Œ After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have

concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the

appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2).

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1532

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY COLLINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division

No. 87-CR-105—Larry J. McKinney, Chief Judge.

____________

SUBMITTEDŒ AUGUST 15, 2007—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 2007

____________

Before COFFEY, EVANS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM. Five years after Jeffrey Collins’s plea

agreement and conviction, the government asked the

district court to find him in breach of the agreement. In

this appeal we review whether the district court had

jurisdiction to do this, and if so, whether the district

court’s finding of breach was clearly erroneous. We hold

that the district court had jurisdiction, and that its finding was not clearly erroneous.
2 No. 07-1532

Collins was indicted in 1987 as a leader of a ten-year

drug operation that smuggled at least 140,000 pounds of

marijuana into the United States, creating millions of

dollars in proceeds for Collins. He also set up a series of

front corporations, which he used to perform fraudulent

transactions in order to hide the source and movement

of his drug money. Collins escaped from custody one

month after the 1987 indictment and remained a fugitive

until his arrest in 1997. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to a

Continuing Criminal Enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848, and in

1999 he additionally pleaded guilty to money laundering,

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), and escape, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). The

district court sentenced him to a total of 23 years’ imprisonment.

The plea agreement that Collins made with the government obligated him to disclose his interests in any assets

that stemmed from his drug transactions, to aid the

government in the recovery of those assets, to forfeit all

those assets and interests to the United States, and not

to contest any action initiated by the government for

that purpose. In particular Collins agreed to identify and

assist in the forfeiture of millions of dollars that he held

through various corporate entities in accounts in the

Principality of Liechtenstein. In return, the government

committed to set aside a significant portion of the recovered funds in trust for Collins’s wife and children. The

parties also agreed that if the government believed Collins

was in breach, it would ask the district court to determine whether there was a breach before taking any

“unilateral” action.

As the government began to pursue these funds in

Liechtenstein, it sent a letter to Collins’s attorneys stating that its resources for this pursuit were limited and

that Collins “was free” to use his own funds to assist in

recovering the money. Collins instead retained counsel in

Liechtenstein to oppose the government’s recovery efforts.
No. 07-1532 3

He also testified in the Liechtenstein proceedings that he

was never a drug dealer and that the money in that

country’s accounts was legally earned and not subject to

forfeiture. Additionally, he unsuccessfully attempted to

have the district court here prohibit the U.S. government

from documenting to the Liechtenstein courts Collins’s

crimes and illicit sources of his money. Several years of

legal proceedings ensued in Liechtenstein, culminating

in the Liechtenstein court ultimately returning the money

to Collins after ruling that it was not the product of illegal

transactions.

In response to Collins’s efforts to block the forfeiture of

these funds, in 2005 the government asked the district

court in Collins’s criminal case to find that Collins had

breached his plea agreement. The government also requested that the court issue a preliminary order of forfeiture of Collins’s assets in Liechtenstein and relieve the

government of its obligations under the plea agreement.

After considering Collins’s actions recounted above, the

district court found that Collins had breached the plea

agreement and awarded the government the relief it

had requested. But then the court sua sponte amended

its order, limiting it to a factual finding of breach alone.

Collins appeals this order.

We briefly address the issue of appellate jurisdiction.

The district court’s order is unusual in that it found a

breach but did not award relief. Nonetheless, the order

affects legal relationship between the parties, and the

court made clear after issuing its finding that it was

finished with the case. Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction. See United States v. Ettrick Wood Prod., 916 F.2d

1211, 1216 (7th Cir. 1990); see generally Chase Manhattan

Mortgage Corp. v. Moore, 446 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2006)

(similar circumstance in the civil context).

Collins first argues that the district court did not have

jurisdiction to consider the government’s motion because
4 No. 07-1532

the motion came five years after the entry of judgment

and because the court never ordered the forfeiture of his

assets at sentencing. As to timing, a court always has

jurisdiction to enforce a defendant’s obligations under a

plea agreement unless the government too has breached,

a position that Collins has not developed on appeal. See

United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2003)

(recognizing defendant’s breach of plea agreement); United

States v. Sowemimo, 335 F.3d 567, 570-72 (7th Cir. 2003)

(same); United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 419 (7th

Cir. 2000) (same). Though courts have not explicitly

stated the source of this jurisdiction, we note that it is

secured by 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which provides to the federal

district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions,

suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.” The

motion in this case was a proceeding initiated by the

government to enforce its rights under the plea agreement. This brings its actions within the ambit of § 1345.

Contrary to Collins’s arguments, it does not matter how

many years have passed since the district court issued

judgment because under § 1345 all that matters for

purposes of jurisdiction is that the government initiated

the proceeding. Likewise, Collins’s argument that the

district court lacked jurisdiction because it never ordered

a forfeiture of his assets at sentencing is unavailing. The

government need not specifically seek to enforce an order

of forfeiture to satisfy the conditions for jurisdiction under

§ 1345; the statute covers all government-initiated proceedings.

We turn, therefore, to Collins’s argument that the

district court erred in finding that he was in breach of his

plea agreement. Analogizing to the enforcement of civil

settlement agreements, the government suggests that we

review the court’s finding for abuse of discretion. But

because the court made only a factual finding of breach

and awarded no relief, we think this factual determination,
No. 07-1532 5

like factual determinations in general, should be reviewed

for clear error. See, e.g., Winkler v. Gates, 481 F.3d 977,

882 (7th Cir. 2007). There was no clear error here. In

exchange for his plea, reduced sentence, and the permitted

family trust fund, Collins agreed to recover and forfeit the

funds in Liechtenstein to the government. But instead he

aggressively prevented the forfeiture. The only evidence

Collins identifies in support of his argument that he did

not breach is the letter sent from the government to his

counsel. He offers this letter without any context to aid in

its interpretation. Nowhere in the letter does the government tell him that he could contest the recovery of the

funds and keep them himself without breaching his plea

agreement. Consequently he has not shown that the

district court’s finding of breach was a clear error.

Collins’s final argument is moot. He argues that the

government was not permitted to seek a preliminary order

of forfeiture in the district court because it had not

sought such an order at sentencing. But the district

court’s final order did not award such relief.

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—9-25-07