1

Special Exposure Petition

Pinellas Plant

Revised Edition 

August 17, 2020 

Replaces Document Submitted on January 21, 2020 and May 20, 2020
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PART A: NAME OF PETITIONER REPRESENTATIVE 

A.3 Name of Petition Representative: 

A.4 Address of Petition Representative: 

A.5 Telephone Number of Petition Representative: 

A.6 Email of Petition Representative: 

A.7 I have attached to this form written authorization to petition by the energy employee(s) 

indicated in Part C of this form. 

PART B: SURVIVOR INFORMATION NON-APPLICABLE

PART C: ENERGY EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 

 PETITIONER 1 

C.1 Name of Energy Employee: 1

C.3 Address of energy employee: 

C.4 Telephone Number of Energy Employee: 

C.5 Email of Energy Employee: 

C.6 Employment Information Related to Petition: 

C.6a Energy Employee Number: 

C.6b Dates of Employment: 

C.6c Employer Name: The Pinellas Plant has been known by several names; 

• Temporary Plant (intersection of 24th Street North and 26th Avenue North in 

St. Petersburg, Florida)2

• 908 Plant 

• GE Aerospace Neutron Generators (previously not included)3

• Pinellas Peninsula Plant 

• GE X-ray Division-Florida (GEXF) 

1 files were not available from the Department of Labor. Therefore, a Privacy Act Request was 

made to the Department of Energy by . DOE provided Industrial Hygiene Records, Medical 

Records, Personnel Records and Radiological Records via DOE Request No. . Those records 

were provided to DOL by . 2 Oak Ridge Associated University (2011) Pinellas Plant – Site Description. Document No. ORAUT-TKBS-0029-2, 

Revision No. 02. p. 12 3

 US Department of Energy Pinellas Area Office, Neutron Devices, (November 1990) Pinellas Plant Facts. The 

Pinellas Plant was operated for the U. S. Department of Energy by GE Neutron Devices under Contract No. DEAC04-76DP00656.
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• GE Neutron Devices Department (GENDD) 

• GE Neutron Devices (GEND) 

• GE Pinellas Plant (GEPP) 

• Pinellas Plant 

C.6d Work Site Location: 7887 Bryan Dairy Road 

 Largo, Florida 34294 

The Pinellas County Site is located in Largo, Florida, about 10 miles north-northwest of 

St. Petersburg and across Tampa Bay from the city of Tampa. The Pinellas Plant's 

facilities occupied approximately 70,195 square meters (755,584 square feet) under roof 

on 40.4 hectares (99.9 acres) midway between Clearwater and St. Petersburg, Florida.4 

C.6e Supervisor’s Name: 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

PETITIONER 2 

C.1 Name of Energy Employee: 5

 

C.3 Address of energy employee: 

 

C.4 Telephone Number of Energy Employee: 

 

C.5 Email of Energy Employee: 

C.6 Employment Information Related to Petition: 

4 GlobalSecurity.org (Accessed December 4, 2019) Weapons of Mass Destruction: Pinellas Plant. 

https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/pinellas.htm

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C.6a Energy Employee Number: 

C.6b Dates of Employment: 

C.6c Employer Name: The Pinellas Plant has been known by several names; 

• Temporary Plant (intersection of 24th Street North and 26th Avenue North in 

St. Petersburg, Florida)6

• 908 Plant 

• GE Aerospace Neutron Generators (previously not included)7

• Pinellas Peninsula Plant 

• GE X-ray Division-Florida (GEXF) 

• GE Neutron Devices Department (GENDD) 

• GE Neutron Devices (GEND) 

• GE Pinellas Plant (GEPP) 

• Pinellas Plant 

C.6d Work Site Location: 7887 Bryan Dairy Road 

 Largo, Florida 34294 

The Pinellas County Site is located in Largo, Florida, about 10 miles north-northwest of 

St. Petersburg and across Tampa Bay from the city of Tampa. The Pinellas Plant's 

facilities occupied approximately 70,195 square meters (755,584 square feet) under roof 

on 40.4 hectares (99.9 acres) midway between Clearwater and St. Petersburg, Florida.8

 

C.6e Supervisor’s Name: 

•

•

•

•

•

PART D: LABOR ORGANIZATION INFORMATION NON-APPLICABLE – Authorized 

Petitioner, does not represent a labor organization.

PART E: PROPOSED DEFINITION OF ENERGY EMPLOYEE CLASS COVERED BY PETITION 

Definition of Class: Employees of the Department of Energy (DOE), DOE contractors 

and/or subcontractors who were employed by General Electric Neutron Devices 

including all names of this company listed in Part C, Martin Marietta Specialty 

Components, and/or Lockheed-Martin Specialty Components, Inc. (a.k.a. the Pinellas 

Plant) during the period from January 1957 through December 1997, and, who were

employed for a number of works days accumulating at least 250 workdays either solely

under this employment or by aggregating the total number of days of that worker that 

6 Oak Ridge Associated University (2011) op. cit. p. 12 7 Us Department of Energy Pinellas Area Office, Neutron Devices, (November 1990) op. cit. 8 GlobalSecurity.org (Accessed December 4, 2019) Weapons of Mass Destruction: Pinellas Plant. 

https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/pinellas.htm
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was employed in a class at multiple covered SEC facilities. The total number of days of

employment in a class at each facility can be combined together to meet the 25 work

day requirement. The designation of the Pinellas Plant in this class definition must be

inclusive of all workers involved in AEC/DOE operations at the Pinellas Plant and neither 

limited to nor excluding workers, activities or site locations involved in these operations. 

E.1 Name of DOE or AWE Facility: The Pinellas Plant has been known as: 

• 908 Plant 

• GE Aerospace Neutron Generators (previously not included)9

• Pinellas Peninsula Plant 

• GE X-ray Division-Florida (GEXF) 

• GE Neutron Devices Department (GENDD) 

• GE Neutron Devices (GEND) 

• GE Pinellas Plant (GEPP) 

• Pinellas Plant 

• General Electric Temporary Plant 

E. 2 Locations at the Facility Relevant to this Petition 

All locations and areas of the facility including but not limited to: 

• Building:100 - Main Building 

• Building: 100/Area 101 

• Building: 100/Area 103 - Tool Equipment Construction, Equipment Fabrication and 

Test; Equipment Laboratory 

• Building: 100/Area 104 - Machine Shop 

• Building: 100/Area 105 - Ceramics 

• Building: 100/Area 105- -Incoming Inspection 

• Building: 100/Area 105 - Receiving/Traffic 

• Building: 100/Area 106 - Tool Room, Tool & Fixture Machine Shop 

• Building: 100/Area 107 - Tube Assembly

• Building: 100/Area 108 - Tube Exhaust, Neutron Tubes; Tube Exhaust and Test 

• Building: 100/Area 109 – Magnetics 

• Building: 100/Area 110 

• Building: 100/Area 110 - Magnetics Development 

• Building: 100/Area 110 - Opto-Electronic Production 

• Building: 100/Area 110 - Storage 

• Building: 100/Area 110F - Waste Storage Tank (Calcium Chromate) 

• Building: 100/Area 111 - Magnetics Production 

• Building: 100/Area 112 - Generator Assembly: Coils TTA and Final Assembly; Neutron 

Generators 

• Building: 100/Area 112 Stock Room

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 US Department of Energy Pinellas Area Office, Neutron Devices, (November 1990) op. cit. 
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• Building: 100/Area 113 --Environmental Chemistry: Environmental Health Lab; 

Health Physics Laboratory; Solder Training Facility

• Building: 100/Area 114 - Final Certification and X-Ray

• Building: 100/Area 114E - Silver Recovery 

• Building: 100/Area 114I - Product Storage. 

• Building: 100/Area 114J - Shelf Life and Stockpile Evaluation 

• Building: 100/Area 115 - Graphic Services

• Building: 100/Area 116 - Capacitor Assembly

• Building: 100/Area 117 0 Metallize and Plate: Furnaces & Ceramic Metallize 

• Building: 100/Area 118 - Stock Pile Bulk Storage: Laundry; Stock Room; Storeroom 

Bulk Storage 

• Building: 100/Area 119 – Cafeteria

• Building: 100/Area 119O - Silver recovery

• Building: 100/Area 121 - Medical Center

• Building: 100/Area 122 - Air Purity Analysis Laboratory: Contamination Control; 

Security Patrol 

• Building: 100/Area 123 - Calibration and Maintenance Shop

• Building: 100/Area 124 - Facilities Maintenance

• Building: 100/Area 125 - Protection Services: Chemistry Laboratory; Health Physics 

Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 126 - Tube Processing

• Building: 100/Area 127 - Space Planning: Mail room; Mail room/Reprographics; 

Polymer Laboratory; Standards Laboratory 

• Building: 100/Area 128 - Tube Test: Final Test and Assembly; Neutron 

Tube/Generator Test 

• Building: 100/Area 129 – Accounting

• Building: 100/Area 130 – Resonators: Instrumentation Lab; Test Support Area; Tester 

Cal/Maintenance Lab; Tube/Standards Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 131 - Final Test: Final Test and Assembly; Neutron Generator Test

• Building: 100/Area 132, 132O

• Building: 100/Area 132 - TRS Equipment Room

• Building: 100/Area 132I - Waste storage

• Building: 100/Area 132M - Central Exhaust Fan Room

• Building: 100/Area 132N - East Stack Fan Room

• Building: 100/Area 133 - Finance Offices

• Building: 100/Area 134 - Manufacturing IGS

• Building: 100/Area 135 - Operations Offices

• Building: 100/Area 136 - Manufacturing Offices

• Building: 100/Area 137 - Electrical Switch Gear Room

• Building: 100/Area 138 - Defect Analysis

• Building: 100/Area 13 - Final Preparation: Final Mechanical Shop 

• Building: 100/Area 138D - Classified Part Assembly
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• Building: 100/Area 138F - Nitrogen Fill

• Building: 100/Area 139 - Resin Casting

• Building: 100/Area 139M - Tritium Recovery System

• Building: 100/Area 140 - Furnace Room

• Building: 100/Area 141 – Inspection: Braze NSP; QC Inspection

• Building: 100/Area 142 – Spot weld Assembly

• Building: 100/Area 143 - Chemical Processing Facility

• Building: 100/Area - 144 Inspection

• Building: 100/Area 145 - Ceramic Manufacturing and Machining

• Building: 100/Area 146 - Ceramic Manufacturing and Fabrication 

• Building: 100/Area 147 - Manufacturing Offices and Inspection 

• Building: 100/Area 148 - Manufacturing Offices and General facilities

• Building: 100/Area 149 - DOE Offices

• Building: 100/Area 150 - Equipment Engineering

• Building: 100/Area 151 - Production Stock

• Building: 100/Area 151 - Production Stock

• Building: 100/Area 152 - General Stock

• Building: 100/Area 153 - Emergency Communication

• Building: 100/Area 154 - Metallurgy and Ceramics Chemistry: Engineering Detector 

Lab; RTG Model Shop 

• Building: 100/Area 155 - Chemistry Laboratory 

• Building: 100/Area 156 - Chemical Analysis Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 157 - Gas Analysis Laboratory, Engineering Gas Analysis Lab

• Building: 100/Area 158 - Gas Analysis Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 159 - Chemistry Laboratory: Advanced Analyses Laboratory; 

Engineering Instrumentation Lab 

• Building: 100/Area 160 - Chemistry Laboratory: Engineering Instrumentation Lab

• Building: 100/Area 161 - Surface Science Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 162 - Metallurgy Laboratory: Engineering Instrumentation Lab

• Building: 100/Area 162E - Product Test Engineering Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 164 - Engineering Process Technology Lab

• Building: 100/Area 168 - Oscillator Shop

• Building: 100/Area 169 - Library and Records: Computer Systems

• Building: 100/Area 170 - Credit Union

• Building: 100/Area 171 - Information Systems Operator

• Building: 100/Area 173 - Engineering Documents

• Building: 100/Area 174 - Human Resources

• Building: 100/Area 175 - Engineering Quartz Devices Lab and Frequency Devices

• Building: 100/Area 176 - Environmental Chemistry Laboratory: Radioanalytical 

Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 176 - LAC, Glass, RTG Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 176B - Quartz Processing Laboratory
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• Building: 100/Area 176D - Neutron Detector Laboratory: Electrical Test Laboratory; 

Electrical Test Room. 

• Building: 100/Area 176G - Technical Information Center

• Building: 100/Area 180 - Engineering Capacitor Development Lab and Materials 

Engineering 

• Building: 100/Area 181 - Tube Development Engineering

• Building: 100/Area 182 - Tube Development, Exhaust, and Assembly Area

• Building: 100/Area 183 - Systems Development: Engineering Field Test Neutron 

Generator Lab; Generator Development 

• Building: 100/Area 184 - Tube Test: Engineering Field Test Neutron Generator Lab; 

Systems Development Laboratory 

• Building: 100/Area 185 - Polymer Technology Laboratory: Engineering Polymer Lab; 

Materials Engineering Laboratory; Systems Development 

• Building: 100/Area 185C - Pump Shed

• Building: 100/Area 186 - Polymer Laboratory and materials engineering 

• Building: 100/Area 186A - Decontamination Area

• Building: 100/Area 188

• Building: 100/Area 189 - Engineering Offices

• Building: 100/Area 190 - Engineering Offices

• Building: 100/Area 191 - Magnetics Engineering Defects Analysis: Ceramic Product 

Engineering (CPE); Engineering Magnetics Lab; Tube Development Laboratory 

• Building: 100/Area 192 - Ceramics and Deposition Technology Laboratory: Ceramic 

Product Engineering (CPE); Ceramics Laboratory; Engineering Ceramics Lab; 

Engineering Laboratory Ceramics 

• Building: 100/Area 193 - Magnetics Engineering Defects Analysis: Engineering 

Environmental Test. 

• Building: 100/Area 193 - Magnetics Engineering Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 194 - Engineering Environmental Test: Engineering 

Environmental Conditioning & Test Lab. 

• Building: 100/Area 194 - Ferroelectric Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 194 - Non-destructive Testing

• Building: 100/Area 195A - Instrument/Computer Maintenance Shop Building: 

100/Area 300

• Building: 100/Area 195B - Lithium Battery Dry room

• Building: 100/Area 195C - Furnace Room

• Building: 100/Area 195D - Storage room

• Building: 100/Area 195E - UPS Battery Room

• Building: 100/Area 195F - UPS Battery Room

• Building: 100/Area 195G - Storage room

• Building: 100/Area 195MA - Storage

• Building: 100/Area 195MB - Air Handler Room

• Building: 100/Area 195MC - Storage
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• Building: 100/Area 196A, Neutron Generator Testing

• Building: 100/Area 196B - Clock/Resonator Testing

• Building: 100/Area 196D - Incoming Inspection Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 300

• Building: 100/Area 306

• Building: 100/Area 307 - Engineering Dry Room

• Building: 100/Area 309

• Building: 100/Area 313 - Chemical Cleaning

• Building: 100/Area 314

• Building: 100/Area 315 - Ceramic Processing

• Building: 100/Area 316 - Power Sources Development

• Building: 100/Area 325 - Maintenance Shop

• Building: 100/Area 327 - Heather Glassing Shop

• Building: 100/Area 330 - Heather Glassing Shop

• Building: 100/Area 331 - Heather Electron Beam Welding Shop

• Building: 100/Area 336 - Heather Testing Shop

• Building: 100/Area 347 - Packing and shipping WR parts; Electrical Switchgear Room; 

Utilities Room; Packing and shipping WR parts. 

• Building: 100/Area 348 - Opto-Electronics Shop; Product Acceptance Inspection; 

Optoelectronics Development Laboratory; Temporary Off-Loading Area. 

• Building: 100/Area 349 - Manufacturing Dry Room Ambient battery 

• Building: 100/Area 350 - Instrumentation Standards Laboratory. LAMB 

• Building: 100/Area 350 - LAMB Battery Production and Testing

• Building: 100/Area 350 - Equipment Calibration and Instrumentation Laboratory

• Building: 100/Area 350 - Standards Lab

• Building: 100/Area 351 - Tube calibration and maintenance Building: Maintenance 

Calibration & Maintenance

• Building: 100/Area 351 - Resonator/Clock Manufacturing and Testing: 

Calibration/Maintenance and Tube/Resonator 

• Building: 100/Area - 352

• Building: 100/Area 353 - Iron Disulfide Processing: Acid storage shed

• Building: 100/Area 357

• Building: 1000 - Waste Storage and Management: Compressed Gas Cylinder Storage; 

Container Storage Facility; Liquid Waste Storage; Radioactive Waste Storage 

• Building: 1010 - New Container Storage

• Building: 1040 - Waste Storage and Management: Radioactive Waste Storage

• Building: 1100 - Reactive Metals Facility: Special Storage 

• Building: 1200 - Security Facility

• Building: 1400 - Remote Shipping and Receiving Facility

• Building: 1600

• Building: 200 - Environmental Test Facility

• Building: 307
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• Building: 4.5 - Acre Site

• Building: 400 - Thermoelectric Facility: RTG Assembly and Testing; Thermoelectric 

Test Facility

• Building: 40-Foot Trailers

• Building: 500 - Utility Building: Deionized Water Facility; Emergency Power; Plant 

Heating/Cooling; Plant Services; Utilities, Deionized Water Plant

• Building: 550 - Sewage Treatment Facility: Industrial Wastewater Neutralization 

Facility; IWNF; Wastewater Neutralization 

• Building: 600 - Chemical Storage Facility

• Building: 6000

• Building: 700 - Vehicle Storage Facility: Fire Station; Maintenance Building and Fire 

Department; Reactive Metals Facility; Tractor Wash Station 

• Building: 710 - Maintenance Storage Shed

• Building: 720 - Facilities Maintenance Storage

• Building: 800 - Linear Accelerator Facility

• Building: 900 - Fire Training Facility

• Building: Bonded Stock Area

• Building: Bonded Stock East Building

• Building: Bulk Tank # 3 - Hazardous Waste Storage, Treatment and Disposal 

• Building: Bulk Tank # 5 - Hazardous Waste Storage, Treatment and Disposal

• Building: Drum Storage Pad: Hazardous Waste Storage, Treatment and Disposal 

• Building: Drum Storage Site: Environmental remediation activities and waste storage 

• Building: Former Fire-Training Site

• Building: Liquid Incinerator 

• Building: Manufacturing Engineering: Calcium Chromate synthesis research

• Building: Northeast Retention Pond

• Building: Northeast Site: Groundwater Sampling 

• Building: Northeast Site Area B: environmental remediation activities 

• Building: Old Pistol Range: Weapons cleaning and firing activities

• Building: Pistol Range

• Building: Sludge Storage Tank. Hazardous Waste Storage, Treatment and Disposal

• Building: South Pond

• Building: Tank Storage Facility: Fire/explosion response and spill/material release 

response

• Building: West Pond

E. 3 List of Job Titles and/or Duties of Energy Employees included in the class. This includes 

but is not limited to the following titles: 

• Administrative Assistant: including Aide, Administrative; Aide, Design Control; Aide, 

Distributed Systems; Aide, Engineering Measuring Systems; Aide, Engineering 

Support Systems; Aide, Environmental Health Support; Aide, Facilities Design; Aide, 

Fire Protection Support; Aide, Laboratory Support; Aide, Waste Management 

Support; Clerk-Typist; Executive Secretary; Receptionist; Secretary 
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• Administrator: including Administrator, Construction Subcontracts; Administrator, 

Contract; Administrator, Subcontracts; Administrator, Planning & Control 

• Analyst: including Advanced Analyst-Design Definition; Analyst, Benefits 

Administration; Analyst, Budget; Analyst, Business Development; Analyst, Business 

Operations; Analyst, Classification; Analyst, Computer Operations; Analyst, Cost 

Accounting; Analyst, Data; Analyst, Data Base Administration; Analyst, Design 

Definition; Analyst, Financial; Analyst, Networking; Analyst, Programming; Analyst, 

Quality Systems; Analyst, Safety; Analyst, Systems; Analyst, Systems & Networks; 

Analyst, User Computing; Senior Analyst-Design Definition; Systems Analyst, 

Program Requirements 

• Apprentice: including Apprentice, Quality; Apprentice, Quality Engineering 

Coordinator 

• Assembler: including Assembler Chemical Cleaner; Assembler/Chemical Cleaner; 

Assembler/Operator; Chemical Cleaner 

• Auditor 

• Buyer

• Carpenter 

• Chemist: including Advanced Chemist; Senior Developmental Chemist 

• Clerk: including Calibration Scheduling and Monitoring Clerk; Clerk/Typist; 

Manufacturing Documentation Clerk/Instructor; Shop Clerk; Typist/Clerk 

• Construction Worker

• Controller: including Controller, QC Reject Material; Controller, Special Materials 

• Coordinator: including Chemical Waste Coordinator; Coordinator - Environmental 

Test; Coordinator - Equipment Calibration & Test; Coordinator - Life Test Program; 

Coordinator, Compensation and Human Resources Information Systems; 

Coordinator, Customer Service; Coordinator, Engineering Material Control; 

Coordinator, Equipment Calibration & Maintenance; Coordinator, Inventory Control; 

Coordinator, Maintenance Services; Coordinator, Material; Coordinator, Office 

Graphics Systems; Coordinator, Office Services; Coordinator, Personnel Security; 

Coordinator, PMT; Coordinator, Process; Coordinator, Product Evaluation; 

Coordinator, Production; Coordinator, Production Control; Coordinator, Production 

Materials; Coordinator, Production Planning; Coordinator, Public Affairs; 

Coordinator, Quality Assurance; Coordinator, Reconfiguration & Transition; 

Coordinator, Records and Document Control; Coordinator, Reproduction Support; 

Coordinator, Retraining; Coordinator, Security Escorts; Coordinator, Senior Process; 

Coordinator, Shelf Life/Stockpile; Coordinator, Shipping & Receiving; Coordinator, 

Special Projects; Coordinator, Systems; Coordinator, Transportation; Equipment 

Calibration & Maintenance Coordinator; Maintenance Service Coordinator 

• Cost Estimator 

• Designer: including Designer, Applications; Designer, Data Base; Designer, 

Engineering Computer Operations; Designer, Facilities; Designer, Systems 

Application 

• Drafter: Draftsman 
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• Electrician 

• Engineer, Applications 

• Engineer, Ceramic 

• Engineer, Component: including Component Engineer; Component Production 

Engineer 

• Engineer, Computer Systems 

• Engineer, Development: including Senior Development Engineer 

• Engineer, Engineering Computer Operations: including Engineer, Facility Computer 

Systems 

• Engineer, Engineering Systems Application 

• Engineer, Equipment Software 

• Engineer, Facilities: including Facilities Engineer; Facilities Project Engineer 

• Engineer, Instrumentation: including Advanced Instrumentation Engineer 

• Engineer, Laboratory Operations 

• Engineer, Materials & Resources 

• Engineer, Measurement & Standards: including Advanced Measurements and 

Standards Engineer; Measurement & Standards Engineer 

• Engineer, Metallurgical: including Advanced Metallurgical Engineer; Senior 

Metallurgical Engineer 

• Engineer, Nondestructive Evaluation: including Senior NDE Engineer 

• Engineer, Operational Surety 

• Engineer, Operations: Operations Engineer; Operations Specialist/Engineer; Senior 

Operations Specialist/Engineer 

• Engineer, Packaging 

• Engineer, Planning 

• Engineer, Principal 

• Engineer, Process

• Engineer, Process Technology: including Advanced Process Technology Engineer; 

Senior Process Technology Engineer

• Engineer, Producibility 

• Engineer, Product

• Engineer, Production 

• Engineer, Production Evaluation 

• Engineer, Production Quality 

• Engineer, Production Quality 

• Engineer, Project

• Engineer, Quality 

• Engineer, Quality Assurance: including Engineer, QA; Quality Assurance Engineer; 

Senior Quality Assurance Specialist/Engineering Group Leader 

• Engineer, Reliability 

• Engineer, Requirements: 

• Engineer, Safety 
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• Engineer, System Design

• Engineer, Systems 

• Engineer, Systems & Networks 

• Engineer, Technical Operations 

• Engineer, Test

• Engineer, Tool & Gage 

• Engineer, Welding

• Engineering Aide, Magnetics 

• Engineering Aide, Measuring System 

• Engraver 

• Equipment Developer 

• Escort: including Security Escort 

• Expediter: including Expediter, Indirect Mail; Expediter, Production Control; 

Expediter, Purchase Orders 

• Final Product Certifier 

• Fire Brigade Member 

• Foreman: including Foreman, Facility Rearrangement; Foreman, Incoming Test & 

Inspection; Utilities Operator Foreman; Waste Management Foreman 

• Gas Handler 

• General Counsel 

• Glass Worker 

• Graphics Artist 

• Groundskeeper

• Health Physicist: including Advanced Health Physicist; Health Physics Group Leader; 

Senior Health Physicist; Support Aide - Health Physics

• Industrial Hygienist: including Advanced Industrial Hygienist; Industrial Hygienist 

Technician 

• Inspector/Tester: including Electronic Tester; Environmental Tester; Incoming 

Inspector/Tester; Inspector; Inspector, Mechanical Calibration; Inspector, Quality 

Assurance; Mechanical/Calibration Inspector; Mechanical/Cap Study Inspector; 

Quality Assurance Inspector Trainee; Tester; Tester, Electronic; Tester, QC 

Environmental 

• Instructor: including Instructional Technologist; Mechanical/Capability Study/Final 

Product Inspector Instructor 

• Intern: including Intern, Summer Education Program; Summer College Trainee 

• Ironworker 

• Key Operator 

• Laborer: including General support/Entry Level Laborer; Janitor; Maintenance 

Labor/Support; Maintenance Laborer; Maintenance Laborer Support

• Laser Trimmer & Tester 

• Liquid Nitrogen/Gas Handler 

• Maintenance Cleaner 
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• Manager: including Budget Manager, Environmental Management; Director; 

Director, Business Development; Director, Business Management; Director, 

Environment, Safety & Health; Director, Environmental Management; Director, 

Facilities & Security; Director, Human Resources; Director, Operations; Director, 

Program Management; Director, Quality Assurance; Director, Technical & 

Operations Systems; Director, Technical Services; Facility Manager; Floor Manager; 

General Manager; Manager Product Tester Support Lab; Manager Tube Engineering 

Laboratory; Manager, Accounting, Benefits & Banking; Manager, Advanced 

Components Engineering; Manager, Applications Design; Manager, Applications 

Development; Manager, Audit & Ethics; Manager, Benefits Accounting; Manager, 

Business Development Programs; Manager, Classification; Manager, Communication 

Programs; Manager, Compensation/Human Resources Information Systems; 

Manager, Computer Security; Manager, Computer Services; Manager, Computer 

Systems Support; Manager, Computing & Telecommunication; Manager, Contracts; 

Manager, Cost Accounting; Manager, Cost Estimating; Manager, Cost Management; 

Manager, Data Processing Support; Manager, Database; Manager, Design Definition; 

Manager, EEO & Nonexempt Practices; Manager, EH&S Programs; Manager, 

Electrical Services & Support; Manager, Emergency Management; Manager, Energy 

Devices Engineering; Manager, Engineering; Manager, Engineering Support Services; 

Manager, Environmental Restoration & Permitting; Manager, Equipment Calibration 

& Electrical/Mechanical Maintenance; Manager, Equipment Calibration & 

Instrument Maintenance; Manager, Equipment Calibration & Maintenance; 

Manager, Equipment Calibration & Vacuum Maintenance; Manager, Equipment 

Engineering; Manager, Estimating & Cost Management; Manager, Facilities 

Engineering; Manager, Facilities Maintenance; Manager, Finance; Manager, 

Financial Operations; Manager, Fire Protection; Manager, Generator & Magnetics; 

Manager, Health Physics; Manager, Hourly/Nonexempt Relations; Manager, 

Industrial Hygiene; Manager, Instrument & Computing Maintenance; Manager, 

Manufacturing; Manager, Materials & Process Engineering; Manager, Materials & 

Process Laboratory; Manager, Materials & Process Technology; Manager, 

Medical/ESH Administration; Manager, Metrology Laboratory; Manager, NetworkInternet-User Computer Services; Manager, Neutron Generator Engineering; 

Manager, Occupation Safety, Health & Fire; Manager, Operational Security; 

Manager, Operations Management Systems; Manager, Organization & Staffing; 

Manager, Performance Management; Manager, Plant Engineering; Manager, Plant 

Facilities; Manager, Plant Protection/Utility Operations; Manager, Plant Security; 

Manager, Process Monitoring; Manager, Procurement & Distribution; Manager, 

Product Assurance; Manager, Product Review & Certification; Manager, Production; 

Manager, Production Engineering; Manager, Production Operations; Manager, 

Production Planning & Scheduling; Manager, Production Programs; Manager, 

Production Tube and Subassembly; Manager, Program; Manager, Programs & 

Administration; Manager, Property Accounting and Accounts Payable; Manager, 

Public Affairs; Manager, Purchasing & Stockroom; Manager, Quality Assurance 

Incoming Material; Manager, Resources Planning; Manager, Risk Management & 
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Radiological Protection; Manager, Safety; Manager, Security Computer Systems; 

Manager, Special Materials; Manager, Surety Programs; Manager, Technical and 

Personnel Security; Manager, Technical Support; Manager, Technology Center; 

Manager, Technology Transfer; Manager, Thermal Battery; Manager, Training & 

Integration; Manager, Transportation; Manager, Tube and Generator Engineering; 

Manager, Waste Management; Manager, Waste Management and Waste 

Minimization; Manager, Weapon Program Requirements; Manager, Zetatron; 

President & General Manager; Program Leader, Capital Planning; Program Manager 

& Classification Officer; Unit Manager, Production 

• Mason 

• Mechanic, Maintenance: including General Maintenance; Maintenance - 

General/Utilities; Maintenance General; Maintenance Mechanic; Maintenance 

Utilities; Maintenance Worker, General/Utilities; Mechanic 

• Medical Director 

• Nurse

• Oiler/Machinist 

• Operator, Computer: including Computer Operator; Data Processing Computer 

Operator 

• Operator, Machine: including C-Flow Machine Tool Associate; C-Flow Production 

Associate; Machine Operator; Machine Operator - Special Materials; Machine Tool 

Operator; Machine Tool Operator/Toolroom Machinist; NC Programmer/Machinist; 

Operator, Machine Tool; Production Associate, C-Flow; Setup/Maintain/Repair; 

Support Machine Operator; Support Operator; Tool Cutter and Grinder 

• Operator, Metallize 

• Operator, Micrographics 

• Operator, Process 

• Operator, Process Control 

• Operator, Resin Casting Machine 

• Operator, Special Materials-Machine 

• Operator, Support 

• Operator, Switchboard 

• Operator, Tritium Recovery System 

• Operator, Utilities 

• Operator, Vacuum: including Vacuum Operator; Vacuum Operator (Tube 

Exhaust/Evaporation); Vacuum Process Setup & Operate (Tube 

Exhaust/Evaporation); Vacuum Process Setup, Operate & Maintain (Tube 

Exhaust/Evaporation) 

• Operator, Vehicle 

• Operator, Vending Machine 

• Operator, Waste 

• Operator, Welding Machine 

• Operator, Winding Machine 

• Operator, X-Ray: including X-Ray Operator; X-Ray Operator/Inspector 
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• Painter 

• Paralegal 

• Patent Officer 

• Physician 

• Physicist: including Advanced Physicist; Physicist, Development; Senior Development 

Physicist

• Planner: Advanced Process Planner; Emergency Planner; Equipment Construction 

Planner; Machine Load Planner; Planner, Design Definition; Planner-Engineering; 

Process Planner 

• Plumber/Pipefitter 

• Program Manager: including Program Manager, Electronics & Computers; Program 

Manager, Neutron Generators; Program Manager, Occurrence Reporting; Program 

Manager, Reimbursables; Program Manager, Special Components; Program 

Manager, Technology Development; Program Manager, Training & Education; 

Program Manager, Transition; Program Manager, Weapons Systems 

• Programmer 

• Project Manager: including Manager, Project; Project Manager, Development; 

Project Manager, Engineering; Project Manager, Equipment; Project Manager, 

Inventory 

• Purchasing Associate 

• Quality Auditor: including Advanced Quality Auditor; Equipment Quality Technician; 

Manufacturing Product Auditor; Senior Quality Auditor 

• Rejected Material Controller 

• Remediation Worker 

• Security Officer 

• Sheet Metal Worker 

• Solid Waste Attendant 

• Specialist: including Advanced Specialist; Advanced Specialist, Facilities Computer 

Systems; Specialist, Archives & Records; Specialist, Audio-Visual Support; Specialist, 

CAD Operations; Specialist, Communication; Specialist, Component; Specialist, 

Computer Systems; Specialist, Configuration Management; Specialist, Cost 

Accounting; Specialist, Emergency Management; Specialist, Employee & Plant 

Safety; Specialist, Engineering Administration; Specialist, Environmental Oversight; 

Specialist, Environmental Protection; Specialist, Equipment Maintenance Programs; 

Specialist, Equipment Management; Specialist, Equipment Software; Specialist, 

Facility Computer Systems; Specialist, Facility Project Engineering; Specialist, Facility 

Schedule and Control; Specialist, Facility Utilities; Specialist, Fire Protection; 

Specialist, Fire Protection Group Leader; Specialist, General Accounting; Specialist, 

Human Resources; Specialist, Industrial Engineering; Specialist, Inspection & Test 

Planning; Specialist, Maintenance Planning; Specialist, Maintenance Programs; 

Specialist, Materials; Specialist, Neutron tube; Specialist, Operational Planning; 

Specialist, Operational Surety; Specialist, Operations; Specialist, Operations & 

Procedures; Specialist, Packaging; Specialist, Personnel Security; Specialist, Physical 
17

Security; Specialist, Polymer Support; Specialist, Procedures & Forms; Specialist, 

Process Planning; Specialist, Process Technology; Specialist, Producible Engineering; 

Specialist, Product Acceptance; Specialist, Product Development; Specialist, Product 

Evaluation; Specialist, Production Planning; Specialist, Program Requirements; 

Specialist, Programs & Administration; Specialist, Property Accounting; Specialist, 

Property Management; Specialist, Public Affairs; Specialist, Publications; Specialist, 

Quality; Specialist, Quality Assurance; Specialist, Quality Control Field Engineering; 

Specialist, Quality Systems; Specialist, Requirements; Specialist, Security Awareness; 

Specialist, Software; Specialist, Software & Techniques; Specialist, Surety Programs; 

Specialist, Technical and Communications Security; Specialist, Technical Information; 

Specialist, Training; Specialist, Video Production; Specialist, Visual Support; 

Specialist, Waste Management 

• Specialist, Chemical Analysis 

• Specialist, Computer Systems 

• Specialist, Fire Protection 

• Specialist, Instrumentation 

• Specialist, Maintenance Planning 

• Specialist, Material Control 

• Specialist, Polymer Chemistry 

• Specialist, Process Monitoring 

• Specialist, Product Development 

• Specialist, Product Evaluation 

• Specialist, Requirements 

• Stock keeper/Packer/Shipper: including Material Handler; Picker-Shipper; Stock 

keeper; Stock keeper, Material Control; Stock keeper/Material Control; Stock 

keeper/Packer Shipper; Stock keeper/Packer-Shipper; Storekeeper 

• Supervisor: including Area Supervisor; Group Leader; Group Leader, Banking & 

Travel; Group Leader, Engineering; Group Leader, Product Development; Group 

Leader, Tube Development; Project Leader, Engineering; Supervisor, Waste 

Management; Supervisor, Accounts Payable; Supervisor, Component Production 

Engineering; Supervisor, Computer Operations; Supervisor, Facilities; Supervisor, 

General Stockroom; Supervisor, Payroll & Cashiering; Supervisor, Production; 

Supervisor, Receiving & Traffic; Supervisor, Security Patrol; Supervisor, Security 

Patrol Relief; Unit Supervisor 

• Technician 

• Technician, Ceramics 

• Technician, Chemistry 

• Technician, Computer Hardware/Software Support 

• Technician, Development 

• Technician, Electrical Component Systems 

• Technician, Electromechanical 

• Technician, Electromechanical Data 

• Technician, Electronic Data 
18

• Technician, Electronics: including Electron Beam Instruments Technician; Electronics 

Technician; Laboratory Technician; Laboratory Technician - Group Leader; Senior 

Technician - Electronics; Senior Technician - Electronics (Data); Unit 860 

• Technician, Environmental Health 

• Technician, Health Physics 

• Technician, Laboratory Mechanical Calibration 

• Technician, Materials & Process Laboratory 

• Technician, Mechanical Calibration 

• Technician, Mechanical Equipment Measurement & Test 

• Technician, Metallurgical 

• Technician, Neutron Tube: including Neutron Tube Development and Manufacturing 

Laboratory Aide; Neutron Tube Development and Manufacturing Technician; 

Neutron Tube Technician 

• Labor Category: Technician, Optoelectronics 

• Technician, Physical Security 

• Labor Category: Technician, Physics 

• Technician, Polymer 

• Technician, Polymer Chemistry Applications 

• Technician, Security 

• Technician, Tube 

• Technician, Waste Management 

• Technologist, Data Processing 

• Technologist, Electromechanical 

• Technologist, Electronics 

• Technologist, Environmental Management 

• Technologist, Firearms & Training Systems 

• Technologist, Industrial Hygiene 

• Technologist, Instructional 

• Technologist, Mechanical Equipment 

• Technologist, Operations Systems 

• Technologist, Photography 

• Technologist, Physics 

• Technologist, Polymer Chemistry 

• Technologist, Waste Management 

• Telephone contractor 

• Tool, Die & Gage Maker: including Tool Cutter & Grinder; Tool Maker 

• Trainer, Security Patrol 

• Vacuum Craftsman 

• Welder

• Writer: including Copy Editor; Technical Writer 
19

A mentioned previously, a list of associated work processes can be obtained at EOICP 

Site Exposure Matrices Website -- Home Page - DOE FACILITIES AND RECA SITES DATA: 

Pinellas Plant https://www.sem.dol.gov/expanded/index.cfm 

E.4 Employment Dates relevant to this petition: 

 Start: January 1957 End: December 1997

E.5 Is this petition based on one or more unmonitored, unrecorded or inadequately 

monitored or recorded exposure incidents? NO

PART F: BASIS FOR PROPOSING THAT RECORDS AND INFORMATION ARE INADEQUATE FOR 

INDIVIDUAL DOSE RECONSTRUCTION 

F.1 Historic Approach to Monitoring of Radiological Exposures at the Pinellas 

Plant. 

Exhibit 1: Radioactive Material Inventory at the Pinellas Plant,10 located at the end of this 

document, provides an extensive list of radiological materials included in this inventory. In 

regard to the possibility of radiological exposure to these radionuclides, an extensive discussion 

of Occupational Medical Dose; Occupational Environmental Dose; Occupational International 

Dose; and, Occupational External Dose have been provided by Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU) in a multiplicity of ORAU authored documents. In these documents, ORAU 

identifies several radionuclides deemed pertinent to estimating the aforementioned doses of 

the former workers of the Pinellas Plant. These radionuclides are: 

1. Tritium11 

2. Plutonium12 

3. Depleted Uranium: Please note that according to ORAU: “The DU (mainly 238U) inside the 

Tritium storage beds presented no significant external radiation hazard, due to the low 

specific activity and the nonpenetrating radiation emitted.”13 

4. Natural Uranium: Please note that according to ORAU: “Because the uranium would have 

been encapsulated in the glass prior to its arrival at the Pinellas Plant, the glass was 

considered to be a sealed source and would have posed little to no internal dose 

hazard.”14 

5. Nickel-6315 

6. Carbon-1416 

10 Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services State of Florida and Department of Energy (1994) op. cit. 11 IBID., pp. 8-10. 12 Regarding plutonium, the document states: “... plutonium intakes were extremely unlikely at the facility.” IBID., 

pp. 10-11. 13 IBID., pp. 11-12. 14 IBID., pp. 11-12. 15 Regarding Nickel 63, the document states: it is unlikely that any workers at the Pinellas Plant received a 

significant internal dose from 63Ni, and potential 63Ni exposures do not need to be assessed for Pinellas Plant 

workers.” IBID., p. 12.

16 Regarding Carbon-14, the document states: it is unlikely that 14C was a significant internal dose concern at the 

Pinellas Plant. Therefore, internal doses due to 14C exposures do not need to be assessed for Pinellas Plant 

workers.” IBID., p. 13.
20

7. Krypton-8517 

Beyond these seven radionuclides, ORAU states that intakes and internal doses for other 

miscellaneous radionuclides did not normally need to be evaluated for Pinellas Plant workers, and these 

radionuclides were not discussed further in ORAU TBD.18

This conservative approach to monitoring radionuclide exposure is further discussed in the 

Pinellas Plant Feasibility Study: Final Report (see Exhibit 1 below).19 The main focus of attention 

according to this study are the following radionuclides: Tritium (since 1957), Krypton-85 (since 

1963), Carbon-14 (1979 to 1984), and Plutonium 238 and Plutonium 239.20 

This conservative approach appears to be corroborated by the former nuclear weapons 

workers files received from the Departments of Labor and Energy and reviewed by 

. A small percentage of former nuclear weapons workers were monitored 

through bioassay or urinalysis for exposure to Tritium, neutrons and x-ray gamma to the deficit 

of other radionuclides contained in the Radioactive Material Inventory for the Pinellas Plant. 

Additionally, the majority of former nuclear weapons workers at the Pinellas Plant were NEVER

monitored for any possible exposure to radioactive materials. As discussed below, the failure 

to monitor ALL workers for all radioactive materials at the Pinellas facility resulted in exposures 

that went undetected until former nuclear weapons workers from this facility partook in 24-

Hour Heavy Metals Urine Tests in 2019 and 2020, as discussed below. 

F. 2 Incomplete Radiological Characterization at the Pinellas Plant and 

Need for Special Exposure Cohort

Despite ORAU’s characterization that most radionuclides at the Pinellas facility did not need to 

be monitored, research has identified several additional exposure pathways that DO NOT

reflect Oak Ridge Associated Universities existing radiological characterization of the Pinellas 

Plant. NOR are these additional exposure pathways reflected in the dose reconstructions of 

former Pinellas nuclear weapons workers conducted by NIOSH. 

Exposures Not Monitored or Inadequately Monitored 

1. Although the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Institute of Occupational Safety and 

Health (NIOSH) have documented a series of radiological incidents that occurred at the 

Pinellas Facility, nowhere in this documentation is there any discussion of whether these 

exposures were actually used to determine the extent of exposure for ANY worker at the 

Pinellas Plant at the time of the incident. These documents include but are not limited to: 

a. US Department of Energy Environment, Safety and Health (1990) Tiger Team 

Assessment of the Pinellas Plant. (DOE/EH – 0126)

b. John Holliday (1989) Health Physics Report: Historical Report of Radiation Protection. 

GEPP-97004407

17 Regarding Krypton-85, the document states: “Because 85Kr is a noble gas, it is not a significant internal dose 

concern. Therefore, internal doses due to 85Kr exposures do not need to be assessed.” IBID., p. 13.

18 IBID., p. 13 19 Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and U.S. Department of Energy (September 1994) op. 

cit.

20 IBID., p. 26.
21

c. Department of Labor Site Exposure Matrices (https://www.sem.dol.gov/) 

2. Additionally, the files of former nuclear weapons workers at the Pinellas Plant, received 

from DOL and DOE, do not contain any exposure information related to these radiologic 

incidents. 

3. In the Health Physics Report: Historical Report of Radiation Protection (1989), Health 

Physicist John Holliday notes that on July 1961 100 m ci Cobalt 60 source found leaking, this 

despite the assertion that Cobalt 60 was an encapsulated source. 21

4. Health Physicist Holliday also reported that accurate monitoring was impacted by the fact 

that “Employees were found falsely identifying urine samples.”22

5. Radiologic aspects of the Pinellas Plant exclusively focus on exposures and/or monitoring of 

the following radiologic materials: tritium, Krypton-85, Carbon-14, and in some cases, 

Plutonium 238/239. While the Department of Energy notes that plutonium present at the 

Pinellas Plant site was triply encapsulated in metal to contain potential releases, air 

monitoring and soil monitoring procedures were put in place to monitor for the release of 

plutonium 238/239. Despite encapsulation, levels of plutonium 238 and 239 were detected 

in both air and soil samples. While the Department of Energy noted that the levels of 

plutonium were at environmental background levels, it is important to note that the Tiger 

Team found sampling deficiencies where plutonium was concerned: 

A/CF-6 Plutonium Stack Sampling Deficiencies23

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE: Environmental Monitoring Procedure EM-2.01 

"Plutonium Stack Releases - Building 400" stipulates a procedure which applies to 

the collection of particulate plutonium 238 and 239 as well as specifying review 

frequencies.

FINDING: The stack sampling equipment for Bldg. 400 which has been installed 

for the purpose of detecting potential releases of particulate Pu-238 and 239 is 

not of an isokinetic design, more than 15 feet from the sample extraction point 

and is downstream of numerous abrupt direction changes in the sample line. 

Additionally, stack gaskets and joints are leaking in both of the exhaust stacks. 

Furthermore, documentation does not exist verifying that the procedure has

been reviewed since November 2, 1987. These deficiencies can lead to the 

sample mass not being proportional to the total mass of material (possibly 

including plutonium) exiting the stack. The filter for collecting this particulate is 

failure to properly sample particulate effluent streams can lead to inaccurate 

estimates of doses to the public. The site is aware of this situation and has an 

approved project budgeted for fiscal year 1990, No. 9082002 (I-R-16) to correct 

this situation. 

The majority of workers WERE NEVER monitored for plutonium 238/239 exposures. 

21 John Holliday (1989) Health Physics Report: Historical Report of Radiation Protection. GEPP-97004407, p. 2. 22 * This note was entered into the aforementioned report in September 1963. IBID.

23 US Department of Energy: Environment, Safety and Health (May 1990) Tiger Team Assessment. of the Pinellas 

Plant. DOE/EH—0126. DE90 010294. pp. 3-14.
22

6. In the US Department of Energy (June 1997) Environmental Baseline Report, mention is 

made of the potential for unconfined radioactive materials or emissions, resulting from 

Radioactive Materials Management Area (RMMA) located in Building 100. 24

7. Also not taken into consideration is the fact that the rooms within Building 100 were not 

self-contained. In other words, the rooms were wide open so any radioactive materials 

that were in the air, would be circulated throughout the entire plant.25

8. According to Bill Murray, part of the Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team that developed 

the Pinellas Plant Site Profile, “employer-required chest x-rays were required of employees 

at the facility.”26 HOWEVER, a review of employee files found that the majority of 

employees WERE NOT afforded these x-rays. 

9. According to Independent Technical Review of Pinellas Plant (July 1994): 

d. Certain rooms in Building 100, several hoods in Buildings 200 and 800, and areas 

of Buildings 550 and 1000, have some radioactive contamination. No

comprehensive radiological surveys have been completed for these buildings.27

e. Building 100 laboratories and processes handle or have handled radioactive 

isotopes. There is radioactive contamination in some hoods and associated duct 

work. A precise, accurate survey of location, quantity and type of radiological 

contamination does not exist.28

10. According to the Pinellas Plant Feasibility Study Final Report (1990): “Typical of many DOE 

facilities, meticulous environmental monitoring and records keeping did not take place until 

the early to mid 1970's. Prior to that, monitoring and records keeping was not very 

thorough.”29

11. Therefore, there is inadequate or non-existent monitoring of exposures resulting from the 

presence of other radioactive materials in the confines of the Pinellas Plant. 

Characterization of Former Nuclear Weapons Workers at Pinellas Plant 

1. A review of files of former nuclear weapons workers at the Pinellas Plant reveal that 

workers rarely worked in only one area. They worked across all building locations 

associated with the Pinellas facility. Dose reconstructions performed by NIOSH reflect only 

one employment associated location rather than the full range of employment locations 

held by these workers. Each plant location has unique radiologic characteristics and the 

failure to include each and every employment location negatively impacts the former 

nuclear weapons worker dose reconstruction. 

24 US Department of Energy (June 1997) Environmental Baseline Report, p. 3-1 25 NIOSH Dose Reconstruction Project Meeting on Pinellas Site Profile – Afternoon Session. (November 19, 2004) 

p. 2. 

26 Bill Murray (2004) Development of the Pinellas Site Profile, Oak Ridge

Associated Universities Team, slide 12.

27 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Facility Transition and Management (1994) Independent Technical Review of 

the Pinellas Plant, p. A4. 28 IBID., p. A9. 29 Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services State of Florida (1990), Pinellas Plant Feasibility Study Final 

Report, p. 113
23

2. A review of files of former nuclear weapons workers at the Pinellas Plant reveal that 

workers were employed in a variety of labor categories associated with the Pinellas facility. 

Dose reconstructions performed by NIOSH reflect only one labor category rather than the 

full range of labor categories held by these workers. Each plant location has unique 

radiologic characteristics and the failure to include each and every labor category negatively 

impacts the former nuclear weapons worker dose reconstruction. 

3. A review of files of former nuclear weapons workers at the Pinellas Plant reveal that 

workers participated in a multitude of work processes associated with the Pinellas facility. 

Dose reconstructions performed by NIOSH reflect only one work process rather than the full 

range of work processes held by these workers. Each work process has unique radiologic 

characteristics and the failure to include each and every work process negatively impacts 

the former nuclear weapons worker dose reconstruction. 

4. A small number of workers were monitored for radiologic exposures, although 

inconsistently, and some were never monitored for such exposures. For those that were 

monitored, their dosimetry records only included information until 1981. Dosimetry 

records beyond 1981 were missing from all of their DOL and DOE files that were examined. 

5. As mentioned in point 4, monitoring was often inconsistent and erratic – a script might 

prescribe an employee be monitored on a weekly basis, but documents pertaining to these 

monitored employees reveal that they were not. Questionable record keeping as 

mentioned in the Tiger Team report, is one of the problematic issues identified at the 

Pinellas Plant.30

24 Hour Heavy Metals Urine Tests 

1. Failure to secure dosimetry and exposure data for the majority of former nuclear 

weapons employees at the Pinellas Plant led to 24-Hour Heavy Metals Urine Test testing 

with additional testing for radionuclides administered to a sample of former Pinellas 

employees. Members of this sample tested positive for exposure to radionuclides listed 

in the Radioactive Material Inventory at the Pinellas Plant and that were previously 

determined as not needing further evaluation by ORAU: 

• Strontium-9031

• Cobalt-6032

• Thallium-20433

• Uranium34 

30 US Department of Energy: Environment, Safety and Health (May 1990) Tiger Team Assessment. of the Pinellas

Plant. Op. cit. 31 Stronbtium-90 is mentioned here because a former employee who was monitored until 1981, tested positive 

for Strontium-90 exposure but was only monitored for Tritium, Neutrons and X-ray gamma. 32 Cobalt-60 is mentioned here because a former employee who was monitored until 1981, tested positive for 

Cobalt-60 exposure but was only monitored for Tritium, Neutrons and X-ray gamma. 33 Thallium-204 is mentioned here because a former employee who was monitored until 1981, tested positive for 

Thallium-204 exposure but was only monitored for Tritium, Neutrons and X-ray gamma. 34 Uranium is mentioned here because several unmonitored former workers tested positive for uranium exposure 

in their 24-Hour Urine Metals Test.
24

• Beryllium35 - although the author understand that an SEC will not be qualified on 

the basis of beryllium, beryllium is added to this list not only because of the large 

number of individuals who tested positive for the material and whose exposures 

were ignored not only during the period of plant operation but in the years following 

plant closure. 

2. Several conclusions can be drawn from these 24-Hour Urine Heavy Metals Test results 

with additional testing for radionuclides: 

a. For the sample of former nuclear weapons employees, these radiologic exposures 

could have ONLY resulted from employment at the Pinellas Plant. 

b. Since the focus of dosimetry and other forms of radiologic monitoring at the Pinellas 

Plant was on Tritium, neutrons and X-ray gamma and there appears to be no 

dosimetry or documentation available for the remainder of the radionuclides on the 

Radioactive Material Inventory at the Pinellas Plant, including those aforementioned 

radionuclides to which a sample of Pinellas Plant employees tested positive 

(Strontium-90, Cobalt-60, Thallium-204, Beryllium, and Uranium). the radiological 

characterization of the Pinellas Plant is incomplete and insufficient. 

c. There is an absence of dosimetry records beyond 1981 for those employees that 

were actually monitored at the Pinellas Plant. 

d. Former employees that were never monitored while employed at the Pinellas Plant 

would have been unaware of their exposures to the aforementioned radionuclides had 

this test not have been administered. 

3. Even though ORAU admits that the radionuclides used at the Pinellas Plant contain 

“significant quantities of radioactivity (Author unknown undated b),”36 ORAU has 

adopted the position that the majority of these radionuclides “were not considered to 

be potential sources for radionuclide intakes.”37 Two questions emerge and form the 

basis for this Special Exposure Cohort Petition: 

a. How does ORAU explain the former workers’ positive 24-Hour Urine Heavy 

Metals Test results for exposures, when it has determined that these 

radionuclides were not considered as possible sources of radiation beyond what 

might be encountered in a limited number of incidents? 

b. Given the absence of complete dosimetry for former employees who were and 

were not monitored at the Pinellas Plant, as well as the unavailability of 

radiological records pertaining to Strontium-90, Cobalt-60, Thallium-204, 

Beryllium, and Uranium, reconstruction of radiologic exposures is not possible. 

It is clear the radionuclides on the Radioactive Materials Inventory List for the 

Pinellas Plant pose severe health risks for not only those who have tested 

positive for exposure but for all workers that may have unknowingly found 

themselves victims of exposures they were unaware and never monitored for. 

An overall lack of dose assessment concerning the radionuclides included on the 

35 Beryllium is mentioned here because several unmonitored former workers tested positive for Beryllium

exposure in their 24-Hour Urine Metals Test. 36 Oak Ridge Associated Universities (2011) op. cit. 37 IBID., p. 13
25

Radioactive Material Inventory at the Pinellas Plant is confirmed by the findings 

by the Tiger Team that there was incomplete documentation of doseassessments.38

F.3 Presence of Radioactive Materials at the Pinellas Plant 

Strontium-90

1. The presence of Strontium-90 is affirmed in the Radioactive Material Inventory at the 

Pinellas Plant39 and Pinellas Plant Radioactive Source Historical Inventory Status (see exhibit 

2 located at end of document).40

2. Some information about the presence of Strontium-90 at the Pinellas Plant can be gleaned 

from the Department of Labor’s Site Exposure Matrices. 

3. The Pinellas Plant was well known for groundwater contamination related to the nuclear 

weapons activity conducted for the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of 

Energy.41 The Tiger Team found that it was not unusual for the Pinellas Plant to add small 

quantities of radioactive waste to non-radioactive classified waste to solve classified waste 

disposal problems.42 Additionally, radioactive Strontium-90 was found to be present in the 

groundwater in Pinellas County (see Exhibit 3 located at end of document). 

4. In a study conducted in 1994, the contents of groundwater contamination were revealed in 

the Pinellas County Water Sources Radioactive Measurements.

43 (See Exhibit 3) Strontium90 was detected until approximately 1984. There is a lack of data available that provides a 

reasonable explanation as to why measurements of Strontium-90 contamination were 

discontinued at this time. 

5. General Electric was well known for its development and production of Radioisotope 

Thermoelectric Generators (RTGS) at the Pinellas Plant. In fact, it served as the primary 

location of such undertakings. General Electric, under the auspices of the U.S. Atomic 

Energy Commission (AEC), began developing these devices in 1956 at a temporary facility in 

order to create power supplies for space, terrestrial and marine applications. These devices 

were all described by the general title: Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP).44 

General Electric was known to use both Strontium-90 and plutonium as power supplies for 

RTGS. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency: “Radioisotope thermoelectric 

generators (RTGS) use heat generated by decay of radioactive isotopes to produce electric 

power... They are used as a power supply where frequent maintenance or refueling is 

38 US Department of Energy: Environment, Safety and Health (May 1990) op. cit., p. ES-2 39 Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services State of Florida and Department of Energy (1994) op. cit. p. 23 40 IBID. p. 108. 41 US Department of Energy: Environment, Safety and Health (May 1990) op. cit., pp. ES-2 through ES-3. Included in 

the Tiger Team assessment pertaining to groundwater contamination found lack of adequate characterization of 

inactive waste sites; deficiencies in the site-wide environmental monitoring program; on- and offsite groundwater 

contamination which was above State standards; and failure to apply for air pollution permits. A key National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) finding concerned reliance by the site on an outdated site-wide Environmental 

Assessment which has no documented Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). 42 US Department of Energy: Environment, Safety and Health (May 1990) op. cit., pp. ES-2 through ES-3 

43 IBID. 44 D. L. Parks; J. P. Grimm; and J. Dominick (2009) “End of an Era and Closing the Circle – Disposal of Strontium-90 

Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators – 9415,” WM2009 Conference, March 1-5, 2009, Phoenix, AZ 
26

expensive or impractical. Most terrestrial RTGS are fueled with Strontium-90.45Therefore, 

Strontium-90 was used extensively in terrestrial RTGS, such as in the “Sentinel.”46 

Strontium-90 was also used in RTGS for communication satellites as shown in Exhibit4. 

Since a Strontium-90 based RTG deteriorated about three times as fast as one based on Pu238,47 when General Electric was tasked with extending the life of RTGS, it shifted the focus 

of its research and development to plutonium. Given the Pinellas Plant’s central role in the 

development and production of RTGS, the use of Strontium-90 cannot be ruled out. 

6. In the case of Strontium-90, the levels of Strontium-90 detected in the Pinellas Country 

water sources could not feasibly be related to only the Strontium-90 check sources. Some 

form of Strontium-90 in dispersible form had to be present and/or used at the facility to 

cause this level of contamination. Groundwater contamination is symptomatic of other 

forms of Strontium-90 exposures included those to the former employees of this facility. 

7. Beyond the amount of Strontium-90 acknowledged for use as a check source, it is important 

to note that there is a lack of available documentation regarding the additional use and/or 

amount of Strontium-90 present at the Pinellas Plant. However, the positive test response 

to Strontium-90 revealed in the 24- Hour Urine Heavy Metals Test that included additional 

testing for radionuclides administered to a sample of former nuclear weapons workers is 

unsettling.48 If the only acknowledged use of Strontium-90 at the Pinellas facility was as a 

check source, how might one explain positive test results for exposure? A positive response 

for exposure raises questions about the completeness of data sources, technical accuracy 

and overall adequacy of data regarding the use of radionuclides at the Pinellas facility. 

Furthermore, the lack of available data speaks to the inability to adequately assign a 

radiation dose for this radionuclide. 

Cobalt-60

1. The presence of radioactive cobalt, specifically Cobtal-60, is confirmed in the Radioactive 

Materials Inventory at the Pinellas Plant. (See Exhibit 1).49 Its presence is also confirmed in 

the Department of Labor’s Site Exposure Matrices. While these two sources confirm that 

Cobalt-60 was used as check source at the Pinellas Plant, additional uses of this radionuclide 

are provided in the Site Exposure Matrices: 

• Use as a levelling device and thickness gauge. 

• Use in machining, sheet metal fabrication, and welding.50 

45 International Atomic Energy Agency; Technical Reports Series No. 436. Disposal Options for Disused Radioactive 

Sources. p 6, 13. Vienna, Austria, 200 46 I. Yaar & E. M. A. Hussein (2013) Passive Detection of Concealed Strontium-90 Radioisotope Thermoelectric 

Generators in Transport, Scientific and Technical Papers; and "Power Sources for Remote Arctic Applications”. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. June 1994. OTA-BP-ETI-129. 47 Rod Adams (1996) RTG Heat Sources: Two Proven Materials. Atomic insights. https://atomicinsights.com/rtgheat-sources-two-proven-materials/ 48NOTE: A special request to the laboratory was made to test for several radionuclides including Strontium -90 for 

one particular claimant who remembers having a possible exposure to the radionuclide. See Appendix 1 for the 

relevant 24-HourUrine Heavy Metals Tests. 49 Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services State of Florida and Department of Energy (1994) op. cit. p. 23 50 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Division of Toxicology; Public Health Statement: Cobalt. 

http://www.ntis.gov
27

• Used in radiography for purpose of detecting structural flaws in metal parts. 51 

• In the magnetics of a neutron tube that is part of a neutron generator.52

• Mixed with other metals to form alloys, which are harder or more resistant to wear and 

corrosion. These alloys are used in a number of military applications such as aircraft 

engines, magnets, and grinding and cutting tools.53

2. The aforementioned uses seem to challenge the assumption that Cobalt 60 was an 

encapsulated source. 54 In general, there is an overall lack of available documentation 

regarding the use and/or amount of Cobalt-60 used at the Pinellas Plant for other purposes. 

3. Extensive research reveals that in addition to use as a check source, Cobalt-60 was 

commonly used as a power source for RTGS developed under the Systems for Nuclear 

Auxiliary Power (SNAP)55 (see Exhibit 4 located at end of document). Given the Pinellas 

Plant’s central role in the development and production of RTGS, the use of Cobalt-60 cannot 

be ruled out as a power source. Neither can its use in magnetics associated with neutron 

tubes be ruled out. 

4. In the Health Physics Report: Historical Report of Radiation Protection (1989), Health 

Physicist John Holliday notes that on July 1961 100 m ci Cobalt 60 source found leaking, this 

despite the assertion that Cobalt 60 was an encapsulated source. 56 (Please see Appendix 2)

Thallium

1. The presence of Thallium-204 is affirmed in the Radioactive Material Inventory at the 

Pinellas Plant57 (See Exhibit 1located at end of document) as well as the Department of 

Labor Site Exposure Matrices. Both confirm that Thallium-204 was used as a check source. 

However, there is a lack of available documentation regarding the use and/or amount of 

Thallium-204 beyond this use. 

2. Extensive research reveals that Thallium-204 was used in several activities associated with 

the work conducted at the Pinellas Plant beyond that as a check source. These activities 

include: 

• Use in electrical switches in nuclear weapons.58

• Use for isotopic power generation59 for RTGS developed under the Systems for Nuclear 

Auxiliary Power (SNAP).60 (See Exhibit 4 located at end of the document) 

51 Wikipedia (Accessed 12/12/2019) Industrial Radiography. 

https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Industrial radiography 52 See: EW Blackmore (1985) Radiation effects of protons on samarium-cobalt permanent magnets.

IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, http://www.ieeexplore.ieee.org; AH Frentrop (1970) Neutron generator 

including an ion source with a massive ferromagnetic probe electrode and a permanent magnet-electrode.

US Patent 3,546,512, 1970 

53 Dr. Marco Ferrante (2013) Health Effects of Metals and Related Substances in Drinking. Science 54 John Holliday (1989) Health Physics Report: Historical Report of Radiation Protection. GEPP-97004407,see 

Attachment A. Page 2 of document. 

55 M. Ragheb (2011) op. cit. 56 John Holliday (1989) op. cit. 57 Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services State of Florida and Department of Energy (1994) op. cit. p. 23

58 US DOE Office of Declassification (1996) Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to the Present, p. 93.2 59 M. Ragheb (2011) op. cit. 60 IBID.
28

Uranium

1. According to ORAU, Uranium was the radionuclide encountered by the most 

workers.61 The use of Uranium included but was not limited to: 

• Classified Component Testing and Inspection, including

o Heather Glassing Shop 

o Heather Electron Beam Welding 

o Heather Testing Shop 

• Equipment calibration and maintenance

• Glass and glass parts development and production including borosilicate glass that was 

doped with natural uranium

• Neutron tube processing 

• Neutron tube and device assembly 

• Source and target processing 

• Tube loading including exhaust and assembly process, inspection and radiological 

monitoring

• Use in the Tritium storage beds

2. Despite the vast number of activities involving Uranium, ORAU asserts that Uranium would 

have posed little to no internal dose hazard and therefore, workers were not monitored for 

this radionuclide. 

3. There is an overwhelming lack of dosimetry or other exposure monitoring for this sample of 

former nuclear weapons employees of the Pinellas Plant regarding this radionuclide and 

there is even less documentation regarding the use and/ or amount of Uranium used at the 

Pinellas Plant in general.

Beryllium

1. Throughout the course of its operations, the potential for beryllium exposure existed at the 

Pinellas Plant due to beryllium use, residual contamination, and decontamination activities. 

At the Pinellas Plant, Beryllium was used to fabricate metal, weapons components and to 

facilitate a number of weapons-related experiments. Specifically, Beryllium was used for: 

• Equipment calibration and maintenance 

• Equipment fabrication and testing 

• Glass parts development and production 

• Reflector material (or 'pit liner') in most neutron generators.62

2. While workers can be tested for Beryllium exposure by the National Supplemental 

Screening Program, many former nuclear weapons workers have not been informed about 

this program or told that they were unlikely to have suffered from such an exposure. 

Therefore, the majority have not been screened nor informed that screening was available. 

Beryllium exposure should be of grave concern to all former employees in the nuclear 

weapons complex.

61 Marquis P. Orr, Paul J. Demopoulos and Brian P. Glecker (2011) Pinellas Plant – Site Description, Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities, ORAUT-TKBS-0029-2 62 Beryllium (accessed December 12, 2019) https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/beryllium.htm
29

3. While Beryllium may or may not fit into the normal parameters of the Special Exposure 

Cohort, in the case of the Pinellas Plant, much more needs to be done to ensure that former 

employees receive access to adequate screening programs, diagnosis and medical care. 

F. 8 Conclusion

The request for a Special Exposure Cohort for the Pinellas Plant is based upon the incomplete 

radiological characterizations by the Department of Labor, Department of Energy and the Oak 

Ridge Associated Universities. The probability of exposure to the radionuclides listed below is 

more likely than not despite the denial of the aforementioned government agencies. Both 

monitored and unmonitored former nuclear weapons workers tested positive to the 

radiological materials list below with the application of 24 Hour Heavy Metals Urine Tests: 

• Strontium-9063

• Cobalt-6064

• Thallium-20465

• Beryllium66 

• Uranium67 

These radiologic exposures could have only resulted from employment at the Pinellas Plant. 

The focus of dosimetry and other forms of monitoring at the Pinellas Plant were on Tritium, 

neutrons and X-ray gamma, not the radionuclides listed on the Radioactive Material Inventory 

at the Pinellas Plant. There is an absence of dosimetry and exposure records beyond 1981 for 

former workers who were actually monitored at the Pinellas Plant. Former employees that 

were never monitored while employed at the Pinellas Plant would have been unaware of their 

exposures to the aforementioned radionuclides had this test not have been administered. The 

revelation of these positive exposures to Strontium-90, Cobalt-60, Thallium-204, Beryllium, and 

Uranium raise serious questions about the ability of NIOSH to adequately and accurately 

perform the dose reconstructions for former employees of the Pinellas Plant given the 

incompleteness of data sources, questionable technical accuracy and overall in adequacy of 

data regarding the overall use of radionuclides at the Pinellas facility. 

The presence of these radiological materials has been acknowledged by the Department of 

Energy and DOL through the Site Exposure Matrices. There is no documentation that reveals 

how much Strontium-90, Cobalt-60, Thallium-204, Beryllium, and Uranium was present at the 

facility. There is no dosimetry or other exposure data available for these radioactive materials 

from the DOL or DOE. The absence of documents related to the quantity and weapons use of 

63 Stronbtium-90 is mentioned here because a former employee who was monitored until 1981, tested positive for 

Strontium-90 exposure but was only monitored for Tritium, Neutrons and X-ray gamma. 64 Cobalt-60 is mentioned here because a former employee who was monitored until 1981, tested positive for 

Cobalt-60 exposure but was only monitored for Tritium, Neutrons and X-ray gamma. 65 Thallium-204 is mentioned here because a former employee who was monitored until 1981, tested positive for 

Thallium-204 exposure but was only monitored for Tritium, Neutrons and X-ray gamma. 66 Beryllium is mentioned here because several unmonitored former workers tested positive for Beryllium

exposure in their 24-Hour Urine Metals Test. 67 Uranium is mentioned here because several unmonitored former workers tested positive for uranium exposure 

in their 24-Hour Urine Metals Test.
30

the aforementioned radionuclides at the Pinellas Plant, in addition to the lack of dosimetry and 

exposure data for these radionuclides points to the inability of NIOSH and ORAU to adequately 

assign a radiation dose for this radionuclide for the former employees of the Pinellas Plant. 

F. 4 Bibliographic of Scientific or Technical Reports 

I/We have attached a bibliography of scientific or technical reports, issued by a government 

agency of the Executive Branch of Government or the General Accounting Office, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, or published in a peerreviewed journal that identifies dosimetry and related information that are unavailable (due to 

either a tack of monitoring or the destruction or loss of records) for estimating the radiation 

doses of energy employees covered by the Pinellas Plant petition. 

1. Elizabeth D. Ellis; John D. Boice, Jr.; Ashley P. Golden; et. al. (2018) “Dosimetry is Key to 

Good Epidemiology: Workers at Mallinckrodt Chemical Works had Seven Different Source 

Exposures.” Health Physics: Volume 114 - Issue 4 - p 386–397: According to this study, 

accurate and quality dosimetry is essential to deriving the dose response from radiation 

exposure in an epidemiological study. When dosimetry is unavailable, inconsistent or 

varies widely the quality of the dosimetry is questionable. If one were to apply these 

standards to the availability of data and quality of dosimetry, it is reasonable to conclude 

that In the case of the Pinellas Plant, lack of dosimetry, inconsistent data reporting, 

discrepancies in employment categories, etc. bring into question the quality and reliability 

of dosimetry characterizing the Pinellas Plant. 

2. Institute of Medicine 2013. Review of the Department of Labor's Site Exposure Matrix 

Database. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press 

(https://doi.org/10.17226/18266): 

a. One of the failures of the Site Exposure Matrices (SEM) is its ability to accurately 

characterize the responsibilities of the employment categories for former employees 

of the Pinellas Plant. Distinct employment categories are lumped together under a 

generic category. For instance, employees who report holding a Janitor position 

involving cleaning duties did not perform the same tasks as a Janitor involved in 

labor duties. In fact, the two positions do not work in the same location of the plant. 

Yet, in the SEM the two positions do not appear to be distinct. Not only are the 

employment locations often generically presented rather than emphasizing exact 

locations, many of the radionuclide and chemical exposures are not accurately 

provided or provided at all for the umbrella category. It has been Denise DeGarmo’s 

experience in representing Pinellas claimants that the ability of the SEM to 

accurately characterize the responsibilities of employment categories is limited. 

Additionally, the SEM does not provide accurate information regarding employee 

exposures to radionuclides as well as other toxic substances. Therefore, the SEM 

was built upon inaccurate information and flawed assumptions. 

b. A list of incidentsthat occurred atthe Pinellas Plant between 1963 and 1995 are list 

below.68

1. Tritium Leak, Tritium Stack, 1963

68 Site Exposure Matrices. https://sem.dol.gov/expanded/Incident3.cfm 
31

2. TritiumContamination,Building400,1969

3. TritiumContamination,Building100,1971

4. Tritium Release, Building100,Area182D,1971

5. Firein Tritium-Containing BoomBox,Building200,1973

6. Area EvacuationDue toPotentialExplosiveMixtureof Chromium Trioxide, 

Titanium Hydride, Manganese and Vanadium Pentoxide, Building100,

Area132,1978

7. Nitrogen Dioxide Release, Building100/Area 143,1978

8. Tritium Release, Building 100, 1979

9. Diesel Fuel Spill, North Building 500, 1981

10. Tear gas exposure,Building900, March 3, 1982

11. Area114RoomsEvacuationDuetoHydrogenSulfide Emissions, 1990

12. Cristobalite Exposure, Area 117, 1993

13. LithiumSiliconBatteryFire,Building300/Area307, 1983

14. Tritium Contamination, Building 400, 1995

However, information taken from microfilm records and the recollections of John 

Holliday, GEND Health Physicist 1967-1985, under contract # R-00162-X (See Appendix 

2) provide a list of accidents/incidents not reported in the Site Exposure Matrices: 

Table 2: Incidents at Pinellas Plant 1972-1982
32

The non-reporting of additional toxic chemical and radiological accidents and/or 

incidents result in inaccurate worker exposure data. Therefore, exposure estimates 

do not accurately reflect the depth, breadth, and pathways of chemical and 

radiological exposures. Thesheernumber of incidents to which employees would have 

been exposed would have increased significantly, thus increasing exponentially not

only the levels of exposures but the types of radiological exposures. In regard to the use

ofthe SEM to determine toxic and radiological materials a worker at the Pinellas Plant 

was exposed to, as discussedelsewhere, the matrices are flawed as a resultofGEND

practicesdiscussedelsewhere inthisdocument. 

c. The Site Exposure Matrices for the Pinellas Plant, based upon the 

aforementioned evidence, are flawed and do not fully represent the 

positions that workersheld at the plant nor the array of toxic and radiological 

substances workers were exposed to. 

3. DepartmentofEnergyEnvironment,Safety andHealth(May1990)TheTigerTeamAssessmentof

the Pinellas Plant. DOE/EH – 0126, DE90 010294: 

a. The Tiger Team Assessment of the Pinellas Plant reported the employment position 

guides for many positions at the plant were out of date.69 

b. According to the Tiger Team Assessment of the Pinellas Plant in 1990, GEND 

historically and consistently failed to comply with DOE regulations. This finding calls into 

question the ability of the DOE and DEEOIC to accurately reconstruct important elements 

of the Pinellas Plant’s operation including the depth, breadth, and pathways of exposures 

to both radiological materials and toxic chemicals.70

c. According to the Tiger Team Assessment of the Pinellas Plant: A General Electric policy 

and program governing the use of procedure site-wide was not developed and 

implemented. Properly controlled technical documents and drawings and other 

related material were not readily available to the personnel that required such 

information. Safety goals and performance were not measurable nor auditable for 

the various health and safety functions. Most of the personnel training was 

accomplished in an informal manner. As a result, in some critical health and safety 

areas, the training program was non-existent and not at the level required at DOE 

facilities. 

d. There was no policy and procedure manual or GEND standard for training, which led to 

considerable variability in each training program. This deficiency was found in many 

of the disciplines appraised by the S & H Sub-team. These areas include technical 

support (packaging and transportation), emergency preparedness, industrial hygiene, 

occupational safety and fire protection. In conclusion, many of the concerns 

expressed by the S & H Sub-team might have been the result of a lack of 

comprehensive safe (hazard) assessment of the many functions and operations at the 

Pinellas Plant. Without such an analysis, a clear understanding of the hazards 

associated with the varied operations and the consequences of credible accidents is 

69 DepartmentofEnergyEnvironment,SafetyandHealth(May1990)op. cit. 70 IBID. p. 3-35.
33

not possible. ”71 In other words, these failures call into question the ability of DOE 

and DEEOIC to accurately detail the hazards and exposures associated with the 

Pinellas Plant across the time period 1957-1990.72

e. TheTigerTeamassessmentrevealedseveralkeyfindingsthat impacted the health and

safety of workers atthe Pinellas Plant:

i. A site-wide safety assessment did not existto identify hazards of a type and 

magnitude not normally encountered and accepted by the public.

ii. TheOccupationalSafetyProgramdidnotimplementan effective program for 

identifying, evaluating, and resolving potential safety and health concerns. 

The Pinellas Plant has potential serious hazards and code violationsasrelatedto

DOEandOSHArequirements.

iii. The emergency preparedness program has not: 1) incorporated credible 

hazards or consequence assessmentsintotheemergencyplans;2)developed 

emergencyplansforspecificbuildings;3)implemented procedures for emergency 

actions; or 4) provided adequate levels of training for spills of hazardous 

materials.73

iv. The Tiger Team Assessment also revealed: 

1. A disciplined safety and health culture was not fully accepted by the 

Pinellas Plant.74

2. A management program to develop, control, and documentsite-wide

operations andfunctionswas not established for health and safety

purposes.75

3. GeneralElectricNeutronDeviceswasnotrequired to provide:1) safety 

assessment of site activities to establish ranking of hazards as well as 

relative risks of operations; and, 2) safety oversight function required 

by DOE for the site-wide operations, health and safety performance, 

follow-ops to safety concerns.76

4. Workerswereexposed to hazardous air born particulates because “The

ventilationsystems were notchecked, tested and maintained in a manner 

consistent with generally accepted industrial practices.”77

5. “Therewas a widespreadmindsetthatthe Pinellas Plant posesno unusual 

oruniquerisks.”78

6. Therewereinstancesofnon-compliancewith radiological regulations.79

71 IBID. p. 4-3 72 IBID. p. 2-4 73 IBID. p. 2-3 74 IBID. p. 2-4 75 IBID. 76 IBID. p. ES-3 77 IBID. p. 4-56 78 IBID. 79 IBID. 4-90
34

7. “The radiological safety controls associated with the accelerator and X-ray

machineswere lacking in formality and were not in compliance with

generally accepted standards.80

8. “Compliance with procedural requirements for workoncontaminated

systems and compliance with ‘hold points’ in safety work permits was 

less than acceptable.”81

9. Accreditation ofthe dosimetry system was not completed along with the 

formalization of employee exposure investigations.82

10. Radiation workers were observed not wearing their personnel

dosimeter consistently or failed to ensure they were properly located on

their body.83

11. The facility and site didnotensure effective implementation and control 

of radiological protection activities on the facility and site.84

12. The internal audit program for both routine operations and unusual 

radiological occurrences did not provide adequate performance 

assessments: The Health Physics internal appraisal program was not in 

accordance with the DOE 482,1B, Section 9.d., and DOE5480.11.85

13. Theradiologicalprocedures at the Pinellas Plant did not provide for the 

control and use of radioactive materials and radiation generating 

devicesin regard to safe operations.86

14. Radiological postings were notbeing accomplished in accordance with 

DOE 5480.11 and GEND procedures.87

15. “Radiologicalworkprocedureswerenotbeing followed.”88

16. GEND dosimetry was not accredited by 1990 as required by DOE 

Regulation 5480.11. The plant lacked formal documentation of

investigationsinto personnel exposure anomalies and supervisors were

not required to acknowledge the facts surroundingtheassignmentof

radiationexposure to their personnel.89

17. The personnel dosimetry program at GEND did not ensure personnel

radiation exposures were accurately determined and recorded.”90

18. The contamination control program did not ensure that workers were 

protected from unnecessary radiation exposure.91

80 IBID. 81 IBID. 82 IBID. 83 IBID. 84 IBID. p. -92. 85 IBID. p. 4-93 86 IBID. p. 3-94 87 IBID. p. 4-94 88 IBID. p. 4-95 89 IBID. p. 4-96 90 IBID. p. 4-98 91 IBID. p. 4-102
35

f. In sum, the assessment of the Pinellas Plant by the Tiger Team identified numerous 

deficienciesinGENDoperations generally and safety and healthprocedures governing the 

exposure ofworkers to toxic chemicals and radiological hazards. Insufficient data 

collection calls into question the reliability of notonly the actual doses workers

received fromradiologicalmaterials. Exposure pathways remain underdeveloped and 

under reported. Incidents/accidents atthe Pinellas Plant are notfully reported thus

adversely impacting the ability to accurately reconstruct exposuresto toxic chemical and 

radiological materials. 

4. Matthew P. Moeller, Ronald D. Townsend, and David A. Dooley (2008) “The NIOSH 

Radiation Dose Reconstruction Program: Managing Technical Difficulties. 95(1):14-9: The 

initial challenges of this program included garnering sufficient and capable scientific staff, 

developing an effective infrastructure, establishing necessary methods and procedures, and 

integrating activities to ensure consistent, quality products. And while the Dose 

Reconstruction Program has been a helpful tool to analyze data related to worker exposure, 

challenges remain. These “challenges include maintaining the project focus on 

recommending a compensation determination (rather than generating an accurate dose 

reconstruction), managing the associated very large data and information management 

challenges, and ensuring quality control and assurance in the presence of an evolving 

infrastructure. The lessons learned concern project credibility, claimant favorability, project 

priorities, quality and consistency, and critical path project activities.” 

5. Richard E. Toohey (2005) “Scientific Issues in Radiation Dose Reconstruction.” Health 

Physics 95(1):26-35: This article points to several issues that continue to plague the dose 

reconstruction process. Most of these issues involve the scientific basis of radiation dose 

reconstruction for compensation. These issues include data issues, dosimetry issues, and 

compensation issues. Data issues include demographic data of the worker, changes in site 

operations over time (both production and exposure control), characterization of episodic 

vs. chronic exposures, and the use of coworker data. Dosimetry issues include methods for 

assessment of ambient exposures, missed dose, unmonitored dose, and medical x-ray dose 

incurred as a condition of employment. Specific issues related to external dose include the 

sensitivity, angular and energy dependence of personal monitors, exposure geometries, and 

the accompanying uncertainties. Those related to internal dose include sensitivity of 

bioassay methods, uncertainties in biokinetic models, appropriate dose coefficients, and 

modeling uncertainties. Compensation issues include uncertainties in the risk models and 

use of the 99th percentile of the distribution of probability of causation for awarding 

compensation. In order for the system of compensation to reach greater accuracy in the 

reflection of exposures to former nuclear weapons workers, these issues need further study 

and correction. 
36

Exhibit 1: Radioactive Material Inventory at the Pinellas Plant92

92 IBID. p. 23
37

Exhibit 2: Pinellas Plant Radioactive Source Historical Inventory Status93

93 IBID.
38

Exhibit 3: Radioactive Measurements of Pinellas County94

94 IBID.
39
40

Exhibit 4: Space Isotopic Power Systems95

95 Capt. RT Carpenter, USAF. Space isotopic power systems. Atomic Energy Commission. 

https://fas.org › nuke › space › carp
41

Exhibit 5: Properties of Isotopes Useful for Isotopic Power Generation96

96 IBID.
42

Appendix 1: 24-Hour Urine Heavy Metals Tests 

Background to requesting the tests: 

1) Several DEEOIC claimants represented by volunteered to have 

24-hour Heavy Metals Urine Tests Conducted. 

2) provided these claimants with a list of radionuclides for which to be 

tested: Beryllium;97 Cobalt; Thallium; and, Uranium.

3) In one particular case, a specific claimant was advised to be tested for Strontium-90

because of possible exposure due to specific employment categories. 

4) Claimants used three specific labs to have these tests conducted: LabCorp; Quest; and 

Genova Diagnostics. Although information was requested by regarding the 

process by which these tests were conducted, the labs stated that they were unable to 

provide that information at this time due to the demands for testing related to the 

current COVID-19 pandemic. 

5) A chart was created by , that summarizes the information obtained from 

claimants’ employment files and results of the 24-hour Urine Heavy Metals Test. Due to 

Privacy Act concerns, each claimant who participated was assigned a unique ID number. 

For each claimant, a list of their employment categories is provided. The reason this 

information has been included is to illustrate regardless of employment location, former 

workers had the potential for radiological exposures ignored by the existing tests within 

this facility. While some claimants included in this sample were tested by the Pinellas 

facility for radiologic exposure to tritium,98 neutrons and gamma; most claimants 

included were never afforded testing throughout the duration of their employment. It 

is also important to note that while one might argue that these exposures were 

insignificant, the shear fact that people were exposed to radionuclides without their 

knowledge is unacceptable. These exposures have more likely than not contributed to 

these individuals long term health concerns. 

6) Finally, redacted copies of the test results are also included in this appendix. 

7) Final note, in the case of one specific claimant, a complete file entailing medical, 

personnel and radiological information was not available through the DOL nor DOE. In 

fact, it was delivered to claimant via special delivery from University of Florida. We have 

been unable to ascertain as to why the file was never turned over to the DOE. 

97 As discussed elsewhere in this document, although Beryllium is not considered a radionuclide, it is included here 

to illustrate the extensive exposure of workers to this toxin. 98 In available dosimetry contained in several of these former employee’s files, no tritium exposure records exist 

prior to 1970 which impact the reliability of all dosimetry related to this material.
RESULTS HEAVY METALS TESTS FOR FORMER WORKERS AT PINELLAS PLANT*

ID Yrs Employed Beryllium Cobalt Strontium90 Thallium Uranium

1 1965-1997 X X

2 1963-1997 X X

3 1964-`970 X X

4 1963-1997 X X

5 X X

1982-1992 Pinellas

6 1967-1995 X X X

 

7 1958-1992

8 1968-1972 X X