United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1470

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Raymond Earl Combee, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: August 7, 1997 Filed: August 25, 1997

___________ Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
In April 1995, a confidential informant working with Pulaski County Deputy Sher iff Chris Smith engaged in a controlled purchase of methamphetamine fro m Raym ondEarl Combee. Smith then arrested Combee, who was charged in Pulask i County Municipal Court with drug-trafficking offens es. These charges were later nollprossed, and in May 1996, a federal grand jury charged Combee in a two-coun t indictment with distributing methamphetamin e, and with possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Combee moved to suppress evidence seized following his arrest, and to di smiss the indictment on speedy-The HONORABLE WILLIAM R. WILSON, JR., United States District Judge 1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2- trial grounds. In November 1996, the district court held a suppression hearing an d 1 bench trial, at the conclusion of which the court denied Combee & s pretrial motions and found him guilty as charged. At sentencing, the court refused to depa rt downward from the applicable Guidelines range based on Combee & s physical ailments. Combe e appeals the denial of his pre trial motions and the district court & s refusal to depart. We affirm.

We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress, although we revie w findings of hi storical fact only for clear error. See United States v. Weinbender , 109 F.3d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997). Smith testi fied that he and the confidential informant entered Combee & s trailer home after Combee & s girlfriend i nvited them inside to wait for him. When Combee arrived moments later, he indicated that he would be willi ng to sell drugs to the confidential informant for redistribution to Smith. Combee then stepped away with the informant--who had been given funds for the purchase and had bee n searched for drugs--and engaged in an exchange. The confidential informant returned to S mith and gave him a baggie of methamphetamine. At that point, Smith arreste d Combee, and during an ensuing pat-down search, discovered additiona l methamphetamine in Combee & s jacket.
Based on this testimony, which the district court credited, see United States v. Adipietro , 983 F.2d 1468, 1472 (8th Cir. 1993), we conclude the court did not err in denyingCombee & s motion to suppress, see Conrad v. Davis , 1997 WL 398569, at *4 (8th Cir. July 17, 1997) (because custodial arrest of suspect based on probable cause is reasonable intrusion under Fourth Amendment, search incident to arrest requires no additional justification (cited case omitted)); United States v. Scott , 91 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 1996) (in determining whether probable cause exists to make warrantless-3-

arre st, court looks to totality of circumstances to see whether prudent person woul d believe individual had committed or was committing crime).

We also affirm the denial of Combee & s motion to dismiss the indictment. W e agr ee with the district court that the time lapse between Combee & s arrest by Pulask i County officials and his federal indictment and trial did not violate his statutory right under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), see United States v. Beede , 974 F.2d 948, 950 -51 (8th Cir. 1992 ) (state arrest does not trigger the statutory thirty-day period), cert. denied , 50 6 U.S. 1067 (1993), or his constitutional rights. See United States v. Walker , 92 F.3 d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 1996) (Sixth Amendment s peedy-trial factors); Bennett v. Lockhart , 39 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1994) (Due P rocess Clause and pre-indictment delay), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1018 (1995).
Finally, after carefully reviewin g the sentencing transcript, we conclude that the district cou rt was fully aware of its authority to depart under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, p.s

. (1995) (departure based on def endant & s extraordinary physical impairment), and made
an unreviewable discretionary decision not to do so. See United States v. Field , 110 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, we affirm.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.