[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10284

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CHARLES FRANKLIN HYDE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BOWMAN,

Captain, Liberty County Sheriff's Office, 

SHAWN FIELDS,

Drug Enforcement Agent, 

UNKNOWN DRUG TASK FORCE OFFICERS,

CAPT. ASHDOWN, 

Defendants-Appellees,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10284

SAVANNAH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 

Emergency Room Doctor, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00091-RSB-CLR

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This pro se appeal arises out of the district court’s sua sponte 

dismissal of Charles Hyde’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against 

Captain Lonnie Bowman, Officer Shawn Fields, Captain Ashdown, 

and other unknown Southeastern District Drug Task Force 

Officers for allegedly using excessive force when arresting Hyde in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Hyde was injured when 

Bowman, after correctly determining Hyde was armed with a 

firearm, shot Hyde in the course of executing a search warrant for 

drugs on Hyde’s home. The district court, screening Hyde’s 

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b),1 determined that, 

1 As relevant here, § 1915A provides that the district court “shall review . . . a 

complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

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23-10284 Opinion of the Court 3

even taking as true all the allegations in the light most favorable to

Hyde, he failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted 

because his allegations did not establish that Bowman’s conduct 

was objectively unreasonable. Hyde argues that the district court 

erred in dismissing his complaint because Bowman acted 

unreasonably and maliciously in shooting him. After careful 

review, we affirm.

I . Background

In April 2019, Hyde, proceeding pro se, sued Bowman,

Fields, Savannah Memorial Hospital, and the Southeastern Drug 

Task Force alleging various violations of his civil rights.2 After 

multiple rounds of screening by the district court, and Hyde’s 

criminal conviction,3 the district court struck Hyde’s Amended 

Complaint as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

because many of his allegations were inconsistent with his criminal 

governmental officer or employee of a government entity” and “dismiss the 

complaint . . . if the complaint . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a)–(b). 

2 The hospital and the Southeastern Drug Task Force were dismissed from this 

case, and any claims against them are not before us on appeal. 

3 Hyde was convicted on federal drug and firearm charges and sentenced to 

444 months’ imprisonment. We recently affirmed his conviction and 

sentence. United States v. Hyde, No. 22-10332, 2024 WL 726909 (11th Cir. Feb. 

22, 2024) (unpublished).

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trial testimony and ordered Hyde to file a “renewed Amended 

Complaint.”4 

Hyde filed the operative Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”) which alleged the following. At night, on May 3, 2018, the 

Liberty County Sheriff’s Office raided Hyde’s home to search for 

drugs. They did not announce their presence before entering the 

home, and Hyde was awakened by “dogs barkin[g] and glass 

breaking.” After waking up, Hyde entered the dark hallway armed 

with a gun where a flash bang went off and stunned him. After 

entering the home, the officers shouted “Sheriff’s Department,” 

and afterward there was “total silence.” The officers were in 

Hyde’s living room, and he was in the hallway leaning against the 

doorframe, stunned from the flash bang, when he was shot in the 

hand after he pulled the trigger on his gun to make a clacking 

sound. After being shot, Hyde fled to his bedroom, screaming at 

the officers “why did you shoot me?” The officers asked Hyde 

“where is the gun” to which he responded, “it’s on the floor here 

in the bedroom.” The officers instructed Hyde to place his hands 

outside the door and to lay on the floor. Hyde complied and an 

officer put a knee on his neck and a boot on his face. He was

arrested, stripped naked, and taken outside. 

Hyde alleged that Officer Bowman “admit[ted] to shooting 

Hyde” and also admitted “to hearing” Hyde squeeze the trigger, 

although he did not see Hyde pull the trigger. Hyde alleged that 

4 The district court’s sanctions order striking Hyde’s Amended Complaint is 

not before us on appeal.

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the clacking sound his gun made when he pulled the trigger 

showed that it was inoperable, and he speculated that Bowman 

knew what the sound meant. Accordingly, he alleged that the use 

of force against him was “completely needless” because he had 

demonstrated to the officers that the gun he held when they 

entered his home did not shoot, and he never threatened the 

officers. He argued in his pleading that Officer Bowman could 

have talked to him before shooting, and that if the officers believed 

he had tried to shoot anyone, that he would have been charged 

with attempted murder. He also argued that Bowman could have 

taken other measures if he thought that Hyde was trying to shoot 

him, including “talk[ing] to Hyde” to de-escalate the situation. 

Hyde alleged that “Bowman tried to be a hero” by “shoot[ing] 

[Hyde’s] gun out of [his] hand” instead of taking de-escalating 

measures. He also took issue with how various pieces of evidence 

were handled and alleged that the officers fabricated evidence to 

cover for Bowman. 

Based on the above allegations, Hyde sent a follow-up 

document, which essentially continued his complaint, demanding 

a jury trial under § 1983 and bringing claims for “excessive force in 

violation of the 4th Amendment” and “cruel [and] unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” 

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

(hereinafter “report”), recommending that the district court sua 

sponte dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for 

failing to state a claim. The magistrate judge determined that the 

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majority of Hyde’s complaint was allegations related to an 

excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment against 

Bowman and that, even taking Hyde’s allegations as true, his 

allegations failed to show that Bowman acted objectively 

unreasonably under the circumstances. Thus, the magistrate judge 

determined that Bowman had not used excessive force and 

recommended that the excessive force claim be dismissed.5 The 

magistrate judge’s report informed Hyde that he would have 

fourteen days to file objections to the report and that “failure to 

timely file objections [would] result in the waiver of rights on 

appeal.” 

Hyde objected to the dismissal of the excessive force claim. 

Specifically, he argued that the magistrate judge failed to construe 

the allegations in the light most favorable to him and, when 

construed in the correct light, his allegations showed that 

Bowman’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. He emphasized 

that (1) Bowman was never in danger and that Hyde never 

attempted to escape; (2) it was objectively unreasonable for 

Bowman to shoot him and argued that the court held Hyde to a 

higher standard than Bowman; (3) officers, including Bowman, had 

provided false testimony against him at his criminal trial; and (4) 

5 The magistrate judge also recommended that to the extent Hyde alleged (1) 

a claim for excessive force based on the manner of his arrest; (2) a claim for 

cruel and unusual punishment for his strip search; and (3) conclusory claims 

regarding evidence tampering, those claims be dismissed as well.

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Bowman had “snuck up and shot [him without] warning, never 

giving him a chance to not be shot.” 

The district court overruled those objections. In doing so, it 

adopted the magistrate judge’s report and determined that, based 

on the allegations in Hyde’s amended complaint, Bowman’s use of 

deadly force was objectively reasonable in light of the 

circumstances, namely the fact that Hyde had a gun while in the 

hallway during the officers’ raid of Hyde’s home and Hyde pulled 

the gun’s trigger causing it to make a clacking sound. Accordingly, 

the district court dismissed Hyde’s complaint because his 

“allegations were insufficient to state an excessive force claim.” 

Hyde timely appealed. 

II. Legal Standard

“We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for 

failure to state a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).” 

Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). The same 

standards that apply to a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) apply to dismissals under § 1915A. Leal v. Ga. 

Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2001). 

III. Discussion

On appeal, Hyde argues that he “state[d] enough facts to 

relief that is plausible on its face” and that the district court failed 

to construe the allegations, and draw all reasonable inferences, in 

the light most favorable to him. He contends that “discovery will 

show the proof” of his claim and that the district court improperly 

weighed the facts and made credibility determinations in 

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concluding that the allegations did not show that Bowman’s 

conduct was objectively unreasonable.6 Hyde also argues in 

passing that the district court erred in dismissing his other claims, 

particularly, the claims related to the alleged improper strip search 

and the alleged fabrication of evidence.7 

To state a claim, a complaint must contain facts that, if 

accepted as true, state a plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). All factual 

allegations—as opposed to legal conclusions—must be taken as 

true, but the allegations must be more than speculation. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678–79 (explaining that plausibility “demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and 

6 This portion of Hyde’s brief includes additional factual allegations that were 

not in his operative complaint, including allegations that Bowman saw Hyde 

surrendering, with his back turned, and his gun pointing at the floor. This 

recitation of the facts is drastically different than Hyde’s operative complaint 

wherein he alleged that Bowman heard Hyde, but did not see him, squeeze 

the trigger on his gun to make a “clacking sound.” In any event, our de novo 

review of a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim requires us to 

accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 909 (11th 

Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we do not consider these new factual allegations in 

our analysis.

7Hyde did not object to the magistrate judge’s dismissal of these claims. 

Because he did not object to the magistrate judge’s report regarding his other 

claims, he has waived the right to challenge on appeal the dismissal of these 

claims. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (providing that if a party fails to object to the 

magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations after being provided notice 

of the opportunity to object and the consequences of not doing so, he waives 

the right to challenge those matters on appeal). 

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requires more than mere speculative conclusions); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pro se pleadings are liberally 

construed. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

“[A] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure 

to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is 

not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). 

Further, “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts 

or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent 

dismissal.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 

(11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).

Excessive force claims that arise from events incident to an 

arrest are judged under the Fourth Amendment’s objective 

reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 

(1989). “That standard requires us to ask ‘whether the officer’s 

conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting 

the officer.’” Patel v. City of Madison, 959 F.3d 1330, 1338–39 (11th 

Cir. 2020) (alteration adopted) (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 

1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, we must “examine the 

totality of the circumstances, ‘including the severity of the crime at 

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety 

of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively 

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Baker v. 

City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1279 (alteration adopted) (quoting 

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Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). Factors to be considered include 

whether the officer (1) has probable cause to believe that the target 

may harm the officer or others; (2) reasonably believes the use of 

deadly force is needed to prevent escape; and (3) has—if feasible—

given a warning before using deadly force. Bradley v. Benton, 10 

F.4th 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2021). Thus, to allege a plausible 

excessive force claim, Hyde’s complaint must include allegations 

that, when taken as true, plausibly allege that Bowman’s conduct 

was objectively unreasonable. If Hyde’s allegations do not do so,

then the allegations are insufficient to state a claim for excessive 

force. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215.

Although the mere presence of a gun does not itself justify 

the use of deadly force, when a gun “is available for ready use” 

officers are not required to wait until an armed suspect uses his 

weapon before applying such force. Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 

922 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 143 S. Ct. 110 (2022). An officer is not 

required to warn an armed suspect before opening fire, especially 

if the time taken to warn could result in the officer’s death. Id. The 

officer’s actions are not to be viewed with the benefit of 20/20 

hindsight, and the court’s determination of reasonableness “must 

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced 

to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving[.]” Kisela v. Hughes, 548 U.S. 100, 

103 (2018)). 

Here, even liberally construing the factual allegations in 

Hyde’s operative complaint in the light most favorable to him, 

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Hyde failed to plausibly allege that Bowman’s actions were 

objectively unreasonable. Hyde’s operative complaint describes a 

“tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situation. Id. He alleged 

that (1) the officers were raiding his house at night; (2) Hyde

entered the dark hallway carrying his gun; (3) he squeezed the 

trigger on his gun to cause it to make a “clacking” sound; 

(4) Bowman heard the gun clack and knew that it was a gun; and 

(5) Bowman shot him. Although Hyde alleged that he made the 

gun clack to show that it was not operable and speculates that 

Bowman knew the clacking sound meant it was inoperable, the 

district court was not required to credit this speculative allegation 

as to what Bowman believed the sound meant. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555; Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that conclusory 

allegations and speculative deductions of fact are not admitted as 

true for purposes of the failure to state a claim analysis). Based on 

Hyde’s allegations concerning the facts known to Bowman at the 

time—namely that he heard Hyde squeeze his gun’s trigger to 

make it clack—it was reasonable for Bowman to believe that Hyde 

was armed and dangerous, meaning the use of deadly force was 

objectively reasonable. See Bradley, 10 F.4th a 1240–41. 

Although Hyde makes much of the fact that Bowman shot 

him without a warning, under the circumstances, the failure to 

provide a warning was not plausibly objectively unreasonable 

given that, according to Hyde, Bowman knew Hyde was armed 

and had heard Hyde make a “clacking” sound with the gun by

pulling the trigger. Powell, 25 F.4th at 921–22. Accordingly, the 

district court properly concluded that Hyde’s complaint failed to 

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adequately allege that Bowman used excessive force, and we affirm 

the district court’s dismissal. 

AFFIRMED. 

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