NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

METROPOLITAN CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

BRENDA CROOK, as the aunt of her minor niece, ALEXIS EVANS; 

CAMEO CARROLL, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0363

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CV201600094

The Honorable David L. Mackey, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Peshkin & Kotalik, PC, Phoenix

By E.J. Kotalik, Jr. 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Goldberg & Osborne LLP, Mesa

By Ryan Lamb 

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

FILED 4-23-2019
METROPOLITAN v. CROOK, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Appellants challenge the trial court’s summary judgment 

ruling finding Cameo Carroll was not covered under an automobile policy 

issued to Laci Navarro by Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company 

(Metropolitan). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In July 2010, Navarro loaned a 2005 Toyota Corolla to her 

mother, Terri Martin, with specific instructions not to let anyone other than 

herself and her then-husband drive it. Martin agreed to this condition. 

¶3 After Martin damaged the Corolla, she had it towed to 

Carroll’s father’s repair shop. When the repairs were complete in 

September 2010, Martin asked Carroll, her employee and friend, to deliver 

the Corolla to her. On the return trip, the Corolla was struck by another 

vehicle as Carroll pulled out of a gas station parking lot. Carroll’s threeyear-old daughter, A.E., was seriously injured in the collision.

¶4 A.E., through her aunt, Brenda Crook, sought compensation 

for her injuries from an insurance policy (the Policy) issued by Metropolitan

premised upon Carroll’s negligent operation of the Corolla. The Policy was 

issued to Navarro and James London II and designated only Navarro and 

London as named insureds. In February 2016, Metropolitan filed a 

complaint seeking a declaration that Carroll was not an “insured” under 

the Policy and therefore Metropolitan had no obligation to defend or 

indemnify any claims against Carroll arising out of the September 2010 

accident.

¶5 After considering the parties’ competing motions for 

summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in Metropolitan’s 

favor. Appellants timely appealed the final judgment, and we have 
METROPOLITAN v. CROOK, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1)1 and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Appellants challenge the trial court’s order granting 

summary judgment in Metropolitan’s favor on its complaint for declaratory 

relief. The interpretation of insurance contracts presents a question of law 

subject to de novo review. First Am. Title Ins. v. Johnson Bank, 239 Ariz. 348, 

350, ¶ 8 (2016) (quoting First Am. Title Ins. v. Action Acquisitions, L.L.C., 218 

Ariz. 394, 397, ¶ 8 (2008)). We interpret such contracts in accordance with 

the plain and ordinary meaning of the words contained therein. Id. (citing 

Sparks v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins., 132 Ariz. 529, 534 (1982)). In the course of 

our review, “we determine de novo whether any genuine disputes of 

material fact exist and whether the trial court correctly applied the law, 

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to . . . the non-prevailing 

party.” Robertson v. Alling, 237 Ariz. 345, 347, ¶ 8 (2015) (citing Ariz. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a), and BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, L.L.C., 236 Ariz. 

363, 365, ¶ 7 (2015)).

¶7 The Policy’s insuring clause states:

We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage 

to others for which the law holds an insured responsible 

because of an accident which results from the ownership, 

maintenance or use of a covered automobile, a non-owned 

automobile or trailer while being used with a covered 

automobile or non-owned automobile. We will defend the 

insured, at our expense with attorneys of our choice, against 

any suit or claim seeking these damages. We may investigate, 

negotiate or settle any such suit or claim.

An “insured” under the Policy is defined to include:

with respect to a covered automobile:

a. you;

b. any relative; or

 

1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of rules and statutes.
METROPOLITAN v. CROOK, et al.

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4

c. any other person using it within the scope of 

your permission.

The Policy also defines “you” as “the person(s) named in the Declaration of 

this policy as named insured and the spouse of such person or persons if a 

resident of the same household.” The Policy’s terms are consistent with

Arizona’s omnibus statute, which requires that all motor vehicle liability 

policies issued in Arizona “insure the person named in the policy as the 

insured and any other person, as insured, using the motor vehicle or motor 

vehicles with the express or implied permission of the named insured.” 

A.R.S. § 28-4009(A)(2). We construe the omnibus statute broadly in favor 

of providing coverage for permissive drivers. Hille v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 

25 Ariz. App. 353, 354 (1975). But it is Appellants’ burden to present facts 

establishing that Carroll had the permission necessary to trigger coverage. 

