### F I LE D U. S . COURT OF AP PE ALS E LEVE NTH CI RCUI T Fe br uar y 1, 2006 T HOM AS K. KAHN C L E RK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 05- 13859 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C . D ocketN o. 04 -016 37 -C V -T W T -1 O L I N U S H E R , J R .,
P e titio n e r - A p p e lla n t, v ersu s C A L V I N M O R T I N , R e s p o n d e n t- A p p e lle e , J A M E S E . D O N A L D , I n te r v e n o r - A p p e lle e .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e N o r th e rn D is tr ic t o f G e o r g ia

_________________________ ( F e b r u ar y 1, 2006) B efo re T JO F L A T , H U L L an d W IL S O N , C i rcu i tJu d g es.Although theCOA is silent on the matter of proc edural defa ult, we may

still reach the 1 issue. See M

cCoy v. United States , 266 F.3d 1245, 1248 n.2 ( 11th Cir. 2001). 2 P E R C U R I A M: O l i n U sher , Jr . , a G eorgi a pri soner procee di ng pro se, appeal s the di stri ct c o u r t’s d e n ia l o f

h is f e d e r a l h a b e a s p e titio n , b r o u g h t p u r s u a n t to 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 . T h e c e r tif

ic a te o f ap p e a lab ility ( “C O A ” ) in th e p r e s e n t ap p e a l c o n c e rn s o n ly U s he r ’ s c l a i m tha thi s a l l - w hi t e j ury a rr a y vi ol a t e d hi s S i xth A m e ndm e ntr i ghtt o a j ury r epre se nt i ng a f

ai r c ross -s ec t i on of the com m un i ty. T he di stri ctcourtre j ec t ed thi s c l a i m a s pr oc e dur a l l y de f a ul t e d, be c a us e the s t a t e c our tr e f us e d t o c ons i de rthe c l a i m a f t e rU s he r ’ s c ouns e l f

a i l e d t o obj e c ti n a t i m e l y m a nne ra ttr i a l . C ons trui ng U s h e r ’s p r o s e b r ie f

lib e r a lly , h e a r g u e s o n ap p e a l th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t e rr e d in its pr oc e dur a l de f

a ul trul i ng, a nd tha thi s a tt or ne y w a s i ne f f e c t i ve , c r e a t i ng c a us e a nd prej ud i ce suff

i ci entt o o verc om e the procedural defaul t . W e a ff i rm the di stri ct c o u r t. T he i s s ue of

w he the ra ha be a s pe t i t i one r ’ s c l a i m s a r e s ubj e c tt o the doc tr i ne o f p r o c e d u r a l d e f

a u lt is a m ix e d q u e s tio n o f la w a n d f

a c t th a t w e r e v ie w d e n o v o . Juddv. H

al ey , 250 F . 3d 1308, 1313 ( 11th C i r . 2001) . W e a na l y z e thi s i s s ue 1 ac cordi ng t o the fol l ow i ng rul e: I n a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h a s t a t e p r i s o n e rh a s d e f a u l t e d h i s f

e d e r a l c l a i ms in s ta te c o u r t p u r s u a n t to a n in d e p e n d e n t a n d a d e q u a te s ta te p ro ced u ral ru l e, fed eral h a b e a s rev i ew o f th e cl ai m s i s b arred u n l essA fundamental miscarriag e of justice is actual innocence. See M urray v. Carrier , 477 2 U. S. 4 78 , 4 96 , 1 06 S. Ct . 2 63 9, 26 49 , 9 1 L . E d. 2d 39 7 ( 19 86 ); Dretkev. Haley , 541 U.S. 386, 39 3- 94 , 1 24 S. Ct . 1 84 7, 18 52 , 1 58 L . E d. 2d 65 9 ( 20 04 ). Although U sh e r u se s th ephra se “funda mental miscarriag e of justice”on several occ asions, he does not a ppear to claim actual innocenc e. 3 the pri soner c an dem on stra t e c ause for the default a n d actual prej ud i ce as a r es ul tof th e alleg ed vi ol at i on of fe dera l l aw , or dem on stra t e that f a i l ur e t o c ons i de rthe c l a i m s w i l l r e s ul ti n a f unda m e nt a l m i s c a rr i a ge o f ju s tic e . C ol e m an v . T

hom ps on , 501 U . S . 722, 750, 111 S . C t . 2546, 2565, 115 L . E d. 2d 640 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ; P e o

p le s v . C a m

p b e ll , 3 7 7 F .3 d 1 2 0 8 , 1 2 3 4 - 3 5 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) , c e r t. deni ed , __ U . S . __ , 12 5 S . C t . 29 63 , 16 2 L . E d. 2d 89 2 (20 05 ). 2 W e app l y athree -par tt es tt o d et erm i ne w hether ast at e c ou rt ’ s proce du ra l ru lin g is in d e p e n d e n t a n d a d e q u a te : F ir s t, th e la s t s ta te c o u r t r e n d e r in g a ju d g m e n t in th e c a s e m u s t c le a r ly a n d e x p r e s s ly s ta te th a t it is r e ly in g o n s ta te p r o c e d u r a l ru le s to r e s o l v e th e f

e de r a l c l a i m w i th o u tr e a c h i n g th e me r i t s o f th a tc l a i m. S ec o n dl y, the st at e c ou rt ’ s dec i si on m ustre stsol i dl y on st at e l aw grou nd s, and m ay n otbe i nt ertw i ned w i th an i nt erpret at i on of fe dera l la w . F in a lly , th e s ta te ru le m u s t b e a d e q u a te , i . e. , i tm us tnotbe ap p li ed in an arb itra ry o r u n p re ce d en ted fa sh io n . T h e s tate co u rt’s pr ocedur a l rul e c a nnotbe “ m a ni f e s t l y unf a i r ” i n i t s tr e a tm e ntof the pe t i t i o n e r ’ s f

e de r a l c ons t i tut i ona l c l a i m t o be c ons i de r e d a de qua t e f or the pu rposes of the procedural defaul tdo ctri ne. J udd , 2 5 0 F .3 d a t 1 3 1 3 ( in te rn a l q u o te s a n d c ita tio n s o m itte d ) . H e r e , th e G e o r g ia C o u r t o f A p p e a ls e x p r e s s ly d e te r m in e d th a t U s h e rh a d f a ile d to p r e s e r v e h is c o n s titu tio n a l c la im , b e c a u s e h e d id n o t p r e s e n t h is c h a lle n g e to th e ju ry a rr a y inGeorg ia law require s that, “to avoid waiving a ny right to challeng e the c ompositi on of a 3 traverse jury

on appeal, a def

endant must raisesuch a challeng e prior to the c ommencement of voir dire .” Spencer v. Kemp , 7 8 1 F. 2 d 1 4 5 8 , 1 4 6 4 (1 1 thC i r. 1 9 8 6 ) ( enb an c) . T h e c h al l en ge must be in writing. See O.C.G.A. § 15-12- 162. 4 w ri t i ng and p ri or t o the com m ence m entof vo i r d i re , a s r e q u ir e d b y G e o r g ia la w . Se e U s h e rv . S ta te , 5 7 4 S .E .2 d 5 8 0 , 5 8 4 ( G a . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) . A lth o u g h th e s ta te 3 c o u r t a d d e d th a t “e v e n if [ U s h e r ’s c la im ] w a s p r o p e r ly p r e s e r v e d , it is m e r itle s s ,” i d. , th is d o e s n o t f

o r e c lo s e r e lia n c e o n a p r o c e d u r a l b a r . See M a rek v. S i n g l eta ry , 62 F . 3d 1295, 1301- 02 ( 11th C i r . 1995) ( “ W he n a s t a t e c our ta ddr e s s e s both the i nd ependentst at e procedural grou nd and t he m er i t s of the fe dera l const i tut i on al c l a i m , the f

e de r a l [ ha be a s ] c our ts houl d appl y the s t a t e pr oc e dur a l ba ra nd de c l i ne to re ac h th e m er it s o f th e c laim .”). A s f o r th e n ex t p ro n g , th e s tate co u rt’s p r o c e d u r a l d e c is io n r e s te d s o lid ly o n s ta te la w , a n d w a s n o t in te r tw in e d w ith fe dera l l aw . F i nal l y, U sherdo es no tar gu e–and w e do n otfi nd –thatthe st at e c ou rt appl i ed G eorgi a l aw i n an arbi tra ry or un prec edent ed fa shi on . T he re cord i nd i ca t es th a t U s h e r ’s c o u n s e l d id n o t lo d g e e v e n a n o r a l o b je c tio n to th e ju ry a rr a y u n til a f te rth e ju ry w a s s w o rn . T h e tr ia l ju d g e in d ic a te d th a t th e a tto rn e y c o u ld s u p p l e m e n tth e o b

j e c t i o n i n wr i t i n g l a t e ro n , b u th e f i l e d n o s u c h s u p p l e m e n t . As U s h e r ’s c h a lle n g e w a s n e ith e rtim e ly n o rp la c e d in w r itin g , th e s ta te ap p e lla te c o u r t’s ap p lic a tio n o f

G e o r g ia la w w a s n o t a rb itr a ry o ru n p r e c e d e n te d . SeeIt is un c ontrov e rt e d th at a writt e n c halleng eto U sh e r’ s jury array firs t a pp e are d in

his 4 amende d motion for a new trial. On direc t appeal, Usher’ s appellatecounsel pointed out that Georg ia cour

ts have sometimes per

mitted a defendant to object orally and later present the objection in writing , in a motion for a new trial. See, e .g. , An tho ny v . S tate , 444 S.E.2d 393 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). As the State pointed out in response, how ever , Anthonyinvolved a jury array with a disproportional number of colleg e students, and the de fenda nt would not have been awa re of this fac t until after voir dire . See id. at 39 4- 95 . Thu s, it w ould h avebe e n unf air to e xpe c t him to raise the issue prior to voir dire . See id. at 396. In the instant case , the State explained, Usher’ s trial counsel wa s able to discer n the race of

the member s of the jury

panel when they were brought into the courtroom, but made no oral objection until the day after voir direhad been c onducted a

nd the jury

had been selec ted, seated, and swor n. Nor did the attorney

follow up wi th a writt e n s upplement. Thus , U sh e r w a s n ot deprive d o f a fair oppo rt unity to raisehis objection in a timely

fashion. See A nthony , 444 S.E.2d at 395 (“[A] challeng e to the ar ray is not waived a s long a s it is raised at the ea rliest opportunity

to do so, and . . . if

the def endant ha s no fair oppor tunity to put his challeng e in writingat that time, he may do so for the f

irst time in a motion for a new

trial.”) ( emphasis adde d). Usher does not demonstratethat this rule, which we have c onsidered “rooted in sound policy,” see Spencer , 7 81 F .2 d at 14 65 , isfu ndamentally unfair. 5 Sp ence r , 7 8 1 F .2 d a t 1 4 6 4 ; O .C .G .A § 1 5 - 1 2 - 2 6 2 . U s h e rd e f a u lte d h is c la im in 4 s ta te c o u r t p u r s u a n t to a n in d e p e n d e n t a n d a d e q u a te s ta te p r o c e d u r a l ru le . T o s how c a us e t o ove r c om e thi s pr oc e dur a l de f a ul t , U s he ra r gue s tha tthe d e f a u lt w a s d u e to in e f

f e c tiv e a s s is ta n c e o f

tr ia l c o u n s e l. In order t o est abl i sh that coun se l ’ s per form ance i s c ause suff i ci entt o o verc om e adefaul t , the performance m us tbe c ons t i tut i ona l l y de f i c i e ntunde rthe s t a nda r d s e tf or th i n Stri cklan d v. W as hi ngton , 4 6 6 U .S . 6 6 8 , 1 0 4 S . C t. 2 0 5 2 , 8 0 L . E d . 2 d 6 7 4 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . See B row nl ee v. H

al ey , 30 6 F . 3d 10 43 , 10 66 (11t h C i r. 20 02 ). U nd er Str i c kland , a defe nd antm ustshow that(1) hi s c ou nsel ’ s per form ance w as defi ci enti n that c o u n s e l m a d e e rr o r s s o s e r io u s th a t h e w a s n o t f u n c tio n in g a s th e “c o u n s e l” gu ar ant ee d b y the S i xth A m endm ent , and (2) there i s are as on abl e probabi l i ty that6

th e o u tc o m e w o u ld h a v e b e e n d if f e r e n t, b u t f

o rc o u n s e l’s u n p r o f

e s s io n a l e rr o r s . Str i c kland , 4 6 6 U .S . a t 6 8 7 , 6 9 4 , 1 0 4 S .C t. a t 2 0 6 4 , 2 0 6 8 . F i r s tof a l l , i tdoe s notappe a rtha tU s he rpr ope r l y r a i s e d a n i ne f f e c t i ve assi st an ce o f co u n sel cl ai m , ei th er o n d i rectap p eal o r i n st at e h ab eas p ro ceed i n g s, th a t w a s b a s e d o n h is c o u n s e l’s f a ilu r e to m a k e a tim e ly o b je c tio n to th e ju ry a rr a y . T h i s i n i t s e l f

c o n s t i tu t e s a d i s t i n c tp r o c e d u r a l d e f a u l tf o rwh i c h Us h e rh a s s h o wn n e ith e rc a u s e n o rp r e

ju d ic e . Se e C ham be rs v . T hom ps on , 150 F . 3d 1324, 1325- 27 (11t h C i r. 19 98 ); O . C . G . A § 9 -14-51 . T hu s, U sherca nn otre l y upo n a si m i l ar c l a i m of i ne f f e c t i ve a s s i s t a nc e t o e s t a bl i s h c a us e f orthe pr oc e dur a l de f

a ul ta ti s s ue in th is ap p e a l: th e u n tim e ly o b je c tio n to th e ju ry a rr a y . See E dw ards v. C arpent er , 5 2 9 U. S . 4 4 6 , 4 5 0 - 5 1 , 1 2 0 S . C t . 1 5 8 7 , 1 5 9 1 , 1 4 6 L . E d . 2 d 5 1 8 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ( “ [ A] p ro ced u ral l y d efau l t ed i n effecti v e-assi st an ce-o f-co u n sel cl ai m can serv e as cau se t o excuse the procedural defaul tof anot her habeas cl ai m on l y i f the habeas pe t i t i one rc a n s a t i s f

y the ‘ c a us e a nd pr e

j udi c e ’ s t a nda r d w i th r e s pe c tt o the in e f f e c tiv e a s s is ta n c e c la im its e lf .” ) . Ev e n i f U s h e rd i d p r o p e r l y r a i s e th e ap p r o p r i a t e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e c l a i m, he ha s s t i l l f

a i l e d t o s how c a us e f

orthe pr oc e dur a l de f

a ul ta ti s s ue . U s he rha s not a de qua t e l y e xpl a i ne d how hi s tr i a l c ouns e l ’ s f a i l ur e t o obj e c ti n a t i m e l y f a s hi on, and p rovi de a w ri tt en supp l em ent , w as “ so i neff ec t i ve as t o v i ol at e the F eder alThus, while “petit juries mustbe dra wn from a

sourcefairly

representa

tive of the 5 community ,” there is “no re quirement that pe tit juries actually chosen must mirror the community

and re flec t the various distinctive groups in the population.” Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S. C t. 692, 702, 42 L . Ed. 2d 690 (1975). Under Taylor , “ thejur y wh e e ls, po olsof name s, pa

ne ls, or venire s f ro m which th ejurie s a

redrawn mus t no t systematic ally exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby

fail to be re asonably

representative there of.” Id. 7 C on st i tut i on , ” E dw ar ds , 529 U . S . a t451, 120 S . C t . a t1591, be c a us e the obj e c t i on U s h e rd e s ir e d u ltim a te ly la c k e d m e r it. C f . B row nl ee , 30 6 F . 3d at10 66 (“ C ou nsel w as no ti neff

ec t i ve for f

ai l i ng t o rai se these i ss ues bec ause they c l ea rl y l ac k m eri t . ”). U sh er’ s S i x th A m en d m en tri g h tw as t o “ th e p resen ce o f a fai r cro sss e c tio n o f

th e c o m m u n ity o n v e n ir e p a n e ls , o rlis ts f r o m w h ic h g r a n d a n d p e tit j uri es ar e dra w n. ” U

ni t e d Stat e s v . H

e nde rs on , 40 9 F . 3d 12 93 , 13 05 (11t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) . T o d e m o n s tr a te a p r im a f a c ie v io la tio n o f

th is r ig h t, U s h e rm u s t p r o v e : 5 ( 1) tha tthe gr oup a l l e ge d t o be e xc l ude d i s a ‘ di s t i nct i ve ’ gr oup i n the c om m uni ty ; ( 2) t h at the r e pr e s e nt a t i on of thi s gr oup i n ve ni r e s f r om w hi c h j u r i e s a r e s e l e c t e d i s n o t f a i r a n d r e a s o n a b l e i n r e l a t i on t o t he n u m b e ro f

s u c h p e r s o n s in th e c o m m u n ity ; a n d ( 3 ) th a t th is unde rr e pr e s e nt a t i on i s due t o s yst em at i c e xc l us i on of the gr oup i n the ju ry s e le c tio n p r o c e s s . H e nde rs on , 409 F . 3d a t1305. H e r e , U s he rw oul d notha ve s uc c e e de d, be c a us e ( 1) he c onc e de s tha tthe 1990 c e ns us num be r s w e r e the pr ope rbe nc hm a r k f orappl y i ng the fa i r c ross -s ec t i on re qu i re m ent , (2) the un cont rovert ed re cord evi dence i s that the perce nt age of bl ac k p er sons on the appl i cabl e tra vers e j ury l i st(7. 4% ) r ef l ec t ed the pe r c e nt a ge of

bl a c k pe r s ons ( 18 y e a r s a nd ol de r ) i n R oc kda l e c ounty i n 1990Usher a rgues that he is entitled to re lief under J oh ns on v . Ca lif

or nia , _ _ U .S. __ , 1 25 S. 6 Ct. 2410, 162 L . Ed. 2d 129 (2005) a nd Miller-El v. Dre tke , _

_ U . S . _ _ , 1 2 5 S . C t . 2 3 1 7 , 1 6 2 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005). Unlike Usher’ s case , however, Mi ller-El and Johnson involved alleg ations that prosecutors had intentionally used peremptory

strikes to exclude potential jurors base d on their race. 8 ( 7. 37% ) , w i thi n a m a r gi n of . 03% , a nd ( 3) U s he rdoe s noti de nt i f y , a nd w e do not f i nd, a ny r e c or d e vi de nc e tha tbl a c k pe r s ons w e r e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y e xc l ude d dur i ng the pr oc e s s i n w hi c h j ur or s w e r e dr a w n f r om the tr a ve r s e j ury l i s tt o s e r ve on U s h e r ’s ju ry a rr a y . Se e B e r r y hi l l v . Zant , 858 F . 2d 633, 638 ( 11th C i r . 1988) ( pe t i t i one rm us ts how tha tgr oup i n que s t i on w a s “ s y s t e m a t i c a l l y e xc l ude d f r om the j ury s ou rc e” ) . Wh e r e a p e t i t i o n e rf

a i l s t o s h o w c a u s e t o o v e r c o m e a p r o c e d u r a l d e f a u l t , we n e e d n o t g o o n to d e te r m in e w h e th e rth e r e is p r e ju d ic e . Se e Mc C l e s ke

y v . Zant , 499 U . S . 467, 494- 495, 111 S . C t . 1454, 1470, 113 L . E d. 2d 517 ( 1991) . F orthe re as on s s t at ed abov e, U sherhas notshow n cause for hi s proce du ra l defaul t , no r has he ra i se d a col orabl e c l ai m thatthere w as a f un dam ent al m i sc arri age of j ust i ce . 6 A c c or di ngl y , the di s tr i c tc our tdi d note rri n di s m i s s i ng U s he r ’ s ha be a s pe t i t i on, a n d w e a f

f i r m. AF F I RME D.