VIRGINIA:

 In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 

Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 27th day of 

February, 2009. 

Demetres Jerrod Rudolph, Appellant, 

 against Record No. 080794 

 Court of Appeals No. 0240-07-1 

Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellee. 

 Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the 

Court of Appeals of Virginia. 

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 

counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is reversible error in 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

Demetres J. Rudolph was charged with and found guilty of 

possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute in the 

Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach. By an unpublished 

memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed Rudolph’s 

conviction. Rudolph claims that he was stopped in violation of his 

rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

and that all evidence obtained as a result of that stop should have 

been suppressed. The Commonwealth contends that, under the 

circumstances, the police officer’s investigatory stop was 

constitutionally permissible. 

 On January 23, 2006, at approximately 8 p.m., Officer Jeremy P. 

Latchman was patrolling the Cypress Point Plaza Shopping Center 
2

area. Multiple burglaries of closed businesses and robberies of 

individuals had occurred in that area. Latchman saw a "vehicle with 

no lights on parked parallel in the rear of [a] Citgo Gas Station," 

located on an outparcel of the shopping center. The gas station was 

open for business, and there was an entry door for customers in the 

"rear," which is the side of the building that is opposite the side 

of the building where the gas pumps are located. Latchman thought 

the circumstance of the vehicle being parked in that location was 

unusual because he did not believe that customers used the station’s 

rear entry in the nighttime. In addition, while there are parking 

spaces on that side of the building, the vehicle was not parked in a 

marked parking space. 

 There were two people in the parked vehicle. Rudolph was in 

the driver’s seat. In the few seconds he observed the parked 

vehicle from about a car length and a half away from Rudolph’s 

vehicle, Latchman saw Rudolph moving around in the vehicle and saw 

Rudolph’s head "[go] down a couple of times and back up." Latchman 

testified that Rudolph appeared to be looking or reaching for 

something inside the vehicle. Latchman decided to drive his marked 

police vehicle around the gas station to "make sure everything was 

fine." In doing so, he did not observe anything unusual. While 

Latchman was circling around the gas station, Rudolph began to drive 

away. 

 Latchman stopped Rudolph’s vehicle. During the stop, Rudolph 

was asked to exit the vehicle; marijuana was found at the center 

floor divider where Rudolph’s right leg had been. The discovery of 
3

that marijuana led to the conviction that is the subject of this 

appeal. 

A defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that 

we review de novo on appeal. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 

470, 561 S.E.2d 701, 704 (2002). In making such a determination, 

we give deference to the factual findings of the circuit court, but 

we independently determine whether the manner in which the evidence 

was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 

McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552, 659 S.E.2d 512, 515 

(2008). 

In order to conduct an investigatory stop, a police officer 

need not have probable cause; he must have a reasonable suspicion, 

based on objective facts, that the person is involved in criminal 

activity. Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 

722 (1997). To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be 

able to articulate more than an unparticularized suspicion or 

"hunch" that criminal activity is afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 

U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000). A court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances when determining whether a police officer had a 

particularized and objective suspicion that the person stopped was 

involved in criminal activity. Ewell, 254 Va. at 217, 491 S.E.2d 

at 722-23. The fact that the stop occurred in a "high crime area" 
4

is a relevant factor; however, this fact is insufficient to supply 

a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal 

activity on the part of the particular person stopped. Wardlow, 

528 U.S. at 124; McCain, 275 Va. at 552-53, 659 S.E.2d at 516. 

We hold that the circumstances and actions observed by 

Latchman were not enough to create a reasonable articulable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Viewing the totality 

of the circumstances objectively, even though it was 8:00 p.m. and 

there had been robberies and burglaries in the area, the 

circumstances did not supply a particularized and objective basis 

to suspect that Rudolph’s observed behavior was a precursor to a 

break-in, robbery, or any other criminal activity on his part. 

Therefore, Latchman stopped Rudolph in violation of Rudolph’s 

rights under the Fourth Amendment. Because the marijuana was 

discovered as a result of an illegal stop, the trial court should 

have granted Rudolph’s motion to suppress. 

