UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VIVIAN VASSER, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 14-0185 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 56 : DAVID SHULKIN, Secretary, : United States Department of Veterans Affairs : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING P LAINTIFF V IVIAN V ASSER ’ S M OTION F OR S POLIATION OF E VIDENCE AND S ANCTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION This case involves an employment discrimination action brought by Plaintiff, Vivian Vasser, against David Shulkin i n his capacity a s Secretary of t he United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). Ms. Va sser claims that the VA discrim inated and retaliated against her when it failed to promote her several times over the course of three years. The matter now comes before the Court on Ms. Vas ser’s Motion for Spoliation of Evidence and Sanctions (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 56. For the reasons set forth below, that moti on is GRANTED

.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In September 2008, Ms. Vasser applied for a position as a Deputy Regional Manager for the Readjustment Counseling Servi ce (“RCS”) at the VA in Bay Pi nes, Florida under Vacancy Announcement No. MPA 08-351 (the “2008 Vacancy” or “2008 Positi on”). Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶ 18, ECF No. 19. Acco rding to Ms. Vasser, the former Regional Manager responsible for selecting a ca ndidate wanted to hire her, but w as unable to get the necessary2 approval from Dr. Alfonso Batres, the former chief of RCS. SAC ¶ 18. Thus, instead of selecting Ms. Vasser, the vacan cy was canceled. SAC ¶ 18. A f ew months later, in April 2009, that very same position was advertised again, this time under V acancy No. 2009-196-AA (the “2009 Vacancy” or “2009 Position”). SAC ¶ 19. Ms. Vassar once again applied for the position, but ultimately someone else was selected. See SAC ¶ 21–28. In February 2010, Ms. Vasser filed a formal Equal Employment Op portunity (“EEO”) Complaint in which she alleged that her non-sele ction for the 2 009 Position was discriminatorily motivated. See Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 13, ECF No. 21- 5. In an attachment, Ms. Vass er described the history of her non-selection, inc luding how she had previously been offered the 2008 Position before it was later can celed and re-advertised. See Def.’s Partial Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 13, ECF No. 21-5. The VA’s Office of Resolution Management (“ORM”) accepte d Ms. Vasser’s EEO Complaint for investigation a nd further processing, but limited the investigation solely to the 2009 Vacancy. 1 See Def.’s Partial Mot. Dis miss, Ex. 15, ECF No. 21-5. In June 201 0, after Ms. Vasser complained that ORM had failed to accept her non-selecti on claim for the 2008 Vacancy, ORM informed her that any non-selection claim that she was soug ht to assert relating to the 2008 Vacancy must be dismissed because it was untimely. 2 See Def.’s Partial Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 14, ECF No. 21-5. Thus, ORM did not conduc t a separate investigati on into Ms. Vasser’s nonselection under that vacancy announcement. Winston Johnson Dec l. ¶ 13.

1 ORM is a component of the VA th at is charged with documenting and investigating complaints made under the laws covered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and provides EEO complaint proc essing services, including couns eling, alternative dispute resolution, and investigati on. Winston Johnson Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 61-6.
2 Ms. Vasser appealed this decision in November 2010, see Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 20, ECF No. 65-1, but ultimately withdrew her re quest for a hearing and the issue went undecided, Pl.’s Reply at 14.3 However, even despite the dismi ssal, both the EEO investigator and Ms. Vasser apparently viewed the facts surrounding the 2008 Vacancy to be relevant to her non-selection claim for the 2009 Vacancy. Indeed, the EEO investigator issue d questions to relevant VA personnel, including Dr. Batres and a human resources represent ative, inquiring about the 2008 Vacancy and specifically linked it to the investigation of the 2009 Vacancy. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 2. Likewise, in November 2010, Ms. Vasser propounded her o wn interrogatories and document requests relating to the 2008 Vacancy. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 3, ECF No. 56-1. Counsel for the VA, however, refused to address or provide the discovery that Ms. Vasser requested because ORM had dismissed her 2008 Vacancy claim as untimely. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 4, ECF No. 56-1. Indeed, agency counsel sugge sted that the discovery was “irrelevant an[d] immaterial to the subject claim.” Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 4; Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 5, EC F No. 56-1. Although Ms. Vasser did not seek to compel responses to her discovery requests, see Pl.’s Reply at 13, in her correspondence with agency counsel, she continued to maintain that her prior non-selections were relevant to “rebut any pro ffer that the agency possessed alegitimate basis for its nonpromotion of Ms. Vasser,” especi ally given “Dr. Batres’s role i n each of the non-selections,” Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 22, ECF No. 65-1 ( emphasis in original). Ultimately, Ms. Vasser filed suit in this Court alleging discri mination and retaliation stemming from her non-selection f or ten separate vacancies, inc luding both the 2008 Vacancy and the 2009 Vacancy. See First Am. Compl., ECF No. 5. Ms. Vasser again propounded discovery requests on Defendant a nd again sought information an d documents relating to each of her prior non-selections. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 6, ECF No. 56-1. D efendant objected to the discovery on the grounds that some of the claims, including the claim regarding the 2008 Vacancy, was the subject of a partial motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 6. Ms. Vasser4 protested Defendant’s objections, see Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 7, ECF No. 56-1, and eventually brought the issue before the Court on S eptember 28, 2016. After hearing ar gument from counsel, the Court ordered that the Secretary produ ce the documents that Ms. Vasse r had requested. See Hr’g Tr. at 13:15–17 (Sept. 28, 2016); Minute O rder (Sept. 28, 2016). Howe ver, rather than produce documents relating to the 2008 Vacancy, the Secretary provided Ms. Vasser with a declaration from a human resources representative stating that she was unab le to locate any documents other than the vacancy announcement and that, under the VA’s Record C ontrol Schedule, any documents relating to that vacancy should have been previously destroyed. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 8 ¶¶ 6–9. A later deposition of that representative revealed tha t this destruction would have happened in January 2011. Dep. Rachelle Seybold at 43:12–44:5. In December 2016, the Court issued an opinion dismissing Ms. Va sser’s non-selection claim for the 2008 Vacancy because her EEO contact regarding th at claim was indeed untimely.
See Mem. Op., ECF No. 50. The Court, how ever, made clear that this decision did not mean that the failure to promote Ms. Vasser to the 2008 Vacancy was irrel evant to her claim concerning the 2009 Vacancy. See Mem. Op. at 20 n.12. On April 18, 2017, Ms. Vasser filed the instant motion for spol iation sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pl.’s Mot. Ms. Vasser requests adverse findings of fact, appropriate infer ences related to this eviden ce and, if appropriate, a missing evidence jury instruction and a ttorney fees. Thereafter, on Oc tober 12, 2017, the Court heard argument from both parties on the motion and ultimately request ed further briefing from the parties, which the parties timely submitted for the Court’s rev iew.5 III. LEGAL STANDARD A party has a duty to preserve pot entially relevant evidence wh enever “litigation is reasonably foreseeable.” Gerlich v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 711 F.3d 161, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
see also Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos. , 62 F.3d 1469, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (a party to litigation has “an obligation to preserve and also not to alter documents it knew or reasonably should have known were relevant . . . if it kne w the destruction or alterat ion of those documents would prejudice” an opponent.). “A party that fails to preserve evid ence ‘runs the risk of being justly accused of spoliation’—defined as ‘the destruction or material alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in p ending or reasonably foreseeable litigation’—and find itself the subject of sanctions.” Zhi Chen v. District of Columbia , 839 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Group, Inc. , No. 06-0687, 2010 WL 3324964, at *5 n.5 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010)). “The sanctions available for the destruction of documents or evidence with noti ce of their potential usefulness in litigation may include the assessment of fines or attorneys ’ fees and costs, the preclusio n of certain lines of argument that might have been advanced by the cul pable party, and/or the issu ance of an instruction informing jurors that they may draw an adverse inference from the spoliat or’s actions.” Id. “A court generally imposes such sanctions in the exercise of its inheren t authority ‘to manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the or derly and expeditious dispositio n of cases.’” Id. (quoting Young v. Office of U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms , 217 F.R.D. 61, 65 (D.D.C. 2003)). However, “[t]hat authority ‘must be exercised w ith restraint and discretion.’” Id. “Moreover, because the overriding purpose of the inherentpower is ‘to achieve the ord erly and expeditious disposition of cases,’ the use of this power s hould reflect our judicial syste m’s strong presumption in favor of6 adjudications on the merits.” Shepherd , 62 F.3d at 1475 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. , 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)). The party seeking sanctions bear s an evidentiary burden that i s calibrated to “ensure that the gravity of [the] sanction co rresponds to the misconduct.” Shepherd , 62 F.3d at 1479. In the context of a party seeking an a dverse inference instruction, th e moving party must show that such a sanction is supported by a pr eponderance of the evidence

. See Clarke v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 904 F. Supp. 2d 11, 21 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Shepherd , 62 F.3d at 1477–78. Specifically, the reques ting party must show that: (1) the party having control ove r the evidence had an obligatio n to preserve it when it was destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss was accompani ed by a “culpable state of mind”; and (3) the evidence thatwas destroyed o r altered was “ relevant” to the claims or defenses of the party that soughtthe discovery of the spoliate d evidence, to the extent that a reasonable factfinder could conc lude that the lost evidence w ould have supported the claims or defense of the party that sought it. Mazloum v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t , 530 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS In opposing Ms. Vasser’s motion forsanctions, the Secretary ar gues that there is no evidence that any relevant documents were ever destroyed and th at Ms. Vasser has not otherwise made the requisite showing of an e ntitlement to relief. For th e reasons stated below, the Court concludes that Ms. Vasser has made a sufficient showing to meet her burden and that a spoliation instruction is an appropria te remedy in this case. A. Existence of Destroyed Documents The analysis of Ms. Vasser’s spoliation motion must necessarily begin with the issue of what documents in the Merit Promotion File, if any, existed. Of course, there can be no spoliation of7 evidence if the evidence sought did not exist. See Mahaffey v. Marriott Int’l, Inc. , 898 F. Supp. 2d 54, 61 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[I]f no [] evidence was created, it coul d not have been destroyed.”). The Secretary points out that Ms. Vasser has already received a cop y of the announcement for 2008 Vacancy and its cancellation no tice. Def.’s Opp’n at 5. He ar gues that “[i]f Plaintiff suggests that Defendant failed to preserve other [2008 Vacancy] documents (be yond these two records), Plaintiff must at least identify what other documents that might have exi sted but were improperly destroyed.” Def.’s Opp’n at 5–6. The Secretary is correct on this point. A movant seeking sanct ions for spoliation must demonstrate that the subject documents actually existed. For e xample, in Mahaffey v. Marriot
International , 898 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2012), the plaintiff in that c ase claimed that he was injured at the defendant’s hotel while he was exiting an elevat or on his way to his room shortly after checking in. The plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to preserve investigative reports and similar documents relating to the plaintiff’s alleged accident. Id. at 60. The defendant urged, however, that it had been unable to locate any such documents o r find any witnesses that remembered creating such documents. Id. Rather than identify evidence showing that the documents ever existed, the plaintiff pointed to the defendant’ s policies and procedures and argued that an investigation should have been conducted. Id. at 60–61. The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden to demonstrate spoliation because, wi thout any showing that an investigation took place, there can be no basis to find that an y investigative documents ever existed.
Id. at 61. Here, the Court is satisfied that Ms. Vasser has made a suffici ent showing that at least some documents other than those already produced existed in the Meri t Promotion File at the time of its destruction. In her reply, Ms. Vasser did not squarely address the Secretary’s argument, instead she simply claimed that “[w]hat is contained in a ‘Merit Promotion File’ is not a secret.” Pl.’s Reply at 9. But she did not specifically identify for the Court what these “non-secret” documents8 supposedly were or otherwise provide specific evidence supporti ng their existence. See Pl.’s Reply at 9. The Court is convinced, however, that if the record show s that other people applied to the position, then the Merit Promotion File, at a bare minimum, mus t have contained application materials from those persons. With this issue in mind, the Court asked the parties at the October 13, 2017 motion’s hearing whether people other than Ms. Vasser actu ally applied to the 2008 Vacancy. Neither party could definitively answer the question at the tim e. But in a subsequent filing, Ms. Vasser identified some evidence supporting the view that others did in fact apply for the position.
See Pl.’s Submission Regarding Spoliation Evidence at 1, ECF No. 85 . First, Ms. Vasser pointed to her deposition testimony in which she testified that, during he r interview with Mr. Walker for the 2008 Vacancy, Mr. Walker informed her that he had also intervie wed other candidates for the position. 3 Vasser Dep. at 62:17–25. Mr. Wal ker, however, implicitly dis putes this purported admission because, according to him, he never interviewed Ms. W alker, making his purported admission impossible. See Walker Decl. ¶ 15. Nevertheless, Ms. Vasser also points to the fact that, when the VA re-advertised the same Deputy Regional Manager posi tion just a few months later, twenty-five people submitted applications. The Secretary has n ot disputed this fact nor has the Secretary ever affirmatively claimed that no one else applied t o the 2008 Vacancy. Although the evidence is relatively thin, the Court is persuaded that, based on this record, it is more likely than not that persons other than Ms. Vasser also applied to the 2008 Vac ancy. Consequently, the Court is

3 Mr. Walker’s purported statement is not hearsay because it qua lifies as an admission by a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2 )(D) of the Federal Rules o f Evidence. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) states that statements “offered against an opposing party . . . made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed” does not qualify as hearsay. The D.C. Circuit has advised that “in the employme nt discrimination context,” this Rule “requires only that the decl arant have some authority to s peak on matters of hiring or promotion or that the declarant be involved in the decision-mak ing process in general.” Talavera v. Shah , 638 F.3d 303, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Because Mr. Walker was c learly involved in the hiring of his own Deputy, his purported statements in th at regard are admissible as a statement by a party opponent.9 swayed that Ms. Vasser has satisfied her burden to show by a pr eponderance of the evidence that the Merit Promotion File contained, not only her application, but a lso applications of other candidates. 4 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Calif., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Calif. , 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (“preponderance of the evidence . . . simply re quires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence” (internal quotations omitted)). B. Duty To Preserve Having concluded that Ms. Vasser has adequately shown that the Merit Promotion File contained at least applications of other candidates, the Court is also persuaded that the VA had a duty to preserve those documents in connection with this litigation. A litigant “is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reason ably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the su bject of a pending discovery request.” Arista Records, Inc. v. Sakfield Holding Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 n.3 (D.D.C. 2004) ( internal quotation o mitted). In this case, Ms. Vasser clearly attempted to put the 2008 Vacancy documents at issue both before and after they were destroyed in approximately January 2011. Indee d, in February 2010, Ms Vasser filed a formal complaint of discrimination and, in an attachment to that complaint, described her nonselection for the 2008 Vacancy. Then, in the Summer of 2010, when the ORM accepted her

4 During the motion’s hearing, th e Court requested that Defendan t clarify its search for electronically stored informati on to determine whether the Defe ndant’s search captured electronic information, such as emails, over the entire period that Vacancy Announcement No. MPA 08-381 was open (from August 29, 2008 through January 9, 20 09). In its response, Defendant stated that emails for some custodians, such as Mr. W alker, spanned the entire relevant period. Def.’s Resp. C ourt Order at 1, ECF No. 79. H owever, for other custodians, such as Dr. Batres, the Secret ary only searched for documents s tarting in January 2009, the very tail end of the relevant timefram e. Def.’s Resp. Court Order a t 1–2. Nevertheless, the Court does not decide whether Defenda nt can be charged with spoliatin g or otherwise failing to produce any of those documents because Plaintiff failed to rais e that issue in her motion, thereby waiving the issue. Because the Pl aintiff failed to otherwise r aise this issue, the Court declines to rule on the matter sua sponte

.10 complaint for investigation but limited that investigation sole ly to the 2009 Vacancy, Ms. Vasser complained that ORM failed to accept her claim based on the 200 8 Vacancy. By November 2010, Ms. Vasser’s counsel was specifically requesting documents rela ting to the 2008 Vacancy. And then in this litigation, Ms. Vasser again pled the issue concerning her nonselection for the 2008 Vacancy into her complaint and requested discovery pertaining to that v acancy. The Secretary argues that, because Ms. Vasser’s attempt to asse rt an independent claim concerning her non-selection for the 2008 Vacancy “was rejected as untimely at every step and there was no separate investigation of that positon,” Defendant was t herefore “not on ‘notice’ of any investigation surrounding Plaintiff’s non-selection under [the 2008 Vacancy].” Def.’s Opp’n at 9. This argument plainly cannot stand. Whether Ms. Vasser could b ring an independent action related to the 2008 Vacancy or whether there was an investigation that specifically considered her nonselection under that announcement does not necessarily answer t he operative question of whether the Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the evide nce was potentially relevant to the action. Of course, if Ms. Vasser was permitted to assert a cla im regarding her non-selection for the 2008 Vacancy, then the relevance of the documents would be obvi ous. But the fact that she is not permitted to do so—even though she d id try—does not necessarily mean that the documents are irrelevant to the 2009 Vacancy or that Defendant should not hav e reasonably foreseen their relevance. The 2008 Vacancy documents are patently relevant to Ms. Vasser’ s non-selection for the 2009 Vacancy and the VA most certainly knew or reasonably shoul d have known that to be the case. Even though the VA solicited applications through two announcem ents, the two announcements were for the exact same position. Indeed, the only reason there was a 2009 Vacancy Announcement at all was because the VA did not make a selection among the candidate s who applied in the 2008 Vacancy Announcement. Thus, the circumstances surrounding what happene d in the 2008 Vacancy have a clear and direct nexus to Ms. Vasser’s non-selection under the 2009 Vacancy. This alone should11 have been sufficient to put the VA on notice that the Merit Pro motion File documents were relevant to Ms. Vasser’s action. But, even if Ms. Vasser’s own complain ts were not enough to put the VA on notice, the VA should have recognized this clear connection by at least July 2010 (after the ORM had dismissed the 2008 Vacancy non-selection) because the EEO inves tigator propounded questions to Dr. Batres and a Human Resources employee that specifically req uested information about the 2008 Vacancy and tied it to the inve stigation about Ms. Vasser’s non -selection for the 2009 Vacancy. See Pl.’s Ex. 2. Thus, the VA either knew or should have known tha t the 2008 Vacancy documents were related to Ms. Vasser’s claim concerning the 2009 Vacancy befor e those documents were destroyed. 5 Consequently, the VA had a duty to preserve those documents for purposes of litigation. 6

5 The Secretary attempts to di stinguish this case from Gerlich v. U.S. Department of Justice , 711 F.3d 161 (D.C. Cir. 2013), on the ground that, in that case, the Court found that there was “[u]nrebutted evidence ” demonstrating that certain Ju stice Department officials “were on notice” that an investigation or future litigat ion was “reas onably foreseeable.” See Def.’s Opp’n at 8–9. The Court in Gerlich , however, never required tha t the evidence of potential future litigation be unrebutted. In any event, the evidence th at both Ms. Vasser and the EEO investigator attempted to put the circumstances of the 2008 Vac ancy at issue in connection with the 2009 Vacancy claim before the documents were destroyed is, in fact, unrebutted. That ORM found the 2008 Vacancy claim to be untimely does not negate the se facts or otherwise suggest that the agency should not have r ecognized the relevance of the documents to Ms. Vasser’s remaining claims. Thus, this argument is w ithout merit.
6 The Secretary also argues that “ it was not reasonably foreseeable that the[] documents were still relevant to Plaintiff’ s future litigation either at the agency level or in federal court” because “Ms. Vasser fail[ed] to pur sue these documents in disco very at the administrative stage.” See Def.’s Opp’n at 9–10. The Secret ary cites to no case law suppo rting his position that Plaintiff must file a motion to c ompel to preserve the spoliati on issue concerning documents Plaintiff plainly requested but f or which her requ ests were reb uffed without justification. Regardless, the potential relevance of documents does not turn on whether a plaintiff pursues them at any given point. Each party has an affirmative obligat ion to preserve potentially relevant evidence regardless of wheth er or how an opposing party pursues it. In this case, the relevance of the documents to Ms. Vasser’s non-selection for the 2009 Pos ition was clear and the Secretary was on notice of that relevance . Those documents and that info rmation did not cease to be relevant merely because Ms. Vasser did not move to compel their production at the administrative stage.12 C. Culpable State of Mind The Court is also persuaded that the documents were destroyed w ith the requisite culpable state of mind. “[T]o justify the issuance of an adverse infere nce instruction, the destruction need not be purposeful, and negligent spoliation suffices.” Mahaffey , 898 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (citing Chen v. District of Columbia , 839 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 709 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (spoliation inference may be “ appropriate in light of the duty of preservation notwithstanding the fact that the destruct ion was negligent” (citing Talavera v.
Shah , 638 F.3d 303, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2011))); More v. Snow , 480 F. Supp. 2d 257, 274–75 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[A] court may employ an adverse inference due to a part y’s ‘failure to preserve evidence,’ even if deliberate or reckless conduct is not present.”) (quoti ng Rice v. United States , 917 F. Supp. 17, 19–20 (D.D.C. 1996)). In this case, the documents were des troyed pursuant to the VA’s Record Control schedule. That is, the VA destroyed the documents in a ccordance with its typical practice for retaining documents. But this fact does not absolve the VA of its duty to preserve relevant documents for litigation. See Talavera , 638 F.3d at 311 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (fact that the records were destroyed as part of the defendant’s “‘typical’ practice” was i nsufficient to overcome the duty to preserve them); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC , 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its ro utine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the prese rvation of relevant documents.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, advisory committee’s notes (2006) (“When a party is under a duty to preserve information because of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, interv ention in the routine operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a ‘lit igation hold.’”). As noted above, the VA knew or should have known that these documents were relevant to Ms. Vasser’s claims at the time the VA voluntarily destroyed them and thus that decision w as at least negligent. In fact, the VA13 not only knew or should have known that these documents were re levant, it knew the Plaintiff had requested them (and has done so at every stage of this litigati on), yet it failed to preserve them. D. Relevance of the Documents “Once a court has determined tha t future litigation was reasona bly foreseeable to the party who destroyed relevant reco rds, the court must then asses s . . . whether the destroyed records were likely relevan t to the contested issue.” Gerlich v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 711 F.3d 161, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Kronisch v. United States , 150 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir. 1998)). The D.C. Circuit has recognize d that “in an inquiry that ‘is un avoidably imperfect . . . in the absence of the destroyed eviden ce, [a court] can only venture g uesses with varying degrees of confidence as to what that missi ng evidence may have revealed.’ ” Id. (quoting Kronisch , 150 F.3d at 127–28) (alteration in origin al). In circumstances whe n “the document destruction has made it more difficult for a party to prove that the documents destroyed were relevant . . . the burden on the party seeking the advers e inference is lower; the trier of fact may draw such an inference based even on a very slight showing that the document s are relevant.” Ritchie v.
United States , 451 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoted approvingly in Gerlich , 711 F.3d at 171). Here, the relevance of the destroyed documents is readily appar ent. Ms. Vasser claims that, not only did she interview for the 2008 Deputy Regional Manager position, Mr. Walker actually recommended her for the position. If Ms. Vasser is right, this fact would raise a serious question of why, when the exact same position was later readvertised in 200 9, Mr. Walker instead chose a white man who at best held “similar qualifications.” Pl.’s Mot. Summ . J. at 12, ECF No. 66-2. Mr. Walker, however, disputes Ms. Vasser’s account and claims that he never selected Ms. Vasser and, in fact, never interviewed her. See John Walker Decl. ¶ 15. Documents in the Merit Promotion File , including applications filed by other candidates, would clearly have shed light on the truth of Ms.14 Vasser’s claim by, at the very least, showing whether or not Ms . Vasser was the most qualified applicant for the position. Thus, a reasonable factfinder could c onclude that the lost evidence would have supported Ms. Vasser’s claims. E. Remedy Based on the foregoing, the Court co ncludes that Ms. Vasser has adequately shown that the VA negligently destroyed documents relating to Vacancy Anno uncement MPA 08-351, which a reasonable jury coul d conclude would have supported Ms. Vasser’s claims, and that this destruction occurred at a time when litigation was reasonably f oreseeable and the VA was under an obligation to preserve relevan t documents. Under these circ umstances, the Court finds that the appropriate remedy is the is suance of a missing evidence in struction to the jury. See e.g. , Zhi Chen v. District of Columbia , 839 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2011). The Court must decide then on the s ubstance of that instruction . An adverse inference instruction is intended to be “remedial rather than punitive,” Shepherd , 62 F.3d at 1478, and thus the Court must assess what ins truction will suffice to remedy the harm Ms. Vasser suffered. Other courts in this Districthave observed that “any adverse i nference instruction grounded in negligence” should “be considerably weaker in both language and probative force than an instruction regarding del iberate destruction.” Mazloum , 530 F. Supp. 2d at 293. Ms. Vasser proposes the following language: Defendant failed to produce certa in documents and emails that w ere within its control relating to the Deputy Regional Manager recruitment under vacan cy announcement 08- 351 and Ms. Vasser’s assertion that she was qualified, intervie wed and was recommended for selection to that position. You must, therefor e, presume that the evidence contained in those doc uments would have been favorable to Ms. Vasser and unfavorable to defendant. Pl.’s Proposed Adverse Inference Jury Instruction, ECF No. 85-1 . The Court finds this language to be inappropriate under the ci rcumstances, especially given that the instruction requires that the15 jury make an adverse inference. Even the case that Ms. Vasser cites as support concludes that a permissive instruction, rather t han a mandatory instruction, is appropriate when “the Court does not find intentional misconduct.” Beck v. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. , 289 F.R.D. 374, 380 (D.D.C. 2013). The Court instead finds that the instruction proposed by Defend ant, which has been used in other spoliation cases in this District, adequately addresses t he harm suffered by Ms. Vasser. Thus, the Court proposes to give an instruction along these lines: You have heard testimony about a merit promotion file for Vacan cy Announcement MPA08-351 that has not been produced. That file related to the fi rst solicitation for applicants to the Deputy Regional Manager position in Bay Pines, Florida. Co unsel for plaintiff has argued that this evidence was in defendant’s control and would have proven facts material to the matter in controversy. If you find that the defendant could have produced the evidence , and that the evidence was within the defendant’s control, and that this evidence would have been material in deciding among the facts in dispute in this case, then you are permitted , but not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the defendant. In deciding whether to draw this inference, you should consider whether the evidence not produced would merely have duplicated other evidence already be fore you. You may also consider whether the defendant had a reason for not producing this evidence, which was explained to your satisfaction. Again, any inference you decid e to draw should be based on all of the facts and circumstances in this case. See Zhi Chen , 839 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (quoting 4 Hon. Leonard B. Sand, et al. , Modern Federal Jury
Instructions ¶ 75.01 (2007) (Instruction 75–7: Party’s Failure to Produce Ev idence).

V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Vivian Vasser’s Moti on for Spoliation of Evidence and Sanctions (ECF N o. 56). An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: November 22, 2017 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge