Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1612-CR-2826 | June 15, 2017 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Darnell Hatton

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darnell Hatton,

a/k/a Darnal Hatton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 15, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1612-CR-2826

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marc T. 

Rothenberg, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

CR-79-324B

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1612-CR-2826 | June 15, 2017 Page 2 of 4

[1] Darnell Hatton appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

[2] In 1979, Hatton was convicted of Class B felony robbery, Class B felony 

confinement, Class D felony theft, and Class D felony receiving stolen property. 

He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty years each on the two 

Class B felonies and four years each on the two Class D felonies, and his 

sentence was enhanced by thirty years because he was found to be an habitual 

offender.1 The sentencing order bears a stamp stating, “Commitments being 

held in abeyance.” Appellant’s App. p. 15-16. 

[3] On October 28, 2016, Hatton filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, 

arguing that the portion of the sentencing order directing that the sentence be 

“held in abeyance” was erroneous. Id. The trial court denied the motion, 

finding as follows: “Denied. Sentence herein was not postponed; Ct. simply 

noted it would be run consecutively to other cases.”2 Id. at 9. Hatton now 

appeals.

[4] A motion to correct erroneous sentence is appropriate only when the sentence is 

erroneous on its face. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004) 

 

1

In 1998, the trial court vacated Hatton’s conviction for receiving stolen property and the habitual offender 

finding. Appellant’s App. p. 16.

2 On April 10, 1979, a trial court had imposed a sixty-year term on Hatton in another unrelated cause. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 13-14. In the sentencing transcript for the instant offenses, the trial court did, in fact, state 

that the sentences for these offenses “shall run consecutively to all other sentences to be imposed or 

heretofore imposed by the Courts.” Appellant’s App. p. 17-19.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1612-CR-2826 | June 15, 2017 Page 3 of 4

(cautioning that “[c]laims that require consideration of the proceedings before, 

during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct 

erroneous sentence” and emphasizing that the narrow confines of this 

procedure are to be strictly applied). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a 

motion to correct erroneous sentence, we will reverse only if the ruling is 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. 

E.g., Hobbs v. State, 71 N.E.3d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[5] At the time Hatton committed these offenses, the statute authorizing 

consecutive sentences was generally found to apply only to those occasions 

where the trial court was meting out two or more terms of imprisonment at one 

time. E.g., Kendrick v. State, 529 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (Ind. 1988), superseded by 

statute. At that time, however, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(b) stated as 

follows:

If a person commits a crime: 

(1) After having been arrested for another crime; and 

(2) Before the date he is discharged from probation, 

parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for that 

other crime; 

The terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served 

consecutively, regardless of the order in which the crimes are 

tried and the sentences are imposed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1612-CR-2826 | June 15, 2017 Page 4 of 4

I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b) (1979). Our Supreme Court found that this statute does not 

require consecutive sentences where the subsequent crime was committed 

between arrest and sentencing for a prior crime, but does require consecutive 

sentences where the subsequent offense occurred after sentencing for a prior 

crime. Groff v. State, 488 N.E.2d 711, 712 (Ind. 1986).

[6] In this case, it is impossible to tell from the face of the sentencing judgment 

whether Hatton committed the instant crimes after having been sentenced for 

another crime but not yet discharged from probation, parole, or incarceration. 

To make that determination, the trial court would have been required to go 

beyond the face of the judgment and examine the record, which is improper 

when evaluating a motion to correct erroneous sentence. As a result, the trial 

court did not err by denying Hatton’s motion to correct erroneous sentence.3

[7] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.

 

3 We note that in Hatton’s direct appeal, our Supreme Court described Hatton’s criminal history in the year 

leading up to his 1979 convictions in this case: in 1978, he was convicted of burglary, arrested for attempted 

robbery, escaped from custody, convicted of robbery, kidnapping, rape, and criminal deviate conduct, and 

convicted of burglary and murder; in 1979, he was convicted of escape. Hatton v. State, 439 N.E.2d 565, 569 

(Ind. 1982). It seems nearly certain, therefore, that on July 25, 1979, when Hatton committed the instant 

offenses, he had already been sentenced for another crime(s) but not yet discharged from probation, parole, 

or incarceration.