NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 1 of 10 10/27/2005 

Meeting Date: 

April 6, 2005 

Meeting with: 

PACE Local 5-288 and International Union 

Attendees: 

Floyd Oliver PACE Local 5-288 

Tom Moser PACE Local 5-288 

John Steward PACE Local 5-288 

Dennis Pennington PACE Local 5-288 

Wesley Howard PACE Local 5-288 

Ben Gaylor Retired 

Bruce Lawson PACE Local 5-288 

Herman Potter PACE International 

NIOSH and ORAU Team Representatives: 

LaVon Rutherford – National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Office of 

Compensation Analysis and Support (OCAS) 

Richard “Dick” Toohey – Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) 

William “Bill” Murray – ORAU 

Melissa Fish – ORAU 

Vernon McDougall – Advanced Technologies & Laboratories International, Inc. (ATL) 

Mark Lewis – ATL 

Jay Maisler – Integrated Environmental Management, Inc. 

Proceedings 

Note: The ORAU Team attempted to record this meeting. However, there was a problem 

with the audio recorder, and we were not able to record the entire meeting. These minutes 

were compiled to the best of our ability from the notes of people who attended the meeting. 

Mark Lewis opened the meeting at 10:00 a.m. He introduced himself, explained his role in the 

worker outreach efforts, and thanked everyone for attending the meeting. Mr. Lewis emphasized 

the need for labor input into the EEOICPA process. The other participants then introduced 

themselves and provided a brief background of their work history. 

Mr. Lewis stated that an audio recorder was being used to help accurately capture the concerns 

and issues that were voiced at the meeting, but that comments would not be attributed to 

individuals by name. 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 2 of 10 10/27/2005 

LaVon Rutherford stated that NIOSH is seeking worker input to make the K-25 Site Profile as 

complete and accurate as possible. 

Bill Murray indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Oak Ridge Gaseous 

Diffusion Plant (K-25) Site Profile, to describe how the K-25 Site Profile will be used, to 

document the concerns and issues raised by the workers, and to answer any questions that people 

might have. Mr. Murray emphasized that the most important aspect of the meeting is getting 

worker suggestions and information that will improve the K-25 Site Profile. 

Mr. Murray told the group that the K-25 Site Profile team was established in January 2004 and 

led by Jay Maisler. The K-25 Site Profile has been through a thorough review process and has 

been approved by NIOSH. It can be viewed on the NIOSH website: 

www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocastbds.html#k25. 

Mr. Murray explained that the site profiles include five sections: Site Description, External 

Dosimetry, Internal Dosimetry, Occupational Environmental Dose (primarily for workers not in 

a dosimetry program), and Occupational Medical Dose (for both monitored workers and 

unmonitored workers). Mr. Murray added that by including the environmental dose and the 

medical dose, the dose reconstructions are claimant favorable. 

The Site Description section of the K-25 Site Profile provides an overview of the facilities and 

activities at K-25 from 1945 to 1987. It documents the radioactive materials and radiation 

sources at K-25 and identifies potential sources of radiation exposures at the site. It specifically 

includes information about the uranium enrichment process, radioactive material storage 

facilities and waste handling, the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation project, and the 

specific radionuclides at the site (uranium-234, 235, and 238; americium-241; neptunium-237; 

plutonium-238, 239/240; and technetium-99). 

The External Dosimetry section includes information regarding sources of exposure, methods 

and practices used by the dosimetry program, whether or not adjustments to recorded doses were 

made, and minimum detectable levels. Mr. Murray pointed out that the minimum detectable 

levels are important because they indicate the minimum sensitivity of a dosimeter. If a worker 

has zeros recorded in their dose records, often a portion of the minimum detectable level will be 

added as missed dose. This is one way that NIOSH makes the dose reconstruction claimantfavorable. The K-25 External Dosimetry section includes information regarding the beta and 

photon dosimeter technology used from 1945 to 1988 and the neutron dosimeter technology used 

from 1951 to 1988. Also included are the documented calibration procedures, badge exchange 

frequency, workplace radiation fields, and the workers’ locations around the radiation sources. 

The Internal Dosimetry section includes information on the methods and practices used at the 

site, the sources of exposure, the minimum detectable activity for whole body counting and 

urinalysis, and reporting levels. Mr. Murray added that the minimum detectable activity for 

internal exposure is used in the same way that the minimum detectable level is used for external 

exposure. At K-25 the Bioassay program started in 1945. Urine was tested for uranium. 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 3 of 10 10/27/2005 

Radioactive materials inside the body were measured using a lung counter in 1958 and from 

1965-1995 and using a whole body counter from 1960-1980. 

Mr. Murray said that people who were not in the monitoring program could still have been 

exposed to radiation at the site due to radioactive materials in the air, radiation sources in the 

buildings, and radioactive materials in the work environment, e.g., cylinder yards, storage areas, 

and waste pits. Site-wide monitoring data are used to determine the environmental external dose 

for unmonitored workers. Based primarily on dosimeter readings around the K-25 site, the 

average annual exposure rates were 0.0074 to 0.0105 mR/h. The annual exposure rates are used 

to assign environmental external dose to the workers. The same is true for environmental 

internal dose: The annual intake of radioactive material is calculated from the average annual air 

concentration. The primary radionuclides at K-25 are uranium-234, 235, and 238, neptunium237, technetium-99, and plutonium-238, 239/240. In assigning these environmental doses to the 

reconstructed dose, NIOSH is being claimant-favorable. 

Mr. Murray explained that NIOSH also adds in medical radiation dose from employer-required x 

rays. When calculating the medical dose, the frequency of employer-required x rays is 

considered as well as the type of x-ray equipment and techniques that were used. The x-ray 

equipment changed over time, and older equipment gave off more x-ray radiation which resulted 

in higher worker doses. 

In conclusion, Mr. Murray said that developing a site profile is an important task and that the site 

profiles can be changed based on worker input. He provided a few examples of site profile 

documents that have changed based on worker input (Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, Hanford, 

Savannah River, and the Internal Dose section of Y-12). Comments on the site profiles should 

be sent directly to NIOSH. Mr. Murray provided the mailing address, email address, and fax 

number for NIOSH. 

Discussion Session

Comment: 

Why didn’t you have someone who worked at K-25 help write the K-25 Site Profile? 

Bill Murray: 

Having someone work as an author on a site profile when they are directly connected to the 

site would be a conflict of interest, and ORAU has a Conflict of Interest Policy in place 

which prevents this. 

Comment/Question: 

Workers should have more input into the K-25 Site Profile. How many workers were 

consulted when preparing the first draft of the K-25 Site profile? Why weren’t the workers 

contacted when NIOSH began working on the K-25 Site Profile? How could you get data 

without talking to the workers? 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 4 of 10 10/27/2005 

Bill Murray: 

The Worker Outreach program did not start until a year ago, after some of the site profiles 

had been started. Because of this we have taken a multi-phased approach. For the sites 

where work on a site profile has started, we are scheduling rollout meetings. For the sites 

where a site profile has not been started, we are going to those sites and asking for input at 

the beginning of the process. For sites that do have a completed site profile, the revision 

process is always in place. The NIOSH/ORAU team can always return to talk to workers 

and former workers, and make revisions to the site profiles as needed. There are numerous 

sites that we are trying to get input from, and we are playing catch up with this process. 

Jay Maisler: 

As to where we got the data, the NIOSH/ORAU team had minimal information available to 

us because we did not have access to the K-25 vault. As a result, we had to rely on the 

reports that were made available, in addition to information from the Portsmouth and 

Paducah Sites. We used the limited data that were available to put together the best 

document that we could. This is why the worker input is crucial. Worker information can 

help us improve the K-25 Site Profile. However, it is important to understand that we did use 

claimant-favorable assumptions when data was not available. 

Comment: 

Using data from Portsmouth and Paducah to write the K-25 Site Profile is not appropriate. 

There are huge differences in the percentages of enrichment. It is also important to 

remember that K-25 was more experimental than Paducah and Portsmouth. 

Comment: 

I remember traps and converters starting on fire. Men died in their 40s and 50s due to 

exposures working at K-25. 

Comment: 

There were secret military operations at K-25. It cannot be classified only as an enrichment 

facility. 

Comment: 

The Uranium Mass Balance Report only considered production/process buildings. 

Question: 

What was the delay in getting the vault open? 

Dick Toohey: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) needed to recognize security 

clearances. 

Comment: 

I can’t see the security problem or the time delay. 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 5 of 10 10/27/2005 

Dick Toohey: 

The data capture process requires that security cleared people go into the vault. Once inside, 

the people doing the data capture literally page through boxes of material that must be 

reviewed. Just getting into the K-25 vault caused a huge delay. 

Jay Maisler: 

Getting into K-25 has taken months. At first we were told that we had to be escorted; from 

there the story progressed. We have finally removed the barriers to gaining access to K-25 

documents. 

Comment: 

The J Lab Facility had a Plutonium Program which processed plutonium. 

Comment/Question: 

We know that there were specific operations occurring throughout the gaseous diffusion 

plants (K-25, Paducah, and Portsmouth) that would be useful to the dose reconstructors. 

Some areas had different ratios. If you get this type of information and it is verified, will the 

site profiles change to reflect the new information? 

Bill Murray: 

Yes. 

Comment: 

Transuranics plate out in various stages of the cascade. The Operational Report from 

Portsmouth only checked for UF6, not for solids. There would be different transuranics 

depending on where you are cutting into the system. Different ratios affect exposures 

Comment: 

Workers are very concerned that NIOSH is only looking at data that are being provided 

directly to them. We have heard countless stories about workers who were removed from a 

job because their badge readings were so high. However, when these same workers got their 

badge reading reports back, they had zeros. In addition to the false zeros, many workers 

cannot locate their medical records. This all seems like a cover-up. 

Question: 

Have any correlations been made between urinalysis and air samples? 

Dick Toohey: 

Validation of urinalysis data is something that is on our list to do. Validation of urinalysis 

data varies widely site-by-site. Trying to figure out which air sample goes with which urine 

sample is difficult. We could do a broad brush approach, but that does not tell us much. The 

NIOSH/ORAU team is also trying to develop a job exposure matrix, but we are currently 

struggling with how to index different job titles. 

Comment/Question: 

I am an operator and I go into different areas of the K-25 site. There is no sample data for the 

last seven years. How do I know what is happening to me? 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 6 of 10 10/27/2005 

Dick Toohey: 

If the exposures are chronic, the radioactive material will build up in your body. Without 

samples, there is a problem. 

Jay Maisler: 

DOE requirements regarding who should be in a dosimetry program have changed over time. 

Comment: 

 I worked 20 years before we started participating in urinalysis programs. One co-worker of 

mine, who worked in Building 1131 at K-25, had a badge with such a high reading that they 

recorded his badge results as a zero. They accused him of sticking his badge in a bucket of 

uranium fluoride—he did not do that. 

Comment: 

Some of the greatest minds put K-25 together. Some of those minds have admitted that they 

know people were overexposed to radiation due to the Monday morning cascade ‘burp’ and 

the near-criticalities. They acknowledge that they are alive because, unlike most workers, 

they knew how to protect themselves. 

Question: 

Regarding external dosimetry, has there been any validation between personal 

thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) badges and area monitoring badges? 

Jay Maisler: 

There is an absence of area monitoring from previous years. 

Dick Toohey: 

Assume that a worker who has had consistent TLD readings that follow an upward trend on a 

graph suddenly has readings that are low. In most cases, the dose reconstructors are 

instructed to assume that those lower dosimeter readings are not correct. They will extend 

the line on the graph. This results in the worker being assigned a higher dose than indicated 

in their personal dosimeter records. We are also in the process of analyzing co-worker data. 

This means that we are trying to apply co-worker monitoring data to claimants who do not 

have monitoring data available. 

Comment: 

Documented calibration procedures, instrument types, and monitoring frequencies for the K25 site would help out with the dose reconstruction calculations. 

Comment: 

Getting a logbook that a shift Superintendent kept would be very helpful. However, many of 

the logbooks are contaminated. The Union Carbide logbooks would be accurate but the 

logbooks belonging to Lockheed Martin have been sanitized. 

Dick Toohey: 

We looked at logbooks for Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 7 of 10 10/27/2005 

Comment: 

It is important to remember that DOE told its contractors that they did not want to know 

about any exposure problems. 

Question: 

Have you seen any procedures regarding the TLDs for K-25? 

Jay Maisler: 

We have not seen any. 

Question: 

Page 5, Section 2.2—References “characterization studies to date,” what are these 

characterization studies? 

Jay Maisler: 

I will follow up on that and see what was referenced. 

Question: 

On page 6, Activity Ratios—are those from the Recycled Uranium Report? 

Jay Maisler: 

 I believe that is where we got the information. 

Comment: 

Page 7, Section 2.2.2—References “characterization studies.” I think that you are 

referencing one survey and basing all of your information on that one survey. Please find out 

if this is the case. 

Comment: 

The External Dose section of the K-25 Site Profile does not mention slow cooker effects. 

Question: 

Was everyone monitored at K-25? 

Jay Maisler: 

 I do not know the overall quantity and quality of monitoring data for K-25 but I can find out. 

Comment: 

Many K-25 workers do not trust any of the records (whole body or dosimeter). TLD badge 

practices varied and some badge readings were deleted. For example, there was a worker 

who worked in one of the hottest places in K-25. Eventually he was pulled out of his specific 

job and was not allowed to work around radiation for the rest of his life. 

Comment: 

K-25 did not seem to care how radioactive materials were handled or transported. 

Comment: 

There was a Deposit Removal Project that took place at K-25 in which highly enriched 

uranium deposits were removed. I am not sure if this is noted in the K-25 Site Profile or not. 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 8 of 10 10/27/2005 

Comment: 

NCS documents as well as other references could provide another source of validation for 

K-25 data. 

Comment: 

Building 1401 had a compressor shop and a converter maintenance shop. The southwest 

corner had ovens that recovered highly enriched uranium from converters. I believe that 

Building 1401 had to contain transuranics. I checked vent stack information and found out 

that 58 pounds of uranium-containing material were removed from one vent stack in a single 

24- hour period. 

Comment: 

Building 1000 performed barrier experiments and tests that we can’t talk about here because 

part of the process is still in use. 

Dick Toohey: 

We can arrange for a classified interview. 

Comment: 

After dark, the incinerator in Building 1421 was used to burn anything and everything (rags, 

clean up materials from spills). 

Comment: 

Building 1405 was a High Temperature Laboratory and I have been told that lots of highly 

enriched uranium was used in that building. 

Comment: 

The 131 Pipe Shop Maintenance building rebuilt parts. Parts were robbed from the K-25 

building itself and used throughout the plant and then machined in Building 1401. 

Comment: 

Building 631 was the “Test Loop” Tails Withdraw Facility. 

Comment: 

The sanitary water system was crossed with the fire water system resulting in the sanitary 

water containing strontium and cesium. 

Comment: 

There was beryllium all over K-25. 

Comment: 

K-25 management lied when they said that there was no cyanide in the plant because they 

actually had permits to burn it. 

Comment: 

The K-25 Site Profile does not discuss vaults. We had hot vaults at K-25. 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 9 of 10 10/27/2005 

Question: 

Section 6.5.3—Are there any other data sources available regarding neutron exposure before 

1989? Has there been any attempt to correlate information? 

Jay Maisler: 

No correlation has been made due to lack of records. 

Comment: 

Paducah was in denial about neutron exposures. 

Comment: 

DOE will only admit what you can prove. 

Jay Maisler: 

Did anyone keep individual logbooks of where you were working? 

Answer: 

No. 

Comment: 

The RaLa operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory resulted in radioactive iodine being 

sprayed and the wind carrying the iodine to other places, likely to K-25. 

Comment: 

The Blair Gate/Gallaher Gate Monitoring Stations kicked on once a week for 24 hours. This 

could have been done on Sunday when there would have been less to monitor. 

Comment: 

A word of caution regarding using environmental data for validating – the environmental 

badges did not pick up neutron exposures because there was no phantom in place, so no 

whole body dose could be measured. Neutron monitoring was not being done as properly as 

it should have been. 

Comment: 

Workers question whether instruments were calibrated correctly, so please check into the 

procedures used, especially for cesium-137. 

Comment: 

Section 6.5, Page 13—approaches for estimating missed dose. What source document did 

you use for Tables 6.4 and 6.5? Has this been validated against source records? 

Jay Maisler: 

I will check. I do not see a reference listed for that. 

Comment: 

Five of my working partners and I all had prostate cancer. I understand that if you are a male 

and you live long enough, you will develop prostate cancer. However, there are huge 

numbers of men with prostate cancer at K-25 who are in their 40s and 50s. This cannot be a 

coincidence and it is likely related to the chemical and radiation combination. DOE has 

killed. 
NIOSH Dose Reconstruction 

Project Meeting 

On K-25 Site Profile 

Final Minutes 10 of 10 10/27/2005 

Comment: 

Many men who worked with the centrifuge process developed bladder cancer. Also, the 

centrifuge process will be starting again. 

Comment: 

The bladder cancer survey was not accurate for the people who worked at K-25. Person after 

person has said that they worked in the centrifuge process and that they have bladder cancer. 

The data from the survey are skewed. 

Dick Toohey: 

Remember that bladder cancer is part of the Special Exposure Cohort. 

Comment: 

Yes, but it all goes back to the validity of surveys; and what is found at this site will be 

applied to sites that are not Special Exposure Cohort sites. 

Comment: 

There were a lot of system breaks with the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 

Incinerator. For example, one employee was told that the system was depressurized when it 

was not. Another employee was never told that he was in contact with transuranics until 

after his exposure. 

Comment: 

A classification officer at DOE asked me what was being burned in the incinerator but was 

not on the log. DOE should know. Why would he ask me that? 

Comment: 

Remember that time is not on your side for this site. The plant is closing down. Also, many 

of the workers are dead or will be dead soon. 

Dick Toohey: 

Our first priority is clearing out the backlog of claims. 

Comment: 

We will be submitting all of our comments in writing to NIOSH. 

Mark Lewis concluded the meeting at 11:30 a.m. and thanked everyone for a productive 

meeting.