April 17, 2006 

Department of Health and Human Services 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

Robert A. Taft Laboratories 

MS-C34 

4676 Columbia Parkway 

Cincinnati, OH 45226 

RE: Initial Comments on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site Profile #054 

Tri-Valley CAREs has been monitoring LLNL activities for more than twenty years. 

During these past two decades, Tri-Valley CAREs has been very active in 

documenting accidents and releases and has worked closely with workers in those 

endeavors. During our review of the LLNL Site Profile, we have found numerous 

inaccuracies and shortfalls that significantly disadvantage the worker in the dose 

reconstruction process. The Site Profile does not acknowledge that many records 

have been destroyed, misplaced or are inaccurate. Whole categories of documents 

were not included in the site profile that we personally handed to a NIOSH 

representative, Riasp Medora, who visited our office prior to the release of any section 

of the site profile. In short, we are very disappointed in the quality of the site profile 

and believe that it should be revised from the ground up. It is so fundamentally 

flawed and incomplete that all dose reconstructions that rely upon this profile are 

questionable at best. We are also disappointed that individuals with conflicts of 

interest have been employed in the site profile process. As is stated in more detail in a 

later section of this comment, we urge you to withdraw any site profile document that 

was drafted by a conflicted individual. Included below are comments on the profile, 

recommendations and general concerns. 

Problems with calculating dose 

We are concerned about the accuracy of dose estimations when they are based upon 

annual or semi-annual testing. Radiation can pass through the human system within 

days unless it is stored in the bone mass or bodily tissue and can cause damage to 

human tissue as it passes through. Furthermore, badges cannot be relied upon to 

provide accurate estimates of dose to the worker. Even if badges were functioning 

properly (we have spoken with workers willing to sign affidavits to the fact that films 

were not loaded properly at times) and were worn properly (e.g. not under lead 

aprons), there are still problems with estimating dose to the worker from badges 

because they only record exposures that affected the badge. Some badges were more 
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sensitive to different types of radiation and some were not worn at the area of the 

body with highest exposure. Additionally some employees were not given badges at 

all. The site profile does not acknowledge the known problems with badges and 

instead states that “[t]he External Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline 

identified dosimeter records as the highest quality records for a retrospective dose 

assessment.” The profile should acknowledge existing badge problems and alert dose 

reconstructors to factor this into their decisions. 

Significant Documents that are not included in the Site Profile

The Occurrence Reporting System appears to be absent from LLNL’s site profile. This 

is a system of documenting most accidents at LLNL. It is a veritable goldmine of 

information about exposures to workers and the history of accidents. It does an 

injustice to the workers to fail to include and consider these documents. 

Incident Reports were also omitted from any mention in the Site Profile. They, too, 

contain information crucial to profiling the Livermore Lab and understanding 

pathways to worker exposures. 

The DOE publication Operating Experience Weekly Summaries were processed as 

external sources of lessons learned information. These relied upon daily operations 

reports, notification reports, and time permitting, conversations with DOE facility or 

field office staff. The Operating Experience Weekly summaries that describe accidents 

at Livermore Lab should be included. 

Documentation about Decommissioning and Decontamination of buildings was 

omitted from the site profile. Whenever buildings are demolished or decommissioned a 

substantial amount of documentation is created that describes the actual, rather than 

the expected or recorded, contamination in a building. This information will 

substantiate worker’s claims that contamination exists when the official records do 

not support it. It is the responsibility of NIOSH to include this information in the site 

profile process to shift some of the onus of documentation away from the workers. 

These sick workers who were told to not keep documentation of classified activities 

are now asked for documents to substantiate their memories. This is unjust and can 

be alleviated by good faith efforts to incorporate this information and the associated 

uncertainties in data that are revealed into the site profile process and into the dose 

reconstruction assumptions. 

The Tiger Team Report from 1990 was not mentioned or cited in the Site Profile. This 

report is important to include because it casts doubt on the Environment Safety and 

Health programs within the lab that existed prior to 1990. This report contradicts the 

Site Profile’s implicit assumption that rules and regulations on the books accurately 

reflected the actual practices at the site. This document contained the following 

observations about LLNL’s internal processes: 
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• Widespread noncompliance exists relative to DOE Orders, Federal regulations, 

and LLNL procedures. 

• The supervisors have responsibility for providing safety information, including 

Material Safety Data Sheets to their employees. However, in all but one 

instance, employees interviewed could not provide information in their own 

words about the chemicals with which they worked daily. In addition these 

data sheets were not consistently available or accessible. Numerous unlabeled 

or partially labeled chemical containers were noted. 

• The deficiencies identified during this assessment exist largely as a 

consequence of the lack of trainings, procedures, and as audit program. Some 

supervisors are not carrying out their responsibility in the areas of available an 

accessible data sheets, labeling containers with a description of their content 

and hazard rating and consistently communicating safety information to 

working level employees. 

• LLNL management systems lack the control, discipline and formality 

necessary to consistently accomplish Environment Safety and Health 

objectives. 

Superfund Data should also be included. Both Livermore Lab and Site 300 – 

Livermore’s high explosive testing site – are on the EPA’s Superfund list of most 

contaminated sites in the nation. There is an enormous amount of documentation 

about contamination that should be included in the site profile document. 

National Environmental Policy Act and California Environmental Quality Act

documents hold a lot of information from the last four decades about what types of 

materials are in different rooms of the laboratory. These documents should be mined 

for information to include in the site profile and should be listed as references at the 

end of the site profile. 

Significant Events not in the Site Profile include, but are not limited to, the 

following:

a) Uranium Fire 

On July 26, 1999, a uranium fire broke out in an area where wastes contaminated 

with uranium are prepared for transport to the Nevada Test Site for disposal. An 

employee was loading bags of uranium shavings and other waste materials when he 

noticed the bag was "glowing and starting to expand," says the DOE report. The 

Lab's hazardous waste and fire departments were called in to extinguished the blaze. 
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The uranium waste shipment facility was closed for three days while the Lab 

investigated the incident. Two other buildings where uranium experiments are carried 

out were closed for one day. Faulty waste packaging procedures that allowed a spark 

caused by the uranium filings to ignite paper inside the bag are thought to be at fault. 

b) Filter Shredding Accident with Curium 

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=537309 

On July 2, 1997 at approximately 6:00 A.M., two operators (Workers 1 and 2), 

wearing approved personal protective equipment (PPE), began a shredding operation 

of HEPA filters for volume reduction in Building 513 (B-513) at Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL). The waste requisitions indicated they were shredding 

filters containing 1 micro curie of americium-241 (Am-241). A third operator (Worker 

3) provided support to the shredder operators in the shredding area (hot area) from a 

room that was adjacent to the shredding area (cold area). At approximately 8:00 

A.M., a fourth operator (Worker 4) relieved Worker 2 in the shredding operation. 

Sometime between 8:30 A.M. and 9:00 A.M., Worker 3 left the cold area to make a 

phone call and set off a hand and foot counter in Building 514. Upon discovering the 

contamination, the shredding operation was stopped and surveys were conducted in 

the shredder area. Surveys conducted on the workers found significant levels of 

contamination on their PPE and the exterior of their respirator cartridges. An exit 

survey of Worker 1 was conducted at approximately 10:05 A.M., and found 

contamination on his PPE, as well as on the exterior and interior of his respirator. 

Contamination was also found on his face, chest, back of neck, hair, knees, and 

mustache. A nose blow indicated significant contamination, which was later 

determined to be curium. 

c) Two of the Biggest U.S. Tritium Accidents on Record

The two major Livermore Lab Tritium accidents (one of which is the subject of the 

assessment mentioned above --A Review of the January 20, 1965 Tritium Release from the 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory by Sylvie-Ring Peterson, Gretchen M. Gallegos, Robert J. 

