# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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## N O



## . 15-0912

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# C O L O R A D O 

# C O U N T Y 

# , T E X A S 

# , R

. H

. “ C U R L Y 

# ” W IE D 

# , IN H IS O F F IC IA L 

# & IN D IV ID U A L C A P A C IT Y 

# , P E T IT IO N E R 

# ,

v.


# M A R C 

# S T A F F 

# , R E S P O N D E N T

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## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## F I R S T 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued October

4, 2016

J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court.

Chapter 614, Subchapter B of the Texas Gover nment Code provides cover ed peac e office rs

cer tain proce dural safe g uards to help ensure adver se empl o y m en t actions are not based on
unsubstantiated complaints of misconduct. Under Subchapter B, a cover ed peac e office r cannot be 1 

## disciplined based on a “complaint” unless the complaint is (1) in writing , (2) “sig ned by the person making the complaint,” and (3) prese nted to the employ ee “within a rea sonabl e t i m e af t er the

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 6 1 4

. 0 2 1

- . 0 2 3 ; s e e , e

. g

. , P a s k e v

. F i t z g e r a l d , 4 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 5 , 4 7 4 ( T e x
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. ] 2 0 1 6 , n o p e t

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e x

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. f i l e d ) ( m e m

. o p

. ) ; H a r r i s C t y

. S h e r i f f ’ s C i v i l S e r v

. C o m m ’ n v

. G u t h r i e , 4 2 3 S

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.

## complaint is filed.” Moreove r, ultimate disc iplinary action (indefinite suspension or termination) 2



## may not be “base d on the subject matter of [a] complaint” of misconduct absent an investiga tion and some supporting evidenc e. 3



## The statutory -construc tion issues raised in this employ ment-termination dispute conce rn the

events nece ssary to tr igg er and satisfy Chapter 614, Subchapter B’ s proce dural require ments. The
issues prese nted include whether Subchapter B’ s d isciplinary proce dures apply to at-will employ ment rela tionships; whether those proce dures apply to any complaint of misconduct or only citizen-g ener ated complaints; and whether a complaint must be signe d by the “victim” of the alleg ed misconduct and pre sented to the e mploy ee some time before discipline is impos ed.

We hold that (1) Chapter 614, Subchapter B does not alter the at-w i l l re l at ionship, but

p re s cr i b es proce dures that apply when the employ er elec ts to terminate employ ment based on a complaint of misconduct rathe r than terminating at will; (2) the statutory phrase “the person making
the complaint” is not limit ed to the “victim” of the alleg ed misconduct; and (3) in this case , a signe d disciplinary notice provided to the employ ee contempora neously with suspension of employ ment

was sufficie n t to meet Chapter 614, Subchapter B’ s notice require ments and allowed the office r ample opportunity to de fend himself to the final decisionmake r. We the ref ore reve rse the court of

appea ls’ judgme nt and re nder judg ment in the employ er’ s favor

.

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 6 1 4

. 0 2 2 , . 0 2 3 ( a )

- ( b )

. 2

I d

. § 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 ( c )

. 3


## 2

## I. Background

After serving as a Colorado County Deputy Sheriff for near ly five y ear s, Mark Staff’s

e mploy ment was terminated. Contemporaneously with St a f f ’ s d is mi s s a l, h e r e c e iv e d a “ Pe r f o r ma n c e
Def iciency Notice (Ter

mination)” signe d by his s u p er v i sor, L ieutenant Troy Neisner (De ficienc y Notice)

. Thoug h the County is an at-will employ er with “the rig ht to terminate employ ment for any leg al rea son or no rea son,” the Def iciency Notice identified and provided details about three specific
incidents in which Staff’s interac tions with the public wer e char acte rized as “rude ,” “unac cepta ble,” “unprof essional,” “g rossly unprofe ssional,” and contra ry to depar

tmental policy

. Per the Def iciency Notice, these incidents did not constitute a “complet e re cord” of S taff’ s perf ormanc e deficienc ies

or “an exhaustive list of the re asons for [his] termination,” but w ere mere ly “re cent [performanc e]
defic iencies.”
Whil e other unspecifie d perf ormanc e is sues may

have impac ted the ter

mination decision, 4



## the Def iciency No ti c e id e n tifies the impetus for Staff’s dismiss al as an internal investiga tion initiated
afte r County Attorney Ken Sparks informed Sheriff R.H. “Curly ” Wied that Staff’s behavior during
a recorde d traff

ic i ncident was “inappr opriate an d neede d to be addressed.” Sparks s ug g ested the
Sheri ff re v i ew a DVD of dash-c am footag e of the event, which Staff had provided to support
criminal char g es he filed ag ainst the motorist. Acc ording to Sparks, assistant county attorney s had

T h o u g h n o t m e n t i o n e d i n t h e D e f i c i e n c y N o t i c e , a n “ A n n u a l P e r f o r m a n c e E v a l u a t i o n ” m a d e t h r e e y e a r s i n t o 4 S t a f f ’ s t e n u r e a s a d e p u t y s h e r i f f s t a t e s t h a t , d u r i n g t h e r e v i e w p e r i o d , S t a f f h a d b e e n “ c o u n s e l e d r e g a r d i n g d e a l i n g w i t h
c i t i z e n s i n a n u n p r o f

e s s i o n a l m a n n e r ” a n d h a d “ c o m m o n l y d i s p l a y e d p r o b l e m s m a k i n g c o n t a c t s w i t h m e m b e r s o f t h e p u b l i c

. ”


## 3

## also viewed the rec ording and “fe lt [S taff’ s] con duct and/or behavior was inappropria te and

conce rning enoug h to bring it to his attention.” Sparks g ave the DVD to Sheriff Wied, who immediately forwa rded it to L t. Neisner

. L t.
Neisner and two other

office rs, Serg eant Gir

ndt and Serg eant Edma

n, independe ntly revie wed the
video footag e. As rec ounted in the Def iciency Notice, Staff’s behavio r toward the motorist was
“de me a n in g ” a n d in v o lv e d “ s c r e a

mi n g , ” “ ta u n ting ,” and “appa

rent rag e” that “esc alated” the incident
and “re sulted in an arr est for an acc ident in which

. . . no damag e to an y v ehicle” had occur red.

Ba sed on the video depiction of Staff’s conduct, “it was deter mined without question that [S taff’ s]
behavior was una cce ptable and unpr ofessional” on the occ asion in question.

As a result of that incident, L t. Neisner and Sgt. Edman conducte d “spot chec ks” of Staff’s
dash-c am videos to evalua te his perf ormanc e and found his behavior to be unacc eptable on at least

one other occa sion. The Def icienc y Notice states that, during a traff ic stop that occur

red shortly
befor e the inciting incident, Staff was “ar g umentative,” “scr eam[ed]” at a “ca lm” and “compliant” motorist, repe atedly asked questions that had alre ady been answe red, and “continued to esca late the
incident highe r by threa tening to take the subject to jail sever al times for not cooper ating , althoug h
there was no evidenc e of her not cooper ating on video.” L t. Neisner and Sgt. Edman deeme d Staff’s
behavior “rude ,” “una cce ptable,” a nd “g rossly

unprofe ssional.”

I n addition to the fore g oing eve nts, which occur red in the wee ks prec eding Staff’s termination, the Def

iciency Notice rec alled a near ly five-y ear -old incident i n v o l v i ng simil ar
behavior

. About a month afte r Staff was hired, he repor tedly display ed his badg e during an off- duty
traff ic stop and “cusse d, rante d, and rave d” at a m o t orist for “spee ding up and slowing down[,]

4

## preve nting [hi m] from passing .” The Def iciency Notice states that Staff was formally repr imanded
for his conduct and admonished that further misconduct could result in termination of employ ment.

L t. Neisner informed Staff that all three incidents violated section 22 of the Colorado County
Sheriff’ s Offic e Policy Manual, Conduct: Un b ecoming an Employe e
. L t. Neisner there fore

“re commended” immediate termination of Staff’s employ ment and terminated Staff’s employ ment
“ef fec tive immediately .” Howeve r, L t. Neisner also advised Staff that he had 30 day s to appea l the
termination to Sheriff Wied for a “fina l” decision on the matter. The signe d Def iciency Notice was provided to Staff at the time of termination, which wa s t wo d ay s afte r Sparks had repor ted his

conce rns about Staff’ s conduct to Sheriff Wied.
Staff timely appea led the termination decision to Sheriff Wied, seeking reinstateme nt. I n an exchang e of initial letters, Sheriff W i ed ad v i s ed Staff to “ar ticulate all of his response s to his
termination and the re asons for his appea l” prior to the appea l deadline. Eac h incident had been
identified i n the Deficienc y Notice with fac tual details and objective cr i t er i a such as case number

or date and time, and the Sheriff’ s office had produce d co p i es o f the video rec ording s and other
rele vant documents at Staff’s reque st. Howeve r, rathe r than contesting the substantive g rounds for
termination or attempting to contextualiz e his behavior , Staff’s appea l to Sheriff Wied complained
of proce dural irreg ularities in the proce ss leading to his discharg e. Citi ng sections 614.022 and

614.023 of the Texas Gover nment Code, Staff asser

ted he could not be disciplined absent a written complaint signe d by “the person who was the sub j ec t o f t h e all eg ed misconduct,” that no such
document had ever been provided t o h i m, and as a result, he had no opportunity to respond to the complaint or explain his actions.

5

## After Sheri ff W i ed summarily upheld the termination decision, Staff sued the sheriff and

Colorado County (collec tively , Sheriff Wied) for decla ratory , injunctive, and monetary relief

. Staff alleg ed the Colorado County Sheriff’ s Depa rtment violated Gover

nment Code sections 614.022 and

6 1 4.023 by terminating his employ ment without obtaining and g iving him a copy o f a s i gn ed complaint and without allowi n g h i m an opportunity to respond to the alleg ations befor e he was disciplined.

I n cross-motions for partial summary judgme nt, the m ater ial fac ts wer e not disputed. Nor

was there any dispute that Staff was cover ed under Chapter 614 , S u b chapte r B. Howeve r, in 5 

## seeking summary judgme nt on liability , the parties relied on conflicting constructions of the rele vant
statutory provisions. The parties’ summary -judg ment positions diverg ed as to whether the
circ umstances attending Staff’s terminati o n tr ig g e r e d the statutory proce ss and, if so, whether Sheriff Wied complied with the statutory require ments.
Staff’s summary -judg ment motion asser ted Chapter 614, Subchapter B applied beca use his employ ment was terminated based on an investiga tion that orig in at ed with Sparks’s complaint; Sparks did not sign a written complaint ag ainst Staff; Colorado County ’s investiga tion of Sparks’s complaint was “ex pa

rte” and did not a ffor d Staff an oppor tunity to respond to the alleg ations; the
Def iciency Notice L t. Neisner signe d did not satisfy the statutory require ment of a signe d complaint
beca use “the investiga tion into the complaint did not beg in internally , but was g ener ated as the result

C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B a p p l i e s t o “ a p e a c e o f f i c e r u n d e r A r t i c l e 2

. 1 2 , C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , o r 5

o t h e r l a w w h o i s a p p o i n t e d o r e m p l o y e d b y a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o f t h i s s t a t e , ” u n l e s s t h e p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n i s s u b j e c t t o a m e e t

- a n d

- c o n f

e r o r c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t t h a t h a s b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d u n d e r c h a p t e r s 1 4 3 o r 1 7 4 o f t h e L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t C o d e a n d t h a t “ i n c l u d e s p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f , a n d d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m , a c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t a p e a c e o f f i c e r o r f i r e f i g h t e r , a s a p p l i c a b l e

. ” I d

. § 6 1 4

. 0 2 1

. 

## 6

## of an external communication with the Sheriff’ s Offic e”; and even if the Def iciency Notice would
otherwise be sufficie nt, Staf f had no opportunity to de fend himself a g ainst the alleg ations beca use
he did not rec eive the notice until discipline was imposed. The centr al theme of Staff’s summary judgme nt motion was that an internal repor t based on an external complaint alleg ing misconduct is insufficient to satisfy

the statutory

require ments.
Sheriff Wied’s motion for partial summary judgme nt arg ued that Chapter 614, Subchapter

B did not apply to Staff’s termination beca use Staff’s employ

ment was termi nable at will;
termination “wa s not ba sed on a spec ific complaint”; and the g rounds for termination stated in the
Def iciency Notice wer e not exhaustive. I n the alterna t i v e, Sheriff Wied asser ted the disciplinary

proce ss satisfied the statutory require ments as a mat t er o f l aw b eca use (1) the alleg ations of
misconduct wer e investig ated and supported by evidenc e; (2) the Def

iciency Notice qua lified as a signe d complaint reg arding those alleg ations; (3) t h e s igne d complaint was provided to Staff promptly afte r the interna l investiga tion was initiated; and (4) Staff had an oppor

tunity to respond to the alleg ations in the Defic iency Notice be fore Sheriff W ied—the head of the l aw- enfor ceme nt

ag ency and fina l decisionmaker

—acte d on it.
The trial court g rante d Sheriff Wie d ’s m o t ion for partial summary judgme nt and denied
Staff’s motion. The trial court subsequently rende red final judgme nt dismiss ing Staff’s claims and

awa rding Sheriff Wied $10,483.07 f or rea sonable and nece ssary attorney ’s fee s and up to $30,000 in conditional appellate a ttorney ’s fe es.
The cou rt of appeals reverse d, rende red judgment that Sheriff W ied vi olated C hapter 614,
and remanded th e ca s e t o t h e t rial court for a decision on Staff’s request for attorney ’s fees under

7

## Texas’s Uniform Dec lara tory J udg ment Act. As an initial matter, the court held Colorado County ’s 6



## status as an at-will employ er would not prec lude application of s ections 614.022 and 614.023,
beca use the statute does not limit an employ er’ s authority to discharg e an employ ee but mere l y

pres cribes proce dures that apply only “whe n a complaint of misconduct forms the basis of the
decision to terminate employ ment.” The court further held that Sheriff Wied did not comply with

7



## the statute beca

use he terminated Staff’s employ ment based on a “complaint” of misconduct without obtaining and providing a complaint signe d by “the victim of the alleg ed misconduct.” The court 8



## conclude d Sparks was the complaining party , beca use t h e misconduct alleg ations orig inated with
him. Acc ording ly , the internally g ener ated Def iciency Notice L t. Neisner signe d did not constitute 9



## a “complaint” within the meaning of sec tion 614.022, and no statutorily -compliant complaint was provided to him befor e he w as terminate d “ef fec tive immediately .” 1 0



## We g rante d Sheriff Wied’s petition for revie w to addre ss statutory issues of first impression
that have broad application to la w-e nforc ement ag encie s, peac e office rs, and other public serva nts
and their e mploy ers. 1 1

4 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d 2 5 1 , 2 6 2 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 5 )

. 6

I d

. a t 2 5 8

. 7

I d

. a t 2 6 1

. 8

I d

. 9

I d

. a t 2 6 1

- 6 2

. 10

I n a d d i t i o n t o p e a c e o f f i c e r s a p p o i n t e d o r e m p l o y e d b y a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n , C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B , 11

a p p l i e s t o l a w - e n f

o r c e m e n t o f

f i c e r s f o r t h e S t a t e o f T e x a s , c e r t a i n s t a t e a n d l o c a l f i r e f i g h t e r s , d e t e n t i o n o f

f i c e r s , a n d
c o u n t y j a i l e r s

. T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 6 1 4

. 0 2 1

. 

## 8

## II. Discussion

The dispute in this case turns on the proper constru ct i o n o f Chapter 614, Subchapter B as applied to the undisputed fac ts. Subchapter B addre sses termination of a cover ed peac e office r’s 1 2 

## employ ment, and any

other “ disciplinary

action,” tha t is based on a “complaint” of misconduct. 1 3



## The statute imposes c erta in pr ocedur es the head of a local law-e nforc ement ag ency must follow to
“conside r[] ” a c omplaint or take disciplinary action, including te rminating employ ment “base d on the subject matter

of the c omplaint.” 1 4 

## Subchapter

B, a statute of notable br evity , provides:

§ 614.022 Com plain t to Be in Writing and S igned b y Com plain ant

To be considere d by the head of a

. . . l o ca l l aw en forcement ag ency , the complaint must be: (1) in wr iting; and (2) sig ned by

the per son making the complaint. 1 5



## § 614.023 Copy of

Com plain t to Be G iven to Off icer or Em ployee (a) A copy of a signe d complaint ag ainst a law enfor ceme nt office r of this state or a fire fig hter, detention office r, county jailer, or pea ce of fice r appointed or

employ ed

S e e B C C A A p p e a l G r p

. , I n c

. v

. C i t y o f H o u s

. , 4 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 1 , 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( “ T r a d i t i o n a l s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t 12 i s p r o p e r w h e n t h e m o v a n t e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t n o g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s a n d t h e m o v a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t
a s a m a t t e r o f l a w
. ” ) ; S t a t e v

. S h u m a k e , 1 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 2 7 9 , 2 8 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n p r e s e n t s a q u e s t i o n o f l a w r e v i e w e d d e n o v o )

.

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 6 1 4

. 0 2 1

- . 0 2 3

. 13

I d

. § § 6 1 4

. 0 2 2

- . 0 2 3

. 14

I d

. § 6 1 4

. 0 2 2

. 15


## 9

## by a political subdivision of this state shall be g iven to the office r or employ ee within

a re asonable time after

the complaint is filed. (b) Di s ci p l i nary action may not be taken ag ainst the office r or employ ee unless a copy of the sig ned complaint is g iven to the offic er or employ ee. (c) I n addition to the require ment of Subsection (b), the office r or employ ee may not be indefinitely suspended or terminated from employ ment based o n t h e subject matter of the complaint unless: (1) the c omplaint is i nvestig ated; and (2) ther e is evidenc e to prove the alleg ation of misconduct. 1 6



## These statutes provide “cove red employ ees with proce dural safe g ua r d s to r e d u c e th e r is k that adver se employ ment actions would be based on unsubstantiated complaints .” I n enac ting these statutes, 1 7



## the L eg islature “dete rmined that the value of these p ro t ec t ions outweig hs the fiscal and
administrative burde ns incurre d by comply ing w ith statutory require ments.” 1 8



## Sheriff Wied arg

ues that (1) Subchapter B does not apply to employ ment rela tionships that

are terminable at will, and (2) to the extent it does apply , no proce ss is trig g er ed absent a citizen-g ener ated complaint that provides the sole basis for disciplinary action. Acc ording to Sheriff Wied, County Attorney Ken Sparks did not file a “complaint” ag ainst Staff, bu t m erely discussed
evidentiar y problems in a case ref

err ed for prosec ution by the Sheriff’ s office

. The communication,
he say s, “demonstra ted the nece ssary and req u ir ed coordina tion of the Texas judicial sy stem betwee n

I d

. § 6 1 4

. 0 2 3

. 16

T u r n e r v

. P e r r

y , 2 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 6 , 8 2 3 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 9 , p e t

. d e n i e d )

. 17

I d

. 18


## 10

## the prosecuting attorney

. . . and the law enf orce ment ag ency

. . . to eff ectively prosec ute criminal
violations.” He asser

ts, m o re o v er , that the problem Sparks identified was mere ly an example of
Staff’s d ef

i ci encies, and not the exclusive basis for disciplinary action. I n short, there was no “complaint” that provided t h e b asi s for St aff ’s t ermination and, even if there wer e, S taff could be
terminated at will notwithstanding a pending complaint. I n the alterna tive, Sheriff Wied maintains the disciplinary

proce ss fully

complied with the statutory require ments.
Staf f c ounters that, under the statute’s plain lang uag e, the statutory proce dures are a predic ate

to discipline when an alleg ation of misconduct from any source —whether external to the
law-e nforc ement ag ency or arising from within the ag ency —play s a part in the disciplinary action.

Acc ording ly , the statutory proce ss was trig g ere d beca use Sparks’s complaint about Staff’s behavior

was the cata ly st for his dismiss al. Rely ing on judicial constructions of the statute, Staff arg ues the
Def iciency Notice cannot meet the signe d-complaint require ment beca use it was not signe d by “the
victim of the all eged misconduct.” Per Staff, the only possible victims of his behavior are the 1 9



## aff ecte d citi z en s an d perha

ps the county attorney , whose criminal prosec ution could have been
frustra ted by evidentiar

y problems arising from S t af f’s rec orded encounte r with the defe ndant. 2 0

S e e G u t h e r

y v

. T a y l o r , 1 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 5 , 7 2 3 ( T e x
. A p p

. — [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t

. ) ( c o n s t r u i n g “ p e r s o n 19

m a k i n g t h e c o m p l a i n t ” t o m e a n “ c o m p l a i n a n t ” a n d a p p l y i n g a s p e c i a l d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t t e r m f

r o m a c i v i l

- s e r v i c e s t a t u t e
w i t h a s i m i l a r p u r p o s e ) ; s e e a l s o T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 1 4 3

. 1 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( “ ‘ C o m p l a i n a n t ’ m e a n s a p e r s o n c l a i m i n g t o b e t h e v i c t i m o f m i s c o n d u c t b y a f i r e f i g h t e r o r p o l i c e o f

f i c e r

. ” )

.
C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y h a d n o b e t t e r k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e i n c i t i n g i n c i d e n t t h a n L t

. N e i s n e r , 20 S t a f f ’ s d i s t i n c t i o n s s p l i t r e m a r k a b l y f i n e h a i r s

. H e i n v o k e s C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B ’ s r e q u i r e m e n t s o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ’ s r e p o r t a b o u t t h e v i d e o ’ s c o n t e n t s , b u t i n t h e s a m e b r e a t h , a r g u e s L t

. N e i s n e r c o u l d n o t h a v e m a d e
a c o m p l a i n t b a s e d o n e q u a l a c c e s s t o t h e s a m e i n f o r m a t i o n

. C

f

. F u d g e v

. H a g g a r , 6 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d 1 9 6 , 1 9 8

- 9 9 ( T e x
. A p p

. — T e x a r k a n a 1 9 8 1 , w r i t r e f ’ d n

. r

. e

. ) ( w h i l e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d f

r o m a n e x t e r n a l s o u r c e p r o m p t e d a n i n t e r n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g s u p e r v i s o r c o u l d s a t i s f y t h e s i g n e d

- c o m p l a i n t r e q u i r e m e n t b a s e d o n a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t
w a s c o n d u c t e d i n t e r n a l l y )

. 

## 11

## Staff does not allow that his public interac tions may have harme d the integ rity of the sheriff ’s depar tment or impaired the eff ective administrati o n o f justice by his colleag ues, but even if so, 2 1



## Staff say s the Def

iciency Notice did not satisfy Su b ch apter B’ s require ments beca use L t. Neisner imposed discipline cotempora lly with that document’s prese ntment to him. Thoug h Staff does not
contend the alleg ations wer e not investiga ted or supported by some evidenc e, he asser ts the failure

to provide a signe d copy of a complaint before d i s m i s sal prec luded his participa tion in the investiga tion and hamper ed his ability to defe nd himself.
The parties’ arg uments prese nt statutory construction issues perta ining to when and how the

statute applies. These are questions of law that we revie w de novo under famil iar statutory construction princ iples. 2 2


## A. Applicabl e Standards of Review
When construing a statute, our primary objective is to g ive eff ect to the L eg islature’s intent. 2 3



## We seek that intent “first and fore most” in the statutory text , and “[w]here text i s cl ea r, t ext is 2 4



## deter minative” of intent. “The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of leg islative intent 2 5



## unless a differ ent meaning is appar ent from the contex t o r t he plain meaning leads to absurd or

C f

. C i t y o f D e S o t o v

. W

h i t e , 2 8 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 8 9 , 3 9 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 9 ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h e “ v i t a l r o l e ” o f p o l i c e o f f i c e r s 21 i n o u r s o c i e t y a n d “ t h e n e e d f o r c o n t i n u e d p u b l i c t r u s t i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r d u t i e s ” )

.
S t a t e v

. S h u m a k e , 1 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 2 7 9 , 2 8 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 6 )

. 22

G r e a t e r H o u s

. P ’ s h i

p v

. P a x t o n , 4 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d 5 1 , 5 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 5 )

. 23

I d

. 24

E n t e r g y G u l f S t a t e s , I

n c

. v

. S u m m e r s , 2 8 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 3 , 4 3 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 9 )

. 25


## 12

## nonsensical results.” When interpre ting the L eg islature’s words, howeve r, we must never “re write 2 6



## the statute under the g uise of interpre ting i t , ” and we may not look bey ond its lang uag e for 2 7



## assistance in deter

mining leg islative intent unless the statutory text is susceptible to more than one

rea sonable interpr etation. 2 8



## The statutory -construc tion issues integ ral to the dispositi on of this appea l arise in the context
of cross-motions for summary judgme nt based on undisputed materia l fac ts. When both parties
move for summary judgme nt and the t ri al co u rt grants one mot ion and denies the ot her, as in this

case , we deter

mine all issues prese nted and rende r the judgme n t t h e t ri al court should have
rende red. 2 9



## B. At-Will Em ployme nt

We beg in our analy sis by considering Sheriff W i ed’s principal arg ument, that sections

614.022 and 614.023 are inapplicable beca use Staff’s employ

ment was terminable at will and there

wer e other

g rounds for te rmination besides any specific “complaint” that might have tr igg ere d the
statutory proce ss. I n other wor ds, the exist ence of a “ complaint” is immaterial if the she riff c ould
have disc harg ed Staff f

or any other re ason.

M o l i n e t v

. K i m b r e l l , 3 5 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 0 7 , 4 1 1 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 1 ) ; s e e K e y s t o n e R V C o

. v

. T

e x

. D e p ’ t o f M o t o r V

e h i c l e , 26

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ , 2 0 1 6 W L 6 6 7 7 9 3 5 , a t * 1 n

. 7 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 6 , n o p e t

. ) ( “ [ C ] o n t e x t i n f o r m s , a m o n g o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h e t h e r t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d w o r d s i n t h e i r ‘ p l a i n ’ o r ‘ c o m m o n ’ m e a n i n g , i n a n a r r o w e r o r m o r e t e c h n i c a l c o n n o t a t i o n , o r w h e t h e r t h e f a c i a l l y ‘ p l a i n ’ m e a n i n g w o u l d y i e l d t h e r a r i t y o f ‘ a b s u r d r e s u l t s ’ t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y h a v e i n t e n d e d

. ” )

.

I n r e F o r d M o t o r C o

. , 4 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d 2 6 5 , 2 8 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 4 )

. 27

T e x

. M u t

. I

n s

. C o

. v

. R u t t i g e r , 3 8 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 0 , 4 5 2 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 )

. 28

M e r r i m a n v

. X T O E n e r g y , I n c

. , 4 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d 2 4 4 , 2 4 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 3 )

. 29


## 13

## Appointment of a deputy sheriff involves the public welf are and the expenditure of publ ic
funds. The ge n er al rule is that a deputy sheriff serve s at t he sheriff’s pleasure, which means the 3 0 

## public officia l chosen by the voters to se rve the public’s interest holds the powe r and discr etion to
terminate the employ

ment of subordinates and “is acc ountable to no one other than the voters for his
conduct.” Sheriffs hold “virtually unbridled authority in hiring and firing their employ ees,” and

3 1 3 2



## as a g ener al proposition, may terminate a deputy ’s employ ment for g ood cause , bad cause , or no

cause at all. Thus, a deputy sheriff has “pre car ious tenure ” and no entitlement to continued

3 3 3 4 

## employ ment unless an except i o n t o the at-will doctrine is rec og nized at law or the at-will 3 5

T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 8 5

. 0 0 3 ( c ) , ( f ) ; s e e a l s o C t

y

. o f D a l l a s v

. W i l a n d , 2 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 4 , 3 4 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 7 )

. 30

F a m i l i a s U n i d a s v

. B r i s c o e , 6 1 9 F

. 2 d 3 9 1 , 4 0 4 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 0 ) ( “ B e c a u s e o f t h e u n i q u e s t r u c t u r e o f c o u n t y 31 g o v e r n m e n t i n T e x a s , . . . e l e c t e d c o u n t y o f f i c i a l s , s u c h a s t h e s h e r i f f a n d t r e a s u r e r h o l d [ ] v i r t u a l l y a b s o l u t e s w a y o v e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r t a s k s o r a r e a s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y e n t r u s t e d t o [ t h e m ] b y s t a t e s t a t u t e a n d [ a r e ] a c c o u n t a b l e t o n o o n e o t h e r t h a n t h e v o t e r s f

o r [ t h e i r ] c o n d u c t t h e r e i n

. ” ) ; s e e a l s o A b b o t t v

. P o l l o c k , 9 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d 5 1 3 , 5 1 7 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n 1 9 9 7 , w r i t d e n i e d ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h e “ p o l i c y t h a t e l e c t e d o f f i c e r s , s u c h a s s h e r i f

f s , d i s c h a r g e t h e p u b l i c t r u s t a n d c a r r y t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f

o r t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e o f t h a t t r u s t , a n d t h e r e f o r e , s h o u l d b e f

r e e t o s e l e c t p e r s o n s o f t h e i r o w n c h o i c e t o a s s i s t t h e m ” ( c i t i n g R e n f r o v

. S h r o

p s h i r e , 5 6 6 S

. W

. 2 d 6 8 8 , 6 9 1 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p

. — E a s t l a n d 1 9 7 8 , w r i t r e f ’ d n

. r

. e

. ) ) )

.
I r b y v

. S u l l i v a n , 7 3 7 F

. 2 d 1 4 1 8 , 1 4 2 1 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 4 )

. 32

S e e , e

. g

. , M o n t

g o m e r y C t y

. H o s p

. D i s t

. v

. B r o w n , 9 6 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 0 1 , 5 0 2 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 8 ) ; A b b o t t , 9 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d a t 33 5 1 7

.
M u r r a y v

. H a r r i s , 1 1 2 S

. W

. 2 d 1 0 9 1 , 1 0 9 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p

. — A m a r i l l o 1 9 3 8 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ; s e e a l s o B a r r e t t

34

v

. T h o m a s , 6 4 9 F

. 2 d 1 1 9 3 , 1 1 9 9 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 1 ) ( “ [ D ] e p u t y s h e r i f f s h a v e n o l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t t o t h e i r j o b s a s p u b l i c e m p l o y e e s ; t h e s h e r i f

f m a y f i r e t h e m f

o r m a n y r e a s o n s o r f

o r n o a r t i c u l a b l e r e a s o n a t a l l

. ” )

.
S e e , e

. g

. , B a t t i n v

. S a m a n i e g o , 2 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 8 3 , 1 8 8 ( T e x
. A p p

. — E l P a s o 2 0 0 0 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h e 35 L e g i s l a t u r e c a n m a k e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e a t

- w i l l e m p l o y m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d d i s c h a r g e m a y n o t v i o l a t e t h e l a w ) ; M o t t v

. M o n t g o m e r y C t y

. , T e x

. , 8 8 2 S

. W

. 2 d 6 3 5 , 6 3 7

- 3 8 ( T e x
. A p p

. — B e a u m o n t 1 9 9 4 , w r i t d e n i e d ) ( t e r m i n a t i o n o f e m p l o y m e n t
c a n n o t c o n t r a v e n e a s t a t u t e o r r e s u l t f r o m t h e e m p l o y e e ’ s r e f u s a l t o p e r f

o r m a n i l l e g a l a c t )

. 

## 14

## employ

ment rela tionship has been modified by express ag ree ment or supplanted by a civil-servic e 3 6



## sy stem. 3 7



## I n this case, the pa

rties ag ree Staff’s e mploy ment was terminable at will, but take c ontrary positions on Subchapter B’ s application in the at-will context. I n Sheriff Wied’s view, the statutory

proce dures apply only when a misconduct complaint is the sole basis for termination. Staff
contends—a

nd the court of appea ls held—that the statute applies whene ver the decision to terminate employ ment is based on a complaint of misconduct. We ag ree with Staff and the court of appea ls. 3 8 

## Although Sheriff Wied could have discharg ed Staff for any rea son or no rea son, Chapter 614, Subchapter B never

theless applies when an at-will employ er terminates for cause that derive s from alleg ations in a complaint of misconduct instead of te rminating at will for no ca use or terminating
for other cause

. 3 9



## Sections 614.022 and 614.023 do not abrog ate the rig ht to discharg e an employ ee at will or require cause for termination. Rather, the statute sets out a proce s s fo r addressing discipline, 4 0



## includin g t er m i n at i o n, when discipline is based on a “complaint” of misconduct. I f an employ er

S e e C t y

. o f D a l l

. v

. W i l a n d , 2 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 4 , 3 4 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 7 )

. 36

S e e T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 8 5

. 0 0 3 ( f ) ( d e p u t i e s c o v e r e d b y a c o u n t y c i v i l

- s e r v i c e s t a t u t e a d o p t e d u n d e r 37 C h a p t e r 1 5 8 o f t h e L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t C o d e “ m a y b e s u s p e n d e d o r r e m o v e d o n l y f o r a v i o l a t i o n o f a c i v i l s e r v i c e r u l e
a d o p t e d u n d e r t h a t s y s t e m ” )

.

4 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d 2 5 1 , 2 5 8 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 5 )

. 38

P a s k e v

. F i t

z g e r a l d , 4 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 5 , 4 7 5 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 6 , n o p e t

. ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t 39

n o t e v e r y t e r m i n a t i o n o f a l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t o f

f i c e r n e c e s s a r i l y h a s i t s g e n e s i s i n a “ c o m p l a i n t ” )

.
S e e , e

. g

. , S t e m v

. G o m e z , 8 1 3 F

. 3 d 2 0 5 , 2 1 2

- 1 3 ( 5 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 6 ) ( “ S e c t i o n 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t e x p l i c i t l y 40 p r o v i d e t h a t a n o f

f i c e r f a c i n g a c o m p l a i n t c a n o n l y b e t e r m i n a t e d f o r c a u s e

. S e c t i o n 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 a l s o d o e s n o t r e s e m b l e o t h e r s t a t u t e s t h a t c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h s u c h a r u l e

. ” )

. 

## 15

## terminates or indefinitely su s p en d s a cover ed employ ee based on the subject matter of a

complaint—rathe r than dismiss in g t h e em p l oy ee at will—removal on the basis of a misconduct complaint require s compliance with the statutory proce dure.
The cre ation of proce dural rig hts for cause -base d dismiss al does not limit the sheriff ’s ability

to terminate at will. Nor does conditioning an employ ee’ s remova l on co m p l i ance wit h specifie d

proce dures in specifie d circ umstances equate t o an entitlement to continued employ ment or a
modification of the at-w il l e mploy ment rela tionship. Rather, the statutory proce ss helps ensure that

4 1



## cause -base d remova ls of a specifie d nature bear a modicum of proof and that the aff ecte d employ ee
has notice of

the basis for r emoval. Simply stated, Chapter 614 does not g ive an e mploy ee a rig ht

to continued employ

ment, but it does req u i re co mpliance with the statutory proce ss befor e an employ ee ma

y be per manently encumbe red by

a dama g ing disc harg e re cord.

Remo v al b as ed on an alleg ation of misconduct natura lly car ries more signific ant

conseque nces than dismiss al at will, and the proce dural s af egu ards provided in Chapter 614, 4 2

C f

. R e n k e n v

. H a r r i s C t

y

. , 8 0 8 S

. W

. 2 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 5 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 1 9 9 1 , n o w r i t ) ; I r b y v

. 41 S u l l i v a n , 7 3 7 F

. 2 d 1 4 1 8 , 1 4 2 2 n

. 4 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 4 ) ( “ ‘ [ M ] e r e l y c o n d i t i o n i n g a n e m p l o y e e ’ s r e m o v a l o n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h
c e r t a i n s p e c i f

i e d p r o c e d u r e s ’ d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y m e a n t h a t a n e m p l o y e e h a s a s u b s t a n t i v e p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n c o n t i n u e d
e m p l o y m e n t

. ” ( q u o t i n g B i s h o p v

. W o o d , 4 2 6 U

. S

. 3 4 1 , 3 4 5 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ) )

. B u t s e e T u r n e r v

. P e r r

y , 2 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 6 , 8 2 2 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 9 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( h o l d i n g s c h o o l d i s t r i c t p o l i c e o f f i c e r h a d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n c o n t i n u e d e m p l o y m e n t p u r s u a n t t o C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B , w h i c h w a s e x p r e s s l y a d o p t e d i n t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ’ s p o l i c y m a n u a l a n d h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n a p p l i e d t o t h e o f f i c e r )

.
I n a n y e m p l o y m e n t c o n t e x t , b e i n g d i s c h a r g e d f o r m i s c o n d u c t i s m a n i f e s t l y m o r e c o n s e q u e n t i a l t h a n 42 t e r m i n a t i o n a t w i l l

. B u t f o r p e a c e o f

f i c e r s , t h e e n s u i n g r e p e r c u s s i o n s m a y b e e v e n m o r e s e r i o u s

. F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n a l i c e n s e d p e a c e o f

f i c e r ’ s e m p l o y m e n t i s t e r m i n a t e d , t h e l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t a g e n c y m u s t s u b m i t a r e p o r t t o t h e T e x a s C o m m i s s i o n o n L a w E n f o r c e m e n t t h a t i n c l u d e s a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e l i c e n s e e w a s h o n o r a b l y d i s c h a r g e d , g e n e r a l l y d i s c h a r g e d , o r d i s h o n o r a b l y d i s c h a r g e d a n d , t o t h e e x t e n t r e q u i r e d b y t h e C o m m i s s i o n , p r o v i d e a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h t h e p e r s o n w a s t e r m i n a t e d

. T E X

. O C C

. C O D E § 1 7 0 1

. 4 5 2 ( a ) , ( b )

. A p e a c e o f f i c e r i s
n o t “ h o n o r a b l y d i s c h a r g e d ” i f t h e o f f i c e r w a s t e r m i n a t e d f

o r i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n o r u n t r u t h f u l n e s s , d u e t o a l l e g a t i o n s o f
c r i m i n a l m i s c o n d u c t , a d o c u m e n t e d p e r f o r m a n c e p r o b l e m , o r a d i s c i p l i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n

. I d

. § 1 7 0 1

. 4 5 2 ( b )

. A l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t a g e n c y c a n n o t h i r e a l i c e n s e d p e a c e o f f i c e r b e f o r e “ m a k i n g a r e q u e s t t o t h e c o m m i s s i o n f o r a n y 

## 16

## Subchapter B advanc e two signific ant objectives: (1) ameliora ting the risk that disciplinary action

might be based on frivolous complaints and (2) helping to ensure an aff ecte d employ ee has sufficie nt
notice of the char g es to de fend ag ainst the alleg ations. Providing notice aff ords the employ ee an 4 3 

## opportunity to addre ss the matter but does not prec lude the employ er from terminating employ ment

s o long as the “complaint” has been investiga ted and “ther e is evidenc e to prove the allega t i o n o f
misconduct.” 4 4



## I n sum, Chapter 614, Subchapter B does not prec lude termination of empl o y m en t ab s ent compliance with t h e s t at u t ory proce ss, but when alleg ations of misconduct are serious enoug h to

war rant termination—independe ntly or as a component of cumulative discipline—a complaint must
be filed, investiga ted, and substantiated. The statute presc ribes a proce dure that applies when 4 5

e m p l o y m e n t t e r m i n a t i o n r e p o r t r e g a r d i n g t h e p e r s o n ” o r “ o b t a i n [ i n g ] f r o m t h e c o m m i s s i o n a n y s e r v i c e

. . . r e c o r d s
r e g a r d i n g t h e p e r s o n m a i n t a i n e d b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n

. ” I d

. § 1 7 0 1

. 4 5 1 ( a )

. M o r e o v e r , “ [ t ] h e c o m m i s s i o n s h a l l s u s p e n d t h e l i c e n s e o f a n o f

f i c e r

. . . o n n o t i f

i c a t i o n t h a t t h e o f

f i c e r h a s b e e n d i s h o n o r a b l y d i s c h a r g e d i f t h e o f f i c e r h a s p r e v i o u s l y b e e n d i s h o n o r a b l y d i s c h a r g e d f r o m a n o t h e r l a w e n f

o r c e m e n t a g e n c y
. ” I

d

. § 1 7 0 1

. 4 5 2 1 ( a )

.
S e e T r e a d w a y v

. H o l d e r , 3 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d 7 8 0 , 7 8 4

- 8 5 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 0 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e 43 p r o p e r d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f t h e c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t a n o f f i c e r i m p a i r s t h e o f

f i c e r ’ s a b i l i t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e o r d e f e n d a g a i n s t t h e c o m p l a i n t s )

.

S e e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 6 1 4

. 0 2 3

. 44

T h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p r e s c r i b e a q u a n t u m o f p r o o f f o r s u b s t a n t i a t i n g a n a l l e g a t i o n o f m i s c o n d u c t

. T h o u g h 45

a n i n i t i a l d r a f

t o f s e c t i o n 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 ( c ) ’ s e n a c t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n i n c l u d e d l a n g u a g e r e q u i r i n g “ s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e a n
a l l e g a t i o n o f m i s c o n d u c t , ” t h a t l a n g u a g e d i d n o t m a k e t h e f i n a l c u t

. A b i l l a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t l a n g u a g e w a s s p e c i f i c a l l y a m e n d e d t o ( 1 ) l i m i t i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d p r o o f t o i n d e f i n i t e s u s p e n s i o n o r t e r m i n a t i o n a n d ( 2 ) r e q u i r e

“ ‘ e v i d e n c e ’ r a t h e r t h a n ‘ s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e ’ a s i n t h e o r i g i n a l b i l l , t o p r o v e a n y a l l e g a t i o n o f m i s c o n d u c t

. ” S e e H o u s e C o m m

. o n U r b a n A f

f a i r s , B i l l A n a l y s i s , T e x
. H

. B

. 6 3 9 , 7 9 t h L e g

. , R

. S

. ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( r e s p o n d i n g t o o p p o n e n t s ’ c o n c e r n s t h a t
n o t h r e s h o l d s t a n d a r d o f p r o o f w a s r e q u i r e d a n d s u p p o r t e r s ’ p o s i t i o n t h a t s i l e n c e o n t h e q u a n t u m o f e v i d e n c e “ w o u l d l e a v e t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o d e c i d e w h a t i s s u f f i c i e n t i n t h e h a n d s o f s t a t e a n d l o c a l d e p a r t m e n t s w h e r e i t l i e s a l r e a d y [ , s o ] s t a t e
a n d l o c a l a g e n c i e s w o u l d l o s e n o a u t h o r i t y b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f a s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e s t a n d a r d ” )

. W e h a v e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t c o u r t s m u s t t a k e s t a t u t e s a s t h e y f i n d t h e m a n d m u s t p r e s u m e t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n c l u d e d w o r d s i n t h e m t h a t i t i n t e n d e d t o i n c l u d e a n d o m i t t e d w o r d s i t i n t e n d e d t o o m i t

. T G S

– N O P E C G e o p h y s i c a l C o

. v

. C o m b s , 3 4 0 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 2 , 4 3 9 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 1 )

. 

## 17

## termination or indefinite suspension is “base d on the subject matter of [a misconduct] complaint.” 4 6



## Thoug h the statutory proce ss may cause an administrative burden on law-e nforc ement ag encie s, the

proce dural prote ctions offe red by the statute outweig h the cor responding burden. 4 7



## The iss ue here is not whether Sheriff W ied could have d i s ch arg ed S taff at will rathe r t han
for sufficie nt cause ; the issue is whether h i s t er m i n at i on for cause was based on a “complaint,”
within the meaning of the statute. I f it was, the alleg ations in the complaint could not provide a basis
for his discharg e unless he was timely provided a copy of the “comp l ai n t ” “s i gn ed by the person making the complaint.”

C. Invoki ng and F ulf

illin g Chapter 614, Subchap ter B’s Requirem ents
The parties’ arg uments require us to consider, as a matter of first impression, t h e k i n d of “complaint” and “per s o n m ak i ng the complaint” that is nece ssary to both activate and satisfy the

statute’s proce dural safe g uards. Subchapter B does not define or elabor ate on the nature of a 4 8 

## “complaint” or the ty

pe of “per son” who may make and sign a complaint. Be cause these terms are

not sta tutorily define d, we must g ive them their ordinary and common mea ning unle ss the context

sug g ests the L eg islature intended a differ ent or more technica l meaning or unless such a construction
leads to absur d results. 4 9

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 ( c )

. 46

T u r n e r , 2 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 2 3

. 47

S t e m v

. G o m e z , 8 1 3 F

. 3 d 2 0 5 , 2 1 5 ( 5 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 6 ) ( “ T e x a s c o u r t s h a v e n o t r e s o l v e d i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t 48 [ C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B ]

. ” )

.

S e e F K M P ’ s h i p , L t d

. v

. B d

. o

f R e g e n t s o f t h e U n i v

. o

f H o u s

. S

y s

. , 2 5 5 S

. W

. 3 d 6 1 9 , 6 3 3 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( “ W e 49

u s e d e f i n i t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e L e g i s l a t u r e a n d a n y t e c h n i c a l o r p a r t i c u l a r m e a n i n g t h e w o r d s h a v e a c q u i r e d , b u t
o t h e r w i s e , w e c o n s t r u e t h e s t a t u t e ’ s w o r d s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p l a i n a n d c o m m o n m e a n i n g u n l e s s a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t i o n i s 

## 18

## I n deter mining the ordinary and common meaning of an undefine d word in a statute, we may
consider a varie ty of source s, including dictionary definitions, judicial constructions of the term, and
other statutory definitions. A revie w of dict i o nary definitions reve als that “complaint” ref ers to 5 0



## “the act or action of expressing protest, censur e, or rese ntment: expression of injusti ce” ; a “for mal 5 1



## al l ega t i o n or char g e ag ainst a party made or prese nted to the appropr iate court or office r”; 5 2 

## “something that is the cause or subject of protest or g rieve d outcry ”; “a statement that a situation 5 3



## is unsa tisfactory or unacc eptable” ; and “a rea son for

. . . [or] the expression of dissatisfaction.” 5 4 5 5 

## Statutory definitions of th e t er m gen erally acc ord with the fore g oing. As the authorities 5 6

a p p a r e n t f

r o m t h e c o n t e x t , o r u n l e s s s u c h a c o n s t r u c t i o n l e a d s t o a b s u r d r e s u l t s

. ” )

.
S e e , e

. g

. , T G S

– N O P E C G e o p h y s i c a l , 3 4 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 4 1 ( c o n s u l t i n g d i c t i o n a r i e s t o a s c e r t a i n t h e g e n e r a l l y 50

a c c e p t e d d e f

i n i t i o n o f u n d e f

i n e d s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e )

.
W E B S T E R ’ S T H IR D N E W I N T ’ L D IC T IO N A R Y ( 2 0 0 2 )

. 51

I d

. 52

I d

. 53

N E W O X F O R D A M E R IC A N D IC T IO N A R Y ( 3 d e d

. 2 0 1 0 )

. 54

I d

. 55

S e e , e

. g

. , T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E , T i t l e 2 , S u b t i t l e G A p p

. A

- 1 § 1

. 0 6 ( G ) ( “ ‘ C o m p l a i n t ’ m e a n s t h o s e w r i t t e n 56

m a t t e r s r e c e i v e d b y t h e O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f D i s c i p l i n a r y C o u n s e l t h a t , e i t h e r o n t h e f a c e t h e r e o f o r u p o n s c r e e n i n g o r p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a l l e g e P r o f e s s i o n a l M i s c o n d u c t o r a t t o r n e y D i s a b i l i t y , o r b o t h , c o g n i z a b l e u n d e r t h e s e r u l e s o r t h e T e x a s D i s c i p l i n a r y R u l e s o f P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t

. ” ) ; T E X

. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E § 5 5 5

. 0 0 1 ( “ ‘ C o m p l a i n t ’
m e a n s i n f

o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d b y t h e o f f i c e o f i n d e p e n d e n t o m b u d s m a n r e g a r d i n g a p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n o f a r i g h t o f a
r e s i d e n t o r c l i e n t a n d i n c l u d e s i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d r e g a r d i n g a f a i l u r e

. . . t o c o m p l y w i t h [ r e l e v a n t ] p o l i c e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s

. . . . ” ) ; T E X

. I N S

. C O D E § § 5 4 2

. 0 0 5 ( a ) ( d e f i n i n g “ c o m p l a i n t ” a s “ a n y w r i t t e n c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r i m a r i l y e x p r e s s i n g a g r i e v a n c e ” ) , 7 5 1

. 0 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( “ ‘ C o m p l a i n t ’ m e a n s a w r i t t e n o r d o c u m e n t e d o r a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e p r i m a r y i n t e n t o f w h i c h i s t o e x p r e s s a g r i e v a n c e o r a n e x p r e s s i o n o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

. ” ) , 8 4 3

. 0 0 2 ( 6 ) ( d e f i n i n g “ c o m p l a i n t ” a s “ a n y d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n e x p r e s s e d o r a l l y o r i n w r i t i n g b y a c o m p l a i n a n t t o a h e a l t h m a i n t e n a n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n r e g a r d i n g a n y a s p e c t
o f t h e h e a l t h m a i n t e n a n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n ’ s o p e r a t i o n ” ) ; c f

. a l s o T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E , T i t l e 2 , S u b t i t l e G A p p

. A

- 1 § 1

. 0 6 ( R ) ( “ ‘ G r i e v a n c e ’ m e a n s a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t , f r o m w h a t e v e r s o u r c e , a p p a r e n t l y i n t e n d e d t o a l l e g e [ a t t o r n e y m i s c o n d u c t o r d i s a b i l i t y ] r e c e i v e d b y t h e O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f D i s c i p l i n a r y C o u n s e l

. ” )

.



## 19

## consistently confirm, the word “complaint” ordinarily means an expression of dissatisfaction,

including a

n alleg ation made by

one ag ainst another. 5 7



## When a “complaint” is made, howeve r, the proce dures in Chapter 614, Subchapter B come into play and limit the law-enf

orce ment ag ency ’s ability to take “disc iplinary action” ba sed on the complaint. Thoug h t h e o rd inary meaning of “complaint” encompa sses alleg ations that may be
formal or informal, written or unwritten, satisfac tion of the statute require s complaints that are in writing and “sig ned by

the per son making the complaint.” 5 8



## The term “p erson” g ener ally ref ers to a natura l person (i.e., any individual), and under 5 9 

## Subchapter B’ s plain lang uag e, more than one “per son” could make a “complaint.” Apply ing the ordinary meaning of the terms to the fac ts in this case , the county attorney could be a “per son” who

P a s k e v

. F i t

z g e r a l d , 4 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 5 , 4 7 4 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 6 , n o p e t

. )

. 57

T h e a n a l y s i s i n o n e c a s e s u g g e s t s t h a t f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n a s i g n e d c o m p l a i n t f r o m t h e v i c t i m o f m i s c o n d u c t 58

m i g h t p r e c l u d e t h e s t a t u t e ’ s a p p l i c a t i o n a l t o g e t h e r

. S e e G e h r i n g v

. H a r r i s C t y

. T e x

. , C i v
. A

. H

- 1 5

- 0 7 2 6 , 2 0 1 6 W L 2 6 9 6 2 0 , a t * 1 1 ( S

. D

. T e x
. J a n

. 2 1 , 2 0 1 6 ) ( “ G e h r i n g d o e s n o t a s s e r t t h a t a n y o f t h e a l l e g e d v i c t i m s i n t h e t h r e e i n c i d e n t s s i g n e d a w r i t t e n c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t h i m t h a t w a s t h e b a s i s o f t h e d i s c i p l i n a r y m e a s u r e s t a k e n a g a i n s t [ h i m ] , b u t w h i c h w a s
n o t p r o v i d e d t o h i m b e f o r e t h o s e m e a s u r e s w e r e t a k e n

. T h u s G e h r i n g h a s f a i l e d t o s t a t e a p l a u s i b l e c l a i m u n d e r t h e T e x a s G o v e r n m e n t C o d e

. ” )

. A l t h o u g h t h e a n a l y s i s i n t h e o p i n i o n i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r , r e a d i n g t h e s t a t u t e i n s u c h a
m a n n e r w o u l d c o n f

l a t e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n o f i t s r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d w o u l d a l l o w e m p l o y e r s t o s k i r t t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s s i m p l y b y c h o o s i n g n o t t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e s t a t u t e

. T h i s i s n o t a r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e

.
N E W O X F O R D A M E R IC A N D IC T IO N A R Y ( 3 d e d

. 2 0 1 0 ) ( “ p e r s o n ” m e a n s “ a h u m a n b e i n g r e g a r d e d a s a n

5 9 i n d i v i d u a l ” ) ; W E B S T E R ’ S T H IR D N E W I N T ’ L D IC T IO N A R Y ( 2 0 0 2 ) ( “ p e r s o n ” i s “ a n i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g , ” “ a h u m a n b e i n g a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a n a n i m a l o r t h i n g ” )

. D e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , h o w e v e r , t h e t e r m m a y a l s o i n c l u d e a n
a r t i f i c i a l p e r s o n , s u c h a s a g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c y , p a r t n e r s h i p , a s s o c i a t i o n , c o r p o r a t i o n , t r u s t , o r o t h e r l e g a l e n t i t y
. S e e , e

. g

. , T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 0 5 ( u n l e s s a s t a t u t e o r c o n t e x t e m p l o y i n g t h e w o r d o r p h r a s e r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n ,
“ p e r s o n , ” w h e n u s e d i n a s t a t u t e , “ i n c l u d e s c o r p o r a t i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t o r g o v e r n m e n t a l s u b d i v i s i o n o r
a g e n c y , b u s i n e s s t r u s t , e s t a t e , t r u s t , p a r t n e r s h i p , a s s o c i a t i o n , a n d a n y o t h e r l e g a l e n t i t y ” ) ; T E X

. I N S

. C O D E § 8 4 3

. 0 0 2 ( 2 1 ) ( d e f i n i n g “ p e r s o n ” a s “ a n y n a t u r a l o r a r t i f i c i a l p e r s o n , i n c l u d i n g a n i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t n e r s h i p , a s s o c i a t i o n , c o r p o r a t i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n , t r u s t , [ a n d o t h e r l e g a l e n t i t i e s ] ” )

. W h i l e i n c l u d i n g a r t i f i c i a l p e r s o n s s e e m s u n l i k e l y i n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e i s s u e i s i m m a t e r i a l t o t h e a p p e a l ’ s d i s p o s i t i o n

. 

## 20

## may make and sign a written “complaint” for purposes of trig g ering and sati s fy i n g t h e s tatute’s

proce dural re quirements, and L t. Neisner c ould as well.

Courts construing th e s t atute, howeve r, have rec og nized distinctions that aff ect when the

proce dural require ments are invoked and limit who may discharg e them. Some case s have held that Chapter 614, Subchapter B applies to “any alleg ation of misconduct that could result in disciplinary action,” but disag ree ment exis ts about whether t he st atute applies to misconduct alleg ations that

6 0 

## orig inate from within the law-e nforc ement ag ency as opposed to those arising from external

source s. Others hold that internal disciplinary m at t er s based on the ag ency head’ s persona l

6 1 

## knowledg e do not constitute a “complaint” under section 614.022 and 614.023, and conse quently ,

B r a c e y v

. C i t y o f K i l l e e n , 4 1 7 S

. W

. 3 d 9 4 , 9 9 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 3 , n o p e t

. ) ; T r e a d w a y v

. H o l d e r , 3 0 9 60 S

. W

. 3 d 7 8 0 , 7 8 2

- 8 6 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 0 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ; i d

. a t 7 8 6

- 8 9 & n

. 1 ( W A L D R O P , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( a g r e e i n g
w i t h t h e m a

j o r i t y t h a t t h e s t a t u t e m a k e s n o d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n “ e x t e r n a l ” c o m p l a i n t s a n d “ i n t e r n a l ” c o m p l a i n t s , b u t
a r g u i n g t h e t e r m “ c o m p l a i n t ” d o e s n o t i n c l u d e a l l e g a t i o n s o f m i s c o n d u c t o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h i n t h e o f f i c e r ’ s o w n “ c h a i n o f
c o m m a n d , ” w h i c h a r e p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s d i s c i p l i n a r y m a t t e r s t h a t d o n o t r e q u i r e p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B )

.

C o m p a r e P a s k e , 4 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 7 5 ( “ [ A ] ‘ c o m p l a i n t ’ m a y o r i g i n a t e f r o m e i t h e r o u t s i d e a l a w e n f o r c e m e n t 61

a g e n c y o r f

r o m w i t h i n i t ” b u t n o t a l l d i s m i s s a l s “ n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e [ t h e i r ] g e n e s i s i n a ‘ c o m p l a i n t ’ ” ) , T r e a d w a y , 3 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 8 4 ( “ [ A ] n y ‘ a l l e g a t i o n o f m i s c o n d u c t ’ f o r w h i c h d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n m a y b e i m p o s e d r e p r e s e n t s a c o m p l a i n t , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s o u r c e

. ” ) , a n d T e x
. A t t ’ y G e n

. O p

. N o

. G A

- 0 2 5 1 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ( “ T h e a u t h o r i t y o f a h e a d o f p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t t o d i s c i p l i n e i s n o t l i m i t e d t o c o m p l a i n t s f i l e d b y a c i t i z e n

. . . ; [ a ] s c i r c u m s t a n c e s w a r r a n t , a s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t o r o t h e r s m a y i n i t i a t e d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n b y f i l i n g a s i g n e d c o m p l a i n t , o r c o m p l a i n t s m a y p r o m p t a n i n t e r n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d r e p o r t b y t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f

y t h e [ s t a t u t o r y ] r e q u i r e m e n t s

. ” ) , w i t h G e h r i n g , 2 0 1 6 W L 2 6 9 6 2 0 , a t * 1 1 ( h o l d i n g t h a t a n o f f i c e r f a i l e d t o s t a t e a p l a u s i b l e c l a i m u n d e r C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B , b e c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s o n l y w h e n “ a w r i t t e n s i g n e d c o m p l a i n t h a s b e e n m a d e b y a v i c t i m , n o t a l a w e n f o r c e m e n t a g e n c y ’ s i n t e r n a l o b s e r v a t i o n ” ) a n d J a c k l e y v

. C i t y o f L i v e O a k , N o

. S A

- 0 8

- C A

- 0 2 1 1

- O G , 2 0 0 8 W L 5 3 5 2 9 4 4 , a t * 5 ( W

. D

. T e x D e c

. 1 9 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( “ B e c a u s e t h e l e t t e r p u t [ t h e t e r m i n a t e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r ] o n n o t i c e o f

a n i n t e r n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n
a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f a c o m p l a i n t b y a c i t i z e n , i t w a s a p p r o p r i a t e l y s i g n e d b y [ t h e C i t y M a n a g e r ] ” a s “ t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e s t a t u t e t o i n d i c a t e t h a t s e c t i o n s 6 1 4

. 0 2 2

- [

. ] 0 2 3 a p p l y t o a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n c i t i z e n - g e n e r a t e d c o m p l a i n t s ” ) ; c f

. B a l d r i d g e v

. B r a u n e r , N o

. 0 1

- 1 0

- 0 0 8 5 2

- C V , 2 0 1 3 W L 4 6 8 0 2 1 9 , a t * 5 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 3 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( d e c l i n i n g t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r s e c t i o n 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 a p p l i e s t o i n t e r n a l p e r f o r m a n c e i s s u e s b e c a u s e t h e e m p l o y e r c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e s t a t u t e i n a n y e v e n t ; m u l t i p l e p o t e n t i a l g r o u n d s f o r t e r m i n a t i o n w e r e g i v e n a n d s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s
w e r e s a t i s f

i e d w i t h r e g a r d t o a t l e a s t o n e o f t h e s t a t e d g r o u n d s )

. 

## 21

## compliance wit h the statutory proce ss is not require d. Wit h reg ard to the signe d-complaint 6 2 

## requirement, judicial constructions of the statute have narr owed the ordinary meaning of “per son making the complaint, ” s u ch that only the “victim” of the alleg ed misconduct can fulfill that require ment. 6 3



## We need not consi der in this case whether Chapter 614, Subchapter B is implicated by an internally g ener ated complaint; whether or under what circ umstances disciplina ry action by an

ag ency head or someone else in the chain of command invokes the statute; wh at constitutes “per sonal knowledg e” that m ay b e sufficie nt to remove disciplinary action from Chapter 614’s ambit; or whether persona l knowledg e may be acquir ed technolog ically and, if so, how conce rns
about authenticity or completene ss fac tor into the analy sis. Rather, we conc lu d e th a t the dispositi ve 6 4



## issue under the fac ts prese nted is whether “the pe rson making the complaint” must be “the victim
of the alleg ed misconduct.” Adher ing to the prec epts that “[e]nforcing the law as written is a court’s

S e e P a s k e , 4 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 7 5 ; T r e a d w a y , 3 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 8 6

- 8 9 & n

. 1 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 0 , p e t

. 6 2 d e n i e d ) ( W A L D R O P , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( a g r e e i n g w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e s t a t u t e m a k e s n o d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n “ e x t e r n a l ”
c o m p l a i n t s a n d “ i n t e r n a l ” c o m p l a i n t s , b u t a r g u i n g t h e t e r m “ c o m p l a i n t ” d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h o s e g e n e r a t e d w i t h i n t h e o f f i c e r ’ s o w n “ c h a i n o f

c o m m a n d ” ) ; a c c o r d R o g e r s v

. C i t y o f Y o a k u m , 6 6 0 F

. A p p ’ x 2 7 9 , 2 8 5 ( 5 t h C i r

. A u g

. 3 0 , 2 0 1 6 ) ( C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B w a s n o t i m p l i c a t e d w h e n t h e c i t y m a n a g e r f i r e d t h e p o l i c e c h i e f f o r m i s h a n d l i n g a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o a l l e g a t i o n s o f m i s c o n d u c t a b o u t a s u b o r d i n a t e o f f i c e r ; t h e t e r m i n a t i o n d e c i s i o n w a s b a s e d o n t h e c i t y
m a n a g e r ’ s “ o w n o b s e r v a t i o n s o f [ t h e c h i e f ’ s ] b e h a v i o r a n d h i s r e s p o n s e s t o i s s u e s w i t h i n t h e d e p a r t m e n t ” ( c i t i n g P a s k e , 4 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 7 5 ) )

. B u t s e e T r e a d w a y , 3 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 8 3

- 8 5 ( a p p l y i n g C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B t o c o m p l a i n t t h a t
o r i g i n a t e d w i t h i n t h e c h a i n o f c o m m a n d )

.

S e e , e

. g

. , G u t h e r

y v

. T a y l o r , 1 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 5 , 7 2 3 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t

. )

. 63

I n t h i s c a s e , t h e v i d e o r e c o r d i n g s , w h i c h c o n f e r r e d s o m e d e g r e e o f “ p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e ” t o t h o s e w h o v i e w e d 64 t h e m , w e r e o b t a i n e d d i r e c t l y f r o m S t a f f ’ s v e h i c l e

. A c c o r d i n g l y , c o n c e r n s a b o u t a u t h e n t i c i t y m i g h t n o t b e a s s i g n i f i c a n t
a s t h o s e t h a t c o u l d a r i s e f r o m v i r a l v i d e o s , f

o r e x a m p l e , o r r e c o r d i n g s p r o v i d e d b y a t h i r d p a r t y
. B u t e v e n i f a u t h e n t i c i t y i s n o t a c o n c e r n , i m a g e c a p t u r e m i g h t n o t t e l l t h e w h o l e s t o r y
. H e r e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e D e f

i c i e n c y N o t i c e o b s e r v e s t h a t , i n o n e o f S t a f

f ’ s t r a f f i c - s t o p e n c o u n t e r s , “ t h e r e w a s n o e v i d e n c e o f h e r n o t c o o p e r a t i n g o n t h e v i d e o
. ” ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d

. ) A p i c t u r e m a y b e w o r t h a t h o u s a n d w o r d s , b u t n o t e v e r y n a r r a t i v e i s a s h o r t s t o r y
. E v e n w h e n t h e r e i s r e l a t i v e l y

“ o b j e c t i v e ” e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e , c o m p l y i n g w i t h C h a p t e r 6 1 4 , S u b c h a p t e r B ’ s r e q u i r e m e n t s w o u l d a l l o w a n a f f e c t e d
e m p l o y e e t o r e s p o n d w i t h e v i d e n c e t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e c r i t i c a l c o n t e x t

. 

## 22

## safe st ref

ug e in matters of statutory construction” and that “we should alway s ref rain from rew riting

text that lawmake rs chose ,” we hold the statute’ s plain lang uag e does not support a construction 6 5



## that restric ts the mea n i n g o f “t he person making the complaint” to “the victim of the alleg ed
misconduct.”

D. Collater al Lin guistic Restr aints on Plain Lan guage
T he “victim of misconduct” limit ation is borrowe d from a specia l definition of t h e t er m “complaina

nt” provided in section 143.123 of the Texas L ocal Gover nment Code, which is pa

rt of

a civil-servic e statute enac ted to “sec ure eff icient fire and police depar tments composed of capa ble

personne l who are fre e fro m political influence and who have perma nent employ

ment tenure as public serva

nts.” Chapter 143’s purpose is simil ar but not identical to Chapter 614, Subchapter B’ s 6 6



## purpose, beca

use the latter does not g uara ntee “per manent employ

ment tenure ” for cover ed public

serva nts and “fr ee[dom] from polit ical influenc e” may be advance d by Subchapter B but is not an
express statutory

objective.
Section 143.123, which g overns investiga tion of misconduct complaints ag ainst fire fig hters
and p o lice office rs in municipalities meeting a threshold population require ment, define s “complaina

nt” for purposes of that section as “a person claiming to be the victim of misconduct by

a fire fig hter or police office r.” The term “complaina nt” includes a person who is a peac e office r. 6 7 6 8

E n t e r g y G u l f S t a t e s , I

n c

. v

. S u m m e r s , 2 8 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 3 , 4 4 3 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 9 )

. 65

T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 1 4 3

. 0 0 1 ; s e e G u t h e r y , 1 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 2 2

- 2 3 ( d e r i v i n g “ v i c t i m o f m i s c o n d u c t ” 66 l i m i t a t i o n b y r e f

e r e n c e t o s e c t i o n 1 4 3

. 0 0 1 )

.
T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 1 4 3

. 1 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; s e e a l s o i d

. § 1 4 3

. 1 0 1 ( e x c e p t a s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d , C h a p t e r 1 4 3 , 67 S u b c h a p t e r G a p p l i e s o n l y t o a m u n i c i p a l i t y w i t h a p o p u l a t i o n o f 1

. 5 m i l l i o n o r m o r e ) ; i d

. § § 1 4 3

. 3 0 1 , . 3 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( d e f i n i n g “ c o m p l a i n a n t ” s i m i l a r l y i n a c i v i l

- s e r v i c e s t a t u t e a p p l i c a b l e t o c e r t a i n m u n i c i p a l i t i e s w i t h a p o p u l a t i o n o f


## 23

## The theory that the L eg islature intended “a person making a complaint” under Chapter 614,

Subchapter

B to be ar a

simil arly narr ow meaning derive s from a sy llogism of sorts.
That is:

• I n common parla

nce, a “person m aking a compl aint” is the s ame thing as a “complaina

nt.”

• Under a specia l definition in a statute of simil ar purpose (sec tion 143.123 of the L ocal Govern m en t C ode), the term “complaina nt” is restric ted to an alleg ed “vic tim of misconduct.”

• There fore , the L eg islature likely intended a “per son making a complaint” in
s ec t i o n 614.022 of the Gover nment Code to ref

er only to “the victim o f misconduct.” 6 9 

## This analy sis relies on a pr inciple of statutory construction that,
Whenever a leg islature has used a word in a statute in one sense an d wi t h one m eaning, and subsequently uses the same word in leg islating on the s am e subje ct -m atter, it will be understood as using it in the same sense, unless there be something in the context or the nature of things to indicate that it intended a differ ent meaning there by . The rule applies whe n the phra ses ar e substantially the same. 7 0

4 6 0 , 0 0 0 o r m o r e o r w h i c h o p e r a t e u n d e r a c i t y - m a n a g e r f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t )

.
S e e i d

. § 1 4 3

. 1 2 3 ( e ) ( “ c o m p l a i n a n t ” m a y n o t b e a s s i g n e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e a c o m p l a i n t ) , ( f ) ( a f i r e f i g h t e r o r 68 p o l i c e o f f i c e r m a y n o t b e i n t e r r o g a t e d b a s e d o n “ a c o m p l a i n t b y a c o m p l a i n a n t w h o i s n o t a p e a c e o f f i c e r u n l e s s t h e c o m p l a i n a n t v e r i f

i e s t h e c o m p l a i n t ” ) ; s e e a l s o i d

. § 1 4 3

. 3 1 2 ( f ) , ( g ) ( s a m e )

.
S e e g e n e r a l l

y G u t h e r y , 1 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 2 1

- 2 2

. 69

B r o w n v

. D a r d e n , 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 2 6 1 , 2 6 3 ( T e x
. 1 9 3 2 ) ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n a n d p u n c t u a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ; s e e a l s o L & M

70 S u r c o M f g

. , I n c

. v

. W i n n T i l e C o

. , 5 8 0 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 0 , 9 2 6 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p

. — T y l e r 1 9 7 9 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e “ a p p l i e s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r f o r c e w h e r e t h e m e a n i n g o f a w o r d a s u s e d i n o n e a c t i s c l e a r o r h a s b e e n j u d i c i a l l y d e t e r m i n e d , a n d t h e s a m e w o r d i s s u b s e q u e n t l y u s e d i n a n o t h e r a c t p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e s a m e s u b j e c t ” )

. 

## 24

## S tated another way , “[w]ords and phrase s that have acquir ed a technica l or particula r meanin g,
whether by leg islative definition or otherwise , shall be construe d acc ording ly .” 7 1



## A few prac tical considerations preve nt us from draw ing the same c o n c lu s io n a b o u t th e im pact
of the specia l definition of “complaina nt” in section 143.123, howeve r. First, “complaina nt” is not

a ter m the L eg islature used in e nacting sections 614.022 and 614.023 or the prede cessor statute. 7 2 

## Although the term was added to section 614.022’s caption du ri n g codifica tion, “the title of the 7 3



## section ca rries no w eig ht, as a he ading ‘does not limit or ex pand the mea ning of a statute.’” 7 4


## Second, while a “per son making a complaint” and a “complaina nt” ar e s i m i l ar terms, for

purposes of deter

mining wh et h er statutory lang uag e share s a technica l meaning , the rele vant
statutory compar ators are “per son making the complaint,” a s u s e d in s e c ti o n 6 1 4

. 0 22, and “complaint by a complainant” in section 143.123. When stated thusly , the fallac y of the sy llogism as a basis for discerning intent to cabin the plain meaning of section 614.022’s lang uag e is more rea dily appar ent.

We further observe that section 143.123 appea rs to contemplate investiga tion of complaints
made by persons other t han “complaina nts” and to use the specia l definition of that term to
differ entiate betwee n proce sses that apply depending on the source of the in formation under investiga tion. Section 143.123 require s disclosure of “ the name of eac h person who complained”

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 1 1 ( b )

. 71

S e e A c t o f

M a y 1 6 , 1 9 6 9 , 6 1 s t L e g

. , R

. S

. , c h

. 4 0 7 , § 1 , 1 9 6 9 T e x
. G e n

. L a w s 1 3 3 3 , 1 3 3 3

- 3 4 , a m e n d e d a n d 72

c o d i f i e d b y A c t o f M a y 4 , 1 9 9 3 , 7 3 d L e g

. , R

. S

. , c h

. 2 6 8 , § 1 , s e c s

. 6 1 4

. 0 2 2

- . 0 2 3 , 1 9 9 3 T e x
. G e n

. L a w s 5 8 3 , 6 7 9 ( a m e n d e d 2 0 0 5 ) ( c u r r e n t v e r s i o n a t T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 6 1 4

. 0 2 2

- . 0 2 3 )

.

S e e A c t o f M a y 4 , 1 9 9 3 , 7 3 d L e g

. , R

. S

. , c h

. 2 6 8 , § 1 , s e c

. 6 1 4

. 0 2 2 , 1 9 9 3 T e x
. G e n

. L a w s 5 8 3 , 6 7 9 ( a m e n d e d 73 2 0 0 5 ) ( c u r r e n t v e r s i o n a t T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 6 1 4

. 0 2 2 )

.

W a f f l e H o u s e , I

n c

. v

. W i l l i a m s , 3 1 3 S

. W

. 3 d 7 9 6 , 8 0 9 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 0 ) ( q u o t i n g T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 2 4 )

. 74


## 25

## conce rning the matters under investiga tion; prohibits interrog ation of a fire fig hter or police office r

“base d on [an unverifie d] complaint by a complainant who is not a peac e office r”; permits interrog ation based on “ events or c onduct re ported by a witness who is not a complaina nt without
dis cl o s i ng the name of the witness”; permits interrog ation by anony mous complainants if “the depar tmental employ ee rec eiving the anony mous complaint” swea

rs and cer tifies that the complaint

was anony

mous; an d re q u i re s disclosure of “the name of eac h complaining party .” A “per son 7 5 

## making a co m p laint” within the meaning of Chapter 614.022 could rea sonably encompa ss all of
these c ateg ories of individuals.
Fina l l y , we note that there is a distinct differ ence betwee n consulting other statutory
definitions to d et er m i n e common meaning and eng raf ting a specia l definition from one statute to
circ ums cr i b e the plain meaning of a term used in another

. Whil e doing so may be appropr iate 7 6



## when a word with a

n established meaning is employ ed in a subsequently enac ted statute of simil ar purpose, that is not the case here; the spec ial definition in section 143.123 was enacte d more than

T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 1 4 3

. 1 2 3 ( e ) , ( f )

. 75

I n p o i n t o f f

a c t , w h e n t h e L e g i s l a t u r e s p e c i a l l y d e f i n e s t h e t e r m “ c o m p l a i n a n t , ” t h e s p e c i a l d e f i n i t i o n u s u a l l y 76

a c c o r d s w i t h t h e c o m m o n m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m a n d i s n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o a n a l l e g e d “ v i c t i m

. ” C o m p a r e T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E , T i t l e 2 , S u b t i t l e G A p p

. A

- 1 § 1

. 0 6 ( F ) ( d e f i n e d a s “ t h e p e r s o n , f

i r m , c o r p o r a t i o n o r o t h e r e n t i t y , i n c l u d i n g t h e C h i e f D i s c i p l i n a r y C o u n s e l i n i t i a t i n g a C o m p l a i n t o r I n q u i r y ” ) ; T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 4 3 7

. 4 0 1 ( m e a n i n g “ a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o b r i n g s a n a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g u n d e r t h i s s u b c h a p t e r ” ) , 5 7 1

. 0 0 2 ( m e a n i n g “ a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o f i l e s a s w o r n c o m p l a i n t
w i t h t h e c o m m i s s i o n ” ) ; T E X

. I N S

. C O D E § § 8 4 3

. 0 0 2 ( 5 ) ( m e a n i n g “ a n e n r o l l e e , o r a p h y s i c i a n , p r o v i d e r , o r o t h e r p e r s o n d e s i g n a t e d t o a c t o n b e h a l f o f a n e n r o l l e e , w h o f

i l e s a c o m p l a i n t ” ) , 1 3 0 5

. 0 0 4 ( m e a n i n g “ a p e r s o n w h o f i l e s a c o m p l a i n t
u n d e r t h i s c h a p t e r , ” i n c l u d i n g a n e m p l o y e e , e m p l o y e r , h e a l t h

- c a r e p r o v i d e r , o r a n o t h e r p e r s o n d e s i g n a t e d t o a c t o n b e h a l f
o f a n e m p l o y e e ) ; T E X

. L A B O R C O D E § 2 1

. 0 0 2 ( 4 ) ( m e a n i n g “ a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o b r i n g s a n a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g u n d e r t h i s c h a p t e r ” ) ; a n d T E X

. P R O P

. C O D E § 3 0 1

. 0 0 3 ( 2 ) , ( 1 2 ) ( m e a n i n g “ a p e r s o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n , t h a t f i l e s a c o m p l a i n t
u n d e r S e c t i o n 3 0 1

. 0 8 1 , ” a n d “ p e r s o n ” d e f i n e d t o i n c l u d e a n i n d i v i d u a l a n d v a r i o u s a r t i f i c i a l b e i n g s ) , w i t h T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 3 2 1 5 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( m e a n i n g “ a p e r s o n w h o c l a i m s t o b e t h e v i c t i m o f a v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r ” ) a n d T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 1 4 3

. 1 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) , . 3 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( m e a n i n g “ a p e r s o n c l a i m i n g t o b e t h e v i c t i m o f m i s c o n d u c t b y a f

i r e f i g h t e r o r p o l i c e o f

f i c e r ” )

. 

## 26

## fiftee n y ear s later, making an infere nce of leg islative intent to sim ilarly constrain the meaning of 7 7



## the words in sec tion 614.022 much less compelling. 7 8



## Whil e it is clea

r that the main objective of sections 614.022 and 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 i s to provide

proce dural safe g uards for cover ed employ ees, it seems inconce ivable that the L eg islature intended

to hamstring employ ers from investiga ting and disciplining err ant employ ees ch ar ged with
safe keeping the public trust. No rea sonable construction of the statute can support rea ding it as requiring employ ers to turn a deaf ear and a blind e y e to a lleg ations of misconduct serious enoug h

to war rant termination of employ ment unless “the victim of the misconduct” is both willing and able to sign a complaint. 7 9


## Thus, we are not persuad ed t h at resor ting to extra-textual source s informs the statutory analy sis, a

nd we do not ag ree that the specia l de finition of “complaina nt” in se ction 143.123(a) (1)

can be adopted to res t ri ct t h e plain meaning of the words the L eg islature enac ted in Chapter 614, Subchapter B. Doing so would add limit ations neither foun d i n n o r supported by the text and is

unnece ssary

to avoid an absur d conseque nce.

A c t o f M a y 2 7 , 1 9 8 5 , 6 9 t h L e g

. , R

. S

. , c h

. 9 5 8 , § 1 9 , s e c

. 3 0 , 1 9 8 5 T e x
. G e n

. L a w s 3 2 2 7 , 3 2 4 0 ( a m e n d e d 77 1 9 8 7 ) ( a m e n d e d 1 9 8 9 ) ( c u r r e n t v e r s i o n a t T E X

. L O C

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 1 4 3

. 1 2 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) )

.

B u t s e e G u t h e r

y v

. T a y l o r , 1 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 5 , 7 2 2 n

. 7 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t

. ) 78 ( a p p l y i n g s e c t i o n 1 4 3

. 1 2 3 ’ s d e f i n i t i o n o f “ c o m p l a i n a n t ”

— d e s p i t e i t s s t a t u s a s a s u b s e q u e n t l y e n a c t e d s t a t u t e

— b a s e d o n

“ t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t w o s t a t u t e s ” )

.

T h e a b s u r d i t y i s m a n i f e s t i n a s c e n a r i o i n v o l v i n g a n a l l e g a t i o n o f e x c e s s i v e f o r c e w h e r e t h e v i c t i m i s 79 i n c a p a c i t a t e d , b u t a w i t n e s s t o t h e e v e n t s t e p s f o r w a r d t o m a k e a c o m p l a i n t

. 

## 27

## E. App lication

Considering the plain meaning of the lang uag e in Chapter 614, Subchapter B, we conclude
the disciplinary proce ss culminating in Staff’s remova l from his position as a deputy sheriff for the Colorado County

Sheriff’ s Offic e complied with both the letter and the spirit of the la

w.
The statute r equire s a si g ned complaint setting forth the allega tions of m isconduct. That 8 0 

## require ment was satisfied by the Def iciency Notice L t. N eisner signe d. Whil e the statute doe s not

set forth re q u i re d co ntents for a “complaint” or establish particula r standards for specific ity , the
information detailed in the Def iciency Notice serves t he “over arc hing statutory purposes” of 8 1 

## (1) reduc ing the risk that adver se employ ment actions will be based on unsubstantiated complaints
and (2) ensuring the aff

ecte d employ ee rec eives suffic i en t i n formation to enable him to defe nd

ag ainst the alleg ations. 8 2



## The stat u t e also require s that the signe d complaint be prese nted to the employ ee within a

rea sonable time a

nd prec ludes imposit ion of any discipline “unless a copy of the signe d complaint
is g iven to the office r or employ ee.” Staff rec eived the signe d Def iciency Notice within two day s 8 3



## of the initiation of an internal investiga tion. He suffe red no disciplinary action until the complaint
was in hand. Unlike s ections 614.023(a) and (c), the re is neither an express nor impl ied t empora l

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 6 1 4

. 0 2 2 , . 0 2 3 ( a )

. 80

L a n g v

. T

e x

. D e p ’ t o f P u b

. S a f e t y , N o

. 0 3

- 1 2

- 0 0 4 9 7

- C V , 2 0 1 4 W L 3 5 6 2 7 3 8 , a t * 9 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n J u l y 81 1 8 , 2 0 1 4 , n o p e t

. ) ( m e m

. o p

. )

.

S e e T u r n e r v

. P e r r

y , 2 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 6 , 8 2 3

- 2 4 ( T e x
. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 9 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( v a g u e 82

o r a n o n y m o u s c o m p l a i n t s l a c k i n g n a m e s , d a t e s , a n d o t h e r d e t a i l s p r e v e n t e d t h e o f f i c e r f r o m i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e a l l e g a t i o n s
a n d d e f e n d i n g a g a i n s t t h e m )

.
T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 ( a ) , ( b )

. 83


## 28

## limit ation on prese ntment of a complaint in rela tion to the imposit ion of discipline. Nothing in the

statute require s the complaint to be serve d befor e discipline is im p o s ed or prec ludes disciplinary
action whi l e an investiga tion is ong oing. Nor does the statute require an opportunity to be hear d
befor e discipli n ar y ac t i o n may be taken. I n some situations, prese ntment of a complaint
contempora

neously with the imposit ion of discipline may not be “within a rea sonable time afte r the complaint is filed,” but that is not the case here

. The statute further require s that indefinite suspension or terminat io n f r o m employ

ment based

on a complaint’s subject matter be defe rre d until an investiga tion uncover s some evidenc e to prove
the alleg ations. Howeve r, once ag ain, there is no require ment that the aff ecte d employ ee be offe red 8 4



## a pre- termination opportunity to b e h eard or participa te in the investiga tive proce ss. Moreove r, despite the Def

iciency Notice’ s statement t h at Staff’s employ ment was terminated “ef fec tive immediately ,” his termination was actua lly conditioned on his rig ht to appea l within a time cer tain.

I n substantive eff

ect, “immediate terminat i o n ” was equivalent to suspension during the investiga tion—which the statute does not prohibit. Thereaf t er , S taff had ample opportunity to
marshal any evidenc e bear ing on the matters identified in the De fi ci en cy Notice and to defe nd
himself befor e Sheri f

f Wi e d

— the head of the law-e nforc ement ag ency —“conside red” the complaint and upheld the te rmination decision. 8 5

I d

. § 6 1 4

. 0 2 3 ( c )

. 84

I d

. § 6 1 4

. 0 2 2

. 85


## 29

## III. Conclusi on

Under Chapter 614, Subcha pter B , a disciplinary

action may

follow a signe d complaint, or
information that has been repor ted may prompt an internal investiga tion t h at g ener ates a repor t
sufficie nt to satisfy the statutory require ments. I n this case , Staff had sufficie nt information to allow

him to investiga te the alleg ations and ample opportunity to defe nd himself and bring forth additional
fac ts or circ um s tance s for Sheriff Wied’s considera tion. Acc ording ly , assuming Chapter 614, Subchapter B applies under the circ umstances, we hold Sheriff Wied complied with the statute. We
there fore reve rse the c ourt of appe als’ judg ment and re nder judg ment in Sheriff Wied’s fa vor.

___________________________ Eva M. Guzman J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: Fe bruar y 3, 2017

30