alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CEO/CFO Certification Pursuant to § 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350)

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation, respectively, certify that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009, which accompanies this certification, fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and subsidiary at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350) and shall not be relied
upon for any other purpose. The undersigned expressly disclaim any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as required by law.



|               |  |                                             
|-------------- |  | --------------------------------------------
|March 26, 2010 |  | /s/ Robert H. Gilliam, Jr.                  
|Date           |  | Robert H. Gilliam, Jr., President and       
|               |  | Chief Executive Officer                     
|               |  | (principal executive officer)               
|               | 
|March 26, 2010 |  | /s/ Bryan M. Lemley                         
|Date           |  | Bryan M. Lemley, Secretary,                 
|               |  | Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer       
|               |  | (principal financial and accounting officer)
(May 9, 1898.)

(May 27, 1898.)

#### LEWISTON NATIONAL BANK v. TEFFT.

[53 Pac. 271.]

Practice — Nonjoinder of Parties — Adverse Party. — In an appeal by one of two defendants from a judgment and decree of foreclosure, wherein a joint judgment was rendered against both, the defendant not joining in the appeal is an adverse party, and should be served with notice of appeal.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court, Idaho County.

James W. Eeid, for Appellants,

cites no authorities on the point decided by the court.

James E. Babb, for Eespondent,

files no brief.

HUSTON, J.

— This is an action to foreclose a mortgage executed by Albert P. Tefft and Carrie M. Tefft. A joint judgment and decree was rendered against both. From this judgment and decree Carrie M. Tefft appeals. There were other parties made defendants, some of whom appeared; others made default.

Two of the defendants, Carrie M. Tefft and Mary E Osborn, join in the appeal. Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that no notice of appeal was served upon Albert P. Tefft, against whom a joint judgment was rendered. Under the rule as given by this court in *Lydon v. Godard,*5 Idaho, 607, 51 Pac. 459, Albert P. Tefft was an adverse party, and should have been served with notice of appeal. (See *Lydon v. Godard, supra,*and cases there cited.) Motion allowed, and appeal dismissed, with costs to respondent.

Sullivan, C. J., and Quarles, J., concur.

ON REHEARING.

Per CURIAM.

— The petitioner claims that as Tefft has been released from all liability under the judgment of foreclosure, and the deficiency judgment against him had been satisfied, *105he was no longer interested in the appeal, was not an adverse party, and therefore entitled to service of the notice of appeal. The release of the defendant Tefft from all liability under the judgment of foreclosure as well as the deficiency judgment was based upon the validity of the judgment. If, upon appeal, the judgment of foreclosure was reversed, set aside, or invalidated, the consideration for the release failed, and the plaintiff’s right of action against Tefft was thereby revived, under the provisions of section 4498 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho. *(Cantwell v. McPherson,*3 Idaho, 321, 39 Pac. 102, and eases there cited.) As stated by this court in *Cantwell v. McPherson, supra,*there is no difference, under the statutes of Idaho, between a sale under an execution and one upon an order of sale upon foreclosure of mortgage. The reversal or modification of the judgment upon appeal revived the liability of the defendant Tefft upon the original contract. How can it be said, then, that he was not an interested party? Rehearing denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-03-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-29-1997
<CASH>                                          13,096
<SECURITIES>                                    17,467
<RECEIVABLES>                                   30,529
<ALLOWANCES>                                       800
<INVENTORY>                                     19,523
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                83,340
<PP&E>                                          83,069
<DEPRECIATION>                                  32,199
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 142,400
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           20,975
<BONDS>                                          7,600
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           775
<OTHER-SE>                                     104,260
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   142,400
<SALES>                                         43,168
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                43,168
<CGS>                                           32,938
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   36,301
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (435)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   8
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,294
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,954
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,340
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,340
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .28
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .27
        

</TABLE>
(May 9, 1898.)

#### WALLACE v. McKINLAY.

[53 Pac. 104.]

UNDERTAKING ON APPEAL-VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY.-Oil an appeal from a judgment and from an order sustaining a demurrer to defendants’ amended answer and undertaking, which provides “that said appellants will pay all damages and costs which may he awarded against them on the appeal or on a dismissal thereof, only, without reference to either appeal, is insufficient.

(Syllabus by the court.)

*96APPEAL from District Court, Shoshone County.

H. T. Samuels and Jones & Morphy, for Appellants.

No brief filed.

C. W. Beale, for Respondent,

cites no authorities upon the point on which the court dismissed the appeal, to wit, for the want of an undertaking on appeal.

HUSTON, J.

— This was an appeal from a judgment and from an order sustaining plaintiff’s demurrer to defendants’ amended answer. A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by respondent. The motion enumerates several grounds, but upon the hearing but one ground was argued, viz., the insufficiency of the undertaking. The undertaking provided only “that said appellants will pay all damages and costs which may be awarded against them on the appeal or on a dismissal thereof,” without any reference to which appeal it was intended to apply. It is urged by the appellants that, as the order sustaining the demurrer was not an appealable order, the appeal therefrom should be treated as surplusage, and the undertaking be sustained upon the appeal from the judgment. We cannot agree with this contention. Appellants appealed from both the order and the judgment and the undertaking covering but one appeal. It is not the province of this court to say to 'which appeal it is intended to apply. Appellants must stand or fall by the record they have presented to this court, tinder repeated rulings of this court, the motion to dismiss is allowed, with costs to respondent. (See *Kelly v. Leachman,*decided by this court, and reported in 5 Idaho, 521, 51 Pac. 407, and cases there cited.)

Sullivan, C. J., and Quarles, J., concur.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302(a) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, John A. Flanagan, certify that:

1.

I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the MacroShares Major Metro Housing Down Trust;

2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.

The other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a.

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b.

Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c.

Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal period (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.

The other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors, the board of managers of MacroShares Housing Depositor, LLC, and the audit committee of MacroMarkets LLC (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a.

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b.

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves persons who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: September 14, 2009

| |     |                                                                               
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | By: | /s/ John A. Flanagan                                                          
| |     | John A. Flanagan
Chief Financial Officer of Depositor,
on behalf of Registrant
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 88 (Friday, May 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25315-25316]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-10737]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service


Open Meeting of the Area 7 Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (Including the 
States of Alaska, California, Hawaii, and Nevada)

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: An open meeting of the Area 7 Taxpayer Advocacy Panel will be 
conducted. The Taxpayer Advocacy Panel is soliciting public comments, 
ideas, and suggestions on improving customer service at the Internal 
Revenue Service.

DATES: The meeting will be held Monday, June 7, 2010 and Tuesday, June 
8, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Janice Spinks at 1-888-912-1227 or 
206-220-6098.

[[Page 25316]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given pursuant to Section 
10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988) 
that a meeting of the Area 7 Taxpayer Advocacy Panel will be held 
Monday, June 7, 2010, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and Tuesday, June 8, 2010, 
from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Pacific Time in San Diego, CA. The public is 
invited to make oral comments or submit written statements for 
consideration. Notification of intent to participate must be made with 
Janice Spinks. For more information please contact Ms. Spinks at 1-888-
912-1227 or 206-220-6098, or write TAP Office, 915 2nd Avenue, MS W-
406, Seattle, WA 98174 or post comments to the Web site: http://www.improveirs.org.
    The agenda will include various IRS issues.

    Dated: May 3, 2010.
Shawn F. Collins,
Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.
[FR Doc. 2010-10737 Filed 5-6-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1572

To provide that children’s sleepwear shall be manufactured in accordance

with stricter flammability standards.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 9, 1999

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. DODD, Mr. BIDEN, and Mr. INOUYE) introduced

the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

A BILL

To provide that children’s sleepwear shall be manufactured

in accordance with stricter flammability standards.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Children’s Sleepwear

5 Safety Act of 1999’’.

6 SEC. 2. REVOCATION OF AMENDMENTS.

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the

8 date of enactment of this Act, the Consumer Product

9 Safety Commission shall propose for comment and, not

10 later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
2

S 1572 IS

1 this Act, issue a final rule amending its Flammable Fab2 rics Act standards to revoke the amendments to the stand3 ards for the flammability of children’s sleepwear sized 0

4 through 6X (contained in regulations published at 16

5 CFR part 1615) and 7 through 14 (contained in regula6 tions published at 16 CFR part 1616) issued by the Com7 mission on September 9, 1966 (61 FR 47634).

8 (b) APPLICATION.—None of the following shall apply

9 with respect to the promulgation of the amendment pre10 scribed by subsection (a):

11 (1) The Consumer Product Safety Act (15

12 U.S.C. 2051 et seq.).

13 (2) The Flammable Fabrics Act (15 U.S.C.

14 1191 et seq.).

15 (3) Chapter 6 of title 5, United States Code.

16 (4) The National Environmental Policy Act of

17 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).

18 (5) The Small Business Regulatory Enforce19 ment Fairness Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–121).

20 (6) Any other statute or Executive order.

21 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Sleepwear manufactured or

22 imported before the effective date (as established by the

23 Commission) of the Commission’s revocation required by

24 subsection (a) shall not be considered in violation of the

25 Flammable Fabrics Act if it complied with the Commis-
3

S 1572 IS

1 sion rules in effect at the time it was manufactured or

2 imported.

Æ
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

JAIME RENE LOPEZ-VAAL,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-50037

D.C. No. 

