RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1007-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.H.F.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted May 3, 2022 – Decided June 28, 2022

Before Judges Hoffman and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 19-02-0147.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Ruth E. Hunter, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief). 

William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1007-20

Defendant appeals from his guilty plea conviction for third-degree 

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Defendant contends 

that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea on the 

grounds that he did not provide an adequate factual basis at the plea hearing. 

After reviewing the record of the plea colloquy, we reject defendant's contention 

and affirm. 

I.

We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record. 

On October 11, 2018, defendant drove his car along Union Avenue in Elizabeth. 

Defendant pulled the vehicle alongside a fourteen-year-old girl, M.A.,1and 

began to yell at her in an aggressive manner, directing her to get into the car. 

M.A. was not related to defendant and in fact was a complete stranger to him. 

In February 2019, a Union County grand jury indicted defendant for 

second-degree attempt to lure or entice a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a), and thirddegree endangering the welfare of a child by a non-caretaker, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a)(2). On August 2, 2019, defendant appeared before Judge Robert A. Kirsch 

and entered a guilty plea to the third-degree child endangerment count, pursuant 

to a negotiated agreement in which the State agreed to dismiss the count 

1

 We use initials to protect the identity of the minor. See R. 1:38-3(d)(9).
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charging second-degree luring. At the plea hearing, defendant was placed under 

oath and provided the factual basis for his guilty plea in the following colloquy 

with defense counsel and Judge Kirsch:

COUNSEL: Mr. Figueroa, on October 11, 2018[,] were 

you in the city of Elizabeth?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COUNSEL: And were you driving your vehicle?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COUNSEL: And what kind of vehicle was it?

DEFENDANT: Chevy Impala.

COUNSEL: And you were driving your Chevy Impala 

on what street?

DEFENDANT: On Union Avenue.

COUNSEL: And on Union Avenue did you see a girl 

walking on the block?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

. . . .

COUNSEL: And you approached M.A. and M.A. was 

an individual that was a minor, correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And it was obvious to you, correct, Mr. 

Figueroa, that this was a child?
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DEFENDANT: Yes.

COUNSEL: She was actually in a school uniform and 

appeared to be walking to school, correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

. . . .

COUNSEL: And you pulled up your—your Chevy 

Impala alongside the individual in this—in this—the 

victim in this case, correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COUNSEL: And when you pulled up your vehicle 

alongside the victim you yelled at her in an aggressive 

manner, correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COUNSEL: And you yelled at her in an aggressive 

manner in an attempt to get her in your car, correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COUNSEL: And by doing so the victim in this matter 

became upset, distressed, and in a manner that rendered 

her a[n] abused and neglected child, correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COUNSEL: And you knew that was illegal to do that, 

correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.
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THE COURT: Mr. Figueroa, you were not related to 

this child, were you?

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: She was a complete stranger to you?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

The judge accepted defendant's guilty plea after questioning defendant as 

to his understanding of the proceedings and the consequences of his pleading 

guilty. The judge explicitly asked defendant whether he was entering the guilty 

plea "voluntarily, meaning on [his] own accord." Defendant confirmed that he 

was pleading guilty voluntarily. 

Following the entry of the guilty plea, defendant requested the judge to 

adjourn sentencing for six months "to allow him to get his family affairs in order 

. . . ." Judge Kirsch granted defendant's request, scheduling the sentencing 

hearing for February 7, 2020. 

Around February 1, 2020, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Judge Kirsch heard oral argument on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea on June 30, 2020. The judge denied defendant's motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea, rendering a nineteen-page written opinion that thoroughly analyzed 
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the four-factor test2established in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 155 (2009). In 

the opinion, the judge explained that (1) defendant had not demonstrated a 

colorable claim of innocence, (2) defendant's reasons for withdrawal were weak, 

(3) defendant entered his plea as part of a plea bargain, and (4) the State may 

suffer prejudice due to defendant's delay in attempting to withdraw his guilty 

plea. 

On August 13, 2020, Judge Kirsch sentenced defendant to probation for a 

period of five years. The judge ordered defendant to serve 270 days in county 

jail as a condition of probation. The judge also ordered defendant to have no 

contact with M.A., M.A.'s residence, or M.A.'s school.

This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contention for our 

consideration:

POINT I

DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE 

FACTUAL BASIS FOR ENDANGERING THE 

2

 Slater requires trial courts to consider and balance four factors in evaluating 

motions to withdraw a guilty plea: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a 

colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature of strength of defendant's reasons 

for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal 

would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." 

198 N.J. at 157–58. We note that defendant on appeal does not challenge the 

trial court's analysis of the Slater factors. In State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 

(2015), the Court made "clear, when the issue is solely whether an adequate 

factual basis supports a guilty plea, a Slater analysis is unnecessary." 
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WELFARE OF A CHILD BECAUSE HE DID NOT 

"ACKNOWLEDGE [] [THE] FACTS 

CONSTITUTING THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF 

THE CRIME." (citing State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 293 

(1987)).

II.

We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing 

this appeal. "The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate 

a guilty plea for lack of an adequate factual basis is de novo." Tate, 220 N.J. at 

403–04. "An appellate court is in the same position as the trial court in assessing 

whether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfy the essential 

elements of an offense." Id. at 404.

Rule 3:9-2 provides that

[t]he court, in its discretion, may refuse to accept a plea 

of guilty and shall not accept such plea without first 

questioning the defendant personally, under oath or by 

affirmation, and determining by inquiry of the 

defendant and others, in the court's discretion, that there 

is a factual basis for the plea and that the plea is made 

voluntarily, not as a result of any threats or of any 

promises or inducements not disclosed on the record, 

and with an understanding of the nature of the charge 

and the consequences of the plea.

A trial court's conformance with Rule 3:9-2 need not follow a "prescribed 

or artificial ritual." State ex rel. T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 327 (2001). A judge must 

determine that there is "a factual basis for [a] guilty plea." R. 3:9-2. "The factual 
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basis for a guilty plea can be established by a defendant's explicit admission of 

guilt or by a defendant's acknowledgement of the underlying facts constituting 

[the] essential elements of the crime." State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 419 

(2015). The defendant's admission "should be examined in light of all 

surrounding circumstances and in the context of an entire plea colloquy." T.M., 

166 N.J. at 327. Importantly, when evaluating the validity of a guilty plea, "our 

law requires that each element of the offense be addressed in the plea colloquy." 

State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 231 (2013). 

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) prescribes the elements of the third-degree crime 

of endangering a child, providing in relevant part:

Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child 

or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a 

child who causes the child harm that would make the 

child an abused or neglected as defined in Rule 9:6-1, 

Rule 9:6-3, and [L. 1974, c. 119, § 1] is guilty of a crime 

of the second degree. Any other person who engages 

in conduct or who causes harm as described in this 

paragraph to a child is guilty of a crime of the third 

degree. 

[(emphasis added).]

N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 provides:

Abuse of a child shall consist in any of the following 

acts: (a) disposing of the custody of a child contrary to 

law; (b) employing or permitting a child to be employed 

in any vocation or employment injurious to its health or 
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dangerous to its life or limb, or contrary to the laws of 

this State; (c) employing or permitting a child to be 

employed in any occupation, employment or vocation 

dangerous to the morals of such child; (d) the habitual 

use by the parent or by a person having the custody and 

control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of 

profane, indecent or obscene language; (e) the 

performing of any indecent, immoral or unlawful act or 

deed, in the presence of a child, that may tend to 

debauch or endanger or degrade the morals of the child; 

(f) permitting or allowing any other person to perform 

any indecent, immoral or unlawful act in the presence 

of the child that may tend to debauch or endanger the 

morals of such child; (g) using excessive physical 

restraint on the child under circumstances which do not 

indicate that the child's behavior is harmful to himself, 

others or property; or (h) in an institution as defined in 

[L. 1974, c. 119 § 1] (C. 9:6-8.21), willfully isolating 

the child from ordinary social contact under 

circumstances which indicate emotional or social 

deprivation.

. . . .

Cruelty to a child shall consist in any of the following 

acts: (a) inflicting unnecessarily severe corporal 

punishment upon a child; (b) inflicting upon a child 

unnecessary suffering or pain, either mental or 

physical; (c) habitually tormenting, vexing or afflicting 

a child; (d) any willful act of omission or commission 

whereby unnecessary pain and suffering, whether 

mental or physical, is caused or permitted to be inflicted 

on a child; (e) or exposing a child to unnecessary 

hardship, fatigue or mental or physical strains that may 

tend to injure the health or physical or moral well-being 

of such child.

[(emphases added).]
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N.J.S.A. 9:6-3 provides,

Any parent, guardian or person having the care, custody 

or control of any child, who shall abuse, abandon, be 

cruel to or neglectful of such child, or any person who 

shall abuse, be cruel to or neglectful of any child shall 

be deemed to be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. 

If a fine be imposed, the court may direct the same to 

be paid in whole or in part to the parent, or to the 

guardian, custodian or trustee of such minor child or 

children; provided, however, that whenever in the 

judgment of the court it shall appear to the best interest 

of the child to place it in the temporary care or custody 

of a society or corporation, organized or incorporated 

under the laws of this State, having as one of its objects 

the prevention of cruelty to children, and the society or 

corporation is willing to assume such custody and 

control, the court may postpone sentence and place the 

child in the custody of such society or corporation, and 

may place defendant on probation, either with the 

county probation officers or an officer of the society or 

corporation to which the child is ordered, and may order 

the parent, guardian or person having the custody and 

control of such child to pay to such society or 

corporation a certain stated sum for the maintenance of 

such child. When, however, a child is so placed in the 

custody of such society or corporation, and defendant 

fails to make the payments as ordered by the court, the 

court shall cause the arrest and arraignment before it of 

such defendant, and shall impose upon the defendant 

the penalty provided in this section.

We next apply the foregoing legal principles to the August 2, 2019, plea 

hearing. Defendant contends the plea colloquy did not establish an adequate 

factual basis for his conviction of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child 
11 A-1007-20

because he did not "acknowledge [the] facts constituting the essential elements 

of the crime." Sainz, 107 N.J. at 293; see also Gregory, 220 N.J. at 419. More 

specifically, defendant argues that his yelling at M.A. in an aggressive manner 

did not cause M.A. harm that would make her an abused or neglected child. 

Defendant emphasizes that his yelling at M.A. to enter his car did not debauch 

or endanger the child's morals. Moreover, defendant argues he never admitted 

that he attempted to lure M.A. "with a purpose to commit a criminal offense 

against her."

3

 Defendant thus claims the judge relied on information outside the 

plea colloquy to establish the factual basis of his plea in violation of the rule 

recognized in Tate, 220 N.J. at 408 (reaffirming that the factual basis for a guilty 

plea must come directly from the defendant and not from informational sources 

outside of the plea colloquy); see also State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 422 (1989) 

(quotation marks omitted) (stating that "the trial court must be satisfied from the 

lips of the defendant that he [or she] committed the acts which constitute the 

crime"). 

The flaw in defendant's argument is that he fails to recognize that there 

are multiple ways to establish child abuse or neglect. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

3

 We note that defendant did not plead guilty to luring, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a). 

The first count of the indictment charging that second-degree crime was 

dismissed in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement. 
12 A-1007-20

4(a)(2), it is not necessary for the State to prove that defendant engaged in sexual 

conduct that would impair or debauch the morals of a child. That proof 

requirement applies to the second-degree crime set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a)(1). To prove a violation of the third-degree crime set forth N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a)(2), the State instead needed to establish that the offender caused the child 

harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child under N.J.S.A. 9:6-

1, N.J.S.A. 9:6-3, and L. 1974, c. 119 § 1. 

Defendant's reliance on Tate, 220 N.J. at 393, is therefore misplaced. In 

Tate, the Court found an inadequate factual basis to support a guilty plea for 

child abuse where the defendant used "[c]urse words and off-color language" in 

front of his foster child. Id. at 411. The Court found this testimony insufficient 

to demonstrate the defendant's "habitual use of profane, indecent, or obscene 

language" in the presence of the child. Id. at 412. 

We stress that the Court in Tate by no means held that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 

requires a defendant's actions to meet all of the various alternative means for 

satisfying the definition of abuse or neglect in N.J.S.A. 9:6-1. On the contrary, 

the Court recognized that "[c]hild abuse is defined in various ways under 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-1." Id. at 409. 
13 A-1007-20

Contrary to defendant's assertion, the plea colloquy in the present matter 

provided an adequate factual basis to establish child abuse or neglect to support 

defendant's conviction of third-degree child endangering. Defendant's 

aggressive instruction to M.A.—a total stranger—to get into his car was 

sufficient to establish that defendant caused M.A. to endure "unnecessary 

suffering or pain, either mental or physical," which in turn was sufficient to 

establish "cruelty to a child" that constitutes a harm for purposes of N.J.S.A. 

9:6-1. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Endangering the Welfare of a 

Child, Abuse or Neglect (Third Degree) (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a(2))" (rev. March 9, 

2015).

Importantly, defendant admitted during the plea colloquy that his yelling 

at M.A. caused her to become distressed and upset. Defendant's alarming 

conduct also satisfies the definition of cruelty to a child in subsection (d), which 

refers to "any willful act of omission or commission whereby unnecessary pain 

and suffering, whether mental or physical, [that] is caused or permitted to be 

inflicted on a child." Ibid.

We add that defendant expressly acknowledged under oath that the 

circumstances in which he yelled at the victim caused the child to become upset 

and distressed "in a manner that rendered her a[n] abused and neglected child," 
14 A-1007-20

knowing "that [it] was illegal to do that . . . ." In view of that explicit admission, 

we are "satisfied from the lips of the defendant that he [or she] committed the 

acts which constitute the crime." Barboza, 115 N.J. at 422. We thus conclude 

that defendant adequately "acknowledge[ed the] facts constituting the essential 

elements of the crime" during the plea colloquy. Sainz, 107 N.J. at 293. 

To the extent we have not addressed them, any remaining arguments 

raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.