FILED

No. l6-360

Filed: November l 5, 20'l 6

t + + * * * * * * * * * * * :r :r * * * r. * :r * * * * * * * * * * :r :r ,r ,r ir ir * * 

2g u.s.c. $ l4g1 (Tucker Act

i rr".'.3:ifllfilamagesror JACOBJ.ZHUCKKAHOSEE, *

. z'..r.3:'u';:ff?;""i'fi)igainstthe

Plaintiff, pro se, * united States for Uniust +_

" I ,r , , !;lt1il)i.un,r.. to c*"

Want of Jurisdiction);

* Rules of the United States Court of

. 

Federal Claims f'RCFC")

THE UNITED STATES' * l2(b)(l) (Subject Matter * RcFc#effl3:]:"rAmended Defendant. *

.. 

Pleading).

+1.**i.****:|,t,t*:*1.**++t,B++ ,t ** **********

Jacob J. Zhuckkahosee, pro se, Plaintiff.

Albert Salvatore Iarossi, United States Department of Justice, Acting Assistant Attorney

General, Washington, D.C., Counsel for the Government.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER

BRADEN, Judge.

I. RELEVA}ITFACTUALBACKGROUND.'

Jacob Zhuckkahosee is a member ofthe Menominee Indian Tribe. On January 10,2012,

the Menominee Tribal Court convicted Mr. Zhuckkahosee of one count of First Degree Sexual

Assault Of A Child and one count of Battery. Pl. Ex. B. That same day, Mr. Zhuckkahosee was

sentenced to: (l) twelve months ofTribal Jail with six months stayed; (2) payment ofa $150 fine;

and (3) eighteen months of probation. Pl. Ex. A. Pursuant to the Menominee Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Ordinance, Mr. Zhuckkahosee was required to register and remain

I The relevant facts discussed herein were derived from the June 22,2016 Amended

Complaint ("Am. Compl. l-3"), and the attached exhibits ("P1. Ex. A-D"). The court has labeled

the January 31,2012 Menominee Tribal Court Sentencing Order as Exhibit A; the September 16,

2013 Ami R. Nacotee Criminal Complaint as Exhibit B; and the July 19,2013 Statement of Gerald

Thorpe, Sex Offender Registry Coordinator, as Exhibit C.

USPS TRACKING # 9114 9014 9645 0594 5522 45

& CUSTOMER NUMBER For Tracking or inquiries go to USPS.COM

 or call 1-800-222-1811
registered for the duration of his life, as asex offender with the Tribal Sex Offender Registry. Pl.

Ex. B.

On May 30, 2012,lhe Menominee Sex Offender Registry Coordinator and the Wisconsrn

Sex Offender Registry Specialist visited Mr. Zhuckkahosee at the Menominee Tribal Jail. pl.

Ex. C. Mr. Zhuckkahosee was informed of his obligations as a registered sex offender and

provided with acknowledgment forms. Pl. Ex. C. Mr. Zhuckkahosee signed the forms and

subsequently was released from the Menominee Tribal Jail. Pl. Ex. C.

On July 12, 2012, Mr. Zhuckkahosee reported to the Menominee Tribal Sex Offender

Registry Office that he lived at N276 Max Martin Road, Keshena, Wisconsin. pl. Ex. C. On April

13, 2013 and June 3, 2013, the Registry Coordinator mailed a letter to N276 Max Martin Road in

order to verify that Mr. Zhuckkahosee lived at that address. Pt. Ex. C.

On July 16,2013, the police responded to a fire at N276 Max Martin Road. pl. Ex. C. At

the scene, officers questioned a resident of N276 Max Martin Road who informed them that Mr.

Zhuckkahosee did not live there. Pl. Ex. C.

On July 17, 2013, the police received a report that Mr. Zhuckkahosee inappropriately

touched a four-year old girl. Pl. Ex. c. In response, the police visited Mr. Zhuckkahosee's listed

residence to conduct a Sex offender Registry Residential verification. pl. Ex. c, Upon amival,

they discovered that Mr. Zhuckkahosee had not lived at N276 Max Martin Road since Julv 4.2013.

Pl. Ex. C.

On July | 8, 2013, the police determined that Mr. Zhuckkahosee was living in the woods

offof Kittecon Road on the Menominee Reservation. Pl. Ex. c. Later that dav. Mr. Zhuckkahosee

was located and arrested. Pl. Ex. C.

On September 16,2013, the Menominee Tribal Prosecutor filed a Criminal Comolaint in

Tribal Court alleging that Mr. Zhuckkahosee violated the Menominee Sex Offender Resistration

and Notification Ordinance. Pl. Ex. B.

Some time later, the United States indicted Mr. Zhuckkahosee for sexual Abuse of A

Person under The Age of Sixteen. Am. compl. at l. Mr. Zhuckkahosee pled guilty before the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and was sentenced to 135 months of imprisonment. Am. compl. at L The Menominee Tribe subsequently transferred Mr.

Zhuckkahosee to the Federal Correctional Institute in Mariana, Florida, where he is currentlv

serving his prison term.

II. PROCEDURALHISTORY.

On March 18,2016, Mr. Jacob Zhuckkahosee (,,plaintiff ') filed a Complaint (.,Compl.")

in the united states court of Federal claims alleging that wisconsin, Menominee Tribe and

federal officials violated his statutory and constitutional rights. Plaintiff also filed a Motion For

Leave To Proceed 1n Forma Pauperis. on April 8, 2016, the court granted the March lg,2016

Motion.
On May 19, 2016, the Govemment filed a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule l2(b)( I ) of

the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"), arguing that the court did not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims alleged in the March 18, 2016 complaint, because Plaintiff

did not name the United States as a defendant.

On June 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion To Amend and an Amended Complaint. The

June 22, 201 6 Amended Complaint named the United States as the defendant and set forth two

claims. The first claim alleged that the Menominee lndian Tribe improperly transferred Plaintiff

into federal custody and that the United States wrongfully imprisoned Plaintiff in violation ofthe

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as the

Wolf River Treaty of 1854.2 The second claim alleged that the United States improperly certified

Plaintiff for civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam walsh child

Protection And Safety Act Of 2006,42 U.S.C. g$ 16901-16962 (,,Adam Walsh Act',). On June

23,2016,the court granted Plaintiffs June22,2016 Motion To Amend.

On July 7,2016, the Govemment filed a Motion To Dismiss PlaintifPs Amended

Complaint ("Gov. Mot."), pursuant to RCFC I 2(bxl ), arguing that the court did not have

jurisdiction over either claim alleged in the June 22,2016 Amended Complaint.

On July 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Response to the July 7, 2016 Motion. On August 4,

2016, the Government filed a Reply.

On September 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Extension Of Time To File ISur] Reply

to the Govemment's August 4, 2016 Reply and a Motion For Leave To File A Second Amended

Complaint.

On September 26, 2016, the Government filed a Response to the September 20, 2016

Motion For Leave To File A Second Amended complaint, arguing that the court should deny the

motion, because amendment would be futile.

ilI. DISCUSSION.

A, Jurisdiction.

The United States court ofFederal claims hasjurisdiction under the Tucker AcL 2g U.S.c.

$ 1491, "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon tre

constitution, or any Act of congress or any regulation of an executive department, o. upon uny

express or implied contract with the united States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in

cases not sounding in tort." 28 u.s.c. $ lagl(a)(l). The Tucker Act, however, is ,,ajurisdictional

slatute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money

damages. . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the united States court of Federal

claimsl whenever the substantive right exists." united stqtes v. Testan,424ll.S.3g2,3gg (1g76).

To pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identifv and oleao an

independent contractual relationship, constitutional provision, federal statute ani/o. executive

' The full text of the Wolf River Treaty of 1854 is available at: htto://digital.librarv.

okstate.edu/kapnler/vol2ltreaties/men0626.htm.
agency regufation that provides a substantive right to money damages. See Todd v. United States,

386 F.3d l09l , 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[J]urisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to

identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker

Act[.]"); see also Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, ll72 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (*The

TuckerAct...doesnotcreateasubstantivecauseofaction;...aplaintiffmustidentifyaseparate

source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages. . . . [T]hat source must be

'money-mandating. "'). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the source of substantive

law upon which he relies "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal

Government[.]" Testan, 424 U.S. at 400. And, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

jurisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence. See Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,

846 F.2d 746,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[O]nce the [trial] court's subject matter jurisdiction [is] put

in question. . . [the plaintiffl bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence.").

B. Standard For Motion To Dismiss Under RCFC l2(bxl).

A challenge to the United States Court ofFederal Claims' "general power to adjudicate in

specific areas of substantive law is properly raised by a [Rule] l2(b)(l) motion[.]',

Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d I 3 10, I 3 I 3 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see c/so RCFC l2(b)( I ) (,.Every

defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading. . . . But

a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (l ) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[.],').

When considering whetler to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "a court

must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintifFs complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Trusted Integration, Inc. v. [Jnited states, 659 F.3d I 159,

I 163 (Fed. Cir. 201l).

C, Standard Of Review For llo ,9e Litigants.

Pro se plaintiffs' pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those of litigants

represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding that pro se

complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers"). The court traditionally examines the record "to see if [a pro se]

plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere displayed." Ruderer v. united states,4lz F.2d l2g5,

1292 (ct. cl. 1969). Nevertheless, while the court may excuse ambiguiti es in a pro se plaintiff s

complaint, the court "does not excuse [a complaint's] failures." Henke v. united states,60F.3d

795,799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

D. The Government's July 7, 2016 Motion To Dismiss The Jun e 22,2016

Amended Complaint, Pursuant To RCFC f 2OXl).

1, The Government's Argument.

The Government argues that the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate any of the claims alleged in the June 22,2016 Amended complaint. Gov.

Mot. at 4. The Government reads the June 22,2016 Amended complaint to identify six possible

claims: (l) wrongful conviction; (2) unjust imprisonment; (3) violation ofdue process rigtrts under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) violation of the Sixth and Eighth Amindments;
(5) improper custody of a member of the Menominee Indian Tribe in violation of the Fifth

Amendment's Takings Clause; and (6) improper application of the "contract provisions" of the

Adam Walsh Act.

First, the Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the

payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the Tucker Act. Gov. Mot.

at 6. Similarly, the Sixth and Eighth Amendments do not mandate money damages. Gov. Mot.

at 6.

Although the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims alleging a violation of the Fifth

Amendment's Takings clause, a valid takings claim must allege that the Govemment lawfully

seized private property for public use, without just compensation. Cov. Mot. at 6 (citing Ruth

Energt, Inc. v. United States,247 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir.200l)). Because the June 22,2016

Amended Complaint alleged that the Government's actions were wrongful and illegal, the takings

claim does not satisfy the pleading requirements to establish jurisdiction under the Takings Clause.

Gov. Mot. at 6.

To the extent that the June 22,2016 Amended complaint alleges that the united states

District Court for the Eastem District of Wisconsin wrongfully convicted Plaintiff, that clarm

would require the court to review the merits ofa federal district court decision. Gov. Mot. at 5.

But, the United States Court ofFederal Claims "does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of

a decision rendered by a federal district court." Gov. Mot. at 5 (quoting ,s/,il necock Indian Nation

v. United States,782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).

Moreover, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for compensation due

to unjust imprisonment, unless a plaintiffs "conviction has been reversed or set aside on the

ground that he is not guilty ofthe offense of which he was convicted, or . . . he has been pardoned

upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction." Gov. Mot. atit see a/so 2g U.s.c.

$ 2513(a). Plaintiffs conviction, however, has not been reversed or pardoned. Gov. Mot. at 7.

Finally, although the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate breach of contract claims against

the United States, the June 22,2016 Amended Complaint does not allege a contractual relationship

between Plaintiffand the united states, instead the "contract provisions" of the Adam walsh Act

is cited. Gov. Mot. at 7.

2, Plaintil?sResponse.

Plaintiff respond s that, under Moden v. [Jnited states,404 F.3d 1335 (Fed. cir.2005), the

court.has jurisdiction to adjudicate a plaintiffs claim alleging a violation of a money-mandating

constitutional provision, statute, or regulation unless the claim is "so insubstantial, implausible,

foreclosed by prior [case law], or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal

controversy." Id. at 1341. The June 22,2016 Amended complaint's Fifth Amendment takings

claim alleges a violation of a money-mandating constitutional provision and is not completely

devoid of merit. Therefore, the court at least hasjurisdiction to adjudicate that claim.
E. The Court's Resolution.

l. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Any Claims Alleged In

The June 22, 2016 Amended Complaint.

The June 22,2016 Amended Complaint alleges that the Government violated Plaintif|s

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as the wolf River Treaty of 1854.

Am. compl. at l-2. Plaintiff does not specify how the Govemment violated the enumerated

constitutional provisions, except by alleging that the Menominee Tribal court wrongfully

transferred Plaintiff into the Government's custody and that the United States District Court for

the Eastem District of wisconsin wrongfully convicted and imprisoned him. Am.compl.atl-2.

The June 22,2016 Amended Complaint also alleges that the United States District Court for the

Eastem District of Wisconsin wrongfully applied the Adam Walsh Act. Am. Compl. at 2.

As the Government argued, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate any of the

constitutional claims alleged in the June 22,2016 Amended complaint. "The law is well settled

that the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the

payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the Tucker Act." see smith v.

United states,709 F.3d I I 14, I I l6 (Fed. cir. 2013). Likewise, the courr does not have jurisdiction

to adjudicate claims based on the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, because neither is moneymandating. see Milas v. united states,42 Fed. c1.704,710 (1999) ("[T]he . . . Sixth Amendment[]

[is] not money mandating and, consequently, cannot combine with the Tucker Act to provide the

court jurisdiction;'), aff'd per curiam, 217 F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Trafny v. United

states, 503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. cir. 2007) (quoting Edelmann v. United states, 76 Fed. cl. 376,

383 (2007) ("The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under

the Eighth Amendment, as Iit] 'is not a money-mandating provision."')

To the extent that the June 22, 2016 Amended Complaint alleges a violation ofthe Takings

Clause, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim. "ln determining whether the

[court] has jurisdiction, [the court must determine] that the [relevant] claim is fognded upon a

money-mandating source and [that] the plaintiffhas made a nonfrivolous allegation that it is within

the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under the money-mandating source." Jan's Helicopter

Serv., Inc. v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Althougtr the

Takings clause is money-mandating, "[a] claimant under the Takings clause must show that the

government, by some specific action, took a private property interest for a public use without just

compensation." Adams v. united states,3gl F .3d l2l2,l2l 8 (Fed. cir. 2004). TheJune22.20l6

Amended Complaint does not allege that the Government interfered with Plaintiff s orivate

property interests. Instead, it claims that the Government violated the Fifth Amendment by

wrongfully convicting and imprisoning plaintiff. Therefore, the June 22,2016 Amended

Complaint fails to make a nonfrivolous allegation that Plaintiff is within the class of claimants

entitled to recover under the Takings Clause. As such, the court does not have iurisdiction to

adjudicate this claim.

The court has jurisdiction to "renderjudgment upon any claim for damages by any person

unjustly convicted ofan offense against the United States and imprisoned." zt u.S.c.-g r+rs.

But, for the court to adjudicate such a claim, the plaintiff must satisfy the requirements orzs u.s.c.

$ 2513. see Grayson v. unitecl states, l4l ct. cl. 866 ( I 958) (explaining that 28 u.s.c g $ 1495
and 2513 must be read together); see also See Chevalier v. United States,329 F. App'x 924, 926

(Fed. Cir.2009). Section 2513, provides that any person suing the Govemment under section 1495

must allege:

[that] [h]is conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not

guilty ofthe offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he was

found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the

court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon

the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction[.]

28 U.S.C. 2513(a)(l ). The June 22,2016 Amended Complaint, however, does not allege that

Plaintiffs conviction was reversed or set aside or that Plaintiff subsequently was found not guilty

or pardoned ofthe relevant offenses. Therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

Plaintiff s unjust conviction and imprisonment claims.

Finally, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on either the Adam

walsh Act or the wolf River Treaty of 1854, because neither "can fairly be interpreted as

mandating compensation by the Federal Government," Testan, 424 tJ.S. at 400. The Adam walsh

Act establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of sex offenders. ,see 42

U.S.C. $ 16901. But, none of its provisions mandate the payment of money to registered sex

offenders' The Wolf River Treaty of 1854 provides that the Menominee Tribe will cede tribal

lands to the Government in exchange for a temporary settlement on the wolf River, sponsorship

of various public welfare programs and payment of $242,686. The Treaty does not contain any

language that can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Govemment to

individual members of the Menominee Tribe. Moreover, the court does not have iurisdiction to

adjudicate the wolf River Treaty claim under 28 u.s.c. g 1505-providing that "[r]he united

States Court of Federal Claims [has] jurisdiction ofany claim against the United States accruing

. . . in favor of any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians"-because that

provision does not apply to actions brought by individual members of Indian Tribes and the June

22, 2016 Amended complaint only alleges injuries to plaintiff as an individual . see Fields

v. united states, 423 F.2d 380, 383 (ct. cl. 1970) ("[S]ince the instant case is one broueht bv

individual Indians and not a tribe, band, or identifiable group of Indians . . . defendant is coiecr in

asserting that section 1505 does not apply to the present case.").

2. The June 22, 2016 Amended Complaint Should Not be Transferred

To A United States District Court, pursuant To 2g U.S.C. $ 1631.

Title 28 U.S.C. g l63l provides:

[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title or

an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or

filed with such a court and that court finds that there is a want ofjurisdiction, the

court shall, if it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action or appeal to any

other such court in which the action or appeal could have been broughfat the timi

it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed
in or noticed for the court to which it is transfered on the date upon which it was

actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transfened.

28 U.S.C. $ 1631.

The United States Court of Federal Claims is authorized to transfer the June 22,2016

Amended Complaint, but only when the conditions of section 163l are met. ,See Tex. peanut

Farmers v. United States,409 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("tTlhe trial courr could have

ordered transfer without being asked to do so by either party[.]"). The decision to transfer rests

within the discretion ofthe transferor c ourt. see In re vistaprint Ltd.,628 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed.

Cir. 2010) (recognizing that "[the] trial court has broad discretion in transfer decisions"); see also

Christianson v. Colt Industies Operating Corp.,486 U.S. 800, Sl6-17 (l9SS) (holding that a

transfer order should be affirmed unless "clearly erroneous"). In order for a case to be transferred

under section 163 I , the court must determine that: ( I ) the transferring court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction; (2) the case could have been brought in the transferee court at the time the case was

filed; and (3) transfer is in the interest ofjustice. see Tex. peanut Farmers, 409 F.3d at 1374

(holding that transfer is appropriate under section 163 I when the court finds that there is a want of

jurisdiction, the action could have timely been brought in another court, and transfer is in the

interest ofjustice).

In this case, the first requirement of section I 631 is satisfied, because the court does not

have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims alleged in the June 22, 2016 Amended Complaint.

But, transfer would not be in the interest ofjustice, because th e lune 22,2016 Amended Complaint

also fails to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted. See Faullorcr v. (Jnited States,45Fed.

cI.54,56(1999)("If...transferwould...befutile...thedecidingcourtmaydeclinetotransfer

the case and dismiss it;'); see also Bunch v. Llnited states, 7g F.3d 605 (Fed. cir. 1996) ("[T]ransfer is likely to be futile, and thus not 'in the interest ofjustice' as [section] 163l

requires.") (unpublished). The June 22,2016 Amended complaint alliges no facts that altow the

court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleeed. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 u.s. 662 (2009). It contains only "the-defendant-un lawfully-ha-rmed-me

accusation[s]." Id. at 678. Therefore, the court has determined that the June 22,2016 Amended

Complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim so that transfer, under

section 163 l, would not be in the interest ofjustice.

3, Plaintiffs September 20,2016 Motion For Leave To File A Second

Amended Complaint Is Denied.

_ 

Under RCFC l5(a), a party may amend its pleadings once as a matter of course. ,,ln all

other cases [however] a party may amend its preading only with the opposing party,s written

consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." RCFC l5(a)(2). But, the court may exercise its discrettn to deny leave lt it nna,

evidence of" undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part ofthe movant, repeated failure

to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment." Foman v.'barxlilt u.s. t78, t82 0962\.
"Futifity ofthe proposed amendment is an adequate reason to deny leav eto amend." Cultor

Corp. v. A.E. Stsley Mfg. Co.,224 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). "When a parry faces the

possibility of being denied leave to amend on the ground of futility, that party must . . . proffer

sufficient facts supporting the amended pleading that the claim could survive a dispositive pretrial

motion." Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V.,464 F.3d 1339,

1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 20, 2016,

but it does not allege any new claims; instead it simply reiterates allegations raised in the June 22,

2016 Amended Complaint and lists a number of federal statutes, without any explanation of how

they apply to this case.

For the reasons discussed herein, the claims alleged in the September 20, 2016 Second

Amended Complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss, pursuant to RCFC l2(bxl).

Therefore, the court has determined that amendment would be futile and denies the Plaintiffs

September 20, 2016 Motion.

IV. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons discussed herein, the Govemment's July 7,2016 Motion to Dismiss is

granted. ,see RcFc l2(bX1). The clerk is directed to dismiss the March 18,2016 complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

G. BRADEN.

Jadge