COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Coleman, Bray and Bumgardner Argued at Ches apeake, Virginia

DANIEL SCOTT PIELA MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0550-99-1 JUDGE RICHAR D S. BRAY APRIL 4, 2000 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY William H. Shaw , III, Judge Andrea K. Amy-Pressey for appellant. Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistan t Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Daniel Scott Piela (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial of obstructing justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A). 1 Appealing to this Court, he chal lenges the suff iciency of the evidence to supp ort the conviction . Finding no er ror, we affirm the trial court. The parties ar e fully conversa nt with the re cord, and this memorandum opinion re cites only those fa cts necess ary to a disposition of the appeal.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1 Although both the warrant and conviction order reference Code § 18.2-460 generally, the warrant alleges conduct proscribed by paragraph (A) of the statute and the briefs and oral argument addressed only that provision.I. "On appeal, 'we re view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Comm onwealth, granti ng to it al l reasonable inferences fairly dedu cible theref rom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 83 1 (1997) (citat ion omitted). The credibility of the witnesses, the weig ht accorded testimony, and the inferences drawn from the proven facts are matt ers to be determined by th e fact finder. See Long v. Co mmonwealth , 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S. E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The ju dgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unle ss plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. See Code § 8.01-680. On November 21, 19 98, Gloucester County Sheriff's Deputy Lawrence Stolk, a "watch commander" at the local jail, wa s on duty when a "small riot" erupted in the "dayro om" of the "maximum security cell bl ock," then housing "10 to 12" inmates in four cells. Stolk im mediately init iated a "lockdown, " which required all inmates "to go back into thei r separate cells. " After "[a] lot of noise, . . . co mplaining, . . . and cursing," jail staff "got them all back in," the cell doors were electronically closed and locked, and Stolk departed the area. Within minutes, Stol k "got a call to come back." Returning, he observed defendan t "standing in the do orway" of his cell, "holding the door open." As Stolk wa tched, defendan t "took one of his plastic shoes and put it in th e locking mechanis m to stop the door from closin g," resulting in a "grinding soun d." Uncertain

- 2 -"what kind of da mage had been done" to th e door, Stolk decided to temporarily re locate defendant pending inve stigation. However, when Stolk approached defendant, then in side his cell, and requested him to "get . . . out of the bed," defendant "cursed" 2 Stolk and repeated ly refused to cooperate. Finally, Stolk, aided by two deputies, "put [defendant] up agains t the wall," applied "a come-along hold," an d removed him from the cell. Defendant physically "resisted" and "curse[d] al l the time," reminding Stolk that "he wouldn't be in jail forever" and threatening to "take care of" him when "he had th e chance." Defendant argues on appeal that such "con duct did not oppose, impede or resist the officer's effort s to ensure a secure prison" but only offended an d insulted Stolk.

II. Code § 18.2-460(A) provides, in pertinen t part, that "[i]f any person without ju st cause knowingly ob structs . . . any law enforcement of ficer in the perf ormance of his du ties or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so by such . . . law en forcement office r, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 misd emeanor." "'To constitute an obstruction of an officer in the performance of his duty, it is not necessary that there be an actual or technical assault upon the officer, but there must be acts clearly indicating an

2 The record reflects that defendant "called [Stolk] a big ear son of a bitch."

- 3 -intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to obstruct ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action. . . . It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede . . . the officer . . . .'" Ruckman v. Commonwealth , 28 Va. App. 428, 429, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth , 141 Va. 471, 478-79, 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925) (c itation omitted) ). Thus, "f ail[ing] to cooperate fully wi th an officer" or engaging in conduct which "merely renders the officer's ta sk more difficult" is not proscribed by Code § 18.2-4 60(A). Id. Here, defendan t's conduct cons tituted direct action clearly calculated to re sist, oppose, impe de and prevent Stolk from the lawful discharge of hi s duties. After intent ionally disa bling the cell door, which preven ted a proper lockdown, defendant re fused to exit his cell on comm and, and physically re sisted the efforts of Stolk and other la w enforcement of ficers to remove him, while cursing and threat ening Stolk. Such behavior did not simply burden the task of a law enforcement officer, but necessitated affirmative and violent interven tion to allo w the proper performance of his duti es, circumstance s clearly cont emplated by Code § 18.2-460(A). Accordingly, we fi nd the evidence suff icient to prove the conviction and affi rm the trial court. Affirmed.

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