NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN EDWARDS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

VEMMA NUTRITION, DBA Bode Pro; 

VEMMA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, 

INC.; TOM ALKAZIN; BETHANY 

ALKAZIN; HARESH MEHTA; TARAK 

MEHTA, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

 and 

IVAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; J. CLARK 

LAW FIRM PLLC; IVAN & KILMARK 

PLC; FLORIN VALERIU IVAN; JUSTIN 

MATTHEW CLARK, 

Intervenors-Appellees,

No. 19-16448 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02133-DWL 

MEMORANDUM*

JOHN EDWARDS, 

Plaintiff, 

and 

No. 19-17453 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02133-DWL 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

NOV 12 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

FLORIN VALERIU IVAN, 

Appellant, 

 v. 

VEMMA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, 

INC.; TOM ALKAZIN; BETHANY 

ALKAZIN; HARESH MEHTA, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

VEMMA NUTRITION; VEMMA 

VITAMINS PTY. LIMITED; TARAK 

MEHTA, 

Defendants, 

IVAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; J. CLARK 

LAW FIRM PLLC; IVAN & KILMARK 

PLC, 

Intervenors.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 10, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TROTT, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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In appeal No. 19-16448, Dr. John Edwards challenges the district court’s 

dismissals of his claims against Vemma Nutrition, Vemma Holdings, H. Mehta, 

Tom and Bethany Alkazin, Vemma Vitamins, and T. Mehta, and its order that he 

pay 60% of the attorneys’ fees incurred by Vemma Holdings, Haresh Mehta, and 

the Alkazins. In appeal No. 19-17453, Florin Ivan challenges the district court’s 

order that he pay 20% of the attorneys’ fees incurred by Vemma Holdings, Haresh 

Mehta, and the Alkazins. As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them 

only as necessary to explain our decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1291.

I

By failing “to present a specific, cogent argument” with regard to any of the 

district court’s final dismissal orders in his Opening Brief, Edwards has waived the 

argument that all or any such orders of dismissal were in error. Greenwood v. FAA, 

28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). While he attempts to revive such argument in his 

Response Brief, he provides no substantive argumentation as to why the district 

court’s dismissals were in error. As such, Edwards has failed to provide this court 

with any basis to consider overturning the district court’s dismissal orders. Where 

an appellate brief fails to provide “the contentions of the appellant . . . and the 

reasons therefor,” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4) (emphasis added), or where “[i]ssues 

raised in a brief are not supported by argument,” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 
4 

634 (9th Cir. 1988), it is not the place of this court to provide such argumentation 

on the litigant’s behalf.

Irrespective of Edwards’s waiver, none of the dismissals of his copyrightinfringement or pendent state-law claims, for which the district court provided 

sound and thorough legal analysis, were error. As to Vemma Nutrition, such court 

properly held that the Federal Arbitration Act required it “to enforce the arbitration 

agreement in accordance with its terms.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 

Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). It properly dismissed all other 

defendants for failure to state a claim, lack of personal jurisdiction, and/or failure 

of service.

II

This court lacks jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred in 

awarding attorneys’ fees against Edwards. While he filed a notice of appeal as to 

the district court’s judgment dismissing the defendants, Edwards never amended 

such notice to appeal the district court’s subsequent award of attorneys’ fees. 

Edwards’s failure so to amend destroys this court’s appellate jurisdiction over the 

order granting attorneys’ fees against him. Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 

703, 719 (9th Cir. 2011). In any event, it does not appear that the district court 

abused its discretion.
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III

The district court acted within its discretion, and within its jurisdiction, when 

it sanctioned Ivan under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 

Such sanctions require “a showing of the attorney’s . . . bad faith,” which is 

deemed present “when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous 

argument.” Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, the 

district court found that Edwards’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was 

frivolous as to Vemma Holdings, the Alkazins, and H. Mehta, insofar as such 

defendants “were all dismissed from the SAC for the exact same reasons they were 

dismissed from the FAC.” It found that Ivan was reckless in defending the SAC, 

insofar as the SAC had violated the “clear, emphatic, and . . . plain” instructions of 

its order granting leave to amend. These factual findings, as to whether Ivan “acted 

recklessly or in bad faith,” are not clear error and therefore not reversible. Pac. 

Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000).

In turn, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions against 

Ivan. Estate of Blas, 792 F.2d at 860.

Ivan is also unavailed by his argument that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to award sanctions against him after Edwards had already filed a notice 

of appeal. A “district court retain[s] the power to award attorney’s fees after the 

notice of appeal from [its] decision on the merits [has] been filed.” Masalosalo by 
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Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983).

AFFIRMED.