Home Ins. v. Keeley, 20 Ariz. App. 200, 202 (1973) (citing Hartford Accident & 

Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 273 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1959), and Allstate Ins. v. Smith, 

471 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)). 

¶8 Permission may be express or implied. Id. (citing Jurd v. Pac. 

Indem. Co., 371 P.3d 569, 572 (Cal. 1962)). However, both the Policy and the

omnibus statute direct that such permission come from a named insured. 

See supra ¶ 7. 

¶9 Appellants do not contend that either of the named insureds

— Navarro or London — gave Carroll express permission to drive the 

Corolla, arguing instead that “there were two grants of authority to use the 

[Corolla]” — one from Navarro to Martin and a second from Martin to 

Carroll. Even assuming permission could be granted in a two-step manner, 

the undisputed evidence indicates Navarro specifically instructed Martin 

not to let anyone other than herself or her husband drive the Corolla. 

Accordingly, Carroll did not have express permission from a named 

insured to drive the Corolla.

¶10 Appellants also contend that Carroll had implied permission 

to drive the Corolla. Permission to use a vehicle, without more, does not 

authorize the permittee to allow another to use it. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 

v. Williamson, 331 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1964) (citation omitted). However:

If an owner reasonably should anticipate that, in view of the 

scope and nature of the permission granted (even if less than 

unfettered dominion), and because of the permittee’s 

relationship to another, the permittee will allow that other
METROPOLITAN v. CROOK, et al.

Decision of the Court

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[person] to use the car, the owner’s permission, without more, 

can be found to encompass permission for that use.

Id. at 520. Thus “‘[i]mplied permission’ may be inferred where there is a 

course of conduct or relationship between the parties indicative of mutual 

acquiescence or a lack of objection under circumstances signifying assent.” 

Keeley, 20 Ariz. App. at 202 (collecting cases).

¶11 No such course of conduct implying that Carroll received 

permission from the named insureds exists here. There is no evidence that 

Navarro or London knew who Carroll was before the accident, and Carroll 

did not know who owned or insured the Corolla. Nor is there any 

indication that Navarro or London knew or had reason to know that Martin 

had permitted or would permit other persons to drive the Corolla against 

Navarro’s instructions such that a fact question regarding implied 

permission would prevent summary judgment. See Williamson, 331 F.2d at

520 (affirming the jury’s finding that the insureds’ twenty-year-old son had 

implied permission to allow his friends to operate the insured vehicle 

where evidence showed the son frequently disregarded the insureds’ rules

limiting his use of the vehicle without significant consequence). Therefore, 

Carroll did not have implied permission to drive the Corolla.

¶12 Finally, Appellants argue Martin had apparent authority to 

grant Carroll permission to drive the Corolla. Apparent authority arises 

when a principal induces third persons to believe that a person was her

agent, even if she conveyed no actual or express authority to that person. 

See Escareno v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. W., L.L.C., 239 Ariz. 126, 130, ¶ 8 (App. 

2016) (quoting Reed v. Gershweir, 160 Ariz. 203, 205 (App. 1989)). Again, 

there is no evidence that Navarro or London, the persons capable of 

extending the benefits of the Policy, ever knew of or communicated with 

Carroll prior to the accident. There is no apparent authority.

¶13 Because the undisputed evidence establishes that Carroll was 

not a named insured, was not a relative of a named insured, and did not 

have express or implied permission from a named insured to drive the 

Corolla, the trial court did not err in concluding as a matter of law that she 

was not an “insured” under the Policy.

2

 

2 Because we conclude Carroll was not an “insured” covered by the 

Policy, we need not and do not address whether her decision to drive the 

Corolla to a gas station before returning it to Martin removed her from 

coverage.
METROPOLITAN v. CROOK, et al.

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CONCLUSION

¶14 The trial court’s order is affirmed.

¶15 Both Appellants and Metropolitan request an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(A). Appellants are not successful parties, and their request is denied. 

As the successful party to a claim arising out of contract, Metropolitan is 

awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on appeal upon 

compliance with ARCAP 21(b). See Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Granillo, 117 

Ariz. 389, 395 (App. 1977) (awarding attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(A) to the successful party in an action seeking a declaratory 

judgment interpreting an insurance contract).