[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-13975

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESUS CHAVEZ-BORJA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00334-CEH-MRM-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13975

Before ROSENBAUM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jesus Chavez-Borja appeals his sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. See 21 

U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). He challenges the calculation 

of his guideline range and the conditions of his supervised release. 

The government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on a sentence-appeal waiver in Chavez-Borja’s plea agreement. ChavezBorja responds that we should adopt and apply a “miscarriage-ofjustice” exception to appeal waivers and hear his challenges. 

We review de novo the validity and scope of an appeal-waiver 

provision. King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022). 

Sentence-appeal waivers are enforceable if they are made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1367. To enforce a waiver, “[t]he government must show that either (1) the district court specifically 

questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver 

during the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the 

record that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 

(11th Cir. 1993). 

“We have consistently enforced knowing and voluntary appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb, 451 

F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, an appeal waiver may apply

“not only to frivolous claims, but also to difficult and debatable 

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legal issues” or even “blatant error.” King, 41 F.4th at 1367 (quotation marks omitted). Still, we have recognized certain exceptions 

to appeal waivers, including jurisdictional defects, sentences based 

on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, sentences 

that exceed the statutory maximum penalty, or “extreme circumstances” like a “public flogging” sentence. Id. But we have “never 

adopted a general ‘miscarriage of justice’ exception to the rule that 

valid appeal waivers must be enforced according to their terms.” 

Id. at 1368 n.3; see also Rudolph v. United States, 92 F.4th 1038, 1048–

49 (11th Cir. 2024) (declining to recognize a miscarriage-of-justice 

exception to appeal waivers). 

Here, the government has shown that the appeal waiver is 

enforceable. In a provision of the plea agreement titled and underlined, “Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal the Sentence,” 

Chavez-Borja “expressly “waive[d] the right to appeal [his] sentence on any ground, including the ground that the Court erred in 

determining the applicable guidelines range,” except the grounds 

that the sentence (a) exceeded the guideline range as determined 

by the district court, (b) exceeded the statutory maximum, or (c) violated the Eighth Amendment. In addition, Chavez-Borja would 

be released from the waiver if the government appealed. ChavezBorja initialed the bottom of each page of the plea agreement, and 

he and his attorney signed the final page under a certification stating that he fully understood the plea agreement’s terms.

Then, during the plea colloquy, a magistrate judge questioned Chavez-Borja through an interpreter about the terms of the 

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plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. The magistrate judge 

explained that, under the appeal waiver in his plea agreement, 

Chavez-Borja was “waiving [his] right to appeal [his] sentence except on very narrow grounds.” In particular, the magistrate judge 

stated, he was “waiv[ing his] right to appeal [his] sentence on any 

ground, including the ground that the [d]istrict [j]udge made a mistake in calculating [his] sentencing guidelines range,” unless one of 

the waiver’s exceptions applied, which the magistrate judge described nearly verbatim from the agreement. Chavez-Borja confirmed that he understood the appeal rights he was giving up, that 

he had discussed the appeal waiver with his attorney, that he did 

not have any questions about it, and that he made the waiver freely 

and voluntarily. The magistrate judge found that Chavez-Borja 

pled guilty freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the consequences. And the district court accepted the plea without any 

objections. 

Because Chavez-Borja was specifically questioned about the 

waiver, and it is otherwise clear from the record that he understood 

the waiver’s full significance, we will enforce the waiver according 

to its terms. See Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1294; Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. 

And Chavez-Borja does not contend that the terms of his appeal 

waiver permit his current appeal, which challenges the guideline 

range under which he was sentenced and the conditions of his supervised release. 

Instead, Chavez-Borja maintains that we should adopt and 

apply a miscarriage-of-justice exception, as some other circuits

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have done. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th 

Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 

2003) (en banc). But he fails to explain why the issues he raises 

would qualify under such an exception.1 And we have repeatedly 

declined to recognize any exceptions beyond “our established categories of unwaivable claims,” which are outlined above and do 

not apply in this case. King, 41 F.th at 1368 n.3; see also Rudolph, 92 

F.4th at 1048–49 (“declin[ing] to create [a miscarriage-of-justice] exception”). We follow that same course here. 

For these reasons, we grant the government’s motion to dismiss Chavez-Borja’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in his plea 

agreement. 

DISMISSED.

1 It does not appear Chavez-Borja would be barred from filing a motion under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to obtain the benefit of Amendment 821 to the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines, which took effect after sentencing. Similarly, 

Chavez-Borja may move to modify the conditions of his supervised release 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). 

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