[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Delta Lookout, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5486.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -5486
T HE S TATE EX REL
. D ELTA L OOKOUT , L.L.C., A PPELLANT , v . T HE C ITY OF C INCINNATI ET AL ., A PPELLEES
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Delta Lookout, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5486.] Mandamus—Platting Commission Act created a method of achieving a statutory dedication—Two streets near appellant’s office building were subject of a statutory dedication as of 1876 under terms of Platting Commission Act— Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ reversed and cause remanded for that court to determine whether appe llant satisfied all requirements of
mandamus standard. (No. 2020-0205—Submitted August 18, 2020—Decided December 3, 20 20.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-170107, 2019-Ohio-5353.

_________________ Per Curiam.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 1} Appellant, Delta Lookout, L.L.C., appeals a judgment of the Fir st District Court of Appeals denyin g its request for a writ of man damus ordering appellees, the city of Cincinnati, Cincinnati Mayor John Cranle y, former Cincinnati City Manager Harry Black, and former Cincinnati Director of Tra nsportation and Engineering Michael Moore (collectively, “the city”), to repair and maintain two
streets located within Cincinnati’s boundaries. 1 In denying the writ, the court of appeals determined that the streets were never subject to a sta tutory or commonlaw dedication, leading it to conclude that the streets are pri vate rather than public. On appeal, Delta Lookout argues that the streets were the subje ct of a statutory
dedication as of 1876 under the te rms of the Platting Commissio n Act. We agree. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgme nt of the court of appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND {¶ 2} The two streets at issue are Willbarre Terrace (formerly, Hills ide Street) and Close Court, which are located in the Mt. Lookout n eighborhood of
Cincinnati. Willbarre Terrace runs northeast to southwest and is intersected by Close Court, which runs mostly east to west. Cincinnati has ne ver passed an ordinance accepting the street s as public. And the parties do not identify in whose
name the streets are titled. {¶ 3} Delta Lookout owns an office building that abuts Willbarre Terr ace and, in March 2017, filed a complaint in the court of appeals s eeking a writ of mandamus to compel the city to repair and maintain the streets. Delta Lookout alleged that the city’s neglect of the streets had resulted in unsafe conditions caused by inadequate water drainage. After the parties filed cross-mo tions for summary judgment, the court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the streets had never

1. The current interim city manager, Paula Boggs Muething, and the current director of transportation and engineering, John Brazina, are automatically substituted as appellees. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B).January Term, 2020

3 become public through either a statutory or common-law dedicati on. 2 Delta Lookout then appealed to th is court as of right.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶ 4} “In order to grant a writ of mandamus, a court must find that t he relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that the rel ator has no plain and adequate remedy at law.” State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft , 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (1992). Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Esber Beverage Co. v. Labatt USA Operating Co., L.L.C. , 138 Ohio St.3d 71, 2013-Ohio4544, 3 N.E.3d 1173, ¶ 9.
III. ANALYSIS {¶ 5} Delta Lookout asserts one pr oposition of law for us to
consider:

The Platting Commission Act of 1871, as amended,
authorized an alternative form o f statutory dedication separate and
distinct from that codified in current Section 723.03 of the Oh io Revised Code, and not requiring the passage of an ordinance specially accepting such dedication.

For the reasons that follow, we adopt the proposition of law an d further conclude
that the streets at issue were t he subject of a statutory dedic ation. A. Statutory dedication {¶ 6} The Revised Code does not define the term “statutory dedication ,” but long ago, we explained that the term means compliance with the statutory

2. Although the court of appeals’ opinion and judgment entry do not explicitly state that it granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, that is the only plausi ble basis for the court’s disposition.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 requirements for achieving a dedication of a public street. See Lessee of Fulton v. Mehrenfeld , 8 Ohio St. 440, 444-445 (1858). {¶ 7} Generally, this process cont emplates (1) a landowner’s dedication of land for street purposes to a public authority and (2) a public authority’s acceptance of that land for street purposes. As an example, a current met hod of statutory dedication provides for a “proprie tor[’s]” dedication of a stre et or alley for public use together with a “municipal corporation[’s]” acceptance of t he street or alley as confirmed by an ordinance. R.C. 723.03; but see Eggert v. Puleo , 67 Ohio St.3d 78, 84, 616 N.E.2d 195 (1993) (observing that the method prescr ibed by R.C. 723.03 is not exclusive). An older procedure, as described by a court of appeals, required proof “that the land wa s conveyed to the public for ro ad or street purposes by deed or plat duly recorded and accepted by the proper author ities * * *.”
Oberhelman v. Allen , 29 Ohio C.D. 596, 598 (1st Dist.1915). The term “commonlaw dedication” bears a similar meaning. See Mehrenfeld at 446 (“To constitute a binding dedication of ground to public uses at common law, ther e must have been an intention to dedicate, and an actual dedication, on the part of the owner, and an acceptance on the part of the public, which may be proved by th e circumstances of the case”). B. The Platting Commission Act {¶ 8} The question we must decide here is whether the Platting Commis sion Act furnishes a means of achieving a statutory dedication. Pas sed in 1871, the act empowers the council of a municipal corporation to “appoint a c ommission” to create a plat “showing the location of the streets and alleys a lready dedicated and those proposed * * *.” Section 1, 68 Ohio Laws 36

. Upon completing the plat, the commission is required to submit it to the office of the city c ivil engineer to allow interested persons to object to it. Id. After the time for objections has expired, and after the commission has made any needed alterations to the pla t, the commission is required to submit it in finalized form to the offices of th e county recorder andJanuary Term, 2020

5 city civil engineer. Id. at 37. The submitted plat constitu tes “the regularly adopted plan for streets and alleys * * * and no streets or alleys, exc ept those laid down on such plan, shall subsequently be in any way accepted as public streets or alleys by the municipal corporation * * *.” Id. {¶ 9} Section 2 of the act, much of which is now codified at R.C. 735 .24, provides that “owners of any portion of the ground so platted m ay at any time” accept the plan insofar “as it concerns their property” by decl aring and recording their intention to accept in the county recorder’s office. 68 Ohio Laws at 37. “[S]uch acceptance, or the selling of lots referring to the pla n or the streets and alleys therein laid out, shall be a statutory dedication of the streets and alleys in the property described in the accepta nce, or of the streets or alle ys [associated with] the
lots so sold * * *.” Id. {¶ 10} In 1876, the legislature vested t he duties of the platting comm ission in a board of public works. 73 Ohio Laws 43, 43-44. For simpl icity, we refer to the board of public works a s the platting commission. C. The Platting Commission Act furnis hes a means of achieving a statutory
dedication {¶ 11} Although Delta Lookout’s argument does not focus on the text of the Platting Commission Act, Section 2 of the act is key to resolvi ng the interpretive dispute in this case. See In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. , 150 Ohio St.3d 437, 2017-Ohio-5536, 82 N.E.3d 1148, ¶ 19 (observing that “with any question involving statutory construction, we begin our analysi s with the statutory language”). {¶ 12} Section 2 expressly provides that an owner of ground covered by the platting commission’s “regularly adopted plan for streets and a lleys” may achieve a “statutory dedication” by following the steps prescribed by t he act. Although the phrase “statutory dedication” is undefined, Mehrenfeld (a pre-act decision) explains that the phrase means to comply with a statute’s requirements f or achieving aS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 dedication of a public street. 8 Ohio St. at 444-446. We thus presume that the phrase “statutory dedication,” a s it is used in the act, bears the meaning that we assigned to it in Mehrenfeld

. See R.C. 1.42 (when a phrase has “acquired a technical or particular meaning ,” it should be construed accord ing to that meaning);
Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. , 10 Ohio St.3d 163, 166, 462 N.E.2d 403 (1984), quoting Tax Comm. of Ohio v. Sec. Savs. Bank & Trust Co. of Toledo , 117 Ohio St. 443, 450, 159 N.E. 570 (1927) (the General Assembly pr esumably knows this court’s caselaw “ ‘and, where it uses words or phrases tha t have been defined or construed by this court, it is presumed to have used them in the sense that they
have been so defined o r construed’ ”). {¶ 13} It follows, then, that the phrase “statutory dedication” in Sec tion 2 means compliance with the act’s provisions for the purpose of a chieving a dedication of a public street. A nd when such compliance is sho wn—that is, by the commission’s finalizing the plan and the owner’s accepting the plan—a street will be deemed public. {¶ 14} This interpretation is supporte d by decisions cited by Delta Lo okout in support of its proposition of law. For example, Boyce v. Cincinnati , 9 Ohio Dec.Rep. 763 (Super.Ct.1886)—which appears to be the first deci sion to have
addressed the act—tracks this int erpretation. In that case, th e plaintiffs sought to enjoin the city of Cincinnati from improving a part of a street on the ground that the street had never been dedicated to public use. Cincinnati countered with a deed in which the grantor had referre d to the street in question as laid out by the platting commission and, in describing the lot, called for the street as the commission had laid it out. The grantor’s recognition in the deed of the comm ission’s work, Cincinnati argued, meant that the grantor had dedicated the str eet. {¶ 15} The court agreed, explaining that the act “reverses the order” of the
common-law method of dedication. Id. at 764. Under the act, “[t]he acceptance of the city is indicated in advan ce, that is, the wish of the publ ic authorities that thereJanuary Term, 2020

7 shall be a street in a particular place is first officially ind icated, and after that the only point remaining is to show the acceptance or consent by th e owner,” which takes the form of a “declaration acknowledged and recorded” or a “deed calling for the plan or for the streets and alleys shown on it.” Id. at 764-765. From those principles, the court reasoned tha t the grantor, whose deed fol lowed “the adoption, publication and recording of the [commission’s] plan,” had achi eved “a dedication to public use.” Id. at 765. {¶ 16} Under this reasoning, compliance with the act constitutes a val id method of achieving a statutory d edication. The city would hav e us distinguish Boyce on the ground that whereas the public authority in that case h ad taken steps to improve the street, nothing similar has occurred here. We d isagree, for the court
in Boyce did not assign significance to the city’s attempted improvemen ts in discussing the meaning of the act. {¶ 17} The First District Court of Appeals’ decision in Hermann v. Spitzmiller , 34 Ohio C.D. 453 (1st Dist.1914), reflects the reasoning of Boyce , for it too explains that the actions of a platting commission do suffice to constitute acceptance of a public street. See Hermann at 455. And contrary to the city’s argument, our decision in Wisby v. Bonte , 19 Ohio St. 238 (1869), does not
undermine Hermann , for the simple reason that we decided Wisby more than a year
before the act became law. {¶ 18} Here, the court of appeals found Winslow v. Cincinnati , 9 Ohio Dec. 89 (Super.Ct.1899), dispositive of the question presented. In Winslow , the court compared the act to an Ohio s tatute—R.S. 2650, 66 Ohio Laws 222 , a precursor to R.C. 723.03—that created a method of achieving a statutory dedi cation through the passage of an ordinance. The court in Winslow wrote, “We can not think that the ‘acceptance’ referred to in the platting commission statute is anything other than a statutory acceptance by the muni cipal corporation which imposes upon it a liability to repair, and that in this respect the purpose of the act is n o different from” R.S.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 2650’s. Id. at 96. The court went on to decl are that the power vested in the platting commission by the act “is exclusively that of acceptance.” Id. {¶ 19} The court of appeals understood Winslow as “h[o]ld[ing] that the 1871 Act’s reference to subsequent acceptance by a municipality following the work of the platting commission rebutted the contention that th e 1871 Act empowered the platting commission with the authority to dedicat e streets as public.” 2019-Ohio-5353, 150 N.E.3d 556, ¶ 12. Based on this understanding of
Winslow , the court of appeals concluded that “the 1871 Act does not im plicitly accept streets as public simply because the platting commission included the streets on a plat map.” Id. {¶ 20} We disagree. Winslow expressly states that the act vests the platting commission with the power of accepta nce, yet the court of appea ls concluded here that the act does not deem a street as accepted when it appears on the commission’s map. The court of appeals’ analy sis raises the question of wha t else the act requires to achieve an acceptance of a street. The answer cannot be the passage of an ordinance, because although Winslow compares the purpose of the act to a statute requiring the passage of an ordinance, the court in Winslow did not hold that the act requires the passage of an ordinance. And although the court of appeal s did not
cite Boyce , that decision explains that the plan itself constitutes the m unicipality’s acceptance. {¶ 21} In summary, the text of the act and the caselaw construing it b oth
confirm that the act creates a method of achieving a statutory dedication. D. The streets at issue were the subj ect of a statutory dedication as of 1876 {¶ 22} Having concluded that the act c reates a method of achieving a statutory dedication, we next c onsider whether the two streets at issue were the subject of a statutory dedication. {¶ 23} Delta Lookout’s most compelling evid ence that the streets were statutorily dedicated is a document entitled “Map of Cincinnati Compiled UnderJanuary Term, 2020

9 the Direction of the Platting Commission 1876.” A reference ke y denotes
“dedicated streets” with solid lines, “proposed streets adopted by the platting commission” with dashed lines, a nd so on. The map identifies t he disputed streets
with a solid line. {¶ 24} We conclude that the map shows that the streets were the subjec t of a statutory dedication. First, in accord with the presumption of regularity, which is unrebutted here, we presume that the platting commission meant what it said on the map and that the steps necessary to achieve a statutory dedicat ion were followed
here. See Gaston v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision , 133 Ohio St.3d 18, 2012-Ohio3872, 975 N.E.2d 941, ¶ 16. Second, the city offers very littl e to dissuade us from crediting the map as accurately depicting the streets as statut orily dedicated. It appears to contend that the map i s unreliable because the parti es’ joint stipulation of facts does not include a stipul ation that the streets were e ver dedicated. But a stipulation of facts need not res olve every contested issue in a case. See Kestner v.
Kestner , 173 Ohio App.3d 632, 2007-Ohio-6222, 879 N.E.2d 849, ¶ 29 (7t h Dist.) (“A stipulation is a voluntary agreement entered into between o pposing parties concerning the disposition of som e relevant point in order to e liminate the need for proof on an issue or to narrow th e range of issues to be litiga ted”). {¶ 25} Accordingly, we conclude that the two streets at issue were the subject of a statutory dedication as of 1876.
IV. CONCLUSION {¶ 26} Although we adopt Delta Lookout ’s proposition of law and
determine that the streets were the subject of a statutory dedi cation as of 1876, our decision today does not mean tha t Delta Lookout is now entitled to a writ of
mandamus. That is because De lta Lookout still must show that i t has a clear legalS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 right to the relief requested and that the city has a clear leg al duty to perform the requested acts. 3 {¶ 27} It is true that in a proper case, we may exercise “discretionar y, plenary authority to fully addr ess the merits of an extraordina ry action as if it were originally filed in this court, without the necessity of remand .” State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 27. But we decline to exercise that aut hority here, because the parties have not adequately b riefed the clear-legal-right a nd clear-legal-duty requirements of the mandamus sta ndard—understandable omissions in light of the court of appeals’ analysis, whi ch, given its conclusion that th e act did not furnish a method of achieving a statutory dedication, esche wed a comprehe nsive mandamus discussion. On remand, the court of appeals will need to fully apply the mandamus
standard and determine whether Delta Lookout has satisfied all its requirements. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Delev & Associates, L.L.C., Gregory D. Delev, and Donald W. Ha rper II, for appellant. Paula Boggs Muething, Cincinnati City Solicitor, and Shuva J. Paul, Assistant City Solicitor, for appellees.

_________________

3. Because the court of appeals’ d etermination that Delta Looko ut lacks an adequate remedy at law is undisputed, we do not disturb it. See 2019-Ohio-5353, 150 N.E.3d 556, at ¶ 5-8.