IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Erie Insurance Property & :

Casualty Company, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 148 C.D. 2023

 : Argued: November 6, 2023

David Heater (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: May 29, 2024

Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company (Insurer) petitions for review 

of the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that upheld the 

decision of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) granting David Heater’s

(Claimant) Claim Petition. The WCJ found that Claimant gave timely notice of his 

injury to his employer, David W. Heater (Employer), a sole proprietorship which 

Claimant owns and by which Claimant was employed, and that Claimant was injured 

in the course and scope of his employment. On appeal, Insurer argues Claimant

should have been required to give notice to Insurer within 120 days of the injury and

the finding that Claimant’s notice of the injury on himself as Employer was 

sufficient is inconsistent with the purpose of Section 311 of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act1(Act), prejudicial to Insurer, and a violation of Insurer’s due 

process rights. Insurer further asserts the record evidence does not support the 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 631.
2

WCJ’s finding that the injury occurred in the course and scope of Claimant’s

employment and the WCJ’s failure to address inconsistencies in the record on how 

the injury occurred rendered the WCJ’s decision not reasoned as required by Section 

422(a) of the Act.

2

 Claimant responds the Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s 

decision because neither Section 311 of the Act, nor precedent interpreting that 

provision, required him to provide notice to Insurer, Employer received timely 

notice of the injuries, and the credited evidence supports the WCJ’s findings of fact 

and conclusion that Claimant was injured in the course and scope of his employment.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant procedural and factual background have already been set forth 

by this Court in considering Insurer’s request for supersedeas and is as follows.

Claimant is the owner of . . . Employer[] and was its sole employee up 

until April 2015. (WCJ Decision/Order, 1/20/2022 (January 2022 

Decision), Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 1 . . . ; WCJ Decision/Order, 

7/21/2020 (July 2020 Decision), FOF ¶¶ 1, 9(b) . . . .) On September 

28, 2015, Employer performed roof repairs as a sub-contractor to Pip’s 

Roofing. (January 2022 Decision at 4; July 2020 Decision, FOF ¶ 8(b).) 

The WCJ found that, while on site that day, Claimant sustained a 

disabling injury “while coming off a ladder and tripping over a shovel,” 

when he “attempted a tumbling move known as a round-off to land on 

his feet”; however, “[u]pon landing, Claimant slipped on [] wet grass,” 

fell backwards, and landed on his head. (January 2022 Decision, FOF 

¶¶ 5-6, 8-9.) Claimant sustained “a C3 teardrop fracture and spastic 

quadriparesis[,] for which he underwent immediate surgery[,] including 

an extensive fusion from C2 to T1[.]” (Id., FOF ¶ 7.) 

There was a question as to when Claimant notified Insurer of his work 

injury. Insurer nevertheless issued a Notice of Workers’ Compensation 

(WC) Denial (NCD) on February 24, 2017, indicating that Claimant 

“attempted to do a backflip while on a break,” i.e., he was not in the 

course of his employment, and fractured his neck, and that he provided 

2

77 P.S. § 834.
3

notice of the injury on February 24, 2017.[] (Certified Record (C.R.) 

Item No. 58 (Ex. J-01).) . . . On September 6, 2018, Claimant filed 

[the] Claim Petition, naming Employer and Insurer, alleging he slipped 

and fell and sustained a cervical spine fracture on September 28, 2015, 

and seeking ongoing total disability benefits beginning on that date. 

(January 2022 Decision at 4; C.R. Item No. 2.) 

Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Heater (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 148 C.D. 2023, filed June 14, 2023) (Cohn Jubelirer, P.J.) (single-judge op.)

(Erie I), slip op. at 2-3 (alterations added).

Following proceedings that are unrelated to issues presently before the Court,

the WCJ held

numerous hearings, at which both lay and medical testimony was 

offered by Claimant and Insurer, [and] the WCJ circulated the July 

2020 Decision, denying the Claim Petition. The WCJ concluded 

Claimant failed to establish he provided timely notice of his alleged 

work injury to Insurer within 120 days of the injury’s occurrence, as 

required by Section 311 of the . . . Act . . . . (July 2020 Decision at 9-

10 & [Conclusions of Law (]COL[)] ¶ 4.) In denying the Claim Petition 

on this basis, the WCJ acknowledged and explained the following:

Claimant is his own employer, so it could be argued that 

notice was instantaneous. However, [Insurer] is the 

insuring party in this instance, and notice must be received 

by the insurer within the time limits of the Act. Even if 

Claimant’s testimony that he called Mr. [James] Reagle to 

inform him of the injury is credible, it is not proper notice. 

Mr. Reagle is an insurance agent, not the insurer. Notice 

should have been given to the claims offices of [Insurer]. 

Claimant has not offered evidence of such notice to 

[Insurer] at any time following the injury. It is unclear 

how [Insurer] finally received notice in February 2017. 

Perhaps Mr. Reagle forwarded the information to [Insurer] 

after receiving the call from Claimant’s counsel’s office 

[in February 2017]; neither party addressed that hole in the 

evidence. This [WCJ] notes the 2/24/2017 [NCD] states 

notice was received on 9/28/2015, the alleged injury date. 

However, this is just sloppiness on the part of [Insurer]. 
4

There is no evidence in the record, credible or otherwise, 

that notice was made on the date of injury.

(Id. at 9, see also FOF ¶ 10(c) (emphasis in original).) Thus, the WCJ 

concluded that Claimant was precluded from receiving any 

compensation under Section 311 of the Act based on his untimely 

notice to Insurer. (Id. at 9.) . . . Claimant . . . appealed to the Board. 

Claimant challenged the WCJ’s findings and conclusions on the notice 

issue . . . . (C.R. Item No. 9.) 

. . . . 

By opinion and order mailed on July 29, 2021, the Board . . . reversed 

the WCJ’s decision . . . that Claimant failed to give timely notice of the 

work injury. (Board Opinion (Op.) & Order, 7/29/2021 (Board 2021 

Op.) at 4-13 . . . .) In reversing . . . , the Board relied on Travelers 

Insurance Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board 

(Levine), 447 A.2d 1116 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982), and agreed with 

Claimant’s argument “that because he was his own employer,” notice 

of the work injury was instantaneous, and, further, that Section 311 of 

the Act does not require that notice be given to an insurer. (Board 2021 

Op. at 4-5.) The Board also remanded the matter to the WCJ for a 

determination on the remaining merits of the Claim Petition.[] (Id. at 

12-13.) 

Following the Board’s remand, the WCJ circulated the January 2022 

Decision, in which he summarized the evidence and the lay and expert 

medical testimony from the prior hearings and depositions on the merits 

of the Claim Petition and granted the Claim Petition. The WCJ 

concluded Claimant established that, on September 28, 2015, he 

suffered an injury in the course and scope of his employment that totally 

disabled him as of that date and ongoing and prevented him from 

returning to his pre-injury position. (January 2022 Decision, FOF ¶ 9 

& COL ¶¶ 4-6.) In so doing, the WCJ found credible Claimant’s live 

and deposition testimony as to the events and mechanics of his work 

injury and his wages, as well as both Sandeep Singh, M.D.’s 

(Claimant’s expert) and Robert Mauthe, M.D.’s (Employer’s expert) 

deposition testimony in which they essentially agreed on Claimant’s 

injury and physical capabilities because of the work injury. (Id. at 4-5, 

FOF ¶¶ 5-9.) The WCJ determined “the evidence of record does not 

establish that Claimant was performing a backflip when he suffered his 

injury” and “there is no evidence of record that Claimant was on a break 

from his work duties” when he suffered his injury, as Insurer alleged. 
5

(Id. at 7.) The WCJ also found, based on his and the Board’s prior 

decisions, that . . . Insurer received timely notice of Claimant’s work 

injury, and that Claimant’s average weekly wage was $1,200.00 as of 

September 28, 2015, resulting in an $800.00 weekly compensation rate. 

(Id., FOF ¶¶ 2-4 & COL ¶¶ 3(a)-(c), 7.) . . . Accordingly, the WCJ 

granted the Claim Petition and ordered Insurer to pay Claimant total 

disability benefits at the weekly rate of $800.00 plus statutory interest 

and all reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to the 

September 28, 2015 work injury, and to deduct 20% from all wage loss 

benefits paid to Claimant and pay that sum directly to Claimant’s 

counsel according to their fee agreement. (See id. at 9, Order.) 

Claimant and Insurer appealed to the Board.

In its appeal, Insurer . . . argued that the WCJ erred in crediting 

Claimant’s testimony and evidence on how the injury occurred and 

finding that Claimant’s injuries occurred in the course and scope of his 

employment. Insurer also challenged the WCJ’s determination as to 

notice of the work injury, asserting the Travelers [Insurance] case, 

upon which the Board relied, is distinguishable, and that Claimant’s 

failure to timely notify Insurer violated its due process rights because it 

prevented Insurer from conducting a timely investigation into the claim. 

(See C.R. Item No. 19.) 

. . . . 

By opinion and order mailed on July 29, 2022, the Board affirmed the 

WCJ’s decision and order granting the Claim Petition . . . (Board Op. 

& Order, 7/29/2022 (July 2022 Board Op.) at 1, 13-14 . . . .) . . . The 

Board [] rejected Insurer’s argument that Claimant was injured outside 

the course and scope of his employment, i.e., when he attempted a 

backflip “to impress his co-workers” while on a break from his work 

duties, and its challenge to the WCJ’s credibility determinations, noting 

the WCJ found Claimant’s testimony and both Claimant’s and Insurer’s 

expert medical evidence credible, which was within the WCJ’s 

province as factfinder. (Id. at 7-12.) Further, the Board noted, the WCJ 

specifically did not find that Claimant was attempting a backflip while 

on a break from his work. (Id. at 12.) The Board thus determined it 

could not reweigh the evidence or overturn the WCJ’s credibility 

determinations, as Insurer requested. (Id.) 
6

Erie I, slip op. at 3-8 (some alterations and omissions added). After a second remand 

to address another issue not relevant to this appeal, the WCJ issued a third decision, 

and 

Insurer appealed to the Board, “rais[ing] and preserv[ing] issues raised 

previously on appeal that could not be further appealed to the 

Commonwealth Court due to the Board’s remand order.” (C.R. Item 

No. 29.) . . . Insurer reiterated the arguments from its prior appeal to 

the Board from the WCJ’s January 2022 Decision, i.e., that the WCJ 

erred in finding that: [] Claimant was injured in the course and scope 

of his employment; . . . ; [] Claimant’s testimony as to the mechanism 

of injury was credible; [and] Claimant provided timely notice of injury

. . . . (Id.) Insurer also filed [a] Motion to Finalize [the Board’s July 

2022 Opinion (Motion to Finalize)], so it could take an immediate 

appeal to this Court of the prior legal rulings in the July 2022 Opinion 

without the need for further proceedings before the Board. (C.R. Item 

No. 31.) By opinion and order mailed on January 30, 2023, the Board 

granted Insurer’s Motion to Finalize its . . . July [] 2022 [Opinion], and 

indicated that Insurer’s stated issues are preserved for further appeal. 

(Board Op. & Order, 1/30/2023 (January 2023 Op.), at 4-5 

& Order . . . .) 

Erie I, slip op. at 8-9 (some alterations and omissions in the original).

Insurer now petitions this Court for review.3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Issues

On appeal,4Insurer sets forth two issues for this Court’s review. 

1. Did the Board and [WCJ] err by determining that Claimant provided 

timely adequate notice of the injury based upon Claimant[,] sole 

3

Insurer sought a supersedeas from this Court, which was denied in Erie I.

4 This Court’s review “is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether 

constitutional rights were violated.” Elberson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Elwyn, Inc.), 936 

A.2d 1195, 1198 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” WAWA v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Seltzer), 951 A.2d 405, 407 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
7

proprietor[,] himself having notice and that notice to Insurer [] was 

not required, as this case is distinguishable from Travelers 

Ins[urance] . . . , and as this determination is not supported by 

substantial evidence, and was inequitable, prejudicial[,] and 

deprived [Insurer] of its constitutional due process rights?

. . . .

2. Did the Board err by affirming the [WCJ]’s determination that 

Claimant was injured in the course and scope of employment as the 

[WCJ]’s findings of fact and crediting of Claimant regarding the 

mechanism of injury are not supported by substantial evidence, and 

the [WCJ] arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the relevant 

competent evidence that every medical record states that Claimant 

was attempting to do a backflip and which established that his 

injuries were caused by his horseplay during a break from work; 

and, as the [WCJ] failed to address or reconcile the glaring 

inconsistency between the medical records and Claimant’s 

testimony or to issue a reasoned decision?

. . . .

(Insurer’s Brief (Br.) at 4 (emphasis in original).)

B. Notice of the Injury 

1. Parties’ Arguments

Insurer argues that in situations where the injured worker is also the owner of 

a sole proprietorship and, therefore, the “employer,” the insurer is the party directly

responsible for the work injury, including its prompt investigation, and is entitled to 

notice of a work injury within 120 days of the occurrence of that injury. Insurer

asserts the Board should not have relied on Travelers Insurance to hold notice to the 

insurer within 120 days is not required because that case is distinguishable. 

Travelers Insurance, Insurer points out, did not involve a sole proprietorship, which 

does not have an existence separate from its owner, but involved a closely held 

corporation as the employer, which was a separate entity from the injured officer 
8

of the corporation. In the case of sole proprietorships, Insurer argues, there is no 

notice from an injured worker to a different, legal entity, as in cases where the 

employer is a corporation, but the notice is from an individual to the same individual, 

a circumstance the Court in Travelers Insurance suggested would be an absurd

reading of Section 311. (Insurer’s Br. at 23-24.) Insurer maintains that sole 

proprietors, unlike corporate officers, do not have automatic WC coverage under 

Section 104 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 22, which places corporate officers, like those in 

Travelers Insurance, in a different position than sole proprietors.

Insurer further argues the Board’s decision leads to an absurd result that is

inconsistent with and undermines the very purposes of Section 311, which is to 

provide timely notice of a work injury to prevent claims and evidence from growing 

stale, as occurred here to Insurer’s detriment. The presumption behind Section 311, 

Insurer asserts, “is that the claimant’s employer would undertake a timely 

investigation into the claim of [i]ts employee.” (Insurer’s Br. at 26.) But, Insurer 

argues, where the employer is the sole proprietor and the injured employee its owner, 

there is a conflict of interest, as it is the injured employee that controls the 

investigation of their own injury. According to Insurer, in these circumstances, there 

is no protection for the party ultimately liable for the claim, the insurer, “wh[ich] 

steps into the employer’s shoes,” but loses the opportunity to benefit from an 

employer’s “‘full and complete investigation of the circumstances[,]’” thereby 

preventing it from formulating relevant defenses to the claim. (Id. at 25-27, 29

(quoting Andring v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Keystone Coal Mining Corp.), 

508 A.2d 1324, 1327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)).) Insurer also argues the Court could 

“interpret Section 311 to require notice to the directly responsible entity” based on

the presence of “a gap in the legislative scheme [meaning] the General Assembly 
9

clearly did not anticipate the precise scenario here.” (Id. at 28 (citing Hannaberry

HVAC v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Snyder, Jr.), 834 A.2d 524, 533 (Pa. 2003)).) 

Interpreting Section 311 as not requiring notice to an insurer in these circumstances 

means, Insurer contends, “that a claimant/employer can withhold or materially delay 

notice to the insurer responsible to pay, and impede a timely investigation, [which]

is at complete odds with [Section 311’s] purpose.” (Id. at 28-29.)

Insurer last argues the WCJ’s decision is otherwise inequitable, prejudicial, 

and deprives it of its due process rights. According to Insurer, equitable remedies 

and defenses have been recognized by the courts in WC matters and it is unfair to 

find that the employee/owner of a sole proprietorship is not required by the Act to 

provide timely notice of their injury to an insurer. Insurer further relies on “Federal 

Black Lung” cases, in which the federal courts have held that the lack of adequate 

notice on the insurer violates due process, to argue that the same principles should 

apply in these circumstances. (Id. at 30-32.)

Claimant responds that “there is no language in Section 311 requiring notice 

to the insurer” and “Section 311 requires notice to the employer[.]” (Claimant’s Br. 

at 14, 18.) Claimant maintains this Court confirmed this reading in Travelers 

Insurance, and there is no legal significance, for purposes of the Act, of the different 

business forms. According to Claimant, Travelers Insurance should apply equally 

to sole proprietorships, as to corporations. Claimant maintains his case is akin to 

that in Dick’s Delicatessen of Paoli, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board 

(DeVirgilio), 475 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984), wherein, based on Travelers 

Insurance, this Court rejected an argument that a claimant, who, in addition to being 

a corporate officer, acted as the manager of a business, was required to provide 

notice to the business’s WC insurer when the claimant was injured. Under both 
10

Travelers Insurance and Dick’s Delicatessen, Claimant argues, there is nothing in 

the Act that limits a claimant’s rights to receive benefits or expands the claimant’s 

duties to provide notice when the claimant is a manager or principal officer of a 

small corporation or business, and actual notice of the work injury on the claimant, 

as manager/principal officer/owner, satisfies Section 311. Finally, Claimant argues 

Insurer’s reliance on federal case law is misplaced because WC matters are governed 

by the Act, not federal law.

Insurer responds that Dick’s Delicatessen, like Travelers Insurance, involved 

a closely held corporation and other officers of the corporation had actual knowledge 

of the work injury because they were the claimant’s family members. Insurer

reiterates its arguments that it is the party directly financially responsible, and that

Travelers Insurance does not support a finding that notice of the injury on the same 

person who is injured satisfies Section 311’s notice requirement because it is plainly 

at odds with the purposes of that provision. Insurer argues that “where the statutory 

language is not explicit as to the point at issue,” (Insurer’s Reply Br. at 5), the Court 

can consider other matters enumerated in Section 1921(c) of the Statutory 

Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c), as well 

as presume that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable, 

Section 1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Not to 

require the Section 311 notice be given to the insurer in these circumstances, Insurer 

asserts, “is an absurd result never intended by the legislature.” (Insurer’s Reply Br. 

at 6.)
11

2. Analysis

At issue is to whom, under the Act, an injured self-employed employee5 must 

provide notice of a work injury within 120 days of the injury when the claimant is 

essentially the employer. Various provisions of the Act address the types of notice

that are required to be provided by an employee and by an employer. Insurer argues 

that Section 311 should be interpreted as requiring an employee/owner of a sole 

proprietorship (the employer) to provide an insurer with notice of an alleged work 

injury within 120 days of the injury, and Claimant argues that neither the Act nor 

precedent interpreting the Act’s notice provisions impose any such requirement, 

speaking only of giving notice to an employer. 

Section 311 provides, in pertinent part, that

[u]nless the employer shall have knowledge of the occurrence of the 

injury, or unless the employe . . . shall give notice thereof to the 

employer within twenty-one days after the injury, no compensation 

shall be due until such notice be given, and, unless such notice be 

given within one hundred and twenty days after the occurrence of 

the injury, no compensation shall be allowed. . . .

77 P.S. § 631 (emphasis added). “The purpose of Section 311 . . . is to protect 

employers from stale claims of which they would have no knowledge, made after 

the opportunity has passed for full and complete investigation of the circumstances.” 

Andring, 508 A.2d at 1327. It is long settled that “[c]ourts should not read into the 

. . . Act a stricter requirement than the language of the Act imports in regard to notice 

. . . . It must be liberally construed[.]” Katz v. Evening Bull., 403 A.2d 518, 519

(Pa. 1979) (quoting McCann v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 208 A.2d 887, 889 

5 We note that as the Act, case law, and the parties use “employee,” “employe,” “claimant,” 

and “worker” interchangeably to refer to the individual who sustained the alleged work injury, we

will do the same.
12

(Pa. Super. 1965)) (first alteration in the original); see also Canterna v. U.S. Steel 

Corp., 317 A.2d 355, 356-57 & n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974) (same). “Whether notice 

has been given is a question of fact.” Katz, 403 A.2d at 519.

The Board found itself “constrained” to hold that Section 311’s notice 

requirement was satisfied, reasoning that this matter is governed by Travelers 

Insurance, because, in its view, Travelers Insurance addressed this scenario and 

“remain[ed] viable precedent to which it was bound.” (Board 2021 Op. at 4-5.)

Claimant cites both Travelers Insurance and Dick’s Delicatessen as controlling. 

Insurer argues both cases are distinguishable, and their analyses are inapplicable to 

situations where there is no separate, corporate entity to which notice is given, such 

as where the claimant is the owner of the sole proprietor “employer.” We agree with 

Insurer that these cases are distinguishable and are not controlling.

In Travelers Insurance, a corporate officer of a close corporation, the 

employer, who was also responsible for handling insurance matters, sustained a 

work injury and advised a fellow corporate officer of the employer. Almost a year

later, the employer informed the WC insurer of the injury, which challenged the 

claim on the basis that because the employer was a close corporation, the Section 

311 notice should have been provided to the insurer within 120 days of the injury. 

We disagreed, holding that

[t]here is no case law offered by [the insurer] in support of that 

proposition. 

. . . . 

The fact that [the c]laimant was the principal officer of a small 

corporation in no way limits the [c]laimant’s right under the Act.

Absent a showing of fraud or improper corporate 

manipulations designed to circumvent the public policy 
13

encompassing the . . . Act, courts will not sanction a 

disregard of the corporate entity merely because the 

corporate stock is closely held or family owned.

Gayer v. Quaker Hair Goods, . . . 289 A.2d 763, 766 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 

1972). . . . [The insurer] admits, as it must, that Section 311 does not 

require notice to the insurer; rather, the mandate is for notice to the 

[e]mployer. [The insurer] argues, nevertheless, that any interpretation 

of Section 311 other than that which [it has] suggested could lead to an

absurd result such as in the case of a one person corporation where an 

injury to the only employee would require that [the c]laimant give 

notice of the injury to himself. It would be our view, to the contrary, 

that notice in that circumstance would not be from an individual to 

an individual but from an individual to a corporation, a different 

entity, and in the absence of fraud or improper corporate manipulation, 

would be valid notice under Section 311. The result would not be

absurd, it would be compliance with the law. Inasmuch as the Act 

does not require notice to the insurer in this or any other circumstance 

and [the insurer] cannot point to any case law or other authority which 

would warrant us in reaching the conclusion [it] urge[s], we must reject 

that conclusion.

Travelers Ins., 447 A.2d at 1118-19 (emphasis added). 

We applied Travelers Insurance in Dick’s Delicatessen, where the claimant, 

who was “president, chairman of the board[,] [] 60% shareholder[,]” and manager 

of a family corporation, sustained a work-related stroke. Dick’s Delicatessen, 475 

A.2d at 1347. Notice of the injury to the insurer was not provided until two or three 

months after the injury. Id. at 1348. The insurer argued, as Insurer does here, that 

where a “claimant is also the employer, the claimant must give notice to the 

insurance company in order to permit a prompt investigation of the claim; failure to 

notify the insurer would result in forfeiture of benefits[.]” Id. at 1349. In addition 

to noting that the other corporate officers, who were the claimant’s immediate 

family, had actual knowledge of the stroke, we broadly stated, citing Travelers 

Insurance, that “[S]ection 311 does not require notice to the [WC] carrier where 
14

the claimant is also the employer.” Id. (emphasis added). That the claimant was 

a principal officer of a small corporation did not limit his rights or enlarge his duties

under the Act. Id. The insurer also argued that the employer’s failure to provide 

immediate notice as set forth in Section 438(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 994,6should 

result in the claimant’s forfeiture of benefits. We disagreed, explaining that

[w]e understand the insurer’s concern in these cases where the claimant 

and the employer, who ordinarily have interests adverse to one another, 

are interrelated. Without some provision for the enforcement of the 

employer’s duty to provide the [WC] carrier with prompt notification 

of work-related injuries, the claimant-employer could sit on his claim 

indefinitely, later requiring the insurer to defend a claim which it did 

not have a meaningful opportunity to investigate. However, unlike 

[S]ection 311 of the Act, [S]ection 438 does not contain any forfeiture 

language, and we find no basis for reading such language into that 

section. The rights and duties of the employer and the [WC] carrier are

contractual matters to be agreed upon by the parties and set forth in the 

policy of insurance, rather than determined by the legislature. The 

[WC] carrier can guard against possible abuse of the . . . Act by 

close corporations and sole proprietorships by conditioning coverage 

on compliance with mandatory prompt notification provisions 

written into the insurance contract. Issues concerning the 

interpretation and fulfillment of contractual provisions of the policy are 

not for the [WC] authorities to decide[] but can be litigated in a civil 

action between the parties to the contract.

Dick’s Delicatessen, 475 A.2d at 1349 (emphasis added).

After carefully reviewing Travelers Insurance and Dick’s Delicatessen, it is 

apparent that the rationales therein were predicated on the existence of a separate

corporate entity to whom the injured employee/corporate officer provided notice, 

Travelers Insurance, or other officers of the separate corporate entity that had 

actual knowledge of the work-related injury, Dick’s Delicatessen. The Court in 

Travelers Insurance specifically reasoned that it would not disregard, or, essentially, 

6 Section 438 was added by Section 4 of the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, as amended, 

77 P.S. § 994.
15

pierce the veil on the corporate entity, by finding that the claimant’s notice on the 

close corporation by which he was employed was insufficient for the purposes of 

Section 311 absent evidence of fraud or manipulation. In doing so, the Court cited

Gayer, a case that inquired whether a claimant could “take advantage of the 

corporate veil[,]” 289 A.2d at 766, in a WC matter, thereby invoking that concept of 

corporate law. Travelers Ins., 447 A.2d at 1118-19. And, while Dick’s Delicatessen

cited Travelers Insurance and generally included a reference to claimants who are

“the employer” and “sole proprietorships,” Dick’s Delicatessen involved only a 

close corporation—a legal entity distinct from the injured worker. Judicial holdings 

must be read against the facts of a case, and an analysis of a factual scenario that is 

not specifically presented is dicta. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t 

of Lab. & Indus., Bureau of Law Compliance, 162 A.3d 384, 394 (Pa. 2017). Quite 

simply, neither Travelers Insurance nor Dick’s Delicatessen involved this legal and 

factual scenario, and the broader language appearing to include it in those opinions 

is non-binding dicta.

7

 

Although Claimant maintains the form of business carries no legal 

significance and Travelers Insurance and Dick’s Delicatessen should apply 

regardless of the business form, we disagree. “A sole proprietorship has no existence 

separate and apart from its owner,[] while a corporation is an independent entity[.]” 

The Glidden Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 700 A.2d 555, 558 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1997). It was the separate and distinct identity of the corporate employer from the 

claimant that was paramount in Travelers Insurance and Dick’s Delicatessen and 

7 To the extent a court in another jurisdiction and secondary sources reviewing WC law 

have cited Dick’s Delicatessen for the broad propositions stated therein, see Daigle v. Daigle, 505 

A.2d 778 (Me. 1986); 21 Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d. § 14.45 (2023); 39 Standard Pa. Pract. 2d §§ 167:152, 

167:153 (2023), the court and the authors of the secondary sources relied on the dicta related to 

sole proprietors, rather than the actual holding of the case.
16

formed the basis of the Court’s rejection of the insurer’s absurdity argument in 

Travelers Insurance, 447 A.2d at 1119. In rejecting that argument, the Court 

distinguished the notice provided in that case, from an individual to a different

entity, the corporation, and an individual providing notice to himself, finding the 

former constituted valid notice absent fraud or manipulation, a standard used when 

piercing a corporate veil, and so not an absurd result. Id. Additionally, as Insurer 

points out, corporate officers are expressly covered by the Act as employees, while 

self-employed persons are not, 77 P.S. § 22,8 making the business form relevant in 

that way. Because this matter does not involve a corporate entity and a claimant 

providing notice to that different entity, the rationale of Travelers Insurance and 

Dick’s Delicatessen, based firmly in corporate law principles that a corporate entity

should not be unnecessarily disregarded, is not controlling, and the Board erred in 

concluding otherwise. 

Although we conclude that Travelers Insurance and Dick’s Delicatessen are 

not controlling, this does not automatically require reversal as Claimant argues 

Section 311’s plain language, speaking only of notice to the “employer,” supports 

the Board’s conclusion. Contrarily, Insurer argues that, under these circumstances—

where there is a conflict of interest due to the unity of identity of the injured worker 

and employer—the insurer “steps into the [] shoes[,]” (Insurer’s Br. at 29), of the 

“employer” to which notice of the work injury is to be given because, otherwise, the 

purposes of Section 311 are unmet. This, Insurer asserts, would lead to an absurd 

8 Section 104 of the Act provides that “every executive officer of a corporation elected or 

appointed in accordance with the charter and by-laws of the corporation . . . shall be an employe 

of the corporation[,]” except that executive officers of for-profit or nonprofit corporations who 

serve voluntarily and without remuneration “may . . . elect not to be an employe of the corporation 

for the purposes of this [A]ct.” 77 P.S. § 22. It also defines “[e]mploye” as “[a]ll natural persons 

who performs services for another for a valuable consideration[.]” Id. (emphasis added).
17

result, which the Court must presume the legislature did not intend. Essentially, both 

arguments implicate the meaning or scope of the word “employer” in Section 311

and how it should be construed to effectuate the legislature’s intent.

As we are called upon to engage in statutory interpretation, we are mindful 

that the object of all statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and 

effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). 

Generally, the plain language of the statute “provides the best indication 

of legislative intent.” Miller v. C[ou]nty[] of Centre, . . . 173 A.3d 1162, 

1168 ([Pa.] 2017) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)). If the statutory language 

is clear and unambiguous in setting forth the intent of the General 

Assembly, then “we cannot disregard the letter of the statute under the 

pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. 

Ass’n, . . . 985 A.2d 678, 684 ([Pa.] 2009) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)). 

In this vein, “we should not insert words into [a statute] that are plainly 

not there.” Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada Nurses, 

Inc.), . . . 52 A.3d 241, 245 ([Pa.] 2012). 

Alpini v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tinicum Twp.), 294 A.3d 307, 320 (Pa. 2023). 

Additionally, “we interpret statutory language not in isolation, but with reference to 

the context in which it appears.” Commonwealth v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917, 922, 

924 (Pa. 2016) (consulting other provisions of the Crimes Code9for context and 

viewing the statute “as a whole” in interpreting unambiguous text). This is because

we do not “dissect statutory text and interpret it in a vacuum.” Id. at 924. Thus, in 

determining legislative intent, the language of every section of a statute must be read 

and construed with reference to the entire statute. Bowman v. Sunoco, Inc., 65 A.3d 

901, 906 (Pa. 2013).

When the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we may ascertain the 

General Assembly’s intent by considering the factors set forth in Section 1921(c) of 

the Statutory Construction Act, and other rules of statutory construction. See Pa. 

9

18 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9546.
18

Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d 432, 436 (Pa. 2004) 

(observing that “other interpretive rules of statutory construction are to be utilized 

only where the statute at issue is ambiguous”). “Words of a statute are ambiguous 

when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text under review.” 

Bowman, 65 A.3d at 906. Factors that may be considered under Section 1921(c) 

include “[t]he object to be attained” and “[t]he consequences of a particular 

interpretation.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(4), (6). We are further guided by Section 

1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act, which provides that, in ascertaining the 

intent of the General Assembly, we are to presume that the legislature “does not 

intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1922(1).

Relevant to our inquiry, Section 311 states that “[u]nless the employer shall 

have knowledge of the occurrence of the injury, or unless the employe . . . shall give 

notice thereof to the employer within twenty-one days after the injury, no 

compensation shall be due until notice be given” and “unless such notice be given 

within one hundred and twenty days after the occurrence of the injury, no 

compensation shall be allowed.” 77 P.S. § 631 (emphasis added). Claimant relies 

on the use of the term “employer” to argue that the legislature intended to exclude

an insurer from the notice provision regardless of the circumstances. However,

when Section 311 is read in context with other provisions of the Act, two plausible

interpretations of that term become apparent. 

Claimant’s argument presumes that there is a single meaning of the word 

“employer” under the Act. However, the Act defines the term “employer” two ways, 

one of which includes the employer’s insurer. Section 103 of the Act states

“employer,” as used in this [A]ct, is declared to be synonymous with 

master, and to include natural persons, partnerships, joint-stock 
19

companies, corporations for profit, corporations not for profit, 

municipal corporations, the Commonwealth, and all governmental 

agencies created by it.

77 P.S. § 21. Section 401 of the Act provides that “‘employer,’ when used in this 

article, shall mean the employer as defined in article one of this act, or his duly 

authorized agent, or his insurer if such insurer has assumed the employer’s 

liability . . . .” 77 P.S. § 701 (second emphasis added). 

In Kramer v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Rite Aid Corporation), 

883 A.2d 518, 526-27 (Pa. 2005), the Supreme Court held that these two “divergent”

definitions “contribute[d] to the ambiguity” of the term “employer” in Section 

204(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 71(a) (authorizing, among other offsets and credits, an 

offset to an “employer directly liable for compensation” for severance payments a 

claimant receives). The Supreme Court in Kramer explained, citing Brown v. 

Travelers Insurance Company, 254 A.2d 27, 28-29 (Pa. 1969) (plurality), that

neither of these definitions were “substantive” provisions of the Act, and that where

questions of interpreting the Act “have to do with remedial aspects of the Act, and 

specifically with the rights afforded to employers who participate in the [WC] 

system and to their insurers[,]” such as immunity from liability or offsets, the

broader definition of employer applied. Kramer, 883 A.3d at 526-28 (emphasis 

added). See also Manolovich v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kay Jewelers, Inc.), 

694 A.2d 405, 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (explaining that the definition of employer 

in Section 401 “would, for all remedial or procedural purposes, be taken to be a 

complex entity, including within its scope the compensation insurer” even where the 

statutory section at issue “fails to mention the insurance carrier”). 

The Supreme Court further explained that this interpretation was “consistent 

with fundamental precepts of statutory construction[,]” including that “[s]tatutory 
20

words and phrases are to be interpreted with reference to the context in which they 

appear.” Kramer, 883 A.2d at 528. In this regard, the Supreme Court looked to 

Section 305(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 501(a), for context as to the meaning of the term 

“employer” in Section 204(a). Notably, Section 305 appears in the same chapter as 

Section 311, at issue here. Section 305(a)(1) provides that where an employer 

purchases WC coverage, the insurer “assume[s] the employer’s liability hereunder 

and shall be entitled to all of the employer’s immunities and protection 

hereunder” except in circumstances not applicable here. 77 P.S. § 501(a)(1) 

(emphasis added). The Kramer Court reasoned that limiting the “protection” or 

“immunity” of the offset for severance benefits only to self-insured employers,

which would preclude offsets to WC insurance carriers that likewise bear liability 

for the payment of WC benefits for the employer with which they contract, “would 

negate [Section 204(a)]” and create an absurd result. 883 A.3d at 528-29.

Applying Kramer’s framework here, we similarly conclude that the divergent 

definitions of employer within the Act contribute to Section 311’s ambiguity, and 

that ambiguity is confirmed when read in context of other provisions, such as Section 

305(a)(1). Section 311 relates to the right afforded to employers to receive timely 

notice, within 120 days of an alleged work injury and, if timely notice is not received, 

immunity from any WC claim arising from such injury. It also protects employers 

against stale claims and the inability to perform prompt investigations due to the 

failure of an injured worker to provide timely notice. The fact that Section 311 

addresses the rights, immunities, and protections of an employer suggests, under 

Kramer, that the broader definition of employer, which would include the 

employer’s insurance carrier, should apply. Kramer, 883 A.3d at 526-28.
21

Furthermore, when Section 311 is read in context with Section 305(a)(1), the 

ambiguity becomes more apparent. Section 305(a)(1) ensures the insurer’s 

“entitle[ment] to all of the employer’s immunities and protection” as the corollary 

to the insurer assuming the employer’s liability. 77 P.S. § 501(a)(1) (emphasis 

added). If Section 311 is read using only its plain language or the narrow definition 

of employer in Section 103, it is consistent with the legislature’s use of the general 

term and common usage of the term “employer.” See Section 1903(a) of the 

Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a) (stating “[w]ords . . . shall be 

construed . . . according to their common and approved usage”). And, under nonsole proprietorship circumstances, this reading makes sense, as an employer that 

does not share a unity of identity with the claimant is more likely to engage in a 

prompt investigation of its employee’s alleged injury to protect its own, and its 

insurer’s, interests. However, this reading has the potential to eliminate an insurer’s 

“entitle[ment] to all of the employer’s immunities and protection” guaranteed by 

Section 305(a)(1) in this situation, where a self-employed claimant/employer 

notifies themselves of their own injury and waits until just before the expiration of 

the three-year period for filing a claim petition set forth in Section 315 of the Act, 

77 P.S. § 602, to notify the insurer. In contrast, reading Section 311 using the 

broader definition of employer in Section 401, which includes an employer’s insurer, 

in these circumstances may not be consistent with the common usage of the term

“employer.” Nevertheless, this reading is more consistent with Section 305(a)(1) 

and the purposes of Section 311 under these circumstances. As two reasonable 

interpretations of the term “employer” exist, Section 311 is ambiguous. Bowman, 

65 A.3d at 906.
22

Having concluded that Section 311 is ambiguous where there is unity of 

identity between the injured worker and sole proprietor employer, we turn to 

Sections 1921(c) and Section 1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act to aid in 

ascertaining the legislature’s intent. First, interpreting Section 311 using the broader 

definition of employer and requiring an injured claimant/employer to provide notice 

to the insurer within 120 days in these circumstances meets the object to be obtained 

by that provision in that its purpose is to protect against stale claims, notice of which 

is given “after the opportunity has passed for full and complete investigation of the 

circumstances.” Andring, 508 A.2d at 1327. Notice by the claimant on the insurer 

in these circumstances allows the insurer, rather than the claimant/employer (who 

has an obvious interest in the outcome of such investigation), to control the 

investigation of an alleged work injury sustained by a claimant/employer that may 

otherwise be delayed to the detriment of the insurer. 

Second, the consequences of interpreting Section 311 otherwise creates a 

potential class of claimants, those who are sole proprietors and injured, who are not

subject to the forfeiture/loss of benefits provision of Section 311 for failing to give 

notice within 120 days of the injury, unlike other, non-self-employed claimants who 

must give such notice to their employers. Sole proprietor claimants can, in essence, 

control the investigation of their own injury by delaying notice on the insurer until 

the last possible moment, sometimes years after the injury, as Claimant did here,

thereby defeating the purpose of this provision. This leaves the insurer, which bears 

the ultimate liability for the claim, unprotected from stale claims and without the 

ability to timely investigate and formulate all of its possible defenses.
23

Both of these reasons, which support the use of the broader definition of 

“employer,” also have the benefit of avoiding absurd results, which we are to 

presume the legislature did not intend. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, under these circumstances, where a 

claimant is both the injured employee and the sole proprietor/employer, the 

“employer” to whom the claimant must notify of a work-related injury for the 

purposes of Section 311 is the insurer that bears the ultimate liability for the claim. 

This allows the insurer to ensure that the prompt and complete investigation into the 

claimed injury, that would normally be performed by a disinterested employer, can 

be performed to protect against stale claims, thereby meeting the purpose of Section 

311. Andring, 508 A.2d at 1327. Because Claimant did not provide timely notice 

to Insurer under Section 311, “no compensation shall be allowed[,]” 77 P.S. § 631, 

and Claimant’s Claim Petition is barred.

10

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s Order upholding the grant of the Claim 

Petition is reversed.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

10 As a result of this conclusion, we do not address any of Insurer’s other arguments on the 

notice issue or its issue that Claimant was not injured in the course and scope of his employment.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Erie Insurance Property & :

Casualty Company, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 148 C.D. 2023 

 : 

David Heater (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, May 29, 2024, the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board, entered in the above-captioned matter, is REVERSED.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge