[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________
No. 21

- 12804

Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________
MICHAEL LANCE TAYLOR,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant

- Appellee.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:20

- cv

- 00578

- DCI

____________________ USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 1 of 172 Opinion of the Court 21

- 12804

Before J ILL P RYOR , B RANCH , and B RASHER , Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Michal Taylor appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefit s . Taylor contends that the administ rative law judge improperly discounted the opinions of hi s treating physicians and made findings not supported by substantial evidence. He also argues that the ALJ erred by rel ying solely on objective medical evidence to discredit his testimony about the l imiting effects of his pain . After careful review, we affirm the Commissioner’s denial of benefits

. I.
Taylor applied for Social Security benefits in 2016, contending that he became unable to work due to his medical condition on May 15th of that year. His application stated that pain frequently impaired his ability to stand, walk, lift, drive, and move, and caused difficulty concentrating. Taylor also reported that he quit his prior job due to these limitations. The Commissioner denied the claim initial ly and upon reconsideration, concluding each time that Taylor’s medical conditions did not render him incapable of performing work requiring less physical effort than his previous occupation. Taylor then requested a hearing before an ALJ

. Prior to the hear ing, Taylor submitted medical records and two medical source USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 2 of 1721

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statements from treating physicians, Drs. James Scott and Michael Kohen. Both physicians opined that Taylor functioned at a less than sedentary level. For example, the physicians opined that in a regular workday, Taylor could sit, stand, or walk for two hours or less, he would require frequent unscheduled breaks, he would be off

task 20% or more of the day , and he would miss four or more days of work each month. B oth physicians also opined that Ta ylor had significant limitations with reaching, handling, or fingering. A vocational expert would later testify that no jobs exist for a person with such limitations. At the hearing, Taylor testified that rheumatoid arthritis, lupus, hypermobility , and nec k and back pain were the medical conditions preventing him from working. Most days he was home alone, and he “spen[t] an awful lot of time in the bed. ” He couldn’t sit for more than 30 minutes without getting up to move around, couldn’t stand in one place without moving for more than five minutes, and couldn’t walk more than 30 feet without taking a break. As for other physical activities, Taylor testified that he hurt his back lifting a 12

- pack of soda, he struggled to extend his arms in any direction , and he struggled with handling small objects like coins and buttons. The only household task Taylor sometimes completed was making breakfast, but he couldn’t fold laundry or cut up vegetables. And although Taylor sometimes drove, he didn’t like to because he couldn’t feel the gas pedal with his feet. After Taylor’s testimony
, the ALJ asked a vocational expert whether a hypothetical person with the following limitations could USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 3 of 174 Opinion of the Court 21

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perform Taylor’s past relevant work: the person could lift or carry 10 pounds frequently, but 20 pounds only occasionally; he could stand, walk, or sit for a total of six hours per workday with normal breaks; he could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but could occasionally climb ramps and stai rs, balance, kneel, stoop, crouch, and crawl; he must avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, and extreme cold; and he c ould perform simple and multiple

- step routine tasks and c ould have occasional contact with others. The vocational expert testified that such limitations would preclude a person from performing Taylor’s past relevant work but would not preclude him from performing other work

. And t he same would be true if the person was somewhat limited in reaching and h andling. However, i f the person could only occasionally reach and feel
, the vocational expert testified that “[v]ery, very few” jobs exist for such a person. T he vocational expert testified also that a person with the restrictions provided in Drs. Scott ’s and Kohen ’s statements would be incapable of performing any known jobs. In a written decision, the ALJ concluded that Taylor was not disabled under the Act. At step two of the sequential evaluation
process, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, t he ALJ explained that Taylor suffered from the following severe impairments: undifferentiated and mixed connective tissue disorder, neuropathy, spine disorder,shoulder disorder, fibromyalgia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
, affective disorder, and anxiety disorder. T he mental USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 4 of 1721

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impairments identified by the ALJ and the limitations they impose on Taylor are not relevant to this appeal. At step four, the ALJ found that Taylor had the residual functional capacity to perform work limited to lifting/carrying 20 pounds occasi onally and 10 pounds frequently, he could sit, stand, or walk for a total of six hours per eight

- hour workday, and he could “frequently handle/feel with the bilateral upper extremities”and “frequently reach in all directions w[ith] the bilateral upper ext remities.” Taylor could also “occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, stoop, crouch and crawl.” In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ made two findings thatare the subject of this appeal. First, the ALJ discredited Taylor’s testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms , finding that it was “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other e vidence in the record.” For example, the ALJ concluded that Taylor’s testimony about the severity of hispain was inconsistent with physician progress notes indicating relief from epidural steroid injections. The ALJ also noted that although Taylor testifi ed to balance issues, he had recently “reported [to a physician] that he had only fallen [one] time” over the lastyear. In all, the ALJ concluded that the “the overall evidence” supported the lifting, carrying, standing, walking, manipulative, and postura l limitations imposed, instead of the stricter limitations supported by Taylor’s testimony. Second, the ALJ gave “little weight” to Taylor’s treating physicians’ opinions. The ALJ explained that the opinions were “overly restrictive based on the overall ev idence USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 5 of 176 Opinion of the Court 21

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of record.” The ALJ gave six reasons, discussed in more detail below, for discounting the opinions. Based on Taylor’s residual functional capacity, he could notperform his past relevant work; but, based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ explained that “there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed” during the relevant period. Therefore, Taylor was not disabled. Taylor sought review of the denial of benefits by the Appea ls Council, contending that “[t]he finding from [his] physicians [was] inconsistent with the finding from the [ ALJ] .” The Appeals Council denied his request for review. Taylor later filed a complaint in district court seeking review of the determination th at he was not entitled to disabilit y benefits. The district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, rejecting Taylor’s arguments that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard to his testimony and the opinions of his treating physicians. Taylor timely a ppealed.

II.

Our standard of review “is the same as that of the district court.” Phillips v. Barnhart , 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)

. That is, we ask whether the ALJ ’s decision was “ supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal st andards .” Lewis v. Callahan
, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997) . “‘ Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. ’ ” USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 6 of 1721

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Crawford v. Comm ’ r o f Soc. Sec.
, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting id. ). Our review precludes us from “ decid [ing] the facts anew, reweigh [ing] the evidence, or substitut[ing] our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Bloodsworth v. Heckler , 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1 983)

. “ If the Commissioner ’ s decision is supported by substantial evidence we must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it .” Miles v. Chater , 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996)

. III.
Taylor makes two arguments on appeal . First, he contends that the AL J improperly diminished the weight of the treating physician opinions provided by Drs. Scott and Kohen by applying thewrong legal standard and making findings not supported by substantial evidence. Second, Taylor argues that the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony on the severity of his pain

.

A. The ALJ A

rticulated S pecific
, E vidence

- B

ased R easons for
D

iscounting the O pinions of Taylor’s T reating P hysicians.
Taylor argues that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard to the opinions of his treating physicians

. Specifically, he contends that the reasons the ALJ gave for discount ing his treating physicians’ opinions were not supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner responds that Taylor’ s argument is merely an invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence, and we agree. USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 7 of 178 Opinion of the Court 21

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An individual claiming entitlement to disability benefits must prove that he is disabled

. Moore v. Barnhart , 405 F.3d 1208,

121 1 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

. A disa bility is defined as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which canbe expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The burden of proving disability always rests with the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1).
The ALJ uses a five

- step, sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. S ee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1)

. This appeal concerns the ALJ’s determination at step four
, wh ich evaluates the claimant’s “ residual functional capacity and [his] pas t relevant work .” Id. § 404.1520(4)(iv). To determine Taylor’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ considered medical opinions, including those of Taylor’s treating physicians. For claims filed on or before March 27, 2017, the Social Security Administrat ion “ give [s] more weight to medical opinions from [a claimant’s] treating

sources .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). And we have explained that

“ the testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary. ” Lewis , 125 F.3d at 1440 (quotation omitted). Good cause “e xists when the: (1) treating physician ’ s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician ’ s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor ’ s own medical records. ” Phillips , 357 F.3d at 1241 . An ALJ USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 8 of 1721

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“must clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician ,” and the failure to do so is reversible error. Schink v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec. , 935 F.3d 1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) . We will not speculate about the grounds an ALJ may have relied on to give less weight to an opinion, but

w hen the ALJ articulates specific reasons for failing to give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reversible error.
Moore , 405 F.3d at 12 12

. Here, the ALJ articulated several reasons for giving little weight to Drs. Scott’s and Kohen’s opinion s. As an initial matter, it was not error for the ALJ to consider the separate opinions together , as they did not differ in any material respect . E ach physicianconcluded that Taylor’s symptoms would cause significant limitations with reaching, handling, o r fingering, that he would need to frequently shift from sitting, standing, or walking, that he would need frequent breaks, and that he would miss at least one day of work per week on average

. To be sure, t he physicians were treating Taylor for different a ilments. Dr. Scott listed Taylor’s diagnosis as “neuropathy,” manifesting as “pain in legs, numbness, neck pain, fatigue, [and] memory issues.” Dr. Kohen was treating Taylor for a slew of maladies, but he listed similar symptoms, such as joint pain, instab ility, muscle pain, weakness, and fatigue. Nonetheless, the physicians’ bottom

- line conclusions were nearly identical. The ALJ viewed these opinions as “overly restrictive” for six

reasons , and Taylor takes issue with each

. First, the ALJ noted that USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 9 of 1710 Opinion of the Court 21

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Taylor’s “gait/station” and “muscle strength” were frequently reported by physicians as “normal.” Taylor contends that the ALJ “failed to cite any evidence in support of [this] finding,” and that the record contains “multiple not ations” of his “antalgic gait and stance” and “reduced muscle strength/weakness.” But just twoparagraphs prior in the ALJ’s decision, the same statement was supported by citation to treatment notes by Dr. Scott and another physician. And contrary to Taylo r’s suggestion, t he record is replete with examples of physicians, including Drs. Scott and Kohen, reporting that Taylor presented with normal muscle strength. Indeed, the Commissioner points us to no less than 20 such occasions in its brief. We have expla ined that it is not enough for a claimant to point to some evidence in support of a disability. See Moore , 405 F.3d at 1213 ( explaining that e ven when a claimant identifies “ other evidence which would undermine the ALJ ’ s [disability] determination ,” our st andard of review “precludes us” from disturbing a determination otherwise supported by substantial evidence)

. Because the ALJ’s reasoning finds substantial support in the record , Taylor’s argument is not meritorious. Second, the ALJ noted that Taylor’s pai n was sometimes relieved by treatment

— specifically, epidural steroid injections. Taylor argues that such “relief was short

- lived and related to his neck and back pain ,” not the conditions Drs. Scott and Kohen treated him for. I n reality, however, both Drs. Scott and Kohen listed pain as a symptom that impacts Taylor’s ability to work, and Dr. Scott specifically listed “neck pain” as a symptom of Taylor’s USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 10 of 1721

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neuropathy. Thus, if Taylor’s neck pain was somewhat relieved by treatment, then it would tend to make t he physicians’ opinions inconsistent with the record. See Phillips , 357 F.3d at 1241. T he medical evidence shows that the injections worked : Taylor reported as much as a 60% reduction in pain after an injection in March 2015 ;

an d as late as June 2018, Dr. Kohen noted that Taylor was “getting injections in his neck and low back with some relief

. ” Again, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reasoning. Third, the ALJ explained that electromyography (“EMG”) studies indicated that Taylor had mild, rather tha n severe, cervical radiculopathies. Taylor objects to this evidence , contending that the ALJ “complete ly overlooked” studie s “support[ing] a finding that [he] suffered from sever e peripheral neuropathy.” But of the three studies Taylor cites

