[Cite as State v. Lawson, 2023-Ohio-3456.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

v.

DONNELL LAWSON

Appellant

C.A. No. 30409

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE No. CR 20 01 0001

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 27, 2023

SUTTON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Donnell Lawson, appeals from the judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mr. Lawson shot his mother’s boyfriend, M.P., while M.P. was lying on his 

stomach in bed. The three lived together and, before the shooting, Mr. Lawson had consumed 

alcohol and taken drugs. Although Mr. Lawson had been prescribed medication to control his 

mental illness, he was not taking his medication at the time of the shooting.

{¶3} Police officers brought Mr. Lawson and his mother to the police station to be 

interviewed. During their separate interviews, they told conflicting stories. When detectives 

reported those inconsistencies to the mother during a second interview, she admitted Mr. Lawson 

had shot M.P. The detectives then spoke to Mr. Lawson again, and he admitted he shot M.P. 
2

 

{¶4} A grand jury indicted Mr. Lawson for murder, felony murder, felonious assault, 

having a weapon under disability, and several firearm specifications. He was found competent to 

stand trial and withdrew a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity once an expert determined he 

was sane when he shot M.P. Mr. Lawson moved to suppress statements he made to detectives, but 

the trial court denied his motion. A jury found him guilty on all counts, and the trial court 

sentenced him to a total of 18 years to life in prison.

{¶5} Mr. Lawson now appeals from his convictions and raises two assignments of error 

for our review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED [MR. LAWSON’S] 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS[.]

{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Lawson argues the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress. He argues the court should have excluded statements he made to the police 

because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and his 

statements were involuntary. Upon review, we reject his argument.

{¶7} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 

Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, 

the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual 

questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 

366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. “Accepting these facts as true, the 

appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial
3

 

court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 

Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).

{¶8} “When a suspect is questioned in a custodial setting, the Fifth Amendment requires 

that he receive Miranda warnings to protect against compelled self-incrimination.” State v. 

Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, ¶ 34. “The State has the burden of proving by the 

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights was knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Dunlap, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28762, 2018-Ohio-3658, ¶ 11. 

The waiver must have been “‘a free and deliberate choice’” of the accused rather than a product 

of “‘intimidation, coercion, or deception.”” State v. Dailey, 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 91 (1990), quoting 

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). Further, it “‘must have been made with a full 

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 

abandon it.’” Dailey at 91, quoting Moran at 421. Courts “review the totality of the circumstances 

in determining whether a suspect has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.” State v. Rafferty, 

9th Dist. Summit No. 26724, 2015-Ohio-1629, ¶ 33. 

{¶9} The question of whether law enforcement officials complied with Miranda and the 

question of whether a confession was voluntary “are analytically separate inquires.’” State v. 

Anderson, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 30081, 30082, 30083, 2023-Ohio-2364, ¶ 35, quoting State v. 

Porter, 178 Ohio App.3d 304, 2008-Ohio-4627, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). Due Process requires the 

exclusion of an involuntarily induced statement even when the strictures of Miranda have been 

satisfied or are inapplicable. Rafferty at ¶ 37; State v. Antoline, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008100, 

2003-Ohio-1130, ¶ 21. To determine whether a confession was voluntary, courts apply the same 

totality of the circumstances test that applies when courts assess the voluntariness of a Miranda

waiver. State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261 (1988). The totality of the circumstances “includes 
4

 

‘e.g., the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and 

frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence 

of threat or inducement.’” State v. Lather, 110 Ohio St.3d 270, 2006-Ohio-4477, ¶ 9, quoting State 

v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, ¶ 25. 

{¶10} The Supreme Court has recognized that “the use of an inherently coercive tactic by 

police is a prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness.” State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-

Ohio-6179, ¶ 71. Accord Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, at ¶ 35; State v. Snow, 

9th Dist. Summit No. 19742, 2000 WL 670664, *2 (May 24, 2000). A court need not assess the 

totality of the circumstances if there is no evidence of such tactics. Perez at ¶ 71. “Evidence of 

use by the interrogators of an inherently coercive tactic (e.g., physical abuse, threats, deprivation 

of food, medical treatment, or sleep) will trigger the totality of the circumstances analysis.” State 

v. Osie, 140 Ohio St.3d 131, 2014-Ohio-2966, ¶ 93, quoting State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261 

(1988).

