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299 Nebraska Report

IN RE ESTATE OF KARMAZIN

Cite as 299 Neb. 315

In re Estate of Bernadine M. Karmazin

Denise Baumgart and Kenneth Karmazin

and cross-appellants, v. Judy O’Sul

Personal Representative of the 

of Bernadine M. Karmazin, d

appellant and cross-appell

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 16, 2018. No. S-17-228.

1. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. An appeal from the county 

court’s allowance or disallowance of a claim in probate will be heard as 

an appeal from an action at law. In reviewing a judgment of the probate 

court in a law action, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence, but 

considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the successful party 

and resolves evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party, who is 

entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence. The 

probate court’s factual findings have the effect of a verdict and will not 

be set aside unless clearly erroneous.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On a question of law, an appellate court 

is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination 

reached by the court below.

3. Contracts. The meaning of a contract and whether a contract is ambiguous are questions of law.

4. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing requires that a litigant have such a 

personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation 

of a court’s jurisdiction and justify the exercise of the court’s remedial 

powers on the litigant’s behalf.

5. Pleadings. The pleadings in a cause are not mere ordinary admissions 

for the purposes of use in that suit, but are judicial admissions.

6. Pleadings: Evidence: Waiver. In effect, pleadings are not a means 

of evidence, but a waiver of all controversy, so far as the opponent 

may desire to take advantage of them, and therefore, a limitation of 

the issues.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/01/2018 01:09 AM CDT
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7. Appeal and Error. A party cannot complain of error which the party 

has invited the court to commit.

8. Actions: Pleadings: Parties: Joinder. Joinder or substitution of the real 

party in interest shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced by the real party in interest.

9. Property: Taxes. Real property tax liability rests with the owner or 

owners of the real property at the time real property taxes are charged, 

accrued, or assessed, i.e., due and payable.

10. Contracts: Words and Phrases. A contract is ambiguous when a word, 

phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible of, at least two 

reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings.

Appeal from the County Court for Hall County: Arthu

S. Wetzel, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and

remanded with direction.

Brenda K. Smith and Gretchen L. McGill, of Dvorak Law 

Group, L.L.C., for appellant.

Mark A. Beck, of Beck Law Office, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellees.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, 

Funke, J

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

A life tenant leased real estate to a remainderman for 1 year 

ending on October 31, 2015. The life tenant died in August. 

The principal issue is whether the lease clause requiring the 

lessor to pay unspecified real estate taxes made her liable for 

2015 taxes that became due and payable on December 31. 

The county court allowed the remaindermen’s claims for these 

taxes. Although two interpretations are possible, the one requiring the estate to pay taxes becoming due after the lease expired 

was not reasonable. We reverse that portion of the order and 

otherwise affirm.
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IN RE ESTATE OF KARMAZIN

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II. BACKGROUND

Bernadine M. Karmazin (decedent) conveyed a remainder 

interest in certain property to Kenneth Karmazin (Karmazin) 

and in other property to Denise Baumgart. Decedent retained a 

life estate interest in the property.

In 2014, decedent entered into two lease agreements with 

Karmazin. The lease terms required Karmazin to pay cash rent 

to decedent for land intended for crops, pasture, or hay. The 

leases were for a 1-year term, commencing November 1, 2014, 

and ending on October 31, 2015. They provided that “Real 

Estate Taxes will be paid by [decedent].” Karmazin’s rent payments were due April 1, August 1, and November 1, 2015.

On August 23, 2015, decedent died. After the commencement of informal probate proceedings, a notice to creditors 

published in a local newspaper stated that creditors of the estate 

must file their claims with the court on or before December 15, 

2015, or be forever barred. The estate did not mail to either 

Baumgart or Karmazin (collectively the claimants) a copy of 

the notice to creditors.

On December 15, 2015, an attorney for the estate wrote a 

letter to the personal representative regarding liability for real 

estate taxes. The attorney stated that because decedent died in 

2015, the estate’s obligation to pay real estate taxes ended with 

the real estate taxes that became delinquent in 2015, in other 

words, the 2014 taxes.

On April 11, 2016, Baumgart filed an “Application to 

Determine Tax Liability.” She alleged that in “late 2015, 

demand was placed upon the Personal Representative to pay 

the 2015 real estate taxes,” which resulted in the December 

15, 2015, letter. She asked that the court determine the estate’s 

liability for the 2015 real property taxes and require the estate 

to reimburse 2015 taxes paid. The estate disallowed the claim. 

On July 28, the claimants filed an amended application to 

determine tax liability and liability for rent paid by Karmazin. 

The estate also disallowed this claim.
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The claimants filed a petition for allowance of the claim. 

They identified the amount of the claim as “unknown.” The 

estate objected. It alleged that the claims were barred under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2485(b) (Reissue 2016). It also alleged 

that the claimants failed to properly file a claim because they 

did not identify an amount.

During a hearing, the parties stipulated that the estate did not 

pay any of the 2015 real estate taxes on the property. Baumgart 

testified that she was a remainderman of certain property in 

Nuckolls County, Nebraska, that the property “became [hers]” 

when decedent died, and that she paid the 2015 real estate 

taxes. Karmazin similarly testified that he was a remainderman in real estate in Nuckolls County pursuant to a deed, that 

he became the sole owner upon decedent’s death, and that he 

paid taxes and interest. Over objection, the court allowed the 

claimants to submit deeds at a later time showing life estate 

and remainder interests. The claimants subsequently filed an 

affidavit to which they attached copies of deeds evidencing the 

ownership of the relevant parcels of real estate.

The county court determined that Karmazin did not timely 

submit his claim for rent. With regard to real estate taxes, the 

court stated that under operation of law, the liability for real 

estate taxes would lie with the owner of the property at the 

time the taxes became due and payable. However, the court 

determined that because the lease agreements controlled the 

lessor’s and lessee’s respective obligations to pay taxes, the 

law’s default rule did not apply. The court found the leases 

to be ambiguous, noting that they did not specify the tax 

year. Ultimately, the court ordered the estate to reimburse 

Baumgart for payment of real estate taxes in the amount of 

$2,097.74 and to reimburse Karmazin $8,929.46, plus interest 

of $68.40.

The estate filed a timely appeal, and the claimants asserted a 

cross-appeal. We moved the case to our docket.1

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Supp. 2017).
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III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The estate assigns, consolidated, that the court erred in (1) 

determining the claimants had standing, (2) allowing testimony 

from the claimants regarding their status as remaindermen of 

the estate, (3) admitting deeds without proper foundation, (4) 

determining the claimants made a proper claim under the probate code, (5) determining the lease agreements were ambiguous, and (6) determining the estate must reimburse the claimants for payment of real estate taxes and interest.

On cross-appeal, the claimants allege that the court erred 

in determining that Karmazin failed to properly file his claim 

for rent.

IV. SAN

[1] An appeal from the county court’s allowance or disallowance of a claim in probate will be heard as an appeal from 

an action at law.2 In reviewing a judgment of the probate court 

in a law action, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence, 

but considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

successful party and resolves evidentiary conflicts in favor of 

the successful party, who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence.3

 The probate court’s factual 

findings have the effect of a verdict and will not be set aside 

unless clearly erroneous.4

[2,3] On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to 

reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached 

by the court below.5 The meaning of a contract and whether a 

contract is ambiguous are questions of law.6

2 In re Estate of Alberts, 293 Neb. 1, 875 N.W.2d 427 (2016).

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Frohberg Elec. Co. v. Grossenburg Implement, 297 Neb. 356, 900 N.W.2d 

32 (2017).
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V. ANALYSIS

1. Stan

The estate contends that the claimants failed to establish 

standing. The claimants based their claim on their remainder 

interests in the property. But the estate argues that they failed 

to offer valid evidence of ownership.

[4] The estate conflates standing with proof of the validity of a claim. Standing requires that a litigant have such a 

personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant 

invocation of a court’s jurisdiction and justify the exercise of 

the court’s remedial powers on the litigant’s behalf.7 The probate code gives standing to purported creditors of an estate.8

Because the claimants purported to be creditors of the estate, 

they had standing to assert their claims.

2. Interestin Prop

The estate argues that the claimants’ failure to offer deeds 

into evidence defeats their claim of an ownership interest. It 

relies upon In re Estate of Olsen.

9

 In that case, we stated that 

in cases involving questions of title, ownership, and right to 

possession in the proof of deeds, leases, and mortgages and 

other instruments of title, the best evidence rule requires that 

the instrument itself be produced, unless a sufficient foundation 

is laid for the production of secondary evidence of the contents 

of such instrument, such as by showing its loss or destruction 

or that it is in the possession or control of an adverse party who 

has neglected to produce it after notice to do so.10

[5,6] But here, the estate admitted in its pleadings the 

claimants’ ownership interests. The pleadings in a cause are 

not mere ordinary admissions for the purposes of use in that 

7 Stewart v. Heineman, 296 Neb. 262, 892 N.W.2d 542 (2017).

8 See, generally, § 30-2485 and Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2486 and 30-2488 

(Reissue 2016).

9 In re Estate of Olsen, 254 Neb. 809, 579 N.W.2d 529 (1998).

10 Id.
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suit, but are judicial admissions.11 In effect, pleadings are not 

a means of evidence, but a waiver of all controversy, so far 

as the opponent may desire to take advantage of them, and 

therefore, a limitation of the issues.12 In the estate’s objection to the claim, it stated that “[p]ursuant to Claimant’s 

Amended Application, [decedent] died in 2015, and Claimants 

owned a remainder interest in the Property subject to the life 

estate interest of [decedent].” The objection next stated that 

“Claimants were the owners of the Property as of December 

31, 2015.” Because of the estate’s judicial admissions of the 

claimants’ remainder interests, the claimants were not bound 

to produce the actual deeds at the hearing.

3. Amount of Each 

The estate next contends that the claimants failed to make 

a proper claim under the probate code. It submits that the 

failure to identify the amount of the claims was a fatal defect. 

We disagree.

The estate relies on J.R. Simplot Co. v. Jelinek.

13 In that 

case, a creditor filed a “‘Demand for Notice’” (demand) which 

stated that the creditor had “‘a financial interest in the estate 

of the deceased and holds an outstanding claim’” but did not 

include a basis for the potential claim nor an amount due.14

We concluded that the demand was “at most ‘notice to a representative of an estate regarding a possible demand or claim 

against the estate.’”15 We observed that the demand did not 

refer to the statute governing presentation of claims,16 but, 

rather, referenced a statute providing that interested parties 

11 Prime Home Care v. Pathways to Compassion, 283 Neb. 77, 809 N.W.2d 

751 (2012).

12 Id.

13 J.R. Simplot Co. v. Jelinek, 275 Neb. 548, 748 N.W.2d 17 (2008).

14 Id. at 556, 748 N.W.2d at 25.

15 Id. at 557, 748 N.W.2d at 25.

16 See § 30-2486.
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can request notice from the court of filings pertaining to an 

estate.17 We further noted that the claimant had earlier filed a 

“‘Statement of Claim’” which “provided a description of the 

claim, a due date, and the name and address of the claimant or 

authorized party.”18

We do not read J.R. Simplot Co. as mandating that an 

amount due be specified. We noted in the facts section of the 

opinion and again in the analysis that the demand did not list 

a basis for the claim or an amount due. But those omissions 

merely buttressed our ultimate conclusion that the demand did 

not qualify as a statement of a claim under § 30-2486(1).

Significantly, the statute governing presentation of claims 

does not require that the amount of the claim be specified. 

Instead, § 30-2486(1) provides that a claimant “may file a 

written statement of the claim.” The statute identifies matters 

that shall be stated: “If a claim is not yet due, the date when it 

will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent or 

unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty shall be stated. If the 

claim is secured, the security shall be described.”19 The statute 

provides that the failure to correctly describe such matters 

“does not invalidate the presentation made.”20

Here, the amount of the claims was easily ascertainable and 

not subject to dispute. The claimants sought reimbursement for 

2015 real estate taxes paid. The amount of such taxes was a 

matter of public record. Karmazin additionally requested reimbursement for rent, and he attached a copy of the leases which 

showed the payment dates and amounts due. The application 

notified the estate of the basis for the claims, and the amounts 

of the claims could be determined with certainty. We find no 

merit to the estate’s assignment of error.

17 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2413 (Reissue 2016).

18 J.R. Simplot Co. v. Jelinek, supra note 13, 275 Neb. at 558, 748 N.W.2d 

at 26.

19 § 30-2486(1).

20 Id.
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Although not statutorily required, the better practice is to 

identify an amount of a claim. Doing so advances the purpose 

of § 30-2485—“‘facilitation and expedition of proceedings for 

distribution of a decedent’s estate, including an early appraisal 

of the respective rights of interested persons and prompt settlement of demands against the estate.’”21

4. Re

On cross-appeal, the claimants assert that the county court 

erred in finding Karmazin’s claim for rent to be barred. At 

issue is a payment made after decedent’s death. The claimants 

now contend that Karmazin’s claim is not yet due or, alternatively, that it arose before decedent’s death. But they advanced 

a different view at the trial level.

[7] Any error by the county court in finding that the claim 

arose after death was invited. In a brief filed with the court, 

the claimants took the position that the claim arose after decedent’s death and that they had 4 months after the claim arose 

to file a claim.22 Similarly, the estate asserted in its responsive 

brief that the claim arose after decedent’s death. The court 

ruled accordingly. A party cannot complain of error which the 

party has invited the court to commit.23 Because the claimants 

contended before the county court that the claim arose after 

decedent’s death, they cannot now argue that it arose before 

her death.

The statute does not authorize a court to extend the time 

for filing a claim that arose after death. Section 30-2485(a)(1) 

allows the court to grant a creditor additional time upon “good 

cause shown” for a claim that arose prior to a decedent’s death. 

But there is no similar “good cause” provision for a claim that 

arose after the decedent’s death.24

21 J.R. Simplot Co. v. Jelinek, supra note 13, 275 Neb. at 554, 748 N.W.2d 

at 23.

22 See § 30-2485(b)(2).

23 Linda N. v. William N., 289 Neb. 607, 856 N.W.2d 436 (2014).

24 See § 30-2485(b).
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Karmazin did not timely present his claim for rent. The 

claim concerned rent due on November 1, 2015. Karmazin 

asserted the claim on July 28, 2016. Because he did not assert 

it within 4 months after it arose, we conclude the county 

court did not err in finding Karmazin’s claim for rent to 

be barred.

5. Real Estate Ta

(a) Timeliness of Claim

The estate argues that Karmazin did not timely present 

a claim for the 2015 real estate property taxes. Those taxes 

became due and payable on December 31, 2015.25 Thus, the 

estate contends that any claim for such taxes must have been 

made by May 1, 2016, and that Karmazin did not present his 

claim until July 28.

[8] Whether Karmazin’s claim was timely turns on whether 

the claim for taxes in the July 2016 amended application 

related back to the claim for taxes in the April 11 application. It did. In the April 11 application, Baumgart stated that 

she and “her siblings owned a remainder interest in certain 

real property, subject to the life estate interest of [decedent].” 

We digress to note that the filing of this claim on behalf 

of Baumgart’s “siblings” did not constitute an unauthorized 

practice of law.26 The application requested a determination 

of “the Estate’s liability for 2015 taxes on real property that 

the Decedent held a life estate interest and received all 2015 

income therefrom.” The July application added Karmazin’s 

name as an “[a]pplicant.” In effect, it joined a real party in 

interest. “Joinder or substitution of the real party in interest 

shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced by the real party in interest.”27 Thus, the amended 

25 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-203 (Reissue 2009).

26 See In re Estate of Cooper, 275 Neb. 297, 746 N.W.2d 653 (2008).

27 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301 (Reissue 2016).
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application related back to the original.28 And because the 

April application was filed within 4 months of when the 

claim arose, Karmazin’s claim for real estate taxes was 

not barred.

(b) Liability for Taxes

The estate argues that the county court erred in determining 

that the estate must reimburse the claimants for 2015 property 

taxes. We agree.

(i) Default Rule

[9] The default rule is that the owner of real property on 

December 31 is liable for the taxes assessed and levied for that 

calendar year. Real property tax liability rests with the owner 

or owners of the real property at the time real property taxes 

are charged, accrued, or assessed, i.e., due and payable.29 As 

mentioned above, the 2015 real estate taxes became due and 

payable on December 31, 2015. On that date, the remaindermen were the sole owners of the real property. Thus, under the 

default rule, the claimants would be responsible for payment of 

the 2015 taxes.

(ii) Lease Agreements

The default rule can be modified by contract. Here, lease 

agreements between decedent and Karmazin provided that 

“Real Estate Taxes will be paid by [decedent].” Due to the 

leases, the county court determined that the default rule did not 

apply. The court reasoned:

It is clear the decedent/life tenant received cash rent 

for crops planted and harvested in 2015. Logic and equity 

further dictate the estate should be responsible for the payment of real estate taxes for 2015. The Court determines 

28 See Fisher v. Heirs & Devisees of T.D. Lovercheck, 291 Neb. 9, 864 

N.W.2d 212 (2015).

29 See In re Estate of Olsen, supra note 9.
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the intent of the parties was for the tenant to pay rent and 

the landlord to pay real estate taxes associated with the 

crop year 2015.

But the county court erred in resorting to consideration of 

equity. We are presented with an action at law, not in equity.30

Thus, equitable principles do not apply.

The county court also determined that logic compelled the 

conclusion that the estate was liable for the taxes. It found the 

leases to be ambiguous. And in attempting to determine the 

intent of the contracting parties, it reasoned that it was logical 

for the estate to pay taxes associated with the 2015 crop year. 

We disagree on both of these points of law.

[10] A contract is ambiguous when a word, phrase, or 

provision in the contract has, or is susceptible of, at least 

two reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings.31

Here, the leases did not specify whether decedent would be 

responsible for the 2014 taxes or the 2015 taxes. But the leases 

are ambiguous only if both of the conflicting interpretations 

are reasonable.

We are mindful of the nature of these specific leases. In 

the absence of a different agreement, a yearly lease of farmland begins on March 1 and ends on February 28 of the succeeding year.32 But the leases here supplied a different term: 

November 1, 2014, to October 31, 2015.

In terms of real property taxation, several dates are important. Property is assessed for taxation purposes on January 

1.33 On or before October 15, the county board of equalization levies taxes for that calendar year.34 The taxes levied for 

that calendar year become due and payable on December 31, 

30 See Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 N.W.2d 

906 (2016).

31 Frohberg Elec. Co. v. Grossenburg Implement, supra note 6.

32 See Wilson v. Fieldgrove, 280 Neb. 548, 787 N.W.2d 707 (2010).

33 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2016).

34 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1601(1) (Reissue 2009).
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in other words, on the last day of the year.35 In counties 

with a population of less than 100,000—such as Nuckolls 

County—the first half of the prior year’s taxes becomes delinquent on May 1, and the second half becomes delinquent on 

September 1.36

One interpretation of the leases is that decedent would pay 

the taxes due or delinquent during the term of the leases. Those 

would be the 2014 real estate taxes. The 2014 taxes became 

due on December 31, 2014, and would be delinquent in May 

and September of 2015—all within the term of the lease.

The claimants proposed, and the county court adopted, a 

different interpretation. This interpretation, premised upon rent 

received for crops planted and harvested in 2015, would be 

that decedent would be responsible for the taxes assessed and 

levied during the lease term, that is, the 2015 taxes. But those 

taxes did not become due until December 31, 2015. Typically, 

they would not be paid until sometime in 2016. Moreover, 

under this interpretation, either decedent would not have been 

liable at all for the 2014 taxes (which became due and, if not 

paid by the delinquency dates, delinquent during the lease 

term) or decedent would have been liable for both the 2014 

and 2015 real estate taxes in the 1-year term of the lease. This 

interpretation is not reasonable.

We conclude that the leases are not ambiguous. Although 

there are two conflicting interpretations of the contract language, only one of them is reasonable. That interpretation 

made decedent responsible for the 2014 taxes.

The answer becomes clearer if decedent’s death is removed 

from the equation. Under the default rule, decedent—as the 

owner of the property on December 31, 2015—would have 

been responsible for the 2015 taxes. And if the leases had been 

renewed for another 1-year term—from November 1, 2015, to 

October 31, 2016—decedent would have been liable for the 

35 § 77-203.

36 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-204 (Reissue 2009).
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2015 taxes, because they became due and payable during the 

term of the lease. With or without a lease, the owner of the 

land would be responsible for the 2015 taxes.

The confusion stems from Karmazin’s status as both a tenant under the lease and an owner of the remainder. As the 

tenant, the lease agreements did not make him responsible for 

the taxes. But upon decedent’s death, the claimants became 

the sole owners of the land Karmazin leased. As the owners of 

the land on December 31, 2015, the claimants were liable for 

the taxes that became due and payable on that date.

Because the estate did not own the property on December 

31, 2015, and the leases did not obligate decedent to pay taxes 

that had not yet become due, we conclude the county court 

erred in ordering the estate to reimburse the claimants for the 

real estate taxes they paid. We reverse that part of the court’s 

order and remand the cause with direction to deny this claim.

VI. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the county court did not err in finding 

Karmazin’s claim for rent to be barred. Because the claimants 

were the owners of the property on December 31, 2015, and 

the leases did not obligate decedent to pay the taxes due on 

that date, we reverse that portion of the court’s judgment and 

remand the cause with direction.

 Affirmd in part and in part 

and remanded with di

Wright and Kelch, JJ., not participati