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09- 0683- cr U S A v . P ick e tt
UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT 

## SUMMA RY ORDER Rulings by summ ary ord er do no t have precedent ial effect. Citatio n to a summ ary order filed on or

after January 1, 2007, is permit ted and is gover ned by F ederal Rule of Appellate Pr ocedure 32.1 and thi s court’s Local Rule 32.1 .1. When citing a summ ary ord er in a d oc um en t f

il edwi thth is c ou r t, a p ar ty m us t c it e ei th er

th e F ed er al

App en di x o r

an el ect r on ic da ta ba se (

wi thth e n ot at io n " su m m ar y o r de r ") . A p ar ty

ci ti ng a su m m ar

y o r de r must serve a copy of iton any part y not r epresented by cou nsel. Ata st at edte r mof

th e U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t o f Ap pe al s f or th e S eco nd

Cir cu it , h el d a t th e D an ie l P at r ic k Mo yn ih anUn it edSt at es Co ur th ou se, 500 P ear l S tr eet , i n t he Cit

y o f N ew York, on th e twentiethday of July, two thou sand and ten.

PR E SE NT: R AL P H K. W I NT ER , J OS É A. C AB R ANES , RI C HA R D C. W ES L EY ,

Circuit Jud ges .

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appellee ,
v. No . 09 -0 683 -c r G OR DON P I CK ETT , De

fe ndant -A ppe lla nt .

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F OR DE F EN DAN T- AP P ELLAN T: K AT HER I NE A LF I ERI , Law Offices of Kather in e Alf ier i, N ew Yo r k, N Y. F OR AP P ELLEE : W I NS T ON M. P AE S , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney (B ent onJ . Cam pb ell , Unit ed S tat es Attorney, Jo Ann M. Navicka s, Ass istant Unit ed S tat es At to r ney , on the brief ), Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern Di s tr ict of New Yor k, B r oo kly

n, NY. App eal f r om a ju dgm ent

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( J oh n G lees on , Judge

). UPON CONSIDERAT ION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJU DG ED , AN D D ECR EED tha t th e j ud gm en t of the Di stri ctC ou rt i s AF F IRME D

. Defendant-appel lant Gordon Pickett (“defendant” or “Picke tt”) appeals from a judgment of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t e nt er ed o n F ebruar y 18 , 20 09. Def

end ant was con vic te d o n eight

cou nt s —all relating to his production and poss ession of counterfeit credit cards and identifica tion cards—and sentenced principa lly to 168 months’ impris onment. On appea l he argue s as f ollows: (1) that the Distr ict Court erred in denying

his motion to pr ocee d pro se at trial; (2) that there was insufficient evi den ce t o s us tai n a co nv ict io n o n eac h o f the e igh t c ou nt s ; ( 3) th at the D is tr ict Cou r t e r r ed i n denyin g hi s mo ti onfo r

bl ank et s up pr es s io n o f all i te ms s eize d d ur in g the e xecu ti onof

a s ear ch warrant; (4) that the Distr

ict Court erred in admitting evide nce of his prior conviction purs uant to Fe d. R. Ev

id . 40 4( b) ; ( 5) th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t g ave aner r on eou s ju ry in s truct io n; (6 ) that

hi s sentence is subs tantively

unreasonable; a nd (7) that the District Court made errors in ordering restitution. We a ss ume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining fac tual and proce dural histor y of th e cas e. We add r es s whe th er

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t r et ain ed au th or

it y t o o r der r es ti tu ti onmo r e than ni net y day s af te r def end ant ’s s ent enc in g he ar

in g ina s epar ate op inio n f ile d o n the s ame day a s this order. We consider defenda nt’s r emaining arguments in this s ummary order and find them to be without merit. Fi r s t, we f in d n o er r or

inth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s den

ial of def end ant ’s r equ es t—mad e eig ht days after the jury was empane led and during the sec ond day of the gove rnment’s case—to pr ocee d pro se . Af te r a tr ial has beg un , a cr im in al d ef end ant ’s r igh t t o r epr es ent

hi ms elf “is s harply cu r tailed .” United St ate s v . S te v en s, 83 F.3d 60, 67 (2d C ir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). A distr ict court considering such a request “must weigh ‘the prejudice to the legitimate interests of the defendant’ agai ns t the ‘ po te nt

ial di s r up ti onof

pr oce edi ngs alr eady

inpr ogr es s .’” Id

. (q uo ti ng Uni

te d St ate s e x r el

.3

Ma ldo nado v. De nno , 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d C ir. 1965)). In weighing the prejudi ce to the le gitimate interests of the defendant, the court should consider “the defendant’s reasons for the selfrepresentation request, the quali ty of counsel representing the party, and the pa rty’s pr ior proclivity to s ub s ti tu te cou ns el. ” United Sta tes v. M atsushita , 794 F.2d 46, 51 (2d C ir. 1986). We hav e no tr ou bl e co ncl udin g that th e Di s tr ict Cou r t ac te d we ll w

ithi n i ts di s cr et

io n i n denying defendant’s request to pr ocee d pro se . D ef end ant ’s r eas on s fo r

s eeki ng t o r epr es ent

hi ms elf wer e exp r es s ed i n wh at the D is tr ict Cou r t ac cur ate ly d es cr

ib ed as a “b ar ely c om pr ehe ns ib le di atr ib e,” du r in g whichdef

end ant as s er te d that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t l acke d j ur

is di ct io n o ver hi m b as ed on, among other things, the Administrative Procedure Act. Appe llant’s App. 164-65. De fendant als o as s er te d, witho ut

exp lan ati on , that

he w as “wi th ou t c om pet ent cou ns el. ” Id

. at 1 64. Aga inst thos e “reasons” for the request, the Distr ict Court was required to weig h the potential disruption of the trial. In our view, the potentia l for dis ruption was self evident from defendant’s request. In s um, we de tect no error in the Dis trict Court’s denial of defendant’s motion to r epr es ent

hi ms elf fo r th e r emain der

of th e t r ial

. Def end ant nex t c hallenges th e s uf

fi cien cy o f the e vid enc e pr od uce d t o d emo ns tr ate hi s guilt oneach of

th e eig ht cou nt s char

gedinth e in di ct men t. Up onr evi ew o f the r eco r d, we co ncl ud e t hat th er e was amp le ev

id enc e t o s us tai n the j ur

y’s ver di ct oneachcou nt . Se e U

nit ed Stat es v. Ga gl iar di , 506 F.3d 140, 149 -50 (2d Cir. 2007) (expla ining that a j ury’s verdict mus t be affirmed “unless no rational trier of fact could have found all of the eleme nts of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We als o f in d n o m er

it indef end ant ’s argum ent

th at the s ear ch o f his r es id enc e s o ex ceed ed th e s cop e of

th e s ear ch w ar r ant

as to r equ

ir e bl ank et

s up pr es s io n o f all e vid enc e s eize d. T he D is tr ict C ou rt c on cl ud ed tha t th e se a rc h o f de fe nd a nt’ s bas eme nt exce eded the scope of the w arrant but excl ud ed o nly the e vid enc e s eize d f r om th e bas eme nt

it s elf . D ef end ant argue s th at all e vid enc e s eize d d ur in g the s ear ch s ho ul d h ave b eens up pr es s ed b ecau s e go ver nm ent agen ts “f lagr ant ly di s r egar d[ ed] ” the s cop e of th e war r ant . Se e U

nit ed Stat es v. Shi Yan Liu , 239 F.3d 138, 14 0 (2d Cir. 2000). The Distr

ict Court, howev er, found that the search of the basement was conducted i n good faith an d that

bl ank et s up pr es s io n was un

war r ant ed. Se e i

d. (n ot in g that bl ank et s up pr es s io n i s appropriate only w here government ag ents (1) “effect a widespread seizure of items that were not within the scope of the wa rrant and (2) do not act in good faith” (internal quotation marks and cit ati onom it te d) ). We co ncl ud e that th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s goo d f

aith f in di ng w as no t c lear

ly er ron eo us. Defendant next a rgues that the District Court erred in admitting evidenc e of his prior conviction pursuant to Fed. R. E vid. 404(b). We disagree. Defenda nt place d his intent at iss ue4

du r in g t r ial , ther eby

mak in g hi s pr io r con vic ti onr elev ant . See Fe d. R. Ev id . 40 4( b) (e xp lai ni ng that evi den ce o f o th er

cr im es may be ad mi s s ib le as pr oo f o f i nt ent ). T he p r io r con vic ti ondem on s tr ate d that defendant wa s aware that counte rfeit credit cards are used to commit f raud. A reasonable juror could therefore infer fr om defendant’s poss ession of counterfeit credit cards and ca rd-making equipment that he ha d the requisite intent to defraud. Mor eover, the District Court gave a forceful lim it in g in s truct

io n r edu cin g an y r

is k that th e ju ry might

con s id er def end ant ’s pr

io r con vic ti onas evi den ce o f his pr op ens it

y t o co mm it

cr im e. We als o dis agr ee that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s ju ry in s truct

io n o n ag gr avat ed i den ti ty

th ef t w as er r on eou s . T he D is tr

ict Cou r t i ns truct ed the j ur

y that , t o f

in d d ef end ant guilt y of aggr avat ed identity theft, it must, among other things , find that defendant knewat the time he c ommitted bank fr audth at the p er s on s who s e id ent it ies he w as us in g “we r e actual as op po s ed t o f

ict it io us per s on s .” App ell ant ’s App . 23 2. D ef end ant argue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t w as r equ

ir ed t o i ns truct

th e ju ry t hat “de fe nd ant

kn ew that

th e me ans of

id ent if icat io n at is s ue b elo nge d t o an other per s on ,” Flore

sFiguero a v. United Sta tes

, 129 S. C t. 1886, 1894 (200 9), not just that he kne w that the other persons wer e actual

as op po s ed t o f

ict it io us . B ecau s e de fe nd ant

di d n ot ob ject to th e in s truct

io n at tr ial , we r evi ew the i ns truct

io n f or pl ainer r or . See Fed. R. C rim. P. 52(b). We di scern no error , much less plain error, in the District Court’s jur y instruction. T he Di s tr ict Cou r t i ns truct ed the j ur

y that it mu s t f in d b oth ( 1) th at d ef

end ant “kn owi ngl

y us ed . . . a means of identification of another person” and (2) that he knewthat that other pers on “w[as an] act ual as op po s ed t o [a] f

ict it io us per s on [ ] .” A pp ell ant ’s App . 23 1- 32. T hat in s truct io n i s fully consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the st atute as “requir[ing] the Government to s ho w t hat th e de fe nd ant

kn ew that

th e me ans of

id ent if icat io n at is s ue b elo nge d t o an other per s on .” Flore s-Figuero a , 12 9 S. Ct. at 1 894

. W it h re spe ctto se nte nc in g, we re je ctde fe nd a nt’ s a rgu me nt t ha t hi s sen te nc e o f 16 8 m on ths’ im pr is on men t i s s ub s tan ti

vely un r eas on abl e. See United States v. Ca vera , 550 F.3d 180, 18 9 (2d Cir. 2008) ( en banc ) (no ti ng tha t w e wil l “ seta sid e a di stri ctco urt ’s substan tive det er mi nat

io n o nly in exce pt io nal cas es whe r e the tr

ial cou r t’ s dec is io n can no t b e lo cat ed w ithi n the r ang e of

per mi s s ib le dec is io ns ” (

in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ); se e al so Uni te d St ate s v . Rig as , 58 3 F .3d108 , 12 3 (

2d Cir. 2009) (expla ining that substantive unreasonableness is akin to the “manifest-injust ice,” and “shocks-the-conscience ” standards employed in other contexts). Defendant’s final argument is that the Distr ict Court committed several errors in ordering restitution in the amount of $2,400,80 0. Spec ifically , defendant ma intains that (1) the record fails t o demonstr ate that the District Court considered the factors set for th in 18 U.S.C . § 3664(f)(2); (2) the government failed to mee t its bur den of proving the amount of loss by a preponde rance of the evi den ce; a nd(3 ) the r es ti tu ti onor der mu s t b e vac ate d b ecau s e it was ent er ed m or e thanni net y day s5

af te r th e s ent enc in g he ar

in g incon tr aven ti onof

18 U .S. C. § 3 664 (d

)( 5) . We ad dr es s def

end ant ’s third argument in a separately filed opinion. W e find the remaining tw o arguments to be without merit. Fi r s t, with r es pec t t o the f act or s s et fo r thin18 U .S. C. § 3 664 (f )( 2) , we h ave h eldth at “ we will not va cate a nd remand [restitut ion orders ] solely by reason of the sentencing judg e’s failure to in di cat e co ns id er ati onof

th e ma nd ato ry f

act or s .” United Sta tes v. Walker , 353 F.3d 130, 13 4 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, the Dis trict Court’s failure to recite those factors in the r ecord does not require vaca tur. Second, with respect to the proof of loss , we reje ct defendant’s suggestion that the gov er nm ent

was r equ ir ed t o es tab lis h the l os s amo un ts fo r each vic ti m b y af

fi dav it . Se ct io n 3 664 pr ov id es on ly that

“t o the e xt ent

pr act icab le” vic ti ms s hall b e no ti fi ed o f the o pp or tu ni ty to file “ a s epar ate af

fi dav it r elat in g t o the am ou nt

of th e vi ct im ’s lo s s es s ub ject

to r es ti tu ti on .” 1 8 U. S.C. § 36 64(d) (2)(

A) (v i) . N othi ng p r eclu des a cou r t f r om or der in g r es ti tu ti oninth e abs enc e of s uch affidavits. Here, although a ffidavits f rom each of the victims were not produced, the District Court relied on the trial testimony of a ca se agent a long with a chart prepared by that a gent summarizing the lo sses i nc urre d b y t he vi ctim ba nk s. Th a t e vi de nc e w a s suff ic ie nt t o e sta bl ish the a mo un t of lo ss by a p r epo nd er ance of

th e evi den ce. See

18 U.S.C . § 3664(e ) (providing that the government bears the burden of proving the amount of res titution by preponderance of the evidence ). CONCLUSI ON We hav e co ns id er ed all o f d ef end ant ’s argum ent s andfi ndth em t o b e witho ut mer it . We affirm Dis trict Court’s imposition of r estitution ninety-eight days after defendant’s sentencing hear in g ina s epar ate ly f

ile d o pi ni on . I n all o th er

r es pec ts , the j ud gm ent

of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t i s AF F IRME D

.
FOR THE C OU R

T, Ca therine O’Haga n Wolfe, C lerk of Court