If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

DARREN BIELBY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

February 29, 2024

v No. 365300

Genesee Circuit Court

HURLEY MEDICAL CENTER, LC No. 21-116445-CD

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Darren Bielby, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary 

disposition in favor of defendant, Hurley Medical Center (HMC), in this employee discrimination 

action. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was first hired by defendant as a database administrator/developer (DBA) in 2009, 

and was ultimately promoted to senior DBA. In the summer of 2016, he had a brain tumor 

surgically removed, leaving him with a major neurocognitive disorder. However, he returned to 

work full-time with accommodations in January 2017, including working from home and 

additional time to study and take tests for Microsoft certifications. By that time, defendant had 

hired a second (but not senior) DBA, Patrick Wallace. 

Defendant has a contract with a medical software company called Epic, which provides 

software for electronic medical records (EMR). Epic has a program called Honor Roll, wherein it 

offers financial incentives in the form of discounts on its software when medical providers 

maintain employees with certain IT certifications. One such certification is the Microsoft Certified 

Solutions Associate (MCSA). In 2018, both plaintiff and Wallace took the certification test two 

times, but only Wallace passed. Despite having his accommodations in place, plaintiff declined 

to take the test throughout 2019 as he found it frustrating to study and not pass, and HMC only 

needed one person with the certification to be eligible for Honor Roll. 
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In 2020, defendant experienced a budget deficit as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

As a result, the decision was made to lay off employees, specifically in the IT department. Plaintiff 

was laid off in May 2020, when he was 45 years old. Wallace, age 38 or 39, was retained, and 

ultimately promoted to senior DBA in 2021. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging age and disability 

discrimination in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2201 et seq.

and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., respectively. 

Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that plaintiff could 

not establish his discrimination claims under the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas 

Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). Specifically, defendant asserted 

that plaintiff could not prove that defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s 

layoff—financial difficulty because of the pandemic—was mere pretext. The trial court agreed, 

granted defendant summary disposition, and dismissed plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. 

Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 229; 964 NW2d 809 (2020). “A trial court may 

grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when the affidavits or other 

documentary evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

If the moving party properly supports his or her motion, the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. A genuine 

issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt 

to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might 

differ. Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a 

nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials 

in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing 

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. If the opposing party fails to present 

documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the 

motion is properly granted. Our review is limited to the evidence that had been 

presented to the circuit court at the time the motion was decided. [In re 

Guardianship of Malloy, 343 Mich App 548, 558-559; 997 NW2d 733 (2022) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).]

III. AGE AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

The trial court properly granted defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s age and 

disability discrimination claims because there is no genuine issue of material fact under the burdenshifting analysis that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant’s proffered financial reasons for 

his layoff were mere pretext.

The PWDCRA provides that the opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination 

based on disability is a civil right. MCL 37.1102(1). To prove a violation of the PWDCRA, 

plaintiff must show: 
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(1) that he is disabled as defined in the act, (2) that the disability is unrelated to his 

ability to perform his job duties, and (3) that he has been discriminated against in 

one of the ways delineated in the statute. [Jewett v Mesick Consolidated Sch Dist, 

332 Mich App 462, 471; 957 NW2d 377 (2020) (quotation marks, citations, and 

brackets omitted).]

The PWDCRA “generally protects only against discrimination based on physical or mental 

disabilities that substantially limit a major life activity of the disabled individual, but that, with or 

without accommodation, do not prevent the disabled individual from performing the duties of a 

particular job.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The ELCRA bars discrimination on the basis of age. Specifically, MCL 37.2022(1)(a) 

provides that an employer shall not discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual 

because of age. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff must present 

evidence that (1) he belonged to a protected class, (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment 

action, (3) he was qualified for the position, and (4) he was discharged under circumstances that 

gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle v Malady, 458 Mich 153, 172-173; 579 

NW2d 906 (1998). For a claim based on termination based on age, the plaintiff may rely on 

evidence that he was replaced by someone outside his protected class, or that he was treated 

differently than similarly-situated employees outside the protected class for the same or similar 

conduct. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 709; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). 

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff has a disability—his neurocognitive disorder. The 

parties also do not dispute that plaintiff, at age 45, was laid off while Wallace, a younger employee, 

was retained, and ultimately filled the senior DBA position. Nor do the parties dispute that 

plaintiff’s layoff or termination was an adverse employment decision. In making its decision from 

the bench, the trial court assumed for analysis purposes that plaintiff remained qualified for the 

position. Although the job description for senior DBA was ultimately updated to remove the 

certification plaintiff held, at the time that he sought accommodations, his physician verified that 

he was able to perform his job duties. Additionally, he held the senior DBA position from the time 

he returned to work after brain surgery in December 2016, up to the date of his discharge in May 

2020. There is no indication that his disability was related to his ability to perform his job. Thus, 

plaintiff established a prima facie case of age and disability discrimination.

If a plaintiff does not have direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff may proceed 

under the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas, 411 US 792. White v Dep’t of 

Transp, 334 Mich App 98, 107; 964 NW2d 88 (2020). Plaintiff admitted that Wallace was 

“quicker” than him, and had a “wall” of Epic certifications. He admitted that he could not learn 

as fast as Wallace, and he “felt” like he was looked at as a liability. He never actually heard anyone 

refer to him as “a liability.” No one ever said his layoff was because of his disability, or refer to 

him as any kind of slur. Thus, there was no direct evidence of discrimination, and the trial court 

properly applied the burden-shifting framework. 

“If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the burden 

shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate business reason for the decision.” Jewett, 332 

Mich App at 474. Defendant maintained that the reasoning for plaintiff’s layoff was the financial 

condition of the hospital at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Dr. Michael Roebuck, 
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emergency room physician and Chief Medical Information Officer, testified that the IT department 

had a tight budget going into year 2020, which was made worse by the pandemic because the 

decrease in patients meant a decrease in revenue. He testified that around March 2020 to May 

2020, the month plaintiff was laid off, the hospital was losing $3 million each month. Because 

finances were so tight, it was beneficial to the IT department to retain the financial incentive 

offered by Epic by retaining Wallace, the employee with the MCSA certification required to 

qualify for the Epic Honor Roll. These facts provide legitimate business reasons for defendant’s 

employment action against plaintiff.

“If a defendant provides a legitimate business reason, then the burden returns to the plaintiff 

to prove that the reason was a pretext.” Id. Pretext can be established 

(1) by showing the reasons had no basis in fact, (2) if they have a basis in fact, by 

showing that they were not the actual factors motivating the decision, or (3) if they 

were factors, by showing that they were jointly insufficient to justify the decision. 

The plaintiff may use direct or indirect evidence, but the plaintiff must establish a 

causal connection between the discriminatory animus and the adverse employment 

action. [Id. at 475 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] 

“[I]n order to survive a motion for summary disposition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

evidence in the case, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, is sufficient to permit a reasonable 

trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by 

the employer toward the plaintiff.” White, 334 Mich App at 109 (quotation marks and citations 

omitted). There is no genuine issue of material fact that the reasons offered by defendant for 

plaintiff’s employment action were not pretextual.

Renee Link, plaintiff’s supervisor, testified as to several reasons why plaintiff was let go 

while Wallace was retained. She said that during the pandemic, key resources were needed to 

support critical operations, so there was a halt on anything noncritical regarding patient care 

because of the budget crisis. The stability of the EMR system was key not only during the 

pandemic, but for patient care overall, and the safest and most sustainable decision was to maintain 

staff certified to keep the Epic Honor Roll grant. She said IT is a cost with almost no opportunity 

to reduce costs. Link testified that defendant had gotten over $530,000 in a three-year period 

because Wallace had the requisite certifications. She stated that defendant received over $150,000 

in 2018, $236,000 in 2020, and over $245,000 in 2021. Link testified that Wallace had the 

necessary skill set and ability to sustain hospital operations while limiting negative impact to keep 

these critical software systems. She also said that had defendant retained plaintiff over Wallace, 

defendant would have lost the grants immediately. 

Dr. Roebuck testified that the hospital was losing $3 million each month when the 

pandemic began, and the entire hospital went through massive layoffs to stay open and provide 

care. He did not know the specific numbers but was sure revenue decreased from 2019 to 2020. 

He said plaintiff was laid off for the same reason as everyone else—to save money. The decision 

on who to lay off was based on skill set, broadness of tools, ability to do different work, and meet 

certain requirements like Honor Roll; however, he did not make the decision to lay off plaintiff. 

He testified that factors considered in retaining Wallace over plaintiff included reducing the 

workforce quickly, considering the needs of the department and hospital, the difficulty of 
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predicting what the pandemic would bring, considering what work employees could do outside 

their job duties, and the Honor Roll. Dr. Roebuck was not familiar with plaintiff’s 

accommodations, but he never had any discussions regarding disabilities when deciding who to 

lay off. Evon Barno, Senior Director of Virtual Services and Revenue Enhancements, took part in 

the layoff meeting among management, and although he was not involved in the decision to lay 

off plaintiff, he said there was no concern expressed regarding plaintiff’s disability at these 

meetings. 

Plaintiff asserts that the Court cannot rely on the affidavit of Keith D. Poniers, HMC Vice 

President and Chief Financial Officer, because he was not listed in defendant’s initial disclosures 

or on its witness list. However, defendant’s initial disclosures included HMC and “any of its 

employees, agents, or representatives, including but not limited to . . . .” Poniers is not specifically 

listed on defendant’s witness list; however, defendant lists any record custodians of HMC, as well 

as any rebuttal witnesses. As such, the Court may consider his affidavit, which was produced in 

the trial court. He attested that before the pandemic, defendant was operating on a tight budget, 

and when the pandemic hit, there was a major decrease in patient volume, and therefore operating 

revenue. The monthly operating losses were as follows: $4.2 million in March 2020, $3.9 million 

in April 2020, and $5.4 million in May 2020. Therefore, staff reductions were implemented, 

including 17 layoffs in May 2020. Poniers attested that defendant received $8.3 million in federal 

stimulus money in April 2020, and $18.5 million in May. However, that only provided short-term 

relief and operating revenue still needed to be reduced. The financial reports actually showed a 

reduction in net patient revenue from 2019 to 2020 ($420,931,738 to $397,337,936) and a $4.5 

million reduction in other operating revenue ($43,949,134 to $39,375,822). Thus, despite the 

stimulus, defendant was required to reduce expenses to meet the reduction in revenue caused by 

the pandemic. 

Plaintiff also fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext as the 

evidence establishes that his layoff and Wallace’s retention complied with the IT department layoff 

policy, which provides:

2. Layoffs: In the event workforce reduction is mandated, IT management shall 

have sole discretion as to which positions are laid off. Management will be guided 

in this process by the following non-exclusive criteria: 

a. reducing personnel that results in the least negative impact to Medical Center 

operations;

b. targeting reductions to ensure on-going safety and efficiency of Medical Center 

operations;

c. utilizing employee evaluation scores so as to retain the highest performing 

employees.

3. Seniority: while Management may consider employee seniority when evaluating 

team assignments, reassignments, layoffs, or recalls, seniority shall not be the 

exclusive criteria for decision-making. Rather, Management shall consider all 

factors that result in the best support of Medical Center operations. 
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4. Equal Employment Opportunity: all management decisions regarding 

assignments, reassignments, layoffs, or recalls shall comply with SP 2828, Equal 

Employment Opportunity/Non-Discrimination Policy (Title VII Policy).1 

Reducing plaintiff over Wallace produced the least negative impact to HMC and ensured ongoing 

efficient operation because Wallace’s MCSA certification ensured the IT department made the 

Epic Honor Roll and secured financial incentives at a time when defendant was in a financial crisis. 

Regarding evaluation scores, although plaintiff and Wallace both consistently scored within the 

“Solid Performer” range, Wallace’s actual scores were higher than plaintiff’s. In 2016, plaintiff’s 

overall score was 2.00; Wallace’s was 2.58. In 2017, plaintiff’s score was 2.45; Wallace’s was 

2.66. In 2018, plaintiff’s score was 2.51; Wallace’s was 2.54. In 2019, plaintiff’s score was 2.28; 

Wallace’s was 2.63. In 2020, Wallace’s score was 2.53, and in 2021, 2.75. 

Plaintiff does not establish a question of fact regarding pretext in his argument regarding 

the terminology used by defendant. Although plaintiff argues that defendant’s usage of the term 

“layoff” rather than “termination” demonstrates a discriminatory motive, plaintiff actually testified 

that during the process he did not feel misled as to whether his layoff was temporary or permanent. 

He assumed a layoff was temporary with the chance for recall. He was not told it was permanent. 

But his understanding does not create a question of fact. Link testified that she read plaintiff the 

layoff policy, and told him it was a layoff because of COVID-19. Link’s comments in retrospect 

regarding plaintiff’s practice of taking notes in reference to the e-mails regarding recall rights also 

does not establish any question of fact regarding pretext. Link testified that defendant’s disability 

was absolutely not a factor in her decision. 

Lastly, plaintiff does not establish a question of fact regarding pretext because the job 

description for senior DBA was ultimately updated to remove his certification, but included the 

MCSA. Although the MCSA was set to retire, as explained above, it was one of the certifications 

required for eligibility for the Honor Roll, which the IT department sought to maintain to qualify 

for the financial incentives. Moreover, the updated job description was not posted for the senior 

DBA position until the last quarter of 2021. In the ever-changing field of computer technology, 

the updated job description over a year after plaintiff’s layoff does not establish pretext or any 

discriminatory motive to preclude plaintiff from reapplying for the position. 

In sum, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, he has failed to present 

evidence that defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination was pretextual, let 

alone pretext for unlawful discrimination based on age or disability. The evidence does not raise 

a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether discrimination was a motivating factor in 

defendant’s decision. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting defendant summary 

disposition of both of plaintiff’s discrimination claims. 

 

1 The general HMC policy for the layoff and recall of nonbargaining unit employees provided that 

department-specific layoff policies prevailed over this general policy. 
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Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett