## In T he Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07

- 20

- 00218

- CR

DYRON DONTAVIOUS THOMPSON , A PPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , APPELLEE On Appeal from the 440th District Court Coryell County, Texas Trial Court No

. 17

- 24064 , Honorable Grant Kinsey , Presiding



### January 5, 2021 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS , JJ. Dyron Dontavious Thompson , appellant, appeal ed his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and contend ed (via o ne issue) his conviction lacked sufficient eviden tiary support . We affirm

. 1

1 Because this appeal was transferred from the T enth Court of Appeals, we are obligated to apply its precedent when available in the event of a conflict between the precedents of that court and this Court. See T EX

. R. A PP . P. 41.3

.2

Background The following was obtained from the trial of the cause. According to a Copperas Cove police officer , the latter performed a traffic stop on appellant after appellant left a residence known for drug trafficking . The officer observed appellant fail to signal a turn , initiated the stop , knew appellant by his vehicle and from previous contact , and knew appellant was t he subject of outstanding warrants. Rather than stop , appellant “rolled very slowly for a block.” Driving slowly and having just left a known drug house indicated, to the officer, that appellant may either be attempting to hide or eat narcotics or acquir e or hide a weapon. Eventually , appellant stop ped, at which point the officer saw two pe ople in the car. One was appellant, who drove. The other was a female sitting in the front passenger
seat. The officer arrested appellant based on the active arre st warrants and decided to impound the vehicle. A ppellant became upset about the vehicle being impounded but , nevertheless , consented to its search. Once the passenger was removed, a search ensued. It revealed a bag containing methamphetamine “in the dr iver’s seat where the back of the seat meets the part of the cushion that you sit on.” Appellant did not act surprised or confused upon the officer’s discovery of the drug. Nor did he deny that it was his.
T he vehicle belonged to someone other than appellant

. Its owner testified that appellant borrowed the car from time to time since they ha d two children together. She also denied that she used drugs or that the drugs belonged to her.
D rugs were not found on the pass enger or by the front passenger seat. The
passenger also testified that the drugs were not hers , did not know from where they came ,3

and did not see appellant buy the drugs at the aforementioned drug house. Nevertheless,

s he conceded that she and appellan t had planned to smoke methamphetamine at a motel and “hang out

. ” Issue

– Possession Appellant contends that the evidence showing possession is “so tenuous that this Court must reverse the conviction.” 2 We overrule the issue.
T o establish that appellant possessed the narcotic, the State had to show he 1) exercised "actual care, custody, control, or management" of the substance, and 2) knew the matter possessed was contraband. T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp.
2020 ); Poindexter v. St ate , 153 S.W.3d 402, 405

– 06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Here, the alleged infraction occurred in a vehicle occupied by two people. In that circumstance, various non

- exclusive factors become relevant to the question of whether appellant, as opposed to another occupant, possessed the contraband. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at
406. T h ey include: 1) the defendant's presence when a search wa s conducted; 2) whether the contraband was in plain view; 3) the defendant's proximity to and accessibility of the contraband; 4) whether the defendant was under the influence of contraband when arrested; 5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; 6) whether th e defendant made any incriminating statements when arrested; 7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; 8) whether the defendant made any furtive gestures; 9) whether there was an odor of contraband present ; 10) whether other contraband or drug parapherna lia was present; 11) whether the defendant owned or had

2 One is guilty of possession of a co ntrolled substance when they knowingly or intentionally possess a control substance, i.e., methamphetamine. See T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN

. § 481.115(a) (West 2017 ).4

the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; 12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; 13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and 14) wheth er the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evans v. State , 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ; see Triplett v. State, 292 S.W.3d 205, 208

– 09 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2009, pet. ref'd) ; see also Harrell v. State , No. 10

- 16

- 00342

- CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 4629, at *9

– 10 (Tex. App.

— Waco June 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Evans, supra ). To reiterate, t he record contained evidence that: 1) appellant drove the vehicle with permission of its owner; 2) the drugs were found in the very seat on which he sat and were seen when the officer pushed on the seat ; 3) he had just left a known drug house;
4 ) he failed to immediately stop when the officer attempted to halt him; 5 ) he engaged in conduc t which the officer interpreted (based on his experience) as effort to hide or destroy drugs or hide or obtain a weapon; 6 ) the drug s a ppeared to have been recently placed in the location where it was found, according to the officer; 7 ) appellant did not act surprise d when it was found; 8) appellant did not deny the contraband was his ; 9 ) the passenger had no drugs on her person and denied those in the car were hers; 10) she and appellant had intended to consume, at a local motel, the v ery type of drugs found in appellant’s
seat ; 11) she lacked opportunity to hide the drugs in the driver’s seat since another officer was in her presence once appellant was arrested, and 1 2 ) though a third party owned the vehicle that individual denied owne rship of the drug s . In viewing th is evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, we conclude that it wa s enough for a rational fact

- finder to reasonably infer, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found in his car seat. Metcalf v. State , 597 S.W.3d 847 , 855

– 56 (Tex.5

Crim. App. 2020) (describing the pertinent standard of review, which standard included the obligation to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and stating that j uries may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence if each inference is supported by the evidence )

. We overrule appellant’s sole issue. Accordingly, t he judgment of the trial court is affirmed

.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice
Do not publish.