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14-4371-cv 

Baker v. Gates

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 28th day of December, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

PATRICK SCOTT BAKER, individually and as the 

personal representative of the Estate of David Baker, 

JERRY BAKER, individually and as the personal 

representative of the Estate of David Baker, LOIS 

BAKER, individually and as the personal 

representative of the Estate of David Baker, STACIE 

BAKER, individually and as the substitute executrix 

and successor in interest of the Estate of Scarlett 

Rogencamp, and as the executrix of the Estate of Hetty 

E. Peterson, VALERIE PETERSON, as executor of the 

estate of Vernon W. Peterson, PATRICIA A. HENRY, 

individually and as the substitute executrix and 

successor in interest of the Estate of Scarlett 

Rogencamp, and as the executrix of the Estate of Hetty 

E. Peterson, KATHARINE D. DORIS, PAUL G. 

PETERSON, MICHELLE Y. HOLBROOK, JACKIE 
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NINK PFLUG, RYLMA NINK, EUGENE NINK, 

GLORIA NINK, MARY NINK, SCOTT PFLUG, 

Petitioners-Cross 

Defendants-Third-Party 

Defendants-Appellees, 

CRAIG BAKER, individually and as the personal 

representative of the Estate of David Baker, 

Petitioner-Third-Party 

Defendant-Appellee 

v. No. 14-4371-cv 

FRANCIS GATES, individually and as administrator 

for the Estate of Olin Eugene “Jack” Armstrong, PATI 

HENSLEY, SARA HENSLEY, JAN SMITH, 

Third-Party Defendants-Cross 

Defendants-Appellants, 

NATIONAL BANK OF EGYPT, CITIBANK, N.A., 

INTESA SANPAULO S.P.A, COMMERZBANK AG, 

 Respondents, 

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., JPMORGAN CHASE 

BANK, N.A., 

Respondents-Third-Party 

Plaintiffs, 

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, 

Respondent-Third-Party 

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, 

ESTATE OF JACK HENSLEY, BANCA UBAE, 

S.P.A., MSC MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING 

COMPANY S.A., VANBREDA INTERNATIONAL, 

N.V., MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY 

(CYPRUS) LTD., LEBANON & GULF BANK, 

S.A.L., UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 

PROGRAMME TRUST FUND, COMMERCIAL 

BANK OF SYRIA, DEVELOPMENT OF 
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NATIONAL BIO-SAFETY, AYMAN KALAI, BLOM 

BANK S.A.L., INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA, 

SEETECH CO., LTD., EBLA PETROLEUM 

COMPANY, BANK OF MONTREAL, LONKAR 

SERVICES LTD., SUNCOR ENERGY GERMANY 

GMBH, f.k.a. Petrocanada Germany Gmbh, HSBC 

TRINKAUS & BURKHARDT (INTERNATIONAL) 

SA, HSBC BANK USA, N.A., BUFFALO BRANCH, 

DOHA BANK PETRONASH FZE, STANDARD 

CHARTERED BANK, NEW YORK, ALTUWAIJRY 

BELAL ABDULLAHA, MINISTRY OF CULTURE, 

CENTRAL BANK OF SYRIA, ARAB LIBYAN 

MAURITANIAN BANK FOR TRADE & 

DEVELOPMENT, ARAB CULTURAL AND 

COMMUNITY CENTER, AL ALAMIAH 

EXCHANGE GROUP LTD., STANDARD 

CHARTERED BANK, SYRIATEL MOBILE 

TELECOM S.A., SYRIAN TELECOM & 

TECHNOLOGY, GENERAL PETROLEUM 

COMPANY, ESTATE OF JACK ARMSTRONG, 

NATIONAL BANK OF KUWAIT SAK, NATIONAL 

BANK OF KUWAIT, NEW YORK, A.H. ALSAGAR 

& BROS., CREDIT SUISSE, SWITZERLAND, 

RIYAD BANK, ABDULRAHMAN ABDULLAH AL 

ZAMIL, HSBC PRIVATE BANK SUISSE S.A., 

HONG KONG, REX BERNARD MARTIN, JR., 

BANK MUSCAT, ONIC HOLDING, AMWAL 

Q.S.C., ABN AMRO BANK N.V., NEW YORK, ABN 

AMRO BANK N.V., DUBAI, ABRAAJ GROUP, as 

successor to Abraaj Capital (Cayman) Limited, ABU 

DHABI COMMERCIAL BANK, P.J.S.C., MAJID AL 

FUTTAIM TRUST LLC, HSBC BANK MIDDLE 

EAST LIMITED, DUBAI, DUBAI 

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL LLC, INHERITORS 

OF LATE ABDULAZIZ AL SAGAR, EMIRATES 

NBD, as successor to National Bank of Dubai, Ltd., AL 

FUTTAIM CAPITAL COMPANY, LLC, KHALID 

ABDULLA AL SAGAR CHAM HOLDING 

COMPANY S.A.L., NATIONAL BANK OF RAS AL 

KHAIMAH, TRIAD SOFTWARE SERVICES, 
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SYRIA DUTY FREE SHOPS, LEBANESE 

CANADIAN BANK, SAL, BLOM BANK S.A.L., 

CYPRUS, I.B.C.S. TRADING AND DISTRIBUTION 

CO. LTD., PUIG MIDDLE EAST FZCO, ARAB 

UNION REINSURANCE COMPANY, SUEZ 

CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, SUEZ CANAL 

BANK, BYBLOS BANK S.A.L., UNION BANK OF 

INDIA, J.B. BODA REINSURANCE BROKERS 

PVT. LTD., SYRICAN ARAB AIRLINES, BRITISH 

ARAB COMMERCIAL BANK PLC, BANK OF 

IRELAND, SHANNONSIDE AVIATION SERVICES 

LTD., 

Third-Party Defendants, 

FRONTIER OPPORTUNITIES FUND I, L.P., 

SHUAA CAPITAL PSC, 

Third-Party Defendants-Cross 

Claimants-Counter Claimants.

*

_____________________________________ 

APPEARING FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN F. SALTER, Barnes Law Group LLC, 

Marietta, Georgia (James P. Bonner, Stone 

Bonner & Rocco LLP, New York, New York, 

on the brief). 

APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: SANDRA CAVAZOS (Michael Dockterman, 

on the brief), Steptoe & Johnson LLP, New 

York, New York. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of New York (George B. Daniels, Judge). 

 

*

 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above. 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment deemed to have been entered on March 19, 2015, is 

AFFIRMED.1

 

Appellants, a group of default judgment creditors against the Syrian Arab Republic 

(“Syria”) collectively referred to as the “Gates Plaintiffs,” appeal from the denial of their 

motion to vacate a default judgment entered in favor of a different group of judgment 

creditors, collectively referred to as the “Baker Plaintiffs,” against Syria. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b)(4). “We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of 

discretion,” Johnson ex rel. United States v. University of Rochester Med. Ctr., 642 F.3d 

121, 125 (2d Cir. 2011), though the denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion challenging an 

underlying judgment as void is reviewed de novo, see Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. 

Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2003). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we 

reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

The Gates Plaintiffs’ default judgment arose out of the 2004 murders of U.S. 

civilian contractors Jack Armstrong and Jack Hensley by al-Qaeda in Iraq, for which a 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia found Syria liable to their estates 

and surviving family members in the amount of $412,909,587. See Gates v. Syrian Arab 

 

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 Because the district court did not enter a separate judgment as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

58(a), a judgment is deemed to have been entered 150 days after the October 20, 2014 entry 

of the district court’s order denying appellants’ motion and dismissing them from the 

action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
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Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). The Baker Plaintiffs’ default judgment 

arose out of the 1985 hijacking of EgyptAir Flight 648 and the shooting of three 

Americans, one of whom—Scarlett Rogenkamp—was killed, and two of whom—Patrick 

Baker and Jackie Pflug—were grievously injured. See Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan 

Arab Jamahirya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2011). Syria did not initially make an 

appearance in Baker, and default judgment in the amount of $601,969,151.50 was entered 

by a magistrate judge, to whom the case had been referred for all purposes. See App’x 

140–41. Syria subsequently appeared in Baker to challenge the default on grounds that, 

inter alia, it had not consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). The magistrate judge rejected this argument, see Baker v. 

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 810 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98–99 (D.D.C. 2011), and 

Syria, after initially appealing the default judgment, voluntarily dismissed its appeal, see 

Baker v. Qadhdhafi, No. 11-7034, 2011 WL 5515579 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 2011). 

The Baker Plaintiffs subsequently registered their judgment in the Southern District 

of New York and filed a turnover petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. 

§§ 5225, 5227. Petition respondents JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of New York 

Mellon interpleaded, inter alia, the Gates Plaintiffs, who unsuccessfully moved under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) in that action to vacate the Baker judgment as void. 

We need not here decide the merits of the Gates Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Baker 

judgment, because we conclude that the Gates Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the Rule 
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60(b) motion. See Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) 

(“It is beyond cavil that an appellate court may affirm the judgment of the district court on 

any ground appearing in the record.”). On its face, Rule 60(b) affords relief from 

judgment only to “a party or its legal representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Under 

certain circumstances, we have held that a nonparty “sufficiently connected and identified 

with” an action can obtain relief under Rule 60. Dunlop v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 

672 F.2d 1044, 1052 (2d Cir. 1982). The non-parties to whom we applied this conclusion 

in Dunlop were Pan Am employees suing the airline under state law. They made a Rule 

60(b) motion to modify a stipulation of dismissal in a federal case between the Secretary of 

Labor and Pan Am to clarify that the dismissal did not preclude their state action. See id. 

at 1047–49. We held that “[a]lthough Rule 60(b)(6) would not ordinarily be available to 

non-parties to modify final judgments, . . . on the facts of this case appellants were 

sufficiently connected and identified with the Secretary’s suit to entitle them to standing to 

invoke Rule 60(b)(6).” Id. at 1052 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We have on 

one other occasion extended Rule 60(b) to a non-party. In Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. 

of New York, 443 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2006), we held that 

[W]here plaintiffs enter into a settlement agreement with a 

judgment-proof, pro se defendant with the intent at the time of 

the settlement to collect from a third party that allegedly 

received fraudulent conveyances, and further, they attempt to 

use the judgment as a predicate for a fraudulent conveyance 

action against the third party, the third party is “strongly 

affected” by the judgment and entitled to standing to bring a 

Rule 60(b) motion. 
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Id. at 188. As in Dunlop, however, we limited the holding to the facts of the case. See id. 

 These extensions of Rule 60(b) are so factually cabined that we have summarily 

refused to construe Dunlop or Grace to reach more broadly. See Federman v. Artzt, 339 

F. App’x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“Both Dunlop and Grace involved 

extraordinary circumstances in which a non-party had interests on which the outcome of 

the proceedings had significant consequences for the movants, yet those interests had not 

been adequately represented during litigation, because of the peculiar structure of each 

case. There is nothing similarly extraordinary about the situation before us.”). Nothing 

about the instant situation is sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a different conclusion. 

We have considered all of appellants’ remaining arguments and conclude that they 

are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court