COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges McClanahan, Haley and Senior Judge Willis

SHANINA R. HORSLEY MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1004-09-3 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 1, 2009 LYNCHBURG DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG J. Leyburn Mosby, Jr., Judge (David E. Mass, on briefs), for appellant. Appellant submitting on briefs. (Joyce M. Coleman; Dion F. Richardson, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.

Shanina R. Horsley (mother) appeals the decision of the circuit court terminating her parental rights to her children, S. and Z. She contends the trial court erred in failing to adequately

consider continued foster care as an alternative to termination and misapplied the law relating to termination. We disagree and affirm the trial court.

BACKGROUND On appeal, we view the evidence and all reas onable inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party prevailing below. McGuire v. McGuire , 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). So viewed, the evidence s howed that the Lynchburg Division of Social Services (LDSS) became involved with mother and her children on March 6, 2007. At the time, someone contacted police and reported that S., tw o years old at the time, was alone in the middle of the street and was almost hit by a car, and Z., then five, was unattended on the sidewalk.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Mother was in a laundromat at the time. When mo ther finally appeared, she cursed S. and jerked him up by the wrists. Instead of removing the child ren, LDSS entered into two safety plans with mother and one with the maternal grandmother and referred mo ther and the children for services. On March 22, 2007, S. was severely burned while under mother’s care and had to be hospitalized. A nurse saw mother hit S. at the hospital while he was bei ng prepared to be transpor ted to a burn center. Mother and grandmother gave inconsistent accounts of how S. was burned. As a result of the incident, LDSS removed S. from mother and placed him in foster care. LDSS evaluated and provided services to mo ther and the children following the removal. On October 1, 2008, nineteen months after the children were removed, LDSS filed petitions to terminate mother’s residual parent al rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283. On October 31, 2008, the juvenile and domestic relations distri ct court granted the termination petitions. Mother appealed, and on February 25, 2009, the trial court heard evidence. Dr. Andrew James Anderson conducted a ps ychological evaluation of mother. He determined mother’s IQ to be 69, placing her in the lower 2% of subjects in her age group.

Dr. Anderson described mother as passive-aggressive, narcissistic and paranoid, and opined that her personality was such that she blames the chil dren or others for her parenting shortcomings. In addition, she suffers from generalized anxiet y disorder. Dr. Anderson felt her refusal to acknowledge any problems or fault would prevent her from being able to apply the skills LDSS tried to offer her and keep the children safe and healthy. He further noted that mother performed extremely poorly in a parenting skills assessment, suggesting a risk of family dysfunction, child abuse, and neglect. Dr. Anderson opined that continued services and intervention would not improve mother’s parental functioning sufficientl y for her to safely and independently rear the

children.- 3 - Ashley Bryant worked with mother as a parenting instructor two hours each week for thirteen months. Bryant observed mother intera ct with the children, afte r which she would meet with mother to instruct her how to be more pos itive, patient, and consistent with the children. Bryant testified that mother did not accept res ponsibility for creating the danger to the children, and she opined that mother reached a minimal le vel of progress from which she would likely not improve further. Moreover, mother indicated to Bryant she could stop us ing drugs in order to regain custody of the childre n, but said she would probably st art back after their return. Mary Rice, a licensed counselor, began counseling mother on November 8, 2007, and

worked with her once a week for fifteen months . Rice was concerned with mother’s depression, anger management, mood swings, and substance a buse. Although mother has made progress in her depression and anger, she still struggles with those issues. Because mother was not able to understand or acknowledge her role in the children being remove d, Rice did not think mother could adequately and safely care for the children.

Social worker Elizabeth Meeks worked with mother’s case for nineteen months, from April 2007 until October 2008. Initiall y, Z. had educational and emotional issues as did S., who was born premature and who exhibited developmenta l delays. Both children have demonstrated marked improvement in emotional, social, and academic areas with their foster families, and social worker Kelsey Hammitt testified as such. Meeks described the following services provided to mother: [She was offered] a psychologi cal evaluation, a psychiatric evaluation . . . , crisis interven tion with Mary Rice, medication management through Johnson’s family Health Center, therapy for two hours per week with Rice Family Counseling, one-on-one parenting instruction two hours per week with Family Preservation Services, parenting classes through the CSB, and attachment assessment with Z. at Arise Orie ntation at the Courtland center, intensive outpatient class[es], substance abuse classes at the Courtland Center, random drug sc reens, she was referred to Narcotics Anonymous and Al coholics Anonymous, she was- 4 - offered monthly bus passes, and we also paid for three sets of anger management classes and continuing-care substance abuse classes. During the period mother received services, sh e tested positive for or admitted to use of marijuana in September 2007, March 2008, Apr il 2008, twice in May 2008 , and June 2008. Several relatives petitioned for cu stody of the children, but all were denied. Meeks explained that she petitioned for termination in October 2008 because she felt that mother would not be able to meet the needs of her children or keep them safe. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that LD SS established by clear and convincing evidence grounds to terminate mothe r’s residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C). It included both ba ses for termination in its final order.

DISCUSSION Mother argues that: (A) the trial court failed “to give adequate consideration to continued foster care” and it “incorrectly applied the law to its factual findings,” and (B) the trial court’s oral statements should prevail over the writ ten findings set forth in its final orders. “When addressing matters concerning a chil d, including the termination of a parent’s residual parental rights, the paramo unt consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Where the trial j udge hears the evidence ore tenus, his decision is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it. See Lowe v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare , 231 Va. 277, 282, 343 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1986). A termination of rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) requires the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that terminati on was in the child’s best interests and- 5 - 1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his lif e, health or de velopment; and 2. It is not reasonably likely th at the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be subs tantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe retu rn to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. Pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B)(2 )(a), proof that the parent is suffering from a “mental deficiency of such severity that there is no reasonab le expectation that such parent will be able to undertake responsibility for the car e needed by the child in accord ance with his age and stage of development” constitutes prima facie evidence of the conditions set forth in Code § 16.1-283(B)(2). Termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C )(2) requires proof that the parent, without good cause, ha[s] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or requi red continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies. A. Failure to Give Adequate Cons ideration to Continued Foster Care Mother claims the trial court incorrectly a pplied the statutes and committed reversible error by failing to consider continued foster ca re placement while mother continued to receive

services. Contrary to mother’s assertion, the record showed that the trial court considered continued foster care placement, but it found, ba sed on the evidence, that mother would not be able to remedy the conditions th at endangered the child ren and adequately and safely care for them within a reasonable period of time.- 6 - In her argument, mother cited two cases she claimed were distinguishable from her case, however, she cited no case law in support of her argument that the trial court inco rrectly applied the law by failing to continue the children in foster care. Viewed in the light most favorable to LDSS, the prevailing party, the evidence clearly and convincingly proved that mother is “suffering from a . . . mental de ficiency of such severity that there is no reasonable expectatio n that [she] will be ab le to undertake respon sibility for the care needed by [the children] in accordance with [their] age and stage of development,” Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a), and she has “been unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was place d in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continua tion of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding reasonable and ap propriate efforts of social, me dical, mental health or other rehabilitative agen cies,” Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).

The children were in foster ca re for nineteen months before LDSS filed its petitions for termination during which ti me mother received extensive services . Expert evidence demonstrated that mother had intellectual, social, and psyc hological problem s that limited her ability to understand how her past conduct negatively affected the children and those limitations would likely

not be overcome with continued services. More over, the children had educational, social, and emotional problems and special need s that mother was unable to reco gnize and address, now or in

the future. LDSS presented sufficient clear an d convincing evidence to suppo rt the trial court’s findings and rulings. Therefore, the evid entiary requirements of Code § 16.1-283(B)(2 ) and (C) have been met, and the trial court’s findings and judgment were not plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.- 7 - B. The Trial Court’s Written Orders Should Be No Bar to Mother’s Relief Mother argues that the trial court’s oral statem ent that the law says that it is in the best

interests of the children “not to have these thi ngs drag out and delay decisions for the children’s best interest, more than thirteen months” should s upersede its findings in its final written order. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a ch ild to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be cap able of resuming [her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). “It is the firmly established law of this Commonwealth that a trial court speaks only through its written orders.” Davis v. Mullins , 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996). In its final written order granting the termination petitions, the trial c ourt found sufficient evidence to terminate under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C). Here, the children were in foster care and mo ther received services for nineteen months before LDSS filed the termination petitions, si x months longer than the thirteen-month period mother claimed the trial court relied upon. Moreove r, after the court’s statement about thirteen months, it found the children were properly remo ved due to abuse and neglect, they have flourished in foster care, and e xpert testimony proved that mother “won’t ever have the capacity to” safely and responsibly parent the child ren. The evidence supports those findings. Accordingly, the final order did not conflict with nor was it contrary to the trial court’s oral findings. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.