{¶11} The trial court made each of the following factual findings. The police were 

dispatched to a residence regarding a homicide shortly after 7:00 a.m. They encountered Mr. 

Lawson and his mother at the residence, brought them back to the police station, and placed them 

in separate interview rooms. At that time, a detective gave Mr. Lawson water to drink. Mr. 

Lawson then waited in his interview room while two detectives interviewed his mother. During 

their interview with the mother, the detectives learned Mr. Lawson suffered from schizophrenia 

and had a mental health-related episode several days earlier. They also learned he had stayed 

awake until the early hours of the morning, consuming alcohol and using drugs.

{¶12} The detectives concluded their initial interview with the mother and briefly 

observed Mr. Lawson before beginning his interview. As they watched Mr. Lawson, they noticed 
5

 

him speaking to himself. Mr. Lawson was able to follow along, however, as one of the detectives 

obtained a buccal swab from him and conducted a gunshot residue test. In fact, when the detective 

sought to obtain Mr. Lawson’s buccal swab, Mr. Lawson told the detective the police should 

already have his DNA on file from an earlier, unrelated incident. The detective administered Mr. 

Lawson’s Miranda warnings by reading them from a card. When she asked him whether he 

understood each of his rights, he responded affirmatively. 

{¶13} The trial court found Mr. Lawson spent a total of six hours and forty-two minutes 

in his interview room, but much of that time was spent waiting while detectives spoke with his 

mother. The detectives interviewed the mother twice and interviewed Mr. Lawson twice. 

Collectively, his interviews lasted two hours and forty minutes. The trial court found that, during 

interview breaks, Mr. Lawson sometimes touched the walls, hummed, rapped, or talked to himself. 

He also repeated words and phrases and “meandered off topic” while speaking with the detectives. 

Nevertheless, he answered questions posed to him by the detectives and discussed concerns he had 

for his family, his mental illness, and his relationship with his mother. The trial court found no 

evidence that Mr. Lawson did not understand what was happening during his interviews or the 

impact of the statements he made.

{¶14} The trial court found that detectives never engaged in any tactics to threaten, 

harass, abuse, or coerce Mr. Lawson. They let him know his mother had “told [them] what 

happened,” and encouraged him to do the same. They never promised him leniency, misstated the 

law, or discussed any potential punishments. The trial court concluded that Mr. Lawson 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed. 

Consequently, it denied his motion to suppress.
6

 

{¶15} Mr. Lawson has not challenged any of the trial court’s factual findings. Instead, he 

challenges the court’s legal conclusion that he acted in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

manner when he (1) waived his Miranda rights, and (2) confessed. While he had prior experience 

with the criminal justice system, Mr. Lawson argues, the detectives never asked him about his 

level of education or his ability to read or write. They failed to ensure he understood his “complex 

constitutional right,” particularly when they knew he had not slept enough, had been drinking, and 

had taken drugs. Further, Mr. Lawson argues, the detectives knew he suffered from untreated 

mental health issues and observed behavior that should have alerted them to his altered mental 

state. Because the evidence showed he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his 

Miranda rights and confess, Mr. Lawson argues, the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress.

{¶16} This Court accepts the trial court’s factual findings, which Mr. Lawson has not 

challenged, as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. See Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 

152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. Further, upon review, we must conclude the trial court reached the 

correct legal conclusion when it denied Mr. Lawson’s motion to suppress. See id.

{¶17} Mr. Lawson nodded his head and responded affirmatively when a detective 

explained she would need to obtain DNA and gunshot residue samples from him. He signed the 

forms he was handed and asked why the police did not already have his information on file. He 

gave no indication he could not understand the forms he was handed, write his name, or understand 

the procedures the detective performed in taking samples from his mouth and hands. Instead, he 

chatted with the detective as she prepared to collect the samples. When the detective read Mr. 

Lawson his Miranda rights, she paused after reading each right and asked him whether he 

understood the right she had described. Each time, he said he understood. He also responded 
7

 

affirmatively when the detective finished reading his rights and asked whether he wished to speak 

with her. Mr. Lawson spoke coherently, and the detective testified that she did not notice any 

indicators of impairment while speaking with him. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion 

that the State proved Mr. Lawson knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. See 

Dunlap, 2018-Ohio-3658, at ¶ 11.

{¶18} As to the voluntariness of Mr. Lawson’s Miranda waiver and confession, he has 

failed to identify any coercive tactics on the part of the police that would trigger a totality of the 

circumstances review. See Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, at ¶ 71. The detectives 

provided him with water, afforded him a lengthy break while speaking with his mother, and never 

engaged in any physical abuse. Additionally, there is no evidence they denied him food, sleep, or 

medical treatment. See Osie, 140 Ohio St.3d 131, 2014-Ohio-2966, at ¶ 93, quoting Clark, 38 

Ohio St.3d at 261. While the detectives repeatedly encouraged Mr. Lawson to tell them what 

really happened, “[a]dmonitions to tell the truth are considered to be neither threats nor promises 

* * *.” State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 67 (1994). Mr. Lawson’s argument that his confession 

was involuntary is based on the detectives having interviewed him when they knew he had mental 

health issues, had not slept, had consumed alcohol, and had taken drugs. Yet, “the use of an 

inherently coercive tactic by police is a prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness.” Perez at ¶ 

71. See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). This Court will not engage in a 

review of the totality of the circumstances when Mr. Lawson has not set forth any evidence or 

argument in support of that prerequisite. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Upon review, Mr. Lawson has not 

shown the police involuntarily induced his Miranda waiver or his confession. We reject his 

argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. As such, Mr. Lawson’s first 

assignment of error is overruled. 
8

 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED [MR. LAWSON’S] 

REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION OF RECKLESS HOMICIDE[.]

{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Lawson argues the trial court erred when it 

refused to instruct the jury on reckless homicide. We disagree.

{¶20} “[A] trial court must fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are 

relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder.” 

State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Crim.R. 30(A). 

“This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to give or not give jury instructions for an abuse of 

discretion under the particular facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Calise, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 26027, 2012-Ohio-4797, ¶ 68. An abuse of discretion implies the trial court’s decision 

is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 

(1983). When applying an abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply 

substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 

619, 621 (1993).

{¶21} A person commits murder if he “purposely cause[s] the death of another * * *.” 

R.C. 2903.02(A). A person commits reckless homicide if he “recklessly cause[s] the death of 

another * * *.” R.C. 2903.041(A). See also R.C. 2901.22 (defining culpable mental states). 

“[R]eckless homicide is a lesser included offense of murder * * *.” State v. Elwell, 9th Dist. Lorain 

No. 06CA008923, 2007-Ohio-3122, ¶ 39. “A jury instruction on a lesser included offense, 

however, is required only when the evidence presented at trial ‘would reasonably support both an 

acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included offense.’” (Emphasis in 

original.) State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 20CA011618, 2021-Ohio-2540, ¶ 56, quoting State 

v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. “In deciding whether to 
9

 

instruct the jury on a lesser-included or inferior-degree offense, the trial court must view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant.” State v. Meadows, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

26549, 2013-Ohio-4271, ¶ 8.

{¶22} While being interviewed by the police, Mr. Lawson and his mother offered 

conflicting information. The mother initially told detectives a third party shot M.P. while she, 

M.P., and Mr. Lawson were sleeping in the same room. Mr. Lawson initially told detectives he 

was in a different room when the shooting occurred. When the detectives spoke with the mother 

a second time, she admitted Mr. Lawson had shot M.P. The detectives then returned to speak with 

Mr. Lawson. During that interview, Mr. Lawson confessed. He told the detectives he shot M.P. 

because M.P. “was gay and * * * had possibly messed with [Mr. Lawson’s] son, who was two or 

three at the time.” 

{¶23} The evidence showed M.P. died from a single gunshot wound to his back, delivered 

while he was lying on his stomach in bed. His daughter and niece testified that M.P. lived with 

Mr. Lawson and his mother and paid their bills. According to the niece, M.P. did not have a good 

relationship with Mr. Lawson, and Mr. Lawson and his mother expected M.P. to spend his money 

on them. According to the daughter, M.P. was shot on the day he had planned to move out of Mr. 

Lawson and the mother’s residence. 

{¶24} At trial, Mr. Lawson testified in his own defense. He explained how he suffered 

from a mental illness and how that illness affected him. He described experiencing extreme 

instances of paranoia and partaking in irrational behavior. Mr. Lawson admitted he did not like 

taking his prescription medications due to their side effects. Around the time of the shooting, he 

testified, he was not taking his medication and was using drugs and alcohol to self-medicate. He 

claimed he never planned to kill M.P. but shot him because he came to believe M.P. “was out to 
10

 

get [his] eyeballs and [his] brain cells.” He agreed that he felt M.P. presented a clear and present 

danger to him at the time of the shooting.

{¶25} The defense sought to advance two theories at trial. The first was that Mr. Lawson 

engaged in reckless behavior when he failed to take his prescription medications and opted to selfmedicate with illegal drugs and alcohol. The defense claimed the resulting paranoia Mr. Lawson 

experienced led him to shoot M.P. The second, related theory the defense posited was that Mr. 

Lawson shot M.P. in self-defense when his mental illness and paranoia caused him to believe he 

was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from M.P.

{¶26} The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense but refused to issue an instruction 

on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide. The court found that instruction would be 

inconsistent with the evidence and argument the defense presented in support of its self-defense 

theory. While Mr. Lawson might have acted recklessly in choosing not to take his medication, the 

court reasoned, the evidence showed that he intended to shoot M.P. Mr. Lawson told the police 

he shot M.P. because he thought M.P. might have molested his son. M.P. told the jury he shot 

M.P. because he thought M.P. wanted to harm him. The court found that, regardless of his reason 

for doing so, Mr. Lawson meant to shoot M.P. Accordingly, the trial court found the evidence 

presented at trial would not warrant an instruction on reckless homicide.

{¶27} Mr. Lawson argues the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to instruct 

the jury on reckless homicide. He argues there was no evidence that he planned to kill M.P. or 

acted with purpose when he shot him. Rather, the evidence showed he was sleep-deprived, under 

the influence of narcotics and alcohol, and suffering from paranoia related to his mental illness. 

Mr. Lawson argues the evidence, when viewed in his favor, supports the conclusion that he acted 
11

 

with reckless disregard for the consequences of his actions. Thus, he claims he was entitled to an 

instruction on reckless homicide.

{¶28} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion 

when it refused to instruct the jury on reckless homicide. The trial court was only required to issue 

that instruction if the evidence presented at trial reasonably supported both an acquittal on the 

murder charge and a conviction for reckless homicide. Brown, 2021-Ohio-2540, at ¶ 55, quoting 

Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus. Whatever his specific reason for doing 

so, Mr. Lawson told the police and the jury that he meant to shoot M.P. The jury heard evidence 

that he intentionally shot M.P. in the back while M.P. lay in bed. “Even viewing the evidence at 

trial in the light most favorable to [Mr. Lawson], this Court cannot conclude that [he] could 

reasonably have been acquitted of murder.” Brown at ¶ 57. See also State v. Thomas, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 27266, 2015-Ohio-2935, ¶ 31. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it refused to issue the jury an instruction on reckless homicide. Mr. Lawson’s second 

assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶29} Mr. Lawson’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
12

 

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

BETTY SUTTON

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.

STEVENSON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

ANGELA M. KILLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.