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Filed 10/21/22 P. v. Imel CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDON MARK IMEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095531

(Super. Ct. No. 21F7284)

Defendant Brandon Mark Imel pleaded no contest to inflicting corporal injury on 

his girlfriend. The trial court placed defendant on three years of formal probation and

ordered him, as a condition of probation, to have no contact with the victim except for 

visitation as set forth in family court orders. It also allowed the probation officer to 

prohibit contact. 

On appeal, defendant contendsthe trial court’s orally pronounced protective order 

was inconsistent with a prejudgment protective order issued by the court, creating an 
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unreasonable risk of his erroneous arrest. He further argues the trial court improperly 

allowed the probation officer to override family court orders. Both parties agree the 

prejudgment protective order should be modified. We will direct the trial court to modify 

the protective order to permit contact pursuant to family court orders allowing supervised 

visits, and to reflect the correct statutory authorization. We also direct the trial court to 

modify the minute order. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. 

FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The People filed a complaint on November 18, 2021, charging defendant with 

inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); statutory section 

citations that follow are to the Penal Code) and criminal threats (§ 422). In the infliction 

of corporal injury count, the People further alleged defendant had a prior conviction 

(§ 273.5, subd. (f)). 

On the same day, the trial court issued a prejudgment protective order pursuant to 

section 136.2. In the protective order, the trial court checked the “no-contact” and “stayaway” provisions in items 12, 13, and 14, prohibiting defendant from making any contact 

with the victim or coming within 100 yards of her. Item 16, which allows peaceful 

contact pursuant to family court orders as an exception to the “no-contact” and “stayaway” requirements, was left unchecked. The order stated it takes precedence over any 

conflicting family court orders, and “[u]nless box a or b in item 16 . . . is checked, contact 

between [defendant] and [the victim] permitted by a Family . . . court order for child 

custody or visitation must not conflict with the provisions of this order.” The order was

set to expire three years from its issuance. 

On December 1, 2021, defendant pleaded no contest to infliction of corporal injury 

and admitted the prior conviction allegation in exchange for the dismissal of the criminal 

threats count. The trial court placed defendant on three years of formal probation and 

imposed fees and fines. 
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The court further ordered defendant, as a condition of probation, to “have no 

contact with [the victim] except as directed by [his] probation officer, and that would be 

with the probation officer ensuring strict adherence to the family law orders or a stricter 

adherence as directed by the probation officer.” In other words, the trial court explained, 

if the probation officer does not “see[] things the way that the family judge does” when 

executing an order from the family court, “he’s going to have the control to make the 

orders a little bit more difficult for [defendant] simply because of the dangerousness of 

the situation which is reflected in the [probation] report.” The trial court went on to 

quote the probation report: “It is abundantly clear the defendant and the victim should 

have zero contact with one another for the safety of their wellbeing, their children, and 

ultimately the entire community.” 

Defendant’s counsel objected to this order on the ground that it gave the probation 

officer the “authority to override a family law judge’s orders with respect to the no 

harassment.” The trial court disagreed, stating its order did not allow the probation 

officer to change visitation. But if a family court order allowed contact during visitation, 

the probation officer may “oversee [] defendant personally and order that he have no 

contact with the victim.” Thus, the probation officer “will have the right to make orders 

as it relates to [defendant] that will potentially be different than what a family law judge 

would allow.” 

The minute order stated only that defendant cannot contact the victim “without the 

prior written approval of the Probation Officer – except as directed by his probation 

officer.” It made no mention of contact between defendant and the victim pursuant to 

family court orders. 

Defendant timely appealed. 
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DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant contends the protective order must be stricken or modified 

because: (1) it improperly delegated to the probation officer the authority to make orders 

that conflict with the orders from the family court; (2) the prejudgment protective order 

conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement by prohibiting contact without 

exceptions; and (3) the discrepancy between the prejudgment protective order and the 

court’s oral pronouncement creates an unreasonable risk that he may be erroneously

arrested. He requests that we direct the trial court to modify its order by (1) adding an 

exception to item 14 that allows defendant to come within 100 yards of the victim when 

“ordered by the probation officer, approved by the trial court, and entered into the 

CLETS,” and (2) checking item 16 of the protective order. 

The People agree the order should be modified as proposed by defendant. We 

conclude the court’s delegation of authority to the probation officer was improper and 

note several discrepancies between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and its written 

orders. We will direct the trial court to modify the protective order and minute order. 

The trial court’s oral pronouncement is the rendition of judgment. (People v. 

Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) “Where there is a discrepancy between the oral 

pronouncement of judgment and the minute order . . ., the oral pronouncement controls.” 

(People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) 

“It is well settled that courts may not delegate the exercise of their discretion to 

probation officers.” (In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372.) Although 

probation officers have wide discretion to enforce probation conditions, “they may not 

create conditions not expressly authorized by the court.” (People v. O’Neil (2008) 

165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358.) 

Here, the trial court orally pronounced the protective order, as a condition of 

probation, permitting contact between defendant and the victim pursuant to family court 
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orders. Its written orders, however, conflict with the oral pronouncement in several 

ways. First, the prejudgment protective order stated it was issued under section 136.2, 

which authorizes protective orders that are “operative only during the pendency of the 

criminal proceedings and as prejudgment orders.” (People v. Selga (2008) 

162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118-119; accord, People v. Corrales (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 283, 

287 [“section 136.2 is not the proper vehicle for obtaining a postjudgment restraining 

order”].) The orally pronounced order, on the other hand, was issued under section 

1203.097 as a condition of probation. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(2) [requiring a criminal 

protective order where a defendant is convicted of a crime of domestic violence and 

placed on probation].) Second, the prejudgment protective order prohibited contact 

between defendant and the victim without exceptions. Third, the minute order did not 

reflect that contact was allowed pursuant to family court orders. 

The trial court also erred in allowing the probation officer to “make orders” to 

defendant “that will potentially be different than what a family law judge would allow” 

“because of the dangerousness of the situation.” We recognize the trial court’s concerns, 

but this order improperly authorized the probation officer to disregard family court 

orders. The parties propose that we modify the protective order by checking item 16, 

which allows contact pursuant to family court orders, and by adding an exception to item 

14 permitting defendant to come within 100 yards of the victim as “ordered by the 

probation officer, approved by the trial court, and entered into the CLETS.” This change, 

however, still allows the probation officer to prohibit contact when family court orders 

state otherwise. 

Thus, to ensure proper delegation of authority and the safety of all involved, the 

protective order should be modified by checking item 16 and noting the exception applies 

only to supervised exchange of children and court-ordered supervised visitation as stated 

in orders from the family court. Because item 16 serves as an exception to the stay-away 

requirement in item 14, we need not provide a separate exception to item 14. We also
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order the trial court to modify the protective order to reference the proper statutory 

authorization, section 1203.97 and to correct the minute order. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to modify the protective 

order by checking item 16 and adding that the exception is for “[supervised] safe 

exchange of children and court-ordered [supervised] visitation” only. If there exists a 

family court order that the trial court decides defendant should follow, the court should 

check item 16.a. and specify the case number and the date of the order. Otherwise, it 

should check item 16.b. The court should further correct the order to reflect the proper 

statutory authorization, section 1203.097. Finally, the trial court is directed to prepare a 

minute order reflecting the changes. 

 

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 

DUARTE, J.

 

KRAUSE, J.