Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1349 | December 18, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A.B.

Joann M. Price Franklin

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R.P.

Deidre L. Monroe

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of 

An.B. and Ar.B. (Minor 

Children) and A.B. (Father) and 

R.P. (Mother)

A.B. (Father) and

R.P. (Mother),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

December 18, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-1349

Appeal from the 

Lake Superior Court

The Honorable

Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

45D06-1808-JT-280

45D06-1808-JT-281
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1349 | December 18, 2019 Page 2 of 11

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] A.B. (“Father”) and R.P. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the 

termination of their parental rights to two of their children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts that follow are taken primarily from the trial court’s findings of fact, 

none of which Parents challenge on appeal.1 Parents are the biological parents 

of three children: Am.B., born in 2010, An.B., born in 2013, and Ar.B., born in 

2016. 

[3] In 2010, the Department of Child Services (DCS) opened the first CHINS case 

involving Parents because Father “spanked” Mother several times and then fled

with three-month-old Am.B. See Ex. EEE. Am.B. was found on the side of the 

road about a block away from Parents’ house, lying on wet ground and wearing

only one piece of clothing. Father was charged with and pled guilty to Class D 

felony neglect of a dependent. In November 2011, DCS filed a petition to 

terminate Parents’ parental rights to Am.B. Then in January 2012, Mother pled 

guilty to Class D felony theft. In May, the court ordered the termination of 

1 Because Parents do not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, we accept them as true. See Maldem v. 

Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).
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Parents’ parental rights to Am.B., after finding that Parents had been in and out 

of incarceration since June 2011 and were not participating in services.2 Then 

in 2013, An.B. was born. In February 2015, Father pled guilty to Class C 

felony burglary. 

[4] About a year later, in March 2016, DCS received a report that Ar.B. was born

positive for marijuana and cocaine. Mother admitted that she used marijuana 

while pregnant. Father refused to take a drug screen and told DCS that he did 

not want “anything . . . to do with DCS.” Tr. p. 37. DCS was also concerned 

about Mother’s housing. Father had recently kicked Mother out of their house,

and she was living in a shelter. However, Father agreed to let Mother move 

back in. On March 15, DCS filed petitions alleging that An.B. and Ar.B.

(collectively, “Children”) were in need of services (CHINS). Mother admitted 

the allegations in the petitions, and Father denied them. Children remained in 

Mother’s custody while she was living with Father.

[5] About a month later, Parents left Children unattended in a car for over an hour. 

The temperature was forty degrees or less, and Children were not properly 

dressed. Police arrived and took Children to the police station until DCS 

arrived. DCS removed Children and placed them in foster care. In April, the 

trial court found that Children were CHINS and ordered that Children continue 

to be detained. Later that month, following a dispositional hearing, the court 

2 Because Parents’ parental rights to Am.B. have been terminated, Am.B. is not involved in this appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1349 | December 18, 2019 Page 4 of 11

ordered that Parents participate in services, including substance-abuse 

assessments, parenting assessments, home-based casework services, initial 

clinical assessments, random drug and alcohol screens, individual therapy, and 

supervised visitation.

[6] For a brief period, Mother engaged in random drug screens and met with her 

home-based case manager. Father did not participate in any services other than 

supervised visitation. Parents visited Children for a few weeks, but visits 

stopped in June 2016. On June 10, Parents were arrested on federal charges for 

committing bank robbery in California and for committing three bank robberies 

that occurred in Indiana on April 28, May 6, and May 27. Mother pled guilty 

to the California bank robbery in November 2016 and one of the Indiana bank 

robberies in October 2017. See Ex. DDD. She is currently incarcerated in 

federal prison in Dublin, California, and her expected release date is January 

2022. In November 2016, a jury found Father guilty of the California bank 

robbery. Then in April 2018, a jury found Father guilty of the April 28, May 6, 

and May 27 Indiana bank robberies. See Ex. CCC. He is currently incarcerated 

in federal prison in Kentucky, and his expected release date is December 2025.

[7] In August 2018, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights to 

Children. A fact-finding hearing was held in February 2019. At the time of the 

hearing, Parents were serving their federal sentences and testified 

telephonically. Mother testified that since she has been in prison, she has 

obtained eleven certificates for completing various classes, including Bible 

studies, nutrition, and support classes such as Alcoholics Anonymous and 
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Narcotics Anonymous. Mother said that none of her relatives could care for 

Children and that she did not want to separate them. See Tr. p. 15. Father 

testified that he has not completed any classes while he’s been in prison because 

he “figured that whatever [he] did, didn’t make a difference.” Id. at 73. Father 

said that he has been incarcerated many times for “[a] lot of driving while 

suspended, a couple of failure to appears. . . . a domestic and . . . retail theft, 

conversion, and . . . burglary.” Id. at 81. 

[8] Family Case Manager (FCM) Shavon Smith testified that she conducted the 

initial assessment after DCS received a report that Ar.B. was born positive for 

marijuana and cocaine. FCM Smith said that when she conducted her 

assessment, Father refused to do a drug test. See id. at 31. FCM Titoria Battle 

testified that she is the family’s case manager and has been for the entire case. 

FCM Battle recommended the termination of Parents’ parental rights 

“[b]ecause [Parents] do[n’t] have any stable housing, they cannot financially 

support [Children], they haven’t been with them for going on three years and 

they haven’t completed any of the services recommended by DCS.” Id. at 45. 

FCM said that Children have been placed in the same foster home for three 

years but that Children will be moving to a new pre-adoptive foster home 

because their current foster mom “fell ill, therefore, she is not able to care for 

[Children] long term.” Id. at 46. After FCM Battle testified, the court 

continued the fact-finding hearing to April.

[9] When the fact-finding hearing resumed, FCM Battle testified that she 

investigated Parents’ relatives as placement options for Children, but none were 
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able to care for Children. Children’s new foster dad, J.O., testified that 

Children had been with his family for just over a month and had “adjusted very 

quickly.” Id. at 87. J.O. said that he and his wife have been wanting to adopt 

for a long time and that they have “just been so blessed by [Children] and they 

are doing very well in [their] home.” Id. at 88. In May 2019, the trial court 

issued its order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Children.

[10] Father and Mother separately appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[11] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 

2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. Id. When a trial court has 

entered findings of fact and conclusions, we will not set aside the trial court’s 

findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a 

judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether 

the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and whether the findings support 

the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016).

[12] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 
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placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. If the court 

finds that the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the 

parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[13] Parents first argue that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

Children’s removal will not be remedied. In determining whether the 

conditions that resulted in a child’s removal will not be remedied, the trial court 

engages in a two-step analysis. First, the trial court must ascertain what 

conditions led to the child’s placement and retention in foster care. In re K.T.K., 

989 N.E.2d at 1231. Second, the trial court determines whether there is a 

reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. “The 
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trial court must consider a parent’s habitual pattern of conduct to determine 

whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id.

[14] Here, Parents failed to demonstrate that they were any closer to providing 

Children a safe, stable home than they were at the beginning of the CHINS case

in March 2016. The trial court’s unchallenged findings on this issue support its 

conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

Children’s removal will not be remedied. See, e.g., In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644 

(Ind. 2014) (findings regarding father’s non-compliance with services support 

trial court’s conclusion that conditions resulting in children’s removal from 

father’s care would not be remedied). That is, the trial court found:

*****

Once the children were removed from parental care, [Parents] 

stopped participating in the services offered through the case 

plan.

*****

[DCS] has a history with [Parents] for a sibling whose parental 

rights were terminated in May of 2012 due to domestic violence 

issues and [F]ather leaving the infant on the side of the road 

unattended.

Both [M]other and [F]ather have a pattern of criminal conduct 

which the court cannot ignore. There has been a number of 

incarcerations and both [M]other and [F]ather continue to be 

incarcerated after receiving lengthy sentences.
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Neither parent is available to parent [Children]. Neither parent 

will be available to parent [Children] in the near future. 

[Children] have been removed from parental care since April of 

2016 and have not seen either of their parents since June of 2016 

when [P]arents were arrested. . . .

Neither parent is providing any emotional or financial support 

for [Children]. Neither parent has completed any case plan for 

reunification. . . . It is unlikely that either parent will be able to 

provide the necessary care, support and supervision necessary to 

parent [Children]. Neither parent is in a position to receive 

[Children] back into the home.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 3. Most notably, Parents’ most serious crimes—the 

bank robberies—occurred while they were under DCS supervision and after 

Children were removed. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it 

concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

Children’s removal and continued placement outside the home will not be 

remedied.3

[15] Parents next argue that the trial court erred in concluding that termination is in 

Children’s best interests. To determine what is in the child’s best interests, the 

trial court must look to the totality of the evidence. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 

3 Because we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in Children’s removal will not be remedied, we do not address its alternate conclusion that there is a 

reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships pose a threat to the well-being of 

Children. See In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (Indiana Code section 31-35-4(b)(2) is 

written in the disjunctive and requires the trial court to find only one of the two requirements of subsection 

(b) has been established by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.
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1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In doing so, the trial court must 

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. Id. The trial court 

need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the 

parent-child relationship. Id. “Moreover, the testimony of service providers 

may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re 

Z.B., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[16] Here, in addition to Parent’s instability, criminal activity that necessitated DCS 

involvement, and their complete lack of progress since then, FCM Battle 

testified that terminating Parents’ parental rights is in Children’s best interests. 

See Tr. p. 45. Furthermore, the trial court found that Children have been out of 

parental care for almost three years and are bonded and thriving in their 

placement. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 3. The trial court also concluded 

that “[i]t would be unfair to [Children] to delay such permanency on the very 

remote likelihood of [Parents] being released from incarceration and completing 

services in the near future. . . . these children definitely deserve permanency, 

especially in light of the fact that both children are at ages where crucial brain 

development occurs.” Id. at 4. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it 

determined that termination is in Children’s best interests. See In re K.T.K., 989 

N.E.2d at 1230 (finding that “children have an interest in terminating parental 

rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, 

continuous relationships); see also In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 883 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004) (children’s needs are too substantial to force them to wait while 

determining if their parents will be able to parent them).
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[17] Finally, Parents argue that the trial court erred in concluding that there is a 

satisfactory plan for Children’s care and treatment. In order for the trial court 

to terminate a parent-child relationship, it must find that there is a satisfactory 

plan for the care and treatment of the child. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). 

That plan need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the 

direction the child will go after the parent-child relationship is terminated. Lang 

v. Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007), trans. denied. Adoption is generally a satisfactory plan, even when a 

potential adoptive family has not been identified. See id. at 375. Part of the 

reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the 

termination court, to decide whether an adoptive placement is appropriate. In 

re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[18] Here, DCS’s plan is adoption. FCM Battle agreed with this plan. Parents 

contend that because Children recently moved into a new pre-adoptive 

placement—because their original foster mom fell ill—that adoption by their 

new foster family is not a satisfactory plan. However, Children’s new foster 

dad, J.O., testified that Children quickly adjusted to his home and that his 

family wanted to adopt Children if Parents’ parental rights were terminated. 

See Tr. p. 88. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that adoption 

is a satisfactory plan for Children.

[19] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.