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DOMENIC CAMMAROTA v. ANTHONY M. GUERRERA

(AC 34521)

Beach, Bear and Keller, Js.

Argued September 18, 2013—officially released March 18, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Radcliffe, J.)

John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Dennis J. Kokenos, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

BEACH, J. The plaintiff, Domenic Cammarota,

appeals following the judgment of the trial court directing a verdict in favor of the defendant, Anthony M.

Guerrera. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in

granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the

counts of his complaint alleging (1) professional negligence and (2) breach of fiduciary duty.1 We agree with

his first claim and disagree with his second claim.

Evidence introduced at trial includes the following

relevant facts, which we construe in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn.

845, 855–56, 37 A.3d 700 (2012). The plaintiff and his

brother, Alfonso Cammarota, were involved in the

development of real property. They retained the defendant as counsel, and the defendant prepared an

agreement that was agreed to by the plaintiff and by

Alfonso Cammarota, who signed it both individually

and on behalf of Bella Investors, LLC, his construction

company, in December, 2004. The agreement conveyed

real estate known as 3404 Madison Avenue in Bridgeport (property), in which the plaintiff and Alfonso Cammarota each owned a 50 percent interest, to 3404

Madison Avenue, Inc. The plaintiff was president, secretary and treasurer of the stock corporation, 3404 Madison Avenue, Inc.; the plaintiff and Alfonso Cammarota

each owned 50 percent of the shares of stock in 3404

Madison Avenue, Inc. The agreement further provided

that Bella Investors, LLC, would construct six condominium units on the property and that ‘‘the net proceeds

of the first three units nearest Madison Avenue would

belong to [the plaintiff] and the net proceeds of the three

units further from the street shall belong to [Alfonso

Cammarota].’’ The agreement provided for the payment

of construction costs.

Following the construction of the condominium

units, a check for $215,000 payable to the plaintiff was

handed to Alfonso Cammarota by either the defendant

or an employee in the defendant’s law office. Three

checks payable to 3404 Madison Avenue, Inc., in the

amounts of $269,003.68, $12,558.41, and $189,005.48,

respectively, were also delivered to Alfonso Cammarota. The check payable to the plaintiff was deposited,

without proper endorsement, into the account of

Alfonso Cammarota in May, 2005. The plaintiff’s action

is based on the supposition that the defendant tortiously

delivered the plaintiff’s check to Alfonso Cammarota.

The plaintiff testified that he had had ‘‘concern[s]

about [Alfonso Cammarota] which I expressed to [the

defendant].’’2 The plaintiff did not discover that the

checks had been given to Alfonso Cammarota until he

went to the defendant’s office to collect his share of

the proceeds, where the defendant informed him that

he had previously handed the checks, including the one
payable to the plaintiff, to his brother.

The plaintiff initiated an action against the defendant

alleging legal malpractice,3 conversion and breach of

fiduciary duty. At a jury trial, the plaintiff’s counsel

offered evidence through the testimony of the plaintiff,

the defendant, and Vincent Longo, an employee at the

bank where the check was deposited. After the plaintiff

had rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict

as to all three counts of the plaintiff’s complaint. The

court granted the motion. This appeal followed.

‘‘Whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff was

sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict

is a question of law, over which our review is plenary.

. . . Directed verdicts are not favored. . . . A trial

court should direct a verdict only when a jury could

not reasonably and legally have reached any other conclusion. . . . In reviewing the trial court’s decision to

direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

. . . Although it is the jury’s right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts

proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and

speculation. . . . A directed verdict is justified if . . .

the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the

court to set aside a verdictrendered forthe other party.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Curran v. Kroll, supra, 303 Conn. 855–56.

‘‘A verdict may be directed . . . where the claim is

that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a favorable

verdict. . . . [T]o establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced

to prove. . . . [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff

is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff’s] favor. . . .

[W]hether the plaintiff has established a prima facie

case is a question of law, over which our review is

plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 110

Conn. App. 736, 739, 955 A.2d 1241, cert. denied, 289

Conn. 955, 961 A.2d 421 (2008).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the count of

the complaint alleging professional negligence or legal

malpractice. The plaintiff raises two reasons why in his

view the court erred in dismissing this count. The court

erred, he argues, in dismissing the claim on the grounds

that expert testimony, required in most professional

negligence or legal malpractice actions, was lacking

and any delict on the part of the defendant did not

proximately cause harm to the plaintiff. We agree with

the plaintiff.
A

The plaintiff argues that the court erred in holding

that he was required to present expert testimony to

prove his claim of professional negligence. We agree.

First, it is not at all clear that the count actually

sounded in professional negligence. In order for a claim

to sound in professional negligence, it must be alleged

that (1) the defendant is sued in his or her capacity

as a professional, (2) the alleged negligence is of a

specialized professional nature that arises out of the

professionalrelationship, and (3)the alleged negligence

is substantially related to the professional conduct and

involved the exercise of professional judgment. See Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation

Center, 61 Conn. App. 353, 358, 764 A.2d 203, appeal

dismissed, 258 Conn. 711, 784 A.2d 889 (2001).4

The plaintiff alleged legal malpractice, but the labeling of the claim is not necessarily dispositive. ‘‘[T]he

interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law

for the court . . . . Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary. . . .

Furthermore, in determining the nature of a pleading

filed by a party, we are not bound by the label affixed

to that pleading by the party.’’(Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Selimoglu v. Phimvongsa,

119 Conn. App. 645, 651–52, 989 A.2d 121, cert. denied,

296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d 1103 (2010).

The count alleged that the defendant prepared contractual documents outlining the plans for construction

of the condominium units and distribution of the eventual proceeds. Assets from the sale of the units were

deposited in the defendant’s trust account. Certain

amounts were due to the plaintiff individually. Without

right, the defendant delivered all proceeds to Alfonso

Cammarota. The plaintiff claimed that this behavior on

the part of the defendant was negligent and fell below

the minimum standard of care.

The evidence in dispute at trial did not involve an

arcane issue implicating professional judgment. Rather,

evidence was introduced to show that the defendant

prepared a check payable to the plaintiff, but handed

it toAlfonso Cammarota, who arranged to have it deposited in a bank account not belonging to the plaintiff.

Although the language in the complaint could reasonably be construed to describe the exercise of professional judgment—such as contract interpretation and

professional obligations—the evidence, also consistent

with the complaint, suggested a more straightforward

scenario easily understandable by one not versed in

the law.

There may be some ambiguity, then, as to whether

the action realistically sounded in professional negligence or in ordinary negligence. If the case ultimately

required resolution of the question of whether the
defendant committed professional negligence, then

ordinarily expert testimony would be required to prove

the applicable standard of care and, perhaps, deviation

from the standard of care. ‘‘The determination of

whether expert testimony is needed to support a claim

of legal malpractice presents a question of law. . . .

Accordingly, our review is plenary. . . . Generally, to

prevail on a legal malpractice claim, in Connecticut, a

plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish the

standard of proper professional skill or care. . . . Not

only must the plaintiffs establish the standard of care,

but they must also establish that the defendant’s conduct legally caused the injury of which they complain.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Moore v. Crone, 114 Conn. App. 443, 446, 970 A.2d 757

(2009). If, on the other hand, the case realistically

required resolution of an issue of ordinary negligence,

then the usual rule is that expert testimony is not

required, but rather the jury is to apply the standard of

the reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances. See, e.g., Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 48, 179 A. 9 (1935). Even in

cases clearly alleging professional negligence, however,

expert testimony is not required if the issues in dispute

are not beyond the knowledge of the ordinary juror.

‘‘[Legal] malpractice claims do not necessarily require

expert testimony.Although a courtrequires expert testimony to establish the relevant standard of care in most

cases . . . [s]ome aspects of a [legal] malpractice

action are considered to be within the realm of a jury’s

knowledge . . . and, thus, do not require expert testimony.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital

Rehabilitation Center, supra, 61 Conn. App. 360; see

also Ciarlelli v. Romeo, 46 Conn. App. 277, 283, 699

A.2d 217 (1997) (‘‘[w]hile expert testimony is permitted

in a great many instances, it is required only when the

question involved goes beyond the field of ordinary

knowledge and experience of judges and jurors’’

[emphasis omitted]).

The question of whether expert testimony is required

is not resolved by characterizing the case as sounding

in legal malpractice or ordinary negligence, but rather

by determining whether the issue, unaided by expert

testimony, is within the realm of a jury’s ordinary knowledge. Thus, professional negligence claims do not necessarily require expert testimony, and claims of

ordinary negligence may require expert testimony. The

appropriate question is whetherthe issue can be reliably

decided by a jury without the assistance of expert testimony. The court reasoned that expert testimony was

required because the act of giving the checks to Alfonso

Cammarota properly was viewed in the context of complicated transactions in which the defendant had a longstanding relationship with both parties. The defendant

had drafted the agreement and the documents of incor-
poration, and Alfonso Cammarota’s role included

obtaining and paying subcontractors.5

If resolution of

the matter depended on the interpretation of complex

contractual language or the application of standards

peculiar to the practice of the legal profession, then

expert testimony may well be required if the plaintiff

is to prevail.

Viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, however, this

case presented a simple matter of the defendant’s handing a person a check, payable to someone else, after

the defendant had been warned6 about that person.

Although the jury may well not have made inferences

nor drawn conclusions favorable to the plaintiff had

the case reached the jury, the scenario was one which,

in the light viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, was

comprehensible by an ordinary juror. The question of

whether handing a check to the wrong person constitutes negligence is within the common experience of

the jury and does not require the use of peculiar or

specialized knowledge. See Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 993

N.E.2d 944, 965–67 (Ill. App. 2013) (expert testimony

not needed in claim of legal malpractice where attorney,

inter alia, gave to third party sale proceeds check payable to client), cert. denied, 996 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. 2013);

Asphalt Engineers v. Galusha, 160 Ariz. 134, 135–36,

770 P.2d 1180 (App. 1989) (negligence obvious so as

notto require experttestimony where complaint alleged

that attorney failed to follow instructions to deliver

client’s check owed to third party but rather put check

in file with ‘‘void’’ written on it); see also 7 Am. Jur. 2d

273, Attorneys at Law § 225 (2007) (‘‘[t]he most appropriate application of the common knowledge doctrine

regarding the necessity of expert testimony in a legal

malpractice action involves situations where the carelessness of the defendant attorney is readily apparent

to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience’’).

As previously discussed, the court viewed the case as

one involving more complex issues not readily resolved

without the assistance of expert testimony. A court is

not to grant a motion for a directed verdict, however,

unless the jury could not reasonably have reached a

verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, under the construction

of the case most favoring the plaintiff. Because one

construction of the case, viewed most favorably to the

plaintiff, did not require expert testimony, the court

erred in directing a verdict as to the legal malpractice

count on the ground that the plaintiff failed to present

expert testimony.7

B

The plaintiff next argues that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as to

the count of professional negligence on the ground that

the plaintiff had not presented evidence of proximate

cause as a matter of law. We agree.
As stated previously, ‘‘[w]hether the evidence presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to withstand a

motion for a directed verdict is a question of law, over

which our review is plenary.’’ Curran v. Kroll, supra,

303 Conn. 855.

The court concluded that granting the defendant’s

motion for a directed verdict as to the count alleging

legal malpractice or professional negligence was appropriate for the additional reason that the plaintiff had not

presented sufficient evidence to establish proximate

cause. The court stated that there was no evidence that

the defendant knew or had reason to know that Alfonso

Cammarota would create a separate bank account and

would deposit the checks, including the check payable

to the plaintiff, in that account. The court reasoned that

exhibit 5

8 demonstrated that it was the action of Alfonso

Cammarota, perhaps in concert with Vincent Longo, a

bank employee who deposited the plaintiff’s check into

Alfonso Cammarota’s account without a proper

endorsement, that caused harm to the plaintiff, rather

than any action of the defendant.

‘‘To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must

establish that the defendant’s conduct legally caused

the injuries . . . . The first component of legal cause

is causation in fact . . . . The test for cause in fact is,

simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for

the actor’s conduct. . . . The second component of

legal cause is proximate cause . . . . [T]he test of

proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct

is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s

injuries. . . . Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the

burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that

tied his injuries to the [defendant’s conduct]. . . . The

existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act

complained of for the necessary causal connection.

. . . This causal connection must be based upon more

than conjecture and surmise.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew’s

Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 24–26,

734 A.2d 85 (1999). Proximate cause has been defined

in case law as ‘‘[a]n actual cause that is a substantial

factor in the resulting harm . . . . The proximate

cause requirement tempers the expansive view of causation [in fact] . . . by the pragmatic . . . shaping [of]

rules which are feasible to administer, and yield a workable degree of certainty. . . . Remote or trivial [actual]

causes are generally rejected because the determination

of the responsibility for another’s injury is much too

important to be distracted by explorations for obscure

consequences or inconsequential causes. . . . In

determining proximate cause, the point beyond which

the law declines to trace a series of events that exist

along a chain signifying actual causation is a matter of

fair judgment and a rough sense of justice . . . This
definition of proximate cause implicitly includes . . .

[a limitation on] the defendant’s liability to foreseeable

bounds.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263

Conn. 424, 441 n.17, 820 A.2d 258 (2003).

‘‘The question of proximate causation . . . belongs

to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a

factual issue. . . . It becomes a conclusion of law only

when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could

reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined

by the trier as a matter of fact.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Turrell v. Dept. of Mental Health &

Addiction Services, 144 Conn. App. 834, 845, 73 A.3d

872, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 930, 78 A.3d 857 (2013).

The plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant

or one of the defendant’s employees gave a check payable to the plaintiff to Alfonso Cammarota, that a bank

employee let him deposit it without a proper endorsement, and that the plaintiff in some manner warned

the defendant about Alfonso Cammarota. Whether the

defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in the

check being placed in Alfonso Cammarota’s bank

account without a proper endorsement, as tempered

by the concept of foreseeability; see Barry v. Quality

Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 441 n.17; is a

question properly for the jury.9 The defendant’s handing

the check to Alfonso Cammarota rather obviously satisfied the ‘‘but for’’ test for causation. The further issue

of proximate cause was appropriately one for the jury

to decide. We conclude that the court improperly

granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict

as to the claim sounding in professional negligence.

II

The plaintiff last claims that the court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to his claim of

breach of fiduciary duty. We disagree.

The court reasoned that granting the defendant’s

motion for a directed verdict as to the count alleging

breach of fiduciary duty was proper because there was

no evidence of fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest

on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff argues that

the court erred in determining that there was no conflict

of interest. He contends that the following evidence

presented was sufficient for a jury to conclude that

there was a breach of fiduciary duty: there was an

attorney-client relationship in which the plaintiff

entrusted his affairs to the defendant, and the defendant

delivered checks payable to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s corporation to Alfonso Cammarota, despite being

on notice of a financial conflict of interest between the

plaintiff and Alfonso Cammarota. The plaintiff acknowledges in his brief that not every breach of duty in the

context of an attorney-client relationship is a breach
of fiduciary duty. ‘‘Professional negligence implicates

a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary duty implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty.’’ Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 247

Conn. 48, 57, 717 A.2d 724 (1998).

‘‘[A] fiduciary or confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence

between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent

the interests of the other. . . . The universe of fiduciary relationships is not static. Rather than attempt to

define a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in

such a manner to exclude new situations, we have

instead chosen to leave the bars down for situations in

which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side

and a resulting superiority and influence on the other.

. . . [A]lthough we have not expressly limited the application of . . . traditional principles of fiduciary duty

to cases involving only fraud, self-dealing or conflict of

interest, the cases in which we have invoked them have

involved such deviations.’’(Citations omitted; emphasis

in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Di Teresi

v. Stamford Health System, Inc., 142 Conn. App. 72,

94, 63 A.3d 1011 (2013). A ‘‘breach of a fiduciary duty

implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty.’’ Beverly Hills

Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin,

supra, 247 Conn. 57.

The first component of a breach of fiduciary duty is

present in this case because an attorney-client relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the attorney. See

Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 184, 627 A.2d 414 (1993).

With regard to the second component, the court properly determined that, as a matter of law, there was no

conflict of interest in a traditional sense.10

The plaintiff does not indicate what specific type of

conflict of interest was presented by the evidence,11 but

in his brief he seems to refer to a concurrent conflict

of interest based on a dualrepresentation of the plaintiff

and Alfonso Cammarota. Rule 1.7 (a) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct12 provides: ‘‘Except as provided

in subsection (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client

if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of

interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1)

the representation of one client will be directly adverse

to another client; or(2)there is a significantrisk that the

representation of one or more clients will be materially

limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,

a former client or a third person or by a personal interest

of the lawyer.’’ ‘‘Loyalty and independent judgment are

essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the

lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person orfrom the lawyer’s own interests.’’

Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, commentary. Rule

1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct ‘‘concerns con-
flicts of interest that may arise when an attorney represents a client and such representation will be directly

adverse to another client.’’ Cheverie v. Ashcraft & Gerel,

65 Conn. App. 425, 434, 783 A.2d 474, cert. denied, 258

Conn. 932, 785 A.2d 228 (2001).

The plaintiff did not submit evidence that the defendant’s representation of him was directly adverse to

that of Alfonso Cammarota, nor can it logically be

inferred that any misplaced loyalty motivated the handling of the check. There simply was nothing in the legal

representation of them that presented a professional

conflict of interest. Rather, the plaintiff presented evidence that he warned the defendant about Alfonso Cammarota and that the defendant or someone in his office

gave the four checks—including one made out to the

plaintiff—to Alfonso Cammarota. There has been no

suggestion that the defendant intended to benefit

Alfonso Cammarota at the expense of the plaintiff. Any

construction of a scenario involving divided loyalty or

adverse interests would be, on the evidence presented

in this case, a product of unmitigated speculation and

conjecture, which is an impermissible basis on which

to deny a motion for a directed verdict. See Curran v.

Kroll, supra, 303 Conn. 856. On the evidence presented,

the defendant’s act in giving the checks to Alfonso Cammarota may have presented a jury question regarding

negligence, in that there perhaps may have been a

breach of a duty to exercise ordinary care, but did not

demonstrate a breach of the duty of loyalty or honesty.

Negligence alone is insufficient to support a claim of

a breach of fiduciary duty. ‘‘Professional negligence

alone . . . does not give rise automatically to a claim

for breach of fiduciary duty. Although an attorney-client

relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the attorney

. . . not every instance of professional negligence

results in a breach of that fiduciary duty. . . . Professional negligence implicates a duty of care, while breach

of a fiduciary duty implicates a duty of loyalty and

honesty.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz &

Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, supra, 247 Conn. 56–57.

Because the duty of loyalty and honesty is not implicated by the facts viewed most favorably to the plaintiff,

the court acted properly in granting the defendant’s

motion for a directed verdict with respect to the count

of the complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty.

The judgment is reversed as to the legal malpractice

count, and the case is remanded forfurther proceedings

according to law. The judgment is affirmed in all

other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The court also directed a verdict as to the final count of the three count

complaint, which alleged conversion. The court’s judgment as to this count

has not been challenged on appeal.

