### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry 25, 200 5

C EC IL M OS S v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty

No. 40400225 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2004- 00787-CCA -R3-HC - F iled Fe brury 15, 2005

Th e Pe tit ion e r, Ce c il M os s, fi le d a pe tit ion fo r w ri t of ha

be a s c or pu s se e kin g re lie f f

ro m a n a lle g e dly void judgment, whic h the trial court summarily dismiss ed. On appea l, the Petitioner contends that the ha be a s c or pu s c ou rt e rr e d by no t ho ldi ng a n e vid e nti ary he ari ng a nd that it erred whe n it dis mis se d h is p e tit ion . F ind ing no e rr or in the jud g me nt o f the ha be a s c or pu s c ou rt , we a ff

ir m it s dismiss al of the Petitioner’ s petition for habe as cor pus relief

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d t h e o p i n i o n of the c ourt, in which D AVI D H. W ELLES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.
Roge r E. Ne ll, Cl arksville, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Cecil Moss.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi sta nt Att or ne y

Ge ne ra l; J ohn W. C arne y , District Attorney Gene ral; and H elen O. Y oung , Assist an t Di s t ri ct Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION I. F acts
The Petitioner pled g uiltyto t wo co unts of sale of c ocaine , a Class B f elony , and the tria l court sent e n c e d h im to s e r v e e ig h t y e ar s in c o mm u n it y c o rr e c ti o n s s ta r ti n g M a y 1 5 , 1 9 9 2 . The Petitioner’s probation wa s rev o k ed , he appe aled to this Court, and we a ffirme d the trial court’s judgme nt. I n our opinion on the Petitioner’s appea l, w e summarized the fac ts and proce dural history

a s f oll ow s:

Def endant, Cec i l M oss, appea ls from the trial court’s order revoking his probation and re instating his ori gi nal sentenc e to be se rved in the Te nnessee Depa rtment of Correc tion. Defe ndant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed by fa iling to consider

any alternative sentenc ing options other tha n incar cer ation. We aff irm the judg ment of-2-

the tr ia l c ou rt

.
Def endant pled g uiltyon May 15, 1992, to two count s o f sale of c ocaine , a Class B fe lony . Following a sentenc ing hearing, D efe ndant was se ntence d to eig ht y ear s, as a Rang e I , standard offende r. Def endant’ s sentenc e was suspended, and he

was place d on Communi ty Correc tions for eig ht y ear s. On J une 10, 1993, a violation of pr obation w a s f

ile d a lle g ing that D e fe nd a nt h a d f a ile d to pe rf

or m th e re qu isi te
c omm un ity se rv ic e wo rk , f a ile d to re po rt

to o r atte ndg ro up c ou ns e lin g , a ndfa ile d to abide by his imposed c urfe w. Following a re vocation hea ring , the trial court found that D e fe nd a nt w a s in vio la tio n of his pr ob a tio n bu t pe rm itt e d De fe nd a nt t o r e ma in in the c omm un ity

c or re c tio ns pr og ra m. On May 5, 1994, Def

endant was transfe rre d to the Tenne ssee De partment of Cor re c tio n a ndpla c e d o n r e g ula r p ro ba tio n f

or the rem aind e r o f h is s e nte nc e , s ix y ear s and two day s. Defe ndant conc edes tha t a violation of probation was filed on De ce m b er3 0 , 1 9 9 6 , al l egi n g t h at De fe n d an th ad m o v ed w i t h o u tp ro v i d i n g a forwa rding addre ss, had fa iled to report to his probation off icer as re quired since October , 1996, and wa s delinquent in pay ing his super visory fee s. The viol ation of pro b a ti o n w a s a me n d e d o n D e c e mb e r 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , a ll e g in g th a t D e f e n d a n t h a d been

a rr e s t e d f o r f i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r , e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y , a n d e s p e c i a lly

a g g ra va te d r ob be ry

in M on tg ome ry

Cou nty a ndha d fa ile d to re po rt the se arr e sts to his probation office r.

At the r e v o c a ti o n h e ar in g , Ja me s M a xe y , a p r o b a ti o n o f f ic e r w ith the Tennes see D e pa

rt me nt o f P aro le a ndPr ob a tio n, te sti fi e d th a t E ma nu e l T ind le initiallyserve d as Def

endant’ s probation office r. Mr. Maxey stated that De fenda nt had not re ported to the probation office s i n ce Oc t ober 3, 1996, a nd the offic e wa s
unawa re of Def endant’ s loc ati on until his arr ests in Montgomery County . Mr. Maxey said that all court c osts other than a $24.00 transportation charg e had been pa id, but Def endant ha d not paid any

supervisory

fee s since 1996.

De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d that he wa s li vin g in B ow lin g Gr e e n, Ke ntu c ky pr ior to his arr ests in Montgomery County . He ha d previously lived in Guthrie, Ke ntucky for six y e ars a nd wo rk e d a t Ac c omp lis h I nd us tr ie s un de r his ow n na me . D e fe nd a nt s a id that he did not have a Kentucky driver’ s license and his Te nnessee li ce n s e was inv a lid . D e fe nd a nt s a id tha t he wa s pla c e d ba c k on c omm un ity c or re c tio ns a ft e r h is first probation violation beca use he ha d a job with State I ndustries.

Def endant insisted that he ha d reported to Mr. Tindl e d u ri ng 1996 and perha ps in 1997. Def

endant sa id that Mr. Tindle told him at some point i n 1997 that he no long er had to r eport beca use he was a model probationer

. Def endant did not

re po rt to M r. Ti nd le or

pa y his su pe rv iso ry

fe e s a ft e r this c on ve rs a tio n b e c a us e he did not think it was re quired a nd denied that he was in hiding . Def endant sa id t h at he-3-

had g iven M r. Tindl e his mother’s address and telephone number. Defenda nt denied that eith e r he or his mothe r re c e ive d an y le tte rs c on c e rn ing his mis se d a pp oin tme nts or proba t i o n v i o lations and said that Mr. Tindle ne ver told him there w as an
o u t s t a n d i n g w arr a n tf

o r h i s arr e s t

. A s f

o r t h e arr e s t s i n M o n t g o m e r y C o u n t y, Def endant sa id that the police “pic ked up the wr ong person.”

On rebut tal , Mr . M a xey

sa id tha t D e fe nd a nt w a s se nt s e ve ra l le tte rs a t hi s mother’s addre ss c oncerning his missed appointments from May , 1996, to October , 19 96 . D e fendan t ma de up the se app oin tme nts a ft e r h e re c e ive d th e le tte rs un til October of that y ear

. Mr. Maxey said that a letter was sent to D efe ndant on Dec ember

18, 1996 at hi s mother’s addr ess, and the le tter wa s not returne d by the po st o ff ic e . A ft e r M r. Ma xey wa s a ssi g ne d a s D e fe nd a nt’ s p ro ba tio n o ff ic e r, he sa id that he se nt Defend ant a l e tte r o n Se pte mbe r 2 6, 19 99 , in fo rm ing De fe nd a nt tha t a
war rant ha d been issued for his arr est as a result of proba tion violations . The letter was not re turned to Mr. Maxey ’s offic e.

At the conc lusion of the re vocation hea ring , the trial court found Def endant’ s testimony , that he was told not to r eport to his probation officer afte r 1997, wa s not
cre dible

. T h e tria l c o u r t f o u n d th a t D e f

e n d a n t w a s in v io lati o n o f th e te rms and conditions of his pr obation for failing to r eport as require d. The trial c ourt revoke d Def endant’ s probation and order ed him to serve the rema inder of the sentenc e in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection.

State of Tenne ssee v. Ceil Moss, N o. M2003-00477-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 350642, at *1-2 (T enn. Crim. App., at Nashville, F eb. 25, 2004), perm. app. de nied (T e nn . Se pt. 13 , 2 00 4) . I n th a t app e a l, the Petitioner did not challeng e the trial court’s revoc ation of his pr obation, but he contende d that the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in not co ns ide ri ng him a s a ca nd idate fo r e ith e r p ro ba tio n o r f or pa rt ic ipatio n in the c omm un ity

c orrec tio ns pr og ra m. I d. a t *2 . T he Pe tit ion e r s ub mit te d th a t he su c c e ssf ull y complied with the terms of his community corr ections sentenc e, and he complied with the terms of his pr ob a tio na

ry se nte nc e fo r t wo y e ars un til he wa s to ld tha t he no lon g e r ne e de d to re po rt . I d. Th is Court concluded that the t rial court did not abuse its discretion when it orde red the Petitioner to serve his or ig ina l se nte nc e . I d. We n ote d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r’ s a sse rt ion that he su c c e ssf ull y c omp le te d h is first participa tion in the community corr ections prog ram was “somewhat mislea ding” beca use the Petitioner “violated the conditions of his c ommunity corr ections sentenc e but was e x tended a second chanc e, and it wa s this second attempt that was suc cessf ully completed.” I d.
This Court filed its opini on in the Petitioner’s case on Fe bruary 25, 2004, and, prior to our decision, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief on Fe bruary 4, 2004. I n that petition, the Pe tit ion e r c on te nd e d tha t the tr ia l cou rt wa s with ou t jur isd ic tio n to r e vo ke his pr ob a tio n b e c a us e his probation had ex pired. The habea s corpus c ourt denied the Petitioner’s petition without hol ding

a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ng . It is fr om tha t or de r tha t th e Pe tit ion e r n ow app e a ls.-4- II. Ana lys is

On app e a l, the Pe tit ion e r co nte nd s th a t th e ha be a s c or pu s c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

dis mis se d h is petition without hol ding a n evidentiary hearing. F urther, he cont en ds that the probation violation

war rant filed on D ece mber 10, 1996, wa s void. The Petitioner also asserts that the probation viola t i o n wa rr ant filed on De cembe r 10, 2001, wa s untimely . There fore , the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the Petitioner’ s probation pursuant to either of these w arr ant s

. Finally , the Petitioner asserts that the tria l court er red when i t failed to “or der se ntencing cre dits in t he various judgme nts and order s.”

Article I , section 15 of the T ennesse e Constituti on g uaran t ee s i t s ci tiz ens the rig ht to seek habea s corpus relief

. I n Tenne ssee, a “per son imprisoned or restra ined of [hi s or her ] l iberty , under any prete nse wha tsoever .

. . may prosec ute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2000). The g rounds upon which ha beas c orpus rel i ef wi l l b e granted are very narr ow. See Sta te v. Ritc hie
, 20 S.W .3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000)

. “Unlike the post-c onviction petition, the pur pose of a habea s corpus petition is to c ontest void and

no t me re ly

vo ida ble jud g me nts .” Pot ts v . St a te , 83 3 S .W .2 d 60, 62 (T e nn . 1 99 2) . T he re fo re , in

or de r t o s ta te a

c og niza ble c la im fo r ha

be a s c or pu s re lie f, the pe tit ion mus t c on te st a vo id j ud g me nt. I d. “A void judg ment is one in which the judg ment is facia lly invalid because t he court did not have the statut ory

a uth or ity to r e nd e r s uch jud g me nt .

. . . Avo ida ble jud g me nt i s o ne wh ic h is fa c ia lly valid and re quires proof bey ond the face of the record or judgme nt to demonstrate its voidableness.” Dykes v. Compton
, 97 8 S.W. 2d 52 8, 52 9 (T e nn

. 19 98 ) (c iti ng Ar c he r v . St a te , 851 S.W .2d 157, 161 (Tenn. 1993) ). Thus, a w rit of habe as cor pus is available only

when i t ap p ea rs o n the fa ce of the judgme nt or the re cord that the convicting court wa s without jurisdi ction to convict or sente nce the defe ndant, or that the sentenc e of imprisonment or other restra int ha s expired. Arche r , 851 S.W .2d

a t 16 4; P ott s , 833 S.W .2d at 62.
The pe ti ti o n e r b e ar s th e b u r d e n o f s h o w in g b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f th e e v id e n c e that the

c on vic tio n is vo id o r tha t th e pr iso n term h a s e xpir e d. Pa ssa re lla v. Sta te , 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Furthermore , the proc edura l require m en t s fo r h abea s corpus re lief ar e mandatory

and must be scr

upulouslyfollowed. Arc her
, 851 S.W .2d at 165. I t is permissible for a trial court to summarily dismiss a petiti on of habeas cor pus without the appointment of a lawy er a nd without an evidentiary h ea ri n g i f there is nothing on the fa ce of the judg ment to indicate that the

c on vic tio ns a dd re sse d th e re in a re vo id. Pa ssa

re lla
, 89 1 S.W.2 d at 627 ; Rodn e y B uf or d v. St a te , No. M 1 9 9 9 -0 0 4 8 7-CCA-R3-PC, 2000 W L 1131867, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul y 28, 2 0 0 0 ), perm. app. de nied ( T e n n

. Ja n

. 1 6 , 2 0 0 1 )

. B e c a u s e th e d e te r mi n a ti o n o f w h e th e r h abeas corpus relief should be g rante d is a question of law, our revie w is de novo with no presumption of

c or re c tne ss. Ha

rt v. Sta te , 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)

.
I n the ca se under

submissi on, the habe as cor pus court took j udicial notice of this Court’s opinion filed on Fe bruary 25, 2004, and then it found:

The fa cts as found in [the Court of Criminal Appeals] opinion establish t hat a wa rra nt-5-

alleg ing tha t the [P etitioner] violated the terms of his proba tion was filed on Dec ember

30, 1996. That wa

rra nt s t o p p ed the running of his probation and it wa s filed within the probationary time. The ame nded wa rra nt was filed within the probationary

time. The fa ct that a pr ob at ioner a bsconds and is not serve d with the

war rant ha s no bearing on the expiration of probation.

On appea l, the Petitioner’s first assertion is t hat the De cembe r 30, 1996, proba tion violation

war rant wa s void because it misst ated his convic tion d at e as May 13, 1904, rathe r than May 13, 19 94 . T he se c tio n of the wa rr a nt titl e d “V I OLAT I ON OF PRO B AT I ON ,” re a ds in p e rt ine nt p art :

B e f o r e m e , A l l e n W

. W a l l a c e , J u d g e o f t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t i n a n d f o r D i c k s o n C o u n t y, Te nn ., pe rs on a lly

c a me Em ma nu e l, w ho , b e ing fi rst d uly sw or n, sa y s th a t Ce c il H u E d w ar d M o s s , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e rr e d t o a s t h e a f

o r e s a i d , w a s o n t h e 1 3 d a y o f M a y, A.D. 1994 convic ted of the of fense of Sale of Coc aine Doc ket #CR131/C R132 in the Circuit Court of Dickson County

. . . . The probation v i o lation warr ant then states the r easons f or the issuanc e of the probation violation

war rant. L at er , u n d er a sec tion tit led “WARRANT,” the doc ument states that the Petitioner wa s convicted of

Sale of Coca ine “on the 13 day of May A.D. 1904.” The United States Supreme Court set forth the e lements nee ded to establish the “minimum require ment s o f d u e proc ess” in a

revoc ati o n of proba tion procee ding, w hich include a “wr itten notice of the c laimed violations of [probation or] parole

. . . .” Gag non v. Scarpe lli, 411 U.S. at 786 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Br ewe r, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)); see also State v. Wade, 863 S .W.2d 406, 408 (Tenn.1993)

. We conclude tha t the pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n w arr a nt d a te d De c e mbe r 30 , 19 96 , wh ic h pr op e rl y lis te d th e Pe tit ion e r’ s d a te of ar rest in one section but c ontained a typog raphic al err or in a nother section, satisfies the minimum require ments of due pr ocess. Ac cording ly , this warra nt was n o t v o i d , and the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke the Petitioner’ s probation.

The Petitioner next c ontends that the De cembe r 10, 2001, proba tion violation warrant wa s untimely . Gene rally , revoc ation may occur only within the probationary

period. State v. Shaffe r, 45 S.W .3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2001). I f, howe ver, a probation re vocation wa

rra nt is iss ued within the term of pr obation, it toll s the limit ation of time in wh i ch the court may act to re voke probation. Alder v. State, 108 S.W .3d 263, 267 (Tenn. 2002) (empha sis omit ted) (c iting Shaff er, 45 S.W.3d at 555). Ther efor e, bec ause w e conc lude that the 1996 wa rra nt was valid, it tolled the limi tati on of time in which the trial court ha d to act to re voke proba tion, and the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on these g rounds.

Th e Pe tit ion e r n e xt as se rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y fa ili ng to o rd e r s e nte nc ing c re dit s in the va ri ou s ju dg me nts a ndor de rs . Fi rs t, we no te that this iss ue is wa ive d be c a us e the Pe tit ion e r d id not raise this issue in his habea s corpus petition. Further, thi s Court has held, “[T] ime cre dits, being internal matter s, are g ener ally inappropria te consider ations in a habe as cor pus proce eding . The validity of any sentenc e re duction cre dits must be add re s s ed t h roug h the ave nues of the U niform Administrative Procedur es Ac t.” Carroll v. Raney , 868 S.W .2d 721, 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.-6-

Acc ording ly , the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas c orpus re lief base d upon this assertion.

Fin all y , th e Pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

su mma ri ly dis mis se d h is petition. As stated above, a habea s corpus court may summarily dismiss a petiti on for writ of habe as corpus without an e videntiary hearing if there is nothing on the face of t he judgment t o indicate that the Pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio ns are vo id or his se nte nc e is e xpir e d. Pa ssa re lla
, 8 9 1 S. W. 2 d a t 6 2 7

. We conclude that the habe as cor p u s co u rt did not err whe n it summ arily dismiss ed the Petitioner’s petition.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the foreg oing rea soning a nd authorities, we c onclude the Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of ha

beas c orpus. Acc ording ly , we af fi rm the habe as cor

pus court’s judg ment dismiss ing the Petitioner’s habe as cor pus petition.

_______________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE