IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20228

Summary Calendar

EDWARD CHRISTIAN BEDFORD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-3231

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Edward Christian Bedford appeals from the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the Texas Department of Transportation. He 

had claimed disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. 

Bedford also challenges the denial of his motion for an extension of the 

discovery deadline. 

We AFFIRM. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 17, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Edward Christian Bedford is proceeding pro se on appeal, but in the 

district court he had the assistance of counsel. He is an African American who 

was employed by Texas Department of Transportation (“TxDOT”) as a Ferry 

Maintenance Technician III at the Galveston Port Bolivar Ferry System from 

April 15, 2013 until March 12, 2018. Bedford took Family Medical Leave from 

February 16, 2017 until that leave expired, and he then took leave without pay 

until October 30. On November 9, Bedford requested a reasonable 

accommodation for his inability to be exposed to the ferry engine room and 

bilge. Because an appropriate accommodation or position could not be found, 

TxDOT terminated Bedford’s employment on March 12, 2018. 

Before Bedford took leave, he had filed a charge of discrimination with 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on November 10, 

2016, alleging discrimination based on his race, color, and national origin, and 

alleging retaliation. The EEOC gave Bedford a notice of right to sue on July 

31, 2017. Bedford then filed his initial complaint in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Texas on October 24, 2017. Bedford filed the 

operative complaint on December 27, bringing claims against TxDOT for 

disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. 

On April 27, 2018, the district court granted TxDOT’s unopposed motion 

for partial dismissal on Bedford’s discrimination claims based on acts that 

occurred before January 16, 2016, because they were time barred. TxDOT 

later moved for summary judgment on the remainder of Bedford’s claims. The 

district court denied Bedford’s motion for an extension of discovery and granted 

summary judgment. Bedford appealed.

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DISCUSSION

Arguments in a pro se brief are liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). The emphasis in Bedford’s pro se brief is the 

failure of the district court to ensure that thorough discovery was obtained and 

failures of Bedford’s trial counsel in presenting the case. The degree of 

discovery to be sought is for counsel to determine within his or her professional 

judgment, and oversights in counsel’s discovery pursuit are not for the district 

court to point out or correct. Bedford also argues that his trial counsel colluded 

with the defendant. Perhaps indicative of his relationship with counsel is

Bedford’s assertion that he needed to get the Texas State Bar involved before 

he was able to have his own files returned for the appeal. To the extent these 

matters were addressed by the district court, we could consider the possibility 

of error in how that court resolved them. We are not empowered, though, to 

consider and remedy various disagreements that arose between a party and 

his counsel during litigation. 

Regarding the possibility of the ineffective assistance of Bedford’s 

counsel, the constitutional right to reasonably effective counsel does not apply 

in civil proceedings. Sanchez v. USPS, 785 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986). 

We cannot grant any relief based on those arguments.

Though those improper arguments seem central in the briefing, Bedford 

does provide some discussion of the dismissal of his claims of disparate 

treatment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. Liberally construed, 

the brief presents arguments for us to review. Summary judgment in favor of 

TxDOT was entered on those claims. Our review of that judgment is de novo. 

Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2016). We also address one 

discovery issue.

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I. Discovery extension

The one issue Bedford raises about discovery that is properly before us 

is his argument that the district court erred in denying an extension of time 

for its completion. Bedford sued in October 2017, and the scheduling order 

provided for a close of discovery in February 2019. Two weeks before the 

discovery deadline, TxDOT filed for summary judgment. The district court 

denied Bedford’s motion for an extension of discovery. A scheduling order, 

including one that involves discovery deadlines, may be modified “only for good 

cause and with the judge’s consent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). Decisions on such

motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Marathon Fin. Ins., Inc., RRG v. 

Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 458, 469 (5th Cir. 2009). One justification Bedford 

offered for the extension was to allow Bedford time to review his work journals 

and identify TxDOT employees who were treated more favorably than him. 

Bedford’s work journals, though, were always in Bedford’s possession. TxDOT 

requested those journals in its own discovery requests, but Bedford failed to 

produce them. Further, Bedford’s deposition testimony indicated Bedford was 

not aware of any similarly situated employees treated more favorably. 

Based on these facts, there was no abuse of discretion in denying an 

extension of time for discovery.

II. Discrimination claims 

Bedford’s appeal from the summary judgment was timely, though it took 

a grant of an extension nunc pro tunc by the district court. That brings to us 

the rulings of the district court, prior to and at final judgment, to the extent 

Bedford challenges them. One challenge Bedford does not make is to the 

dismissal of any claims of discrimination based on defendants’ acts prior to 

January 16, 2016 as time barred. Thus, we do not have that decision before us 

for review. Bedford argues the district court erred in denying him relief under

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Rule 60(b). The record, though, contains no Rule 60(b) motion and no district 

court ruling on such a motion. Of course, then, there is nothing as to Rule 60(b) 

for us to review. 

After the dismissal of claims based on the earliest events in his TxDOT 

employment, what was left were Bedford’s grievances about being 

“marginalized,” criticized for “his tardiness and attendance,” refused time off 

to take a certification exam, and “written-up” for refusing to leave his post.

Again, using liberal construction, we consider Bedford’s brief to have 

sufficiently challenged the merits of the district court’s dismissal of his claims. 

We conclude that the best way for us to proceed is to discuss what was needed 

under each claim and then analyze the dismissal of each.

To survive summary judgment on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, 

the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by 

showing “(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the 

position at issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse employment action, and 

(4) he was treated less favorably” than similarly situated employees under 

nearly identical circumstances. Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 

259 (5th Cir. 2009). It is undisputed that Bedford, an African American, is a 

member of a protected class. The district court held, however, that none of the

four allegations we just identified “constitute adverse employment actions.” It 

is true that TxDOT terminated Bedford’s employment. Nevertheless, Bedford’s 

EEOC charge of discrimination and his operative complaint contained no 

allegation of discriminatory termination. In fact, Bedford filed his EEOC 

charge, received his notice of right to sue, and filed his operative complaint 

before his employment was terminated. No allegation of improper termination

was before the district court.

A claim of hostile work environment under Title VII requires that a

plaintiff prove

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(1) [he] belongs to a protected group; (2) [he] was subjected to 

unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was 

based on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, 

condition, or privilege of employment; (5) the employer knew or 

should have known of the harassment in question and failed to 

take prompt remedial action.

Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). The district court 

granted judgment on this claim because Bedford failed to provide record 

evidence for the claim or adequate argument. That was not error.

Next, to prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show 

that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action 

occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the 

adverse action. Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 610 (5th Cir.

2005). The district court held that Bedford abandoned his retaliation claim 

because Bedford failed to respond to TxDOT’s motion for summary judgment 

on the claim. We see no error in that conclusion.

AFFIRMED. 

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