Rudolph entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Code 

§ 19.2-254, which provides in part that "[i]f the defendant 

prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea." 

Rudolph has prevailed on appeal regarding suppression of the 

evidence in this case. He is, therefore, entitled by statute to 

withdraw his plea of guilty. Rudolph must be given the opportunity 

to reassess the admissible evidence that may be used against him 
5

and, if the Commonwealth wishes to continue its prosecution, 

Rudolph may demand a trial if he so desires. See Code § 19.2-254; 

Hasan v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 674, 681, 667 S.E.2d 568, 572 

(2008). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 

Rudolph’s conviction in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia 

Beach, case number CR06-1036, is vacated, and we will remand this 

case to the Court of Appeals with direction that the Court of 

Appeals remand the case to the circuit court for proceedings 

consistent with the views expressed in this order if the 

Commonwealth be so advised. 

_______________ 

JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO 

join, dissenting. 

 The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court dealing 

with searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment has always 

sought to strike the correct balance between protecting the 

constitutional rights of citizens and ensuring that law enforcement 

officers can take necessary action to protect the public and ensure 

compliance with the law. 

 I believe the majority today has misapplied the law relating to 

investigatory stops under the Fourth Amendment, both in discounting 

the cumulative effect of the circumstances encountered by the police 

officer here, and in misconstruing the degree of suspicion required 
6

to justify such stops under Terry v. Ohio in a way that imposes a 

much heavier burden on police than the constitution warrants. 

I. Principles of Law 

 Under the Fourth Amendment, brief stops by law enforcement 

officers to investigate the possibility of criminal behavior may be 

justified by a lower standard of suspicion than is required for "a 

'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search,'" in the words of Terry 

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable 

searches and seizures" by the Government, and its 

protections extend to brief investigatory stops of 

persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional 

arrest. Because the "balance between the public 

interest and the individual’s right to personal 

security" tilts in favor of a standard less than 

probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment 

is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by 

reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal 

activity " 'may be afoot.' " 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citations 

omitted). This doctrine, which was recognized as to pedestrians in 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, has been extended to stops of vehicles whose 

drivers are suspected of engaging in wrongdoing. United States v. 

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 

U.S. 648, 663 (1979). We have also recognized and applied this 

lower standard to vehicle stops. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 

666, 673, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004). 

 While "reasonable suspicion" must be based on more than an 

"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' " Terry, 392 

U.S. at 27, the United States Supreme Court has also made clear that 

the standard only requires "some minimal level of objective 
7

justification" for making the stop in question, INS v. Delgado, 466 

U.S. 210, 217 (1984) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 

544, 554 (1980); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Indeed, the Court has 

often reemphasized the significant difference between the low 

threshold of "reasonable suspicion" on the one hand, and the 

considerably more demanding requirements of "probable cause," "a 

preponderance of the evidence," and "beyond a reasonable doubt" on 

the other. For example, in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 

(1989), the Court noted that reasonable suspicion is "considerably 

less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence," 

and "obviously less demanding than that for probable cause." And in 

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court further explained 

that 

reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 

than probable cause not only in the sense that 

reasonable suspicion can be established with 

information that is different in quantity or content 

than that required to establish probable cause, but 

also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise 

from information that is less reliable than that 

required to show probable cause. 

Id. at 330. 

 Whether officers making an investigatory stop are presented 

with circumstances sufficiently suspicious to satisfy this minimum 

standard is determined by examining the totality of the 

circumstances in the context of the officer’s experience and 

training. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). As 

the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]his process allows officers to draw 

on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences 
8

from and deductions about the cumulative information available to 

them that 'might well elude an untrained person.' " Arvizu, 534 

U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). 

 And, as the Court has insisted since it first recognized the 

constitutionality of reasonable investigative stops in Terry, "it is 

imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard," 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, meaning that the officer’s actual conclusion 

in the particular case at issue is irrelevant. Instead, reviewing 

courts must ask: "would the facts available to the officer at the 

moment of the [stop] 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 

belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Id. at 21-22. 

 This legal framework exists to guide trial courts in ruling on 

challenges invoking the Fourth Amendment, and to guide appellate 

courts in reviewing the constitutionality of those rulings. In our 

constitutional order, some (but not all) violations of the Fourth 

Amendment trigger an extreme remedy: the exclusionary rule, which, 

if applicable, provides that the improperly obtained evidence is 

inadmissible against the defendant. See, e.g., id. at 12-13. 

 The Supreme Court has recently reemphasized the severity of the 

exclusionary rule and the resulting restraint courts must show when 

invoking it. "[E]xclusion 'has always been our last resort, not our 

first impulse.' " Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 

S.Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 

(2006)). " '[T]he rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law 

enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging 

[its] application.' " Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 701 (quoting 
9

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 

364-65 (1998)). 

 The "major thrust" of the rule is "a deterrent one," Terry, 392 

U.S. at 12 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35 

(1965)), targeting "police conduct which is overbearing or 

harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the 

objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution 

requires," id. at 15. In contrast, the rule is abused where it is 

"invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative 

techniques." Id. at 13. 

 When applied to evidence recovered pursuant to an investigatory 

stop, the exclusionary rule is best equipped to deter stops made not 

because of legitimate suspicion, but because the stop was motivated 

by some pernicious reason (such as racial profiling, personal 

animus, or the like), or by arbitrariness evidencing a genuine abuse 

of police power. Such a wrongful basis for the stop warrants the 

application of the exclusionary rule’s severe penalty. 

 But not all investigatory stops arise from such base 

motivations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized 

that conduct observed by police may be "ambiguous and susceptible of 

an innocent explanation" and yet still justify an investigatory 

stop, allowing the officers to "detain the individuals to resolve 

the ambiguity." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). The 

Court in Wardlow continued: 

In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk 

that officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the 

Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with 

more drastic police action; persons arrested and 
10

detained on probable cause to believe they have 

committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The 

Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply 

allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. 

If the officer does not learn facts rising to the 

level of probable cause, the individual must be 

allowed to go on his way. 

Id. at 126. Applied injudiciously, the exclusionary rule improperly 

deters this kind of legitimate police conduct, conduct that strikes 

the appropriate balance between respecting the privacy citizens 

enjoy under our Constitution, and preserving the state’s interest in 

preventing crime. 

II. Error in Application of Law to Facts 

 The majority today holds that the circumstances here were 

insufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion for the stop that led 

to Rudolph’s arrest. In my view, the majority has reached the 

incorrect conclusion given the facts of this case, in part because 

it ignores repeated admonishments from the United States Supreme 

Court and our prior cases that the constitutionality of such stops 

must be evaluated by examining the collective weight of the totality 

of the circumstances. 

 Here, at least four circumstances could have reasonably lent 

support to Officer Latchman’s conclusion that criminal activity may 

have been afoot. First, the encounter at issue here occurred in the 

parking lot of a shopping center that had recently experienced a 

significant rise in criminal activity. As the Supreme Court has 

held, "officers are not required to ignore the relevant 

characteristics of a location in determining whether the 

circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
11

investigation. . . . [T]he fact that the stop occurred in a 'high 

crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a 

Terry analysis." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Adams v. 

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 (1972)). And indeed, the 

majority here concedes that "[t]he fact that the stop occurred in a 

'high crime area' is a relevant factor" in the reasonable suspicion 

analysis. In the period leading up to this encounter, police "had 

beefed up a lot of extra patrol and a lot of overtime due to the 

fact that there w[ere] a lot of break-ins and robberies in that 

specific shopping center." 

 Second, the location of the car was unusual, and inconsistent 

with where and how a typical patron of the service station would be 

parked. The car was located on the side of the building opposite 

the gas pumps and main entrance to the station. Furthermore, the 

car was "parked parallel," not in any of the marked spaces nearby. 

This location was particularly odd because of the time of day; 

although there was a door to the station on that side of the 

building, in the officer’s experience (unquestionably a permissible 

consideration in evaluating reasonable suspicion), such back doors 

were rarely if ever used by customers, especially at night. 

Finally, although it was after dark, the car’s lights were off. 

 Third, the "furtive gestures" of the car’s occupants could 

reasonably have raised questions about their activities and intent. 

We have previously recognized that furtive gestures are relevant in 

determining whether probable cause exists for an arrest, see, e.g., 
12

Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 

(1976), and therefore they are unquestionably relevant when 

evaluating the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion. Here, when 

the officer pulled his vehicle within approximately one and a half 

car lengths behind the parked car, he observed two individuals 

within. The driver, who later turned out to be Rudolph, was 

"moving around in the vehicle" in a way that suggested to the 

officer that he might be "looking around for something." The other 

occupant was also "moving around in the vehicle;" the officer 

described the occupants’ actions as "furtive movements," "reaching 

for stuff," and "ben[ding] down a couple of times." 

 Finally, the occupants’ decision to depart the parking lot 

after encountering the officer could have been reasonably 

interpreted as evasion, or at least raised the possibility that was 

their motive. "[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor 

in determining reasonable suspicion." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 

(citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); 

Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam); Sokolow, 

490 U.S. at 8-9). This is especially true when coupled with other 

factors. See, e.g., United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 

(11th Cir. 1991) (defendant was parked in lot adjacent to closed 

businesses and attempted to evade police); Losee v. Dearinger, 911 

F.2d 48, 49-50 (8th Cir. 1990) (defendants were parked illegally 
13

behind closed business in high-crime area, and attempted to evade 

police). Here, after observing the car from close distance, the 

officer decided to "go around the vehicle" and around the gas 

station building to "make sure everything was fine." As he rounded 

the building on the opposite side from where Rudolph was parked, 

the officer immediately saw the parked car starting to drive away. 

 It is of course true that each of these circumstances might be 

wholly innocent. Indeed, when viewed in isolation from one another, 

it is doubtful that any of them could provide police with a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. However, 

engaging in such an exercise, as the majority implicitly does, 

ignores the correct application of a totality-of-circumstances test. 

As the Supreme Court has made clear, 

Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-andconquer analysis. The officer in Terry observed the 

petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back 

and forth, look into a store window, and confer with 

one another. Although each of the series of acts was 

"perhaps innocent in itself," we held that, taken 

together, they "warranted further investigation." 

392 U.S. at 22. See also Sokolow[, 409 U.S.] at 9 

(holding that factors which by themselves were "quite 

consistent with innocent travel" collectively 

amounted to reasonable suspicion). 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75. The point, again, is that when viewed 

together, circumstances – even if wholly innocent – may be 

suspicious enough to warrant a reasonable officer in conducting a 

Terry stop in order to "resolve the ambiguity." Our cases are in 

perfect accord on this point. See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth, 276 

Va. 747, 757, 668 S.E.2d 150, 156 (2008); Harris v. Commonwealth, 
14

276 Va. 689, 695-98, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145-47 (2008); Buhrman v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008); Bass v. 

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000). Viewed 

together, the circumstances here could reasonably be considered 

suspicious. 

 In a remarkably similar case, United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 

1427 (8th Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 

considered a Terry stop based on an officer’s observation of a 

vehicle parked, late at night, behind a closed pharmacy at which 

there had been prior reported false burglary alarms. 46 F.3d at 

1428. The car’s lights were off but it was occupied, and when the 

officer entered the parking lot to investigate, the driver of the 

car started the vehicle and began to drive toward the exit of the 

lot, at which point officers stopped the car to investigate. Id. at 

1428-29. The Eight Circuit held that the stop was valid, 

emphasizing "not merely the presence of two men sitting in a parked 

automobile at night," but also the prior suspicious activity in the 

area, the occupants’ apparent lack of a legitimate business purpose, 

and the occupants’ potentially evasive behavior. Id. at 1430. 

 The similar circumstances here suggest the same result. Like 

the occupants in Dawdy, Rudolph and his companion were parked, late 

at night and with the lights off, behind a business. In Dawdy, 

there had merely been prior false burglary alarms, which could be 

seen as less suspicious than the confirmed robberies and break-ins 

here. In both cases, the likelihood of a legitimate business 

purpose was slight: in Dawdy, the officer reasonably believed the 
15

pharmacy was closed, while here Officer Latchman knew from 

experience that gas station customers seldom used back entrances, 

especially at night. When they encountered law enforcement 

officers, both sets of occupants attempted to make a quick exit. 