Harrach. US Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) were, by 

any measure, major radiological events. We know that on January 20, 1965 at 3:30 

pm roughly 350,000 curies were released from a stack in building 331. We are told 

that this was the result of human error and that most of the tritium was in gas form 

(3H2). Nothing is known about meteorological conditions at the time and apparently 

no local environmental sampling was done following the release. On August 6, 1970 

at 6:14 am another 300,000 curies were released from the same stack when a 

component of a pressurized gas system failed. 
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300,000 Ci of a relatively long-lived radioactive isotope like tritium is a very 

substantial accidental release of radioactivity. Our reading of the Site Profile yielded 

no mention of these accidents. If they were not considered, this appears to show gross 

negligence on the part of the preparers of the site profile. We believe these accidents 

warrant Site Profile attention and concern. Worker exposure and negative health 

impacts naturally flow from these events but they are missing in the site profile. In 

fact, a review of the event was conducted by the Laboratory in July 2002 that 

documented worker exposure and the results of urine samples following the accident. 

Tritium Accident Review: A Review of the January 20, 1965 Tritium Release from the 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory was conducted by Sylvie-Ring Peterson, Gretchen M. 

Gallegos, Robert J. Harrach for the US Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory. 

This document discusses the 1965 tritium accidents including release to the workers 

and the public and should be incorporated in the dose reconstruction of workers at the 

lab at that time. 

d) Plutonium Exposure in 2003 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) occurrence report LLNL-2003-

0035 described an incident where multiple failures in the safety systems resulting in 

twelve workers potentially exposed to airborne plutonium. 

On October 7th, 2003 - LLNL health physicists noticed that the passive air monitors 

in a lab in the superblock were reporting elevated readings. It was determined that a 

routine test of the emergency generators on October 3rd led to a temporary power 

outage. When power was restored – it was restored in the room before the glove box – 

causing the air in the glove box to be drawn into the room for thirty seconds or so. 

Inspection revealed that the gasket on the glove box cover – “had been apparently 

removed 8 to 10 years ago” and never replaced. Results indicated contamination at 

pass-through unit, on a side window and on top of a workstation (at a few hundred 

counts per minute of alpha contamination) but the alarm in the room had not 

sounded. Elevated filter readings covered work in the room for the afternoon of 

October 2nd to the morning of October 6th. They checked the room log and 

discovered that 12 people had entered the room during this time frame. 

Concerns about Principle Author of Site Profile 

A substantial controversy has emerged concerning Carol Berger, one of the principle 

authors of the Livermore site profile. While not conflicted in regard to Livermore’s 

site profile that we know of, Carol has received significant public criticism for her 

conflicts of interest in drafting the Paducah site profile. Apparently, Ms. Berger 

included previously criticized tables from a 1992 report that she created while 

employed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems into the Paducah site profile. Ms. 

Berger had been employed under contract to Martin Marietta Energy Systems to 
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assess worker exposure to transuranic compounds from processing over 100,000 tons 

of recycled uranium. The fact that Ms. Berger agreed to work on the site profile 

despite the fact that she was relying on her own data that had been discredited before 

calls into question her integrity in the site profile process. These workers have already 

been wronged enough and no one who is responsible for their compensation should 

have a blemish on their credibility as an objective member of this process. We call 

upon you to remove Ms. Berger and her work from Livermore’s site profile. 

Conclusion 

We recognize that it is a difficult task to try to recreate doses to workers for more 

than 50 years of Livermore Lab operations. Record keeping has been spotty over the 

years. Even when records were properly established, so many records are missing or 

destroyed that it makes it difficult to pinpoint dosage. Through these comments, we 

have only begun to scratch the surface of the problems with the site profile. That is 

why we believe that certain jobs at Livermore Lab should be categorized as a special 

exposure cohort. 

Thank you for your consideration of these comments. We hope that either a special 

exposure cohort is established or the site profile is fundamentally redrafted so that it 

reflects a broader and deeper consideration of records relating to workplace exposures. 

No worker’s claim should be denied on the basis of this shoddy analysis. This is the 

only way that we can do justice to the sick workers. 

Sincerely, 

Loulena Miles 

Staff Attorney 

Tri-Valley CAREs