review the actions of the trial court ; the petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
PER CURIAM
```

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 88 (Friday, May 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25235-25236]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-10805]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER10-1109-000]

Eagle Creek Hydro Power, LLC; Supplemental Notice That Initial 
Market-Based Rate Filing Includes Request for Blanket Section 204 
Authorization

April 29, 2010.
    This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding of 
Eagle Creek Hydro Power, LLC's application for market-based rate 
authority, with an accompanying rate tariff, noting that such 
application includes a request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR 
part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 
385.214). Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a 
copy of that document on the Applicant.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with 
regard to the applicant's request for blanket authorization, under 18 
CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability, is May 19, 2010.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with Internet 
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an 
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the 
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the 
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 
14 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First St., NE., Washington, DC 20426.

[[Page 25236]]

    The filings in the above-referenced proceeding are accessible in 
the Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in 
the above list. They are also available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link 
on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail notification 
when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For assistance with 
any FERC Online service, please e-mail [email protected] or 
call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-10805 Filed 5-6-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                      16,937,039
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          99,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            14,425,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 52,637,509
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      32,924,483
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        32,881,489
<LOANS>                                    263,688,249
<ALLOWANCE>                                  2,915,985
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             398,467,580
<DEPOSITS>                                 350,122,467
<SHORT-TERM>                                 3,056,368
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          2,675,950
<LONG-TERM>                                 15,000,000
<COMMON>                                    15,242,520
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  12,370,275
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             398,467,580
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             18,550,502
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            3,403,426
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               346,828
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            22,300,756
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           9,135,728
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           9,938,219
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                       12,362,537
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  455,500
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                              36,884
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                             10,017,055
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,065,418
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   2,633,757
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,633,757
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.04
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.88
<LOANS-NON>                                    407,909
<LOANS-PAST>                                    39,008
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             2,795,941
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  395,731
<RECOVERIES>                                    60,275
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            2,915,985
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         2,415,985
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        500,000
        

</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman,

 Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 19, 2017

s0516

Order 

Clerk

May 19, 2017

154437

BRUCE MILLAR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 154437

COA: 326544

Lapeer CC: 14-047734-CZ

CONSTRUCTION CODE AUTHORITY, ELBA

TOWNSHIP, and CITY OF IMLAY CITY,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 4, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral 

argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). 

The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order 

addressing whether the plaintiff’s claim under the Whistleblowers Protection Act was 

barred by the 90-day limitation period set forth in MCL 15.363(1). The parties should 

not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 21

- 2214

___________________________ United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v. Geoffrey Seldon Six

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

____________ Submitted: January 3, 2022 Filed: January 6, 2022 [Unpublished]

____________ Be fore LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________
PER CURIAM.

Geoffrey Six pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 846 , and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug

- trafficking crime , 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In an Anders brief, Six’s counsel suggests that the-2- sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). A pro se supplemental brief raises several other issues

. We conclude that Six’s sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461

– 62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) ( reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence under “a deferential abuse

- of

- discretion standard” (quotation marks omitted)) ; United States v. Per kins , 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a within

- Guidelines

- range sentence is presumptively reasonable)

. The record establishes that the district court 1 sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and di d not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Larison , 432 F.3d 921, 923

– 24 (8th Cir. 2006).

As for the issues raised in Six’s pro se supplemental brief , t he district court did not plainly err when it declined to apply a mitigating

- role reduction or give him relief under the so

- called safety valve. See United States v. Kirlin , 859 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review)

. And Six’s ineffective

- assistance

- of

counsel claim , to the extent he tries to raise it here, will have to await “ collateral ” review

. United States v. Ramirez

- Hernandez , 449 F.3d 824, 826

– 27 (8th Cir. 2006) ; see also App. Br. at 1 (claiming that “[his] lawyer failed to properly represent [him] and

. . . bring to light [certain] issues”).

Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other non

- frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 82

– 83 (1988). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court, grant counsel permission to withdraw, and deny the pending pro se motion as moot.

______________________________

1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.


# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

WI

- FI ONE, LLC, Appellant

v.

BROADCOM CORPORATION
, Appellee

______________________

2015

- 1945

______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2013

- 00602.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

D OUGLAS A ARON C AWLEY , McKool Smith, PC, Dallas, TX, argued for appellant. Also represented by D ONALD P UCKETT , Nelson Bumgardner PC, Fort Worth, TX; P ETER J. A YERS , Lee & Hayes, PLLC, Austin, TX.

K EVIN G OLDMAN , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, argued for appelle e. Also repr esented by D OMINIC E. M ASSA
, Z ACHARY P ICCOLOMINI
, K

ATIE S AXTON

.

______________________T HIS C AUSE having been heard and considered, it is

O RDERED and A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (D YK
, B RYSON
, and R EYNA
, Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

September 16, 2016 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner Date Peter R. Marksteiner Clerk of Court
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Tower Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ending September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Franklin T. Klink, III, ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350,as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.
|        |   | /s/ Franklin T. Klink, III    |   |
|--------|--------|-------------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Treasurer                     |
|   |   | (Principal Financial Officer) |
|   |   | November 8, 2006              |

 

1

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4110

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ADRIAN MARQUESE ADAMS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (1:06-cr-00028-MR-DLH-1)

Submitted: October 29, 2015 Decided: December 4, 2015

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eric A. Bach, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill 

Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Adrian Marquese Adams appeals the consecutive 27-month 

sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised 

release. On appeal, Adams argues that the district court 

committed reversible error in running the sentence consecutive 

to any previously or subsequently imposed sentence of 

imprisonment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2012). 

Because Adams did not preserve a challenge to the district 

court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence, we review 

this decision for plain error. See United States v. Webb, 738 

F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013). Even if we were to conclude that 

the court committed error and that the error was plain, Adams 

has not met his burden to establish that the error affected his 

substantial rights. See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 

1121, 1126-27 (2013) (defining plain error test); United States 

v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 843 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing 

sentencing error that affects substantial rights). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED 

PAUL EMMANUEL KNIGHT, 

Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D18-1058

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

________________________________/ 

Opinion filed June 12, 2018 

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Orange County,

Leticia J. Marques, Judge.

Paul Emmanuel Knight, Lake City, pro se. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. 

AFFIRMED. See Perry v. State, 637 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). 

ORFINGER, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.