And the furtive gestures of Rudolph here – a factor not present in 

Dawdy, in which the stop was deemed valid – lends further support to 

the reasonableness of the stop here. 

III. Error in Legal Standard Applied 

 In this case, the majority’s error may reach deeper than merely 

misunderstanding the way the circumstances here work together to 

provide a reasonable suspicion. In reaching its conclusion, the 

majority appears to have applied a more exacting legal standard than 

the Fourth Amendment permits, declaring legitimate police activity 

unconstitutional and upsetting the delicate balance between 

individual privacy and community safety. 

 It is possible that this divergent standard has its genesis in 

a slight discrepancy in the language used by the United States 

Supreme Court, and subsequently in our cases, in describing the 

reasonable suspicion standard under the Fourth Amendment. In Terry, 

the Supreme Court explicitly stated its holding, including the 

following language: "We merely hold today that where a police 

officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 

conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be

afoot," an investigatory stop is warranted. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 

(emphasis added). Some later cases utilize the same conditional 

language. See, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 ("may be afoot"); 
16

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ("may be afoot"). 

 However, other reasonable suspicion cases have included more 

definitive language, suggesting that circumstances must indicate 

that criminal activity is afoot, or that a suspect is involved in 

criminal activity. These cases include Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 

51 (1979) ("is involved in criminal activity") and Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

at 123 ("criminal activity is afoot"). 

This disparity is reflected in our cases. Compare, e.g., 

Moore, 276 Va. at 757, 668 S.E.2d at 155 ("may be afoot"); McCain v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552, 659 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008) ("may be 

afoot") with Harris, 276 Va. at 697, 668 S.E.2d at 147 ("is involved 

in criminal activity"); Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 S.E.2d at 923 ("is 

afoot"). In at least one case, both kinds of language are used in 

subsequent sentences. See Ewell, 254 Va. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 722-

23 ("In order to justify the brief seizure of a person by an 

investigatory stop, a police officer . . . must have a reasonable 

suspicion, based on objective facts, that the [person] is involved 

in criminal activity. In determining whether a police officer had a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the person 

stopped may be involved in criminal activity, a court must consider 

. . . ." (emphases added) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 

 These examples suggest that there may be little theoretical 

difference between the two constructions. However, semantic 

differences can come to acquire great practical importance over 

time. The more definite language of the latter line of cases could 

be easily misconstrued as a requirement that police officers have 
17

some certainty that criminal activity in fact is about to commence, 

is already underway, or has recently concluded. Terry and its 

progeny do not go so far, but the conclusion reached by the majority 

here suggests that it has. 

If so, this heightened requirement forecloses a vast range of 

legitimate investigatory practices, authorized by Terry, that result 

in only "minimal intrusion." Far from allowing officers the limited 

ability to request clarification when confronted with ambiguous 

circumstances, it places a weighty and unwarranted burden of proof 

on police to postpone any encounter until criminal culpability, or 

at the very least probable cause to suspect a crime is underway, can 

be conclusively established. This is not the holding of Terry or 

the cases that have followed it, and the majority’s implementation 

of this foreign requirement, which is implicit in its resolution of 

this case, is error. 

In this case, the majority does not properly apply the 

principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 

evaluating Terry stops. The United States Supreme Court has long 

made clear that states are permitted to provide greater protections 

to their citizens than the minimal levels guaranteed by the federal 

Constitution; however, they must do so by means of state law, 

whether embodied in state statute or state constitution. Danforth 

v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1046 (2008) (citing 

Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 397 

(1872); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859)). States are free to 

"impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by 
18

the Federal Constitution," but this must be accomplished by state 

law. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604 

(2008) (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)). 

IV. Conclusion 

 For all the forgoing reasons, I believe the Court of Appeals 

was correct in affirming the trial court’s denial of Rudolph’s 

motion to suppress and in affirming his conviction. Accordingly, I 

would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and 

shall be certified to the Court of Appeals and the said circuit 

court. 

 A Copy, 

 Teste: 

 Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk