SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3697-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

FURN-LEE SALOMON, a/k/a 

FURN-LEE SOLOMON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________

Submitted February 28, 2024 – Decided May 3, 2024 

Before Judges Accurso and Walcott-Henderson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 97-01-

0121.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on

the brief). 

William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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 Defendant Furn-Lee Salomon appeals from the December 14, 2021 order 

denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, 

specifically the abstract of a scientific paper identifying alcohol abuse as a risk 

factor for rupture of intracranial aneurysms, and his motion for a medical 

expert at the State's expense. As we are convinced both motions were 

correctly decided, we affirm, essentially for the reasons expressed by Judge 

Candido Rodriguez, Jr. in the written decision accompanying his order. 

 Defendant was convicted by a jury in 2003 of first-degree murder in the 

beating death of Fletcher Brown. State v. Salomon, No. A-4149-03 (App. Div. 

Apr. 28, 2006) (slip op. at 1-2). The State's forensic pathologist testified at 

trial she was not convinced Brown's death was a homicide following her initial 

examination of the body. Although she found ample evidence that Brown had 

been badly beaten, his death was caused by the rupture of a pre-existing berry 

aneurysm in the base of his brain. 

The pathologist testified the rupture of an aneurysm like that could occur 

spontaneously, or as a result of "a lot of alcohol in his system," cocaine use, or 

blunt force trauma. Toxicology results revealed Brown's blood alcohol level 

was .305 at the time of his death and there were cocaine metabolites in his 

blood and urine. According to the pathologist, she became certain the rupture 
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of the aneurysm and Brown's death were brought on by blunt force trauma to 

the back of his neck only after discovering an area of dramatic hemorrhage 

deep in the semispinalis muscles on the right side of his cervical spine. On 

cross-examination, the pathologist agreed with defense counsel that "Brown's 

use of cocaine and the stress of this fight or assault" could be a contributing 

factor to the bursting of the aneurysm, but she maintained the actual cause was 

blunt force trauma to Brown's neck.

The defendant presented his own expert, the Chief of Neuropathology at 

Mt. Sinai Hospital in Manhattan. Although agreeing with the State's 

pathologist that Brown's death was caused by the rupture of a berry aneurysm, 

he disagreed the rupture was brought on by blunt force trauma. In the defense 

expert's opinion, "[t]rauma is not a predisposing factor in the rupture of a berry 

aneurysm in the absence of severe trauma to the head, the degree of trauma 

that would produce a skull fracture or other evidence of damage to the brain." 

He testified he was "not aware of any literature that trauma predisposes to the 

rupture of this kind of aneurysm," in the absence of that sort of severe head 

trauma. The State's pathologist had conceded Brown did not suffer a skull 

fracture or any injury to his brain in the assault. The defense expert 

specifically referenced a New England Journal of Medicine article that 
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included alcohol abuse among several risk factors for rupture of intercranial 

aneurysms but not trauma. 

Defendant's expert opined the rupture of Brown's berry aneurysm and 

death were likely the result of a transient increase in blood pressure caused by 

"the stress of being attacked." The doctor also opined the victim's cocaine use 

may have also had the same effect of temporarily causing a rise in blood 

pressure resulting in a rupture in the aneurysm, noting the "rather sizable" 

body of scientific "literature relating rupture of berry aneurysm to exposure to 

cocaine." 

The question of whether the rupture of Brown's berry aneurysm was 

caused by blunt force trauma or something else was obviously hotly contested 

at trial. The issue was further addressed on direct appeal in our rejection of 

defendant's contention that the trial court failed to adequately mold the jury 

charge to reflect his contention "that death was caused by elevated blood 

pressure and cocaine use and was never contemplated by defendant." 

Salomon, Id. at 8-15. Judge Rodriguez thus found that defendant's proffer of 

the abstract of a paper entitled "Alcohol Consumption and Aneurysmal 

Subarachnoid Hemorrhage," suggesting a link between ruptured aneurysms 
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and alcohol consumption — although published in 2017, almost fifteen years 

after defendant's trial — was "not exactly newly discovered evidence." 

The judge found the jury considered "the connection between the berry 

aneurysm and the alcohol consumption." The State's own expert testified the 

victim's ruptured aneurysm could have happened spontaneously or as a result 

of "a lot of alcohol in his system." Applying the Carter factors, that new 

evidence "must be (1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or 

impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not 

discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would 

probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted" to entitle a 

defendant to a new trial, the judge found defendant's evidence obviously could 

not meet the mark. State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981). The judge further 

found the State could not be forced to pay for a defense expert "to interpret 

information in a one-page abstract, which appears more speculative than 

substantive." 

We agree that defendant's proffered abstract does not qualify as newly 

discovered evidence under the Carter test, thus obviating the need for a 

defense medical expert. We affirm the denial of defendant's motions, 
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essentially for the reasons expressed by Judge Rodriguez in his cogent and 

well-reasoned opinion. 

Affirmed.