106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1453

AN ACT

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive

solution to the war in Sudan.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.
2

S 1453 ES

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) With clear indications that the Government

4 of Sudan intends to intensify its prosecution of the

5 war against areas outside of its control, which has

6 already cost nearly 2,000,000 lives and has displaced

7 more than 4,000,000, a sustained and coordinated

8 international effort to pressure combatants to end

9 hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict of10 fers the best opportunity for a comprehensive solu11 tion to the continuing war in Sudan.

12 (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally

13 sponsored peace process, protected from manipula14 tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso15 lution of the war, protection of human rights, and

16 a self-sustaining Sudan.

17 (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian

18 relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in

19 the effort to bring an end to the war.

20 (4) Continued leadership by the United States

21 is critical.

22 (5) Regardless of the future political status of

23 the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov24 ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au25 thority and institutions is a major impediment to

26 achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
3

S 1453 ES

1 and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace

2 process.

3 (6) Through manipulation of traditional rival4 ries among peoples in areas outside their full con5 trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used

6 divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their

7 population, and Congress finds that internationally

8 sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical

9 role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human

10 suffering.

11 (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly

12 utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense

13 Forces, and other irregular troops for raiding and

14 slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the

15 Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt

16 the ability of those populations to sustain them17 selves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of

18 bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the

19 war through selective starvation and to minimize the

20 Government of Sudan’s accountability internation21 ally.

22 (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly

23 stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds

24 from future oil sales to increase the tempo and
4

S 1453 ES

1 lethality of the war against the areas outside its con2 trol.

3 (9) Through its power to veto plans for air

4 transport flights under the United Nations relief op5 eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov6 ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the

7 receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the

8 United States and other donor countries as a dev9 astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the

10 Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out11 side of the Government’s control.

12 (10) The efforts of the United States and other

13 donors in delivering relief and assistance through

14 means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad15 dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov16 ernment of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations

17 to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

18 (11) While the immediate needs of selected

19 areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad20 dressed in the near term, the population in areas of

21 Sudan outside of the control of the Government of

22 Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of

23 their ability to sustain themselves.

24 (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in

25 Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions
5

S 1453 ES

1 have been excluded completely from relief distribu2 tion by OLS, consequently placing their populations

3 at increased risk of famine.

4 (13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per

5 day, and with a primary focus on providing only for

6 the immediate food needs of the recipients, the cur7 rent international relief operations are neither sus8 tainable nor desirable in the long term.

9 (14) The ability of populations to defend them10 selves against attack in areas outside the Govern11 ment of Sudan’s control has been severely com12 promised by the disengagement of the front-line

13 sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of

14 the Government of Sudan that success on the battle15 field can be achieved.

16 (15) The United States should use all means of

17 pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu18 tion to the war, including—

19 (A) the maintenance and

20 multilateralization of sanctions against the Gov21 ernment of Sudan with explicit linkage of those

22 sanctions to peace;

23 (B) the support or creation of viable demo24 cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of

25 Sudan outside government control;
6

S 1453 ES

1 (C) continued active support of people-to2 people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in

3 areas outside of government control;

4 (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms

5 to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;

6 (E) cooperation among the trading part7 ners of the United States and within multilat8 eral institutions toward those ends; and

9 (F) the use of any and all possible unilat10 eral and multilateral economic and diplomatic

11 tools to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end

12 their hostilities and again assume a constructive

13 stance toward facilitating a comprehensive solu14 tion to the ongoing war in Sudan.

15 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

16 In this Act:

17 (1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov18 ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic

19 Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

20 (2) IGAD.—The term ‘‘IGAD’’ means the

21 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

22 (3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United

23 Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the

24 World Food Program, and participating relief orga25 nizations known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.
7

S 1453 ES

1 SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN

2 RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW TACTICS BY THE

3 GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

4 Congress hereby—

5 (1) condemns—

6 (A) violations of human rights on all sides

7 of the conflict in Sudan;

8 (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall

9 human rights record, with regard to both the

10 prosecution of the war and the denial of basic

11 human and political rights to all Sudanese;

12 (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and

13 the role of the Government of Sudan in abet14 ting and tolerating the practice; and

15 (D) the Government of Sudan’s increasing

16 use and organization of ‘‘murahalliin’’ or

17 ‘‘mujahadeen’’, Popular Defense Forces (PDF),

18 and regular Sudanese Army units into orga19 nized and coordinated raiding and slaving par20 ties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains,

21 Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and

22 (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on

23 air transport relief flights by the Government of

24 Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a

25 tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys26 tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and
8

S 1453 ES

1 economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in

2 a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

3 SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby—

5 (1) declares its support for the efforts by execu6 tive branch officials of the United States and the

7 President’s Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a re8 invigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace process;

9 (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European

10 Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt,

11 and other key states to support the peace process;

12 and

13 (3) urges Kenya’s leadership in the implementa14 tion of the process.

15 (b) RELATION TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY.—It

16 is the sense of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts

17 toward resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made

18 through a peace process based on the Declaration of Prin19 ciples reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and

20 that the President should not create any process or diplo21 matic facility or office which could be viewed as a parallel

22 or competing diplomatic track.

23 (c) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The

24 Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel

25 of the Department of State for the support of—
9

S 1453 ES

1 (1) the secretariat of IGAD;

2 (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov3 ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;

4 (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried

5 out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD

6 Partners’ Forum (IPF); and

7 (4) other United States diplomatic efforts sup8 porting a peace process in Sudan.

9 SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

10 It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting

11 through the United States Permanent Representative to

12 the United Nations, should—

13 (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations

14 Security Council to investigate the practice of slav15 ery in Sudan and provide recommendations on meas16 ures for its eventual elimination;

17 (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human

18 rights practices of the Government of Sudan at the

19 United Nations conference on human rights in Gene20 va in 2000;

21 (3) press for implementation of the rec22 ommendations of the United Nations Special

23 Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to human rights

24 monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan;
10

S 1453 ES

1 (4) press for UNICEF, International Com2 mittee of the Red Cross, or the International Fed3 eration of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or

4 other appropriate international organizations or

5 agencies to maintain a registry of those individuals

6 who have been abducted or are otherwise held in

7 bondage or servitude in Sudan;

8 (5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government

9 of Sudan each time it subjects civilian populations to

10 aerial bombardment; and

11 (6) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations

12 General Assembly condemning the human rights

13 practices of the Government of Sudan.

14 SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

15 Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of

16 this Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the President

17 shall submit a report to Congress on—

18 (1) the specific sources and current status of

19 Sudan’s financing and construction of oil exploi20 tation infrastructure and pipelines;

21 (2) the extent to which that financing was se22 cured in the United States or with involvement of

23 United States citizens;
11

S 1453 ES

1 (3) such financing’s relation to the sanctions

2 described in subsection (a) and the Executive Order

3 of November 3, 1997;

4 (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the

5 Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its con6 trol, including targets, frequency, and best estimates

7 of damage;

8 (5) the number, duration, and locations of air

9 strips or other humanitarian relief facilities to which

10 access is denied by any party to the conflict; and

11 (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace

12 process and any other ongoing effort to end the con13 flict, including the specific and verifiable steps taken

14 by parties to the conflict, the members of the IGAD

15 Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD toward

16 a comprehensive solution to the war.

17 SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

18 It is the sense of Congress that the President should

19 organize and maintain a formal consultative process with

20 the European Union, its member states, the members of

21 the United Nations Security Council, and other relevant

22 parties on coordinating an effort within the United Na23 tions to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power

24 of the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for

25 air transport relief flights.
12

S 1453 ES

1 SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR

2 RELIEF EFFORTS.

3 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the progress

4 made by officials of the executive branch of Government

5 toward greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more

6 effective distribution of United States relief contributions.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that the President should continue to increase the

9 use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup10 plies in southern Sudan.

11 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date

12 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de13 tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to14 ward carrying out subsection (b).

15 SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS16 PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

17 (a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a detailed

18 and implementable contingency plan to provide, outside

19 United Nations auspices, the greatest possible amount of

20 United States Government and privately donated relief to

21 all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Moun22 tains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Govern23 ment of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban

24 on OLS air transport relief flights.

25 (b) ELEMENT OF PLAN.—The plan developed under

26 subsection (a) shall include coordination of other donors
13

S 1453 ES

1 in addition to the United States Government and private

2 institutions.

3 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 2 months after the date

4 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a clas5 sified report to Congress on the costs and startup time

6 such a plan would require in the event of a total ban on

7 air transport relief flights or in the event of a partial or

8 incremental ban on such flights if the President has made

9 the determination required by subsection (a)(2).

10 (d) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—Notwith11 standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the

12 plan developed under subsection (a), the President may

13 reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for

14 support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for

15 the purposes of the plan.

16 SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID’S SUDAN TRANSITION

17 ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION (STAR)

18 PROGRAM.

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby ex20 presses its support for the President’s ongoing efforts to

21 diversify and increase effectiveness of United States as22 sistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of the

23 control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long24 term focus shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for

25 Rehabilitation (STAR) program with its emphasis on pro-
14

S 1453 ES

1 moting future democratic governance, rule of law, building

2 indigenous institutional capacity, promoting and enhanc3 ing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people

4 reconciliation efforts.

5 (b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts made

6 available to carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign

7 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating

8 to development assistance) for the period beginning on Oc9 tober 1, 2000, and ending on September 30, 2003,

10 $16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable

11 civil authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in

12 Sudan, including the provision of technical assistance, and

13 for people-to-people reconciliation efforts.

14 (c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.—Notwithstanding

15 any other provision of law, the President is granted au16 thority to undertake any appropriate programs using Fed17 eral agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct support

18 of indigenous groups, agencies, or organizations in areas

19 outside of control of the Government of Sudan in an effort

20 to provide emergency relief, promote economic self-suffi21 ciency, build civil authority, provide education, enhance

22 rule of law and the development of judicial and legal

23 frameworks, support people-to-people reconciliation ef24 forts, or implementation of any programs in support of
15

S 1453 ES

1 any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or na2 tional level.

3 (d) IMPLEMENTATION.—It is the sense of Congress

4 that the President should immediately and to the fullest

5 extent possible utilize the Office of Transition Initiatives

6 at the Agency for International Development in an effort

7 to pursue the type of programs described in subsection

8 (c).

9 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that enhancing and supporting education and the

11 development of rule of law are critical elements in the

12 long-term success of United States efforts to promote a

13 viable economic, political, social, and legal basis for devel14 opment in Sudan. Congress recognizes that the gap of 13–

15 16 years without secondary educational opportunities in

16 southern Sudan is an especially important problem to ad17 dress with respect to rebuilding and sustaining leaders and

18 educators for the next generation of Sudanese. Congress

19 recognizes the unusually important role the secondary

20 school in Rumbek has played in producing the current

21 generation of leaders in southern Sudan, and that priority

22 should be given in current and future development or tran23 sition programs undertaken by the United States Govern24 ment to rebuilding and supporting the Rumbek Secondary

25 School.
16

S 1453 ES

1 (f) PROGRAMS IN AREAS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT

2 CONTROL.—Congress also intends that such programs in3 clude cooperation and work with indigenous groups in

4 areas outside of government control in all of Sudan, to

5 include northern, southern, and eastern regions of Sudan.

6 SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUN7 TAINS AND OTHER AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS

8 ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

9 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that civilians in

10 the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions

11 of Sudan are not receiving assistance through OLS due

12 to restrictions by the Government of Sudan.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con14 gress that the President should—

15 (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the

16 humanitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red

17 Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan;

18 (2) respond appropriately to those needs based

19 on such assessment; and

20 (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on

21 efforts made under paragraph (2).
17

S 1453 ES

1 SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE

2 FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PAR3 TICIPANTS.

4 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date

5 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to

6 the appropriate congressional committees a report, in clas7 sified form if necessary, detailing possible options or plans

8 of the United States Government for the provision of non9 lethal assistance to participants of the National Demo10 cratic Alliance.

11 (b) CONSULTATIONS.—Not later than 30 days after

12 submission of the report required by subsection (a), the

13 President should begin formal consultations with the ap14 propriate congressional committees regarding the findings

15 of the report.

16 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘appro17 priate congressional committees’’ means the Committee on

18 Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations

19 of the Senate and the Committee on International Rela20 tions and the Committee on Appropriations of the House

21 of Representatives.

Passed the Senate November 19, 1999.

Attest:

Secretary.
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1453

AN ACT

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a

comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.