[Cite as Hal v. Ohio Dept of Edn., 2020-Ohio-204.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Martha Hal, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 18AP-301 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 17CV-4132)

State of Ohio : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Department of Education, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on January 23, 2020 

 

Farlow & Associates, LLC, and Beverly J. Farlow, for 

appellant. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Mary L. Hollern, and Hannah 

Stoneburner, for appellee. 

 

ON APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

BRUNNER, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Martha Hal, filed a timely application for reconsideration, 

under App.R. 26(A), asking this Court to reconsider its decision entered on December 10, 

2019 in Hal v. State Dept. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-301, 2019-Ohio-5081. Defendantappellee, State of Ohio Department of Education ("ODE"), filed a memorandum in 

opposition. In our decision, we affirmed the decision and entry of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas affirming the decision and resolution of the State of Ohio Board of 

Education ("Board") that Hal had engaged in conduct unbecoming to the teaching 

profession, in violation of R.C. 3319.31(B)(1), and denying appellant's applications for a 

five-year professional principal license and five-year professional special all grades 

teaching license. First, we examine our standard of review under App.R. 26:
No. 18AP-301 2 

" 'App.R. 26 provides a mechanism by which a party may 

prevent miscarriages of justice that could arise when an 

appellate court makes an obvious error or renders an 

unsupportable decision under the law.' " Corporex Develop. & 

Constr. Mgt., Inc. v. Shook, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-269, 

2004-Ohio-2715, ¶ 2, quoting State v. Owens, 112 Ohio App.3d 

334, 336, 678 N.E.2d 956 (11th Dist.1996). When presented 

with an application for reconsideration filed pursuant to 

App.R. 26, an appellate court must determine whether the 

application "calls to the attention of the court an obvious error 

in its decision, or raises an issue for consideration that was 

either not considered at all or was not fully considered by the 

court when it should have been." Columbus v. Hodge, 37 Ohio 

App.3d 68, 523 N.E.2d 515 (10th Dist.1987), syllabus. 

Importantly, an appellate court will not grant "[a]n application 

for reconsideration * * * just because a party disagrees with the 

logic or conclusions of the appellate court." Bae v. Dragoo & 

Assoc., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-254, 2004-Ohio-1297, ¶ 2. 

State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1014, 2014-Ohio-672, ¶ 8.

{¶ 2} An application for reconsideration is not intended for cases in which a party 

simply disagrees with the reasoning and conclusions of the appellate court. Drs. Kristal & 

Forche, D.D.S., Inc. v. Erkis, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-06, 2009-Ohio-6478, ¶ 2, citing State v. 

Owens, 112 Ohio App.3d 334, 336 (11th Dist.1996). An application for reconsideration will 

be denied where the moving party "simply seeks to 'rehash the arguments' " presented in 

the initial appeal. Appenzeller v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-747, 

2018-Ohio-1698, ¶ 4, quoting Garfield Hts. City School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn., 85 Ohio 

App.3d 117, 127 (10th Dist.1992). Thus, if an application for reconsideration does not raise 

an issue that either was not considered at all or was not fully considered, nor demonstrates 

the court made an obvious error or rendered a decision unsupportable under the law, it 

should not be disturbed. Harris at ¶ 8.

{¶ 3} In her application, Hal argues that this Court did not properly consider 

mitigating and aggravating factors required for imposing a penalty arising from licensure 

suspension. Hal argues that what the hearing officer considered and relied on as 

aggravating—the allegation that Hal did not disclose her misconduct to the Board—was 

inadequate. Hal points to the fact that she testified to and provided to the Board a list of the 

students involved in the Freshman Forgiveness Program ("FFP"). (Application for Recons. 

at 4.) Hal also reargues that the hearing officer only considered a few of the required 
No. 18AP-301 3 

mitigating factors. As we previously discussed, the Board is not required to consider any 

particular factor or even every factor. Hal at ¶ 42. The evidence demonstrated that Hal 

changed the grades of students enrolled in the FFP in a way that did not comply with the 

program guidelines because she admitted to changing final grades, not just grades for a 

nine-week period. The hearing officer found Hal's conduct to be "serious." (Report & 

Recommendation, Conclusions of Law at ¶ 8.) We cannot see that our review of what the 

hearing officer found contains either obvious error or was unsupportable under the law. 

Our review of the record did not lead us to any conclusion that the hearing officer should 

have found that Hal's cooperation with the investigation was mitigation to divert 

application of a suspension of her license. We find no reason to disturb our previous 

decision that the hearing officer properly considered the aggravating and mitigating factors.

{¶ 4} Hal again argues that Exhibit 11 was not reliable, probative, or substantial 

such that it could have been considered as evidence by ODE. We note that this argument 

is repetitive of what Hal presented in her direct appeal and that we specifically found that 

"the common pleas court did not err in finding that Exhibit 11 constituted reliable, 

probative, and substantial evidence." Hal at ¶ 15.

{¶ 5} Hal's third argument is that the common pleas court used an incorrect legal 

standard because it asserted "that only conclusions matter, not the accuracy of the 

underlying evidence." (Application for Recons. at 11.) Again, she asserts that Exhibit 11 

was not reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and that there was no evidence 

demonstrating its reliability. We specifically addressed this argument in our decision, 

finding that Hal ignored the testimony of the creator of Exhibit 11 (Ziemba) and that the 

hearing officer specifically found Hal's testimony "not credible." (Report & 

Recommendation, Findings of Fact No. 15.) Hal has used her application for 

reconsideration as a method to reargue the same issue. This is not a viable path to obtain 

reconsideration.

{¶ 6} Hal further argues that the common pleas court used a standard of review 

that is based solely on the amount of evidence. We addressed this argument finding it had 

no merit in paragraph 34 of Hal ("The common pleas court examined the evidence and its 

probative value and did not simply find there was a certain amount of evidence as Hal 

suggests.").
No. 18AP-301 4 

{¶ 7} Finally, Hal argues that this Court should adopt a narrower interpretation of 

Henry's Café, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233 (1959). Hal contends that the 

common pleas court may modify the sanction imposed by a Board when the sanction is an 

error as a matter of law, because the Henry's Café rule is not so broad that the penalty is 

beyond the scope of review. But we stated in our decision that, under the facts of this case, 

the Board's action was based on reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and made in 

accordance with law, finding this to be a sufficient review by the common pleas court and 

this Court of the sanction. We found no error of law by the Board then and nor do we now, 

according to the evidence supporting the facts as contained in the record.

{¶ 8} In her application, Hal raises neither an obvious error, i.e., that our decision 

was unsupportable under the law, nor an issue this Court should have but did not fully 

consider. Hal's motion posits the same arguments that we fully considered in our merit 

decision. Accordingly, we deny her application for reconsideration.

Application for reconsideration denied.

DORRIAN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.