[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12804

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

MICHAEL LANCE TAYLOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00578-DCI

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12804

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Michal Taylor appeals the district court’s order affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his applications for a 

period of disability and disability insurance benefits. Taylor contends that the administrative law judge improperly discounted the 

opinions of his treating physicians and made findings not supported 

by substantial evidence. He also argues that the ALJ erred by relying solely on objective medical evidence to discredit his testimony 

about the limiting effects of his pain. After careful review, we affirm 

the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.

I. 

Taylor applied for Social Security benefits in 2016, contending that he became unable to work due to his medical condition on 

May 15th of that year. His application stated that pain frequently 

impaired his ability to stand, walk, lift, drive, and move, and caused 

difficulty concentrating. Taylor also reported that he quit his prior 

job due to these limitations. The Commissioner denied the claim 

initially and upon reconsideration, concluding each time that Taylor’s medical conditions did not render him incapable of performing work requiring less physical effort than his previous occupation.

Taylor then requested a hearing before an ALJ. Prior to the 

hearing, Taylor submitted medical records and two medical source 

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statements from treating physicians, Drs. James Scott and Michael 

Kohen. Both physicians opined that Taylor functioned at a less than 

sedentary level. For example, the physicians opined that in a regular workday, Taylor could sit, stand, or walk for two hours or less, 

he would require frequent unscheduled breaks, he would be offtask 20% or more of the day, and he would miss four or more days 

of work each month. Both physicians also opined that Taylor had 

significant limitations with reaching, handling, or fingering. A vocational expert would later testify that no jobs exist for a person 

with such limitations. 

At the hearing, Taylor testified that rheumatoid arthritis, lupus, hypermobility, and neck and back pain were the medical conditions preventing him from working. Most days he was home 

alone, and he “spen[t] an awful lot of time in the bed.” He couldn’t 

sit for more than 30 minutes without getting up to move around, 

couldn’t stand in one place without moving for more than five 

minutes, and couldn’t walk more than 30 feet without taking a 

break. As for other physical activities, Taylor testified that he hurt 

his back lifting a 12-pack of soda, he struggled to extend his arms in 

any direction, and he struggled with handling small objects like 

coins and buttons. The only household task Taylor sometimes 

completed was making breakfast, but he couldn’t fold laundry or 

cut up vegetables. And although Taylor sometimes drove, he 

didn’t like to because he couldn’t feel the gas pedal with his feet.

After Taylor’s testimony, the ALJ asked a vocational expert 

whether a hypothetical person with the following limitations could 

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perform Taylor’s past relevant work: the person could lift or carry 

10 pounds frequently, but 20 pounds only occasionally; he could 

stand, walk, or sit for a total of six hours per workday with normal 

breaks; he could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but could 

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, stoop, crouch, 

and crawl; he must avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected 

heights, moving mechanical parts, and extreme cold; and he could

perform simple and multiple-step routine tasks and could have occasional contact with others. The vocational expert testified that 

such limitations would preclude a person from performing Taylor’s past relevant work but would not preclude him from performing other work. And the same would be true if the person was 

somewhat limited in reaching and handling. However, if the person could only occasionally reach and feel, the vocational expert 

testified that “[v]ery, very few” jobs exist for such a person. The 

vocational expert testified also that a person with the restrictions 

provided in Drs. Scott’s and Kohen’s statements would be incapable of performing any known jobs.

In a written decision, the ALJ concluded that Taylor was not 

disabled under the Act. At step two of the sequential evaluation 

process, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ explained that Taylor 

suffered from the following severe impairments: undifferentiated 

and mixed connective tissue disorder, neuropathy, spine disorder, 

shoulder disorder, fibromyalgia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, affective disorder, and anxiety disorder. The mental 

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impairments identified by the ALJ and the limitations they impose 

on Taylor are not relevant to this appeal.

At step four, the ALJ found that Taylor had the residual functional capacity to perform work limited to lifting/carrying 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, he could sit, stand, 

or walk for a total of six hours per eight-hour workday, and he 

could “frequently handle/feel with the bilateral upper extremities” 

and “frequently reach in all directions w[ith] the bilateral upper extremities.” Taylor could also “occasionally climb ramps and stairs, 

balance, kneel, stoop, crouch and crawl.”

In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ made two findings that 

are the subject of this appeal. First, the ALJ discredited Taylor’s testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his 

symptoms, finding that it was “not entirely consistent with the 

medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” For example, 

the ALJ concluded that Taylor’s testimony about the severity of his 

pain was inconsistent with physician progress notes indicating relief from epidural steroid injections. The ALJ also noted that although Taylor testified to balance issues, he had recently “reported 

[to a physician] that he had only fallen [one] time” over the last 

year. In all, the ALJ concluded that the “the overall evidence” supported the lifting, carrying, standing, walking, manipulative, and 

postural limitations imposed, instead of the stricter limitations supported by Taylor’s testimony. Second, the ALJ gave “little weight” 

to Taylor’s treating physicians’ opinions. The ALJ explained that 

the opinions were “overly restrictive based on the overall evidence 

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of record.” The ALJ gave six reasons, discussed in more detail below, for discounting the opinions.

Based on Taylor’s residual functional capacity, he could not 

perform his past relevant work; but, based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ explained that “there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed” during the relevant period. Therefore, 

Taylor was not disabled. Taylor sought review of the denial of benefits by the Appeals Council, contending that “[t]he finding from 

[his] physicians [was] inconsistent with the finding from the [ALJ].” 

The Appeals Council denied his request for review.

Taylor later filed a complaint in district court seeking review 

of the determination that he was not entitled to disability benefits. 

The district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, rejecting

Taylor’s arguments that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard 

to his testimony and the opinions of his treating physicians. Taylor 

timely appealed. 

II. 

Our standard of review “is the same as that of the district 

court.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004). 

That is, we ask whether the ALJ’s decision was “supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal standards.” Lewis v. 

Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). “‘Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

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21-12804 Opinion of the Court 7

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 

2004) (quoting id.). Our review precludes us from “decid[ing] the 

facts anew, reweigh[ing] the evidence, or substitut[ing] our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 

F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). “If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence we must affirm, even if the proof 

preponderates against it.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th 

Cir. 1996). 

III. 

Taylor makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends 

that the ALJ improperly diminished the weight of the treating physician opinions provided by Drs. Scott and Kohen by applying the 

wrong legal standard and making findings not supported by substantial evidence. Second, Taylor argues that the ALJ improperly 

discredited his testimony on the severity of his pain. 

A. The ALJ Articulated Specific, Evidence-Based Reasons for 

Discounting the Opinions of Taylor’s Treating Physicians.

Taylor argues that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal 

standard to the opinions of his treating physicians. Specifically, he 

contends that the reasons the ALJ gave for discounting his treating 

physicians’ opinions were not supported by substantial evidence. 

The Commissioner responds that Taylor’s argument is merely an 

invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence, and we agree. 

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An individual claiming entitlement to disability benefits

must prove that he is disabled. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 

1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A disability is defined as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The burden of proving disability always 

rests with the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1).

The ALJ uses a five-step, sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(1). 

This appeal concerns the ALJ’s determination at step four, which

evaluates the claimant’s “residual functional capacity and [his] past 

relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(4)(iv). To determine Taylor’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ considered medical opinions, including those of Taylor’s treating physicians. For claims filed on or 

before March 27, 2017, the Social Security Administration “give[s]

more weight to medical opinions from [a claimant’s] treating 

sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). And we have explained that 

“the testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or 

considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” 

Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440 (quotation omitted). Good cause “exists 

when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the 

evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating 

physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. An ALJ 

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“must clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the 

opinion of a treating physician,” and the failure to do so is reversible error. Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1259 (11th 

Cir. 2019) (per curiam). We will not speculate about the grounds 

an ALJ may have relied on to give less weight to an opinion, but 

when the ALJ articulates specific reasons for failing to give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight and those reasons are 

supported by substantial evidence, there is no reversible error. 

Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212. 

Here, the ALJ articulated several reasons for giving little 

weight to Drs. Scott’s and Kohen’s opinions. As an initial matter, it 

was not error for the ALJ to consider the separate opinions together, as they did not differ in any material respect. Each physician 

concluded that Taylor’s symptoms would cause significant limitations with reaching, handling, or fingering, that he would need to 

frequently shift from sitting, standing, or walking, that he would 

need frequent breaks, and that he would miss at least one day of 

work per week on average. To be sure, the physicians were treating Taylor for different ailments. Dr. Scott listed Taylor’s diagnosis 

as “neuropathy,” manifesting as “pain in legs, numbness, neck pain, 

fatigue, [and] memory issues.” Dr. Kohen was treating Taylor for 

a slew of maladies, but he listed similar symptoms, such as joint 

pain, instability, muscle pain, weakness, and fatigue. Nonetheless,

the physicians’ bottom-line conclusions were nearly identical. 

The ALJ viewed these opinions as “overly restrictive” for six 

reasons, and Taylor takes issue with each. First, the ALJ noted that 

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Taylor’s “gait/station” and “muscle strength” were frequently reported by physicians as “normal.” Taylor contends that the ALJ 

“failed to cite any evidence in support of [this] finding,” and that 

the record contains “multiple notations” of his “antalgic gait and 

stance” and “reduced muscle strength/weakness.” But just two 

paragraphs prior in the ALJ’s decision, the same statement was supported by citation to treatment notes by Dr. Scott and another physician. And contrary to Taylor’s suggestion, the record is replete 

with examples of physicians, including Drs. Scott and Kohen, reporting that Taylor presented with normal muscle strength. Indeed, the Commissioner points us to no less than 20 such occasions 

in its brief. We have explained that it is not enough for a claimant 

to point to some evidence in support of a disability. See Moore, 405 

F.3d at 1213 (explaining that even when a claimant identifies “other 

evidence which would undermine the ALJ’s [disability] determination,” our standard of review “precludes us” from disturbing a determination otherwise supported by substantial evidence). Because 

the ALJ’s reasoning finds substantial support in the record, Taylor’s 

argument is not meritorious.

Second, the ALJ noted that Taylor’s pain was sometimes relieved by treatment—specifically, epidural steroid injections. Taylor argues that such “relief was short-lived and related to his neck 

and back pain,” not the conditions Drs. Scott and Kohen treated 

him for. In reality, however, both Drs. Scott and Kohen listed pain 

as a symptom that impacts Taylor’s ability to work, and Dr. Scott 

specifically listed “neck pain” as a symptom of Taylor’s 

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neuropathy. Thus, if Taylor’s neck pain was somewhat relieved by 

treatment, then it would tend to make the physicians’ opinions inconsistent with the record. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. The medical evidence shows that the injections worked: Taylor reported as 

much as a 60% reduction in pain after an injection in March 2015; 

and as late as June 2018, Dr. Kohen noted that Taylor was “getting 

injections in his neck and low back with some relief.” Again, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reasoning. 

Third, the ALJ explained that electromyography (“EMG”) 

studies indicated that Taylor had mild, rather than severe, cervical 

radiculopathies. Taylor objects to this evidence, contending that 

the ALJ “completely overlooked” studies “support[ing] a finding 

that [he] suffered from severe peripheral neuropathy.” But of the 

three studies Taylor cites—performed on July 19, 2016, December 

19, 2016, and November 2, 2018—only the last one resulted in a 

finding that was “consistent with a severe axonal motor and sensor 

polyneuropathy.” And an EMG study conducted one week later indicated only “mild” findings. Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning was 

supported by substantial evidence. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1215.

Fourth, the ALJ noted that Taylor “reported that his hypermobility syndrome was fairly controlled with medications.” Taylor 

contends that Drs. Scott and Kohen were not treating him for hypermobility, and whether it was under control had nothing to do 

with their conclusions. But that is plainly not the case. Dr. Kohen 

treated Taylor for hypermobility—identified in his treatment notes 

by the code M35.7—by, among other things, giving Taylor an 

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injection in his wrist. See Schink, 935 F.3d at 1262 (examining 

whether treating physicians’ notes “fleshed out and were consistent with their conclusions”). And in his treating source opinion, 

Dr. Kohen listed M35.7 as one of Taylor’s diagnoses. Thus, 

whether Taylor’s hypermobility was well controlled bears directly 

on the consistency of Dr. Kohen’s opinion “with the doctor’s own 

medical records.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. And because he does 

not challenge the ALJ’s finding that his hypermobility was adequately managed with medication, we conclude that the ALJ’s reasoning was substantially supported by the evidence.

Fifth, the ALJ concluded that the physicians’ opinions conflicted with CT scans of Taylor’s spine that “showed mild to moderate degenerative changes with only mild neural foraminal narrowing.” Taylor again contends that the ALJ “completely ignored” 

other “MRI findings of his cervical and lumbar spine” that “documented significant findings.” Again, however, Taylor’s assertion 

falls flat. He does not explain what “significant findings” the MRI 

studies allegedly revealed. The MRIs he relies on revealed “stable,” 

“mild,” and “small” findings, some of which were listed as “resolved” or “not worsening.” Taylor fails to explain how these studies undermine the ALJ’s conclusion, and we see no inconsistency 

on the face of the studies.

Sixth and finally, the ALJ noted that Drs. Scott’s and Kohen’s 

opinions conflicted with Taylor’s own reported activities of daily 

living. Taylor argues that the ALJ failed to refer to any specific activities that were inconsistent with the opinions. And he contends 

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that merely being able to do “everyday activities” is not enough to 

“disqualif[y] a claimant from disability.” See Lewis, 125 F.3d at 

1441. The Commissioner responds that although the ALJ did not 

“expressly detail” Taylor’s reported activities of daily living, the 

ALJ referred to them “elsewhere in the decision.” For example, 

when considering the severity of Taylor’s mental limitations, the 

ALJ referred to a psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Jonas 

Trinidad. From this evaluation, the ALJ explained that Taylor “reported that he cared for his personal hygiene, that he drove, and 

that he prepared meals.” And Trinidad’s report listed other activities, including “spending time with [his] kids” and “complet[ing] 

basic household chores with assistance.”

We agree that the inconsistency between Taylor’s activities 

of daily living and the limitations suggested by his treating physicians is less apparent than the other inconsistencies identified by 

the ALJ. But our review of the record does not convince us that the 

decision is unreasonable or unsupported by substantial evidence. 

True, the activities of daily living relied on by the ALJ are not 

enough to disqualify Taylor from eligibility for disability benefits, 

Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1441, but that is not what occurred here. Instead, 

the ALJ explained that the activities of daily living were inconsistent with a medical opinion. We review only whether the ALJ’s 

articulated reason was supported by “more than a scintilla” of evidence, id. at 1440, and we readily conclude that it was. 

For these reasons, the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for discounting Taylor’s treating physicians’ opinions. Contrary to 

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Taylor’s suggestion, we need not “scour the record to find support 

for the ALJ’s decision,” as the ALJ articulated six evidence-based 

inconsistencies between the treating physicians’ opinions and Taylor’s medical records. That is all we require. See Phillips, 357 F.3d 

at 1240 (affirming the denial of benefits “[b]ecause the ALJ articulated several legitimate reasons for giving less weight to [a treating 

physician’s] opinion”). 

B. The ALJ Relied on Appropriate Evidence to Discredit Taylor’s Testimony.

Finally, Taylor contends that the ALJ rejected his testimony 

“solely based on the lack of objective medical evidence.” By not 

considering any of the “factors that [the Social Security Administration] promises claimants it will consider . . . when evaluating a 

claimant’s testimony regarding pain and limitations,” Taylor argues that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard to his testimony.

We disagree. 

A claimant may establish that he has “a disability through his 

own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms.” Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). In such a case, the 

claimant must show evidence of an underlying medical condition 

and either “objective medical evidence that confirms the severity 

of the alleged pain arising from that condition” or “that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can 

be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). Once a claimant has 

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made this showing, the Commissioner “must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms” in light of “all 

available evidence,” including the claimant’s testimony. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1529(c)(1). The Commissioner “will not reject” a claimant’s 

statements “solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate” the statements. Id. § 404.1529(c)(2).

Instead, the ALJ considers several “[o]ther factors concerning [the 

claimant’s] functional limitations and restrictions due to pain and 

other symptoms.” Id. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii).

If a claimant provides subjective testimony on the severity 

of his symptoms, as Taylor did here, the ALJ “must articulate explicit and adequate reasons” for rejecting the complaints. Foote v. 

Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s “credibility determination does not need to cite particular phrases or formulations[,] but it cannot merely be a broad rejection” that fails to 

consider a claimant’s “medical condition as a whole.” Dyer, 395 

F.3d at 1210-11 (cleaned up). We will not disturb “[a] clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in 

the record.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562. 

Here, the ALJ concluded that Taylor’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the 

symptoms he alleged, and proceeded to consider Taylor’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of 

the symptoms. The ALJ concluded that Taylor’s testimony was 

“not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record,” and the ALJ articulated five reasons to 

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support that conclusion. Four of the reasons overlapped with the 

inconsistencies discussed previously—Taylor’s pain was somewhat 

relieved by epidural steroid injections, his postural and muscular 

limitations were inconsistent with physical examinations, and

EMG studies and CT scans revealed only mild objective findings. 

These four reasons were based on the objective medical evidence, 

and we have already explained that these reasons find substantial 

support in the record. See Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 

941 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the reasons an 

ALJ articulates for “refus[ing] to credit a claimant’s subjective pain 

testimony” must be “based on substantial evidence” (footnote 

omitted)). 

However, Taylor is incorrect to suggest that the ALJ relied 

solely on objective medical evidence to discredit his testimony. As 

a fifth ground for discrediting Taylor’s testimony, the ALJ noted 

that his testimony concerning “balance problems” was inconsistent

with a physician’s note indicating that Taylor reported “he had 

only fallen [one] time in the prior year.” In other words, the ALJ 

discredited Taylor’s testimony based on his own prior inconsistent 

statement. Cf. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562 (explaining that an ALJ “failed 

to identify any inconsistencies between [the claimant’s] statements 

to her physicians and those she has made . . . during her administrative hearing”). Thus, the ALJ articulated reasons for discrediting 

Taylor’s testimony that were based on both objective evidence and 

a “conflict[] between [Taylor’s] statements and the rest of the 

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evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). The ALJ employed the 

proper legal standard for discrediting Taylor’s testimony.

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits is affirmed in all respects. 

AFFIRMED. 

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