3:16-cr-00995-GPC-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 30, 2018** 

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, BYBEE, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

Jaime Rene Lopez-Vaal appeals the district court’s sentence of 40 months’

imprisonment and three years’ supervised release following his guilty plea for

FILED

SEP 04 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
being a removed alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

and (b). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Lopez-Vaal admitted the facts establishing the elements necessary for

conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1) in his plea agreement and Rule 11

colloquy, namely that he was an alien who had been “lawfully excluded, deported

and removed from the United States to Mexico on April 16, 2007,” and that prior

to this 2007 removal, he had been convicted of a felony for trafficking cocaine in

violation of section 69.50.401(A)(1) of the Revised Code of Washington.1

 

Because Lopez-Vaal’s conviction under §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1) was proper, the 40-

month sentence imposed by the district court, which was below the ten-year

statutory maximum established in § 1326(b)(1), was lawful. The district court did

not directly or implicitly hold that Lopez-Vaal had been convicted of a violation of

§ 1326(b)(2) or that it was imposing a sentencing enhancement under that section. 

Therefore, we reject Lopez-Vaal’s arguments that the district court erred by

imposing a sentence under § 1326(b)(2). 

AFFIRMED.

1

 Lopez-Vaal waived the argument that the Washington offense does not

categorically qualify as a felony for purposes of § 1326(b)(1) because he did not

raise it in his opening brief. See United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 668 (9th

Cir. 2006). Further, Lopez-Vaal failed to develop this argument or cite any

relevant precedent to support this claim. Therefore, we do not address it here.

2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0324

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

RICHARD JAMES HAACKE,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including September 20, 2024, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 13 2024

08/13/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0324
Exhibit 99.1

  Certification of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the
                          Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

In connection with this quarterly  report on Form 10-Q (the "report") of Options
Talent Group (the  "Company").  I, Mark Tolner,  Chief Executive  Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:

1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

     Date:  December 23, 2002



                                    /s/    MARK TOLNER
                                   -----------------------
                                   Mark Tolner
                                   Chief Executive Officer
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROGELIO CONCHAS-FERNANDEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 11-72189

Agency No. A092-294-084

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 19, 2012** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 

Rogelio Conchas-Fernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his second

motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to

FILED

JAN 03 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
reopen, and review de novo questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d

785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review. 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Conchas-Fernandez’s

motion to reopen where petitioner failed to establish prejudice arising from the

alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182,

1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (presumption of prejudice resulting from counsel’s failure to

file a brief may be rebutted where petitioner is unable to “show plausible grounds

for relief”). 

In light of our disposition, we need not address Conchas-Fernandez’s claim

regarding equitable tolling.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

2 11-72189
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

July 12, 2018

No. 04

- 17

- 00808

- CV

Daniel CRISP

, Appellant

v.

Ismael CLAY , et al., Appellee

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CI10107 Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

This is an appeal from an enforcement order rendered against appellant Daniel Crisp. On December 11, 201 7

, the trial court signed an “ Order Enforcing Prior Turnover Order, ” requiring Crisp , the sole signatory on a certain TD Ameritrade account, to wire $406,917.50 to a receiver

that had been appointed in a previously rendered t urnover order in favor of appellees, Ismael Clay, Joshua Kennedy, Matthew Arneson, Arthur Charles, Samone Drake, Phillip Erbe, Christopher Ramos, Christopher Rochon, Elric Thomas, Jimmie Walden, Jorge Garza, and Christopher Buza

.

During the pendency of this appeal

, Crisp filed a “ Motion t o Abate Appeal, ” requesting

this court to abate t his appeal because he had filed a “ Motion for Relief from Judgment under

Federa l Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ” in federal court. Crisp stated his motion for relief challeng ed an underlying federal judgment upon which the turnover order and enforcement order

are based. In his request for an abatement, Crisp indicated his motion for relief was set for a hearing before Magistrate Judge Bemporad on May 7, 2018. We therefore granted Crisp’s

motion to abate and ordered the appeal abated pending resolution of any action relating to the “Motion for Relief from Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)” filed by Crisp

in Cause No. SA

- 17

- CA

- 279

- FB (HJB), Clay v. Mcanear and Crisp

. We further ordered the parties to notify this court with a status update regarding the motion for relief on or before June 18, 2018.

On June 1 8 , 2018, Crisp filed a status report, indicating Judge Bemp orad issued a Report and Recommendations, stating the motion for relief wou ld be denied. In his report, he alsoindicated the parties could file objections to the report on or before June 25, 2018. Crisp stated he intended to file objections, and after the objections were filed, the federal court would make

its final determinat ion as to the motion.

Based on the foregoing, we ORDER the parties to notify this court with a status update regarding the objections and final determination as to the motion for relief on or before July 23,

2018.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 12th day of July, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court