FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APR 21, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

Honorable Anne C. Conway, United States District Judge for the Middle District of *

Florida, sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 04-15727

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-20765-CR-UUB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

MEHRZAD ARBANE, 

a.k.a. Tony, 

a.k.a. El Turco, 

a.k.a. Achi Saba, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(April 21, 2006)

Before BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY , District Judge. *
2

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Mehrzah Arbane appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for

conspiracy to import five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(1)(B), and 963. On appeal, Arbane

argues that: (1) we lack jurisdiction to try, imprison, and punish him because his

presence in the United States was procured in violation of the extradition treaty

between the United States and Ecuador; (2) the trial court erred in admitting

evidence of prior unrelated crimes involving alien smuggling and false documents

while excluding evidence of Arbane’s acquittal in an Ecuadorian criminal tribunal

for possession of the drugs in question in this case; (3) the trial court erred in

denying Arbane’s motion for mistrial based on testimony highlighting Arbane’s

invocation of his right to remain silent in the context of the Ecuadorian criminal

proceedings; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; and (5)

the trial court erred in imposing a 235-month sentence in violation of United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

We conclude that the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to support his

conviction for conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States, thus we address

only Arbane’s arguments on jurisdiction and sufficiency of the evidence.

I. BACKGROUND
3

Arbane was indicted on one count of conspiracy to import five kilograms or

more of cocaine. The indictment alleged that Arbane was guilty of a conspiracy to

import cocaine into the United States which commenced in October 2001 and

ended on January 8, 2002. During Arbane’s trial, the government’s key witness

was Jose Jairo Velez, a government informant who testified that he and Arbane had

engaged in various criminal activities, including the exportation of cocaine from

Ecuador. Arbane was convicted and sentenced to 235-months’ imprisonment, a

five-year term of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $5,000 fine. 

He now brings this timely appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Arbane first challenges whether there was jurisdiction to try him in the

Southern District of Florida because of the manner in which his presence in the

United States was obtained. After Arbane was acquitted on drug possession

charges brought in Ecuador, he was ordered deported to Iran. En route to Iran,

Arbane’s plane landed for a stopover in Houston, Texas, where Arbane was

arrested on the instant indictment and removed to the Southern District of Florida. 

Arbane argues that because he arrived in the United States outside of the normal

judicial and treaty processes, the court lacked jurisdiction to try, convict, and
4

imprison him. 

We conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), precludes relief on this basis. In Alvarez-Machain,

the Court held that unless an extradition treaty contains an explicit provision

making the treaty the exclusive means by which a defendant’s presence may be

secured, extra-treaty seizures are permitted. Id. at 664. Alvarez-Machain was

forcibly abducted from Mexico at the behest of the DEA to stand trial in the United

States. The Court dismissed Alvarez-Machain’s claim because our treaty with

Mexico did not expressly forbid abductions to secure a defendant’s presence. Id. 

Whereas the defendant in Alvarez-Machain was abducted by law enforcement

agents, Arbane was simply placed, by Ecuadorian officials, on a plane that stopped

in the United States. Arbane does not and cannot claim that our extradition treaty

with Ecuador contains a clause expressly requiring that we secure his presence in

accordance with the treaty.

Arbane likewise cannot point to a law which divests us of jurisdiction under

these circumstances. “[T]he power of a court to try a person for crime is not

impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by

reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’” Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)

(citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)). The Supreme Court's
We review de novo the sufficiency of evidence to support convictions. United States v. 1

Pineiro, 389 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2004). We resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of

the jury’s verdict. Id. “The evidence is sufficient so long as a reasonable trier of fact, choosing

among reasonable interpretations of the evidence, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. 

Arbane also argues that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to import drugs to 2

the United States. Because we conclude that there was insufficient evidence of a culpable coconspirator, we need not address Arbane’s other arguments concerning sufficiency of the

evidence.

 The government presented the testimony of an Ecuadorian police officer who seized 3

222 packages from an apartment in Guayaquil, Ecuador that Jose Lopez-Posada was renting

from Arbane. An Ecuadorian forensic chemist testified that the substance seized was cocaine. 

Neither of these witnesses testified as to a conspiracy or agreement involving Arbane. 

The government also offered the videotaped deposition of Jose Lopez-Posada. However,

5

Ker-Frisbie doctrine holds that a criminal defendant cannot defeat personal

jurisdiction by asserting the illegality of the procurement of his presence in the

relevant jurisdiction — here, the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega,

117 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, Arbane is not entitled to dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence1

Arbane argues that the government’s evidence is insufficient to support his

conspiracy conviction because the government failed to prove that he conspired

with anyone other than a government informant, which is insufficient to support a

conviction for conspiracy and requires reversal.2

The evidence of the charged conspiracy in this case was presented only

through the testimony of confidential informant Jose Jairo Velez. Velez testified 3
Lopez-Posada testified that he was a farmer from Colombia who was paid $1,000 per month to

reside in the apartment in Guayaquil, Ecuador where the cocaine was found. He stated that he

used $300 to pay the rent and used the remaining money for expenses. He denied any

involvement in drug transactions. 

Arbane did not testify on his own behalf. 

6

that he and Arbane met in 1999 and began engaging in various illegal conduct

throughout Central America, South America, and Mexico. Eventually, they

engaged in the drug trade. He and Arbane shipped drugs from Ecuador to Mexico, 

from Mexico to Guatemala, from Guatemala to Panama, and from Panama to

Ecuador. These transactions began in 1999 and ended in December 2000. 

In early 2000, Velez and Arbane purchased and shipped cocaine from

Ecuador to Mexico, where they sold fifteen kilograms to Jose Luis Jimenez, known

as the Engineer. Just before Easter in 2000, the Engineer transported the fifteen

kilograms to New York, where they were sold. Velez testified that in the summer

of 2000, Velez showed two men how to vacuum seal the drugs so they could fit on

the Engineer’s airplane. He testified that one of these men “had sort of a swarthy

or darkish skin” and the other “had perhaps Indian features” and “was called Jose.”

According to Velez, the Engineer bought ten more kilograms of cocaine

from him and Arbane in early December 2000 and an additional amount in late

December 2000, both of which he imported to the United States. This was the
 This evidence pertaining to the prior importation of drugs into the United States was 4

admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The district court correctly instructed the

jury, without objection from the government, that it was not permitted to consider evidence of

Arbane’s prior acts similar to those charged in the indictment but committed on other occasions

except for the purpose of determining Arbane's intent, and only if they found beyond a

reasonable doubt from other evidence in the case that Arbane did commit the acts charged in the

indictment. We agree with the district court that the evidence of Arbane’s prior drug dealing

was properly admitted as probative of intent. See Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1332. We also agree

with the district court that evidence of prior bad acts without evidence that Arbane committed

the acts charged in the indictment is insufficient to sustain a conviction. 

The evidence of a prior conspiracy to import drugs throughout South America and even

to import drugs into the United States from 1999 through 2000 with the assistance of the

Engineer cannot support the conspiracy actually charged. The government presented all

evidence regarding the Engineer as 404(b) evidence precisely because it predated the period of

illegal activity alleged in the indictment. The notice requirement within Rule 404(b) as well as

the fact that Rule 404(b) expressly bars evidence of prior bad acts from being used to suggest

action in conformity therewith makes clear that 404(b) evidence cannot, by itself, serve as a

basis for a conviction. See United States v. Terrell, No. 04-12882, 139 Fed.Appx. 208 (11th Cir.

2005) (approving jury instruction that prior conviction alone could not be basis to determine

guilt for charged offense).

7

final instance when they sold drugs to the Engineer. 

4

Velez testified that towards the end of 2000, Arbane discussed with Velez

the possibility of storing drugs for shipment to Mexico or possibly Miami in

containers of frozen seafood: 

[Arbane] had attempted to speak with a nautical shipping company,

and I spoke with another nautical shipping company in Mexico City,

so there were two possibilities of bringing the drugs over: One was

bringing it among a load of frozen vegetables into the port of

Mazatlan, Mexico, and another one was on a ship in a load of seafood

and fish coming into the city of Miami.

In one of my trips into Ecuador in the year 2000, [Arbane] took me to

show me a storage place for containers, which was a hidden

compartment this container had, a frozen container, next to the
 October 2001 through January 2002 were the dates of the conspiracy charged in the 5

indictment.

8

refrigeration unit, and it was there we were gonna store, put the drugs

in that we were gonna bring to Miami. And in that instance only Tony

and I would be the only people involved.

Despite the discussion regarding the possibility of importing drugs to the United

States by boat, Velez testified that they did not do so at the time: 

Q: So, between October 2001 and January of 2002, you and [Arbane] 5

never had an agreement during that time frame to bring drugs into the

United States, did you?

A: No to the United States and not to anywhere else, because we

couldn’t.

In June 2001, the Engineer was arrested and detained in the United States. 

Velez testified that the Engineer was the only conduit they used to bring drugs to

the United States by plane:

Q: So the only connection you had to bring drugs into New York was

the Engineer, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

. . .

Q: Other than the Engineer, there was nobody else to take it to the

United States. Am I correct?

A: There were more people, but we didn’t work with anyone else but

the Engineer.

Just after the Engineer was arrested, Velez began cooperating with the

government as an informant and then began taping conversations between himself
In the spring of 2000, Velez and his wife had attempted to buy a false visa from an

6

undercover agent. Velez left the United States and waited for his wife’s legal problems to clear

up. His wife was subsequently arrested, and both he and his wife were charged. Velez then

returned to the United States in the summer of 2001 and became a government informant. 

9

and Arbane. At trial, the government introduced these recorded conversations. 

6

Velez testified that during these conversations, Arbane complained that it was

costing him a lot of money to pay Lopez-Posada for the storage of the drugs in

Ecuador. He also explained that during one of these conversations, he and Arbane

were discussing the possibility of importing drugs to the United States via boat. 

Velez explained that although he told Arbane during the conversation that there

was a third party who would receive the drugs once the ship arrived at its final

destination and who would receive 30% of their profits, in reality the plan was for

U.S. Customs to receive the ship and unload the drugs upon the ship’s arrival.

The question before us is whether Velez’s testimony suffices to support a

conviction for the charged conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. To

support such a conviction, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that there existed an agreement between two or more persons to import narcotics

into the United States and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily

participated in that agreement. United States v. Obregon, 893 F.2d 1307, 1311

(11th Cir. 1990). 
10

It is axiomatic that you cannot have a conspiracy without an agreement

between two or more culpable conspirators. See United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d

732 (11th Cir. 1989). If there are only two members of a conspiracy, neither may

be a government agent or informant who aims to frustrate the conspiracy. See

United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir. 1995). The government

may prove the existence of an agreement by circumstantial evidence through

“inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from circumstantial

evidence of a scheme.” Obregon, 893 F.2d at 1311 (quoting United States v.

Tamargo, 672 F.2d 887, 889 (11th Cir. 1982)). 

In this case, we do not find sufficient evidence of the relevant agreement

between Arbane and anyone other than Velez, a government informant, during the

relevant time period. The government concedes that Velez cannot be a coconspirator because he was a government informant. The government likewise

concedes that the Engineer was not a member of the conspiracy charged in the

indictment because there is no evidence that he had a continuing role or interest in

a relationship with Arbane and Velez after he was arrested and detained in June

2001. 

The government asserts the existence of three possible co-conspirators —

(1) Jose Lopez-Posada, the man renting the house where the drugs were found, (2)
The government did not argue in its brief that “Rene” was a member of the conspiracy 7

and raised that possibility for the first time at oral argument. 

The indictment alleged that Arbane conspired with “other persons both known and 8

unknown,” but did not name any co-conspirators. While it is the law of this Circuit that “an

individual can be convicted of conspiracy with ‘unknown persons’ referred to in the indictment,”

United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1244-45, 1245 n. 8 (11th Cir. 1983), the government

has not proven the existence of unknown persons and has only proffered the three named

possible co-conspirators discussed herein. While in its brief, the government argues that Arbane

“was paying a lot of money” to safeguard the cocaine, the evidence at trial revealed only that

Lopez-Posada was paid to guard the house where the cocaine was found and did not reveal the

existence of any other persons, known or unknown, who were responsible for anything relating

to drugs. Furthermore, the government did not argue either in its briefs or at oral argument that

there were unnamed co-conspirators -- they only argued that Arbane conspired with LopezPosado and Luis Castillo Amen, and at oral argument, Rene. Accordingly, the government has

waived any arguments pertaining to additional co-conspirators. See Marek v. Singletary, 62

F.3d 1295, 1298 n.2 (11th Cir.1995) (“Issues not clearly raised in the briefs are considered

abandoned.”). In any event, we have reviewed the entire record and fail to find any other

conspirator to import drugs into the United States.

11

Luis Castillo Amen, Arbane’s secretary in Ecuador, and (3) “Rene,” one of 7

Velez’s contacts who could allegedly transport the drugs out of Mexico. Having 8

reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the government failed to

prove the existence of a co-conspirator to import drugs into the United States other

than Velez. 

With reference to Jose Lopez-Posado, the government presented evidence

that he was arrested with Arbane in Ecuador and that he took care of the apartment

in Ecuador where the drugs were kept. Specifically, Velez testified that Jose

Lopez-Posado was “the gentleman who took care of or who guarded the house
 In addition to the testimony of Velez, the government presented at trial the testimony of 9

an Ecuadorian police officer, who testified that on January 8, 2002, the National Police of

Ecuador searched the apartment where Jose Lopez-Posada lived and discovered 222 packages

containing a total of 261 kilograms of cocaine. Both Lopez-Posada and Arbane were detained

that day. Arbane later gave a statement to Ecuadorian prosecutors. Arbane stated that he sublet

the apartment to Lopez-Posada under an oral agreement and denied any involvement with drugs

or drug trafficking.

12

where the drugs were kept.” However, the government presented no evidence that 9

Lopez-Posado was a participant in, or had knowledge of, a conspiracy to import

drugs into the United States. 

Even if one were to infer that Lopez-Posado knew that the house he was

guarding contained drugs, there is no evidence that Lopez-Posado possessed “a

general understanding of the unlawful purpose of the plan,” United States v.

Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 2005), nor “knowledge that h[is] actions

would further the venture,” United States v. Pedrick, 181 F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th

Cir. 1999). There was simply no evidence introduced at trial from which the jury

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopez-Posada knew or intended

or agreed in any way to import drugs to the United States. Accordingly, the

government did not meet its burden to show an agreement between two or more

culpable co-conspirators to commit the illegal act charged.

The crux of the agreement element in a conspiracy case is that the

government must prove a “meeting of the minds” to achieve the unlawful result. 
13

United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir. 1998); see also United

States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 806 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[t]he

government must . . . show circumstances from which a jury could infer beyond a

reasonable doubt that there was a ‘meeting of the minds’” to commit the unlawful

act charged). While it is true that the government need not prove that a

conspirator knew all of the details or participated in every aspect of the conspiracy,

it was the government’s burden to prove the “essential element” of “an agreement

between two or more persons to violate [United States] narcotics laws.” United

States v. Fernandez, 797 F.2d 943, 948-49 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Miranda, 425

F.3d at 959 (noting that each conspirator “knew the essential nature of the

conspiracy”) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.

2005)). 

The only conspiracy charged in this case was a conspiracy to import drugs

into the United States. The venture or plan to which two culpable co-conspirators

must have agreed is thus the importation of drugs into the United States. See

United States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 919-20 (11th Cir. 1983), rehearing

denied, 708 F.2d 734 (“The most basic element of such a conspiracy is an

agreement between two or more persons to violate federal narcotic laws.”). Of

course, conspiracy to possess drugs in Ecuador, to export drugs from Ecuador, or
 The dissent suggests that this opinion “seems to read a new essential element into the 10

offense of conspiracy-to-import: knowledge on the art of an unindicted co-conspirator as to the

intended destination of the drugs.” This is simply not the case. The reason that the destination

of the drugs is significant here is because the agreement to import is the essence of the charged

conspiracy. In fact, the only reason we have subject-matter jurisdiction in this case is the laws of

the United States are alleged to have been violated. In a conspiracy to import drugs into the

United States, the essential nature of the conspiracy is the importation of narcotics into the

United States. Such a conspiracy requires the agreement of two or more people to violate the

laws of the United States. The co-conspirator need not know every fact about the conspiracy –

for example, he need not know the details of when the drugs will be imported into the United

States or who else is involved in the importation, but he must at the very least know that the

drugs will be imported into the United States.

This is, of course, not meant to suggest that in every drug prosecution the government

need prove an agreement about the intended destination of drug shipments, for example, in cases

involving actions which take place wholly within the borders of the United States. However, the

gravamen of a drug importation crime, which permits the case to be brought in U.S. courts, is the

importation into the United States.

For these reasons, I fully agree with Judge Conway’s special concurrence. 11

14

to distribute drugs in South America are not crimes in the United States. The 10

government was therefore obligated to prove that two co-conspirators agreed to a

United States crime – to be precise, the crime charged in the indictment. 

11

The requirement that the government prove an agreement to the basic

conspiracy is not a new one. The government has universally been held to the

burden of showing that at least two persons have agreed to the basic object of the

conspiracy. See United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The

government must show that each member participated in the conspiracy with

knowledge of its illegal purpose and not merely that a member associated with a

bad person.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir.
The dissent seems to be bifurcating the agreement and knowledge elements, arguing 12

that there can be an agreement between two persons even if one does not have any knowledge of

the basic purpose of the agreement. See Dissenting Opinion at n.1. The dissent cites numerous

cases in which we have discussed the government's need to prove the defendant's requisite

knowledge, but of course none of those cases are exclusive of the government's obligation to

prove an agreement between the defendant and at least one other co-conspirator. In fact, it is

impossible to have an agreement absent knowledge by both parties as to what it is they have

agreed to accomplish. There exists no scenario where a person will have agreed to a conspiracy

without knowledge of the essential nature of the conspiracy – the very definition of an

“agreement” is a meeting of the minds, and there can be no meeting of the minds if only one

mind contains knowledge of the object of the agreement.

15

1999), opinion amended, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] person cannot conspire

with himself; at least two conspirators must have sufficient knowledge in order for

there to be a conspiracy.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Hendrickson, 26

F.3d 321, 333 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is axiomatic that no conspiratorial agreement

exists unless at least two culpable co-conspirators agree, and consequently, the

defendant's agreement must be with someone other than a government agent or

informant.” (emphasis added)). 

12

As the Supreme Court has stated, “It is impossible in the nature of things for

a man to conspire with himself. . . . [C]onspiracy imports a corrupt agreement

between not less than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each.” Morrison v.

California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934) (emphasis added and citations omitted). The

Supreme Court’s analysis of the facts in Morrison is particularly apt. Two men,

George Morrison and H. Doi, were convicted of conspiracy to violate California’s
16

Alien Land Law. That statute made it a crime to knowingly conspire to place an

alien Japanese, ineligible for citizenship, in the possession and enjoyment of

agricultural land within the state. Because Morrison did not have knowledge that

Doi was ineligible for citizenship, the Court reversed each’s conviction since “[i]n

California as elsewhere conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between not less

than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each.” 291 U.S. at 92. The Court

concluded that “Doi was not a conspirator, however guilty his own state of mind,

unless Morrison had shared in the guilty knowledge and design.” Id. at 93; see

also 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 111 (2005) (“When knowledge is an essential

element of the underlying substantive offense, all co-conspirators must possess the

requisite knowledge, as a person cannot conspire with himself or herself, and at

least two conspirators must have sufficient knowledge in order for there to be a

conspiracy.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1139-40

(11th Cir. 1997) (affirming jury instruction that “a person who has no knowledge

of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of

one, does not thereby become a conspirator”).

In this case, the record is devoid of any evidence that Lopez-Posado knew of

the existence of a plan to import the drugs into the United States, much less its

purpose or his role in furtherance thereof. For instance, the recorded conversations
As noted in footnote 10, the essential element of the charged conspiracy to which two 13

or more persons must have agreed was importation of narcotics into the United States. Even if it

could be inferred that Lopez-Posada was the man “called Jose” with “Indian features” who Velez

taught to vacuum seal drugs to fit on the Engineer’s airplane in 2000, this is at best evidence that

in 2000, Lopez-Posada knew that Arbane and Velez intended to export drugs from Ecuador on

the Engineer’s airplane. There was absolutely no evidence that the man “called Jose” knew

where the airplane was headed. The facts that the drugs were vacuum packed, sealed with tape,

and covered in an oily substance to mask the smell are likewise evidence that Lopez-Posada may

have known the drugs would be exported, but not that he knew they were headed to the United

States. 

Moreover, even if there was evidence that Lopez-Posada was part of the conspiracy to

import drugs to the United States with the Engineer, that conspiracy occurred prior to the period

of conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and there was no evidence that Lopez-Posada knew of or

was part of the charged conspiracy to import drugs to the United States by boat from October

2001 to January 2002. See Fernandez, 797 F.2d at 949 (holding that past involvement in drug

activity does not qualify as evidence of an agreement to import). As we have stated, the

evidence regarding the Engineer was introduced as 404(b) evidence, which cannot be the sole

basis to convict Arbane of the charged conspiracy.

17

between Velez and Arbane reveal an agreement between the two men to import

drugs, but the only involvement of Lopez-Posada anywhere in these conversations

is Arbane’s mention that Lopez-Posada was guarding the house where the drugs

were stored. Neither the conversations themselves, nor Velez’s explanation of

them during his testimony at trial, reveal an agreement by Lopez-Posada to import

drugs into the United States. The fact that Lopez-Posada rented and guarded the

house from Arbane does not support an agreement on Lopez-Posado’s part to

belong to a conspiracy to import drugs into the United States. Even if we could

infer that Lopez-Posada knew that the drugs were leaving Ecuador, there was no

evidence that Lopez-Posada knew they were headed to the United States. We

13
18

recognize that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove an agreement, but the

government presented no evidence - neither direct nor circumstantial - to support

an agreement by Lopez-Posada to import drugs into the United States.

In that respect, this case is unlike those cases where we have found sufficient

evidence to convict crew members aboard ships which were headed to the United

States as knowing participants in a drug conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v.

Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Munoz,

16 F.3d 1116, 1124-25 (11th Cir.1994); but see United States v. Vidal-Hungria,

794 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing convictions of seven crew members for

conspiring to possess and possessing marijuana, on the ground that the

circumstances of the discovery of the marijuana “does not lend itself to an

inference that all persons on the vessel necessarily knew of the presence of the

marijuana”). In both Cruz-Valdez and Munoz, the co-conspirators were arrested in

a boat which the evidence showed was headed to the United States. Indeed, the

defendants in Cruz-Valdez and Munoz never contended that the government had

failed to prove their knowledge that the ship on which they were all arrested was

heading to the United States. In fact, we have on least one occasion affirmed a

conspiracy conviction only after analyzing whether the government met its burden

of introducing sufficient evidence of an agreement to import to United States
19

specifically. See United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (5th Cir.

1980) (affirming conviction for conspiracy to import based on presence of

navigational charts aboard the boat and expert testimony that the ship was headed

to the United States and based on the close relationship between captain and crew

during the long voyage).

None of the evidence from which we have previously inferred knowing

participation in a conspiracy to import was present in this case. Lopez-Posada was

not arrested aboard a ship laden with drugs and headed to the United States. There

was simply no circumstantial evidence tying anyone other than Arbane and Velez

in any way to an agreement to import drugs into the United States. The

government may have proved a conspiracy to possess drugs in Ecuador or export

them from Ecuador to any number of South American countries, but that was not

the conspiracy charged, nor could the United States criminalize such conduct

without a jurisidictional basis. For these reasons, we must conclude that the

government did not present sufficient evidence of an agreement between Arbane

and Lopez-Posada to import drugs to the United States.

Nor can the evidence support the government’s alternative claim that Velez

and Arbane conspired with Luis Castillo Amen, Arbane’s secretary in Ecuador. 

The only evidence pertaining to Luis is that he functioned as Arbane’s secretary,
20

for example, by keeping Velez in touch with Arbane. According to Velez, Arbane

stopped sending Luis money in Ecuador, so Velez “sent him $500 so that he could

work.” Velez stated that he desired to send Luis out of Ecuador because he was

concerned that he would talk to the authorities, though Velez did not testify as to

what Luis might say to the authorities. As of December 23, 2001, neither Velez

nor Arbane had a telephone number or other means of contacting Luis. This

evidence is clearly insufficient to demonstrate that Luis Castillo Amen was a

participant in or had knowledge of any criminal conspiracy, much less the one

alleged here. We have long held that mere association with persons engaged in a

conspiracy does not qualify someone as a member of the conspiracy. See, e.g.,

Kelly, 888 F.2d at 740. Furthermore, Velez’s fear that Luis might speak with the

authorities fails to establish the requisite knowledge or agreement absent testimony

as to what Luis might speak about. 

Finally, at oral argument, the government argued for the first time that a 

“Rene” could be counted as a co-conspirator with Velez and Arbane. At trial,

Velez testified that someone named Rene had a connection at a port in Mazatlan,

Mexico and that Rene could send drugs from Mexico to the United States. 

However, rather than presenting evidence that Arbane and Rene were coconspirators, the government’s evidence was to the contrary. In the transcript of
21

the December 23, 2001 conversation between Arbane and Velez, it is evident that

Arbane rejected the offer of working with Rene; when Velez mentioned that he had

a friend who could help bring it, ostensibly referring to the ability of Rene to assist

in bringing drugs across the border, Arbane told him to “[f]orget about that.” 

When Velez testified that Arbane showed him the storage compartments where he

claimed they were planning to put drugs to be brought to Miami, he described the

scheme as one in which “only Tony and I would be the only people involved.”

In short the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that anyone other than a

governmental informant was involved with Arbane in an agreement to import

drugs into the United States. Although there is no doubt that Arbane had been

involved in illegal conduct elsewhere, it was the government’s burden to prove,

beyond all reasonable doubt, that there existed a specific agreement between the

defendant and at least one or more culpable co-conspirators to import narcotics into

the United States. The government failed to meet this burden. Accordingly,

Arbane’s conviction must be reversed.

REVERSED.
CONWAY, District Judge, concurring specially:.

I concur in the result. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence that

Arbane agreed with Velez (the confidential informant) to import cocaine into the

United States from Ecuador. There is also sufficient circumstantial evidence that

other persons identified by the Government in its brief were participants in the

conspiracy to import drugs out of Ecuador. There is no evidence that any of the

other unindicted co-conspirators knew that the drugs were to be imported into the

United States. In order to have a conspiracy to import drugs into the United States

at least one person, other than the confidential informant, had to agree with Arbane

to that essential element of the conspiracy. 
23

WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent because I am convinced that the evidence was sufficient to support

Arbane’s conviction for conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. The

opinion concludes that the evidence was insufficient to convict Arbane because the

government failed to prove that Arbane conspired with anyone other than the

government informant Velez. I disagree. I think that there was sufficient evidence

from which a reasonable jury could find that Arbane conspired with Jose LopezPosada, the man who guarded the drugs, to import cocaine into the United States

during the indictment period. 

“To prove participation in a conspiracy, the government must have proven

beyond a reasonable doubt, even if only by circumstantial evidence, that a

conspiracy existed and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the

conspiracy.” United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam). To meet this burden, “the government need not prove that the defendant[]

knew all of the detail[s] or participated in every aspect of the conspiracy. Rather,

the government must only prove that the defendant[] knew the essential nature of

the conspiracy.” Id. at 1269-70 (citation and quotations omitted). The government

may prove the existence of a conspiracy by “direct or circumstantial evidence,

including inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from
Judge Barkett’s opinion seems to read a new essential element into the offense of 14

conspiracy-to-import: knowledge on the part of an unindicted co-conspirator as to the intended

destination of the drugs. Such a reading places an enhanced burden on the government that is

not supported by our precedent, which speaks in terms of the defendant’s knowledge, not the

knowledge of an unindicted co-conspirator such as Lopez-Posada. See Garcia, 405 F.3d at 1270 

(“[T]he government must only prove that the defendant[] knew the essential nature of the

conspiracy.”) (citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Pedrick, 181

F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he evidence need not show that each defendant knew of

each phase of the conspiracy, all of its details, all of the conspirators, or the participants in each

event.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1131-32 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A

defendant may be culpable even if he . . . played a minor role in the conspiracy, since a

conspirator need not know the details of each act making up the conspiracy.”) (emphasis added);

United States v. Pantoja-Soto, 739 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he government must

demonstrate . . . that the accused had knowledge of at least the essential objective of th[e]

agreement . . . .”) (emphasis added); United States v. Pintado, 715 F.2d 1501, 1503 (11th Cir.

24

circumstantial evidence of a scheme.” Id. at 1270 (citation and quotations

omitted). “Indeed, because the crime of conspiracy is predominantly mental in

composition, it is frequently necessary to resort to circumstantial evidence to prove

its elements.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 

The opinion concludes that the record is devoid of any evidence that LopezPosada knew of the existence of a plan to import the drugs into the United States,

and that even if one were to infer that Lopez-Posada knew that the apartment he

was guarding contained drugs that were leaving Ecuador, there is no evidence that

Lopez-Posada possessed “a general understanding of the unlawful purpose of the

plan,” United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 2005), i.e., that the

drugs were to be imported to the United States. The opinion writes that the only 14
1983) (per curiam) (“To be guilty of a conspiracy a defendant need not have knowledge of every

detail of the conspiracy. Knowledge of the primary objective of the conspiracy will suffice.”)

(emphasis added). In fact, the opinion does not cite to a single conspiracy-to-import case, from

any circuit, in which the government was required to prove that an unindicted co-conspirator

knew that the drugs were headed for the United States in order to establish the defendant’s guilt.

Evidence of an unindicted co-conspirator’s particular knowledge as to the object of the

alleged conspiracy (here the importation of drugs into the United States) is certainly relevant to

establishing the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, but it is the agreement–not the

unindicted co-conspirator’s particular knowledge–that is the essential element to be proved. 

Because a conspiratorial agreement can be established by circumstantial evidence, one can

conceive of numerous plausible scenarios in which the existence of a conspiracy to import drugs

into the United States can be inferred without any specific showing as to an unindicted coconspirator’s knowledge of its object. The question then becomes whether the defendant knew

the essential nature of the conspiracy and joined it voluntarily–and even this can be proven by

circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 810 F.2d 1538, 1542-43 (11th Cir.

1987) (per curiam); United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (5th Cir. 1980). For

example, in DeWeese, the defendant’s intention to import drugs into the United States was

proven with only one Coast Guard Commander’s testimony, which was based on inferences

drawn from navigational charts discovered aboard the boat, that the boat carrying the drugs was

heading toward the United States, instead of Mexico, Cuba, or the Bahamas. 632 F.2d at 1271.

In this case, the jury was not instructed that in order to convict Arbane it must find that

the government proved Lopez-Posada’s knowledge. Rather, the jury was instructed properly that

in order to convict Arbane it must find “[t]hat two or more persons . . . came to a mutual

understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan,” “[t]hat the Defendant,

knowing of the unlawful purpose of the plan, willfully joined in it; and [t]hat the object of the

unlawful plan was to import . . . cocaine into the United States . . . .” (emphasis added).

25

evidence concerning Lopez-Posada was that he was arrested with Arbane and that

he was paid to guard the house where the drugs were found. The record does not

support the opinion’s conclusion or its characterization of the evidence. The

opinion entirely disregarded our long-standing precedent with regard to our

standard of review. We must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury’s
26

verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed.

680 (1942). Furthermore, “[a] reversal is in order only if the evidence, viewed in

the light most favorable to the [g]overnment, is such that a reasonably minded jury

must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the essential elements of the

crime charged.” United States v. Kelly, 749 F.2d 1541, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1985)

(citation and quotation omitted). The opinion completely ignored our obligation to

sustain the jury’s verdict if any reasonable construction of the evidence allowed

them to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d

547, 549 (Former 5th Cir. Unit B 1982), and instead re-weighed the evidence in the

light most favorable to the defendant. “It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to

determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80.

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government

established facts from which the jury could reasonably infer that Arbane

knowingly and voluntarily conspired with Lopez-Posada to import cocaine. The

government presented substantial evidence to support its theory that Arbane paid

Lopez-Posada to guard the cocaine, which was vacuum-sealed, wrapped in small

packages and stored in an apartment in Guayaquil, Ecuador, until it was time for

the drugs to be shipped by plane (and later, by boat) to the United States. For
27

example, the government offered Lopez-Posada’s videotaped deposition and the

trial testimony of Velez and an Ecuadorian police officer to prove Lopez-Posada’s

knowledge of the cocaine he was guarding and his participation in the conspiracy

to import. Lopez-Posada testified that he was a farmer from Colombia who left

behind his family to live in a two bedroom apartment in Guayaquil for

approximately ten months. During that time, he was paid $1,000 monthly to stay

in the apartment. He used $300 to pay the rent, and the remaining money was for

his expenses. He testified that he did nothing in the apartment but wait to be taken

to a farm where he could work. On January 6, 2002, Arbane arrived at the

apartment with a plastic bag, a typewriter, and another bag, which Lopez-Posada

stored for Arbane at the apartment. That day, Lopez-Posada also changed the

apartment locks. Two days later, on January 8, Arbane returned to the apartment,

and he and Lopez-Posada were arrested there with 261 kilograms of cocaine,

wrapped in 222 packages. The Ecuadorian police officer testified that the

packages were sealed with silver wrapping tape and covered with an oily substance

that had a strong, spicy odor. The packages were found in the bedroom closets. 

The police also discovered in the apartment a roll of silver packaging tape and two

machines used for vacuum sealing. Velez testified that the vacuum machines were
The opinion writes that Velez never identified Lopez-Posada as the man called “Jose” 15

and refuses to infer that Velez was referring to Lopez-Posada when he testified that he showed

“Jose” how to vaccum-pack the drugs. To be exact, Velez testified:

On that trip that I took to Guayaquil, [Arbane] took me to a house that had two

floors. The drugs were there at that house, and two other people were guarding

the drugs. One person had sort of a swarthy or darkish skin, and another person

had perhaps Indian features, and he was called Jose.

At that house I inspected all the drugs with [Arbane], Geraldo and those other

two, and I asked them to do me a favor. I showed them how to manipulate this

vacuum packer, and we used two types of wrapping tapes. One was first coffee

color or brown, and then the other one was gray. And then we left the drugs all

ready to that house.

Later, he testified:

And [Arbane] told me we have more than 200 kilos stored in Guayaquil and we

need to pay for the security for that. He told me that Jose, the person that I had

met, was storing the drugs at a house and that he moved it to another, but it was

always with security, and he told me that that entailed some expense. 

(emphasis added). Next, Velez testified: 

There were two different kinds of expenses. One was to take care of the legal

28

used to “vacuum pack,” or compress, the drugs so that they could fit into the

Engineer’s plane’s hidden compartment, which could only fit approximately 200

kilograms of drugs. Velez further testified that he showed “Jose” (presumably,

Lopez-Posada) how to use the vacuum sealing machines to compress the drugs so

that the packages were small enough to fit in the hidden compartment of the plane,

seal the packages in silver tape, and then cover the packages with a mixture of oil,

cream, pepper, and mustard. This oily substance was used a repellant so that the 15
problems that [Arbane] had in Guayaquil, Ecuador, and then the other expenses

was the person that was guarding the drugs in the house, and all the expenses that

were occurred in Guayaquil. 

Velez unequivocally identified Lopez-Posada in a picture and explained that Lopez-Posada was

the man to whom he was referring when he testified about the expenses involved in paying “the

person that was guarding the drugs in the house.” Finally, Velez distinguished Lopez-Posada

from the only other “Jose” mentioned regularly in this case, Jose Luis Jimenez, also known as

the Engineer:

Q: And there was mention in that phone call [during which Arbane and Velez

discussed the expenses involved in guarding the drugs in Guayaquil] of a man

named Jose Luis.

A: The mention was of Luis and Jose–of Jose Luis. Luis is one person; Jose is

another.

Q: Is this [referring to the photograph picturing Lopez-Posada] the Jose that was

mentioned in that telephone conversation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And who introduced you to this Jose?

A: [Arbane] in Guayaquil, Ecuador.

In light of this testimony, to conclude that “Jose” was anyone other than Lopez-Posada would

itself be an unreasonable conclusion. A reasonable jury could infer that Jose Lopez-Posada, the

man who guarded the drugs, is the same “Jose” who Velez testified he showed how to pack the

drugs where the drugs were being stored and guarded.

29

dogs in any airport would not perceive the smell of the drugs. 

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a

reasonable jury could infer Lopez-Posada’s knowing and voluntary participation in

the conspiracy to import from the circumstantial evidence. A jury could

reasonably conclude that Lopez-Posada knew that he was being paid to guard the

cocaine and prepare it to be imported. “[A] conspirator is not required to

participate in all aspects of a conspiracy and may be convicted as a co-conspirator .
30

. . if [he] participates in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the success of the

venture with knowledge that [his] actions would further the venture.” Pedrick, 181

F.3d at 1272. Lopez-Posada offered no other explanation as to why he was being

paid $1,000 monthly to do nothing in the apartment but wait. Furthermore, he

denied any knowledge of the cocaine hidden in the apartment closets despite

having lived there for approximately ten months. The jury was entitled to use its

common sense to discredit this testimony and infer his knowledge from the

testimony of Velez and the police officer. See Garcia, 405 F.3d at 1270 (“Because

credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the fact finder, we cannot

disregard the jury’s credibility determination unless it is unbelievable on its face.”)

(citation and quotations omitted).

Furthermore, conspiracy cases in which we have found sufficient evidence

to convict a crew member aboard a ship with drugs bound for the United States are

analogous and instructive. In United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1547

(11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute), we

ruled that “the government’s burden to prove participation is relatively light[,]”

once it has been established that the defendant was a crew member aboard a ship

laden with a large quantity of drugs. We may look to circumstances such as the
31

large quantity of drugs, suspicious behavior before apprehension, inculpatory

statements made after apprehension, witnessed participation as a crewman, and

whether the drugs were obvious. Id.; see also, United States v. Munoz, 16 F.3d

1116, 1123-24 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying Cruz-Valdez analysis in a conspiracy to

import case); Gonzalez, 810 F.2d at 1543 (holding that evidence that the crewmen

were aboard a ship with a large quantity of drugs, that the odor was noticeable

from the deck, and that a crewman became nervous upon questioning, among other

evidence, was sufficient to show the crewmen’s knowing and voluntary

participation in the conspiracy to import). We also have found “particularly

persuasive” the argument that “it is illogical to believe that one person would

attempt [to import a large quantity of drugs] to the United States without prearranged assistance.” DeWeese, 632 F.2d at 1272; see also, Gonzalez, 810 F.2d at

1543 (“Courts and juries also may take notice of the fact that drug smugglers are

unlikely to employ outsiders to work a vessel carrying [a large quantity of

drugs].”). Several of the factors cited in Cruz-Valdez, which suffice to enable a

reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, are also present here. 

Lopez-Posada was discovered with a large quantity of cocaine in the apartment,

where the drugs would have been obvious considering their strong, spicy odor. He
32

engaged in suspicious behavior including storing items for Arbane and changing

the locks on the apartment. He made inculpatory statements at his deposition such

as the fact that he was paid $1,000 monthly to do nothing but wait. Moreover, it is

unlikely that Arbane would trust an outsider to prepare 261 kilograms of cocaine

and guard it for 10 months. Though “a showing of knowing participation [in a

conspiracy] is required[,]” “[c]ulpable participation need not be great.” Lyons, 53

F.3d at 1201. “Guilt may exist even when the defendant plays only a minor role

and does not know all the details of the conspiracy.” Id. “The very nature of

conspiracy frequently requires that the existence of an agreement be proved by

inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from circumstantial

evidence of a scheme.” United States v. Ayala, 643 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. Unit A

Apr. 1981).

The tape recorded conversations between Arbane and Velez, as decoded by

Velez at trial, further supported the conclusion that Arbane conspired with LopezPosada to import cocaine into the United States. During these conversations, the

two used code words to refer to the drugs. Velez explained the meaning behind

their words when he testified at trial. During their December 23, 2001,

conversation, Arbane stated to Velez, “Look, the truth is that I want to take out that
33

shit we have over there, that we have over there in Ecuador” and “I want to take

that out fast.” Velez explained at trial that Arbane was referring to the drugs that

they had been storing in Guayaquil. Velez asked, “What are we going to do with

that shit? . . . I have someone who can take it out. . . . I’ll pay you if it gets lost. 

That’s the deal.” Arbane responded, “yes, okay, I’ll put it in.” The two discussed

the details of the deal, and then Velez asked, “When are we going, when can we do

it?” to which Arbane responded, “I . . . am available to do it on January 15th.” 

Velez agreed to the date and then stated, “We have to fax him, fax him the

document of the vessel and the contents of the container, what is usually done. We

have to send it out to him and he’ll take it out.” 

At trial, Velez deciphered their conversation. He explained that the drugs

were to be shipped by boat from Guayaquil to Mexico and from Mexico to Miami,

and then he had someone who could take the drugs off the boat when it arrived in

the United States. Arbane would need to fax the shipping documents for the boat,

so that he “would know what goods the boat was bringing that was coming from

Guayaquil to Miami–Guayaquil to Mexico and Mexico to Miami.” Velez further

testified that shortly after that conversation, in January of 2002, Arbane traveled to

Guayaquil to facilitate moving the drugs out of Ecuador (where they were stored
However, even on cross examination Velez testified that “the goal was to bring the drug 16

that we had in Ecuador to the United States.” In response to defense counsel’s question, “Did

you talk on direct examination about the option of having drugs on a ship to go all the way to

Miami?” Velez testified, “Yes. I explained previously . . . that there were two options: One to

take the drugs to Mazatlan, and the other one from Guayaquil to Miami.” He reiterated, “We

had a plan since December of the year 2000[,]” when they met in Ecuador and discussed two

options: “On a boat–on a vessel . . . that would make a stop in Mexico and then would go on to

the United States; or another vessel that would leave directly from Guayaquil to Miami.” 

Moreover, on redirect, he explained that once Arbane fixed his problem in Ecuador, “the

agreement” was to “[g]o back and pick up the drugs and send them to Mexico and then the

United States or to Miami directly.” The government asked, “had the situation with the

34

and guarded by Lopez-Posada) and into the United States. Two days before

Arbane’s arrest, on January 6, 2002, the same day that Arbane first arrived at the

apartment, Velez and Arbane spoke again, this time about what percentage each

would take from the sale of the drugs. Arbane asked, “You told me that he wants

thirty, thirty for you and thirty for me, like that?” Velez explained at trial that

Arbane wanted to know what percentage the person in the United States would

receive for taking the drugs off the ship; each of them would receive one-third

share.

The opinion states that these conversations reveal that shipment of drugs by

boat remained only a possibility and that Arbane did not agree to the plan. It relies

heavily on Velez’s cross examination testimony during which he testified that

Arbane did not want to import the drugs to the United States during the indictment

period. Although there was conflicting testimony in this case, particularly during 16
agreement changed on January 6th?” to which Velez reiterated, “No. [Arbane] was expecting to

or waiting until he got to Guayaquil . . . to fix his personal problem and immediately get our

drugs out of Ecuador.” And, in response to the question “[W]hat was the status with [Arbane]

and the drugs” “as of January 6th[?],” Velez responded, “[Arbane] was going to get the drugs. 

He was going to move them out of Ecuador. He was going to send them to Mexico, and if they

couldn’t be gotten into Mexico, he was going to send them to the United States.” 

35

the direct and cross examination of Velez, the jury is entitled to draw reasonable

inferences from circumstantial evidence. “Evidence need not be inconsistent with

every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt in order to be sufficient. The jury

is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” United States

v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 1995). The conversations, combined with

Velez’s explanation on direct examination of the plan to import the drugs to Miami

and the fact that Arbane traveled to Guayaquil to facilitate the move directly after

their conversation, reveals that Arbane did in fact agree to the plan and desire to

import cocaine into the United States. 

In sum, the evidence to support the charged conspiracy was presented

through Velez’s testimony that Lopez-Posada was the man who was paid to guard

the drugs, that Arbane planned to import the drugs by boat to Miami, and that

Arbane traveled to Guayaquil to facilitate the plan. The tape recorded

conversations between Velez and Arbane during which they discussed the details
36

of the importation, Lopez-Posada’s videotaped deposition during which he testified

that he was paid a large amount of money to live in the apartment where the drugs

were seized, and testimony of the Ecuadorian police officer who found both

Lopez-Posada and Arbane at the apartment with the drugs also supported the

conspiracy charge. There was evidence about the amount of drugs, the careful

packaging of the drugs, and the length of time that Lopez-Posada was guarding the

drugs. This evidence was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational

jury could infer that Lopez-Posada knew of the cocaine, knew that it was headed

for the United States, and assisted in this plan. The jurors had plenty of evidence

on which to convict Arbane, and therefore, I would affirm.