NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HANI ABDI NUURE, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

1

Respondent.

No. 17-72909

Agency No. A208-595-821

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 10, 2021

San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN,** District 

Judge. Concurrence by Judge FRIEDLAND.

1 On March 11, 2021, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland was 

automatically substituted as Respondent. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c). 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the 

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 24 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Petitioner Hani Abdi Nuure seeks review of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of relief from removal. Because the BIA’s decision was 

supported by substantial evidence, the petition is denied. 

Petitioner, a citizen and native of Somalia, sought asylum in the United 

States after being held in captivity by the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab. The 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her asylum claim under the material support for 

terrorism bar in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(3)(B). The IJ concluded that she would qualify for asylum if not for the 

fact that she had provided material support to Al-Shabaab by cooking for them 

under duress while imprisoned. The BIA affirmed.

2

The parties agree that Petitioner cooked for a terrorist organization but 

dispute whether that constituted “material support” under the INA. In her petition 

for review, Petitioner argues that the support was de minimis and that Al-Shabaab 

would have continued as a terrorist organization had she not cooked for its 

members. The Government argues that no exception exists for de minimis support. 

Where “the BIA conducted an independent review of the record and 

provided its own grounds for affirming the IJ’s decision,” this Court will review 

2 Petitioner also applied for withholding of removal and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ determined that the material support 

bar rendered Petitioner ineligible for withholding of removal, and the BIA 

affirmed. The IJ also denied Petitioner’s application for CAT relief, and the BIA 

deemed the issue to be waived on appeal. 
3 

the BIA’s opinion and any portion of the IJ’s decision expressly adopted by the 

BIA. Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Navas v. INS, 217 

F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2000)). A denial of asylum is “conclusive unless manifestly 

contrary to the law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). The BIA’s findings of fact are 

reviewed for substantial evidence and “are conclusive unless any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

“A noncitizen who has engaged in ‘terrorist activity’ cannot obtain asylum 

or withholding of removal.” Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 

2019) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)). “Engag[ing] in terrorist activity” 

includes committing “an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, 

affords material support” to a terrorist organization. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). This bar to entry applies even if the support was provided 

under duress. Rayamajhi, 912 F.3d at 1244 (citing Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 

254, 267 (9th Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Abdisalan v. 

Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 526 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)).

This Court has held that there is no de minimis exception for material 

support in the form of funds. Id. at 1244–45. The BIA has gone further, holding

that the material support bar generally contains no de minimis exception. In re AC-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 308 (BIA 2018). This Court has not determined 

whether cooking constitutes material support or whether de minimis support in the 
4 

form of cooking is material. In the context of a criminal prohibition on providing 

material support for terrorism, the Supreme Court has noted that even “[m]aterial 

support meant to promote peaceable, lawful conduct can further terrorism” because 

it “frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent 

ends.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30 (2010) (internal 

quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). The Sixth Circuit has applied 

this reasoning to the immigration statute at issue here and held that material 

support must be both “relevant” and “significant.” Hosseini v. Nielsen, 911 F.3d 

366, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2018). 

In this case, we need not decide whether a de minimis exception exists or 

whether cooking provides material support in all instances. Before the BIA, 

Petitioner argued only that the support she provided was not material because it 

was de minimis. The BIA’s decision that her activity was not de minimis, and was 

therefore material, is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner has not disputed 

the BIA’s finding that she “cooked for Al-Shabaab for an extended period of time 

while she was detained,” and the record supports the BIA’s conclusion that the 

support provided was above a threshold that could be considered de minimis.

Therefore, we find no factual basis on which to reach a conclusion contrary to the 

BIA’s decision.
5 

DENIED. The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of 

the mandate. The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.
1

Nuure v. Garland, No. 17-72909

FRIEDLAND, J., concurring:

I concur because it appears that Nuure failed to argue before the BIA that 

cooking is not “material support” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). See 

Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010). I write separately to urge 

our court to clarify the meaning of “material” in a future case because I believe that

cooking is not “material support” under the statute.

A noncitizen is ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal if he or she 

has provided “material support” to a terrorist organization or its members. 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). Under traditional rules of statutory construction, it 

is apparent that “material” modifies “support,” and that “material” must be given 

some effect that does not render it redundant. See Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 

969 (2019). Yet in two recent cases, while declining to adopt a precise definition, 

we have narrowed the possibilities for what “material” could mean under the 

statute.

First, we held that the material support bar contains no exception for 

activities conducted under duress. Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254, 267 (9th 

Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 

517, 526 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Second, we held that the material support bar 

contains no exception for “de minimis aid in the form of funds.” Rayamajhi v. 

FILED

MAY 24 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2019). Although we limited our holding 

to “aid in the form of funds,” we approved in dicta of the BIA’s broader 

determination that “no de minimis exception exists” to the material support bar. 

Id. (citing In re A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 307 (BIA 2018)). 

Given these precedents, if “material” is to be given any effect, then it must 

be to modify “support” to include only certain types of conduct. The Sixth Circuit 

has reached a similar conclusion, holding that “material” requires that support be 

“relevant” and “significant” to the commission of terrorism. Hosseini v. Nielsen, 

911 F.3d 366, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2018). This construction comports with the term’s 

ordinary meaning. Id.; see also Material, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 

(defining “material” as “significant; essential”). It is also consistent with the 

remaining text in the relevant provision, which lists examples of types of support

that should be considered “material support,” including “a safe house, 

transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial 

benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, 

biological or radiological weapons), explosives, or training.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). These activities, unlike cooking, are all clearly important 

to advancing the goals of terrorism. 

If the statute barred admissibility for noncitizens who provided “support” to 

terrorists—without qualification—then perhaps it would apply to cooking. But 
3

because the statute requires that support be “material,” I urge our court to clarify in 

a future case that cooking cannot trigger the material support bar.1

1 In the same fractured opinion in which the BIA held that the material 

support bar includes no de minimis exception, it also rejected the proposition that 

“the support provided must be of a certain type in order to be covered by the 

material support bar.” In re A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 310. We have not

considered whether the statute compels a contrary determination. We also have 

not considered whether the BIA’s conclusion was a reasonable interpretation of an 

ambiguous statute—we have only considered the BIA’s conclusion as to whether a 

de minimis exception exists. See Rayamajhi, 912 F.3d at 1245. I believe the 

BIA’s determination that “material” does not limit “support” to certain types of 

conduct should be rejected on the ground that the statute unambiguously requires 

otherwise or on the ground that, even if the statute is ambiguous, this interpretation 

is unreasonable. 

Alternatively, I urge the BIA to adopt a different position that gives meaning 

to each of the terms in the statute.