UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2208

TROY D. PETTY; ANNAH A. PETTY,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

MARVIN LUMBER AND CEDAR COMPANY, t/a MARVIN WINDOWS AND 

DOORS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. James C. Fox, 

Senior District Judge. (2:13-cv-00062-F)

Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: April 12, 2016

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Norman W. Shearin, Kevin A. Rust, VANDEVENTER BLACK, LLP, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Thomas H. Boyd, 

Michael E. Obermueller, WINTHROP & WEINSTINE, P.A., Minneapolis, 

Minnesota; Wes J. Camden, Brooks Pierce, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Troy D. Petty and Annah A. Petty appeal from the district 

court’s order dismissing their civil complaint as barred by the 

statute of limitations. The Pettys sought damages under 

contract and warranty causes of action for damages caused by the 

Defendant’s allegedly defective windows. Finding the complaint 

untimely filed, we affirm.

I.

On appeal, the Pettys do not dispute that their claims are 

barred by the statute of limitations. Rather, they argue that 

the Defendant waived the protection of the statute of 

limitations by providing an express warranty of ten years. We 

review a district court’s dismissal of a pleading on statute of 

limitations grounds de novo. Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 143 

(4th Cir. 2014).

The Pettys rely on Christie v. Hartley Constr., 766 S.E.2d 

283, 287-88 (N.C. 2014), which affirmed the right of parties to 

contract around a statute of repose. Christie offers the Pettys 

no assistance. The instant case concerns a statute of 

limitations which, as the Christie court recognized, “exhibit 

significant differences in both form and function” from statutes 

of repose. Id. at 286. One way North Carolina treats statutes 

of limitations differently from statutes of repose is by 
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forbidding parties from extending the four year statute of 

limitations for contract claims. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-

725(1) (2015). Thus, the district court correctly dismissed the 

Pettys’ complaint as untimely.

II.

Next, the Pettys assert that, even if the Defendant did not 

waive its statute of limitations defense, they were entitled to 

equitable tolling during the time of the Defendant’s repair 

attempts. Where the district court denies equitable tolling as 

a matter of law, we will review the court’s determinations de 

novo. Cruz, 773 F.3d at 143. However, where the issue is

whether facts bearing on the inquiry have been appropriately 

pled, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Chao 

v. Virginia Dep’t of Transp., 291 F.3d 276, 279-80 (4th Cir. 

2002). Here, the district court found that the complaint lacked 

sufficient detail to determine whether equitable tolling 

applied. We review that determination for abuse of discretion.

Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, a party is barred 

from asserting a technical defense, such as a statute of 

limitations, “when delay has been induced by acts, 

representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which would 

amount to a breach of good faith.” Nowell v. Great Atl. & Pac.

Tea Co., 108 S.E.2d 889, 891 (N.C. 1959). However, a plaintiff 
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who seeks to obtain equitable tolling of a limitations period 

must show that he reasonably relied upon a representation made 

by the Defendant. See Town of Pineville v. Atkinson/Dyer/Watson 

Architects, P.A., 442 S.E.2d 73, 74-75 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). In 

this case, regardless of when the repairs took place or how long 

they took, the Pettys have failed to make any allegation that 

they relied on any representations by the Defendant.

Contending that they were not required to do so, the Pettys 

rely on Haywood St. Redevelopment Corp. v. Harry S. Peterson, 

Co., 463 S.E.2d 564, 567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), which held that 

the limitations period for a breach of express warranty claim 

may be tolled “during the time the seller endeavors to make 

repairs to enable the product to comply with a warranty.” In 

their complaint, the Pettys list dates that Defendant attempted 

to “assess” and “repair” the windows, ranging from October 2010 

until November 2012. However, assuming Haywood stands for the 

proposition that repairs can toll the statute of limitations 

even in the absence of inducements and reliance, the Pettys have 

still, as the district court found, failed to specify how long 

each repair took, failed to explain the details of the testing 

and inspections, and failed to allege that the repairs were made 

in order to enable the product to comply with its warranty. 

Moreover, after the district court warned the Pettys about their 

insufficient pleading, they failed to offer any further details 
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in their amended complaint. Absent the necessary details, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

not applying the equitable tolling doctrine.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED