************************************************

The “officially released” date that appears near the 

beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be 

published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it 

is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the 

beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut 

Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event 

of discrepancies between the advance release version of 

an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut 

Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest 

version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying 

an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or 

Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may 

not be reproduced or distributed without the express 

written permission of the Commission on Official Legal 

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

GARY RYDER v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

(AC 46128)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after

a jury trial, for the defendant bank. Following certain litigation over

two mortgages on the plaintiff’s property, the parties executed a settlement and release agreement and a loan modification agreement. After

the defendant commenced a foreclosure action against the plaintiff,

claiming that he had defaulted on the modified loan, the plaintiff initiated

the underlying action against the defendant, claiming, inter alia, breach

of the loan modification agreement and settlement agreement, to which

the defendant asserted the special defense of setoff. The jury returned

its verdict, pursuant to which it found for the plaintiff on the count of his

complaint alleging breach of the settlement agreement, and it awarded

damages in the amount of $350,000. The jury also found that the defendant had proven that, due to the plaintiff’s ongoing default in his loan

obligations, the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant for more than

$4 million. The jury subtracted the amount of the indebtedness from

the damages award on the interrogatories form. The jury, however,

returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Following clarifying instructions from

the court, the jury returned a defendant’s verdict on all counts of the

complaint consistent with its responses to the interrogatories. The plaintiff filed various postverdict motions, which the court denied. Held:

1. This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claims that the trial court

improperly denied his motions to set aside the verdict and for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict as those claims were unpreserved: the plaintiff never sought to challenge the legal sufficiency of the defendant’s

setoff defense by filing a motion to strike in accordance with the rules

of practice and failed to distinctly raise his claim that the setoff defense

was invalid prior to the submission of the case to the jury; moreover,

the plaintiff failed to preserve his claim that the defendant’s material

breach of the settlement agreement necessarily discharged his obligations under the loan modification agreement by failing to submit a

written request to charge or proposed jury interrogatories on the issue

and by agreeing to the submission of interrogatories to the jury that

plainly allowed it to find both that the defendant materially breached

the settlement agreement and that the plaintiff was indebted to the

defendant pursuant to his loan obligations; furthermore, because the

plaintiff’s trial counsel neither objected to questions about the debt

posed by the defendant’s counsel nor moved to strike the plaintiff’s
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 3

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

responses as to the amount of the debt, his claim that the court improperly concluded that his testimony as to the amount he owed the defendant was a judicial admission was unreviewable.

2. This court declined to review the plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that the

trial court improperly precluded him from presenting evidence relevant

to the damages he incurred after he transferred title to the property to

a trust; the record did not reflect that the plaintiff distinctly raised

this claim in opposition to the defendant’s motion in limine seeking to

preclude the plaintiff from presenting evidence of such damages or at

any other point during the trial.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motions

to set aside the verdict as inadequate and for additur; because there

was a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury’s verdict and there

was no evidence of mistakes or partiality, this court deferred to the

jury’s judgment.

4. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

denied his postverdict motion to consolidate the underlying action with

the defendant’s related foreclosure action against him: after the defendant initiated the foreclosure action, the plaintiff initiated the underlying

action instead of asserting his breach of contract claims in a counterclaim in the foreclosure action; moreover, the court properly considered

the belated nature of the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate as well as the

futility of doing so after a verdict had been returned and after the

plaintiff’s motion for a new trial had been denied.

Argued March 12—officially released August 6, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of

contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, and

tried to the jury before Clark, J.; verdict for the defendant; thereafter, the court Clark, J., denied the plaintiff’s motions to set aside the verdict, for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, and for additur; judgment

for the defendant; subsequently, the court, Genuario,

J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate, and the

plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Ridgely Whitmore Brown, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Brian D. Rich, for the appellee (defendant).
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, Gary Ryder, appeals from

the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury

trial, in favor of the defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank,

National Association. On appeal, the plaintiff claims

that the court improperly (1) denied his motions to set

aside the jury’s verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ‘‘to the extent that the verdict awarded

no damages to the plaintiff,’’ (2) precluded the plaintiff

from presenting evidence relevant to the damages

incurred after November, 2014, when he transferred

title to the property to a trust, (3) denied his motions

to set aside the verdict as inadequate and for additur,

and (4) denied his postjudgment motion to consolidate

the underlying action with the defendant’s related foreclosure action against the plaintiff. We disagree and,

accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as the jury reasonably could have

found them, and procedural history are relevant to the

plaintiff’s claims on appeal. In January, 2003, the plaintiff executed a mortgage on his property in Greenwich

(property) in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, FA

(Washington Mutual) to secure an adjustable rate note

in the principal amount of $2.45 million (first mortgage).

In March, 2003, the plaintiff executed a mortgage in

favor of the defendant to secure future advances pursuant to a home equity line of credit agreement and disclosure statement with a $300,000 limit (second mortgage).

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed two lawsuits related to

the loans, one against Washington Mutual in the United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut and

the other against the defendant in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia. In the Connecticut action, Washington Mutual filed a counterclaim

to foreclose the first mortgage. The defendant subsequently acquired the first mortgage from Washington
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 5

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

Mutual and was substituted as the defendant and counterclaim plaintiff in the Connecticut action.

In November, 2011, the parties executed a settlement

and release agreement along with a loan modification

agreement. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the

parties released all of their respective claims in the

federal actions, the plaintiff agreed to withdraw both

actions by December 15, 2011, and the defendant agreed

to release the second mortgage on the property. Pursuant to the loan modification, the maturity date of the

note is November 1, 2051, the new principal balance

was $2.9 million, with interest beginning to accrue as

of November 1, 2011, at the rate of 1 percent until

November 1, 2014, when the rate increased to 5.1 percent (modified loan). Although the plaintiff performed

his obligations under the settlement agreement, the

defendant did not release the second mortgage on the

plaintiff’s property until April 21, 2014. On November

3, 2014, the plaintiff conveyed the property to SFK Trust,

LTD (SFK Trust) by virtue of a deed recorded in the

Greenwich land records.

In October, 2018, the defendant commenced a foreclosure action against the plaintiff, claiming that he had

defaulted on the modified loan. In February, 2019, the

plaintiff initiated the underlying action against the

defendant. In the operative seven count complaint, the

third amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the

defendant: (1) breached the loan modification agreement by failing to pay the real estate taxes to the town

of Greenwich in a timely manner (first count); (2)

breached the settlement agreement by (a) failing to

release the lis pendens in a timely manner (second

count), (b) failing to release the second mortgage until

April 21, 2014 (third count), (c) attempting to enforce

the second mortgage in violation of General Statutes

§ 36a-648 (fourth count), (d) improperly increasing his

monthly mortgage payment, principal, interest, and
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

taxes (fifth count), and (e) claiming that his outstanding

debt was greater than $2.9 million (sixth count); and

(3) improperly induced him to execute the settlement

agreement by falsely representing that his outstanding

debt was $2.9 million even though it since has claimed

that his outstanding debt is greater than $2.9 million

(seventh count).

The defendant denied the material allegations in the

complaint and asserted, as a special defense, that ‘‘[a]ny

and all damages to which the plaintiff would otherwise

be entitled must be offset by the debt owed to the

defendant related to the ongoing default in his loan

obligations.’’ The plaintiff filed a reply in which he, inter

alia, denied the allegations in the defendant’s special

defense of setoff.1 The defendant subsequently filed a

motion in limine, seeking to preclude evidence of any

damages claimed by the plaintiff after he conveyed the

subject property to the SFK Trust in November, 2014,

as he was no longer the owner of the subject property.

The court granted the motion in limine, without prejudice, on May 20, 2022.

Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury over the course

of several days in June and July, 2022, with the court,

Clark, J., presiding. At trial, the plaintiff was represented by Attorneys Richard P. Silverstein and John

Ferranti. On June 28, 2022, the first day of evidence, the

court addressed certain preliminary matters, indicating

that, if necessary, it would revisit its ruling concerning

the time period for which evidence of damages could

1 We note that the parties used ‘‘setoff’’ and ‘‘offset’’ interchangeably in

their pleadings and during the proceedings before the trial court in reference

to the defendant’s special defense. Although we refer to that defense as a

‘‘setoff’’ in this opinion, there is no meaningful distinction between the two

terms. See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18,

116 S. Ct. 286, 133 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1995) (‘‘[t]he right of setoff (also called

offset) allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual

debts against each other, thereby avoiding the absurdity of making A pay

B when B owes A’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 7

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

be introduced. The court also noted the defendant’s

request to charge the jury as to its setoff defense and

stated that, at that time, it did not believe that it would

be appropriate to instruct the jury as to the defendant’s

claimed setoff, as the foreclosure case was a separate

action, and it could be prejudicial to combine the claims

made therein with those in the plaintiff’s case. The

plaintiff’s counsel agreed.

Despite the court’s initial concerns, however, it permitted the plaintiff’s alleged default on the modified

loan and the issue of setoff to be raised at trial. During

trial, the plaintiff testified that he stopped making payments as required under the loan modification agreement in 2014 because he believed ‘‘there was no agreement anymore because it had been breached in so many

different ways . . . .’’ Nevertheless, on cross-examination, he admitted that he owed the defendant approximately $3 million for the principal amount of the loan

and for the property taxes that the defendant paid to

the town of Greenwich.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case on July 1,

2022, which was a Friday, the defendant moved for a

directed verdict, arguing, among other things, that the

plaintiff’s admission of his indebtedness had established the defendant’s setoff defense. The trial court

deferred ruling on the motion for a directed verdict and

briefly discussed the charging conference scheduled

for the following week. The court invited counsel to

submit any revised requests to charge or proposed verdict forms, noting that the ‘‘plaintiff’s request was very

basic, [while the] defense’s request was robust. And,

obviously, now we have some evidence.’’ The court

issued a written order that same day, which stated:

‘‘Consistent with the discussion on the record during

the trial on July 1, 2022 . . . [t]he parties shall review

the working draft of the court’s jury charge that was

presented to counsel at the beginning of evidence and
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

which has since been emailed to counsel by caseflow.

Counsel shall submit any proposed edits to the draft

charge by Tuesday, July 5, 2022, at 1:00 p.m. . . . The

parties shall be prepared to engage in a charging conference on Wednesday, July 6, 2022, with the court.’’

At the beginning of the day on July 6, 2022, the court

explained that the parties had provided the court with

proposed edits to the charge, and that the court would

defer any ruling on the defendant’s motion for a directed

verdict until the conclusion of the case or after a verdict.

Thereafter, the defendant presented a single witness,

and the plaintiff offered no rebuttal.

After releasing the jury, the court held a charging

conference. After reviewing several of the parties’ suggested edits, the following exchange occurred between

the court and the parties’ counsel:

‘‘The Court: I think that goes through all of the edits.

I know we didn’t solve all of them. But you noted,

Attorney Ferranti, you thought you might have some

other—a couple other—some other points that we

might not have touched on there.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: No, I—we touched on them,

thank you—

‘‘The Court: Okay.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: —for asking, Your Honor.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I don’t

believe we addressed the offset edit. . . .

‘‘The Court: Oh, the offset, I’m sorry. So, the offset,

yes, there was an effort to add in, I . . . think given

the evidence that some instruction on the offset is

appropriate. . . . I took the liberty of taking the language proffered by [the defendant] and making some

softening. . . . So, I’ll pass . . . that out to . . .

counsel. I do think given the evidence that the special
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 9

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

defense is appropriate and that the offset—charge as

to the offset is appropriate . . . . So, I . . . think it’s

something like that and then, you know, it’s a matter

of whether the jury finds that there is evidence.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Isn’t this a subject of different

litigation currently pending?

‘‘The Court: I’m sorry?

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Isn’t that three million the

subject of litigation currently pending in this courthouse?

‘‘The Court: The—I think there certainly is an active

foreclosure case.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Right, which claims that my

client is three million in arrears. How does that, which

is a separate and distinct action, get to be argued in

this court and then again in the other case?

‘‘The Court: Well, there’s a variety of ways that it can,

and it still could be, and either way, could end up being

relevant to that case. But I think in this case, there is

a—it is a special defense that was claimed. There is

evidence associated with a potential offset and therefore, I believe, it’s appropriate for the jury to consider

whether or not one should apply to any verdict that

they would issue. There is no counterclaim in this case,

so we don’t have the foreclosure case, and this case is

one claim. So, what the offset would potentially do here

could be, depending upon whatever damages there are,

it could reduce or eliminate them for sure, but I don’t

think that forecloses any action or defenses associated

with the foreclosure action.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: Your Honor, I do have—

‘‘The Court: Yeah.
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: —concerns on the fourth paragraph—I’m sorry, the third paragraph, halfway down.

‘Importantly, before you consider any setoff that the

defendant may be entitled to, the plaintiff must prove

all of his damages claims by a preponderance of the

evidence.’ It seems a little confusing. It seems to me

somebody might read this—the jury might read this and

say, he’s gotta prove count one, count two, count three,

count four.

‘‘The Court: Uh-huh.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: Certainly, the plaintiff must

prove damages. I’m not sure about ‘all [of] his damages

claims.’ They might read that as all the counts.

‘‘The Court: Right. Well, part of the practical nature

of this, which goes to the verdict forms, which is how

this is—where does this appear and how does it apply,

and is it to the macro or is it to each count. You know,

because there could be certainly some confusion in the

calculation—the question.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Your Honor, it would seem

to me that if you’re going to allow them, and I know

they [pleaded] offsets setoff, to have this charge, again,

I’m wondering why it is that what my client gave up is

not damages. It’s as if you’re—you’re removing what

he did from the contract and focusing only on what

[the defendant’s] responsibilities were. My client under

the contract had responsibilities that he fulfilled to his

detriment. In other words, he couldn’t revive those lawsuits, but yet you’re telling us that those aren’t damages.

I just can’t understand the logic of how a contract where

one party—

‘‘The Court: Okay. Attorney Silverstein, we’re not

going to keep arguing that same point. This—to the

extent—let’s assume you can’t understand, okay.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: I can’t understand it.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 11

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

‘‘The Court: And we’ll just move on. The issue of

the offset in this case, among many other pieces of

evidence, comes from the fact that there was an obligation on your client to pay the mortgage and apparently

from his testimony and corroboration, there—payments have not been made since 2014. So, if he hasn’t

made the payments, and I understand his position is

there was no longer a contract, which sort of begs the

question of, well then how are you seeking to enforce

a contract, but I’ll leave that aside for the moment. How

is that not a potential offset? So, he didn’t do—you said

he did everything he was supposed to do. The evidence

does not appear to be so in that regard. So, if he didn’t

pay the mortgage, and how is that not a potential offset

to his damages attempting to assert the damages associated with the enforcement of the mortgage.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Can I answer that?

‘‘The Court: So, that has nothing to do with the foreclosure of the prior settlement agreement or evidence

that doesn’t exist in this case of the negotiation, what

the parties actually valued it as, et cetera. It goes to,

from alleged breach forward, what were the actions,

and are there any offsets to those actions, which in this

case, a lack of payment of a mortgage for eight years

strikes me as something the jury could value.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: . . . [W]ell, then what Your

Honor is saying is that when my client became aware

of the breach, that he still had to fulfill all the obligations

even in light of the fact that [he] was aware that they

had breached the contract. Once he becomes aware of

that, from my understanding of contracts law, years

ago, that’s just not the case. His . . . responsibilities

don’t go on under that breached contract forever. It

just—that’s not how it works. Once he—

‘‘The Court: Okay, thank you.
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, even if that

legal interpretation or proposition was correct—

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: It is correct.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: —[The plaintiff] sat on

the stand and said he owes [the defendant] at least

three million dollars. So, even if Attorney Silverstein’s

comments are legally correct, which I think there’s

some—I don’t think they’re correct. [The plaintiff] has

testified, and the jury has heard, that he owes [the

defendant] at least three million dollars, plus, by the

way, the unpaid taxes, which I didn’t even include in

my draft language here. So, that’s the evidence before

the jury, and I understand Your Honor’s softening of

my proposed language and the reasons behind it. But

the plaintiff in this case testified quite explicitly that

he owes the defendant at least three million dollars.

So, I think there’s a compelling argument to be made

that the jury should be affirmatively charged that it

must offset the damages based on his testimony, which

Your Honor’s revised draft is a little short of that, but

that’s what I believe is appropriate in this case based

on his undisputed testimony.

‘‘The Court: Anything further, Attorney Ferranti?

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: Not on that subject. Thank you,

Your Honor.’’ The court then briefly discussed the interrogatories and verdict form before adjourning for the

day.

The next morning, the court began by noting that it

had given counsel updated copies of the draft verdict

forms and the jury charge and that they had discussed

the jury interrogatories prior to opening court. Following closing arguments, the court took a recess before

reviewing the verdict form, interrogatories and charge

with the parties. At that time, Attorney Ferranti commented on the interrogatories pertaining to the setoff
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 13

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

defense as to the first count of the plaintiff’s complaint,

which provided: ‘‘Subtract the amount entered in

response to question 6 [‘What is the amount plaintiff

owes the defendant due to his ongoing default in his

loan obligations?’] from the amount entered in response

to question 4 [‘Calculate the total amount of damages,

if any, entered in response to 3a-3d above’]. If the difference is a positive number, enter it below, and you may

enter a verdict for the plaintiff in this amount. If the

difference is zero or a negative number, you must enter

a verdict in favor of the Defendant.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Attorney Ferranti, reading from the interrogatories, stated: ‘‘If the difference is zero, you must enter

a verdict . . . in favor of the defendant, is fine. I do

believe a negative number would still be valid because

it would be a setoff even though it doesn’t [rise] above

what is owed, that number should be subtracted from

what is owed. So, I would take exception to that. I think

it should [read], ‘[I]f the difference is zero, then you

must enter a verdict in favor of the defendant.’ If not,

I think we’re stuck with what that number is.’’ The court

acknowledged that point and proceeded to bring in

the jury.

