### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

KATIA ALVARES

- WATTERS
, Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH WATTERS
, Appellee.

No s . 4D2023

- 1448 and 4D2023

- 1561

[ June 5, 2024 ]

Consolidated a ppeal s from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Laura Johnson, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502020DR005277XXXX M B.

Eddie Stephens and Caryn A. Stevens of Stephens & Stevens, PLLC, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Matthew S. Nugent an d Adam M. Zborowski of Nugent Zborowski, North Palm Beach, for appellee.

W ARNER
, J.

This is an appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage involving children and equitable distribution of property. Over a year after the trial

, the court entered the judgment which changed the parenting plan and required the children to a ttend di fferent schools, failed to completely resolve the equitable distribution of property, and failed to address the issue of retroactive alimony, the last two issues conceded by the appellee. We reverse, not only on th e conceded error s but also on the parenti ng plan, as it was entered without the necessary evidence to support whether it was
in the best interests of the children.

Background

The parties were married in 2013 and had two children, one born in

201 4 and the other in 2019. They moved to Palm Beach County where they lived in Royal Palm Beach. The former husband worked as an executive chef in Jupiter, and the former wife worked as a veterinarian

,2 also in Jupiter. The oldest daughter attended kindergarten at a Catholic school in Jupiter

.

When COVID arose in 2020, the former wife quit working and stayed
home with the children. The former husband continued to work, which
caused friction because the former wife was concerned about his exposure to the disease. Tensions rose, the parties separated, and the former husband moved out of the marital residence. He filed for divorce in July

2020.

Since their separation, the f ormer h usband agreed that he ha s lived in three separate homes, four different times. At the time of trial, he lived in
Palm Beach Ga rdens. During the divorce, the former wife moved to Parkland in Broward County and became employed with a veterinary clinic
there.

Because the parties could not agree on where to send the children to school, the f ormer w ife moved for the court to designa te her residence for school zone purposes and to approve the f ormer w ife ’ s proposed plan for
the 2021

- 2022 school year. In the motion, she alleged her new residence

was twenty

- five miles from the marital home. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the f ormer w ife ’ s motion allowing her residence to be used for school designation for the 2021

- 2022 school year. The court also approved the f ormer w ife ’ s proposed plan for the children
for the 2021

- 2022 school year. The former wife then enrolled the oldest
child in a P arkland public school and the younger child in a n early learning

center

.

The case went to trial in M arch 2022 and was heard over the course of
three days

, concluding in May

. At trial, the parties did not agree on time

sharing or school designation for th eir minor children. Former h usband requested 50/50 equal timesharing with the minor children, and f ormer

w ife alternatively suggested that f ormer h usband have time

- sharing every other weekend with one overnight during the off week.

F ormer wife offered the deposition of the older child ’ s teacher in
evidence . The teacher testified how well the older child was doing in
school. The court also admitted deposition testimony from the manager of the younger child’s early learning center, where the older chil d also attended aftercare, who testified that the younger child was doing well at the center. Each of the parents took turns dropping her off or picking her

up, and the maternal grandmother was back

- up

.3 The former husband testified that he wanted his chi ldren to attend the Catholic school in Jupiter, which he testified had been a thirty

- five minute
drive from the marital home and also from where he was currently living in Palm Beach Gardens. He testified that the current schedule, when he
has the childre n overnight during the week

, requires his day starting at 5:30 a.m. to get the children ready for school, driving to Broward County to drop them off, then driving back to his place of employment in Jupiter, and then returning to Broward to pick them up and driving with them back to Palm Beach County. He testified that he spent five hours to five

and

- a

- half hours daily in the car.

Former w ife testified that she was the historic caregiver of the minor children since their respective births

, taking them to d octor ’ s visits,
extracurricular activities

, and doing most of the pick

- up and drop

- off at
school. Former wife testified that the Catholic school in Jupiter was unaffordable. In addition, the school was further north and would require much more driving from her present home and work in Fort Lauderdale. Furthermore, the older daughter was doing well and stab ilized in her
Parkland school. If her parenting plan were adopted, the former wife
offered that she could take the children to the former husband at the beginning of his time

- sharing.

The court took the case under advisement. By September , when no

final judgment had been obtained, former wife moved for a status
conference. The record does not reflect if the conference w as held , only
that the former wife had noticed the motion for hearing

.

At the end of March 2023, former wife filed a motion to reopen t he case to receive additional evidence regarding the children ’ s progress in their schools and their stability in their current environment. The court summarily denied the motion. The former wife a lso noticed a hearing on the status of the final judgment for the beginning of May but then
cancelled the hearing . The trial court finally produced a final judgment on May 15, 2023, more than a year after the beginning of the trial. T he court
also entered another final judgment regarding the equitable distribut ion of the property on June 1, 2023.

In the final judgment

, the trial court found that the then

- existing parenting plan was not viable, as former husband was in the car for five

and

- a

- half hours per day to exercise his three days with overnight visitation under that plan. The children were in the car for some of that
time. The court determined

, despite the parties’ attack s on each other ’ s character, that both parties were loving parents and morally fit.4 The trial court stated it evaluated all the factors under section 61.13(3)

, Florida Statutes (2022)

, but noted that it did not need to address all of the
factors

. The trial court then adopted former husband ’ s parenting plan which provided a 50/50 split of time

- sharing between the parents. The
court also de cided that former husband ’ s address should be used for school boundaries and registration for other activities.

F ormer wife moved for rehearing on various issues, including the
location of the school boundary at former husband ’ s residence and the

court ’ s refusal to hear additional evidence regarding the children ’ s current situation, but the trial court denied the m otion without a hearing. F ormer wife filed appeals of both final judgments.

Analysis

F ormer wife challenges the trial court’s parenting plan with the designation of f ormer husband ’ s address in Palm Beach Gardens as the
children ’ s school boundary as lacking any substantial competent evidence to support that it was in the best inte rests of the children. A trial court ’ s parenting and timesharing plan is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Krift v. Obenour , 152 So. 3d 645, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). “A trial court ’ s decision regarding school designation is reviewed for abuse of disc retion.”
Johnson v. Johnson , 313 So. 3d 651, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citing Bruce

v. Bruce , 243 So. 3d 461, 464 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)). But, as with any trial
court decision , it must be supported by competent

, substantial evidence.

Best Interest of the C hild in School Attendance Determination

Section 61.13(2)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2022)

, requires the parenting plan to contain a designation of the residence for school attendance. See
also Johnson , 313 So. 3d at 655

. Section 61.13(2) (b) provides:

(b) A parenting plan approved by the court must, at a

minimum:

1. Describe in adequate detail how the parents will share and be responsible for the daily tasks associated with the upbringing of the child;

. . . .

3. De signate who will be responsible for:

. . . .5 b. School

- related matters, including the address to be used
for school

- boundary determination and registration.

§ 61.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2022).

The trial court ’ s decision as to the school designation should be guided by what is in the child ’ s best interest. Johnson , 313 So. 3d at 655; Hassenplug v. Hassenplug , 346 So. 3d 149, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2022)

, sets forth twenty factors that the
trial court should consider when determining the welfare and best
interests of the child. Id. “Although the trial court need not address each factor independently, at a minimum, it must find that its school designation is in the best interests of the child. ” Hassen plug , 346 So. 3d

at 153.

In Hassenplug , the trial court order ed the former husband ’ s address to
be used for school

- related matters. The child, who had autism, had been
home

- schooled by the former wife and was flourishing in this setting. Id.

at 151 , 153

. However, to “level the playing field,” and allow the former husband to have a greater role in the child ’ s schooling

, and because of the friction between the parties, the trial court ordered the former husband’s address be designated for the child to attend a public school which had programs suitable for the child. Id. at 152.

The Second District reversed, noting the trial court had not considered
the child ’ s best interests in making the determination.

[T] he trial court ’ s school designation seems premised on diminishing the parties ’ discord which, the trial court reasoned, would allow F ormer H usband to participate more fully in the child ’ s education. We are certain that the trial court sought to tamp down the parties ’ apparent power struggl e. This is a praiseworthy goal. Yet, we search, without success, for how this goal advances this young child ’ s best

interests.

. . . .

Unfortunately, conflict between the parties is all too customary in dissolution cases. The trial court, a stranger to the family, is placed in the unenviable position of making potentially life

- changing decisions affecting the child. In the discharge of our duty, however, we must ensure that the6 record reflects the trial court ’ s paramount decisional consideration, the child ’ s best interests.

. . . .

The trial court ’ s ruling lacks the necessary evidentiary support sufficient to satisfy our concerns that such a change
is in the child ’ s best interests.

Id. at 153.

Similarly, in this case

, the trial court ’ s ruling appears to have been
made to reduce the time which the former husband spends traveling

, and
thus seems to be in his best interest rather than the children ’ s. N o discussion occurred either at the trial or in the final judgment about the
children’s best interests other than travel time. At trial, no evidence was presented as to what schools were available around the father ’ s home.

E vidence was presented that the older child had attended kindergarten at

a Catholic school in Jupiter, but no evidence was presented that school was within the school boundary ordered by the tri al court. On the other side of the issue, testimony was presented that the children were doing exceptionally well at both Parkland schools. Also, as we review the 50/50 split, it appears that, while the father may spend less time in the car, the
children are likely to spend more time in the car attending schools based
on the father’s residence , which would ultimately interfere with school

related activities.

F ormer husband focuses on the fact that former wife denied him overnight visitation with the chil dren for two years, and contends the trial court was taking that “vindictive” conduct into consideration in the parenting plan and school boundary designation. But the trial court found that both parents ’ claims against the other were exaggerated, and the court made no findings of vindictive conduct. Moreover, the court found that both parents loved their children and were fit parents

.

In sum, no competent substantial evidence support s the designation of
the father ’ s address for the school boundary. The trial court focused on the best interest of the father, not the children. This was an abuse of discretion, requiring the court ’ s final judgment to be reversed.

Concession of Error on Other Iss u es

With respect to the equitable distribution of property, the trial court failed to attach an exhibit which designated the distribution. Without7 such an exhibit, we cannot determine how the property was distributed and whether it was equitable. F ormer husb and concedes that this failure requires a reversal.

F ormer wife had requested retroactive child support which the trial court failed to address in either judgment

. F ormer husband concedes that
the trial court erred as well in this regard.

Delay in Issui ng Final Judgment

Finally, the foregoing errors , including the failure to address issues and the lack of evidence to support rulings, show why we must also reverse for the extreme delay in issuing the final judgment, as excessive delay can be a ground for reversal. See e.g. Caswell v. Caswell , 674 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). This is particularly true in cases involving children. See
Falabella v. Wilkins , 656 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (finding delay of fourteen months between hearing and oral pronouncement and another two months before the written judgment in a child custody case “indefensible and intolerable” and requir ing a new trial because “trial courts have a responsibility to render their decisions under circumstances which give no d oubt but that the matter was seriously and promptly considered.”); Tunnage v. Bostic , 641 So. 2d 499 , 500

– 01 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (finding seven

- month delay between the trial and the entry of the final judgment required new trial where the final judgment wa s confusing and contradictory in its provisions and in some respects not supported by the evidence)

.

Cases such as this show the importance of a robust system of accountability. To that end, the supreme court recently amended Florida
Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.215(g), which should promote promptness in issuing orders and judgments, as well as support the administrative responsibilities of the chief judge. 1 See Fla. R.
Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(b)(2) and (b)(3 ).

1 Significantly, the amendment now requires the trial judge to enter an order on

every matter , not every case, within a reasonable time and to advise the chief judge of matters under advisement pending without judicial action for more than sixty days. See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Gen. Prac. and Jud. Admin.

, --- So.
3d

--- , 2024 WL 1202717, at *7 (Fla. March 21, 2024).8 Conclusion

The trial court failed to consider the best interests of the children in the parenting plan

, failed to fully address the equitable distribution of property

, and failed to consider the former wife ’ s entitlement to retroactive
child support

. In light of the foregoing , t he trial judge’s extreme delay in
this case was also reversible error. We therefore reverse for a new trial on
all issues , except the dissolution of the marriage of the parties . This will
include a complete retrial o f all issues relating to the children. As the trial judge retired shortly after entering the final judgment, this case must be tried before a new judge. See Austin v. Austin , 12 So. 3d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Polizzi v. Polizzi , 600 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

K LINGENSMITH
, C.J., and K UNTZ
, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.