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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TYWAN EDWARDS

(AC 42327)

Lavine, Alexander and Flynn, Js.*

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of larceny in the second degree,

the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant’s conviction

stemmed from his alleged reception of stolen property in the form of

one Rolex watch, taken from the victims, D and S, during a break-in of

their home by the defendant’s brother. During the break-in, three Rolex

watches were stolen, valued by D at $11,000, $5000 and $16,000. Over

the defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted a portion of a police

detective’s testimony regarding a surveillance video that showed the

defendant, in a business that provided jewelry appraisals, in possession

of one of the Rolex watches. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the

evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the value of the watch

in his possession was more than $10,000 or that he knew the watch

was stolen as required by statute (§ 53a-123). Held:

1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of

larceny in the second degree:

a. There was sufficient evidence that the value of the property was more

than $10,000 as required by § 53a-123 (a) (2): although D testified that

one of the stolen watches had been worth only $5000, his description

of that watch did not include diamonds, and D testified that the watch

seen with the defendant in the surveillance video was his diamond

Rolex, recognizable by its dial and condition, which he had valued at

$16,000, a clerk on the surveillance video examined the watch and

confirmed the authenticity of diamonds on it to be genuine, and the

jury was entitled to weigh the credibility of conflicting evidence that S

had valued all three watches below $10,000, and, thus, the jury could

have found that the defendant possessed the $16,000 watch; moreover,

the state established that D owned the watch and D’s testimony as to

the value of his watch was sufficient to put the question of value before

the jury, which was entitled to weigh that evidence in finding the value

of the property.

b. Sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that the defendant

knew the property was stolen; the jury’s decision to find the defendant

not guilty of various other crimes with which he had been charged by

the state did not preclude the inference that the defendant likely knew

the property was stolen, as there was testimony that the watch the

defendant possessed days after the break-in was stolen, the defendant

made inconsistent statements to the police as to how he had obtained

the watch, there was evidence that the defendant’s brother had been

identified by the victims as a suspect in the break-in, had been connected

to the stolen watches and had been found in possession of D’s stolen

documents, and the defendant made an unsolicited reference to the

police regarding identifications of the suspects made through Facebook

that suggested the defendant was aware of the circumstances of the

break-in.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in

admitting evidence of the police detective’s testimony regarding the

surveillance video over his objection, even if improper, as he failed to

show that the admission caused him harm; the challenged testimony

was cumulative of D’s testimony in which he identified the Rolex as his

from the surveillance video, which the defendant did not challenge.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain impeachment evidence by prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining S on

the topic of her drug related arrest subsequent to the break-in: S testified

that she had a criminal history and had sold drugs from her home but

that she stopped selling pills after the break-in, and the court denied

defense counsel’s request to cross-examine S regarding the underlying

facts of her arrest months after the break-in during which she had been

found with a large quantity of cash and pills on her person, as she

was ultimately convicted of illegal storage, not sale, of narcotics, that
conviction did not tend to prove that she had lied about ceasing to sell

controlled substances, and impeaching S on this issue would be an

overly speculative collateral inquiry requiring impermissible extrinsic

evidence; moreover, the court gave the defendant wide latitude to

impeach S through other means.

4. The defendant’s claim that the trial court committed structural error by

using a certain phrase in its jury instruction concerning reasonable

doubt was unavailing; our Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld the use

of instructions employing the very language challenged by the defendant,

and this court, as an intermediate appellate court, was bound by that

controlling precedent.

Argued September 21, 2020—officially released January 26, 2021

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of burglary in the first degree, robbery in

the first degree, conspiracy to commit larceny in the

first degree, assault in the second degree and larceny

in the second degree, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area

number twenty-three, and tried to the jury before B.

Fischer, J.; verdict of guilty of larceny in the second

degree; thereafter, the court, B. Fischer, J., denied the

defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from

which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jeremiah Donovan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Walker, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state’s

attorney, and Karen M. Roberg, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The defendant, Tywan Edwards, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial

to a jury, of larceny in the second degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (2). On appeal, the

defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient

to convict him of larceny in the second degree because

the jury could not reasonably have found that (a) he

possessed stolen property of a value greater than

$10,000 or (b) he knew the property in his possession

was stolen, (2) the trial court improperly admitted into

evidence the testimony that the victim had identified

items in a video exhibit as his, in violation of the rule

against hearsay, (3) the trial court improperly prevented

the defendant from cross-examining a witness concerning her alleged drug dealing subsequent to the crime

with which he was charged, and (4) the trial court

erroneously instructed the jury concerning reasonable

doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found, are relevant to this appeal. Samantha Frank

(Samantha)1 generated income by working from her

New Haven home as a psychic and by illegally selling

pills for which a prescription was required. One of her

customers was Dijon Edwards, the wife of the defendant’s brother, Terrance Edwards. On January 20, 2017,

Dijon Edwards, accompanied by a man named Marcel,

purchased pills from Samantha.2 Later that night, two

men broke into the Franks’ home, disturbing Samantha,

her husband David Frank (David), and two relatives

who were staying with them. One of the men wore a

mask covering the lower portion of his face. The intruders threatened them at knifepoint and stabbed David

in the arm. The men took Samantha’s purse and David’s

wallet and left. The purse contained car keys, jewelry,

and, notably, three expensive watches: a Rolex Daytona

watch and two Rolex Datejust watches, which are at

the center of this appeal.

The Franks (victims) called the police, and David

went to the hospital. The victims later spoke to Detectives Kealyn Nivakoff and her partner, members of the

New Haven Police Department. The victims gave statements and identified the defendant and his brother as

the intruders.

The police undertook surveillance of Terrance

Edwards’ residence. On January 23, 2017, Nivakoff

interviewed Terrance Edwards and Dijon Edwards. At

the conclusion of Terrance Edwards’ interview, Nivakoff searched his wallet and found a driver’s license

and Social Security card belonging to David. The police

made contact with the defendant that day, at which

time they searched him with his consent and found a

business card from the American Diamond Exchange

on his person. The police subsequently searched Ter-
rance Edwards’ residence and recovered jewelry and

a Rolex Daytona. The victims identified the items the

police found in the residence as theirs, which they had

last seen on the night of the break-in. A search of Dijon

Edwards’ phone revealed a photograph of a Rolex

watch. When David was shown a printout of the photograph from Dijon Edwards’ phone, he identified his

stolen property, writing ‘‘Yes, that’s my [Rolex] Daytona

watch 5-16-18’’ on the photograph.

Nivakoff went to the American Diamond Exchange

and spoke to a clerk, Kathleen Kirker, who had interacted with the defendant. Nivakoff viewed a surveillance video of the defendant’s visit. The video depicted

the defendant showing Rolex watches to Kirker and

asking about an appraisal to establish the value of one

of the watches and to confirm the authenticity of the

diamonds on it.

An arrest warrant for the defendant was issued in

February, 2017. The defendant was located in Arizona

and arrested in November, 2017. He was charged with

burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree,

conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree, assault

in the second degree, and larceny in the second degree.

At trial, the state offered the photograph of the Daytona watch found in Dijon Edwards’ phone into evidence. The defendant did not object. David identified

the handwriting on the photograph as his own and again

identified the Daytona watch in the photograph as his.

The Daytona watch itself was admitted into evidence.

In his testimony, David also identified one of the

watches in the American Diamond Exchange surveillance video as his Rolex Datejust. Neither of the two

stolen Datejust watches was recovered by the police.

On June 19, 2018, the jury found the defendant guilty

of larceny in the second degree by receiving stolen

property, but found the defendant not guilty of the other

charges. The court accepted the jury’s verdict and

imposed a total effective sentence of eight years of

incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts

will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the state presented

insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the value of the stolen property in his possession exceeded $10,000, or that he knew that one of the

watches in his possession had been stolen. We disagree.

The standard of review for such claims is well established. ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part]

test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most

favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact]

reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative
force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We note that the [finder of fact] must

find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt

in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged

offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical

for the [finder of fact] to conclude that a basic fact or

an inferred fact is true, the [finder of fact] is permitted

to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether

the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the

defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged

beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. App. 427, 447,

238 A.3d 797, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 974, 240 A.3d

676 (2020).

The following additional facts inform our analysis.

On the afternoon before the break-in, Samantha sold

Percocet pills to Dijon Edwards. Marcel was present

during the transaction. In order to complete the transaction, Samantha retrieved the pills from her purse, and

while she did this, the contents of her purse were visible

to Dijon Edwards and Marcel. During the break-in that

night, the intruders threatened the victims with knives,

yelling, ‘‘Where’s the purse?’’ The intruders ultimately

departed with Samantha’s purse. Following the breakin, she told police that her purse contained three Rolex

watches valued at $6000, $4000, and $8500.

Samantha suspected one of the intruders was related

to Dijon Edwards. Dijon Edwards was a frequent customer of Samantha, and Dijon’s husband, Terrance

Edwards, had sold Samantha cocaine in the past. The

day after the break-in, the victims contacted Marcel in

the hope that he could provide more information about

the intruders. Marcel shared with the victims several

Facebook photographs of individuals whom he believed

may have been involved in the break-in. These Facebook photographs depicted the defendant and his

brother. Believing the individuals in the Facebook photographs were the intruders, the victims shared their

suspicions with Nivakoff on January 22, 2017. The victims went to the police department to give statements,

at which time they were shown photographic arrays.

Both victims identified the defendant and his brother

Terrance Edwards as the intruders from their recollection of the event.

The police detained the defendant near his brother’s

residence. The police found a business card from American Diamond Exchange on the defendant’s person. On

the business card were the words ‘‘Rolex Watch

Appraisal $250 Call for Apt.’’ Nivakoff interviewed the

defendant after the police detained him. The defendant

stated to her that he was not on good terms with his

brother but planned to meet him for drinks that day.
The defendant explained to Nivakoff that he had

acquired the American Diamond Exchange card during

a visit to the store concerning a Michael Kors watch he

was wearing. When speaking to Nivakoff, the defendant

also made a vague reference to ‘‘people being able to

identify people from Facebook,’’ which Nivakoff

found odd.3

Nivakoff visited American Diamond Exchange and

obtained an audiovisual surveillance video depicting

the defendant and another man entering the store.4 The

second man handed the defendant two watches, which

he handed to the clerk, Kirker. One of the watches had

a broken band and was referred to by the defendant

as a Rolex. The other watch contained what appeared

to be diamonds. The defendant stated to Kirker that

his Rolex was broken. Kirker responded that David

Schnee, another employee, might be able to look at it

when he was in, as he was the ‘‘only one who knows

about Rolexes.’’ The defendant then asked her if the

store had a diamond checker, showing her the second

watch. He indicated that he wanted to make sure the

diamonds were real, commenting that there were a lot

of diamonds on the watch. Kirker took the watch into

a back room to look at the diamonds. When she

emerged, she and the defendant discussed appraising

the watch’s value. She asked the defendant if he planned

to sell the watch, to which he replied in the negative.

He asked her if she had tested all the diamonds, and

she assured him that the ones she had looked at were

definitely real. She gave the defendant a card and stated

that the fee for ‘‘the Rolex watch appraisal [would be]

$250’’ and he needed to call for an appointment. The

police did not recover either of the watches depicted

in the video.

Following his November, 2017 arrest in Arizona, the

defendant gave a statement to Nivakoff in which he

stated that his brother Terrance Edwards had given him

a Rolex watch in payment of a debt and that he had

taken it to American Diamond Exchange for appraisal.

This statement contradicted his previous statement in

which he had stated that he had obtained the American

Diamond Exchange card with respect to a Michael Kors

watch appraisal.

In a long form information, the state charged the

defendant with, inter alia, larceny in the second degree

and charged that ‘‘at the city of New Haven, on or about

January 23, 2017, at approximately 3:45 p.m., in the area

of 1280 Whalley Avenue [American Diamond

Exchange], the said [defendant] received or retained

stolen property knowing that it had probably been stolen or believing that it had probably been stolen, and the

value of the property exceeded [$10,000], said conduct

being in violation of sections 53a-119 (8) and 53a-123

(a) (2) of the Connecticut General Statutes.’’

At trial, Schnee testified that American Diamond
Exchange provided ‘‘jewelry appraisals’’ on Rolex

watches to determine valuation. According to Schnee,

Rolex watches are a particularly desirable brand of

watch, and the presence of gems on a watch increases

the value ‘‘depending on the quality.’’ He confirmed that

the handwriting on the American Diamond Exchange

card was Kirker’s. David testified that in the video he

recognized ‘‘one of my watches, the—the diamond

Datejust. Or the Datejust, yes, one of the Rolex

watches.’’ He recognized it ‘‘by the video and knowing

that it’s—it was mine.’’ When asked if there was anything particular about it that he observed, he referenced

the condition and the dial.

David also testified as to the value of the watches.

According to him, the watches in Samantha’s purse

were a Rolex Daytona worth $11,000, a Rolex Datejust

worth $5000, and a second Rolex Datejust worth

$16,000. He described the first Datejust watch, valued at

$5000, as ‘‘a black—one had black face, oyster perpetual

and oyster band, late 80’s model . . . stainless.’’ As for

the second Rolex Datejust, it was worth $16,000, but

David did not describe it in detail.

The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at

the close of the state’s case-in-chief and following closing arguments. The court denied both motions. After

the court charged the jury, the jury returned a verdict

of guilty of the charge of larceny in the second degree.

The defendant filed a written motion for a judgment

of acquittal on July 9, 2018, in which he argued that

there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he

‘‘knew that the watches he displayed at [American]

Diamond Exchange were stolen or probably had been

stolen,’’ and that there was insufficient evidence to conclude either that (a) property meeting the statutory

value of $10,000 was identified, or (b) David’s testimony

concerning value was sufficiently reliable. The court

denied the motion.

A

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient

evidence as to the value of the watches to support

his conviction. Section 53a-123 (a) provides in relevant

part: ‘‘A person is guilty of larceny in the second degree

when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a119, and . . . (2) the value of the property or service

exceeds ten thousand dollars . . . .’’ The defendant’s

first claim of insufficiency of the evidence challenges

the second element, that the value of the property

exceeded $10,000. He raises two points. First, in charging him with larceny by possession of stolen property

at American Diamond Exchange, the state relied on

David’s identification of one of the two watches in the

surveillance video as one of the stolen watches. He

argues that because David identified only a single Datejust, the jury lacked sufficient evidence from which it
could have determined that David was referring to the

Rolex Datejust watch worth $16,000, as opposed to the

Rolex Datejust watch worth only $5000. Consequently,

he contends that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to

find that he possessed stolen property worth more than

$10,000. Second, he argues that, even if the jury concluded David had identified the watch in the video as

the $16,000 watch, the jury could not find the value of

that watch to be $16,000 solely on the basis of David’s

testimony. We reject both claims.

1

With respect to the defendant’s claim that the jury

could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt

which of the two watches David identified in the video,

we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from

which the jury reasonably could have found that David

identified a watch worth more than $10,000.

In his testimony, David identified his diamond Rolex

Datejust in the video.5 He stated that he recognized the

watch ‘‘by the video and knowing that it’s . . . mine,’’

and explained that he had observed the watch’s ‘‘dial’’

and ‘‘condition’’ in the video. When describing the items

stolen from him, David testified that the $5000 Datejust

watch was stainless with a black face and oyster band,

but he did not reference diamonds. By contrast, the

watch that Kirker looked at in the back room had ‘‘a

lot of diamonds’’ on it. The jury thus could have drawn

the inference that the ‘‘diamond Datejust’’ David identified was not the $5000 watch with the black face and

oyster band, but the more expensive $16,000 watch.6

Additionally, Schnee testified that diamonds will

increase the value of a Rolex watch. The jury had a

basis to infer that the watch David identified was the

more expensive of the two given that it had ‘‘a lot of

diamonds,’’ some of which Kirker had examined and

confirmed to be genuine, while the other was not

described as containing diamonds. ‘‘[A] jury may draw

whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and

logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Rhodes, Conn , , A.3d (2020).

The defendant points out that Samantha told the

police that her purse contained Rolex watches with

values of $6000, $4000, and $8500—values below

$10,000. This, however, goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence, not its sufficiency. ‘‘When there is

conflicting evidence . . . it is the exclusive province of

the . . . trier of fact, to weigh the conflicting evidence,

determine the credibility of witnesses and determine

whether to accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony. . . . Questions of whether to believe or to disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review. As

a reviewing court, we may not retry the case . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams,

supra, 200 Conn. App. 448. Giving the evidence the most
favorable construction toward sustaining the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for

the jury to find that David identified the $16,000

Rolex watch.

2

The defendant next contends that, even if the evidence was sufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that David identified a watch with a value

exceeding $10,000, his testimony alone was insufficient

for the jury to find the value of the watch. He argues

that David’s single sentence testimony that the watch

was worth $16,000 was insufficient to satisfy the statutory value element because ‘‘there was no evidence

by an appraiser, by a seller of similar items, by an

independent owner or collector of Datejusts . . . no

documentary evidence: no catalogues, invoices,

Internet searches, price tags. . . . [David] gave no

background information concerning his acquisition of

the Datejusts . . . . Nor did he provide any basis for

his belief as to how much they were ‘worth’—or even

what he meant by ‘worth.’ ’’ The defendant reasons that

it is not clear that David was referring to the ‘‘market

value’’ of the watch at that time.7 The defendant’s

claim fails.

‘‘The determination of value is a question for the trier

of fact.’’ State v. Collette, 199 Conn. 308, 314, 507 A.2d

99 (1986). ‘‘A reviewing court will not disturb the trier’s

determination if, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Felder, 95 Conn. App. 248, 261,

897 A.2d 614, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 905, 901 A.2d

1226 (2006).

‘‘Under the law in Connecticut, it is well settled that

an owner may testify as to the value of his or her

property.’’ State v. Sherman, 127 Conn. App. 377, 393,

13 A.3d 1138 (2011), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 936, 195

A.3d 385 (2018). In Sherman, this court explained that

‘‘[a]n owner may estimate the worth of his or her property, and the jury must consider the weight of the owner’s testimony. . . . The state does not need to prove

the value of property with exactitude. . . . The state

is required only to lay a foundation which will enable

the trier [of fact] to make a fair and reasonable estimate.

. . . Whether an owner’s testimony as to the . . .

value provides sufficient information to support a jury

verdict depends on the circumstances of each case.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id.

The defendant attempts to distinguish Sherman by

pointing out that in that case the owner testified as to

‘‘value,’’ not ‘‘worth,’’ and the jury could examine the

stolen jewelry itself as an exhibit, while here, the Datej-
usts were not in evidence.8 As the state correctly points

out, ‘‘value’’ and ‘‘worth’’ are typically synonymous

terms in our case law. See State v. Sherman, supra, 127

Conn. App. 393 (using terms interchangeably). The state

is also correct that the owner’s testimony is sufficient

and the property need not be available for the jury to

inspect. In Sherman, this court rejected the claim that

‘‘any testimony provided by the owner regarding the

value of his or her property is incompetent unless the

state also provides some sort of factual foundation in

support of the testimony.’’ Id.

On the contrary, the owner’s testimony on its own

may be considered by the trier of fact. Our Supreme

Court has ruled that ‘‘the competence of the witness

to testify to the value of property may be established

by demonstrating that the witness owns the property

in question.’’ State v. Baker, 182 Conn. 52, 60, 437 A.2d

843 (1980); see also State v. Felder, supra, 95 Conn.

App. 262 (‘‘[the victim’s] testimony with regard to the

value of his vehicle was sufficient to satisfy the statutory

element that the value of the motor vehicle was in

excess of $10,000, and [the victim] was competent to

testify as to the value of his property’’). Here, the state

established that David owned the watch. His testimony

was sufficient to put the question of value before the

jury, and the jury was entitled to weigh that evidence

accordingly.

B

The defendant next argues that whatever the value

of the watches may have been, there was insufficient

evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

he actually knew either one of the watches in his possession at American Diamond Exchange was stolen. He

argues that the jury’s finding of not guilty of four of the

counts with which he was charged established that he

was not one of the intruders, that there was no evidence

that he knew of the break-in, that he could assume

his brother had received the watch in exchange for

controlled substances consistent with his account to

Nivakoff, and that his conduct at American Diamond

Exchange was consistent with honest activity. We do

not agree.

General Statutes § 53a-119 defines larceny by receiving stolen property in relevant part: ‘‘A person commits

larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property

or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person,

he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property

from an owner. Larceny includes, but is not limited to

. . . (8) Receiving stolen property. A person is guilty

of larceny by receiving stolen property if he receives,

retains, or disposes of stolen property knowing that it

has probably been stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained

or disposed of with purpose to restore it to the owner.

. . .’’ The defendant disputes the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to establish the statutory knowledge element.

The jury’s decision to find the defendant not guilty

of four of the counts, charging burglary in the first

degree, robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree, and assault in the second

degree, does not preclude an inference that, even if the

defendant had not participated in the January 20, 2017

events at the victims’ home, he still knew the property

was probably stolen. ‘‘[An] inference may be drawn if

the circumstances are such that a reasonable man of

honest intentions, in the situation of the defendant,

would have concluded that the property was stolen.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nunes, 58

Conn. App. 296, 301, 752 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 254 Conn.

944, 762 A.2d 906 (2000). ‘‘[P]ossession of recently stolen property raises a permissible inference of criminal

connection with the property, and if no explanation is

forthcoming, the inference of criminal connection may

be as a principal in the theft, or as a receiver under the

receiving statute, depending upon the other facts and

circumstances which may be proven.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Foster, 45 Conn. App. 369,

376, 696 A.2d 1003, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 904, 701

A.2d 335 (1997).

The jury heard David testify that the watch the defendant possessed at American Diamond Exchange mere

days after the break-in was one of the stolen watches.

Our review of the evidence, undertaken in a light most

favorable to sustaining the verdict, reveals sufficient

evidence on which the jury could have relied in concluding the defendant knew that the watch was stolen.

The defendant told the police initially that he had

received the American Diamond Exchange card during

a visit that concerned his Michael Kors watch. Kirker’s

handwriting on the card referenced a Rolex, however,

and the defendant later told Nivakoff that he had

received a Rolex watch from his brother in satisfaction

of a debt. The defendant argues that the jury lacked a

basis to refute his claim that he received the watch

from his brother as payment without knowledge that

it was stolen. The jury did not have to accept either of

the defendant’s explanations. Rather, the jury could

have found that the defendant was not credible in light

of the state’s evidence of his inconsistent statements

to the police and in light of the other evidence produced

at trial.9 The jury heard evidence that the victims identified Terrance Edwards, that the police connected the

stolen watches to Terrance Edwards, and that Terrance

Edwards was found in possession of David’s documents. The jury could have understood the defendant’s

unsolicited reference to Nivakoff regarding Facebook

identifications as suggesting that he knew the circumstances of the break-in, given how the victims identified

the purported suspects through Facebook. On the basis

of this evidence, construing all inferences in favor of
upholding the verdict, we conclude there was sufficient

evidence for the jury to find that the defendant’s brother

was involved in the break-in, and to thus find that the

defendant’s explanation to the police for possessing the

watch was not truthful.

II

The defendant next claims on appeal that the trial

court erred by admitting into evidence a portion of

Nivakoff’s testimony regarding the surveillance video

over his objection, in violation of the rule against hearsay. This is a close issue, but irrespective of whether

the testimony is viewed as impermissible hearsay or

not, we conclude that the trial court’s admission of the

testimony was harmless.

The following additional facts inform our analysis.

David testified at trial that he was shown a surveillance

video by Nivakoff at the police station. As previously

stated in this opinion, he testified that he recognized

‘‘one of the watches’’ in that video—specifically, a diamond Rolex Datejust—as belonging to him. Nivakoff

later testified at trial. During Nivakoff’s testimony, the

surveillance video from American Diamond Exchange

was admitted into evidence and played to the jury. The

defendant’s hearsay claim concerns the state’s direct

examination of Nivakoff, objection by defense counsel,

and the court’s ruling, which occurred during the following colloquy:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Now, after you viewed this video,

did you show it to anybody else?

‘‘[The Witness]: I showed it to David Frank.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And when you showed it to David

Frank was he able to identify items in that—in that

video as his?

‘‘[The Witness]: Ye—

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Hearsay.

‘‘The Court: What’s your claim on that?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Asking—

‘‘The Court: And hearsay, in other words, what David

Frank identified.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yeah.

‘‘The Court: Yeah. What’s your claim on that?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: I’m just asking yes or no, did

that happen?

‘‘The Court: I’m going—I’ll allow yes or no.

‘‘[The Witness]: Yeah.

‘‘The Court: Go ahead.

‘‘[The Witness]: I’m sorry. Yes, he did.’’

Following Nivakoff’s testimony, defense counsel did
not object to, or move to strike, the answer.10

We see no need to discuss in detail our analysis of

the relevant legal principles and applicable standard of

review, given our resolution of this issue. ‘‘Our standard

of review for evidentiary claims is well settled. To the

extent [that] a trial court’s admission of evidence is

based on an interpretation of the [Connecticut] Code of

Evidence, our standard of review is plenary.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Michael T., 194 Conn.

App. 598, 611, 222 A.3d 105 (2019), cert. denied, 335

Conn. 982, A.3d (2020).

The defendant argues that Nivakoff’s testimony,

answering ‘‘[y]es, he did’’ to the question of whether

David had identified items in the video as his, was

inadmissible hearsay. He claims that the testimony was

offered for its truth, i.e., for the proposition that David

asserted items in the video were his. The state argues

that it elicited Nivakoff’s testimony merely to clarify

and to explain the process of Nivakoff’s investigation.

The state contends that it sought only a yes or no answer

and did not attempt to elicit the identity of the items

in the video.

For the purpose of resolving this claim, we will

assume, without deciding, that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay through Nivakoff’s testimony.11

We thus turn to the question of whether the admission of

Nivakoff’s challenged testimony amounted to harmful

error. Examining the evidence here, we cannot conclude, with a fair assurance, that the testimony substantially affected the jury’s verdict, and we, therefore,

determine that any error was harmless.

‘‘When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . . We have

concluded that a nonconstitutional error is harmless

when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the

error did not substantially affect the verdict. . . . We

previously have considered a number of factors in

determining whether a defendant has been harmed by

the admission or exclusion of particular evidence.

Whether such error is harmless in a particular case

depends [on] a number of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s

case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,

the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,

and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s

case. . . . Considering these various factors, we have

declared that the proper standard for determining

whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless

should be whether the jury’s verdict was substantially

swayed by the error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 171 Conn. App. 328, 338, 157

A.3d 120 (2017).
In the present case, the state argues that the hearsay

testimony was harmless error because the state had

previously elicited the substantive facts at issue from

David and did not need Nivakoff’s testimony to prove

that the items belonged to him. We agree. Nivakoff’s

testimony, to which the defendant objects, was cumulative of David’s testimony in which he identified a Rolex

watch in the video as being his. Nivakoff’s testimony

established only that David had identified items as his,

which the jury had heard from David himself. See State

v. Kerr, 120 Conn. App. 203, 215–16, 991 A.2d 605 (defendant not harmed by hearsay statements of two witnesses, where testimony of one was ‘‘largely parallel’’

of other witness’ testimony and other was cumulative),

cert. denied, 296 Conn. 907, 992 A.2d 1136 (2010).

The defendant argues that the error was harmful

because Nivakoff’s testimony referenced ‘‘items,’’ while

David testified only that a single item in the video—a

Rolex Datejust watch—belonged to him. He argues that

due to uncertainty as to which of the two Datejust

watches David’s identification applied to, which comprises his first insufficiency of the evidence claim, the

state needed to rely on Nivakoff’s testimony that David

identified ‘‘items’’ in the plural in order to establish that

the defendant possessed stolen property exceeding a

value of $10,000. Because we conclude in part I of this

opinion that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to

conclude that David identified a stolen watch with a

value exceeding $10,000, we reject the defendant’s

claim of harm. Thus, because the defendant did not

challenge the admissibility of David’s testimony on this

point, we conclude he was not harmed by Nivakoff’s testimony.

III

The defendant next claims that the trial court abused

its discretion by prohibiting him from cross-examining

Samantha about her drug dealing subsequent to the

break-in. We do not agree that the court abused its

discretion in declining to permit cross-examination on

what we view as a collateral matter.

The following additional facts inform our analysis.

Before Samantha testified, the court heard argument

on the state’s motion in limine to preclude certain evidence of her criminal history. She testified that she had

felony and misdemeanor convictions. The court limited

the defendant’s examination regarding these convictions to general terms without specific references to the

offenses involved. Several of her convictions concerned

illegal storage and possession of narcotics. In her subsequent testimony, she confirmed her criminal history

and admitted that she had sold drugs from her home,

including to Dijon Edwards and Marcel. She also admitted that she had purchased cocaine from Terrance

Edwards and admitted on both direct and cross-exami-
nation that she had lied to the police during the investigation regarding her drug dealing. She also testified that

she stopped selling pills after the break-in because it

was dangerous.

Defense counsel asked the court, outside the presence of the jury, to allow him to cross-examine Samantha concerning her arrest on July 5, 2017, which led to

her conviction in November, 2017, of illegal storage of

narcotics. Defense counsel argued that because Samantha had been found with a large quantity of pills and

cash on her person,12 it was suggestive of continued

drug dealing and cast doubt on the veracity of her previous testimony that she had stopped selling drugs after

the break-in. The prosecutor argued in response that

this line of inquiry was a collateral issue because the

witness had been convicted only of illegal storage of

narcotics, and that litigating it would require bringing

in a police officer for an ‘‘expert opinion on possession

with intent to sell.’’ The court allowed defense counsel

to cross-examine Samantha outside the presence of the

jury. She testified that the pills with which she had been

found in July, 2017, were for her own use. The court

ultimately ruled that the defense could not cross-examine her on the underlying facts of the July, 2017 arrest,

on the basis of her testimony that she had ceased selling

pills and the fact that she had been convicted only

of possession.13 On cross-examination before the jury,

Samantha admitted that she sold pills to Marcel the day

after she was interviewed by the police concerning the

break-in, in order to recoup money that she had lost.

She stated that this ‘‘must’ve slipped [her] mind’’ during

her previous testimony, and insisted that this was the

last sale she had conducted.

The defendant argues that he should have been permitted to cross-examine Samantha on the facts of her

July, 2017 arrest in order to impeach her previous testimony by suggesting that she had lied about ceasing to

sell drugs after her sale to Marcel. He contends that

the intended cross-examination regarding Samantha’s

arrest was offered to prove that she had lied under

oath, rather than to use the conviction itself, and thus

fell outside the ambit of § 4-5 of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence.14 We do not agree.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant

legal principles and applicable standard of review.

‘‘Upon review of a trial court’s decision, we will set

aside an evidentiary ruling only when there has been

a clear abuse of discretion. . . . The trial court has

wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination and [e]very

reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the

correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether

there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bermudez, 195 Conn. App.

780, 806, 228 A.3d 96, cert. granted on other grounds,
335 Conn. 908, 227 A.3d 521 (2020). ‘‘[I]t is well settled

that [a] court . . . [may] exclude . . . evidence [that]

has only slight relevance due to . . . its tendency to

inject a collateral issue into the trial. . . . An issue is

collateral if it is not relevant to a material issue in the

case apart from its tendency to contradict the witness.

. . . This is so even when the evidence involves

untruthfulness and could be used to impeach a witness’

credibility.’’ (Citations omitted, emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Annulli, 309

Conn. 482, 493, 71 A.3d 530 (2013).

Section 6-7 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence

provides in relevant part: ‘‘Evidence that a witness has

been convicted of a crime may be introduced by . . .

(1) examination of the witness as to the conviction

. . . .’’ The underlying facts of the conviction may not

be used to impeach the witness. See State v. Denby,

198 Conn. 23, 30, 501 A.2d 1206 (1985), cert. denied,

475 U.S. 1097, 106 S. Ct. 1497, 89 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1986).

‘‘If the crime for which the witness was convicted is

admissible on the merits of the case, however, the facts

surrounding the crime are admissible to the extent they

are relevant to a material issue in the case.’’ E. Prescott,

Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (6th Ed.

2019) § 6.29.8 (a), p. 401, citing State v. Denby, supra,

30–32.

Here, the crime for which Samantha was convicted, in

the court’s view, was a matter unrelated to the material

issues at trial; rather, it was relevant only to cast doubt

on her credibility before the jury. Samantha’s drug dealings were not a material issue in the trial. See State v.

Annulli, supra, 309 Conn. 494–95 (evidence sought on

cross-examination properly excluded because it was

not related to material issue ‘‘apart from its tendency

to contradict the witness’’ (emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Section 6-6 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence

provides that a witness may be cross-examined on specific instances of conduct if probative of truthfulness,

but extrinsic evidence may not be used to prove those

instances. If denied, the examiner must take the witness’ answer. See E. Prescott, supra, § 6.28.5, p. 390. The

court allowed defense counsel to inquire of Samantha

whether she had sold drugs after her sale to Marcel;

she denied it. The court was not required to permit

further examination. See State v. Annulli, supra, 309

Conn. 495.

We agree with the state that allowing cross-examination to demonstrate that Samantha lied about her drug

dealing would result in a ‘‘minitrial of Samantha,’’ which

would require further offers of proof to determine

whether or not she had continued to sell drugs. Such

extrinsic evidence is normally not permitted. ‘‘[E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible for impeachment on a

collateral matter . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) State
v. Annulli, supra, 309 Conn. 497–98; see id., 498 (stating

that ‘‘the introduction of such evidence, if permitted,

would have expended a disproportionate amount of

time in relation to the issue’s probative value’’). Samantha’s conviction of illegal storage of narcotics did not

tend to establish that she lied about ceasing to sell

controlled substances. The court acted well within its

discretion in determining that the defense had ‘‘no evidence’’ that the witness had continued to sell narcotics

and that impeaching her on this point would be an

overly speculative collateral inquiry necessitating

impermissible extrinsic evidence.

Moreover, the court gave the defendant wide latitude

to impeach Samantha through other avenues, such as

the fact that she had been convicted of multiple felonies,

that she had bought and sold drugs, and that she first

testified that she ceased selling drugs after the breakin before subsequently admitting to one additional sale

to Marcel following the break-in. As the court stated,

the jury was equipped to assess the credibility of Samantha’s testimony that the pills she was found with were

for personal use and that she had not continued to sell

them. The court did not abuse its discretion in limiting

the defendant’s cross-examination of Samantha.

IV

The defendant’s final claim on appeal is that the trial

court committed ‘‘structural error’’ in its jury instruction

regarding reasonable doubt.15 The defendant specifically objected to the court’s charge, ‘‘It is such a doubt

as, in the serious affairs that concern you, you would

heed; that is, such a doubt as would cause reasonable

men and women to hesitate to act upon it in matters

of importance.’’16 He claims that the inclusion of the

words ‘‘upon it’’ in the court’s jury instruction ‘‘renders

the instruction nonsensical’’ because it then ‘‘means

almost the opposite of what it should.’’ The defendant

cannot prevail on the merits. As we stated in State v.

Holley, 174 Conn. App. 488, 167 A.3d 1000, cert. denied,

327 Conn. 907, 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, U.S.

, 138 S. Ct. 1012, 200 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2018), in which

the same model jury instruction was used, ‘‘our

Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld the use of instructions that utilized the very language the defendant challenges. . . . [A]s an intermediate court of appeal, we

are unable to overrule, reevaluate, or reexamine controlling precedent of our Supreme Court. . . . As our

Supreme Court has stated: [O]nce this court has finally

determined an issue, for a lower court to reanalyze and

revisit that issue is an improper and fruitless endeavor.

Accordingly, since our Supreme Court already has

determined that the challenged description of reasonable doubt is not improper, we cannot conclude to the

contrary.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 494–95. This court is

bound by these precedents.
The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 Samantha identified herself as ‘‘Samantha Rose DeMetro’’ when she was

sworn in to testify, but she subsequently answered to the name ‘‘Mrs. Frank’’

during her testimony. For clarity, we will refer to her in this opinion as

Samantha Frank.

2 Samantha and her husband David Frank both testified that they did not

know Marcel’s last name.

3 Nivakoff testified at trial that she ‘‘thought it was kind of odd that he

would have brought it up.’’

4 The defendant concedes in his brief that he is pictured in the video.

5 To the extent that the brand of the second watch in the video, which

Kirker inspected, is disputed, the jury could have found that it was a Rolex.

The defendant contends in his brief that the second watch’s brand was

unidentified. Kirker, however, referred to the second watch as a Rolex.

6 The defendant also contended at oral argument before us that the diamonds were a red herring because when David explained how he knew the

watch was his, he referenced the ‘‘condition’’ and the ‘‘dial,’’ but did not

mention diamonds. This vague description does not preclude a reasonable

inference that the watch stolen from David had diamonds on it, particularly

given that the jury heard David identify the watch as his ‘‘diamond Datejust’’

immediately prior.

7 The defendant also contends that the court’s jury instruction on larceny,

that ‘‘[t]he third element is that the property had a value that exceeded

$10,000,’’ was unclear on what ‘‘value’’ actually meant because the court

did not define it for the jury. To the extent that this raises an instructional

error claim, we agree with the state that such a claim is not reviewable,

because the defendant did not object to this part of the instruction at trial.

See State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 482–83, 10 A.3d 942 (2011) (acceptance

of jury instructions without objection waives constitutional claim of instructional error on appeal).

8 Although the watch itself was not in evidence, the jury was able to see

the watches depicted in the surveillance video. The state could not very

well offer a watch in evidence that had been stolen and not recovered.

9 The defendant’s arguments that his trip to American Diamond Exchange

and behavior within the store were ‘‘not the kind of secretive activity

expected of a purveyor of stolen property’’ are irrelevant because these

arguments go to the weight of the evidence. The jury was free to weigh the

state’s evidence and the nature of the defendant’s activity as described in

his statements to the detective in reaching its verdict, and it was not required

to infer what the defendant suggests.

10 The defendant argues that the question elicited hearsay but, because

there was no objection or motion to strike the answer, we question whether

the issue is properly preserved for review. ‘‘It is usually the case that when

. . . the answer to [a] question contains inadmissible material, an objection

made upon the answer is seasonable . . . . The proper form of such an

objection is a motion to strike the answer.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 75 Conn. App. 364, 374, 815

A.2d 1261 (2003), rev’d on other grounds, 272 Conn. 515, 864 A.2d 847 (2005).

We need not decide this issue of preservation, however, because we conclude

that admission of Nivakoff’s testimony was harmless error, if any.

11 We note that the state’s offer of David’s identification has relevance

both to the sequence of events in the investigation and to the truth of the

matter asserted. Following the presentation of the video to the jury, the

state asked Nivakoff whether David had identified items in the video as his.

Of some concern is the fact that in essence, Nivakoff’s ‘‘yes’’ response could

be construed as testimony that David asserted his ownership of the items

to her. The state’s question could be construed as an attempt to elicit

testimony of such an assertion.

12 Samantha testified that she had 148 Alprazolam pills, 40 Risperdal pills,

82 acetaminophen and hydrocodone pills, and 125 TEVA diazepam pills, as

well as $1600 in cash.

13 The court ruled as follows: ‘‘She testified, and the jury is going to assess

her credibility, counsel, that she hasn’t sold pills since January 20, 2017,

the date of this incident. She has indicated in this offer of proof that the

pills that she purchased . . . were for her own personal use over the course

of time . . . and that’s her testimony . . . from what’s in front of me now
. . . I’m not going to allow a challenge to the—your claimed underlying

facts of her arrest . . . she has admitted to the felony there, but again it’s

not a sale, it’s a possession case.’’

14 Section 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant

part: ‘‘(a) . . . Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is

inadmissible to prove the bad character, propensity, or criminal tendencies

of that person except as provided . . . .

‘‘(c) . . . Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other than those specified in subsection (a), such as to

prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of

mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an element

of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.’’

15 ‘‘Structural errors’’ have been defined as ‘‘fundamental defects in the

trial mechanism that affect the entire framework within which the trial

proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vines, 71 Conn. App. 751, 758, 804 A.2d

877 (2002), aff’d, 268 Conn. 239, 842 A.2d 1086 (2004). The defendant claims

that the jury instruction in this case was deficient and thus constitutes

structural error under Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124

L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993). See id., 278–82 (holding that constitutionally deficient

reasonable doubt instruction requires reversal).

16 The language in question is taken from the model criminal jury instructions on the Judicial Branch website. See ConnecticutCriminal Jury Instructions 2.2-3 (November 20, 2017), available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited January 18, 2021).