have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with

cancer . .

The summary continues, “Appendices A-1 and B-1 provide synopses of the findings for
the 159 facilities that were evaluated as required by NDAA: Appendix A-1 applies to 94
facilities evaluated for residual radioactive contamination while Appendix B-| applies to
65 facilities evaluated for residual beryllium contamination.”. Mathieson Chemical
Company is listed under Appendix A-1 Residual Radioactive Contamination -Summary
of All Sites. Please note that the above-mentioned “synopsis” of work was performed
during periods which DOE “believes, based on current information” concerns “known
facts about the time and conditions of weapons-related processing at each facility”. I am
of the opinion that, based on the significance of this information, this should be more
than a “synopsis”. A comprehensive review or a condensed statement of unconfirmed
beliefs is, I believe, not sufficient. 1 repeat, the “current information” concerning “known
facts” which is used in this determination is only information given by officials of
Mathieson Chemical Company, which was a company known to have kept significant
information secret for decades and thereby intentionally perpetuated the deception which
began when uranium was placed in the worksite and employees were put in harms way.
These “known facts” are only pieces of information which Mathieson officials wanted
known and provided in order to protect their deceptive purposes. These are not “known
facts”. No records were kept. Too many employees have died of cancer and too much
harmful radioactive waste material still exists in that 240 acre pile of waste products for
this deception to not be taken seriously

To continue, Section III. Residual Radioactive Contamination Evaluation (Page 3397)
states in part: “In all cases, the individual site finding is based on the available
information. The finding on any single site was based on the quantity and completeness
of the information available regarding that site and professional judgment as necessary
In this evaluation of residual contamination, as in the previous report, the following
factors were considered: (1) The radionuclides involved; (2) The quantity of radioactive
material processed; (3) The physical form of the radioactive material processed (i.e.,
solid, liquid, or gas); (4) The operations performed and their potential for
radiation/radioactivity exposure; (5) Documented radiological control and monitoring
programs that were in place during operations; and (6) Documented decontamination of
facilities.” Sadly, none of this information is available, and could not possibly have been
considered. Documentation (in letters, reports and surveys, including correspondence to
and from Mathieson Chemical Company officials) confirms this. Please see Exhibits
with attachments which I am herein submitting for confirmation of this. Also, regarding
“Findings of evaluation of Facilities for Residual Radioactive Contamination” states in
part, “The results of this study indicate that there are atomic weapons employer facilities
for which the potential for significant residual radiological contamination exists outside
of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred as listed on the DOE ES&H
website. Appendix A-| lists the findings for the potential for significant residual
tadioactive contamination at the 94 facilities required for evaluation by NDAA.”. (See
Appendix A-1, page 8 of 13, attached.)

tf


Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 16/Thursday, January 25, 2007/Notices

3397

upon DOE's findings as well as
information from claimants and other
sources.

This study consisted primarily of an
evaluation of documents pertaining to
AWEs. These include documents
compiled by DOE ES&H, documents
obtained through NIOSH data capture
efforts, and documents located on the
Formerly Utilized Sites Remediation
Action Program (FUSRAP) and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers Web sites. The
quantily and quality of the information
available for each site varied
significantly. Examples of
documentation reviewed include
radiological surveys, descriptions of
production operations, contractual
agreements, and interoffice
correspondence. In addition, interviews
with current and past employees of
these facilities were conducted to obtain
information not contained in available
documentation. When such interviews
were used in the facility evaluation,
they are listed in the individual site
descriptions in Appendix B-3.

NIOSH believes that contamination
levels at designated facilities in excess
of those indicatad in 10 CFR part 835,
Appendix D (Occupational Radiation
Protection, Surface Contamination
Values) indicate that there is
“significant contamination” remaining
in those facilities. Docnmentation for
cach facility was reviewed, as available,
lo determine if there was an indication
that residual radioactive contamination
was present outside of the periods in
which weapons-related production
occurred. Those levels then were
compared to current radiation
protection limits as listed in 10 CFR part
835, to determine if there was
“significant contamination.” If there
was no documentation or limited
documentation on radiation levels at
specified facilities, NIOSH made a
professional judgment regarding the
residua) contamination. If NIOSH
determined there was “tba potential for
significant contamination” at a
designated facility, then NIOSH
determined. pursuant to NDAA, that
such contamination “could have caused
or substantially contributed to the
cancer of a covered employee with
cancer.”

In the case of beryllium.
contamination, if there was no evidence
that the beryllium areas had been
decontaminated, it was determined thal
this material could have caused or
substantially contributed to the
beryllium illness of an omployee.
Because beryllium sensitization can
occur at very low levels of exposure, the
level of residual beryllium

contamination remaining was not
included in the determination.

Because the investigation involved
evaluating potential radioactive
contamination and beryllium
contamination, the study was divided so
thal the required expertise could he
devoted to the radiological facilities and
the beryllium facilities. Appendices A-
1 and B-1 provide synopses of the
findings for the 159 facilities that were
evaluated as required by NDAA:
Appendix A-1 applies to 94 facilities
evaluated for residual radioactive
contamination while Appendix B-1
applies to 65 facilities evaluated for
residual beryllium contamination.

Some of the periods in which
woapons-related production occurred
have been changed on the DOE ES&H
Web sile since the June 2004 report.
Appendices A-2 and B-2 provide the
current descriptions and evaluations for
al] AWE and Beryllium Vendor
facilities, respectively. Appendices A-3
and B-3 provide descriptious of each
facility, the data reviewed as a part of
this evaluation, and the final findings.

Periods of Residual Contaminotion

The evaluations focused on
determining whether the potential for
significant residual contamination
existed outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occnrred.
In many cases, no records of
decontamination were found or surveys
performed outside of the period in
which weapons-related production.
occurred indicated the existence of
significant residual contamination.
However, some of the documentation
provided dates of decontamination,
dates of demolition of the facility, or
descriptions of the radiological controls
in place during operations. For sites that
exhibited a potential for significant
residual radioactive contamination
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred,
and for which an indication of a more
accurate period was available, this time
period was provided. For sites that
exhibited a potential for significant
residual radioactive contamination
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred,
and for which an indication of a more
accnrate period was not available, it was
assumed that significant residual
contamination existed until the time
which the facility was demolished or
until the present, defined as July 2006,
when this report was written.

Some sites performed work with
radioactive material and/or beryllium
for commercial purposes, in addition to
work for the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC)/DOE. Whon it was

impossible to distinguish residnal
contamination resulting from AEC/DOE
activities from those resulting from
commercial purposes, it was assumed
that the contamination was attributable
to weapons-related activities.

IIL. Residual Radioactive
Contamination Evaluation

This study consisted primarily of an
ovaluation of documents pertaining to
AWEs. These include documents
compiled by DOE £S&H, documents
ohtained through data capture efforts of
NIOSH, and documents located on the
FUSRAP and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Web sites. In all cases, the
individual site finding is based on the
available information. The finding ov
any single site was based on the
quantity and completeness of the
information available regarding that site
and professional judgment as necessary.

In this evaluation of residual
radioactive contamination, as in the
previous report, the following factors
were considered:

{1) The radionuclides involved;

(2) The quantity of radioactive
material processed;

(3) The physical form of the
radioactive material processed (i.e.,
solid, liquid, or gas);

(4) The operations performed and
their potential for radiation/
radioactivity exposure;

(5) Documented radiological control
and monitoriag programs Lhal were in
place dnring operations; and

(6) Documented decontamination of
facilities

These factors were used to estimate
the potential for radiation exposure both
during operations and after production/
processing had ceased. For oxample, a
facility for which a decontamination
survey was documented was classified
as having little potential for residual
radioactive contamination after the
decontamination date, while a facility
with a high potential for residual
radioactive contamination during
operations and no documented
decontamination data was classified as
having a potential for residual
contamination after operations had
ceased.

Each site was assigned to one of two
categories:

1. Documentatian reviewed indicates
there is little potential far significant
residual contamination outside the
period in which weapons-related
production accurred.

A site was assigned to this category if
the documentation available for (be
facility indicated one or more of the
following characteristics:

1b


[3

Z861-ES61 UOREIPEH
IN iN 2961-€961 ‘sisixg lenuelod | fenpisey 'zo6 1-61 Zg61-yy6) WN | e6puquied {diog yoIeOs8y |EUONEN,
(uoneipewer) 2861] (uonelpetuel)
BOG '9861-2965 2961 30
uoueipen lenpiseu|:,e61-2561 voneIpey
YIN YIN 9861-2961 ‘S1SPX3 feHUB}Od {LS61-Zp61 SAAY| fenDISEM *1S6}-2r6) | I o6ea149) Arowly pieng leuoneNn
VIN VIN VIN Tenueiog om owes 2961-9961 a OBe1D] _Aisnpul pue eous!9g jo winasny
S61 voneIpeN
VIN 7 og6t SISK (eNUO}Og | lenPISeY ‘6r6L-Ey6L Br6l-ErEb HO. uoxea 109 [eoWeYD oWwesUoHy
0961-2561 vonEIpeY
VIN Tenuaiod en 0961-2961 SISK IenueIog | lenpisay ‘9961 9961 09 IavOW F SHIN,
VIN VIN 70 USI ORI Sues ob) “0D 1881S [EYOUM
WIN VIN VIN [enue OT ‘ewes vreL Bingsareo) OD SUUMIDEINUEY ISSMDIN
9861)
‘y861 30d 's86}| 996! ‘y86l 30a
‘861-1961 uone|pey|:ae6}-196) uoneIpeY
vIn vIn 9861 ‘6961 — 196} _| sisx<3 jenusiog | renprsey ‘o961-ey6L | renpISeY ‘O961-Bh61 |_ FN XeSeIPPIN, upuey fedioiun xesaIpPIN,
9002;
Ainr-9961 voneipey
2661-8961 VIN quasesd-g961 SIsXg fenveiod | IeNpIseY:J961-ZS61| 4961-2561 VN Suogarny| ‘diog sjo,1U0D pue SION,
(uoneipewes) 286)
996}-y861| ‘e861-ze61 30d
‘1861-961 ‘PeU|‘e961-EG61 UoNEIPEY (o8e149 Jo Ayssenun Woy
2861-2461 WIN QB6i-PA6) ‘86L-ES61 | SISK JeAUEIOd “sey ‘9p61-Zh6s| IenpseN ‘Zs6L-Zr6t | “I oBeo14o} _paBueyo eweN) G27 lea\GunIHeW
9002]
Ainp-€96} voneipey
qwoseud-e96) vIN quaseid-eo6} siswa jenueiod | lenpisey ‘zo64-1961| __ZS61-1S61 OW #1007 1S, “09 uepeW|
Le6I-SrE! vONEIDeY a)
YIN VIN 1961-761 S393 [NUD lenpised ‘prél eel HO_|__‘pueiensio| _Suumoejnueyy pue joo) Aouuniow
9002
Ainr-1¢64 UoneIPey,
VIN YIN quasesd-1 961. SISK ENUOIOd | IENPISER ‘0G61-Z6L OS6L-2b61 tN Boomsey SYJOM\ IeoIWeYD pooMKe/
qeseud-pS61 SISIxZ [PRUE VIN TenUaIOg OMT ewes ES6L-LS61 XL Buepesed OE [eORWeYD UOSSINEW,
ABojouyseL
YIN VIN VIN (equated a1 QPEL-ZrEL BMV] __—€961-Zb61 wn | e6pyqweo Jo eymysuy sasnyoesseW,
896) UOREIDEN
VIN VIN ec6L SiS [eNUeIOd | IeNPISeH ‘266 L-bS61 2961-p96) HO. AEUUIOUID| ‘og sseig snubew
| uOpenT WEI IOD SBUPUTT TOEUTMIEHOD ‘SBOIPUTT SHSM HESS SuSqsM HESS
lenpisay 1enusiod uonenerg lenpisey (enuaiog |  uonenjeny 30d vo pais Boa ue past] | aeis Alo Ayuoed
[49 pouod posiay pasinoy 40 poling sno}Aalg sno|Aadd Ayuasing poued | Aisnoraig pousd

eb jog abed

(g002 ‘L€ 4890190 Jo sy) SayIg [fy yo Arewuung - uoHeUIWeJUOD sAI}OeOIpeY JenpIsey |-y xIpueddy



fa.

Continuing, Section V. Conclusions (Page 3399) states in part: “The findings of this
study are: (1) Some atomic weapons employer facilities and beryllium vendor facilities
have the potential for significant residual radiological and beryllium contamination
outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. (2) For the
purposes of this report, NIOSH believes that facilities having “significant contamination”
had quantities of radioactive material that “could have caused or substantially contributed
to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer.”. was one of those
employees. (For quoted sections, see Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 16 attached.)

Mathieson Chemical Company is a huge blank, due to efforts of Mathieson officials over
the years to keep their secret. I believe we now understand why Mathieson officials and
Government officials visited the wid of it her home after the
sudden death of I believe someone should be held accountable.
Mathieson Chemical is the “forgotten” worksite. No credible determinations can be made
about this worksite because no information can be found. This is a unique situation. No
other worksite is comparable to this. How could anyone possibly complete a credible
Dose Reconstruction Report on this? The last action taken on my claim was in 2005.
Please reconsider my claim. Mathieson Chemical Company claimants should be
designated as an addition to the Special Exposure Cohort.

Attachments:
(1) Appendix A-1 Residual Radioactive Contamination —- Summary of All Sites
(As of October 31, 2008), Page 8 of 13
(2) Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 16 / Thursday, January 25, 2007 / Notices
(Pages 3395 — 3399)
(3) EEOICPA Facility List, Mathieson Chemical Co., Page 126 of 236


3396

[S-

Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 16/Thursday, January 25, 2007/ Notices :

L. Summary of Results

This update to the Report on Residual
Radioactive and Beryllium
Contamination at Atomic Weapons
Employer Facilities and Beryllium
Vendor Facilities is the second revision
of the original study reported in
November 2002 and revised in June
2004. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) is required to submit this
report by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
(NDAA) (Pub. L. 108-375), which
amended the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42
U.S.C. 7384 et seq., as follows:

1. For each facility for which such
report found that insufficient
information was available to determine
whether significant residual
contamination wes present;

2. For each facility for which such
report found that significant residual
contamination remained present as of
the date of the report, determine the
date on which such contamination
ceased to be present;

3. For each facility for which such
report found tbat significant residual
contamination was present but for
which the Director has heen unable to
determine the extent to which such
contamination is attributable to atomic
weapons-related activities, identify the
specific dates of coverage attributable to
such activilies and, in so identifying,
presume that such contamination is
attrihntable to such activities until there
is evidence of decontamination of
residual contamination identified with
atomic weapons-related activities;

4, For each facility for which such
report found significant residual
contamination, determine whether it is
at least as likely as not that such
contamination could have caused an
employee who was employed at such
facility only during the residual
contamination period lo contract a
cancer or beryllium illness compensable
under suhtitle B of the Energy
Employees Occupational [llness
Compensation Program Act of 2000; and

5. If uew information that pertains to
the report has been made available to
the Director since that report was
submitted, identify and describe such
information.

NIOSH found that there were 94 Atomic
Weapons Employer (AWE) facilities and
65 Beryllium Vendors that required
evaluation as described above. The
documents reviewed did not indicate
the existence of a current, unrecognized
occnpational or public bealtb threat.
NIOSH evaluated new information that

had been identified since 2004. NIOSH
also based findings on information
posted on the Department of Energy
(DOE) Office of Environment, Safety,
and Health (ES&H) website as of July 31,
2006 (changes made to the DOE ES&H
website after July 31, 2006 are not
reflected in this report).

The following actions have been taken
in this report:

1. A determination on the presence of
significant residual radioactive or
beryllium contamination has been made
for all of the facilities for which the
previous report found that insufficient
information was available to determine
whether significant residual
contamination was present.

2. A determination on the date when
signilicant residual contamination was.
no longer present has been made for
many facilities for which the previous
report found that significant residual
contamination remained present as of
the date of the report. However, many
sites were determined to have
significant residual contamination
remaining as of the date of this report.
This is described on a facility-by-facility
basis.

3. For all facilities for which the
previous report was unable to determine
that significant residual contamination
was attributable to atomic weapons-
related activities, specific dates of
coverage attributahle to such activilies
have been determined and, when the
source of such contamination was not
clear, the contamination was presumed
lo be associated with atomic weapons-
related activities.

4. All facilities for wbich significant
residual contamination was determined
to be present after the period of
weapons related production are
considered to have the potential of
causing an employee who was
employed at such facility only during
the residual contamination period to
contract a cancer or heryllium illness
compensable under subtitle B of the
Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Program Act of 2000.

5. All information used in making the
determinations in this report are
referenced in the individual facility
evaluations found in Appendices A~3
and B-3.

Individual results for the 94 AWEs
evaluated as required by the NDAA are
as follows:

* 18 of the 94 atomic weapons
employer facilities have little potential
for significant residual contamination
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred.

* 72 of the 94 atomic weapons
employer facilities have the potential for
significant residual contamination

outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred.

* 4 of tbe 94 previously listed Atomic
Weapons Employer facilities are no
longer listed as Atomic Weapons
Employers on the DOE ES&H Web site.

Individual results for the 65
Beryllium Vendor Facilities evaluated
are required by the NDAA are as
follows:

* 7 of the 65 beryllium vendor
facilities have little potential for
significant residual contaminalion
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred.

* 58 of the 65 beryllium vendor
facilities evaluated have the potential
for significant residual contamination
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred.

11. Background and Purpose

The Energy Employees Occupational
Ines Compensation Program Act of
2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 ef seq.,
established a program to compensate
individuals who developed illnesses as
a result of their employment in nuclear
weapons production-related activities at
certain facilities in which radioactive
materials or heryllium was processed.
DOE was directed by Executive Order
13179 to publish in the Federal Register
a list of facilities covered hy the Act. On
January 17, 2001, DOE published a
of AWEs, DOE facilities, and beryllium
vendors, in the Federal Register; the list
was revised on December 27, 2002, 67
FR 32690. Updates to the list
(corrections, additions, and deletions)
have been made periodically by DOE.
This update to the Report on Residual
Radioactive aud Beryllium
Contamination at Atomic Weapons
Employer Facilities and Beryllium
Vendor Facilities is the second revision
to the original study reported in
November of 2002 and revised in Jnne
of 2004

The DOE ES&H Web site (hitp://
www.eh.doe.gov/advocacy) provides a
synopsis of the work performed at eacb
facility, including a listing of periods
during which DOE believes, based on
current information, that weapons-
related processing was conducted. In
determining these periods, DOE has
applied the definitions in EEOICPA lo
the known facts about the time and
conditions of weapons-related
processing at each facility. DOE changes
the entries on its database as additional
information is obtained. These periods
are referred to in this report as “Periods
in which weapons-related production
occurred.” [t must be noted that the
Department of Lahor (DOL) is
responsible for determining actual
periods of covered employment based



Page 7

NEW EVIDENCE

EXHIBIT A

APPENDIX A-1 RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION - SUMMARY
OF ALL SITES (AS OF OCTOBER 31, 2008) REVISED PERIOD OF
POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION.

This is new evidence. Previous Evaluation Findings on this report show “Little
Potential”. Previous Period of Potential Residual Contamination shows “N/A”. As of
October 31, 2008, Revised Evaluation Findings show “Potential Exists”. Revised Period
of Potential Residual Contamination shows “1954-present”. (See Attachment 1.) This
indicates to me that in 2008, someone discovered new information about this plant. It
appears that some realization was made that the one small room was not the only area in
the plant that should have been surveyed. The information I obtained about the Mathieson
Chemical Plant Site was a one page document taken from the EEOICPA Facility List
which shows that Mathieson Chemical Company in Pasadena, Texas is a facility also
known as Pasadena Chemical Corp., Olin Mathieson Chemical Co., and Mobile Mining
and Minerals Co.. This company was an Atomic Weapons Employer and, for the period
of 1951 — 1953, extracted uranium oxides out of phosphoric acid compounds in a pilot
study for the Atomic Energy Commission. This earlier document shows residual
Radiation 1954 — October 2009. Another one page document from the EEOICPA
Facility List gives basically the same information but also states in part, “Documentation
describes the activities as bench-top type experiments for extracting uranium oxides from
phosphoric acid compounds, which would most likely have been conducted under
laboratory controls. There is no description of the quantities of uranium extracted or
radiological conditions immediately after cessation of activities.” (See Attachment 3.)
Also, “A radiological survey was performed for the DOE in 1977.” This was a survey
made November 18, 1977 (approximately 25 years later), documented March 1980, and
conducted by of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and

of the Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office. This survey was
made at the direction of Mathieson Chemical Company officials and information given
was only information which Company officials wanted known. This consisted of
information regarding one room (12 x 14 ft) in a one story building. This room was
located in the west end of the old administration building. Company officials alleged that
activities in this one room comprised the entire contract work done under Government
contract for the period of 1951-1953 to extract uranium oxides out of phosphoric acid
compounds in a pilot study for the Atomic Energy Commission. For more information
on this room and a copy of this survey made in 1977, please see Exhibits G, H, I, and J.
Please be aware that employees were not aware of the presence of uranium in their
workplace. For decades, this was kept secret by Company officials and Government
officials. Please consider the following:


Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 16/ Thursday, January 25, 2007 / Notices

3399

findings for potential residual beryllium
contamination. Appendix B~3 describes
each facility evaluated for residual
beryllium contamination, the data
reviewed as a part of this evaluation,
and the final findings.

V. Conclusions

The findings of this study are: (1)
Some atomic weapons employer
facilities and beryllium vendor facilities
have the potential for significant
residual radiological and beryllium
contamination outside of the periods in
which weapons-related production
occurred. (2) For the purposes of this
report, NIOSH believes that facilities
having “significant contamination” had
quantities of radioactive material tbat
“could bave caused or substantially
contributed to the cancer of a covered
emplovee with cancer.” (3) The
documents reviewed did not indicate
the existence of a current, unrecognized
occupational or public health tbreat.

(FR Doc. E7-1157 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 aml
BILLING CODE 4163-19-P

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES

Request for Information (RFI):
Guidance for Prioritization of Pre-
pandemic and Pandemic Influenza
Vaccine—Extension of Comment
Period

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary,
Department of Health and Human
Service.

ACTION: Nolice.

SUMMARY: On December 14, 2006, the
Department of Health and Hnman
Services (HHS) issued a notice in the
Federal Register (FR Doc. Vol. 71, No.
240, Pages 75252-75253) to request
input from the public on considerations
in developing guidance for
prioritization of the distribution and
administration of both pre-pandemic
and pandomic influenza vaccines based
on various pandemic severity and
vaccine supply scenarios. Specifically,
HHS is seeking input on pandemic
influenza vaccine priorilization
considerations from all interested and
affected parties, including but not
limited to public health and health care
individnals and organizations, as well
as those from other sectors of the
economy including, for example, travel
and transportation, commerce and trade,
law enforcement, emergency
management and responders, other
critical infrastructure sectors and the
general public.

Previous reports relating to pandemic
influenza vaccine prioritization issues
are available at hitp://
www.pandemicflu.gov.

The purpose of this notice is to inform
all interested parties that the comment
period originally identified in the
December 14, 2006 Federal Register is
now being extended to February 5,
2007.

DATES: Responses should be submitted
to the Department of Health and Human
Services on or before 5 p.m., EDT,
February 5, 2007.

Instructions for Submitting
Comments: Electronic responses are
preferred and may be addressed to
PandemicFlu.RFI@hhs.gov. Written
responses should be addressed to the
Department of Health and Human
Services, Room 434B, 200 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20201,
Altention: Pandemic Influenza Vaccine
Prioritization RFI. A copy of this RFI is
also available on the PandemicFlu.Gov
Web site and at http://
www.aspe.hhs.gov/PIV/7fi. Please follow
instructions for submitting responses.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ben
Schwartz, Office of Public Health and
Science, (404) 639-8953.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Extensive
information on Federal government
strategic and implementation plans for
pandemic flu is available at Aftp://
www.pandemicflu.gav.

Dated: January 19, 2007,

John O. Agwanobi,

Assistant Secretory of Health, Office of Public
Heolth ond Science, Department of Health
and Human Services.

[FR Doc. 07-323 Filed 1-24-07;
BILUNG CODE 4181-05-44

245 am]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Contro] and
Prevention

National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), Safety and
Occupational Health Study Section
{(SOHSS); Notice of Meeting

In accordance with section 10{a)(2) of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(Pub. L. 92-463), the Centers for Disense
Control and Prevention (CDG)
announces the aforementioned
committee meeting. ©

Times ond Dotes: 8 2.m.-5 p.m., February
20, 2007. 8 a.m.—5 p.m., February 21, 2007.

Place: Embassy Suiles Hotel, 1900
Diagonal Road, Alexandria, Virginia, 22314,
telephone 703.684.5900, fax 703.684.1403.

Status: Open 8 a.m.-8:30 a.m., February
20, 2007. Closed 8:30 a.m.-5 p.m., February

20, 2007. Closed 8 a.m.-5 p.m., February 21,
2007.

Purpose: The Safety and Occupational
Health Study Section will review, discuss,
and evaluate grant applications received in
response to the Instilule’s standard granis
review and funding cycles pertaining to
research issues in occupational safely and
health and allied areas.

itis the intent of NIOSH to support broad-
based research endeavors in keeping with the
Institule’s program goals. This will lead lo
improved understanding and appreciation for
the magnitude of the aggrogate health burden
associated with occupational injuries and
iNlnesses, as well as to support more focused
research projects, which will lead to
improvements in the delivery of occupational
safely and health services and the prevention
of work-related injury and illness. It is
anticipated that the research fuaded will
promote these program goals.

Matters to be Discussed: The meeting will
convene an open session from 8-8:30 a.m. ov
February 20, 2007, to address matters related
to the conduct of SOHSS business. The
remainder of the meeting will proceed in
closed session. The purpose of the closed
session is for tho study section to consider
safety and occupational health-related grant
applications. These portions of the meetiog
will be closed to tha public in accordanca
with provisions set forth in Section
552b{c)(4) and (6), Tille 5 U.S.C., and the
Determination of the Diractor, Management
Analysis end Services Office, Cenlers for
Disease Cootrol and Pravention, pursuant to
Section 10{d) Pub. L, 92-463. Agenda items.
are subject lo change as priorities dictate.

For Further Information Contact: Price
Connor, Ph.D., NIOSH Health Scientist, 1600
Cliflon Road, NE., Mailstop E~20, Atlanta,
Georgia 30333, lelephone 404.498.2511, fax
404.498.2571.

‘The Director, Management Analysis ond
Services Office, has been delegated tha
authority lo sign Federal Register notices
perlaining to announcements of meetings and
other committee managomant aclivities for
both CDC and the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry.

Elaine L. Baker,

Acting Director, Monogement Anolysis ond
Services Office, Centers for Disease Control
ond Prevention.

[FR Doc. E7-1083 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 416%-18-P

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES

Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration

Agency Information Collection
Activities: Proposed Collection;
Comment Request

In compliance witb Section
3506{c)(2)(A) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 concerning
opportunity for public comment on
proposed collections of information, the

‘8


3398

17

Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 16/Thursday, January 25, 2007 / Notices

(a) The facility was decontaminated
within tbe periods in which weapons-
related production occurred,

(b) The facility had very litue
potential for residual contamination
during actual operations, or

(c) The facility is still in operation
and tbe end date is listed as “‘prosent.”

2. Documentation reviewed indicates
there is a potential for significant
residual contamination outside the
period in which weapons-related
production occurred.

A site was assigned to this category if
there was documentation indicating the
following:

(a) Radioactive material was present
in quantities or forms which could have
caused or substantially contributed to
the cancer of a covered employee, and

(b) Radioactive material was
processed or present outside of the dates
as listed on the DOE ES&H wehsite.

‘This type of documentatiou often
iucluded FUSRAP surveys conducted
after Manhattan Engineering District
(MED)/AEC/DOE operations were
complete, which indicated the presence
of residual radioactive contamination
that could be attrihuted to those
activities.

In some cases, the facilities processed
radioactive material for not only nuclear
weapons production, but also
commercial, non-DOE contracts.
Sometimes the material processed for
nuclear weapons production was
indistinguishable from material
processed for commercial purposes.
Wherever residual radioactive
contamination due to DOE operations
was not clearly distinguishable from
that resulting from commercial
operations, it was assumed that the
contamination was the result of
weapons production activities. As a
result, in these cases, the findings were
that the potential for significant residual
contamination existed outside of the
periods in which weapons-related
production occurred. For sites that
exhibited a potential for significant
residual radioactive contamination
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred,
and for which an end date could not be
determined, it was assumed that
significant residual contamination
existed until the time the facility was
demolished or until the present, defined
as the date this report was written.

Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for
Residual Radiaactive Contamination
The results of this study indicate that
there are atomic weapons employer
facilities for which the potential for
significant residual radiological
contamination exists outside of the

periods in whicb weapons-related
production occurred as listed on the
DOE ES&H website.

Appendix A-1 lists the findings for
the potential for significant residual
radioactive contamination at the 94
facilities required for evaluation by
NDAA. Appendix A-2 lists all of tbe
AWE facilities and the findings for
potential residual radioactive
contamination. Appendix A-3 describes
each facility evaluated for residual
radioactive contamination, the data
reviewed as a part of this evaluation,
and the final findings.

IV. Residual Beryllium Contamination
Evaluation

Tho primary sources of information
used to evaluate each site were the
individual facility files compiled by
DOE ES&H. In addition, interviews with
current and past employees of these
facilities were conducted to obtain
information not contained in available
documentation.

‘The finding on any single site was
based on the quantity and completeness
of the information available regarding
that site and professional judgment as
necessary.

{n this evaluation of residual
radioactive contamination, as in the
previous report, the following factors
were considered:

(1) If beryllium was actually handled
at the sile.

(2) If there was evidence of
decontamination of the facility.

These factors were used to estimate
the potential for beryllium exposure
hoth during operations and after
production/processing had ceased. For
example, a facility for which a
decontamination survey was
documented or for which personal
interviews indicated that
decontamination was performed, was
classified as having little potential for
residual beryllium contamination after
the decontamination date; a facility
without such evidence of
decontamination was classified as
having a potential for residual beryllium
contamination after operations had
ceased.

Each site was assigned to one of two
calegories:

1. Documentation reviewed indicates
there is little potential for significant
residual contamination outside the
period in which weapons-related
production occurred.

A site was assigned to this category if
the documentation available for the
facility indicated one or more of the
following characteristics:

(a) Evidence of decontamination and/
or beryllium contamination survey data,

(b) The facility had very little
potential for residual contamination
during actual operations, or

(c) The facility is still in operation
and the end date is listed as “‘presant.”

2. Documantation reviewed indicates
there is a potential for significant
residual contamination outside the
period in which weapons-related
production occurred.

A sile was assigned to this category if
either of the following conditions
existed:

(a) Documentation was available
indicating that boryllium was processed
or present oulside of the dates listed on
the DOE ES&H website that could have
caused or substantially contribnted te
the heryllium illness of a covered
employee.

(8) There was no evidence of a
decontamination of the facility or area
where beryllium was processed.

In some cases, the facilities processed
beryllinm material for not only nuclear
weapons production, but also
commercial, non-DOE contracts.
Sometimes the material processed for
nuclear weapons production was
indistinguishable from material
processed for commercial pnrposes.
Wherever residual beryiium
contamination due to DOE operations
was not clearly distinguishable from
that resulting from commercial
operations, it was assumed that the
contamination was the result of
weapons production activities. As a
result, in these cases, the findings were
that the potential for significant residual
contamination existed outside of the
periods in which weapons-related
production occurred. For sites that
exhibited a potential for significant
residual beryllium contamination
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred,
and for which an end date could not be
determined, it was assumed that
significant residual contamination
existed until the time the facility was
demolished or until the present, defined
as the date this report was written.

Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for
Residual Beryllium Cantamination

The results of this study indicate that
there are Beryllium Vendor facilities for
which the potential for significant
residual beryllium contamination exists
outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred as
listed on the DOE ES&H website.
Appendix B-1 lists the findings for
the potential for significant residual
beryllium contamination at the 65
facilities required for evaluation by
NDAA. Appendix B-2 lists all
Beryllium Vendor facilities and the


Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 16/Thursday, January 25, 2007/ Notices :

3395

preempts state law, or otherwise has
Federalism implications.

This rule announces the provisions of
section 6053(b) of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005. We do not estimate this
regulation will have any significant
effect on the economy. Nevertheless, we
estimate the impact of the provision,
once implemented, to be minimal. Our
analysis suggosts that the modification
to the FMAPs will only affect Texas
The effect will likely be a minimal
decrease in State Medicaid and SCHIP
sponding and a corresponding minimal
increase in foderal Medicaid and SCHIP
spending.

In addition, the provisions only
directly affect states. Therefore, thore is
no need to perform a regulatory
flexibility analysis in accordance with
section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibitity
Act.

H. Summary

We propose to adjust the fiscal year
2008 FMAP rate only for the State of
Texas, by reducing the income estimates
used in the FMAP calculation through.
the application of adjustments to reflect
interstate population dispersal income
and FEMA disaster assistance incomo
for evacuees. Because this is the only
income thal can be attributed to Katrina
evacuees based on BEA data, this
income will he subtracted from the 2005
state personal income as published by
BEA in October 2006 to obtain a new
stato porsonal income for Texas. This
state personal income will be divided hy
the state population as of july 2005 io
got a revised per capita personal income
for each state. ‘This revised 2005 per
capita personal income will replace the
2005 per capita personal income in
calculating the 2008 FMAPs.

Effective Dotes: The percentages listed
will be effective for each of the four (4)
quarter-year periods in the period
beginning October 1, 2007 and ending
September 30, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Thomas Musco or Robert Stewart, Office
of Healtb Policy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation,
Room 447D—Hubert H. Humphrey
Building, 200 Independence Avenue,
SW., Washington, DC 20201, (202) 690-
6870.
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Nos. 93.778: Medica) Assistance
Program; 93.767: State Children’s Health
Insurance Program)

Dated: January 19. 2007.
Michael O. Leavitt,
Secretary of Health ond Human Services.
(FR Doc, E7-1174 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 em)
BILLING CODE 4210-31-P

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES

Meeting of the Presidential Advisory .
Council on HIV/AIDS

AGENCY: Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of tbe Secretary,
Office of Public Health and Science.
ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: As stipulated by the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, the
Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) is herehy giving notice
that the Presidential Advisory Council
on HIV/AIDS (PACHA) will hold a
meeting. This meeting is open to the
public. A description of the Council’s
functions is included with this notice.
DATES: February 27, 2007, 8 a.m. to 5
p.m., and February 28, 2007, 8 a.m. to
4pm.

ADDRESSES: Hubert H. Humphrey
Building, 200 Independence Avo., SW.,
Room 705A, Washington, DC 20201.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Dana Ceasar, Program Assislant,
Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/
AIDS, Department of Health and Human
Services, Hubert H. Humphrey Building,
200 Independence Avenue, SW., Room
733E, Washington, DC 20201; (202)
690-2470 or visit the Conncil’s Web site
at hitp://www.pacha.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PACHA
was established by Executive Order
12963, dated June 14, 1995, as amended
by Executive Order 13009, dated June
14, 1996. The Council was estabiished
to provide advice, information, and
recommendations to the Secretary
regarding programs and policies
intended to (a) promote effective
prevention of HIV disease, (b) advance
research on HIV and AIDS, and (c)
promote quality services to persons
living with HIV disease and AIDS.
PACHA was established to serve solely
as an advisory body to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. The
Council is composed of not more than
21 members. Council membership is
determined by the Secretary from
individuals who are considered
authorities with particular expertise in,
or knowledge of, matters concerning
HIV/AIDS. -

‘The agenda for this Councit meeting
inclndes the following topics: HIV/AIDS
prevention, treatment and care issues,
botb domestically and internationally.
Members of the public will have the
opportnnily to provide comments at the
meeting. Public comment will be
limited to three (3) minutes per speaker.

Public attendance is limited to space
available and pro-mgistration is required

for both attendance and public
comment. Any individual who wishes
to participate should register at hitp-//
www: pacho.gov. Individuals who plan
to attend and need special assistance,
such as sign language interpretation or
other reasonable accommodations,
should indicate in he comment section
when registering.

Dated: January 16, 2007.
Anand K. Parekh,
Acting Executive Director, Presidential
Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS.
IFR Doc. E7-1125 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]
BILUNG CODE 4150-43->

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES

National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health; Report on Residual
Radioactive and Beryllium
Contamination at Atomic Weapons
Employer Facilities and Beryllium
Vendor Facilities

AGENCY: National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).

ACTION: Nolice.

SUMMARY: Tbe Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) gives notice as
required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
(Pub. L. 108-375) of the release of a
report on residual contamination of
facibties under the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42
U.S.C. 7384 et seq. The report is below.
The report and appendices are also
available at: Aittp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
ocos.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Larry Elliott, Director, Office of
Compensation Analysis and Support,
National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, 4676 Columbia
Parkway, MS C~46, Cincinnati, OH
45226, Telephone 513-533-6800 (this is
not a toll-free numher). Information
requests can also be snbmitted by e-mail
to OCAS@CDC.GOV.

John Howard,

Director, Notional institute for Occupational
Safety and Health.

Report on Residual Radioactive and
Beryllium Contamination at Atomic
Weapons Employer Facilities and
Beryllium Vendor Facilities

Prepared by: National Institute for
Occupational Safely and Health

John Howard, M.D., Director, December 2006


fo

interviews indicate that the pilot uranium recovery unit and associated support facilities
were phased out around 1955.”. Mr. Bailey also states that “Based upon our
investigation of this site, we cannot help but conclude, even in the absence of copies of
contracts between MED or AEC and Mathieson Chemical Company, that the radioactive
contamination measured at the facility exists as a result of the contract work performed
by Mathieson Chemical Company for MED/AEC.”. Now we have mention of “at least
one contract” and “the absence of copies of contracts”. It appears obvious that more
work on this project was done than anyone wants us to know about. All parties seem to
agree that radioactive material exists. No one wants to take responsibility. It appears that
this argument as to responsibility for remedial action is ongoing. The 240 acres of waste
material continues to exist and be a threat. Please see Exhibit G

The Summary continues by showing actions that have been taken in this report. I would
like to know what information was used in evaluating the Mathieson Chemical Facility. I
wish to remind you that no records are available for the Mathieson Chemical plant site
for the period of 1951 - 1953. This work could possibly have continued until 1955, ( see
above) when the company had a government contract(s) for extracting uranium oxides
out of phosphoric acid compounds or for the residual radiation period of 1954 — October
2009. (As of October 31, 2008, Revised Evaluation Findings were that Potential Exists
and the period of potentia! residual contamination was revised to be 1954 — present.) No
records exist because the presence of uranium in the plant was kept secret by officials of
Mathieson Chemical Company and officials of the government. The first documentation
that can be found is a survey made by ORNL November 18, 1977, and documented in
1980. The record of this survey consists only of a description of one 12 x 14 ft room in
the old administration building, which was a one-story building. As mentioned earlier,
this room, with no air-conditioning, is said to be the entire location of operations of
uranium activities in the plant. This is the information that was given by Mathieson
officials and is the information accepted and used by NIOSH in their evaluation of this
plant site. Mathieson employees did not know of the presence of uranium in the plant.
Bear in mind that this was still secret in 1977

To return to the Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 16 / Thursday, January 25, 2007 /
Notices, also on Page 3396, in Il. Background and Purpose, the DOE ES&H Web site
“provides a synopsis of the work performed at each facility, including a listing of periods
during which DOE believes, based on current information, that weapons-related
processing was conducted. In determining these periods, DOE has applied the
definitions in EEOICPA to the known facts about the time and conditions of weapons-
related processing at each facility. DOE changes the entries on its database as additional
information is obtained. These periods are referred to in this report as “Periods in which
weapons-related production occurred.” It must be noted that the Department of Labor
(DOL) is responsible for determining actual periods of covered employment based upon
DOE’s findings as well as information from claimants and other sources.” Also, “If there
was no documentation or limited documentation on radiation levels at specified facilities,
NIOSH made a professional judgment regarding the residual contamination. If NIOSH
determined there was “the potential for significant contamination” at a designated
facility, then NIOSH determined, pursuant to NDAA, that such contamination “could


of some contamination; however, levels seem minor.” Also, when describing Category
and Status: “ No survey is anticipated. ORNL is preparing a survey report.”. This
“survey report” was eventually made in March 1980. This complete “survey” is of one
(12 x 14 ft) room in a one story building with no air conditioning. The diagram in the
“survey report” does not show any windows in this room. This is clearly an attempt to
prepare paperwork, approximately 27 years after the fact, to minimize the consideration
of any harmful working conditions. This indicates that no investigation or actual
“survey” was made. A second enclosure in this letter from Mr. Mott “lists the specific
information that should ideally be included in the attached site summaries.” Mr. Mott
continues, “As you can see, a portion of the information has not yet been identified. I
would appreciate receiving any supplemental information you can supply that might fill
in some of the incomplete areas. I would also like to solicit any additional information
regarding other facilities involved in the feed materials program of MED/AEC.”. Mr.
Mott is asking for information approximately 27 years later and also informing
Mathieson officials what information they should include in the report. Information that
has been considered regarding this Mathieson Chemical Company site was given by
Mathieson officials. For more information on this, please see Exhibit G, Exhibit H, and
Exhibit I. Mathieson officials had kept the presence of this uranium secret for decades.
Why should my claim be determined by deception such as this? The few surviving
Mathieson employees and spouses continue to be victimized. I have been told by others
that they would like to file a claim, but they feel it would be an exercise in futility. Some
are not able to file claims, due to age and other reasons. My claim was filed August 19,
2002, over eight years ago. It seems as if some officials are just waiting for the rest of us
to die.

Please see Exhibit J for comments from Mr. Edmund A. Vierzba, Environmental Control
and Analysis , Directorate, The Aerospace Corporation, for other questions regarding this
report made in March 1980. In his letter dated 16 July, 1980 to Mr. William E. Mott, Mr.
Vierzba adds an attachment with the following comments: (1) Is there any explanation
for the high Ac-227 concentration in the sink? The value of 185 pCi/g appears high for a
phosphate operation. And (2) It is not clear from the report that only the bench, drain-
line and sink were found to have surface contamination above background. It should be
stated that the floor and walls were found within typical background levels, if such is the
case.”. These issues have apparently never been addressed

Also in Exhibit J, regarding the Remedial Action Program, in a letter dated June 29,
1981 from Mr. Edgar D. Bailey, P.E., Director, Division of Licensing, Registration and
Standards, of the Texas Department of Health, to Mr. William E. Mott, Director, Office
of Environmental Protection, Safety, and Emergency Preparedness, Department of
Energy, Mr. Bailey states in part, “We are disturbed that you feel that this site is not
eligible for Department of Energy (DOE) remedial activities. It is our opinion that the
contamination present at the site is a direct result of the Federal government’s nuclear
energy program conducted under the auspices of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED)
and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The Preliminary Survey attached to your
letter clearly reflect the presence of radionuclides that one would expect to be associated
with an uranium recovery facility of that time period. Historical documents and


FEDERAL REGISTER / VOL. 72, NO. 16 / THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2007 /
NOTICES — BEGINNING ON PAGE 3396 — DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES — NIOSH, REPORT ON RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE AND
BERYLLIUM CONTAMINATION AT ATOMIC WEAPONS EMPLOYER
FACILITIES AND BERYLLIUM VENDOR FACILITIES. Referring to 1. Summary of
Results, Page 3396, this update is the second revision of the original study reported in
November 2002 and revised in June 2004. The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) is required to submit this report by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) (Pub. L. 108-375), which amended the
Energy Employees Occupational IIIness Compensation Program Act of 2000
(EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 et seq.. Also “NIOSH evaluated new information that had
been identified since 2004. NIOSH also based findings on information posted on the
Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H)
website as of July 31, 2006 (changes made to the DOE ES&H website after July 31, 2006
are not reflected in this report).” The following actions have been taken in this report:
“1, A determination on the presence of significant residual radioactive or beryllium
contamination has been made for all of the facilities for which the previous report found
that insufficient information was available to determine whether significant residual
contamination was present. 2. A determination on the date when significant residual
contamination was no longer present has been made for many facilities for which the
previous report found that significant residual contamination remained present as of the
date of the report. However, many sites were determined to have significant residual
contamination remaining as of the date of this report. This is described on a facility-by-
facility basis. 3. For all facilities for which the previous report was unable to determine
that significant residual contamination was attributable to atomic weapons-related
activities, specific dates of coverage attributable to such activities have been determined
and, when the source of such contamination was not clear, the contamination was
presumed to be associated with atomic weapons-related activities. 4. All facilities for
which significant residual contamination was determined to be present after the period of
weapons related production are considered to have the potential of causing an employee
who was employed at such facility only during the residual contamination period to
contract a cancer or beryllium illness compensable under subtitle B of the Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000.”. (See Attachment
2.)

Regarding the above, no records were kept for activities on the Mathieson Chemical
Company site either for the alleged contract period of 1951 — 1953 or for the period of
residual contamination. In a letter dated March 13, 1979 to Mr. M. S. Davenport, Plant
Manager from Mr. William E. Mott, Acting Director Environmental Control Technology
Division, (DOE) one enclosure shows the following when describing the Site Function:
“Olin Mathieson Chemical Company had at least one contract for research and
development on uranium recovery from phosphoric acid produced at Pasadena. A pilot
plant was operated during the early 1950s.” Under Radiological History and Status:
“This site was visited by Oak Ridge Operations (OR) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL) personnel on November 18, 1977. ORNL is preparing a letter report covering
the findings of the site visit. Preliminary review of the field notes indicate the presence


FACILITY NAME: Mathieson Chemical Co.
Pasadena, Texas

ALSO KNOWN AS: Pasadena Chemical Corp.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Co.
Mobil Mining and Minerals Co

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1953

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE ES&H Website:

Mathieson Chemical extracted uranium oxides out of phosphoric acid compounds in a pilot
study for the Atomic Energy Commission.

DISCUSSION:

Documentation describes the activities as bench-top type experiments for extracting uranium
oxides from phosphoric acid compounds, which would most likely have been conducted
under laboratory controls. There is no description of the quantities of uranium extracted or
radiological conditions immediately after cessation of activities. But, it is reasonable to
believe that laboratory work would not have resulted in widespread distribution or residual
contamination post-operations. A radiological survey was performed for the DOE in 1977,
with the only finding of residual contamination on inside surfaces of one sink and possibly the

drain line, which poses no significant exposure to personnel based on the low activity levels
discovered.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE ES&H Website
along with documentation provided by the DOE ES&H Group consisting of written
communications by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual
contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

Page 126 of 236

9