### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE A T ME MP H IS Ja nuary 23, 200 8 S es sio n

MIC HAE L GOLD EN v. TE RR Y M UR REL L

Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Shelb y County No. 137474 Felicia M . Hogan, Refer ee

No. W2005-02968-C OA-R3-JV - Filed July 23, 2008

Father a nd Mother ar e par ents of a minor c hild born out of wedlock. A fter Mothe r re g ained c ustody of c h ild, she petitioned the trial cour t for prospe ctive and r etroa ctive child support and me dical insurance

. Father also petitioned for retroac tive child support. The juvenile r efe ree set prospec tive child support and orde red F ather to provide medica l insurance for the child, but rese rved the issue of re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt pe nd ingthe pa

rt ie s’ su bmi ssi on of the ir pa st ye ars ’ f

ina nc ia l r e c or ds

. After multipl e continuan ces and Father’s a ppare nt unwillingness to comply with trial court’s discovery order , the Refe ree dismiss ed both par ties petitions. A special judg e af firmed. F ather appea led and Mother

cross-a ppeale d. We rema

nd the cause t o the t rial court to issue a rulingthat

c on ta ins a ba sis fo r the dis mis sa l and fo r a de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he tr ia l c ourt

int e nd e d f

or its dismiss al to serve as a de nial of the pa rties’ pe tition for retroa ctive child support.
Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Re manded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the o p i n i o n o f t he court, in which Alan E. Highe rs, P.J., W.S., joined. W. F R ANK C RAW FORD , J., not participating.

Dewun R. Settle and K im G. Sim s, Memphis, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, Michae l Golden.

Jo hn R. H e rs hb e rg e r, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , T e rry M ur re ll.

OP IN ION

Fac ts a nd P

ro c e dural H

ist or y

Michae l G olden, Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellant (her einaf ter, “F ather ”), an dTerr

y Murre ll, Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appe llant (here inafter , “Mother” ), are the pare nts of a minor

c hil d, M. J. Go lde n (he re ina ft e r, “ Chi ld” ), bo rn De c e mbe r 28, 19 88 . Fr om 1 98 8 unti l 19 94 , Ch ild liv e d w ithMo the r. Al tho ug h no chi ld su ppor t w a s o rd e re d, F a the r t e sti fi e d to pa ying$2 00 .0 0 to Mo the r e ve ry

month f rom 19 88 to 1 99 4 a

nd pr ov idi nghe a lthins ur anc e fo r t he c hil d. F a the r a lso te sti fi e d, and

Mo the r a g re e d, that F a the r v isi te d Ch ild a t le a st s ix (6 ) t ime s a

y e ar, de sp ite Chi ld residingin Tennesse e and Fathe r residing in Texas. In 1994, Father filed a P etition to Modify Orde r-2-

and re quested that the court awa rd custody to him. In 1995, the Refer ee awa rded c ustody

to Fathe r; howeve r, the orde r wa s silent as to child support. Chil d lived with Fathe r until 2002, and duringthat time, Mother allege dly provided no child support. Mother contends that she vi sited with Child at le a st six (6 ) time s a y e ar, and that Moth e r ca re d for Chi ld d ur ingthe summe r m on ths e a c h y e ar whil e Child was in Father ’s custody

.

I n May of 2003, custody was returne d to Mothe r. In J anuar y of 2004, Mother pe titioned the court for child support, retroa ctive support, and me d ical insuranc e. In Marc h of 2004, F ather petitioned the cour

t for re troac tive child support from J anuar y 1995 to May

2003. I n April of 2004, the Refe ree order ed F ather to provide medica l insurance for Child and to pay $ 5 4 0 p er m o n th for child support, but reser

ved the issue of retroa ctive child support. Fr om May of 2004 to Dec ember of 2004, the c ase w as continu ed n u m er o us times at the parties’ reque st. I n May of 2005, Mother moved for sa

nctions, alleg ing that Fathe r had c ontinuously ref used to pro v ide his financia l inf or matio n, that hi s c ur

re nt i nc ome is k

no wn and sh ou ld be imp ute d for pa st ye ars be c a us e of his fa ilure to p ro vid e pa st f

ina nc ia l in fo rm a tio n, and

that hi s p e tit ion

fo r r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt sh ou ld be dis missed for failure to prosec ute. On J une 1, 2005, the Ref ere e dismissed both parties’ pe titions for r etroa ctive child support, but made no wr itten findings. B oth parties re quested a rehe aringbefor e
a j u v e nil e jud g e , a

nd Spe c ia l Judg e B lanc e tt a ff ir me d th e Re fe re e ’s F ind ing s and Re c omm e nd a tio ns , but issued no written finding s.

On Dec ember

6, 2005, Father filed a

Notice of

Appea l wi t h t h is Court, but failed to file a

cer tified transc ript with the t rial court cler k, as required by Tenn. R. App. P 24(b). On O ctober 23, 2006, this Court di smissed the appea l after g iving F ather

ample time to cure his err or. F ather filed a “Motion to Vac ate Dismissal of Appe al Entere d October 23, 2006,” and this Court g rante d the motion on March 9, 2007. On May 2, 2007, the juvenile court cler k cer tified the rec ord. We now tur n to the iss ue s o n a

pp e a l.

Issues on A

ppeal and St

andard of Review

I n his brief, Appe llant raises the f ollowing issue:

1. Whether the Responde nt mother is obligate d to pa y retroa ctive child support wh e n th e Re sp on de nt c la ims th at Mr. Go lde n w a ive d h is r ig hts to c hil d support, when the c ustody o rder is silent as to child support and when the Court has deviate d from Child Support Guidelines without a writing of finding or findingof law?

As state d in

he r b ri e f, Ap pe lle e ra ise s si x (6) a dd iti on a l is su e s:

1

. Ca n th e t r i a l c o u rt b i f ur c a t e d e t e r

m i n a t i o n o f c ur

r e n t c h i l d s u

p p o rt f ro m a de te rm inatio n o f r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt fo r n e arl y

tw o y e ars ?-3-

2. I f a

tr ia l c ourt

bif ur c a te s d e te rm inatio n o f c ur re nt child su pp or t f ro m a deter minati o n o f retroa ctive child support for near ly two y ear s, is the order setting c urre nt child suppor t a n “orde r for support” pursua nt to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 et seq. (Supp. 2004), which c annot be modified

r e t r o a c t i v e l y?

3. I f a tri a l court “ re se rv e d “ det e rm inatio n of re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt , d oe s a child support order

for curr ent support bec ome mere ly a “te mporary” support

o r d e r , w h i c hc anb e m o d i f i e d r e tr o a c t i v e l y?

4. I f Golden’ s actions below a re the rea son that the trial cour t could not calc ulate re troac tive child support, can the trial court dismiss the Golden’s claims for retroa ctive child support as a sanction for

Golden’s noncooper ation?

5. I f Golden’ s actions below a re the rea son that the trial court could not make

a ca lculation of retroa ctive child support, ca n a dete rmination of re troac tive child support on rema

nd incorporate the entire period of the minor child’s life calc ulated under

the cur rent “ income shar es” c hild support guidelines, so that a “c urr en t ” child support order and “r etroa ctive” c hild support order a re
c a lc ulate d und e r t

he same g uid e lin e s?

6. I f Murre ll is t he primar y residential pa

rent of Par

ties’ minor ch i l d, and Golden’s a ctions below ar e the r eason tha t the trial court c ould n o t m ake a calc ulation of retr oactive c hild support, c an a dete rmination of re troac tive child support incorporate either a set-off or downwar d deviation of the presumptive support order to adjust for ne cessa ry and burde nsome leg al fe es incurre d by

Murre ll due to Golden’s conduc t in this case ?

We re vie w the tr ia l c ourt ' s fi nd ing s of fa c t de novo on the re cord w ith the presumption that those finding s are corr ect, unless “ the pre pondera nce of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3( d) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W .2d 87, 9 1 (Tenn. 1993). We review conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. Campbell v. Fla. St eel Corp., 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996)

.

Di sc uss ion and

Le ga l Ana ly

sis

First, we addre ss the issue of whe ther the tria l court er red in dismissing the parties’ petitions fo r r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt . O n Jan ua ry 27 , 2 00 4, Mo the r p e tit ion e d th e tr ia l c ourt fo r c hil d-4-

support, including r etroa ctive child support and medical insura nce. I n response , on Marc h 19, 2004, Father pe titioned the court for retroa ctive child support for the time Child was in his custody , from J anuar y 1995 to May 2003. Fr om Marc h 30, 2004, to J une 1, 2005, the c ase w as continued six (6) tim e s. On

Ap ri l 1 4, 20 04 , th e Re fe re e or de re d F a the r t o p ay $5 40 pe r m on th i n p ro sp e c tiv e c hil d

su pp or t and to p ro vid e me dic a l in sura nc e fo r C hil d, but reser ved th e iss ue of re tr oa c tiv e c hil d

su pp or t. O n M ay

19 , 2 00 4, the Re fe re e c on tin ue d th e c a se un ti l July

14 , 2 00 4, in o rd e r f

or bo th parties to provide proof of support paid, proof of income fr om previous y ear s, and proof of medica l expenses paid. On Jul y

14 and September

29, 2004, the ca se wa s further continued. On Oc tober 8, 2004, a Consent Orde r wa s issued in which the parties ag ree d to another c ontinuance of no less than six (6) week s. Th e pa

rt ie s a lso a g re e d to pr ov ide ta x re tur ns to e a c h o the r a

nd fo r e a c h p art

y to provi de ca lculations of the re troac tive support eac h party claimed to be ow ed. On Nove mber 23, 2004, Mother sent, by

cer tified mail, her f

inancial doc uments, as re quired by the Consent Orde r. On Dec ember

12, 2004, the Refe ree continued the c ase f or final disposition to March 30, 2005, and order ed that, if the pa

rties wer e unable to agre e on how much r etroa ctive support wa s owed, then b o th p arties’ att o r

n e y s w o u ld

p r o v id e a

y e ar b y y e ar a c c o un t o f

th e ir c li e n ts ’ in c o me s a t t

h e n e xt he ari ng . A dd iti on a lly , th e Re fe re e or de re d F a the r t o s ig n th e I RS rele a se to o bta in h is t a x re tur ns , to make pa

y me nts fo r co pie s of the re tur ns , an d to mail the re le a se on De c e mbe r 1 2, 20 04 (t he same date a s the Refe ree ’s Finding s and Recommendations). Mother was awa rded attorney ’s fe es in the amount of $870.00.

The tec hnical re cord c ontains no rec ord of a Marc h 30, 2005, dispositi on, but on May 31, 2005, Mother moved f

or sanc tions a gai n s t Father, re questing that Father’s pe tition for retroa ctive

c hil d s up po rt be dis mis se d for wa nt of pr os e c uti on

. Mo the r al le g e d that Fathe r’ s cur re nt i nc ome is known and a

vailable a nd should be im puted t o past y ear s beca use Father ha s failed to produc e ac tual income figures. Mother also asked for Father and hi s counsel to reimburse her f or attorne y ’s fe es and expenses since Dec ember 8, 2004.

On J une 1, 2005, the Ref ere e is s u ed her

Finding s and Recommenda tions. Her ruling

c on ta ine d n o w ri tte n f

ind ing s of fa c t or law , but dis mis se d b oth pa rt ie s’ pe tit ion s f

or re tr oa c tiv e c hil d

su pp or t and wa ive d the c os ts. No tr ans c ri pt o f t he he ari ngle a din g up to t he ru lin g wa s in c lud e d in the re cord. The parties r equeste d a re hear ing be fore the juvenile judge and, on De cembe r 9, 2005, Spe c ia l Judg e B lanc e tt r e c on fi rm e d the Re fe re e ’s ru lin g of June 1, 20 05 . Jud g e B lanc e tt’ s O rd e r d id not contain any

finding s of fa ct or law , and the tra nscript of the hearing leadingup to his Order doe s not reve al the cour

t’s rea soning be hind the dismiss al.

Our re view of the re cord r evea ls that Fathe r and his counse l never provided Mother

or the court with the re quired fina ncial information, despite multipl e continuanc es which a ppear to be at the re quest of F ather

or his counsel. Father a

ppear s to have c ontinually sty mied these c hild support proce eding s by

his willful non-compliance w ith the discovery proce ss and those dea dlines imposed by the juvenile cour

t. The re cord doe s not r evea l if Father’s c ounsel eve r notified his client of the court-or dere d task of securing the required financial documents; howeve r, t his Court has affir med-5-

dis mis sa ls e ve n w he re the pa rt y ' s fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th t he tr ia l c ourt ' s d isc ov e ry

or de r a pp e ars to be more attributable to that par ty ' s atto rn ey t h an t o t h e par ty

. See, e .g., Gordon v. W ilson, No. 02 A0 1- 96 11 -C V- 00 28 2, 19 98 WL 31 59 40 , at * 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App . Jun e 17 , 1 99 8) ; Nok es v . H oo pe r, No. 89-90-I I , DeKa lb L aw, 1989 WL115186, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct.4, 1989).

Although both or ders a

re silent as to the r eason for the dismiss al, it se ems most likely that the Refe ree and Specia l J udg e dismissed the parties’ petitions because o f the numer ous reque sted continuance s and Father ’s failure t o supply the financ ial documents re quired by the Consent Orde r and the Ref

ere e’s sc heduling order

of De cem b er 8 , 2004. The trial c ourt may have dismissed the parties’ petitions as sanctions, pursuant t o Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 37.02(C) or a s an involuntary dismiss al for f

ailure to prose cute, pur suant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 41.02.

We n ote tha

t T e nn e sse e ' s t ri a l c ourt s p os se ss b ro a d d isc re tio na ry a uth or ity to c on tr ol t

he ir dockets a nd the proce eding s in their courts. Hessme r v. He ssmer , 1 38 S.W. 3d

90 1, 90 4 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 2003). How ever , dismiss al i s a harsh sanction that g ener ally is not favore d in circumstanc es wher e lesser

sanctions ar e ava ilable. Mf rs. Con so l. S

e rv ., In c . v . R od

e ll , 42 S.W .3d 846, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

I n M c Ka yv

. M cKay , we d iscussed the propr iety of dismissal as sanctions in a family law matter:

[Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e dure ] Rule 37 e xpre ssl y a uth or ize s th e tr ia l c ourt

to dismiss a plaintiff

's ac t i o n , either upon motion or sua sponte, as a sa nction for the plaintiff' s violation of the court' s discovery order or for a par ty ' s failure to attend a deposition. SeeT e n n

. R

. C i v

. P

. 3 7

. 0 4 an d T e n n

. R

. C i v

. P

. 3 7

. 0 2 ( C )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, courts have repe atedly

upheld the dismissal of an ac tion where the plaintiff has f ailed to comply with the trial court' s order compelling discovery

. Se e, e .g ., Ho lt v . W e bs te r, 63 8 S.W. 2d

39 1 ( Te nn . Ct . App .1 98 2) ; Johnson v. W ade, 2000 WL 1285331 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. Se pt. 6, 20 00 ); Gordon v. W ilson, 1998 WL 315940 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15 , 1 99 8) ; Nok

es v . H oo pe r, 19 89 WL11 51 86 (T e nn . Ct . App . O c t. 4 , 1 98 9) ; Ra tli ff De v . Co rp . v . B ro ok

s, 1988 WL 116455 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1988). When a trial court imposes t he sanction of di smissal, the decision will not be disturbed on appe al in the absenc e o f an af

firmative showingthat the trial judg e abuse d his or her discretion. Shahrdar v. Global Hous., Inc., 983 S.W .2d 230, 2 3 6 (T en n

. Ct. App. 1998).

McKay v . McKay , No. W2004-00610-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 240607, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 31, 2005) ( no perm. app. filed ).S ec t i o n 3 6 -2 -3 1 1 (a)(1 1 )(B ) p ro v i d es: 1

In cas es i n whi ch t he p res um p t i o n of t he ap p l i cat i o n of t he gui d el i nes i s rebutt ed b y c lear and

c o n v inc ing e v id e n c e , t h e c o u rt sh a ll d e v ia te fro m the c h ild su p p o rt g u i del i n es t o re du ce , i n wh ol e or i n par t , an y r et r oact i ve s up p o rt

. T he co urt m ust m ake a wri t t en f i nd ing that ap p l i cat i o n of t he gui d el i nes would b e unjus t o r i nap p rop ri at e i n o rder t o p rovide f o r t he b est i nt erest s o f

t he chi l d or t he equi t y bet ween t he part i es

.

T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 6 -2-3 1 1 (a)( 1 1 )( B )( 2 0 0 5 ).

-6- The la w re g ardinginvoluntary dismiss als is simi lar. Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure Rule 41.02 aff

ords trial cour

ts ex press a

uthority to dismi ss case s for f

ailure to prose cute or

for f ailure to comply with the proce dural rule s or the orde rs of the court, but this authority should be exerc ised spar i n gly and with g reat car e. Hessme r , 138 S.W .3d at 904. Th e purp os e of thi s r ule is t o e na

ble the trial cour

t to manag e its own docke t, and to protec t defe ndants ag ainst plaintiffs who ar e unwilling to put their cla ims to t he test, but are deter mined to subject them to the continuing thr eat of an e ve ntu a l ju dg me nt. Os ag ie v . P e ak loa d Te mp . S

e rv s. , 91 S.W .3d 326, 3 2 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

I n the ins t an t ca s e, t he Refe ree and the Spec ial J udg e dismissed the parties’ petitions for retroa ctive child support, but did not specify the rea son for the dismiss al. Section 36-2-311 of the Tenne ssee C o de g overns r etroa ctive child-suppor t orders. The pe rtinent code provisions and the

1 Chi ld S up po rt

Gu ide lin e s ma

ke it c le ar t

hat, i n c a se s w he re an in iti a l c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio n is se t, there is a presumption that the non-c ustodial parent must pay retroa ctive support. SeeTenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. ch. 1240-2- 4-.06(1) , (2) ( 2006). Any deviation from this presumption must be supported by written finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, includinga wr itten finding that retroa ctive support would be unjust a

nd inappropriate and that the be st interest of the c hildren would be se rved by not order ing suc h support. See Te nn . Co mp. R. & Re g s. c h. 12 40 -2-4-. 06 (2) (2 00 6) . B e c a us e c hil d support decisions re tain an ele ment of discre tion, we re view these decis i o ns based upon the defe rential “ abuse of

discretion” sta

ndard. Ri c ha rd

so n v . S pa no s, 18 9 S.W.3 d 720 , 725 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 05 ). Th is s tand ard is a re vie w- c on str a ini ngsta

nd ard of re vie w that cal ls for le ss i nte ns e appellate revie w and, ther efor e, less likelihood that the tri al co u rt' s decision will be re verse d. Id. (c i t i n g State ex re l. Jones v . Looper , 86 S.W.3 d 189 , 193 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; W hite v . V an de rb ilt Univ. , 21 S.W .3d 215, 222-23 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1999)).

Wit h only

a spar se re cord a

nd two (2) nons p ec i fic orde rs, we c annot deter mine the re ason wh y t h e t r i a l c o u rt d i s m i s s e d b o t h p art i e s ’ p e t i t i o n s , l e t a l o n e w h e th e r th e tr i a l c o urt a b u se d it s discretion in dismissi ng the ca se for sanctions, a failure to pr osecute , and/or finding that retroa ctive child support was unjust or inappropr iate in this case. A ccor dingly , we r emand this case to the juvenile cour

t with instructions to issue an order that sets out t he re quisite authority and explains the

rea soning be hind the dismiss al. Additionally , if the dismissal is i ntended to be a denial of the pa rt ie s’ pe tit ion s f

or re tr oa c tiv e c hi ld su pp ort , th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r m us t c omp ly

wi th t he Chi ld-7-

Support Guidelines require ments as discussed s up ra

. Ba s ed on our findings, a ll other issues are prete rmitted or ar e pre mature to this appea l.

Fina l l y , M other see ks an aw ard of attorney ’s fe es and c osts for a f rivolous appea l. I n the exercise of

our discre tion, we dec line to awar d attorney ’s fe es to either pa rty

.

Conclu sion

For the fore g oing r easons, this ca use is rema

nded to the trial c ourt for a deter mination of why the par ties’ petitions for re troac tive child support wer e dismissed. Costs of thi s appea l are assessed e qually

betwee n the par

ties, Appellant, Michae l Golden, and his sure ty , and Appe llee, Terr y Murre ll.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE