UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4858

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COREY JERMINE WHITNEY,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,

Chief District Judge. (5:08-cr-00108-FL-1)

Submitted: July 23, 2010 Decided: August 17, 2010

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne 

M. Hayes, J. Gaston B. Williams, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Corey Jermine Whitney pleaded guilty to a three-count 

indictment charging him with drug and gun-related offenses, 

reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 

suppress. On appeal, Whitney argues that the district court 

erred in failing to exclude evidence obtained from Whitney 

during a traffic stop and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

On appeal, Whitney contests the denial of his 

suppression motion. We review the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 

United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004). 

And, “[b]ecause the district court denied the motion to 

suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the government.” Id.

The evidence in this case showed that, on September 

14, 2007, Agent John Canady and Lieutenant Angela Bryan of the 

Johnston County, North Carolina, Sheriff’s Department were 

traveling in an unmarked vehicle on Highway 42 East between the 

towns of Clayton and Wilson. Shortly after noon, Agent Canady 

passed a black Cadillac Escalade driving the opposite direction; 

when Agent Canady looked back at the Escalade in his side-view 

mirror, he saw a dark spot where the license plate should be and 
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could not tell if the vehicle had a proper license plate. Agent 

Canady turned around his vehicle and, after several minutes, 

caught up with the Escalade. From that vantage point, Agent 

Canady saw that the Escalade did, in fact, have a license plate. 

Agent Canady called in the license plate and learned that it 

belonged to a 2001 Lexus. Agent Canady also observed that the 

license plate was covered by a plastic cover. At that point, 

Agent Canady activated his blue lights and siren and effected a 

traffic stop of the Escalade.

Agent Canady, who was in plainclothes, approached the 

vehicle and asked the driver, Corey Jermine Whitney, for his 

identification and vehicle registration. Whitney provided Agent 

Canady with appropriate paperwork, showing that he had purchased 

the vehicle in August 2007 and had legally transferred the 

license plate from his wife’s 2001 Lexus to the Escalade. Agent 

Canady took Whitney’s license back to the police vehicle to 

check its validity and any outstanding warrants. Thereafter, 

Agent Canady returned Whitney’s license but, as was his 

practice, asked Whitney to step out of the vehicle so that he 

could show Whitney the tinted license plate cover that Whitney

would need to remove when he returned home.

While they were at the back of the Escalade, Agent 

Canady asked if Whitney had any weapons on his person. Whitney 

responded that he did not and consented to a search of his
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person. Agent Canady felt a large bulge in both of Whitney’s 

front pants pockets, and Whitney revealed that he was carrying 

roughly $3000 in cash in his pockets. Agent Canady observed

that Whitney was nervous and could see him breathing hard. 

Agent Canady also noticed the veins in Whitney’s neck pulsating 

slightly. At that point, Lieutenant Bryan asked for consent to 

search the Escalade. Whitney refused consent and, thereafter, 

the officers requested a canine unit be dispatched to the scene. 

The canine unit arrived several minutes later; during a sweep of 

the Escalade, the canine alerted on the driver’s and passenger’s 

sides of the vehicle. A search of those areas revealed a 

plastic bag containing crack cocaine and a clear plastic bag 

containing marijuana in one compartment of the center console. 

In another compartment in the center console, Agent Canady found 

a Rossi .357 caliber handgun and a purple Crown Royal bag 

containing powder cocaine, marijuana, and a digital scale.

Thereafter, a federal grand jury in the Eastern 

District of North Carolina indicted Whitney, charging him with 

possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (2006); possession 

with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base 

and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006); and 
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possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).

Whitney filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

obtained during the traffic stop and, following an evidentiary 

hearing, a magistrate judge issued a written Report and 

Recommendation that recommended denying the motion to suppress. 

In reaching this recommendation, the magistrate judge first 

concluded that the traffic stop ended when Agent Canady returned 

Whitney’s license, even though he then asked Whitney to exit the 

vehicle. The magistrate judge further found that Whitney was 

re-seized when the canine unit was called but, at that point, 

Agent Canady had reasonable suspicion to seize Whitney because 

of the $3000 in his pockets and his nervous demeanor.

Whitney filed timely objections to the magistrate 

judge’s Report and Recommendation and, following a de novo

review, the district court adopted the Report. Whitney then

entered into a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), pleading guilty to the 

indictment while reserving the right to appeal the denial of the 

suppression motion. The district court ultimately sentenced 

Whitney to 120 months' imprisonment, and Whitney noted a timely 

appeal.
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II.

On appeal, Whitney makes two separate arguments. 

First, Whitney contends that Agent Canady illegally prolonged 

the stop by returning Whitney’s identification but then 

requesting that he exit the vehicle to look at the license 

plate. According to Whitney, at the time Agent Canady decided 

to return Whitney’s license and registration, he did not possess 

the requisite reasonable suspicion to prolong their encounter 

and, because Whitney was told to exit the car, the encounter was 

not consensual. In the alternative, Whitney argues that, even 

assuming he consented to exiting the car and the search of his 

person, at the time Whitney refused consent to the search of his 

vehicle, Agent Canady did not possess reasonable suspicion to 

detain him until the drug dog arrived.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “the law has become well-established 

that during a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a 

driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, 

and issue a citation,” United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 

781 (4th Cir. 2004), without running afoul of the Fourth 

Amendment. “Any further investigative detention, however, is 

beyond the scope of the Terry stop and, therefore, illegal 

unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion of other criminal 

activity or the individual consents to the further detention.” 
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Id. The Supreme Court has held that a drug-dog sniff is not a 

“search” as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment. United 

States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983). In order to 

perform the sniff, however, “there must be a seizure of the 

vehicle and, therefore, the person, requiring either consent to 

be detained or reasonable suspicion.” Foreman, 369 F.3d at 781.

Turning to Whitney’s first argument, we agree with the 

district court that the initial traffic stop ended when Agent 

Canady returned Whitney’s license. Under Florida v. Bostick, 

501 U.S. 429 (1991), a police/citizen encounter is not 

consensual and triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny if “the police 

conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the 

person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or 

otherwise terminate the encounter.” Id. at 439. This inquiry 

is “an objective analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” 

United States v. Meikle, 407 F.3d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 2005).

In Meikle, we noted that “we have repeatedly found to 

be consensual encounters” traffic stops in which the 

individual’s license and registration had been returned. Id. at 

673. For instance, in Meikle, the officer had returned Meikle’s 

papers and shaken his hand, and Meikle, who was standing by the 

police car, began walking back to his vehicle. The officer then 

asked if they could speak again, and Meikle said yes. 

Eventually, Meikle consented to a search of his vehicle, 
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revealing three kilograms of heroin. Id. at 671-72. In finding 

the search “purely consensual,” this Court noted that Meikle 

“understood that he was free to leave,” in part because “[t]he 

officer had . . . returned all of Meikle’s papers.” Id. at 673-

74. See also United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 219 (4th 

Cir. 2008) (noting that the act of returning a license and 

registration “strongly indicates that the encounter was 

consensual and that no seizure occurred within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 

872 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding a search as consensual when the 

officer issued a warning, returned Rusher’s driver’s license and 

informed him that he was “free to go” before seeking consent to 

search his vehicle, even though driver was seated in the 

officer’s patrol car at the time his license was returned and 

the questioning began).

Likewise, in United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 

129 (4th Cir. 1998), the officer stopped Sullivan for driving 

without a front license plate. During the stop, Sullivan 

admitting to having an unpaid ticket; after attempting to 

confirm this statement, the officer eventually returned to 

Sullivan’s car, handed back his license and registration, and 

informed him to replace the license plate and take care of the 

unpaid ticket. Id. at 129. The officer continued to believe 

that “something else [was] wrong,” and, after returning 
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Sullivan’s papers, began asking him if he had anything illegal 

in the vehicle. Id. Sullivan started acting nervous, and the 

officer continued to repeat the question six times for roughly 

one minute until Sullivan finally replied that he had a gun. 

Id. Reversing the district court, we found the encounter 

consensual. Id. at 133-34. In so concluding, this Court relied 

on the fact that Sullivan “remained in his own car throughout 

the dialogue,” and that the officer had returned Sullivan’s 

license and registration, “thus ending the traffic stop and 

affording Sullivan the right to depart.” Id. at 133. That 

Sullivan had not been told he was free to go “alone [was] not 

dispositive,” particularly because Sullivan was not coerced or 

physically touched or threatened during the encounter. Id. at 

133-34.

In light of this consistent precedent, the district 

court did not err in concluding that Whitney consented to 

further questioning at the end of the traffic stop. First, 

Whitney’s license and registration were returned to him, a 

significant indication that he was free to go. Moreover, there 

is no indication that Agent Canady threatened or made a show of 

authority to prompt Whitney to exit the car. And, while Whitney 

was asked to exit his vehicle, in Meikle and Rusher, we found 

similar encounters to be consensual even though the drivers were 

not in their cars at the time further questioning commenced. In 
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sum, the totality of the circumstances indicates that Whitney 

consented to exiting his car and continuing his conversation 

with Agent Canady after Agent Canady concluded the traffic stop.

In the alternative, Whitney argues that, once he 

refused consent to search his car, Agent Canady lacked 

reasonable suspicion to detain Whitney until a drug dog arrived 

on the scene. In rejecting this argument, the district court 

concluded that the large amount of cash in Whitney’s pockets, in 

combination with his nervous behavior, created reasonable 

articulable suspicion, and we agree.

Under the Terry standard, an officer must have 

“reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” to 

perform a brief investigatory stop. Foreman, 369 F.3d at 781. 

This standard “is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a

neat set of legal rules, but, rather, entails common sense, 

nontechnical conceptions that deal with factual and practical 

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 

persons, not legal technicians, act.” Id. Reasonable suspicion 

“is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a 

showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” 

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).

We have previously indicated that a motorist’s extreme 

nervousness could help provide reasonable suspicion. See

Foreman, 369 F.3d at 785 (citing United States v. Lebrun, 261 
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F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2001)). In addition, courts have found 

that carrying large sums of cash can create reasonable 

suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 8-9 

(1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that discovery of $2000 in cash 

during traffic stop supported determination of reasonable 

suspicion and justified a brief period of further detention); 

Conrod v. Davis, 120 F.3d 92, 97 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding 

that discovery of $6000 cash in individual’s pocket and $4000 in 

suitcase furnished reasonable suspicion).

Accordingly, given Whitney’s nervous demeanor and the 

large amount of cash found in his pockets, Agent Canady 

possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Whitney for 

a short period until the canine unit arrived.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's 

judgment is affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the Court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED