UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ 

)

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL, )

UNION NATIONAL INDUSTRY PENSION )

FUND, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 14-cv-00334 (APM)

)

CASTLE HILL HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, )

LLC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Service Employees International Union National Industry Pension Fund (“the

Pension Fund”), a multiemployer pension plan, and its Trustees (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought 

an action against Defendants Castle Hill Healthcare Providers, LLC and Alaris Health LLC 

(collectively, “Defendants”) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 

29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants breached their obligations under the 

parties’ collective bargaining agreements by failing to produce remittance reports and make 

contribution payments, as well as violated the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (“PPA”), Pub. L. 

No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006), by failing to pay surcharges and supplemental contributions 

for those years in which the Pension Fund was in “critical status.” See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 5–

8. Plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including: (1) a declaration that Defendants were 

delinquent in remitting owed contributions to the Pension Fund; (2) a judgment requiring 

Defendants to pay delinquent contributions, interest, liquidated damages, surcharges owed under 
2

the PPA, and attorney’s fees and costs; and (3) a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to 

timely file remittance reports and pay all owed contributions as they become due. See id. at 9–12. 

The court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered Defendants to 

disclose particular remittance reports and Plaintiffs, following receipt of those reports, to submit

supplemental briefing on the final damages award sought. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 27, 

at 15–16. The court subsequently entered a final judgment against Defendants for $38,872.82 for

all delinquent contributions, interest, liquidated damages, PPA surcharges and fees owed, plus 

additional pre- and post-judgment interest. See Order & Final J., ECF No. 32, at 2. The court 

retained jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 3.

Now before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. After thorough 

review of the evidence submitted, the court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion in part and denies it in part.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek $31,070.50 in attorney’s fees for 162.4 hours of work performed between 

February 28, 2014, and April 12, 2016, as well as $501.20 in court costs, for a total award of 

$31,571.70. See Pls.’ Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees & Costs, ECF No. 36 [hereinafter Pls.’ Mot.], at 3; 

Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 1B, ECF No. 36-1, at 30–31. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled 

to attorney’s fees and costs under ERISA, but they do contest whether the amount of fees Plaintiffs 

seek is “reasonable.” See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).1

 

To calculate reasonable attorney’s fees, the court multiplies a reasonable number of hours 

worked by a reasonable hourly rate and then, if necessary, adjusts the sum downward or upward. 

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 968

 1 As Defendants make no argument that Plaintiffs’ request for costs is unreasonable, the court deems that request to 

be conceded. See Kone v. District of Columbia, 808 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[A]n argument in a dispositive 

motion that the opponent fails to address in an opposition may be deemed conceded.” (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).
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(D.C. Cir. 1994); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Nat’l Indus. Pension Fund v. Bristol Manor Healthcare 

Ctr., No. 12-cv-01904, 2016 WL 3636970, at *3 (D.D.C. June 30, 2016). The party seeking fees 

bears the burden of proving that its request is reasonable, “and the opposing party remains ‘free to 

rebut a fee claim.’” Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). To meet its burden, 

the moving party may submit “supporting documentation [that is] ‘. . . of sufficient detail and 

probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours 

were actually and reasonably expended.’” Role Models, 353 F.3d at 970 (quoting In re Olson, 884 

F.2d 1415, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). 

The only issue before the court is whether Plaintiffs’ counsel expended an unreasonable 

number of hours in this litigation.

2

 Defendants assert that the fee award should be “substantially 

reduced” because (1) Plaintiffs “block billed” many of their billing entries, meaning they listed 

several distinct tasks in one billing entry; (2) certain billing entries are duplicative; (3) the number 

of hours expended for certain tasks was excessive; and (4) Plaintiffs’ counsel inappropriately billed 

for time spent correcting a filing error. See Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees & 

 2 Defendants make no argument that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rates were unreasonable, and the court is satisfied 

that those hourly rates in fact were reasonable. The rates Plaintiffs seek are well below those set out in the United 

States Attorney’s Fees Matrix (“USAO Laffey Matrix”) for 2015–2016, upon which the court relies for a baseline 

determination of the contemporary, prevailing market rates. See Bristol Manor, 2016 WL 3636970, at *4 (relying on 

the USAO Laffey Matrix in an action for attorneys’ fees under ERISA); Pls.’ Mot. at 3; compare Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 1, 

ECF No. 36-1, at 2–4 [hereinafter Bardes Decl.], ¶ 4, with Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2, ECF No. 36-2 [hereinafter USAO Laffey

Matrix 2015–2016], at 2. Here, a partner with over eighteen years’ experience, two associates with over four years’ 

experience each, an associate with over two years’ experience, a paralegal, and two law clerks worked on the litigation. 

See Bardes Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs’ counsel charged $220 per hour for work performed by partners; $195 per hour for

work performed by associates; $120 per hour for work performed by paralegals; and $75 per hour for work performed 

by law clerks. Id. The USAO Laffey Matrix provides that the market rate for attorneys with 16–20 years’ experience 

is $504 per hour; those with 4–5 years’ experience is $325 per hour; those with 2–3 years’ experience is $315 per 

hour; and paralegals and law clerks is $154 per hour. See USAO Laffey Matrix 2015–2016. Thus, the hourly rate for 

each member of Plaintiffs’ litigation team was significantly below the prevailing market rate. In the absence of any 

argument or contradictory evidence suggesting Plaintiffs’ counsel’s rates were unreasonable, the court concludes that 

Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing the hourly rate was reasonable. 
4

Costs, ECF No. 37 [hereinafter Defs.’ Opp’n], at 4–6.

3

 In light of these four faults, Defendants 

contend, Plaintiffs cannot “satisfy their burden of demonstrating with a high degree of certainty 

the reasonableness of their fee request.” Id. at 5. After thoroughly reviewing the briefs and 

evidence submitted, the court concludes Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of demonstrating to 

a high degree of certainty that the number of hours their counsel billed was reasonable, except as 

to those hours spent correcting and refiling an exhibit to the Complaint. 

With respect to Defendants’ allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ counsel’s “block billing,” the 

court is satisfied with the billing entries submitted. Though several billing entries list multiple 

tasks, the court readily can discern that those tasks included in the block entries not only all pertain 

to aspects of this litigation, but also nearly all involve work on substantive motions for this 

litigation. The only two entries Defendants specifically challenge clearly pass muster in this 

regard. Moreover, nowhere in the billing records has Plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to charge for 

administrative tasks4 or other client matters. Cf. Role Models, 353 F.3d at 971. 

To the extent Defendants argue that the number of hours expended is excessive and the 

billing entries are duplicative, those arguments are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs’ counsel, including all 

non-lawyer timekeepers, billed a total of 162.4 hours for the entirety of this matter, which roughly 

equates to 40 hours per week over four weeks. This litigation took more than two years to 

complete. During that time, Plaintiffs’ counsel, among other things, drafted a complaint, moved 

for entry of default judgment after Defendants failed to timely answer, filed a motion for summary 

judgment, prepared a supplement to their motion for summary judgment at the court’s direction, 

 3 All pin citations are to the document’s original pagination. 4 Plaintiffs agreed to exclude those entries from March 16, 2015, and June 14, 2015, that Defendants argued were 

unreasonable charges for administrative work and have not included them in the requested amount of attorneys’ fees. 

See Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees & Costs, ECF No. 38, at 5. Those are the only entries Defendants 

claim were bills for administrative work. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 5.
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and wrote reply briefs in support of the motions and supplement. Each pleading was supported by 

client affidavits, supporting evidence, or both. Thus, securing a favorable final judgment in this 

matter took Plaintiffs’ counsel substantial time and effort. 

Defendants challenge the total hours billed as excessive, citing in particular the 83.7 hours 

spent to draft the summary judgment motion and reply and the 25.9 hours spent to draft the 

summary judgment supplement and reply. Defs.’ Opp’n at 4–5. The court finds neither sum to be 

unreasonable. The summary judgment motion and reply brief were both substantive pleadings, 

which, taken together, consisted of 25 pages of legal argument, a 12-page statement of facts, three 

declarations, and other supporting evidence. The supplement consisted of 15 pages of legal 

argument, two more declarations, and additional evidence. The court finds the total time that 

Plaintiffs’ counsel expended to research, draft, and assemble those pleadings was reasonable. Nor 

can Plaintiffs’ counsel be accused of trying to run up fees by relying on higher-billing partners to 

do the lion’s share of the work. To the contrary, the primary timekeeper in this litigation was a 

young associate, see Pl.’s Mot. at 2 (stating that associate with over two years’ experience billed 

87.2 of the total 162.4 hours), whose limited years of experience likely caused him to take slightly

longer—but at a lower hourly rate—to research, draft, revise, and finalize the key pleadings in this 

case. 

The only “evidence” Defendants submit to support their contention of excessive billing is 

an affidavit from their own counsel. But defense counsel’s statements are not evidence; they are 

legal arguments, which Defendants ultimately transcribed into their opposition brief without

further elaboration. Compare Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. 1, ECF No. 37-1, ¶¶ 19–21, with Defs.’ Opp’n at 

4–5. Similarly, although Defendants charge that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing entries are 

duplicative, they identify no allegedly duplicative entries. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4. Accordingly, 
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having thoroughly reviewed Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing entries, see Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 1A, ECF No. 

36-1, at 5–29 [hereinafter Billing Entries], the court is satisfied that the number of hours expended 

was not excessive and the billing entries are not duplicative.

Lastly, Defendants dispute whether they should be required to pay for time Plaintiffs’ 

counsel spent correcting a filing error. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 5. The court agrees that the amount 

charged for the correction is improper. Prior to ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, the court alerted Plaintiffs of the need to refile an exhibit to their Complaint—18 pages 

of summary payroll charts containing Social Security Numbers—with redactions, as required 

under Local Rule 5.4(f). See LCvR 5.4(f); Minute Order, November 3, 2015. The billing entries 

reflect that counsel spent 2.4 hours, in total, reviewing the court’s Order and the Local Rules, 

consulting one another, making the necessary redactions, telephoning the Clerk’s Office, and 

refiling the exhibit. See Billing Entries at 15.5

 Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to payment 

because their attorneys would have spent the same time making the necessary redactions initially 

as they did after being informed of the error. See Pls.’ Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 38, at 5. 

The court disagrees. The 2.4 hours Plaintiffs’ counsel charged to make this simplistic redaction

upon discovery—removing from view data contained in single column in one exhibit—is an 

excessive amount of time, and it would be unfair for Defendants to bear the burden of that cost in 

full. It would not have taken any timekeeper 2.4 hours to make the redaction prior to filing; at 

most, it would have taken .2 hours to complete. Accordingly, the court will reduce Plaintiffs’ fee 

award by $345.6

 With the $345 reduction, Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees total $30,725.50. 

 5 All pin citations are to the document’s original pagination. 6 The billing entries reflect that two associates collectively billed 1.5 hours, at $195 per hour, and one law clerk billed 

.9 hours, at $75 per hour, to make the redactions required under the Local Rules and refile the exhibit. See Billing 

Entries at 14–15. This time amounts to a $360 bill to correct and refile the exhibit. One law clerk, however, easily 

could have made the redactions and properly filed the exhibit in .2 hours. Consequently, Plaintiffs may only recover 

$15—.2 hours of time billed by a law clerk at $75 per hour—for the time spent correcting and refiling the exhibit. 
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III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

in part and denies it in part. The court hereby awards Plaintiffs $31,226.70 in attorney’s fees and 

costs. 

This is a final, appealable Order.

 

Dated: January 18, 2017 Amit P. Mehta

United States District Judge