SEC Petition Evaluation Report 

Petition SEC-00188 

Report Rev #:0 Report Submittal Date: 02/21/2012 

Subject Expert(s): Tim Adler, Jim Bogard, Paul Ruhter

Site Expert(s): N/A

Petition Administrative Summary

Petition Under Evaluation

Petition # Petition 

Type

Petition

Receipt Date

Qualification 

Date

DOE/AWE Facility Name

SEC-00188 83.13 July 18, 2011 October 21, 2011 Sandia National Laboratories-Albuquerque

Petitioner-Requested Class Definition 

All Security Inspectors, Security Clerks, Firemen, Non-regular Recurrent Security Inspectors, Security Officers, 

Security Police Officers I, Security Police Officers II, Security Police Officers III, and Central Alarm System 

Operators that worked in any area at SNL-A for the period from January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011.

Class Evaluated by NIOSH

All personnel that worked in any area at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico for the 

period from January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011.

NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC

All employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies, and its contractors and subcontractors who 

worked in any area at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from January 1, 1963 through 

December 31, 1994, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under 

this employment, or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other 

classes of employees in the Special Exposure Cohort.

Related Petition Summary Information 

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status

SEC-00162 83.13 Sandia National Laboratories, 

Albuquerque

Class added to the 

SEC for January 1, 

1949 through 

December 31, 1962

Related Evaluation Report Information 

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility Name

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00162 Sandia National Laboratories-Albuquerque

ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: Tim Adler ORAU Peer Review Completed By: Daniel Stempfley

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on File] 2/21/2012

Sam Glover Date

[Signature on File] 2/21/2012 SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By:

J. W. Neton Date

[Signature on File] 2/21/2012 SEC Evaluation Approved By:

Stuart L. Hinnefeld Date
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

2 of 79

This page intentionally left blank 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

3 of 79

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00188, Sandia National Laboratories 

This evaluation report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

addresses a class of employees proposed for addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) per the 

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7384 et seq. (EEOICPA) and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as 

Members of the Special Exposure Cohort under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 

Compensation Program Act of 2000.

Petitioner-Requested Class Definition 

Petition SEC-00188 was received on July 18, 2011, and qualified on October 21, 2011. The petitioner 

requested that NIOSH consider the following class: All Security Inspectors, Security Clerks, Firemen, 

Non-regular Recurrent Security Inspectors, Security Officers, Security Police Officers I, Security 

Police Officers II, Security Police Officers III, and Central Alarm System Operators that worked in 

any area at SNL-A for the period from January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011. 

Class Evaluated by NIOSH 

NIOSH incurred internal monitoring data retrieval problems while processing individual claims and 

performing data capture work. The data retrieval issues appeared to affect much of the time period 

within the petitioner-requested class definition and impacted all types of workers (not just workers

associated with the Security Police Association). Considering this information, NIOSH expanded the 

petitioner-requested class to include all personnel. NIOSH evaluated the following class: All 

personnel that worked in any area at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico for 

the period from January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011. 

NIOSH-Proposed Class to be Added to the SEC 

Based on its current research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH has defined a single class of 

employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. The NIOSHproposed class includes all employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies, and its 

contractors and subcontractors who worked in any area at Sandia National Laboratories in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994, for a number of work 

days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment, or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the Special Exposure Cohort. The period from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 

1994 was included (see Section 3.0) primarily due to the lack of internal monitoring program 

documentation, compounded by the lack of internal monitoring data and process information 

applicable to this period. For the purposes of timeliness, NIOSH is issuing this report covering 

available data sufficiency and feasibility conclusions now, but will continue to review and evaluate 

internal exposure reconstruction feasibility for the 1995 through 2011 period when applicable 

databases become available. If NIOSH finds information indicating that doses cannot be bound for 

the January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011 period, NIOSH will proceed with an 83.14 report, 

recommending an additional class. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

4 of 79

Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction 

NIOSH finds it is not feasible to estimate internal exposures with sufficient accuracy for all workers at 

the site from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994. This period was included primarily due to 

the lack of internal monitoring program documentation, compounded by the lack of internal 

monitoring data and process information. For the purposes of timeliness, NIOSH is issuing this report 

covering available data sufficiency and feasibility conclusions now, but will continue to review and 

evaluate internal exposure reconstruction feasibility for the 1995 through 2011 period when applicable 

databases become available. If NIOSH finds information indicating that doses cannot bound for the 

January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011 period, NIOSH will proceed with an 83.14 report, 

recommending an additional class. 

The NIOSH dose reconstruction feasibility findings are based on the following: 

Principal sources of internal radiation for members of the proposed class included exposures to 

plutonium, tritium, uranium, americium, and fission and activation products. Potential exposure 

pathways could have involved the handling of these radionuclides during waste-burial operations 

or exposure to surface or air contamination associated with reactors and/or accelerators work. 

NIOSH has found that source terms and associated exposures varied over the evaluated period. 

Considering the potential exposure scenarios, NIOSH finds it is unable to estimate these internal 

exposures with sufficient accuracy for the period from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 

1994. 

Principal sources of external radiation for members of the proposed class included exposures to 

alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation. Exposures could have occurred during waste-handling 

activities and hot cell work. Work with reactors and accelerators also involved exposure potential 

for workers. Samples obtained from blast experiments conducted at the Nevada Test Site and 

analyzed at Sandia National Laboratories-Albuquerque could have resulted in external exposure. 

Additionally, medical X-rays performed onsite as a condition of employment would have resulted 

in external exposures to the evaluated class. NIOSH finds that it is feasible to reconstruct all 

occupational external dose for Sandia National Laboratories-Albuquerque workers with sufficient 

accuracy for the entire evaluated period. 

Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), NIOSH determined that there is insufficient information to 

either: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer for which radiation 

doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred under plausible circumstances by any 

member of the class; or (2) estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely 

than a maximum dose estimate. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

5 of 79

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct internal radiation doses 

for the proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal and external monitoring data that may 

become available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed 

at Sandia National Laboratories-Albuquerque during the period from January 1, 1963 through 

December 31, 1994, but who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using 

these data as appropriate. 

Health Endangerment Determination 

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), a health endangerment determination is required because 

NIOSH has determined that it does not have sufficient information to estimate dose for the members 

of the proposed class from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994. 

NIOSH did not identify any evidence supplied by the petitioners or from other resources that would 

establish that the proposed class was exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved exceptionally high-level exposures. However, evidence indicates that some workers in the 

proposed class may have accumulated substantial chronic exposures through episodic intakes of 

radionuclides, combined with external exposures to gamma, beta, and neutron radiation. 

Consequently, NIOSH has determined that health was endangered for those workers covered by this 

evaluation who were employed for at least 250 aggregated work days either solely under their 

employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for other SEC 

classes. 

For the period January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011, a health endangerment determination will be 

provided when dose estimation feasibility for this period has been completed. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

6 of 79

This page intentionally left blank 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

7 of 79

Table of Contents 

1.0 Purpose and Scope ........................................................................................................................ 11

2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 11

3.0 SEC-00188, Sandia National Laboratories Class Definitions ...................................................... 12

3.1 Petitioner-Requested Class Definition and Basis ................................................................ 12

3.2 Class Evaluated by NIOSH ................................................................................................. 13

3.3 NIOSH-Proposed Class to be Added to the SEC ................................................................ 13

4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH to Evaluate the Class ........................................................... 14

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs) ................................................................ 14

4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs) and Procedures ..................................... 14

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts .......................................................................................... 15

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions ........................................................................................... 16

4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database .......................................................................................... 16

4.6 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners ................................................. 17

5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Class Evaluated by NIOSH ......................................... 17

5.1 Sandia National Laboratories Facilities and Process Descriptions ..................................... 17

5.2 Radiological Exposure Sources from Sandia National Laboratories Operations ................ 22

5.2.1 Internal Radiological Exposure Sources from Sandia National Laboratories 

Operations ............................................................................................................................ 22

5.2.1.1 Tritium ...................................................................................................... 23

5.2.1.2 Uranium (U-238, U-234, U-235) .............................................................. 25

5.2.1.3 Fission and Activation Products (Sr-90, Cs-137, Zn-65, Co-60, Ta-182) 25

5.2.1.4 Plutonium (Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241) .......................................... 28

5.2.1.5 Americium (Am-241) ............................................................................... 29

5.2.1.6 Thorium (Th-232) ..................................................................................... 31

5.2.2 External Radiological Exposure Sources from Sandia National Laboratories 

Operations ............................................................................................................................ 31

5.2.2.1 Photon ....................................................................................................... 32

5.2.2.2 Beta ........................................................................................................... 32

5.2.2.3 Neutron ..................................................................................................... 33

5.2.3 Incidents .................................................................................................................. 33

6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Class Evaluated by NIOSH ............................. 33

6.1 Available Sandia National Laboratories Internal Monitoring Data .................................... 34

6.1.1 Tritium ..................................................................................................................... 37

6.1.2 Uranium ................................................................................................................... 38

6.1.3 Fission and Activation Products .............................................................................. 38

6.1.4 Plutonium ................................................................................................................ 39

6.1.5 Americium and Thorium ......................................................................................... 39

6.2 Available Sandia National Laboratories External Monitoring Data ................................... 40
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

8 of 79

6.2.1 Photon Exposure Data ............................................................................................. 43

6.2.2 Beta Exposure Data ................................................................................................. 45

6.2.3 Neutron Exposure Data ........................................................................................... 46

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Class Evaluated by NIOSH ...................................... 46

7.1 Pedigree of Sandia National Laboratories Data .................................................................. 47

7.1.1 Internal Monitoring Data Pedigree Review ............................................................. 49

7.1.2 External Monitoring Data Pedigree Review ............................................................ 51

7.2 Evaluation of Bounding Internal Radiation Doses at Sandia National Laboratories .......... 51

7.2.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related Internal Doses ........................................ 52

7.2.1.1 Urinalysis Information and Available Data .............................................. 52

7.2.1.2 Airborne Levels ........................................................................................ 52

7.2.1.3 Alternative Data Sources for Bounding Internal Dose ............................. 53

7.2.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Doses ........................... 53

7.2.3 Methods for Bounding Internal Dose at Sandia National Laboratories .................. 53

7.2.4 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion ............................................. 54

7.3 Evaluation of Bounding External Radiation Doses at Sandia National Laboratories ......... 54

7.3.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related External Doses ....................................... 54

7.3.1.1 Personnel Dosimetry Data ........................................................................ 54

7.3.1.2 Area Monitoring Data ............................................................................... 56

7.3.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses .......................... 56

7.3.3 Sandia National Laboratories Occupational X-Ray Examinations ......................... 56

7.3.4 Methods for Bounding External Dose at Sandia National Laboratories ................. 56

7.3.4.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period External Dose ....................... 57

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion ............................................ 58

7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00188 ....................................................................... 59

7.4.1 Internal Monitoring Associated with SNL-A Security Guards ............................... 59

7.5 Other Potential SEC Issues Relevant to the Petition Identified During the Evaluation ...... 60

7.6 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00188 .................................................. 62

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00188 ...................................................... 63

9.0 Class Conclusion for Petition SEC-00188 ................................................................................... 63

10.0 References .................................................................................................................................... 65

Attachment One: Data Capture Synopsis .............................................................................................. 71
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

9 of 79

Tables 

Table 4-1: No. of SNL-A Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule ............................. 16

Table 5-1: SNL-A Potential Exposure Areas and Processes ................................................................. 20

Table 5-2: SNL-A Facilities with Tritium Exposure Potential, By Year .............................................. 24

Table 5-3: SNL-A Operations with Uranium Exposure Potential ......................................................... 25

Table 5-4: Documented Fission and Activation Products at Sandia National Laboratories ................. 26

Table 5-5: SNL-A Operations Involving Reactor-Generated Nuclides ................................................ 27

Table 5-6: SNL-A Operations Involving Accelerator-Produced Nuclides ........................................... 27

Table 5-7: Example Contamination Survey Results for Selected Areas ............................................... 28

Table 5-8: SNL-A Facilities with Internal Exposure Potential for Plutonium ...................................... 29

Table 6-1: Summary of Individual In Vitro Bioassay Results .............................................................. 36

Table 6-2: Dosimeters Used at Sandia National Laboratories .............................................................. 41

Table 6-3: Dose Quantities Reported in SNL-A Annual Reports to AEC/DOE ................................... 42

Table 6-4: Radiation Exposure Data Reported by SNL-A to AEC/DOE ............................................. 43

Table 6-5: Potential Annual Missed Doses ........................................................................................... 45

Table 7-1: Urinalysis Reports Obtained by NIOSH .............................................................................. 50

Table 7-2: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00188 ............................................................... 62

Figures 

Figure 5-1: Map of Sandia National Laboratories ................................................................................. 19

Figure 6-1: Urinalysis for Tritium Performed at Sandia National Laboratory, 1959-1991. ................. 37

Figure 6-2: Urinalysis for Uranium Performed at Sandia National Laboratory, 1959-1988. ............... 38

Figure 6-3: Urinalysis for Total Plutonium Performed at Sandia National Laboratory, 1959-1971. ... 39
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

10 of 79

This page intentionally left blank 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

11 of 79

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for SEC-00188

ATTRIBUTION AND ANNOTATION: This is a single-author document. All conclusions drawn from 

the data presented in this evaluation were made by the ORAU Team Lead Technical Evaluator: Tim 

Adler, Oak Ridge Associated Universities. The rationales for all conclusions in this document are 

explained in the associated text.

1.0 Purpose and Scope 

This report evaluates the feasibility of reconstructing doses for all employees who worked in any area 

at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico (often referred to as SNL-A throughout 

this report), from January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011. It provides information and analyses 

germane to considering a petition for adding a class of employees to the congressionally-created SEC. 

This report does not make any determinations concerning the feasibility of dose reconstruction that 

necessarily apply to any individual energy employee who might require a dose reconstruction from 

NIOSH. This report also does not contain the final determination as to whether the proposed class 

will be added to the SEC (see Section 2.0). 

This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of EEOICPA, 42 C.F.R. pt. 83,

and the guidance contained in the Division of Compensation Analysis and Support’s (DCAS) Internal 

Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, DCAS-PR-004.1

2.0 Introduction 

Both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 require NIOSH to evaluate qualified petitions requesting that the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) add a class of employees to the SEC. The 

evaluation is intended to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether it is feasible to 

estimate with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses of the class of employees through NIOSH dose 

reconstructions.2 

42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1) states: Radiation doses can be estimated with sufficient accuracy if NIOSH 

has established that it has access to sufficient information to estimate the maximum radiation dose, 

for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred in 

plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or if NIOSH has established that it has access to 

sufficient information to estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely than an 

estimate of the maximum radiation dose.

Under 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), if it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses 

for members of the class, then NIOSH must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such 

radiation doses may have endangered the health of members of the class. The regulation requires 

 

1

 DCAS was formerly known as the Office of Compensation Analysis and Support (OCAS). 

2

 NIOSH dose reconstructions under EEOICPA are performed using the methods promulgated under 42 C.F.R. pt. 82 and 

the detailed implementation guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

12 of 79

NIOSH to assume that any duration of unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of 

members of a class when it has been established that the class may have been exposed to radiation 

during a discrete incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring 

during nuclear criticality incidents. If the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has 

not been established, then NIOSH is required to specify that health was endangered for those workers 

who were employed for at least 250 aggregated work days within the parameters established for the 

class or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other SEC 

classes. 

NIOSH is required to document its evaluation in a report, and to do so, relies upon both its own dose 

reconstruction expertise as well as technical support from its contractor, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU). Once completed, NIOSH provides the report to both the petitioner(s) and the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (Board). The Board will consider the NIOSH 

evaluation report, together with the petition, petitioner(s) comments, and other information the Board 

considers appropriate, in order to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on whether or not 

to add one or more classes of employees to the SEC. Once NIOSH has received and considered the 

advice of the Board, the Director of NIOSH will propose a decision on behalf of HHS. The Secretary 

of HHS will make the final decision, taking into account the NIOSH evaluation, the advice of the 

Board, and the proposed decision issued by NIOSH. As part of this decision process, petitioners may 

seek a review of certain types of final decisions issued by the Secretary of HHS.3

3.0 SEC-00188, Sandia National Laboratories Class Definitions 

The following subsections address the evolution of the class definition for SEC-00188, Sandia 

National Laboratories-Albuquerque (SNL-A). When a petition is submitted, the requested class 

definition is reviewed as submitted. Based on its review of the available site information and data, 

NIOSH will make a determination whether to qualify for full evaluation all, some, or no part of the 

petitioner-requested class. If some portion of the petitioner-requested class is qualified, NIOSH will 

specify that class along with a justification for any modification of the petitioner’s class. After a full 

evaluation of the qualified class, NIOSH will determine whether to propose a class for addition to the 

SEC and will specify that proposed class definition. 

3.1 Petitioner-Requested Class Definition and Basis 

Petition SEC-00188 was received on July 18, 2010, and qualified on October 21, 2010. The petitioner 

requested that NIOSH consider the following class: All Security Inspectors, Security Clerks, Firemen, 

Non-regular Recurrent Security Inspectors, Security Officers, Security Police Officers I, Security 

Police Officers II, Security Police Officers III, and Central Alarm System Operators that worked in 

any area at SNL-A for the period from January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011. 

The petitioner provided information and affidavit statements in support of the petitioner’s belief that 

accurate dose reconstruction over time is impossible for the SNL-A workers in question. NIOSH 

 

3

 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 for a full description of the procedures summarized here. Additional internal procedures are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

13 of 79

determined that the petitioner-provided information supported the qualification of petition SEC00188. Specifically, the affidavits supplied can be used to support the following: 

An F.1 basis, which includes the cases where potential radiation doses were not monitored 

through personal monitoring, as explicitly stated in the affidavits. 

An F.2 basis, which includes the cases where monitoring records were lost, falsified, or destroyed; 

or when there is no information regarding source, source term, or process from the site. 

Based on its SNL-A research and data capture efforts, NIOSH determined that it has access to external 

monitoring data for SNL-A workers during the time period under evaluation. However, NIOSH also 

determined that access to internal monitoring data records is very limited. NIOSH concluded that 

there is sufficient documentation to support, for at least part of the requested time period, the petition 

basis that internal radiation exposures and radiation doses were not adequately monitored at SNL-A; 

that internal radiation monitoring records may have been lost or destroyed; and that there is potentially 

incomplete information regarding monitoring, source terms, or process information relating to SNL-A 

operations. The details of the petition basis are addressed in Section 7.4. 

3.2 Class Evaluated by NIOSH 

Based on its preliminary research, NIOSH expanded the petitioner-requested class to include all 

personnel because of internal monitoring data retrieval problems incurred while processing individual 

claims and performing SNL-A data capture work. The data retrieval issues appeared to affect much of 

the time period within the petitioner-requested class definition and included workers not associated 

with the Security Police Association. Therefore, NIOSH defined the following class for further 

evaluation: All employees who worked in any area at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, from January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011. 

3.3 NIOSH-Proposed Class to be Added to the SEC 

Based on its research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH has defined a single class of employees for 

which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. The NIOSH-proposed class 

to be added to the SEC includes all employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies, 

and their contractors and subcontractors who worked in any area at Sandia National Laboratories in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994, for a number of work 

days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment, or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the Special Exposure Cohort. NIOSH will continue to review and evaluate internal 

exposure reconstruction feasibility when applicable databases become available. If NIOSH finds 

information indicating that doses cannot bound for the period, NIOSH will proceed with an 83.14 

report, recommending an additional class. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

14 of 79

4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH to Evaluate the Class 

As is standard practice, NIOSH completed an extensive database and Internet search for information 

regarding SNL-A. The database search included the DOE Legacy Management Considered Sites 

database, the DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) database, the Energy 

Citations database, and the Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System. In addition to general 

Internet searches, the NIOSH Internet search included OSTI OpenNet Advanced searches, OSTI 

Information Bridge Fielded searches, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agency-wide 

Documents Access and Management (ADAMS) web searches, the DOE Office of Human Radiation 

Experiments website, and the DOE-National Nuclear Security Administration-Nevada Site Officesearch. Attachment One contains a summary of SNL-A documents. The summary specifically 

identifies data capture details and general descriptions of the documents retrieved. 

In addition to the database and Internet searches listed above, NIOSH identified and reviewed 

numerous data sources to determine information relevant to determining the feasibility of dose 

reconstruction for the class of employees under evaluation. This included determining the availability 

of information on personal monitoring, area monitoring, industrial processes, and radiation source 

materials. The following subsections summarize the data sources identified and reviewed by NIOSH.

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs) 

A Site Profile provides specific information concerning the documentation of historical practices at 

the specified site. Dose reconstructors can use the Site Profile to evaluate internal and external 

dosimetry data for monitored and unmonitored workers, and to supplement, or substitute for, 

individual monitoring data. A Site Profile provides process history information, information on 

personal and area monitoring, radiation source descriptions, and references to primary documents 

relevant to the radiological operations at the site. As part of NIOSH’s evaluation detailed herein, it 

examined the following Site Profile for insights into SNL-A operations: 

Site Profile for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the Tonopah Test 

Range, Nevada, ORAUT-TKBS-0037; Rev. 00; June 22, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32531 

4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs) and Procedures 

An ORAU Technical Information Bulletin (OTIB) is a general working document that provides 

guidance for preparing dose reconstructions at particular sites or categories of sites. An ORAU 

Procedure provides specific requirements and guidance regarding EEOICPA project-level activities, 

including preparation of dose reconstructions at particular sites or categories of sites. NIOSH 

reviewed the following OTIBs and procedures as part of its evaluation: 

OTIB: Dose Reconstruction from Occupational Medical X-Ray Procedures, ORAUT-OTIB-0006, 

Rev. 03 PC-1; June 20, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 98147

OTIB: Use of Coworker Dosimetry Data for External Dose Assignment, ORAUT-OTIB-0020, 

Rev. 03; November 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 104029 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

15 of 79

OTIB: External Coworker Dosimetry Data for the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, ORAUT-OTIB-0072, Rev. 00; September 26, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 49941

Procedure: Occupational Medical X-Ray Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites, ORAUT-PROC0061, Rev. 03; March 3, 2010; SRDB Ref ID: 79758

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts 

There have been multiple SNL-A worker interviews. Some of these interviews were completed by 

NIOSH for purposes other than support of this evaluation report, while others were older interviews 

performed by other organizations that were obtained by NIOSH during data capture trips. These 

interviews, plus three additional interviews of semi-retired SNL-A health physicists (conducted 

specifically for this evaluation) as well as one large meeting with current and former SNL-A 

personnel have been considered and referenced throughout this evaluation. Both interviews 

performed specifically for this SEC evaluation were conducted by phone and are referenced below: 

Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication with SNL-A Employee; Telephone 

Interview by ORAU Team; February 24, 2011, 12:00 PM EST; SRDB Ref ID: 93639 (Personal 

Communication, 2011a)

Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication with SNL-A Employee; Telephone 

Interview by ORAU Team; February 24, 2011, 3:00 PM EST; SRDB Ref ID: 93640 (Personal 

Communication, 2011b)

Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication with Former SNL-A Employee; 

Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; April 26, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 105305 (Personal 

Communication, 2011c)

Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication with Multiple Former and Current 

SNL-A Employees; Site meeting by NIOSH; November 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: TBD after 

classification review (Personal Communication, 2011d)
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

16 of 79

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions 

NIOSH reviewed its NIOSH DCAS Claims Tracking System (referred to as NOCTS) to locate 

EEOICPA-related dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to the petition 

evaluation. Table 4-1 summarizes the results of this review. (NOCTS data available as of December 

14, 2011) 

Table 4-1: No. of SNL-A Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule

Description Totals

Total number of claims submitted for dose reconstruction 367

Total number of claims submitted for energy employees who worked during the period under 

evaluation (January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011) 323

Number of dose reconstructions completed for energy employees who worked during the period

under evaluation (i.e., the number of such claims completed by NIOSH and submitted to the 

Department of Labor for final approval). 270

Number of claims for which internal dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 37

Number of claims for which external dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 256

NIOSH reviewed each claim to determine whether internal and/or external personal monitoring 

records could be obtained for the employee. Of the total of 323 claims submitted for energy 

employees who worked during the period under evaluation, SNL-A/Department of Energy (DOE) has 

responded to 320 claims. Of these 320 claims, SNL-A/DOE has indicated that “there is no record of 

internal measurements having been made” for 283 claimants (~ 88%). Of the 320 claims receiving 

SNL-A/DOE responses, 256 (81 %) contain external monitoring data. 

4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database 

NIOSH also examined its Site Research Database (SRDB) to locate documents supporting the 

assessment of the evaluated class. Two thousand five hundred ninety-six documents in this database 

were identified as pertaining to SNL-A. These documents were evaluated for their relevance to this 

petition. The documents include historical background on internal and external dosimetry programs 

and evaluations, monitoring summary reports, annual environmental reports, reviews and assessments 

of SNL-A, evaluations of specific buildings, site surveys, and facility and process descriptions. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

17 of 79

4.6 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners 

In qualifying and evaluating the petition, NIOSH reviewed the following documents submitted by the 

petitioners: 

Petition Form B for SEC-00188; received October 7, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 114974 (Form B, 2011)

Petitioner Consult Call Response with Attachment; October 7, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 114974, pdf pp. 

1-7 (Consult Call Response, 2011)

Affidavit, 2011; Affidavit from SNL-A Security Police Officer; October 4, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 

114974, pdf pp. 8-10 (Affidavit, 2011a) 

Affidavit, 2011; Affidavit from SNL-A Security Police Officer; October 4, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 

114974, pdf pp. 11-13 (Affidavit, 2011b) 

Affidavit, 2011; Affidavit from SNL-A Security Police Officer; October 4, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 

114974, pdf pp. 14-18 (Affidavit, 2011c) 

5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Class Evaluated by 

NIOSH 

The following subsections summarize both radiological operations at SNL-A from January 1, 1963 

through May 21, 2011, and the information available to NIOSH to characterize particular processes 

and radioactive source materials. From available sources NIOSH has gathered some process and 

source descriptions, information regarding the identity of each radionuclide of concern, and limited 

information describing processes through which radiation exposures may have occurred and the 

physical environment in which they may have occurred. The information included within this 

evaluation report is intended only to be a summary of the available information. 

5.1 Sandia National Laboratories Facilities and Process Descriptions 

Sandia National Laboratories is located in Albuquerque, New Mexico on 8,642 acres. The workforce 

consisted of 7,146 workers in 1963 and 4,189 workers in 2010. The highest employee population 

occurred in 1992 with a little over 10,080 employees. SNL-A had its origin as a satellite support site 

for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. In July 1945, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory ZDivision was established to handle weapons development, testing, and bomb assembly for the 

Manhattan Engineer District (Ullrich, 1998). In late fall of 1945, some units of Z-Division were 

moved to the current SNL-A site. In 1948, Z-Division became a separate branch of Los Alamos 

Scientific Laboratory. In 1949, “Sandia Corporation” was created and became completely separated 

from Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Sandia Corporation changed its name to Sandia Laboratories 

in 1971 and then again to its current name, Sandia National Laboratories in 1979. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

18 of 79

SNL-A’s original focus was on weapons assembly, weapon ordinance engineering, and production 

coordination among various AEC contractors. By the early 1950s, a weapon production complex was 

in place and the focus was on weapons development, SNL-A also began field testing components and 

supported atmospheric tests sponsored by partner laboratories. Later in the 1950s, nuclear testing was 

halted temporarily due to the US/USSR test moratorium. Recognizing that flexibility was crucial in 

responding to rapidly changing national defense demands, SNL-A acquired accelerators and built 

reactors to test the responses of materials (including weapon components) to radiation and to conduct 

research in radiation physics and chemistry. 

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the growing emphasis on research to strengthen the underpinnings of the 

engineering effort resulted in a concerted effort to hire more scientists and engineers to bolster and 

expand SNL-A’s research efforts. In response to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, SNL-A 

worked with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to enhance the safety of aerospace 

nuclear power systems and applied some techniques to the development of conventional weapons and 

intrusion sensors for use in the Vietnam War. National and international events, including the energy 

crisis and the terrorist acts at the Munich Olympics of the early 1970s, caused SNL-A to become 

involved in new areas of energy research and in the physical security and safeguards for facilities 

(Johnson, 1997).

Throughout the advance into new areas SNL-A maintained its responsibilities in developing new 

weapons and maintained the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile. As international arms 

control efforts increased in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, more emphasis was placed on 

treaty monitoring while improvements were made in methods of ensuring the safety, security, and 

control of the national stockpile. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the decision to 

stop developing new weapons in the early 1990s, SNL-A’s role as stockpile steward took on new 

importance. Currently, ensuring the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, reliable, and fully supportive 

of the Nation’s deterrence policy is SNL-A’s primary mission. SNL-A scientists and engineers design 

and integrate over 6,300 parts of a modern nuclear weapon’s 6,500 components. Other current SNLA mission areas include: Energy, Climate, Infrastructure Security, Nonproliferation, Defense Systems 

and Assessments, and Homeland Security and Defense (Johnson, 1997).
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

19 of 79

Sandia Technical Areas 

There are five Technical Areas located on the SNL-A site as shown in Figure 5-1. 

Source: This map is a modified version of the map in DOE, 1999. 

Figure 5-1: Map of Sandia National Laboratories 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

20 of 79

Table 5-1: SNL-A Potential Exposure Areas and Processes

(Table 5-1 and its associated notes span 3 pages)

Building or Area/Description Exposure Potential Operational Dates

External Internal

Technical Area-I (Electron/Ion Beam Accelerators)

642/NERUES bremsstrahlung beam system Y N 1971+

672/Fexitron flash X-ray tube Y N 1970 - 1973+

672, 803/Heavy Ion/Proton Accelerators (~100 kV) Y N 1968+

803/Van de Graaff(s) electron generator/accelerator Y Y 1958 - present

884/Cockroft-Walton(s) electron generator/accelerator Y Y Late 1950s - present (2006)

Technical Area-I (Manufacturing Facilities)

802/Chemistry Labs; Radiochemicals to support research 

activities Y Y 1949 - present

802, 805, 870, 884/Kaman Neutron Generators Mfg. (NGMF) Y N --- - present

805/LICA – Low Irradiation Calibrator Apparatus Y Y >2003 - 2005

818, 828 Y Y 1998 - present

858/Sealed sources used in microelectronics development --- --- single incident

868/Machining uranium work (Received wastes from early 

weapons testing; stored stockpiled nuclear cores.) Y Y 1949 - 1968

869/Toxic Metals Machine Shop Y Y ~1959 - 1994

883/6-MeV Ion Generator Y N 1984 - 1996

891 --- Y ---

Technical Area-I (Medical Services)

831, Rm 130/Medical X-ray (Picker GX325-PX350 tube) 

300 mA @ 125 kVp Y N

1949 - present 

(registered in 1978)

Technical Area-II (Waste Handling/Burial, Weapons Assembly)

TA-II Burial Pits/

Items buried included: contaminated tools, clothing, wastes 

from Sandia Pulse Reactor (SPR) and Sandia Engineering 

Reactor Facility (SERF), waste from weapons components, 

airplane sections, residue from processing plutonium samples in 

829, bioassay and soil samples, RaBe and small cobalt-60 

sources, irradiated material from rocket tests, and gap tubes 

containing cesium-137.

Note: Records and logs have been destroyed

Y Y 1949 - early 1960s

935/Neutron generator Y N 1969 - 1993

935 --- --- ---

Technical Area-III (Waste Destruction/Disposal/Transfer)

“Leaking Cask” --- --- single incident

6583/Classified Destruction Facility --- --- 1957 - 1988

6920/Radiological and Mixed Waste facility Y Y 1949 - 1986

Technical Area-IV (Electron/Ion/X-Ray Beam Accelerators)

961/TESLA Y N 1998 - present

961/MITE pulsed 6-MeV X ray (4 units) Y N present
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

21 of 79

Table 5-1: SNL-A Potential Exposure Areas and Processes

(Table 5-1 and its associated notes span 3 pages)

Building or Area/Description Exposure Potential Operational Dates

External Internal

970/HERMES III (Higher-energy version of 

HERMES II)(<20 MeV) Y Y ~1988 - 1998

970/SABRE, 6-12 MeV (Sandia Accelerator and Beam 

Research Experiment) Y Y 1998 - present

981/SATURN (Succeeded PBFA-I, preceded PBFA-II) Y Y 1967 - 1996+

981/SPEED (1.0 MeV) Y Y 1983 - 1986

981/SPHINX Y Y 1992 - present

981-983/Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA)-1 Y Y 1987 - 1995

983/ Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA)-II (<30 MeV) Y Y 1993-present

983/Z-machine (Modified from PBFA-II) Y Y 1996-present

Technical Area-IV (Repair/Test Facility)

905/Neutron Generator -Test Equipment Y --- 1959 - 1997+

Technical Area-V (Electron/Ion Beam Accelerators

6580/Proto-I (1st Generation high-powered short-pulse 

accelerator) Y Y 1972 - 1976

6580/Proto-II (2nd Generation high-powered short-pulse 

accelerator) Y Y 1976 - 1998

6580/Pelletron Facility – Variable-energy high-stability DC 

electron beam generator (1 MeV) Y Y 1968 - 1991

6580/HERMES-I, -II (Field emission electron beam or 

bremsstrahlung X-ray accelerator) Y Y 1968 - 1988

6580/Hydra-HydraMITE-I, -II (Dual transmission line for 

1-MeV short-pulse electron, bremsstrahlung X-ray unit) Y Y 1977, 1984+

6580/REHYD (1.3-MV variable-energy Heavy Ion Accelerator; 

positive-ion combination of REBA and HydraMITE) Y Y 1988 - 1998+

6580/Relativistic Electron Beam Accelerator (REBA) = Zmachine (3.2 MV) Y N 1994 - present

6581/Febetrons (Flash X-ray System, < 2 MeV) Y N 1967+

Technical Area-V (Reactors)

6580/SER Reactor Y --- 1962 - 1969

6581/Sandia Engineering Research Facility (SERF). 5 MW; 

airborne potential after 1962 startup of operations. Y Y 1958 - 1979

6588/ ACRR (600 kW) also operated as Pulsed

Reactor (ACPR) (<15,000 MW) [TRIGA-type] Y Y 1968 - 1998

6588/ACRR – Mo-99 Production (600 kW) Y Y 1998 - present

6590, 6591 /Sandia Pulse Reactor (SPR-I)[GODIVA type] Y Y 1961 - 1975

6590/SPR-II [GODIVA type] (<130,000 MW pk) Y Y >1962 - present

6596/SPR-III (KIVA) [GODIVA type] (<170,000 MW pk) Y Y 2003 - present
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

22 of 79

Table 5-1: SNL-A Potential Exposure Areas and Processes

(Table 5-1 and its associated notes span 3 pages)

Building or Area/Description Exposure Potential Operational Dates

External Internal

Technical Area-V (Irradiation and Calibration Support Laboratories)

6580, 6581/ HCF - Hot Cell Facility support prior to reactor 

startup and Fizeau blast sample work Y ---

1957 - 1959

1988 - Present

6591/GIF - Gamma Irradiation Facility; north and south cells 

(~900 Ci Co-60 and Cs-137 high activity sources for irradiation 

experiments) 1) Co-60 49 kCi (1985) and (2) Cs-137 163 kCi 

(1985) in north cell, and (1) 150 kCi Co-60 (upgraded to 300 

kCi in 1985) in south cell

Y --- 1962 - 1998

6591-6598 Complex/NEW GIF – combined with LICA, more 

flexible sources (Co-60 and Cs-137 high activity sources for 

irradiation experiments)

Y --- 1998(?) - present

Other

Lurance Canyon Burn Site, Uranium Burn Site --- --- ---

Near 9820/Animals from radiation studies buried in pits --- --- 1950s - early 1960s

Pendulum-site burial mounds --- --- closed in the 1970s

Coyote Test Facility/Thunder Range–source metals after 

explosion and fire tests of weapons, containers --- Y 1969 - 1994

Notes: 

This table is a modified version of Table 2-2 in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

--- Three hyphens (---) in a table cell denote a lack of information. 

The potential for chronic intakes in most areas of SNL-A has historically been less than at DOE 

production sites because of the nature of the tasks performed at SNL-A. Certain areas of the site have 

always been non-nuclear. Nevertheless, the nature of the research environment at SNL-A during the 

evaluated period may have resulted in intake potentials that were often unique and of short duration, 

and the potential for monitored and unmonitored intakes has existed throughout the site’s history. 

5.2 Radiological Exposure Sources from Sandia National Laboratories 

Operations 

The following subsections provide an overview of the internal and external exposure sources for the 

Sandia National Laboratories class under evaluation. 

5.2.1 Internal Radiological Exposure Sources from Sandia National Laboratories Operations 

Complete details of the internal exposure sources at Sandia National Laboratories have not been 

identified. However, internal dose potential during the evaluation period is associated with reactors, 

machine shops, accelerators, and other research and supporting activities, along with radioactive waste 

disposal. Technical Areas I and V, with electron- and ion-beam accelerators, generated tritium and 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

23 of 79

tritiated compounds, while the supporting laboratories and machine shops in Technical Area-I worked 

with uranium and plutonium. The radioactive gases N-13 and O-15 are associated with electron, ion, 

and beam accelerators in Technical Area-IV. Mixed waste (uranium, plutonium, and 

fission/activation products) disposal activities with internal exposure potential occurred at the 

Technical Area-II Burial Pits from 1958 to the early 1960s (presumably including a portion of the 

evaluation period), and in the Radiological and Mixed Waste facility of Technical Area-III from 1949 

through 1986. Although specific areas where waste materials were generated and buried are not 

readily identifiable from documents available to NIOSH, a potential for internal intakes from these 

activities is assumed to exist. 

Radionuclides with the widest application throughout the SNL-A facilities during the evaluation 

period are: 

Tritium, 

Uranium (U-238, U-234, U-235), 

Fission and activation products (e.g., Sr-90, Cs-137, Zn-65, Co-60, Ta-182) and, to a lesser 

degree, 

Plutonium (Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241), 

Americium (Am-241), both alone and as a contaminant in plutonium from the radioactive decay of 

Pu-241, and

Thorium (Th-232). 

5.2.1.1 Tritium 

Tritium exposure potential has existed at SNL-A since its beginning and into present time because of 

the numerous accelerator facilities and neutron generators that use tritiated targets. Facilities in each 

of the Technical Areas have exhibited tritium exposure potential during the period of evaluation, as 

shown in Table 5-2. Activities in Technical Area-I have resulted in the potential for tritium intakes 

since 1949, and ambient environmental tritium in Technical Areas IV and V still results in exposure 

potential in 2011. Potential intakes may have resulted from operations with neutron generators, 

accelerator targets, and reactor operations. Surveys and air samples for tritium were routinely 

performed, as indicated by captured logbooks. Positive results have been noted for many samples 

within the logbooks (Monitoring Results, 1959-1970). 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

24 of 79

Table 5-2: SNL-A Facilities with Tritium Exposure Potential, By Year

Technical Area Operations Using or Producing Tritium Period

Area I

Cockroft-Walton Accelerators 1959-2006

Van de Graaff Accelerators 1958-2006

[Redacted] ----

Area II

Neutron Generators 1969-1993

Chemistry Labs 1949-2006

Neutron Generators 1967-1993

II Burial Pits 1949-early 1960s

Area III Mixed Waste Landfill 1959-1988

Area IV

PBFA-I (HT) 1979-2006

Neutron Generator 1959-1998

SATURN 1959-1998a

HERMES III 1987-1999

Area V

SER 1962-1969

Pelletron 1968-1991

HERMES I, II 1968-1988

Proto-I 1972-1976

Proto-II 1976-1998

Hydra-HydraMITE-I, -II 1977-1984+

REHYD 1988-1998+

REBA 1994-Present

SERF 1958-1979

Febetrons 1967-?

b

SPR-I [GODIVA Type] 1961-1975

Ambient Environmental (Airborne)

Area I 1948-1996

Area II 1948-1996

Area III 1953-1996

Area-IV 1979-2011

Area-V 1961-2011

Notes: 

This table is a modified version from tables and information in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

a Excluding 1990-1995

b

 Exposure potential identified, but not verified after 1967 

Exposures to metal tritides and gaseous tritium are described in several NIOSH-obtained documents. 

Metal tritides have been used as components of neutron generators and are associated with specific 

locations in Technical Area-I (Building 891) (ORAUT-TKBS-0037, pdf p. 55). Time frames 

associated with metal tritide use in these locations have not been determined, however.
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

25 of 79

5.2.1.2 Uranium (U-238, U-234, U-235) 

Some potential for internal deposition of uranium (primarily by inhalation of airborne particles) 

existed during the evaluation period at SNL-A, primarily in Technical Areas I and III, although 

Technical Areas II and IV are also implicated. The greatest potential is associated with activities in 

machine shops and burial grounds, which can result in the generation or resuspension of respirable 

particles. Specific facilities with internal exposure potential for uranium are shown in Table 5-3. 

Table 5-3: SNL-A Operations with Uranium Exposure Potential

Technical Area Potential Period

Area I

Cockroft-Walton Accelerators 1956-2006

Van de Graaff Accelerators 1958-2006a

Machiningb1949-1968

Toxic Metal Shopc1959-1994

Area II TA-II Burial Pits 1949-Early 1960s

.

Area III

Mixed Waste Landfilld1959-1988

Rad- and Mixed-Waste Facilityc1949-1986

Chemical Waste Landfill 1954-1994

Area V

SER 1962-1969

SERF 1958-1979

SPR-I [GODIVA type] 1961-1975

Other

Lurance Canyon, Uranium Burn Sitec---

Pendulum site burial mounds Closed in 1970s

Coyote Test Facility/Thunder Rangec1969-1994

Ambient Environmental (Airborne) 1948-2004

Notes: 

This table is a modified version from tables and information in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

a Also heavy-ion and proton accelerators from 1968 

b

 U of unspecified enrichment and U depleted in U-235

c

 Depleted in U-235

d

 All enrichments: Natural, enriched in U-235, and depleted in U-235

5.2.1.3 Fission and Activation Products (Sr-90, Cs-137, Zn-65, Co-60, Ta-182) 

Numerous nuclear reactors and particle accelerators at SNL-A have produced fission and activation 

products during the evaluation period. These radioactive byproducts become available for internal 

deposition when respirable particles are generated in processes such as machining or resuspended 

when waste is disposed of in landfills. The Sandia Pulse Reactor (SPR), KIVA, Sandia Engineering 

Reactor (SER), and other reactors in Technical Area-V have operated during most of SNL-A’s 

history. Activation products were also produced by photoactivation of metals in accelerators such as 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

26 of 79

the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA-II). The specific activities of photoactivated products 

in stainless steel at these facilities can be up to microcurie/gram quantities in localized areas. 

Handling can be delayed to permit the decay of short-half life products, such as isotopes of aluminum 

and copper. However, the ferrous isotopes (Fe-59, half life 45 days) and other activation products, 

such as manganese-54 (half life greater than 300 days), are more persistent and can become 

aerosolized when these parts are machined. Examples of fission and activation products that are 

contained in plant air samples, effluents, and primary coolant have been taken from various reports 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0037) and are shown in Table 5-4.

Table 5-4: Documented Fission and Activation Products at Sandia National Laboratories

Noble Gases Fission Products Activation Products

Kr-85m Zr-95 W-187

Xe-133 I-131 Ag-110m

Xe-135 Ru-103 Ta-182

Ar-41a Ru-106 Mn-54

Ba/La-140 Mn-56b

Te-132 Na-24b

Y-94 Cu-64b

Mo-99/Tc-99m Cd-115b

Zr-97/Nb-97 Al-28b

Rb-89 Co-56

I-132 Co-57

I-133 Co-58

I-134 Co-60b

I-135 Zn-65

Sr-91 Sb-122

Y-91m Ni-57

Y-92 Sn-117m

Cs-136 Sn-119m

Cs-137 Ta-182

Cs-138 Ta-183

Ce-141 As-76

Ce-144 Fe-59b

Sb-124 Be-7

Notes: 

This table is a modified version from tables and information in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

a Main contributor to activity at the SER. 

b

 From the SER and the PBFA. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

27 of 79

Operations producing or handling reactor-generated nuclides and accelerator-produced nuclides are 

shown in Tables 5-5 and 5-6 below, along with the applicable time periods. 

Table 5-5: SNL-A Operations Involving Reactor-Generated Nuclides

Technical Area Facility or Operationa Period

Area III

Mixed Waste Landfill 1959-1988

Classified Destruction Facility 1957-1988

Rad & Mixed Waste Facility (Cs-137) 1949-1986

CWL Chemical Waste Landfill (Co-60) 1949-1986

Area V

SER 1962-1969

SERF 1958-1979

SER 1958-1979

ACRR/ACPR 1968-1998

ACRR – Mo-99 Production 1998-Present

SPR-I 1961-1975

SPR-II 1962-2011

SPR-III (KIVA) [GODIVA type] 2003-Present

Ambient Environmental (Airborne)

All Areas 1967-1994

Notes: 

This table is a modified version from tables and information in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

a Workplace air sampling results have been obtained in all Technical Areas from 1957-2011, and ambient environmental results from 

1967-1994. 

Table 5-6: SNL-A Operations Involving Accelerator-Produced Nuclides

Technical Area Facility or Operation Period

Area I

Cockroft-Walton Accelerators 1956-2006

Van de Graaff Acceleratorsa1958-2006

HIPA, Fexitron 1968-1973

Ion Beam 1984-1996

Area IV

HERMES III 1989-1999

SABRE 1998-Present

PBFA-I (HT) 1982-2006

SATURN 1967-1996+

SPEED 1983-1986

SPHINX 1992-Present

PBFA-II 1993-Present

Z-machine (modified from PBFA-II) 1996-Present

Area V

Proto-I 1972-1996

Proto-II 1976-1998

Pelletron 1968-1991

HERMES I, II 1968-1988

Hydra-HydraMITE-I, -II 1977-1984+

REHYD 1988-1998+

Febetron 1967+

Notes: 

This table is a modified version from tables and information in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

a Including heavy ion/proton accelerators from 1968.
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

28 of 79

Some accelerator facilities, such as the High Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source 

(HERMES III), produce short-half-life air activation products O-15 and N-13, for which occupational 

exposure was controlled by ventilation prior to entry. 

Removable contamination on surfaces provides a source for re-suspension of respirable aerosols 

containing radioactive materials. Examples of results from removable contamination surveys in 

selected areas during the period of evaluation are shown in Table 5-7 below. The maximum results in 

disintegrations per minute (dpm) are for a surveyed area of 1 ft2. A re-suspension factor of 1×10-6 is 

usually applied in estimating the air concentration that could result from loose surface contamination. 

Table 5-7: Example Contamination Survey Results for Selected Areas

Area Date

Alpha

dpm

(max)

Beta

dpm

(max)

Location Remarks

SER/6520 1976 75 7,500 Rm 212 Table top/Inside sink 

SER/6520 1976 782 11,500 - Hood/Berger Hut 

SER/6520 1977 14 20,000 Rm 212 Disassembly area/work surfaces 

SER/6520 1979 10.5 15 Rm 104-121 -

SER/6520 1978 16 1,900 Rm 212 -

SER/6520 1980 5 293 Rm 212 Open shelf 

SER/6520 1981 200 2,800 - Parts on shelf 

TA-V 203 1986 249 112 203 Surfaces/ hot side

TA-1 1993 8350 2990 Industrial Hygiene Lab Average 

Notes: 

This table is a modified version from tables and information in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

5.2.1.4 Plutonium (Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241) 

Plutonium in forms that could typically result in internal deposition resulted from operations in 

Technical Areas I, II, III and V. There is no definitive historical information on the atom ratios of 

SNL-A plutonium sources except for a ‘pure’ Pu-238 source term used in heat source technology with 

the following nominal isotopic composition (Holley 1967): 

Isotope: Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242

Weight Fraction: 81% 15% 2.9% 0.1% 0.3%

Specific Activity in 

Mixture (Ci/g):

1.4E01 9.2E-03 6.6E-03 1.1E-01 1.2E-05

There is also no information about how typical isotopic ratios varied with time and location. The 

dominant (by activity) isotope in most plutonium to which SNL-A workers might have been internally 

exposed is Pu-238. Plutonium used at SNL-A is presumed to be research grade (freshly separated, 

with minimal Am-241 in-growth), except for that encountered in building decommissioning and 

environmental restoration where the plutonium could have been in place for many years. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

29 of 79

Activities at facilities that generate airborne particles, such as the Technical Area-I machine shops, 

waste disposal sites at the Technical Area-II burial pits, and the Technical Area-III Mixed Waste 

facility represent a significant potential source for internal deposition of plutonium. There is also the 

potential for internal exposure to plutonium at Technical Area-V Hot Cell and Reactor facilities, used 

for both experimental research and radiopharmaceutical production. Specific facilities with plutonium 

exposure potential are shown in Table 5-8 below. A 1984 memo (SNL-A, 1984, pdf p. 11) of safe 

operating procedures for the Building 869 Toxic Machine Shop states, “Plutonium metal or 

compounds or alloys of plutonium are not permitted in that area because of their toxicity and the 

complexity of their radioactive contamination potentials.” It is not clear whether this reflects the 

implementation of a new policy in 1984, or when the policy was otherwise adopted, since other 

information suggests that plutonium was used in the Toxic Machine Shop during the period 1959-

1994. These are sealed radioactive sources, and internal deposition of plutonium is possible only in 

the event that the source encapsulation is compromised. 

Table 5-8: SNL-A Facilities with Internal Exposure Potential for Plutonium

Technical Area Facility or Operation Period

Area I Toxic Metal Shopa

~1959-1994

Kaman Neutron Generators Mfg. (NGMF) ?-Present

Area II

TA-II Burial Pits 1949-Early 1960s

Neutron Generatorsb

1969-1993

Area III

Mixed Waste Landfillc1959-1988

Classified Destruction Facility 1958-1988

Rad- and Mixed-Waste Facility 1988-2007

Rad- and Mixed-Waste Facility 1988-2007

Rad- and Mixed-Waste Facility 1988-2007

.

Area IV Neutron Generator – Test Equipment 1959-1997+

.

Area V

SER 1962-1969

SERF 1958-1979

SPR-I [GODIVA type] 1961-1975

Notes: 

This table is a modified version from tables and information in ORAUT-TKBS-0037.

a A 1984 memo of safe operating procedures for the Building 869 Toxic Machine Shop indicates that plutonium is not 

permitted. 

b

 Only if damages so that encapsulation is compromised. 

c

Pu-contaminated waste and Nevada Test Site debris. 

5.2.1.5 Americium (Am-241) 

Americium-241 has always been included in the bioassay profile at SNL-A, but specific source terms 

driving the inclusion of Am-241 are not known (ORAUT-TKBS-0037). Documents have been found, 

however, indicating that a ‘pure’ Am-241 (i.e., americium not associated with plutonium) source term 

has historically existed at SNL-A. There is an indication that workers submitted samples for the 

americium bioassay program only if there was a potential for exposure to pure americium. The 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

30 of 79

potential for chronic exposure either to pure Am-241 or to Am-241 in plutonium at SNL-A is not 

routine but could have occurred in relation to certain experiments or due to handling leaking 

calibration sources. 

The release of small quantities of Am-241 is assumed to apply to all years of operations for Technical 

Areas I and II. Early environmental monitoring reports indicate that the potential for radionuclide 

release in Technical Area-III was minimal, but no emission monitoring data are available prior to 

1973. A building in Technical Area-III was cited as a small source of Am-241 in the mid-1990s. 

Americium-241 was among 21 radionuclides with the potential for contributing more than 

0.01 mrem/year dose equivalent to workers for the maximum yearly airborne release at SNL-A, based 

on the evaluation of radioactive effluent monitoring results for 69 radionuclides from 1973-2004.4

 It 

was added to the list of radioactive air emissions in annual environmental monitoring reports starting 

in 1989. The maximum annual median intake for Am-241 in Technical Areas I and II is estimated to 

be 2E-09 Bq each year from 1948 to 2004. No maximum annual median intake for Am-241 in 

Technical Area-III is estimated prior to 1994. 

Internal occupational exposure to Am-241 is a particular concern from handling damaged neutron 

generators in the Repair and Test facilities of Technical Area-II and Technical Area-IV. A building in 

Technical Area-IV was reported to a Tiger Team as a facility with Am-241 calibration sources in 

March 1991, but there is no quantitative information about the number of sources, their activities, or 

whether periodic leak tests were performed to verify the encapsulation integrity. 

Records obtained by NIOSH document that positive bioassay results for Am-241 did occur. A 

January 1992, memo requesting follow-up whole-body counting for three SNL-A employees cited 

preliminary tissue burden estimates ranging from 0.14 nCi to 0.18 nCi (Monitoring Results, 1991). 

An October 27, 1992, memo (Hallman, 1992; Panel, 1992, pdf p. 2) describes a March 1992 example 

of a potential Am-241 exposure from a leaking Am-241 check source involving five SNL-A 

employees and an infant: 

This incident began in March 1992, when an Am-241 check source began leaking. 

Although the exact date this source began leaking is unknown, the earliest probable 

date of 26 March 1992 has been used as the potential intake date for all internal 

dosimetry calculations. This event took place in [Redacted] ...The dose assigned to all 

individuals involved in this incident is 0.000 rem. Additional information concerning 

this incident is contained in the Internal Radiation Dosimetry Files. 

One result of the exposure evaluation was that significant problems with background results at the 

Bioassay Lab (Atlan-Tech) invalidated all bioassay results previously provided by that lab. 

Another potential exposure was identified on March 30, 1993. It involved the discovery of 

transferrable α contamination from Am-241 exceeding 10,000 dpm on a tray in a cabinet in which 

radioactive solutions were stored prior to disposal. The cabinet was not posted as a Controlled Area 

 

4

 Identification of specific radionuclides released from various facilities in stack emissions are available in data from 1973 

to 2004 and were used to characterize radionuclide emissions for all years. There are no radionuclide-specific data from 

earlier years. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

31 of 79

(although it was posted for radioactive materials). The tray had been in use for 25 years, the first 15 

of which were in other areas at SNL-A, and the source of contamination could not be identified. 

Bioassay samples from two SNL-A Industrial Hygiene staff were analyzed, with no detectable 

internally deposited Am-241 or uranium. 

5.2.1.6 Thorium (Th-232) 

The source term for thorium operations at SNL-A began in 1959 and, except for thorium in storage, 

apparently involved only small amounts used in research. Per a 1994 Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board memo on SNL-A low-level waste management (Helfrich, 1994, pdf p. 20), about 12,000 

kg of thorium oxide was received by SNL-A in 1982 and stored in a bunker. Experiments were 

performed with small quantities of this material also. The remaining material was turned over to an 

SNL-A waste management organization in 1993. Little documentation has been obtained regarding 

thorium bioassay (e.g., documents only make references to thorium bioassay being performed). 

The principal sources of Th-232 emissions from SNL-A during the period under evaluation are the 

Mixed Waste Landfill and Chemical Waste Landfill in Technical Area-III. The Mixed Waste Landfill 

operated from 1959 to 1988. Wastes disposed included thorium and a variety of other radioactive 

materials. It does not appear that any buildings in Technical Area-III, other than small buildings 

housing the operators and screening detectors to manage the waste disposal facilities, had significant 

sources of radioactivity present for normal operations. 

No emission monitoring data are available prior to 1973 for Technical Area-III, but information in 

early environmental monitoring reports indicates that the potential for radionuclide release was 

minimal (ORAUT-TKBS-0037). Technical Area-III activities began in 1953; it is unclear if any 

radionuclides were involved during the earliest years. The Chemical Waste Landfill has been a 

diffuse source of small quantities of Th-232. Thorium-232 was among 21 radionuclides with the 

potential for contributing more than 0.01 mrem/year dose equivalent to workers for the maximum 

yearly airborne release at SNL-A, based on the evaluation of radioactive effluent monitoring results 

for 69 radionuclides from 1973 through 2004.5 The maximum annual median intake for Th-232 in 

Technical Area-III is estimated to be 2E-04 Bq each year from 1953 to 2004. 

5.2.2 External Radiological Exposure Sources from Sandia National Laboratories Operations 

Work involving nuclear weapons components occurred at SNL-A throughout the entire evaluation 

period. The primary mission at SNL-A is to ensure the safety and reliability of the U. S. nuclear 

arsenal. This mission involves the design and engineering of weapons, including the radiationhardened microelectronics, advanced simulation and computing capabilities, and large-scale testing to 

support these simulation capabilities. In support of this mission in the early history of SNL-A, a Van 

de Graaff and a Cockroft-Walton generator/accelerator were introduced in 1958. The SPR began 

operation in 1961, while the SER began operation in 1962. Other reactors were added, such as the 

HERMES in 1968, and the ACRR, also in 1968. The accelerators and reactors are discussed in 

 

5

 Identification of specific radionuclides released from various facilities in stack emissions are available in data from 1973 

to 2004 and were used to characterize radionuclide emissions for all years. There are no radionuclide-specific data from 

earlier years. Any uranium and thorium detected is assumed to originate from facility activities, even though it could be 

naturally occurring. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

32 of 79

Section 5.1 above and Table 5-X, as well as in Section 2.4 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037 and are 

summarized in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 of that document. Many of these reactor facilities continued to 

operate into the 2000s and into the present period, including the Annular Core Research Reactor 

(ACRR/ACPR) and Sandia Pulse Reactors (SPR-II and SPR-III). Electron, Ion, and X-ray Beam 

accelerators were added throughout the years, with many of these operating into the present time, such 

as the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA-II), Sandia Accelerator and Beam Research 

Experiment (SABRE), and Relativistic Electron Beam Accelerator (REBA). Facilities with high-level 

sources also operated throughout this period, such as the Hot Cell Facility (HCF) and the Gamma 

Irradiation Facility (GIF). These accelerators and reactors were used to create radiation fields for the 

purpose of testing materials and system components associated with nuclear weapons. 

Direct exposure to workers from the radiation fields created by operations of these machines was 

limited by shielding, access control, and interlock systems. Some exposure would have occurred 

during maintenance activities and experiment change-out operations. Some external exposure could 

also have potentially occurred during activities at hot cells and from radioactive waste-handling 

activities. Exposure sources associated with these work environments are described below. There 

were also procedures in place for procurement and control of radium and radium compounds; thus, 

these sources would also have been available as potentials for exposure to radiation. NIOSH has not 

located specific documents that explain how these sources were used. 

5.2.2.1 Photon 

As mentioned previously, several reactors and generators/accelerators were operational during the 

evaluated period. The generators/accelerators were originally located in Technical Area-I, but were 

then moved to Technical Area-V sometime after 1967. Radiation areas resulting from the operation of 

these facilities were typically evacuated and/or interlocked to prevent personnel exposures to the 

potential sources of radiation. An example of this design requirement for the SPR facility is stated in 

a report describing the SPR Facility. The report states (Burnett, 1962, pdf p. 4) that “Operation of the 

reactor in a normal manner does not expose any personnel to hazardous radiation. The nature of the 

reactor is such that the production of radioactive waste is minimal, and the spread of radioactive 

contamination is not a problem.” However, residual radiation would potentially still exist for 

personnel entering to modify experimental setup, retrieve samples, or to perform maintenance. The 

energy ranges would have been typical of those associated with fission products or accelerator 

energies at other AEC/DOE facilities; these are discussed in Section 6.6 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037. 

Depending on the design of the accelerators, the accelerators would have produced beams of various 

radiations, electrons, ions, neutrons, or X-rays. However, exposure to these beams would not have 

occurred except under incident conditions caused by the failure of interlocks and alarms (See Section 

5.2.3 Incidents). Small exposures would have been possible during maintenance or experimental 

change outs. During maintenance activities at the SPR, non-uniform fields could have been 

encountered that would have increased the potential for extremity exposures. 

5.2.2.2 Beta 

Known operations at SNL-A did not involve extensive handling of radioactive materials that would 

have resulted in significant sources of beta exposure. As discussed previously, the material was in a 

solid form and would not have resulted in skin contamination. However, NIOSH has located 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

33 of 79

documentation that indicates that beta radiation was involved (Unknown, 1952). After the 

introduction of accelerators and reactors, some exposure to beta radiation occurred during some 

operations. For example, maintenance at the Reactor facilities and/or during experimental changeouts resulted in small exposures to workers, as indicated from available exposure records. Energy 

values are detailed in Section 6.6 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037, specifying that the beta energies are greater 

than 0.15 keV. 

5.2.2.3 Neutron 

Neutron sources would have existed during reactor and accelerator operations, as well as during 

operations involving the handling of weapons components. However, neutrons from the reactors 

would have only been available near the reactor during operation; personnel access to these areas was 

prohibited during reactor operation. The Cockroft-Walton generator/accelerator, put into service in 

1958 and still being used currently, would have produced primarily high-energy neutrons, but only 

while operating and only in the area where access was prohibited during operation. The configuration 

of the nuclear weapons and associated materials at SNL-A presented a very limited source of 

neutrons. Neutron sources used for instrument calibration would also be a source of potential 

exposure, but exposure would have been limited by access controls and interlocks. Any other 

operations associated with the evaluated class would have had very low potential for exposure to 

neutrons. The neutron energy values are discussed in more detail in Section 6.9 of ORAUT-TKBS0037. 

5.2.3 Incidents 

SNL-A incidents are discussed in Section 2.5 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037. There was a single incident 

involving a serious overexposure in 1960. A single employee received a life-threatening exposure and 

serious hand injuries when the interlock protocol intended to prevent such situations was contravened. 

Additional monitoring equipment was installed and revised protocols were created; no similar events 

have occurred in the last 45 years (Incidents, 1960-1978, pdf p. 179. Documents available to NIOSH 

list incidents that occurred from 1960 through 1987 and provide investigation reports indicating that 

no other major incidents occurred at SNL-A during this time period (Incidents, 1960-1978; Incidents, 

1978-1987). Many incident reports have been obtained, but none describing the high exposure levels 

that occurred in the 1960 incident. 

6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Class Evaluated 

by NIOSH 

SNL-A’s Health Physics Section was first established prior to the evaluation period in 1957 within the 

already existing Industrial Hygiene Division (Johnson, 1997). Because of the Industrial Hygiene 

Division’s historical role in performing many analyses, internal monitoring records were frequently 

stored in files located within that Division for much of the evaluation period. The majority of these 

paper records have now been moved into offsite, inactive, record-storage boxes that are not easily, nor 

routinely searched. Similarly, data such as surveys and air monitoring results are also predominantly 

stored within inactive record-storage boxes. Approximately 50,000 boxes of records now exist within 

the inactive record-storage area; the area consists of caves in the nearby “Monzano Area.” 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

34 of 79

Occupational external radiation monitoring records have historically been more centralized and 

readily available than internal monitoring data. External monitoring records are typically found 

within worker files and are also available in summary fashion within AEC and DOE annual summary 

reports, as described below in Section 6.2. SNL-A’s electronic monitoring record databases 

applicable to the evaluated period do not contain records prior to approximately 1993 for internal 

monitoring data and 1989 for external monitoring data. 

Microfilm and Microfiche Records 

In January 2010, NIOSH requested SNL-A to perform additional data searches to address known data 

gaps in information that SNL-A had been providing NIOSH in response to specific EEOICPA-records 

requests. In response to the identified gaps, SNL-A located a specific collection of records that holds 

additional worker radiological records and information. The identified data is primarily stored on 

microfiche, with some of the earliest records stored on microfilm. It is apparent from archived site 

newspaper articles and interviews with SNL-A employees that in the very early 1960s SNL-A made 

the decision to microfilm and microfiche records in an effort to conserve current and future onsite 

record storage space and presumably as a backup for the inactive record storage located in the 

mountain caves. According to discussion conducted with many site experts (Personal 

Communication, 2011d), it was normal practice during most of the evaluated period to convert 

monitoring records onto microfilm (very early years) and then onto microfiche media (later years) 

prior to transferring the paper records to inactive storage. According to several SNL-A employees, 

conversion of paper records to these media before sending offsite for storage was routine and ongoing 

from the early 1960s until approximately the year 2000, or 2001 (Personal Communication, 2011d). 

It is believed by site personnel that the microfilm/microfiche data collection should contain records of 

all occupational personal monitoring data collected at SNL-A for the time it was used. Actual 

contents of the microfilm/microfiche data collection are currently unverified. NIOSH is considering 

pursuing the task of incorporating this information into a database. 

Although NIOSH has worked to determine data availability and sufficiency applicable to the entire 

1963 through 2011 evaluation period, NIOSH is providing this report in the interest of providing 

timely support regarding the proposed 1963 through 1994 SEC period. NIOSH believes it will have 

access to sufficient documentation and data for the post-1994 period and intends to continue 

conducting its analysis of the contents and completeness of the various SNL-A monitoring record 

databases associated with the 1995 through 2011 period when they become available. Specifically, 

NIOSH intends to continue efforts to collect available electronically stored data applicable to this later 

period and will issue subsequent evaluation responses or reports as applicable based on the results of 

its reviews. The following subsections provide an overview of the state of the available internal and 

external monitoring data for the SNL-A class under evaluation. 

6.1 Available Sandia National Laboratories Internal Monitoring Data 

For much of SNL-A’s operational history, using professional judgment, health physics representatives 

designated personnel for participation in internal dosimetry monitoring (primarily urinalysis for the 

evaluated period). Few in vivo (whole-body and lung counting) results have been obtained by NIOSH 

and almost no in vivo results have been found to have been measured prior to 1989, possibly 

indicating it was not routinely used prior to that period. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

35 of 79

SNL-A’s historical monitoring record management practices and lack of database availability 

preclude the summarization and presentation of the total internal personal monitoring data availability 

for the evaluated class period prior to the 1993 period when the Sandia Dosimetry System (SANDOS) 

was first used to store internal occupational doses. Pending a more complete analysis of the more 

recent electronically available results as described in Section 6.0 above, the presentation of internal 

monitoring data availability in this report reflects the data obtained from SNL-A during multiple data 

capture trips performed by NIOSH. Because in vitro (urinalysis) has been the primary internal 

monitoring technique used for the majority of the evaluated period and very few in vivo results have 

been obtained, only the captured urinalysis results are presented. It is expected that many more in 

vivo monitoring results will be available within SNL-A databases for the post-SEC period once the 

data are available to NIOSH. 

NIOSH has extracted and electronically entered monitoring data found within the 2,600 documents 

obtained from the site and other sources during the course of this evaluation. Table 6-1 presents a 

summary of the urinalysis monitoring data pulled from these documents as applicable to the evaluated 

class period. Data obtained include bioassay results for gross beta/gamma, tritium, uranium, and 

plutonium as performed during the evaluated time period. In most cases, results do not contain 

enough detail to be confidently associated with specific source activities. While in some cases NIOSH 

can infer the activity the data were meant to be monitoring (from information coincident with data 

obtained), in most cases this level of detail cannot definitively be determined. Organizational units 

are historically identified in many cases. However, per a 1980 interview conducted with the then 

Supervisor of the Health Instrumentation Division, the “names for internal Sandia organizations do 

not accurately describe job function or potential exposure risk. Some employees worked for 

organizations different from their assigned organization” (SNL-A, 1980a). This situation seemed to 

be improved however with the association of specific “Worksite Codes” to employees in 1992 

(Chavez, 1992). This latter system provided for much more specific work activity association 

including location, job title, facility, and hazard. 

Currently, no urinalysis data after 1991 have been obtained. More recent internal monitoring data are 

available in SNL-A databases and presumably within the microfilm/microfiche data collection. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

36 of 79

Table 6-1: Summary of Individual In Vitro Bioassay Results

Year Tritium Uraniuma Plutonium Beta/Gammab

1963 281 23 2 32

1964 248 14 4 -

1965 224 - 13 -

1966 222 - 98 -

1967 540 41 85 -

1968 78 5 74 -

1969 187 17 46 -

1970 147 47 24 -

1971 281 85 6 -

1972 184 74 - 5

1973 193 110 - 8

1974 99 60 - 3

1975 46 62 - -

1976 126 64 - -

1977 83 50 - -

1978 138 30 - 1

1979 155 24 - 1

1980 147 40 - -

1981 213 40 - -

1982 79 59 - -

1983 26 26 - -

1984 28 74 - -

1985 25 29 - -

1986 33 70 - -

1987 24 29 - -

1988 24 24 - -

1989 10 - - -

1990 442 - - -

1991 281 - - -

Notes: 

- Indicates no data. 

a

 Number of results for total uranium, enriched uranium, and isotopic uranium are summed in the uranium 

column. 

b

 Number of results for beta, beta/gamma, and gamma are summed in the beta/gamma column. 

The number of results obtained by NIOSH show that although a site-wide documented internal 

monitoring program was not in place until 1992, in vitro bioassay was being performed for workers 

within the evaluated class. Tritium and uranium bioassay were most frequently captured for the 

evaluated time frame. Only a relatively small number of ambient and facility air sample results have 

been captured for the evaluated period. No databases are known to exist for air monitoring data and 

the data that are available are predominantly stored in the inactive archives located in the Monzano 

Area caves. As previously indicated, NIOSH believes it will have access to sufficient documentation 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

37 of 79

and data for the post-1994 period and intends to continue conducting its analysis of the contents and 

completeness of the various SNL monitoring record databases associated with the 1995 through 2011 

period when they become available. Therefore, the specific analyses of the available data discussed 

below are limited to the 1963-1994 proposed class period. 

6.1.1 Tritium 

Documented urinalysis results for tritium have been obtained by NIOSH during the period 1959 

through 1991. The total number of tritium urinalysis, number of positive results, and the highest 

values recorded during this period, from the records captured by NIOSH, are shown in Figure 6-1. 

Figure 6-1: Urinalysis for Tritium Performed at Sandia National Laboratory, 1959-1991. 

The largest number of both tritium urinalysis (505) and positive results (311) during the period 1959-

1991 occurred in 1967, which is included in the period of evaluation. The highest result for tritium in 

urine obtained by NIOSH is 300 μCi/L in 1963, also occurring in the period of evaluation; all other 

results were <50 μCi/L. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

38 of 79

6.1.2 Uranium 

Documented urinalysis results for uranium have been found by NIOSH during the period 1959 

through 1988. The total number of uranium urinalysis, number of positive results, and the highest 

values recorded during this period, from the records identified by NIOSH, are shown in Figure 6-2. 

Figure 6-2: Urinalysis for Uranium Performed at Sandia National Laboratory, 1959-1988. 

6.1.3 Fission and Activation Products 

Very few fission and activation products bioassay data have been obtained by NIOSH. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

39 of 79

6.1.4 Plutonium 

Documented urinalysis results for total plutonium during the period from 1959 through 1971 have 

been obtained by NIOSH. The number of plutonium urinalysis, number of positive results, and the 

highest values recorded during this period, from the records identified by NIOSH, are shown in Figure 

6-3. No data are available for 1963 and 1965. 

Year

1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971

Number of Urinalyses

0

20

40

60

80

100

Highest Result (dpm/L)

0

1

2

3 Number of Positive Results

Total Number of Urinalyses 

Highest Pu Result (dpm/L)

Figure 6-3: Urinalysis for Total Plutonium Performed at Sandia National Laboratory, 1959-1971. 

6.1.5 Americium and Thorium 

Very few (potential exposure related) data points have been obtained by NIOSH for Am-241. No 

thorium bioassay data have been captured by NIOSH. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

40 of 79

6.2 Available Sandia National Laboratories External Monitoring Data 

SNL-A employees assigned to operations involving radiation sources were monitored for exposure to 

radiation during the period evaluated. Sandia Corporation Instructions 2043 (SNL-A, 1957-1963) 

provided guidance and direction regarding the film dosimetry program during the early portions of the 

evaluated period. These instructions document that the Industrial Hygiene Division was “responsible 

for the overall administration of the film badge dosimetry program to insure, by centralized control, 

proper and uniform application of its provisions,” including the decisions about which employees 

should be monitored and maintaining a permanent historical dosimetry record for each SNL-A 

employee (SNL-A, 1957-1963 pdf p. 24). Also documented is the 1957 designation of the Health 

Physics Section as well as that section’s responsibilities to implement the Industrial Hygiene 

organizational goals. The scope of the radiation dosimetry program stipulated that all SNL-A 

employees working in locations designated as “Radioactive Areas” or working with radioactive 

materials were to wear film badges. It also stipulated that visitors were to be furnished with film 

badges accordingly. This practice was implemented throughout the organization as witnessed by a 

memo to all members of Section 1626-1 and 1626-3 (Radiation Effects and Radiation Special Studies 

Sections) dated June 25, 1957, stating that all who handled or were around radiation material were 

required to wear film badges (Colp, 1957, pdf p. 81). The memo further stated that “in the case of our 

two Sections, this applies to everyone assigned to work in our area” (Colp, 1957, pdf p. 81). These 

procedures were carried over into the period being evaluated, later being incorporated into the Sandia 

Manual for Industrial Safety, Fire Prevention, and Environmental Health (SNL-A, 1971). Multiple

documents indicate that technically sound procedures were being used in the middle and late 1990s 

(SNL-A, 1994b, 1994c, 1995b, 1996a, 1997, 1996b, 1996c). NIOSH has access to documents that 

specify the requirements for using a radiation dosimeter at SNL in late 1990 (Stanley, 1990; Garcia, 

1991). DOELAP accreditation was completed in 1991 (Loesch, 1991) and included all the categories 

for accurately monitoring the radiation fields at SNL-A, specifically, beta particles, low and high 

energy photons, and neutrons. Table 6-2 summarizes the various dosimeters used at SNL-A during 

the evaluated period. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

41 of 79

Table 6-2: Dosimeters Used at Sandia National Laboratories

Time Period Beta/Photon Dosimeters Used

1963 to April 1971 Film Badge 2: Plastic holders had four windows: open window, 0.035-in. Al filter for

beta/gamma, Tungsten/Cd and Sn filters for thermal neutrons. Used DuPont 558 film

packets for the beta/gamma exposures based on calibrations with cobalt-60 and 70 keV Xrays. 

These packets contained DuPont 519 film (stated range 30 mR to 10 R) and 1290 film (stated 

range 10R to 3000 R).

May 1971 to ~1988 Harshaw Model 2271: The first TL badge had an open window and a 0.035-in. Al filter. The 

TLD card consisted of two TLD-100 elements, each also 0.035-in. thick.

~1989 to ~1994 Harshaw Model 8801 (7776-1141) cards in Model 8812 holder.

1: 0.015-in. thick TLD-700 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS plastic (deep dose).

2: 0.015-in. thick TLD-700 under 242 mg/cm2 ABS, 0.004-in. Cu (low-energy X-rays).

3: 0.0036-in. thick TLD-700 under open window, 0.0025-in. Mylar (shallow dose).

4: 0.015-in. thick TLD-600 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS plastic (neutron dose).

~1995 to present Harshaw/Bicron EXTRAD put into use 2nd quarter 1997 for extremity dose. 

Harshaw Model 8802 (7776-1161) or 8801 cards (see above) in Model 8812 holder 

1: 0.015-in. thick TLD-700 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS plastic (deep dose).

2: 0.015-in. thick TLD-700 under 242 mg/cm2 ABS, 0.004-in. Cu (low-energy X-rays).

3: 0.006-in. thick TLD-700 under open window, 0.0025-in. Mylar (thicker shallow-dose chip 

than in the Model 8801) .

4: 0.015-in. thick TLD-600 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS plastic (neutron dose).

Time Period Neutron Dosimeters Used

1963 to April 1971 Film Badge 2: In a plastic holder with four windows: ones with cadmium and tin filters were used 

to measure thermal neutrons. Used DuPont film for thermal neutron dose and Kodak Personnel 

Monitoring Film, Type A film (NTA) for fast neutron dose based on calibrations with Van de 

Graaff generator/accelerator at energies of 1, 5, and 14 MeV.

May 1971 to ~1973 The first TL neutron badge consisted of three LiF elements: two LiF-600 that were sensitive to 

thermal neutrons and one LiF-700 that was insensitive to neutrons but was used to subtract any 

gamma contribution. The LiF elements were placed behind tin and cadmium filters to support 

determination of incident and scattered thermal neutrons.

~1973 to ~1990 First dedicated neutron dosimeter incorporated two cards, each with a TLD-600 and a TLD700 element. One TLD-600 and TLD-700 were enclosed in a borated polyethylene pouch and 

one TLD-600 and TLD-700 were uncovered. The holder had an open window and three 0.035-

in. Al filters. Deep and shallow measurements were made with the TLD-700 elements and bare 

and boron-filtered measurements of neutrons with the TLD-600 elements to discriminate energies 

near thermal.

July 1984 An albedo TLD was added for neutron dosimetry.

~1990 to 1994 Harshaw ”Sandia Beta-Gamma-Neutron Configuration, Model 8812/8801”

1. 0.015-in. TLD-700 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS plastic (0.277-in.).

2. 0.015-in. TLD-700 under 242 mg/cm2 ABS and 0.004-in. copper.

3. 0.0015-in. TLD-700 under 0.0025-in. Mylar.

4. 0.015-in. TLD-600 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS (neutron dose).

~1995 to present Harshaw -“Sandia Beta-Gamma-Neutron Configuration, Model 8812/8802” 

1. 0.015-in. TLD-700 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS plastic (0.277-in.).

2. 0.015-in. TLD-700 under 242 mg/cm2 ABS and 0.004-in. copper.

3. 0.006-in. TLD-700 under 0.0025-in. Mylar.

4. 0.015-in. TLD-600 under 600 mg/cm2 ABS (neutron dose).

Source: The information for this table was extracted from Tables 6-1 and 6-2 of ORAUT-TBKS-0037 for the period under 

evaluation. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

42 of 79

Data presented in Table 6-3 summarize the dose-related quantities that have been reported in SNL-A 

annual dose summaries for the period of interest. These data confirm that both beta and gamma 

exposures were monitored and reported, as well as thermal and fast neutron exposures. The data also 

confirm that extremity (wrist) exposures were also monitored. 

Table 6-3: Dose Quantities Reported in SNL-A Annual Reports to AEC/DOE

Dose Quantities in Annual 

Dose Reports

1959-

1965 1966 1967-1969 1970 1971-1976

1983-

1987

1988-

1991

1992-

2011

“Total Body” █ █ █

“Total Wrist”

Total Dose (Total)

Total This Period █

Total This Quarter █

Year to Date █ █ █ █

Cumulative Total █ █ █ █

Gamma █ █ █ █ █ █

Fast Neutron █ █ █ █ █

Thermal Neutron █ █ █ █ █

“Beta” █ █

Wrist █ █

Cumulative Beta █

Cumulative Wrist █

Cumul. Non-pen. █ █

Cumul. Extremity █ █ █

Extremity █ █ █ █ █

Non-penetrating █ █ █ █

Ann. Penetrating █

Cumul. Penetrat. █

Annual Skin █ █ █

Cumul. Skin █

Cumul. Gamma █

Cumul.Fast █

Cumul Thermal █

Annual Internal █ █ █ █

Cumul. Internal █

Eye █ █

Neutron █ █ █

Deep █ █

Shallow █

Source: The information for this table (1959-1991) was extracted from Table 6-3 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037 for the period 

under evaluation. The final column (1992-2011) information was based on DOE reporting requirements and claims data 

provided by SNL-A during this period. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

43 of 79

A memo dated August 21, 1996, specifically mentions that “film badge records have existed since 

Sandia came into existence” (Perez-Romo, 1996). It describes the storage location for these dosimetry 

records and indicates that data extracted from the gamma and neutron film were initially manually 

entered on index cards. Later in the process history, a semi-automatic system was developed to 

replace the index cards (Perez-Romo, 1996). Monitoring results are available for the period in 

question. A claim file review was conducted to determine the nature and amount of external radiation 

exposure data that had been returned by SNL-A in response to claims that had been submitted to SNLA. The external monitoring records available appeared to be consistent with work histories. 

However, the records provided by SNL-A show some peculiarities that can complicate the dose 

reconstruction process. For example, some records from the evaluated period indicate specific 

badging periods, but the exposures are listed for an entire year rather than the badging period. 

Therefore, dose reconstruction requires making some judgments regarding which period the exposure 

actually occurred or how many “0” exposures occurred during the year. There are also gaps in the 

exposure records where not every badging period is represented by data. This requires that decisions 

be made regarding whether the worker was actually appropriately unmonitored, or if the worker was 

involved in work that should have been monitored, but for some unknown reason was not. This 

anomaly exists primarily prior to the late 1980s; after this period, the doses provided with the claims 

response are provided by wear period, making the decision process for individual dose reconstructions 

more straight-forward. 

6.2.1 Photon Exposure Data 

Table 6-4 lists whole-body gamma exposure data submitted as part of the annual radiation exposure 

reports to AEC. It is apparent that the external exposure reporting criteria required by AEC changed 

periodically; thus, the same external exposure information is not available for all the years in question. 

Generally, the data specify how many workers were monitored, sometimes an indication of how many 

were not monitored, the number of workers with exposures within specific ranges, and sometimes a 

listing of the maximum exposure for that particular year. The data show that exposures to the vast 

majority of the workers were typically low, generally less than 1 rem/year. 

Table 6-4: Radiation Exposure Data Reported by SNL-A to AEC/DOE

Table 6-4 and its associated notes span two pages.

Year

No.

Employees 

Monitored

No. 

Employees 

Not 

Monitored

<0.1 

rem

0.1-

0.25 

rem

0.25-

0.5 

rem

< 1 

rem

1-2 

rem

2-3 

rem

3-4 

rem

4-5 

rem

Max. 

Dose

1963 3094 4052 3078 14 2 <3

1964 3,380 3,833 3,372 4 4 <3

1965 3,696 3,428 3,685 10 1 <3

1966 3,920 3,161 3,896 17 7 <3

1967 2,692 5,316+25K a2,669 13 8 2 <4

1968 3,135 5,121+25K 3,108 14 7 3 3 <5

1969 2,875 5,106+25K 2,852 11 6 6 <4

1970 2,952 4,755+25K 2,927 18 5 2 <4

1971 2,382 4,648+25K 2,356 19 3 3 1 <5

1972 2,408 4,506+25K 2,374 20 5 4 3 <5
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

44 of 79

Table 6-4: Radiation Exposure Data Reported by SNL-A to AEC/DOE

Table 6-4 and its associated notes span two pages.

Year

No.

Employees 

Monitored

No. 

Employees 

Not 

Monitored

<0.1 

rem

0.1-

0.25 

rem

0.25-

0.5 

rem

< 1 

rem

1-2 

rem

2-3 

rem

3-4 

rem

4-5 

rem

Max. 

Dose

1973 2,802 3,648+25K 2,779 16 3 2 2 <5

1974 1,937 (987)b721 157 45 12 10 4 1 <5

1975 3,880 (2,168)b1,347 250 75 19 18 1 1 <9

1976 4,350 (2,232)b1,848 195 30 30 6 4 4 1

1977 4,631 (2,450)b1,819 247 70 26 10 5 2 2

1978 5,009 (3,443)b1,334 150 38 18 14 7 3 2

1979 4,721 (3,430)b1,107 113 35 21 8 1 4 2

1980 4,279 (3,338)b805 90 20 18 5 1 2

1981 4,764 (4,113)b550 56 33 6 3 2 1

1982 4,725 (3,920)b653 80 39 14 10 4 2 3

1983 4,935 (3,804)b991 100 20 9 3 6 1 1

1984 4,967 (4,243)b634 56 13 13 4 2 2

1985 3,561 (2,903)b569 53 18 9 6 2 1

1986 3,283 (2,849)b368 34 15 10 5 2

1987 989 (979)b9 1

1988 3,440 (2,788)b544 65 21 15 5 2

1989 3,906 (2,980)b854 38 19 5 1 4

1990 4,941 (4,087)b805 30 11 5 3

1991 5,152 (4,581)b532 24 6 5 4

1992 5,298 (4,782)b481 21 10 4

1993 4,285 (3,971)b295 9 8 2

1994 4,001 (3,751)b225 16 5 4

1995 3,750 (3,407)b324 13 6

1996 5,006 (4,521)b465 7 7 6

1997 3,406 (3,213)b175 12 2 3

1998 3,462 (3,281)b167 7 2 5

1999 3,246 (3,126)b107 7 4 2

2000 2,983 (2,878)b83 13 8 1

2001 2,886 (2,787)b88 6 5

2002 2,937 (2,828)b96 11 2

2003 3,024 (2,774)b223 21 6

2004 3,220 (2,903)b269 36 10 1 1

2005 3,345 (3,123)b201 18 3

2006 3,185 (2,917)b229 15 12 11 1

2007 2,998 (2,823)b152 21 2

2008 2,804 (2,644)b136 22 2

2009 2,469 (2,381)b79 6 3

2010 2,124 (2,065)b50 8 1

Notes: 

a

 The value of 25K was submitted by SNL-A as the estimated number of construction workers that were not monitored. 

b Numbers inside the ( ) in the third column show the number of employees with no measurable exposure, while the 

numbers not inside ( ) show the number of employees not monitored. Results for 1974 and later all refer to the number of 

employees with no measureable exposure.
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

45 of 79

Table 6-4 also indicates that not all employees were monitored, which is typical for operations such as 

those conducted at SNL-A. Not all employees performed jobs that caused them to potentially be 

exposed to external radiation. However, as indicated in NIOSH-obtained monitoring procedures, all 

employees who handled or were around radioactive materials were required to wear dosimetry 

devices. As discussed previously, this policy was carried forward into the Sandia Manual for 

Industrial Safety, Fire Prevention, and Environmental Health (SNL-A, 1971) and other more 

contemporary procedures (SNL-A, 1994b, 1994c, 1995b, 1996a, 1997, 1996b, 1996c). Table 6-4 also 

indicates that the vast majority of employees that were monitored did not receive measurable 

exposures, which can be seen by the difference between the number of employees monitored and the 

number receiving measurable exposure. 

6.2.2 Beta Exposure Data 

The radiation dosimetry devices in use at SNL-A during the period under evaluation had the capability 

to monitor beta exposures. The devices were also used as wrist badges to monitor for extremity 

exposures. Records of these exposures have been retained and appear in data request responses 

submitted by SNL-A for specific claims. Table 6-2 summarizes the dosimeters used during the 

evaluated period. Table 6-5 provides the potential annual missed dose for these dosimeters. 

Table 6-5: Potential Annual Missed Doses

Period of Use Dosimeter Exchange 

Frequency

Annual Missed 

Deep Dose

Annual Missed 

Non-Penetrating 

Dose

1959 to April 1971 Film in plastic 

holder

Biweeklya

Monthly

Quarterly

520

240

80

520

240

80

May 1971 to ~1973 2271 TLD Monthly

Quarterly

120

40

228

76

1973 to ~1990 Two-Card Neutron

TLD

Monthly

Quarterly

120

40

228

76

~1990 to ~1994 8801 TLD Monthly

Quarterly

60

20

210

70

~1995 to Present 8802 TLD Monthly

Quarterly

30

16

30

20

Notes: 

Source: The information for this table was extracted from Table 6-7 of ORAUT-TBKS-0037for the period under 

evaluation. 

a

 Dosimeters in reactor areas and for organizations handling radioactive materials consistently were exchanged on a 

biweekly basis (every two weeks). 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

46 of 79

6.2.3 Neutron Exposure Data 

Neutron monitoring began in 1958, which coincides with the beginning of accelerator operations. 

Neutron exposures were monitored as described in SNL-A procedures. Nuclear Track Emulsion 

Type-A film was used to measure fast neutrons; thermal neutrons were measured using the film 

density differences under the cadmium shielded versus tin shielded portions of the film badge. This 

protocol has been described in the “Capture Gammas for Neutron Dosimetry with a Film Badge” in 

Volume 10 of the 1964 Health Physics Journal (Caruthers, 1964). A 1962 document describes this 

calculation procedure as well as the process for determining gamma and beta doses from the film 

badge readings (Unknown, 1962). The requirements for use of radiation dosimetry and the related 

records are described in August 21, 1996, correspondence regarding film badge and TLD records 

(Perez-Romo, 1996). Neutron exposures were recorded in the records of the individual workers. The 

doses to workers were also reported to the AEC, as shown in Annual, Semi Annual, and Quarterly 

Film Badge Exposure Summaries and Annual Summary Reports (1949-1984) (Monitoring Results, 

1949-1984). 

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Class Evaluated by 

NIOSH

The feasibility determinations for the class of employees under evaluation in this report are governed 

by both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1). Under that Act and rule, NIOSH must establish 

whether or not it has access to sufficient information either to estimate the maximum radiation dose 

for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed that could have been incurred 

under plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or to estimate the radiation doses to 

members of the class more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. If NIOSH has access to 

sufficient information for either case, NIOSH would then determine that it would be feasible to 

conduct dose reconstructions. 

In determining feasibility, NIOSH begins by evaluating whether current or completed NIOSH dose 

reconstructions demonstrate the feasibility of estimating with sufficient accuracy the potential 

radiation exposures of the class. If the conclusion is one of infeasibility, NIOSH systematically 

evaluates the sufficiency of different types of monitoring data, process and source or source term data, 

which together or individually might assure that NIOSH can estimate either the maximum doses that 

members of the class might have incurred, or more precise quantities that reflect the variability of 

exposures experienced by groups or individual members of the class. This approach is discussed in 

DCAS’s SEC Petition Evaluation Internal Procedures which are available at 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. The next four major subsections of this Evaluation Report examine: 

The sufficiency and reliability of the available data. (Section 7.1) 

The feasibility of reconstructing internal radiation doses. (Section 7.2) 

The feasibility of reconstructing external radiation doses. (Section 7.3) 

The bases for petition SEC-00188 as submitted by the petitioner. (Section 7.4) 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

47 of 79

7.1 Pedigree of Sandia National Laboratories Data 

This subsection answers questions that need to be asked before performing a feasibility evaluation. 

Data Pedigree addresses the background, history, and origin of the data. It requires looking at site 

methodologies that may have changed over time; primary versus secondary data sources and whether 

they match; and whether data are internally consistent. All these issues form the bedrock of the 

researcher’s confidence and later conclusions about the data’s quality, credibility, reliability, 

representativeness, and sufficiency for determining the feasibility of dose reconstruction. The 

feasibility evaluation presupposes that data pedigree issues have been settled. 

Though workers at SNL-A have been monitored for radiation exposures since 1949, the site’s first 

formally designated Health Physics Section was first formed within the Industrial Hygiene Division in 

1957, approximately five years prior to the start of the SEC evaluation period. It was initially created 

to perform radiation safety for workers participating in atmospheric testing; it quickly expanded to 

provide radiation safety services throughout the site as needed. From 1957 forward, NIOSH has been 

able to obtain several Sandia Corporation Instructions that detail various health and safety oriented 

roles and responsibilities, including proper handling of radioactive material and the dosimetry 

program. The Sandia Corporation Instructions documents show that the Industrial Hygiene Division 

had “overall administration of the Film Badge Program to insure, by centralized control, proper and 

uniform application of its provisions” (SNL-A, 1957-1963). Per the Sandia Corporation Instructions, 

within the Industrial Hygiene Division, the newly formed Health Physics Section was tasked with the 

day-to-day implementation of the program goals. This included furnishing consulting services on all 

aspects of radiation protection, surveillance of all radiation activities, distribution and processing of 

monitoring equipment, maintaining exposure records and submitting reports, scheduling urinalysis 

measurements, evaluating suspected overexposures assessing and eliminating hazards, supervision 

and coordination of the waste disposal program, etc. It is evident from available documentation and 

interviews that during the evaluation period monitoring requirements at SNL-A have been determined 

primarily within specific departments or divisions and based on work area and activity-specific bases. 

Health physicists determined monitoring requirements for workers under their purview based on their 

judgment of exposure potential. Organization supervisors were responsible for implementing the 

health physicists’ recommendations. Often, air monitoring was used as a decision tool for 

determining worker protection needs and bioassay sampling requirements. 

Certain aspects of the SNL-A’s health physics oversight program were not well documented during 

much of the evaluation period however. A lack of program documentation is particularly applicable 

to internal exposure monitoring practices and internal monitoring record maintenance. This may be 

due in part to the relatively low internal exposure potential for much of the work performed at SNL-A, 

and the resultant ad hoc approach to internal monitoring. The first documented “Interim Internal 

Dosimetry Policy” was established in December 1993 (Stanley, 1993), following deficiencies noted 

during internal SNL-A and DOE Tiger Team assessments. Also in response to the assessments, SNLA issued a comprehensive “Control of Radiological Records Procedure” in January 1994 (SNL-A, 

1994a). This procedure’s purpose was to “...establish and implement the controls for the systematic 

generation, distribution, control, and retention or disposition of official Radiation Protection 

Operations Department records and documents related to the radiological control at Sandia National 

Laboratories.” The lack of documented internal monitoring procedures and requirements prior to 

1993 undermines the ability to definitively support the supposition that internal monitoring was 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

48 of 79

performed whenever and wherever necessary, for all appropriate workers. Contrary to internal 

monitoring requirements, external monitoring requirements have been well documented. In addition 

to the Sandia Corporation Instructions described previously, NIOSH has obtained several other 

examples of SNL-A’s external monitoring procedures applicable to the evaluated period. 

Databases containing internal or external monitoring data do not cover the majority of the evaluated 

period. Existing SNL-A electronic monitoring record databases do not contain internal monitoring 

records prior to approximately 1993, or external monitoring records prior to 1989. Earlier records 

associated with the evaluated period were all originally on paper; the very early monitoring records 

were on Cardex cards (Personal Communication, 2007). Paper monitoring records (and apparently 

other records) were converted into and replaced with microfilm for a short time, and then to 

microfiche. Actual contents of the microfilm/microfiche data collection are currently unverified. 

NIOSH is considering pursuing the task of incorporating this information into a database but has not 

done so to date. A large portion of the original paper records created during the evaluated period have 

been archived in inactive records storage in mountain caves for long-term storage purposes. 

Currently, there are approximately 50,000 boxes of records in this long-term storage repository. 

Although these records are technically still available, there are currently no efficient search and 

retrieval methods for these records. 

Active, current, or recently requested radiological records (non-electronically stored) are held in a 

centralized repository called the Environmental Safety and Health (ES&H) Records Center (also 

known as Customer Funded Records Center) on the first floor of Building 869. The Industrial Health 

Division is located on the first floor of the building as well. Health physics records stored in the 

ES&H Records Center include radiation monitoring, contamination surveys, and air sample data. The 

ES&H Records Center allows the originating organization to determine the content of the 

submissions. Documents are retained in the ES&H Records Center for three years from the date they 

are received, not from the date the documents were originated. Afterwards, the records holdings are 

archived into the long-term storage location (also referred to as inactive record storage). Currently 

there are three finding aids for inactive records. They include: 

The Versatile database, which is site-wide in scope; 

The Safety Health Environmental Automated Records System (SHEARS), which is unique to the 

ES&H Records Center; and 

The Inactive Record Transfer (IRT) binder, which catalogs stored records that were submitted 

prior to the establishment of the ES&H Records Center. 

To conduct a thorough search for records it is necessary to know the name of the organization that 

created the record at the time of the record’s creation. Many records applicable to the evaluated 

period and kept in long-term storage, are searchable via the index within the IRT binder listed 

previously. This index however does not provide the detail needed for targeted data capture nor 

determining total data availability. In addition to the ES&H Records Center and inactive records 

holdings, non-electronic employee records may be located within medical records and industrial 

hygiene records. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

49 of 79

More recent SNL-A monitoring records are maintained electronically. The Sandia Dosimetry System 

(referred to as SANDOS) was first created as two separate, independently-operated applications in 

approximately 1989/1990. The external dosimetry SANDOS system came first, followed 

approximately three years later by the radiobioassay SANDOS system. External SANDOS was used 

to manage the SNL-A TLD inventory through the various stages of the TLD life cycle (from issue to 

return of dosimeters, to uploading group files from the dosimeter reader’s application, processing data, 

calculation of doses, and storage of occupational doses). Internal SANDOS was used to issue 

radiobioassay kits, track kits/assignments, log kits back in upon return, store laboratory results 

reported for each kit, and store doses calculated outside of the system associated with laboratory 

results. Various reports were generated using data from SANDOS, including dose histories and 

annual occupational exposure reports. 

External and internal SANDOS applications were combined into one integrated application under a 

“PowerBuilder” platform sometime in 2003. All data and doses in the previously existing, separate 

SANDOS applications were migrated into the newer SANDOS application. This application included 

a new function to calculate air sample doses using ICRP dose conversion factors and user-supplied air 

sample data. All other radiobioassay doses continued to be calculated outside the system and inserted 

manually as appropriate. The SANDOS (PowerBuilder) application was a stand-alone internal and 

external occupational dose electronic database from its inception in 2003 until June 2009 when the 

external dosimetry portion of SANDOS and all associated TLD data/doses were migrated into a new 

web-based Java application called WebDose developed at SNL-A. WebDose is the current external 

occupational dose database. It also functions as the internal and external dose reporting tool. Annual 

dose reports, REMS reports, and other official dose reports are generated using WebDose. Since June 

2009, SANDOS has been used exclusively for internal dosimetry purposes, as described above. 

7.1.1 Internal Monitoring Data Pedigree Review 

As noted in Subsection 6.1, NIOSH has obtained relatively few internal monitoring data for the 

evaluated period. Bioassay data for the evaluated period have occasionally been returned during 

EEOICPA claimant data requests, found in NIOSH-obtained documents, and found in records 

selected from inactive storage during data capture efforts. Additionally, initial reviews of the 

microfilm/microfiche data (see Section 6.0 of this report) indicate the presence of in vitro bioassay 

data within that set. 

Radiochemical and chemical analysis of in vitro bioassay samples was generally performed in-house 

during the period under evaluation. Although no analytical procedures have been obtained, a retired 

health physics manager stated that historically most of the sampling protocol and analytical techniques 

were based on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory procedures (Personal Communication, 2011a). 

Beginning in 1992, the Santa Fe company Controls for Environmental Pollution (CEP) was contracted 

to provide part of SNL-A’s bioassay analytical services. CEP tested approximately 500 employee 

urine samples for SNL-A between 1992 and 1994. SNL-A officials stopped using CEP’s services in 

1994 because quality control testing raised questions about the reliability of CEP’s reports. It is 

NIOSH’s policy that all data provided by CEP are unacceptable for EEOICPA dose reconstruction 

use. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

50 of 79

Difficulty retrieving and receiving SNL-A occupational internal monitoring data has been an ongoing 

problem while processing EEOICPA claimant records requests. To address data gaps identified 

during claims processing, NIOSH requested monitoring data searches to be repeated for 164 SNL-A 

claimants. A comparison of data obtained by NIOSH during its own data capture efforts to data 

resupplied by SNL-A for the EEOICPA claimant data requests has been performed. The results 

highlight the ongoing retrievability issues associated with data collected and stored prior to the advent 

of the first electronic storage systems being put in place (i.e., Internal SANDOS in approximately 

1993). Through data capture efforts, NIOSH retrieved internal monitoring data reports associated 

with 20 current SNL-A claimants employed within the evaluated period and for whom EEOICPA 

monitoring data requests had already been processed. Comparing the two, it was apparent that 

NIOSH has obtained 24 different urinalysis reports that were not provided by SNL-A during the 

processing of these claims. These reports are associated with various decades as noted in Table 7-1

below. 

Table 7-1: Urinalysis Reports Obtained by NIOSH

Decade 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s

No. of Reports 6 15 1 2

The total sample size and data collection method are not conducive to making conclusions regarding 

data retrievability comparisons over time periods. The results do however sufficiently highlight 

internal monitoring data retrievability problems existing from the beginning of the evaluated period up 

into the early 1990s at a minimum. The total quantity of internal monitoring data potentially available 

from SNL-A is likely low, due to the ad hoc nature of the monitoring performed. Difficulty locating 

detailed work process and internal radiation protection program information for the earlier years, as 

well as data retrievability problems known to exist for records not stored within electronic media 

create uncertainty regarding the ability to confidently bound internal doses that might have occurred. 

Access to air monitoring data appears just as difficult as access to personal monitoring data. 

Regardless of data availability issues, the lack of documented internal monitoring procedures and 

requirements prior to 1993 prevents the ability to definitively support a premise that internal 

monitoring was performed as necessary for all appropriate workers. 

Based upon NIOSH’s assessment of the SNL-A internal monitoring program, the results of its 

extensive data capture efforts and document reviews, and interviews with SNL-A personnel NIOSH 

concludes that the SNL-A internal monitoring data pedigree is insufficient to support bounding 

internal doses for members of the class under evaluation during the January 1, 1963 through 

December 31, 1994 period. This is due primarily to the absence of internal monitoring program 

documentation for this period and compounded by the lack of source term information, data retrieval 

problems known to exist into the very early 1990s, and the use of CEP analytical services for bioassay 

well into 1994. Evaluation of internal monitoring data pedigree post 1994 (after electronic databases 

storage systems were becoming the norm) is still ongoing. Completion of this work is dependent 

upon acquiring access to SNL-A’s other electronic data storage media. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

51 of 79

7.1.2 External Monitoring Data Pedigree Review 

There was external radiation exposure monitoring throughout the evaluated period at SNL-A. 

External radiation exposure data were supplied to AEC/ERDA/DOE annually in accordance with 

reporting requirements and these reports are available to NIOSH. External monitoring records for 

monitored SNL-A workers within the evaluated period are typically available within EEOICPA 

claims as well; SNL-A has supplied data for 256 of 367 workers from this period. This monitoring 

ratio is consistent with the data supplied by SNL-A to the AEC during this period, generally indicating 

external records have been properly retained in repositories in a retrievable manner. 

NIOSH has also determined that the external exposure data were obtained from badges with known, 

sufficient performance characteristics and that the data exist as either primary data records or as photo 

copies (microfilm or microfiche) of the primary data. The dosimeters in use were properly calibrated 

with radiations that were appropriate for the fields that were likely to exist at SNL-A. Neutron 

monitoring began in 1958 (prior to the evaluated period), which coincides with the introduction of an 

accelerator that had the potential to produce neutrons. 

Program procedures are available from 1957 forward and they detail an effort to ensure that all 

workers who should have been monitored were monitored; that is, any worker that entered a 

“radiation area.” It is also known that there were a large number of workers at SNL-A that would not 

have entered a radiation area and would not have been monitored, due to the remote nature of the 

areas which contained reactors and accelerators. Given the availability of monitoring program 

documents and the continuity and consistent availability of external records throughout the evaluated 

time period, NIOSH believes that an appropriate external monitoring program has also been in place 

for the entire evaluated period. 

Based upon NIOSH’s assessment of the SNL-A external dosimetry program, the results of its 

extensive data capture efforts and document reviews, and interviews with SNL-A personnel NIOSH 

concludes that the SNL-A external monitoring data pedigree is sufficient to support bounding external 

dose for the entire period for the class evaluated (January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011). 

7.2 Evaluation of Bounding Internal Radiation Doses at Sandia National 

Laboratories 

The principal sources of internal radiation doses for members of the class under evaluation were likely 

associated with waste handling and with machining that supported reactor and accelerator operations. 

Other potential internal doses could have been received from neutron generator work (if damaged) and 

from handling accelerator targets. Most urinalysis data with relevant contextual information obtained

by NIOSH are related to incidents, however. There is no information to indicate that SNL-A had 

routine and documented bioassay programs prior to about 1993, and records of radiological incidents 

are not available in any comprehensive way. Consequently, NIOSH has obtained only relatively few 

results overall. Lack of access to complete, detailed information creates uncertainty regarding the 

presence of other potential internal exposure sources. The following subsections address the ability to 

bound internal doses and the feasibility of internal dose reconstruction. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

52 of 79

7.2.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related Internal Doses 

The following subsections summarize the extent and limitations of information available for 

reconstructing the process-related internal doses of members of the class under evaluation.

7.2.1.1 Urinalysis Information and Available Data 

NIOSH data capture efforts have identified several documents containing urine bioassay results for a 

portion of the evaluated period. NIOSH currently has no means, however, of efficiently accessing 

internal monitoring data (prior to 1993) within individual personnel files or in the long-term record 

storage repository. Therefore, determining total internal monitoring data availability for any of the 

bioassay analytes for the 1963 through 1994 period is not possible. Similarly, obtaining efficient 

access to complete potential internal dose source-term documentation is not possible, and internal 

monitoring program documentation is nonexistent prior to 1993. As a result, data sufficiency for 

determining the feasibility of bounding internal doses for the evaluated period must be based on 

program and bioassay data currently available for this portion of the evaluation period. NIOSH has 

concluded that sufficient bioassay data are not currently available to bound internal dose for the 

January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994 portion of the evaluated class. NIOSH intends to 

continue its assessment of the January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011 period when it has access to the 

internal monitoring data contained within SNL-A electronic databases covering this latter period. If 

NIOSH finds information indicating that it cannot bound for the period, NIOSH will present an 

additional SEC class in an 83.14 ER. 

7.2.1.2 Airborne Levels 

NIOSH has obtained very little air monitoring data for the evaluated period. Documentation for 

assessing and monitoring the workplace for airborne exposure potential has not been obtained for 

years prior to 1995. NIOSH is aware that Revision 01 of an Operational Air Monitoring Assessment 

procedure (ORAUT-TKBS-0037) describing parameters used to identify areas requiring air sampling, 

CAM alarm set-point determinations, air flow pattern studies, placement of air monitoring equipment, 

air sampling line design, and air monitoring in environmental restoration activities was completed in 

1996, but the date of implementation for the original procedure is not clear. Similarly, Revision 01 of 

an Airborne Radioactivity Sampling and Monitoring procedure (SNL-A, 1995a; ORAUT-TKBS0037) appears to have been issued in 1995, but the implementation of the original procedure is 

unknown. Airborne concentration measurement results are not available for all years of operation, 

especially for fission products, and reported results often do not include critical information such as 

the volume of air through the filter. 

Engineered controls to prevent intakes are emphasized in the radiation protection program records. 

Modifications in the SPR facility, for instance, reduced airborne gross alpha activity levels after a 

burst from >1 μCi/m3

in 1961 to <0.1 μCi/m3in 1964. Modifications in the SPR II facility were 

implemented to prevent the leakage of fission products after an incident in 1968 resulted in evacuation 

of the Reactor Control Room. 

In most cases, sampling and analysis parameters necessary for proper interpretation of the little data 

available are not known. As such, NIOSH has concluded that sufficient air monitoring data prior to 

1994 are not currently available to estimate a bounding internal dose. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

53 of 79

NIOSH believes that data are available to bound operational internal doses incurred from January 1, 

1995 through May 21, 2011. NIOSH intends to continue its assessment when it has access to the 

internal monitoring data within SNL-A electronic databases covering this latter period. If NIOSH 

finds information indicating that it cannot bound for the period, NIOSH will present an additional 

SEC class in an 83.14 ER. 

7.2.1.3 Alternative Data Sources for Bounding Internal Dose 

Annual reports to AEC and DOE state that no workers received greater than 50% Maximum 

Permissible Body Burden for the years 1964 through 1974, 1976 through 1984, and 1989 (Monitoring 

Results, 1949-1985; DOE, 1992). Later DOE annual reports summarizing radiation doses do not 

report internal dose separately by site. Missed doses based on the limiting values in the years 

available could technically be calculated and used as a significant overestimate of the dose applied to 

members of the evaluated class. However, because NIOSH does not have access to limiting values in 

all years, nor to the relevant supporting data, validation of these reported results is currently not 

possible. NIOSH has concluded that sufficient alternative data sources are not available to support the 

assessment of bounding internal dose for the proposed class. 

7.2.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Doses 

Because NIOSH has determined that internal monitoring program information and data are 

insufficient to bound operational internal dose, an exhaustive analysis of ambient environmental 

internal dose reconstruction has not been pursued for the 1963 through 1994 portion of this 

evaluation. NIOSH intends to continue its assessment of the January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011 

period when it has access to all data within SNL-A electronic databases covering this latter period in a 

separate review or evaluation, as applicable, to support expediting the evaluation of the proposed SEC 

class as presented in this report. NIOSH intends to use any available data and applicable 

methods/assessments as defined in the Technical Basis Documents (including environmental dose 

assessments) for the purpose of partial dose reconstructions for the proposed SEC class period. 

7.2.3 Methods for Bounding Internal Dose at Sandia National Laboratories 

NIOSH has determined that monitoring program documentation and data are insufficient to bound 

operational internal dose prior to 1994, thus methods for bounding internal doses have not been 

developed for this time period. Based on its initial evaluation of available information, NIOSH 

believes that monitoring program documentation, data, and methods are available to bound 

operational doses incurred from January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011. However, to be certain, 

NIOSH intends to continue its assessment when it has access to internal monitoring data within SNLA electronic databases covering this latter period in a separate review or evaluation, as applicable, to 

support expediting the evaluation of the proposed SEC class as presented in this report. However, 

NIOSH intends to use any available data and applicable methods/assessments as defined in ORAUTTKBS-0037 or other NIOSH documents (including environmental dose assessments) for the purpose 

of partial dose reconstructions for the proposed SEC class period. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

54 of 79

7.2.4 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion 

NIOSH has determined that bioassay monitoring program documentation, workplace monitoring data, 

and process information are insufficient to support bounding EEOICPA internal doses for the January 

1, 1963 through December 31, 1994 portion of the evaluated class. Additional internal monitoring 

data are known to exist that allegedly cover this period (microfilm/microfiche record set), but these 

data are not readily searchable as of the time of this evaluation report. Based on a lack of internal 

monitoring program documentation and source term information data for the January 1, 1963 through 

December 31, 1994 period, NIOSH feels it cannot establish a bounding approach even when the 

microfilm/microfiche records become available. 

Based on its initial evaluation, NIOSH believes that monitoring program documentation, data, and 

methods are available to bound EEOICPA operational internal doses incurred from January 1, 1995 

through May 21, 2011. However, to be certain, NIOSH intends to continue its assessment when it has 

access to internal monitoring data within SNL-A electronic databases covering this latter period. If 

NIOSH finds information indicating that it cannot bound for the period, NIOSH will present an 

additional SEC class in an 83.14 ER. 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to reconstruct internal radiation doses for the period 

from January 1, 1963, to December 31, 1994, NIOSH intends to use any internal monitoring data that 

may become available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures) for the purpose of partial dose reconstructions for the 

proposed SEC class period. Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed at SNL-A 

during the period from January 1, 1963, through December 31, 1994, but who do not qualify for 

inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate. 

7.3 Evaluation of Bounding External Radiation Doses at Sandia National 

Laboratories 

The principal sources of external radiation doses for members of the evaluated class were reactors and 

accelerators being used to provide radiation environments for testing components and systems. The 

following subsections address the ability to bound external doses, methods for bounding doses, and 

the feasibility of external dose reconstruction. 

7.3.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related External Doses 

The following subsections summarize the extent and limitations of information available for 

reconstructing the process-related external doses of members of the class under evaluation. 

7.3.1.1 Personnel Dosimetry Data 

From the beginning of site activities in 1949, employee radiation monitoring was an integral part of 

the SNL-A Radiation Protection program. Radiation exposure data have been provided for claimants 

employed during the 1963 through 2011 evaluation period. Additionally, information presented in 

Section 6.2 indicates that external dosimetry records exist for the evaluation period. Table 6-4 lists 

the data submitted annually to AEC, demonstrating that a significant number of personnel were 

monitored each year. A review of the NOCTS claims also indicates in general terms that such data 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

55 of 79

have been successfully retained over the years, is retrievable, and is being provided by SNL-A when 

requested. 

Photon 

External radiation exposure data have been provided for claimants employed during the entire 

evaluated period. Data presented in various documents/records (Monitoring Results, 1949-1984; 

Monitoring Results, 1964; Monitoring Results, 1972; Monitoring Results, 1981; Monitoring Results, 

1982; Monitoring Results, 1983) and the DOE REMS database are summarized in Table 6-4 of this 

document. The data confirm that a significant fraction of SNL-A personnel were monitored and also 

indicate the maximum exposure occurring each year. These records are available, and when adjusted 

for missed dose and the dosimeter uncertainty correction factor (as described in ORAUT-TKBS0037), are of sufficient quality to represent an appropriate basis for bounding external SNL-A 

radiation exposures.

Based on the information available to NIOSH regarding the SNL-A monitoring program and the 

available monitoring data, NIOSH concludes that sufficient data are available to bound external 

photon doses for the entire class under evaluation. 

Beta 

The preceding general discussion about personnel dosimetry and record-keeping applies equally well 

to the beta component of the dosimeter data. Non-penetrating exposures were monitored during the 

evaluated period as well as extremity exposures using wrist badges. The dosimeters were calibrated 

with uranium slabs, which would be appropriate for the radiation fields that may have been 

encountered at SNL-A. For unmonitored personnel with a work history indicating that the worker 

should have been monitored, the information in Table 6-5 can be used to assign a beta exposure. 

The occupational external monitoring records for beta exposures have been retained and are available 

in summary format from annual reports and in employee files. The missed dose, bias, and uncertainty 

factors described in ORAUT-TKBS-0037 should be applied. With these adjustments, the data 

available should be sufficient to establish a bounding shallow dose estimate for the evaluated period. 

Neutron 

Neutron exposures have been monitored at SNL-A since 1958 and continued for the duration of the 

evaluated period, with the resulting data available in personnel files. There should not typically be 

significant neutron exposure to unmonitored workers since the necessary source for neutrons only 

existed within reactor areas or near neutron sources that would have been designated as radiation areas 

(e.g., Area V). Radiation dosimetry was required for all workers entering such areas. If there is a 

need to estimate neutron exposures for an unmonitored worker, Section 6.7 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037 

provides a protocol. 

Monitoring records have been available in employee files based upon review of DOE-provided 

records for claims. The missed dose and bias/uncertainty factors derived in ORAUT-TKBS-0037
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

56 of 79

should be applied. With these adjustments, the available data should be sufficient to establish a 

bounding neutron dose estimate for the entire class under evaluation. 

7.3.1.2 Area Monitoring Data 

Environmental monitoring data are available for the period beginning in 1980 and extending into the 

end of the evaluated period. An evaluation of the ambient external radiation exposures is discussed in 

Section 4.4.1 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037. The values provided in Table 4-2 of ORAUT-TKBS-0037 are 

sufficiently bounding values for occupational exposures that could be used for unmonitored workers. 

However, the availability of personnel monitoring data obviates the need for area monitoring data as a 

substitute. 

7.3.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses 

Ambient environmental external exposures would be included in the occupational external exposures 

determined for the workers. Consequently, additional assessment of ambient environmental doses is 

not necessary. 

7.3.3 Sandia National Laboratories Occupational X-Ray Examinations 

Although NIOSH has not located specific parameters associated with occupational medical X-rays, 

discussions with former SNL-A X-ray technologists demonstrate a reasonably clear account of the 

frequencies and types of radiographs taken during the evaluated period (Personal Communication, 

2005; SNL-A, 1978) and SNL-A occupational medical records are being made available through the 

EEOICPA claims process. Because individual worker X-ray exams and historical technical data 

regarding the X-ray machine and program are available, NIOSH believes it can reasonably reconstruct 

dose for medical procedures at SNL-A. Additionally, conservative default values and dose 

reconstruction techniques are detailed in ORAUT-TKBS-0037 and may be used in the absence of 

medical records if deemed necessary. The default values in ORAUT-TKBS-0037 are upper limit 

values developed from review of patient doses as reported in literature, machine characteristics, and 

knowledge of X-ray procedures used during different time periods. Therefore, NIOSH concludes that 

it is feasible to reconstruct X-ray occupational medical dose for SNL-A workers with sufficient 

accuracy for the evaluated class.

7.3.4 Methods for Bounding External Dose at Sandia National Laboratories 

There is an established protocol for assessing external exposure when performing dose reconstructions 

(these protocol steps are discussed in the following subsections): 

Photon Dose 

Beta Dose 

Neutron Dose 

Medical X-ray Dose (as applicable per Section 7.3.3) 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

57 of 79

7.3.4.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period External Dose

Photon, Beta, and Neutron Dose 

Photon, beta, and neutron exposures for monitored workers have been measured with sensitive 

dosimeters throughout SNL-A’s history. The dosimetry used to monitor neutron exposures reflected 

the state-of-the-art technology available for the SNL-A operations during the evaluated period. 

Available external monitoring program procedures state SNL-A workers were required to wear 

dosimetry badges when entering a “radiation area.” The resultant monitoring data have been retained 

for the class period under consideration and are available to NIOSH. 

The following are examples of period-specific information describing monitoring devices and brief 

summaries of the known adjustments needed. A document issued in May 1962 (Unknown, 1962) 

describes the calculations used to evaluate the four-window film badge in use during the period from 

1963 through 1971. Calculation procedures are included for gamma exposures, beta exposures, and 

thermal neutron exposures. The thermal neutron exposure was evaluated by using the differential 

exposure density under the cadmium filter, which was being commonly used throughout the AEC 

complex at that time. The technical basis for this process was published in “Capture Gammas for 

Neutron Dosimetry with a Film Badge” in Volume 10 of the 1964 Health Physics Journal (Caruthers, 

1964). If the exposure estimate from the cadmium filter portion of the film was 1.25 times greater 

than the exposure estimate under the lead filter portion of the dosimeter’s film, a thermal neutron 

determination was completed. The determination was made by subtracting the cobalt-60 equivalent 

exposure under the lead filter from that measured under the cadmium filter and assigning half the 

difference as the thermal neutron dose. The document Personnel Dosimetry Records Survey, dated 

May 1980 (SNL-A, 1980b) provided the following information about the 2-Chip Harshaw dosimeter 

that was in use at SNL-A during from 1971 through 1988 (as shown in Table 6-2). Note that 

dosimeters used after 1988 to present were accredited by the DOE Laboratory Accreditation Program 

(DOELAP) and the results need no special adjustments. 

The dosimetry records did not record hire date, date of birth, job class, or gender. 

Internal and external doses were not added together, because the internal exposures were too 

small. 

The dosimetry records did not record fast and slow neutron dose, just total neutron dose using the 

appropriate QF for the energies observed. 

Deep dose was measured at 2 cm. 

Shallow dose was measured at 15 mg/cm2, which corresponded to the depth of the filter over the 

open window of the dosimeter. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

58 of 79

This information would have the following impact: 

The neutron dose in a claimant file should be accurate since the recorded value was adjusted for 

the energies observed. The use of n/p ratios should not be necessary. 

The deep dose being reported at 2 cm would be slightly smaller than what would have been 

reported had the more normal depth of 1 cm been used. This would necessitate a correction to 1 

cm before adjusting to the depth of the specific organ of interest. 

The shallow dose would also have been under reported, since the 15 mg/cm2depth is greater than 

the traditional shallow depth of 7 mg/cm2. This, too, would indicate the need for an adjustment to 

the shallow dose, based upon the assumed energy of the beta radiation, if this exposure route were 

critical. 

With the methods described in ORAUT-TKBS-0037, including the missed dose and bias corrections, 

available data permit adequate estimation of bounding photon, beta, and neutron exposures for 

monitored workers with complete monitoring records. Although unmonitored externally exposed 

workers should not exist, if work history records indicate exposure, then potential maximum values 

adjusted for bias and uncertainty as discussed in ORAUT-TKBS-0037 provide bounding values that 

could be used. In addition, the data in ORAUT-OTIB-0072 can be used to assign dose for any gaps in 

the dosimetry record where a missed dose approach appears inappropriate. If neutron exposures were 

possible from stockpiled nuclear cores, n/p ratios from similar components measured at other facilities 

should be used for the suspected time of exposure. For unmonitored workers who did not enter 

radiation areas, the bounding approach would be to assign the environmental external dose which is 

specified in Table 4-2 of ORAUT-TBKS-0037. 

Medical X-ray Dose 

SNL occupational medical records are being made available through the EEOICPA claims process. 

Because individual worker X-ray exams and historical technical data regarding the X-ray machine and 

program are available, NIOSH believes it can reasonably reconstruct dose for medical procedures at 

SNL-A. In the absence of medical records, the dose associated with medical X-ray exams, if required 

as a condition of employment, can be bounded by using the assumptions and methodology in 

ORAUT-TKBS-0037. The default values detailed in ORAUT-TKBS-003 are upper limit values 

developed from review of patient doses as reported in literature, machine characteristics, and 

knowledge of X-ray procedures used during different time periods. NIOSH believes the ORAUTTKBS-0037 methodology supports its ability to bound the occupational medical X-ray doses for the 

entire SNL-A EEOICPA class under evaluation. 

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion 

The data sources for photon, beta, and neutron doses, as well as occupational X-ray examinations and 

ambient environmental external doses have been examined and found to be adequate for bounding 

EEOICPA external doses for monitored SNL-A workers for the entire evaluated period. NIOSH notes 

that although documentation identifying all potential source terms and program specifics has not been 

obtained, it appears, based on available monitoring documentation, appropriate external monitoring 

procedures have been in place for the entire evaluation period using suitable monitoring devices with 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

59 of 79

the resultant monitoring data being available to NIOSH. Therefore, NIOSH concludes that external 

dose reconstruction for monitored workers for the January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011 evaluation 

period is feasible. 

The assessment of doses for unmonitored workers can be determined from the ambient environmental 

external dose methods defined in ORAUT-TKBS-0037. Based on NIOSH’s assessment of the 

available external data and the dose calculation methods available in ORAUT-TKBS-0037, NIOSH 

concludes that it is feasible to bound external dose for all members of the class under evaluation. 

7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00188 

The following subsection evaluates the assertion made on behalf of petition SEC-00188 for SNL-A.

7.4.1 Internal Monitoring Associated with SNL-A Security Guards 

Assertion: The petitioner asserted that Security Guards working at SNL-A were tasked with working 

in and around radioactive hazard areas and machines. Duties listed included the protection of 

special nuclear materials and weapons. He (and two other employees via affidavit) asserted that at 

times external monitoring devices were not properly worn and that no internal monitoring was 

performed. Additionally, results of requests for external monitoring records have been incomplete. 

Response: NIOSH found support for the petition basis that: (1) radiation exposures and radiation 

doses potentially incurred by members of the proposed class initially proposed in this petition were 

not monitored, either through personal monitoring or through area monitoring; (2) radiation 

monitoring records for members of the proposed class may have been lost, falsified, or destroyed; 

and/or (3) there is limited program information regarding internal monitoring and potential source 

terms at SNL-A. Based on problems identified during NIOSH’s review of SNL-A’s monitoring 

program prior to receipt of this petition, and upon review of the supporting documents provided for 

SEC-00188, NIOSH found that the issues identified by the petitioner required further evaluation and 

that an expansion of the evaluated class was justified. During the course of the current evaluation 

NIOSH has found that potential internal doses associated with work conducted at SNL-A are not 

completely known and access to internal monitoring data and program information is limited, as 

described in Sections 6.0 and 7.0 of this report. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

60 of 79

7.5 Other Potential SEC Issues Relevant to the Petition Identified During the 

Evaluation 

During the feasibility evaluation for SEC-00188, a number of issues were identified that needed 

further analysis and resolution. The issues and their current status are: 

ISSUE: Potential Shortcomings Exist in Completeness and Adequacy of Dosimetry Records

RESPONSE: SNL-A does not have an electronic database containing occupational monitoring 

records for the evaluated class prior to 1990 for external data, and approximately 1993 for internal 

data. In vitro bioassay records prior to this time period are found in paper and microfilm/fiche 

format in archives. Currently, the records are often not located and incorporated by SNL-A as a 

part of claimant files and difficult to access. Data provided to NIOSH for EEOICPA dose 

reconstruction may be limited to summary reports, including dose information in some years for 

tritium, plutonium, and uranium. 

ISSUE: Inaccurate Dose Record for Pulse Reactor Personnel

RESPONSE: Inaccurate dose records for SPR operators resulted from the under-recording of 

external gamma/neutron dose received during shutdown maintenance activities. This underrecording resulted from inadequate dosimetry at the time for a severe gradient of exposure levels 

experienced by personnel working beneath the reactor vessel. Workers in this area experienced 

higher exposures to the head than would have been properly monitored by the badge located on 

the chest. Survey data from 1961 (paired gamma and neutron measurements) for various locations 

in the SPR facility have been obtained by NIOSH. The data’s usefulness for determining actual 

worker exposures has been assessed and corrections can be made enabling conservative estimation 

of bounding exposures. It is noteworthy that wrist badges were used, ostensibly to measure the 

non-uniform fields. The primary issue associated with severe gradients/non-uniform fields is 

unmonitored exposure to extremities (normally hands); the wrist badges were likely used to 

measure that exposure. Additionally, “head” badges were provided to the workers to more 

accurately monitor the exposure to the head and enable a more accurate determination of eye 

exposure (Stanley, 1982; Thompson, 1982).

ISSUE: Site-Wide Workers Not Bioassayed for Potential Internal Intakes Before 1992

RESPONSE: NIOSH has found no documentation supporting the existence of a routine, site-wide 

internal monitoring program prior to 1993. Internal monitoring for much of the evaluated class 

was performed on an ad hoc basis. Information used to determine monitoring needs, as well as the 

actual monitoring results have predominantly not been located prior to 1993. Details regarding 

potential internal source-term information are also unavailable for all years. As a result, NIOSH 

concludes that workers in areas containing radioactive materials may have had the potential for 

internal exposures that were not monitored. Additionally, assigning potential missed dose by 

work location is questionable, particularly in the absence of complete work history records. 

Therefore, NIOSH concludes that it cannot bound internal doses for the period from January 1, 

1963 through December 31, 1994. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

61 of 79

ISSUE: Use of Air Monitoring Data in Dose Estimation is Problematic

RESPONSE: Worker bioassay monitoring was often dependent on air monitoring results. 

However, only limited air monitoring data have been obtained. No centralized or easily accessed 

repository exists. With only limited air monitoring data availability for many periods and areas of 

operation, using air monitoring data as a substitute for bioassay sampling is not possible for the 

1963 through 1994 period. NIOSH intends to continue its assessment of the post-1994 period 

when it has access to SNL-A electronic databases covering this latter period. If NIOSH finds 

information indicating that it cannot bound for the post-1994 period, NIOSH will present an 

additional SEC class in an 83.14 ER. 

ISSUE: Inadequate Identification of Potential Radiological Exposure Sources

RESPONSE: NIOSH is unable to be certain complete source term information has been obtained

for the evaluated period. Examples of obstacles for determining the existence as well as the 

retrievability of all source term information include: (1) multiple large and vaguely indexed SNLA records repositories, (2) limited access to classified electronic and hard copy repositories, (3) 

inability to efficiently redact information collected from classified repositories, and (4) inability to 

definitively demonstrate all SNL-A activities involving exposure potential were documented and 

that those documents were retained. 

ISSUE: Some Claimant Data Supplied by SNL has been Incomplete

RESPONSE: This issue is primarily applicable to internal monitoring data. NIOSH has compared 

internal monitoring data obtained during site visits to data that were supplied by SNL-A for 

EEOICPA claims monitoring-data requests. The results are presented in Subsection 7.1.1 of this 

report. The comparison demonstrates that efficient, complete retrieval of internal monitoring data 

for SNL-A employees remains problematic for data collected prior to approximately 1994. 

NIOSH intends to continue its assessment of the post-1994 period when it has access to SNL-A 

electronic databases covering this latter period. If NIOSH finds information indicating that it 

cannot bound for this period, NIOSH will present an additional SEC class in an 83.14 ER. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

62 of 79

7.6 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00188 

This report evaluates the feasibility for completing dose reconstructions for employees at SNL-A from 

January 1, 1963 through May 21, 2011. NIOSH found that the available monitoring records, process 

descriptions, and source term data available are not sufficient to complete EEOICPA internal dose 

reconstructions for the evaluated class of employees from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 

1994. A lack of internal monitoring data has precluded a detailed assessment for each radionuclide 

during that time period; therefore, a specific feasibility finding for each is not presented. For the 

purposes of timeliness, NIOSH is issuing this report covering available data sufficiency and feasibility 

conclusions now, but will continue to review and evaluate internal exposure reconstruction feasibility 

for the 1995 through 2011 period when applicable databases become available. If NIOSH finds 

information indicating that doses cannot bound for the January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011 period, 

NIOSH will proceed with an 83.14 report, recommending an additional class. 

Table 7-2 summarizes the results of the feasibility findings at SNL-A for each exposure source during 

the time period from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994 and from January 1, 1995 through 

May 21, 2011. 

Table 7-2: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00188

January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994;

January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011

Source of Exposure

January 1, 1963

through 

December 31, 1994

January 1, 1995

through 

May 21, 20111

Reconstruction 

Feasible

Reconstruction 

Not Feasible

Reconstruction 

Feasible

Reconstruction 

Not Feasible

Internal X

1 1

External X X

 - Gamma X X

 - Beta X X

 - Neutron X X

 - Occupational Medical X-ray X X

Note: 

1 To expedite the presentation of the infeasibility and proposed SEC class, NIOSH is issuing the current recommendation 

now, but will continue to review and assess the January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011 period when applicable electronic 

data become available. If NIOSH finds information indicating that it cannot bound for this period, NIOSH will present an 

additional SEC class in an 83.14 ER. 

As of December 14, 2011, a total of 323 claims have been submitted to NIOSH for individuals who 

worked at SNL-A during the period under evaluation in this report. Dose reconstructions have been 

completed for 270 individuals (~84%). 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

63 of 79

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal and external monitoring data that may become 

available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed at 

SNL-A during the period from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994, but who do not qualify 

for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate. 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00188

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3). Under these requirements, if it is not 

feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, NIOSH must 

also determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered the 

health of members of the class. Section 83.13 requires NIOSH to assume that any duration of 

unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of members of a class when it has been 

established that the class may have been exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If 

the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then NIOSH is 

required to specify that health was endangered for those workers who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 

Based on the sum of information available from available resources, NIOSH’s evaluation determined 

that it is not feasible to estimate radiation dose with sufficient accuracy for members of the NIOSHevaluated class for the time period from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 1994. Therefore, the 

resulting NIOSH-proposed SEC class must include a minimum required employment period as a basis 

for specifying that health was endangered for this time period. 

For the period January 1, 1995 through May 21, 2011, a health endangerment determination will be 

provided when dose estimation feasibility for this period has been completed 

9.0 Class Conclusion for Petition SEC-00188 

Based on its current research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH has defined a single class of 

employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. The NIOSHproposed class to be added to the SEC includes all employees of the Department of Energy, its 

predecessor agencies, and its contractors and subcontractors who worked in any area at Sandia 

National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from January 1, 1963 through December 31, 

1994, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this 

employment, or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more 

other classes of employees in the Special Exposure Cohort. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

64 of 79

NIOSH has carefully reviewed all material sent in by the petitioner, including the specific assertions 

stated in the petition, and has responded herein (see Section 7.4). NIOSH has also reviewed available 

technical resources and many other references, including the SRDB, for information relevant to SEC00188. In addition, NIOSH reviewed its NOCTS dose reconstruction database to identify EEOICPArelated dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to the petition evaluation. 

These actions are based on existing, approved NIOSH processes used in dose reconstruction for 

claims under EEOICPA. NIOSH’s guiding principle in conducting these dose reconstructions is to 

ensure that the assumptions used are fair, consistent, and well-grounded in the best available science. 

Simultaneously, uncertainties in the science and data must be handled to the advantage, rather than to 

the detriment, of the petitioners. When adequate personal dose monitoring information is not 

available, or is very limited, NIOSH may use the highest reasonably possible radiation dose, based on 

reliable science, documented experience, and relevant data to determine the feasibility of 

reconstructing the dose of an SEC petition class. NIOSH contends that it has complied with these 

standards of performance in determining the feasibility or infeasibility of reconstructing dose for the 

class under evaluation. 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

65 of 79

10.0 References 

42 C.F.R. pt. 81, Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule, Federal 

Register/Vol. 67, No. 85/Thursday, p. 22,296; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 19391

42 C.F.R. pt. 82, Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 

19392

42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special 

Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000; Final Rule; May 28, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 22001 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385 [EEOICPA], Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program Act of 2000, as amended 

Affidavit, 2011a; Affidavit from SNL-A Security Police Officer; October 4, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 

114974, pdf pp. 8-10 

Affidavit, 2011b; Affidavit from SNL-A Security Police Officer; October 4, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 

114974, pdf pp. 11-13 

Affidavit, 2011c; Affidavit from SNL-A Security Police Officer; October 4, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 

114974, pdf pp. 14-18 

Burnett, 1962, Health Physics Aspects of the Start-Up and Operation of the Sandia Pulsed Reactor 

Facility (SPRF); William D. Burnett, Harold L. Rarrick, George E. Tucker, and Milton W. Tucker; 

May 1962; SRDB Ref ID: 23971 

Caruthers, 1964, Capture Gammas for Neutron Dosimetry with a Film Badge, article in Health 

Physics Journal, Vol. 10; L. T. Caruthers and E. J. Story; revised form-February 28, 1964; SRDB Ref 

ID: 94296 

Chavez, 1992, Worksite Codes for Individuals in the External Dosimetry Exchange; Kathye Chavez, 

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); July 16, 1992; SRDB Ref ID: 31277 

Colp, 1957, Film Badge Regulations, correspondence to all members of Section 1626-1 and 1626-3; 

John L. Colp; June 25, 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 34984, pdf p. 81 

Consult Call Response, 2011, Petitioner Consult Call Response with Attachment; October 7, 2011; 

OSA Ref ID: 114974, pdf pp. 1-7
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

66 of 79

DCAS-PR-004, Internal Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, Rev. 1, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); Cincinnati, Ohio; April 15, 2011; 

SRDB Ref ID: 94768 

DOE, 1992, Twenty-Second Annual Report, Radiation Exposure for DOE and DOE Contractor 

Employees-1989; Department of Energy (DOE); December 1992; SRDB Ref ID: 16122 

DOE, 1999, DRAFT Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Sandia National 

Laboratories/New Mexico; Department of Energy (DOE); April 1999; SRDB Ref ID: 22770 

Form B, 2011, Petition Form B for SEC-00188; received October 7, 2011; OSA Ref ID: 114974 

Garcia, 1991, Bioassay Program Requirements, correspondence to K. K. Babcock; T. B. Garcia; April 

3, 1991; SRDB Ref ID: 23664 

Helfrich, 1994, Sandia National Laboratory-New Mexico-Low Level Waste Management and 

Environmental Protection, correspondence to G. W. Cunningham; Monique Helfrich; June 9, 1994; 

SRDB Ref ID: 19307, pdf pp. 19-23 

Holley, 1967, Methods of Assessing the Lung Dose from Inhaled 238 PuO2, SC-TM-67-594; W. L. 

Holley; July 1967: SRDB Ref ID: 24022

Incidents, 1960-1978, Various Radiation Incident Reports for 1960 through 1978; various dates; 

various authors; SRDB Ref ID: 35015 

Incidents, 1978-1987, Radiation Incidents-Book 1 in Chronological Order; SRDB Ref ID: 35014 

Johnson, 1997, Sandia National Laboratories: A History of Exceptional Service in the National 

Interest; Leland Johnson; July 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 84961 

Loesch, 1991, Laboratory Accreditation of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), correspondence to 

Gene Runkle; Robert M. Loesch, Department of Energy; October 31, 1991; SRDB Ref ID: 19079 

Monitoring Results, 1949-1984, Annual, Semi Annual, and Quarterly Film Badge Exposure 

Summaries and Annual Summary Reports (1949-1984); various reports for years from 1949 through 

1984; SRDB Ref ID: 23833 

Monitoring Results, 1949-1985, Annual Summary and Quarterly Reports of Whole Body Exposures to 

Ionizing Radiation, various reports and correspondence; various dates ranging from January 1949 

through March 1985; SRDB Ref ID: 23864, pdf pp. 1-174 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

67 of 79

Monitoring Results, 1959-1970, Chemical Analysis Cards for Tritium; card dates ranging from July 

14, 1959 through September 28, 1970; SRDB Ref ID: 31087 

Monitoring Results, 1964, Summary of Whole-Body Radiation Exposures to External Penetrating 

Radiation Accumulated During the Year (1964); reports for Calendar Year 1964; SRDB Ref ID: 

14442 

Monitoring Results, 1972, Summary of Whole-Body Radiation Exposures to External Penetrating 

Radiation Accumulated during the Year (1972); reports for Calendar Year 1972; SRDB Ref ID: 13802 

Monitoring Results, 1981, Personnel Radiation Dosimetry Records for Calendar Year 1981; SRDB 

Ref ID: 19073 

Monitoring Results, 1982, Personnel Radiation Dosimetry Records for Calendar Year 1982; SRDB 

Ref ID: 19074 

Monitoring Results, 1983, Monitoring Results for Calendar Year 1983; SRDB Ref ID: 18270 

Monitoring Results, 1991, Helgeson Results of In Vivo Counting for Sandia National Laboratories 

(September 1991), contains associated correspondence; results are for work performed from 

September 3, 1991 through September13, 1991; SRDB Ref ID: 31027 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, OTIB: Dose Reconstruction from Occupational Medical X-Ray Procedures, 

Rev. 03 PC-1; ORAU Team Dose Reconstruction Project for NIOSH; June 20, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 

98147

ORAUT-OTIB-0020, OTIB: Use of Coworker Dosimetry Data for External Dose Assignment, Rev. 

03; ORAU Team Dose Reconstruction Project for NIOSH; November 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 

104029 

ORAUT-OTIB-0072, OTIB: External Coworker Dosimetry Data for the Sandia National Laboratory 

in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Rev. 00; ORAU Team Dose Reconstruction Project for NIOSH; 

September 26, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 49941

ORAUT-PROC-0061, Procedure: Occupational Medical X-Ray Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites, 

Rev. 03; ORAU Team Dose Reconstruction Project for NIOSH; March 3, 2010; SRDB Ref ID: 79758

ORAUT-TKBS-0037, Site Profile for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

and the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Rev. 00; ORAU Team Dose Reconstruction Project for 

NIOSH; June 22, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32531 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

68 of 79

Panel, 1992, Summary Report on Expert Panel Recommendations and Actions on the Americium-241 

Occurrence at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM; Expert Panel; panel discussed 

March 1992 incident; SRDB Ref ID: 22318 

Perez-Romo, 1996, Film Badge Information-Record Series Number to be Determined, correspondence 

to Cathy Pasterczyk; Lydia Perez-Romo, Sandia National Laboratories; August 21, 1996; SRDB Ref 

ID: 22258 

Personal Communication, 2005, SNL X-Ray History, email correspondence; December 14, 2005; 

SRDB Ref ID: 26800 

Personal Communication, 2007, Discussion on Sandia Records, e-mail summary of a previous 

discussion; initiated by Rowena Argall; February 18, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 45054 

Personal Communication, 2011a, Personal Communication with SNL-A Employee; Telephone 

Interview by ORAU Team; February 24, 2011, 12:00 PM EST; SRDB Ref ID: 93639

Personal Communication, 2011b, Personal Communication with SNL-A Employee; Telephone 

Interview by ORAU Team; February 24, 2011, 3:00 PM EST; SRDB Ref ID: 93640 

Personal Communication, 2011c, Personal Communication with Former SNL-A Employee; Telephone 

Interview by ORAU Team; April 26, 2011; SRDB 105305 

Personal Communication, 2011d, Personal Communication with Multiple Former and Current SNL-A 

Employees; Site meeting by NIOSH; November 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: TBD after classification 

review 

SNL-A, 1957-1963, Sandia Corporation Instruction-Film Badge Dosimetry Program; Sandia 

National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A); various dates ranging from October 31, 1957 through 

September 17, 1963; SRDB Ref ID: 34984, pp. 2-27

SNL-A, 1971, Manual for Industrial Safety Fire Prevention Environmental Health; Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A); January 7, 1971; SRDB Ref ID: 23985 

SNL-A, 1978, 1978 Guidelines for Diagnostic X-Rays; Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque 

(SNL-A); 1978; SRDB Ref ID: 26818 

SNL-A, 1980a, Questions and Answers regarding Sandia Dosimetry Records; Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A) personnel answers to questions; February 4, 1980; SRDB Ref 

ID: 31273, pp. 2-7 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

69 of 79

SNL-A, 1980b, Personnel Dosimetry Records Survey; Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque 

(SNL-A); associated correspondence dated May 1, 1980; SRDB Ref ID: 23918 

SNL-A, 1984, Safe Operating Procedure Building 869 Toxic Machine Shop, 78000 8401; Sandia 

National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A); January 23, 1984; SRDB Ref ID: 19606, pdf pp. 11-17

SNL-A, 1994a, Sandia National Laboratories Radiation Protection Operating Procedure, Control of 

Radiological Records Procedure, RPOP-143; Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A); 

January 17, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 19230 

SNL-A, 1994b, Internal Dosimetry Response to Inhalation or Ingestion of Radioactive Materials, 

RPID-31-02; Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A); June 13, 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 

35811 

SNL-A, 1994c, Assessment of Whole Body Dose in Non-Uniform Radiation Fields, RPXD-30-05; 

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A), prepared by D. C. Ward; November 2, 1994; 

SRDB Ref ID: 35813 

SNL-A, 1995a, Airborne Radioactivity Sampling and Monitoring, RPOP-00-004, Issue No. 01; 

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A), author Steve Rima; January 24, 1995: SRDB 

Ref ID: 19227 

SNL-A, 1995b, Characterization of Neutron Fields for Personnel Dosimetry Purposes, RPXD-30-07; 

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A), prepared by Arthur Shanks; December 4, 1995; 

SRDB Ref ID: 35814 

SNL-A, 1996a, Combining External and Internal Dose Equivalent, RPXD/RPID-40-02; Sandia 

National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A); February 7, 1996; SRDB Ref ID: 35804 

SNL-A, 1996b, Radiation Protection External Dosimetry Project Overview, RPXD-00-01; Sandia 

National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A), prepared by Scottie Walker; May 15, 1996; SRDB Ref 

ID: 35815 

SNL-A, 1996c, Dosimetry Action Levels Procedure, RPXD-02-06, Issue No: 3; Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL-A), revised by S. W. Walker; May 15, 1996; SRDB Ref ID: 35817 

SNL-A, 1997, Response to Radiological Incidents, RPID-31-03; Sandia National Laboratories, 

Albuquerque (SNL-A), prepared by Charles Potter; July 16, 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 35812 

Stanley, 1982, Special Dosimetry for Area V, correspondence to G. E. Tucker; A. L. Stanley, Sandia 

National Laboratories (SNL-A); October 5, 1982; SRDB Ref ID: 35009 
Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

70 of 79

Stanley, 1990, Radiation Dosimeter Policy, correspondence; A. L. Stanley, Sandia National 

Laboratories (SNL-A); March 23, 1990; SRDB Ref ID: 32083 

Stanley, 1993, Interim Internal Dosimetry Policy, correspondence; A. L. Stanley; December 20, 1993; 

SRDB Ref ID: 23894 

Thompson, 1982, SPR III Head/Eye Test Dosimetry, correspondence to G. E. Tucker; D. J. 

Thompson; October 26, 1982; SRDB Ref ID: 35011 

Ullrich, 1998, Tech Area II: A History, contractor report; Rebecca Ullrich, Sandia National 

Laboratories; printed July 1998; SRDB Ref ID: 6505 

Unknown, 1952, Reference to Letter from J. S. Pelton, summary of letter; unknown author; December 

8, 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 34984, pdf p. 78 

Unknown, 1962, Calculation Procedures for “Four Window” Calculations; unknown author; May 

14, 1962; SRDB Ref ID: 23951 
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

71 of 79

Attachment One: Data Capture Synopsis 

Table A1-1: Summary of Holdings in the SRDB for Sandia National Laboratories

Data Capture Information Data Capture Description Completed Uploaded 

into SRDB

Primary Site/Company Name: Sandia National 

Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL-A/NM) 

Primary Point of Contact: [Name and Contact 

Information Redacted]

Physical size of the site:

The physical size of Sandia National 

Laboratories, NM is 8642 acres. The site 

contains 847 buildings with a total of 5,822,908 

square feet under roof. 

Size of the workforce during the SEC related 

periods:

In 1960 the site population, as reported to the 

AEC, was 6,778, of which 5,509 were not 

monitored for radiation exposure. The most 

recent site population number is 10,419 FTEs 

in FY-11.

Routine and special dosimetry reports, neutron spectra, research, dosimetry, 

tritium, uranium, polonium, and actinide bioassay reports, internal 

dosimetry results, procedures, technical basis documents, environmental 

reports and dosimetry, Technical area descriptions, SAND reports, incident 

reports, facility safety analyses, special facility surveys, dosimetry 

calibrations, descriptions of radiological monitoring, counting, and 

detection systems and equipment, waste management documentation, 

inactive records storage box inventories, health physics logs, Tiger Team 

appraisals and responses, Operation Gumdrop plans and procedures, 

DOELAP documentation, site history, process knowledge interview notes, 

Reactor Division search results, tritide research reports, Technical Area V 

radiation survey data, laboratory surveys, Ross Aviation aircraft and 

shipment surveys performed by SNL, NM, a 1957-1962 Reactor Division 

individual telephone listing, Area V log books, health physics SPR log 

books, inactive records transfers, SERF health physics log books, 1992-

2006 in-vivo and in-vitro spreadsheets, waste management data inventories, 

factors relating to portable survey instruments, an approximation of 

radiation dose from a tritium release, and Sandia's symposium on 

instrumentation and health physics tritium control. NOTE: NIOSH and the 

ORAU Team are awaiting the identification of site repositories for Reactor 

Division exposure data from 1957-1962.

Ongoing 1969

State Contacted: [Name Redacted], Bureau 

Chief, Radiation Control Bureau

The State of New Mexico has never regulated Sandia National Laboratories 

and does not hold records regarding the site.

09/27/2010 0

Cincinnati Public Library The history of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1953-1963. 02/18/2009 1

Colorado State University Library Site environmental reports and a 1993 environmental monitoring plan. 04/10/2006 5

Department of Energy (DOE) The DOE's guide for good occupational radiological protection practices at 

plutonium facilities.

05/11/2007 1

Department of Labor / Paragon A 1952 Tonawanda area progress report which indicates that 30 radium 

sources were imported for Sandia.

12/30/2008 1

DOE Albuquerque Operations Office Internal dosimetry programmatic documents, 1982 Technical Area V safety 

appraisal, 1982 dose reduction proposal for SPR-III, 1972 exemption 

request for plutonium storage facilities, and fallout measurements from the 

07/12/2010 7
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

72 of 79

Table A1-1: Summary of Holdings in the SRDB for Sandia National Laboratories

Data Capture Information Data Capture Description Completed Uploaded 

into SRDB

Gravel Gertie test.

DOE Brookhaven National Laboratory Description of air monitoring parameters at DOE facilities, an assessment 

of external dosimetry services, 1992 annual exposure report to DOE, 1950 

report of Brookhaven personnel who worked on other AEC projects, and 

urinalysis reports.

10/24/2008 5

DOE DOELAP Office, Idaho National 

Laboratory

Listing of Albuquerque Operations Office facilities applying for DOELAP 

accreditation.

06/11/2009 1

DOE Germantown A 1949 report on difficulties with RaBe sources, a plea agreement from the 

CEP case, and the Manhattan District history section detailing the 

establishment of Sandia.

03/12/2008 3

DOE Hanford The 1978 guidelines for diagnostic X-rays, 1958 Hanford report which 

mentions a visit by Sandia personnel on vacuum etching, and a description 

of destructive testing of neutron sources performed by Sandia personnel at 

Pantex.

07/31/2008 3

DOE Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL)

Nevada Test Site external exposures 1957-1958, Sandia temporary film 

badge records 1959, exposure records for Lawrence Berkeley National 

Laboratory personnel visiting Sandia 1970, external exposure of Sandia 

personnel at Livermore 1958, and tritium results for Sandia personnel at 

Livermore 1962.

05/18/2007 8

DOE Legacy Management - Grand Junction 

Office

A 1982 Fernald long range plan which mentions supplying depleted 

uranium to Sandia, 1952 Tonawanda area progress reports which mention 

radium sources being imported for Sandia, notes on early Middlesex 

Sampling Plant operations which mention Sandia, NIOSH interview notes, 

a 1990 decontamination and decommissioning monthly status report, and a 

1959 summary of fuel types and enrichments from various reactors. 

08/25/2011 9

DOE Legacy Management - Morgantown A 1988 DOE site summary of environmental, safety, and health needs and 

a report which documents the shipment of normal UO3 to Sandia.

05/24/2011 8

DOE Legacy Management - MoundView 

(Fernald Holdings, includes Fernald Legal 

Database)

Complex-wide waste management and effluent discharge reports, unusual 

occurrence reports, report of the DOE precious metals program, a 

metallographic examination of a milli-watt generator manufactured for 

Sandia, a report of a bioassay and analytical chemistry conference 

sponsored by Sandia, and a description of destructive tests Sandia 

performed on Galileo and Ulysses heat sources. 

02/02/2009 14

DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Sandia environmental monitoring reports, radioactive waste disposal 12/06/2007 6
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

73 of 79

Table A1-1: Summary of Holdings in the SRDB for Sandia National Laboratories

Data Capture Information Data Capture Description Completed Uploaded 

into SRDB

correspondence, descriptions of DOE mixed waste streams, and 

reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex.

DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory / 

LAHDRA

Process knowledge interview, 1949 progress reports, an environmental 

impact statement for storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile 

material, and guidelines for the disposal of contaminated personal property.

12/06/2007 6

DOE Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute Descriptions of analysis of thorotrast solutions at Sandia, correspondence 

and results, and Lovelace dosmetry services provided by Sandia. 

09/09/2008 2

DOE Nevada Test Site Shipping documents with smear results for radioactive materials shipments 

from Sandia to Nevada Test Site.

06/03/2009 12

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical 

Information (OSTI)

Surveys of irradiation facilities including the Sandia Pulsed Reactor and 

1993 DOE site maps and facilities listings. 

05/17/2007 5

DOE Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Film badge work sheets including visitors from Sandia. 01/25/2005 1

DOE Pantex Records transfer forms, report on Tweezer Operations, and a request from 

Sandia for Pantex to irradiate rocket motors.

12/31/2008 3

DOE Sandia National Laboratories / California Dosimetry results from 1965, 1970, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1997, a draft 

external dosimetry program manual, procedure for the assembly and testing 

of the rapid deployment test payload, positive exposure reports, and a 

procedure for the Co-60 Calibration Facility.

03/28/2007 25

DOE Sandia National Laboratories / SC&A The 1962 health physics study of the Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility, 1959 

and 1960 reports of environmental airborne radioactivity, and a health 

physics report for Operation Roller Coaster. 

03/28/2006 4

Dr. Henry Spitz The 1983 Pacific Northwest Laboratory performance comparison of 

personnel dosimetry systems.

08/17/2003 1

Federal Records Center (FRC) - Denver Finding of no significant environmental impact from heat source testing on 

the Sandia sled track, finding of no significant environmental impact from 

the new gamma irradiation facility, safe operating procedures for the 

Gamma Irradiation Facility, and a LANL request for Sandia to participate 

in an external dosimetry survey. 

06/15/2010 4

General Atomics Radioactive material shipments from Sandia to General Atomics and a 

radiation exposure report cover letter with limits and definitions.

11/02/2005 2

Interlibrary Loan Proceedings of a 1973 criticality safety short course. 11/30/2006 1

Interlibrary Loan / SC&A Environmental radioactivity levels at Sandia during 1971. 01/21/2010 1

Internet Environmental monitoring reports, an NRC information notice on accuracy 

of bioassay and environmental sample results, brief history of the site, 

11/16/2009 14
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

74 of 79

Table A1-1: Summary of Holdings in the SRDB for Sandia National Laboratories

Data Capture Information Data Capture Description Completed Uploaded 

into SRDB

report on the need to develop source term estimates for sabotaged spent 

fuel casks, and parameter and pathway analysis for residual contamination 

from decommissioning activities.

Internet - Defense Technical Information 

Center (DTIC)

A 1959 Sandia bibliography of radiation effects publications. 01/03/2012 1

Internet - DOE Analysis of experimental airborne release data from nonreactor facilities. 12/04/2008 1

Internet - DOE Comprehensive Epidemiologic 

Data Resource (CEDR)

No relevant data identified. 05/27/2010 0

Internet - DOE Hanford Declassified Document 

Retrieval System (DDRS)

No relevant data identified. 05/27/2010 0

Internet - DOE Legacy Management 

Considered Sites

Tonawanda area progress report that mentions radium sources imported for 

Sandia. NOTE: This document was added by Site Association Review. 

05/27/2010 1

Internet - DOE National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) - Nevada Site Office

No relevant data identified. 05/27/2010 0

Internet - DOE OpenNet Sandia monthly progress reports and R&D board minutes, a Z-Division 

report, descriptions of radiation and fusion research facilities, Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project, and history of the Nuclear Weapons 

Program. NOTE: 4 documents were added by Site Association Review. 

09/10/2010 18

Internet - DOE OSTI Environmental monitoring reports, environmental assessment for Technical 

Area IV, tritium in soils at the Technical Area III mixed waste landfill, and 

health physics programs for the HP-41CV calculator. 

11/30/2009 8

Internet - DOE OSTI / SC&A The production of specialty glass for Sandia at Pinellas. 03/02/2004 1

Internet - DOE OSTI Energy Citations A report on the characterization and segregation of legacy mixed waste, a 

citation for the characterization plan for the Sandia Livermore Tritium 

Research Laboratory, a report on contaminated concrete, a Pinellas report 

which documents plutonium shipments from Sandia, and a 1995 waste 

minimization and pollution prevention program report. NOTE: 4 

documents were added by Site Association Review. 

05/27/2010 5

DOE-OSTI Information Bridge Environmental reports, 1991 Tiger Team assessment, source 

characterizations, personal accident dosimetry, radioactive material 

package testing, site history, waste packaging reports, remediation of 

Technical Area II uranium calibration pits, ERDA radioisotope production 

and customer lists, transuranic and mixed waste reports, nuclear facility 

decommissioning reports, complex-wide reports on environmental dose 

11/18/2011 58
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

75 of 79

Table A1-1: Summary of Holdings in the SRDB for Sandia National Laboratories

Data Capture Information Data Capture Description Completed Uploaded 

into SRDB

models and personnel dosimetry, and a report on starting production of 

neutron generators. NOTE: 32 documents were added by Site Association 

Review. 

Internet - Google Environmental reports and planning, safety bases corrective actions, 

epidemiologic surveillance, site histories and descriptions, nuclear 

materials storage report, long term stewardship plan, Z-Division progress 

report, site capabilities descriptions, complex-wide reports on site clean-up, 

transuranic waste management and disposal, nuclear materials 

management, Congressional budget information on site clean-up costs, 

workforce transition report, clean-up standards, Sandia's WIPP waste 

stream profiles, and a neutron generator facility safety information 

document. NOTE: 47 documents were added by Site Association Review. 

11/12/2011 154

Internet - Health Physics Journal Behavior of plutonium aerosols, neutron dosimetry at the Sandia Pulsed 

Reactor and Potter's review of internal dosimetry.

09/28/2010 4

Internet - Journal of Occupational and 

Environmental Hygiene 

No relevant data identified. 09/27/2010 0

Internet - National Academies Press (NAP) A citation for The Nuclear Weapons Complex: Management for Health, 

Safety, and the Environment.

05/27/2010 1

Internet - National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH)

The petition evaluation report for Petition SEC-00162 Sandia. 09/29/2011 1

Internet - NRC Agencywide Document Access 

and Management (ADAMS)

The 1991 and 1992 U.S. spent fuel and radioactive waste inventories, 

projections, and characteristics, environmental impacts of highly enriched 

uranium disposition and stockpile stewardship, reviews of shipping casks, 

and management of radioactive sources at Sandia. NOTE: 9 documents 

were added by Site Association Review. 

10/29/2011 20

Internet - USACE/FUSRAP No relevant data identified. 05/27/2010 0

Internet - Washington State University (U.S. 

Transuranium and Uranium Registries)

No relevant data identified. 05/27/2010 0

Iron Mountain Operating manual for the Jordan Radector. 09/12/2006 1

Missouri Department of Natural Resources A draft environmental impact statement on stockpile stewardship and 

plutonium working group reports.

10/01/2008 3

Mound Museum Milli-watt generator and heat sources proposals submitted to Sandia, 1959-

1964 plutonium shipments, plans for Sandia to test Apollo Thermal Energy 

Application assemblies, Mound newsletter articles regarding items

05/18/2010 17
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

76 of 79

Table A1-1: Summary of Holdings in the SRDB for Sandia National Laboratories

Data Capture Information Data Capture Description Completed Uploaded 

into SRDB

designed by Sandia and produced at Mound, and Mound newsletter articles 

that mention Sandia.

NARA / SC&A Radiation doses received by Sandia personnel at Pinellas, neutron source 

information, neutron source shipments to Sandia, tritium stack releases, and 

a research proposal for the dissolution of metal tritides in biological 

systems. 

06/10/2004 7

National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA) - Atlanta

Radiation doses received by Sandia personnel at Pinellas, 1989 radioactive 

material shipments, controlatron/zetatron contamination surveys, shipping 

surveys of a contaminated accelerator, a truck contamination survey, 

directories of AEC consultants, and a research proposal for the dissolution 

of metal tritides in biological systems. 

07/01/2006 16

National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA) - College Park

Researcher notes documenting the presence of Sandia correspondence in 

the Oak Ridge Series 6 collection and a listing of box contents.

07/26/2010 3

National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health (NIOSH)

Worker outreach meeting sign-in sheets, minutes, correspondence, and 

emails, SC&A data capture plan with associated emails, and Sandia records 

retention and disposal schedules.

03/22/2011 26

NIOSH / SC&A Working group reports on highly enriched uranium. 02/16/2006 3

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public 

Document Room (NRC PDR) 

Neutron pulsed generator reports, and a report on the dissociation of cesium 

iodide in radiation fields.

09/02/2011 3

Oak Ridge Library for Dose Reconstruction Manhattan Project history and an Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) 

report which notes the similarities between the ORNL Health Physics 

Research Reactor and the Sandia Pulsed Reactor.

04/01/2011 2

ORAU Team Radiation exposure reports 1977-1986, 2005 data capture notes, a Project 

spreadsheet, Project analyses of dose results and neutron/photon ratios, site 

profile and technical basis documents, external coworker dosimetry 

technical information bulletin, a neutron/photon spreadsheet, process 

knowledge expert documented communications, notes on records box 

contents, and the DOE adoption of 1990 ICRP recommendations on 

neutron weighting factors. 

01/05/2012 36

RETN, Inc. Correspondence with Sandia personnel and process knowledge expert 

regarding internal dosimetry issues.

03/10/2008 6

SAIC Radiation exposure summaries for 1960, 1961, 1964, 1972, and 1973. 09/02/2004 5

S. Cohen & Associates (SC&A) Tritide studies, tritium studies, DOELAP reports, urinalysis 

intercomparison, environmental radiation dosimetry reports, dosimetry 

03/31/2010 48
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

77 of 79

Table A1-1: Summary of Holdings in the SRDB for Sandia National Laboratories

Data Capture Information Data Capture Description Completed Uploaded 

into SRDB

blind audit results, internal dosimetry TBD, records information and 

reports, 1997 ESH report, 1994 incident data sheet, and neutron response 

testing of Harshaw Model 8801 TLD.

SC&A / Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Idaho National Laboratory inventory statements including Sandia material. 06/24/2010 9

SC&A / NARA - Atlanta A Pinellas report which includes the results of Sandia's testing of RTG 

shipping containers.

08/09/2004 1

SC&A / NIOSH A highly enriched uranium working group report, a plutonium working 

group report, and a Pantex ES&H progress assessment which details 

Sandia's participation at Pantex.

06/01/2001 3

SC&A / Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) A trip report to a tritium symposium. 06/24/2010 1

Southern Illinois University AEC construction cost differentials report and a description of the AEC 

cryptographic telecommunications network.

10/16/2008 2

University of Colorado - Norlin Library Environmental monitoring plans and report, characterization of low-level 

waste, a study of increasing the film badge exchange interval, Sandia 

performance indicators, and a 1977 ERDA workshop on neutron dosimetry.

04/18/2006 9

University of Rochester - Miner Library Dose estimates from the accidental exposure at the Van De Graaff Facility. 10/14/2008 1

University of Tennessee Library Stannard 

Papers

Report of the Operation Plumbbob field release of plutonium aerosols. 03/15/2010 1

Unknown Environmental monitoring reports, history of Technical Area II, Operations 

Grommet and Toggle radiological safety reports, Linking Legacies excerpt, 

Operation Gumdrop re-entry instructions, and beryllium reports.

01/25/2006 34

Total 2,632

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Sandia National Laboratories

Database/Source Keywords Hits Uploaded 

into SRDB

NOTE: Database search terms employed for each of the databases listed below are available

in the Excel file called “Copy of Sandia NM Data Capture Rev 02 01-19-12.”

DOE CEDR

http://cedr.lbl.gov/ See Note above 4 0
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

78 of 79

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Sandia National Laboratories

Database/Source Keywords Hits Uploaded 

into SRDB

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

DOE Hanford DDRS

http://www2.hanford.gov/declass/

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 38 0

DOE Legacy Management Considered Sites

http://csd.lm.doe.gov/

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 0 0

DOE OpenNet

http://www.osti.gov/opennet/advancedsearch.jsp

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 113 14

DOE OSTI Energy Citations

http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 1,121 1

DOE OSTI Information Bridge

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/advancedsearch.jsp

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 2,393 26

Google

http://www.google.com

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 2,787,919 107

HP Journal

http://journals.lww.com/healthphysics/pages/default.aspx

COMPLETED 09/28/2010

See Note above

146 4

Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 

http://www.ijoeh.com/index.php/ijoeh

COMPLETED 09/27/2010

See Note above

0 0

National Academies Press

http://www.nap.edu/

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above

2,229 1

NNSA - Nevada Site Office

www.nv.doe.gov/main/search.htm

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 0 0

NRC ADAMS Reading Room

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/webbased.htmlSee Note above 4,267 11
 Sandia National LaboratoriesSEC-00188 02-21-2012 Albuquerque 

79 of 79

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Sandia National Laboratories

Database/Source Keywords Hits Uploaded 

into SRDB

COMPLETED 10/17/2011

USACE/FUSRAP

http://www.lrb.usace.army.mil/fusrap/

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 0 0

U.S. Transuranium & Uranium Registries 

http://www.ustur.wsu.edu/

COMPLETED 05/27/2010

See Note above 0 0

Table A1-3: OSTI Documents Requested

Document Number Document Title Requested Date Received Date

SAND96-2152C

REF ID 89687

Thar's Gold in Them Thar Notebooks: Benefits of 

Laboratory Notebooks in the Government Archive

10/25/2010 10/26/2010

RHO-HS-ST-5

REF ID 77087

Seven Health Physics Calculator Programs for the HP41CV, 198408/18/2009 11/30/2009

SAND-78-0620

REF ID 77102

Environmental Monitoring Report, Sandia Laboratories, 

1977, Health Physics Division 3312 dated 1978

08/18/2009 10/08/2009

SAND-81-0566

REF ID 77091

1980 Environmental Monitoring Report, Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Environmental 

Health Department 3310, April 1981

08/18/2009 10/08/2009

SAND-83-0789

REF ID 77089

1982 Environmental Monitoring Report, Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Environmental 

Health Department 3310, April 1983

08/18/2009 10/08/2009

SAND-84-0429

REF ID 77100

1983 Environmental Monitoring Report, Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Environmental 

Health Department 3310, April 1984

08/18/2009 10/08/2009