[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-10462

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00242-PGB-DCI-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

RENE ROLANDO CERON-FLORES,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(October 17, 2018)

Before TJOFLAT, BRANCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rene Ceron-Flores appeals from his 48-month sentence for illegal reentry 

after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). On appeal, Ceron-Flores 

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argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the judge, citing 

the seriousness of Ceron-Flores’s prior conviction and the need for deterrence, 

deviated 34 months from the applicable Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months. 

Despite this deviation, and for the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

I.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2016). 

“The party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the sentence is 

unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial 

deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 

1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). 

The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater 

than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need: 

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 

and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 

manner[.]

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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances 

of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. Id. § 

3553(a)(1). 

So long as the sentence is reasonable in light of all the circumstances, we 

will not second guess the weight the district court gave to a given § 3553(a) factor. 

United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). Unjustified reliance

on any one § 3553(a) factor may, however, be indicative of an unreasonable 

sentence. Id. The district court is not required to state or discuss each of the § 

3553(a) factors—it need only acknowledge that it has considered the defendant’s 

arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 

1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). However, “[a] district court abuses its 

discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due 

significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, 

or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United 

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United 

States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). A district court 

commits a “clear error of judgment” when it unreasonably considers the proper 

factors. Id.

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II.

In this case, the District Court determined that a sentence above the 

Guidelines was necessary to achieve the purposes enumerated in § 3553(a)(2), 

specifically the need to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and 

deter future illegal reentry. As the District Court noted, even though Ceron-Flores 

was previously convicted of a serious crime—a sex crime against a child that 

carried a three- to seven-year sentence—he received a lenient 120-day sentence. 

Because of the unusual leniency of this sentence, the Guidelines resulted in a 

recommended sentence range that the District Court believed underrepresented the 

seriousness of his previous felony conviction.1 Thus, to reflect the seriousness of 

his prior conviction and to deter Ceron-Flores from illegally entering the country

yet again, the District Court departed from the sentence recommended by the 

Guidelines. On this record, we cannot say that the Court abused its discretion in 

doing so. 

None of Ceron-Flores’s arguments suggest a conclusion to the contrary. On 

appeal, Ceron-Flores focuses on the percentage by which his sentence exceeds the 

Guidelines, noting that this Court in a previous (unpublished) decision reversed a 

 

1 As the District Court noted, the commentary to U.S.G.G. § 2L1.2 provides that “a 

departure may be warranted” where, as the District Court concluded here, “the offense level 

provided by an enhancement . . . substantially understates or overstates the seriousness of the 

conduct underlying the prior offense.” Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2L1.2, 

cmt. n.5 (Nov. 1, 2016).

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sentence that exceeded the Guidelines by a lesser degree. But the facts of that 

case, and the concerns animating the district court’s sentence, were different from 

those confronting us here. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1217 (“[S]entencing courts may 

determine, on a case-by-case basis, the weight to give the Guidelines . . . .”) 

(quotations omitted) (emphasis added). And, in any event, the Supreme Court has 

“reject[ed] the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a 

departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justification required 

for a specific sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47, 128 S. Ct. 586, 

595 (2007).2 Furthermore, the District Court’s sentence, though above the 

Guidelines, was well below the statutory maximum of 20 years. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1326(b)(2). This further supports an inference of reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 

550 F.3d at 1324 (holding that the sentence was substantively reasonable in part 

because it was well below the statutory maximum).

Ceron-Flores also argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable 

because the District Court “did not adequately explain why it thought that 

imposing a sentence of 48 months” was necessary. Appellant’s Br. at 13. This 

charge is curious because, only two pages earlier in his brief, Ceron-Flores 

extensively documents the District Court’s concern with the Guidelines range and 

 

2 Even if the percentage of departure from the Guidelines range were dispositive, the 

departure here would be within the range this Court has previously affirmed. See, e.g., RosalesBruno, 789 F.3d at 1273 (affirming an 87-month sentence as reasonable when the Guidelines 

suggested a maximum of 27 months). 

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its rationale for imposing an above-Guidelines sentence. Id. at 11–12. Thus, it 

appears that Ceron-Flores’s real quarrel is with the District Court’s conclusion—

i.e., that a sentence within the Guidelines range was inadequate—rather than the 

process by which it reached that conclusion. And, as explained above, we do not 

conclude that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. 

IV.

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Ceron-Flores’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED. 

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