SEC Petition Evaluation Report 

Petition SEC-00139 

Report Rev #: Addendum 1 Report Submittal Date: August 2, 2011 

Subject Expert(s): Robert Coblentz 

Site Expert(s): N/A 

Petition Administrative Summary 

Petition Under Evaluation 

Petition # Petition 

Type 

Petition 

Receipt Date 

Qualification 

Date 

DOE/AWE Facility Name 

SEC-00139 83.13 February 27, 2009 September 8, 2009 Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB) 

Class Evaluated by NIOSH 

All employees who worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), from March 1, 1989 through February 

29, 1996. 

NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC 

None 

Related Petition Summary Information 

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status 

None 

Related Evaluation Report Information 

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility Name 

SEC Petition Evaluation Report, SEC-00139, Rev. 1 Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB) 

ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: Robert Coblentz ORAU Peer Review Completed By: Daniel Stempfley 

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on File] 8/4/2011

Samuel E. Glover Date 

[Signature on File] 8/4/2011 SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By: 

J. W. Neton Date 

[Signature on File] 8/4/2011 SEC Evaluation Approved By: 

Stuart L. Hinnefeld Date 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Addendum to Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB (SEC-00139) 

Special Exposure Cohort Evaluation Report
 

NIOSH presented a Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) evaluation report (NIOSH, 2010) regarding the 

Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB) site to the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health (Advisory Board) during the Advisory Board’s meeting held on November 17, 2010. In its 

report, NIOSH evaluated the feasibility of reconstructing radiation doses of all employees who 

worked at Hangar 481 from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. During the Board meeting, 

additional issues and concerns were raised regarding the feasibility of reconstructing doses for all 

Hangar 481 workers. In response, NIOSH conducted a further review, which included additional data 

capture trips to records retention facilities, a visit to the Hangar 481 facility, and the development of a 

detailed questionnaire that was submitted to the Department of Energy, Office of Secure 

Transportation. This addendum reports on the results of these efforts. 

NOTE: This Evaluation Report Addendum only addresses those sections in the Hangar 481, 

Kirtland AFB Evaluation Report that require discussion; therefore, the section numbering is not 

contiguous. The sections requiring additional discussion begin below. 

3.2 Class Evaluated by NIOSH 

The currently-established covered period identified by the Department of Labor (DOL) for Ross 

Aviation at Hangar 481 is March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. The petitioner has pointed out 

that DOE contracts with Ross existed back to 1970. NIOSH followed up on this issue with the U.S. 

Department of Energy Office of Secure Transport (DOE OST). DOE OST indicates that DOE work 

contracted with Ross starting in 1970 was not performed at Hangar 481; Ross relocated its operations 

to Hangar 481 in April 1984 (Personal Communication, 2011). DOE has determined that the facility 

is covered only for the currently-defined period; therefore, only that period and location will be 

evaluated as part of this review. 

4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH to Evaluate the Class 

NOTE: Eberline was the TLD processor for Ross Aviation throughout the covered period except for 

1996; no external monitoring results were recorded for 1996 because operations requiring 

monitoring had ceased. Eberline was later bought by Landauer, which now possesses the 

Eberline data. 

At the time the ER was completed, NIOSH was working with Landauer to obtain the raw data 

represented in the Eberline summary reports. However, as of the date of the evaluation report, 

NIOSH had not been able to coordinate with Landauer for the review and release of the applicable 

data. Since then, NIOSH has received Eberline dosimetry data sheets from Landauer for Ross 

Aviation personnel for the years 1990 through 1994. These additional data are discussed in Section 

6.0. 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

During the November 17, 2010 Advisory Board meeting, additional issues and concerns were raised 

by the petitioner and the petitioner’s designated representative regarding the feasibility of 

reconstructing doses for all Hangar 481 workers. As a result, NIOSH initiated additional efforts to 

acquire additional Hangar 481 personnel data. NIOSH staff visited records retention facilities at the 

Sandia National Laboratories, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and at the Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In addition, a visit and tour were conducted at the Hangar 481 

building and adjacent areas at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Through these 

efforts, NIOSH located radiation exposure data for Hangar 481 workers for the time period under 

evaluation. These additional data are discussed in Section 6.0. Issues raised at the November 17, 

2010 Advisory Board meeting are discussed in Section 7.5. Additional documents provided by the 

petitioner and designated representative following their review of the Hangar 481 ER are listed in 

Section 4.7. 

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts 

To obtain additional information for an issue germane to this Addendum, NIOSH interviewed a staff 

member of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Secure Transport. 

 Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication [Name redacted], summary of 

telephone call and follow-up email with staff member at the U.S. Department of Energy Office of 

Secure Transport (DOE OST); July 27, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 100320 

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions 

NIOSH reviewed its NIOSH OCAS Claims Tracking System (NOCTS) to locate EEOICPA-related 

dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to the petition evaluation. Table 4-1 

summarizes the results of this review. (NOCTS data available as of July 26, 2011) 

Table 4-1: No. of Hangar 481 Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule 

Description Totals 

Total number of claims submitted for dose reconstruction 3 

Total number of claims submitted for energy employees who meet the definition criteria for the class 

under evaluation (March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996) 3 

Number of dose reconstructions completed for energy employees who meet the definition criteria for 

the class under evaluation (i.e., the number of such claims completed by NIOSH and submitted to the 

Department of Labor for final approval). 1 

Number of claims for which internal dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 0 

Number of claims for which external dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 2 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

NIOSH reviewed the current Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB claims to determine whether internal and/or 

external personal monitoring records could be obtained for the employees. No internal dosimetry 

records have been found; however, external dosimetry records have been obtained for two of the 

claimants. 

4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database 

NIOSH also examined its Site Research Database (SRDB) to locate documents supporting the 

assessment of the evaluated class. Two hundred forty-seven (247) documents in this database were 

identified as pertaining to Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base. This includes 52 documents acquired 

during recent data capture and research efforts. These documents were evaluated for their relevance 

to this petition. The documents include historical background on contracts between the U.S. Atomic 

Energy Commission and Ross Aviation, contracts between DOE and Ross Aviation, DOE 

Occupational Radiation Exposure Reports, periodic regulatory site inspection reports, radiological 

surveys of facilities and aircraft, shipping records, and site drawings and photos. Included in the 

additional acquired documents are personnel exposure reports for the years 1990 through 1994, site 

tour photographs, and various documents provided by the petitioner (see Section 4.7). 

4.7 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners 

The petitioner and the petitioner’s designated representative provided the following additional 

documents following their review of the Hangar 481 ER. NIOSH reviewed these documents as part 

of its research for this addendum. 

	 Memo of [Name redacted], transcript of telephone interview with a former Ross Aviation pilot 

conducted by the SEC-00139 petitioner representative; November 11, 2010; SRDB Ref ID: 91418 

(Personal Communication, 2010a) 

 Phone Interview of [Name redacted], transcript of telephone interview with a former Ross 

Aviation flight attendant by the SEC-00139 petitioner representative; November 11, 2010; SRDB 

Ref ID: 91417 (Personal Communication, 2010b) 

	 Ross Aviation, Inc. Silver Anniversary, inter-office memorandum commemorating the company’s 

25th Anniversary; November 18, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 91410 (Ross Aviation 25th, 1994) 

	 Supplemental Agreement: Contract Modification No. AC11, excerpted pages from contract 

modification document addressing individual exposure records retention requirements; U.S. 

Department of Energy; April 30, 1979; SRDB Ref ID: 91411 (Ross Aviation, 1979) 

	 Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.2, Departmental Materials Transportation and 

Packaging Management, excerpted pages briefly discussing loading methods and tie-down 

requirements; U.S. Department of Energy; November 15, 1996; SRDB Ref ID: 91412 

(Implementation Guide, 1996) 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

	 Ross Aviation Contract No. DE-AC04-89AL52318, excerpted pages discussing records retention 

requirements; U.S. Department of Energy; April 1984; SRDB Ref ID: 91414 (Ross Contract, 

1984) 

	 National Transportation Safety Board Safety Study: Public Aircraft Safety, excerpted pages 

defining “public” vs. “private” aircraft as well as recent U.S. aircraft accidents; National 

Transportation Safety Board; January 2001; SRDB Ref ID: 91415 (NTSB, 2001) 

	 Ross Aviation Contract Guide, list of contracts and modifications from Feb 1970 to Mar 1994; 

undated, but from context, after March 1, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 91416 (Ross, undated) 

	 Implementation of New Department of Energy Contract, inter-office memo from General Manager 

to all pilots; Ross Aviation; May 1, 1996; SRDB Ref ID: 91419 (Ross, 1996) 

	 New Airfreight Service Manifest, inter-office memorandum from Operations Director to all 

Operations Department personnel describing changes to manifest form; Ross Aviation; December 

7, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 91420 (Ross, 1994) 

	 Office of Environmental Management Table I-1. Status of All DOE Facilities/Sites Subject to 

Section 120 of CERCLA, designates Ross Aviation with soil/chemical contamination; U.S. 

Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management; undated, but from context, after 

1996; SRDB Ref ID: 91421 (OEM Table I-1, undated) 

	 Audit Report: The U.S. Department of Energy’s Aircraft Activities, report describing number of 

aircraft and costs of operation; U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General, Office of 

Audit Services; January 1999; SRDB Ref ID: 91422 (DOE Audit Report, 1999) 

	 1994 Radiation/Hazardous Materials Recurrency, memo from Chief Pilot to all pilots, flight 

mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers, terminal personnel, and counter personnel with 

excerpted pages of DOT shipping requirements; Ross Aviation; December 27, 1994; SRDB Ref 

ID: 91423 (Training, 1994) 

	 Comparison of Shielding Performances of the AT-400A, Model FL, and Model AL-R8 Containers, 

report describing containers with calculated exterior dose rate estimates on loaded containers; 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; UCRL-JC-120849; April 28, 1995; SRDB Ref ID: 

91413 (Shielding, 1995) 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Class Evaluated by 

NIOSH 

In response to questions and concerns raised by the Hangar 481 SEC petitioner and petitioner 

representative, and by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, a questionnaire was 

assembled and submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Secure Transport (DOE OST) 

for their evaluation and knowledge input (DOE OST, 2011). 

In addition, a site visit and tour was conducted at the Hangar 481 building and adjacent areas at 

Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico by NIOSH staff, the petitioner, the petitioner 

representative, and other former Hangar 481 workers. During this visit, additional questions were 

posed to DOE OST staff. 

5.1 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB Plant and Process Descriptions 

U.S. DOE Office of Secure Transport Questionnaire and Responses 

As previously stated, NIOSH assembled a questionnaire and submitted it to the U.S. Department of 

Energy Office of Secure Transport (DOE OST) for its evaluation and knowledge input (DOE OST, 

2011). The topics addressed were: 

 Facility Information 

 Radiological Activities 

 External Dosimetry Program 

 Internal Dosimetry Program 

In addition, a meeting was conducted in conjunction with the Hangar 481 facility tour, during which 

other questions were asked by NIOSH and by the petitioner/representative (DOE OST, 2011). 

NOTE: The subsections below provide a summary of the DOE OST responses. Figures 5-1 through 

5-3 supersede Figure 5-1 in the SEC-00139 Hangar 481 Rev. 1 Evaluation Report. Figures 

5-4 through 5-7 were taken by NIOSH staff during the site tour. 

5.1.1 DOE OST Responses Regarding the Hangar 481 Facilities 

DOE OST staff stated that contracted activities began at the Hangar 481 facilities around 1970 and 

remained unchanged. They provided layout drawings that designate locations for Hangar 481, 

adjacent facilities, Hot Pads 2 and 5, personnel lockers inside Hangar 481, and the location inside the 

hangar where non-destructive radiographic testing was performed. Starting in 1985, facilities 

operated 24 hrs/day, 7 days/wk with about 200 employees. After 1987, operations were only two 

shifts/day, 5 days/wk with staffing levels reducing down over time to about 80 employees in 1996. 

Administrative personnel only worked on day shift with no overtime. 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

5.1.2 DOE OST Responses Regarding Hangar 481 Radiological Activities 

DOE OST staff stated that no radiological activities were performed in Hangar 481 and facilities and 

there was no license to do so. Rather, packages containing radioactive materials were handled and 

loaded only at Hot Pads 2 and 5. Unmonitored personnel were not allowed to come in contact with 

packages containing radioactive materials. The packages contained predominately tritium. 

Radiographic testing of airplanes was performed only once per year for a few minutes. Testing was 

performed in the center of the Hangar 481 building during either the evening or night shift when only 

radiography personnel were present. Strict controls were in place during radiography, including 

warning banners, dosimeters, area Geiger counters, and strict access controls. 

5.1.3 DOE OST Responses Regarding the Hangar 481 External Dosimetry Program 

DOE OST staff state that Ross Aviation’s dosimetry program was developed and managed by the 

Ross Safety Office with monitoring for various periods subcontracted to outside organizations (e.g., 

Eberline, Sandia). Individual dosimetry records exist from 1990 to 1994 from Eberline; NIOSH has 

obtained these reports. 

The only radiological materials handled by Ross personnel were those loaded and unloaded at the Hot 

Pads, which were at least three kilometers from Hangar 481. Only Cabin Safety Specialists and Pilots 

were allowed access to the Hot Pads; no non-badged personnel were permitted access. Access 

controls included the isolation of the Hot Pad from the rest of Ross operations and the presence of Air 

Force security teams. 

No area dosimetry of Hangar 481 was performed. Neutron dosimetry was never provided for this 

location. Personal dosimetry badges were kept in the facility’s administration area when not in use by 

flight line personnel. In addition, no X-rays conducted for medical reasons (required as a condition of 

employment) occurred at the covered facility; personnel routine medical X-rays were conducted by 

the individual employees’ medical providers. 

Regarding the increased reported annual personnel doses in 1994, DOE OST did not know the reason. 

However, NIOSH has since determined that this increase is the result of a data transfer error in which 

the individual lifetime dose values were transferred from the dose reports into the REIRS database 

(rather than the appropriate 1994 annual personnel doses). This error resulted in overstated annual 

doses for personnel in the REIRS database for the year 1994. 

Page 8 of 33 
SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Figure 5-1: Hangar 481 and Surrounding Buildings 

(Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 in this Addendum supersede Figure 5-1 in the SEC-00139 Hangar 481 Rev. 1 Evaluation 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Figure 5-2: Location of OST Aviation and Hot Pads 

(Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 in this Addendum supersede Figure 5-1 in the SEC-00139 Hangar 481 Rev. 1 Evaluation 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Figure 5-3: Floor Plan for Hangar 481

(Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 in this Addendum supersede Figure 5-1 in the SEC-00139 Hangar 481 Rev. 1 Evaluation 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Figure 5-4: Photo of Hangar 481 and Associated Shop Buildings 

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Figure 5-5: Front of Hangar 481 Building 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Figure 5-6: Hangar 481 Inside View 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Figure 5-7: Hangar 481 Personnel Lockers 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

5.1.4 DOE OST Responses Regarding the Hangar 481 Internal Dosimetry Program 

DOE OST staff stated that no bioassay program was ever implemented at Hangar 481. Furthermore, 

no Ross facilities were monitored for contamination (because there was no need to perform surveys 

due to lack of use/storage of radioactive materials at the facility; all surveys were performed where 

radioactive materials were handled; i.e., on the Hot Pads). 

DOE OST personnel indicated that no radiological accidents occurred at Hangar 481. They also 

confirmed that no thoriated welding rods (or associated thorium-bearing materials) were present or 

used at Ross facilities. 

5.1.5 DOE OST Responses to the Hangar 481 Site Visit and Tour Questions 

During the Hangar 481 site visit and tour, DOE OST staff made or reiterated the following points: 

	 Ross Cabin Security Specialists and Pilots, who handled the loading and unloading of containers 

containing radiological contents, were badged and monitored for radiation exposure. 

	 According to the former Ross Aviation Director of Safety, no containers were ever delivered to the 

flight line adjacent to Hangar 481. 

	 The Ross Aviation organization does not have records to indicate that containers having 

radioactive contents were delivered only to the Hot Pads rather than to the flight line adjacent to 

Hangar 481. 

	 All containers were owned by the Air Force or Sandia and controlled by them until custody was 

transferred to Ross or transferred from Ross at the Hot Pads. 

	 Delivering the containers to any areas other than the Hot Pads would constitute a security 

violation. 

	 No radiation monitoring was performed inside Hangar 481, the adjacent flight lines, or the 

adjacent buildings and structures. 

	 No radiological monitoring was performed in and around the Hangar 481 building (because there 

was no need to perform surveys due to lack of use/storage of radioactive materials at the facility; 

all surveys were performed where radioactive materials were handled; i.e., on the Hot Pads). 

	 No personnel are aware of thoriated welding (or associated thorium-bearing materials) being 

performed (or present) at the Hangar 481 facilities. 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

5.2.2 External Radiological Exposure Sources from Hangar 481 Operations 

5.2.2.3 Neutron 

At the time the evaluation report was completed, it appeared from the REIRS database that neutron 

monitoring had taken place at Hangar 481. This conclusion was based on REIRS database entries for 

neutron values showing as zero. It was known that neutron generators were frequently transported by 

aircraft at Hangar 481. These devices emit neutron radiation only when powered and energized 

(Procedure, 1990). Since these devices were only being transported, neutron exposure was infeasible. 

Based on this information, the ER concluded that neutron exposure was not a factor for the Hangar 

481 site. 

In their response to NIOSH’s questionnaire (see Section 5.1), DOE OST staff stated that shipments 

predominantly contained tritium, which does not emit neutrons. They further stated that no personnel 

neutron exposure monitoring was performed for Ross Aviation personnel. 

The above information supports the previous evaluation report’s original conclusion that there is no 

credible potential for personnel neutron exposure to Hangar 481 personnel. 

6.2 Available Hangar 481 External Monitoring Data 

External personnel monitoring data (TLD data) are available for Hangar 481 personnel during the 

covered period at the site, with the exception of 1996. For a two-month covered period in 1996, 

external personnel monitoring was not performed because operations requiring external monitoring 

and reporting had ceased (DOE/EH-0575, pdf p. 64 footnote). In addition, the DOE Occupational 

Radiation Exposure, 1997 Report lists Ross Aviation as “not reported” for 1996 (DOE/EH-0575, pdf 

p. 61). 

At the time the evaluation report was completed, NIOSH was working to obtain Eberline data from 

Landauer to support a data pedigree review for this evaluation. Since the ER’s completion, additional 

Eberline data has been received from Landauer. These data include Eberline dosimetry data sheets for 

Ross Aviation personnel for the years 1990 through 1994. 

In response to issues raised by the petitioner and the Advisory Board, NIOSH initiated additional 

efforts to acquire Hangar 481 personnel data. NIOSH staff visited records retention facilities at the 

Sandia National Laboratories, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and at the Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. No additional documentation or data supportive of internal or 

external dose assessment for this evaluation were found. 

7.1.2 External Monitoring Data Pedigree Review 

External monitoring data from TLD results are available for individuals who were monitored at 

Kirtland AFB, Hangar 481. The data are annual summaries for each individual who was monitored 

for all years of the evaluation period except for 1996. Eberline was the TLD processor throughout the 

covered period except for 1996. Based on occupation codes included in the REIRS database tables, 

and from interviews with former Ross employees, those who were monitored included mechanics, 

pilots, and personnel involved with handling or securing packages (Personal Communication, 2009b; 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Personal Communication, 2009e; Ross, 2009). These individuals were expected to have received the 

highest exposures because their work activities frequently put them in close proximity to the source 

(radioactive packages). Monitored individuals were issued TLDs that were changed out on a quarterly 

basis. 

The Eberline TLD data received from Landauer were compiled and compared to the annual 

summaries listed in the REIRS exposure database. All values were confirmed for the associated 

years. However, during the data analysis, it was apparent that the reported whole-body photon doses 

for 1994 were anomalous because they were unusually high compared to all other years. To illustrate 

the anomalous nature of 1994 values, Table 7-1 shows the yearly maximum whole-body photon doses 

and total person-rem as reported in the REIRS database from 1989 to 1995. 

Table 7-1: REIRS Annual Dose Summaries for Kirtland AFB, Hangar 481 

Year Total 

Monitored 

Maximum Individual 

Shallow Dose (mrem) 

Maximum Individual Deep 

Dose (mrem) 

Total Person-mrem 

1989 95 77 58 246 

1990 89 89 89 201 

1991 87 61 44 207 

1992 70 51 48 203 

1993 67 47 37 163 

1994 66 83 172 1501 

1995 56 77 54 445 

As a part of the review, assistance was requested of the Program Manager for Occupational Exposure 

and Worker Health – Center for Epidemiologic Research (OEWH-CER) to determine the cause of the 

higher reported doses in 1994. Through detailed comparison of the REIRS database values with the 

values listed on the copies of the original Eberline exposure reports, it became apparent that during the 

transfer of data from the reports into REIRS in 1994, the individual worker lifetime whole-body 

exposure values from the Eberline data sheets were transferred into the REIRS database instead of the 

appropriate annual whole-body exposure values. This was apparent because the 1994 REIRS database 

annual exposure values matched the individual lifetime exposure values listed on the 1994 Eberline 

data sheets. The OEWH-CER Program Manager concurs with this conclusion and is working to 

correct the relevant 1994 values in the REIRS database. All other exposure values were in agreement 

for all associated years. 

The REIRS database covers years 1987 through 1995 for Ross Aviation employees, and is regarded as 

a secondary data source. However, data for five of the years under evaluation and covered by the 

REIRS database have now been confirmed by copies of the original Eberline exposure reports, which 

are primary data documents. 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

7.3.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related External Doses 

The original evaluation concluded that bounding process-related doses for Hangar 481 personnel 

would be based on external monitoring data that was available at the time the ER was completed. 

Subsequent data capture efforts have acquired additional data that support the existing conclusion. 

7.3.1.1 Personnel Dosimetry Data 

The original evaluation based bounding Hangar 481 personnel occupational radiation exposures on the 

data contained in the Radiation Exposure Information and Reporting System (REIRS), which is 

managed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The data contained in REIRS are not, 

however, a primary data source. Additional data capture efforts conducted subsequent to the original 

Hangar 481 petition evaluation acquired primary exposure reports that confirm five of the years 

covered in REIRS for Hangar 481 personnel (Eberline, 1990-1994). The highest individual annual 

whole-body exposure of 89 millirem was reported in 1990. Individual annual doses are summarized 

in the Table 7-2 and reflect pending corrections to the REIRS database. 

Table 7-2: Corrected Annual Dose Summaries for Kirtland AFB, Hangar 481 

Year Total 

Monitored 

Maximum Individual 

Shallow Dose (mrem) 

Maximum Individual Deep 

Dose (mrem) 

Total Person-mrem 

1989 95 77 58 246 

1990 89 89 89 201 

1991 87 61 44 207 

1992 70 51 48 203 

1993 67 47 37 163 

1994 66 83 49 224 

1995 56 77 54 445 

Photon 

Hangar 481 personnel most likely to receive external dose were pilots and flight mechanics who 

would have directly handled packages containing radioactive materials. Since all the shipments were 

packaged in sealed containers, the primary exposure source was from photon radiation penetrating 

through the package materials. However, the majority of the packages handled through Kirtland AFB 

contained only tritium, which only emits low-level beta radiation; therefore, annual photon doses 

would have been low. 

7.3.3 Hangar 481 Occupational X-ray Examinations 

DOE OST responses to questions and interviews with former Hangar 481 workers indicate that annual 

occupational X-ray examinations were not performed at Hangar 481. Based on this information, 

medical X-ray dose for Hangar 481 personnel has been excluded for the purposes of the review of this 

evaluation. 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion 

After reviewing the additional information and data obtained subsequent to the original evaluation, 

NIOSH has concluded that the original feasibility determination is confirmed. Specifically, given the 

availability of TLD data for the covered years of employment, it is feasible to bound the evaluated 

worker class external dose (reconstruct external doses with sufficient accuracy). The TLD data 

available from 1989 through 1995 is believed to adequately assess the radiological exposures at 

Kirtland AFB Hangar 481 during this timeframe and is, therefore, adequate for performing dose 

reconstructions. Using the methods described in ORAUT-OTIB-0008, dose for 1996 can be 

over-estimated by using the highest individual dosimetry data for all previous covered years (1989 

through 1995). 

7.5 Other Potential SEC Issues Relevant to the Petition Identified During the 

Evaluation 

During the November 17, 2010 Advisory Board meeting, additional issues and concerns were raised 

by the petitioner and the petitioner’s designated representative regarding the feasibility of 

reconstructing doses for all Hangar 481 workers. The petitioner and designated representative also 

provided additional documents following their review of the Hangar 481 ER (see Section 4.7). As a 

result, NIOSH conducted additional research and data capture activities. Through these efforts, 

NIOSH located radiation exposure summary data for Hangar 481 workers for the time period under 

evaluation (see Section 6.0). Issues raised at the Advisory Board meeting and NIOSH responses in 

light of its further research are provided below. 

	 ISSUE: Raw dosimetry data are lacking or not available. Secondary summary data were used for 

the evaluation. 

Additional data capture efforts have acquired primary-source dosimetry data which have been 

used to validate the accuracy secondary-source data contained in the REIRS database. 

	 ISSUE: Contracts existed back to 1970. The covered period should be changed to cover earlier 

dates back to 1970. 

The currently-established covered period identified by the Department of Labor for Ross Aviation 

at Hangar 481 is March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. NIOSH followed up on the 1970 

issue with the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Secure Transport (DOE OST). DOE OST 

indicates that DOE work contracted with Ross starting in 1970 was not performed at Hangar 481; 

Ross relocated its operations to Hangar 481 in April 1984 (Personal Communication, 2011). DOE 

has determined that the facility is covered only for the currently-defined period; therefore, only 

that period and location will be evaluated as part of this review. 

The Department of Labor and Department of Energy coordinate to establish appropriate covered 

periods for the designated covered sites. Should either DOE or DOL re-evaluate the covered 

period for Hangar 481, this evaluation may be expanded to include the earlier time period. 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

	 ISSUE: Newly-available documents have not been evaluated. 

All available documents (including additional documents acquired through recent data capture 

efforts) have been evaluated and incorporated into this review. 

	 ISSUE: Radioactive shipments were delivered to the Hangar 481 building and stored. The “hot 

pads” were used to load explosive materials. Reliance on an interview with one former worker as 

the basis for determination that all radioactive shipments were handled at the “hot pads” was 

criticized. 

Per the response from DOE OST, no radioactive materials were stored or handled at the Hangar 

481 facility or adjacent areas, and all loading/unloading of radioactive shipments were performed 

at the areas known as Hot Pads 2 and 5. This is substantiated by a documented Occupational 

Safety and Health Inspection report dated December 2, 1992, that states, “Ross does not handle, 

store, or use radioactive materials in the Albuquerque facilities” (Ross, 1992). 

	 ISSUE: Radioactive shipments were made using the AL-R8 container, which was found in 1991 to 

be inadequate to shield the contents (shielding for alpha and beta radiations was not disputed). 

NIOSH has acquired additional primary-source exposure documents for Hangar 481workers 

which support/confirm the data contained in the REIRS database. All personnel who handled, or 

came in contact with, packages containing radioactive material were monitored for radiation 

exposure. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that hypothetical doses from inadequatelyshielded containers would be included in the personnel exposure data. 

	 ISSUE: The evaluation report’s ambient external methods are not bounding. 

Given that no radioactive materials were stored or handled at the Hangar 481 facilities, and that 

radiological surveys of transport aircraft show no indication of contamination or loss of package 

integrity, there is no credible potential for personnel internal exposures from ambient sources 

related to Ross shipment activities. Therefore, the only credible source for ambient exposure is 

from work activities at the Sandia National Laboratory directly adjacent to the Kirtland Air Force 

Base, as described in the Hangar 481 evaluation report, Section 7.2.1 (NIOSH, 2010). The ER 

states: 

Because Kirtland AFB is located immediately adjacent to Sandia National LaboratoryAlbuquerque (SNL-A), it might have been possible for individuals at Kirtland, and therefore 

Hangar 481, to receive low-level ambient environmental internal exposure from SNL’s radioactive 

effluent releases. Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at SNL-A have been 

researched and assessed (ORAUT-TKBS-0037). Considering the effect that the additional 

distance beyond the SNL-A boundary would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the SNL-A Site Profile 

document would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at an off-site 

location. Therefore, the ambient environmental internal exposure assessment method defined for 

SNL-A workers in the environmental section of the SNL-A Site Profile will serve to bound any 

ambient internal doses for individuals at Kirtland AFB and Hangar 481. 

Page 21 of 33 
SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

	 ISSUE: One individual states that barrels were stacked at the hangar which may have been nuclear 

waste, and there is no apparent indication of “sweeps” that were done in the hangar building or 

adjacent areas. 

NIOSH has discovered no information that supports the assumption that barrels “may have been 

nuclear waste.” DOE OST states that no radioactive materials were stored or handled at the 

Hangar 481 facility or adjacent areas, and that all loading/unloading of radioactive shipments were 

performed at the areas known as Hot Pads 2 and 5. DOE OST did state that radiological 

monitoring was not performed inside Hangar 481, the adjacent flight lines, or the adjacent 

buildings and structures; however, if no radioactive materials were stored or handled at the hangar, 

radiological monitoring would not necessarily be needed or required. The information available to 

NIOSH indicates that radiological monitoring was performed inside the aircraft used for 

transporting radioactive materials and the results showed no indication of contamination. 

	 ISSUE: One pilot left his dosimeter in his locker and had an abnormally high dose reading when 

the badge was processed. 

DOE OST confirms that no radioactive materials were stored or handled at the Hangar 481 facility 

or adjacent areas, and that all loading/unloading of radioactive shipments were performed at the 

areas known as Hot Pads 2 and 5. The circumstance in which a pilot’s dosimeter badge was 

inadvertently left inside a locker, and subsequently showed elevated dose values, was possibly 

caused by the badge being subjected to dose rates resulting from radiographic activities performed 

in the hangar during either evening or night shift. No incident reports or other explanations are 

available to explain any abnormal personnel dosimeter readings 

7.6 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00139 

The SEC-00139 Evaluation Report evaluated the feasibility of reconstructing radiation doses of all 

employees who worked at Hangar 481 from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996 (NIOSH, 

2010). When the ER was presented at the Advisory Board’s meeting on November 17, 2010, 

additional issues and concerns were raised regarding the feasibility of reconstructing doses for all 

Hangar 481 workers. In response, NIOSH conducted a further review, which included additional data 

capture trips to records retention facilities, a visit to the Hangar 481 facility, and the development of a 

detailed questionnaire that was submitted to the Department of Energy, Office of Secure 

Transportation. This addendum has reported on the results of these efforts. 

ADDENDUM CONCLUSIONS: After reviewing all recently-received information and data, NIOSH 

has arrived at the following feasibility findings: 

1.	 External deep and shallow occupational dose can be bounded based on available personal 

monitoring data, using the methods described in ORAUT-OTIB-0008, A Standard Methodology 

for Overestimating External Doses Measured with Thermoluminescent Dosimeters. For 

unmonitored workers, the maximum dose to monitored individuals can be applied. 

2.	 There is no credible potential for personnel neutron exposures. 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

3.	 Potential doses from radiographic testing would be included in the reported personal monitoring 

exposures. 

4.	 Internal occupational dose is determined to be insignificant based on the types of work performed, 

and workers handling only DOT-compliant, sealed packages. 

5.	 Ambient environmental internal doses can be bounded by the ambient dose reconstruction 

methods described in ORAUT-TKBS-0037, Site Profile for Sandia National Laboratories in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. 

6.	 Ambient environmental external doses are accounted for in the personnel external monitoring 

data. 

7.	 Because medical X-ray examinations were not performed at the Hangar 481 facility, medical 

X-ray exposures are excluded from Hangar 481 dose reconstructions. 

The monitoring records, process descriptions, and source term data now available are sufficient to 

complete dose reconstructions for the evaluated class of employees. Consequently, the feasibility 

findings remain as issued in the SEC-00139, Rev. 1, Hangar 481 Evaluation Report (NIOSH, 2010), 

as shown in Table 7-2 below. 

Table 7-3: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00139 

March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996 

Source of Exposure Reconstruction Feasible Reconstruction Not Feasible 

Internal X 

External X 

 - Gamma X

 - Beta X

 - Neutron N/A N/A

 - Occupational Medical X-ray N/A N/A 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

10.0 References (for this Addendum) 

DOE Audit Report, 1999, Audit Report: The U.S. Department of Energy’s Aircraft Activities, report 

describing number of aircraft and costs of operation; U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector 

General, Office of Audit Services; January 1999; SRDB Ref ID: 91422 

DOE/EH-0575, DOE Occupational Radiation Exposure, 1997 Report; Appendix A, Exhibit A-2, 

Organizations Reporting to DOE REMS, 1993-1997; U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Public 

Health and Safety; SRDB Ref ID: 64900, pdf pp. 61 and 64 (footnote ****) 

DOE OST, 2011, Office of Secure Transportation Responses to National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health Questions of March 3, 2011, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Secure Transport 

(DOE OST); cover memo dated June 1, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 99968 

Eberline, 1990-1994, Current TLD Occupational Radiation Exposure Report - Summary, TMA 

Eberline Thermo Analytical Inc.; annual summaries for 1990 through 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 91966 

Implementation Guide, 1996, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.2, Departmental 

Materials Transportation and Packaging Management, excerpted pages briefly discussing loading 

methods and tie-down requirements; U.S. Department of Energy; November 15, 1996; SRDB Ref ID: 

91412 

Miller, 1976, Radiographic Activities at Ross Aviation, memo to the files from R. L. Miller, U.S. 

Department of Energy, Health Protection Branch; March 23, 1976; SRDB Ref ID: 71018, pdf p. 2 

NIOSH, 2010, SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00139, Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB, 

Rev. 1; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); September 23, 2010; SRDB 

Ref ID: 99255 

NTSB, 2001, National Transportation Safety Board Safety Study: Public Aircraft Safety, excerpted 

pages defining “public” vs. “private” aircraft as well as recent U.S. aircraft accidents; National 

Transportation Safety Board; January 2001; SRDB Ref ID: 91415 

OEM Table I-1, undated, Office of Environmental Management Table I-1. Status of All DOE 

Facilities/Sites Subject to Section 120 of CERCLA, designates Ross Aviation with soil/chemical 

contamination; U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management; undated, but from 

context, after 1996; SRDB Ref ID: 91421 

ORAUT-OTIB-0008, A Standard Methodology for Overestimating External Doses Measured with 

Thermoluminescent Dosimeters, Rev. 01; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; May 12, 2006; SRDB 

Ref ID: 29950 

ORAUT-TKBS-0037, Site Profile for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

and the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada;, Rev 00; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; June 22, 2007; 

SRDB Ref ID: 32531 

Page 25 of 33 
 

SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Personal Communication, 2010a, Memo of [Name redacted], transcript of telephone interview with a 

former Ross Aviation pilot conducted by the SEC-00139 petitioner representative; November 11, 

2010; SRDB Ref ID: 91418 

Personal Communication, 2010b, Phone Interview of [Name redacted], transcript of telephone 

interview with a former Ross Aviation flight attendant by the SEC-00139 petitioner representative; 

November 11, 2010; SRDB Ref ID: 91417 

Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication [Name redacted], summary of telephone 

call and follow-up email with staff member at the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Secure 

Transport (DOE OST); July 27, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 100320 

Personal Communication, 2009e, Personal Communication with at Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; 

Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; August 25, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 72792 

Procedure, 1990, Safe Operating Procedure for the Use of Neutron Generators (1990); Sandia 

National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, 1990; SRDB Ref ID: 23742 

Ross, undated, Ross Aviation Contract Guide, list of contracts and modifications from Feb 1970 to 

Mar 1994; undated, but from context, after March 1, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 91416 

Ross, 1992, Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Inspection, Ross Aviation, Inc., U.S. Department 

of Energy, December 2, 1992; SRDB Ref ID: 71004 

Ross, 1994, New Airfreight Service Manifest, inter-office memorandum from Operations Director to 

all Operations Department personnel describing changes to manifest form; Ross Aviation; December 

7, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 91420 

Ross, 1996, Implementation of New Department of Energy Contract, inter-office memo from General 

Manager to all pilots; Ross Aviation; May 1, 1996; SRDB Ref ID: 91419 

Ross, 2009, Ross Aviation External Dosimetry Data and Results (Access Database name: Ross 

Aviation 09-29-2009); Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Radiation Exposure Recording System 

(REIRS) database; September 29, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 73850 

Ross Aviation, 1979, Supplemental Agreement: Contract Modification No. AC11, excerpted pages 

from contract modification document addressing individual exposure records retention requirements; 

U.S. Department of Energy; April 30, 1979; SRDB Ref ID: 91411 

Ross Aviation 25th, 1994, Ross Aviation, Inc. Silver Anniversary, inter-office memorandum 

commemorating the company’s 25th Anniversary; November 18, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 91410 

Ross Contract, 1984, Ross Aviation Contract No. DE-AC04-89AL52318, excerpted pages discussing 

records retention requirements; U.S. Department of Energy; April 1984; SRDB Ref ID: 91414 

Shielding, 1995, Comparison of Shielding Performances of the AT-400A, Model FL, and Model 

AL-R8 Containers, report describing containers with calculated exterior dose rate estimates on loaded 

Page 26 of 33 
91423 

SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

containers; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; UCRL-JC-120849; April 28, 1995; SRDB Ref 

ID: 91413 

Training, 1994, 1994 Radiation/Hazardous Materials Recurrency, memo from Chief Pilot to all 

pilots, flight mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers, terminal personnel, and counter personnel with 

excerpted pages of DOT shipping requirements; Ross Aviation; December 27, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 

Page 27 of 33 
SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Attachment 2: Data Capture Synopsis 

Table A2-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured 

Primary Site/Company Name: Hangar 481 March 1, 1989 - February 29, 1996; DOE Other Site Names: 

Ross Aviation, Inc. Pierce Air Pierce Enterprises, Inc. Physical Size of the Site: The exact dimensions of Hangar 481 are not known. However, its size may be inferred from its photographs in the SRDB. Size of the Site Population: In 1990, 93 Ross Aviation employees were on the TLD service. In 1994, 65 Ross Aviation employees were on the TLD service. In 1992, 100 Ross Aviation employees were eligible for discount rates for contract-related travel. 

On 06/03/2009 the ORAU Team was informed by [Name redacted], former Ross Aviation employee, that dosimetry records are in the possession of the DOE. Radiological surveys were performed by Sandia 

National Laboratory. 

On 08/25/2009 the ORAU Team confirmed with [Name redacted], former Ross Aviation employee, that Ross Aviation went out of business in 2008. On 12/28/2010 the ORAU Team confirmed with [Name redacted], former TMA Eberline Laboratory Manager, that TMA Eberline provided the dosimetry service for Ross Aviation, and that Ross Aviation dosimetry records would have been transferred to R.S. Landauer when Eberline sold its dosimetry business to Landauer. NIOSH requested the records, which were uploaded to the SRDB on 01/27/2011. 

08

State Contacted: [Name and title redacted], New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau [Phone No. redacted] 

No relevant data identified. The New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau does not hold records for Hangar 481 or Ross Aviation. 

10

DOE Albuquerque Office (DOE AL) Contract documents pertaining to Ross Aviation contracts with the AEC 

and DOE. 

04

DOE Hanford Keyword search request submitted 07/07/2011. ODOE Hangar 481 Photographs in and around Hangar 481. 01DOE Idaho National Laboratory A 1988 DOELAP application and 1988 and 1993 DOELAP 

accreditations. 

06

DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - Service Center 

1997 Ross Aviation Safety Manual. 08

DOE Nevada Test Site Records Center Radioactive material shipping records, checklists, and documentation. 07

DOE Office of Secure Transportation (OST) The Transportation Safeguards Division technical basis for eliminating 

intakes as a credible source of exposure. 

07

Page 29 of 33 
SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Table A2-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured 

DOE Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico (SNL, NM) Contamination surveys of aircraft and associated equipment, a 

computed exposure report, documents regarding annual environmental reports, statement of work for providing external dosimetry services and the associated NEPA determination, DOE appraisals, occupational 

radiation exposure reports, drawings and photos of Hangar 481, drawings of pads 2 and 5, Ross Aviation organizational chart, shipping surveys and documentation, a roster of employees authorized for official government travel, and requirements for TLD storage and use. 

10

Internet - DOE Comprehensive Epidemiologic Data Resource (CEDR) 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - DOE Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System (DDRS) 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - DOE OpenNet No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - DOE OSTI Energy Citations No relevant data identified. 10Internet - DOE OSTI Information Bridge No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - Google Occupational radiation exposure reports, an audit of aircraft activities, 

fire protection review, brief mentions of Ross Aviation as a transporter 

of weapons components, and a listing by state of EEOICPA covered facilities and contractors. NOTE: 2 documents were added during site association reviews. 

10

Internet - Health Physics Journal No relevant data identified. 07Internet - Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene 

No relevant data identified. 07

Internet - National Academies Press (NAP) No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - Nevada Site Office 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - NRC Agencywide Document Access and Management (ADAMS) (Downloadable Files) 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - NRC Agencywide Document Access and Management (ADAMS) (Microform Citations) 

No relevant data identified. 06

Internet - Washington State University (U.S. Transuranium and Uranium Registries) 

No relevant data identified. 10

National Archives and Records Administration - Atlanta Results of the DOE Indoor Radon Study. Hangar 481 was included in 

the study. 

08

Page 30 of 33 
SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Table A2-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured 

NIOSH Contract documents pertaining to Ross Aviation contracts with the AEC 

and DOE, a contract implementation guide, the new air freight manifest, an aircraft safety study, a comparison of the shielding performance of various containers, and process knowledge interviews with former Ross Aviation personnel. 

01

ORAU Team The seventh through eleventh annual reports of contractor radiation 

exposures, and process knowledge interviews with former Ross Aviation, DOE AL, NNSA, and OST personnel. 

12

ORISE Ross Aviation external dosimetry data from the REMS/REIRS 

Database, and the 1996 transmittal letter that accompanied Ross' submittal to the REIRS Database. 

12

R. S. Landauer Annual external exposure results by individual employee, 1990 - 1994. 01SAIC Radiation exposure summaries from 1970 and 1972. 09Unknown DOE Occupational Exposure Report 1992-1994. N/TOTAL 

Table A2-2: Databases Searched for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

NOTE: Database search terms employed for each of the databases listed below are available 

in the Excel file called “Hangar 481 Rev 01, (83.13) 07-08-11” 

DOE CEDR http://cedr.lbl.gov/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

DOE Hanford DDRS http://www2.hanford.gov/declass/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

DOE OpenNet http://www.osti.gov/opennet/advancedsearch.jsp COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

Page 31 of 33 
SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Table A2-2: Databases Searched for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

DOE OSTI Energy Citations http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

DOE OSTI Information Bridge http://www.osti.gov/bridge/advancedsearch.jsp COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

Google http://www.google.com COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

HP Journal http://journals.lww.com/health-physics/pages/default.aspx COMPLETED 07/05/2011 

See Note above 

Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health http://www.ijoeh.com/index.php/ijoeh COMPLETED 07/05/2011 

See Note above 

National Academies Press http://www.nap.edu/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

NNSA - Nevada Site Office www.nv.doe.gov/main/search.htm COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

NRC ADAMS Reading Room http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

NRC ADAMS Reading Room http://wba.nrc.gov.8080/ves/ COMPLETED 06/30/2011 

See Note above 

U.S. Transuranium & Uranium Registries http://www.ustur.wsu.edu/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

See Note above 

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SEC-00139 Rev. 1 Addendum 08-02-11 

Table A2-3: OSTI Documents Requested 

Document Number Document Title 

No documents ordered. 

Page 33 of 33