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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 47624

In the Matter of: John Doe I and Jane 

Doe I, Children Under Eighteen (18) 

Years of Age.

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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND WELFARE,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN DOE (2019-43),

Respondent.

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Filed: March 16, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Canyon County. Hon. Courtnie Tucker, District Judge. 

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Aaron Bazzoli, Canyon County Public Defender; Alex W. Brockman, Deputy 

Public Defender, Caldwell, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kathryn T. Garrett, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Chief Judge

John Doe appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating his parental rights, 

arguing the court erred when it terminated his parental rights. The court’s finding that Doe 

neglected his children by failing to comply with the case plan and providing appropriate care and 

control is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Similarly, the magistrate court’s 

finding that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children is also 

supported by substantial and competent evidence. The magistrate court’s judgment terminating 

Doe’s parental rights is affirmed. 
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe is the biological father of three minor children, Child 1, who is not the subject of the 

underlying Child Protective Act (CPA) case, B.P., and D.P. Doe was married to the children’s 

mother. In a previous, unrelated Montana case, B.P. and D.P. were removed from Mother’s care

and custody was granted to Doe. Doe returned to Idaho with B.P. and D.P., and Mother soon 

rejoined them. In November 2016, D.P. was declared in imminent danger. At the subsequent 

shelter care hearing, B.P. was added to the CPA case. On December 1, 2016, at the adjudicatory 

hearing, the magistrate court vested legal custody of B.P. and D.P. with the Department of 

Health and Welfare (Department). That same month, the magistrate court approved a case plan 

for Doe. On January 18, 2018, after the children had been in custody for fifteen months, the 

Department petitioned to terminate Doe’s parental rights. In June 2018, the magistrate court 

relieved the Department of making any further reasonable efforts for reunification based on 

Doe’s lack of progress.

The hearing to terminate Doe’s parental rights was scheduled intermittently between 

October 2018 and July 2019; the hearing lasted approximately eight days. At the end of the 

hearing, the magistrate court found by clear and convincing evidence that Doe had neglected his 

children, had not accomplished reunification within fifteen of the most recent twenty-two 

months, and that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Doe 

timely appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable 

inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights 

be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test 

requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported 

by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. Doe v. 

Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally 
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understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 

certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s 

decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d 

at 600.

III.

ANALYSIS

Doe argues the magistrate court’s decision to terminate his parental rights should be 

reversed because the magistrate court erred when it found that Doe neglected his children. Doe 

also asserts that the magistrate court erred when it found it is in B.P.’s and D.P.’s best interests to 

terminate Doe’s parental rights. Doe does not challenge any of the magistrate court’s factual 

findings, only whether those findings rise to the level of substantial and competent evidence to 

support the magistrate court’s findings.

A. Review of Reasonable Efforts

Doe argues the Department did not make reasonable efforts to provide him with 

sufficient housing resources such that he could comply with the case plan requirement to provide 

safe and stable housing. To the extent Doe is arguing the Department had an obligation to 

engage in reasonable efforts, those efforts relate to reunification in the CPA case. It is 

well-settled that the Department’s efforts at reunification are not relevant to the magistrate 

court’s termination decision under Idaho Code § 16-2005. See In re Doe, 164 Idaho 883, 889, 

436 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2019). To the extent this argument is raised, we decline to address it. 

B. Termination

1. Statutory basis

Doe argues there is not clear and convincing evidence of his neglect, but even if there is, 

he is not directly responsible for his failure to comply with the case plan and, thus, it was error 

for the magistrate court to terminate his parental rights on the grounds of neglect. We hold that 

the magistrate court’s determination that Doe neglected his children is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence.

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 

341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 
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Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, 

family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of 

due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 

383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a 

parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a 

fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a 

court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; In 

re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 

652. 

Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the 

parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five 

factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between 

the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or 

(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each 

statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 

1117. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the 

case plan in a CPA case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for 

fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the 

last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody.

The magistrate court found that Doe had neglected his children on two different 

statutory grounds. First, Doe failed to comply with the court-ordered case plan and was 

unable to accomplish reunification within fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months 

pursuant to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). Second, Doe did not exercise proper parental care and 

control over B.P. and D.P., and his ongoing lack of care constituted neglect under I.C. § 16-

1602(31)(a). The magistrate court’s finding of neglect on each ground is supported by clear 

and convincing evidence.

Doe was present when the requirements of the case plan were discussed in court, and 

he was also present at a meeting with the case manager a month later when the case plan 

requirements were discussed. The case plan required Doe to: provide a safe, clean, and 
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secure residence for a minimum of 120 consecutive days; secure and maintain legitimate and 

sufficient income to meet the financial needs of the family, documenting the income source, and 

the ability to meet the needs for 120 consecutive days; attend, participate, and complete a 

protective parenting plan; and complete a mental health evaluation within 60 days of a referral 

and comply with all recommendations therein for a minimum of 180 days. During the CPA case, 

the Department indicated that it would submit an amended case plan that would include 

substance abuse testing and treatment and asked the magistrate court to order Doe to undergo 

substance abuse testing. Doe was ordered to complete a hair follicle drug test, which he did not 

complete.1

Doe asserts that he was not responsible for his failure to comply with the case plan,

but even if he was, the failure “was not substantial.” This Court has recognized that a 

finding of neglect for failure to comply with the case plan requires that the parent is 

responsible, either directly or indirectly, for the lack of compliance. See Idaho Dep’t of 

Health and Welfare v. Doe, 161 Idaho 596, 600, 389 P.3d 141, 145 (2016). 

Doe’s claim that he was not responsible for failing to comply with the case plan is 

unpersuasive. For example, Doe concedes he did not maintain stable housing but claims he 

could not obtain safe and stable housing because he had an eviction on his record; he could 

not save enough money for alternate housing while paying for motel rooms; and the 

Department did not intervene to help Doe obtain stable housing. Doe asserts he was not 

responsible for failing to comply with the housing requirement because the Department’s 

housing assistance consisted of the Department providing Doe with a resource manual 

regarding housing information without addressing Doe’s financial limitations. 

The magistrate court found that Doe’s legal problems significantly affected Doe’s 

ability to obtain or maintain stable housing and reunify with his children. For example, Doe 

 1 Neither the case plan nor the amended case plan are included in the record on appeal, and 

neither party sought to augment the record with the documents. However, Doe does not 

challenge the terms of the case plan or that he failed to meet them; thus, we will analyze the 

terms as articulated by the magistrate court. The parties do not challenge the lack of record or 

the magistrate court’s articulation of the terms of the case plan; therefore, this Court will refer to 

those terms as uncontested terms of the case plan and we will presume the missing records 

support the findings of the trial court. Estate of Ekic v. Geico Indemnity Company, 163 Idaho 

895, 897-98, 422 P.32 1101, 1103-04 (2018). 
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admitted to repeated periods of incarceration during the pendency of the CPA case. Doe 

was responsible for the behavior that led to his incarceration. Moreover, Doe has neither 

demonstrated that the resource manual provided by the Department was insufficient nor 

established how the Department was expected to address Doe’s financial limitations. Doe 

testified to living in approximately thirteen different locations during the pendency of the 

case. The living situations included no less than three different motels; staying at a friend’s 

home, his camper, and a rental; and periods of homelessness. The case manager testified 

that although not ideal, a motel room could be sufficient, but Doe failed to maintain the 

same motel room for any meaningful length of time. Contrary to Doe’s argument, living in 

approximately thirteen different housing situations is not substantial compliance with the 

case plan. The record provides clear and convincing evidence that Doe was solely 

responsible for his inability to provide a safe and stable residence as required by the case 

plan. 

Doe also claims that his failure to attend visits with his children was because the 

Department cancelled visits while he was regularly attending. This claim is belied by the 

record. Approximately forty visits were scheduled between the time the children were taken 

into care and June 2017. Of those forty visits, Doe cancelled (or Doe’s inaction led to the 

cancellation of) thirteen visits, which is approximately one-third of the visits. Between June 

2017 and August 2017, Doe was incarcerated, so no visits occurred. Upon his release, in 

September 2017, Doe cancelled three of the four scheduled visits. Visits ceased. A little 

less than a year later, the foster parents began facilitating visits between Doe and his 

children, but after Doe cancelled approximately one-third of those visits, the visits again 

ceased. By the end of the termination trial, Doe had moved out of state and his whereabouts 

were unknown. In light of this evidence, Doe has failed to establish that he was not directly 

responsible for failing to comply with the term of his case plan that he attend scheduled 

visitation with his children. 

Doe argues he cannot be held responsible for failing to obtain substance abuse 

treatment when there were no funds available in the CPA case to pay for his treatment. It is 

true that the funding situation was beyond Doe’s control at the time. However, although 

there were no general funds available in the CPA case, there was substance abuse treatment 

money available to Doe. As part of the CPA case, Doe was told he could attend classes and 
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after attending a specific number, obtain a “single case agreement” that would have made 

funding available on an individual basis. Doe was also told he could seek funding through 

the Department of Correction as part of his probation. Finally, Doe was told he could wait 

until the beginning of the new fiscal year (July 1, 2018) when he would be almost 

guaranteed to receive substance abuse treatment money through the CPA case. Doe 

obtained his GAIN evaluation in April 2018. He could have sought CPA funds for 

treatment shortly thereafter at the beginning of the new fiscal year. Doe did none of these 

things. Additionally, Doe testified that he did not believe he needed treatment or testing. 

He testified that he thought testing was a waste of time because he would tell his probation 

officer or the case manager if he had used drugs. His failure to obtain treatment was not the 

fault of the Department but rather, was based on Doe’s unwillingness to obtain treatment.

Finally, Doe argues that his failure to obtain mental health treatment was not 

sufficiently egregious to warrant a finding of neglect. Doe’s characterization of his mental 

health issues is unconvincing. The mental health evaluation found Doe’s mental health 

needs were significant enough to warrant a recommendation for twelve months of treatment. 

Doe never challenged this condition of his case plan. Moreover, Doe recognizes that 

following through with mental health treatment would have permitted him to more 

successfully comply with and complete the terms of the case plan, demonstrating the 

significance of this requirement. There was clear and convincing evidence that Doe’s 

failure to comply with the case plan was the direct result of Doe’s behavior. 

Doe also argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that Doe did not exercise 

sufficient parental control because Doe’s single instance of leaving the children at the time 

the children were taken into custody is insufficient to justify a finding of neglect. The 

magistrate court’s findings on this issue are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 

When the children were declared in imminent danger, Doe was out of town, leaving the 

children in Mother’s care, despite knowing the children had been removed from Mother’s 

care on a prior occasion because of neglect. At the termination hearing, Doe testified that 

Mother’s substance abuse “messed up” her ability to parent, affected everything, and she was not 

“capable of being anything to anybody at that time.” Doe also admitted this was not the only 

time he left the children in the care of Mother. Doe concedes that leaving the children in 

Mother’s care could technically be neglect, but argues it does not rise to the level of neglect
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because it only occurred one time. If one instance constitutes statutory neglect, multiple 

occurrences similarly establish an inability to exercise proper care and control over the 

children. Thus, despite Doe’s argument to the contrary, repeatedly leaving his children with 

Mother, an unfit caregiver, establishes the failure to provide sufficient parental control. 

The magistrate court found that Doe exhibited parental unfitness by his repeated 

incarceration, his untreated mental health and substance abuse issues, and the inability to 

provide safe and stable housing. The magistrate court found that Doe made almost no 

progress on his case plan and that the circumstances that resulted in the Department 

obtaining custody remained unchanged throughout the case. The magistrate court’s findings

that Doe neglected his children are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

2. The magistrate court did not err when it found termination is in B.P.’s and 

D.P.’s best interests

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next 

determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. 

In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When determining whether 

termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the parent’s history with 

substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the 

financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective 

custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or 

her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. In re Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 

358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding 

that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon 

objective grounds. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012). 

The magistrate court found that it is in the child’s best interests to terminate Doe’s 

parental rights. At the conclusion of the termination trial, B.P. and D.P. had been in the 

Department’s care for thirty-two months. Not only had reunification not occurred, but as 

found by the magistrate court, Doe’s situation at the conclusion of the proceedings was not 

significantly different than when the children were originally taken into care. Doe continued 

to use drugs, had unmanaged mental health issues, and his whereabouts were unknown by the 

end of the termination hearing. The magistrate court found that both children had mental health 

issues that Doe never addressed and the children received therapeutic services while in foster 

care which Doe never established or became involved with. The children improved in foster care 
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academically, emotionally, and behaviorally. Although D.P. had demonstrated some concerning 

behaviors, over time, those behaviors were managed and improved. The magistrate court found 

the children need long-term services and Doe is not equipped to meet the children’s physical, 

financial, emotional, therapeutic, or medical needs. This finding is supported by substantial and 

competent evidence.

Doe argues the effect of terminating Doe’s parental rights leaves the children legal 

orphans and it cannot be in the children’s best interests to terminate Doe’s rights when there was 

not a permanent placement for the children at the time of the termination hearing. In other 

words, he argues there has to be a comparative benefit to the child to terminating the parental 

relationship. Although the children had yet to receive a permanent adoptive placement at the 

time of the termination trial, that does not mean the children’s permanency and stability would 

be better served by leaving the children in Doe’s custody, nor is that a ground to set aside the 

magistrate court’s findings. The magistrate court’s conclusion that terminating Doe’s parental 

rights is in the best interests of the children is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

Finally, Doe argues that terminating parental rights based solely on a finding of the best 

interests of the child without a statutory ground demonstrating parental unfitness is 

unconstitutional. He concedes that if a finding of parental unfitness is based on clear and 

convincing evidence that a parent has failed to exercise proper parental control necessary for the 

welfare of a child, then such a statutory provision would be constitutional, citing to Idaho Dep’t 

of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 151 Idaho 498, 506 P.3d 1169 (2011). Nonetheless, he argues that 

in this case, the evidence is insufficient to find Doe was unfit. He asserts that failing to attend 

one-third of the visits, failing to make medical appointments, and failing to obtain suitable 

housing does not render him unfit. This Court disagrees. 

In addition to the reasons cited by Doe, the magistrate court found that “Doe has not 

provided [the children] subsistence, education, medical or other care and control necessary for 

their well-being” and that Doe left the children in Mother’s care despite knowing she was not a 

fit caregiver. Based on the factual record, there was substantial and competent evidence to 

support the magistrate court’s finding that Doe did not exercise proper parental care and control 

over the children and that termination is in the children’s best interests. 
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The magistrate court’s findings that Doe neglected his children are supported by 

substantial and competent evidence. Doe’s failure to comply with or complete the case plan was 

due to his repeated incarceration; his unwillingness to obtain and complete mental health and 

substance abuse treatment; and his failure to provide a safe and secure residence for B.P. and 

D.P. The magistrate court’s conclusion that terminating Doe’s parental rights to his two minor 

children is in the children’s best interests is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

The magistrate court’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed. 

Judge LORELLO and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.