The court charged the jury regarding the plaintiff’s

claims and the defendant’s special defense of setoff.

The court provided the agreed upon interrogatories that

required the jury to answer whether the defendant had

proven that the plaintiff owed it moneys ‘‘due to his

ongoing default in his loan obligations,’’ and, if so, to

determine the amount of that debt. The interrogatories

also directed the jury to subtract the debt amount from

any award of damages to the plaintiff and, if the difference was zero or a negative number, to enter a verdict

in favor of the defendant.

As to the defendant’s setoff special defense, the court

instructed the jury as follows: ‘‘To the extent you find

that the plaintiff has proven liability and damages for
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

any of his claims, you must then consider whether any

amount to which you have decided the plaintiff is entitled must be offset by any debt that you may [find] is

owed to [the defendant] related to the plaintiff’s ongoing

loan obligations. As I mentioned earlier, [the defendant]

has affirmatively asserted this as a special defense. As

I have mentioned, [the defendant] has the burden of

proving its special defense by a fair preponderance of

the evidence. The plaintiff does not have to disprove

it. In Connecticut, a setoff may be legal in nature. A

party may be entitled to a setoff to enforce the simple

but clear natural equity in a given case. In this case, [the

defendant] is claiming a setoff relating to [the plaintiff’s]

alleged ongoing default of his loan obligations, which

are the subject of this case.

‘‘As applied to here, if you determine that [the defendant] is entitled to recover any moneys unpaid by [the

plaintiff], but due and owing to [the defendant], then

any possible award of damages that you feel has been

sufficiently proven by the plaintiff may be reduced by

this amount. Importantly, before you consider any setoff that the defendant may be entitled to, the plaintiff

must prove all of his damages claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Once you have determined, what,

if any damages have been sufficiently established, you

must determine whether the defendant is entitled to a

setoff which will reduce any potential award of damages

to the plaintiff. . . .

‘‘In this case you have heard other evidence related

to the mortgage payment status and the taxes paid on

the property in question. It is for you to determine the

ultimate value of any setoff, if applicable, and then to

apply such setoff [in] the amount that you find is proven

to exist in this case. Therefore, to the extent that you

enter any verdict in favor of the plaintiff, I direct you

to offset such amount by the amount, if any, that you
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 15

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

find applicable to this case based on the facts as you

find them.’’

As to the plaintiff’s damages, the court instructed the

jury in relevant part that, ‘‘if you determine that the

plaintiff has proven both liability and damages by a

preponderance of the evidence in this action, then you

may only award amounts for damages incurred related

to the property while [the plaintiff] was actually in title

of the property, i.e., before November 3, 2014, and may

not award damages for any alternate time period.’’

After the jury exited the courtroom, the court

inquired of counsel, ‘‘Exceptions, objections, concerns?’’ Although the defendant’s counsel took some

exceptions to the charge, Attorney Ferranti simply

responded, ‘‘No, Your Honor. Thank you.’’

On July 11, 2022, the jury returned a verdict along

with answers to the interrogatories, which the courtroom clerk read for the record. Pursuant to the interrogatories, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the

third count of his complaint but for the defendant on

the remaining counts. Specifically, the jury found that

the defendant had breached the settlement agreement

by failing to release the second mortgage until April,

2014, and that the plaintiff had proven that the defendant’s material breach had caused him to suffer damages in the amount of $350,000 due to the inability to

refinance the loan and the loss of a potential sale of

the property. The jury also found that the defendant

had proven that, due to his ongoing default in his loan

obligations, the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant in

the amount of $4,023,338.21 ‘‘per [Defendant’s] Exhibit

GG,’’ which was a payoff statement for the plaintiff’s

loan obligations under the modified loan agreement,

and that it had subtracted that amount from the

$350,000 damages award on the interrogatories form.

On the verdict form, however, the jury found for the
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

plaintiff in the amount of $350,000. After the clerk read

the verdict and the answers to the jury interrogatories,

all of which the jury confirmed, the following exchange

occurred between the court and the jury foreperson:

‘‘The Court: . . . I just want to note, I did not hear

when the clerk was reading the interrogatories the

response to number seven in the damages. . . . I did

not hear number seven, it says subtract the amount

entered in response to question six from the amount

entered in response to question four. If the difference

is a positive number, enter it below. And . . . you may

enter a verdict for the plaintiff in this amount. If the

difference is zero or a negative number, you must enter

a verdict in favor of the defendant. And there is an

amount there and that amount is negative

[$3,673,338.21]. I did not hear that amount referenced

when you read the interrogatory previously, Mr. Clerk,

and I just want to ask the jury, did you answer number

seven in section three to that amount, that the negative

number of [$3,673,338.21]?

‘‘[The Jury Foreperson]: We did enter that amount.

‘‘The Court: Thank you. And with that confirmation,

what I’d like to do is just ask you to just step into the

jury room for a minute and so I can clarify this with

counsel and then just bring you right back out. Okay.

So, it’ll just be a minute, folks.’’

After the jury exited the courtroom, the court discussed the apparent inconsistency between the clear

instructions on the interrogatories and the verdict form

with respect to count three. Specifically, the court’s

review of the forms determined that the jury had failed

to properly follow the instruction for the third count.

As such, the acceptance of the verdict was halted, and

the court engaged in a discussion on the record with

counsel outside the presence of the jury.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 17

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

‘‘The Court: So the problem . . . is the instruction

was if they came to zero or negative to issue that as a

defendant[’s] verdict. . . . Right, wrong, or indifferent,

that was the instruction. So, in their verdict they carried

over the [$350,000] and do not appear to have applied

the setoff. So, my thought given that is that . . . I need

to—and they did not sign the interrogatories, which we

have to address too. But I believe I may need to give

them an instruction to reread that section and to reconsider what, if any, number they’re going to put in the

verdict to count three in the verdict form. Because I

think their verdict, at this point, is inconsistent with

what they wrote in the interrogatories. Attorney Ferranti.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: I don’t necessarily disagree,

Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Attorney Rich?

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I agree entirely, Your

Honor. It is inconsistent upon its terms and that it needs

to be corrected.

‘‘The Court: Okay. Of course, like every other day in

this case, now we approach a witching hour so we’re

right at one. I think we could accomplish this relatively

quickly. I could give them instruction to review it again,

to sign it again, to make any correction in the verdict

form that needs to be made, and we’ll see if the problem

is then absent waiving it, [the clerk] has—would have

to read it all again.

***

‘‘So why don’t we do this, why don’t I bring them

back, let [them] know that I have to give them—I’m

going to give them the quick instruction, and then I

want them to take lunch, come back, review, sign off on

everything, check their math and so forth, and correct

it as needed to the extent [there are] any [changes to]
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

the verdict form, you just initial where he makes the

correction, and we’ll take it up at two.’’

At that point, the jury returned, and the court

instructed them as follows. ‘‘Based upon the interrogatories you answered and the verdict you gave, there’s

an inconsistency, and I need you to correct that, however you choose to correct it, and then we’ll deal with

that. . . . In other words, there’s no damages if it’s

zero or a negative number. That was the instruction.

On the verdict, you still had it with a plaintiff’s verdict

of $350,000, which appears to conflict with the math

on the interrogatory which would appear to have been

a negative number. So, what I’m going to ask you to do

is two things. One, you—to review the interrogatories,

specifically, that one, number seven, in—in—in subsection three. And, to the extent that is . . . a positive

number and you need—there was some other error you

need to correct, make that correction, and then you fill

out the verdict form accordingly. To the extent it is

. . . a negative number or zero, then there would . . .

be a defendant[’s] verdict, not the [$350,000]. So, you’d

correct that on the jury form, initial that correction,

and then hit the right box. . . . So, what I’m going to

have the clerk do is give you back the verdict forms,

you make whatever corrections you need to based upon

that instruction and based upon your findings, write

them out, sign the interrogatories. If there’s any change

to the numbers that currently exist in here, cross it out,

initial and put the new number in.’’

Thereafter, the jury submitted two questions to the

court: (1) ‘‘As a jury, we are unclear why the verdict

flips in favor of the defendant even though we found

. . . breaches per the interrogatories’’ and (2) ‘‘[i]f the

verdict [on the third count] is changed to be in favor

of the defendant, will [the plaintiff] still receive an offset
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 19

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

of the damages amount we indicated in the interrogatories (currently showing $350k), from the amount owed

to [the] defendant[?]’’

After the court read the jury’s questions, Attorney

Ferranti stated: ‘‘That was the exact reason for my

exception to jury interrogatory Roman numeral three,

six and seven, and it is further compounded by the

jury’s confusion. It appears that the [plaintiff] wouldn’t

be able to realize the jury’s verdict finding of $350,000

in damages if there is a verdict for the defendant. While

the foreclosure action subject of the mortgage and settlement agreement here is a separate action, I don’t

believe it is a distinct and separate action, Your Honor.

The verdict form finding in favor of the defendant would

appear to bar the recovery of the $350,000 as a setoff

in the foreclosure action. If the jury finds on one hand

for $350,000 in damages but is directed to find in favor

of the defendant . . . on the verdict form, then the

$350,000 seems to be rendered immaterial. It doesn’t

make sense to me. Is he going to realize—be able to

realize that $350,000 in the foreclosure action? And it

would appear by the verdict form that he wouldn’t, so

that would render their—the damages irrelevant.’’

The court then allowed the defendant’s counsel to

respond, and the following exchange occurred:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: If the defendant has

proven its offset defense, then the funds have to be

offset against any finding in favor of the plaintiff. That

appears to be what the jury has done in response to

their interrogatories and, you know, I think that the

jury should either be directed accordingly or, in light of

. . . some possible confusion the jury is having about

following Your Honor’s instructions, perhaps, Your

Honor needs to issue a ruling yourself.

‘‘The Court: Yeah, I think the two, perhaps, pieces of

confusion are, are there damages once you do the offset? And—and I think ultimately—so that’s number one.
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

And then number two, if an offset brings it to zero or

a negative number, does that necessarily mean it’s a

defendant’s verdict? In other words, we started the

interrogatories and found the plaintiff’s verdict and as

we worked all the way through we get to a defendant’s

verdict, how does . . . that work is the way I’m kind

of reading it. And, I think the answer is that’s because

I’m telling you how that—that’s how it works. So, if

you go through the interrogatories and you find that

applicable offset that does flip it, essentially, to there

being no award of damages and thus a defendant’s

verdict.

‘‘So, I understand your exception to the, you know,

how is this, but I think there is a distinction to be drawn

that’s been drawn a number of times in this [case], but

this is this case.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: Correct.

‘‘The Court: So, I don’t believe there’s—this necessarily is something that [the defendant] can run into the

foreclosure [court] and say, hey, we proved an offset

of 4 . . . million dollars, give us that in the foreclosure.

I mean, [the defendant has] got to prove his foreclosure

case. And I think you can’t go to the foreclosure case

and say, hey, we proved to a jury in a different case

that there’s a value of $350,000 somewhere here that

needs to be credited, you’d have to prove that in the

foreclosure case.2

2 Although not at issue in the present case, we disagree with the trial

court’s assessment of the import of the jury’s findings regarding the $350,000

in damages. ‘‘The concept of setoff allows [parties] that owe each other

money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thus avoiding the

absurdity of making A pay B when B in fact owes A.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Those Certain Underwriters

at Lloyd’s of London, 84 Conn. App. 688, 703, 854 A.2d 1100, cert. denied,

272 Conn. 905, 863 A.2d 698 (2004). Given that the defendant utilized the

outstanding mortgage debt as a setoff to negate the plaintiff’s award in the

present case, that setoff necessarily reduced the amount of the plaintiff’s

outstanding debt to the defendant by the $350,000 that the defendant did

not have to pay to the plaintiff. Although the setoff avoids ‘‘the absurdity
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 21

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: I disagree, but . . . . It is a separate action, but it’s not distinct. We are talking about

the same mortgage, the same settlement agreement,

there should be an—an effect, a realization of the

$350,000 in damages in the foreclosure because, again,

it’s separate, but it’s not distinct. We’re talking—

‘‘The Court: Right. Either party could have chose—

tried to consolidate, that didn’t happen in this case. . . .

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, Your Honor, just

in response to that comment, I think Attorney Ferranti

and I agree to some extent that all of these issues are

fertile ground in the foreclosure case. . . . But back

to this case, I mean, the interrogatories are very clear,

if you find this, you must enter a verdict in the favor of—

in favor of the defendant. And based on their responses,

that’s what they found. And I think the jury has to be

directed to find in favor of the defendant based on their

responses.

‘‘The Court: Any[thing] further, Mr. Ferranti?

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: No, Your Honor. . . .

‘‘The Court: So, just to recap, my intention would

be to answer the first question, basically, that, as I

instructed you, once you apply the offset, it is possible

that . . . any damages found [can], in fact, be entirely

offset as appears to be the case here. And, you know,

as I told them before, they are to follow my instructions

on the law and this is one of those, they have to follow

my instructions with respect to how to apply the offset.

In number two, my answer would be the verdict has

not changed, the verdict is a result of you going all the

of making’’ the defendant pay the plaintiff $350,000 when the plaintiff in

fact owes the defendant more than $3 million, the plaintiff still is entitled

to realize the practical effect of that setoff, most likely by reducing the

amount of the debt due in the foreclosure case, assuming that the doctrines

of collateral estoppel or res judicata apply to this issue in that case—a

question on which we express no opinion.
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

way through the interrogatories. And, per my instruction on the law, if you go all the way through the interrogatories and, after they answered number seven, you

come to a zero or a negative number, I’m directing you,

as a matter of law, to find a defendant’s verdict. So,

that I would send them back in and direct them to

correct their verdict with respect to count number three

consistent with my charge.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: With all due respect, I—I disagree with that, Your Honor. I—I would suggest that

the court strike answer seven from Roman numeral

three on the jury interrogatory and the corresponding

and the same question on the verdict form in favor of

the defendant.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, we’ve

already been through this. Of course, we went through

the charging conference, we can’t change the jury interrogatories now after we’ve already directed the jury

that way. Even if it was merited, I don’t think that would

be appropriate, but it’s not merited in this particular

case, there’s just simply no basis to do that, to undo

what Your Honor has already told the jury it must do

in this case.

‘‘[Attorney Ferranti]: Perhaps it’s a mistrial on that

count.

‘‘The Court: Okay. That motion is denied, and we

will complete our process. So, let’s bring in the jury.’’

(Footnote added.)

When the jury returned, the court answered the jury’s

questions as follows: ‘‘[I]n this case, there is a special

defense of offset. So, I’ve instructed you how to apply

the offset if you found an offset . . . . So, from the

clarity standpoint in the interrogatories it walks you

through if you find damages then you go to the offset,

if you find an offset you do the math. If the math is a
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 23

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

zero or a negative number it then must be, must be, a

defendant’s verdict. And that is the application of the

law as I’ve given it to you. . . . So, you must apply

that offset how it works. With respect to your second

question with respect to [the change], my answer to

you is it doesn’t change anything. If you go all the way

through [the interrogatories] it either is or it isn’t a

plaintiff’s verdict. If you apply an offset and it’s zero or

negative it isn’t [a plaintiff’s verdict], it is a defendant’s

verdict. So, it’s not changing anything, it’s just going all

the way through the interrogatories. So, what I’m going

to do at this point based upon what you put in the

interrogatories and these questions, to avoid any confusion, I’m going to instruct you to apply the offset as

you have and to do the math as you have, and in doing

so to render a verdict for the defendant [on] that count.

‘‘So, you would just make the correction and essentially cross off the [$350,000] and make that a defendant’s verdict there, sign the . . . interrogatories forms

that’s still fine because you have the—the negative number, you’ve done that properly. Just sign the interrogatories form. All you have to do is make the correction on

the verdict form, just initial that. But that would be as

I’m instructing you on the law, that’s how you apply

the offset in this case. Okay. So, I’m instructing you to

go back and do that. If you have any other questions or

that wasn’t clear, we’ll be waiting here for your knock.’’

After the jury exited the courtroom, the court asked

counsel whether they had any comments or concerns

based on its instruction, and Attorney Ferranti

responded, ‘‘Nothing that hasn’t already been stated,

Your Honor.’’ Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a

defendant’s verdict on all counts of the complaint consistent with their responses to the interrogatories, and

the court accepted the jury’s verdict.

The defendant renewed its oral motion for a directed

verdict by filing a written motion and supplemental
Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

24 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

brief in support of its motion for a directed verdict,

seeking to eliminate the jury’s award of $350,000 on

the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support it. The plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the

verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,

in which he claimed that, as a matter of law, the

$4,023,338.21 setoff against the $350,000 damages

award was improper because (1) the defendant’s material breaches of the settlement agreement discharged

his obligations under the modified loan agreement, (2)

it did not arise out of a debt that was ‘‘independent’’

of the plaintiff’s claim under the settlement agreement

and should have been raised in a counterclaim, and (3)

pursuant to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v.

Essaghof, 336 Conn. 633, 249 A.3d 327 (2020), the

amount of debt owed could only be finally determined

within the context of the foreclosure action. The plaintiff also argued that the trial court erred in not permitting evidence of his damages after he conveyed legal

title to the subject property to the SFK Trust in November, 2014.

In addition, the plaintiff filed a motion for additur

‘‘to add the amount of $350,000 to the jury’s verdict

. . . .’’ In his memorandum of law in support of the

motion, he argued that ‘‘the jury verdict of zero for the

plaintiff on the verdict for material breaches of the

settlement agreement [was] based on a mistake of law

as to the effect of the defendant’s claimed right of setoff.

The defendant had no such rights because the defense

of setoff could not be asserted in this action because

it is not an independent action, and because any obligation to pay the defendant per the terms of the settlement

agreement was discharged by the defendant’s material

breaches.’’

The defendant objected to each of the plaintiff’s posttrial motions, arguing that the plaintiff waived any claim

regarding its setoff special defense because he neither
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 25

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

challenged the legal sufficiency of that defense nor took

exception to the jury charge. The plaintiff filed a

response, arguing that he had not waived his challenge

to the setoff special defense because he (1) denied the

setoff in his reply to the defendant’s special defenses,

(2) agreed with the trial court on the first day of trial,

when the court indicated that it did not believe the

setoff defense was proper, and (3) argued against a

setoff when objecting to the defendant’s oral motion

for a directed verdict. The plaintiff also argued that any

exception to the jury charge on setoff was unnecessary

because the issue of whether it was a valid defense is

a question of law for the court, not one of fact for

the jury.

After filing reply memoranda to the defendant’s

objections, the plaintiff filed a ‘‘Motion for Equitable

Relief and Consolidation with the Foreclosure Case’’

(motion to consolidate), which provided in relevant

part: ‘‘This motion is made in the alternative to the

pending motions for mistrial, to set aside, etc. The two

cases should be consolidated so that the equitable and

legal relief may be considered together [in the foreclosure action]. . . . In fact, a counterclaim was just filed

last week (October 19, 2022) in the foreclosure case

. . . .’’ The defendant filed an objection, arguing that

the plaintiff’s ‘‘request would create procedural chaos

by consolidating two duplicative sets of claims by [the

plaintiff] into one case, with a jury having already adjudicated one of them.’’

The court held a hearing on the parties’ motions on

November 7, 2022, and it issued a memorandum of

decision denying both parties’ motions on December

9, 2022. The court held that the plaintiff had waived

any claim that a setoff was improper and, alternatively,

that the jury had properly applied the setoff based upon

the evidence. Specifically, the court reasoned that ‘‘the

special defense of setoff was not the subject of a motion
Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

26 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

to strike or some other timely challenge or exception

either before or during the trial. Also, after discussions

about the special defenses, the charge, the interrogatories, and the verdict forms on the record and in a charging conference, this is not a defense which was

unknown to the plaintiff. . . . Thus, by not raising an

exception to the charge on the record or objections to

the special defense of setoff until these posttrial

motions, such claims have been waived.

‘‘Further, beyond the issue of waiver, as to the substance of the claims in the plaintiff’s motions, there are

no grounds to set aside or otherwise reject the verdict.

The plaintiff himself testified on the record and freely

admitted to the fact that he owes the defendant on the

outstanding loan. The jury appears to have accepted

the plaintiff’s admission/concession that he still owes

money [to the defendant] while also accepting the plaintiff’s testimony that the gap in time where the second

mortgage was not released and that damages resulted

to the plaintiff from that breach of the settlement agreement.

‘‘The plaintiff’s complaint did not allege or seek to

be absolved from the mortgage as a remedy. In fact,

both parties through their arguments on various

motions were quite aware of the pending foreclosure

action . . . . That case is a separate and distinct case

that the parties are actively litigating. The defendant

has made no claim in this case to seek collection on

the foreclosure case either. The plaintiff’s argument

that the setoff special defense is improper is inconsistent with the law, the facts of the case, and the evidence

presented.

‘‘The defendant properly asserted a defense of setoff

based on the debt owed to it by the plaintiff, a debt

that the plaintiff conceded to in open court, on the

record. . . . While it is true that the jury did assign
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 27

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

some damages to count three, the same jury also concluded a specific amount applicable to a setoff consistent with the jury instructions related to the special

defense of the defendant. This was not some random

or invented number that the jury pulled out of thin air.

Rather, the jury took the time to cite the source of the

number in the evidence, exhibit GG. This deliberative

process is not to be ignored. . . .

‘‘The court did not find its own facts or tell the jury

to find facts or make its own calculation of damages

or even engage in any math . . . rather, the court used

the findings made by the jury in their interrogatories.

The court simply reminded the jury to confirm their

calculation and the math and to follow the instruction

of how to transfer their result to the verdict form with

respect to the damages figure and any setoff figure

found. If the result of that math was a zero or negative

number, the jury was to follow the instructions as to

how to apply that result to the verdict form. Once the

jury returned to their deliberations and reviewed the

calculation, they reasonably and logically concluded

that the math result of their findings was a negative

number. This is reflected in their own hand where they

had written the negative number on the interrogatories

form. The jury applied the setoff that it found to apply

based on the evidence they found in a manner consistent with the instructions and the charge that had been

vetted with the parties in advance and returned a

defense verdict as to count three, along with a defense

verdict on the other six counts. That verdict was

accepted by the court.

‘‘The verdict does not shock the conscience, it is not

unreasonable. The jury listened to the evidence and

chose to credit the testimony and evidence presented

by the plaintiff with respect to the second mortgage

breach and the plaintiff’s lost opportunities to refinance

or sell the property. . . . They then assigned a specific
Page 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

28 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

amount of damages that they found proven. Given the

dates, figures, and testimonial evidence submitted, the

court cannot determine that these findings are unreasonable to require the verdict be directed or set aside.

‘‘Considering the unchallenged special defense pleading of setoff, the various discussions on the record and

the evidence presented at trial, including admissions/

concessions by the plaintiff and various financial documents submitted as full exhibits, it is entirely logical and

understandable that the jury would consider a potential

setoff. The jury appears to have paid extremely close

attention to the evidence in this regard, even citing an

exhibit in their interrogatories as the source of their

offset amount. . . .

‘‘[T]he totality of the verdict and the answers to interrogatories reflect an appropriate and thoughtful review

of the evidence presented and a following of the law

given through the charge. . . . By finding certain

breaches of the settlement agreement without any damages as well as other breaches with specific damages,

the jury did exactly what the parties asked them to

do. . . .

‘‘At this juncture, it appears that these experienced

litigators and parties seek to undo the result of the

litigation that they collectively framed and presented

simply because they are displeased with certain aspects

of the results. The parties presented their respective

cases and made their arguments to the jury. The jury

applied the law to the facts found. The jury exhibited

a fidelity to their oath that is laudable and there is no

basis for their work and their verdict to be undone by

this court. As such, the defendant’s motions for directed

verdict . . . and the plaintiff’s motions to set aside the

verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

are denied . . . .
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 29

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

‘‘The court finds that the jury made no mistake in

the calculation of their final verdict and that the jury

applied the setoff, that they found to have been proven,

appropriately. As such, there [are] no grounds for the

court to grant the plaintiff’s motion for additur, and it

is denied.

‘‘The court does not consider the motion [to consolidate] to be an appropriate remedy . . . to the . . .

motions as suggested by the plaintiff. . . . Retroactively moving to consolidate postverdict and seeking

to apply a portion of the verdict as opposed to the entire

verdict to another pending case does a disservice to

this jury and their complete verdict. As such, the court

will decline the invitation to incorporate [the motion

to consolidate] into its remedies or rulings on these

motions. Rather, that motion . . . will stand alone and

be referred to the presiding civil judge for due consideration.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.)

The court, Genuario, J., held a remote hearing on

the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate on December 19,

2022. That same day, the court issued a written order

denying the motion ‘‘for several reasons,’’ though primarily because the motion was ‘‘untimely.’’ This appeal

followed.3

I

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict and

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ‘‘to

the extent that the verdict awarded no damages to the

plaintiff.’’ More specifically, the plaintiff claims that the

court improperly concluded that (1) ‘‘the defendant’s

3 After filing the appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation, which

Judge Clark denied on March 7, 2023, without comment. The plaintiff filed

a motion for review, requesting that this court order the trial court to

articulate the bases of its decision denying his posttrial motions. This court

granted review but denied the relief requested therein.
Page 28 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

30 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

claimed setoff could properly be plead[ed] and prosecuted as a defense,’’ (2) the defendant’s material breach

of the settlement agreement did not discharge the plaintiff from his obligations under the settlement agreement, and (3) ‘‘the plaintiff’s testimony that he owed

the defendant an amount of money on the loan was

a judicial admission.’’ We conclude that the plaintiff’s

claims are unpreserved and, therefore, decline to

review them.

Practice Book § 16-20 provides in relevant part: ‘‘An

appellate court shall not be bound to consider error as

to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction

unless the matter is covered by a written request to

charge or exception has been taken by the party appealing immediately after the charge is delivered. Counsel

taking the exception shall state distinctly the matter

objected to and the ground of objection. . . .’’ Accordingly, ‘‘a party may preserve for appeal a claim that an

instruction . . . was . . . defective either by: (1) submitting a written request to charge covering the matter;

or (2) taking an exception to the charge as given. . . .

Thus, the essence of the preservation requirement is

that fair notice be given to the trial court of the party’s

view of the governing law and of any disagreement that

the party may have had with the charge actually given.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Champeau v.

Blitzer, 157 Conn. App. 201, 207 n.5, 115 A.3d 1126,

cert. denied, 317 Conn. 909, 115 A.3d 1105 (2015).

It is well settled that ‘‘we will not permit parties

to anticipate a favorable decision, reserving a right to

impeach it or set it aside if it happens to be against

them, for a cause which was well known to them before

or during the trial. . . . This same principle requires

parties to raise an objection, if possible, when there is

still an opportunity for the trial court to correct the

proposed error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 Conn. App.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 29

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 31

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

589, 619, 43 A.3d 722, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 920, 47

A.3d 389 (2012), and cert. denied, 305 Conn. 920, 47

A.3d 389 (2012). ‘‘Raising that objection as an issue

for the first time in a motion to set aside the verdict,

obviously does not allow such a possibility because the

jury has been excused. When we speak of correcting

the claimed error, we mean when it is possible during

that trial, not by ordering a new trial. We do not look

with favor on parties requesting, or agreeing to, an

instruction or a procedure to be followed, and later

claiming that that act was improper.’’ Powers v. Farricelli, 43 Conn. App. 475, 478, 683 A.2d 740, cert. denied,

239 Conn. 954, 688 A.2d 326 (1996); see also Herrera

v. Madrak, 58 Conn. App. 320, 325, 752 A.2d 1161 (2000)

(‘‘to preserve for appeal a claimed error in the trial

court’s charge to the jury, a party must take an exception when the charge is given that distinctly states the

objection and the grounds therefor’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

The plaintiff first contends that the court improperly

concluded that the setoff defense ‘‘could properly be

plead[ed] and prosecuted as a defense’’ because the

debt is contingent, and it is not independent of the

plaintiff’s claims.

In the present case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was on notice of the defendant’s setoff defense

because the defendant asserted it in its initial answer

and special defenses and specifically requested an

instruction on the issue in its request to charge. The

plaintiff, however, never sought to challenge the legal

sufficiency of that defense by filing a motion to strike

in accordance with our rules of practice. Nor did the

plaintiff distinctly raise his claim that the setoff defense

was invalid because the debt is contingent and arises

from the same transaction prior to the submission of

the case to the jury.
Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

32 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

On the first day of evidence, although the court initially disagreed with the defendant’s request to charge

on the setoff defense, and the plaintiff’s counsel

expressed agreement with the court’s position at that

time, the court made clear that it was expressing its

preliminary thoughts only, and the defendant’s counsel

maintained that he intended to present evidence on

that defense at trial. Ultimately, when the defendant’s

request for a setoff instruction was discussed again

during the charging conference, although Attorney Silverstein questioned the fairness of instructing the jury

as to setoff while not allowing the plaintiff to assert

damages arising from his release of his claims in the

two federal lawsuits against the defendant, he did not

claim that it was improper because the alleged debt

was not independent of the plaintiff’s breach of contract

claims. In fact, rather than arguing that the setoff was

invalid on the ground that it was not independent of

the plaintiff’s claims, Attorney Silverstein argued that

setoff was improper because the foreclosure action is

a separate proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Alvarez, 209

Conn. App. 250, 252 n.2, 267 A.3d 303 (2021) (when

party makes different argument on appeal than at trial,

claim is unpreserved), aff’d, 346 Conn. 530, 292 A.3d

1 (2023).

Furthermore, when discussing the interrogatories

that clearly set forth how the jury was to apply any

setoff based on their answers, the plaintiff’s counsel

again failed to object to the setoff on the ground that

it was not independent of the plaintiff’s claims. In fact,

not only did the plaintiff’s counsel not object to the

inclusion of the setoff defense in the interrogatories,

but Attorney Ferranti noted his partial agreement with

the framing of that issue when he stated: ‘‘If the difference is zero, you must enter a verdict—a verdict in

favor of the defendant, is fine. I do believe a negative

number would still be valid because it would be a setoff
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 31

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 33

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

even though it doesn’t [rise] above what is owed, that

number should be subtracted from what is owed.’’

(Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, the plaintiff had every opportunity to

challenge the validity of the defendant’s setoff defense,

either by filing a motion to strike or by objecting to the

charge and interrogatories on that basis, but he failed

to do so. Instead, he waited until the jury had reached

its verdict before claiming that the defendant’s setoff

was improper because it did not arise from an independent transaction. ‘‘Raising that objection as an issue

for the first time in a motion to set aside the verdict,

obviously does not allow [the trial court to correct the

proposed error] because the jury has been excused.’’

Powers v. Farricelli, supra, 43 Conn. App. 478.

Although the plaintiff contends that the court improperly concluded that he waived his challenge to the setoff

defense, during oral argument before this court, his

appellate counsel conceded that, because the plaintiff

failed to take an exception to the inclusion of either

the setoff charge or the setoff interrogatories, his claim

challenging that defense is unpreserved. Consequently,

because the plaintiff did not preserve his challenge to

the setoff, we decline to review it on appeal. See, e.g.,

Barrese v. DeFillippo, 45 Conn. App. 102, 104, 694 A.2d

797 (1997) (‘‘Our review of the record reveals that the

defendant first raised the claim of inconsistency in his

motion to set aside the verdict. The defendant never

undertook to require the plaintiff to choose between

negligence and intentional battery and assault, did not

except to the jury charge, and, in fact, submitted jury

verdict forms and interrogatories based on the plaintiff’s allegations of both negligence and intentional tort.

Because the defendant’s claim was not properly preserved, we decline to review it.’’ (Footnote omitted.)).

Likewise, the plaintiff failed to preserve his claim

that the defendant’s material breach of the settlement
Page 32 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

34 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

agreement necessarily discharged his obligations under

the loan modification agreement by failing to submit a

written request to charge or proposed jury interrogatories on the issue and by agreeing to the submission of

interrogatories to the jury that plainly allowed it to

find both that the defendant materially breached the

settlement agreement and that the plaintiff was

indebted to the defendant pursuant to his loan obligations. The interrogatories specifically required that the

jury determine whether the defendant’s alleged breach

of the settlement agreement was ‘‘a material breach’’

and, if the plaintiff proved his damages as to that material breach, whether ‘‘the defendant [had] proven that

the plaintiff owes it mon[eys] due to the plaintiff’s ongoing default in his loan obligations.’’ If the plaintiff

believed that the jury’s finding that the defendant’s

material breach of the settlement agreement necessarily

excused his ‘‘ongoing default in his loan obligations,’’

then he should have distinctly raised that claim by

objecting to those interrogatories. Our review of the

record reveals that the plaintiff, however, expressed no

disagreement with this portion of the interrogatories,

and ‘‘[w]e may presume from the plaintiff’s repeated

failure to object to the interrogatories that he agreed

to their content and their submission to the jury.’’

Mokonnen v. Pro Park, Inc., 113 Conn. App. 765, 770–71,

968 A.2d 916 (2009). Accordingly, we decline to review

this unpreserved claim as well.4

4 The plaintiff also claims that, ‘‘[b]y instructing the jury to mark the

damages award to zero, the court impermissibly found a fact that was within

the province of the jury because it effectively reversed the jury’s decisions

that the defendant’s breaches were material.’’ The plaintiff argues that,

‘‘although the court instructed the jury to set off the plaintiff’s damages

according to what it believed to be the legal effect of the defendant’s claim

for setoff, the actual legal effect of the material breach found by the jury

compelled the court to conclude that the plaintiff’s obligations under the

modified mortgage were discharged. By instructing the jury to the contrary,

the court effectively negated their findings as to material breaches of the

defendant.’’ Although the plaintiff briefed this subclaim separately, he simply

restates his unpreserved challenges to the court’s setoff charge and the

related interrogatories, which we decline to review.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 33

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 35

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

Finally, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly

concluded that his testimony that he owed the defendant more than $3 million was a judicial admission that

supported the jury’s finding as to the defendant’s setoff

because that admission is a ‘‘legal [conclusion] which

. . . a layman could not be qualified to make.’’ The

problem, however, is that his counsel neither objected

to the questions about the debt posed by the defendant’s

counsel nor moved to strike the plaintiff’s responses

as to the amount of the debt. As a result, his claim is

unreviewable. See State v. Heriberto M., 116 Conn. App.

635, 641, 976 A.2d 804 (‘‘[t]he defendant’s failure to

object to the admission of [the] testimony [at issue]

renders his claim unpreserved and unreviewable’’), cert.

denied, 293 Conn. 936, 981 A.2d 1080 (2009).

II

Next, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly

precluded him from presenting evidence of damages

incurred after November, 2014, when he transferred

title to the property to the SFK Trust. We conclude that

the plaintiff’s evidentiary claim is not reviewable.

‘‘A trial court may entertain a motion in limine made

by either party regarding the admission or exclusion of

anticipated evidence. . . . The judicial authority may

grant the relief sought in the motion or such other relief

as it may deem appropriate, may deny the motion with

or without prejudice to its later renewal, or may reserve

decision thereon until a later time in the proceeding.

Practice Book § 42-15. This court has said that [t]he

motion in limine . . . has generally been used in Connecticut courts to invoke a trial judge’s inherent discretionary powers to control proceedings, exclude evidence, and prevent occurrences that might

unnecessarily prejudice the right of any party to a fair

trial.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Patel, 186 Conn. App. 814, 843, 201
Page 34 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

36 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

A.3d 459, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 906, 203 A.3d 569

(2019).

Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In

jury trials, where there is a motion, argument, or offer

of proof or evidence in the absence of the jury, whether

during trial or before, pertaining to an issue that later

arises in the presence of the jury, and counsel has fully

complied with the requirements for preserving any

objection or exception to the judge’s adverse ruling

thereon in the absence of the jury, the matter shall be

deemed to be distinctly raised at the trial for purposes

of this rule without a further objection or exception

provided that the grounds for such objection or exception, and the ruling thereon as previously articulated,

remain the same. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

Consistent with these rules of practice, it is well settled that an appellate ‘‘court is not bound to consider

claims of law not made at the trial. . . . In order to

preserve an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel

must object properly. . . . In objecting to evidence,

counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature

of the objection and its real purpose, in order to form

an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling. . . . Once

counsel states the authority and ground of [the] objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground asserted.

. . . [T]hese requirements are not simply formalities.

[A] party cannot present a case to the trial court on

one theory and then seek appellate relief on a different

one . . . . For this court to . . . consider [a] claim on

the basis of a specific legal ground not raised during

trial would amount to trial by ambuscade, unfair both

to the [court] and to the opposing party. . . . Thus,

because the essence of preservation is fair notice to

the trial court, the determination of whether a claim

has been properly preserved will depend on a careful

review of the record to ascertain whether the claim on
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 35

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 37

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

appeal was articulated below with sufficient clarity to

place the trial court on reasonable notice of that very

same claim.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda,

327 Conn. 451, 464–65, 174 A.3d 770 (2018).

As previously noted in this opinion, before trial, the

defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude

the plaintiff from presenting evidence of damages he

allegedly incurred after November, 2014, when he was

no longer the owner of the subject property. The court

granted the motion in limine without prejudice on May

20, 2022. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court

erred in granting the defendant’s motion in limine

‘‘despite the representation of [the] plaintiff’s counsel

that the trust agreement allows the plaintiff to access

the equity in the property and therefore should be admitted as an exhibit . . . [and] the plaintiff testified that

under the terms of the trust, he still had access to the

funds of the trust and received reimbursements from

the trust from the rental of the property . . . . In fact,

[the] defendant’s counsel admitted as much by eliciting

this testimony on cross examination . . . .

‘‘The plaintiff therefore did suffer damages after the

conveyance of legal title to the trust in November, 2014.

The beneficiary of a trust has an equitable interest or

title that is legally cognizable . . . . [T]he plaintiff

therefore should have been permitted to introduce evidence that the damages to his credit arising from the

defendant’s failure to release the lis pendens and second

mortgage continued past the date of conveyance to the

trust and that the plaintiff’s interest in the property gave

him the ability to sell or refinance the property or rent

it. In addition, he should have been able to show evidence that the damage to his credit prevented him from

obtaining gainful employment.’’ (Citations omitted.)

Initially, we note that the record is bereft of any

arguments that the plaintiff made in opposition to the
Page 36 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

38 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

defendant’s motion in limine because he neither filed

a written objection nor requested the May 20, 2022

transcript of the hearing on that motion for his appeal.

Accordingly, the record does not reflect that the plaintiff distinctly raised the claim that he now advances on

appeal in opposition to the defendant’s motion in limine.

See Practice Book § 61-10 (a) (‘‘[i]t is the responsibility

of the appellant to provide an adequate record for

review’’); Practice Book § 63-8 (a) (‘‘[w]ithin ten days

of filing an appeal, the appellant shall . . . order . . .

the transcript of the parts of the proceedings not already

on file that the appellant deems necessary for the proper

presentation of the appeal’’).

Moreover, although the plaintiff attempts to marshal

the purportedly ‘‘uncontroverted and admitted evidence’’ as to the plaintiff’s alleged ‘‘beneficial ownership’’ of the property to support his claim on appeal

that the court should have allowed him to present ‘‘evidence of [his] rights under the trust and damages suffered after the conveyance,’’ he fails to identify any

attempt to seek a definitive ruling from the court on

the basis of that evidence. Indeed, in arguing that the

court granted the motion in limine ‘‘despite the representation of the plaintiff’s counsel’’ as to the nature of

the trust, the plaintiff relies on a representation that

was made on the first day of trial, more than one month

after the court granted the defendant’s motion in limine.

Specifically, the plaintiff directs this court’s attention

to the following exchange between the trial court and

the plaintiff’s counsel before the start of trial:

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: [F]rom my understanding,

you want to limit this case from 2011 when it was

breached to today because we’re claiming the breach

is ongoing. Fair enough?

‘‘The Court: Fair enough. Also understanding the

transfer of property in 2014 and that motion in limine.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 37

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 39

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: We haven’t really reached

that on—are you saying that 2012 to 2014 is where I’m—

my damages end?

‘‘The Court: There’s a line at [2014], at the moment

based upon the transfer of property based on the prior

rulings, so as we sit here right now, that is a line.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Right.

‘‘The Court: With respect to damages.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: But with the understanding

that when we produce what we intend to produce, the

trust agreement which is no different than the others,

other than different characters, and if it allows him to

access the equity or sell the property on behalf of the

trust, then that’s a completely different parameter.

‘‘The Court: I’m not sure it’s a completely different

parameter, but depending on how the evidence goes—

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Well—

‘‘The Court: —we may need to revisit certain dates

and time and whatnot, but based on where we are today

and based on the motions and the rulings, there was

a transfer of the property, I believe it was November

of 2014—

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: —and so, at the moment, there is no

discussion or evidence of damages associated with the

ownership of that property by [the plaintiff] from that

transfer forward because the entity it was transferred

to is not a party to this case.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: But I don’t want to run afoul

to the court’s ruling because it was my intention to

argue on opening that should you hear evidence that

the damages are ongoing after this issue of whether

the property still remained in the condition where [the
Page 38 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

40 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

plaintiff] could access it, that is something that you can

also consider, but only if the judge—

‘‘The Court: Well, there won’t be an opening, so we

won’t have that problem.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: I’m not going to be able to

open?

‘‘The Court: No. But as we get to evidence, I think

as we discussed in the motion in limine, the—to the

extent there’s damages that occurred between breach

and the sale in 2014, that any of those damages continue

on. I think that’s fair game. But to the extent that there’s

damages associated with the property and the owner

of that property post the transfer of that property, that’s

where the cut off would be pursuant to those rulings

as we sit here right now.

‘‘[Attorney Silverstein]: Your Honor, with all due

respect, you know, I know that you are concerned that

I will deviate from your order, but I can assure you that

over lunchtime, I confined myself just to what happened

in 2011 on. I will cut it off at 2014 with just a simple

statement that the judge may instruct you that those

damages that we intend to show my client incurred

from 2011 to 2014 may in fact be ongoing. That was all

I was gonna say. . . . I think it would be helpful.’’

(Emphasis added.)

This exchange demonstrates that the plaintiff’s counsel never sought ‘‘a definitive ruling [when the evidence

was offered at trial] in [compliance] with the requirements of our court rules of practice for preserving his

claim of error . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patel, supra, 186 Conn. App. 844. To the

contrary, it appears to demonstrate counsel’s acquiescence to the court’s preliminary ‘‘without prejudice’’

ruling on the motion in limine, as counsel ends the

exchange by stating, ‘‘I will cut it off at 2014, with just
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 39

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 41

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

a simple statement that the judge may instruct you

that those damages that we intend to show my client

incurred from 2011 to 2014 may in fact be ongoing.’’

Consequently, because the record does not reflect

that the plaintiff distinctly raised his evidentiary claim

in opposing the defendant’s motion in limine before

trial or at any point during the trial, we conclude that

the plaintiff has not preserved his claim for appellate

review. See State v. Patel, supra, 186 Conn. App. 844

(‘‘[h]aving not taken advantage of the court’s offer and

having not objected at the time the evidence was

offered, the defendant has not preserved this evidentiary issue for appellate review’’). Therefore, we will

not review it.

III

The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly

denied his motions to set aside the verdict as inadequate

and for additur. The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he jury’s

determination that the plaintiff’s damages for breach

of the settlement agreement were only $350,000 was

clearly against the weight of the evidence’’ and that the

court ‘‘should have found the verdict to be so clearly

against the weight of the evidence in the case as to

indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law

. . . and set aside the verdict and grant a new trial as

to any consequential and incidental damages in addition

to the $350,000 that the jury found for the plaintiff

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the plaintiff’s postverdict motions to set aside

the verdict as inadequate and for additur.

In considering a motion to set aside the verdict and

to order an additur, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. See Maldonado v. Flannery, 343 Conn. 150, 166,

272 A.3d 1089 (2022). ‘‘The question for the trial court
Page 40 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

42 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

is not whether the jury exercised poor judgment but,

instead, whether the jury’s damages award lies outside

the range of reasonableness; mere disagreement is not

enough to warrant judicial intervention. For this reason,

[t]he ultimate test [that] must be applied to the verdict

by the trial court is whether the jury’s award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just

damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks

the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the

jury [was] influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake

or corruption. . . . If the verdict cannot be explained

rationally, then the trial court may presume that it is

tainted by improper considerations. . . .

‘‘We review a decision of the trial court to set aside

the jury’s verdict and to order an additur for an abuse

of discretion. . . . A trial court’s decision to set aside

a verdict and to order an additur is entitled to great

weight and every reasonable presumption should be

given in favor of its correctness. . . . The trial court,

having observed the trial and evaluated the testimony

firsthand, is better positioned than a reviewing court

to assess both the aptness of the award and whether the

jury may have been motivated by improper sympathy,

mistake, partiality, or prejudice. . . .

‘‘The action of a trial judge is no less entitled to

weight when he sets aside a verdict, than when he

refuses to set it aside; and for the same reasons. He

has seen the witnesses, heard their testimony, observed

their demeanor on the witness stand, their manner and

bearing, their intelligence, character and means of

knowledge. And if while all this is fresh in his mind he

sets aside a verdict, great weight would naturally be

given to his action. . . .

‘‘[O]ur case law involving trial court rulings on

motions to set aside a jury’s verdict and award of damages as excessive or inadequate . . . reflects a firm
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 41

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 43

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

commitment to the belief that we should give great

weight to the trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding the reasonableness of the jury’s verdict.’’ (Citations

omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 166–69.

In the present case, in returning a defendant’s verdict

on the second count of the plaintiff’s complaint, the

jury found that the defendant’s failure to release the lis

pendens until March 2, 2012, constituted a material

breach of the settlement agreement but also found that

the plaintiff failed to prove that that breach caused

him to incur damages due to ‘‘negative references with

regard to his credit and good name,’’ lost employment

opportunities, the loss of ‘‘a potential favorable refinance,’’ and lost potential sale of the property. As to

the third count, the jury found that the defendant’s

failure to release the second mortgage until April 21,

2014, constituted a material breach of the settlement

agreement and that the plaintiff had proven that he

suffered $350,000 in damages due to ‘‘lost potential

favorable refinance’’ and ‘‘lost potential sale of the property,’’ but rejected his claims for damages for negative

references to his credit and good name and for lost

employment opportunities.

In denying the defendant’s postverdict motions seeking additur, the court specifically noted that ‘‘[t]he jury

listened to the evidence and chose to credit the testimony and evidence presented by the plaintiff with

respect to the second mortgage breach and the plaintiff’s lost opportunities to refinance or sell the property.

. . . They then assigned a specific amount of damages

that they found proven. Given the dates, figures, and

testimonial evidence submitted, the court cannot determine that these findings are unreasonable to require

the verdict be directed or set aside. . . .

‘‘[T]he totality of the verdict and the answers to interrogatories reflect an appropriate and thoughtful review
Page 42 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

44 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

of the evidence presented and a following of the law

given through the charge. . . . By finding certain

breaches of the settlement agreement without any damages as well as other breaches with specific damages,

the jury did exactly what the parties asked them to do.’’

(Citations omitted.)

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that ‘‘the principal

amount of the [modified] loan was $2.9 million, with

interest to be charged at 1 percent for the first three

years and then 5.12 percent for the remainder of the

life of the loan . . . . The monthly mortgage payments

would, therefore, rise from $7332 to $13,636 in November, 2014, an increase of $6304 per month, $75,648 per

year, and an increase of $2,792,672 over the 443

remaining payments under the term of the mortgage

. . . . The increase in payments that would render the

plaintiff unable to meet the monthly mortgage payments

and the fact that the failure to release the second mortgage prevented a refinance for a more affordable mortgage resulted in damage that is far greater than the

$350,000 damages that the jury found.’’ (Citations omitted.) We are not persuaded.

Although the plaintiff focuses on the increase in the

mortgage payments as of November, 2014, as the primary basis for the damages he suffered, he ignores the

fact that, because he transferred the property to the

SFK Trust on November 3, 2014, the court instructed

the jury that it could ‘‘only award amounts for damages

incurred related to the property while [the plaintiff] was

actually in title of the property, i.e., before November

3, 2014 . . . .’’ Given that limited time period during

which the plaintiff suffered damages due to his inability

to refinance or sell the property, the jury’s award of

$350,000 ‘‘falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages’’ and, therefore, that amount

does not ‘‘compel the conclusion that the jury [was]
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 43

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 45

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maldonado

v. Flannery, supra, 343 Conn. 166. We recognize that the

plaintiff believes that $350,000 ‘‘is clearly inadequate’’

to compensate him for ‘‘the millions of dollars that [he]

could have saved, as well as [for] the prevention of the

loss of his home.’’ ‘‘In the absence of evident mistakes

or partiality, however, we defer to the jury’s judgment

. . . .’’ Munn v. Hotchkiss School, 326 Conn. 540, 579,

165 A.3d 1167 (2017). In short, because there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury’s verdict, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the

plaintiff’s motions to set aside the verdict and for additur.

IV

Finally, the plaintiff claims that the court, Genuario,

J., improperly denied his motion to consolidate this

breach of contract action with the pending foreclosure

action. We disagree.

We review a court’s ruling on a motion to consolidate

under the abuse of discretion standard. See Valentine

v. LaBow, 95 Conn. App. 436, 453, 897 A.2d 624, cert.

denied, 280 Conn. 933, 909 A.2d 963 (2006). In the

absence of ‘‘a case of manifest abuse,’’ the court’s ‘‘exercise of that discretion will not be reversed on appeal

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In denying the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate in the

present case, the court explained that ‘‘this case has

already been tried before a jury and a verdict has been

rendered. Postverdict motions have been filed and

decided by the trial judge. . . . Thus, the purpose of

consolidation as set forth in [Practice Book §] 9-5 (a)

cannot be achieved, since this case has already been

tried and the foreclosure action has not yet been tried.

The motion is quite untimely. The plaintiff knew of [the]

foreclosure action, at the time he chose to file this
Page 44 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

46 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

action, at the time he claimed this action for the jury

on [July 16, 2021], and at the time this case was tried

in the summer of 2022. He did not move to consolidate

until after this case had been tried and postverdict

motions had been filed. The motion is therefore grossly

untimely and serves little purpose in either promoting

judicial economy or avoiding contradictory results. Any

meaningful attempt to accomplish either would have

required, at a minimum, this motion to have been filed

before trial. The court sees no purpose in consolidating

these cases at this time. Indeed, the court believes that

such belated consolidation would only promote confusion in the adjudication of these cases. Finally, the court

observes that the motion to consolidate was not filed

in the foreclosure action as required by Practice Book

§ 9-5 (b). For all these reasons, the motion to consolidate is denied.’’ (Citation omitted.)

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court abused

its discretion in denying his motion to consolidate

because: ‘‘(a) the trial court mischaracterized the

motion to consolidate as a motion to consolidate the

case based on the verdict rendered and not on the basis

of a new trial that would be granted after reversal on

appeal; (b) the two cases contained the same parties;

(c) they arose out of the same transaction; (d) the ends

of substantial justice would be promoted by having the

plaintiff’s claims adjudicated in connection with the

foreclosure; and (e) judicial economy and the avoidance

of inconsistent results would be promoted by the consolidation of the cases.’’

The plaintiff’s arguments ring hollow given that, after

the defendant initiated the foreclosure action, the plaintiff initiated the underlying action instead of asserting

his breach of contract claims in a counterclaim in the

foreclosure action. Moreover, the court properly considered the belated nature of the plaintiff’s motion to

consolidate, as well as the futility of doing so after a
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 45

0 Conn. App. 1 , 0 47

Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.

verdict had been returned and after Judge Clark had

denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. See Valentine v. LaBow, supra, 95 Conn. App. 454 (finding no

abuse of discretion as to denial of defendant’s motion

to consolidate when ‘‘her attempt at consolidation came

at the eleventh hour of an action that ha[d] been ongoing

since 1979 and would serve only to further delay its

resolution’’). In light of the procedural history of the

case, and given Judge Clark’s denial of the plaintiff’s

postverdict motions, the court’s denial of the postverdict motion to consolidate was not an abuse of its discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.