SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3708-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

ABDUL WILLIAMS, a/k/a 

EUGENE TUTLER, 

ABDUL M. WILLIAMS, 

and AKBAR WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Submitted November 27, 2023 – Decided December 1, 2023 

Before Judges Sabatino and Mawla. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 95-07-2473, 

99-08-2789, and 99-08-2790. 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Anderson David Harkov, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief). 

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Hannah Faye Kurt, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Abdul Williams appeals the trial court's denial without an 

evidentiary hearing of his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). We 

affirm. 

Defendant's petition stems from a plea agreement he entered into twenty 

years ago in February 2003. Through that agreement, defendant pled guilty to 

a fourth-degree offense of possession of prohibitive devices, specifically 

dumdum bullets. Two other counts in the indictment were dismissed. 

Consistent with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced in April 

2003 to a custodial term of eighteen months, concurrent to his sentences on 

charges in two unrelated indictments. The eighteen-month term was satisfied 

by time served. 

Fourteen years later in 2017, federal authorities arrested defendant and 

charged him with a federal firearms offense. He was convicted of that federal 

charge. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, defendant's 2003 state court 

conviction on the bullets possession offense increased his federal sentencing 

exposure. He consequently received a ninety-two-month federal prison 

sentence. 
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In his PCR petition filed in 2021—eighteen years after his 2003 

sentencing—defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective in not advising 

him that his sentencing exposure on a future federal charge would be higher 

because of his guilty plea. Defendant further asserted his former attorney was 

ineffective in failing to move to dismiss the indictment, which had been issued 

eight years before his plea hearing. He also alleged his attorney ignored his 

claims of innocence and coerced him to accept the State's plea offer. 

After considering the parties' submissions and oral argument, the PCR 

judge issued an oral decision on June 22, 2022, denying defendant's petition. 

The PCR judge concluded the petition was time barred and, furthermore, lacked 

merit. This appeal ensued. 

In his brief on appeal, defendant presents the following points: 

 POINT I 

 THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 

GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE 

DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT PLEA 

COUNSEL FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE FUTURE 

RAMIFICATIONS OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT, 

WAS NOT CONTRADICTED BY THE RECORD 

BELOW AND WAS NOT REFUTED BY THE 

STATE. 
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 POINT II 

 THE TIME BAR OF [RULE] 3:22-12 SHOULD NOT 

HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DEFENDANT'S 

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NEVER INFORMED 

OF HIS RIGHT TO FILE A PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND HE DID NOT KNOW 

HIS GUILTY PLEA IN THIS CASE WOULD 

RESULT IN A SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT IN 

FEDERAL COURT. 

 POINT III 

 THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO ADVISE 

DEFENDANT THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA AND 

SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION IN STATE COURT, 

WOULD RESULT IN THE ENHANCEMENT OF 

ANY SENTENCE HE WOULD RECEIVE IN 

FEDERAL COURT, DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF 

HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 

 Having considered these arguments, we concur with the PCR court that 

defendant's petition was both procedurally barred as untimely and devoid of 

merit. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in the court's oral 

decision. We add only a few brief comments. 

 Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) plainly states that "no [PCR] petition shall be filed . . . 

more than [five] years after the date of entry . . . of the judgment of conviction 

that is being challenged." Here, defendant's judgment of conviction was entered 

on April 24, 2003, thereby requiring his PCR petition to be filed on or before 
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April 24, 2008. As we noted, defendant's petition was not filed until 2021, more 

than twelve years after that five-year deadline had passed. 

As the PCR court correctly recognized, none of the exceptions to the fiveyear time bar set forth in Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) and (B) can salvage defendant's 

late petition. In particular, the PCR court reasonably rejected defendant's 

contention that his lateness is justified by excusable neglect under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(1)(A). Defendant claims that he was not aware of his state post-conviction 

rights until he arrived in federal prison in 2017. Even if that assertion were true, 

defendant's ignorance of the applicable deadline does not comprise excusable 

neglect. A defendant's lack of sophistication in the law does not establish 

excusable neglect. State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000) (citing State v. 

Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)). Moreover, the burden to justify a late filing 

of a PCR petition increases with the length of the delay, which in this case is 

over twelve years. State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492 (2004). 

In addition, to meet this exception to the five-year deadline under the 

Rule, defendant must also demonstrate that enforcing the time bar would "result 

in a fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). For the reasons we will 

discuss next concerning the merits, no such injustice would be caused by 

rejecting defendant's untimely petition. 
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Turning to the substance of defendant's claims of ineffective counsel, we 

apply well settled principles. In reviewing such claims, courts apply a strong 

presumption that defense counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The two-part Strickland 

test requires defendants to prove (1) deficient performance by their former 

counsel; and (2) resultant actual prejudice. Id. at 687; see also State v. Fritz, 

105 N.J. 42, 54 (1987). In the present context in which a defendant is alleging 

the ineffectiveness of plea counsel, the defendant must show a "reasonable 

probability" that the result would have been different had the defendant received 

proper advice from the trial attorney. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63 

(2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). 

Defendant's contentions of ineffectiveness fail to meet these requirements. 

His contention that his attorney should have moved to dismiss the indictment 

because of the time lag from his arrest in 1995 to his plea in 2003 is unavailing. 

It is pure speculation that the court would have granted such a dismissal. 

Likewise, defendant's argument that his attorney should have forecast that 

he would be sentenced more harshly if he committed a federal offense at some 

future time, does not amount to deficient performance. This court rejected a 
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similar claim in State v. Wilkerson, 321 N.J. Super. 219, 227 (App. Div. 1999), 

in which we held that "[t]here is no constitutional requirement" for counsel to 

advise a defendant pleading guilty to a current charge of the "possible or even 

potential enhancement consequences of future aberrant conduct." 

Finally, defendant's claim that his former counsel coerced him to plead 

guilty is belied by the transcript of the plea hearing, during which defendant 

stated under oath that his attorney had reviewed the plea agreement with him, 

that he was satisfied with the attorney's services, and that he was pleading guilty 

voluntarily. 

No plenary hearing was required before the PCR court because 

defendant's arguments do not present a prima facie case for relief. State v. 

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). 

Affirmed.