IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-22-00044-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.R., A CHILD

From the 21st District Court

Burleson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 30,068

OPINION

Stephanie and the unknown father of A.M.R. appeal from separate judgments that 

terminated their parental rights to A.M.R. Stephanie complains that the evidence was 

legally and factually insufficient to support the finding that termination was in the best 

interest of A.M.R. or that she "knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to 

remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional 

well-being of the child" or "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with 

persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being 

of the child." The unknown father complains that the evidence was legally insufficient 

for the trial court to have terminated his parental rights pursuant to Section 161.002 and 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 2

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we find no reversible error, we 

affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury trial was conducted, in which Stephanie participated in person and through

counsel. The unknown father had an attorney appointed to represent his interests; 

however, a different attorney appeared on behalf of the unknown father at the trial. The 

attorney participated in the jury trial and cross-examined various witnesses regarding 

the unknown father's identity and location. 

The jury charge was submitted to the jury with individual questions as to each 

predicate act alleged and the best interest of the child relating to the termination of 

Stephanie's parental rights. The jury answered "Yes" to each of the questions submitted. 

The trial court did not submit any questions and reserved any findings relating to the 

unknown father without objection by counsel. The trial court signed a judgment that 

terminated Stephanie's parental rights based on each of the three predicate acts that the 

jury found to be true and that termination was in the best interest of the child. That 

judgment purports to be a final judgment reciting that it disposes of all issues and parties. 

Approximately two weeks after entry of the first judgment, the trial court signed 

a second judgment terminating the unknown father's parental rights without reference 

to the first judgment. Both Stephanie and the unknown father filed motions for new trial. 

Because the issues raised by Stephanie and the unknown father are entirely distinct from 

each other, we will address each party's issues separately in this opinion.
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 3

STEPHANIE'S APPEAL

In Stephanie's first issue, Stephanie complains that the evidence was legally and 

factually insufficient for the jury to have found that termination was in the best interest 

of the child. In Stephanie's second issue, Stephanie complains that the evidence was 

legally and factually insufficient for the jury to have found that she "knowingly placed or 

knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which 

endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child" or "engaged in conduct 

or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the 

physical or emotional well-being of the child." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency in cases involving the 

termination of parental rights are well established and will not be repeated here. See In 

re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-68 (Tex. 2002) (legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 

(Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344-45 (Tex. 2009). 

We give due deference to the factfinder's findings and must not substitute our judgment 

for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). The factfinder is 

the sole judge "of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony." 

Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). 

If the evidence is sufficient as to one ground, it is not necessary to address the other 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 4

predicate grounds because sufficient evidence as to only one ground in addition to the 

best interest finding is necessary to affirm a termination judgment. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 

230, 232-33 (Tex. 2019). 

The termination judgment reflects that Stephanie's parental rights were 

terminated based on three predicate grounds: endangering environment (Subsection 

(D)); endangering conduct (Subsection (E)); and failure to comply with a court-ordered 

service plan (Subsection (O)). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). 

However, Stephanie's issues on appeal challenge only the endangering environment and 

endangering conduct grounds, but not the failure to complete her service plan. By failing 

to challenge the finding under Subsection (O), Stephanie has waived any complaint about 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding. See id. § 161.001(b) (requiring only 

one predicate ground to support termination); In re Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541, 542 (Tex. 

2019) (per curiam) (stating that "only one ground is required to terminate parental 

rights"). Because of this, if we determine that the evidence was legally sufficient for the 

jury to have found that termination was in the best interest of the child, we will affirm 

the judgment of termination.

However, we are also required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant 

to Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) if challenged even if the termination is proper as to 

some other section, therefore, we will also address one of those grounds. In re N.G., 577 

S.W.3d 230, 235-36 (Tex. 2019). This is because a finding under either section could be 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 5

used in a subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(M).

Although Stephanie raises the issue relating to best interest first, because the 

evidence as to the predicate act is relevant to our discussion of best interest, we will 

address the sufficiency of the evidence as to the predicate act before best interest.

SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(E)

In her second issue, Stephanie argues that the evidence was legally and factually 

insufficient for the trial court to have found that she committed the predicate act set forth 

in Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the Family Code. Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows 

termination of parental rights if the factfinder finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged 

in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). "Endanger" means "to expose a child to loss or injury, or 

to jeopardize a child's emotional or mental health." In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 

1996) (per curiam). An endangerment finding often involves physical endangerment, but 

it is not necessary to show that the parent's conduct was directed at the child or that the 

child suffered actual injury. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 

1987). "Rather, the specific danger to the children's well-being may be inferred from the 

parent's misconduct alone." Id. In our endangerment analysis pursuant to Section 

161.001(b)(1)(E), we may consider conduct both before and after the Department 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 6

removed the child from her parent. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). In general, a parent's conduct that subjects a child to a life 

of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of that 

child. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 531.

In our endangerment analysis, domestic violence and a propensity for violence 

may constitute evidence of endangerment. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Additionally, drug use may constitute evidence of 

endangerment. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Further, a parent's criminal 

conduct, convictions, or imprisonment are relevant to the question of whether she 

engaged in endangering conduct. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360-61. Routinely subjecting 

a child to the probability that the child will be left alone because a parent is in jail 

endangers the child's physical and emotional well-being. See In re S.M., 389 S.W.3d 483, 

492 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). Finally, we may consider Stephanie's failure to 

complete her service plan in determining whether her conduct risks endangering the 

child. In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 818 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).

FACTS RELATING TO ENDANGERMENT

A referral was made to the Department of Family and Protective Services 

regarding domestic violence in the home of A.M.R. An investigation had been 

undertaken by law enforcement relating to a report alleging that Stephanie had assaulted 

her boyfriend Daniel, with whom she was living, and that A.M.R. witnessed the assault. 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 7

Stephanie had fled the scene before law enforcement arrived, but Daniel was observed 

with scratches and red marks on his neck and body. Daniel alleged that there was 

ongoing domestic violence in the home. Daniel admitted to methamphetamine use two 

days before the incident but denied that he used it in A.M.R.'s presence. 

Stephanie was arrested two days later and a safety plan was entered placing 

A.M.R. with Daniel's mother, who was to supervise all contact between Daniel and 

A.M.R. At that time, Daniel was alleged to be A.M.R.'s father. A caseworker for the 

department met with Stephanie at the jail more than once. During the first visit, 

Stephanie alleged that Daniel was A.M.R.'s father and that this incident was the first 

occurrence of domestic violence in the home. Stephanie admitted to using drugs in the 

past and expressed concern that Daniel was currently using drugs. At the next visit, 

Stephanie alleged that the father of three of her older children was also possibly A.M.R.'s 

father and admitted that she also had recently used methamphetamines. After this time, 

Daniel and his mother stated their intention to return A.M.R. to Stephanie upon her 

release from jail.

A.M.R. was placed in the department's custody. She was two years old at the time 

of the removal. A hair test was conducted on A.M.R. which tested positive for 

methamphetamines. The test results went back 90 days from the date of the test. When 

asked about the positive result, Stephanie initially denied knowing how it had happened 

unless it was from smoking methamphetamines when pregnant with A.M.R. Later, 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 8

Stephanie stated that it must have occurred when A.M.R. was left with Daniel. Stephanie 

had been in jail for approximately two weeks before A.M.R.'s removal by the department.

Stephanie was jailed for approximately 90 days and pled guilty to abandoning or 

endangering a child, A.M.R. Stephanie was placed on three years of community 

supervision and testified that she thought the assault with bodily injury-family violence 

charge had been dismissed when she pled guilty to the felony offense.

A family service plan was ordered by the trial court to be completed by Stephanie 

in order to have A.M.R. returned to her. She completed a psychological evaluation in 

November of 2020, which the evaluator was unable to score accurately because of 

significant deception and Stephanie's refusal to discuss her drug use. She did not 

regularly attend parenting classes or counseling until after a mediated settlement 

agreement in September of 2021 and had not completed either at the time of the trial. 

Stephanie was discharged from therapy for non-attendance, even in virtual therapy 

programs, more than once. She claimed to have completed services but with different 

providers than those listed in the service plan and did not provide documentation of 

completion. Stephanie did not complete drug treatment counseling. She refused to sign 

a release for an MHMR assessment that she had taken. 

Stephanie's counselors and service providers testified that Stephanie refused to 

address her issues with anger, domestic violence, drug use, and grief. Each testified that 

Stephanie had not made progress in her therapy and classes, which could be dangerous 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 9

for A.M.R.'s safety and well-being.

A.M.R. exhibited a lack of attachment to Stephanie and was almost non-verbal 

when she was placed in foster care. She was easily frightened, especially by men, and 

would say "No, momma" when she was scared. A.M.R.'s play therapist opined that 

A.M.R. had been traumatized in her home prior to her removal.

APPLICATION

Viewing the evidence with the appropriate standards, we find that the evidence 

was legally and factually sufficient for the jury to have found that Stephanie "engaged in 

conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which 

endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 

161.001(b)(1)(E). Because we have found the evidence sufficient regarding Section 

161.001(b)(1)(E), we do not address Section 161.001(b)(1)(D). In the Interest of H.H., No. 

10-21-00040-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 4225 *1, n.1, 2021 WL 2252707 (Tex. App.—Waco 

May 27, 2021 pet. denied) (mem. op.). We overrule issue two.

BEST INTEREST

In her first issue, Stephanie complains that the evidence was legally and factually 

insufficient for the jury to have found that termination was in the best interest of A.M.R. 

In determining the best interest of a child, a number of factors have been consistently 

considered which were set out in the Texas Supreme Court's opinion, Holley v. Adams, 

544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). This list is not exhaustive, but simply indicates factors 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 10

that have been or could be pertinent in the best interest determination. Id. There is no 

requirement that all of these factors must be proved as a condition precedent to parental 

termination, and the absence of evidence about some factors does not preclude a 

factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction that termination is in the child's 

best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). Evidence establishing the 

predicate grounds under section 161.001(b)(1) also may be, and in this proceeding is,

relevant to determining the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28.

Stephanie contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient as to 

best interest because the department had agreed to not move forward to a final hearing 

if she started engaging more substantially in therapy and parenting classes as well as 

maintaining a stable, safe residence a few months before the final hearing. Although 

Stephanie acknowledges that she did not complete her service plan and had to leave the 

residence she was fixing up and move to another residence that was not suitable for 

A.M.R. shortly after the agreement, she contends that the only reason the department 

wanted to terminate at that time was because the foster parents wanted their relative to 

adopt A.M.R.

FACTS RELATING TO BEST INTEREST

A.M.R. was four years old at the time of the trial and had been in the same foster 

home for the entire time. She was bonded with the family, and always indicated a desire 

to return home with the foster mother after visits with Stephanie. The foster mother 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 11

testified that her brother and sister-in-law were interested in adopting A.M.R. The foster 

mother testified that she believed that A.M.R. would do better in a home with no other 

children, and the foster parents had multiple other children in the home and wanted to 

continue having foster children placed with them in the future. Her brother and sisterin-law had no children and would not have any other than by adoption. The foster 

mother's brother and sister-in-law were certified babysitters of A.M.R. and were working 

to become licensed foster parents so that A.M.R. could be placed with them permanently 

with a hope of adopting her. A.M.R. had spent time with and was fond of the other 

family. However, the foster mother testified that if it was determined to be better for 

A.M.R. for her current foster parents to adopt her that they would do so. 

While in the care of the foster parents, A.M.R. had tremendously improved 

emotionally and they had provided for her medical and physical needs. Prior to her first 

doctor's visit after being removed by the department, records of only one doctor's visit 

were found. That visit was from when A.M.R. turned one year old. A.M.R. did not

appear to have received any medical care other than that one visit during her lifetime. 

A.M.R.'s issues regarding speech and her fear of men had improved greatly while with 

the foster parents and in play therapy. A.M.R.'s therapist testified that A.M.R. showed a 

"real disconnect" between A.M.R. and Stephanie and that she did not want to talk to the 

therapist about her mom but loved talking about her foster family. A.M.R. would need 

continuing counseling, but Stephanie did not present any evidence as to her plans to meet 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 12

A.M.R.'s emotional needs if the termination was not granted.

On appeal, Stephanie argues that the only reason for the removal was that she was 

incarcerated; however, she does not acknowledge that it was her violent behavior in the 

presence of her child that led to her arrest and incarceration. Stephanie admitted to past 

methamphetamine use and told the caseworker that a reason that A.M.R. tested positive 

for methamphetamines might be from Stephanie smoking it while pregnant with A.M.R. 

Upon her release from jail after A.M.R.'s removal, Stephanie was placed on community 

supervision for a felony offense where A.M.R. was the victim. Stephanie failed to address 

any of the issues for A.M.R.'s removal, including her anger issues, violent tendencies, 

poor relationship choices, past drug use, and instability in homes and employment. 

Although Stephanie and her sister testified that she had a strong support system in place 

at the time of the jury trial, that support system had by all appearances done little to assist 

her during the pendency of the proceedings. Stephanie acknowledges that she did not 

complete her service plan but blames the department and the service providers for that 

failure.

Stephanie had multiple providers for therapy throughout the case and had been 

discharged and reinstated more than once due to her non-attendance. Stephanie blames 

the pandemic for her inability to complete services, but the providers and the caseworker 

testified that the providers were willing to meet with her virtually. Stephanie did not 

really maintain contact or make a significant effort to participate in services until well 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 13

over a year after A.M.R.'s removal and very late in the proceedings. At that time, when 

Stephanie did attend therapy and her other classes, she did not address her issues and 

made little to no progress, even though she knew that the failure to do so would result in 

the department setting this proceeding for a final trial where they would seek termination 

of Stephanie's parental rights. 

APPLICATION

Reviewing the record using the appropriate standards, we find that the evidence 

was legally and factually sufficient for the jury to have found that termination was in the 

best interest of the child. We overrule issue one.

We affirm the judgment of termination of Stephanie's parental rights to A.M.R.

UNKNOWN FATHER'S APPEAL

The unknown father appeals from a judgment entitled "Order Determining No 

Father was Identified and Termination of Parental Rights of Unknown Father" after a 

hearing was conducted by the trial court approximately two weeks after the conclusion 

of the jury trial and entry of the first judgment as to Stephanie. On appeal, the unknown 

father argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the judgment of 

termination and that the unknown father received ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

department argues that the appeal as to the unknown father should be dismissed because 

his trial counsel did not have authority to file an appeal without the client's knowledge

or consent.
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 14

Generally, the procedure to terminate the parental rights of an unknown father are 

set forth in Section 161.002(b)(2)(A) of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 

161.002(b)(2)(A). Section 161.002(b)(2)(A) allows for the termination of parental rights of 

an alleged father if the child is over the age of one, the alleged father has not registered

with the paternity registry, and his identity and location are unknown after the exercise 

of due diligence by the department. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.002(b)(2)(A). Further, 

a certificate from the paternity registry is required from any state in which the child may 

have been conceived or born, if any. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §160.421(b). 

PROCEDURAL AND BACKGROUND HISTORY RELATING TO THE UNKNOWN FATHER

When A.M.R. was removed, it was first believed that Daniel was her father. 

Stephanie subsequently stated that the father of three of her older children could be 

A.M.R.'s father. There was no father named on A.M.R.'s Mississippi birth certificate.

During the pendency of the case, both Daniel and the father of three of Stephanie's older 

children were excluded by DNA testing as being A.M.R.'s father. Thereafter, Stephanie 

refused to divulge the identity of A.M.R.'s father, other than giving the name of a man 

who allegedly resided in Louisiana. The department checked into the name but could 

not locate the person. Stephanie stated that the man named was white and based on that 

description the caseworker concluded that the man could not be A.M.R.'s biological 

father. Stephanie also stated that she did not know the identity of A.M.R.'s father.

The department filed a motion for substituted service by publication on the 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 15

unknown father which the trial court granted. The trial court appointed counsel to 

represent the interests of the unknown father approximately eleven months before the 

jury trial. Appointed counsel participated in permanency hearings and questioned 

witnesses about the unknown father's identity and potential whereabouts.

A different attorney appeared in person to represent the unknown father at the 

jury trial and for the rest of the trial court proceedings. That attorney questioned 

witnesses and participated in the jury trial relating to the potential identity and location 

of the unknown father; however, the trial court reserved any issues relating to the 

termination of the unknown father's parental rights to be determined at a later date rather 

than submitting any issues relating to the unknown father to the jury because no report 

had been filed as to the attorney's efforts to identify or locate the unknown father.

Approximately two weeks after the conclusion of the jury trial, the trial court 

conducted a hearing at which the appointed attorney also did not appear. The attorney 

who appeared at the jury trial did appear and argued against the termination at that 

hearing. The parties discussed the necessity of the certificate from the paternity registry 

and the trial court stated that it would consider the certificate when filed. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. §160.422(c). The Texas certificate was filed with the clerk the day of the 

hearing. Mississippi does not have a paternity registry, so no certificate from a paternity 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 16

registry in that state where A.M.R. was born could be obtained.1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 160.421(b). The trial court later signed a judgment that terminated the unknown father's 

parental rights for failure to register with the paternity registry pursuant to Family Code 

Section 161.002(b)(2)(A). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(b)(2)(A).

After the hearing, but prior to the signing of the judgment as to the unknown 

father, counsel that appeared at the jury trial and the hearing for the unknown father filed 

a motion for new trial, notice of appeal, and a motion to withdraw. Two days later, the 

trial court signed the judgment, discharged that attorney from his duties, and granted the 

motion to withdraw but did not appoint a new attorney to represent the unknown father 

on appeal. Five days later, the department filed a motion to bar the attorney from 

appearing on behalf of the unknown father and to strike his pleadings due to a lack of 

"authority." Eleven days later, the trial court entered an order that granted the 

department's motion, denied the motion for new trial and appeal, and stated that his 

counsel was precluded from any additional filings since the withdrawal had previously 

been granted. Because the trial court does not have jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal that 

was prematurely, but timely filed, the appeal remained. In order to proceed with the 

appeal, this Court abated the proceeding for the appointment of counsel to prosecute the 

1 We have found no statutory paternity registry authority in Mississippi. Rather, the only method for an 

alleged father to assert paternity outside of a court proceeding is set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated 

Section 93-9-28 (Rev. 2013), which requires a mother and alleged father to sign a voluntary 

acknowledgement of paternity while at the hospital within 24 hours after the birth of the child, and the 

signing and notarizing of the form results in the addition of the father to the birth certificate of the child. 

See Prout v. Williams, 55 So. 3d 195 (Miss. App. 2011). No father is listed on the birth certificate of A.M.R.
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 17

appeal on behalf of the unknown father, and counsel was duly appointed.

DISMISSAL

The department argues that the appeal relating to the unknown father should be 

dismissed as unauthorized because the unknown father is an unknown person and could 

not have authorized the appeal. Neither party has provided this Court with any 

authority relating to the authority of an attorney appointed to represent an unknown 

father's ability to file an appeal on the unknown father's behalf.2 The notice of appeal was 

filed prematurely in that it was filed prior to the signing of the judgment relating to the 

unknown father. That judgment also included a provision that removed the attorney 

from representing the unknown father. However, at the time the notice of appeal was 

filed, counsel was still properly representing the unknown father, notwithstanding that 

at the time the notice of appeal became effective, counsel had been removed. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 27.1(a).

While we recognize that the unknown father did not personally authorize the 

appeal, that does not mean that an attorney that is appointed to represent that person is 

required to stand by and allow an improper termination judgment to be rendered while 

they are still representing that party. Indeed, that would potentially be ineffective 

2 Substantively there is little difference between this situation and an appeal by an appointed attorney that 

has lost contact with the parent but nevertheless pursues an appeal on that person's behalf. In the Interest 

of C.P., No. 10-19-00108-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6301, 2019 WL 3331118 (Tex. App.—Waco July 24, 2019

no pet.) (mem. op.).
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 18

assistance on that attorney's part. The role of the attorney ad litem is to ensure that the 

department and the trial court comply with the relevant laws and due process to ensure 

that the unknown father's rights are not ignored or violated. Because of that, if an 

attorney charged with representing a party believes that the trial court has improperly 

granted the termination of the unknown father's parental rights at a time when that 

attorney is still charged with the duty of representing that party, then that attorney has 

the right, if not the duty or obligation, to seek whatever legal remedies are available to 

challenge those errors. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §107.016(2).

Generally, an attorney is appointed to represent an unknown father pursuant to 

Family Code Section 107.013(a)(3) and that attorney's duties are set forth in Section 

107.014(a). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.013(a)(3); 107.014(a). Counsel appointed to 

represent the interest of a parent whose identity or location is unknown is "only" required 

to: 

(1) conduct an investigation regarding the petitioner's due diligence in 

locating the parent;

(2) interview any party or other person who has significant knowledge of 

the case who may have information relating to the identity or location of 

the parent; and

(3) conduct an independent investigation to identify or locate the parent, as 

applicable.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §107.014(a). If the attorney is unable to identify or locate the 

unknown parent, that attorney "shall submit to the court a written summary of the 

attorney ad litem's efforts to identify or locate the parent with a statement that the 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 19

attorney was unable to identify or locate the parent" and upon receipt of that "required" 

summary, the trial court "shall discharge the attorney from the appointment." TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. §107.014(e).

However, the attorney appointed to represent the unknown father who appeared 

at each hearing prior to the jury trial did not comply with the requirements of the statute

by filing a written summary. If he had done so, the trial court would have been within 

its authority to discharge the attorney and the attorney would have been without the 

authority to pursue any further remedies. However, since no written report was filed 

that led to the discharge of the attorney, the attorney was required to proceed until 

relieved of his obligations, which he did, including filing a notice of appeal to correct 

what he presumably perceived to be the erroneous termination of the parental rights of 

the unknown father, which was based at least in part upon his own failure to comply 

with the statute. Because of this, we will address the contentions raised by counsel 

appointed to represent the unknown father on appeal.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 The unknown father argues that the evidence was legally insufficient for the trial 

court to have terminated the parental rights of the unknown father because no certificate 

of a search of the paternity registry was filed with the trial court. A supplemental clerk's 

record filed with this Court after the filing of the unknown father's brief shows that the 

Texas certificate was filed with the trial court on the same day as the hearing conducted 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 20

by the trial court, and several days before the judgment terminating the rights of the 

unknown father was signed. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §160.422(c). 

Section 161.002(b)(2)(A) allows for the termination of parental rights of an alleged 

father of a child over the age of one who has not registered with the paternity registry 

whose identity and location are unknown after the exercise of due diligence by the 

department. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.002(b)(2)(A). The unknown father does not 

contend that the department did not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate the 

unknown father. Rather, counsel argues that the failure to file the certificate renders the 

evidence legally insufficient. 

Because there was a certificate from Texas, and no certificate could be procured 

from Mississippi because they do not have a registry, we find that the evidence was 

legally sufficient for the trial court to have terminated the rights of the unknown father 

pursuant to Section 161.002(b)(2).3 We overrule unknown father's issue one.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The unknown father's second issue alleges that the unknown father received 

ineffective assistance of counsel because neither his initial counsel nor the attorney who 

appeared at trial filed the written report required by Section 107.014(e). Parents and 

3 The unknown father discusses Louisiana and a man whose name Stephanie had given as a potential father 

who resided in Louisiana; however, we have found no evidence that A.M.R. was potentially conceived in 

Louisiana. Because of this, no paternity registry search from Louisiana was required. See TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. §160.421(b).
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 21

children, as parties to a government-initiated suit to terminate their parental rights have 

a right to effective assistance of counsel. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003). 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in parental-termination cases, as in criminal 

cases, are governed by the two-prong test articulated by the United States Supreme Court 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In re 

D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Tex. 2021). "First, the [parent] must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "Second, the [parent] must show 

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. A party claiming ineffective 

assistance of counsel must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to succeed. Id.

In order to prevail on the second prong of Strickland, in showing that the alleged 

error prejudiced the defense, it was necessary for the unknown father to show that, but 

for the alleged error on the part of the unknown father's counsel, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. However, the unknown father's appointed 

counsel and the attorney who appeared at trial each participated diligently in the 

hearings and the trial, questioning witnesses regarding the identity and location of any 

potential father. The record is silent as to any searches the attorneys may have made 

outside of trial; however, it was the obligation of the unknown father to prove that the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. Indeed, had the attorneys filed the 

written report, their participation in the further proceedings might not have taken place 

because the trial court could have discharged them from their representation. We find 
In the Interest of A.M.R., a Child Page 22

that the unknown father did not prove the second prong of Strickland, and thus, the 

ineffective assistance of counsel issue cannot be sustained. Because we have found that 

the second prong was not established, we need not address whether the failure of counsel 

to file the mandatory written summary pursuant to Family Code Section 107.014(e) is 

sufficient to meet the first prong of Strickland. We overrule issue two.

Having found no reversible error as to the unknown father, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court relating to the termination of the parental rights of the 

unknown father.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of the issues of Stephanie and the unknown father, we 

affirm the judgments of the trial court.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson, and 

Justice Smith

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed July 20, 2022

[CV06]