international President

J. English Z

Internationa} Secretary/Treasurer

L. Lynch
IntemationalVice President
of Human Affairs

Oo a Size ¢

_Caln. Moma
C..N. Morris
international Representative

ACCEPTED AND A\

BY THE

GREED TO

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO-CLC

On Behalf

of

Local Union 8034

A.W. DeMaiori

f
Local 8031
Treasurer/Committeeperson
C. W. Buchholz

President

Me. Loot.
Local 80314
Financial Sec./Committeeperson

Local 80374
ye Barton
ice President
R. F. Malito
Local 8031

~ RF. DiGiorgio
Comifnitteeperson
Local 8031

Cand ~

C.A Miller

ACC. Scarpelia
Trustee/Committeeperson
Local 8034

100



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Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix ~ Continuation Page

Rocky Flats Historic Lung Counting and Dosimetry
Background Information

From the early 1950s until approximately 1989 several processes were etaployed at Rocky Flats
that required the purity of plutonium. Of these processes many dealt with highly insoluble forms,
including high fired oxides in particular.

All of the work activities described in response to Section E2 of Form B were very high in
penetrating radiation exposure and known by employees as bum out lines. Because of the nature
of these materials it was not uncommon to have an airborne excursion, some so high in
contamination that it would take months to decontaminate. Unfortunately the only way a worker
would know of a release was when the selective alpha air monitors (SAAMs) would alarm. At the
time of these alarms, the workers were typically without respiratory protection and nasal and
mouth smears and lung counts were not readily employed. Only when skin contamination was
involved were bioassay actions taken and an employee sent up to lung count. The lung counter
could not detect plutonium because of the low abundance of gamma photons and the severe
attenuation of L X-rays. Instead, the 59.5-keV gamma photon from Americium 241 was used to
detect americium in the lung. The activity of plutonium was then calculated from the detected
americium by measuring, calculating, or assuming the fraction of the Americium 241 in the
plutonium mixture on the date of the lung count. Direct in vivo measurement of plutonium in the
lungs, although investigated, was never implemented at Rocky Flats. The following bullets
describe lung counting capabilities over time. Note that no lung counting capabilities existed from
1952 to 1964 and that they were seldom used from 1964 to 1968.

© 1964 — 1968 - One counting room consisting of two Nal(TP) scintillation detectors
and a third detector used for cesium and potassium measurements.

e 1969 — 1976 - Two counting rooms with three 4x4 Nal(T)) scintillation detectors, two
over the upper chest and one over the liver. The liver detector was eliminated in
1974. An index method was developed by Robert Bistline to reflect chest wall
thickness.

¢ 1976-1984 - Three counting rooms were equipped with the new high-purity
Germanium (Ge) detector array system. The Nal(TT) system would latter only be
used as a backup system.

® 1985 — 1995 - Ge detectors in the organ pipe configuration were implemented.
© 1995 —Present - The lung counter hardware, software, and detectors were upgraded.

In 1966, the type of dosimeter badge used to monitor employees’ exposure to radiation was a
Type-A gamma ray film badge. However, very few if any radiation workers used them in the
fifties and early sixties. By 1969, all gamma ray dosimeters were converted to thermoluminescent
dosimeters (TLDs) and by 1976 all neutron badges used were TLD badges. These had their faults,
because in order too obtain the information in the employee’s dosimeter badge the crystal chips
had to be activated by heat, and if not done appropriately the record would be lost. The presence
of body oils or hair on the chips could result in false readings and improper and inconsistent
practices with employee dosimetry use resulted in missing information (forgot to wear badge or
‘wore it under a lead apron) or inaccurate information. The crystals are also very small and would
easily get lost. See an employee letter included as an attachment in response to Section F.2 of
Form B. Jn addition, the site routinely under reported lower level exposures over time.
The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
‘and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.

20



‘Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix ~ Continuation Page

1996 and 1997 — A few years later, a similar incident in Building 371 resulted in office workers
Teceiving unmonitored exposure that penetrated the operations area wall and exposed adjacent
office workers, one of whom included a pregnant worker. These incidents itlustrate that the
potential for unmonitored and unrecorded exposures has existed throughout time at Rocky Flats.
The Building 371 unmonitored exposures and several other radiological issues, including
unsecognized intakes, less than adequate monitoring, and unnecessary exposures was the topic of
a April 14, 1998, Price Anderson Amendments Act Investigation that is included in ifs entirety in
response to F.4. The contractor was fined $100,000 for these failures in radiological monitoring
and protection of the workers.

May 15, 2001 —On May 15, 2001, Rocky Flats Closure contractor Kaiser-Hill issued a
comprehensive report detailing its independent investigation into exposure incidents in Building
771, Investigative Team Report Investigation of the source of potential internal radiological
exposures involving eleven personnel in Building 771. The Building 771 worker exposure
investigation came to the disturbing conclusion that: [emphasis added]

“When D&D activities take place in facilities contaminated with plutonium, the
challenges to a radiation safety program are especially great. Workplace indicators are
not capabk ing low levels of plutonium contamination in equipment and
materials or as airborne radioactivity. In addition, urinalysis and lung counting do
not have the sensitivity necessary to detect intakes of plutonium at the DOE
investigative level of 100 mrem. .. . In summary the investigative team concluded that
the most likely cause of the positive bioassay results was exposure to low levels of
airborne plotonium radioactivity from radiological work operations exacerbated by D&D
operations. These low levels of air] ioactivil the threshold of
workplace indicators.”
The report (included as an attachment in response to F.4) outlines a series of poor work practices,
poor record keeping on radiological jobs, inadequate worker protection and inabilities of work
place monitoring systems to detect longer term chronic exposures — “an exposure of 10 to 20
DAC-hours protracted over a working year would not be detected by work place indicators.”

The results of this investigation are important for several reasons:

1) The report provides evidence that as recently as 2000/2001 workers at Rocky Flats
routinely received exposures that went undetected by workplace indicators and standard
urinalysis bioassay. it concludes that it is impossible to prevent undetected exposures in
a plutonium facility undergoing D&D.

2) The exposures were detected by happenstance as part of the review on an unrelated issue
identified by a DOE facility representative in which an instrument being used was past its
calibration date. If this unrelated issue had not been raised on Oct. 16, 2000, then these
exposures very likely would still be undetected today.

3) After nearly five months of investigation, the expert review team could not with certainty
ascertain the exact source of exposure. Without the source and date of exposure, as
indicated in the report “interpretation of the results, without a known intake event, is very
difficult.” Imagine how difficult this will become after Rocky Flats is closed and 10 years
down the road a dose reconstruction expert is trying to estimate dose for Rocky Flats
workers.

This incident was part of a July 17, 2001, Price Anderson Amendment Act enforcement action.
A copy of that Notice of Violation is included in its entirety in response to F.4.

‘The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this pefition
16

and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.





Speciat Exposuse Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Iiiness Compensation Act . Nationat Institute for Occupational Safety and Heaith

OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 06/31/2007
Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B Page 6 of 7

F.3 DG We have attached a report from a health physicist or other individual with expertise in
radiation dose reconstruction documenting the limitations of existing DOE or AWE records on
radiation exposures at the facility, as relevant to the petition. The report specifies the basis for -
believing these documented limitations might prevent the completion of dose reconstructions for
members of the class under 42 CFR Part 82 and related NIOSH technical implementation
guidelines.

(Attach report to the back of the petition form.) See Tab F.3

F.4 01a We have attached a scientific or technical report, issued by a government agency of the
Executive Branch of Government or the General Accounting Office, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, or the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, or published in a peer-reviewed
joural, that identifies dosimetry and related information that are unavailable (due to either a lack
of monitoring or the destruction or loss of records) for estimating the radiation doses of
employees covered by the petition.

See Tab F.4

G Signature of Person(s} Sub

All Petitioners shouldgn an,

ASS:
Signatur Anthpny DeMaiori President Date
2s OS”
Signi Santangelo VP. Date |:
C= Etim hl ek
Signature Steven _ Trujillo Committee Date
Notice: Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, misrepresentation, concealment of

fact or any other act of fraud to obtain compensation as provided under EEQICPA or who
knowingly accepts compensation to which that person is not entitled is subject to civil or.
administrative remedies as well as felony criminal prosecution and may, under appropriate
criminal provisions, be punished by a fine or imprisonment or both. | affirm that the information
provided on this form is accurate and true.

Send this form to: SEC Petition
Office af Compensation Analysis and Support
NIOSH

4676 Columbia Parkway, MS-C-47
Cincinnati, OH 45226

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner:_Anthony W. DeMaiori, USWA, 8031



SPOHOHHHHHHHHOHSHSHHSHSHSHSHSHSHHOHHOHSHHOHHOHHSHOHHEEOEES

211

guy next to him, standing shoulder to shoulder
with him, comes up with nothing. And so you
can't really rely on fellow workers as an
indicator of internal uptakes in a lot of cases.

So I just bring those points out to the
Board, that there's a lot of uniqueness with
working around a facility like that. And I
certainly hope that all the information possible
can be captured in terms of historical knowledge
of the dosimetry. And I know Larry and people
are anxious to capture as much of that as
possible, but unfortunately at a place like Rocky
there aren't very many of us old-timers around
anymore that have the historical knowledge of the
site and the dosimetry. Most of the guys that
work out there now in closure, most of the old-
timers are gone. And it's guys that have worked
there less than five years, or five to ten years
is the lifespan of most of those guys.

So I just encourage you, that the Board work
on trying to get a little more clarification in
some of these areas that would certainly be
helpful to some of us in considering whether
Special Exposure Cohorts would be appropriate to

pursue. Thank you.

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



23
24

25

209

Prior to 1957 there were only 18 people out
of the entire population at the plant that had
ever been given neutron dosimeters. There is a
neutron dose reconstruction project, and I know
Larry -~ Mr. Blliott and the crew are looking at
that. Some of that data is -- we're making
progress on re-reading some of the films, but
there isn't even data available on some of these
people.

And so there are very specific types of
cohorts here that I'm concerned, we're concerned
about. And I think that those kinds of nuances
probably occur throughout the nuclear industry,
the Department of Energy, with different sites.
And I would hope that -- and I don't know how
extensive that's going as far as capturing the
unique information that is lacking at the various
sites, the historical information that some of us
know about.

And I know the NIOSH people are trying to
explore that, and I certainly would encourage any
information that they can gain by various
sources. And maybe through the public comment at
stakeholder meetings and so forth they could

capture some of that through some of the old-

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



Fa

a , ; : >)

HISTORICAL NEUTRON
DOSIMETRY AT ROCKY FLATS

. presented by

__ Roger B. Falk
Health Effects Dosimetrist

May 18, 1994

¢ly#GeG ROCKY FLATS ~/



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207

Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Field Office.
And I just wanted to make a few comments to the
Board here this afternoon, and I appreciate the
opportunity, Dr. Ziemer and Board members.

My background is I’ve been at Rocky Flats for
about 36 years, a little over 36 years, and
worked on the contractor side in their internal
dosimetry, lung counting and so forth, and
started a study back in 1280 bringing back old
retired workers from the plant that had known
depositions of plutonium or had exposures greater
than 20 rem dose, overall external dose, and
xecognized some of the problems with the
dosimetry of the program at Rocky Flats. And so
started that program in 1980. I had about 900
individuals that I was bringing back to the site
every three years for physical exams.

I presently work for the Department of
Energy, have been there with the Department of
Energy for about a little over seven years now
heading up the internal dosimetry oversight,
occupational medicine oversight, and the
beryllium program oversight.

But I want to concentrate, and appreciate any

helpfulness that can be given by the Board, in

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



‘Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix — Continuation Page.

* Room 3602 (shipping and receiving) would take non-weapons speck plutonium
metal and cook it in a muffle furnace at 450 degrees Celsius turning it into oxide.

¢ 3515 (button breakout) fired buttons before being shut down in 1989.

* 3701 and 3717 continuously had four furnaces going at 850 degrees Celsius for
approximately four hours to stabilize oxide for shipment to Savannah River.

* 3305 (Electro refining) yielded dry plutonium oxide, metal, and 411 high gamma
neutron salts.

Building 374 was a waste processing facility adjacent to Building 371. Building 374 included a
thermal process known as the spray dryer where liquid plutonium waste was dried and atomized
using a high temperature furnace and spray process. Building 374 was also the site of smaller
fires, including a fire in the bag house for the spray dryer in the late 1970s.

Building 776-777 was built between 1956 and 1957. It went into service in 1958 to handle the
increased plutonium workload. While building 771 undertook recovery operations, Building 776
would perform the plutonium machining, and Building 777 would handle the assembly
operations. In 1968 a process known as molten salt extraction was introduced to Building 776.
This process would take the pure plutonium metal from site returns and remove the americium
ingrowth. The plutonium metal would then be sent directly to the plutonium foundry operations
in Building 777 for casting and subsequent processing into plutonium components. Other refining
processes included direct oxide reduction and salt scrub processing. Building 776 was the site of
the largest plutonium fire in Rocky Flats history. At the time this fire was also the largest
industrial fire to have ever occurred in our nation. The fire started at approximately 2 p.m. on
Mother’s Day, May 11, 1969, and bumed for over 6 hours. The temperature of this fire was so
hot it melted through stainless steel gloveboxes and released massive amounts of contamination
throughout the entire building. See Building 776/777 Contamination Map as attached to the end
of this section E.2. Because worker protection standards were less at the time fire cleanup
workers in 1969 wore inferior respiratory protection resulting in internal depositions of high fired
oxides. Building 776.was.also the site of an earlier fire.in 1965 that resulted in the highest
radiation exposure to workers. This fire which burned in an oil-laden pipe under a glovebox
burned at temperatures in excess of 1800 degrees Celsius. More than 25 workers received
significant internal depositions from the 1965 fire with some as high as 30 times the maximum
allowable lung dose at the time which equated to lung burdens of more than 480 nanocuties.
More than 380 people received special lung counts and many more than 25 workers have now
been identified through further lung counts as having received exposures from the 1965 fire. The
D&D of Building 776/777 began in 1997. D&D workers in Building 776 have the greatest
chance of undetected high fired oxide exposure from day-to-day operations and D&D operations
in the facility in which the small high fired oxide particles can become airbome at levels
undetectable by workplace monitoring equipment. These particles have both self-sheilding
properties because they were ceramicized by the high temperature of the fire and deep penetration
with particles as small as .12 um AMAD. Also these are highly insoluble taking as much as
6,000 days to show up in urine bioassays. The following bullets provide additional information
on thermal processes in Building 776/777.

© Six production-scale electric fumaces were installed in 1966 to conduct electro-
refining and were later discontinued due to low yields. In 1988 the process was

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this pefition
10

‘and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Fiats class of workers.



Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

Investigations into unusual dosimetry results frequently resulted in the assignment of zero when
the investigator was unable to determine the cause of the exposure. From 1951 through 1992
Rocky Flats embraced a philosophy of reporting dose down to zero. In 1993 a minimum reported
dose jevel of 10 mrem was adopted. Any dose below this level is reported as zero (RFETS 2001).
‘This practice is still in place today.

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right fo provide addifional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of cur ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.
21

SOOHHHHHHSHHHSHOHSHHOHSHHSHHOSCHSHSHEHOOHOHOHHOHOHOOOOOOOEES



2) Little is known about high fired oxides. Accurate dose modeling takes decades to
develop. Because high fired oxides are a relatively recent phenomenon, they are not
accounted for in dose modeling in use today by NIOSH or in dose modeling for instance
at Rocky Flats. Current models in use underestimate high fired oxide exposure by as
much as a factor of 10 according to Dr. Bob Bistline. For example, high fired oxides at
Rocky Flats have been found to range from 0.12 to 0.3 um AMAD, however NIOSH uses
a particle size of 5.0 (CRP 66) and even Rocky Flats Dosimetry Department uses a
particle size of 1.0.

3) High fired oxides have self-shielding properties that make accurate assessment, even by
lung count, impossible. When plutonium particles are heated to extreme temperatures
they become “ceramicized” or glazed over on the outside of the particle. The hardened
outer surface of the high fired oxide particle actually shields or masks the plutonium
alpha radiation being emitted from the particle. This factor tricks the lung counter into
detecting less plutonium than is actually present in the ling. According to Dr. Bistline
with high fired oxides, the caleulation of lifetime dose based on lung count is usually in
error.

4) Itis impossible to tell whether plutonium detected by lung count is soluble or insoluble
so it is impossible to know what model to apply. Rocky Flats has both soluble and
insoluble forms of plutonium. Using even a moderately soluble equation results in
calculations that are completely in error. “Super Y screws up the modeling,” said one
dose assessment expert at Rocky Flats.

5) Because of the insolubility of high fired oxides, worker exposures can go undetected for
decades. “We have found a number of people now years later that have plutonium in
their bodies that was never picked up by the monitoring in place at the time,” Dr. Bistline
said in a recent phone interview. These new-found exposures cannot be tied to an
incident date and so accurate dose reconstruction is impossible. “Dose assessment works
well when you know the incident that the dose came from, not when you don’t,”
according to a Rocky Flats dose assessment expert.

Legal Right of Representation

It is on the basis of the numerous factors outlined above that the United Steelworkers of America,
Local 8031, in good faith submits this Petition for inclusion in the Special Exposure Cohort on
behalf of its membership. USWA, Local 8031 has legal right of representation of this Rocky
Flats class of workers both through vote certified by the National Labor Relations Review Board
and as recognized in labor-management contracts, including the most recent contract with Kaiser-
Hill Company, LLC signed on February 2, 2001. Documentation of legal representation by
USWA, Local 8031 is included as an attachment to SEC Petition, Form B. The Rocky Flats class
of workers has been under union representation since May 18, 1953. Unions that have
represented this class of workers include: Denver Metal Trades Council (1953-1964), United
Mine Workers of America (1965-1968), International Union of District 50 (1968-1972), and
United Steelworkers of America (1972-Present),

Rocky Flats Class of Employees and Relevant Locations of the Facility

The class of employees covered by this petition were/are employed at the U.S. Department of
Energy’s Rocky Flats site near Golden, Colorado, also known as Rocky Flats Plant, Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site and Rocky Flats Closure Project anytime during the period of
April 1952 through present and as of the date of this petition. The class of employees includes all
workers who were cither:

1) Monitored using a dosimeter badge and/or bioassay or who worked in positions that are now
required to be monitored wearing a dosimeter badge and/or bioassay, and/or

‘Rocky Flats Special Exposure CohorvUSWA, Local 3031 pi)



‘Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix ~ Continuation Page

inadequate monitoring. As applicable, these reports and expert testimony are referenced and
attached to the SEC Petition, Form B.

Finally, due to changing methodologies, a worker can end up with multiple different dose
calculations. Pre-1989, Rocky Flats used a systemic burden model for calculating dose and then
switched to a lifetime dose assessment. While the systemic burden analysis calculation tended to
overestimate doses, the later doses calculated using the ICRP 26 tended to underestimate and the
program that NIOSH currently uses based on ICRP 66 underestimates dose by up to a factor of
10. So a worker ends up with three different calculations — none of which are accurate.

A review of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Dose Reconstruction Program similarly
concinded that dose reconstruction is not accurate. “The committee has concluded, however, that
‘upper-bound doses from external gamma, neutron, and beta exposure are often under estimated,
sometimes considerably, particularly when doses are reconstructed (National Academy of
Sciences Press, A Review of the Dose Reconstruction Program of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, 2003, Page 258.) Similarly, the committee also found “Estimation of internal dose —
most important, the dose from inhalation — is an inherently more difficult problem . . . because
data that could be used to estimate intakes of radionuclides by the atomic veterans is not
available.” This very closely mirrors the issue at Rocky Flats; the data needed to accurately
estimate dose — the form of plutonium (soluble or insoluble) and the date of exposure ~ are often
not available. Absent this knowledge it is impossible to accurately record dose.

1) Dates and Descriptions of Incidents

1953-Present — Undetected/under recorded exposures to high fired oxides. See High Fired
Oxides on the following pages for a detailed discussion on the basis for petition based on
exposure to high fired oxides at Rocky Flats.

April 1952-1964 — Rocky Flats had no lung counting capabilities until 1964 and did not routinely
perform lung counts on workers until the late 1960s. Exposures to high fired oxides are not
detected in standard urine bioassay for as long as 6,000 days after the exposure occurred making
accurate dose modeling impossible. Dr. Robert Bistline from the Department of Energy, Rocky
Flats Field Office stated in his testimony to the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health
that “ Before 1964 we had no lung-counting capabilities and to try to go back and capture the
exposures of individuals back in the 1950s and sixties is next to impossible.” And that “ If you
didn’t have ling-counting capabilities that some of the old-timers that worked back in the fifties
and sixties would show no indication of positive bioassays.” Dr. Bistline’s Testimony is included
as an attachment in response to F.3 of Form B.

April 1952-1958 — No neutron dose recorded. Neutron dosimetry was not in use at site until the
late 1950s.

1958-1968 — Improper reading of dosimetry films resulted in inaccurate reporting of dose; more
than 38,000 film badges were affected. Subsequent dose reconstruction efforts could not
accurately record dose due to the time that had elapsed and inability to tie doses to specific
exposure incident dates. In 1994, Roger B. Falk a health effects expert at Rocky Flats presented
his finding on Historical Neutron Dosimetry and stated that “Few radiation workers were
monitored for neutron doses in the 1950’s and that neutron doses were poorly evaluated from
neutron film until 1967.” His presentation is included as an attachment in response to Section F3
of Form B. The fact that the neutron track plates and NTA film badges were poorly evaluated was
uot determined for certain until at 1994 study, nearly 25 years after the fact. The study concluded
that actual exposures could have been significantly different than what was recorded. Twenty-
five years from today, it is likely that the same thing will be said of the doses recorded for Rocky

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.
4



ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO.
BY

KAISER-HILL COMPANY, L. L. Cc.

A.M. Parker . M., S. Elenbaas
Executive Vice President & Manager
Chief Operating Officer Benefits Administration
M. C. Keese
Representative
Sp AB Ay
RC.Easdon SA. Shaw
Division Manager . Representative
Labor Relations Labor Relations
\O a all_o_ hho
RL, Piers R. D. Slaughter
Manager Representative
Labor Relations Labor Relations

9S



PAGE 1 OF 2

Building 776/777 1969 Fire Cleanup Photos

FIRE CLEANUP PHOTOS

i


Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

exposure to high fired plutonium oxides. However since Building 771 also involved processes in
which soluble forms of plutonium were handled, it is impossible to determine by bioassay alone
what form of plutonium a worker was exposed to making accurate dose reconstruction
impossible. Building 771 was also the facility known for the Buildiag 771 Worker Exposure
Incident in which several workers received exposures that could not be linked to an incident. An
investigation concluded that the cause of the exposures was chronic long-term exposure to small
amounts of airbome contamination that were below the detection limit of monitoring equipment.
This was documented in the March 2001 investigative report which is attached to this petition.
Examples of Building 771 processes generating high fired oxides are as follows.

« The incinerator fine was designed to recover plutonium from contaminated objects,
by heating a burn box type furnace to approximately 800 degrees Celsius; this
process would create a fine ash type material that would eventually be run through
the ball mill process.

e = The Calcination line would take a high gram per liter wet green cake material (Pu03)
and by heating it to approximately 1200 degrees Celsius it would be dried into a
powdery light oxide and staged for the hydrofluorination line.

¢ The fluorination line would take the green cake (PuO3) and by a heat and chemical
reaction convert it to pink cake (PuF4).

¢ Button breakout was 2 high-fired line that produced an almost pure plutonium button.
This was achieved by taking PuF4, an initiator (magnesium metal) placing them into
acrucible and then into a reaction vessel (RV). The RV would then be inserted into K
furnace. Extreme heat would cause a reaction creating pressure that would initiate a
small explosion, generating a button.

¢ The crusher fine would take button breakouts crucibles as well as the sand and slag
from the incinerator and pulverize it into a fine powder so that it could be dissolved
and the plutonium recaptured.

Building 371 was built between 1973 and 1981. It was designed to replace Building 771 recovery
operations. Design problems forced the shutdown of the chemical processing part in 1985,
however high fired oxide, ash, and salt residue repack and stabilization continued on a full time
basis until the early 2000s. The last of the material was packaged and sent off site by the
Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System group (PUSPS) in early 2004. High fired oxide
exposures stem from the processes bulleted below. Similarly to Building 771, Building 371 also
involved processes using soluble forms of plutonium. The form of plutonium a person was
exposed to cannot be accurately determined since both forms are present on a day-to-day basis.
Not knowing the form of plutonium makes it impossible to accurately assess dose. Building 371
was aiso the site of numerous small fires, including the most recent glovebox fire in 2003. The
D&D of Building 371 began in 2000 and continues today. Workers performing D&D in areas
where thermal processes occurred and in areas contaminated by multiple fires have potential for
exposure to high fired oxides.

© Room 3206 (site return) would take plutonium oxide that was stored in the stacker
retriever and high fire it in an oven at 450 degrees Celsius for up to four hours then
package it in produce cans for shipment to Los Alamos.
The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.

9



‘Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

Flats workers in the 1990s and 2000s. A letter regarding dose reconstruction authored by the
Radiation Protection Manager July 26, 1994, is included in its entirety in response to F.4.

1966-Present — In 1966, the type of dosimeter badge used to monitor employees’ exposure to
radiation was a Type-A gamma ray film badge. However, very few if any radiation workers used
them in the fifties and early sixties. By 1969, all gamma ray dosimeters were converted to
thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and by 1976 all neutron badges used were TLD badges.
These had their faults, because in order to obtain the information in the employee’s dosimeter
badge the crystal chips had to be activated by heat, and if not done appropriately the record would
be lost. The presence of body oils or hair on the chips could result in false readings and improper
and inconsistent practices with employee dosimetry use resulted in missing information (forgot to
wear badge or wore it under a lead apron) or inaccurate information. The crystals are also very
small and would easily get lost. See an employee letter included as an attachment in response to
Section F.2 of Form B. In addition, the site routinely under reported lower level exposures over
time. Investigations into unusual dosimetry results frequently resulted in the assignment of zero
when the investigator was unable to determine the cause of the exposure. From 1951 through
1992 Rocky Flats embraced a philosophy of reporting dose down to zero. In 1993 a minimum
reported dose level of 10 mrem was adopted. Any dose below this level is reported as zero
(RFETS 2001). This practice is still in place today.

1976-Present — The Technical Basis Document (TBD) used by NIOSH to reconstruct Rocky
Flats doses does not capture any radiological incidents or events past 1976. However, a review of
the most recent five years worth of Radiological Incident Reports documents more than 200
exposure incidents just in that five-year timeframe. None of these incidents is accounted for in
the Rocky Flats TBD.

1957 ~ The second largest plutonium-related fire occurred in Building 771 generating high fired
oxides that spread throughout the facility. See High Fired Oxides discussion later in this section.

1965 ~ Building 776 was also the site of an earlier fire in 1965 that resulted in the highest
radiation exposure to workers. This fire which burned in an oil-laden pipe under a glovebox
burned at temperatures in excess of 1800 degrees Celsius. More than 25 workers received
significant intemal depositions from the 1965 fire with some as high as 30 times the maximum
allowable lung dose at the time which equated to lung burdens of more than 480 nanocuries.
More than 380 people received special lung counts and many more than 25 workers have now
béen identified through further lung counts as having received exposures from the 1965 fire.

1969 — The largest plutonium fire at Rocky Flats occurred in Building 776 in May 1969. At the
time the Building 776 fire was the most costly industrial fire in U.S. history. This fire generated
plutonium particle sizes as small as 0.12 um AMAD. These high fired oxide particles spread
throughout the building and some were released to the environment. These particles posed a
significant exposure risk to workers both during production days and later during D&D of the
facility when the tiny particles would become re-suspended during D&D operations.

December 1, 1993 — A Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board report, included in its entirety in
response to F.4, noted that “the potential existed for workers to be exposed to radiation with out
being monitored . . .” This resulted from TLDs on a storage rack in an area in Building 771
where workers were not required to wear dosimeters resulted in readings as high as 300 mrem.
The Defense Board noted that workers in the area could have received in excess of 100 mrem
without being monitored. The same report also noted the use of wrong correction factors in
assessing dosimeter chips and the fact that an accreditation program in place at the time “failed to
respond adequately to the plant’s various neutron radiation fields.” The report goes on to list
numerous deficiencies in radiation protection.
The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.

15



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Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
under the Eneray Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Contro! and Prevention
{ness Compensation Act National institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OMB Number. 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007

Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B Page 2 of 7
Survivor Information — Complete Section B if you are a Survivor or representing a Survivor.

B.1 Name of Survivor:

Mr/Mrs./Ms. First Name Middle Initial Last Name
B2 Social Security Number of Survivor:
B.3 Address of Survivor:

Street Apt#® P.O. Box

City State Zp Cade
B.4 ‘Telephone Number of Survivor: 2
B.5 Email Address of Survivor:

B6é Relationship to Employee: DB Spouse Q Son/Daughter QO Parent
O Grandparent 0 Grandchild

: = Cs zs & Sees,
Employee Information — Complete Section G UNLESS you are a tabor organization.

C.1 Name of Employee:

Mr/Mrs./Ms. First Name Middle initial Last Name
C.2 Former Name of Employee (e.g., maiden namé/legal name change/other):

M r/Mrs./Ms. First Name Middle Initial Last Name
C.3 Social Security Number of Employee:
C4 Address of Employee (ftiving):

- Street ° Apt® ——B.0, Box
City State Zip Code

C.5 Telephone Number of Employee: 2 -
C6 Email Address of Employee:

C.7 Employment information Related to Petition:
|C.7a Employee Number (if known): _

C.7b Dates of Employment: Start End
C.7¢ Employer Name:
C.7d Work Site Location:

C.7e Supervisor's Name:

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: Anthony W. DeMaiori, USWA, Local 8031

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PARTIAL LIST OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS

JOB DESCRIPTIONS AND LOCATIONS

Much of the data in the following table is taken from DOE Uranium Mass Balance Project report found at http:/Kis.
legacy/reports/rockytlats/section1_2.paf. This table Is not a comprehensive listin
Rocky Flats, but Is a summary of data readily avallable at this time,

eh.doe.gov/
ig of potential radiological exposures associated with

1 Pam

Primary
: radiation} Maximum
1. Job title Process description Butiding Type of work Begin | End Natertat type, energy
/Analylical taboratory ‘Sample processing ~~~1659 (Plutonium sample analysis Pu a [646 MeV
techniclans
[Anaiytica laboratory Sample processing BET EU or BU sample analysts aes aS HET a [46 Mev
technicians
Assemblers _ PitAssembly_ 700, Handted “War Raserve” components
Assemblers Varied - simitorto Metallurgical Varied [Handled meial paris
Operators depending on location 4

Boller vant operators (bvos) [Varied - depending on location’ [Varied |Mankor exhaust systema, wasie tanks,

land process waste tines
[Carpenters \Varlad - depending on location [Varad } Refractory replacement in casting and

heat treatment furnaces
(Chemicel oparaiors Pu metal reprocessing a7 [Handled contaminated reagents
Chemical oparators Waste treatment 374 [Handled contaminated reagents
Chemical operators [Waste handling sar Handled contaminated reagents: 7956 }1980_ (007 aa Mey
‘Ghemical operators [Component cleaning, aaz. Handieg conteminaied reagents 1986 [1989 DU. a 14.2 MeV
Chemies! operators, Waste handing aaz Processed waste materials 7? |? |DU chips o/4.2 Mov"
[Chemical operators Electrolytic decon of legacy HEU {707 Handied contaminated reagents 1987 {1990 [HEU a 14.6 MeV)

[contaminated with Pu Pu. 3.6 Mey

Chemical operators [Pu metal reprocessing 77t Handled contaminated reagents; Pu- )1666? |1989 }Pu-""U oxide a 6.18 MeV |

contaminated **Us0s oxide 4.2MeV |
Ghervicel operators Waste treatment acs Fencled contamineted reagents, Nquld |T863 | 7869) iqula wastes aya. Mev"

wastes from 88”
Ghainical operators Molten salt processing 776 [Handled contaminated reagents 1658 _\7980_|Pu-235 Cm ERR
[Chemical operators [Process DU metal (e65 fandied contaminated reagents 1953/1989 [DU 14.2 We
|Chemient operators HEU metal reprocessing 681 Handled contaminated reagenie 19531968 (HEU Ta (4.6 MeV
[Chemical operators (Grany! mtrate processing 886 [Handled contaminated reagents _
Glerk packers: Varied ~ dapanding on location Varied Lite hands-on ‘Work with radioactive

materials,
Configuration control |Vaned - depending on location Varied ‘Routine access to process areas; little
authority personne! hands-on work,
Decontamination & Varied = depending on location 1883 Deconned 1963/1986 [HEU a 46 MeV
decommissioning workers Du 4.2 MoV
[Becgatamination & Varied = dapanding on location 881 B ede [Deconned oss \1867 [HEU a ]4.6 MoV

decommissioning workers

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2) Who worked in areas of plutonium exposure, in particular focusing on but not limited to
facilities with known high fired oxide processes or exposures, including: Building 371/374,
Building 559, Building 707, Building 771, Building 774, Building 776, Building 777,
Building 778, Building 779 and any others identified.

Unmonitored, Unrecorded or inadequately Monitored or Recorded
Exposures and Supporting Documentation

This petition is based on multiple unmonitored, unrecorded, or inadequately monitored or
recorded exposures that are not specific to specified incidents. Therefore, this petition covers the
entire time period of plutonium exposure at Rocky Flats from April 1952 to the date of petition
submittal. Specifics regarding unmonitored, unrecorded, inadequately monitored or recorded
exposures are included in our SEC Petition Form B, Section E.5. This petition is further based on
the fact that records and information are inadequate for individual dose reconstructions based on
the fact that 2} certain types of radiation exposures and doses incurred by the Rocky Flats class
were not monitored for certain periods of time and certain types of exposure (i.¢. to high fired
oxides) are inaccurately modeled and reported on dose records; 2) for certain areas either no
monitoring occurred ot dosimetry chips were destroyed or lost during processing resulting in no
data available; 3) for many employees accurate records of what facilities a person worked in and
when they worked there do not exist, and 4) expert testimony supports the inability to reconstruct
dose for high fired oxides; technical documents including site dependent investigation reports,
Price Anderson Amendment Act and Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board reports support
periods of inadequate monitoring. As applicable, these reports and expert testimony are
referenced and attached to the SEC Petition, Form B.

Unique Chalienges of a Closure Site

This petition is further based on the unique challenges of a closure site that render the accuracy of
future dose reconstruction impossible. This coupled with the passage of time, the secrecy of the
past weapons production mission and the elimination of the recall programs that allowed for
model refinement preclude accurate dose reconstruction. As stated by R. Williams Field, M.S,
Ph.D., from the College of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology, “It is a fatal flaw to
assume that an investigator, 30 to 50 years after the fact, can validly reconstruct work conditions
and processes that led to maximal exposures at the time of employment. . .. Because.of the
secrecy of much of the former AEC/DOE work, especially on bomb construction and
dismantlement, much of the work process information has been intentionally suppressed or
destroyed,”

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is
included in this petition in support of our efforts to achieve Special Exposure Cohort designation.

Rocky Flats Special Exposure Cohort/USWA, Local 8031 iv





Speciat ure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
liiness Compensation Act National institute for Occupationat Safety and Health

OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007

Page 1 of 7
z ay

Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B
5 -Ose0F SeSocial:
bas x capa 2 :
General Instructions on Completing this Form (complete instructions are available in a separate packet):
Except for signatures, please PRINT all information clearly and neatly on the form.

Please read each of Parts A — G in this form and complete the parts appropriate to you. if there is more
than one petitioner, then each petitioner should complete those sections of parts A— C of the form that apply
to them. Additional copies of the first two pages of this form are provided at the end of the form for this pur-
pose. A maximum of three petitioners is allowed.

If you need more space to provide additional information, use the continuation page provided at the end of
the form and attach the completed continuation page(s) to Form B.

if you have questions about the use of this form, please call the following NIOSH toll-free phone number and
request to speak to someone in the Office of Compensation Analysis and Support about an SEC petition:
1-800-356-4674,

BaA Labor Organization, StartatD on Page3

It you O An Energy Employee (current or former), StartatC on Page 2
are: 0 A Survivor (of a former Energy Employee), StartatB on Page2
0 A Representative (of a current or former Energy Employee), StartatA on Page1

Representative information — Complete Section A if you are authorized by an Employee or
Survivor(s) to petition on behalf of a class.

A1 Are youa coritact person for an organization? 0 Yes (Go to A.2) 1 No (GotoA3)
A2 Organization Information:

Name of Organization

Position of Contact Person _
A3 Name of Petition Representative:

Mr/Mrs/Ms. First Name Middle Initial Last Name
A4 Address:

Street Apt # PO. Box

City State Zip Code
'A.5 Telephone Number: ¢___) -
A.6 Email Address:

AT UCheck the box at left to indicate you have attached to the back of this form written authorization to
petition by the survivor(s) or employee(s) indicated in Parts B or C of this form. An authorization

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner. Anthony W. BeMaiori, USWA, 80314



©0000 OHHHHHHHHHHHHHHOHHHHHHHHHHOHOHOHOCE

Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B ‘OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix — Continuation Page

restarted to produce pure plutonium metal, salts (magnesium, sodium, and potassium)
and anode heels.

* Jn 1972 six furnaces were jnstalled to remove americium salts and plutonium
chloride salts from the contaminated salt process. Also known as the “salt scrub
process”.

* Without using aqueous processing, direct oxide reduction processes produced
plutonium metal from plutonium oxide, and eliminated a high-exposure
bydroflurination step used in Building 771.

Building 707 was built in the late sixties, and was known as the new assembly building. It took
over final assembly operations from Building 776 shortly after the fire. Solid waste treatment and
size reduction started in 1972. The building contained eight side by side modules (A through H)
and Building 707A housed modules J and K. these two modules contained plutonium foundry
operations and two plutonium storage vaults. Building 707 was also the site of smaller fires and
included processes that produced both soluble and insoluble forms of plutonium. D&D in
Building 707 began in the 1990s and were completed with demolition in late 2004. D&D
workers in Building 707 that removed the furnaces and D&Ded areas where high temperature
processes or past fires occurred were exposed to high fired oxides.
¢  J-module contained several tilt pour furnaces. These furnaces were designed to melt
the non-speck Plutonium buttons and other material not meeting a specific standard.
They would sun at 950 degrees Celsius for about one hour. The molten metal would
then be poured into a 680 degree Celsius graphite mold. J module also contained
several bottom pour furnaces with a range of operation between 500 to 600 degrees
Celsius.

¢ K-module contained several tilt pour and bottom pour furnaces and ran at operating
temperatures similar to J module.

¢ A-module contained a muffler furnace, burn box, and tilt pour furnaces.

* Inthe 1990s and early 2000, Building 707 furnaces were used to perform plutonium
- oxide stabilization processes in'response'to a Defense Board milestane: These
processes involved temperatures in excess of 900 degrees Celsius and generated high
fired oxides.

E.2. ATTACHMENTS
Building 776/777 Contamination Map
Building 776/777 1969 Fire Cleanup Photos

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond fhat which is included in this petition
11

and in support of our ability to abtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.



oO OO Zr oo ees eoescooosegcossoosoccesooccgcooe





Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
iliness Compensation Act National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 06/31/2007

Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B Page 4 of 7

Proposed Definition of Employee Class Covered by Petition — Complete Section E.
E.4 Name of DOE or AWE Facility: Rocky Flats (also Rocky Fiats Plant, Rocky Flats
ntal Technology Site, Rocky Flats Closure Project)

nvironmel
£2 Locations at the Facility relevant to. this petition: 7
Suchen Bataan aoa aaa ae. vor FTL 798. T7728. 78 and amrathee hie

371, 374, 559, 707, 771, 776, 77. identi

E.3 List job titles and/or job duties of employees included in the class. In addition, you can list by
name any individuals other than petitioners identified on this form who you believe should be
included in this class:

All___- See Tab E.3 for additional information

£.4 Employment Dates relevant to this petition:

St art End
St art End
St art End
E.5 _ Is the petition based on one or more unmonitored, unrecorded, or inadequately monitored or
recorded exposure incidents?: M&K Yes 0D No See Tab E.5 for additional details.
if yes, provide the date(s) of the incident(s) and a complete description (attach additional pages
as necessary):

This petition is based on multiple unmonitored, unrecorded or inadequately monitored or
recorded exposures that are not related to a specific incident. It is our contention that
throughout the history of the site it was common practice for incidents in the workplace
to be handled at the floor or building level and not officially reported. Some exposure
incidents were below the detection thresholds in place at the time which varied greatly
over time. This is evidenced by. the 2000/2001 Building-771 worker.exposure incident
in which several workers were found to have received doses that had gone undetected
by workplace monitoring. Because there was no incident to tie the dose to, the dose
estimates assigned are suspect. Most importantly, this incident provides proof that
exposures routinely go undetected. Tab E.5 contains more information on this incident,
a copy of the investigation report and details of additional incidents.

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner:__ Anthony W. DeMaiori, USWA, 8031

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[Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Heaith and Human Services
under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Dsease Control and Prevention
Mines Compensation Act National Insfitute for Occupational Safety and Heaith

OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007

Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B Page 3 of 7

nization Information — Complete Section D ON!

D.1 Labor Organization information:
United Steelworkers of America, Local 8031 (Rocky Flats)

if you are a labor o1

Name of Organization
President
Position of Contact Person
D.2 Name of Petition Representative:
4
D3 Address of Petition Representative:
Street Apt # P.O. Box
iokden. jor 80403
City State Zip Code

D4 Telephone Number of Petition Representative:
05 Email Address of Petition Representative: —_—
D.6 Period during which labor organization represented employees covered by this Petition

{please attach documentation): Stat __ End —
D.7 Identity of other labor organizations that may Tepresent or have represented this class of
employees (if known):

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner:__ Anthony W. DeMaiori, USWA, 8031

000000 000000000000000000000000000000CC00008 |



r

Preliminary Conclusions:

Few radiation workers were monitored for neutron doses in

the 1950's.

The radiation workers most ex;

1950’s (until July,1958) were not mohitored for neutron

doses,

Neutron doses were poorly evaluated from neutron film until

1967, with some exceptions.

May 8, 1994

posed to neutrons in the early

¢y Gs ROCKY FLATS



‘Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

F.1 Records and Information are Inadequate for Individual Dose:
Radiation Exposures Not Monitored

As discussed in response to E.5, there are several examples throughout history where worker
exposures were not monitored for periods of time. For example, from 1952 to 1958 when no
monitoring was conducted for neutron exposure, in Buildings 371 and 771 when workers in
office areas and non-dosimetry areas had potential to receive up to 300 mrem in uamonitored
dose. In addition, worker exposures and doses have gone uncaptured due to a variety of
engineering, poor work practices and procedural deficiencies.

For example, employees routinely removed lead-lined or water shielded glove port covers
because when the ports were opened they hit the employee in the chest while working. Once
removed, the employees frequently forgot or chose not to put these important exposure shielding
devices back on the gloveport. Then the employees would sit in chairs with their heads near the
open glove ports. Your dosimeter is worn on the front of your chest. There is no dosimeter for
your head so exposure to the head goes unmonitored and uncaptured.

Similarly, many glove lines had lots of different glove ports at different elevations. Some
operations required access from many different areas. Operators would open a glove port for part
of the job at waist level and leave it open and then open and work from another glove port
overhead. While working overhead their pelvic region was receiving exposure from the open
glove port below. This exposure was not monitored or captured because there is no dosimeter at
that level.

Another example is workers removing “produce” cans of material. The workers would be
wearing lead aprons and the cans were supposed to be shielded in a lead container, but many
times when the work took longer, workers would remove the produce cans and place them under
their arms or between their legs with no shielding in order to cut and tap it out of the line faster.
The workers wouid be gaining exposure to their underarms and legs where no lead apron was
present and where no monitoring devices existed to capture this exposure.

Lead aprons themselves presented a problem, because it was not clear to workers whether their
dosimeter was supposed to go under or over the lead apron. So, depending on the job or building
area, workers did it differently. Those who wore their dosimeters under the lead apron would.
have no record of dose exposure to the rest of their bodies (head, arms, legs, etc.). In particular
with exposure to the head, a lawsuit involving an employee who contracted a brain tumor after
receiving unmonitored exposure to the head was ruled in favor of the deceased employee. In
another instance an NDT operator who wore lead aprons for a high exposure job now has cancer
in an area that was unprotected by his apron (his larynx). He wore his dosimeter under the lead
apron so his exposure was unrecorded. His testimony letter is included as an attachment in
Tesponse to Section 4.

During production days, each plutonium building had a calculated background dose that was
subtracted from the workers exposure. This was based on the exposure the TLD received from
just hanging on the storage board in the hallway. However, two things are wrong with that
scenario: 1) workers in the building, but not in the back area, were receiving unmonitored dose
just like the dosimeters on the board, and 2) many workers did not store their dosimeters on the
storage board so when the background was subtracted if actually resulted in lesser exposure being
recorded. Workers also frequently forgot to wear their dosimeters into the production areas and.
most would not self-report so doses went uncaptured.

Another issue surrounded proximity of glovebox lines. In many buildings there would be a very
“hot” operation requiring lead aprons going on next fo a line that did not require lead aprons. So

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.

22



i {
6
= |
Attachment 2E (Continued) _ co
Primary =
radiation) Maximum rj
Job title |_____Process description Building Type of work Begin | End Materlat type. energy Bl
[Metallurgical operators Roll and press Ba. 883 8 side |Operated metal handing equipment ]1964__ 177. Be metal i=)
[Metallurgical operators Casting, rolling, forming, shearing, {883A Operated metal handling equipment |1967 {1902 OU, DU alloys: « 4.2 MeV" z
land cleaning
[Metrology tochnieaans [Varied - depending on location |Variad  }Liite hands-on work with radioactive I
materials, i=
Non-desiructive, testing tech_|Testing _ 444 {Tested parts 1953 }7994 JOU a 4.2 MeV Hy
INon-destructive testing tech, 1447" Tested parts 1956 | 4989 JOU, a [4.2 Mev. io}
[Non-dastructive tasting 700 Sampled completed pits
lechnicions A t 4
Non-destructive testing Casting, extruding, machining 865 Operated metal handling equipment {1979 _|1088 BU, DU alloys a 4.2 MeV S|
technicians.
[Non-destructive testing Testing 881 HEU 1953 11965 [HEU a 4.8 MeV
Hechniclans _. 1}
Non-destructive testing Varied - depending on location ~~ [Varled Sampled completed pits
itechniclans
Painters Varied - depending on location _|Vaned [Paint over.conlamiination ~ “I
Ppatitiers Varied = depending on location [Varied —~TRepeit leaks on process ites z
Radiation conirol technicans |Varied - depending on location Varied Monitoring in Support of chemical and a]
Imetalturgical processes; exposures: 4
similar to chemical and metallurgical g
a _ loperators of
Security guards Varied - depending on location Varied Routine security patrols { g
Shift managera Varied - depending on location Varied Routine access to process areas; ilitie qj
. ae hands-on work a
‘Stationary operating Varia lepending on location \Vatied Monitor exhaust systems, waste tanks, 3
lenginsers (SOES) land process waste lines. Fy
Welders ‘Welding _ © TA4a Welded parts as necessary 1953 [1994 [DU @ 4.2 MeV. 2?
Welders Electron-beam, tungsten-inerl gas }447 Welded parts as necessary 1956" [1989 [OU a 4.2 MeV gi
welding g
Welders Plutonium assembly TIF Welding, brazing 7969 |Pu28o oO _|5.10 Mev =|
|Weldars Varied - similar to Metallurgical Varied Welded metal parts ‘I
L_ Qperators depending on iocatlon _
I
Ie
8
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gi)
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Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix ~ Continuation Page

F.3 Records and Information are Inadequate for Individual Dose:

Health Physicist or Expert on Dose Reconstruction Limitations
Attached are pages of the testimony of Dr. Robert Bistline to the Advisory Board on Radiation
and Worker Health on July 1, 2002, in Denver, Colorado. Dr. Bistline’s testimony supports our
basis for petition with respect to the inability to accurately reconstruct doses associated with high
fired oxides. Attached is also a presentation presented by Health Effects Dosimetrist Roger B.
Falk that supports our basis for petition with respect fo no monitoring data for neutron exposure
prior to 1958 and difficulties associated with dose reconstruction.

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.
25



Attachment 2E (Continued) fal
y Primary 3
radiation| Maximum EY
Job title Process deseriation __| Building Type of work Bogin | End Material type_| ener, 3
Deconlamination & Varied - depending on location |Varied —_} Drained systems, removed 9
decommissioning workers [contaminated equipment. Often in Bs
high alrborne contamination areas, x
Often wore PPE, including respirators 2
Le with ot without supplied alr. Lo 5]
Bleckiclans Varied - dapending on location Varied [Repalr of instruments and controllers t~
inside gloveboxes and other systems
Experimental operators” [Varied - depending on location | Varled ~~ lOpereted prototype systems, often
lunshietded on ia
Fandymen Variad= depending on Tocation [Varied ~~ ICiile hands-on work with radioaclive
L imaterials. 2|
Inspection technicians: (Dimensional inspection Ca EW 1083 [1965 HEU) a” 4.8 MeV 3
Inspectors Testing {Aaa lingpecled completed parts 7953__|1904 [DU a |4.2 MeV. :
Janitors Varied - depending on location ~~ Varied’ {Little hands-on work with radioaclve g
{ materiais. Z)
Machinists PitAssembly mii Handled “War Regarve” componente 2
Machinists Machining of Pu parts 776. [Operated machining eqampment 1958 [7965 _(Pu-350 a [6.16 MeV fy
Machinists Plutonium assembly ia Driling, turning, polishing 71969 [Pu-339 a (5.16 MoV
Machinists Process OU matal 685 [Machined DV and DU alloys 7963 [i988 [Ou a {42 MeV
Machinists 681 [Stainless steel boost reservolrs, oic,_[1966_|1967 tI
Machinists Rod rail grinding [881 Machined HEU parts 1953-4985 _1HEU. S48 Mev §
{Machinists Rolling, forming, machining (884 HEC 1953 {1985 |HEU. 14.5 MeV. g
Machinists Presses, roling mils (683-8 |Operated machining equipment 9571965 [HEU a }4.8 MeV
Machinists Roll and press DU inio sheets _(883-C [Rolling mills, shears 1983 }1992_ [OU aq 14.2 MeV" 3
Machinists Roling, forming, machining 1683-A | Operatad machining equipment 1957/1992 [DU OU alioys [a ]a.2 Mov. 3
Machinists Varied - similar to Metallurgical ~~ [Varied Repair of mechanical eystems r)
Operators depending on lacallon, O}
|Matenal analysts Varied - stmilar to \Variod [Collected motal samples zg
(Operators depending o
Metallargical operators ig and machining aaa, Operated metal handing equipment [1068 [1669 (00. a laz Wav ‘Ss
[Metallurgical operators ~"[Gasting and machining. aaa, Operated metal handling equipment [1980 }1964 {DU a (4.2 Mev o
{Metallurgical operators "/Casting and cleaning Ase Operated motel handling equipment {1967 __ [1960 IDUIMo. a 4.2 MeV |
Motatlurgical operators, Trim and polish OU sheeis [aad [Operated metal handing equipment (1983 11980 [DU a \42 Mev | 3
{Metallurgical operators Rofl and press OU. (4a7. Operated melal handling equipment 11956 [1989 |DU. g___[4.2 Mev") g
Metallurgical operators Roll and press Pu 707 Operated metal handling equipment Pu-235 oO 15.18 MeV} S|
{Meteilurgical operators Roll and press Pu. 776 [Operated metal handling equipment [1088 |1060_|Pu-z9e a {516 Mev | >
Motallurgical operators Ptutonium assembly aad 1969 _{Pu-239 a 15.18 MoV 6
elailurgica? operators Casing, ring forming, shearing, es [Operated metal handing equipment [178 ]19e8 DU, DU alloys a (4.2MeV
land cleaning
Metallurgical operators ~""|[Casting, extroding, machining (668 Spacated matal hendhag squipment 197) oes (BU DU are o__|42 Mev. me
|Motallurpical operators __|Process DU metal Bes Machined DU and OU alloys 1983 |1988_ ow. 14.2 MeV’ a)
Metallurgical opersiors Uranium casting 684 Operated metal handling equipment 11953 _ (1965 (Uranturn @_ [4.6 MeV"
Metallurgical operators Melting and casting 87 “THEW 191 1966_}HEU ga (4.6 MeV ®
[Metalluraicat operators Annealing 883-5” [Operated matal handing equipment [1957 [1968 [HEU a (46 MeV gy
[Metallurgical operators [Roll and press OU into shesis~]883-C_~ [Operated metal handing equipment" [1963 ~ [eg2“1OU 42 MeV ry
Motallurgical operators Ro and press OU '883.A side [Operated metat handling equipment DU a (4.2 MeV g
Metallurgical operators JRoll and press HEU ‘1883.8 side [Operated motel handling equipment ]4068 [1064 HEU. a 14.6 Mev "|

SOHHHHOHHSHHOSHOHSHOHHOHOHSHSHHOHSHSHOHHHHHOHHHHOHHHHCEES



SEC PETITION, FORM B



©0080 88 OHOOOOHOHHHHHOHHHHOOOOHOHOCHOOOOOOO

Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

E.2 Locations at this facility relevant to this petition:

The United Steelworkers of America Local 8031 is seeking Special Exposure Cohort designation
under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act for all current and former
Rocky Flats employees who as by job description or by circumstance came into contact with high
fired oxides, salts, ash, and plutonium metals, all of which produce large amounts of penetrating
radiation and are highly insoluble to the lung when inhaled. The locations of the Rocky Flats
facility that are relevant to this petition include all plutonium process areas, including but not
limited to areas in which high fire oxides occurred through unintentional fires or thermal
processes.

The following provides additional information on the locations at Rocky Flats where plutonium
exposures occurred that either went unmonitored or unrecorded or where inadequate monitoring
and recording occurred. It is our contention that inaccurate recording of doses includes the
inability of current models to accurately assess dose of high fired oxides otherwise known as
super class Y materials. Therefore, the following information is focused in particular, but not
limited to, areas in which high fired oxides were present.

The following are some, but not all, of the materials processed/handled at Rocky Flats that had
the potential to result in high fired oxide/insoluble plutonium exposures: plutonium and enriched
uranium oxides, metal buttons for molten salt process, metal buttons and skin turnings for molten
salt, americium oxide and miscellaneous oxides, anode heel, high level caustic waste oxide, high

purity oxide heel, peroxide cake, green cake, impure peroxide cake, Hanford Purex oxide, grease
oxide, high fired DOR oxide, Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PUSPS), pure and
impure metals and oxides, PUSPS chlorinated oxides, incinerator sludge, hydride from TA
crucibles, unpulverized slag, grounded/blended slag, unpulverized and pulverized sand, slag and
crucible, sand, slag and crucible (SS&C) heel, ground SS&C heel, molten salt pulverized and
unpulverized (CA, Zn and K), electrorefining salts, plutonium chloride mixed salt, incinerator ash
and pulverized incinerator ash, ash and debris from the 1969 fire, ash heel, soot and soot heals,
resin, unleached resin, electrorefining saits and ceramics, etc.

and P. Histo

Building 771 was built in 1952 and became operational in 1953. It was designed for plutonium
recovery and purification operations. It had the capability of producing plutonium buttons.
Although many of the process lines were of an aqueous nature, many others were dry. Building
77) was the site of the second largest fire in Rocky Flats history. That fire occurred in 1957. As
a result of the fire much of the facility became contaminated with high fired oxides. Numerous
other smaller fires throughout the building history also contributed to high fired oxide exposures,
including the incinerator plenum fire in 1980. Deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of the
facility began in 1995. The D&D workers tearing apart Building 771 were exposed to high fired
oxides. Additionally, Building 771 had several dry lines that would take the wet plutonium
material and by procedure heat it to a prescribed temperature, creating an ash or light powdered
oxide. These thermal processes created high fired oxides. And finally, the infamous Building 771
incinerator which was a central topic in the FBI raid of 1989 burned plutonium contaminated
wastes and residues also generating high fired oxides. All dosimeter-bearing workers and
workers who worked in positions where dosimeters or bioassays were later required had potential
The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is inciuded in this petition
and in support of our ability fo obtain Speciat Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.

8



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high-fired oxides have absolutely no relevance
whatsoever.

DR. ANDRADE: Right. I completely agree in
that particular case. And, furthermore I wanted
to ask you if you had tried any of the ultra-—
sensitive techniques with some of the folks --
for example, mass spectrometry, whether it be
thermal or inductively~coupled plasma?

DR. BISTLINE: We haven't done that with any
of the folks at Rocky that I'm aware of. I don’t
think anybody has tried that with any of those.
Back in 1967 I started up with the -~ converting
over to germanium, hyper-pure germanium detectors
for lung counting. But as far as looking at the
bioassay with some of these newer techniques, no,
we haven't. Only just on a few people, isolated
people.

DR. ANDRADE: fhe last point I'd like to make
is just simply a comment. I think that this is
precisely the type of case that I think one
would, in my opinion, would be considered for a
special cohort status, because new information
has come to light about an activity that was
common to many, many people for many, many years

that we perhaps never kept any formal records on.

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix ~ Continuation Page

material is highly insoluble with retention half-lives of transport from hungs to blood 20 times
Jonger than normal Class Y materials. It also noted the uncertainty surrounding this new class of
material: “The precise nature of super class Y material is not known, although it appears to
have been associated with processes involving high fired plutonium oxides. The phenomenon has
been informally verified by dosimetry personnel at Rocky Flats, Savannah River, and Los
Alamos sites, and is supported by literature PNNL-MA-860 Chapter 8.0, Page $.13).”

What is known about high fired oxides at Rocky Flats are that they are highly insoluble, may not
be detected by standard bioassay, and result in particle sizes as smal] as 0.12 um AMAD.

The following factors make accurate assessment of dose for high fired oxides impossible:

1) High fired oxides are highly insoluble. This means that they can take as long as 6,000
days or more to show up in a urine bioassay. So by the time a high fired oxide exposure
is detected in urine it is nearly impossible to link the exposure in time to the actual
exposure incident, making accurate dose assignment impossible. In addition, standard
chemistry used in fecal bioassay is unable to dissolve high fired oxides, invalidating
many feca} results in which special chemistry was not used.

2) Little is known about high fired oxides. Accurate dose modeling takes decades to
develop. Becanse high fired oxides are a relatively recent phenomenon, they are not
accounted for in dose modeling in use today by NIOSH or in dose modeling for instance
at Rocky Flats. Current models in use underestimate high fired oxide exposure by as.
much as a factor of 10 according to Dr. Bob Bistline. For example, high fired oxides at
Rocky Flats have been found to range from 0.12 to 0.3 um AMAD, however NIOSH uses
a particle size of 5.0 (CRP 66) and even Rocky Flats Dosimetry Department uses a
particle size of 1.0.

3) High fired oxides have self-shielding properties that make accurate assessment, even by
lung count, impossible. When plutonium particles are heated to extreme temperatures
they become “ceramicized” or glazed over on the outside of the particle. The hardened
outer surface of the high fired oxide particle actually shields or masks the plutonium
alpha radiation being emitted from the particle. This factor tricks the lung counter into
detecting less piutonium than is actually present in the lung. According to Dr. Bistline
with high fired oxides, the calculation of lifetime dose based on lung count is usually in
error.

4) Itis impossible to tell whether plutonium detected by hung count is soluble or insoluble
80 it is impossible to know what model to apply. Rocky Flats has both soluble and
insoluble forms of plutonium. Using even a moderately soluble equation results in
calculations that are completely in error. “Super ¥ screws up the modeling,” said one
dose assessment expert at Rocky Flats.

5) Because of the insolubility of high fired oxides, worker exposures can go undetected for
decades. “We have found a number of people now years later that have plutonium in
their bodies that was never picked up by the monitoring in place at the time,” Dr. Bistline
said in a recent phone interview. These new-found exposures cannot be tied to an
incident date and so accurate dose reconstruction is impossible. “Dose assessment works
well when you know the incident that the dose came from, not when you don’t,”
according to a Rocky Flats dose assessment expert.

The following are some, but not all, of the materials processed/handled at Rocky Flats that had
the potential to result in high fired oxide exposures: plutonium and enriched uranium oxides,
metal buttons for molten salt process, metal buttons and skin turnings for molten salt, americiam

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right fo provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.
18



SPOHOHOHHHHHOHHSHHHHHHHSHOHOHSOSHOHHOHOSOOHOHOHOSHOHOEEE

Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

oxide and miscellaneous oxides, anode heel, high level caustic waste oxide, high purity oxide
heel, peroxide cake, green cake, impure peroxide cake, Hanford Purex oxide, grease oxide, high
fired DOR oxide, PUSPS pure and impure metals and oxides, PUSPS chlorinated oxides,
incinerator sludge, hydride from TA crucibles, unpulverized slag, grounded/blended slag,
unpuiverized and pulverized sand, slag and crucible, SS&C heel, ground SS&C heel, molten salt
pulverized and unpuiverized (CA, Zn and K), electrorefining salts, plutonium chloride mixed salt,
incinerator ash and pulverized incinerator ash, ash and debris from the 1969 fire, ash heel, soot
and soot heals, resin, unleached resin, ER salts and ceramics, etc.

ES ATTACHMENT
Rocky Flats Historic Lang Counting and Dosimetry Background Information

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
19

and in support of our ability to obiain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.



SOOHOHHHHSHHSHHHSHSSHSOHCHOSHHOSOHHHOHOHOHOHOOHOHOHOEO

a Oo 8 WN

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timers that could provide additional information
along the dosimetry lines, because there is a lot
of information that's lacking in, I think, all
the sites. Probably we're not unique at Rocky
Flats. I know other sites are struggling with
some of the same things that -- to try to go back
and capture the exposures of individuals back in
the 1950's and sixties is next to impossible.

And on internal dosimetry of plutonium, with
the insolubility and the various differences that
you find, just going to a fellow worker and
looking at a fellow worker, it doesn't
necessarily give you anything in terms of
internal deposition. We've found at Rocky Flats
where we're doing a lot of hands-on work, and I
think this is a unique population at Rocky Flats
because these guys have been doing hands-on work
with plutonium for years. In fact, we still have
over 12 tons of plutonium out there right now.
And these are the guys that made almost all the
nuclear weapons in the Defense Department over
the years. And we know that some of these guys,
two guys standing side by side, one guy can be
pumping the gloves and be pumping, and a hole in

the glove, and that guy gets an intake; and the

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



PAGE 20F2

FIRE CLEANUP PHOTOS:



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you are performing, or are you doing any special,
say, urinalysis or --

DR. BISTLINE: Yeah, we're doing urinalysis
and the lung counting both. The reason why
that’s particularly important, because at Rocky
Flats we have quite a cohort of population that
has been exposed to what you would call high-
fired plutonium oxide.

And just to give you a good example, one of
the individuals that I did an autopsy on back a
number of years ago -- I’ve done autopsies on
about 120 people from Rocky Flats, former workers
-~ and one of these individuals was involved in a
fire in 1965 with high-fired plutonium oxide, and
there were a number of people -- in fact, there's
quite a few people -- that have been exposed to
this type of material. At the time of this
autopsy, 20 years post-exposure, almost 20 years
post-exposure, at the time I did the autopsy he
had 222 nanocuries of plutonium, 48 nanocuries of
americium still in his lungs and lymph nodes; and
in all the rest of the body -- the soft tissues,
the bones, et cetera ~- less than 10 nanocuries
after 20 years. So the models that exist out

there for transport of plutonium in the case of

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



COCCCee eee Ce OOCOCOSOOCCOOOOLCCCCCOOCCCCEES

employees on an annual basis will go away at closure. Currently there is nothing in
place to replace these important activities.

7) Exposure to plutonium has been causally linked to more than 20 types of cancer
as well as Jung fibrosis. Plutonium exposure, in particular to high-fired oxides and
their related ailments endanger the health of the members of this Rocky Flats class of
workers. DOE and the federal government have recognized the causal role of
plutonium exposure in these specific cancers as evidenced in the Energy Employees
Occupational Inesses Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) which designates a
list of cancers currently linked to radiation exposure. Additionally, the effects of
synergism of exposures to different toxins are not known. In particular the effects of
combination exposures where an individual has both plutonium and toxic chemical
exposure, such as carbon tetrichloride, trichloroethylene, nitric acids, and numerous
other toxic chemicals used at Rocky Flats. Synergism has been documented, for
example, for the combination of plutonium exposure and cigarette smoking. The
Tesult is that a person who was exposed to plutonium and also smoked is 16 times
more likely to contract lung cancer than a person who was not exposed to plutonium
and smoked.

High Fired Oxides

Due to the extreme nature of high fired oxides, we have focused our basis for petition primarily
on, but not limited to this unique area. High fired oxides are a relatively recently identified class
of plutonium material. This form of plutonium is generated when plutonium is exposed to high
temperatures in excess of 600 degrees Celsius (some argue this number to be as low as 400
degrees Celsius). High fired oxides at Rocky Flats were generated from the 1957 fire, the 1965
fire, the 1969 fire, numerous smailer fires, and numerous high temperature processes in several
plutonium production facilities as described in response to Section E.2 of Form B. The 1965 fire
had recorded temperatures in excess of 1800 degrees Celsius. High fired oxides are also referred
to as Super Class Y materials. “(Tyhe possibility of a super class Y (super Y) form has been
identified. Super Y was defined by the Hanford Internal Dosimetry Program in 1988 to describe
highly nontransportable forms of plutonium based on some actual observed cases at Hanford
(Bihl et al. 1988; Carbaugh, Bibl, and Sula, 1991).” The presence of Super Class Y materials has
also been noted by experts at Rocky Flats, including Dr.. Robert Bistline. The PNNL-MA-860

” Chapter 8.0 issued January 31, 2003, noted that Super Class Y material is highly insoluble with

retention half-lives of transport from lungs to blood 20 times longer than normal Class Y
materials. It also noted the uncertainty surrounding this new class of material: “The precise
nature of super class Y material is not known, although it appears to have been associated with
processes involving high fired plutonium oxides. The phenomenon has been informally verified
by dosimetry personnel at Rocky Flats, Savannah River, and Los Alamos sites, and is supported
by literature (PNNL-MA-860 Chapter 8.0, Page 8.13).” In addition, British literature in the last
few years has also noted the unique attributes of high fired oxides.

What is known about high fired oxides at Rocky Flats are that they are highly insoluble, may not
be detected by standard bioassay, and result in particle sizes as small as 0.12 um AMAD.

The following factors make accurate assessment of dose for high fired oxides impossible:

1) High fired oxides are highly insoluble. This means that they can take as long as 6,000
days or more to show up in a urine bioassay. So by the time a high fired oxide exposure
is detected in urine it is nearly impossible to link the exposure in time to the actual
exposure incident, making accurate dose assignment impossible. In addition, standard
chemistry used in fecal bioassay is unable to dissolve high fired oxides, invalidating
many fecal results in which special chemistry was not used.

Rocky Flats Special Exposure Cohor/USWA, Local 8031 ii



Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B ‘OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix ~- Continuation Page

F.2 Records and Information are inadequate for Individual Dose:
Records Lost, Falsified or Destroyed

Attached is a copy of a letter from a worker who provides evidence that dosimetry chips were
inadvertently lost or destroyed during the reading process, calling into question the accuracy of
completeness of individual dose assessments.

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right fo provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.
24

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Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07

Appendix - Continuation Page
workers working a couple feet from each other would not be wearing the same protective
equipment.

The practice of borrowing or assigning dose from an employee’s co-worker when dose
infomation for the employee has been Jost or was not gathered has created inaccurate dose
records for many employees.

Finally, in many instances workers would perform special “furtive” job tasks to help out their
supervisors or managers, many times to correct a problem, clean up a contamination incident or
perform rework. This work would be done outside the bounds of normal work controls with no
airbome contamination monitoring and with no special worker monitoring, One RCT said that
after such a job, he was highly contaminated and simply took off his respirator and contaminated
clothing and threw it in the same waste drum with the mess he was cleaning up. This worker was
working in an area with high fired oxide contaminates. Because the work evolution was not
documented, no nasal smears or bioassays were conducted and no monitoring for dose beyond
TLD was conducted. In talking to numerous workers, this sort of practice was more common.
than not.

Rocky Flats workers were chronically and repeated the recipients of unmonitored exposures. The
engineering, procedural and work practice deficiencies, examples of which are outlined above,
prevalent in Rocky Flats history make accurate dose reconstruction impossible.

Attached is a presentation that documents the fact that neutron doses were not monitored during
the early years of site and inaccurately reported until 1968. Attached in response to Section F.4 is
additional documentation of unmonitored exposures as indicated in official government technical
reports,

The USWA, Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
23

and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.



Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Mines Compensation Act National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

‘OMB Number. 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007
Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B Page 7 of 7|

Public Burden Statement

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 300 minutes per response,
including time for reviewing instructions, gathering the information needed, and completing the form. If you
have any comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, send them to CDC Reports Clearance Officer, 1600 Clifton
Road, MS-E-11, Atlanta GA, 30333; ATTN:PRA 0920-0639. Do not send the completed petition form to this
address. Completed petitions are to be submitted to NIOSH at the address provided in these instructions.
Persons are not required ta respond to the information collected on this form unless it displays a currently
valid OMB number.

Privacy Act Advisement

tn accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (5 U.S.C. § 52a), you are hereby notified of the
following:

The Energy Employees Occupational iliness Compensation Program Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385)
(EEOICPA) authorizes the President to designate additional classes of employees to be included in the
Special Exposure Cohort (SEC). EEOICPA authorizes HHS to implement its responsibilities with the
assistance of the National Institute for Occupational Safety (NIOSH), an Institute of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. Information obtained by NIOSH in connection with petitions for including additional
classes of employees in the SEC will be used to evaiuate the petition and report findings to the Advisory
Board.on Radiation and Worker Heaith and HHS.

Records containing identifiable information become part of an existing NIOSH system of records under the
Privacy Act, 09-20-147 “Occupational Health Epidemiological Studies and EEOICPA Program Records.
HHS/CDC/NIOSH." These records are treated in a confidential manner, unless otherwise compelled by law.
Disclosures that NIOSH may need to make for the processing of your petition or other purposes are listed
below.

“TNIOSH may need to disclose personal identifying information to: (a) the Department of Energy, other federal

agencies, other government or private entities and to private sector employers to permit these entities to
retrieve records required by NIOSH; (b) identified witnesses as designated by NIOSH so that these
individuals can provide information to assist with the evaluation of SEC petitions; (c) contractors assisting
NIOSH; (d) collaborating researchers, under certain limited circumstances to conduct further investigations;
(e) Federal, state and local agencies for law enforcement purposes; and (f} a Member of Gongress or a
Congressional staff member in response to a verified inquiry.

This notice applies to all forms and informational requests that you may receive from NIOSH in connection
with the evaluation of an SEC petition.

Use of the NIOSH petition forms (A and B) is voluntary but your provision of information required by these
forms is mandatory for the consideration of a petition, as specified under 42 CFR Part 83. Petitions that fail to
provide required information may not be considered by HHS.

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: _ Anthony W. DeMaiori, USWA, 8031



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212

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much.

Again, let me ask if there are questions or
clarifications? I might ask one question. I
assume now on these ones where you're going back
and doing the lung counts, assuming some kind of
a clearance model, you can reconstruct doses then
on them?

DR. BISTLINE: It's ~- yeah, you can do @
pretty good job of it if you capture those. But
unfortunately, like in this particular
individual, it just so happens that he's 92 years
old. He left the plant site before we ever got a
lung counter. So we are able to go back on that
individual. But there's a lot of people that are
no longer living, and a lot of people that worked
at the site that aren't a part of this particular
recall cohort. And so many of those people have
never been lung-counted, historically never have
been lung-counted. But yeah, Dr. Ziemer, we have
been able to go back and get a fairly good range
of dose that this -- the internal uptake from the
dosimetry models on this individual.

DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Tony.

DR. ANDRADE: I'm curious, sir. In your

follow-up bioassay, is it only lung counting that

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



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Basis for Petition

The class of Rocky Flats workers identified by this petition meet all the specifications and
requirements for inclusion in the Special Exposure Cohort based on the following factors which
will be elaborated on in greater detail in response to Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B:

1) Exposure to a anique form of plutonium referred to as high fired oxides or super
class Y materials that are metabolized differently and have self-shielding properties
which make accurate assessment of dose impossible. In addition, the uniquely small
particle size of high fired oxides — as small as 0.12 um Activity Median Aerodynamic
Diameter (AMAD) — makes current dose models inaccurate. Dose models in use at
Rocky Flats use a particle size of 1.0 um AMAD and underestimate high fired oxide
doses by a factor of 1-3. Current models in use by NIOSH — International
Commission on Radiological Protection (CRP) 66 — use a particle size of 5.0 um
AMAD and underestimate these doses by as much as a factor of 10. High fired
oxides were generated from the Building 771 fire in 1957, the Building 776 fires in
1965 and 1969, numerous other smaller fires, and multiple high temperature
processes in furnaces, incinerators and production process areas used in multiple
plutonium buildings at Rocky Flats. A detailed accounting of these activities is
included in our petition. The impossibility of accurate dose assessment for high fired
oxide exposure is summarized in more detail on the following pages.

2) Inability to link exposures to specific incidents or events as evidenced by the
Building 771 worker exposure issue as recently as 2000/2001. In this incident,
workers received undetected exposures through chronic long-term exposures below
the threshold of workplace monitors that were discovered only by happenstance.
Without a date to enter into the equation for bioassay results, an accurate dose
assignment is impossible.

3) Periods of inadequate monitoring, lack of monitoring, changes in methodology,
and inconsistency in procedures over the history of the Rocky Flats site which
make accurate dose reconstruction over time impossible. Examples include: no
routine lung counting -until the late 1960s; no monitoring for neitron radiation prior
to late 1950s and neutron measurements found in error until 1970s.

4) Unmonitored exposures surfacing throughout time. As recently as 2004, a former
worker from the 1950s was monitored under a DOE former worker radiation program
and was found to have a significant internal deposition that had gone undetected and
unrecorded for nearly 50 years.

5) Negative effects of site closure on accuracy of dose reconstruction. As a closure
site, Rocky Flats presents unique challenges for dose reconstruction in that the entite
infrastructure will be eliminated and with it the subject matter experts that provide
information and clarification for dose reconstruction questions. No one will be left
that understands the data. Currently the Rocky Flats dosimetry department answers
calls on a regular basis in support of dose reconstruction where data is missing, or
part of a file is missing, in particular with the change in 1989 from systemic burden
to dose when the Radiation Control Manual was implemented. When Rocky Flats is
gone, there will be no one left who understands these nuances, making accurate dose
reconstruction impossible.

6) With closure, worker recall monitoring programs are going away. The contract
has ended for the former worker recall program through Oak Ridge where workers
were called back every three years. The Rocky Flats program that recalls active

Rocky Flats Special Exposure Cohort/USWA, Local 8031 i

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Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B ‘OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

April 20, 2004 — Item 3 on the Event Safety Daily Summary for April 20, 2004, reported on an
event from November 1, 1993, under OR SC3 2004-0055 for a radiological incident from
Building 776. The summary stated the following:

“An individual was assigned a dose for 1993 of 1,900 mrem Committed Effective Dose
Equivalent (CEDE). A routine urine sample was collected as part of the Rocky Flats
Bioassay Program on Jaly 14, 2003. The result was greater than the decision level for Pu
239/240. Followup samples were collected in September and December 2003. Intemal
Dosimetry performed an investigation including five incidents from June 1986 through
‘November 1993 that could have resulted in a significant intake. Routine urine samples
for 2001 and 2002 had also resulted in above decision level for Pu 239/240. Followup
samples and/or recounted samples were below the decision level and Internal Dosimetry
determined the original {2001 and 2002] results to be false positive. Jt is probable that
detection of Pu 239/240 at this time is a result of improved sensitivity in laboratory
analysis and there were small amounts of Pu 239/240 in the urine from old intakes that
were only recently detectable.”

This incident is important to our basis for petition for the following reasons:

1) A dose of 1.9 rem was detected 10 years after the assigned date providing evidence that
significant doses can go undetected potentially for decades and raising the question of how many
other large doses have thus far been undetected.

2) Investigation was unable to link this dose to an incident making accurate reconstruction
impossible. Investigators had full access to all the infrastructure of Rocky Flats and still could
not accurately assign dose. Therefore, dose reconstruction personnel a decade after Rocky Flats
closure will have even a more difficult time.

3) Not one but two times before this individual had bioassay results above the decision level that
were dismissed as “false positives.” How many other people had real doses that have been
dismissed as false positives and had zero dose assigned for significant exposures?

4) As equipment sensitivity continues to increase, we are detecting more and more previously
undetected exposures. How many workers have exposures that are still undetected?

2) HIGH FIRED OXIDES

Unique Properties of High Fired Oxides which Make Accurate
Dose Reconstruction impossible

High fired oxides are a relatively recently identified class of plutonium material. This form of
plutonium is generated when plutonium is exposed to high temperatures in excess of 600 degrees
Celsius (some argue this number to be as low as 400 degrees Celsius). High fired oxides at
Rocky Flats were generated from the 1957 fire, the 1965 fire, the 1969 fire, numerous smaller
fires, and numerous high temperature processes in several plutonium production facilities as
described in response to Section E.2 of Form B, The 1965 fire had recorded temperatures in
excess of 1800 degrees Celsius. High fired oxides are also referred to as Super Class Y materials.
“(The possibility of a super class Y (super Y) form has been identified. Super Y was defined by
HIDP in 1988 to describe highly nontransportable forms of plutonium based on some actual
observed cases at Hanford (Bib! et al. 1988; Carbaugh, Bihl, and Sula, 1991).” The presence of
Super Class ¥ materials has also been noted by experts at Rocky Flats, including Dr. Bob
Bistline. The PNNL-MA-860 Chapter 8.0 issued January 31, 2003, noted that Super Class Y

The USWA, Locat 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Specia! Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.
17



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BASIS FOR PETITION



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THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

convenes the

ADVISORY BOARD ON

RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

VOLUME I

The verbatim transcript of the Meeting of the
Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health held
at the Hyatt Regency Denver, Denver, Colorado, on

Monday,. July 1, 2002.

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES
Certified Verbatim Reporters
P. O. Box 451196
Atlanta, Georgia 31145-9196
(404) 315-8305



‘Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix — Continuation Page

E.5 Is this petition based on one or more unmonitored,
unrecorded or inadequately monitored or recorded exposure
incidents?

‘Yes. In response to this question, we provide two forms of documenting evidence: 1) a
description of incidents or occurrences which document unmeasured or unrecorded or
inadequately measured or recorded exposure incidents and 2) evidence of inadequacy in
monitoring or recording of exposure incidents in particular in light of the unique properties of
high fired oxides which make accurate dose reconstruction impossible. We contend that
exposures to high fired oxides cannot and have never been accurately recorded.

The federal government has recognized the role of plutonium exposure in causing more than 20
types of cancers as addressed by the Compensation Act. In particular plutonium has been linked
to cancers of the bone, liver, lung and leukemia and chromosome aberrations (Potential Health
Problems from Exposure to Selected Radionuclides, May 2000). Other research has suggested
that plutonium exposure weakens the immune system and leads to the development of cancers
outside the lymph nodes. In 1987, a study by Gregg Wilkinson of Rocky Flats workers
concluded that workers with plutonium inside their bodies had an increased risk of tymphopoietic
neoplasms (tumors affecting white blood cells). One of the difficulties in assessing causation is
the long lapse of time between when exposure occurs and when cancers are developed and
diagnosed. “For plutonium exposure, the latency period is estimated to be more than 30 years,
but it can vary depending on the dose received (Voelz, 1991).” Another difficulty is that research
has yet to determine at what jevel plutonium exposure is harmful. In some cases an individual
with low exposures contracts cancer and other suspected plutonium-related ailments, while in
other cases an individual with abundant exposure does not. There are too many unknowns with
respect to individual susceptibility to cancer and individual body reactions to plutonium exposure
for causation determiners to set limits for an exposure level that is deemed by them to be harmful.
Additionally, the effects of synergism of exposures to different toxins are not known. In
particular the effects of combination exposures where an individual has both plutonium and toxic
chemical exposure, such as carbon tetrachloride, trichloroethylene, nitric acids, and numerous
other toxic chemicals used at Rocky Flats, Synergism has been documented, for example, for the
combination of plutonium exposure and cigarette smoking. The result is that a person who was
exposed to plutovium and also smoked is 10 times more likely to contract lung cancer than a
person who was not exposed to plutonium and smoked.

This petition is based on muitiple unmonitored, unrecorded, or inadequately monitored or
recorded exposures that are not necessarily specific to a particular “incident.” Therefore, this
petition covers the entire time period of plutonium exposure at Rocky Flats from April 1952 to
the date of petition submittal. Specifics regarding unmonitored, unrecorded, inadequately
monitored or recorded exposures are included below. This petition is further based on the fact
that records and information are inadequate for individual dose reconstractions based on the fact
that 1) certain types of radiation exposures and doses incurred by the Rocky Flats class were not
monitored for certain periods of time and certain types of exposure (i.e. to high fired oxides) are
inaccurately modeled and reported on dose records; 2) for certain areas either no monitoring
occurred or dosimeter chips were destroyed or lost during processing resulting in no data
available; 3) expert testimony supporting inability to reconstruct dose for high fired oxides;
technical documents including site independent investigation reports, Price Anderson
Amendment Act and Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board reports that support periods of

The USWA, Loca} 8031 reserves the sight to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
13

and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.



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Speciat Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B OMB #0920-0639 Expires 05/31/07
Appendix - Continuation Page

E.3 List Job Titles and/or Job dutles of employees included in the
class.

All employees represented by USWA, Local 8031 or its predecessors who mect the criteria
outlined below. The class of employees covered by this petition were/are employed at the U.S.
Department of Energy’s Rocky Flats site near Golden, Colorado, also known as Rocky Flats
Plant, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site and Rocky Flats Closure Project anytime
during the period of April 1952 through present and as of the date of this petition. The class of
employees includes:

1) All workers who either were monitored using a dosimeter badge or bioasssay or who worked
in positions that are now required to be monitored wearing a dosimeter badge or bioassay,
and/or

2) Who worked in areas of plutonium exposure, in particular focusing on but not limited to,
facilities with known high fired oxide processes or exposures, including: Building 371/374,
Building 559, Building 707, Building 771, Building 774, Building 776, Building 777,
Building 778, Building 779 and any others identified.

Job titles and/or job duties of employees included in this class include, but are not limited to, both
production operations classifications and D&D classifications of employees. Due to the nature of
D&D great potential exists for exposure to plutonium, including but not limited to high fired
oxides, during the D&D process which go undetected because they are below the detection
threshold of workplace monitoring equipment; refer to Investigation Team Report — Investigation
of the source of potential internal radiological exposures involving 11 personnel in Building 771
dated March 15, 2001, and included as an attachment to this petition. In particular, D&D workers
in areas of past plutonium fires and areas of high temperature thermal processes are vulnerable to
exposures that could go undetected for years. Inability to link these exposures to an incident date,
lack of knowledge regarding particle size and forms of plutonium exposed to and self-shielding
and unique metabolic properties of high fired oxides make dose reconstruction for these
employees included in this class impossible.

Workers traveled from facility to facility in later production days and even moré so during D&D.
Accurate records were not kept on where an employee worked or when he/she worked in a.
particular facility. Therefore it is difficult to track what building an exposure came from when
there is no incident to tie the exposure to. A worker may be assigned to a non-plutonium area and
yet work two days of overtime a week in a plutonium area where high fired oxides are present.
Additionally workers who worked as Steelworkers at one time and transferred to a
subcomntractor(s) may have multiple employee numbers so when their dose records are retrieved
for evaluation, entire periods of time and exposure may be missing.

Attached is a listing of some of the job titles under our union contract at Rocky Flats. As stated
above, this petition is to cover ALL our represented employees who meet the criteria outlined
above.

E.3 ATTACHMENT
List of Job Titles

‘The USWA, Loca} 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that which is included in this petition
and in support of our ability to obtain Special Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Flats class of workers.
12


SPOHHHSHHHHHHSHHHHSHHHHOHOHHOHHOOCHHOHHOHOOHCEOOOHECO

Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
iiness Compensation Act National institute for Occupational Safety and Health

: OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007
Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B Page 5 of 7
F Basis for Proposing that Records and Information are Inadequate for Individuat Dos

Complete Section F.

Complete at least one-of thé following entries in this section by checking the appropriate box and providing
the required information related to the selection. You are not required to complete more than one entry.

F.1 UB We have attached either documents or statements provided by affidavit that indicate that
radiation exposures and radiation doses potentially incurred by members of the proposed class,
that relate to this petition, were not monitored, either through personal monitoring or through area
monitoring.

(Attach documents and/or affidavits to the back of the petition form.)

Describe as completely as possible, to the extent it might be unclear, how the attached
documentation and/or affidavit(s} indicate that potential radiation exposures were not monitared.
The highly insoluble forms of plutonium resulting from past fires and high
temperature processes are only now being recognized as a complex issue

when determining internal dose. Although Rocky Flats has had a long standing
history of personne! monitoring, it is has only been with the improvement of
laboratory analysis that workers considered to be falsely positive be re-evaluated
as having a positive internal deposition, many of which had no significant

event or events associated to their intake.

Tab F.1 includes additional details, testimony and other documentation.

F.2 DG I/We have attached either documents or statements provided by affidavit that indicate that
tadiation monitoring records for members of the proposed class have been lost, falsified, or
destroyed; or that there is no information regarding monitoring, source, source term, or process
from the site where the employees worked.

(Attach documents and/or affidavits to the back of the petition form.)

~ Describe-as completely as’ possible; to the extent it might be unclear, how the attached ©
documentation and/or affidavit(s) indicate that radiation monitoring records for members of the
proposed class have been lost, altered illegally, or destroyed.

Tab F.2 includes additional detail nd signed work nt

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner:__ Anthony W. DeMaiori, USWA, 8031



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in the nuclear network, and I still have some
questions about that. There are a lot of other
worker studies out there. I don't know exactly
whether -~ how we're looking at those things or
if we are looking at those things. But we
certainly should assure ourselves that we need to
compare apples to apples and oranges to oranges.

There was one other thing that I had and I
don't -- I'm trying to think here; I didn't get
it jotted down.

Well, those were the three particular things
that I had in mind. If I think of the other one
I'll mention it. But with that, I guess those
would be my comments.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. If you'd
remain there just a moment, let me ask if any of
the Board members have questions or items they
want clarified here.

(No responses}

DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you.

Did Phillip come back in?

UNIDENTIFIED: No, still not back yet.

DR. ZIEMER: Let's see, Dr. Bistline? You
can go next.

DR. BISTLINE: I'm Dr. Bob Bistline with the

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



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terms of clarification of the SEC part of it. rt
know Henry and Jim and Tony have addressed some
of those issues as it stands, and I bring out the
point that we are seriously considering at Rocky
Flats looking at Special Exposure Cohorts in a
couple of areas.

One particularly that stands out ~- and if
this is not the intent of it, we certainly would
like to hear, because I'm struggling with that
clarification myself -- things like the fact that
before 1964 we had no lung-counting capability-
And we know now from our experiences with
plutonium and the insolubility of the material
that if you didn't have lung-counting
capabilities, we’re now finding some of these
old-timers that worked back in the fifties and
sixties showed no indication of bicassay,
positive bioassays, and had very little external
exposure recorded for them; that now, lo and
behold, we brought in a 92-year-old gentleman
here a while back, and he's got quite an
extensive lung deposition of plutonium. And so
there's a whole cohort of population before 1964
that we have no internal dosimetry in terms of

lung counting.

NANCY LEE & ASSOCIATES



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