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INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

NO. 70945-3-1 DIVISION ONE Inthe Matterofthe Marriage of ) NIGORA KHAKIMOVA, ) Respondent, ) and ) SHUKHRAT KHAKIMOV, ) Appellant. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: June 9, 2014 Leach, J. — Inthis dissolution action, Shukhrat Khakimov, acting pro se, appeals 

### the trial court's pretrial ruling excluding his untimely disclosed witnesses and exhibits. He also challenges trial court orders distributing the parties' property, denying a new trialand a change injudge, and awarding attorneyfees to Nigora Khakimova. Because the limited record provided by Shukhrat fails to establish error as to any issue on appeal, we affirm. FACTS 

### Nigora and Shukhrat were married in 1987 in Uzbekistan.1 Nigora filed for dissolution in 2011. The trial court issued a scheduling order requiring the parties to disclose witnesses and exhibits by April 9, 2012. The orderstated,


### 1 Because this case involves parties with similar last names, we refer to the parties by their firstnames for clarity.No. 70945-3-1 / 2

NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE ABOVE ORDER may result in the exclusion of evidence or be considered an abandonment of claims or the failure to prosecute or defend diligently. Noncompliance 

### may result inthe entry of ajudgment againstthe non-complying/defaulting party, with respectto either a specific issue or the entire case. The court may impose such additional sanctions, including the award of terms and/orattorneyfees, as itdeems appropriate. 

### Shukhrat, proceeding pro se, failed to timely file a list ofwitnesses and exhibits. 

### On April 20, 2012, Nigora filed a motion in limine to exclude any witnesses and exhibits not timely disclosed. On April 23, 2012, Shukhrat filed a witness list, and the parties filed a joint statement ofevidence. On May 3, 2012, the first day of trial, the trialcourt 

### granted Nigora's motion and excluded all of Shukhrat's proposed witnesses and
exhibits. On June 5, 2012, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution and written 

### findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thetrial court awarded Nigora the community's condominium in Uzbekistan and 2004 Chevy Impala and awarded Shukhrat the 

### community's house in Uzbekistan and 1999 Ford Taurus. The trial court awarded each party the financial accounts and personal property in that party's name or possession and granted Nigora a judgment of $2,281 against Shukhrat for his share of the community's debt. The court awarded Nigora$4,000 inattorneyfees due to the husband's intransigentconduct such as his failure to cooperate 

### with the wife's attorney, failure to correctly and fully respond to the 

### interrogatories, failure to appearfor his deposition, failure to participate in the alternative dispute resolution, failure to abide by the case schedule 

### deadlines with regards to disclosure of witnesses and the exchange of exhibits.

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### Shukhrat filed a CR 59 motion for a new trial in which he argued (1) the Uzbekistan house and condominium were his separate property, not community property; (2) the trial court lackedjurisdiction overthe Uzbekistan real property; and (3) the distribution of community assets and debts was inequitable. He also made various claims offraud against Nigora and herattorney. Thetrial courtdenied the motion. Shukhrat appeals the exclusion of his untimely witnesses and exhibits, the decree of dissolution, several of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the order denying his motion for a new trial, and an order denying his posttrial motion for a change injudge. DISCUSSION The trial court has broad discretion to divide property in a dissolution action, and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that 

### discretion.2 This courtalso reviews a trialcourt's rulings on motions in limine,the denial 

### of a CR 59 motion for a new trial, and an award ofattorneyfees forabuse of discretion.3 We review a trialcourt'sfindings of fact forsubstantial evidence.4 A trial court's decision "is presumed to be correct and should be sustained 

### absent an affirmative showing of error."5 The party presenting an issue for review has

2In re Marriage ofMuhammad, 153Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005). 

### 3 Gammon v. Clark Equip. Co., 38 Wn. App. 274, 286, 686 P.2d 1102 (1984) (motions in limine), aff'd, 104Wn.2d 613, 707 P.2d 685 (1985); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co.. 140 Wn.2d 517, 537, 998 P.2d 856 (2000) (CR 59 motions); In 

### re Marriage ofMattson, 95 Wn. App. 592, 604, 976 P.2d 157 (1999) (attorneyfees). 4In re Marriage ofSchweitzer, 132Wn.2d 318, 329, 937 P.2d 1062 (1997). 5Statev. Wade. 138Wn.2d 460, 464, 979 P.2d 850 (1999).

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the burden of providing a record adequate to establish the errors claimed.6 An 

### "insufficient record on appeal precludes review of the alleged errors."7 Ifan incomplete record fails to affirmatively establish an abuse of discretion, we may affirm the 

### challengeddecision.8 Moreover, an appellant must provide "argument in support of the issues 

### presented for review, togetherwith citations to legal authority and references to relevant 

### parts of the record."9 Arguments that are not supported by any reference to the record or by citation of authority need not be considered.10 Pro se litigants are held to the
samestandard as attorneys and mustcomply with allprocedural rules on appeal.11 Motion in Limine Shukhrat claims the trial court erred in granting Nigora's motion to exclude his proposed witnesses and exhibits. King County Local Civil Rule (KCLCR) 4(j) requires that parties disclose witnesses and exchange copies ofexhibits by the date provided in the case schedule. "Anywitness orexhibit not listed may not be used attrial, unless the Court orders otherwise for good cause and subject to such conditions as justice 

### requires."12 Inaddition, KCLCR 26(k)(4) provides that any witness not timelydisclosed may not be called to testify attrial.

6Wade, 138Wn.2d at464; see also RAP 9.2,9.9,9.10. 

### 7Bulzomi v. Dep'tofLabor&Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994). 8State v. Sisouvanh, 175Wn.2d 607, 619-20, 290 P.3d 942 (2012). 

### 9RAP 10.3(a)(6). 10 Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).11 Inre Marriage ofOlson. 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). 

### 12 KCLCR 4(j).No. 70945-3-1 / 5 

### However, a trial court's discretion to exclude witnesses is not absolute. Though argued by neither party here, exclusion of witnesses as a sanction for untimely disclosure is permissible only when (1) there is willful or deliberate violation of the discovery rules and orders, (2) the violation substantially prejudiced the other party's ability to prepare for trial, and (3) the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser 

### sanction would have sufficed.13 These findings must be made on the record, either orally or in writing.14 A trial court abuses its discretion when it excludes witnesses withoutthesefindings.15 The record is clear that Shukhrat failed to timely provide a list of witnesses and copies ofexhibits to Nigora by April 9, 2012, the date provided in the scheduling order. Shukhrat appears to argue that good causejustified his late disclosure, claiming that he
was ill prior to trial and that he did not realize he would need witness testimony. To the extent Shukhrat claims that the trial court abused its discretion in considering this to be a willful or deliberate violation, the record is insufficient to permit review. The trial 

### court's ruling was made orally on the first day of trial. Shukhrat did not file a verbatim 

### report of any ofthe proceedings as part of this appeal. Without demonstrating what factors the trial court relied upon in making its decision, Shukhrat does not meet his burden to show the trial court abused its discretion.16

13 Burnetv. SpokaneAmbulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997). 14 Teterv. Deck, 174Wn.2d 207, 217, 274 P.3d 336 (2012). 15 Burnet, 131 Wn.2dat494. 

### 16 In reply, Shukhrat argues that the trial court should have exercised other remedies for his late disclosure, including ruling on the evidence on a case-by-caseNo. 70945-3-1 / 6
Division ofProperty 

### Shukhrat reiterates his argument made below that the trial court erred in finding the Uzbekistan property to be community property, claiming that both the house and condominium are instead owned by his parents. But in order to properly challenge findings offact on appeal, Shukhrat must demonstrate "why specific findings ofthe trial court are not supported by the evidence and [must] cite to the record to support that 

### argument."17 Because Shukhrat has not provided a verbatim report of any of the proceedings or designated any of the exhibits considered by the court at trial, he does
not meet this burden to demonstrate error. 

### Citing Brown v. Brown,18 Shukhratargues thatthe trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties' interests in the Uzbekistan property. But in In re Marriage of Kowalewski,19 the Washington Supreme Court held that a trial court's personal jurisdiction overthe spouses and subject matterjurisdiction overthe marital dissolution action encompasses the powerto distribute spouses' personal interests in all property, 

### including foreign real estate.20 Consistent with Kowalewski, the trial court properly adjudicated the parties' interests inthe Uzbekistan real property inthe context of their
dissolution.



### basis. We do not consider an issue raised and argued for the firsttime in a reply brief. Cowiche Canyon, 118 Wn.2d at 809. 17 In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wn.2d 518, 532, 957 P.2d 755 (1998). 1846Wn.2d 370, 372, 281 P.2d 850 (1955). 19 163Wn.2d 542, 544, 553, 182 P.3d 959 (2008). 20Kowalewski, 163 Wn.2d at 549-50.No. 70945-3-1 / 7
Shukhrat claims thatthe trial court's division ofthe cars was inequitable because 

### the Chevy Impala awarded to Nigorawas more valuable than the FordTaurus awarded to him. Again, the record is inadequate to review this claim because itcontains no evidence of the cars' value or the basis for the trial court's decision. Shukhrat also 

### argues that Nigora lied about her income and stole valuable china, silver, and antiques belonging to him. But the persuasiveness, credibility, and weight of the evidence are 

### matters for the trier of fact and are not subject toreviewby thiscourt.21
Posttrial Motions 

### Shukhratfailed to establish any ofthe grounds under CR 59(a) justifying a new trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. Shukhrat also 

### assigns error to an orderdenying hisposttrial motion for a change injudge. Because the record contains neither Shukhrat's motion nor a transcript ofthe trial court's hearing
on the motion, we decline to review it. Trial CourtAward ofAttorney Fees 

### Shukhrat contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Nigora 

### without considering his ability to pay. But findings as to a party's ability to pay are not 

### required for an award of fees based on intransigence.22 Shukhrat also claims that 

### Nigora inflated the amount oftime her attorney spent on the case, but there is no evidence to support such aclaim. On the basis of therecord before us, Shukhratdoes notdemonstratethetrialcourtabused itsdiscretion inthe award orthe amountoffees.

21 State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). 22 Mattson, 95 Wn. App. at604.No. 70945-3-1 / 8 Attorney Fees on Appeal Citing RAP 18.9(a), Nigora requests attorney fees on appeal, arguing that Shukhrat's appeal is frivolous. We agree and award Nigora attorney fees on appeal, 

### subjectto hercompliancewith RAP 18.1(d).23 Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: 

# ^r„^cx few, '

23 Shukhrat has filed three motions connected with his appeal. Shukhrat's first 

### two motions allege various abuses against him, including that (1) the trial courtjudge 

### was biased againsthim and violated rules ofjudicial conduct; (2)Nigora misrepresented herincome, assets, and ownership ofthe Uzbekistan property; and (3) Nigora's attorney threatened and intimidated him. As the proper place for Shukhratto raise these claims 

### was in his opening brief, we deny his motions. Shukhrat's third motion was to strike 

### Nigora's opening brief, in which he claimed that Nigora served him with a different version than that filed with this court. He also made various other allegations offraud and discrimination. A commissioner of this court denied Shukhrat's motion, and we 

### deny hismotion tomodifythe commissioner's ruling. We include Nigora's attorney fees associated with responding tothese motions as part of our award ofappellatefees.