— performed on July 19, 2016, December 19, 2016, and November 2, 2018

— only the last one resulted in a finding that was “consistent with a severe axonal motor and sensor polyneuropathy.” And an EMG study conducted one wee k later indicated only “mild” findings. Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning was supported by substantial evidence. See Moore , 405 F.3d at 1215.Fourth, the ALJ noted that Taylor “reported that his hypermobility syndrome was fairly controlled with medications. ” Taylor contends that Drs. Scott and Kohen were not treating him for hypermobility, and whether it was under control had nothing to do with their conclusions. But that is plainly not the case. Dr. Kohen treated Taylor for hypermobility

— identified in his t reatment notes by the code M35.7

— by , among other things, giving Taylor an USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 11 of 1712 Opinion of the Court 21

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injection in his wrist. S ee Schink , 935 F.3d at 1262 (examining whether treating physician s’ notes “ fleshed out and were consistent with their conclusions ”). And in his treating sour ce opinion,
Dr. Kohen listed M35.7 as one of Taylor’s diagnoses. Thus, whether Taylor’s hypermobility was well controlled b ears directly on the consistency of Dr. Kohen’s opinion “with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips , 357 F.3d at 1241. And beca use he doesnot challenge the ALJ’s finding that his hypermobility was adequately managed with medication, we conclude that the ALJ’s reasoning was substantially supported by the evidence. Fifth, the ALJ concluded that the physicians’ opinions conflicted w ith CT scans of Taylor’s spine that “showed mild to moderate degenerative changes with only mild neural foraminal narrowing.” Taylor again contends that the ALJ “completely ignored”other “MRI findings of his cervical and lumbar spine” that “documented sig nificant findings.” Again, however, Taylor’s assertion falls flat. He does not explain what “significant findings” the MRI studies allegedly revealed. The MRIs he relies on revealed “stable,”“mild,” and “small” findings, some of which were listed as “reso lved” or “not worsening.” Taylor fails to explain how these studies undermine the ALJ’s conclusion , and we see no inconsistency on the face of the studies

. Sixth and finally, the ALJ noted that Drs. Scott’s and Kohen’s opinions conflicted with Taylor’s ow n reported activities of dailyliving. Taylor argues that the ALJ failed to refer to any specific activities that were inconsistent with the opinions. And he contends USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 12 of 1721

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that merely being able to do “everyday activities” is not enough to “disqualif[y] a claim ant from disability.” S ee Lewis , 125 F.3d at 1441. The Commissioner responds that although the ALJ did not “expressly detail” Taylor’s reported activities of daily living, the ALJ referred to them “elsewhere in the decision.” For example,

w hen considering the severity of Taylor’s mental limitations, the ALJ referred to a psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Jonas Trinidad. From this evaluation, the ALJ explained that Taylor “reported that he cared for his personal hygiene, that he drove , andthat he prepared meals.” And Trinidad’s report listed other activities, including “spending time with [his] kids” and “complet[ing] basic household chores with assistance.” We agree that the inconsistency between Taylor’s activities of daily living a nd the limitations suggested by his treating physicians is less apparent than the other inconsistencies identified by the ALJ. But our review of the record does not convince us that the decision is unreasonable or unsupported by substantial evidence. True, the activities of daily living relied on by the ALJ are not enough to disqualify Taylor from eligibility for disability benefits, Lewis , 125 F.3d at 1441, but that is not what occurred here. Instead, the ALJ explained that the activities of daily living w ere inconsistent with a medical opinion. We review only whether the ALJ’s articulated reason was supported by “more than a scintilla” of evidence
, id. at 1440, and we readily conclude that it was. For these reasons, the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for discounting Taylor’s treating physicians’ opinions. Contrary to USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 13 of 1714 Opinion of the Court 21

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Taylor’s suggestion, we need not “scour the record to find support for the ALJ’s decision,” as the ALJ articulated six evidence

- based inconsistencies between the treating physicians’ opinions and Taylor’s medical records. That is all we require. See Phillips , 357 F.3dat 1240 (affirming the denial of benefits “[b]ecause the ALJ articulated several legitimate reasons for giving less weight to [a treating physician’s] opinion”).

B. The ALJ Relied on A ppropriate Evidence to DiscreditTaylor’s T estimony.
Finally, T aylor contends that the ALJ rejected his testimony “solely based on the lack of objective medical evidence.” By notconsidering any of the “factors that [the Social Security Administration] pro mises claimants it will consider . . . when evaluating aclaimant’s testimony regarding pain and limitations,” Taylor argues that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard to his testimony. We disagree. A claimant may establish that he has “a disability th rough his own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms.” Dyer v. Barnhart , 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). In such a case, the claimant must sho w evidence of an underlying medical condition

an d either “ objective medical evidence that confirms t he severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition ” or “ that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain .” Holt v. Sullivan , 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). Once a claimant has USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 14 of 1721

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made this showing, the Commissioner “must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms” in light of “all available evidence,” including the claimant’s testimony. 20 C.F .R. § 404.1529(c)(1). The Commissioner “will not reject” a claimant’sstatements “solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate” the statements. Id. § 404.1529(c)(2). Instead, the ALJ considers several “[o]ther factors conce rning [the claimant’s] functional limitations and restrictions du e to pain and other symptoms.” Id. § 404.1529(c)(3) (i)

- (vii)

. If a claimant provides subjective testimony on the severityof his symptoms, as Taylor did here, the ALJ “must articulate explicit and adequate reasons” for rejecting the complaints. Foote v. Chater , 67 F.3d 1553, 1561

- 62 (11th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s “credibility determination does not need to cite part icular phrases or formulations[,] but it cannot merely be a broad rejection” that fails to consider a claimant’s “medical condition as a whole.” Dyer , 395 F.3d at 1210

- 11 (cleaned up). We will not disturb “[a] clearly articulated credibility finding with s ubstantial supporting evidence in the record.” Foote , 67 F.3d at 1562.Here, the ALJ concluded that Taylor’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the symptoms he alleged , and proceeded to consider Taylor’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms

. The ALJ concluded that Taylor’s testimony was “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record ,” and the ALJ articulated five reasons to USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 15 of 1716 Opinion of the Court 21

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s upport that conclusion

. Four of the reasons overlapped with the inconsistencies discussed previously

— Taylor’s pain was somewhat relieved by epidural steroid injections, his postural and muscular limitations were inconsistent with physical examinations, and
EMG studies and CT scans revealed only mild objective findings. These four reasons were based on the objective medical evidence, and w e have already explained that these reasons find substantial support in the record. See Jones v. Dep ’ t of Health & Hum. Servs.
, 941 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the reasons an ALJ articulates for “refus[ing] to credit a claimant’s subjective pain testimony” must be “based on substantial evidence” (footnote omitted))

. However, Taylor is incorrect t o suggest that the ALJ relied solely on objective medical evidence to discredit his testimony. As a fifth ground for discrediting Taylor’s testimony, the ALJ noted that his testimony concerning “balance problems” was inconsistent with a physician’s note in dicating that Taylor reported “he had only fallen [one] time in the prior year

. ” In other words, t he ALJ discredited Taylor’s testimony based on his own prior inconsistent

statement. Cf. Foote , 67 F.3d at 1562 (explaining that an ALJ “failed

to identify an y inconsistencies between [the claimant’s] statements to her physicians and those she has made

. . . during her administrative hearing ”). Thus, the ALJ articulated reasons for discrediting Taylor’s testimony that were based on both objective evidence and

a “conflict[] between [Taylor’s] statements and the rest of the USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 16 of 1721

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evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). The ALJ employed the proper legal standard for discrediting Taylor’s testimony.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefi ts is affirmed in all respects.

AFFIRMED. USCA11 Case: 21-12804 Date Filed: 05/24/2022 Page: 17 of 17