THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


NEVADA TEST SITE
 

The verbatim transcript of the Working Group 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at the Marriott Airport, 


Hebron, Kentucky, on July 25, 2006. 

 

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C O N T E N T S
 

July 25, 2006 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


INTRODUCTION BY MR. PRESLEY, CHAIR 15 


INCOMPLETE RADIONUCLIDE LISTS 23 


EARLY REACTOR TEST RE-ENTRY PERSONNEL 41 


ATMOSPHERIC TEST PERIOD 64 

ORONASAL BREATHING 69 


RESUSPENSION MODEL/FACTOR 83 

RESUSPENSION DOSES TO MONITORED WORKERS 130 


1967 EXTERNAL DOSE DATA 136 


EXTERNAL DOSE DATA ’68 TO ’76 144 


PRE-1963 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL DOSE 147 


CORRECTION FACTORS 150 


RADON DOSES IN G-TUNNEL 176 


I-131 VENTING 186 


INTERNAL DOSE FOR PRE-’67 187 


BLAST WAVE 189 


USE OF PHOTON DOSE 189 


INGESTION DOSES 190 


POST-1971 TUNNEL RE-ENTRY WORKERS 199 


PRE-1966 BETA DOSE 199 


NON-USE OF BADGES 206 


EXTREMITY DOSIMETRY 206 


NEUTRON DOSES 210 


SOIL DATA 217 


HIGH-FIRED OXIDES 221 


SITE EXPERT INTERVIEWS 225 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 249 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ signifies speaker failure, usually 


failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 

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PARTICIPANTS
 

ANIGSTEIN, ROBERT, SC&A 


BRACKETT, LIZ, ORAUT 


CHANG, CHIA-CHIA, HHS 


HINNEFELD, STUART, NIOSH 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MCFEE, MATT, ORAUT 


ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH 


ROLLINS, GENE, DMA 


SCHUBERT, SANDI, SEN. REID 


THOMAS, ELISE, ORAUT 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(10:00 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO
 

DR. WADE: Good morning, everyone. This is Lew Wade. 


I'm the Designated Federal Official for the 


Advisory Board, and I'd like to welcome you all 


to this working group meeting of the Advisory 


Board. This is a working group that's ably 


chaired by Robert Presley, has as its members 


Brad Clawson, Wanda Munn and Gen Roessler. And 


this working group is focusing upon issues 


related to the Nevada Test Site site profile 


and the review of that document by the Board. 


Before I make some opening comments, I'd like 


to go around the table here and identify 


everyone who's here, and then I'd like to have 


members of the federal government who are on 


the line, other Board members, if there are 


representatives of SC&A on the line I'd like 


them to identify themselves, then anyone else 


who's on the line who would like to identify 


themself, that would be fine. And please, as 


we go through our deliberations, anyone on the 

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line, if you have trouble hearing us at any 


point, please just shout out. You know, 


positioning the microphones and maintaining a 


high volume is something we'll focus on, but 


please don't let us go too far without 


reminding us that we need to make some 


adjustment. 


Again, this is Lewis Wade. I work for NIOSH. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Robert Presley, Board member. 


DR. ROESSLER: Gen Roessler, Board member. 


 MR. ROLFES: Mark Rolfes, NIOSH. 


 MS. MUNN: Wanda Munn, Board member. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Stu Hinnefeld with NIOSH. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Gene Rollins, DMA, subcontractor 


for NIOSH. 


MS. BRACKETT: Liz Brackett, ORAU team. 


MR. MCFEE: Matt McFee, ORAU team. 


DR. MAURO: John Mauro, Sanford Cohen & 


Associates. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Arjun Makhijani, SC&A. 


 DR. WADE: And Brad Clawson, a member of the 


Board, has just stepped away from the table. 


Brad will be with us in a moment. 


Might I have other members of the NIOSH or ORAU 


family introduce themselves? On the tel-- on 

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the telephone line. 


 MS. THOMAS: This is Elise Thomas and I'm with 


the ORAU team. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. How about other Board members 


who are on the line? 


 (No responses) 


 Members of the SC&A team? 


 (No responses) 


Any other SC&A members on the line? 


 (No responses) 


 Are there other federal employees that are on 


the line participating in this as part of their 


work? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, I assume that there'll be others that'll 


join us through the course of the call. Again, 


as a working group we cannot have a quorum of 


the Board present; otherwise it becomes an 


official Board deliberation and, by my count, 


we do not have a quorum of the Board present so 


I think we're in good shape to continue. 


Let me make some -- some opening comments. We 


will, once I finish my opening comments, go 


around and have Board members, NIOSH/ORAU team 


members and SC&A members identify whether or 

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not they have any conflict with regard to the 


Nevada Test Site. As you know, the Board's 


procedures with regard to conflict of interest, 


if there is someone who's conflicted -- a Board 


member conflicted relative to a particular 


site, they can participate in discussions 


concerning that site but they cannot make 


motions or vote. 


With regard to ORAU, NIOSH and SC&A, we would 


want anyone with a conflict to disclose that 


conflict before we have our discussion so that 


everyone can realize the nature of the conflict 


and can factor that in as they would like to 


their consideration of the words spoken by the 


person with the conflict. 


Again, this is a deliberation -- a meeting to 


discuss the Nevada Test Site. I thought I'd 


just give you a little bit of context of what's 


going on with regard to the Nevada Test Site 


overall. At the last Board meeting the Board 


took action on a petition that NIOSH had 


generated. This is an 83.14 petition for the 


Nevada Test Site that, as my notes show, went 


from 1951 to '62. The Board recommended 


approval. The Secretary has acted consistent 

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with the Board's recommendation. The 


Secretary's recommendation is before Congress, 


and I think the 30 days runs out, if I'm not 


mistaken, the 26th of July. I can't imagine 


that the class will not be added to the cohort, 


but again, it hasn't happened yet. I think 


we're just days away from that. 


If you recall, there was an open issue that 


surrounded that petition that the Board still 


is deliberating upon, and that is -- the 


petition dealt with the 250 days as criteria 


for -- for a membership in the class. We have 


heard from the Department of Labor that they're 


prepared to do the arithmetic that would say 


250 days at the Nevada Test Site quite possibly 


means 250 divided by three because there were 


people who lived at the Test Site. So I think 


that issue has been resolved. 


The Board still is looking into the issue of 


whether it should be something less than that, 


250 days divided by three, should it be 


presence or should it be something between 


presence and some number, and that issue 


remains to be discussed. The Board has a 


working group chaired by Dr. Melius that is 

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I 

slated to look at that issue. That working 


group is supposed to work in close harmony with 


the working group chaired by Robert Presley. 


don't believe that working group has held any 


discussions to this point. 


I was told by Stu Hinnefeld this morning that 


NIOSH is just in receipt of another SEC 


petition -- this is a petitioner filed 


petition. It has not qualified. It is in the 


process of being reviewed. I assume it deals 


with a period later than the '51 to '62 


petition that the -- the Congress is to act 


upon this week. 


 Another issue related to Nevada Test Site is 


several Board meetings ago SC&A informed us 


that a part of their corporation had taken on 


some contract work to do dose reconstructions 


for DTRA, and this created an issue of a 


potential conflict of interest with regard to 


SEC petitions or dose reconstructions or site 


profiles. And we were -- we were keeping SC&A 


from any work with regard to the Nevada Test 


Site and Pacific Proving Grounds until those 


issues were resolved. The short of it is, the 


issues have now been resolved. 

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The -- the middle of it is that the contracting 


officer, David Staudt, asked SC&A to make 


certain proposals. SC&A made a number of 


proposals. David found a proposal that SC&A 


made to construct a firewall between the 


aspects of their business acceptable. SC&A has 


implemented that to the satisfaction of the 


contracting officer and now SC&A is not 


conflicted in the eyes of the government. 


 The Board could have a different view of that 


when the Board meets in August or September, 


but right now the contracting officer has given 


SC&A freedom to participate in this meeting, 


and therefore SC&A is with us at the table. 


I don't think I have any more notes to speak 


to. Sorry about that long introduction. What 


I'd do now is I'd ask any Board member who's on 


the line or present at the room that has a 


conflict with regard to the Nevada Test Site to 


so identify themselves. 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Hearing none, John Mauro for SC&A? 


DR. MAURO: I have no conflict. 


 DR. WADE: Is anyone from SC&A on the line now? 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, Robert Anigstein. 

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 DR. WADE: Okay. Robert, are you conflicted 


with regard to the Nevada Test Site? 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Say again? 


 DR. WADE: Do you have a conflict of interest 


with regard to the Nevada Test -- 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: No, I do not. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Anyone else from SC&A on the 


line? 


 (No responses) 


Stu, could you lead us through any disclosures 


that need to be made for ORAU or NIOSH? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. Neither Mark nor I from 


NIOSH have a conflict at the Nevada Test Site. 


But from the contractor personnel present, Gene 


Rollins is not conflicted at the Nevada Test 


Site. Liz and Matt, who are not personally 


conflicted but there is a corporate conflict 


with --


MS. BRACKETT: I was involved with recent -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, okay, so Liz is personally 


conflicted. Matt is organizationally 


conflicted. MJW has done work for -- at Nevada 


Test Site, so the corporation MJW is 


conflicted. Liz participated in that and is 


personally conflicted. Matt is not personally 

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conflicted. 


 DR. WADE: Liz, could you tell us just briefly 


as to your involvement? 


MS. BRACKETT: I reviewed their technical basis 


document for internal dosimetry and I was 


involved in -- I don't recall, I -- I -- 


THE COURT REPORTER: Could you speak up, 


please? 


MS. BRACKETT: Sorry, I have a cold. I can't 


speak very loud right now. -- and I did one or 


two dose assessments for them. 


 DR. WADE: Anyone else on the line from NIOSH 


or ORAU that has a conflict? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. The last thing I'll bore you with in 


terms of my words are that, if you recall, at 


the last Board meeting Professor Lynn Anspaugh 


with the University of Utah made comments to 


the group. I've been in contact with Professor 


Anspaugh and he very much wanted to participate 


in this call. But on Sunday I received an e-


mail that I'll read to you from the Professor. 


It says (reading) Dear Dr. Wade, as discussed 


with you previously, it was my plan to be on 


the conference call tomorrow. Now however I 

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will be driving in the boondocks of Utah so I 


will not -- it will not be possible. 
I 


continue to have a keen interest in the Nevada 


Test Site dose reconstructions, et cetera, and 


I do not think that the current site profile 


adequately captures the nature of the 


activities and the potential for episodic 


exposures. Regards, Lynn Anspaugh. 


I'll read that last part again -- let me find 


it. (Reading) I continue to have a keen 


interest in the Nevada Test Site dose 


reconstructions, et cetera, and I don't think 


the current site profile adequately captures 


the nature of the activities and the potential 


for episodic exposures. 


I only read that because, again, the Board and 


the working group has always felt it better to 


be informed by the opinions of anyone who might 


have them. That's the Professor's opinion and 


now it's on the record. 


That ends my long introduction. Robert, it's 


all up to you. 


INTRODUCTION BY MR. PRESLEY, CHAIR


 MR. PRESLEY: Lew, thank you very much. What I 


thought we'd do today is start through these -- 

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start through the comments first. I'm not one 


to make a long matrix. We agreed to comments. 


If SC&A would like to comment first and then 


NIOSH, what we'll do is go off of NIOSH's 


document. John, if you've got a comment, you 


want to go first, and then Mark, and go through 


NIOSH's comments. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. John Mauro, I'll be very 


brief. First of all, I appreciate the package 


that was put together. It was extremely 


helpful. I went through it and my first 


impression -- and I'd like Arjun also to weigh 


in -- is that it looks like that we're pretty 


close. That is, by and large, out of the many 


issues that are -- I didn't really get a count 


-- that the developing -- the -- between the 


fact that the -- the SEC petition is pending 


for the pre-19-- 1962 and earlier, that 


resolves a lot of the concerns that we raised 


earlier. Except I believe for skin dose and 


prostate cancer, the other cancers. I think we 


-- I think we -- we do need to discuss what the 


implications of that is for the time period 


covered by the SEC. 


For the time period following 1962, my sense is 

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that two issues have struck me as -- as areas 


where we do need to have some discussion and 


perhaps some protracted discussion. That has 


to do with one of the issues Dr. Anspaugh had 


raised related to mainly reconstructing the 


doses from deposited radioactivity on the 


ground to workers, using the data that 


currently is available, with the special 


consideration of a resuspension of particulate 


material, perhaps the episodic venting of 


radionuclides from underground testing, and the 


-- so those two sort of struck me as areas that 


it looks like we're a little fuzzy on on how in 


fact they will be dealt with. We -- we do have 


some questions regarding that. 


And the other area that Arjun actually reminded 


me of was that -- a result of the interviews 


with Mr. Brady and others having to do with 


some questions on data reliability. So I guess 


in a nutshell, that sort of captures my 


sensibilities regarding where we are on this 


site profile. 


And Arjun, please, if you have anything you'd 


like to add... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, there are -- those are -- 

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those are the big ones, I think. There are a 


number of smaller issues, like beta dosimetry 


until 1966. But a large number of the areas 


where -- where NIOSH has said that they're 


going to revise the TBD or have a new procedure 


or look at the Naval Radiological Defense Lab 


literature and come up with a method -- 


essentially, for -- so far as we're concerned, 


the issue is resolved until we see the new 


procedure and if the Board wants us to review 


that new procedure. There -- there are a few ­

- few items outstanding. 


 MR. ROLFES: All right. Well, I'd like to 


thank Gene Rollins, as well. The credit goes 


to him and his team members. They put this 


together and I was merely the go-between, so I 


guess what we can do is go ahead and, if you 


would like to identify your comment and we can 


identify our response, and then we can open it 


up for discussion if necessary. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Would you like me to go down 


the list one by one 'cause I kind of made a 


little table as to where we're basically 


saying, for now, resolved until -- or resolved 


or some outstanding issue. Would you like me 

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to do that? 


 MR. PRESLEY: What I -- what I would love to do 


is when we have an issue today that is 


complete, that we mark that issue complete and 


we don't go back and revisit it unless 


somebody's got something that's dire wrong with 


it. I'd like to get as much done as we 


possibly can. 


DR. MAURO: Procedurally, one of the things 


we've been talking about is -- as you know, we 


work off a six-step process and right now we 


are in step six in terms of issue resolution. 


One of the things we're not quite sure of is 


whether or not you folks would be asking for a 


seventh step, that being once the -- right now 


there are commitments made. Basically yes, 


we're going to revise the TBD to reflect X, Y 


and Z. At some point in the process the TBD or 


a TIB will be issued to address an issue. By 


the way, this is a recurring theme. This is 


happening with Bethlehem Steel and others. 


Whether or not once that is done and the new 


material is now on the web, in place and is 


functional, whether or not there -- you 


envision that there will be a step -- I guess 

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it's a judgment call once it happens -- a step 


involved -- okay, yes, that in fact does meet 


the intent of our concerns; or yes, it looks 


like the issue has in fact -- now can be closed 


out. So in other words, some of those -- where 


do we -- at what point do we close out an 


issue, when the commitment is made to address 


an issue and we all agree with the basic 


strategy and principle upon which that issue 


resolution is to be implemented, or until it is 


in fact implemented? 


 MS. MUNN: This is Wanda. I thought that was 


one of the issues that we were dealing with in 


the other working group, also, the -- the issue 


of when is done done. And I -- the concern 


that we had been expressing in that other group 


was that, to our -- to the best of our 


knowledge, NIOSH did not have a specific 


process or a specific person who tracked 


outstanding issues and when they were complete. 


Now whether that's been resolved since our last 


other working group meeting, I don't know. But 


does -- does anyone here -- 


 DR. WADE: I can speak to that. I can speak to 


it generically and then specifically I think as 

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well, if we take Bethlehem Steel as an example. 


I think that there is a six-step process and 


then John defines a seventh step. I think in 


the Bethlehem Steel case NIOSH is reporting to 


the Board on a regular basis the closing out of 


issues. And I think then it falls to the Board 


to decide if it accepts NIOSH proposal or -- or 


NIOSH's statement, or if it wants SC&A to look 


into an issue again. 


 MS. MUNN: That was my understanding, was that 


step seven, as I understood John to define it 


just now, was a Board action, not an SCA 


action. 


 DR. WADE: But it could be -- it could be -- 


 MS. MUNN: That was my understanding from the 


other working group. 


 DR. WADE: That's my understanding from -- 


 MS. MUNN: Whether we accept that here as being 


our definition in this group is another thing. 


 DR. WADE: But it doesn't preclude the Board, 


though, saying to SC&A that this is a very 


complex --


 MS. MUNN: No. 


 DR. WADE: -- issue, could you look into it and 


report back to us --

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 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- so I think at the end of the six-


step process the Board sits with the 


information and has to decide the final word. 


It could well, you know, extend the process by 


going to SC&A. 


 MS. MUNN: And -- and my understanding was that 


the Board wanted to see from NIOSH a 


prescriptive method for identifying this 


outstanding item, this outst-- that you said 


you'll do this; when do we know that it's done. 


 DR. WADE: Right, and I think NIOSH is 


intending to follow up with the matrix carried 


out to the extent that items fall away and then 


there's these precious few left, and then NIOSH 


will bring that to the Board and when it's all 


done the Board can decide whether it accepts it 


or wants some further issue looked at. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Robert, is that your understanding? 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's my understanding. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Robert. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I like that. Do you want me to 


read the comments to start with, or -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Either way, that'd be fine -- you 

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or -- or John or Gene. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Have you got -- you've got -- 


you've got it. Why don't -- why don't you read 


the comments. 


 DR. WADE: Could I just make one other comment, 


just to complete the record? The Board has -- 


really gives the latitude to the Chair of the 


working group as to -- you know, when to make 


that call or -- or the Chair of the working 


group can well work with me to assign SC&A 


further tasks, so each Chair of the working 


group will be able to exercise that 


prerogative, as well as the Board as a whole 


when it meets. 


Okay. Sorry. 


INCOMPLETE RADIONUCLIDE LISTS


 DR. MAKHIJANI: These comments are from the 


matrix that SC&A prepared and which was a 


summary of our site profile review, and I think 


submitted to the Board and NIOSH in January of 


2006. And the first comment is some 


radionuclide lists are not complete. This is 


especially important for atmospheric testing 


and for early re-entry workers. 


 And then NIOSH broke it down to four -- four 

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categories. Mr. Presley, should I just go 


through the four categories? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, please. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: In -- in the first category, 


which could more broadly relate to atmospheric 


testing and re-entry workers, NIOSH agreed that 


it's going to revise the table of radionuclides 


so that it would be more complete and republish 


it. So this is one of those items where NIOSH 


will take an action and the Board could decide 


whether it wants further review. For now, so 


far as we're concerned, NIOSH's response is 


fine. We think it needs to be revised and 


NIOSH agrees. 


The second response of NIOSH is there's a 


problem table that needed adjustment, Table 2­

8, and they're going to remove that from the 


TBD, which is fine with us 'cause it was 


somewhat duplicative anyway and did not show 


time dependence, where the other tables do show 


time dependence, which are more complete. 


And then the third and fourth responses related 


to atmospheric testing workers, which have been 


rendered moot by the SEC recommendation of the 


Board and of NIOSH. 

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So I think the summary of the first comment is 


basically we agree with the way that NIOSH has 


decided to deal with it. There's one pending 


action item for NIOSH. 


 DR. WADE: Arjun, could I ask a question? It's 


really never my role to ask technical 


questions, but just sort of as the gatekeeper 


for the Board, I did mention that we have this 


issue of the 250 days or presence left for the 


Board to consider. Does 1c in any way impact 


upon that? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, Dr. Wade, some of the 


radionuclide issues that are involved in this 


table involve very short-lived radionuclides, 


so the amount of dose highly dependent on time 


of tunnel re-entry, for example, or for 


atmospheric testing workers, when exactly they 


went in because there are some -- some 


radionuclides that have half-lives of hours or 


a few days, and it's -- it's in relation to 


those that there are some important questions. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you. 


 MS. MUNN: And that raises a question for me. 


Are our -- are the personnel records adequate 


for us to be able to determine who actually 

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went in when? Can -- can we do that? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Ms. Munn, I have -- I have not 


looked at personnel records -- 


 MR. ROLFES: I can answer that. Yes, they are. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- in that much detail. 


Perhaps --


 MS. MUNN: They're -- they're --


 MR. ROLFES: They keep logs of all re-entries. 


 MS. MUNN: I know that they did, but I wasn't 


sure whether we could identify by employee. We 


can. 


MS. BRACKETT: I knew they had information. 


 MS. MUNN: Good, that helps so that we don't 


have to wonder whether this individual was or 


was not involved in re-entry. Yeah. 


DR. ROESSLER: So back to the second comment, 


that table that's been removed is not -- not a 


useful table, it was --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well --


DR. ROESSLER: -- duplicative and... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, well, I'd have to go back 


to the TBD, but I think that this table did not 


-- did not show any time dependence at all, so 


-- in my opinion -- from the kinds of issues 


that we're discussing in terms of dose 

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reconstruction, not a useful table. If there's 


a consolidated table that shows time dependence 


of all radionuclides that are involved, then 


that will be a good point for dose 


reconstruction and not be confusing and having 


too many tables of the same thing. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. Thanks. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So I'm okay with that. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I had one comment on 1b (sic) 


myself about -- where it says concentrations 


should be estimated by hour for the first day 


and by day after that. Where do we -- huh? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, you're correct, that was 


further comments, not the main body. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, that's 1c, you mean. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right -- no, 1b. 


DR. ROESSLER: 1c. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: 1c. 


DR. ROESSLER: It's right under --


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm sorry. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, yeah, I'm sorry, it is 1c. 


Do you mean there that -- that the first day 


you would do dose reconstructions on something 

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by the hour and then by the day thereafter? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, if there were people who 


went in on the same day or in -- after one or 


two days you would have to do that because as 


you see from -- even from the table that's 


published up above, Table 1, neptunium half-


life, 2.36 days; sodium-24, 15 hours -- so for 


very early re-entry workers you do have to know 


the time. I think it -- it will make a pretty 


big difference. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. It's just that I don't 


know how you're going to say that -- you know, 


if they start at 6:00 o'clock in the morning, 


if they went in at 7:00 o'clock or whether they 


went in at 9:00 o'clock, I don't think the 


records out there are going to be anywhere near 


that good. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, Bob, I'd just offer -- in 


a situation like that, we -- we had to do that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. All right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If we had -- if we had to do 


that, we would probably take a maximum level on 


that first day. You know, when -- when did 


they --


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: -- enter, what was the earliest 


entry, and then we would probably not decay it 


over the course of that day. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I mean just as a practical 


matter of the dose reconstruction -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we'd take the highest level 


and that would be the first day, and then we 


would work -- worry day by day thereafter if we 


had to do that. But that's pretty tedious for 


a dose reconstruction. We would try -- we 


would try to come up with a bounding approach 


that would essentially bound the person's 


intake from his entry, rather than try to do an 


hour by hour evaluation. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's great. Thank you. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And we would agree with that. 


When you're trying to do an accurate job, it 


would be impossible. But in the context of a 


compensation program I think you can come up 


with something. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. Does anybody have any 


other -- other comments about comment 1? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: The only other thing I'd like 

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to note is in 1b where that table is being 


removed, there are some issues that'll be 


covered under environmental dose, so that's 


part of the reason it's okay to remove that, 


and then pick up whatever part of that 


discussion is under -- under the resuspension 


question. 


 MR. PRESLEY: 1b then we want to note that we 


do have some comments coming on that. 


DR. MAURO: Could I bring in a -- I guess a 


different facet of this discussion in light of 


the SEC. In effect what I'm hearing is we're 


really talking about the -- the period that's 


currently covered by the SEC, that is the -- 


this would be aboveground testing. It would be 


during the time period of '51 to '62, and the 


concern, I presume -- please correct me if I'm 


incorrect -- it would be that there were some 


folks who were asked to go forward shortly 


after the test, maybe within a matter of hours 


to days. 


Now as I understand it, what we're really 


saying here is -- I guess a couple of things. 


One -- well, first of all, by and large, for 


most cancers we're not going to be confronted 

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I 

with that issue because most cancers will be 


compensated, but we will be confronted with it 


for cancer such as prostate and skin cancer. 


guess my question is to what -- in fact, this 


struck me as -- as the conversation started. 


To what extent are we going to engage that 


question as part of the site profile? Because 


I believe a lot of the responses that came back 


here had this -- well, really we feel that this 


is -- yes, we understand the issue, but we 


don't really need to engage the issue because 


of the pending SEC. But then I see that the 


responses in the summary are silent on well, 


what about the cancers that are not covered 


under the SEC. To what extent do we want to 


engage that issue as part of this working 


group, or is this something that's more 


appropriate -- I mean I guess it is part of a 


dose reconstruction. It's not part of the SEC, 


so it does really fall within our area of 


responsibility, and I don't think we've really 


engaged that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I can speak to the issue. 


In fact, I -- I spoke to the Board about this 


issue at the last meeting. Our approach has 

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been that a finding of infeasibility, like the 


infeasible -- the infeasible part of the dose 


at Nevada Test Site before '63 was internal 


dose. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's not feasible to 


reconstruct. And since it's not feasible to 


reconstruct the internal dose, we don't think 


it's feasible to reconstruct it for any organ 


and so the prostate cancers or other non-


specified cancers we say -- we just write what 


we call a partial dose reconstruction and say 


that we have reconstructed what we can 


reconstruct, and this is all we can do. And 


then that's what we send to the claimant, and 


if it's -- it doesn't reach 50 percent, it 


doesn't reach 50 percent and the person doesn't 


have the compensation remedy. 


DR. MAURO: But then let's say we move on to 


the other cancers, we'll talk -- let's talk -- 


talk skin, which will be external, and 


internal, which will be prostate, two different 


examples, where the reconstruction of the 


external dose plays on both. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 

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DR. MAURO: And -- and how we would deal with 


such issues as the early mix of radionuclides, 


the resuspension, the direct fallout -- I mean 


-- in other words, I think that the current 


version of the TBD -- and please correct me if 


I'm wrong, I did read it again, you know, in 


preparation for this meeting, but -- is silent 


on how we're going to recon-- can we or how are 


we going to reconstruct a dose to the skin and 


the prostate gland during the -- the SEC 


period. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's correct. It is silent 


on that. 


DR. MAURO: That -- now it is silent on that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It is silent on that point. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. And is that a matter that we 


need to embrace as part of this working group? 


 MS. MUNN: I'd really like to see us put that 


to bed once and for all, because it's going to 


come up in every single SEC petition that we 


have. And I -- I have mixed emotions on it 


when I think about it, personally, and I -- I 


don't think the Board has been clear as to how 


they view it. I'm not even sure that folks who 


aren't on a working group looking at one of 

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these SECs has recognized that this -- it 


bothers me to say we're not going to look at 


this now because it's not an SEC issue. Well, 


if it's still an issue, then when do we look at 


it and how do we address it? 


DR. MAURO: Is this a site profile issue. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, is this a site profile issue. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, to the extent that this 


issue relates to the external dose 


reconstruction, if this is necessary for 


external dose reconstruction, then we need a 


resolution of it. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. This kind of -- it's 


kind of couched, though -- I mean the -- the 


radionuclide inventory and depend -- if it 


depends on the monitoring regime and there are 


other external dose issues that we're going to 


later on, but the -- the radionuclide mixture 


is normally conceived of as an internal dose 


issue because you don't know what the person 


ingested or swallowed if you don't know their 


radionuclide inventory, whereas if the person 


was monitored --


DR. MAURO: Yes. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and you know, if they were 


with a badge and putting aside all the 


shortcomings of badge monitoring, but they were 


monitored for external exposure, which everyone 


was after about 1957 -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- then you have an exposure 


record for external exposure. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So the way it's couched, it's 


kind of -- it's brought up as an internal dose 


-- you know, it's -- it's dismissed as an in-- 


as an issue from an internal dose component 


standpoint. To the extent that it relates -- 


if it relates -- to the external dose to these 


people, then we would have to resolve it and -- 


and we would try to -- certainly try to arrive 


at a technique to do external dose 


reconstruction for those people because, you 


know, if you can't do internal and external's 


all you've got left, and you can't do that 


either, you've left another -- another 


population of people out of potential 


compensation. 


DR. MAURO: And I guess that goes toward my 

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question. Right now do we -- do you feel that 


we have a site profile that provides the 


guidance to the dose reconstructor to deal with 


just that issue, the external dose early years, 


skin -- well, the external dose? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, absent issues we're going 


to talk about today --


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- I certainly think we do from 


the monitoring period forward. Now if you get 


back before the time when everybody was 


monitored, I don't know specifically if I can 


say that. I'm not familiar enough with either 


NTS or the site profile, to be completely 


frank, so I don't really know today. But it 


certainly has to be part of what we resolve as 


we move forward, is do we have a technique for 


external dose reconstruction throughout the 


period, or if -- you know, and try to arrive at 


one. I mean realistically, we should really be 


working very hard to try to arrive at one in 


this pre-'63 period because we -- we do -- 


there's no advantage to anyone by saying well, 


it's not feasible to reconstruct external dose 


before '63. That's no advantage to anyone 

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except we do less work. 


 DR. WADE: I mean let's have a generic 


procedural discussion on Wanda's point because 


I think it's a terribly important point. NIOSH 


presents a site profile to be reviewed by the 


Board. The Board normally spends a great deal 


of time saying we disagree with that provision 


and we disagree with that provision, we 


disagree with that provision -- we spend all 


our time. It's also very legitimate for the 


Board to say, as part of its review, we don't 


think the site profile is complete enough to 


allow for external dose reconstructions for 


people with non-presumptive cancers. I think 


that's a perfectly reasonable comment for the 


Board to raise and -- and should raise such -- 


such questions. And then SC&A, as the Board's 


contractor, can also raise such questions, but 


it would be in the context of saying the site 


profile is not complete enough to do all that 


we think it needs to do. And I think those 


questions need to be raised. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: In this -- in this specific 


instance, I really agree with Stu's construct ­

- just for this instance, not the generic 

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problem -- that there are monitoring data from 


I think April '57. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know, I don't... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And so for that, leaving aside 


the question of the adequacy of the film badge 


record, since there was universal monitoring, 


it should -- in principle -- be okay. And I 


think the main unresolved question will be then 


can you construct a coworker model up to the 


time of universal badging that's adequate, do 


you have enough there -- because there was 


external monitoring before that period. And so 


I think -- I think for the -- for the SEC-


covered workers, that would be the main 


technical outstanding issue, just in regard to 


the completeness of the badge. 


 DR. WADE: And again, it's just not the 


accuracy of what's in the site profile, it's is 


the site profile sufficiently broad to do 


what's -- what it's intended to do. I think 


the Board can comment upon that as it likes. 


Working group as well. 


DR. ROESSLER: I have one additional comment on 


what John brought up, and that's -- the wording 


in here that says (reading) because of the 

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pending SEC petition. 


When I first read that, that was confusing to 


me because I didn't know -- did that mean the 


'51 to '62, which apparently still is pending, 


the Board approved it; or did it mean a 


potential petition beyond that time? I think 


we need to clarify that it does mean the '51 to 


'62. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, it means the one through 


'62. 


DR. ROESSLER: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That was the one that was 


pending --


DR. ROESSLER: On first reading it --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- when the work -- 


DR. MAURO: That's how we interpreted it. 


DR. ROESSLER: -- it wasn't clear to me. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I don't know whether we're going 


to -- this is Bob Presley. I don't know 


whether we're going to be able to get this 


settled down for all SEC petitions or not, 


because I think each one of the larger sites 


especially are going to be different in what 


they did in the early years. I don't know 


whether we're going to be able to settle this 

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off as a -- as -- you know, writing a procedure 


for all the sites or not. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I think it'd almost be 


impossible, to tell you the truth, looking at 


each one of the sites. They have their -- 


their own unique set of problems in doing that. 


I think it's something we're going to have to 


address each time. 


 DR. WADE: NIOSH is supposed to address it in 


making their site profiles adequately broad. 


The Board can certainly ask questions and 


critique them. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: In this specific instance, I 


think the main site profile issue that would be 


outstanding would be a coworker model up to the 


time of universal badging. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: For external dose. 


DR. MAURO: I would add on, also, the special 


circumstance of skin dose. Skin dose is a very 


difficult challenge, even with monitoring -- 


universal monitoring -- there's still going to 


be difficulty, even though you may have some 


monitoring, whether or not you could adequately 

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characterize the nature -- the extent of the 


skin dose during the testing period. That's a 


challenge and it's a very difficult challenge. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Anybody else have any 


comments about comment one? 


 (No responses) 


Ready to go to comment two, Arjun? 


EARLY REACTOR TEST RE-ENTRY PERSONNEL


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Comment two related to the 


early re-entry workers for reactor test 


personnel, and reads (reading) TBD does not 


provide adequate guidance for dose estimation 


to gonads, skin, and gastrointestinal tract for 


early reactor test re-entry personnel. Large 


hot-particle doses to skin and GI tract have 


not been evaluated. Naval Radiological Defense 


Laboratory (NRDL) documents and models have not 


been evaluated, though one document is 


referenced. 


And this is comment two, and NIOSH broke it 


down into six different comments. Overall, we 


agree with NIOSH's response. Basically NIOSH 


agreed to look at the NRDL archive and to look 


at large hot-particle doses and modify the TBD. 


This is -- this is not covered by the SEC. 

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This is a completely separate issue involving ­

- as I understand it; there may be some overlap 


personnel, but it's a completely separate issue 


and -- so basically we agree. 


There are a couple of areas that I'd like to 


flag. There is -- NIOSH raises the question of 


the sparseness of fecal data, and this -- this 


could be an issue in -- in how the 


gastrointestinal tract dose estimations are 


going to be made because it's a very unusual 


type of problem in that you have a surficial 


high dose, but only to a very limited area. 


And so there's some kind of concern, reading 


NIOSH's response, as to how -- how these 


shallow doses that don't go very deep but -- 


but -- internal shallow doses to the GI tract, 


which are very localized, are going to be 


addressed. We had that concern, especially in 


regard to comment 2f -- response 2f, in that -- 


NIOSH agrees that additional investigation into 


the subject of large particle doses -- 


ingestion doses is warranted. But it's not -- 


it's not really clear to me how -- how this is 


going to be approached, based on the response. 


 MS. MUNN: What response number again, please? 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, there's -- there's 2d, I 


think, and 2f especially. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: 2d as in dog? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, D as in dog. No, not 2 ­

- not 2d, 2c. I'm sorry. This is the -- in 


reference to the GI tract doses. 


 MR. PRESLEY: On page 5? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, page 5 -- the first one 


is on page 5 and the second one is on -- starts 


at the bottom of page 6. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Is your concern that if there's 


-- if the data's not robust enough or too 


sparse, there may not be any meaningful 


guidance to develop? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, that's part of the 


concern, and then the other concern about how 


does this all relate to what you do in IREP. 


mean does IREP -- is -- is the risk estimation 


model at all set up -- set up to handle this 


kind of input, very large localized doses? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: For GI tract we're talking -- 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- not skin. 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So the GI tract dose would be 

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due to the contents passing through and you 


have about --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- two days' worth of exposure, 


essentially. So I believe IREP and IMBA, in 


combination, could do this. Liz, am I 


overlooking some --


MS. BRACKETT: Well, I don't know about IREP. 


I mean --


 MR. HINNEFELD: IMBA could – 


 MS. BRACKETT: (Inaudible) 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I can't --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, he can't hear. You need 


to speak louder, Liz. 


 MS. MUNN: He can't hear you at all. 


MS. BRACKETT: Sorry. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's all right. We'll put 


the microphone over here. 


MS. BRACKETT: It's pretty loud in my head. 


 MS. MUNN: Not loud out here. 


MS. BRACKETT: I said I don't know what IREP 


does. I don't know what -- how that would --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know the issue with 


IREP, though. What would be the -- what would 


be the issue with IREP? 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: One -- one suggestion might be 


to ask the NIOSH consultant, Owen Hoffman, who 


-- and his team, that's very familiar with 


this, to -- because I -- I don't know whether 


there's an issue with IREP. It's just a 


question in my mind as to whether IREP can 


handle this kind of input. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there's a -- there's a GI 


tract model. I mean -- or -- or at least one 


that models the GI tract -- I mean the dose 


risk model -- in IREP, and theoretically we 


would be able to arrive at a dose to the GI 


tract if we had -- you know, the whole issue 


here is can you get the -- the intake or some 


other method for determining essentially what 


was the activity resonance time in the GI tract 


from -- and then the dose will fall out of that 


directly, and IMBA would take care of that. 


And so I -- I just don't -- I don't see the 


technical -- technical issue here. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I must be overlooking something 


'cause I don't see the technical issue. 


DR. MAURO: I -- I'm -- I guess I looked at it 


as a different -- had to do with the fact that 

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you're going to -- whether the particle's 


deposited on the skin, the beta emitter is on 


the skin, or it's swallowed, which can still be 


a fairly insoluble particle, it's not as -- 


it's not as if you're going to be develo-- 


delivering a uniform dose to the GI tract -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Gotcha. 


DR. MAURO: -- or to the skin. You're going to 


be delivering -- and I wasn't aware of this 


until I guess you prepared it, this idea of 


what -- the Krebs dose, which is this particle 


sits on the skin or in the GI tract and 


delivers this very high localized dose where it 


sort of sits, on the order of 1,500 rads, which 


is, you know, lethal to the cells. I don't 


know whether this creates something new. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Okay, as far as the 


issue, then, of that -- that specific issue, 


we're aware of that and it'll be part of what 


we have to deal with -- in fact it's mentioned, 


you know, specifically in -- in the report. 


And there is a body of literature out there 


about, you know, hot particle dose and impact 


on the cells. You know, certain cells are -- 


are -- it's fatal to certain cells so those 

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don't become cancer and so it's -- it's 


perturbed in that fashion. There is a body of 


literature out there. But you're right in that 


that will have to be an issue that's -- that's 


addressed and if -- if not on this specific 


finding, it occurs elsewhere I know for sure. 


DR. MAURO: But that would be outside of, right 


now, the way IMBA deals with -- it doesn't -- 


doesn't come to grips with that type of 


exposure setting. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: IMBA does not -- as far as I 


know, right now -- well, IMBA would probably 


give average dose over the organ. 


MS. BRACKETT: Right, it wouldn't calculate to 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It wouldn't -- it wouldn't 


calculate to a particular. 


DR. MAURO: And -- and whether or not that's -- 


I know where it goes down -- the lung, for 


example -- the hot particle issue has been put 


to bed. This is the first time I guess I've 


seen it come up in the context of the GI tract 


or skin, and how do you -- how do you deal with 


whether or not that poses a different kind of 


risk. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, certainly it'll come up 


in the skin does discussion and during that 


portion, you know, we tried to deal with it 


there. I guess by extension we'd have to worry 


about is there -- is the same effect -- occur 


in the GI tract as well. So it is an issue 


that will have to be addressed in -- in the -- 


the continuing work we're going to be doing. 


DR. ROESSLER: Isn't that -- when you look at 


the dose and you assume it's distributed evenly 


over the tissue, isn't that risk higher than if 


you assume it's --


DR. MAURO: That's without -- with the lung, so 


it may turn out to be the same thing here. 


DR. ROESSLER: So if -- that would be an 


overestimate, it would seem like. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


MS. BRACKETT: But because -- and also in the 


GI tract it could be -- it could have a lot of 


shielding around it. It would be part of the 


contents, so it would be overestimating from 


that standpoint also. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


DR. ROESSLER: From -- for the somatic effects. 


MS. BRACKETT: Yeah. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Just from -- from -- from the 


way I read the NIOSH response, we're -- we're 


in basic -- I think we're in basic agreement 


that -- that some technical work here -- it's 


what -- my comment was simply flagging a little 


detail on a couple of items where, you know, it 


-- it looked to us that significant amount of 


work, or there may be a data deficiency in 


regard to fecal monitoring, and I just wanted 


to flag that. But basically we're in agreement 


with NIOSH's response. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So there's really no -- no 


problem with 2c then. Is that correct? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, there's no problem -- 


there's no problem in NIOSH's response. It's 


just -- I'm just flagging it in the sense that 


-- as distinct from item -- comment one where ­

- well, I think it's a very straightforward 


job. We basically agree. NIOSH has flagged 


the character of its response and it should be 


very straightforward to do it. I just wanted 


to call your attention to the fact that there 


are some sufficiency of data issues and some 


modeling issues, IREP issues -- I mean this is 


much more complex than -- to resolve than 

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comment one. But yeah, no, we have no issue 


with NIOSH's response as such. 


 MS. MUNN: So I want to be clear. With respect 


to our hot-particle theory, the process that's 


currently used for dose reconstruction is such 


that the hot-particle theory does not create an 


additional dose over and above what we 


currently do with IMBA. Right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, currently --


 MS. MUNN: Didn't -- didn't we -- didn't -- 


DR. ROESSLER: Maybe "dose" isn't the right 


word. It's more like overall effect or risk. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The overall risk, and that was 


evaluated with respect to somewhere, if not 


necessarily GI tract. You know, would it be 


different -- GI tract -- it require I think a 


little bit of a literature search on our part 


in terms of the information that was available 


from the -- the hot-particle controversy from 


20 years ago. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I just don't want this hot-


particle theory business to be coming up again 


and again if we can identify this is the way we 


address it and it is claimant friendly, as a 


generic response, then that would put this to 

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bed. Not just for this issue, but again and 


again. 


DR. ROESSLER: Not just for this site, but -- 


 MS. MUNN: Exactly. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, all --


DR. ROESSLER: -- across the --


 MR. PRESLEY: -- all the other sites, too -- 


DR. ROESSLER: That's a big --


 MR. PRESLEY: -- 'cause you're going to have 


that. 


DR. ROESSLER: That's a big point that would be 


addressed, I think, for everything. 


 MS. MUNN: This comes in the same category, in 


my mind, as the -- the heavy breathing issue. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 


 MS. MUNN: You know, if -- if we can't make a 


generic statement as to how we're going to deal 


with that and ac-- the Board accept that, then 


we have to keep reinventing this wheel every 


time we go to a new site -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: -- and it seems much more fruitful 


for us to come to a -- an agreement about how 


it will be addressed, and address it that way. 


DR. MAURO: Could I couch it in a different 

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way? 'Cause I'm -- this has been one of these 


nagging problems for me. I visualize a worker, 


claimant, at the Nevada Test Site -- skin 


cancer, localized skin cancer develops. Okay? 


And an attempt has to be made to try to 


reconstruct his dose for compensation purposes 


because he falls outside of the presumptive 


range. Okay. Now we have that person. 


Then we say okay, well, we have a two-step 


process. One is first, what is the dose that 


was delivered to his skin. Now when you speak 


in terms of trying to reconstruct the doses to 


a person's skin, you always -- you're always 


confronted with the easy problem and the 


tougher problem. The easy one is that the 


external dose from the radioactivity that's on 


the ground and the beta emission coming from 


it. There's a way to deal with that. That's 


an easy -- that's the easy one to fix. 


The tough one is -- has to do with direct 


depositions from either fallout or resuspension 


of these particles that we're talking about 


landing on the skin and delivering one of these 


localized doses. What I'm troubled with -- if 


I was -- you know, if someone came to me, said 

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well, how -- how do I know that cancer that I 


got on the back of my hand wasn't because I was 


working in an area and one of these little 


small particle landed on my skin and delivered 


this high localized dose. I have to say I find 


that an intractable problem. I wouldn't know 


whether or not we could do that. I mean if 


someone were to ask me that, how would I come 


to grips with that. 


I could certainly tell you whether or not -- 


what your dose would be, let's say to your skin 


throughout your whole body, or from the -- from 


the feet up, 'cause it gets lower as you go 


higher 'cause a person's standing up on top of 


this field. But from the direct deposition 


problem, I say I don't know whether I could 


help this guy. And so I guess I'd like -- put 


that on the table. This is a nasty problem be­

- for the two reasons. One is -- one is, how 


do you predict what the dose is. And then 


second is, once you know the dose, it goes back 


to the lung issue. Given that yes, 1,500 rads 


were delivered in some kind of comp-- localized 


-- you know, there's a -- there's the -- the 


dead skin, then it gets lower as you get a 

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millimeter or so away. The -- I guess the 


radiobiology of that -- radiocarcinogenicity of 


that, I'm -- I'm not sure if there's literature 


on that or not. So we've got two parts of it 


and I don't think IREP come -- you know, 


engages that issue. I'm not sure. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: IREP does average dose over the 


organ. 


DR. MAURO: Average dose over the -- now that 


turn -- may turn out to be sufficient, the way 


it was demonstrated to be sufficient in the 


cases of law, and that may be the answer to the 


second half of this problem. But the first 


half of the problem is a nasty one, you know, 


because it's almost a stochastic process -- 


 MS. MUNN: Well, it is. 


DR. MAURO: -- where the particle -- you know. 


 MS. MUNN: It is, and -- and the resuspension 


issue is always a question of what's 


resuspended and what's in it, and the other 


issue is how long does it stay on the skin. 


Now how long did this guy go before he washed 


his hands, for goodness sake, and that's a -- 


I'm -- I'm not sure that one could ever be that 


specific, but you can certainly make some 

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reasonable assertions in that regard. And I 


don't know how many cases -- I guess that's -- 


that's the other question, and how many cases 


are we talking about here where that might even 


be an issue? It would be a shame if we got 


into a situation where we were spending three 


weeks of somebody's time working on an issue 


that affected two claimants. That's not to in 


any way disparage the effect with respect to 


the two claimants, but in practical terms, you 


have to decide whether these issues that we're 


talking about are purely theoretical issues or 


are these real issues. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, in terms of the number of 


claimants, it's probably worth it to do the 


effort for the number of claims. There -- I 


only know this because we just ran the report. 


There are roughly 135 non-presumptive cancers 


from Nevada Test Site and PPG in their class -- 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- in those cla-- designated 


classes, and so of those -- you know, the 


majority of those non-presumptives are going to 


be skin cancers, probably the majority. 


There'll be a lot of prostates in there, too. 

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Prostate and skin will account for the vast -- 


the vast -- overwhelming majority , so there 


are -- so it's probably enough cases that it's 


worth the effort to try to determine what -- 


what should be done in these cases and -- 


 MS. MUNN: Certainly --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- what the right answer is. 


 MS. MUNN: Certainly on this site. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And that's strictly -- and I'm 


just talking about the number of cases at 


Nevada Test Site. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. Right, that's just there. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And this -- this issue's going 


to be addressed in several other sites as well. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, it would be. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: This is Bob Anigstein. I'd 


like to make an observation on John Mauro's 


question. I -- I didn't quite hear the last 


response, so forgive me if I'm duplicating 


something that was said. It seems to me the 


issue is tractable -- I don't know if the data 


exists -- and that would be to find out what 


are the statistics on hot particles in a 


comparable situation and then they could plot a 

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probability distribution of any given location 


on the skin having a hot particle land on it 


and what are the probability that that 


particular cancer site did receive a hot 


particle. And then from there, true, the very, 


very near cells actually are spared becoming 


cancerous 'cause they're killed. But then 


there must be a halo around that area where the 


dose falls off, whether it's gamma or -- or 


beta, I think the -- the range that is not 


exact, they're straggling. So there would be a 


region where there would be intermediate doses 


that are not lethal but that would be 


carcinogenic. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: The Naval Radiological Defense 


Lab actually has some statistical analysis of 


this hot particle problem, and since NIOSH has 


said they're going to look at that ar-- I mean 


there's a big archive there. I only looked in 


detail at one report and -- just for the 


purpose of the review, but I think since NIOSH 


is going to look at that archive, you'll -- 


you'll just come up with all of this stuff. 


They -- they do have some statistical analysis 


there. 

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 MS. MUNN: And your mention of the -- of the 


Naval Radiological Defense Lab information 


brings another issue to mind. Twice in the 


SC&A comments there was a reference to that 


particular body of literature and the assertion 


that it should be further analyzed. And since 


I'm not familiar with the -- the documents, it 


raised the question, to me, analyzed for what? 


Certainly the accuracy of the data is not what 


you're being requested, is it? Is -- what --


what -- can you be more specific as to what you 


meant really when you said analyze that data? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, NRDL actually had 


measurements of hot particles, number of hot 


particles, deposition, so you can actually get 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I understand that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- information about doses. 


They also --


 MS. MUNN: I thought you had said --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- have analyses about 


probabilities of -- of deposition and so on, so 


-- and they have these dose calculations. So I 


think -- I think that needs to be made part of 


the -- of the site profile so there's a method 

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to actually calculate these doses. And a lot 


of that work was done by the NRDL. Now you 


might not agree with how -- I didn't do an 


independent evaluation of whether they were 


right or wrong or whether the statistical 


analyses was correct, but it seems to me that 


there's a body of literature there that, if 


NIOSH on analysis feels is valid, could be just 


incorporated into the TBD largely as guidance 


for dose reconstruction. 


 MS. MUNN: That really is my question. Are you 


asking for NIOSH to evaluate the process in 


that body of literature, or are you just asking 


that they incorporate it? If I understand what 


you just said, you're asking that they 


incorporate it. Is it --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I think -- I think some ­

- at least a modest amount of critical 


evaluation would be necessary before -- you 


know, this was done a long time ago and we're ­

- we're operating 50 years from the time these 


documents were written. And so some -- some 


evaluation as to compatibility with the 


existing guidance and the regulations and the 


models that are being used will be necessary. 

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On -- on reading it I didn't find any -- any 


flags went up for me that would say I don't 


think that this can be used or -- it seemed -- 


it seemed that the methods used were sound and 


can be incorporated. But at least a modest 


amount of evaluation should be done before 


incorporating it, I think. 


 MS. MUNN: Any problem with that -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think that's what -- 


 MS. MUNN: -- Stu? I would expect --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we'd do anyway with a body 


of knowledge like that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. You had a comment on 


response 2f? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, it's not -- I think -- I 


think Stu addressed it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. What about -- let's 


go back to the top on two. Anybody have 


anything with A on that? We didn't -- we 


didn't say anything about 2a. I want to make 


sure we don't leave anything out. 


 MS. MUNN: I think that's sort of covered in 


the discussion we just had with respect to that 


data. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. And then b and c? B has 

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to do with the large particle ingestion and 


skin disposition (sic) and that's what we've 


been discussing. Got no problems? With c we 


did. 


 MR. CLAWSON: But -- help me out here for a 


minute. Maybe I got a little bit lost in this, 


but c we were saying that it was okay, but we 


had some questions on it, so how are we -- how 


are we going to track that? 


 MR. PRESLEY: NIOSH is going to go back and 


look --


 MR. HINNEFELD: We -- we propose to provide a 


revision that will resolve this. Now that's 


what we're saying we will do. And so at that 


point it'll be a working group or Board 


question about is the resolution good, is it a 


valid resolution. You may engage your 


contractor to assist in that evaluation or 


whatever. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I just kind of got confused 


between -- dealing with... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Now I'd really like to say that 


NIOSH did a wonderful job in preparing a 


thorough set of responses. It was -- it was 


really easy to go through, very clear -- 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: You're saying something nice 


about our contractor who's sitting right here 


in the room. Now how am I supposed to go beef 


up -- which is our normal mode -- when you go 


and say nice things about him. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We should say nice things when 


warranted. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Let me tell you what, it's easier 


for somebody that's -- like me -- that built 


these things and not work with the scientific 


end of them, to understand and I -- this was 


easy to understand. 


Anybody have anything with d? -- e? -- d deals 


with beta-gamma dose to the gonads, e is 


continuing development of efficient methods to 


facilitate dose reconstruction. 


 (No responses) 


Okay, f we talked about, everybody agrees on 


that. 


DR. ROESSLER: How can we get the NRDL report? 


Is that on the web somewhere? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, the report I reference is 


on the site database of NIOSH. I didn't make 


any attempt to get the rest of the archive. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, site research database, 

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I believe you probably can access our site 


research database. There's --


 MR. ROLLINS: Or you can ask me and I'll e-mail 


it to you. 

DR. ROESSLER: I ask you. I'll give you my 

address later. Okay? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We can -- I can get your 

address. 

 MR. ROLLINS: That's the easiest way, Gen. 


I'll just send it to you. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, anybody else have any more 


-- anything on --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Anybody else want it? Any 


other Board members want it? 


 MS. MUNN: How long is it? 


 MR. ROLLINS: I'm trying to remember -- it's 


not that long, and it's got some test cases in 


the back that work you through the 


calculations. It'd take you about a day to 


read it -- and to absorb it. Maybe -- you, 


maybe half a day. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, send it to me. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, anybody else have anything 


else on two? 


 (No responses) 

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Let's move on to three, comment three -- Arjun? 


ATMOSPHERIC TEST PERIOD


 DR. MAKHIJANI: This relates to the same issue 


as abo-- but for atmospheric -- for testing 


workers. (Reading) Doses from large non-


respirable particles to GI tract and skin for 


workers in the early atmospheric test period 


have not been evaluated. Those doses could be 


high. Hot-particle doses also need to be 


evaluated for early drillback and other reentry workers during underground testing 


periods. 


And basically the response is split up because 


of different types of worker. One is that for 


-- for the atmospheric testing workers, I think 


the -- part of the issue, at least so -- is 


resolved because it's covered by the SEC. So 


far as the external dose is concerned it would 


seem to be approximately the same as for -- as 


for the reactor -- reactor test workers, except 


for reactor test workers there's actually a 


body of data there that you don't have, so far 


as I know, a comparable body of data for the 


external dose for atmospheric testing workers. 


Am I right about that? 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: Gene, for the reactor? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, you don't -- for the 


reactor -- for the reactor areas you actually 


have some empirical data and some measurements 


that were made by NRDL. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But you don't have comparable 


hot-particle data for -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: No, not -- not to my knowledge. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: To my -- yeah. 


 MR. ROLLINS: There's a -- there's a lot of 


data out there and I'm not saying it doesn't 


exist, but I haven't seen it yet -- nothing to 


the degree that they did for the reactor test. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay, so -- the -- this is kind 


of a complication of the external dose 


calculation, but basically we agree with the 


NIOSH response that it's largely covered by the 


SEC issue, and to the extent that you can 


extend your external dose calculation to cover 


it, it would be good. 


 NIOSH also agreed that in regard to accidental 


venting they're going to evaluate the hot-


particle question. And accidental venting did 


occur up to 1970 December, significant ones, 

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which the last one was the Baneberry test. 


And the last one is in regard to tunnel reentry workers, and NIOSH is going to look at 


that issue. And so far as we're concerned -- 


let me look at my comment here -- this -- yeah, 


basically the main issue for the non-SEC 


workers will be the ventings and the early 


drillback re-entry, and NIOSH has agreed to 


revise the TBD. So until then, we're kind of 


in agreement with the NIOSH comment. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Talking about early drillback, to 


my knowledge drillback didn't start till we 


started the underground testing. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And I -- I do not know the 


extent to which this might affect those 


workers. I think that would presumably be the 


first step in evaluating whether this is an 


issue that materially affects that set of 


workers or not. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I've seen the drillback 


operations. I have a DVD with me that shows 


one of the drillback operations and how it was 


done. They were very, very careful when they 

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did bring the samples to the surface in the way 


that they handled them and monitored, and I 


would presume it was done in the early days 


just like it was in the later years 'cause they 


did have the equipment when they started doing 


that. Yeah, that stuff when it came out was 


hot, handling it long distance and immediately 


put into (inaudible) and things of this nature 


and a monitor. I'd say you all ought to have 


all -- there ought to be all kinds of 


monitoring data. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Chances are there's quite a bit 


of record about that. There is a --


 MR. PRESLEY: If you can find it. That's the 


only problem. I know there was people there 


doing the monitoring every time I was there. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And they had -- at least at a 


certain period they had protective equipment 


and --


 MR. PRESLEY: Oh, yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- air -- air line, so -- so 


it's just a --


 MR. ROLLINS: But during the early drillbacks 


they didn't have blowback preventers. 


 MR. PRESLEY: No -- no, they didn't. Now that 

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they didn't. They didn't start the blowback 


preventers until --


 MR. ROLLINS: '66 I think. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, somewhere along in there, 


and they just stuck the drill in the ground on 


an angle and said (indicating), and I'd say 


that there was some venting -- had to be. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, you'd have to think that 


because that's probably why they put the 


blowback --


 MR. PRESLEY: Blowback preventers on, that's 


exactly right. 


 MR. ROLLINS: They had a couple of eruptions. 


I don't know what this stuff is coming up, but 


I don't want to be around it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, something starts coming out 


the hole, y'all run. 


Okay. Mark, do y'all have any comments? 


 MR. ROLFES: I don't believe so. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Anybody else have any 


comments on three? 


 (No responses) 


 Lew, you have anything? 


 DR. WADE: No. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun, you want to go to comment 

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four? 


ORONASAL BREATHING


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) Ingestion of non-


respirable hot particles by reactor testing and 


nuclear weapons testing workers due to oronasal breathing needs to be evaluated. 


And it's a little bit different than the oronasal breathing issue that we raised before in 


that it's sort of direct ingestion of large 


particles, not ingestion via the respiratory 


route. And NIOSH has agreed to evaluate that 


and warrants further consideration. So we 


would just await that response. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So that -- that will be 


forthcoming down the road. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I have a question. Are you 


going to cover this -- sort of meld this 


together with a module oro-nasal response? It 


seems to be somewhat of a distinct -- 


particular issue. Are you going to do a 


special thing on this? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The difference here being hot 


particles present in the non-respirable portion 


of the airborne. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So that essentially an average 


concentration measurement then would not 


adequately represent if there were hot 


particles present. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I would suggest it could 


be -- we'd have to have it consistent with 


whatever the oro-nasal solution is, but you're 


right, it would be a bit of a special case when 


there's a potential for hot particles, which 


would then not be -- you know, they would not 


be adequately represented by the average 


airborne concentration. That's the problem. 


 MS. MUNN: It would not, no. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So that -- that would have to 


be something of a special case and so there 


would probably have to be an addendum of some 


sort to the oro-nasal solution. 


 MR. ROLLINS: That would work back to the 


probability -- sort of NRDL sort of thing. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, probably in that sense. 


MS. BRACKETT: How does this differ from number 


two? I mean this is --


 MR. PRESLEY: That's what I'm wondering. 

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MS. BRACKETT: -- get into the GI tract? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, it's how the -- how many 


-- it's simply how many particles -- the route 


of getting into the GI tract. Number two is 


sort of the broader issue for reactor workers 


only in regard to evaluation of the doses, and 


this just raises -- two, three and four are 


really elaboration of the same issue, just -- 


they could have been 2a, b and c, it just was 


written up that way. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I was going to say, this -- that 


report ought to be -- I think it probably ought 


to roll comment two all the way through four as 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- one comment. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: Regarding the oro-nasal breathing, 


I -- it's been a while when it came up and we 


discussed it at Bethlehem Steel, and -- and I ­

- as I recall, I felt as if it was -- we're 


still a little bit in a fuzzy area about the -- 


the degree of agreement on that issue. As I 


understood it, ICRP has a standard model where 

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-- regarding how people breathe. The idea, 


though, that was brought up -- and I -- and I 


think it's a legitimate question -- is 


apparently there's a significant faction of the 


general public that breathes entirely through 


their mouth. Okay? And -- and please correct 


me again if I'm wrong, but I thought the issue 


had to do with when you're doing dose 


calculations for people that are inhaling 


radioactivity, do we simply adopt the default 


ICRP methodology on -- on the kinetics and 


behavior of particles and the breathing 


patterns of typical people, or do we take into 


consideration -- and the number I recall is 


something like 20 percent of the population 


actually breathe entirely through their mouth 


all the time, not just when they move into 


heavy lifting. And ag-- so -- and as I recall, 


there was still a -- almost a policy question 


that was at play here. 


Since the rules say use ICRP, in effect when we 


raised the issue -- hold the presses. There 


are a lot of people that breathe only through 


their mouth and that's going to change things, 


and I think it had a factor of two to five-fold 

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effect. I think that's the number -- depending 


on the particle size. 


 MS. MUNN: It was larger, though. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, it was -- it was relatively 


sm-- now --


 MS. MUNN: Significantly. 


DR. MAURO: -- are we back to that -- I mean 


are we still engaged in that and has that 


become subsumed and are we going to try to -- 


in other words, okay, we have that. Now we're 


going to fold into that the fact that now we're 


dealing with these large particles that will be 


coming in, and instead of coming in through the 


nose and behaving the way they behave, they'll 


be coming in through the mouth and behave the 


way they're going to behave, which changes the 


kinetics, I presume, and where they're going to 


be deposited and what the potential risks are. 


So I -- I guess I -- I'm putting something out 


-- rather than sort of like avoid it, not go 


back there again, I'd like to get everyone's 


sense about where we are and do we still have 


before us this matter -- are we going to 


deviate from the standard ICRP methodology for 


the way people breathe and explicitly take into 

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consideration the fact that some percentage of 


the American people breathe entirely through 


their mouth, or is that off the table? 


 MS. MUNN: That's exactly the issue that I was 


trying to raise earlier when I mentioned it. 


-- I have the same questions, and I would like 


to see us put it to bed, as a policy matter, 


once and for all. Unless one of the working 


groups, in accordance -- in agreement with 


NIOSH and with SC&A can bring such a 


recommendation to the Board, we're going to 


have to deal with this every time we come into 


a situation where airborne or resuspension is a 


significant factor in dose calculations. 


DR. MAURO: And this may be especially relevant 


here because we are dealing with a situation -- 


we're not just dealing with five micron AMADs 


and how they behave. Now we're dealing with 


the possibility that we have lar-- relatively 


large particles and -- and so it sort of gets 


confounded. And so until we put the first 


issue to bed, we really don't have anything to 


stand on. You see what I'm saying? 


 MS. MUNN: I agree. And in NTS, and I'm sure 


the same is true in Pacific Proving Grounds, 


I 
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other cases of that sort particularly, you have 


this double whammy that if -- if we keep 


beating this issue to death without identifying 


exactly how we're going to approach it, then I 


don't see how NIOSH can approach it in the 


absence of a real decision on the part of the 


Board because it is an unusual circumstance and 


we -- we probably all have different view of 


it. My personal view is to accept the ICRP 


data as being the standard from which we 


operate, but when we have special situations 


like this, an addendum of some sort is 


necessary to say in these cases we will do 


something slightly different. But in terms of 


trying to identify how many people are mouth 


breathers and how many aren't, I don't know how 


we can possibly do that with -- with this 


population that we have. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. I thought 


we put that to bed at the last meeting and -- 


and we said we would go with ICRP except on 


special occasions then that -- that NIOSH would 


go in and -- and take a look on a -- you know, 


a case by case basis. I thought that's what we 


decided to do. 

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I 

 MS. MUNN: On a site by site basis rather --


yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't -- I don't recall. 


don't recall the Board action. I don't -- I 


don't -- I am not really up to date on the 


discussions on oro-nasal breathing so I don't 


recall today. 


DR. MAURO: I'm sort of inclined to re-- I 


think this was actually during a full Board 


meeting --


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- and -- and I think that that -- 


but it for some reason is still a little fuzzy 


and whether or not that's -- okay, that's how 


it -- policy decision, this is ICRP, we're 


going that route. Arjun, I know that you're 


very interested in this, do you have 


recollection on where we are? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I have my notes from the 


Bethlehem Steel -- the discussion where this 


came up, and I could -- I have to find them. 


believe I have -- I have them in my file 


somewhere here. As I recall, the resolution of 


the Bethlehem Steel oro-nasal breathing was 


that basically it wasn't going to be resolved 


I 
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in the context of Bethlehem Steel, but NIOSH 


was going to prepare a generic assessment. And 


what I heard Stu say in -- in the present 


context of Nevada Test Site that you'd put some 


kind of addendum for the larger non-respirable 


particles 'cause this issue only came up in the 


context of respirable particles before and as 


it affected lung dose. And what we're talking 


about here are non-respirable particles as it 


might affect GI tract dose, so it's a little 


bit of a different question that needs special 


attention, but -- but I think can be covered in 


-- in the con-- general context of the same 


issue of oro-nasal breathing. 


DR. MAURO: It seems to me you have to resolve 


the oro-na-- I mean if the decision has been 


made as a poli-- because the science is there. 


There's no dou-- I don't think there's any 


disagreement around the table that yes, if you 


assume a person breathes solely through their 


mouth, and we all agree that there is some 


fraction -- I don't know if we'll agree on what 


that fraction is -- that this is what happens. 


We all ran the numbers. We know what the doses 


-- the differences are. They're not large, but 

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they're a factor of two. So it's not that we 


have a scientific disagreement here. We really 


have a disagreement on policy. Do we -- do we 


say well -- do we say now there's enough people 


out there in terms of percentage of population 


that breathe through their mouth solely that 


maybe we should deviate from the standard 


method and take -- give the benefit of the 


doubt and assign that to everyone, or no, ICRP 


is pretty clear. You follow ICRP. If we 


follow ICRP, it's the standard breathing and I 


think that we've got to put that to bed. Once 


that's put to bed, then we can go ahead and 


move on to this one. We can't move on to this 


until we put that to bed. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Here's what the Board and -- 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: This is Bob Anigstein. I'd 


like to make one -- a couple of comments on 


this. One is -- excuse me if I'm preaching to 


the choir, but ICRP models, the ICRP dose 


coefficients, are specifically designed, to my 


understanding, for regulatory purposes, to 


allow government -- governmental and other 


agencies to set dose limits, to set exposure 


limits to protect the general population. And 

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the usual criterion is it's the dose to -- the 


average dose to the critical group. And the 


critical group would, for instance, include 


mouth breathers and normal nasal breathers on 


say eight -- eight to ten -- eight to two 


ratio. So the average dose would not be 


strongly affected. But if we're dealing with 


individuals, then the model may not necessarily 


apply to all individuals and it would seem not 


unreasonable to make an exception. It's not 


questioning ICRP. They -- they did it for a 


different purpose. 


DR. MAURO: Bob, I'd like to add to that. I 


think when I-- when you look at ICRP, there are 


lots of compromises. They built a reference 


man. They have default kinetics for various 


transfer factors -- and I look to Liz because 


she probably knows more about this than anyone 


that I know of -- and there's uncertainty in 


all these parameters. And there's individual 


variability in all the parameters that go into 


the default respiratory tract model that's 


basically part of the I guess ICRP-68, 66. So 


the question becomes is this just one more 


parameter, perhaps a dozen parameters that -- 

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that define a reference man and woman, and are 


we sort of trying to tweak one particular 


parameter while ignoring all the others? You 


see -- because -- or is this one that's 


special? 


MS. BRACKETT: I was going to make that exact 


point, that nobody -- or very few people are a 


reference man and that's what we're using to 


assign all these doses, so that the question 


then becomes where do we draw the line -- 


DR. MAURO: Where do we stop. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- right, where do you stop. 


 DR. WADE: One very procedural issue. I've 


been given a note by some people who are 


listening on the line and -- and the request is 


that everyone who can, please mute your -- your 


phone so that your breathing and the background 


noise isn't heard by all. Apparently some 


people are having difficulty listening to us, 


so anyone who can, please mute, and then unmute 


when you have a comment to make. 


And then to the issue of what the Board has 


decided on oro-nasal breathing, that's 


something we can research over the lunch hour. 


I don't have the ability to do that right now ­
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- or Arjun, do you have it? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I do have my notes from the 


Bethlehem Steel resolution, and -- according to 


my notes, anyway -- it says SC&A and NIOSH 


agree that the effect of oro-nasal breathing 


would be small for Bethlehem Steel. So we 


decided to drop the issue in the context of 


Bethlehem Steel. And NIOSH will develop 


guidance with regard to this issue. That's how 


I think it was left by the Board. 


 DR. WADE: And Stu, are you -- are you aware of 


the status of NIOSH's development of -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I am not. I am not in -- have 


not been involved in that issue and so I don't 


know the status of it. 


 DR. WADE: Maybe we can find that out over 


lunch and report back to the group. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I could give that a shot. 


MS. BRACKETT: Dave Allen told me that Jim 


Neton had assigned someone to work on it, but 


didn't know any of the details. 


 DR. WADE: We'll give you a status report after 


lunch on where that is, and then both Robert 


and I have captured this as an issue we need to 


bring to the Board, along with the hot particle 

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issue, to try and get resolved. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. We've been going at it 


about an hour and a half. Does anybody need a 


break? It's now almost 11:30. Or do you want 


to continue and let's break at 12:00 or -- you 


could use a short break? Okay. I've got no 


problems with it. Ray said he needs a break. 


Why don't we break for ten minutes and come 


back at 25 till. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 11:25 a.m. 


to 11:35 a.m.) 


 DR. WADE: Okay, the working group's going to 


get back to business. Would the one person on 


the line identify that you can hear us? 


UNIDENTIFIED: I can hear you guys. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, good. Thank you. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay. Bob Anigstein. I'm 


okay. 


 DR. WADE: Anybody have any suggestions to make 


as to our etiquette in terms of conducting the 


conference call? 


 (No responses) 


Again, I would ask that you mute if at all 


possible. 


 Okay, Robert. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, we are through five; is 


that correct? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We're at five. 


DR. MAURO: We're at five. 


RESUSPENSION MODEL/FACTOR


 MR. PRESLEY: We're at five, all right. Arjun, 


you want to go ahead and kick off with the 


comments on five? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Comment five reads (reading) 


Resuspension model and resuspension factor are 


not scientifically defensible or claimant 


favorable due to a variety of factors. Doses 


may be underestimated by an order of magnitude 


or more. Mass-loading approach would be 


preferable for internal dose. 


And this is one of the areas -- so that's the 


end of the comment. But this is one of the 


areas where we do have a disagreement with 


NIOSH in terms of the NIOSH response. NIOSH 


did not agree that their dose estimates could 


be that much off. NIOSH again referred to the 


-- the paper by Anspaugh in Health Physics of 


2002. We did look at this paper in the process 


of preparing the review and felt that it hadn't 


been appropriate -- the research in the paper 

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hadn't been appropriately used in the site 


profile in terms of guidance for dose 


estimation. So I'm going to -- I'm going to 


just stop my comment there because John was 


really the point person for us in terms of this 


issue so I'm going to just leave the rest to 


him. 


DR. MAURO: Yes, the comment goes on quite a 


ways, and you captured basically it all. And 


you folks disagree, and we respectfully accept 


your disagreement. And I've been looking into 


this a bit. your -- in effect, what the -- 


what we're dealing with here is after 1962 


you've got people working at the site and there 


is radioactivity on the ground. And there are 


some 26 or so different areas throughout -- 


gigantic areas, big areas. You know, 50 square 


miles here, 200 square miles there. And 


correct me as I try to step back and -- the big 


picture. I'm saying okay -- and -- and there's 


this radioactivity that has built up on the 


ground from the above-ground testing that took 


place from '51 to '62. Now you've got this 


inventory -- okay? -- in each of these major 


regions. 

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Okay, then -- now you move into the post-'62 


time period. And now we have people on site 


doing all the different things that they were 


doing, including underground testing and -- and 


I'm visualizing that -- people go on site and, 


depending on the -- where they are, the amount 


of radioactivity that's in the soil could 


differ from one place to another. And the data 


are here, lots and lots of good data 


characterizing the activity in each of the 


different -- different regions. But remember, 


these regions are big. You know, 50 square 


miles or more. 


And people go there and the -- now the approach 


taken was okay, we know it's on the ground. 


Aerial surveys, I guess they were at -- lots of 


different kinds of surveys performed to 


characterize the radionuclide distribution in 


these areas and in -- and in the entire site. 


There's also data collected I believe after 


1971 on air sampling, I believe there may have 


been lots of air samples. Each region may have 


had its own sampler, and please correct me as I 


try to capture the big picture. So you almost 


could see as -- you got this gigan-- this -- an 

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area the size of a state, broken up into 


perhaps 26 or so different sub-areas. Each 


sub-area has been well-characterized in terms 


of -- by aerial sur-- flight surveys, also by I 


believe in situ jelly detection systems, and 


there's also an air sam-- I don't think it's a 


-- I think it's a low volume air sample, 


continually running all the time -- all the 


time -- collecting a sample of air. Okay? 


Now, there's your data. Okay? For -- okay, 


here's our start -- here's the rock we're going 


to stand on, and now we superimpose people, 


people are showing up now in these areas, and 


they're going to do whatever they do. And as I 


understand it, the way in which the dose is 


reconstructed to a given individual is to say 


okay, where was this person, as best we can 


tell, and on that basis -- and here's where I'm 


not quite sure exactly what was done. On that 


basis we're going to say okay, for this time 


period, this person -- and remember, this is 


after the SEC period so we are doing dose 


reconstructions now -- this person was located 


for this -- in this year at this location. And 


this location, remember, is this very lar-- by 

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-- when I say location, it's -- you know, 50 


square miles. And they take their best 


estimate of what they believe is the airborne 


radioactivity -- average airborne radioactivity 


in that sector over that year and assign it as 


being the airborne concentration to which this 


worker was exposed. Then they assume some 


standard breathing rate -- 1.2 cubic meters per 


hour -- and they assume the appropriate 


chemical form, I believe, to give the maximum 


dose to the organ. 


Now, the place I ran into a little bit of 


difficulty and -- in our commentaries has to do 


with averaging over this whole area, this big 


area, averaging -- just sort of sm-- as it was 


uniform area. And I'm not quite sure whether 


they depended primarily -- it -- it seems to me 


they had two sources of information for this 


guy. One is the air sampling that was 


collected, which was -- started I believe in 


the '70s. Of course now we want to reconstruct 


the dose to the guy from '62 to '70. Other 


words, there's this ten-year period where -- 


people were there, too -- where -- where I 


don't think you have the air sampling data. 

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And again, correct me as I go through my story 


-- so you really have really good air sampling 


data for these large areas, starting in early 


'70s. You don't really have it in the earlier 


years. So you have air sampling data. 


But then they do something else. They say 


well, we also know what the activity is on the 


ground from the aerial surveys and we could use 


-- another approach is don't let's use the air 


sample. We could theoretically als-- also use 


the resuspension factor approach. Now the 


resuspension factor approach is where Lynn 


Anspaugh comes in and the work he's done. And 


he basically has an -- a ver-- an -- his work, 


his research over the years demonstrated that 


for fresh fallout, which doesn't really apply 


here, you start at a resuspension factor of ten 


to the minus five. For those folks who don't 


play in the world of resuspension factor, this 


means that if you know how many picocuries per 


square meter you have, you multiply by the 


resuspension factor and you get picocuries per 


cubic meter. So it's picocuries per cubic 


meter per picocurie per square meter. It's an 


empirical relationship so that it's expressed 

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in per meter. All right? So you multiply the 


activity on the ground by a resuspension factor 


and you get the activity in the air. All 


right. So -- and in principle, that -- that's 


great. 


Now it turns out, though, that the resuspension 


factor equation changes as function of time. 


It starts at a very high level, on the order of 


around ten to the minus five for fresh fallout, 


because when it's fresh fallout it's very 


available for resuspension. As time goes on, 


the evidence is that it gets more and more 


worked in, then you go -- and this very nice 


curve going from one -- one times ten to the 


minus five -- this is a curve with -- the 


resuspension factor is a function of time. 


Okay? You -- all -- you can't see it, but you 


could -- you could basically visualize -- it 


starts at times zero, at ten to the minus five, 


then it drops like a rock over the course of 


days. Within a matter of ten, 20, 30 days, it 


drops down to ten to the minus eight, and then 


it goes down to ten to the minus nine, so the 


spread on the resuspension factor, based on 


this work done by Lynn Anspaugh, goes -- goes 

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from ten to the minus five to ten to the minus 


nine per meter. Okay? So we're talking four 


orders of magnitude. 


Now -- I'm sorry for going on, but I want to 


paint a picture. So -- but now there's also 


the concern that -- there's a perturbation on 


these -- on this very nice, clean line, and 


that is if a truck goes by, if it's windy that 


particular day, if there was venting from a -- 


a test, what's going to be airborne. So in 


other words, I -- I think this represents sort 


of like a baseline of what your best estimate 


might be of the resuspension factor averaged 


over large areas. 


But I'm more concerned about the fine 


structure. I think this is where my issue 


comes from is that well, if you go to any one 


worker who may have worked in a given location 


in a given year, averaging over this 50 square 


miles may not represent where he really was and 


his experience. Also, the -- in terms of the 


activity on the ground. And then on top of 


that, using the resuspension factor -- which I 


-- which is sort of like your baseline 


resuspension factor, but if there was a 

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91 

perturbation or lots of perturbations, the 


concentrations of dust in the air could easily 


be two to three orders of magnitude greater 


than the sort of baseline. If in fact you had 


a wind, a truck going by, there was some 


excavation activity going on, if there was 


certain venting going on, this would have no 


applicability at all. So my -- my problem is ­

- it's almost as if -- where my criticism comes 


in is your -- your -- the view of the 


inhalation dose to workers from -- from 


resuspension is a macro view, as if things were 


averaged over very large areas. But in 


reality, when you get down to an individual 


worker, what he really experienced is a local 


view of what was going on during the time 


period he was working at a very specific 


location or locations, certainly not averaged 


over 50 square miles. And where there were 


transients from day to day, depending on the 


anthropomorphic activities that were going on, 


where that resuspension factor may not work. 


So what -- what troubled me is -- is -- now I ­

- I -- I just in a -- in a couple of minutes 


tried to capture the sense that's commu-- that 

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I understood from reading the -- the report. 


And I've tried to communicate to you in a 


general sense why I think that there is -- you 


may not really be giving the benefit of the 


doubt to this particular guy. Maybe in the 


aggregate, if you were looking at 1,000 workers 


that worked in the -- at the site in a given 


year, it would sort -- maybe it will average 


out around there. But I'm concerned that -- 


what about the guys who might be at the high 


end. And if -- and if there's a way to make a 


distinction between those, maybe we've got a 


tractable situation. But right now -- I mean 


that's the -- it's a very common sense kind of 


argument and concern that I just presented. 


And I guess -- and in fact what we -- what Bob 


Anigstein and I did over the weekend -- Bob is 


on the line -- is Bob helped out by writing 


this up as -- and -- and -- what our concerns 


are, so I was hesitant in distributing it, but 


why not. So we've got a very crude write-up 


that Bob Anigstein prepared last night -- until 


about midnight perhaps -- and e-mailed it to me 


at 4:00 o'clock this morning. I brought it 


with me. I read it on the plane and I like it. 

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I said this is good. This tells a story that I 


-- the story I just told is -- is here. And in 


fact, Bob, if you -- if there's anything you'd 


like to add that you think would add value to 


the very general picture I painted, please do 


so. But in the meantime I'm going to go ahead 


and distribute this write-up for -- for -- you 


know, so you guys can go ahead and take a look 


at it. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yeah. No, I -- I think -- I 


completely agree with what you said, John. But 


to expand on it a little further, not only is 


the issue about assigning a site-wide -- a 


area-wide intake to each individual in that 


area -- as you say, the areas go from anything 


to a fraction of a square mile to, according to 


the TBD, 148 square miles, area 19. And I 


think that this is in stark contrast to the 


work and the conclusions for Bethlehem Steel 


where there were many air samples for each 


location and there was a lot of discussion and 


final resolution of which of those air samples 


or which group of air samples for a specific 


work location would be the limiting ones, would 


be the applicable ones. And here -- so there 

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you go from say one rolling mill -- one -- one 


roller, excuse me, one -- one roller was in 


that mill, having a different dust 


concentration than another roller. And here 


we're talking about, as you say, tens and -- 


tens of square miles being assigned a single 


value. So that does not seem to be in the same 


spirit. 


 Furthermore, when the -- according to the TBD, 


if the area -- if the worker was not assigned 


to a specific area or it could not be 


determined which area he worked in, he's given 


this site-wide average, meaning this whole 


Nevada Test Site is going to be represented by 


a single value for intake. And that certainly 


seems not claimant favorable. 


DR. MAURO: I'd like to add one more -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: Excuse me, that was not -- part 


of our response was that we were going to 


change the instructions in the TBD about which 


value to add under which -- under which 


circumstances, and I believe we agreed that 


that was not claimant favorable to do it that 


way and in our response we had a proposal to do 


it a different way. And I'd like to know if 

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you have a problem with what we are proposing ­

- the change that we are proposing to make. 


DR. MAURO: I should take another look at that. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: If you could -- could you point 


me to a page? Sorry, I -- I didn't pay 


detailed attention --


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, it's been a while since I 


wrote this so give me just a second. 


 MS. MUNN: I think it's page 11. 


 MR. ROLLINS: It should be very close to the 


end -- yeah, on page 11. 


 MS. MUNN: Page 11, I believe. 


 DR. WADE: Maybe you could just walk us through 


that approach. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I think -- I can -- could I have 


my -- my copy back there that I -- yeah, at -- 


at the very end of this discussion in the TBD, 


after the resuspension factor, there's a table 


down here that provides average and maximum 


intakes based on this resuspension factor and 


average and maximum concentrations in the soil 


across the site. And in my response I go 


through in some detail talking about how the -- 


the air sampling data supports this and is -- 

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it's not too far off, it might be a slightly 


overestimate or slight underestimate, but I 


think if you read through my discussion, it 


basically makes -- it makes a case that says 


the average intakes given in Table 4.2.2-3 are 


reasonable underestimates. And I think -- 


number one, they don't ever give an organ dose 


more than one millirem every year for any 


organ, so that's got to be an underestimate 


because we would throw them all out anyway, we 


wouldn't use them. Okay? So it's not -- it's 


not claimant favorable to use those and we -- I 


say that in my response, that we're not going 


to do that anymore. 


In fact, what I'm proposing in my response is 


that we will use the maximum intakes given in 


that table for -- and if the -- if the case 


goes compensable on that, then we will do a 


more detailed evaluation to determine if it's 


appropriate to give that level or some lower 


level, but only if it makes a difference in 


compensability, because for most cancers it 


would not. 


DR. MAURO: So -- so there's --


 MR. ROLLINS: There are a few that it would. 

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DR. MAURO: -- there's a -- there's a table. 
I 

know one of your tables has the ma-- the max 


numbers, yes. 


 MR. ROLLINS: That's it right there. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah and -- now when I looked -- in 


fact I did some calculations. When I looked at 


the table, what -- in effect -- to convince 


myself the maximum numbers represented 


reasonable maximum numbers, you look -- you 


look at the activity that's on the ground, pick 


-- if you pick the americium that was in 


location number 20, which was the -- I think 


one of the worst locations, area 20 -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: Area 30. 


DR. MAURO: Area 30 it was? Looking at --


 MR. ROLLINS: Which is a very small area -- 


DR. MAURO: Oh, yeah, okay, yeah, 20 was -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- very -- very inaccessible, by 


the way. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I -- I actually used 20. I ­

- I didn't even look -- see 30 down on the 


bottom there, I just saw 20. But any event -- 


and I did -- and I -- in fact I did some calc-- 


did some calculations to convince myself that 


we come in sort of in a way -- see, I'm not -- 

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are you using the resuspension factor approach 


or the actual measured airborne dust loading 


when you -- when you come at -- come up -- in 


other words, for the maximum numbers. 


 MR. ROLLINS: What I did, I used the 


resuspension, and then I compared them to the 


actual air monitoring data. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And in every case the 


resuspension, as I developed it, appeared to be 


claimant favorable 'cause it gave higher intake 


numbers than the actual air sampling data for 


those areas. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: That's -- that's using the 


resuspension of 1.3, ten to the minus eight. 


Correct? 


 MR. ROLLINS: Yes, I put in -- I put in a 


safety factor of ten. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And that's in that table that 


shows the maximum value. So I already 


increased it. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Are we still -- but -- but the 


comment made earlier still holds, that even for 


the maximum, it's simply the highest of those 

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20-odd areas, but it's still an area-wide 


value. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And I'll -- and I'll also make 


one more comment, and it's in my response, that 


if -- if someone were routinely exposed to 


those annual intakes, it would be detectable 


under the methods in use at the time by 


bioassay monitoring programs. 


DR. MAURO: But you were only looking at 


plutonium at the time. 


 MR. ROLLINS: That's right. 


DR. MAURO: And you're not going to see 


plutonium in urine unless it's really up there. 


 MR. ROLLINS: That will put it up there. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, so in other words, high -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: If you -- if you get those 


numbers every year, it will put it up high 


enough to where it should be detectable. 


DR. MAURO: That was one of my other com-- 


high-fired plutonium? 


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, this doesn't -- this is not 


super S assumption. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: All right. We're not -- we're 


going there in the future, but we're not there 

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yet. Okay? Under the typical models now used 


in IMBA, my calculations are they would have 


been detectable at their MDAs in use at the 


time, so if there was a widespread problem, 


they should have seen it. They didn't do a 


great deal of bioassay, but they did do enough 


that if there was a widespread problem, it 


should have been -- it should have shown up. 


MS. BRACKETT: This chapter --


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: But that neglects -- see, you ­

- you make the -- the one hand is favorable -- 


the claimant-favorable assumption that 


plutonium is type M due to the safety tests 


where they didn't actually explode a weapon but 


just -- I mean they didn't detonate a weapon, 


they -- they dispersed it, what we today call ­

- what we'll today call a dirty bomb. However, 


claimant favorable if you know the intake, you 


know how many becquerels were taken in, more of 


it goes to the organs if it's type M. However, 


the opposite, where you're looking for it in 


urine, if it's type S or super S, you won't see 


it in the urine at all, and yet it could be in 


the lungs. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, they -- they did do chest 

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101 

counting, as well. And we're not --


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: What is the lowest -- I'm just 


curious what the lower level of detection for 


plutonium-139 and 140 -- 239 and 240 is. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Give me a minute and I'll tell 


you. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: With the -- with the chest 


count. 


 DR. WADE: Is there somebody on the line trying 


to ask a question or make a comment? 


MS. BRACKETT: There -- I -- I just wanted to 


point out, I -- this is the environmental 


chapter, so this is only assigned to people who 


are not monitored -- unless this site is 


working differently than the rest, it's only 


used for people who were not thought to have 


had routine exposures to radioactive materials, 


just people who would have had background 


levels. And if the person had a job such that 


they would have routinely been exposed to 


radioactive material, then a full dose 


reconstruction would be done based on chapter 


five, the internal dosimetry chapter. So I 


just wanted to make sure that that was clear. 


And if they had bioassay, then this would not 

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apply. It would be based on their bioassay 


results. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I was more concerned that the 


-- in the end, the point that was made that 


well, if it was in fact much higher, we would 


have seen it in the urine, that's sort of like 


the final word and I would agree with that. 


That is -- yeah, you know, if you have enough 


bioassay data for these workers that -- that 


demonstrates that yes, this model bounds it, I 


would say yes to that. But -- and then in the 


end, where I came out was do you have enough 


data and are we pretty sure it's not super S. 


Because if it's super S, then that is not a 


validator. In other words, I don't think -- I 


don't think you -- you'll -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: Except -- except for the lung. 


Now --


DR. MAURO: If you did chest counting. 


 MR. ROLLINS: The chest count MDA for 


plutonium-239 was 7.3 nanocuries in 1993, and 


for --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: You've got a maximum intake 


here of plutonium-239 per year of 20 


becquerels, 20 times 30, that's about .6 

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nanocuries per year. 


DR. MAURO: And there -- would you say below 


the limit of detection? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So that --


 MR. ROLLINS: 7.-- well, for 239 is 7.3. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So I think it's well under the 


detection limit, at least on an annual basis, 


and then --


 MR. ROLLINS: But then it's going to continue 


to accumulate unless it shows up in the urine. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, but it has to accumulate 


for a lot of years before you'll be able to see 


it. 


DR. ROESSLER: What kind of doses do those 


levels give? Are we talking -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: They're in the response. If you 


look in the --


DR. ROESSLER: When you talk about -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- response, I have a table 


there that show. 


DR. ROESSLER: The numbers here look so little 


to me that I'm wondering if we're talking about 


something that really is important or if it's 


just -- you know, with regard to the actual 


doses people get, which would then result in 

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actual compensation, is this something that -- 


that's a really big, important thing, or are 


the doses so low that --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think there are a couple -- 


there are a couple of things to think about in 


terms of how much time do we want to spend 


hashing this out. One is exactly that, how 


high will these doses be. And the second is 


the point that Liz made, from a dose 


reconstruction standpoint, the environmental 


dose is applied to someone who is correctly not 


monitored. Okay? Not only not monitored, but 


correctly not monitored. And so that's when 


this kind of a dose would be added to that. So 


a person theoretically who is a -- and hands-on 


worker, whether it be a construction worker or 


whatever, working in a contaminated area would 


fall into the category of an exposed worker. 


And whether you had bioassay data for that 


person or not, you would have to do some sort 


of internal dose assessment for that person, 


either based on their bioassay record or some 


sort of coworker approach rather than an 


environmental approach. 


DR. MAURO: What about this time period from 

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'62 to '71 when -- and here's where I have to 


admit I'm not quite sure if I understood what 


was being said. There's -- wasn't there about 


a ten-year window where the data for these 


workers and -- not only air-- airborne samples 


but bioassay data for the workers outdoors, you 


didn't -- you have to somehow go with a 


surrogate, or do you have direct data? Other 


words, were all these -- there was something 


about sixty -- seven -- '62 -- '63 to '71 that 


was this hole, and I was worried that how -- 


you know, even with these methodologies and 


some of the limitations that I expressed 


concern about, then you were going to somehow 


apply that to the ten-year period before and -- 


so -- you could see that -- there were these 


confounding questions that -- that popped into 


my mind as I read it, and I'm hoping that the 


write-up that I distributed does a better job 


than I just verbally explained. And it may 


turn out that we're dealing with a problem 


that's a non-problem. 


DR. ROESSLER: That's what -- that's what I 


think we need to clarify --


DR. MAURO: And I'll be the fir-- I'm not sure, 

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'cause I didn't check -- although I noticed in 


your write-up you did mention a couple of 


places we're talking about less than one 


millirem and -- and --


 MR. ROLLINS: In the response there's a -- 


there's a table. Now that table represents 


integrated doses --


 DR. WADE: Could you point out the table? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: 13? 


 MR. ROLLINS: 13, yeah, the --


 MR. HINNEFELD: 13. 


 MR. ROLLINS: In fact the -- where we change 


our position on how we're going to apply those 


intakes is in the last paragraph on page 11, 


the last two sentences, which I agreed that it 


was not necessarily claimant favorable to give 


so we're going to give maximum, unless it 


affects compensability. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And we may still at that point. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And we may still at that point. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If we can't -- if we can't -- 


further than the maximum -- we'll use that, 


yeah. 


DR. MAURO: And your -- and your -- now the 


reason --

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 MR. ROLLINS: Now if you want to see -- excuse 


me. If you want to see what the impact of the 


doses would be, you go to these tables. Now 


understand what these tables are. These are 


30-year integrated doses based on ten years of 


intake at the concentrations given in these 


average and maximum table. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Which tab-- which page -- 


DR. MAURO: He's on page 12. 


 MR. ROLLINS: This is page 13. 


DR. ROESSLER: Table 2 is what you're talking 


about? 


 MR. ROLLINS: This is -- these are the maximum 


values and those are given in -- what's the 


number of the table? 


 MS. MUNN: Table 2. 


 MR. ROLLINS: 4.2.2-3, right. And so you can 


see by looking at these that -- there are only 


a few organs that are potentially affected that 


it could potentially affect compensability. 


DR. ROESSLER: In fact one of them's -- under 


plutonium-239 is ET, and I have to admit my 


ignorance of biology, what is that? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Extra-thoracic, respiratory 


tract. 

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DR. MAURO: Up here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Back of your throat. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


MS. BRACKETT: It's always ET-1 or ET-2. 


 MR. ROLLINS: It's always ET-1 or ET-2. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's probably ET-2. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And LNET is used for lymphoma. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, LNET is --


 MR. ROLLINS: LNET could be very important. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- thoracic lymph nodes, LN -- 


LNET -- actually LNET is the lymph nodes in the 


ET region. 


DR. ROESSLER: Oh, and they're the bigger ones, 


yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: LNTH is thoracic lymph nodes. 


DR. ROESSLER: So that's -- that's --


MS. BRACKETT: That's over 30 years, so that's 


not the (inaudible). 


 MR. ROLLINS: That's 30 years of dose from ten 


years of exposure. 


DR. ROESSLER: So it's a really maximum. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, it's up there. 


DR. ROESSLER: So what does that --


 MR. ROLLINS: That's a -- that's a reasonable ­
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- I wanted to get something that was -- okay, a 


guy worked out there for ten years, this is a 


30-year dose --


DR. ROESSLER: What does that mean in terms of 


compensability then? I mean if you took --


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, my experience, and I've 


done -- I've done a number of these cases. My 


experience is if you've got any kind of alpha 


intake and you've got a lymphoma that requires 


dose to the LNTH, it's almost always going to 


be compensable because the doses are so high. 


Doses to the lung, typically for a smoker, for 


it to go compensable, depending on if it has a 


reasonable latency period, you're talking 60 


rem to get a com-- to get a compensable case. 


DR. ROESSLER: And go back to the lymph nodes ­

-


 MR. ROLLINS: If it's -- if it's a non-smoker, 


it's going to be about half that. 


DR. ROESSLER: And what does it take for the 


lymph nodes for it to be compensable? 


MS. BRACKETT: It depends on the cancer type. 


 MR. ROLLINS: If it's a lymphoma -- I haven't 


done too many of these because usually -- 


usually when I've done them, the doses just go 

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astronomical. They go up in the hundreds and 


200 rem, so --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, the LNTH dose component 


is really high, so if you've got any kind of 


alpha internal exposure -- 


DR. ROESSLER: You're going to get a higher -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- chances are the LNTH will be 


high enough to make a lymphoma compensable. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And more than likely those 


individuals are going to be compensable before 


you -- before you even consider this. 


DR. ROESSLER: So I'm just trying to evaluate 


the importance of how much time we're spending 


on this particular topic. Is -- is this really 


significant or isn't, and I haven't heard any ­

-


DR. MAURO: Yeah, let me see if I could boil it 


down as I'm trying to see -- and looking at 


your numbers. What -- what I see is that the ­

- using the maximum concentration -- in other 


words, the maximum be -- in terms of what's out 


in the soil or whether -- and was -- air 


sample, reflects a particular location, whether 


either the air sample was collected for that 


year -- I mean in that reg-- 'cause I think it 

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was -- get this -- this 50-mile area, you got 


an air sample. Also you've got the 50-mile 


area and you've got these contours where, if 


you looked at the contours you see that if you 


average it there are going to be very large 


areas that are ten times higher. Okay? So --


now -- so we have that. 


So we realize that within this box that we call 


the area of interest where we're going to do 


this maximizing dose calculation, you do -- you 


do have the potential for some locations to be 


ten times higher. Whether or not the workers 


spent a lot of time there may be unplausible 


(sic), or may be plausible, I'm not sure. As 


we understand about it, I believe the air 


samples were generally taken where the workers 


were is the way the text read, so -- sort of in 


support of your argument, so it's unlikely that 


you're going to have a worker spending ten 


years at the worst contour location on a given 


location within the site. 


Then we have this -- okay, that -- that -- 


that's -- so we're talking about perhaps a 


factor of ten un-- using your method there may 


be a situation where a worker might have gotten 

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a factor of ten higher there. And then on the 


resuspension side, let's say we're talking the 


resuspension factor. You have to -- you -- now 


-- you went on the order of ten to the minus 


eight. Now I know that you're going to -- you 


know, that -- now -- I look -- I'm familiar 


with the resuspension literature and -- and it 


easily goes ten to the minus six under cert-- 


certain circumstances where there's 


anthropomorphic activities. And in fact you 


sort of get away from the resuspension factor 


approach and you go to the dust loading 


approach where you know the gra-- picocuries 


per gram. All I'm -- I guess all I'm really 


saying is that I've got all of these facets of 


the issue in my head right now. I'm looking at 


the doses and I ask myself is it possible that 


some of these doses for some worker might be a 


hundred times higher. And I guess if I could 


convince myself that no, that's not going to 


happen, and if it does happen it makes the do-- 


these are very, very small doses, they're still 


small, but the -- and the big doses that you 


have, they -- which are already compensable in 


accor-- to the lungs, the ET1 and ET2, they're 

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going to go -- if they go up by a factor of 


100, they're going to be even more compensable. 


I'm just trying to get to grips is the -- the ­

- the machinery that you're putting in place 


for doing the dose reconstruction for these 


workers, whether or not in the end we're -- you 


know, there's a significant possibility that 


some of the people are not going to get a fair 


deal out of this. And I'm not entirely 


convinced yet, although the arguments you're 


making are very compelling. That's where I 


come out. Bob, I know you had -- you looked at 


this --


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yeah, I'd like to add one 


comment to what was said about the lung 


counting. I did a quick calculation using the 


ICRP tab-- model, and the lung dose at 7.3 


nanocurie, which was the lower limit of 


detection, that corresponds for say one micron 


-- as example, one micron type S slow 


plutonium-239 gives a lung dose of over two 


rem. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, we -- we -- we -- we're 


hearing --


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intake, of course, but that does not mean it's 


two rem per year, because it probably -- I 


don't know what the resonance time is, but I 


don't know how long those seven nanocuries 


would sit in the lung. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Is that -- is that a 50-year dose 


that you --


DR. MAURO: That's a committed --


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: That's a 50-year --


 MR. ROLLINS: Okay, well, divide it by 50 and 


that's a rough estimate. 


DR. MAURO: Per year. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Yeah, per year, which is 


inconsequential to a lung cancer. 


DR. MAURO: And you --


 MR. ROLLINS: As far as POC is concerned. 


DR. MAURO: And you're talking 60 is what 


you're looking for as a thre-- to -- to get -- 


to get you over. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Sixty total. 


DR. MAURO: Tot-- total. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Between --


DR. ROESSLER: Say that again. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- between the intake and the 


date --

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 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Actually --


 MR. ROLLINS: -- of diagnosis. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: -- the one-year dose -- 50-year 


dose -- one-year dose is half of that -- if 


we're talking now about the overall, over one 


rem. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- be possible. 


 MS. MUNN: I don't think so. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And you wouldn't have an acute 


intake of 7.3 anyway. It would be over a 


period of time. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yeah, but the question is -- I 


mean the -- we probably can't do this on line, 


but the question is this 7.3 nanocurie 


detection limit would have to be -- if there's 


a chronic intake, this would have to be a fac-- 


would have to factor in the resonance time and 


see what kind of a chronic intake correspond to 


an av-- to a 7-nanocurie lung burden, which is 


a very different question than if it was a 


single episodic intake and you would count it 


shortly afterwards before there was any 


clearance. 


 MR. ROLLINS: We're going to run those numbers 


right now. 

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 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Excuse me? 


 MR. ROLLINS: We're going to run those numbers 


right now if you'll give us a minute. 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, not what he just said. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Oh, oh, excuse me. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we could pro-- we could 


propose this. I mean Bob's -- or John has 


provided additional piece of information. We 


could kind of lay out -- I think Gene did a 


good job in his response. We'll kind of 


organize it maybe slightly differently, say 


average based on this approach, maximum based 


on this approach, dust loading approach -- you 


know, gives us these various numbers. Measured 


concentrations were this and, you know, and -- 


and then -- and looking at this, see where we 


are on that, do some, you know, organ dose 


numbers at the various levels, propose some 


dose reconstructor instructions that would go 


along with this. 


DR. MAURO: I think we have a communica-- more 


of a communication issue here than a scientific 


disagreement. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think so. 


DR. MAURO: Because the information that's 

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contained in this report is complex. There's a 


lot of different information related to how you 


come at the problem, what data are using -- be 


used for what circumstances, and -- and as a 


result of that, I wa-- I walk away with a 


degree of discomfort that I tried to capture -- 


Bob and I tried to capture in the write-up. 


have a funny feeling the more we talk, the more 


we're going to converge and -- and see it the 


same way 'cause the -- the -- you know, so I -- 


I think we still have an unresolved issue, but 


I think that we have a path forward where I 


think as long as we can maintain our dialogue 


going on, I think we'll be able to be okay on 


this. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I agree. From a practicality 


point of view, what I was trying to do and -- I 


was trying to come up with something that 


everybody could agree was an underestimate and 


some-- and something that we could all agree 


was a reasonable overestimate that we could 


apply --


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- to keep -- to keep the dose 


reconstructions moving forward. 


I 
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DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And then in the very small number 


of cases where it affected compensability, then 


we sharpened the pencil. 


DR. MAURO: I guess the place where I'm coming 


out is I guess I'm not yet convinced that your 


representation of the max overestimate is in 


fact --


 MR. ROLLINS: And that's what we have to go 


back and work on. 


DR. MAURO: And -- and -- and by the way, you 


know, it may turn out you -- you did. But I --


I'd like to look at it a little bit more. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: There's just one other issue -- 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Also --


DR. MAURO: -- and I agree that the 


underestimate piece of it is actually an 


underestimate, so if you're -- like doing a 


minimum dose estimate, you add that -- that 


would be okay. But I think -- I -- I have an 


issue with regard to this -- the scientific of 


using resuspension at all and referencing the 


Anspaugh paper, because in his paper he says 


that resuspension coefficients should not be 

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used at times long after the deposition. And 


so we're -- we're talking about deposition 


during the atmospheric testing time, and then 


using resuspension coefficients for the 


underground testing time. So you know, many 


years and decades afterwards. And it doesn't 


seem very appropriate to do that. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I didn't disagree with that, 


after going back and reading what he wrote. 


think I even quoted something in there, but he 


also said, you know, if you've got air 


sampling, pay attention to it. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, right. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Which I did. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. So there's -- there's 


somewhere in there -- there's -- there's a 


scientific issue to be resolved about exactly ­

- justifying the resuspension approach that 


would be 'cause I think -- partly you did that 


in your response but -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: In your response did you comment 


on the simplified mass loading model that I 


used? Like -- look -- it appears that you did. 


I haven't had time to digest that. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, we did. 


I 
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 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, can I say something? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, please. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yeah. Yeah, we did -- we did ­

- did some algebra writing it, and there is I 


think a conceptual error or maybe a 


communication error that even using -- the 


statement is made in the response that the mass 


loading model is consistent with a resuspension 


factor of 1.3 times ten to the minus nine. We 


don't find that to be correct because above 100 


-- a factor of 100, and even used the upper 1.3 


times ten to the minus eight, the mass loading 


model gives you a factor of about ten higher 


concentrations. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I'll take a look at that. I'll 


look -- look forward to reading it. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And that's in the write-up. 


You should be able to check that. 


 MR. ROLLINS: That's good. 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: By the way, one thing I mentioned 


earlier, I spoke to Lynn Anspaugh 'cause it -- 


recognizing that I think the -- his 


contribution here could be very important, and 


his take on all this. I called him and asked 

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if he would be interested in participating, not 


realizing you had been in contact with him 


also. If it's acceptable to the -- to the 


working group, Lynn indicated that he would 


have no problem signing up as an SC&A associate 


and we could call upon him to participate in 


the ongoing dialogue and get his take on a lot 


of this. He -- his -- his reaction to me when 


I called was listen, John, you know, I read -- 


I read carefully the site profile and I read 


carefully your review of the site profile. And 


his reaction was I have some serious problems 


with the site profile, and I have some serious 


problems with your review of the site profile. 


 MS. MUNN: What an (inaudible). 


DR. MAURO: So that's the man you want, you 


know, that's -- anyway, he's -- he indicated he 


would be more than happy to work with us, or if 


you'd prefer for him to work with NIOSH -- I 


mean I think it's important that he be part of 


this process. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I agree. 


DR. ROESSLER: He should probably come to a 


future Board meeting. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, he -- he -- he asked is the 

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next meeting -- face to face meeting, is that 


going to be in Vegas? Yeah, he said I'll 


absolutely be there, but -- and the conference 


call -- I told him about the conference call 


meeting and certainly he said he'll try to be 


there, so -- you know, we're in the process of 


-- I wanted to first make sure the working 


group was okay with this -- like we brought Bob 


Bistline aboard as the expert on high-fired 


plutonium, Rocky Flats, I believe Lynn Anspaugh 


is the equivalent of that for resuspension 


factors at the Nevada Test Site and could help 


us bring closure to this particular matter. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Is that agreeable with the 


working group? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, yeah, he ought to be here. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: He's done so much work on it. Under 


whose umbrella, I don't know, but... 


 MR. PRESLEY: We'll let Lew worry about that. 


 MS. MUNN: Go worry, Lew. 


 DR. WADE: I will worry. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, let's see, we're through -- 


anybody have any more comments on five? 

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DR. ROESSLER: Could you summarize where we are 


on five? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, we've painted a couple of 


pictures here. 


 MR. PRESLEY: What I wrote down is I have an 


issue, the fact that SC&A and NIOSH do not 


agree on the findings and that what I wrote 


down was that NIOSH will comment -- will come 


up with some new information on this issue. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The next product is ours. 


We'll take what Bob has provided -- John has 


provided, Bob wrote -- and we will try to -- 


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: I have one more -- there's one 


more comment that -- in my write-up, and this 


is -- I looked at some other literature the 


literature that I had available to me on 


surveys at Nevada Test Site, and there was a 


aerial survey done by the Remote Sensing 


Laboratory, and the latest report I have -- I 


don't know if they've done later surveys, but 


it would be applicable to this time period -- 


survey was done on area 11 -- it was called -- 


also known as plutonium valley -- in January 


1982, published in June 1983. And they have 


this report. Mostly they just publish the 

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figures showing the isopleths of the -- of the 


activity concentrations, but for this 


particular one they went further and they did a 


analysis to estimate the total inventory on 


area 11, and they came up with a much higher 


value than what is reproduced in the TBD in 


section two in Table 2-8. Their value is 


higher by I think a factor of ten -- 


approximately a factor of ten for plutonium. 


Now, too, this is only one area. 


Then also they use a smaller area -- a smaller 


number of square meters for the area than is in 


the TBD, so if you put the two together, you 


end up with more than a factor of ten higher 


concentration in terms of becquerel per square 


meter. Now this is only one report and one 


finding, but it should be examined in light of 


the importance of the assigning activity 


concentrations. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, can you --


 DR. ANIGSTEIN: The reference is provided at 


the bottom of my write-up. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, can you go ahead and look 


at that with Tony and Mary and see the 


difference between that and then the rest of 

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the site and see if -- it may be that we do 


have a -- one site there that we need to break 


out. 


 MS. MUNN: Area 11, given the map that SC&A 


provided, looks as though it's a small area, 


but the site of a number of atmospheric tests. 


 MR. PRESLEY: It's a very small site. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Back over on the mountain, if I 


remember correctly. 


 MS. MUNN: Back over on the east side, right on 


the east border. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. It's actually at the foot 


of the mountain there, if I remember where it 


is. 


 MS. MUNN: SC&A page 53 shows it as several 


miles east of the control point on the east 


side of the Mercury Highway, right against the 


eastern border. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, about mid-way up the 


range. 


 MS. MUNN: Right there, yeah, show a number. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the next -- but the next 


product is ours. We'll prepare and -- what's 


been discussed here and take in -- and the 

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paper John provided, try to lay out not only, 


you know, our view of where -- where the 


numbers came from, the validity and also maybe 


a summary of dose reconstructor instructions 


and kind of dose magnitude, 'cause it's not 


clear to me really that this is -- this issue 


warrants months -- you know, months of 


discussion. You know, it may not, so -- but we 


-- that'll -- next product is ours, to address 


those issues. We'll provide that to all the -- 


all the working group members, as well as to 


John and whomever he wants to specify on his 


side. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I have 26 after, do we want to -- 


and we're getting ready to -- does anybody have 


anything else on five? 


 (No responses) 


Do we want to break for lunch before we start 


on this six? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mr. Presley, can we dispense 


with six, because I think we've already covered 


it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I think we have, too. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Because it's average air 


concentration when worker location is not known 

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is not claimant favorable. I think -- think we 


already covered that. Maybe we could go to 


lunch --


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- with one more under the 


belt. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. I have no problems 


whatsoever. Does anybody have any problem with 


dispensing with seven -- I mean with six, 


please, and starting with seven when we come 


back? 


 MS. MUNN: So is six going to drop off our 


matrix next time? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, we've --


 MR. HINNEFELD: No, it'll be part of... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- covered it, because it'll be 


part of the NIOSH... 


 MS. MUNN: It'll be covered in five. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well -- yeah, it'll be covered. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think, I don't know. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It'll be covered. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, in fact I 


think that -- yes, absolutely yes. 


 DR. WADE: How long for lunch, Robert? 


 MR. PRESLEY: How long does everybody want? 

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DR. ROESSLER: Depends on how busy the -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: You want to try it for 45 


minutes? 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Want to try to come back at 15 


after 1:00? 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, we'll break contact with the 


line, but we'll dial back in at a quarter after 


and we'll resume the working group session 


then. Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:30 p.m. 


to 1:15 p.m.) 


 DR. WADE: ...the working group conference 


room. We're about to begin. Can I have at 


least one person identify that you're on the 


line? 


 (No responses) 


Anybody out there? 


MS. CHANG: Chia-Chia Chang. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, thank you. 


(Pause) 


This is Lew Wade again. Could I ask if there 


are any Board members on the telephone hookup? 

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 (No responses) 


 Any Board members with us? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Stu, do you -- did -- were you able to 


get any information as to the oro-nasal 


breathing status? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, I -- I talked to Jim 


Neton, who's kind of the lead guy for this and 


we have actually placed a task order with the 


task order contractor to research the 


literature bases for the values in ICRP and 


other -- what other literature is there about, 


you know, oro-nasal breathing and the impact of 


that, with the idea that we should be able to 


develop some product from the available 


research about whether an adjustment is 


warranted or why the adjustment should be made. 


And that subcontractor -- that contractor's due 


date on their task is the end of August, so 


that would be -- now once we receive that, 


there may still be some work on our part before 


we feel like we even have a product able to 


deliver, so that's the time line we're on right 


now. We haven't set a schedule past the end of 


August for a deliverable back to the Board. 

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 DR. WADE: So I mean on the September Board 


agenda we'll probably touch on science issues, 


so at a minimum maybe you could give the Board 


an update on the status of that. If there's 


something to report, fine. If not, at least, 


you know, put something on the Board's scope as 


to what's coming. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think that'd be a good place 


for it since Jim would have to give that and 


not me, so... 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Okay, well done, sir -- as 


always. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Are we ready? 


 DR. WADE: We're ready. 


RESUSPENSION DOSES TO MONITORED WORKERS


 MR. PRESLEY: Let's start with comment seven, 


that's at the bottom of page 15. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Comment seven is (reading ) 


Resuspension doses to monitored workers, 


especially early re-entry workers, may be 


underestimated due to the presence of short-


lived radionuclides and higher resuspension 


expected in the days and months after a test, 


including safety tests. TBD does not specify 


procedures for estimating environmental 

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internal doses in such cases. 


 Now here again -- let me see what our response 


is. 


(Pause) 


This is your baby. 


DR. MAURO: Partially, yeah. Well, we're in --


bear in mind now we're in the -- the SEC time 


period during atmospheric testing. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, I don't think so. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, early re-entry -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, yes, yes. 


DR. MAURO: -- so -- so -- so within that 


context -- and I believe the relevance of this 


has to do with okay, performing -- the internal 


aspect of it I guess is a non-issue, if it's 


during the -- so the only aspect of this would 


be dealing with external doses -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No --


DR. MAURO: No? Okay, help me out. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- no, it's that -- it's the 


safety tests --


DR. MAURO: Oh --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- aspect --


DR. MAURO: -- oh --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- that is remaining, but maybe 

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we covered that already. Did we cover the 


safety tests aspect? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we -- we spoke briefly 


about this, but let's -- let's go down this 


issue a little bit. It sounds like the issue 


reads to me that you have -- for your -- 'cause 


it talks about monitored workers, so monitored 


workers who have bioassay, and the question 


arises were the bio-- was the bioassay done for 


the short-lived radionuclides or what -- you 


know, bioassay was done for a certain set of 


radionuclides, but there may have been short-


lived components -- like for drillbacks -- am I 


getting this right? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- that wouldn't -- you know, 


the bioassay tests wouldn't be done for. Is 


that the nature of the comment? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, actually, you know -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, that -- the first bullet -- 


yeah, the answer is yes. I'm looking at the -- 


the summary, and that's what it says, that you 


would -- the relatively short-lived 


radionuclides such as sodium-24 and neptunium239 could be missed. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: But I think it relates to the 


atmospheric testing time. 


DR. MAURO: It is the atmospher-- I guess I 


didn't -- does the SEC distinguish between 


exposures from aboveground tests from the 


nuclear weapons tests versus these other safety 


tests or --


 MR. HINNEFELD: The -- the SEC -- any -- any 


internal exposure before the end of 1962 we 


don't feel reconstruction -- 


DR. MAURO: So it doesn't -- doesn't matter 


whether it's --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- so if these -- if these 


safety tests occurred before the end of 1962 -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay, so that's not a 


distinguishing factor then. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- then we would not be -- we ­

- not feel we could reconstruct those. 


DR. MAURO: And -- so that being the case, I 


guess I'm not -- I have to say I'm not quite 


sure whether we have an issue here. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: Unless I'm misreading your 


response, 'cause there is a response here that 


gets into some -- it mentions of course due to 

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the pending SEC, but then it goes on a little 


bit further during the safety tests and other 


radionuclides, and I guess my -- my question 


is, as long -- as long as it's universal, pre­

'63 internal doses are off the table. Then the 


only issue would be external doses, and that 


would of course include skin dose and external 


whole body dose. So maybe we don't have an 


issue here. Help me out. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I -- I think that you're 


right. I'm looking at our site profile review, 


just to see what -- what the detail of the 


matrix item was. Sometimes it's not clear from 


the one sentence what you were talking about. 


And we were -- we were referring to the 


atmospheric testing period -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- so the internal dose part of 


that is -- is a non-issue. I didn't actually 


go back and verify that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So -- and then -- then the 


other radionuclide question doesn't enter into 


the safety test question 'cause there you've -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- primarily got plutonium. 


 MS. MUNN: So we can say SC&A accepts NIOSH's 


response? 


DR. MAURO: That's my sense here -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: For number seven? 


DR. MAURO: -- for number seven. Now I mean I 


-- because it appears that we're -- the SEC era 


it's -- covers this and -- and this is all 


internal. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Except the safety test question 


is still sort of pending. In prior items five 


and six there was this question of resuspension 


factors and so on, and that's going to be 


covered. There's a safety test resuspension 


item under the prior, but not under this. 


 MS. MUNN: Not under this. 


DR. MAURO: But -- but this --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No new item. 


DR. MAURO: I'll say it again. But the safety 


tests, if performed pre-'63, are captured by 


the SEC. That's clear. It's only the external 


portion that's at issue here. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Weren't there post-'63 safety 

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tests? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There was one -- there was one, 


on the Tonopah Test Range. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So -- but that -- that one --


 MR. ROLLINS: That's the one that we said we 


would -- we would pay attention to. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, got it. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, that's why I thought it 


was still pending from the prior comments. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I haven't run into one of those 


cases yet, but I'm sure I will sooner or later. 


 MS. MUNN: Probably. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And this is area 11? 


 MR. ROLLINS: No, no --


 MS. MUNN: This is --


 MR. ROLLINS: -- this is NTS. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Comment eight? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Any comments? Give Arjun just a 


minute, he's --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I'm just correcting my 


notes here so. 


(Pause) 


1967 EXTERNAL DOSE DATA


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, issue eight? 

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137

 DR. MAKHIJANI: Issue eight -- issue eight is 


(reading) Use of 1967 external dose data for 


1963-'66 is not claimant favorable. There were 


no tests in 1967 with measurable offsite 


fallout. Relatively short-lived radionuclides, 


which were likely present in 1963 to '66, would 


have substantially decayed away by 1967. 


So this -- NIOSH's response on this is that 


this would only apply to maximum dose 


reconstruction for non-compensable cases 


because everybody else was monitored. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think from the -- from 


the theoretical basis, since everybody wore a 


film badge, you wouldn't necessarily include 


the environmental external 'cause they wore 


their film badge, it would capture that as well 


-- you know, all of it, so --


DR. MAURO: Now for unmonitored workers, you go 


with Proc. 60, which came out recently. Is 


that... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, for Proc. -- there won't 


-- our belief is there won't be any unmonitored 


workers from '63 to '66 because universal 


badging started in about '57. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, external -- external dose 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: Externally, right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- data you're -- well, the 


question I had about -- about the -- assigning 


a maximum dose, you know, for the purpose of 


compensability, there should be kind of a -- a 


scientific rationale for it. And I think the 


present rationale doesn't address the issue 


that you had no -- you had no tests with 


measurable offsite fallout. So '63-'66 was 


worse than '67, arguably, in terms of external 


dose. If you're going to assign something, you 


need to find a way to assign something from the 


time when there were -- when there were higher 


doses, rather than from '67. And I think it's 


the same thing in the next -- in the next 


comment, actually. Yeah, it's -- the next 


comment is similar. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the -- I guess the -- one 


thing we might propose is just changing the 


instruction to the dose reconstructor if it's 


after '57 since everybody was badged, that 


there's no need to put in environmental 


external. Which would be -- that's to be our 


normal approach --

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and say that, you know, 


regardless of whether you're doing a maximizing 


or not, just -- there's just no need to add it. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I -- I actually think 


that it's better to have something that's 


scientific -- if you throw in something that's 


not scientifically defensible and has a problem 


in it, and then you're removing the dose when 


you're doing -- it kind of -- it's like the 


high-five thing, in some ways it gets messy. 


And if it -- I mean if we had data for 1967 and 


you were adding it, I would say okay. But in 


this case you've got a number that I don't -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There's no --

 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- I don't think is very 

defensible. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: But -- and -- but we all kind 

of -- we all agree, don't we, that there's no 


particular reason to add environmental external 


to someone who wears a film badge all the time 


'cause they get their film badge at Mercury, 


everybody got their film badge at Mercury 


starting in '57, I don't see any particular 


reason to add external environmental. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: I agree with that. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, but Proc. 60 says starting 


from '64 you add 123 millirem a year, and I 


wasn't quite sure what -- where this all -- how 


that mapped, how that merged. I was reading 


that. There's a table -- look at tables of -- 


of --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: -- deal-- dealing with the -- you 


know, when you -- 'cause -- because whatever 


the monitored was on the worker, the record 


some-- for some sites they subtracted -- and 


you've got to add it back in. I was wondering 


whether -- I'm -- I'm not sure how mechan-- 


mechanistically it'll work, but it's rare you ­

- in other words, you've got mon-- you've got a 


worker, you've got monitor data before workers 


were monitored, but meanwhile I read Proc. 60, 


it starts in '64 or '63 -- '63, and it gives -- 


here's -- I think the number was 123 millirem 


each year --


 MR. HINNEFELD: For NTS? 


DR. MAURO: -- for NTS. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: And I wasn't quite sure what, you 

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know, this -- given this conversation, how that 


sort of comes together. I may have it wrong, 


but I seem to recall that. 


 MR. ROLLINS: But that was captured -- what 


we're saying is yes, that -- that is some 


reasonable approximation of the ambient at the 


site --


DR. MAURO: Yes, sure, 123 millirem a year. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- but -- but what we're saying 


is that was captured by the film badge. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, and there's no need to add 


that back in. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Correct. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, it wasn't apparent that that 


was the situation. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Originally those numbers were 


developed to add in for those people that were 


unmonitored, but since everybody's monitored 


since '57, there's no need to do that. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, and before '56 period, 


would you retain that for the before '56 period 


for the non-compensable cancers or how would 


you do that? Oh, no, so we're just talking '63 


-- sorry, I don't know what I was -- 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Sorry, we're talking about the 


'60s. No, I -- I agree that, you know, if it's 


only to be assigned for -- I don't know if John 


agrees so it's sort of real time resolution 


here and there doesn't seem to be any -- any 


reason to add in a dose for -- 


DR. MAURO: No, I --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- unmonitored people -- 


DR. MAURO: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- for uncompensable cases, and 


then if you have to do it, then you take it 


away, it just makes -- I think it makes 


everything much more messy. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So SC&A agrees with --


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I think -- I think -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: But this is our -- response 

hasn't been --

 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- this response would have to 

be changed. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We are amending our response 

here to say that we'll change the instructions 


to the dose reconstructors just to say that 


from -- for the universal badging period when 


people badged and we've gotten information 

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about what they (inaudible) with control 


badges, et cetera, so it's -- there is no need 


to add that environmental at any point from the 


universal, and just make that the general 


instruction, regardless of dose reconstruction. 


DR. MAURO: When I read the site profile on 


this during that time period, apparently the 


mon-- though universal, there was an awful lot 


of problems with the degradation of the badges 


from heat, humidity and their being destroyed ­

- in other words, there wa-- and -- there was a 


lot of that. So though there was universal 


badging, there might be an awful lot of workers 


whose badges were not readable and usable. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think -- another issue 


-- I mean we're getting in -- we'll get into 


issues I think in a -- later in your report 


about the dosimetry record -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and the quality of the 


dosimetry record. And so we can maybe -- 


DR. MAURO: That's the -- we'll deal with that 


then? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- capture that at that point. 


DR. MAURO: Sure, okay. Okay. But given that 

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you've got -- other words, what you're saying, 


given that you've got a sound set of -- of film 


badge dosimetry for this time period, use it. 


And there's no need to add in -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, don't add back in 


environmental external. 


DR. MAURO: -- don't add anything in because it 


wasn't subtracted. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Got it. 


 MS. MUNN: And how will we know when you've 


issued those instructions? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I'll let you know. 


 MS. MUNN: Good, thank you. Then we can take 


that one off. 


 MR. CLAWSON: But we are going to talk later on 


about the film badge reliability. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, it's on here. I'm sure 


it's in here. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Anybody have anything else about 


comment eight? 


 (No responses) 


EXTERNAL DOSE DATA ’68 TO ‘76
 

Okay, let's go on to comment nine. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Comment nine is pretty similar. 


There's no environmental -- (reading) Lack of 


environmental dose -- external dose data for 


'68 to '76 is puzzling. TBD has not specified 


an approach estimating external environmental 


dose for this period. Venting in the 1968-'70 


period likely made external dose in that 


period, and possibly beyond, higher than 1967. 


So your response was the same, and I guess the 


resolution would be the same? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's what I believe would be 


the resolution is that external environmental 


doesn't need to be added back anyway. 


 MS. MUNN: It's captured by the badge. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. 


DR. MAURO: You're going to have to help me out 


a little bit. Now -- okay, we -- what we're 


saying is there's this time period where you 


don't have TL-- you don't have film badge 


readings. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Environmental TLD. 


DR. MAURO: Right, these are -- these are 


environment-- these are workers in -- that -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, you have the worker data, 


but there's no environ-- like the envir-- area 

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-- area monitoring external dose data are 


missing. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And -- and we don't know why. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. But then when I go to Proc. 


60, I see the standard hundred millirem -- I 


think it was 123 millirem per year. But the 


issue here is this business of venting, which 


could be transient situations where exposures 


could be --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Not --


DR. MAURO: Help me out a little bit, maybe I'm 


misunderstanding. In other words, I don't see 


Proc. 60 solving the problem. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: But I mean if you're -- a 


venting -- if the person's badged, will be -- 


DR. MAURO: You've got it. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- you know, will be measured. 


DR. MAURO: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And the --


 MR. PRESLEY: I mean this is in the 1960s. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the approach is that, you 


know, we have a badge record for each person. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, so lack of environmental but 


you've got the badge -- okay. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay? 


DR. MAURO: Okay, that's... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So the external -- the internal 


dose would be an issue, but not -- not the 


external dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: You mean from the venting? 

Yes. 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 

PRE-1963 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL DOSE


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, comment ten? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) TBD does not provide 


any guidance for pre-1963 external 


environmental dose. Issues relating to 


unmonitored workers, as well as time of entry 


into contaminated areas, could be important. 


And I think this is sort of captured by the SEC 


petition, except --


DR. MAURO: This is external --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, this is external dose. 


DR. MAURO: This is external, though. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, so from '57 on, you're 

okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: From '57 on we think we're okay 

with -- with the badge record. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So this is the same as the 

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prior comment, and then you need a coworker 


model for '56 --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- up to '56. 


DR. MAURO: We agree to that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Through '56? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: It's not -- it's not there in 


the response --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's not there now, but we 


agree we need it. Right? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- but --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Isn't that right? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Need a coworker what now? 


DR. MAURO: For the worker model -- well, for 


pre-'57. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Coworker or source term or 


something like that. 


DR. MAURO: Some -- some way to capture -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Some method, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- plausible upper bounds. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Coworker -- coworker is 


preferred, source term might be feasible. Area 


survey might be -- survey data. 


 MR. ROLLINS: There was personnel data back 


then. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Up to --


 MR. HINNEFELD: '57. 


DR. MAURO: 1957. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- 1957. 


DR. MAURO: I guess that's '51 to '57? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: That's important. 


 MS. MUNN: This is going to require a change to 


the TBD. 


DR. MAURO: So far, of all the issues we've 


discussed -- I mean just to give a little 


commentary -- I think that the point being made 


-- some of these internal issues that we -- you 


know, some of the other issues we talked about 


before, but this sounds like a big one. That 


is, these people -- in theory during those time 


periods -- could have experienced some 


substantial exposures. And the co-- how you 


come at the coworker model -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- is going to be very important. 


In other words, if you're saying where's the 


big ticket item here that could really have an 


effect on dose reconstruction, here it is. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And this is -- yeah, this is 

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pre-'57 external, we really -- 


DR. MAURO: Pre-'57 external. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- want to try to come up with 


a way to do that. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, this is a hot one. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I put down '51 through '57. Is 


that correct? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah -- '56. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah --


 MR. PRESLEY: All right, it's up to -- should 


be '51 through '56, right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Correct. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Through '56. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mr. Presley, I think it might 


be somewhere in between -- it might be 


something like April -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, it says April 1st '57 is the 


cutoff point. That's what the response says, 


so -- so some -- so before April 1st, 1957 is 


when there's a lack of data. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Anything else on comment 


ten then? 


 (No responses) 


 Okay, comment 11? 


CORRECTION FACTORS
 
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 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) Correction factors 


for external environmental dose due to geometry 


of organ relative to badge, and angular 


dependence of the dose conversion factor need 


to be developed. 


NIOSH split this into three -- four parts, I 


didn't remember there were four parts. The --


on the first part, in relation to geometry, the 


-- the location of the badge versus the organ 


for which calculations are done, NIOSH agreed 


to develop correction factors for lower torso 


organs, and we agree with that. And also 


agreed that the geometry -- other geometry 


factors, angle of incidence and dose conversion 


factor needs to be fixed. I think there's been 


an extensive discussion about this before in 


relation to the procedures, so we also agree 


with that. 


 And NIOSH also agreed time -- time of entry 


into contaminated zone is important. This is 


partly covered by a prior discussion about the 


radionuclide list, so this is a repeat of that. 


I -- I had one question about the NIOSH 


response to 11c, which was when minimizing or 


provid-- the last -- second last sentence in 

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11c, which is (reading) When minimizing or 


providing a best estimate -- providing a best 


estimate dose, the photon energy range 


assumption is 24 percent in the 30 to 250 keV 


range and 75 percent greater than 250 keV. 


Now I didn't see where the 25/75 split came 


from and why it should be regarded as claimant 


favorable. Is there some sort of fission 


product analysis basis for that, or... 


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, four years ago I remember 


doing a little bit of work using the Harry 


Hicks* documents that -- time dependence, and 


that may be where that came from. 


DR. MAURO: It's a very tractable issue, but as 


-- whether or not that's correct or not, I 


can't speak to it, but the information is out 


there in the literature to determine if that's 


correct. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Now from a IREP point of view, we 


could go 100 percent greater than 250. That 


would be absolute minimizing -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- as far as energy distribution 


is concerned. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 

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 MR. ROLLINS: Now my opinion is it would make 


very differen-- it would make very little 


difference in compensability on a case that's 


from the actual cases. So rather than doing a 


huge study of this, I would -- I would just 


say, for minimizing, go to 100 percent rather 


than 250, and then there's no issue. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah -- no, for minimizing I 


think it's all right. I think that's -- 100 


percent greater than 250's okay. It's sort of 


the best estimate -- is your best estimate 


claimant favorable with a 25 to 75 split, and I 


think that does need some kind of -- a Hicks 


table justification would be fine, but -- but I 


think you do need to show that -- that -- that 


you're covering all reasonable times of entry 


with that split, and that you remain claimant 


favorable in a best estimate dose. I'm not 


saying it's wrong, I just think -- I just think 


that it needs some -- some technical basis, 


which -- which isn't -- that I don't see right 


now. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: All right, we'll provide that. 


DR. MAURO: Am I correct, the -- the lower the 


energy distribution, the more important this 

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issue of angle inci-- angle of incidence and 


badge location becomes, because the difference 


-- the effect of angle of incidence is much 


more profound when -- and the -- and the -- 


where the badge is, relative to the organ of 


concern, if you're dealing with lower energy 


photons, so they -- they -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We don't have our external 


dosimetry expert in the room -- 


DR. MAURO: I don't -- I seem to recall it came 


up on another subject. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Jack was on the phone. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Got a bunch of internal 


dosimetrists -- is Jack on the phone? 


 MR. ROLLINS: He was. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Jack, are you on the line? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. I don't know -- I don't know for sure. 


Film was kind of a funny thing, and low energy 


photon over-responds --


DR. MAURO: It over-responds, but then you -- 


yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and then when -- and even 


when you depart from a 90-degree angle on film, 


since the track -- the photon track through the 

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emulsion is longer, you actually have a higher, 


you know, response to the film for a little bit 


until -- unless you can end at that. So film's 


a funny thing in terms of how it reacts to the 


photons -- photon energy. TLD, I don't know if 


you'd have the same situation. 


DR. MAURO: I -- I guess the point that is when 


-- when we look into this matter of energy 


distribution and what's claimant favorable and 


what's not, I think it's confounded by the 


issues related to angle of incidence and where 


the fil-- where the organ -- target organ is 


versus where the film badge is worn. They sort 


of all play on each other in -- in ways that 


right now I guess is not self-evident. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. Right. 


 MR. FIX: This is Jack Fix --


DR. MAURO: Good. 


 MR. FIX: -- calling in. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Jack, could you hear our 


discussion about --


 MR. FIX: Yeah, I'm sorry, I had trouble with 


my mute button. I had it on. Yes, I did, and 


it is -- it is problematic, as this discussion 


indicated, and that's why laboratory studies 

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were done in which dosimeters placed on a 


anthropomorphic phantom were rotated in 


selected beams. It was done here at Hanford 


with the different historical dosimeter 


designs. All of the Hanford designs were 


placed on phantoms and rotated in selected 


beams. Those -- unfortunately, those 


particular beams were a little higher energy 


than -- so they were 100 keV and higher, and 


the International Agency for Research on 


Cancer, when they did their 50-country study in 


a paper that should be coming out before long, 


they did a similar study in which they placed 


dosimeters -- personnel dosimeters, in this 


particular case, ten widely-used designs used 


throughout the world, and they did laboratory 


studies at the Medical Radiation Physics 


Laboratory for the International Agency for 


Atomic Energy. And both of these studies had 


the same results, and that is for the energies 


that were used and then lowest energy used 


there by the international study was 80 -- 


essentially a narrow X-ray beam of around 80 


keV effective. And all this showed is that the 


-- and they used isotropic and rotational as 

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well as anterior/posterior orientation, and all 


these showed that the film would significantly 


over-respond to the delivered personal dose 


equivalent for that geometry. For example, in 


a rotational geometry, that the dosi-- the film 


dosimeter -- interpretation greatly 


overestimated -- significantly overestimated, 


say by about a factor of three -- the actual 


dose. 


 Now there's still concern at low energies. You 


know, like say 17 or -- but a-- but again one 


has to pay a great deal of attention to the 


actual exposure scenario because as the pho-- 


as the energy gets lower, non-homo-- nonuniform exposures are significant, but the 


range is so much lower so usually you're 


worried about people that are working directly 


with -- with the material. 


So it's complicated and that's why we did the 


laboratory studies, and we didn't -- it wasn't 


feasible to cover all energies, but that's what 


the results showed. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So with respect to our response 


on the apportionment of photon energies, which 


is where we started, it -- it may be well -- 

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that apportionment may well affect angular 


adjustment and those type of things, and we 


will I think go ahead and provide some sort of 


backup for a best estimate split that's 


something -- you know, some sort of best 


estimate --


DR. MAURO: It sounds like you have the 


wherewithal and ability to -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think there's -- 


DR. MAURO: -- to -- to run this to ground. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think there's data out there 


probably that will allow us to do it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So y'all are going to provide an 


explanation of the 25/75 split or a best 


estimate split. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, some sort of best 


estimate split. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And then the last item in 11 is 


this data integrity issue, is sometimes workers 


did not wear their badges when the quarterly 


dose limit was near three rem. Now that's the 


same as a full comment, the comment number 20, 


and we concurred there or here, but the NIOSH 


response that they can't find a way of 

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retrieving the missed data, and since -- and 


you can't do core dosimetry, the -- the basis 


of the response that NIOSH will investigate 


this, along with DOE complex sites where 


similar claims have been made, I -- I disagreed 


with that approach of investigating this. You 


know, there -- there are -- there've been of 


course statements made about Rocky Flats and 


other sites, and I'm aware of that. But in 


this particular case, you had very senior 


health physics officials who personally have 


testified to what was going on, so -- so I 


don't think it's sort of like an affidavit or ­

- I think it's in a completely different class. 


It's in a class like when you brought -- I 


forget her name, the -- the paper by the person 


who was involved in the monitoring at Bethlehem 


Steel, or you had brought Mr. Breslin to say 


how they did things when they actually did the 


monitoring. It's -- it's of that -- so it's 


truly -- you know, I'd say almost a report 


prepared by an expert. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And so I actually think that 


you can't put this particular thing in the same 

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box and say --


 MR. HINNEFELD: As Rocky Flats. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- we -- as we've been 


approaching Rocky Flats where you take an 


affidavit, you go to the worker's record and so 


on. Here you've got somebody who was there 


throughout the testing period, and it was 


corroborated independently by people who are 


still there who are part of the DOE and -- or 


DOE contractor system, and so it had two 


independent corroborations from pretty senior 


health physics people. So I don't think this 


is the right way to deal with it. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there's another way that 


we're looking at dealing with this, and it 


really depends upon can we get the dataset in a 


good re-- in a good fashion, you know, a good 


robust dataset, because a distribution of the 


exposures, if you have all the -- all the 


readings, exposure shows you some particular 


distribution. And if there was a practice of 


shielding your badge so that you wouldn't 


exceed a limit, then at the top end of your 


distribution, instead of carrying out, it 


should roll over because people were not -- you 

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know, they were not badging themselves and so 


they wouldn't get six rem, they're going to 


stay down here at three. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. So in that sense, there 


may be a way to reproduce those. You know, to 


produce that distribution, that probability -- 


or that -- yeah, probability distribution, 


observe that rollover and -- and -- and 


extrapolate how much of an adjustment is 


necessary to these people who were in this 


position. And then that could theoretically be 


applied to people who have significant dose and 


therefore were legitimately in those candidates 


who may be extending -- who may be exceeding. 


So there'd be some threshold probably you would 


choose to apply this adjustment to, something ­

- people above this dose number would do it. 


So far, this is theoretical. Okay? And do --


is the dataset complete? I don't know. 


DR. MAURO: So -- so we have a worker and -- 


the scenario goes like this. He does not want 


to exceed three rem recorded. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: It's not in his interests, let's 

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say in theory his fin-- economic interests. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Now he's badged weekly, monthly or 


quarterly? If it's quarterly, then it becomes 


almost like a non-starter. I mean if it's 


quarterly, it's --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, you --


DR. MAURO: So it would have to be at least 


monthly, I guess. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It'd probably be at least 


monthly, and I don't know -- do you remember 


the badging frequencies, Gene, at NTS, how 


often they exchanged badges? 


 MR. ROLLINS: Monthly. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Monthly. 


DR. MAURO: So in other words -- so the idea 


being all right, the worker's -- sees his 


exposure month number one and he sees -- uh-oh 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, I'm over a rem. 


DR. MAURO: -- wait a minute, it's starting to 


climb month number two -- right? -- so by the 


time he's -- he's approaching this quarterly, 


he say I'm running into trouble and you're 


saying that -- so all of a sudden, the last 

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reading of his quarterly sequence would all of 


a sudden drop off the table. 


Now, it could drop off the table for two 


reasons. He did this --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- or he was taken off that job -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- and put someplace else because 


they didn't want him to exceed his quarterly 


levels --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- LARA practice. My guess is if 


the latter were the case, the records should 


show that. That is that yes, he was 


reassigned. Someplace there's a -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There's some -- be some 


personnel record or something. 


DR. MAURO: -- some documenta-- the personnel 


documentation that he was taken off, put in -- 


because of this. If that doesn't exist, then 


we have a situation where this might be -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- and you're saying that it -- 


under those circumstances, it's tractable, and 


then you would just -- if that were the case, 

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you -- you would -- if you had a real person 


where you thought this might be the case, you 


would just extrapolate, assume that he -- 


whatever dose he got in month one, month two, 


month three --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, actually what we probably 


would expect to do would be -- 


DR. MAURO: One -- one -- the two months in a 


row, then the third one. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, what we would expect to 


do probably would be have some adjustment 


factor based on the total distribution -- beta 


distribution, say -- see, it should go 


straight, it -- it lays over at the top, that 


means we're going to conclude that that meant 


they did this. And -- and rather than seek 


additional individual records about individual 


assignments on the hope that we would see 


somebody was reassigned from a forward area 


after two months and -- and do that, we'd 


probably make this a general application to 


people who fit the category of highly exposed 


and -- and just make that a general adjustment. 


That would -- I'm just -- and we're speaking 


here hypothetically now 'cause like I said, so 

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far all we've done is thought that this might ­

- this might be a way to do that. 


DR. MAURO: A way to track it down. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: This might be to do this and 


that there might -- you know, this -- this may 


be a solution. And we want to be real -- you 


know, pretty careful about saying that we're 


going to make a lot of fine distinctions -- on 


Joe Smith we're going to treat it this way and 


Bob Smith we're going to treat this way -- 


DR. MAURO: You may be universal. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and Joe Jones we're going to 


treat --


DR. MAURO: How do you do it annually then? 


Let's say -- yeah, I guess I didn't quite 


understand. Say you've got this -- you have 


this worker --


 MR. ROLLINS: Let me -- let me make an 


observation. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Just in general -- and this is -- 


this is one thing the workers keep talking 


about, about how nobody ever got any dose out 


there. Well, the reason they didn't get any 


dose, for the most part, is they weren't 

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exposed to very much. There's -- is an 


exception to that, and the only cohort group 


that we see out there that ever got close to 


limits were those that were involved in the 


reactor experiments -- and the cleanup of the 


reactor experiments, because they sent those 


people out there to pick up the pieces and they 


-- they ran their doses up pretty high. And so 


that's a fairly small group of people. It's a 


handful of people, but they're the only ones 


that we see that ever had anything approaching 


any kind of limit. 


DR. MAURO: But then we get this '51 to '57 


time period where we don't have the badging, so 


that's --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, that's problematic in 


another sense. 


DR. MAURO: I know, but you see, that 


confounded --


NOTE: Multiple speakers commented simultaneously. 


DR. MAURO: But I think they're related. I 


mean it's -- doesn't that confound -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, this would be a -- well, 


I don't know if it's a -- I think it's a 


related -- it's a -- it's a different issue, 

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but it -- and it would maybe -- if people 


weren't badged and they weren't hiding the 


badges. So to me it's kind of a separate issue 


DR. MAURO: Oh, you said you had no badges, of 


course. What am I talking about? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So if you're -- but during the 


badged period it would seem to me that it may 


be solvable if the -- if the dataset is 


complete enough, if we can get that and it 


lines up okay. You know, we've had occasions 


when we felt we could line the data up okay and 


-- and the -- when you start looking at 


individual reads, it just doesn't -- individual 


read data just doesn't look that -- you know, 


that consistent internally, you're not really 


sure what you're looking at on some of these 


databases. A lot of annual totals look good -- 


well, annual totals okay, but trying to put -- 


you know, build up those annual -- you know, 


figure out what quarter it was available or 


what the monthlies were to add that total, you 


start looking at the database, it's not -- it's 


kind of hard to figure out which was the 


monthly result. So there may -- we may run 

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into a situation like that where we can't get 


these monthlies in good order and -- and then 


there's still an open question if there's 


something you can do or not. But at the moment 


we're hopeful that we could make some sort of 


adjustment like that for these people who 


intentionally took their badges off to avoid 


exceeding a -- some sort of limit, you know, 


the three rem or administrative limit or 


something like that, so we are hopeful of that. 


But right now, like I said, it's -- it's 


theoretical right now, so I'd have to get up 


with Dr. Neton about exactly, you know, are we 


anywhere on that or anything. I think that may 


be another subcontractor task order. 


DR. ROESSLER: Let me make sure I understand 


this. It seems different now than when I was 


reading this. When I was reading this I had 


the impression that because people hid their 


badges a lot during a certain period of time 


that -- that this was probably impossible. But 


it seems like there were not many people in 


that category where the doses would reach that 


limit, and now from what you're saying, 


theoretically you can -- because they wouldn't 

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hide their badges until they got to the end of 


the quarter, that maybe the first two monthly 


readings would be valid and you can take from 


that -- is that what you're -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It -- it could be, but we 


wouldn't -- we wouldn't think about using that 


person's first two monthly readings and then -- 


and then extrapolate that to the third. I 


don't know that that's -- 'cause that's a 


pretty fine structure for dose reconstruction. 


Probably what we would do is identify the 


likely candidates who probably fit in this 


category, and provide an adjustment to their 


recorded dose --


DR. ROESSLER: For those candidates. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- with the assumption that 


they participated in this practice. So that's 


probably an approach that is, you know, 


implementable if in fact there is -- the data 


provide a basis for it, which is not -- which I 


don't know today. 


DR. ROESSLER: And I have one more question. 


Now this time period where Jay Brady talks 


about -- and the others talk about they're 


hiding the badges, what -- what is that time 

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period that -- that this allegedly happened? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: He said it may have continued 


into -- what, about 1970 or -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Jay Brady thought it went into 


the mid-'60s or about the time -- there's some 


-- there's some doubt about how long this may 


have continued, mid-'60s to maybe early '70s at 


the latest. 


DR. MAURO: I think it was linked to the 


conversion of the film badge into part of the 


security badge. 


DR. ROESSLER: Oh, yeah, --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Brady thought it had been -- 


DR. ROESSLER: -- where their ID was -- 


DR. MAURO: Where their ID was locked up with 


their film badge. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Then it became a minimal 


problem after the --


DR. ROESSLER: So that's the potential period. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, maybe late '60s, some-- 


it's somewhere in there. We haven't been able 


to get a good answer. 


DR. MAURO: Keeping the thought process going, 


so -- so let's say you go through this process 

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with the post-'57 dataset and you come up with 


these fixes for this subcategory of workers, 


which will be these high-end class of workers. 


So now you've built what you would call a 


fairly robust dataset for workers post-'57, 


taking into consideration perhaps some strange 


practices. All right. Now you've got that. 


Now you want to work your way backward and say 


okay, we're going to use that information 


somehow to reconstruct doses to -- external 


doses to workers from '51 to '57. Now I guess 


you haven't started -- I'm trying to visualize 


-- so what you've got now is this very large 


population of badged workers post-'57, and the 


vast majority of the -- and this almost brings 


us back to Y-12 and pre-'61. The vast majority 


of them are going to be -- have low doses or no 


doses --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- except for some small subset, 


perhaps the ones that were involved in the 


reactor testing program are going to be -- 


you're going to have almost like a binom-- 


bimodal distribution -- some -- a group of 


workers that are up here and then the rest are 

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going to be down in this low end. 


 Now, confronted with that set of information, 


then you ask yourself okay -- but now we have 


this other group of workers, who knows how many 


there are, that was from '51 to '57, and 


somehow we want to build a bridge from that -- 


between the data, recognizing that the -- the 


data that was compiled from -- I'm sorry, I'm 


thinking through the problem -- I thought I was 


trying to solve it. From '57 to '62 is 


aboveground testing --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: -- so that becomes the data of 


greatest interest because that's the data that 


-- 'cause there's a lot of testing went on and 


that -- so -- and you -- one could argue that 


the nature of the exposures that took place 


from '57 to '61, the actual monitored data, 


probably represents the most representative set 


of data that might apply to '51 through -- 


through '57. And now would you work off the 


full distribution? So now we have a worker 


that is in the early years. Is it -- would it 


be your inclination to work off the full 


distribution of let's say that dataset, the '57 

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to '61 dataset, or work off the upper 95th 


percentile as being your surrogate? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I haven't even thought about it 


yet, but certainly we'd have to be concerned 


about -- you know, use of -- use of full 


distribution in coworkers is -- we really only 


use like mid-point for people who we're pretty 


confident were unexposed, so if we had, you 


know, job classes that we would consider 


unexposed or -- or at least only moderately 


exposed --


DR. MAURO: 'Cause you -- you could see how 


important that would be -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- because if you go with the full 


distribution, you capture this large number of 


workers who weren't exposed. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Who weren't exposed, right. 


DR. MAURO: If you go with the 95th percentile, 


you're going to be working off this upper -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There was -- there was some 


personnel monitoring data before '57. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Then there's universal 


monitoring after '57. There is some personnel 

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monitoring before '57, but you know, we haven't 


solved the nut -- you know, we haven't solved 


the issue in here today yet about pre-'57. 


DR. MAURO: We're going to have another pre-- 


we're going to have another Y-12 pre-- 'cause 


we haven't done that yet, as you all know, but 


that's going to be another place where this is 


exactly the same situation, and the -- the 


stra-- and I guess we're going to be -- quite 


frankly, I guess we'll be marching forward 


pretty soon with regard to the Y-12 issue. I 


think how that resolves -- is resolved and 


where that ends up is probably going to be a 


very good precedent for the strategy that 


ultimately is adopted here 'cause -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I suspect --


DR. MAURO: -- it seems to me that they're very 


similar. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I suspect it is, right. I 


suspect it is. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So we can say that NIOSH will 


provide an adjusted dose for or to the workers 


that supposedly hid their badges? Is that how 


you'd say that? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: I mean that's --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Some sort of appro-- we're gong 


to work on an approach. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: You know, I can't promise 


success --


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- but we're -- we intend to 


work on an approach to do that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Isn't it a shame we can't have a 


sense of Congress as to how they feel about 


workers who might have shielded their badges 


and now issue claims for compensation. I'd --


I'd like to hear the Congressional sense when 


that --


 MR. HINNEFELD: You might -- you might get 535 


-- maybe more. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Any more comments on 11? 


MS. SCHUBERT: Could a person on the phone ask 


a question? 


 DR. WADE: Surely. 


MS. SCHUBERT: I just was wondering, I just got 


on -- this is Sandi Schubert from Senator 


Reid's office -- and I heard a woman mentioning 

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they'd like a sense of Congr-- a sense from 


Congress as to what they want in a particular 


arena. I didn't actually hear what that arena 


was. 


 MS. MUNN: This is Wanda Munn, and I was being 


facetious. I was sim-- I was not expecting 


Congress to respond at all. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Is there any way to find out 


what the topic was, or if there's notes on this 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, yes. We had been discussing the 


case of workers who may have deliberately 


shielded their badges in order to circumvent 


any level of exposure that would require them 


to change jobs or to not go to work. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Thank you very much, I 


appreciate that. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


RADON DOSES IN G-TUNNEL


 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun, you want to talk about 


comment 12? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, yeah. Comment 12 is 


(reading) Radon doses in G-tunnel are not 


claimant favorable. Gravel Gertie radon doses 


are not discussed, and could be substantial. 

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Site status of Gravel Gertie workers needs 


clarification. 


 NIOSH's response basically was along the lines 


of the recommendation we gave in the site 


profile review, so the -- the suggested value 


is okay with us, the revised upwards 16 working 


level, so that's -- that -- and NIOSH is going 


to research the question of Gravel Gerties for 


relevance to NTS. My -- my question about that 


is the -- the status of the Gravel Gertie 


workers is kind of unclear to me. Were they 


Los Alamos or Livermore or Nevada Test Site or 


do we know? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know today. Gene do 


you know if -- where the people -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: I'm not sure I understand the 


question. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, the question of which -- 


where the records of these workers would be 


located. Are they classified as workers who 


came from Los Alamos who worked in the Gravel 


Gerties just before the tests -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: They would -- any --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- assembling the – the -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- any record of exposure in the 

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Gravel Gerties at NTS would be controlled by 


the NTS. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So -- so there's not an issue 


as to the status of the workers then. They 


would be regarded as NTS workers. 


 MR. ROLLINS: They would be regarded as NTS 

workers. 

 MR. PRESLEY: When you went on site, you 

swapped your badge for an NTS badge. At least 


that's what I did. They held my badge out till 


the day I walked out. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And then -- but that dose would 


be added to the -- in a multi-site way if 


there's a claimant you have -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, there are a lot -- as 


you said, there are a lot of people from Los 


Alamos and Lawrence Livermore who spent time at 


Nevada Test Site. And the records of that are 


pretty clear. We -- we identify both. We get 


the records from both -- you know, on -- in the 


event that their Lawrence Livermore record 


doesn't include their dose received at NTS, we 


go to NTS and see what record NTS has, so yeah, 


we would incorporate those. 


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item from that -- from comment 12 is NIOSH is 


going to research the Gravel Gertie question. 


And -- and this came up a little bit in Iowa as 


regards the radon -- radon dose in Gravel 


Gerties and that Iowa is a high radon area but 


Texas was not, and so I guess maybe your -- 


your comment regarding relevance of other sites 


to NTS activity, was that -- was that what -- 


what you were referring to? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe that'd be correct. 


mean there's other state data relevant to NTS 


and can we make any -- draw any conclusions 


along those lines, that would be what we would 


be interested in. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So basic-- basically we're in 


agreement with NIOSH in response to comment -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: May I ask you a question? These 


-- these Gravel Gerties -- these were concrete 


vaults constructed. The air was forced through 


filters. Is that the situation with Gravel 


Gerties at -- in use at the other locations? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I believe so --


 MR. ROLLINS: These are forced-air filters. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yes -- yes, sir. All that I've 

been in are. 

I 
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 MR. ROLLINS: And they have -- we have radon 


measurements available at those locations? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'd say Pantex has probably -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We've got them for Pantex. 


Okay? We've got them for Pantex. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- got all kinds of them. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But this is -- this is an early 


-- I believe there was one, and only in the 


early period, at -- at Nevada Test Site, so I 


think the site-specific conditions would 


probably be important to know. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Unless you can go back and look 


and see what it is at Pantex, and it may be -- 


I mean the air -- the air circulated through 


those things just almost instantaneous, but it 


-- you know, the -- the chances of getting 


something, I don't know, but they were probably 


slim and none. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: It may be it's not a big dose, 


but it just -- it just -- whatever it is, it 


needs to be put -- resolved. 


DR. MAURO: You know, that -- the handle on 


this problem for radon -- if it turns out the 


air turnover's very high, the radon would come 

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in through cracks and penetrations in the 


foundation of the structure -- I assume it's 


some kind of concrete foundation and -- and 


perhaps even the materials -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: Walls and ceiling. 


DR. MAURO: -- walls, too -- is all -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: It's all concrete. 


DR. MAURO: The whole thing is underground. 


Okay, so the -- so your radon -- now the only 


reason why you get a buildup of radon is that 


there's a resonance time of the -- of the air, 


but if you have an air turnover rate of several 


times per hours, let's say, you know, what's 


going to happen is the radon's going to be -- 


it's going to be brou-- so you get the fresh 


radon coming in -- okay? -- without the 


progeny, 'cause progeny you're not going to see 


then; they're going to sort of be trapped in 


the soil and the cracks and fissures, so the 


progeny don't move in. The radon comes in, the 


radon goes out and -- before it even has a 


chance to decay. I -- I think if I was trying 


to track this and try to come up with a handle 


on whether or not it's possible to have a 


buildup of progeny -- certainly if you have 

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measurements, great; I mean if you have working 


level measurements inside these Gravel Gerties, 


you know, you've got it covered. But if it 


turns out you don't and you're trying to get a 


handle on what kind of working levels might be 


inside these things, knowing the air turnover 


rate inside one of these things is going to be 


the hook to solve this problem. I mean that's 


-- I -- I just -- I just offer that up as a way 


to track this if you don't have actual 


measurements. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Taking it -- taking the thought 


to the limit, if you had extremely high 


turnover rates -- which you indicate air 


whistling around; I know in the canyons the 


air's whistling around 200,000 cubic feet per 


minute -- but you essentially end up with the 


same radon inside the Gertie that you have 


outside, and so you -- now you're starting to 


assign ambient radon. 


DR. MAURO: Right, and you -- and you don't 


have a chance for progeny to grow in because 


the air is not -- the radon is not indoors long 


enough to -- to have progeny grow in, so there 


you go, yeah, I agree. 

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 MR. ROLLINS: But that's something we typically 


don't do on a project --


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- is -- is assign doses to lung 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- from ambient radon. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, yeah. No, I agree with that. 


What are you talking about, a fraction of a 


picocurie per liter. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it has to do -- the 


reason on when we assign radon and when we 


don't has to do with the nature of the 


structure. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And if it is a -- if it's a 


normal working structure, even the basement of 


a building -- it's a building, even the 


basement of a building, we consider that part 


of the natural background. The natural 


background is included in the IREP risk models 


and the background risk and so on and so forth, 


so it's accounted for in that way. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: But if it's a tunnel --

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DR. MAURO: Man-made special --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- or a -- or a structure that 


DR. MAURO: -- special --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- sort of 


assimilates/simulates* underground structure 


like a Gravel Gertie -- we kind of made that 


decision, there may be others; Gravel Gertie is 


the one that comes to mind, or tunneling -- in 


the tunnels, we consider that sort of a nonstandard work location and therefore we put the 


radon in if it's -- it may not amount to 


enough. 


DR. MAURO: No, no, and I understand it, but -- 


and this is the first time I was yet -- I was 


informed that the air turnover rate was 


extremely high, and that's important, and that 


might -- that might be the solution to this 


problem -- Gravel Gertie question and radon. 


 MS. MUNN: Actually it wouldn't even need to be 


very high. If you had any forced air at all 


through it, it seems it would -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: question. The ambient -- in 


Nevada, the ambient amount of radon at ground 


level cannot be too high because of the amount 

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-- the -- the nature of the soil that's on the 


surface. It's not like east Tennessee where 


you have the clay that's full of it. I mean if 


you go down and put a concrete structure 16 or 


20 foot in the ground, you're still not into an 


area that's going to produce a tremendous 


amount, I would not think, of -- of radon. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Could be in the aggregate. 


 MR. PRESLEY: It could be in the aggregate, but 


I mean how long -- how long is that going to 


stay in that aggregate? 


DR. ROESSLER: Where did they get the 


aggregate. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Don't know what they used for -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't think we're going to 


have any of these answers today. I'm certainly 


not up-to-date. 


DR. ROESSLER: It's still not like Tennessee or 


Pennsylvania or even Iowa, those kind of 


states, so --


 MR. PRESLEY: So what I've got down here is 


NIOSH will research the Gravel Gertie problem ­

-


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: -- and get back to us. 


DR. ROESSLER: I'd call it a situation. We 


don't know it's a problem. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, situation. 


DR. MAURO: Keep in mind -- I mean once the 


air turnover rate drops down to let's say one 


per hour, the radon progeny start to grow in, 


half-- 'cause the -- it's the half-life of the 


progeny that determines the degree of working 


level buildup, not three-day half-life of the 


rad-- I mean -- speaking -- preaching to the 


Pope here. Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right, that's 12a? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I think -- I think we've 


covered a, b and c. In a and b basically NIOSH 


accepted the recommendation that we made. They 


changed the working level assumptions for radon 


in the tunnels, and c they're going to 


research. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Anybody else have any more 


comments or questions on 12? 


 (No responses) 


I-131 VENTING


 Thirteen? 


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due to I-131 venting need to be taken into 


account for non-monitored workers. 


And NIOSH is going to do that, so we have -- 


and going to revise the TBD, give new guidance 


to the dose reconstructors, so we have no issue 


with that address. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Will revise TBD? Okay. Anybody 


else have any comments -- 13? 


 (No responses) 


INTERNAL DOSE FOR PRE-‘67


 Fourteen? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Fourteen, (reading) There are 


no internal monitoring data until late 1955 or 


1956; some Pu from then on; some tritium from 


1958; plutonium, tritium and mixed fission 


products from 1961; and full radionuclide 


coverage established about '67. The TBD does 


not provide significant guidance for estimating 


internal dose for the pre-'67 periods for many 


radionuclides. 


 NIOSH response of course is that for the SEC 


period this question has been resolved because 


NIOSH has granted SEC based on inability to 


reconstruct internal dose for that atmospheric 


testing period, but I didn't -- I didn't see a 

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response to the second part of the comment that 


would cover '63 to '67. I -- in -- in 


researching the thing, I -- I must admit I 


didn't do it deeply enough to know exactly how 


the thing was phased in, you know, from -- from 


plutonium and tritium and mixed fission 


products or whether you have an approach to use 


for mixed fission product data to bound the 


doses in some way. But I think -- I think 


there is -- there is a methodological gap in 


'63 to '67 that seems to be outstanding still. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I believe that it's a 


fact that we have to have an approach for '63 


to '67, as we stand today, so I don't know if 


we say that, but certainly something has to be 


done '63 to '67, or if we can't develop one, 


presumably we could extend that period of the 


class or write a new (inaudible) for a new 


class. So clearly something -- we need to be 


able to deal with that, internal doses for '63 


to '67. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So I guess that's sort of a 


pretty big item there. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, that is. 


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anything else on 14. 


BLAST WAVE


 MR. PRESLEY: Fifteen? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Fifteen, (reading) Resuspension 


of radionuclides by the blast wave, 


fractionation of relatively non-volatile 


radionuclides due to the variability of Cs-137 


to -- and the variability of Cs-137 to 


strontium-90 ratios need to be taken into 


account for internal dose. 


This is -- applies only to atmospheric testing 


and has been taken care of. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Good. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Is it okay, no problem? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No problem. 


USE OF PHOTON DOSE


 MR. PRESLEY: Sixteen? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) Use of photon dose, 


as done by DTRA, as the basis for estimating 


internal dose during periods when there are no 


data scattered -- or scattered internal 


monitoring data has significant uncertainties. 


These uncertainties are compounded by data 


integrity issue associated with NTS. 


And I think this has the same response as 

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before, because it applies to the atmospheric 


testing period, and that has been taken care of 


since NIOSH basically re... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We -- let me just look at my 


notes just to make sure I'm not forgetting 


something. 


Yeah, so in -- in our view, the issue's 


resolved. 


INGESTION DOSES


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Seventeen, ingestion? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) Ingestion doses need 


to be better evaluated. 


John, in my notes this is your baby. This is ­

- this is in the context of (inaudible) and I 


was kind of wondering how I had done this. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, well, let me -- let me see the 


response, I --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Basically this -- this relates 


to resuspension doses from ingestion from 


resuspension, and I'll go back to our review 


just to make sure that I didn't miss something. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, I'm looking at your response. 


You're talking about five milligrams per cubic 


meter dust loading, and that's up there. In 

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fact, that's the threshold limit value for 


nuisance dust, five microns. If that's an 


assumption that you're going to use to bound 


the doses -- other words, have that kind of 


dust loading, airborne -- the ingestion -- and 


then you talk in terms of -- that would be 


inhalation. And then ingestion, 50 milligrams 


per day -- again, that would be an upper bound 


on the -- recommended by the Exposure Factors 


Handbook. I guess I'm saying that you -- 


that's -- that's certainly a bounding strategy 


if that's what you're saying here, without a 


doubt, to accommodate -- and if I remember, you 


-- you had pointed out perhaps the -- the doses 


were still extremely small, in spite of that. 


Well, then this problem goes away. That's --


 MR. ROLLINS: relative importance of ingestion 


versus inhalation. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. Now the only thing I -- I 


was -- didn't -- didn't understand is the F-1. 


There were some words here somewhere, and there 


may be an error on our part, I'm not sure. 


When you inhale -- when you run IMBA -- okay? ­

- and you inhale and the -- the stuff that's in 


the upper -- upper respiratory tract and it's 

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cleared through the mucociliary ladder, then 


it's swallowed -- what's swallowed has -- let's 


say it's plutonium oxide, or uranium -- what's 


swallowed has a certain F-1 once it hits the 


gut. Now my -- if that F-1 any different than 


the F-1 you would as-- the absorption fraction 


you would assume if the stuff was actually 


directly ingested, hand to mouth ingestion? 


'Cause here -- I see a comment here that we 


wrote that -- that I'm not -- when I read it 


again in your quote where in one case you 


assume ten to the minus three absorption for 


actinides and in the other case it's .10 to the 


minus one. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That's inhalation versus 


ingestion. 


DR. MAURO: Well, that -- that's what I was 


saying. I mean I guess I was surprised to see 


that, perhap-- I mean I was surprised -- the 


absor-- the fraction that's -- in both cases 


we're talking about what's being swallowed? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, no, no, you're -- 


DR. MAURO: No? Okay, maybe I understood -- 


yeah. 


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correctly, we were talking about the relative 


importance of inhalation versus ingestion -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- and -- and the argument was 


when does ingestion become more important, 


despite the fact that the F-1 for ingestion is 


much less than the F-1 for inhalation. So 


you've got a lot of elbow room before in-- 


ingestion becomes important because of the 


lower F-1, but the point we made in the review 


was that at some point it does become important 


and you have to assess that. 


DR. MAURO: If there's -- okay, but I -- I 


guess make sure. You don't make a distinction 


between the F-1 for what's ingested directly as 


compared to the F-1 which happen-- which is 


built into IMBA, what -- that's swallowed from 


the mucociliary ladder. They're both, for ac-- 


for actinides, extremely -- ten to the minus 


three, on that order. I mean it -- I -- I just 


wanted to -- 'cause that's what confu-- that's 


-- am I correct? That's about where they are. 


They're both treated the same. There's no 


reason to treat them separately. Okay. 


I guess my response is, these assumptions that 

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you would make regarding inadvertent ingestion, 


50 milligrams per day -- in fact, the only 


thing I would want to point out is Jim, when we 


discussed this matter at Bethlehem Steel, was 


concerned with the 50 or 100 milligram per day 


-- I think EPA recommends a default value of 


50. I think it's NCRP 123 talks in terms of 


100 milligrams per day as the amount of inad-- 


soil now, this is soil -- inad-- inadvertent 


ingestion. To me, 50, 100. The -- Jim -- Jim 


did some looking into this as it applied to 


Bethlehem Steel, 'cause if you remember, that 


was one of the six issues that we were 


struggling with. And one of the places that we 


came out on is that -- Jim had his approach, 


which was based on knowing the airborne dust 


loading of five micron AMAD settles and you 


predict on that basis, a certain amount settles 


out on the surfaces, and then a certain 


fraction of what settles out is ingested. So 


there was a direct relationship between what's 


in the air and what's ingested. And our 


concern at the time was well, there -- there 


may not be a direct relationship because what's 


on the ground that you inadvertently ingest may 

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have gotten there because of spills, because 


large particles could have directly settled, so 


as a result -- I'm sorry to re-- re-- this --


I -- I -- I mean it's important that we're 


consistent with the thinking. Jim made a very 


strong case that the EPA's Exposure Factors 


Handbook didn't have very good numbers, and I'm 


familiar with the literature behind that and I 


have to agree, but it's sort of become the 


precedent. People use that all the time. Jim 


felt that, after doing some looking at it, that 


he had a better approach that he described at 


one of our meetings, which was a whole 


different strategy whereby the ingestion model 


would not be 50 milligrams per day, it'd be 


something else, something less. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Something smaller, right. 


DR. MAURO: Smaller, but -- but larger than the 


number you were coming up with from the .00075 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- deposition velocity -- so all 


I'm saying is that whatever approach -- I -- I 


think that the ap-- when Jim described his 


approach to us at one of the meetings on 

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Bethlehem Steel, it was very well-founded in 


science, to the point where I recommended -- 


it's got to be published 'cause I think EPA's 


numbers need to be replaced. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. MAURO: That same approach should be. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it could. I think --


using 50, which we -- is high, higher than 


Jim's -- this issue kind of went away anyway. 


DR. MAURO: And it -- and it went -- it went 


away anyway. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So you know, we can -- if we 


can keep it away, we might be more efficient. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Also Jim's -- Jim's 


argumentation on Bethlehem Steel was that it 


was indoors --


DR. MAURO: That's true. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- numbers related to the 


outdoors, so I don't think you could carry that 


discussion over. I think this is better -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- because it relates to an 


outdoor situation and that applies to Nevada I 


think. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: So instead of carrying over a ­

- a thing out of context, we might have more 


arguments rather than less arguments. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. So you all agree with 17? 


DR. MAURO: We're good. Yeah, we just -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: No problems? 


DR. MAURO: -- it was a nuance on 17 that -- as 


far as we're concerned, the problem's solved. 


DR. ROESSLER: Can I ask a curiosity question? 


What are sterile organs? 


MS. BRACKETT: I was -- I was going to ask that 


same question. 


 MR. ROLLINS: That's a -- that's a -- that's a 


-- that's a term I picked up from Ken 


(inaudible). 


DR. ROESSLER: Well, then maybe you ought to 


tell us. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I didn't make that up. The last 


time I saw him, probably one of the last 


meetings he attended, he used it and -- 


DR. ROESSLER: And what does it mean? 


 MR. ROLLINS: It's organs that are not -- that 


are fed by the bloodstream, that are not open 


to the atmosphere. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Or the GI. 

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 MR. ROLLINS: Or the GI. In other words, non-


respiratory, non-GI. 


DR. ROESSLER: Oh. 


NOTE: Multiple speakers commented simultaneously. 


DR. MAURO: Systemic. 


MS. BRACKETT: Systemic organs. 


DR. MAURO: Maybe he meant systemic as opposed 


to sterile. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Not in contact with bacteria. 


DR. ROESSLER: Well, I'm glad it's -- a lot of 


you didn't know what that meant. 


DR. MAURO: I've never heard of it. I never 


heard of it. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Maybe he was slurring, I don't 


know, but I -- I know he said that. 


DR. ROESSLER: I -- I kind of pictured 


something --


 MR. ROLLINS: I said well, that's an 


interesting way to think about it, but if he 


says it, I can repeat it. 


MS. BRACKETT: I don't know, there's a lot of 


things he says I don't repeat. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Sterile and non-systemic, I bet 


that's what it was. Okay. 


Anybody have any more questions on 17? 

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 MS. MUNN: No. 


POST-1971 TUNNEL RE-ENTRY WORKERS


 MR. PRESLEY: Eighteen? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Eighteen, (reading) Recommended 


use of TIB-2 for post-1971 tunnel re-entry 


workers is contrary to guidance in that 


document, and its scientific validity has not 


been established. Its use may not be 


satisfactory even with restrictions, for 


instance for reactor testing early re-entry 


workers. 


And I think that NIOSH agreed and revi-- will 


issue revised language for dose reconstructors 


who observe the limitations for TIB-2, so given 


that NIOSH is going to address the reactor 


workers in another context, I think that issue 


goes away. Eighteen is resolved. 


 MR. PRESLEY: And NIOSH agrees and will advise 


-- will revise, not advise. Okay. 


Anybody have any more -- anything else about 


18? 


 (No responses) 


PRE-1966 BETA DOSE
 

Make it easy. Nineteen? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) There are no beta 

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dose data until 1966; the TBD does not specify 


a procedure for estimating pre-1966 beta dose. 


When the approach is developed, the large hot-


particle issue will need to be taken into 


account. 


And NIOSH says it is developing an approach by 


re-reading the original -- oh, it has developed 


an approach --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we're developing time-


dependent -- what did we say? 


 MR. ROLLINS: Photon to beta. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, photon to beta -- the rereading of the films, I guess that was proposed 


by what, (inaudible)? Did he still --


 MR. ROLLINS: No, no, that was Ron Catherine 


that proposed that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We haven't committed to doing 


that. We are... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So this is -- this is kind of 


an open question --


 MR. HINNEFELD: It's an open question. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- as to how you are going to 


address skin cancers and things like that for ­

- between --


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that's underway right now, if I'm not mistaken, 


is the -- using the Harry Hicks data to do the 


beta/gamma ratios. 


DR. MAURO: That would be external, not the 


stuff that deposits on the skin, and that's 


certainly appropriate. In other words, that's 


the stuff that's on the ground or on surfaces, 


and you want to know the ratio of the photon to 


beta, you can do that. That's very tractable. 


But the stuff that falls on the skin -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, the hot-particle issue, 


which --


DR. MAURO: -- hot particles is a -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- which is part of that NRVU* 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, right, that -- which is part 


of that, so --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- so it has to be -- you know, 


both --


DR. MAURO: -- it's within that context. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- both those have to be 


incorporated into the skin dose value. 


DR. MAURO: By the way, do you -- in OTIB-17 


doesn't really engage that issue. 


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our earlier discussion on hot particles. 


DR. MAURO: Right, right. I just wanted to 


point that -- 'cause you mentioned OTIB-17 that 


-- you know, certain -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: There's a particular approach 


in there that -- it's the average dose -- the 


risk is the average dose over the organ -- 


DR. MAURO: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- is that really the case, 


that's part of the whole discussion we need to 


-- hot particle issue we talked about this 


morning. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I mean I -- I -- in looking at 


the NIOSH response, I couldn't tell whether -- 


how it's going to come out. I don't have a 


sense of what's going to come out of this or -- 


whether this issue is resolvable or -- neither 


do you? Is that what you said? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So it's research under way. 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's research under way, like 

many of the issues you've raised here today. 


You know, we don't know today how -- how it'll 


be resolved because the research is under way. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. Right, but on some of 


them it's clear that there's going to be some 


technical answer to the question, but on this I 


couldn't -- I couldn't figure out whether there 


is one or not. 


DR. MAURO: we had talked for a minute or two 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: -- before the meeting that might be 


helpful. Just coincidentally, I spent about 


five years looking at the fallout -- BRAVO 


exposure of Rongolapese, and they had some very 


serious skin beta dose, and there's a lot of 


literature and data on real people with real 


exposures from external gamma, external beta 


and beta deposited directly on the skin from 


direct fallout, and beta particles deposited on 


the skin from resuspension and redeposition on 


clothing and skin. And the -- the hook -- and 


there's also clinical data on -- on the amount 


of exposure and the levels of exposure that 


caused what type of clinical outcomes from skin 


damage. If the answer doesn't lie in there 


somewhere, I'm quite -- not quite sure how 


you're going to get a hook on this one. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


DR. ROESSLER: That's deterministic. 


DR. MAURO: Well, yeah, but it's dosimetric. 


That is -- yeah, there are -- the -- certainly 


they had -- they had a full range, from 


reddening up through lesions, bleeding -- 


DR. ROESSLER: (inaudible) 


DR. MAURO: -- pustular lesions, but there is 


actually -- you know, it's almost like a 


dosimetric, you could actually make a curve, 


you know, what -- what doses they received and 


what were the symptoms experienced. And you 


rela-- and the doses to skin can be linked back 


to the external doses. So it's almost as if 


once you know the external dose you could apply 


a multiplier that gives you -- 


DR. ROESSLER: (inaudible) 


DR. MAURO: -- yeah, like I say, the external 


of gamma dose -- I'm not saying you can do it, 


don't get me wrong, I'm saying that if it 


doesn't -- if you don't -- if the -- the 


literature that's -- the body of literature 


that was developed around that doesn't offer a 


hook in dealing with the hot-particle beta dose 


issue, I don't know what does. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: So you were going to talk with 


your firm -- right? -- about -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, we -- we have --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- providing that data. 


DR. MAURO: -- we have -- yeah, in fact the -- 


one of the important documented reports, and I 


can certainly provide you with a copy of it, is 


Sharpe and Chapman* --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: -- and I can provide that to you -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, if you wouldn't mind. 


DR. MAURO: -- and -- and any other records, so 


it's nothing that we did. In other words, we 


just researched the literature the way you 


folks would. We didn't do any experiments or 


anything. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: All right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I've got this marked as an open 


issue, NIOSH will revise beta dose issue and 


will issue a procedure for estimating beta dose 


for pre-1966 time frame? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Is that -- okay. Anybody else 


have anything on 19? 


 (No responses) 

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 Item 20? 


NON-USE OF BADGES


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think we've covered 20. This 


is the -- (reading) appears to have been non-- 


intentional non-use of badges in some 


circumstances to avoid approaching or exceeding 


dose limits. Practice may have occurred until 


the mid-1960s or even extended into the 1970s. 


NIOSH has not investigated this problem, which 


raises questions on the integrity of the 


external dose record possibly into the 1970s, 


which need to be explicitly addressed. 


So I think we covered this under 11b. 


 MR. PRESLEY: NIOSH will investigate. Okay. 


Any more comments on 20? 


 (No responses) 


EXTREMITY DOSIMETRY


 Twenty-one? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) TBD does not contain 


information about extremity dosimetry. Site 


status of bomb assembly workers is unclear. 


So their -- TBD is being revised to have 


external dosimetry guidance. NIOSH has 


developed it. And bomb assembly workers it 


says were mostly laboratory -- Los Alamos and 

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Livermore workers, and so I guess the issue has 


been punted from NTS to Los Alamos and 


Livermore TBDs, is that how I understand -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think we could -- we 


could probably --


I guess my thought is that extremity dosimetry, 


you know, for our program is only going to 


matter for people who have cancer on their 


extremity. You know, that's -- you know, 


that's -- so there -- that's pretty limited, 


based on the cases I've seen. You know, you 


see -- even skin cancers you tend to --you 


don't tend to see on the extremities. There's 


a lot of facial skin cancer, but not so much on 


the extremities, so the extremity being the 


site -- the origin of the cancer is really 


pretty rare in our claimant population, so -- 


and that's the only ones you have to worry 


about the extremity dosimetry. 


Now once you get a case like that, the 


extremity to -- if you have a whole body dose, 


the extremity to whole body dose is largely a 


geometric issue, and it's been measured at a 


number of sites. You know, people who worked 


close into material at arm's length -- at arm's 

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length, like glovebox workers, et cetera, and 


so the geometric issue is -- is measured in 


many places. And so since it's already a 


geometric issue anyway, an adjustment to the 


whole body badge that could be applied to the 


extremity if we don't have any extremity data 


is probably a feasible approach for this. And 


it -- like I said -- will have very limited 


applicability because we don't see very many 


cancers that originate on the -- on the 


extremities. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, there weren't very many 


opportunities at NTS -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- for large radiation gradients. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I think the Gravel Gertie 


-- the bomb assembly was very, very limited, as 


I understand it. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So that's --


 MR. ROLLINS: Consequently I haven't seen much 


-- in fact, I don't think I've seen any 


extremity monitoring information at NTS. 


That's not to say there isn't some, but I 


haven't seen any, going through the records 


I've gone through, so -- 

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 MR. ROLFES: I've seen some. I can identify a 


couple of claims. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Give me the numbers, let me take 


a look at them. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Do you remember if they were 


laboratory workers or were they, or do you 


remember? 


 MR. ROLFES: One was a -- a rad monitor, so -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. NTS rad monitor? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yep. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I'd like to look at that one. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Did they hang it on the wall or ­

-


 MR. ROLFES: It's claim number 3367. 


 MR. ROLLINS: 3367? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- where they would hang the 


monitors on the wall in the rooms or... 


 MR. ROLFES: Have I seen any? No, I haven't --


 MR. PRESLEY: No --


 MR. HINNEFELD: What -- what extremity 


dosimetry did you see -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- was it on a wrist or a ring 


or what? 

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 MR. ROLFES: I believe it was a wrist badge. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So extremity would be either a 


wrist or a ring badge. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Did you see a remarkable 


difference between the wrist and the whole 


body? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah, this -- this individual had 


about maybe one and a half rem on -- on his 


wrist badge and maybe 600 millirem on his whole 


body badge. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So 21, everybody's in agreement, 


no problem? 


DR. MAURO: This -- this rela-- relationship 


you just described, but that's gamma. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 

 MR. PRESLEY: All right, no problem? Okay. 

Comment 22? 

NEUTRON DOSES

 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) There are no neutron 


dose data until 1966, and partial data until 


1979. TBD assertion that neutron doses during 


atmospheric testing were negligible has not 


been substantiated and may be in error for some 


workers. 


And here I didn't agree with the NIOSH response 

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in regard to the distance because Barton 


Hacker's official history does indicate there 


was some tension in the AEC, which was worrying 


about safety, and the DoD, which was wanting to 


push personnel closer for their own operational 


sort of readiness reasons, presumably. And I'm 


not -- I'm not clear there -- there's kind of a 


procedural answer to this -- to this question 


in the way that -- that NIOSH has suggested. 


And the -- the response in the post-1960 -- 


where am I? Yeah, it's not clear to me that 


six -- six kilometers was actually the limit in 


practice. I think in some -- in most -- some 


or most tests, it might actually have been, but 


maybe a look at Hacker's archive, or an 


interview with him, might be useful because he 


does -- he does mention this -- this problem of 


the -- the tension between safety and -- and 


the DoD. 


 MS. MUNN: There's -- there's a little problem, 


I think, in relying -- in -- in asking our 


technical people to go to journalists and 


historians for advice here, and that's probably 


a dreadful thing for me to say because I know, 


being an Oregon State graduate, he's a past 

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member of our faculty -- but I didn't spend 


much time in the history department, I was kind 


of busy over in the rad center. But I guess -- 


there's -- there's a -- I'm not saying one must 


ignore that -- that at all, but what I'm saying 


is, asking our technical people to rely on -- 


on non-technical reports for their 


understanding of what transpired on a site may 


create some dissonance in how we're viewed as 


asking our -- our technical folks to proceed. 


Perhaps I'm being overly sensitive to that, I 


don't know, but you understand what I mean -- 


mean when I say that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, I -- absolutely. Yeah, Ms. 


Munn, I absolutely understand, and the 


suggestion wasn't that NIOSH should go to 


Barton Hacker for the answer, and that's partly 


why I pointed to his archive. I have looked at 


his book and he -- he was given -- he was sort 


of given the charge of writing the official 


history, so he -- he has looked at the 


documents, including the classified documents, 


so his archive is very substantial. And in 


this matter, which is not a dosimetry matter 


but, you know, where were the troops stationed 

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and are there documents that would help us 


resolve this question, and there may be 


documents that he might be able to point to. 


Instead of having a month-long research project 


to arrive at your own conclusion, you may have 


day-long research project. 


 MS. MUNN: If there's a bibliography of raw 


data, that's one thing. But if -- if we're not 


talking about references to raw data, then 


there's -- it's -- it's -- if a historian had 


access to the data, then certainly NIOSH and 


ORAU have access to the data. I guess that's 


my point. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, and that was the 


suggestion, basically. Anyway -- and so far as 


I know, Mr. Hacker's history -- Dr. Hacker's 


history does not contain the numbers and -- it 


contains a reference to this problem, which is 


how I interpreted when I read it and referenced 


it, and so the suggestion is not to accept 


what's there, 'cause there's no -- no technical 


information there anyway. But if he has some 


raw data that might resolve this issue -- 


otherwise, maybe it cannot be resolved. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, DTRA might have it. DTRA 

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might know where those troops were. I think 


they know. I think. 


NOTE: Multiple speakers commented simultaneously. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Troops are not covered under this 


program. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Troops are not covered, but 


there's a question of where the radiation 


monitors, you know, there with the troops, did 


they look for hot spots as the troops marched 


in. At least Brady in his interview said -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, looking for hot spots would 


not be -- they -- they would not necessarily be 


there when they first -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: All the radiation --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, right --


 MR. ROLLINS: This is a neutron issue -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- neutron issue the first -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- first only. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: If -- if the practice was this, 


if the practice was the troops were hunkered 


down close to the blast, and then right after 


the blast they marched them down to ground zero 


-- just for psychological testing, so to speak 


-- and if there was a monitor that preceded 


them to look for particularly hot areas before 

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they started out, that monitor would have to be 


in position relatively close to the troops at 


the blast. It may be one person, maybe one or 


two people. They may not have been AEC 


monitors. Maybe DoD took their monitors, but 


Brady did say that -- Brady's interview said 


that they did it, as I recall. 


NOTE: Multiple speakers commented simultaneously. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: He -- he himself was in the -- 


he himself was in the aircraft that went 


through the mushroom clouds -- on one occasion, 


at least -- and so I raise the issue only in 


that context because -- and I don't have a 


definitive answer to this. It's a question. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- there when the burst occurred, 


probably throw it away in six months. It does 


funky things to airplanes when that blast kind 


of flies back. 


 MS. MUNN: -- all that electronic stuff. 


 MR. ROLLINS: It's turbulence. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I know --


 MR. PRESLEY: What are we going to do now for 


22? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We'll try to -- we'll -- we'll 


look for some evidence, either with Hacker, 

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with DTRA, you know, presence close by, try to 


get some additional information about 


monitored, I suppose. And again -- I mean we 


said less than a millirem at six kilometers, 


right? Isn't that what we said? Of course 


there's -- at what point does -- you know, so 


if it's less than a millirem at six kilometers, 


then at three kilometers it'd be four times as 


high as that, so how close could they have been 


and really is there going to be -- it may be ­

- it may just go away 'cause if they were never 


closer than three kilometers, and so you're at 


four --

 DR. MAKHIJANI: Maybe a sample calc-- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- four millirem . 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: That might be a good approach 

if, you know, there's no easily-available 


information, then the issue can be rendered 


kind of moot. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Going to look for new information 


on neutron dose. Right? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Then do a -- demonstrate that the 


issue is moot, based on dose -- dose -- scoping 


calculations. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: That the info is what did you 


say? 


DR. MAURO: That the issue is moot, based on 


scoping dose calculations, 'cause one way or 


the other you could put this to bed. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Item -- anybody anything 

else on 22? 

 (No responses) 

 Okay, comment 23? 


SOIL DATA


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Here we're back at -- on 


resuspension. (Reading) Adequacy of soil data 


for estimating resuspension doses needs to be 


evaluated, for instance in relation to hot spot 


detection and plutonium soil data. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We've beat that to death. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think we've covered -- 


covered this already. 


DR. MAURO: It's subsumed in the previous ones. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's the first time I've heard 


that. 


(Pause) 


 Okay, covered previously. Okay, 23, anybody 


else got anything on 23? 


 MS. MUNN: No, it's been subsumed. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: There's two parts, we've got 23a, 


23b, which most of the area (inaudible). 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 MR. PRESLEY: 23b, same thing? 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: It's even more likely that they were 


nowhere near the hot spots. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: This is your issue of spatial 


coverage, John. 


DR. MAURO: It's -- yeah, this -- I mean we're 


getting a little bit more into the granularity 


of the issue where we're talking about the way 


in which measurements are made -- it looks like 


in situ measurements made, and the coverage 


that you get out of putting in a jelly -- you 


know, and start to try to characterize and -- 


and is that level adequate. And so -- it is 


very much in keeping with everything else we've 


talked about about the level of resolution 


really needed in order to do a good job in 


reconstructing doses to wor-- to workers at the 


site. So I would say it -- it also is part and 


parcel to the previous, but it probably worth ­

- when -- when it's developed and discussed, 

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within the context of this particular mode of 


measurement, you know, it's relevant. Namely 


these -- the reference we made to is about a -- 


each reading would be about a ten meter by ten 


meter square. I'm not -- no, no, I'm sorry. 


Each -- you only pick up 3.5 percent of the 


area -- I mean that's the issue -- by making 


these kinds of measurements. Is that good 


enough for you -- for a person to -- to use as 


the basis for doing a dose calculation. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, certainly, you know, with 


respect to this, I -- I guess I kind of have 


mixed feelings on this. I mean there are -- 


there are other data besides these intermittent 


sampling that would kind of describe the 


distribution, you know, fly-overs and things 


like that --


DR. MAURO: And that might be -- and that might 


be the answer. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- which kind of showed a 


pattern of, you know, isopleths and -- and so 


there's sort of other characterization besides 


these bit by bit samples. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, so collectively all the 


information may actually create the picture you 

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need. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: It -- it may -- and it may work 


out, and -- and again, resuspension of areas 


and -- areas that sound pretty big probably 


don't become very -- you know, probably don't 


have a lot of really granularity to the outcome 


when you're talking about resuspension. You 


think about a six mile per hour wind that's 


blowing at about nine feet per second, so it'll 


cross a 500-foot grid in about a minute. 


DR. MAURO: So it's an integrator. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. So you're essentially 


integrating all the -- you know, the 


contamination as you resuspend and distribute 


it on the wind --


DR. MAURO: In principle, I think that I would 


agree. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- you're essentially averaging 


DR. MAURO: You're averaging over a large area, 


so... 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- once it gets airborne, yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Good point. 


 MR. PRESLEY: 23b then? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think 23b is covered under 

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the previous. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So you want to skip 24? 


HIGH-FIRED OXIDES


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) Presence of high-


fired oxides resulting from atmospheric weapons 


testing and reactor testing needs to be 


investigated. 


And NIOSH is developing guidance, and we're 


okay with that. 


DR. MAURO: It's a done deal. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 


DR. MAURO: That's for tomorrow. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's exactly -- I'm going to 


put down here --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: This issue has been dealt with 


in the context of Rocky Flats and NIOSH is 


going to reflect that in its NTS (inaudible) 


and we're okay with that. 


MS. BRACKETT: Well, I -- is this two separate 


issues? I mean there's the issue of how to 


assess an intake of super S or high-fired 


oxide, but then I believe part of this question 


is are there high-fired oxides present that 


need to be addressed, so that -- 

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DR. MAURO: I think -- I think the an-- in 


dealing with this, the issue might very well be 


here also, and how it plays out -- in other 


words, we very much have developed how it plays 


out at Rocky, and its implications and how to 


deal with it so they can do dose 


reconstructions. The degree to which this 


issue is at play here and how to deal with it 


in light of the protocols that are laid before 


us, probably needs to be addressed -- and -- 


and -- and to the extent to which the precedent 


established by Rocky is helpful here, great. 


It may turn out the issue is not very 


significant here at all. 


MS. BRACKETT: Is that -- I just meant that, 


you know, addressing it tomorrow doesn't cover 


it here, because --


DR. MAURO: No. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- the concern is --


DR. MAURO: No. 


MS. BRACKETT: -- was it present and do we 


actually have to do something -- 


DR. MAURO: No, the -- yeah, I -- the only 


point being is that you will stand on the 


shoulders of the work that has tomorrow -- 

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MS. BRACKETT: Right. 


DR. MAURO: to be -- be held to be responsive 


to this. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I agree with Liz that 


there is a piece that needs to be done 


regarding reactor testing and atmospheric 


tests. Atmospheric tests, in a way, only -- 


the only way that it enters in is in the 


resuspension because -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: In later years. 

 DR. MAKHIJANI: In later years. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, because you want to be 

doing the internals for the atmospheric testing 


period anyway, so resuspension of that material 


and is it high-fired -- yeah, okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And then you have the reactor ­

-


 MS. MUNN: Do we know that --


 MR. HINNEFELD: (inaudible) 


 MS. MUNN: Do we know that --


 MR. HINNEFELD: (inaudible) 


 MS. MUNN: Do we know that? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, today I don't know. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (inaudible) reactor. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: There's been a lot of studying 


out there and somebody (inaudible) attention to 


it. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, yeah, you'd think somebody 


would know. I would never have thought. I 


wouldn't have thought -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: You get it high enough fired, 


it's glass. 


 MS. MUNN: So surely somebody's done something 


that would tell us, but who where. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's the problem, you've got 


a lot of studies --


 MR. PRESLEY: Going to revise the Technical 


Basis Document down the road sometime to 


identify this question about high-fired 


plutonium. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Whether high-fired oxides were 


generated. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: And -- and it does have a ripple 


effect. I mean the degree to which it's 


determined that yes, they were, then it bears 


on the -- let's say the validation of the 

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resuspension model, as you had mentioned 


earlier, regarding the bioassay for plutonium 


because it does affect how that -- other words, 


I think that once it's determined that yes, we 


are dealing with high-fired with the plutonium 


or uranium or whatever, transuranics, and its 


implications regarding post-'62 dose 


reconstruction, including the use of the data 


as validation for some of the resuspension 


models -- you know, it needs to be embraced. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: But there -- the science upon which 


these -- the -- these -- the answers lie will 


emerge -- has emerged from the work that was 


done on Rocky. In other words, understand the 


kinetics and what a kin-- what assumptions or 


adjustment factors need to be applied. And 


then if you do have that problem here, apply 


them and see what the implications might be. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: It's going to apply to plutonium 


oxides. Right? Okay. 


 Number 25. 


SITE EXPERT INTERVIEWS


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Reading) NIOSH documentation 

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of site expert interviews is inadequate, and 


crucial site expert interviews have not been 


performed or performed in an incomplete manner, 


notably Barton Hacker and William J. Brady. 


Potentially critical archives and documents 


have not been reviewed, including the Naval 


Radiological Defense Laboratory and Barton 


Hacker primary reference materials. 


So there was a little bit of a surprise for me 


in the response here in that NIOSH says they 


documented almost five hours of discussion with 


Mr. Brady in early 2004. We were aware of a 


contact between NIOSH and Mr. Brady and thought 


we had the full information about the one 


question that was put to him, and we published 


that. But we have seen nothing on this five 


hours of interview or its documentation, and he 


certainly didn't remember it when I talked to 


him -- asked him about it, I believe more than 


once. 


 MR. ROLLINS: We have that -- we have that 


documented. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLLINS: It wasn't me, it was some of the 


people on our team. 

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 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And they've -- they've documented 


that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Could we request --


 MR. PRESLEY: Is it --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Can you pull it up? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Has it been redacted or -- or 


checked for classification where it might be -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: I don't -- I don't -- I'm not -- 


I'm not certain exactly what records were kept 


there as far as those conversations are 


concerned except -- except private 


communication records were -- were kept that 


yes, we went and talked to Mr. Brady and we 


talked about these issues. Probably --


probably did not take as good notes, looking 


back on it now, as they should have. But I 


wasn't involved in those discussions, but these 


-- there were several people on our team that 


had a personal relationship with him and they ­

- they asked to speak with him basically not as 


a -- you know, just as a personal relationship 


sort of thing and they -- and they talked about 


these sorts of things while they were there, so 


-- you know, probably couldn't have gotten to 

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talk to him under -- under other circumstances. 


My understanding his health was not very well ­

- very good and he wasn't going to talk to just 


anybody, but he knew these people from way back 


so he agreed to speak with them. 


 MS. MUNN: They may have a good memory that can 


provide some additional notes that might -- 


might be -- might make --


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, there's more -- there's 


more in there as here -- 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- it's just not here. Okay? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Make sure -- can we ask that that 


be provided to SC&A? Before something like 


that (inaudible) go out (inaudible) be checked 


for classification, please? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Classified? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Certainly, I --


 MR. HINNEFELD: When does the conversation 


occur. 


 MR. ROLLINS: If we -- if we -- if we -- if we 


formalize the notes of the discussion -- if I 


understand the question correctly, if we 


formalize the notes of the discussion with the 

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various principals at the NTS that that -- that 


piece of information must go through a 


derivative classifier before it's given to the 


Board, and I happen to know one at NTS that I'm 


sure would be more than happy to do it. 


 MS. MUNN: That's good. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mr. Brady was certainly -- I 


don't know him, I've never met him, but he was 


certainly very gracious with me and -- and 


spent quite a lot of time with me. I -- you 


know, he -- he is unwell and has certain 


restrictions about how much and when he can 


talk and so on, but he was -- he was really -- 


he gave a lot of his time to me in reviewing 


the notes and -- and in spending time with me 


on the phone. But the broader point that came 


up in this context was exactly this question of 


documentation of NIOSH interviews because when 


we talked to NIOSH during -- during the process 


of developing this review, one of NIOSH's 


comments was, you know, that they take down 


what's relevant. And that didn't seem to 


strike us -- that is, I guess -- Kathy DeMers 


and I are the main ones that are doing the 


review. There are -- or interviews, and there 

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are others who were involved, but we normally 


try to write down the highlights of whatever 


the person is saying and decide on its, you 


know, relevance in terms of what we think is 


relevant independently of that and let the 


interview stand on its own because sometimes 


you can't tell the relevance of something until 


you've finished your research. And it doesn't 


-- it doesn't seem -- somehow -- the larger 


comment here in regard -- aside from the 


specific person involved, seemed to be that the 


interview should be taken for what it is. I 


mean if you respect the person enough to 


interview them, then you have to -- you have to 


represent what they said and not what -- what 


you want to write down for what they said. 


And it's a more generic question, but it came 


up very sharply during -- during this 


particular review. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm going to mark this as an open 


issue with a notation on it that NIOSH will 


provide interview data to SC&A, and then we'll 


be looking for your comments back. 


 MS. MUNN: Do you find the other interviews 


that were done as being applicable or adequate? 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: We -- we did look -- we did 


look at some of the other interviews, like the 


ones that were done with Martha DeMarre, and 


some of it was very useful -- 


 MS. MUNN: It would appear to be very 


extensive. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, and some of it was useful. 


The one -- the one thing that kind of stood out 


was this -- this problem with the badges that 


was -- was missing from the NIOSH record, which 


came up in our interview -- in independent 


interviews that we did, and it came up despite 


the fact that we didn't have any particular 


personal relationships or history with the site 


or any reason for people to have or not have 


confidence in us. It was just -- it just came 


up, and it was documented by us at face value. 


But it didn't seem to be recorded anywhere in 


the NI-- although NIOSH did really do an 


extensive amount of work in relation to drawing 


out NTS site experts, and I believe the TBD did 


benefit from that. We did look over it and I 


think NIOSH did a lot of good work. I just 


think -- maybe it came up and it wasn't 


documented, maybe it didn't come up, I don't 

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know what happened. That was a very big and 


important gap. It should have come up. But I 


personally wasn't aware of this issue. It just 


-- it came up in the course of the interview 


from Mr. Brady, and similarly I believe it came 


up when Kathy and Tom Bell were interviewing 


Martha DeMarre and her colleagues 


independently. I -- I don't believe they were 


aware of the issue. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, I -- I thought everyone was 


aware that every site that existed had people 


who maintain that they did that, or were told 


to do that. That's a -- that's -- I mean that 


-- it's -- it's no -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I will look over my notes, but 


I don't believe, for NTS anyway, that I -- it 


was a surprise to me that the principal health 


physicist himself said that he did this thing. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, that -- that surprise -- it 


surprises me, too, because -- but it's 


indicative of some -- some other experiences 


that you hear these kinds of reports from 


almost all sources. So we shouldn't be -- I 


guess what I'm saying is it shouldn't be 


surprising that you hear the report. Whether 

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or not the -- the practice is something that 


can be confirmed or not is a different thing, 


but to hear the report is no surprise. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, we're down to -- according 


to my computer, this thing says 39 of 39. 


Anybody have any more comments on any of the -- 


on the comments that we have, concerns or 


issues that they want to address, any of these 


-- Mark, do you want to add anything? 


 MR. ROLFES: No, not at this time. Thanks, 


Bob. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Now Bob, you took a note -- did 


you take a note with each finding in terms of a 


resolution pathway, is that what -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, what I did is I did comment 


-- just going by each and then -- and then took 


a short thing of what we need to do. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So you're going to share that 


with all of us --


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- then so we all work from 


that same list, or at least have us -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Now what I --


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- take a look at it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- plan on doing is -- is doing 

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my comments and sending it around and let 


everybody add theirs to it. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I have -- I have one question. 


We kept talking about the reactors down there. 


We only dealt with the rocket motor reactors. 


You know, there were others down there and they 


-- they blew off --


 MR. ROLLINS: The propulsion --


 MR. CLAWSON: -- the --


 MR. ROLLINS: The propulsion motors were 


mentioned in here, too. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, the propulsion motors. Did 


-- did they mention the rover reactor that they 


blew up? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Is that in the site profile? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Did that change anything with the 


graphite? I know they spent over four to five 


months cleaning up the desert after that, so 


everything -- I just --


 MR. ROLLINS: That's where -- that's where a 


lot of people got the doses that were pushing 


the limits. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. Well, I just -- 'cause I 


worked on the other end of that so knowing 

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what came through with that and I understood 


there was quite a bit, but I just kind of kept 


hearing the propulsion and I just wanted to 


make sure the rover --


 MR. PRESLEY: The rover was a propulsion. 

 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah. 

 MR. PRESLEY: You -- I mean that's -- I presume 

that that's what they -- they called 


propulsion, which would encompass -- to me it 


would encompass the -- the mishap or whatever 


you want to call it when -- when we blew rover 


sky high out there. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: They might call that a mishap. 


 MR. PRESLEY: It was. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I think -- I think Gene 


mentioned cleanup workers in relation to the 


hot particles when -- when we talked about it, 


which was a new one for me, and I have it in my 


notes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm glad that happened out there 


and not in Oak Ridge. I don't know whether you 


all are aware or not, but we did have something 


similar to that that they ran on Sundays in Oak 


Ridge for a few years at the tower/tire* 


shielding reactor. You could hear it. I -- we 

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lived within about 12 miles so we could hear 


that thing fire up. They would fire it up on 


Sundays. Everybody would be away from ORNL X10 facility. They'd fire that thing up and you 


could hear it roaring in Oak Ridge. Nobody 


knew what it was for years. 


 MS. MUNN: It was an adequate propulsion system 


was what it was. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Inadequate propulsion system, is 


that what you said? That's right -- a huge 


one, at that. 


 Lew, have any comments? 


 DR. WADE: Well, not technically, but 


procedurally I think we need to look at sort of 


a path forward. If you look at sort of 


milestones, there are a number of sort of -- 


there's lots of small issues and some major 


issues were collected. I mean I tried to keep 


a running list of what I thought the major 


issues were. You had the hot particle issue. 


We have an issue on oro-nasal breathing. There 


are many issues surrounding resuspension. You 


have this issue of the covered badges and a 


mechanism for dealing with that. You have 


issues of internal dose from '63 to '67. You 

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have the need of a coworker model or some 


mechanism for dealing with external dose prior 


to '57. You have the post-1966 beta dose that 


we have to deal with. We have issues about the 


presence of high-fired oxides. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe it's pre-'66. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Pre-'66. 


 DR. WADE: Pre-'66? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Pre-'66 beta dose, as opposed 


to (inaudible). 


 DR. WADE: Ah, pre-- I'm sorry, pre-'66 beta 


dose. 


So those are issues. The only reason I run 


down that litany is as we look at a path 


forward, the Board will have a call on August 


the 8th, and certainly the Chair of the working 


group can report out, you know, status and 


significant issues. There's a Board meeting in 


Nevada in the middle of September, so I think 


the working group needs to get a sense from 


NIOSH and ORAU and SC&A as to the pace of the 


work here, and then the working group needs to 


decide when it wants to engage again. And I 


think those are issues for you to talk about 


now as we look at sort of the path forward. 
I 
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guess it would start with NIOSH, who I think 


has the biggest list of, you know, when are you 


going to be ready to -- to share in a 


significant -- in a significant enough volume 


that would warrant the working group coming 


back together. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, given the number of 


issues and if we're -- and the -- well, let me 


think about this for a minute. We have a 


number of items where we said we will amend the 


site profile, we agree we're going to amend -- 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- so those are -- are those 


ones we're pursuing in general but we're -- 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- you know, some of the ones 


you've mentioned, we've said that. 


 DR. WADE: Right. I think really it's where 


there's intellectual lifting to do. I think 


that's when the working group needs to engage. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, there's the resuspension 


issue that we talked about that we have some 


issue to deal with. It's not clear -- it's not 


clear to me that we will have substantial -- 


substantial progress toward all the things we 

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have to be -- have to be done by the September 


Board meeting. I think that would be too 


optimistic. In order to make substantial 


progress, we'd -- on all the things, including 


the things we -- where there's agreement, you 


know, the TBD to write. I guess I'd like to 


get a better sense of outlining and -- with -- 


with the ORAU team in terms of the task, and 


maybe provide some feedback and proposed 


schedule when we think some of these issues 


where we're still in discussion, we didn't 


necessarily agree right off, where we think -- 


you know, when we think we can come back. I 


hate to predict sitting here and, you know, I 


don't know how free Gene is to commit his own 


time. He has a management structure that I'm 


not a part of that essentially gives him his 


priorities, so it's a little difficult for us 


to do that in this meeting, but we should be 


able to gather relatively quickly and provide 


information to the working group before -- 


maybe before the August 8th phone call, but 


that's pretty close, with some ideas about when 


-- some issues we might be able to deal with 


forthwith for a few things, for the -- the ones 

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where we're still -- where we didn't 


necessarily line up and agree today. So you 


know, maybe a time in -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: I can see us having our -- our 


comments ready possibly by August 8th. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: On the -- you know, or the issue 


comments. But as far as what you all have to 


do between August the 8th and September the -- 


week of September 18th -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know that we'll be able 


to make much progress before the next Board 


meeting. August --


 MR. PRESLEY: I hate to say it, but all I can 


see maybe is a -- is a report at the -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: 'Cause August 8th is less than 


two weeks away. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right, and I'm -- I'm busy as I 


can be, too, and I know you all are, 'cause I ­

- I'm going to try to sit down tonight and push 


these things together and maybe if y'all are 


going to be here tomorrow or something -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I'll be here Thursday. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Are you going to be here 

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Thursday? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: If nothing breaks I'll give them 


to you and we --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- cuss them and discuss them. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And then probably between the 


August 8th phone call and the September 21st 


meeting, we may be able to come out with a 


schedule for when we can deliver our product 


that we committed to on some of these issues 


that are in -- where we're still in discussion, 


where we haven't converged. 


 DR. WADE: There I think --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Somewhere in that --


 DR. WADE: -- I think it's a reasonable path 


forward. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- time frame we could maybe -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: So the -- a summary of what 


happened here will be shared with all. You'll 


go back and caucus and look at when you will be 


able to produce intellectual product that will 


be worthy of bringing the working group back 


together. Once you share that information, 

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John will have to look at how long it will take 


his people to get their mind around that. So 


all of this should be aiming at setting a time 


for the working group to come back together 


with sufficient new information to justify that 


happening. And while we can't set that date 


today, I think we need to be reali-- we need to 


realize that we need to be pushing for that 


because, again, we all know what happens if we 


don't keep our focus; then it's easy to -- to 


get distracted and -- so I -- I would think 


that would be a reasonable course of action. 


And then Robert, you can set the time for the 


next working group meeting when this sort of 


comes together. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, I would -- you know, I'm 


going to be honest with you. I'd love for us 


to vote on this thing while we're at the Test 


Site -- I mean we're -- we're at NTS. But with 


what we did today, I -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: We have enough action that 


we've agreed to do, you know, just not even 


counting the things where we're still -- we 


have enough stuff that we've agreed to do that 


require research that I don't see us having a 

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resolution --


 MR. PRESLEY: Right, this last item -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- in front of the working 


group at the time --


 MR. PRESLEY: -- on here I think is going to be 


-- that's going to be one of your long-wait 


items is trying to pull all that stuff 


together. 


 DR. WADE: There again, this is a site profile 


review, so there doesn't have to be a formal 


vote. I mean I --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 


 DR. WADE: -- but I think we need to continue 


to make progress to -- to see that these issues 


are -- are raised, debated, resolved, closed, 


and then we work our way down to the tail of 


the curve. We made great progress today. I 


just think we want to keep some sense of 


urgency to it. 


 MS. MUNN: Maybe we could consider at least a 


working group phone call toward the end of 


August, try to --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we can aim for that. 


Again, I -- I really -- I need to caucus with 


management on the ORAU side to make sure that ­
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-


 MR. PRESLEY: It doesn't take long to get a 


working group phone conversation going. We can 


-- you know, if they get enough done, I don't 


see a problem with that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And we can share -- I would 


assume if we have a product we can share with 


the working group and SC&A at any time -- 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we'll share it. You know, 


when we have a product together, we'll share at 


that time. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We could always meet in Vegas the 


Friday before the 18th. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, yeah, right. 


DR. ROESSLER: Government rate, no less, over 


the weekend. 


 MS. MUNN: And we could fix ourselves over the 


weekend, couldn't we? 


 DR. WADE: But I think great progress has -- 


you -- you did extremely well today. I think 


the discipline of the discussion was fine. 
I 


mean I think you've made great progress on a 


number of issues. We just want to stay with 


it. 

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 MS. MUNN: Yeah, if we could -- if we could aim 


for a phone call, say the week of August 21st 


sometime, then we'd at least have something on 


our schedule for --


 MR. PRESLEY: August what did you say? 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, I --


 MR. HINNEFELD: What do you want to accomplish 


on the phone call? 


 MS. MUNN: Well, accomplish on -- hopefully on 


the phone call, if there are any additional 


issues that you -- that have been encountered 


or that -- that still are -- are really thorns 


in the side for SC&A --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: -- that we can at least get a sense 


of how things are moving along, and if there's 


any -- any major item that is going to take 


more than the kind of discussion that's gone on 


here today, in order for everyone to be aware 


of where we're going. 


 MR. PRESLEY: August 21st, is that what you 


said, that week? 


 MS. MUNN: That -- sometime that week seems to 


be --


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, it'll have to be the first 

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part of the week. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we have a -- there is another 


working group meeting on the 22nd -- 


August -- the week of August 21st. 


Yeah, the Savannah River Site's meeting on the 


22nd. You know, we could try -- would the 23rd 


work for you, Wednesday? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: How would the 23rd be? 


 MS. MUNN: Phone call, tentatively. 


 DR. WADE: Pick a time that's convenient for 


westerners as well as easterners. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you so much. 


 MR. PRESLEY: How about 9:00 o'clock? 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, right -- again. 


 DR. WADE: What do we say, 11:00 or 1:00 -- 


11:00 a.m. or 1:00 p.m.? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Why don't we do it at 1:00? That 


gives everybody time. What do you think about 


that, 1:00 in the afternoon? 


 MS. MUNN: Perfect for me. 


 MR. CLAWSON: 1:00 our time or yours? 


 MR. PRESLEY: No, 1:00 -- 1:00 eastern standard 


time, which would be -- 


 MS. MUNN: 10:00 my time --

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 MR. PRESLEY: -- which would be 10:00 you-all's 


time. 


 MS. MUNN: -- 11:00 your time. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That way we get lunch out of the 


way. The majority of the people in this part 


of the -- are in this part of the country and 


that gets your lunch and stuff like that out of 


the way. 


DR. ROESSLER: August 23rd? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, August 23rd, 1:00 o'clock 


p.m. eastern standard time. 


 DR. WADE: Eastern daylight time. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Eastern -- eastern daylight 


time. 


 MR. PRESLEY: There you go. 


DR. ROESSLER: It's okay, I can eat on -- while 


I'm on the phone. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We'll shoot for that. 


 DR. WADE: With an understanding that call will 


be a -- sort of an update, and maybe just to 


get a status as to, you know, whether or not 


there are significant issues that warrant, you 


know, the working group getting together to 


work or whether it appears to be as we imagined 


it was today. 

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 MS. MUNN: As we hope it will be. 


 DR. WADE: It's quite reasonable. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I think I need a new Blackberry. 


 DR. WADE: Is there anybody on the telephone 


line who'd like to make a comment, ask a 


question, an observation? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That you all very much. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, sir, for your leadership. 


 MR. PRESLEY: A great day. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 3:25 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

249 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of July 25, 


2006; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


13th day of August, 2006. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102