J-S88016-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.E.D.L., a 

Minor 

APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 744 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000772-2015, 

CP-51-DP-0000323-2014, FID: 51-FN-000-284-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.T.L., a Minor 

APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 745 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000769-2015, 

CP-51-DP-0001341-2014, FID: 51-FN-000-284-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.M.L., a 

Minor

APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 746 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 
J-S88016-16

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Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000770-2015, 

CP-51-DP-0001342-2014, FID: 51-FN-000-284-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.N.L., a 

Minor 

APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 747 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000771-2015, 

CP-51-DP-0001343-2014, FID: 51-FN-000-284-2014

BEFORE: OLSON, RANSOM, and STRASSBURGER1, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED JANUARY 23, 2017

Appellant, M.L., (“Mother”), appeals from the order in the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas, which terminated her parental rights to her 

minor children, M.E.J.D.L., N.T.L., T.M.L., and D.N.L., pursuant to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 2511(b). After a 

thorough review of the record, we affirm.

The relevant facts are as follows:

The family in this case became known to [the Department of 

Human Services] DHS on November 11, 2013, when DHS 

received a substantiated General Protective Services (“GPS”) 

report alleging that Mother’s home was without heat or food, and 

that [M.E.J.D.L.] had cerebral palsy and was left alone or with 

inappropriate caregivers. Another GPS report was received by 

____________________________________________

1 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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DHS on December 6, 2013, alleged that [M.E.J.D.L.] was missing 

medical appointments. Over the course of 2013, [M.E.J.D.L.] 

missed thirteen medical appointments. DHS filed an urgent 

petition for [M.E.J.D.L.] on February 5, 2014. [M.E.J.D.L.] was 

adjudicated dependent and committed to DHS on March 7, 2014. 

She was placed with E.L. (“Foster Mother”), her maternal 

grandmother. [M.E.J.D.L.] is a very medically needy child. 

Mother was present at the time of the adjudication, where the 

court ordered her to attend substance abuse treatment. In 

March 2014, Mother began attending Caton Village, an inpatient 

substance abuse treatment facility. Mother was allowed to have 

the three other Children reside with her at the inpatient facility. 

Mother’s goals under the April 16, 2014, Family Service Plan 

(“FSP”) were to participate in family therapy, stabilize mental 

health, attend drug and alcohol treatment, maintain sobriety and 

secure safe living conditions for the Children. Father’s FSP goals 

were to obtain housing, attend all hearings and ensure the 

Children attend all medical appointments. On May 9, 2014, 

another GPS report alleged that Mother used physical discipline 

against the Children. The treatment facility sought to transfer 

Mother elsewhere because of altercations with other patients. 

Foster Mother removed the three children from the treatment 

facility on May 20, 2014, and Mother left the program the same 

day without successfully completing treatment, against medical 

advice. On June 2, 2014, DHS filed urgent petitions for N.T.L., 

T.M.L. and D.N.L. These three children were adjudicated 

dependent on June 18, 2014. They were committed to DHS and 

placed with Foster Mother. The court also ordered Mother and 

Father to the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for 

additional services, and Mother was ordered to the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for forthwith drug screen and dual 

diagnosis assessment. Both parents were offered supervised 

visitation. Over the next year, Mother and Father were found 

non-compliant at every permanency review. The trial court 

found at every review that DHS had made reasonable efforts to 

reunify the family. DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, and to change the 

Children’s permanency goals to adoption on October 29, 2015.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/16 at 1-2.
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At the hearing, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to 

all four children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), as 

well as 2511(b), and changed the children’s goal to adoption. On March 7, 

2016, Mother’s counsel timely filed a notice of appeal as well as a statement 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

A. Whether the court erred in failing to find that for six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, 

when [A]ppellant [M]other’s child was bonded with her and 

[A]ppellant [M]other and did not intend to relinquish her 

claim to her child or refused and/or failed to perform 

parental duties.

B. Whether the court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

[A]ppellant [M]other had contact and visits with her child, 

[A]ppellant [M]other’s child was bonded with her.

C. Whether the court erred in finding that there were 

repeated and continuing findings of incapacity, abuse, 

neglect and/or dependency of this minor child by 

[A]ppellant mother, when [A]ppellant [M]other’s child was 

bonded with her.

D. Whether the court erred in finding that the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist, when [A]ppellant [M]other’s child was 

bonded with her.

E. Whether the court erred in finding that the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the children 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child, when 

[A]ppellant [M]other can remedy the conditions within a 

reasonable period of time, when mother’s child was 

bonded with her.

F. Whether the court erred in finding that DHS made 

reasonable efforts toward reunification, by either failing 
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and/or refusing to help find a viable option or to consider 

options other than terminating [M]other’s parental rights, 

when [M]other’s child was bonded with her.

G. Whether the court erred in terminating the rights of 

[A]ppellant [M]other, when the sole reason she was unable 

to obtain housing, and provide medical care for the care 

and maintenance of the child, was her lack of income.

H. Whether the court erred in terminating the rights of 

[A]ppellant [M]other where it was not supported by clear 

and convincing evidence and not in the best interest of the 

child, and there was a bond between [A]ppellant [M]other 

and child and the termination of parental rights would have 

a negative effect on the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs of the child, pursuant to 23 [Pa. C.S.A.] 

Section 2511(b).

I. Whether the errors committed by the court below deprived 

[A]ppellant of her rights to due process and equal 

protection under the law.

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7 (unpaginated). 

Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is

as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental 

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the 

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse 

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support 

for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a 

trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate 

parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s 

decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence.
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In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In termination cases, the 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence2

that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are 

valid. In re S.H., 879 A.2d at 806. 

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G. and J.G., Minors, 855 A.2d 

68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). “If competent evidence supports the trial 

court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the 

opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., Jr., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). 

While Mother’s appeal raises issues pertaining to all of the grounds for 

termination, this Court may affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to 

any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa. Super. 20014) (en banc). As such, we will focus on Section 

2511(a)(8) and 2511(b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

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2 The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that 

is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to 

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” In re J.L.C. and J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 

2003).
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(a) General rule. – The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more 

have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations. – The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

We first examine the court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). In order to terminate parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(8), the court conducts a three-part analysis in which it is 

determined whether the agency has proven by clear and convincing 

evidence:

“(1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 

months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions 
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which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.”

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa. Super. 2003).

M.E.D.L. was removed from her Mother’s care and custody and placed 

in DHS custody on March 7, 2014. N.T.L, T.M.L, and D.N.L., were removed 

from their Mother’s care and custody and placed in DHS custody on June 18, 

2014. All of the children were placed in the same foster home where they 

have remained since being committed to the care of DHS. All four children 

have been removed from Mother’s care for well over twelve months. Thus, 

the first prong in In re M.E.P. for the requirements of section 2511(a)(8) 

was clearly satisfied.

The conditions that led to the children’s removal and placement 

continue to exist. At the time the children came into care, Mother’s FSP 

objectives were to participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation, a mental 

health evaluation, parenting classes, attend scheduled visitation, and obtain 

housing. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 12/11/15, at 30. At the time of the 

filing of the termination petitions, Mother had completed none of her 

objectives. At every court hearing, Mother was referred to CEU for 

evaluation and has never attended. Id. She failed to receive mental health 

treatment or attend parenting classes. Id. at 31-32. The children were in 

care over twelve months, and Mother attended one supervised visit lasting 

only twenty minutes. Id. at 33. 
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Mother contends that she completed most of her objectives and was 

moving towards reunification. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 12 

(unpaginated). In terminating parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the 

trial court is not required to evaluate a parent’s current “willingness or ability 

to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement.” In re Adoption 

of T.B.B., 835 A.2d at 396; see also In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra, at 

1276. However, by Mother’s own admission she does not have housing, has 

not participated in mental health treatment, and stopped coming to court 

because she wanted Foster Mother to raise her children. N.T. at 101-102. 

Mother has demonstrated a pattern of noncompliance with her FSP 

objectives. Therefore, the conditions which led to removal continue to exist.

We must now consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding that DHS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

“termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.” 

With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to 

Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b) we have observed: [I]nitally, the 

focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the 

child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an 

evaluation of the “needs and welfare of the child” prior to 

proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the 

“developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for 

the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent. 
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In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) 

(citations omitted).

We discern that there was ample testimony in the record from which 

the trial court appropriately concluded that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights best served the needs and welfare of the children. In her testimony, 

Rimani Peace, DHS social worker, testified that Mother only made one 

supervised visit with her children, nine days before the termination hearing. 

N.T. at 33-34. Since the children’s removal, Mother has not completed any 

of her FSP objectives, does not have appropriate housing, failed to complete 

a drug and alcohol program, and did not comply with court-ordered drug 

screens. As such, the conditions that led to removal continue to exist, and 

Mother has done nothing to meet the needs and welfare of the children. We 

agree with the trial court that “termination of Mother’s parental rights was in 

the best interest of the Children for their physical, intellectual, moral and 

spiritual well-being.” Trial Court Opinion at 12. 

After we determine that the requirements of Section 2511(a) are 

satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of Section 2511(b) 

are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc). Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the court, in 

terminating the rights of a parent, shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of a child. 
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Kristen Jenkins, Children’s Choice social worker, testified that she 

observed Mother’s only supervised visit, which occurred after the children 

had been in care for eighteen months and lasted merely twenty minutes. 

N.T. at 66. Based on the lack of visitation, Ms. Jenkins reasoned that the 

children did not maintain an attachment to Mother. Thus, they would suffer 

no irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated. Id. at 67. 

Furthermore, Ms. Jenkins testified that the children look to Foster Mother to 

meet all of their needs. Id. at 68. The children view Foster Mother as the 

parental figure in their lives. Id. 

As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial 

court’s credibility and weight assessments that severing the bond with 

Mother would not cause the children irreparable harm, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to the Children with regard to section 2511(b). 

Mother’s final claim, as set forth in her statement of questions 

presented, reads as follows:

I. Whether the errors committed by the court below deprived 

[A]ppellant of her rights to due process and equal 

protection under the law.

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unpaginated). Mother’s argument that purportedly 

addresses this issue is vague and underdeveloped, cites no case law, and 

fails to explain the basis for this question. Under these circumstances, we 

decline to consider the merits of this claim. See Fielding v. Fielding, 685 
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A.2d 178, 179 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citing Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 

1159, 1160 (1996) (noting that we will not consider the merits of issues that 

are not properly raised and developed in appellant’s brief)).

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/23/2017