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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

SCHOENECKERS INC., 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

September 15, 2015 

v No. 321033 

Tax Tribunal 

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 00-450419 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and MURPHY and SERVITTO, JJ. 

RONAYNE KRAUSE, J. (dissenting) 

 I respectfully dissent. As I read Catalina Mktg Sales Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 470 Mich 

13; 678 NW2d 619 (2004), courts are to look at “the entire transaction,” id. at 24, and although 

the situation at bar is less simple than the situation in Catalina, I conclude that there is only one 

transaction, not two. I conclude that the object of the transaction is functionally 

indistinguishable from the object of the transaction in Catalina: a sophisticated, dynamic, 

custom-targeted behavior modification service consisting of the distribution of incentives to 

individuals other than the provider’s actual clients, which of necessity entails a transmission of 

physical objects. I believe that attempting to separate petitioner’s interactions with its clients 

from petitioner’s interactions with its clients’ employees constitutes a failure to “look[] 

objectively at the entire transaction.” Consequently, I would reverse. 

 The word “transaction” is undefined by any relevant statute, nor did our Supreme Court 

define it in Catalina. To “transact” is “‘to carry on or conduct (business, negotiations, etc.) to a 

conclusion or settlement.’” Oberlies v Searchmont Resort, Inc, 246 Mich app 424, 430; 633 

NW2d 408 (2001), quoting Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Obviously, 

Schoenckers interacts independently with its clients and with its clients’ employees, but neither 

of those interactions has an independent existence. It is undisputed that Schoenckers’s clients 

were not interested in disbursing gifts to their employees out of the pure goodness of their hearts, 

but rather because they wanted to incentivize those employees to perform better and maximize 

the clients’ own profits. The vehicle for accomplishing this was Schoenckers’s “business 

improvement programs.” So far, I believe these facts are undisputed. 

 I differ from the majority because from my perspective, the ultimate disbursement of 

physical goods to Schoenckers’s clients’ employees is an integral and inseparable part of 

Schoenckers’s interaction with its clients. As the majority notes, in Catalina there were 
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ostensibly two interactive occurrences: first, Catalina’s contractual exchange with the 

manufacturers, and second, the issuance of a coupon to shoppers. Although it is, I suppose, 

possible to look at each of those occurrences in isolation, doing so would make no sense, because 

neither of them would have been meaningful without the other. I perceive no sound conceptual 

distinction between that situation and the situation at bar. The majority, correctly in my opinion, 

describes Catalina as “a single transaction that took place between Catalina and its manufacturer 

client, a part of which included the providing of coupons.” The instant situation looks like a 

single transaction that took place between Schoenckers and its clients, a part of which included 

the providing of miscellaneous merchandise. Obviously, the merchandise here has more intrinsic 

value than the slips of paper in Catalina, and Schoenckers interacts more with its clients’ 

employees than Catalina did with the shoppers. I do not believe that those facts fundamentally 

alter the nature of “the entire transaction.” I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that each 

interaction was “supported by its own consideration” simply because the clients’ employees were 

afforded some measure of individual control over what they ultimately received. 

 I therefore conclude that the tribunal adopted a wrong legal principle, and consequently I 

would reverse. 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause