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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 123,589

In the Matter of KEVIN W. KENNEY,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed July 16, 2021. Disbarment.

Krystal L. Vokins, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Matthew J. Vogelsberg, 

Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, was on the formal complaint for the petitioner.

John J. Ambrosio, of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the 

cause, and Kevin W. Kenney, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

PER CURIAM: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 

Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Kevin W. Kenney, of Prairie Village,

an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1996.

On June 18, 2020, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 

complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct (KRPC). The respondent timely filed an answer to the complaint on June 29, 

2020. The Disciplinary Administrator and respondent entered into a joint stipulation 

agreement on August 3, 2020, where the respondent admitted to the facts and stipulated 

that his conduct violated KRPC 3.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 384), 3.3 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 

385), and 8.4 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427). Respondent personally appeared and was 

represented by counsel at the complaint hearing before a panel of the Kansas Board for 

Discipline of Attorneys, which was conducted on August 13, 2020.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel determined that respondent had 

violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) (making a false 

statement of fact or law to a tribunal); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice). The panel set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

along with its recommendation on disposition, in a final hearing report, the relevant 

portions of which are set forth below.

"Findings of Fact

. . . .

"11. The respondent is an attorney at law, Kansas attorney registration 

number 17448. His last registration address with the clerk of the appellate courts of 

Kansas is 7301 Mission Road, Suite 243, Prairie Village, Kansas 66208. The Missouri 

Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the State of Missouri on 

September 29, 1995. The respondent's license to practice law in Missouri is in good 

standing. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the 

State of Kansas on May 15, 1996. The respondent's license to practice law in Kansas is in 

good standing. The respondent has been actively engaged in the practice of law since 

admission. 

"Adoption of C.L.

"12. On September 13, 2016, C.L. was born in Topeka, Kansas. While in the 

hospital, C.L.'s biological mother put C.L. up for adoption through Kansas Children's 

Service League (hereinafter 'KCSL'). On September 15, 2016, the biological mother 

signed relinquishment papers. 
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"13. That same day, KCSL placed the infant with a couple living in the 

Kansas City area who hoped to adopt C.L. The adoptive couple retained the respondent to 

assist them with adopting C.L.

"14. On the evening of September 15, 2016, Melinda Kline, a KCSL social 

work supervisor, contacted C.L.'s biological father by phone and told him about C.L.'s 

birth and that he was believed to be the father. 

"15. Ms. Kline told the biological father that C.L. was placed with prospective 

adoptive parents and explained she was asking him to relinquish his parental rights. The 

biological father asked Ms. Kline who the baby's mother was. Ms. Kline refused to 

answer over the phone, preferring instead to meet with the biological father to sign 

relinquishment papers. The biological father asked if he would be able to meet with the 

prospective adoptive parents or see the baby. Ms. Kline's written log indicated that she 

responded, 'this is usually dependent on trust with the adoptive family.'

"16. The next day, Friday, September 16, 2016, Ms. Kline again spoke to the 

biological father by phone. The biological father's mother joined the conversation. They 

told Ms. Kline that the biological father had an attorney, they provided the attorney's 

contact information, and they asked for a paternity test. The biological father's mother 

said if the baby was the biological father's baby, they wanted to receive custody of the 

baby. 

"17. The following Monday, September 19, 2016, the respondent filed a 

petition for adoption on behalf of the couple in Wyandotte County District Court. The 

petition sought to terminate the biological father's parental rights. 

"18. The petition alleged that the biological father's parental rights should be 

terminated because:

a. The identified biological father, after having knowledge of the 

pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the 

biological mother during the six months prior to the Child's birth;
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b. The identified biological father abandoned the biological mother after 

having knowledge of the pregnancy;

c. The identified biological father has made no reasonable efforts to support 

or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of the birth of the 

Child;

d. The identified biological father abandoned or neglected the Child after 

having knowledge of the Child's birth;

e. The identified biological father is unfit; and

f. Termination of the parental rights of the identified biological father is in 

the best interests of the Child.

"19. The alleged grounds for terminating the biological father's parental rights 

were made without prior factual investigation. Furthermore, the termination allegations 

were substantively false when filed because the biological father only learned of the 

biological mother's pregnancy after C.L.'s birth and only four days before the respondent 

filed the petition seeking to terminate the biological father's parental rights. 

"20. The respondent had his clients sign a verification, affirming under oath 

that the allegations contained in the petition were true. The respondent also signed the 

petition. 

"21. On September 20, 2016, without knowing that a petition for adoption had 

been filed in Wyandotte County, the biological father filed a paternity action in Shawnee 

County, Kansas, stating that he was 'willing and able to meet the financial and emotional 

needs of the minor child' and was 'a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody, 

and control of the minor child.'

"22. On October 5, 2016, the biological mother filed a motion to stay the 

Shawnee County paternity action until the Wyandotte County adoption proceeding was 

concluded. 
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"23. On October 25, 2016, the Wyandotte County district court ordered a 

hearing on the adoption petition and scheduling the hearing for November 29, 2016. On 

November 4, 2016, counsel for the biological father entered his appearance in the 

adoption proceeding. For unknown reasons, the biological father was not served with 

notice of the hearing until November 26, 2016, less than three days before the hearing on 

the adoption petition. 

"24. At the November 29, 2016, hearing, the biological father appeared in 

person and by counsel. The biological father objected to the adoption. The district court 

ordered the biological father to arrange and pay for genetic testing. It also granted the 

prospective adoptive parents' request that the biological father and his attorney have no 

access to the documents in the district court's case file other than a redacted copy of the 

petition for adoption. 

"25. On December 6, 2016, the Shawnee County district court stayed the 

paternity action because the Wyandotte County district court achieved jurisdiction first 

and had already ordered paternity testing. 

"26. Subsequent DNA testing established the biological father's paternity of 

C.L. 

"27. While the adoption case was pending, the biological father was 

prevented from learning the identity of the prospective adoptive parents or where they 

were residing with C.L. 

"28. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on March 24, 2017. The 

biological mother testified at the hearing that she learned she was pregnant the morning 

she gave birth and that she never told anyone, including the biological father, that she 

was pregnant before that day. She also stated that she did not inform the biological father 

of C.L.'s birth. 
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"29. On April 26, 2017, the district court terminated the biological father's 

parental rights, reasoning that the biological father, while the adoption case was pending, 

did not attempt to support or communicate with C.L. or ask about the child's welfare. 

Accordingly, the district court concluded that two statutory grounds for terminating the 

biological father's parental rights were established: (1) the biological father abandoned or 

neglected C.L. after having knowledge of the birth and (2) the biological father had made 

no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with C.L. after having knowledge of his 

birth. 

"30. The biological father appealed the district court's termination of parental 

rights to the Court of Appeals. In an unpublished opinion, on February 23, 2018, the 

Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the biological father's parental rights, 

concluding that evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the biological 

father failed to make reasonable efforts to support or communicate with C.L. while the 

case was pending. The panel concluded, however, that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the district court's other basis for terminating parental rights. 

"31. Judge Tom Malone filed a concurring opinion, stating: 

'What troubles me most about the case are the allegations against [the 

biological father] included in the adoption petition. The adoption petition, 

prepared by legal counsel, alleged the existence of almost every legal basis for 

termination of parental rights set forth in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(A)-

(G). However, the petition alleged no specific facts supporting any of the 

allegations. The petition alleged, in the language of the statute, that [the 

biological father], after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed to provide 

support to the mother and abandoned the mother while she was pregnant, even 

though these allegations obviously were untrue. The petition also alleged, in the 

language of the statute, that [the biological father] had made no reasonable 

efforts to support or communicate with the child and that he had abandoned or 

neglected the child after having knowledge of the child's birth. But at the time the 

petition was filed, there was no evidence to support these allegations because the 

petition was filed only four days after [the biological father] had been informed 

of C.L.'s birth. In fact, the only information available to the parties when the 
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adoption petition was filed was that [the biological father] had communicated his 

desire to assume his parental responsibilities and raise the child. Basically, the 

petition alleged almost every legal ground for termination of parental rights set 

forth in the statute, without any evidence at the time to support the allegations, in 

the hope that something would stick by the time the case was heard in court.

'At the evidentiary hearing on March 24, 2017, [the biological mother] 

testified that during her relationship with [the biological father], he had problems 

with drugs, alcohol, and depression. [The biological father] testified and denied 

any problems with drugs or alcohol, and he stated that his mental health issues 

were behind him. The district court made no findings as to those allegations, and 

in fact, the district court did not make any findings that termination of [the 

biological father's] parental rights was in C.L.'s best interest. Instead, the district 

court terminated [the biological father's] parental rights based on its findings that 

he abandoned or neglected C.L. after he was made aware of the child's birth and 

that he made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with C.L. after 

having knowledge of the child's birth. The evidence to support these findings 

developed after the adoption petition was filed and while the case was pending in 

district court, but none of the evidence actually existed or was known when the 

petition was filed. Had [the biological father] insisted on receiving a hearing 

immediately after the adoption petition was filed, it appears there would have 

been little or no evidence to support the termination of his parental rights.

. . . .

'In light of the preference recognized in the law favoring a biological 

parent's right to raise his or her child, assuming the parent is fit, it seems to me 

like this case went off track from the moment C.L. was born. Only three days 

later, [the biological father] expressed his desire to assume his parental 

responsibilities. At that point, instead of rushing to the courthouse to file an 

adoption petition, all parties involved in the case should have at least temporarily 

put the adoption plans on hold. In the meantime, KCSL or some other 

appropriate agency could have conducted an investigation of [the biological 

father's] home and background to see if he would have been a suitable placement 
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option for C.L. Assuming that [the biological father] passed the initial 

investigation and background check, C.L. could have been temporarily placed 

with [the biological father] for a trial period to be monitored by the appropriate 

agency or the courts. Then, if any evidence developed that [the biological father] 

was not properly caring for C.L., a petition for termination of parental rights 

could have been filed with the court. Giving [the biological father] more of a 

chance to prove his fitness as a father would have been a better approach than 

rushing into an adoption proceeding and finding out later if there was any 

evidence to support it.' [In re Adoption of C.L., No. 117,723, 2018 WL 1022887, 

at *7-8 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion) (Malone, J., concurring).]

"32. The biological father petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The 

Supreme Court granted review on June 19, 2018. At oral arguments on September 12, 

2018, the respondent was questioned by the Supreme Court about the allegations 

contained in the adoption petition:

'JUSTICE JOHNSON: And let's look at that. The petition alleged grounds for 

termination, that the identified biological father, after having knowledge of the 

pregnancy, failed, without reasonable cause, to provide support for the biological 

mother during the six months prior to the child's birth. Is that true?

'MR. KENNEY: That was alleged, yes.

'JUSTICE JOHNSON: How could that be when he didn't find out until after the 

child was—was born?

'MR. KENNEY: Your Honor, it's a reasonable question. 'Um, you know, I was 

informed by the birth mother that she didn't know that she was pregnant until she 

had arrived at the hospital.

'JUSTICE JOHNSON: She didn't know she was pregnant until she went to the 

hospital and had the baby?

'MR. KENNEY: Correct.
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'JUSTICE JOHNSON: But you're alleging that the putative father had knowledge 

for six months before the mother knew?

'MR. KENNEY: Let me explain. Your Honor, I've been doing adoptions for a 

long time and birth mothers have been untruthful to me in the past. And I don't 

know why she would have said she didn't know she was pregnant until she 

showed up at the hospital, but out of an abundance of caution we alleged that 

specific statutory ground just in case.

'JUSTICE JOHNSON: And what are your facts for the second allegation, that the 

biological father abandoned the mother—biological mother after having 

knowledge of the pregnancy? What's your facts that would support that 

allegation?

'MR. KENNEY: Again, Your Honor, birth mother[s] have lied to me in the past. 

We alleged all prebirth grounds, as it were, out of an abundance of caution.

'JUSTICE BILES: I guess I don't understand the abundance of caution, 

particularly since this is a verified petition. You have to have a factual basis to 

make a claim in a petition, regardless of whether it's an adoption case, or any 

case. Right?

'MR. KENNEY: Yes, Your Honor.

'JUSTICE BILES: And so, you're saying that your factual basis for making this 

allegation was that you thought it was possible that the birth mother was lying to 

you and so you claimed facts that you didn't know whether they were true or not?

'MR. KENNEY: That's essentially correct, Your Honor, but—

'JUSTICE BILES: Then let me go one step further, the adoptive parents, these 

people that want to have this child, are verifying, under oath, that there are facts 

to support something that nobody knows is true. How does that happen?
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'MR. KENNEY: Your Honor, as I explained, we alleged that—

'JUSTICE BILES: I know what you did, I'm trying to figure out how it happens. 

It's not enough to just say this is a statutory allegation and I'm going to throw it 

into a petition and put my name on it, as a licensed lawyer, or to have my clients 

verify that that is true without a factual basis, is it?

'MR. KENNEY: That's correct, Your Honor.'

"33. The Supreme Court issued its opinion on October 5, 2018, reversing the 

termination of the biological father's parental rights and remanding the case with 

directions that custody of C.L. be given to the biological father. 

"34. The Supreme Court stated:

'The record is also undisputed that by the next day—a Friday—Father 

was acting to protect his parental rights. He advised Kline he wanted custody, 

had retained a lawyer to accomplish this, and gave Kline his lawyer's contact 

information. Notably, instead of prompting a cooperative opportunity to work 

with that attorney to explore Father's potential relationship with his child, this 

news apparently triggered a one-sided, 'first strike' race to the courthouse to 

initiate adoption proceedings in another county that would preempt any lawsuit 

by Father to establish paternity and support obligations.

'The tactical move by the prospective adoptive parents had the desired 

result, but they admittedly got there by filing a lawsuit without appropriate 

factual investigation and by alleging false grounds for terminating Father's 

parental rights. They claimed, for example, that Father had failed to support 

Mother during the six months prior to C.L.'s birth and abandoned her after having 

knowledge of the pregnancy, even though he did not learn of the pregnancy and 

birth until two days after the fact. Worse yet, the prospective adoptive parents, 

under oath, verified these false accusations as being true. As Judge Malone 
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observed in his concurrence, "these allegations obviously were untrue" given the 

fact that no one—not even Mother—was aware of the pregnancy. [Citation 

omitted.]' [In re Adoption of C.L., 308 Kan. 1268, 1283, 427 P.3d 951 (2018).]

"35. On October 12, 2018, the respondent sent a letter to the disciplinary 

administrator, regarding his conduct in In re Adoption of C.L. In the letter, the respondent 

stated:

'An adoption case of mine was reversed by the Supreme Court on Friday, 

October 5th. The opinion is In the Matter of C.L.

'Although it was not the basis for the reversal, the Court was unhappy 

that the adoption petition included an allegation that the birth father had failed to 

support the birth mother during the last six months of her pregnancy, when birth 

mother claimed she didn't know she was pregnant until she delivered. I explained 

at oral argument that I am accustomed to birth mothers lying and I included the 

allegation out of an abundance of caution. Because the opinion mentioned this 

issue, my explanation does not appear to have appeased the Justice who inquired 

at oral argument.

'While I do not believe I violated the rules, I am concerned that the 

Justice might file an ethics complaint against me. Consequently, I have chosen to 

be proactive and bring this matter to your attention.

'Coincidentally, I learned for the first time Monday that the birth mother 

appears to have known she was pregnant before she delivered. The information 

was provided to me by the girlfriend/fiancée of birth mother's father.'

"36. On October 16, 2018, the disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a 

letter, notifying him that the matter was being docketed as DA13,205 and referred to the 

Johnson County Ethics Committee for investigation. 
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"37. On October 22, 2018, the disciplinary administrator received a letter 

from Douglas T. Shima, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, stating that he had been asked by 

the Supreme Court to transmit a copy of the court's In re Adoption of C.L. opinion 'for 

investigation and consideration of possible violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct by counsel.'

"38. On October 24, 2018, the disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a 

copy of Mr. Shima's letter and asked him to verify in 20 days that he had received the 

letter and to include any information he believed was necessary to respond to the letter. 

"39. On November 12, 2018, the respondent sent a letter in response, stating:

'As I understand it, the issue as framed by the opinion of the Kansas 

Supreme Court . . . is whether alleging "the father had failed to support [the 

biological mother] during the six months prior to C.L.'s birth and abandoned her 

after having knowledge of the pregnancy" constituted "false grounds for 

terminating [the biological father]'s parental rights." [Citation omitted.] [the 

biological father] allegedly did not learn of [the biological mother]'s pregnancy 

until after C.L. was born. [Citation omitted.]

'At oral argument, I attempted to respond to the Supreme Court's 

concerns regarding inclusion of the pre-birth grounds described above. As I 

explained to the Court, it has been my experience in my almost 24 years of 

handling adoptions that birth mothers lie about a variety of issues. Thus, I felt it 

most prudent to include the pre-birth termination grounds in the event that C.L.'s 

mother had lied.

'I also relied on the following legal analysis. First, adoption is a creature 

of statute, In the Matter of the Adoption of L.M., 48 Kan. App. 2d 343, 344-345 

(Kan. App. 2012), and the grounds for termination of parental rights under the 

Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act are set forth at K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1). 

Kansas adoption statutes are strictly construed in favor of preservation of 

parental rights. In re Adoption of B.M.W. 268 Kan. 871, 882 (Kan. 2000). Finally, 

Kansas is a notice pleading state, which requires a "short and plain statement of a 
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claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the ground upon which it rests." Kinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 301-02 (Kan. 

1977). Thus, it seemed fairest to place a young, unwed father on immediate 

notice of all possible grounds available under K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1) for 

termination of his parental rights.'

"40. In his response and at the hearing on the formal complaint, the 

respondent indicated that generally biological mothers often lie and that he was skeptical 

about the biological mother's claim that she was unaware she was pregnant until giving 

birth to C.L. and that his skepticism was 'warranted.' The respondent stated: 

'After having read about the Supreme Court's decision in a Topeka newspaper, 

[the girlfriend of the biological mother's father] sent me the enclosed email . . . 

[and] it appears that the birth mother may have known she was pregnant before 

she delivered the child.'

The information the respondent received after the Supreme Court opinion was released 

was never investigated nor cross-examined. Because the information was not 

investigated, it is difficult to say whether the information was true or false. The receipt of 

this information does not make the false statements in the adoption petition true, nor does 

it mitigate the respondent's misconduct. At the time the respondent filed the adoption 

petition, he had no factual basis for the assertions made in the petition. 

"Adoption of Baby Boy F

"41. In May, 2016, the biological mother and the biological father of Baby 

Boy F, began dating. The biological father moved into the biological mother's residence 

and shortly thereafter, the couple learned that the biological mother was pregnant. 

"42. The biological mother and the biological father's relationship deteriorated 

by November, 2016, and the biological father moved out of the shared residence. A few 

days later, he returned to the residence to find that the biological mother had moved. 
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"43. On January 21, 2017, the biological mother gave birth to Baby Boy F. 

The next day, the biological mother signed documents relinquishing her parental rights 

and agreeing to have Catholic Charities of Northeast Kansas place Baby Boy F with 

adoptive parents. 

"44. In the documents, the biological mother identified the biological father as 

the Baby Boy F's father, stated that he had accompanied her to one doctor's appointment 

and one sonogram appointment while she was pregnant, and asserted that he had not 

provided her with any financial support during the pregnancy. 

"45. Catholic Charities placed Baby Boy F with a prospective adoptive 

couple. The adoptive couple retained the respondent to assist them with adopting Baby 

Boy F. 

"46. Two days after Baby Boy F's birth, on January 23, 2017, the respondent 

filed a petition on behalf of the adoptive couple in Wyandotte County district court to 

terminate the biological father's parental rights and approve the adoption of the child.

"47. Among other allegations, the petition alleged that the biological father 

'made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child after having 

knowledge of the birth of the child' and had 'abandoned or neglected the child after 

having knowledge of the child's birth.'

"48. At the time the adoption petition was filed, the biological father did not 

know that Baby Boy F had been born. He learned of the birth of Baby Boy F when he 

was served with the adoption petition a few days later. 

"49. An initial hearing was scheduled for February 28, 2017. Prior to the 

hearing, the biological father asked the respondent if he could see his child. The record 

does not establish what he was told, but he was not given any visits. At the initial hearing, 

the respondent informed the district court that he had spoken to the biological father and 

that the biological father indicated to him that he wanted to assume parental 

responsibilities of Baby Boy F. 
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"50. At the hearing, the biological father agreed to submit to genetic testing to 

determine paternity. Genetic testing later confirmed the biological father's paternity of 

Baby Boy F. 

"51. The respondent requested at the hearing that all information about the 

adoptive couple be sealed and not available to the biological father. The district court 

granted the request. 

"52. After the initial hearing, the biological father retained counsel to 

represent him.

"53. On November 10, 2017, the district court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing in the adoption case. Following the hearing, the district court terminated the 

biological father's parental rights on the basis that, while the case was pending, the 

biological father failed to make reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the 

child after having knowledge of the child's birth. At that same time, the district court 

approved the adoptive couple's adoption of Baby Boy F. The biological father appealed 

the termination of his parental rights to the Court of Appeals. 

"54. On December 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, 

concluding that the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to support the 

conclusion that the biological father had failed to make reasonable efforts to support or 

communicate with Baby Boy F after having knowledge of his birth. Accordingly, the 

Court of Appeals reversed the termination of the biological father's parental rights and 

remanded the case with directions that custody of Baby Boy F be given to the biological 

father. 

"55. Notably, in support of its decision, the Court of Appeals cited the 

Supreme Court's decision in In re Adoption of C.L.

"56. While the disciplinary action regarding the respondent in the C.L. case 

was pending, the disciplinary administrator's office became aware of the case involving 

Baby Boy F. On November 27, 2019, the disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a 

letter, asking him to address specific questions regarding the Baby Boy F case: 
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'I would like you to explain the facts surrounding your decision in Baby Boy F. to 

allege in the adoption petition that the biological father "made no reasonable 

efforts to support or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of the 

birth of the Child" and that the biological father had "abandoned or neglected the 

Child after having knowledge of the Child's birth." If you did not have a factual 

basis for making these allegations at the time you filed the adoption petition, did 

you note in the adoption petition that your allegations would "likely have 

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity to further investigation or 

discovery?" See K.S.A. 60-211(b)(3).'

"57. On December 5, 2019, the respondent provided a response, stating:

'Before this disciplinary action started, it was my practice to simply quote 

verbatim the provisions of K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1) in my adoption petitions. 

Because Kansas is a notice pleading state, I included all applicable or potentially 

applicable provisions of the statute for termination of the birth father's parental 

rights in my initial pleading. Because a respondent/birth father is generally young 

and sometimes unsophisticated, I thought it fairest to inform the young man as 

soon as possible what was at stake. My intent was never to mislead the birth 

father or the court.

'Since the inception of the disciplinary claim, I have refined my pleading 

practice as you suggest in your letter. For example, in a recent petition filed after 

the child's birth I alleged that the birth father "has made or is expected to make 

no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the Child after having 

knowledge of the Child's birth."'

"Conclusions of Law

"58. The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims 

and contentions), KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), and KRPC 8.4 (professional 

misconduct). Based on the above findings of fact and the respondent's stipulations, the 
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hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1 

(meritorious claims and contentions), KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), and KRPC 8.4 

(professional misconduct).

"KRPC 3.1

"59. A lawyer may not 'bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert 

an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.' KRPC 3.1. The 

respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 3.1. In this case, the respondent included 

issues in both of the adoption petitions without a factual basis for doing so. The 

respondent argued that he did so 'in an abundance of caution.' However, an attorney may 

not include allegations in a petition without factual support. As such, based on the 

respondent's stipulation and the evidence presented, the hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent violated KRPC 3.1. when he did not have a good faith basis for doing so. 

"60. The hearing panel is concerned that the respondent's current practice 

does not sufficiently correct the situation. The respondent indicated that in a recent 

adoption petition, he alleged that the birth father 'has made or is expected to make no 

reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of 

the Child's birth.' The respondent must not make allegations in any petitions that lack a 

factual basis.

"KRPC 3.3(a)(1)

"61. Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides that '[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false 

statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.' The respondent made false statements of 

material fact to the Court when he included allegations in the two adoptions petitions that 

were not true. 

"62. Specifically, in In re Adoption of C.L., the respondent included the 

following allegations:
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a. The identified biological father, after having knowledge of the 

pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the 

biological mother during the six months prior to the Child's birth;

b. The identified biological father abandoned the biological mother after 

having knowledge of the pregnancy;

c. The identified biological father has made no reasonable efforts to support 

or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of the birth of the 

Child;

d. The identified biological father abandoned or neglected the Child after 

having knowledge of the Child's birth;

e. The identified biological father is unfit; and

f. Termination of the parental rights of the identified biological father is in 

the best interests of the Child.

However, the alleged grounds for terminating the biological father's parental rights were 

made without prior factual investigation and were substantively false when filed, as the 

biological father only learned of the biological mother's pregnancy after C.L.'s birth and 

only four days before the respondent filed the petition seeking to terminate the biological 

father's parental rights. The respondent made false allegations in the adoption petition. 

"63. In Baby Boy F.'s adoption petition, the respondent asserted that the 

biological father 'made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child 

after having knowledge of the birth of the child' and had 'abandoned or neglected the 

child after having knowledge of the child's birth.' However, at the time the adoption 

petition was filed, the biological father did not know that Baby Boy F had been born. He 

learned of the birth of Baby Boy F when he was served with the adoption petition a few 

days later. Thus, the respondent made false allegations in the adoption petition. 
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"64. Because the respondent provided false information to the Court, the 

hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1). 

"KRPC 8.4(c)

"65. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' Rule 8.4(c). As detailed above, 

the respondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he made false 

allegations in the two adoption petitions. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent violated Rule 8.4(c). 

"KRPC 8.4(d)

"66. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 

is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' Rule 8.4(d). This disciplinary case is based 

on two adoption cases where, as a result of the respondent's misconduct, two adoptions 

were overturned. In both of those cases, the respondent included allegations in the 

adoption petitions which were not supported by any facts in existence at the time of 

filing. As Judge Malone stated, the respondent:

'alleged almost every legal ground for termination of parental rights set forth in 

the statute, without any evidence at the time to support the allegations, in the 

hope that something would stick by the time the case was heard in court.' [C.L., 

2018 WL 1022887, at *7 (Malone, J., concurring).]

As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(d). 

"American Bar Association

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

"67. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 

considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 

to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
20

injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 

factors. 

"68. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his clients, the legal 

profession, and the legal system to maintain his personal integrity.

"69. Mental State. The respondent negligently and knowingly violated his 

duty. The respondent's pattern of alleging the statutory grounds in adoption petitions 

without any factual support was careless, sloppy, and negligent. In addition, in these two 

particular cases, the respondent knew that some of the factors clearly did not apply.

"70. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 

serious injury to his clients, the birth mothers, the birth fathers, and the two children 

whose adoptions were overturned. The injury caused by the respondent cannot be 

remedied and will be long lasting.

"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

"71. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

aggravating factors present:

a. A Pattern of Misconduct. Based on the respondent's written response and 

testimony, the respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct throughout his 

career. It was his pattern and practice, in an 'abundance of caution,' to include all 

the statutory grounds in his petitions for adoptions regardless of the evidence 

involved in the case. 

b. Vulnerability of Victim. The respondent's clients, the biological mothers, 

the biological fathers, and children whose adoptions were set aside were 

vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct. By the nature of the cases in which 

the respondent's violations occurred, it is clear that these clients, as well as the 

necessary parties, are highly vulnerable. Given the respondent's many years of 
21

experience in filing adoption pleadings, that vulnerability was well-known to the 

respondent.

c. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Missouri Supreme 

Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in Missouri in 1995 and the 

Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the State 

of Kansas in 1996. At the time of the misconduct, the respondent had been 

practicing law for approximately 20 years. 

"72. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

mitigating circumstances present:

a. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 

previously been disciplined. 

b. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 

Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment 

of the Transgressions. The respondent self-reported the misconduct. The 

respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. Additionally, the 

respondent admitted the facts and the rule violations. 

c. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 

Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and 

General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive 

member of the adoption bar. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers 

and generally possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by several 

letters received by the hearing panel. 

d. Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed genuine 

remorse for having engaged in the misconduct. 
22

"73. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel thoroughly 

examined and considered the following Standards:

'6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false 

statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material 

information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, 

and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or 

causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 

'6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in 

determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking 

remedial action when material information is being withheld, and causes 

injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an 

adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 

. . . .

'7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 

conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes 

injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 

'7.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages 

in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes 

injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.'

"Recommendation of the Parties

"74. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's 

license to practice law be suspended for a period of 18 months. Counsel for the 
23

respondent recommended that the respondent be censured and that the censure be 

published in the Kansas Reports."

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 

hearing panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of the 

KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct

must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 

258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 276). 

Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 

truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 

610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]).

The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he 

filed answers; he filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report, but did 

enter into a joint stipulation agreement where he admitted to the facts as outlined in the 

agreement and to violating KRPC 3.1, 3.3, and 8.4. The finding of facts as set forth in the 

hearing panel's final hearing report are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 228(g)(1), 

(2). The evidence before the hearing panel clearly established the charged misconduct 

violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) (making a false 

statement of fact or law to a tribunal); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice).

The final hearing report recommended we suspend respondent's license to practice 

law for a six-month period. Before us, the Disciplinary Administrator recommended an

18-month suspension. Neither the hearing panel nor the Disciplinary Administrator 

requested a Supreme Court Rule 232 reinstatement hearing to follow the suspension. See 
24

2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 287. Respondent requested the hearing panel's recommendation of a 

six-month suspension be followed. 

These recommendations are just that—recommendations. See In re Biscanin, 

305 Kan. 1212, 1229, 390 P.3d 886 (2017). The respondent's admitted pattern of conduct 

in these cases is egregious. He knowingly made false statements to a court with the intent 

to circumvent a father's constitutional rights to parent his own child and to obtain a 

fraudulent termination of that father's parental rights. In so doing, he "won" adoptions of 

the children for his clients which a significant time later had to be overturned due to the 

respondent's fraud. 

In effect, respondent used the legal process to traffic children. It is not hyperbole 

to put the matter this starkly, and we can think of no breach of trust more significant or 

damaging than this. Our legal system depends on the highest standards of

professionalism, integrity, truthfulness, and trustworthiness of our lawyers. Without this, 

we cannot be said to have a system of law, only a corrupt game of power and 

manipulation with a façade of lawfulness. A lawyer cannot come back from a breach of 

trust so grave. The confidence of the public and the sanctity of the rule of law can only be 

protected and preserved by meting out the most serious sanction available to us—

disbarment.

Disbarment is the appropriate sanction when "a lawyer, with the intent to deceive 

the court, makes a false statement . . . and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 

party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal 

proceeding." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 6.11 (1992). The harm 

respondent caused can hardly be understated—to his own clients (who were forced to 

suffer the heartbreaking judicial reversal of the adoptions of their children); to the fathers 

(who lost years of crucial parenting time with their children); to the children (who 
25

doubtless will suffer early childhood trauma which may reverberate through their lives); 

and to the people of Kansas (whose confidence in our legal system's ability to arrive at 

just and equitable resolutions to such disputes is seriously undermined by such 

misconduct). In the past, we have dealt similarly with other cases of fraud and 

dishonesty. See In re Nwakanma, 306 Kan. 704, 397 P.3d 403 (2017); In re Williams, 

302 Kan. 990, 362 P.3d 816 (2015). We hold that respondent is disbarred from the 

practice of law in the state of Kansas and enter judgment as follows.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Kevin W. Kenney be and he is hereby disbarred

from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective the date of this opinion, in 

accordance with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(1) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 275) for violations 

of KRPC 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 

Rule 231 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 286).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 

respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.

STANDRIDGE, J., not participating.