UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4454

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALLISON AMANDA SAULS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (3:16-cr-00560-JMC-9)

Submitted: January 17, 2019 Decided: January 30, 2019

Amended: January 31, 2019

Before KING, FLOYD, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Parks N. Small, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Sherri A. Lydon, United States 

Attorney, T. DeWayne Pearson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Allison Amanda Sauls appeals the district court’s criminal judgment entered 

following her guilty plea to federal wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 

On appeal, Sauls challenges the district court’s calculation of the loss amount and denial 

of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing as to the latter that she credibly 

asserted her legal innocence, that her plea was not knowing and voluntary, and that she 

was not assisted by competent counsel. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

A criminal defendant may withdraw a plea if she can “show[ ] a fair and just 

reason for withdrawal.” United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000); 

see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2). The district court may consider six factors in determining 

whether the defendant has met her burden: (1) whether she provided credible evidence 

that her plea was not knowing or voluntary; (2) whether she credibly asserted her legal 

innocence; (3) whether there was a delay between entering the plea and moving for 

withdrawal; (4) whether the defendant had assistance of competent counsel; (5) whether 

the withdrawal would prejudice the government; and (6) whether a withdrawal would

waste judicial resources. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). We 

review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012). 

“To be convicted of mail fraud or wire fraud, a defendant must specifically intend 

to lie or cheat or misrepresent with the design of depriving the victim of something of 

value.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012). Sauls’ motion to 

withdraw her guilty plea primarily hinges on her argument that she is innocent of the 
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crime to which she pled guilty because she “denied she knew she was doing anything 

wrong, much less with any intent to defraud.” (Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 17) at 25; see 

id. at 15-17, 25-26). However, this argument rests on a misreading of specific intent. We 

have held that specific intent refers to “[t]he intent to accomplish the precise criminal act 

that one is later charged with.” United States v. Batato, 833 F.3d 413, 430 (4th 

Cir. 2016) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). So the necessary intent to 

defraud requires that the defendant specifically intended to deceive or cheat someone, as 

opposed to merely taking action that knowingly or recklessly results in fraud. See United 

States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 623 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018). 

“This specific intent to defraud is the only mens rea requirement for mail fraud and wire 

fraud.” Wynn, 684 F.3d at 478 (emphasis added). 

As a result, Sauls’ argument that “the plea transcript is very confusing . . . on acts 

of culpability” does not establish her legal innocence or support withdrawal of her plea. 

(Appellant’s Br. at 27). To the contrary, the plea hearing indicates that Sauls acted with 

the requisite intent to defraud. Sauls admitted that she made false representations that 

deceived others and enabled her to “accept[ ] payments on loans on accounts receivable 

that [were not] hers.” (J.A. 154-55).*

 She was aware of and specifically intended that 

result. (J.A. 157-58). The second element, proof of the use of a wire, is uncontested. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Sauls failed to 

credibly assert her legal innocence. 

 * “J.A.” refers to joint appendix filed by the parties.
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Sauls contends that various defects in the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing support a 

fair and just reason to withdraw her guilty plea. She argues that, pursuant to the first 

Moore factor, her plea was not knowing or voluntary. But although Sauls may not have 

had a firm grasp on the details of the fraud at the plea hearing, there is no evidence to 

suggest that she misunderstood the nature of the plea or was acting under some form of 

coercion. In fact, she made sworn statements in the plea agreement and plea hearing that 

she had specifically discussed the plea with her attorneys and entered the plea of her own 

free choice. Sauls also argues that, pursuant to the fourth Moore factor, she was not 

assisted by competent counsel. This directly contradicts her own sworn statements in the 

plea agreement and plea hearing that she had discussed the relevant issues with her 

attorneys and was satisfied with their representation. Sauls’ conclusory allegations of 

ineffective assistance do not “demonstrate objectively incompetent representation”

pursuant to United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1392 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc). See

United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sauls’ plea was knowing, voluntary, and 

supported by competent representation. 

The remaining Moore factors are similarly unavailing for Sauls. As to the third 

factor, Sauls moved to withdraw her guilty plea over five months after she pled guilty. 

We have held that six-week and two-month delays are too long, so this factor weighs 

against withdrawal. Nicholson, 676 F.3d at 384. The district court did not make any 

findings regarding the fifth and sixth factors. See Sparks, 67 F.3d at 1154 (stating that 

where “the first four factors identified in Moore militate against granting the defendant’s 
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motion, it can reasonably refrain from trying to ascertain just how much withdrawal of 

the plea would prejudice the government and inconvenience the court”). In this case, the 

first four Moore factors do not support a fair and just reason for withdrawal of Sauls’ 

plea, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to do so. 

Finally, Sauls seeks to appeal the district court’s determination of the total loss 

amount for sentencing purposes. But upon review of the plea agreement and the 

transcript of the Rule 11 hearing, we agree with the Government and conclude that Sauls

knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal and that the issue Sauls seeks to 

raise on appeal falls squarely within the compass of her waiver of appellate rights. See

United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571, 574 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Blick, 

408 F.3d 162, 168-69 (4th Cir. 2005). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

the motion to withdraw her guilty plea and dismiss the appeal of the sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

DISMISSED IN PART