### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 17

‐ 3136

G LORIA D. F IELDS

, Plaintiff

‐ Appellant

,

v.

T HE B OARD OF E DUCATION OF THE C ITY OF C HICAGO & C HAD P.

W EIDEN

, Defendants

‐ Appellees

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 4581

— Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED J UNE 12, 2019

— D ECIDED J UNE 27, 2019

____________________

Before W OOD

, Chief Judge

, and B ARRETT and S T

. E VE

, Circuit

Judges

.

P ER C URIAM

. Gloria Fields, a 63

‐ year

‐ old African

‐ Ameri

‐

can woman, retired in 2016 from her job as a teacher with Chi

‐

cago Public Schools. She sued the Board of Education and the

principal of the school where she worked, alleging that they

discriminated against her because of her race and age and re

‐

taliated against her for fi ling this lawsuit, in violation of 422 No. 17

‐ 3136

U.S.C. § 1981 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34. The district court entered summary judg

‐

ment for the defendants on all Fields’s claims, concluding that

Fields did not su ff er an adverse employment action. We

agree.

I. Background

Fields was a teacher at Edgebrook Elementary School from

2002 until May 2016, when she retired. Chad Weiden became

the principal of Edgebrook in July 2013, and he required all

teachers to submit weekly lesson plans to him. Weiden pro

‐

vided feedback on teachers’ plans during the 2014–15 school

year, and he informed Fields that her lesson plans were too

scripted and too long.

Weiden also conducted informal observations of teachers,

including Fields. He observed often that Fields’s teaching was

disconnected from her lesson plans and that students were

not engaged with the material. Weiden suggested ways for

her to improve, but Fields incorporated his suggestions spo

‐ radically and refused later o ff ers to assist with her lessons.

Based partly on Weiden’s observations, Chicago Public

Schools rated Fields’s job performance for the 2013–14 and

2014–15 school years as “developing,” which ranks below a

“pro fi cient” rating.

Beginning in 2014, Weiden responded to several incidents

by issuing Fields “pre

‐ meeting notices” informing her that

she had to a tt end a meeting to develop a performance im

‐

provement plan. First, Fields did not a tt end an evening “open

house” in February 2014—despite working at the school that

day—that she acknowledges Weiden would have wanted her

to a tt end. She also did not inform the school’s administrationNo. 17

‐ 3136 3

that she would not a tt end. Next, without notifying Weiden,

Fields did not a tt end a mandatory “professional development

session” in November 2014. Then, in 2015, Fields did not sub

‐

mit request forms for a fi eld trip on time and completed the

forms only after several requests from Weiden. Fourth, Fields

did not a tt end a “principal

‐ directed preparation period” in

September 2015. Fields also received notices for failing to turn

in lesson plans and failing to properly notify the school about

requested leave. The notices stated that Fields could receive a

“formal warning” or a “ fi nal warning” after the meetings, or

that Weiden could recommend her dismissal to the Board.

When Fields accrued three performance improvement

plans, she faced possible disciplinary action. The teachers’ un

‐

ion and the Board agreed to mediate the dispute with Fields

in January 2016, and both Weiden and Fields a tt ended. The

Board’s opening position was that Fields could retire with a

“do not hire” designation, preventing her from being rehired.

The mediator, however, asked Weiden if he objected to

Fields’s performance

‐ improvement plans being downgraded.

Weiden did not object because he wanted Fields to improve

her performance, so Fields received no discipline as a result

of the performance

‐ improvement plans.

After the mediation, Fields took a leave of absence under

the Family and Medical Leave Act. She retired in May 2016

without ever returning to work.

Fields then sued Weiden and the Board of Education for

discriminating against her based on her race and age; she later

added a retaliation claim for fi ling this lawsuit. (She also sued

Weiden for intentional in fl iction of emotional distress, but she

abandons that claim on appeal so we do not address it.) The

district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants,4 No. 17

‐ 3136

reasoning that Fields’s discrimination claims failed because

she could not show that she su ff ered an adverse employment

action. The court added that Fields had “li tt le to suggest that

considerations beyond individuals’ job performance entered

into the Defendants’ calculations, and even less to suggest

that Weiden’s nondiscriminatory explanations for his behav

‐

ior was ‘mere pretext.’” And the defendants were entitled to

judgment on Fields’s retaliation claim, the court said, because

she did not prove that she had su ff ered a materially adverse

employment action. Fields was not constructively discharged,

the court reiterated, and the possibility of discipline or termi

‐

nation following the pre

‐ meeting notices was not serious

enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in

protected activity.

II. Analysis

We review the district court’s entry of summary judgment

de novo, construing all facts and drawing all reasonable infer

‐

ences in favor of Fields, the opponent of summary judgment.

See Abrego v. Wilkie

, 907 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2018). On ap

‐ peal, Fields argues that she presented enough evidence to get

past summary judgment on her discrimination and retaliation

claims. On the discrimination claims, she argues that she suf

‐

fered an adverse employment action because she was con

‐ structively discharged and because the Board tried to have

her fi red at the mediation. On the retaliation claims, Fields

adds that she su ff ered an adverse action because Weiden is

‐

sued her multiple pre

‐ meeting notices after she fi led this suit.

She also points to the mediation in January 2016 as a possible

adverse action.No. 17

‐ 3136 5

A. Discrimination Claims

We examine all the evidence when reviewing employment

discrimination claims to determine whether the defendants’

adverse employment actions were motivated by a proscribed

factor such as race or age. See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc

.,

834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). The framework established

by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), has

not been “displaced,” see Ferrill v. Oak Creek

‐ Franklin Joint Sch.

Dist

., 860 F.3d 494, 499

‐ 500 (7th Cir. 2017), and we follow the

district court and the parties in using it. Thus, Fields had to

present evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class,

(2) she was meeting the Board’s legitimate expectations, (3)

she su ff ered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly

situated employees outside of her protected class were treated

more favorably. See Oliver v. Joint Logistics Managers, Inc.

, 893

F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 2018) (race discrimination); Carson v.

Lake Cty., Ind.

, 865 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (age discrimi

‐

nation). We apply the same standard to discrimination claims

under § 1981, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Em

‐ ployment Act. See Lane v. Riverview Hosp.

, 835 F.3d 691, 695

(7th Cir. 2016) (Title VII and § 1981); Simpson v. Franciscan All.,

Inc.

, 827 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting framework ap

‐ plies to “claims of both age and race discrimination”).

The Board contends that Fields’s discrimination claims fail

because she did not su ff er an adverse employment action, but

Fields maintains that she was constructively discharged. We

have recognized two types of constructive discharge. The fi rst

occurs when a plainti ff resigns due to discriminatory “work

‐ ing conditions even more egregious than that required for a

hostile work environment claim.” Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Chil

‐

dren and Family Servs.

, 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). The6 No. 17

‐ 3136

second occurs when an employer acts in a manner that would

make clear to a reasonable employee that she will be immedi

‐ ately fi red if she does not resign. Id. ; Chapin v. Fort

‐ Rohr Mo

‐

tors, Inc.

, 621 F.3d 673, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2010).

Fields cannot show that she was constructively dis

‐ charged. She has no evidence that she was subjected to a

threat of violence or other conditions that are more severe

than those required to establish a hostile work environment.

See Wright

, 798 F.3d at 527; Chapin

, 621 F.3d at 679 (raised

voices and one threat insu ffi cient). She also has no evidence

that her working conditions were objectively intolerable. She

asserted at oral argument that her situation is similar to the

one we saw in Equal Emp’t Opportunity Commission v. Costco

Wholesale Corp.

, 903 F.3d 618, 621–24, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2018),

but in that case a Costco employee was stalked by a customer

for at least 13 months, and the harassment was so severe that

the employee secured a “No Contact Order” from the state

courts. Nothing of the kind happened here. And although

Fields argues that she felt compelled because of her doctors’

advice not to return to work following her leave of absence,

she has no evidence that a reasonable person would have felt

compelled to retire or quit. See Green v. Brennan

, 136 S. Ct.

1769, 1776–77 (2016).

Further, Fields cannot point to any actions that would put

a reasonable employee on notice of her imminent fi ring. See

Wright

, 798 F.3d at 527; Chapin

, 621 F.3d at 679–80. Fields as

‐

serts that the pre

‐ meeting notices and the mediation con fi rm

that the Board wanted to fi re her. But initiating disciplinary

procedures does not necessarily mean that an employer is

preparing to fi re an employee because the employer could, for

example, hope that criticism will lead to be tt er performanceNo. 17

‐ 3136 7

by the employee. See Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc.

, 552 F.3d 594,

602 (7th Cir. 2009); Oest v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.

, 240 F.3d 605, 613

(7th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz

, 834 F.3d at

765. And here, the mediation resulted in no punitive

measures, and Weiden provided sworn testimony that he did

not oppose Fields receiving no discipline because he wanted

her performance to improve. If anything, the outcome of the

mediation would lead a reasonable employee to conclude that

her job was secure. Fields therefore cannot show that, had she

not retired before returning from medical leave, the Board

would have fi red her. See Chapin

, 621 F.3d at 680.

Fields also suggests that the negative performance re

‐

views and performance improvement plans constitute ad

‐

verse employment actions. She is incorrect. See Boss v. Castro

,

816 F.3d 910, 917–18 (7th Cir. 2016) (performance improve

‐

ment plan); Langenbach v. Wal

‐ Mart Stores, Inc.

, 761 F.3d 792,

799 (7th Cir. 2014) (negative review and performance im

‐

provement plan in FMLA retaliation context).

B. Retaliation Claim

Fields’s retaliation claim fares no be tt er. To survive sum

‐

mary judgment Fields needed evidence that would permit a

reasonable fact fi nder to conclude that her engagement in pro

‐

tected activity caused a materially adverse employment ac

‐

tion. See Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc.

, 885 F.3d 465, 472

(7th Cir. 2018); Lauth v. Covance, Inc

., 863 F.3d 708, 716 (7th Cir.

2017). Once again, Fields cannot establish that she su ff ered an

adverse employment action after fi ling this lawsuit, let alone

one taken with the intent to retaliate. As we described above,

the record does not permit the inference that she was con

‐ structively discharged. And she did not experience anything

else that rises to the level of a materially adverse employment8 No. 17

‐ 3136

action. The pre

‐ meeting notices, which warned that discipline

was possible, and the mediation, which resulted in no disci

‐ pline, did not a ff ect Fields’s career prospects or salary. See

Poullard v. McDonald

, 829 F.3d 844, 856 (7th Cir. 2016). And

the performance improvement plans, even though they had

the potential to lead to termination or other discipline, are not

enough. See Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P.

, 651 F.3d

664, 677 (7th Cir. 2011).

Without evidence that she su ff ered an adverse action,

Fields’s discrimination and retaliation claims must fail. The

judgment of the district court, therefore, is AFFIRMED.