### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 26, 200 5

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JAMES THO MAS MANNING

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for P utnam C ounty No. 98-0121 Leon C. Burns, Jr., Judge

No. M2004- 03035-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Janu ary 24, 2006

On April 15, 1998, the Putnam County Gra nd J ury

indicted De fe n dant, J ames Thomas Manning , on o n e co u n t of ag g ravated burg lary , two counts of ag g ravated ra pe, one c ount of

a tte mpt e d a g g ra va te d sexua l bat te ry , an d one c ou nt of a g g ra vate d rob be ry . F oll ow ing a jury tr ia l, Def endant wa s convicted of

two counts of ag g ravat ed rape, a Class A felony , and one c ount of ag g ravated burg lary , a Class C felony . The jury acquitted De fenda nt of attempted ag g ravated sexual battery and could not re ach a

verdic t on the ag gra vated r obbery char g e. De fenda nt rec eived

concur rent twe nty -five y ear

sentenc es for eac h of t he agg ravated rape convic tions, and a conse cutive six y ear sentenc e for

the ag g ravated burg lary conviction, for an eff ective thirty -one y ear

sentenc e. Th e se se nte nc e s w e re or de re d to be se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly to a prior se nte nc e ou t of

Sum ne r C ou nty being serve d by

Def endant at the time of trial and se ntencing

. I n his appea l, Defe ndant ar g ues that the trial court err ed by (1) deny ing his motion to strike expert testimonyfor f ailure to lay

a prope r foundation; (2) e x cluding evidenc e that the victim had pe nding c harg es for ag g ravated assault; (3) violating double je opardy principles in allowing Def enda n t t o be convic ted of two c ounts of

a g g ra va te d r ape ; a nd (4 ) imp os ing c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s. We af fi rm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R

. and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

David Ne al B rady , District Public Defe nder; a nd H. Marsha ll J udd, Assistant Publ ic Def ender
, C o o k ev i l l e, T en n es s ee , fo r t h e a p p el l an t , J am es T h o m as M an n i n g.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Pr e st on S hip p, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam E dwar d Gibson, District Attorney Gene ral; Da vid A. Patterson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral; and B enjamin W. Fann, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound

Th e fa c ts d e ve lop e d a t tria l a ndtake n in a lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the state are a s f

oll ow s:

I n the early morning hours of Fe bruary 10, 1997, the vi ctim, Charlotte B ridg eforth, was at home aslee p, when she awoke to a loud “bang ing” noise. The victim’s husband at the time, Gre g McMurry , told her that he thought t h e n o i s e wa s an intruder . They hear d the noise ag ain and the vic tim ’s hu sb a nd , b e lie vin g the no ise wa s the dr ug ta sk fo rc e , we nt t o th e ma ste r b a thr oo m a ndhid in the sh ow e r b e hin d th e sh ow e r c urta in. De fe nd a nt e nte re d the ba c kd oo r, wa lke d thr ou g h the uti lit y room and the kitche n and looked down into the be droom wher e the victim was standing . Def endant

wa s w e ari ng a

tob og g a n p ull e d d ow n o ve r h is fa c e , a bla c k le a the r c oat, pa nts , a nd so lid wh ite te nn is shoes. He pointed a

g un at Ms. Bridge forth and she beg an scr eaming

.

Def endant e ntere d the bedr oom wher e the victim was standing and beg an y elling at her a nd telling he r to “shut up.” Def endant pointed the g un at the victim’s te mple and kept re peating “g ive me the money

and the stuff." Def

endant asked, “ [W ]here' s Greg at? ” and the victim responded, “ I don' t know.” De fenda nt asked, “ [W ]here' s his cars at? [W ]here' s the jewe lry at? You better

beep h i m

. ” T h e v i ct i mex p l ai n ed t o De fe n d an tt h at Gr eg h ad b ee n “b u s t ed ” b y t h e p o l i ce fo r s el l i n g d ru gs and they took “eve rything” so she could not bee p Gre g nor could she g ive Def endant “ the stuff.” During this time, Gre g was hidi ng in the bathroom showe r adja cent to the be droom wher e De fenda nt and the victim wer e located.

Ms. B ri dg e fo rth g a ve De fe nd a nt h e r m ortg a g e mon e y in the a mou nt o f tw o h un dr e d a ndfi ft y dollars. When she could not mee t De fe n d an t's othe r re quests, he first tried to shove her into the ba thr oo m c los e t a ndthe n th e be dr oo m c los e t. Wh e n tho se a tte mpt s f a ile d, De fe nd a nt o rd e re d M s. Bridge forth to t ake of

f her clothes. De fenda nt then order ed the victim sit down on the bed a nd pe rf or m or a l se x o n him

. Af

te r a fe w min ute s, De fe nd a nt t oldthe vic tim that sh e wa s n ot d oin g it rig ht and she “ better do it rig ht.” He the n told he r to lie back on the be d and he la id on top of her

a ndpr oc e e de d to ha ve va g ina l int e rc ou rs e wi th h e r u nti l he e ja c ulate d. De fe nd a nt c on tin ue d to ho ld a g un to the victim’s he ad throug hout the attack. The victim testified that she complied with all of Def endant’ s reque sts because she did not want to be killed.

Af te r r apin g Ms. B ri dg e fo rth, Defend a nt t oldhe r t o “ g e t th e g old .” She g a ve him a g old br a c e le t va lue d a t app ro xima te ly tw o h un dr e d d oll ars , a nda g oldne c kla c e va lue d at app ro xima te ly six teen hundr ed doll ars. After taking the j ewe lry from the victim, Def

endant tied he r hands be hind her ba ck using telephone c ord fr om the victim’s home telephones. A fter tying he r wrists, Def endant put the victim on the rug in the bathroom whe re he r husband wa s hiding. He told her " I ' m not going to hurt y our kids
, " t hen orde red he r to rema in in the bathroom for f ifteen minutes. The telephone cord w as introduce d at trial along with photogr aphs i llustrating br uises on the victim’s wrists cause d by the cor d.-3-

Shortlyafte r De fenda nt left the bat h ro o m , the victim hear d her f ourtee n y ear

old daug hter

scre aming . The victim’s husband untied the c ord ar ound her wrists so that she wa s able to lea ve the bathroom and f

ind her daug h t er. Her daug hter testified that Defe ndant enter ed her bedroom a nd order ed her

to take her

clothes off. He beg an fumbli ng with his z ipper a s if to take his pants off, but stopped when she informed him that she had her "pe riod." Def endant order ed her

to ge t out of bed and g et in the hall closet. The child did as she wa s told and Defe ndant left the house

.

At approximately 1:05 a.m., S g t. J im Eldridg e of the Putnam CountySheriff' s Depa rtment

re sp on de d to a

c all fro m th e vi ctim’s ho me . Sg t. E ldridg e te sti fi e d th a t he wa s th e fi rs t of fi c e r t o respond to the c all. Upon arri v al
, h e n o ticed that the ba ckdoor to the home had bee n "kic ked in" from the outside. The outside fra me of the backdoor was splintere d and had a larg e size footprint dent just be low the doorknob. Sg t. Eldridge proce eded into the home w here people we re c ry ing a nd up se t. H e se c ur e d th e sc e ne a ndtr ie d to c a lm the vic tim to f indou t w hat ha d h app ened. Sg t. El dr idg e de sc ri bed th e vi ctim a s d ist ra ug ht andin s ho c k. He state d th a t th e ho us e wa s g e ne ra lly clea n and orde rly

and the only

sign of major destruc tion was the dama g e to the bac kdoor.

Charlotte B ridg eforth, her daug hter, a nd Gre g McMurry , wer e the only individuals present when Sg t. Eldridge arrived at the sc ene. Shortly there afte r, t he Putnam CountyAmbulance Service transporte d Ms. Bridg eforth to Cook ev i l le Reg ional Medica l Center for medical tre atment. Sara Robinson, a licensed pr actical nurse ( L PN) from the me dical ce nter, testified tha t the hospital

c omp le te d a

ra pe kit on the vic tim . Sp e c if

ically , th e ho sp ita l to ok

va g ina l sw abs , o ra l sw abs
, c omb ing s, a ndblo odfr om the vic tim . Ph oto g ra ph s w e re take n o f b ru is es on th e vic tim ’s wrist s. Th is e vid e nc e wa s late r s e nt t o the Te nn e sse e B ur e a u o f Inv e sti g a tio n ( TB I ) C ri me L ab f or a na ly sis

.

Detec tive David Andr ews of the Putnam Count y Sherriff ’s offic e wa s involved in the collection of e vidence both from the crime scene and from the vi ctim. Detec tive Andre ws testified that he re c e ive d the ra

pe kit fr om the ho sp ita l and su bmi tte d it to the TB I Cr ime L ab. Ac c or din g to the lab’s a naly sis of the rape ki t, both semen and sperm were present on the vi ctim. After rec eiving th e s e r e s u lt s , D e te c ti v e A n d r e w s to o k b lo o d s a mp le s f

r o m D e f e n d a n t an d s u b mi tt e d th e m t o the crime la b for a DNA c omparison to the sperm a nd semen found on thevictim.

Marg are t Ba sh, a for ensic ser ologist at the TB I Crime L ab, provide d expert testim o ny reg arding the proce dure for conducting DNA a naly sis. She also testified reg arding the re sults of the DNA com pari so n in the pr e se nt c a se . Sh e e xpla ine d th a t th e ma in g oa l in DN A a na ly sis is t o

c omp are tw o s a mpl e s, on e fr om a kno wn so ur c e a nd on e fr om an u nkno wn so ur c e , to de te rm ine if

se ro log ic a l mate ri a l f

ro m th e un kn ow n s ou rc e c ou ld h a ve c ome fr om a kn ow n in div idu a l. M s. B a sh furth e r e xp la in e d th a t th e D N A a n a ly s is in th e p r e s e n t c a s e w a s c o n d u c te d to d e te r mi n e w h e ther Def endant c ontributed the semen and sperm found on the vag inal swabs take n from the victim.

As part of

her te stimonyat trial, Ms. Ba sh simulated the DN A co m p ar ison betwee n Def endant’ s blood, the victim’s blood, and the vaginal swab taken from the vi ctim on the nig ht she

was ra ped. I n her initial finding s and at trial, Ms. B ash found that the DN A in Def endant’ s blood

sa mpl e c on ta ine d “ a

g oo d matc h” to the DN A f ou ndin t he se me n f

ro m th e va g ina l sw ab. Ms. B a sh-4-

did not testify

as to Def

endant’ s g uilt, but s he testified r ega rd i ng the statistical probabilities that

someone unre lated to Def endant c ommitt ed the c rime. Specific ally , Ms. Ba sh testified t hat the “the probability

of selec ting a n u n re l at ed i ndividual at random ha ving the same DN A profile f or the Cauc a s ia n p o p u lati o n is ap p r o xim a te ly 1 in 4 9 0 b il li o n

. A n d f r o m th e b la c k p o p u lati on, it’s approximately

1 in 212 billion.” At the close of all the proof, de fense counsel moved to strike the
te sti mon y re g ard ing statis tic a l pr ob abil iti e s o n th e g ro un ds that a pr op e r f ou nd a tio n h a d n ot b e e n la id fo r i ntr od uc tio n of s uc h e vid e nc e . T he jud g e de nie d th e mot ion a nda llo we d th e te sti mon y to r e ma in in the rec ord.

II. Adm ission of DNA P robabili ty Evidence

Def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed by not g ranting his “motion to strike” the e x pert testimonyof TB I

fore nsic serolog ist, Marg ar et Ba s h
, for failure to lay a prope r foundation. De fe nd a nt do e s no t di sp ute the se ro log ist ’s e xpe rt qu a lif ic a tio ns , b ut a

rg ue s th a t th e Sta te faile d to lay a prope r foundation for introduction of the DN A testimony and the statistical proba

biliti es re lated to the acc urac y of t he DNA comparison. Defe ndant offe rs no basis for w hy the foundation is l acking and fa ils to ex plain what would constit u t e an adequate founda tion. Defe ndant did not contempora neously

object to this evidence , but moved to strike the testimony at the conc lusion of all the proof. As a g ener al rule, the failure of a de fenda nt to interject a c ontemporane ous objection waives c onsideration by

this Court of the issue on appea l. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( a ); Teague v. State, 77 2 S. W.2 d 9 15 , 9 26 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 88 ); Sta te v . Ki lle bre w, 760 S.W .2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Ne verthe less, we briefly addre ss Defe ndant’s conte ntion that the statisti cs relating to the a ccur acy

of the DN A comparison were improperly admitted.

The e x pert e x plained that the pur pose of the D NA ana ly sis in the present case was to make a dete rmination of whether the sperm and semen from Ms. B ridg eforth’s vag inal swab contained the same DNA a s th e b lo o d g iv e n b y D e f e n d a n t. Sh e e xp lain e d th a t D N A is h u man g e n e ti c material unique to every

individual. She further e x plained that the testing method used wa s Restriction Fr ag ment L eng th Poly morphism (RFL P) analy sis, the state of the art method for testing DNA at the tim e of the inv e sti g a tio n of thi s c a se

. Ms. B a sh te sti fi e d abo ut the ma nn e r i n w hic h s he c re a te d s ta in

c ard s f ro m D e fe nd a nt’ s b loo d s a mpl e a ndthe va g inal sw ab f ro m th e vic tim . Sh e pla c e d th e sta in

c ard s in a c he mic a l solu tio n whi c h c a us e d th e DN A t o r e le a se fr om the c ardsa mpl e s in va ri ou s si zes

. She the n too k the DN A sa mpl e s, a n a dd iti on a l un ive rs a lly kn ow n DN A s a mpl e , a nda c on tr ol s a mpl e of her own DNA and place d them in a g el. The a dditional samples wereadded to ve rify the ac cura cy of the test re sults. S he then subjec ted the samples to ele ct rophore sis, an elec tric cur rent, whic h

cause d the DNA to separ ate out by differ ent s ize molecules. Those molecules we re the n embedde d on a ny lon me mb r a n e

. A t th is p o in t, M s

. B a s h c o n d u c te d a s e r ie s o f p r o b e s , e a c h s p e c if ic to a differ ent point on five diffe rent c hromosomes. She then made a visual compa rison and found a “g ood match” be tween the DNA bands from the va g inal swab and the DNA bands from De fenda nt’s blo od . M s. B a sh te sti fi e d th a t th e ma tc h w a s a c c ur a te a ndno mis take s w e re ma de in the a na ly sis

.

The re sults of the DNA analy sis we re enter ed into a computer data base of collecte d DNA profiles. A f

reque ncy was a ssigne d to eac h of the ba nds from De fenda nt’s DNA sa mple. The-5-

pr og ra m th e n c a lc ulate d the ra ri ty wi th w hic h th is p art ic ula r D NA pr of

ile oc c ur s. B a se d o n th e se calc ulations, Ms. Bash testi fi ed that the pr obability of ra ndomly

selec ting a n unrelated individual wi t h t h e s ame DN A profile a s Defe ndant was a pproxi mately

1 in 490 billi on in the Cauca sian population and 1 in 212 billion i n the African- Americ an population.

I n Te nn e sse e , the a dmi ssi bil ity of e xpe rt te sti mon y a s to sc ie nti fi c or te c hn ic a l e vid e nc e is g overne d by Tenne ssee Rul es of Evide nce 702 and 703. See, e.g., State v. Coley, 32 S.W .3d 831, 83 4 ( Te nn .2 00 0) ; State v. Be gley, 95 6 S. W.2 d 4 71 , 4 75 (T e nn .1 99 7) . G e ne ra lly the a dmi ssi bil ity of expert testimony

is a matter e ntrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and there can be

no reve rsal on appe al abse nt a clea r abuse of that discre tion. State v. Ballard, 855 S.W .2d 557, 562 (T e nn . 1 99 3) . T he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s se t fo rth sp e c if ic princ ipl e s to g uid e tr ia l c ou rt s in determining whether

to admit scientific or tec hnical evide nce. Begley
, 95 6 S.W. 2d a t 47 5. F ir st, the evidence m u s t be re levant to a f act at issue in the case

. Id. ( citing Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402). Second, the e x pert must be qualifie d by s p ec i al i zed knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining or education in the field of expertise, and the testimony in question must substantially assist the trier of fa ct to understand the evidenc e or de termine a fac t in i s sue. Id. ( citing Tenn. R. Evid. 702; McD aniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W .2d. 257, 264 (Tenn. 1997) ). F inally , when the e x pert witness offe rs an opinion or states a n infere nce, the underlying f acts or data upon which the e x pert

re lie d mu st b e trus tw orthy . T e nn . R. Ev id. 70 3; McD aniel, 955 S.W .2d at 264.

Tenne s s ee h as s t atutorily addre ssed the issue of the admission of scientific or te chnica l evide nc e re la tin g to D NA a na ly sis . T .C. A. § 2 4- 7- 11 8 ( 20 00 ). I n 1 99 1, the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

e na c te d a statut e to a dmi t DN A e vid e nc e " wi tho ut a nte c e de nt e xpe rt te sti mon y that DN A a na ly sis pr ov ide s a tru stw orthy

a ndre lia ble me tho d o f i de nti fying c ha ra c te ri sti c s in a n in div idu a l' s g e ne tic

ma te ri a l." T. C.A . § 24 -7 -1 18 (b )( 1) (2 00 0)

. Th is sta tut e c on dit ion s ful l a dmi ssi on of DN A a na ly sis into evidence "upon a

showing that the offe red te stimonymeets the standa rd s o f ad m i s sibili ty

set for th in th e Ten nes see Ru les of Evi den ce." Id. ; St at e v . S c ott 33 S.W .3d 746, 758 (Tenn. 2000)

. “B eca use DNA evidenc e is statutorily reg arde d as trustworthy and re liable, it is ex empted fr om the
tr ial c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n un de r Rul e 70 3 of the Rul e s of Ev ide nc e of wh e the r it pr ov ide s a trustworthy and reliable method of identify ing char acte ristics in an individual’s ge netic material.” State v. Spratt, 31 S.W .3d 587, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App

. 2 0 0 0). The sta tute also provides that statis ti cal po pu la tio n f

re qu e nc y e vid e nc e , b a se d o n g e ne tic or blo odte st r e su lts , is a dmi ssi ble in evidenc e to demonstrate the fra ction of the population t hat would have the same blood type or D NA. See T.C.A. § 24-7-118( c).

B a se d u p o n o u r e xa m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e c o r d
, w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e rr in admitting the statistical proba bility evidenc e. The evidenc e of the DNA a naly sis was clea rly rele vant beca use i t tended to make more probable the fact that Def endant raped Ms. Bridg eforth. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401. I n addition, the fore nsic serolog ist was qualified a nd acc epted by the court as an e x pert with "knowle dg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation" in this field, and the expert' s specialized knowledg e no doubt substantially assisted the jury

in determining the identity of the per petra tor. Id.;

s ee a l s o S tate v. Be gley, 9 5 6 S. W. 2 d 4 7 1
, 4 7 6

- 7 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. F in a ll y , a s s tate d ab o v e, DNA evidenc e is statutorily

reg arde d as trustworthy

and reliable

. As such, the r equisite foundation wa s-6-

laid for a dmitti ng th e DN A s t at istical probabilities into evidence . Acc ording ly , we f ind that the evidenc e of D NA ana ly sis met the ge nera l standards unde r the Rules of Evide nce c oncerning the admission of scientific or te chnica l evidence

.

Def endant wa s not prohibited from cha lleng ing the particula r t ests at i ssue i n this case. As Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 24-7-118( c) indicates, the statute wa s car efully draf ted to ensure that it would not be " construed as prohibiting any party in a civil or criminal trial fr om offering pr oof that DNA analy sis doe s not pr ovide a trustworthy and re liable method of identifying c hara cteristics in an individual's g enetic mater i al

. ” I ndeed, D efe ndant took advanta g e of this provision of the statute when he cross-e x amined the e x pert a s to the lack of tr ustworthiness and reliabilityof such analy sis. For these rea sons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the statistical probability

evidenc e to be a dmitted.

III. Pr ior Bad Acts

Def endant ne x t asserts that the tria l court er red in e x cluding evidenc e that the victim had be e n c ha rg e d wi th a g g ra va te d a ssa ult in a n un re la te d inc ide nt. I n a jury ou t he ari ng, t he v ict im admitted that she had be en cha rg ed with ag g ravated assault on J anuary 30, 1999, for pulling a knife on Ms. Devita Jones a nd cutting Ms. J ones ac ross the fa ce. D efe ndant soug ht to admit the evidence as probative of the victim’s cha rac ter for truthfulness.

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 608(b) provides, “spec ific instance s of conduc t of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporti ng the wit ness' s cre dibilit y , other than convictions of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsi c evidenc e. The y may , howeve r, if probative of truthfulness or untr

uthfulness . . . , be inqui red into on cross-e x amination.” Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). Be fore allowing such cro s s -e x am ination to take place , the trial court, upon reque st, must hol d a hearing outside the prese nce of the jury to d et er m i n e whether

the proba tive value of

the alleg ed conduct outwe ighs its pre

judicial eff

ect a nd whether there is a factual basis for the inquiry

. Id. ; Sta te v. Morgan , 541 S.W .2d 285, 390 (Tenn. 1976)

.

I n the pre sent case , the t rial court, having conducte d the re quisite hearing out of the pre sence of the jury , f

ou ndthe fa c t th a t th e vic tim wa s c ha rg e d wi th a g g ra vate d a ssa ult in Ja nu ary

19 99 , d id not “touch on the c hara cter [of the victim] for truthfulne ss or untruthfulness.” This Court has previously held that evidenc e of a victim’s prior ar

rest for assault was not a dmissibl e under 608(b) beca use the victim’s ac t of assaulting the def endant wa s not probative of the vi ctim’s char acte r for truthfulness or untruthfulne ss. State v. Neblett, N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 4 9 4

- CC A

- R3-CD, 2 0 0 3 WL 2 1 1 4 5 5 4 0
, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App. May 19, 2003), perm. to app. denie d ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 3 )

. I n the pr e se nt ca se , we lik e wi se c on c lud e that the a c t of a ssa ult ing a n in div idu a l othe r tha n D e fe nd a nt i n

an unre lated incident is not probative of the victim’s c hara cter for truthfulne ss or untruthfulness. Id.; See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). As such, t he trial c ourt did not err in e x cluding evidenc e of the victim’s assault cha

rg es, and D efe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.-7-

IV. Double Jeopardy

Def endant ne x t arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling t o gra nt his mot ion to merg e, or strike one of

, his two convictions for ag g ravated ra pe. De fenda nt arg ues that hi s co n v i ctions are multipl icitous and failure to gr ant the motion violated the prohibition ag ainst double jeopar dy

.

Th e do ub le je op ard y c laus e in the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on pr ov ide s th a t no pe rs on " sh a ll

. . . b e su bje c t f

or the sa me of

fe ns e to b e tw ic e pu t in je opardy of li fe or li mb

. . . ." U. S. C O N ST

. amend. V. Sim ilarly , the Tenne ssee Constitution s tates that " no person sha ll, for the same offe nse, be tw ic e pu t in je op ard y

of lif e or limb. " Te nn . Cons t. art. I , § 10 . The c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht a g a ins t double jeopar dy

protec ts ag ainst (1) a second prosecution after an acquittal; (2) a second pr osecution afte r a c onviction; and (3) m u l t i p l e p u nishments for the same offe nse. Sta te v . B e au re ga rd , 32 S.W .3d 6 8 1
, 6 8 2 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 )

. I t i s th e th ir d c a te g o r y th a t w e ar e c o n c e r n e d w ith in th e p rese nt

case

. “Multiplicity

concerns the division of

co n d u ct i n t o d i s cr et e o ff

en s es , cr ea t i n g s ev er al offe nses out of a sing le offe nse.” State v. Phillips, 9 2 4 S. W. 2 d 6 6 2
, 6 6 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 ) . I n Ph ill ips
, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court explained that, in determining whether offe nses ar e "stacke d" so a s to be mul tip lic ito us , th e fo llo wi ng pr inc ipl e s sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d:

(1 ) A s ing le off

e ns e ma y no t be div ide d in to s e pa

rate pa rt s; g e ne ra lly , a

sin g le wrong ful ac t may

n o t fu rn i sh the basis for more than one c riminal pr os e c uti on ;

(2) I f ea ch off

ense c harg ed re quires proof of a f act not re quired in proving the other, the of

fense s are not multi plicitous; and

(3) Where time and loc ation separ ate a nd distinguish the commission of the offe nses, the off

enses c annot be said to have arisen out of a single wr ong ful
act. Id. at 665 (c itations omi tted). The Phillips court noted that the following fac tors are also signif

icant in determi n i n g whether sexual offenses a

re mul tip lic ito us :

(1 ) Th e na tur e of

the a c t; ( 2 ) The area of t he vi c ti m' s b o d y in v a d e d b y

th e s e xu a ll y a s s a ultive behavior ; (3 ) Th e tim e e laps e d b e tw e e n th e dis c re te c on du c t; (4 ) Th e a c c us e d' s in te nt, in the se ns e that the laps e of tim e ma y ind ic a te

a new ly formed intent to ag ain see k sexual grat i fi cation or inflict abuse; a nd (5) The c umulative punishment.-8-

Id. The Phillips court noted “that the prese nce or absenc e of any one fac tor or a combination of them other than the nature of t he act is not determinative of t he is sue.” Id. Th e c ou rt a lso ob se rv e d th a t, “althoug h separ ate a cts of interc ourse may be so re lated as to c onstitut e one c riminal offe nse, g ener ally rape is not a continuous offense , but eac h act of intercour se constitut es a d i stinct and separ ate of

fense .” Phillips , 924 S.W .2d at 664-65 (c itation omit ted).

As rele vant her e, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-502(a)( 1) (2003) define s ag g ravated ra

pe as the “unlawf

ul sex ual pene tration of a vic tim bythe def endant or t he def

endant by a vic tim ” wh e re “ [f]o rc e or c oe rc ion is us e d to a c c omp lis h the a c t a ndthe de fe nd a nt i s a rm e d w ith

a we apon . . . .” This Court has previously held that “a n acc used may be convic ted of more than one offe nse whe n the ra

pe involves sepa

rate acts” of se x u al p enetr ation. State v. Burgin, 668 S.W .2d 668, 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) . “Sexual penetration” is defined a s “sex ual interc ourse, cunnilingus, f

ellatio, anal inter course , or any other intrusi o n, howeve r slight, of any part of a person’ s body or of any object into the g enital or a nal opening s of the victim’s, the def endant’ s, or any

other person’ s body
, but emission of semen is not require d.” T.C.A. § 39-13- 501(7) ( 2003). The Phillips court noted tha t eac h act “ is capa ble of produc ing its own att endant f ear , humiliation, pain, and damag e to the victim,” and “ eac h type of pe netration requires a purposef ul act on the pa

rt of the perp etr ato r." Ph ill ips
, 924 S.W .2d at 665.

In P h i lli ps , t h e T en n es s ee S u p re m e C o u rt u p h el d t h re e c o n v i ct i o n s fo r a ggra v at ed ra pe where the def endant inserted a plast i c object into the victim's vag ina; he per formed c unnilingus; and he forc ed her

to eng ag e in vag inal intercour se. Id. at 663-64. The supreme c ourt found that the defe n d a n t c o mm it te d th r e e s e p ar a te o f f e n s e s b e c a u s e e a c h a c t i n v o lv e d th r e e in s tan c e s o f s exual penetr ation, lasted appr ox imately three hours, and r equire d differ ent bodypositions and eng ag ed differ ent body

parts. Id. a t 6 6 5

. I n S t a t e v. Kendrick, 38 S.W .3d 566, 569 (Tenn.2001) , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court applied the Phillips fac tors and concluded that the de fenda nt committed
tw o s e p ar a t e a n d d i s t i n c t o f f e n s e s a f t e r t h e p r o o f s h o w e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t f o r c e d t h e v i c t i mto perf orm fellatio on him and then f orce d the victim to have vag inal intercour se.

I n S ta te v

. Barney, 9 8 6 S.W .2d 545, 549-50 (Te nn. 1999), the Te nnessee Supreme Court applied the Phillips fac tors in de termining whether the ac ts of ag g ravated sexual battery and ra pe of a child we re discr ete a cts that justified separ ate c onvictions. The Barney co u rt u p held the

c on vic tio ns fi nd ing that to uc hin g a pe nis wi th the ha ndis d ist ing uis ha ble fr om t ou c hin g a

pe nis wi th th e mo ut h, and "th e act s, alt ho ugh cl os e in ti me, were n otperf orm ed s im ul tan eou sl y ." Id. at 550. I n Sta te v . W

ate rs, M2001-02682-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. A p p. at Nashville, Jan. 30, 2003), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 2003), this Court upheld t he def endant' s two convictions for a g g ravated rape afte r the e vidence showed that the def endant f orce d the victim to perform fellatio on him twice, fi ve min ute s a

pa rt . T he c ou rt c on c lud e d that, " [u]nd e r the c ir c ums ta nc e s, e a c h a c t of fo rc e d f e llatio

was capab le o f prod uci ng it s own 'fear, hum il iat io n, pai n, and dam age to th e vi cti m. " Id. (citation omitted).

Howeve r, in Sta te v . A rn e tt, No. 03C01-98110-CR-00395 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, Fe b. 2, 2000), aff'

d, 49 S.W .3d 250 (Tenn. 2001), this Court merg ed the de fenda nt's two c onvictions-9-

for a g g ravated ra

pe, holding that the sepa

rate convictions violated double jeopa rdy principles. The

c ou rt e xpla ine d:

Clearly , the pene trations invaded the same body are a of the vi ctim, with onlyseconds elapsing betwee n the two pene trations. Obviously
, from the victim's testimony , the d ig it a l p e n e tr a ti o n w a s me r e ly th e me a n s o f c o mp le ti n g th e p e n il e p e n e tr a ti o n

. We

are unable to conc lude t hat the interve ning se conds betwe en the pe netra tions pr ov ide d a

su ff ic ie nt l aps e of

tim e so a s to pe rm it th e dev elopme nt o f " a ne wl y fo rm e d in te nt” a s th e dig ita l pe ne tr a tio n onl y ser vedto f a c ili ta te the pe nil e penetr ation.

Id. (c i t i n g Ph ill ips
, 924 S.W .2d at 665).

I n the pre sent case , the re cord r efle cts that Def endant or dere d the victim to remove he r clothes, sit down on the bed, a nd perf orm fellatio on him. When he was dissatisfied w ith her perf ormanc e in this reg ard, he instructed her to lie back on the bed. De fenda nt then laid on top of the vic tim

a ndpr oc e e de d to va g ina lly pe ne tr a te he r wi th his pe nis un til he e ja c ulate d. Th e vic tim testified that she didn’t know how muc h time elapsed, but it felt like “f oreve r.”

Apply ing the Ph ill ips fac tors in the present case , we c onclude that De fenda nt’s acts of se x ual penetr ation were s e p a

rate and discre te ac ts constituti ng two separ ate of fense s. I t is our determination that eac h penetr ation was the product of a dis cre te and purposef ul act on the pa

rt of De fenda nt. Each act of sexual penetration involved a differ ent body party and ea ch re quired both De fenda nt and the victim to be in a differ ent position. The differ ent nature of ea ch pene t ra t i o n i s i n d icative of Def endant’ s separ ate intent to conduct e ach a ct. Phillips
, 924 S.W .2d at 665. Although it is unclea r h o w lo n g th e in c id e n t l a s te d
, th e r e c o r d in d ic a te s th a t e a c h a c t la s te d mo r e th a n a f e w s e c o n d s

. We fi nd that ea c h ac t “is c apa ble of pr od uc ing its ow n att e nd a nt f e ar, hu mil ia tio n, pa in, a ndda ma g e to the victim,” and “ea ch type of penetr ation require s a purposef ul a ct on the part of the per petra tor." Id. We theref

ore c onclude that De fenda nt was prope rly convicted of two counts of a g g ravated ra pe, and these convictions do not violate the prohibition ag ainst d o u b l e j eo p ardy . Def endant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

V. Co nse c ut iveSe nt e nc ing

Def endant arg ues t hat the trial c ourt improperly imposed consec utive sentenc es bec ause the
sentenc e he rec eived was not in proportion to the severity of his offense . The trial c ourt sentenc ed De fe nd a nt t o tw e nty -f

ive (2 5) y e ars fo r both ag g ra vate d ra pe c on vic tio ns , to run c on c ur re ntl y ; si x (6) y ear s for the a g g ravated burg lary conviction, to run conse cutively ; and both sentenc es to be

serve d consec utively

to the Sumner County

sent en ce Defe ndant was se rving at the time of the
sentenc ing he aring in this case.

When an ac cused c halleng es the leng th, rang e, or ma nner of service of a sentenc e, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sentence with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations-10-

ma de by the tr ia l c ou rt

are c or re c t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn.1991) . This presumption is "conditioned upon the a ffirma tive showing in the rec ord that th e tr ial cou rt con si dere d th e sen ten cin g p ri nci pl es and all rel evan t f act s an d ci rcum st ances ." Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d at 169. When conducting a de novo r eview of a se ntence , this court must consider: (a) the evidenc e, if a ny , rec eived at trial and the sentenc ing hearing; (b) the pre- sentenc e re port; (c) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and

c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f the c ri min a l c on du c t in vo lve d; ( e ) any statut ory mit ig a tin g or

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s; (f) any statement that the Appellant made on his own behalf; and (g) the pot ential or lac k of potential fo r re ha bil itatio n or tr e a tme nt. T. C.A . § § 4 0- 35 - 1 02 , - 10 3, -2 10 (2 00 3) ; Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d at 168. Furthermore , fac ts releva nt to sentencing must be est ab l i s h ed by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e and not bey ond a re asonable doubt. Sta te v . W inf ie ld , 23 S.W .3d 279, 283 (Tenn.2000)

.

I f our r evie w re flec ts that the trial court, following the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, imposed a lawf

ul sentence afte r having g iven due consideration and proper weig ht to the fac tors and principles set out under

the sentenc ing la w, and made finding s of fac t that are adequately supported by the re cord, the n we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n i f we would have pr efe rre d a diffe rent result. State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991). Howeve r, whe re the trial
court fails to c omply

with the statutory

provisions of sentenc ing, a ppellate r eview is de novo without a pre sumption of corre ctness. The gen era l principles of sente ncing require that the leng th of
sentenc e be “justly deser ved in re lation to the seriousness of the of fense ” and “ be no g reater than tha t deser ved for

the offe nse committed.” State v. Im feld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002) (citing T. C. A. §§ 40-35-102(1) and -103( 2)).

De fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s h is c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s on the g ro un ds that he wa s sen te nc e d as a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r, a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt ma de no fi nd ing that th e se nte nc e wa s r e a so na bly re la te d to the s eriousness of the offense. In support of his arg ument, Def endant r elies on State v. W ilkerson, 905 S.W .2d 933 (Tenn.1995) . I n W ilkerson, our supreme court held that where a def endant is found to be a dang erous of

fende r, the imposition of consecutive se ntence s require s not onlythe application of g ener al sentenc ing principles, but the additional finding s that “an e x tended se ntence is nece ssary to protect the pub l i c aga inst further c riminal conduct by the def endant[,] and the consec utive
sentenc es must rea sonably rela te to the seve rity

of the off enses c ommitt ed. Id. at 939. Def endant does not arg ue that the gene ral sentencing principles were not prope rly applied. He arg ues only

that the trial court failed to mee t the additional require ment of finding that t h e conse cutive sente nce

rea sonably

rela tes to the severity

of the c rime.

The trial c ourt found that conse cu t ive sentenc ing w as justified in light of De fenda nt’s extensive criminal record, misdemeanor assault convictions, the fact that this crime w as committed while Def endant wa s on probation, and the need to inc arc erate Def endant f or a “ substantial period of time to protec t soc iety from potential harm.” Even if the trial court failed to e x plicitlystate that the conse cutive sente nce w as re asonably rela ted t o the s everity

of the c rime, the sente nce is va lid on oth e r g ro un ds . Pu rs ua nt t o T e nn e ssee Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 , “ wh e n a de fe nd a nt i s convicted of

more than one offe nse, “[t] he court may order sentenc es to run conse cutively if the court finds by

a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that . . . [t] he def endant is an of

fende r whose r ecor d-11-

of c ri min a l a c tiv ity

is e xten siv e ,” or

“ [t]he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or a n o ff e ns e c omm itt e d w hil e on probation.” See T.C.A. § 40-35-115( b)(2)
, (6) (2003). Def endant does not dispute that he was

on probation when he committed the offe nses in thecase sub judice. Nor doe s he dispute the trial court’s f inding that he had an e x tensive criminal recor d. As such, we conclude the trial court did not

e rr in o rd e ri ng the se nte nc e s to be se rved con secut ive ly . T he a g g re g a te se nte nc e wa s r e a so na bly relat ed to the seriousness of the offe nse and w as not g reater than tha t deserve d. Def endant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

CO NC LU SION

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE