alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
|   | (1) | The Report fully      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities      Exchange Act of 1934; and                                   |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |
|   | (2) | The information      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the      financial condition and results of operations of the    Company. |
|   |
|   |

|                     Date:  February      13, 2008 | /s/ Barry H.      Black                                                              |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                              | Barry H.      Black                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|                                                                                                                              | Vice President      of Finance and Chief Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|                                                                                                                              |
|                                                                                                                              |
|                                                                                                                              |
|                                                                                                                              |
Honorable Romeo Flores

Attorney forJim Wells County P. 0. Drawer 2080 Alice, Texas 78332 Opinion No. H-1069 Re: Whether a justice of thepeace who moves outside his precinct vacates his office. Dear Mr. Flores: You have requested our opinion concerning whether a justice of thepeace who moves outside of his ,precinctthereby vacates his office. Article 1.05, Texas Election Code, provides that a candidate for justice of thepeace must have~resided in the precinct for sixmonths. However, the statutes,are silent with respect towhether hemust remain in theprecinct after, he is elected and qualifies for office. Article 16, section 14 of the Texas Constitution requires a justice of thepeace to reside in the county which he serves, but makes nomention of precincts. InAttorney General Opinion H-564 (19751and H-220 (1974) we ruled that a iustice of the oeace does not vacate his office when his residence falls within-a new precinct pursuant to redistricting. See Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Civ. AE;isr --Amarillo 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e. at 312 S.W.2d 380). InAttorney General Opinion O-6905 (1945) this office advised that a county commissioner could move his residence to another precinct within his county without vacating his office. Under these authorities it isour opinion that a justice of the peace may move to adifferent precinct of his county without vacating his office.

P. 4581Honorable Romeo Flores -Page 2 (H-1069)

'SU M MA RY A justice of thepeace may move his residence to adifferent precinct within the county without vacating his office. flVery truly yours,

Attorney General of APPROVED: L

First Assistant

c. ROgERT HEATH, Chairman Opinion Committee Texas

jst

P. 4582
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
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<RECEIVABLES>                                     2682
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<OTHER-SE>                                        2582
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      2682
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**699 CA 14-01006**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.

ELISABETH R. VURAL, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MATTHEW OZHAN VURAL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

FINOCCHIO & ENGLISH, SYRACUSE, D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS. (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

ALDERMAN AND ALDERMAN, SYRACUSE (EDWARD B. ALDERMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Kevin G. Young, J.), entered August 27, 2013 in a divorce action. The judgment, among other things, distributed the marital assets and awarded plaintiff child support.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Defendant husband appeals from a judgment of divorce that, inter alia, directed him to pay child support and distributed marital assets and debts. We reject defendant’s contention that Supreme Court erred in its valuation of the marital residence. The court’s valuation was “ ‘within the range of expert testimony and adequately supported by the record’ ” ( Johnson v Johnson , 277 AD2d 923, 925, lv dismissed 96 NY2d 792). The court also properly credited plaintiff with her contribution of separate property for the down payment on the marital residence ( see Pelcher v Czebatol , 98 AD3d 1258, 1259). With respect to the distribution of the remaining marital assets and debts, we conclude that the court did not abuse its “ ‘substantial discretion in determining what distribution of property [—including debt—] will be equitable under all the circumstances’ ” ( Oliver v Oliver , 70 AD3d 1428, 1429).

Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding child support to plaintiff or in calculating the amount of that award. The court acknowledged that, given the roughly equal incomes of the parties and their shared custody arrangement, no award of child support would typically be appropriate ( see generally Leonard v Leonard , 109 AD3d 126, 128). After considering the parties’ respective financial resources, however, including defendant’s inheritance, the court properly awarded child support to plaintiff ( see Matter of Cody v Evans-Cody , 291 AD2d 27,**-2- 699 CA 14-01006** 

30-31; see also Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [e] [4]). Finally, after applying the statutory guidelines to calculate the basic child support obligation, the court considered the relevant statutory factors and properly determined that application of the basic obligation would be unjust or inappropriate ( see Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Day , 96 NY2d 149, 155-156).

Entered: July 2, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
| (1)   | Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: November 12, 2010 | /s/ Patrick S. Smith        |   |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|
|                    | Patrick S. Smith            |   |
|                    | Principal Executive Officer |   |
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7245

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

OSCAR RICO GUTIERREZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Falcon B. Hawkins, Chief District

Judge. (CR-90-232, CA-96-2444-2-11)

Submitted: February 26, 1998 Decided: March 18, 1998

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Oscar Rico Gutierrez, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Hayden Bickerton,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's orders granting his

motion for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. §

3582(c)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997), imposing a new sentence, and

denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, deny Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal and affirm

on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Gutierrez,

Nos. CR-90-232; CA-96-2444-2-11 (D.S.C. June 9, 1997 & Aug. 21,

1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 87 (Thursday, May 6, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 24973]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-10443]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Advanced Coatings for Infrastructure Joint 
Venture Agreement

    Notice is hereby given that, on March 10, 2010, pursuant to section 
6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 
15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Advanced Coatings for 
Infrastructure Joint Venture Agreement (``Advanced Coatings'') has 
filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General 
and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing (1) the identities of the 
parties and (2) the nature and objectives of the venture. The 
notifications were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances.
    Pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, the identities of the parties 
to the venture are: MesoCoat Inc., Euclid, OH; Polythermics LLC, 
Kirkland, WA; and EMTEC, The Edison Materials Technology Center, 
Dayton, OH.
    The general area of Advanced Coatings' planned activity is to 
develop a new innovative method for applying corrosion and wear 
resistant coatings to infrastructure.

Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2010-10443 Filed 5-5-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 147 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

  1st Session
                                 S. 147

 To provide for a reduction in regulatory costs by maintaining Federal 
 average fuel economy standards applicable to automobiles in effect at 
      current levels until changed by law, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 19, 1999

  Mr. Abraham (for himself, Mr. Levin, Mr. Ashcroft, and Mr. DeWine) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
           Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide for a reduction in regulatory costs by maintaining Federal 
 average fuel economy standards applicable to automobiles in effect at 
      current levels until changed by law, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS.

    Beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the average fuel 
economy standards established (whether directly or indirectly) under 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation under 
chapter 329 of title 49, United States Code, prior to the date of 
enactment of this Act for automobiles (as that term is defined in 
section 32901 of title 49, United States Code) that are in effect on 
the day before the date of enactment of this Act, shall apply without 
amendment, change, or other modification of any kind (whether direct or 
indirect) for--
            (1) the model years specified in the regulations;
            (2) the applicable automobiles specified in the regulations 
        last promulgated for such automobiles; and
            (3) each model year thereafter;
until chapter 329 of title 49, United States Code, is specifically 
amended to authorize an amendment, change, or other modification to 
such standards or is otherwise modified or superseded by law.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-29-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                               0<F1>
<SECURITIES>                                         0<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0<F1>
<INVENTORY>                                          0<F1>
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                               0<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0<F1>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0<F1>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                              0<F1>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0<F1>
<PREFERRED>                                          0<F1>
<COMMON>                                             0<F1>
<OTHER-SE>                                           0<F1>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0<F1>
<SALES>                                              0<F2>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0<F2>
<CGS>                                                0<F2>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0<F2>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0<F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0<F2>
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0<F2>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0<F2>
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0<F2>
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0<F2>
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0<F2>
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0<F2>
<CHANGES>                                            0<F2>
<NET-INCOME>                                         0<F2>
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F2>

<FN>
<F1>See June 30, 2000 Statement of Net Assets in Liquidation.
<F2>See June 30, 2000 Statement of Changes in Net Assets in Liquidation.
</FN>



</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-11297 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus FRANCISCO PUENTES, also known as Bucho, also known as Mario Alberto Ceballos, Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:97-CR-408-14-P

---------------------------------------------------------

July 27, 2000 Before POLITZ, HIGGINBOTHAM and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Francisco Puentes appeals his sentence, contending that the district court plainly erred in imposing a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years because it is undisputed that he was involved with only 100 to 400 kilograms of marihuana. The Government concedes that an error occurred requiring remand. It does1 United States v. Ruiz, 43 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 1995). 2 not assert Puentes’ waiver of the right to appeal as contained in the plea agreement. The Government’s motion to file its supplemental brief should be and is GRANTED. Puentes contends that the sentence imposed should be vacated. The Government suggests that the conviction and sentence should be vacated. We conclude that vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing corrects the error presented by the parties. 1 Accordingly, Puentes’ sentence is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED to the district court for resentencing based on Puentes’ involvement with 100 to 400 kilograms of marihuana.
SECURADYNE SYSTEMS, LLC

,
Appellant,

v.

ROBERT CARMICHAEL, RICHARD PEARSON, and CYBERONE SYSTEMS, LLC

,
Appellee s

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPO SITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 5413

_____________________________/

Opinion filed June 1, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Thomas V. Dannheisser , Judge

.
Russell F. Van Sickle of Beggs & Lane RLLP, Pensacola, and Mark A. Shoffner of Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP, Dallas, TX , for Appellant.

Darryl Steve Traylor, T.A. Borowski, and Louis E. Harper, III of Borowksi & Traylor, Pensacola , for Appellee s

.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

RAY

, OSTERHAUS, and BILBREY

, J J

. , CONCUR.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6055 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6055

 To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to indemnify government 
    employees, and employees entities that have contracts with such 
 governments, from certain judgements for acting within their capacity 
 to comply with their official duties and responsibilities, and other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 8, 2018

  Mr. Gomez (for himself, Ms. Lofgren, Mr. Takano, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. 
Smith of Washington, Mr. Payne, Ms. Norton, Ms. Jayapal, Mr. McGovern, 
 and Mr. Quigley) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                     the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to indemnify government 
    employees, and employees entities that have contracts with such 
 governments, from certain judgements for acting within their capacity 
 to comply with their official duties and responsibilities, and other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Keep Our Cities Safe Act of 2018''.

SEC. 2. INDEMNIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.

    Section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(f) Exception.--This section shall not apply to any officer or 
employee of the Federal Government, or of a State or local government, 
or to an officer or employee of an entity with which such a government 
has a contract, who is acting in accordance with the law of the State 
or locality in which the employee engaged in conduct which would 
otherwise violate this section.''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>   1

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10 (h)

                          DELPHI NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS
                           CHARITABLE GIFT GIVING PLAN

The Charitable Gift Giving Plan provides the opportunity for non-employee
members of the Board of Directors to direct Delphi to donate up to $100,000 of
Delphi's funds to the charitable organization or organizations of the director's
choice. This is a one-time donation, which Delphi makes, if a Director chooses
to participate in the program, at the time of the time of the Director's
departure from Delphi's Board (unless such departure is for cause). The Director
may designate up to five charitable organizations to distribute the donation
among. Delphi makes the donation in honor of the Director. The plan may be
discontinued at any time at the discretion of the Board of Directors of Delphi.