UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RAUL OLIVEROS-BALLON,

Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

SF-0752-15-0615-I-1

DATE: April 15, 2016

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Linda A. Albers, Esquire, Laguna Hills, California, for the appellant.

Scott L. Zielinski, Esquire, Long Beach, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

affirmed the agency’s removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this 

one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; 

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation 

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative 

 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were 

not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and 

the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence 

or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not 

available when the record closed. See title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this 

appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 

1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition 

for review and AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Effective May 30, 2015, the agency removed the appellant from his 

Supervisor of Customer Services position based on a charge of unacceptable 

conduct. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 15. The agency based its charge on 

eight specifications that alleged, among other things, that the appellant made 

inappropriate remarks to five female subordinate employees. Id. at 24-25. For 

example, the appellant allegedly told an employee that he would be willing to 

help her cheat on her husband, and informed a different employee that she could 

have a day off in exchange for being “a little unprofessional.” Id. He also 

allegedly touched an employee’s back and squeezed her shoulder. Id. at 24. The 

appellant appealed his removal to the Board and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 

at 1-5. He disputed the agency’s charge and the reasonableness of the imposed 

penalty, and alleged that the agency failed to follow its investigation procedures. 

IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 13 at 2-4, 7-15.

¶3 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision 

affirming the removal action. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 12. The 

administrative judge sustained seven of the eight specifications of the 

unacceptable conduct charge, found a nexus between the sustained misconduct 

and the efficiency of the service, and determined that the penalty of removal was 
3

within the bounds of reasonableness. ID at 4-11. He further found that the 

appellant failed to prove the affirmative defense of harmful procedural error or 

establish a disparate penalties claim. ID at 8, 10-11. 

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) 

File, Tab 1. The agency has responded in opposition. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The agency proved its charge of unacceptable conduct. 

¶5 On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that 

the agency proved its charge, raising the following arguments: (1) the agency and 

the administrative judge improperly used prior bad acts to sustain the charge, in 

violation of Rule 404(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (2) the 

administrative judge erred in relying on the testimony of the five complaining 

witnesses (complainants) in finding that the agency proved its charge. As 

discussed below, we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the agency 

proved the charge. ID at 8; see Burroughs v. Department of the Army, 918 F.2d 

170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that, where more than one event or factual 

specification supports a single charge, proof of one or more, but not all, of the 

supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge). 

¶6 Regarding the appellant’s argument that the agency and the administrative 

judge improperly used prior bad acts to sustain the charge in violation of the

Federal Rules of Evidence, PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 6, 13, we note that the Board 

uses the Federal Rules of Evidence as nonbinding guidance, Social Security 

Administration v. Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 35 (2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 526

(Fed. Cir. 2011). Rule 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 

other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 

particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Here, 

however, the agency did not use the appellant’s prior bad acts to prove his 

character, but charged him with those acts. IAF, Tab 4 at 24-25. He has not 
4

provided any further explanation why he believes the agency is precluded from 

basing its charge on multiple specifications of misconduct.

¶7 On review, the appellant also disputes the administrative judge’s finding 

that the complainants were more credible than him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 8-12; 

ID at 3. Specifically, the administrative judge found that the complainants

described remarkably similar incidents and found no evidence that they were 

friends, worked closely together, or discussed the incidents with each other. ID 

at 3. He also found that it was implausible that one of the complainants would 

have fabricated her allegations merely to retaliate against the appellant for telling 

her to button her shirt higher, as the appellant claimed. The administrative judge 

further found it unlikely that another complainant could have made up her 

allegations so quickly after the incident and presented it so convincingly to a 

coworker. ID at 3-4. While the administrative judge found the complainants

testified vividly and consistently with their previous statements, he found the 

appellant only offered perfunctory denials. Id.

¶8 The Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s credibility 

determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the observation of 

the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing. Haebe v. Department of 

Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, the administrative judge

heard live testimony and based his credibility determinations on the demeanor of 

the witnesses. ID at 3-8. Thus, the Board may overturn such determinations only 

if it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. 

¶9 For the following reasons, we find that the appellant’s allegations do not 

provide a sufficiently sound reason to overturn the administrative judge’s 

credibility determinations. 2

 See Rapp v. Office of Personnel 

 2 The appellant argues that the administrative judge was biased and abused his 

discretion in finding the complainants’ testimony more credible than his own testimony. 

PFR File, Tab 1 at 8, 14. Because we find that the administrative judge properly made 

demeanor-based credibility determinations, we also find that the appellant has not 

established that the administrative judge was biased or abused his discretion. See 
5

Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 13 (2008) (finding that a sufficiently sound 

reason to overturn a credibility determination is when the administrative judge’s 

findings are incomplete, inconsistent with the weight of the evidence, and do not 

reflect the record as a whole). 

¶10 The appellant alleges that the administrative judge arbitrarily discredited his 

testimony because it was “perfunctory,” and credited the complainants’ testimony 

because it was “vivid.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 8, 13; ID at 3-8. He argues that his 

style of communication is due to his military background and the administrative 

judge should not have used it to assess his credibility. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. He 

also cites to a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Gee 

Chee On v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 1958), for the proposition that 

“a court may not arbitrarily reject the testimony of a witness whose testimony 

appears credible.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. The Board has held that an 

administrative judge must consider the demeanor of a witness when making a 

credibility determination. Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 

458, 462 (1987). We find that the administrative judge properly considered the 

manner in which the testimony was delivered in making his demeanor-based 

credibility determinations. See id. at 462 (finding that “demeanor” constitutes the 

carriage, behavior, manner, and appearance of a witness during testimony).

¶11 The appellant also claims that the administrative judge failed to consider his 

background as a “former Marine” and a “family man” and his “good employment 

record” in determining the credibility of his testimony. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. 

However, an administrative judge is not required to consider these factors when 

making a credibility determination. See Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458 (setting forth 

the factors that an administrative judge must consider in making a credibility 

determination).

 

Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980) (finding that a 

party making a claim of bias against an administrative judge must overcome the 

presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators).
6

¶12 Additionally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to 

consider evidence that undermines the credibility of the complainants’ testimony. 

First, he disputes the administrative judge’s finding that there was no evidence 

that the complainants were friends, worked closely together, or discussed their 

allegations with each other. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 11; ID at 3. The appellant

claims that the administrative judge overlooked evidence that the complainants 

had the same work shift and worked at the same facility. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. 

Because the administrative judge’s finding that the complainants were credible is 

consistent with the record, we find that the appellant’s mere conjecture that the 

complainants might have communicated together before they testified does not 

provide a sufficiently sound reason to disturb the administrative judge’s 

credibility determinations. IAF, Tab 16, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD)

(testimony of B.F.) (00:25:20-00:25:53), (testimony of proposing official)

(00:11:07-00:12:43). 

¶13 Next, the appellant alleges that the administrative judge violated Rule 608 

of the Federal Rules of Evidence in failing to consider character evidence that 

reflected the complainants’ untruthfulness. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, 9, 14. 

Rule 608(b) permits extrinsic impeachment evidence of bad acts not involving 

criminal convictions when the bad acts involved dishonesty. Wright v. U.S. 

Postal Service, 84 M.S.P.R. 607, ¶ 10 (1999). The Board also requires that an 

administrative judge consider character evidence when making credibility 

determinations. Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458-59. Here, however, the appellant did 

not present any character evidence. Although two complainants testified 

regarding their attendance issues that resulted in formal and informal discipline, 

HCD (testimony of B.F.) (00:23:42-00:24:25), (testimony of B.C.)

(00:15:35-00:16:10), and one complainant testified about her emotional outburst 

against the appellant that resulted in a letter of warning, HCD (testimony of 

C.M.) (00:07:20-00:09:30), none of their testimony indicated that their acts 

involved dishonesty. 
7

¶14 Further, the appellant alleged in his written response to the proposal notice 

that all the complainants had prior acts of misconduct or attendance problems, but 

he did not submit any documentation showing that they had a capacity for 

untruthfulness. IAF, Tab 4 at 22-23. To the extent the appellant is arguing that 

the administrative judge failed to consider the complainants’ bias against the 

appellant because he previously had disciplined them as their supervisor, we 

disagree. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 14. The administrative judge explicitly 

considered the complainants’ potential bias in the initial decision, but nonetheless 

found their testimony credible. ID at 3; see Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458-60 

(finding that, among the factors to be considered in assessing witness credibility,

is a witness’s bias or lack thereof).

¶15 The appellant also argues that the administrative judge failed to consider 

evidence of the work environment, where “sexually vulgar talk” was pervasive. 

PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10. However, such evidence does not mitigate the 

impropriety of the appellant’s conduct because supervisors are responsible for 

maintaining a work environment free of sexual harassment. Cisneros v. 

Department of Defense, 83 M.S.P.R. 390, ¶ 19 (1999), aff’d per curiam, 243 F.3d 

562 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table); see Lowe v. Department of Justice, 63 M.S.P.R. 73,

75, 77 (1994) (finding that testimony regarding the office atmosphere of sexual 

joking and innuendo was irrelevant to the appellant’s defense against a charge of 

sexual harassment because it would not have mitigated the offensiveness of his 

behavior of kissing, propositioning, and putting his arms around a fellow 

employee); cf. Herrera-Martinez v. Social Security Administration, 84 M.S.P.R. 

426, ¶ 16 (1999) (finding that, although condonation of behavior in the workplace 

may be a factor mitigating the penalty, it does not always warrant mitigation). 

¶16 Finally, the appellant contends that the agency should have provided 

corroborating evidence beyond the complainants’ testimony because the agency 

has the burden of proving the charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 8, 10-14. He cites 

to Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 341 F.2d 683, 691 
8

(8th Cir. 1965), for the proposition that “prejudicial error in receiving 

incompetent evidence will not be found unless it is affirmatively shown that such 

evidence induced the court to make a finding which would not otherwise have 

been made.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 13 (citing also Joseph A. Bass Co. v. United

States, 340 F.2d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 1965) (finding that, in nonjury cases, the 

appellate court only will reverse on the basis of the admission of incompetent 

evidence if the admission of such evidence affected the outcome)). The appellant 

alleges that the case was “essentially decided on the incompetent evidence of 

complainant’s [sic] testimony.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. He argues that the 

complainants’ testimony was incompetent because it was not corroborated by 

other evidence. Id. at 13. The appellant, however, does not support his 

arguments that a lack of corroborating evidence renders the complainants’ 

testimony inadmissible or incompetent, or that the administrative judge cannot 

sustain the agency’s specifications based on the hearing testimony. Further, the 

agency corroborated the complainants’ testimony by calling two witnesses who 

learned of the appellant’s conduct from the complainants. HCD (testimony of 

L.L.), (testimony of H.G.); ID at 3-4.

¶17 Based on the foregoing, we find that the appellant’s arguments on review 

provide no reason for disturbing the administrative judge’s finding that the 

agency proved its charge of unacceptable conduct.

The appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense.

¶18 The appellant argues that the agency’s investigation was flawed and the 

agency was biased. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-4, 6, 12. The administrative judge 

found that, even if it were true that the agency did not follow its procedure for 

investigating a sexual harassment claim, the appellant failed to show that the 

information gathered would have been different. ID at 8.

¶19 The Board has held that due process requires that a Federal employee facing 

removal be provided “notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the 

employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Alford 
9

v. Department of Defense, 118 M.S.P.R. 556, ¶ 6 (2012) (quoting Cleveland 

Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)). Here, the appellant 

received written notice that explained the reasons for his proposed removal, and 

he had the opportunity to make a written or oral reply to the deciding official. 

IAF, Tab 4 at 24-31. The appellant made both a written and an oral response to 

the deciding official, who considered the replies in deciding to remove the 

appellant. Id. at 15, 17, 22-23. 

¶20 To the extent the appellant is arguing that he was denied a “meaningful 

opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker” because the proposing 

and deciding officials were biased, we disagree. Stone v. Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting 

Loudermill, 470 U.S at 543). The appellant has failed to submit evidence that the 

deciding official was actually biased or that the situation created by the agency by 

its nature established an intolerably high risk of unfairness. See Martinez v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 37, ¶¶ 10-11 (2012) (finding that 

the appellant has the burden of establishing a decision maker’s actual bias or an 

intolerable risk of unfairness to prove a violation of due process and that a 

deciding official’s familiarity with the facts of the case and expressed 

predisposition contrary to the appellant’s interests does not constitute a due 

process violation or harmful error). Therefore, we review the appellant’s 

remaining claims of procedural due process as allegations of harmful procedural 

error. See Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377-78 (finding that public employees are entitled 

to procedural protections in addition to constitutional due process).

¶21 An agency’s procedural error is harmful only where the record shows that 

the error likely caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it 

would have reached in the absence or cure of the error. Stephen v. Department of 

the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681, 685 (1991); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r). Even 

assuming the agency violated the investigative procedures, as claimed, the 

appellant still had the opportunity to present positive information about himself 
10

and rebut the agency’s charge before the deciding official. The appellant has 

failed to show that the deciding official lacked due diligence in adjudicating his 

case. We find that the appellant has not proven his affirmative defense because 

he has not shown that the agency’s alleged errors likely had a harmful effect on 

his removal.

3

 

The agency established nexus and the reasonableness of the penalty.

¶22 Where, as here, the agency’s charge has been sustained, the Board will 

review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all 

of the relevant Douglas factors 4 and exercised management discretion within 

tolerable limits of reasonableness. See Portner v. Department of 

Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2013). The administrative judge found that the 

deciding official considered the relevant Douglas factors and that the penalty of 

removal did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness. ID at 9-11. Specifically, 

he found that the penalty was reasonable given the nature and seriousness of the 

misconduct and its relationship to the appellant’s duties. ID at 9-10; see, e.g.,

Cisneros, 83 M.S.P.R. 390, ¶¶ 19-20 (finding that removal was a reasonable 

penalty in view of the seriousness of the appellant’s sexual misconduct, 

particularly its continual, unrelenting nature, its pervasiveness, its perpetration on 

several female employees, and his position as a supervisor). He further found 

that the appellant failed to establish disparate penalties. ID at 10-11. He noted 

that, although the hearing testimony suggested each of the two alleged 

 3 The appellant argues that he did not receive full consideration of his affirmative 

defense because the administrative judge thought he withdrew it during the hearing. 

PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; ID at 8. However, we find that the administrative judge did not 

make a harmful adjudicatory error because he considered the affirmative defense 

despite noting the unclear arguments of the appellant’s representative during the 

hearing. ID at 8; see Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282

(1984).

4 In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board 

articulated a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessing the penalty to 

be imposed for an act of misconduct.
11

comparators had been accused of harassment, the details of what they allegedly 

did were vague, and there was no evidence that their alleged misconduct was as 

pervasive or serious as the appellant’s. Id.

¶23 On review, the appellant reiterates his disparate penalties claim. PFR File, 

Tab 1 at 3, 14. Specifically, he claims that one of the comparators, who was 

“accused of sexual harassment,” was “only temporarily demoted.” Id. The 

appellant’s broad allegations on review do not provide a reason to disturb the 

administrative judge’s findings regarding the appellant’s disparate penalty claim. 

ID at 10-11; see Boucher v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 20 (2012) 

(observing that one of the factors to consider in determining whether employees 

are similarly situated is the nature of their misconduct). Finally, we find that 

there is a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the 

service because his misconduct occurred at work and undermined his ability to 

supervise employees. See Parker v. U.S. Postal Service, 819 F.2d 1113, 1116 

(Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding that there is a sufficient nexus between an employee’s 

conduct and the efficiency of the service where the conduct occurred in part at 

work).

The documents submitted on review do not constitute “new” evidence.

¶24 The appellant submits several documents on review as new evidence 

consisting of his own declaration, written statements from coworkers, and a 

photograph. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-36. 5

 The Board generally will not consider 

evidence submitted for the first time on review absent a showing that: (1) the 

documents and the information contained in the documents were unavailable 

before the record closed despite due diligence; and (2) the evidence is of 

sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. 

Cleaton v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015); 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.115(d). Where, as here, a hearing is held in a Board appeal, the record in 

 5 Several of the documents are difficult to discern. PFR File, Tab 1 at 33-35.
12

the case ordinarily closes at the conclusion of the hearing. See Ruffin v. 

Department of the Treasury, 89 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶ 6 (2001); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(a). 

Thus, we find that the record closed on September 15, 2015, the date of the 

hearing. IAF, Tab 16. Because the appellant does not explain why the submitted 

evidence was unavailable when the record closed despite his due diligence, we 

decline to consider the documents further. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-7, 10, 14, 17. 6

The appellant’s claims of adjudicatory error do not state a basis for review. 

¶25 The appellant alleges that he never received agency records that he 

requested below. Id. at 4. However, the appellant, who was represented by 

counsel, failed to file a motion to compel in accordance with the Board’s 

regulations. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(c); IAF, Tab 2 at 2-3. The appellant’s 

failure to file a motion to compel below precludes him from raising a discovery 

dispute for the first time on review. See Szejner v. Office of Personnel 

Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 275, ¶ 5 (2005), aff’d, 167 F. App’x 217 (Fed. Cir. 

2006). 

¶26 The appellant also argues that his case was prejudiced because he was 

denied supporting witness testimony at the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, 5, 9-10. 

The appellant had the opportunity to request witnesses in his prehearing 

submission, IAF, Tab 6 at 2-3, Tab 13 at 5, and the administrative judge approved 

all of his requested witnesses, IAF, Tab 14 at 2. Further, the administrative judge 

gave the appellant the opportunity to call a rebuttal witness during the hearing, 

but he declined to do so. HCD (testimony of the appellant) (00:00:35-00:00:47). 

Thus, the appellant has failed to show that the administrative judge committed 

error. 

¶27 In conclusion, we find that the appellant’s arguments on review do not 

provide a reason to disturb the initial decision. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal 

 6 We find that the appellant’s allegation that a coworker provided him with the 

photograph after the hearing does not explain why he could not have obtained it before 

the record closed. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10.
13

Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (finding no reason to disturb the administrative 

judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate 

inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility). 

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to the 

court at the following address: 

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days 

after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 

2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held 

that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and 

that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v. 

Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to 

court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in 

title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. Dec. 

27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United States

Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm. Additional 

information is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of 

particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” 

which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any 

attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board