2 See footnote 6 of this opinion.

3 This count alleged that ‘‘the defendant was negligent in his handling of

the plaintiff’s affairs and fell below the minimum standard of care for an
attorney in the practice of his profession.’’ For convenience, we use the

terms ‘‘legal malpractice’’ and ‘‘professional negligence’’ interchangeably.

4 Trimel arose in the context of a claim of medical, not legal, malpractice.

The considerations as to what sorts of activities implicate professional

judgment, and thus what sorts of claims aptly fall into the category of

professional negligence, are the same.

5 Alfonso Cammarota was the contractor on the project. The plaintiff

testified that he did not attend any of the closings.

6 The evidence regarding the ‘‘warning’’ was not precise. The evidence,

however, must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

On direct examination, the plaintiff was asked, ‘‘[D]id you explain to the

defendant your desire that your financial interest should be protected in

this transaction?’’ The plaintiff responded ‘‘yes’’ and elaborated, ‘‘I said how

do I know . . . that I’m gonna end up with my share, and [the defendant]

said, it’s in the contract.’’

The defendant’s counsel asked on cross-examination if the plaintiff had

the opinion that Alfonso Cammarota was ‘‘a crook’’ when he ‘‘started this

transaction.’’ The plaintiff responded, ‘‘[a] little bit, yeah.’’ The defendant’s

counsel questioned whether the plaintiff had ever told the defendant that

he ‘‘should not trust [Alfonso Cammarota].’’ The plaintiff answered, ‘‘Not

in those words. I had questioned the contract.’’

The following colloquy subsequently occurred between the plaintiff and

the defendant’s counsel:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: And . . . you’ve already testified that you

didn’t tell [the defendant] that . . . he had to be aware of [Alfonso Cammarota]?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I did. I actually . . . I thought I did.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: You already said in sum [Alfonso Cammarota]

was a crook.

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I didn’t say—no. I . . . didn’t say that he was a crook.

I have concern[s] about my brother which I expressed to [the defendant].

I didn’t use that word, ‘‘crook,’’ no.’’

7

If consideration of the case had required resolution of a legal question,

such as whether the defendant exercised acceptable legal judgment in

determining to whom the check ought to be payable, the result may have

been different.

8 Exhibit 5 was a memo to Vincent Longo, a bank employee, indicating

that bank policies had not been followed when the check payable to the

plaintiff was deposited into Alfonso Cammarota’s bank account without

proper endorsement.

9 We note that wrongful depositing of a check may be within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by negligently transferring the check. See

Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 441 n.17.

10 There also was no evidence presented of fraud or self-dealing. The

plaintiff does not contest the court’s conclusion in this regard.

11 In addition to ‘‘where an attorney’s own interest conflicts with his client’s

best interest; see Phillips v. Warden, 220 Conn. 112, 137–40, 595 A.2d 1356

(1991); a nonexhaustive list of recognized conflicts of interest include the

following: representation of codefendants by a single attorney; see State v.

Williams, 203 Conn. 159, 167, 523 A.2d 1284 (1987); where interests of an

attorney’s client conflict with interests of a former client of the attorney;

see State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 652, 522 A.2d 795 (1987); and where

an attorney may be a necessary witness. See State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665,

684, 684 n.14, 718 A.2d 925 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1125, 119 S. Ct

911, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999); see also generally Rules of Professional

Conduct 1.7 through 1.11.’’ Abrams v. Commissioner of Correction, 119

Conn. App. 414, 419 n.4, 987 A.2d 370, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 920, 991 A.2d

564 (2010).

12 ‘‘[A] violation of a rule of professional conduct does not give rise to a

cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty

has been breached.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly &

Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 636 n.17, 850 A.2d 145 (2004); see

also Rules of Professional Conduct, scope. The code, however, is useful in

describing conflicts.