1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42233

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v.

CRAIG ALLEN HUNTER ,
Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 597

Filed: August 25, 2015
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Thomas J. Ryan , District Judge.
Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed

. Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly E. Smith , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ GRATTON, Judge Craig Allen Hunter appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An officer observed Hunter exit a parking lot and turn onto Cleveland Boulevard, a one

way, two

- lane road

. Without establis hing himself in the right lane, Hunter pulled into the left
lane and signaled for approximately 150 feet before turning left

. 1 The officer then pulled Hunter

over for failure to utilize a turn signal for five seconds, Idaho Code § 49

- 808(2). The officer approached Hunter’s car, smelled alcohol coming from the car, and o bs erved that Hunter’s eyes

1 The officer later returned to the scene of the stop and measured the distance from the parking lot to the street where Hunter turned; t he distance was 156 feet.2 were bloodshot. Hunter admitted to consuming three alcoholic beverages . He subsequently failed three field sobriety tests and was arrested for felony driving under the influence. Hunter filed a motion to suppress all evidence o btained after the traffic stop

. He asserted
that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation pursuant to I.C. § 49

- 808(2). The court denied the motion, finding that Hunter’s conduct

- - pulling directly into the left
lane without es tablishing himself in the right lane

- - violated I.C. § 49

- 644 (1) and gave the officer reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.
Hunter entered a conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence , reserving the right to appeal the d eni al of his motion to suppress. Hunter timely appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS Hunter argues the traffic stop was not justified under I.C. §§ 49

- 808(2) or 49

- 644 (1)
, and seeks to suppress all evidence obtained after the traffic stop. The standard of review of a

suppress ion motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as fou nd. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial cour t. State v. Valdez

- Molina , 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates
the Fourth A mendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.
Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson , 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal beha vior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic
laws. United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers , 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonablen ess of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira , 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id . An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those3 inferences may be drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague , 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286

. Hunter argues that the officer did not have reasonable sus picion to make the stop because
Hunter did not violate I.C. § § 49

- 808(2) or 49

- 644 (1) . Idaho Code § 49

- 808(2) requires drivers
on controlled

- access highways to signal “contin uously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than one hundred (100) feet” before turning or changing lanes

. The district court found that Hunter signaled his left turn for “approximately three (3) seconds.”
The Stat e conceded that Cleveland Boulevard is not a co ntrolled

- access highway. Thus, Hunter’s failure to signal for five seconds was not a violation of I.C. § 49

- 808(2) for which the
officer h ad reasonable suspicion to stop Hunter

. The district court also found that Hunter signaled his left turn for “approximately one hundred fifty (150) feet.” Accordingly, the officer
did not ha ve reasonable suspicion to stop Hunter for his turn because he complied with I.C. § 49

- 808(2) by signaling for more than 100 feet

. However, the district court held that “regardless of whether the officer was interpreting I.C. § 49

- 808(2) correctly at the time of this traffic stop, he had legal cause to stop the vehicle because of his observation of the violation of I.C. § 49

- 644.”
Ida ho Code § 49

- 644(1) requires “ [ b ] oth the approach for a right turn and the right turn
shall b e made as close as practicable to the right

- hand curb or edge of the roadway.” Hunter concedes that he did not establish himself in the right lane before pulling into the left lane. However, he asserts that I.C. § 49

- 644(1) “ provides an exception to the general rule in that a person is not required to make a right turn into the farthest right lane if it is not practicable.” He maintains that it was not practicabl e for him to comply with I.C. §§ 49

- 808(2) and 49

- 644 (1) because he only had a short distance to establish himself in the right lane
, s ignal his move to the left lane, and signal his turn onto a cross street

. This Court exercises free review over the appli cation and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes , 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory co nstruction. State v. Burnight , 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar , 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000).4 T he language of I.C. § 49

- 644(1) unambiguously requires drivers to turn into the right, or nearest, lane. In re Beyer , 155 Idaho 40, 45, 304 P .3d 1206, 1211 (Ct. App. 2013). The practicability language in the statute does not excuse drivers from turning into the nearest lane. Rather, it instructs drivers to make their turn “as close as practicable to the right

- hand curb or edge of the roadway.” I.C. § 49

- 644(1)

. Practicability does not depend on subjective factors such as a driver’s predetermined route. S ee S tate v. Neal
, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (review pending) (finding that the practicability language in I.C. 49

- 637(1) did
not allow “a person to occasionally leave his lane, without any apparent need ”). Instead, practicability must be determined objectively. See i d. For instance, if the right

- hand lane were blocked in some fashion, a driver may make a right

- hand turn that is less than “as close as practicable to the right

- hand curb or edge of the roadway.” I.C. § 49

- 644(1)

. Thus, b ecause nothing, other than his own predetermined route, made it im practicable for Hunter to make his turn onto Cleveland Boulevard as close to the right

- hand curb or edge of the roadway as he
could
, he was required to do so. As Hunter concedes that he did not establish himself in the right
lane bef ore pulling into the l eft lane, the officer clearly had reasonable suspicion to pull him over
for a violation of I.C. § 49

- 644 (1)

. Therefore
, Hunter is not entitled to suppression of any evidence obtained after the traff ic stop and the district court correctly denied Hunter’ s motion to

suppress. III.
CONCLUSION Hunter violated I.C. § 49

- 644(1) and the officer thus had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. T he district court’s order denying Hunter’s motion to suppress is affirmed

. Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR

.