PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICHARD RONQUILLO, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-1247

_________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado

(D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00356-RM-1)

_________________________________

Deborah Lynn Roden, Woodhouse Roden Ames & Brennan, Boulder, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant Richard Ronquillo

Jena Rose Neuscheler, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Cole 

Finegan, United States Attorney, with her on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee United 

States of America

_________________________________

Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

CARSON, Circuit Judge.

_________________________________

Courts have agonized over the parameters of curtilage since Justice Holmes 

first hinted at the idea nearly a century ago in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 

59 (1924). Once again, we find ourselves confronting this complex matter in a series 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 7, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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of events that led officers to find Defendant Richard Ronquillo sleeping in a detached 

garage. Officers found methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin on his person. 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming that officers wrongly entered because 

the search warrant did not include the detached garage. The district court denied the 

motion and found the search warrant authorized the detached garage because it fell 

within the curtilage. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the 

district court.

I.

The Denver Police Department (DPD) received information from a 

confidential informant (CI) that an individual was selling methamphetamine at

836 North Linley Court. While conducting surveillance the DPD observed various 

people enter the residence, stay for around five to ten minutes, and then leave. The 

DPD used its CI to conduct two separate controlled buys. Both times, the CI entered

the residence and bought methamphetamine. Based on this information, the DPD 

obtained a search warrant for the place described as “836 North Linley Court, a 

single family structure with green siding and trim on the east side of North Linley 

Court with a black metal security door with the numbers ‘836’ to the right of the door 

in black.”

The property at 836 North Linley Court contained two structures: the main 

residence and a detached garage. A brick and wrought iron fence lined the property’s 

front perimeter and a chain link fence extended from the sides of the detached garage 

and lined the property’s back perimeter. The detached garage stood about twentyAppellate Case: 22-1247 Document: 010111011614 Date Filed: 03/07/2024 Page: 2
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five feet away from the residence with a walkway connecting the two structures. The 

detached garage had two boarded-up windows and a door facing the backyard and the

residence. A sealed and inoperable garage door faced the alley. 

On October 24, 2018, the DPD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team 

executed the warrant, securing the residence, the occupants, and the backyard. At the 

time of the raid, the SWAT team had no visibility into the detached garage because 

of the boarded-up windows. The SWAT team breached the detached garage to secure 

the interior. The SWAT team found Defendant sleeping on a bed and ordered him to 

exit. Defendant arose from the bed, shoved a plastic bag into his rear pocket, and 

exited the detached garage where the SWAT team detained Defendant. Officers 

performed two pat downs on Defendant and found cocaine, methamphetamine, and 

heroin.1

 

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found on his person. The district 

court denied the motion and a jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. The district court sentenced 

Defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment. Defendant now appeals the district court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress. 

II.

“We look at the totality of the circumstances in reviewing the denial of the 

motion to suppress.” United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 

1 Defendant challenged the second pat down before the district court but 

abandoned that challenge on appeal.

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2005) (citing United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001)). “When 

reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly 

erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under 

the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Windom, 863 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 

2017) (quoting United States v. Mosley, 743 F.3d 1317, 1322 (10th Cir. 2014)). 

III.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment requires that 

warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things 

to be seized.” Id. “The particularity requirement ‘ensures that the search will be 

carefully tailored to its justifications.’” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1131–

32 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). 

“[P]ractical accuracy rather than technical precision controls the determination of 

whether a search warrant adequately describes the place to be searched.” United 

States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. 

Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1997)). 

Defendant argues that the warrant did not authorize the DPD’s search of the 

detached garage because the warrant and supporting affidavit contained no reference 

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to the detached structure.

2

 But police may search a detached structure not directly 

referenced in a warrant if the curtilage contains the detached structure. See United 

States v. DePugh, 452 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1971) (citing Steele v. United State 

No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)) (holding that the description is sufficient if it 

“enable[s] the officers to ascertain the place to be searched”). We have consistently 

held that a search warrant authorizing a search of a certain place includes any 

detached structures and vehicles located within its curtilage. For example, in United 

States v. Earls, we held that a search warrant authorized the search of a detached 

garage, shed, and office because the detached structures fell within the curtilage, 

even though the search warrant did not describe them.

3

 42 F.3d 1321, 1327 (10th 

Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 458 (10th Cir. 1992) 

(upholding the search of a horse trailer in the curtilage of a residence even though the 

warrant did not specifically state it); United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459, 

1461 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the search of vehicles in the curtilage of residence 

2 The government conceded at the district court that the search warrant did not 

include the detached garage. But “[i]t is well-settled that a court is not bound by 

stipulations of the parties as to questions of law.” Koch v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 

47 F.3d 1015, 1018 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 

803 F.2d 1473, 1477 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986)). Whether a detached structure was within 

the curtilage is a question of law. United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.4 

(10th Cir. 2006) (en banc footnote).

3 Defendant argues that Earls is distinguishable because the search warrant in 

Earls stated, “the premises” and the search warrant here stated, “the place.” We are 

not persuaded that this distinction makes a difference. In Earls, we reached our 

conclusion because the detached structures were within the curtilage, not because the 

search warrant stated, “the premises.” 42 F.3d 1321, 1327. 

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even though they were not specifically enumerated in the warrant). So we must

determine whether the detached garage falls within the curtilage of the residence. 

We hold that it does. 

The curtilage and the home receive the same Fourth Amendment protections 

because “the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated 

with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” Oliver v. United 

States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 

(1886)). We review the curtilage determination de novo. United States v. Cousins, 

455 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc footnote).

To determine the curtilage of the residence, we consider four factors: (1) “the 

proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home;” (2) “whether the area is 

included within an enclosure surrounding the home;” (3) “the nature of the uses to 

which the area is put;” and (4) “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area 

from observation by people passing by.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301

(1987) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J., 

dissenting)). The Dunn factors are useful analytical tools that bear upon our primary

inquiry of “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it 

should be placed under the home's ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. 

Proximity. The close proximity of the detached garage to the residence 

suggests that it falls within the curtilage of the residence. The detached garage was

about twenty-five feet from the main residence, and a walkway through the backyard 

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connected the detached garage to the main residence.

4

 See United States v. Diehl, 

276 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the curtilage included a driveway 

eighty-two feet from the camp); United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1277 (2d Cir.) 

(holding that the curtilage included a cottage 375 feet from the main house), aff’d 

and amended, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996). 

Enclosure. The fence enclosure supports that the curtilage includes the 

detached garage. A chain link fence surrounded the backyard and connected to the 

detached garage. The fence did not enclose the entire building of the detached 

garage, but the fence started and ended at the detached garage and the garage door 

was inoperable—creating a full enclosure and requiring anyone wishing to enter the 

detached garage to do so from inside the fence. Thus, the fence and the detached 

garage “serve[d] to demark a specific area of land immediately adjacent to the house 

that is readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302; 

see also United States v. Swepston, 987 F.2d 1510, 1515 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding 

that an unfinished fence encircling both the house and the chicken shed supported 

that the curtilage included the chicken shed), abrogated on other grounds by Cousins, 

455 F.3d at 1121 n.4.

Nature of the use of the area. The third factor requires us to examine “the 

nature of the uses to which the area is put.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. A “detached 

4 We have held that a driveway entrance “several hundred feet” from the house 

was not part of the curtilage, a dramatic difference from the twenty-five feet here. 

Rieck v. Jensen, 651 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2011). 

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garage . . . [is] the type of building[] which [is] ordinarily a part of residential 

property” as the activity of storing a vehicle in a detached garage is intimately tied to 

home life. Earls, 42 F.3d at 1327; Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1575 (2018) 

(holding that the curtilage included a driveway and “a parking patio or carport into 

which an officer can see from the street is no less entitled to protection from trespass 

and a warrantless search than a fully enclosed garage”). Here, the overhead garage 

door was sealed, inoperable, and prevented the storage of a vehicle. Even with this 

information, the officers had no objective data indicating the use of the garage. But

intimate activities of the home occurred in this detached garage.5

 Defendant used the 

detached garage as a living quarter. The detached garage had clothes, mouthwash, 

multiple chairs, a mirror, lamps, and drinks. Officers also found Defendant sleeping 

in a bed. Defendant used the detached garage as a bedroom, and the activities that 

occur in a bedroom are the type of private intimate activities that occur in the home. 

5 Justice Scalia opined that the officer’s objective data about the use of the 

property lacked significance. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J. concurring). The 

officer’s perception is “no more relevant to whether the barn was curtilage than to 

whether the house was a house.” Id; see also United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d 

1116, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the actual use of the side yard and not 

officers knowledge to determine whether it’s within the curtilage); United States v. 

Diehl, 276 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that officers’ objective evidence of 

intimate use is not required); Harris v. O'Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 240 (2d Cir. 2014) 

(considering the actual use); United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1278 (2d Cir. 

1996) (considering both the actual use of the area and the officer’s objective 

knowledge and holding that the test is the actual intimate and private use made of the 

property); United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (looking to 

both the actual use of storing bulk food, wine, Christmas decoration and the officer’s

knowledge of marijuana smell); United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 

2001) (using both officer’s knowledge and how the homeowner actually made use of 

the property).

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Shielding from public view. The public could not observe the interior of the 

detached garage, which weighs in favor of the notion that the detached garage existed 

within the curtilage. The detached garage had two windows and one door, all of 

which faced the main residence and not the public alley. The sealed inoperable 

overhead garage door was the only entrance facing the public alley. The two boarded 

up windows protected the interior from public observation. After reviewing the 

Dunn factors, we conclude that the curtilage included the detached garage. Thus, the 

search warrant authorized the search of the detached garage.6

IV.

Defendant also argues that officers unreasonably detained him because his 

detention occurred outside the immediate vicinity of the premise to be searched. We 

disagree. “Detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant are reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment because the limited intrusion on personal liberty is 

outweighed by the special law enforcement interests at stake.” Bailey v. United 

6 Arguably, Defendant used the detached garage as a separate residence. But 

here, the property line and address encompassed the detached garage, and the same 

fence around the main residence connected to the detached garage. Nothing the 

officers observed, including the sealed and inoperable garage door, placed them on 

notice that Defendant used the detached garage as a separate residence until after 

officers breached it. See United States v. Smith, 531 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 

2008) (holding that the warrant included the garage apartment because officers were 

not on notice about the separate residence); Harman v. Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1080 

(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that officers had no reason to believe that detached garage 

was a separate residence even though garage had separate address and mailbox, 

certain vehicles parked on property were not used by residents of main house, and 

Operation Order described simultaneous raids on “residence # 1” and “residence 

# 2”).

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States, 568 U.S. 186, 202 (2013). Officers have three law enforcement interests in 

detaining an occupant during the execution of a search warrant: officer safety, 

facilitating the completion of the search, and preventing flight. Michigan v. 

Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981). But the detention must occur within the 

“immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 201. The 

search warrant authorized the search of the detached garage, and thus the immediate 

vicinity included the detached garage, and anyone inside it, such as Defendant. 

Defendant’s detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

AFFIRMED.

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