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SEC Petition Evaluation Report 

Petition SEC-00201 

Report Rev #: 0 Report Submittal Date: May 31, 2012 

Subject Expert(s): Robert Burns

Site Expert(s): NA

Petitioner Administrative Summary

Petition Under Evaluation

Petition # Petition 

Type

Petition A

Receipt Date DOE/AWE Facility Name

SEC-00201 83.14 May 3, 2012 Hanford Engineer Works

NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition

All employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies, and their contractors and subcontractors 

who worked at the Hanford Engineer Works in Richland, Washington, from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 

1983, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this 

employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes 

of employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort.

Related Petition Summary Information

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status

SEC-00057

SEC-00152

SEC-00155

83.13

83.14

83.13

Hanford

Hanford

Hanford

Two classes added to the SEC

One class added to the SEC

No class added to SEC

Related Evaluation Report Information

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility Name

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00057-1

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00057-2

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00152

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00155

Hanford

Hanford

Hanford

Hanford

ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: Robert Burns ORAU Peer Review Completed By: Michael Kubiak

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on File] 5/31/2012

Sam Glover Date

SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By: [Signature on File] 6/1/2012

J. W. Neton Date

SEC Evaluation Approved By: [Signature on File] 6/1/2012

Stuart L. Hinnefeld Date
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Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00201, Hanford Engineer Works

This evaluation report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

addresses a class of employees proposed for addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) per the 

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7384 et seq. (EEOICPA) and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees 

as Members of the Special Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 

Compensation Program Act of 2000.

NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition 

All employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies, and their contractors and 

subcontractors who worked at the Hanford Engineer Works in Richland, Washington, from July 1, 

1972 through December 31, 1983, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, 

occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees included in the Special Exposure 

Cohort.

Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction Findings 

This current evaluation of petition SEC-00201 proposes a class that begins on July 1, 1972 and 

extends through December 31, 1983. For this current report, NIOSH lacks sufficient information, 

which includes biological monitoring data, sufficient air monitoring information, or sufficient process and 

radiological source information, to allow it to estimate with sufficient accuracy the potential internal 

exposures to purified highly-enriched uranium, U-233, neptunium, or thorium to which the proposed 

class may have been subjected. 

The NIOSH dose reconstruction feasibility findings are based on the following: 

In 2009, HHS designated a class of Hanford employees for inclusion in the SEC for the period 

October 1, 1943 through June 30, 1972, thus enveloping two previously-enacted classes. NIOSH 

has continued to evaluate the time period after June 30, 1972 as part of its ongoing dose 

reconstruction and continued data capture efforts since 2009. 

Principal sources of internal and external radiation for members of the current proposed class 

included exposures to HEU, U-233, thorium, and neptunium in the 200 Area and 300 Area during 

activities in support of defense -related research, development of advanced reactor fuels, chemical 

separations of irradiated nuclear fuels, packaging of product materials, maintenance and 

waste-handling operations, and facility decontamination and decommissioning efforts. 

Consistent with previous NIOSH determinations associated with the evaluations of SEC-00057 

and SEC-00152, NIOSH has determined that adequate reconstruction of medical dose is likely to 

be feasible by using claimant-favorable assumptions in the technical information bulletin Dose 

Reconstruction from Occupational Medical X-Ray Procedures (ORAUT-OTIB-0006) and the 

Hanford site profile documents. 
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NIOSH has evaluated the available information and determined that it does not have access to 

sufficient personnel monitoring, workplace monitoring, or source term data to sufficiently estimate 

potential internal exposures to HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium during the period from July 1, 

1972 through December 31, 1983. Consequently, NIOSH finds that it is not feasible to estimate, 

with sufficient accuracy, internal exposures to HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium and resulting 

doses for the proposed class of employees during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 

31, 1983. 

Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), NIOSH determined that there is insufficient information to 

either: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer for which radiation 

doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred under plausible circumstances by any 

member of the class; or (2) estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely 

than a maximum dose estimate. 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal and external monitoring data that may become 

available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed at 

Hanford Engineer Works during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983, but who do 

not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate. 

Health Endangerment Determination 

The NIOSH evaluation did not identify any evidence supplied by the petitioners or from other 

resources that would establish that the class was exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely 

to have involved exceptionally high-level exposures, such as nuclear criticality incidents or other 

events involving similarly high levels of exposures. However, the evidence reviewed in this 

evaluation indicates that some workers in the class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures 

through intakes of inadequately monitored radionuclides and from direct exposure to radioactive 

materials. Therefore, 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3)(ii) requires NIOSH to specify that health may have 

been endangered for those workers covered by this evaluation who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for this class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 
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Table of Contents 

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00201, Hanford Engineer Works .................................................... 3

1.0 Purpose and Scope ....................................................................................................................... 7

2.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7

3.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition and Petition Basis ................................................................ 8

4.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class ........................................................... 9

4.1 Operations Description ....................................................................................................... 9

4.1.1 Operations with Highly-Enriched Uranium or U-233 at Hanford ........................ 12

4.1.2 Operations with Neptunium at Hanford ............................................................... 13

4.1.3 Operations with Thorium at Hanford ................................................................... 15

4.2 Radiation Exposure Potential from Operations ................................................................ 16

4.3 Time Period Associated with Radiological Operations .................................................... 17

4.4 Site Locations Associated with Radiological Operations ................................................ 17

4.5 Job Descriptions Affected by Radiological Operations ................................................... 18

5.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class .............................................. 18

5.1 Data Capture Efforts and Sources Reviewed ................................................................... 18

5.2 Worker Interviews ............................................................................................................ 19

5.3 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data ................................................................................. 20

5.3.1 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data for HEU or U-233 ....................................... 20

5.3.2 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data for Thorium ................................................ 22

5.3.3 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data for Neptunium ............................................ 22

5.3.4 Summary of Evaluation-Specific Internal Personnel Monitoring Data ............... 22

5.4 External Personnel Monitoring Data ................................................................................ 23

5.5 Workplace Monitoring Data ............................................................................................. 23

5.6 Radiological Source Term Data ....................................................................................... 23

6.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class ...................................................... 23

6.1 Feasibility of Estimating Internal Exposures ................................................................... 24

6.2 Feasibility of Estimating External Exposures .................................................................. 25

6.3 Class Parameters Associated with Infeasibility ................................................................ 26

7.0 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00201 ........................................................ 26

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00201 ................................................... 27

9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00201 ...................................................................... 28

10.0 Evaluation of Second Similar Class .......................................................................................... 28
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11.0 References ................................................................................................................................. 29

Attachment 1: Data Capture Synopsis ................................................................................................... 33

Figure 

4-1: Hanford Engineer Works Major Operational Areas ...................................................................... 10

Tables 

4-1: Hanford Engineer Works Development Chronology ..................................................................... 11

5-1: In Vitro Data for Uranium in the REX Database ........................................................................... 21

5-2: In Vivo Data for Uranium in the REX Database ............................................................................ 21
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SEC Petition Evaluation Report for SEC-00201

ATTRIBUTION AND ANNOTATION: This is a single-author document. All conclusions drawn from 

the data presented in this evaluation were made by the ORAU Team Lead Technical Evaluator: Bob 

Burns, NGTS, Inc. The rationales for all conclusions in this document are explained in the associated 

text. 

1.0 Purpose and Scope

This report evaluates the feasibility of reconstructing doses for employees who worked at a specific 

facility during a specified time. It provides information and analysis germane to considering a petition 

for adding a class of employees to the Congressionally-created SEC. 

This report does not make any determinations concerning the feasibility of dose reconstruction that 

necessarily apply to any individual energy employee who might require a dose reconstruction from 

NIOSH, with the exception of the employee whose dose reconstruction could not be completed, and 

whose claim consequently led to this petition evaluation. The finding in this report is not the final 

determination as to whether or not the proposed class will be added to the SEC. This report will be 

considered by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (the Board) and by the Secretary 

of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Secretary of HHS will make final decisions concerning 

whether or not to add one or more classes to the SEC in response to the petition addressed by this 

report. 

This evaluation, in which NIOSH provides its findings both on the feasibility of estimating radiation 

doses of members of this class with sufficient accuracy and on health endangerment, was conducted in 

accordance with the requirements of EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.14.

2.0 Introduction

Both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 require NIOSH to evaluate qualified petitions requesting that the 

Department of Health and Human Services add a class of employees to the SEC. The evaluation is 

intended to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether it is feasible to estimate, with 

sufficient accuracy, the radiation doses of the proposed class of employees through NIOSH dose 

reconstructions.1

NIOSH is required to document its evaluation in a report, and to do so, relies upon both its own dose 

reconstruction expertise as well as technical support from its contractor, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU). Once completed, NIOSH provides the report to both the petitioners and the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. The Board will consider the NIOSH evaluation 

report, together with the petition, comments of the petitioner(s) and such other information as the 

Board considers appropriate, to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on whether or not to 

add one or more classes of employees to the SEC. Once NIOSH has received and considered the 

advice of the Board, the Director of NIOSH will propose a decision on behalf of HHS. The Secretary 

 

1

 NIOSH dose reconstructions under EEOICPA are performed using the methods promulgated under 42 C.F.R. pt. 82 and 

the detailed implementation guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 
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of HHS will make the final decision, taking into account the NIOSH evaluation, the advice of the 

Board, and the proposed decision issued by NIOSH. As part of this final decision process, the 

petitioner(s) may seek a review of certain types of final decisions issued by the Secretary of HHS.2

3.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition and Petition Basis

The current NIOSH-proposed class includes all employees of the Department of Energy, its 

predecessor agencies, and their contractors and subcontractors who worked at the Hanford Engineer 

Works in Richland, Washington, from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983, for a number of work 

days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort. During this period, employees at the Hanford 

facility were involved with defense-related research and development activities, research and 

development of advanced reactor fuels, chemical separations of irradiated nuclear fuels, packaging of 

product materials, maintenance and waste- handling activities, and facility decontamination and 

decommissioning activities. 

The evaluation responds to Petition SEC-00201 which was submitted by an EEOICPA claimant 

whose dose reconstruction could not be completed by NIOSH due to a lack of sufficient dosimetryrelated information. NIOSH’s determination that it is unable to complete a dose reconstruction for an 

EEOICPA claimant is a qualified basis for submitting an SEC petition pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 

83.9(b). 

There are currently three classes of Hanford workers already designated for inclusion in the SEC. 

Two are associated with two previous NIOSH evaluations of petition SEC-00057 (57-1 and 57-2) 

under 42 C.F.R. § 83.13. Together, these two classes cover specified site areas and time periods 

spanning the period October 1, 1943 through December 31, 1968. 

A third class, designated in 2009, is associated with the NIOSH evaluation of petition SEC-00152 

under 42 C.F.R. § 83.14. This class encompasses all employees at all site areas and spans the period 

October 1, 1943 through June 30, 1972, thus superseding the two SEC-00057 classes. This 

encompassing class came about as a result of NIOSH’s ongoing dose reconstruction and continued 

data capture efforts, which confirmed that additional dose reconstruction infeasibilities exist due to 

work with inadequately monitored radionuclides such as purified forms of polonium, thorium, and 

neptunium. NIOSH further determined that there is insufficient access control information and 

worker movement data to accurately assess whether an energy employee, or class of employees, did, 

or did not, potentially enter specific Areas of the Hanford site. 

Detailed information associated with the Hanford worker classes added to the SEC in 2007, 2008, and 

2009 can be found in the respective NIOSH evaluation reports, SEC Petition Evaluation Report, 

Petition SEC-00057-1 (NIOSH, 2007); SEC Petition Evaluation Report, Petition SEC-00057-2

(NIOSH, 2008); and SEC Petition Evaluation Report, Petition SEC-00152 (NIOSH, 2009). 

 

2

 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 for a full description of the procedures summarized here. Additional internal procedures are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 
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The current class proposed in this evaluation report resulted from NIOSH’s ongoing dose 

reconstruction and continued data capture efforts after the implementation of SEC-00152 in 2009. 

NIOSH has determined that additional dose reconstruction infeasibilities exist through December 31, 

1983 due to work with highly-enriched uranium (HEU), U-233, thorium, and neptunium for which 

NIOSH has inadequate information to bound dose. Consistent with the determinations of the SEC00152 evaluation, NIOSH has determined that there continues to be insufficient access control 

information and worker movement data to accurately assess whether an energy employee, or class of 

employees, did or did not potentially enter specific Areas of the Hanford Engineer Works where these 

hazards potentially existed during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983. 

4.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class 

The following subsections summarize radiological operations at the Hanford Engineer Works 

(hereafter referred to as Hanford) from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983 and the information 

available to NIOSH to characterize particular processes and radioactive source materials. Using 

available sources, NIOSH has attempted to gather process and source descriptions, information 

regarding the identity and quantities of radionuclides of concern, and information describing processes 

through which the radiation exposures of concern may have occurred and the physical environment in 

which they may have occurred. The breadth and compartmentalized nature of operations at Hanford, 

which included Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) activities, makes it difficult to identify 

every program or facility where HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium might have been used. The 

information included within this evaluation report is meant only to be a summary of the available 

information. It is not meant to be a complete description of all operations involving the materials of 

concern. 

4.1 Operations Description 

In 1943, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers selected an area of approximately 600 square miles in 

southeastern Washington State for the production of plutonium and other nuclear materials to support 

weapons production for World War II. This area, now known as the Hanford Engineer Works, was 

divided into three major operational areas devoted to plutonium production. The 100 Areas handled 

production reactor operations; the 200 Areas handled fuel reprocessing, plutonium recovery, and 

waste management; and the 300 Area handled fuel fabrication and general research and development 

activities. In the early 1970s, operations began in another area—the 400 Area, about 6 miles 

northwest of the 300 Area. The facility at this location was an experimental sodium-cooled breeder 

reactor known as the Fast Flux Test Facility. There were other Hanford Areas, but they had little, if 

any, involvement with radioactive materials operations. The 600 Area was the general category 

assigned to facilities that supported multiple operations but were not within the security boundaries of 

other major areas (including road systems, fire stations, environmental and weather monitoring 

stations, and Nike missile sites). Figure 4-1 shows the locations of the major Hanford operational 

areas. 
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Figure 4-1: Hanford Engineer Works Major Operational Areas 

To ensure continuing plutonium production capacity, many major Hanford plutonium production 

operations were duplicated. In addition, Hanford plutonium production operations were also 

essentially self-sufficient, containing all necessary support services and facilities. However, both 

initially and with changing missions, some operations utilized facilities and services located in other 

Areas. For example, after 1973 most of the radioactive liquid waste from all Hanford operations was 

transferred to the 200 Areas for processing and storage. 

Plutonium production at the Hanford site peaked from 1956 through 1965. During the late 1960s, 

plutonium needs decreased and many production facilities were shut down. Initial decommissioning 

of many production-related facilities began in the late 1960s and continued through 1990. In 1988, 

the final Separations Plant (PUREX) and production operations at the Plutonium Finishing Plant were 

placed on standby. As production operations decreased, the era of diversification began; Hanford site 

activities related to peaceful applications of nuclear energy replaced those related to weapons. Table 

4-1 summarizes Hanford site development. 
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Table 4-1: Hanford Engineer Works Development Chronology

(This table spans two pages)

Dates Areas Activities

Pre-September 1946 All

Fuel manufacturing (313 and 314), reactors (100-B, 100-D, and 

100-F), and separation/finishing (221/224-T, 221/224-B, 

221/224-U, and 231-Z) facilities completed and operating; 

ongoing R&D activities related to reactors, radiation effects, and 

radiochemistry 

August 1, 1946 All Atomic Energy Act passed

September 1, 1946 All General Electric Company assumes prime site contractor 

responsibility from E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company

January 1, 1947 All Manhattan Engineer Project replaced by Atomic Energy 

Commission

1947 All Cold War Era begins

1947 - 1949 200 Installation of 42 single-shell waste tanks

1949 200 Startup of Rubber Glove (RG) Line in 234-5Z Plutonium 

Finishing Plant

1949 100 Startup of H Reactor

1950 - 1952 200 Installation of 18 single-shell waste tanks

1950 100 Startup of DR Reactor

1951 200 Startup of 242-T and 242-B evaporators 

1952 300 Startup of Physical Constants Test Reactor 

1952 200 Startup of REDOX (S-Plant), U-Plant uranium recovery 

operations, and Remote Mechanical A Line 

1952 100 Startup of C Reactor, Experimental Animal Farm, and Aquatic 

Biology Laboratory

1953 - 1955 200 Installation of 21 single-shell waste tanks

1954 300 Startup of Thermal Test Reactor

1954 100 Startup of KW Reactor

1955 100 Startup of KE Reactor

1956 200 Shutdown of B-Plant and T-Plant; Startup of UO3 Plant and 

PUREX (A-Plant)

1958 200 Shutdown of U-Plant

1960 300 Startup of Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor

1963 - 1964 200 Installation of 4 single-shell waste tanks

1964 100 Startup of N-Reactor power generating plant; Shutdown of DR 

Reactor

1964 200 Startup of Plutonium Reclamation Facility

January 4, 1965 All Battelle Memorial Institute assumes responsibility for 

management of Hanford laboratories 

November 1, 1965 100/300 Douglas-United Nuclear Inc. assumes responsibility for fuels and 

reactors 

1965 100 Shutdown of H and F Reactors

January 1, 1966 200 ISOCHEM assumes responsibility for chemical processing and 

plutonium finishing

September 1, 1967 200 Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company assumes responsibility for 

chemical processing

1967 100 Shutdown of D Reactor

1967 300 Construction completed on High Temperature Lattice Test 

Reactor

1967 200 Shutdown of S-Plant (REDOX)

1968 - 1988 200 Installation of 28 double-shell waste tanks
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Table 4-1: Hanford Engineer Works Development Chronology

(This table spans two pages)

Dates Areas Activities

1968 100 Shutdown of B Reactor 

1969 100 Shutdown of C Reactor

1970 100 Shutdown of KW Reactor

1971 100 Shutdown of KE Reactor

1972 200 Shutdown of UO3 Plant

1973 - 1976 200 Startup of evaporator plants 242-S and 242-A

January 19, 1975 All Energy Research and Development Administration replaces 

Atomic Energy Commission

July 1, 1977 200 Rockwell Hanford Operations assumes responsibility for 

reprocessing

October 1, 1977 All Department of Energy replaces Energy Research and 

Development Administration

1980 400 Startup of Fast Flux Test Facility

1983 200 Restart of UO3 Plant

June 29, 1987 All

Westinghouse Hanford Company assumes responsibility for fuel 

manufacturing, reactor operations, chemical engineering, and 

waste management

1987 100 Shutdown of N Reactor

1988 200 A-Plant (PUREX) placed on standby

1989 200 Plutonium Finishing Plant placed on standby

1989 All Cold War Era ends

4.1.1 Operations with Highly-Enriched Uranium or U-233 at Hanford 

A nuclear material safeguards audit of Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL, predecessor to PNNL) 

performed for FY 1973 showed a total inventory of 7.5E6 grams of enriched uranium held in PNL 

programs at Hanford (PNL-D-1242). This was government-owned material. There was additional 

enriched uranium that was privately-owned. It is emphasized that the data provided are for enriched 

uranium and should not be construed as representing solely HEU. Enriched uranium was held by 14 

organizations, including Metallurgy Development and Fuels Design and Development. 

In addition to enriched uranium, the FY 1973 audit showed an inventory of U-233 which was held by 

five organizations. These included Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) Storage, Plutonium 

Recycle Critical Facility (PRCF) Nuclear Experiments, and Chemical Technology. The U-233

inventory data do not necessarily reflect separated material. Material that is a constituent of another 

medium (e.g., irradiated fuel) is also represented. 

The nuclear materials safeguards audit of PNL for FY 1974 showed a total enriched uranium 

inventory of greater than 2.8E6 grams held in 12 organizations. Seven of these held inventories were 

more than 1 kg. The FY 1974 inventory showed a total of 7,333 grams of U-233 held in four 

organizations. The large majority of this material (> 7 kg) was held by the Nuclear Experiments 

group (PNL-D-1241). 
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Work with HEU at Hanford during the period July 1, 1972 – December 31, 1983 included 

defense-related metallurgical research activities at the 231-Z facility, located in the 200 West Area. A 

former DOE accountability officer, who oversaw materials safeguards at Hanford, stated that 231-Z 

handled "every flavor" of uranium, though not much U-233 (Personal Communication, 2011k). A 

PNNL Security Officer stated that machining of HEU at 231-Z probably took place until 1975 

(Personal Communication, 2011a). A retired metallurgist from Building 231-Z stated that they had 

“huge” amounts of HEU there (Personal Communication, 2011e). HEU was also used in the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant (Z Plant) facility (Personal Communication, 2011m).

Work with HEU also took place in the 300 Area. A retired PNNL program manager stated that work 

with HEU by the reactor physics and chemistry groups in the basement of the 325 Building probably 

took place as late as the mid-1980s, and there were a number of other 300 Area buildings where HEU 

might have been used. These included 303-C, 305, 313, 314, 326, 327, and 333 (Personal 

Communication, 2011m). A current site worker stated that HEU was stored in the 324 Building, but it 

is unclear over what time period this occurred (Personal Communication, 2011d). A retired fuels 

development worker said he believed that operations involving blending melts of HEU and 

low-enriched uranium to create medium-enriched uranium took place in the 306 Building in the post1972 period (Personal Communication, 2011f).

In May 1974, a Criticality Safety Specification (CSS) was activated for the 306 Building to cover 

fabrication of approximately 350 aluminum-HEU fuel rods for the Neutron Multiplier Facility. The 

rods were to contain up to 35 wt% HEU having an enrichment of 93.2%. Each fuel piece was 

specified as containing 7.43 g of U-235. The same CSS was reactivated in July 1976 to cover 

additional fabrication work with fuel for the Neutron Multiplier Facility (CSS, 1976).

The two THOREX processing campaigns performed at the PUREX plant in the mid-1960s and in 

1970 generated large volumes of thorium nitrate product solution. This material was stored in four 

50,000 gallon tanks at the 241-WR Vault facility at the U Plant in the 200 West Area. The thorium 

nitrate solution contained an accountable quantity of U-233 (Personal Communication, 2011k). 

Starting in early 1977, this material was loaded into a series of 33 tank car shipments and sent to 

Fernald for processing into a dry product suitable for long-term storage. Each tank car was expected 

to contain approximately 130 grams of U-233 (dispersed in approximately 8,900 gallons of solution 

containing about 11,000 kg of thorium). The first four of the tank cars received at Fernald contained a 

total of 270.3 grams U-233 (NLO, 1977).

4.1.2 Operations with Neptunium at Hanford 

The nuclear materials safeguards audit of PNL performed for FY 1973 showed a total inventory of 

165 grams of neptunium held by five organizations. These included the Metallurgy Development, 

Chemical Technology, and Fuels Design and Development (PNL-D-1242). As with the U-233

inventory data, the neptunium inventory values do not necessarily reflect separated material. Thus, 

the neptunium held by the Metallurgy Development group (for instance) may have been of a different 

nature than that held by the Fuels Design and Development group. 

The nuclear materials safeguards audit of PNL performed for FY 1974 showed a total inventory of 

276 grams of neptunium held by five organizations. The largest amount was held by the Metallurgy 

Development group. The next two largest inventories were held by the Chemical Technology group 
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and the Fuels Design and Development group (308 Building) (PNL-D-1241). Buildings 325 and 329 

were also mentioned as locations where neptunium was used (Personal Communication, 2011m). 

A retired PNNL program manager noted that neptunium was not a scarce commodity at Hanford; it 

was around and they had it as a matter of routine (Personal Communication, 2011n). 

Defense-related metallurgical research at 231-Z included work with alloys containing neptunium 

metal as a tracer material. The neptunium content of these alloys was low; however, the production 

methods were such that purified neptunium feed material would seem necessary. A nuclear materials 

inventory of 231-Z for April 1977 shows neptunium metal and neptunium scrap. However, it is 

unclear where the materials were physically located (it appears some of the materials in the inventory 

were located off site) (Inventory, 1977). 

The PUREX plant was shut down in September 1972 and did not resume operation until November 

1983. In April 1982 (prior to restart), Rockwell Hanford Operations sent a request to DOE to allow it 

to discard neptunium solution containing approximately 300 grams of neptunium. The solution would 

contain neptunium that was held up in PUREX systems that would be liberated during enhanced 

readiness tests (Request, 1982). Side-pocketing of low-concentration neptunium solution from 

backcycle waste streams in J Cell did not resume until 1985 (Accountability, 1988). Neptunium 

followed the uranium product stream in the PUREX process and was present in the waste stream from 

the final uranium cycle. This stream also contained plutonium and fission products. Neptunium 

would be separated and concentrated from the uranium waste stream until about 2 kg were present. It 

would then be sent to Tank J2 for storage. As of March 1988, approximately 12.6 kg of neptunium 

was present in Tank J2 awaiting final disposition (Accountability, 1988). This material was a dilute 

product, containing significant fission product and actinide contamination. In September 1992, DOE 

issued a concurrence with Westinghouse Hanford Company’s recommendation that the dilute 

neptunium solution stored in J Cell be sent to the 200 Area tank farms as waste (Concurrence, 1992). 

The PUREX plant was identified for closure shortly thereafter (in December 1992) (WHC-SD-WMER-350).

Prior to the PUREX shutdown in 1972, neptunium (nitrate) solution purified in Q Cell would be 

stored in glass pencil tanks contained in gloveboxes. The neptunium product was described as being 

emerald green in color (Personal Communication, 2011k). It would be loaded-out into L-10 

containers for shipment to Savannah River Site (SRS). Shipments would be made whenever the 

pencil tanks got full. A current site worker described a practice where workers loading the purified 

neptunium solution into product receiver cans would top the containers off by manually ladling-in the 

solution (Personal Communication, 2011d). A retired accountability officer said he was unaware of 

this practice (Personal Communication, 2011k). SOP No. 14-28, issued October 10, 1971, describes 

loadout of purified neptunium solution from the measuring tank in Q Cell into one-gallon 

polyethylene bottles at approximately three liters per bottle (SOP, 1971).

Examples of shipments of neptunium nitrate solution to SRS in the period under evaluation include a 

shipment of 54 bottles on October 31, 1972, and a shipment of seven bottles on December 12, 1972. 

The October 31 shipment totaled 184 kg of solution containing greater than 6 kg of neptunium. The 

December 12 shipment contained 455 grams of neptunium (ARH-2327 BK1). 
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Neptunium purification operations (formerly conducted in Q Cell) never resumed after PUREX 

restarted in 1983. However, there are records of entries being made into Q Cell during the shutdown 

period to perform activities such as glove box work and leak repairs (Radiation Survey Cards, 1981).

4.1.3 Operations with Thorium at Hanford 

Two THOREX processing campaigns were conducted at the PUREX plant prior to the SEC period. 

The most recent of these was completed in 1970. Following sampling, batches of thorium nitrate 

product solution from THOREX processing were pumped to a 2,800 gallon tanker trailer staged at the 

203-A trailer loading facility and hauled to storage tanks at either the 241-WR Vault or the 204-S 

railcar unloading facility (ARH-2127). The 241-WR Vault facility was a concrete vault 128 feet long 

and 66 feet wide. It was located just northeast of the U Plant canyon (Building 221-U) in the 200 

West Area. The facility contained nine 50,000 gallon storage tanks, four of which were used to hold 

thorium nitrate product solution (Vault, 2010). The 204-S facility was part of the REDOX complex, 

also in 200 West Area. 

As of 1976, it was recognized that the thorium nitrate storage tanks at the 241-WR Vault were 

showing signs of deterioration, prompting the need for an alternate management path for the thorium 

nitrate solution. A process was selected whereby the solution would be shipped to the Pilot Plant at 

Fernald to be converted into a dry thoria gel suitable for long-term storage. In January 1977, a total of 

33 tank car shipments were planned over a two-year period at a rate of about two shipments per 

month. Fourteen shipments were scheduled in 1977, 18 in 1978, and a final shipment in 1979. The 

33 shipments were to total 222,760 gallons of solution containing 349.9 metric tons of thorium. The 

shipments began in March 1977. Each tank car contained an average of 8,900 gallons of Th(NO3)4

solution containing about 11 metric tons (11,000 kg) of thorium (Thorium Shipping, 1976; FEMP 

History, 1997; NLO, 1977; Authorization, 1977).

There is a procedure dated November 13, 1978 addressing general clean-up of the 241-WR Vault cells 

and flushing of the four tanks that held the thorium nitrate solution (Vault Cleanup, 1978). There is 

another procedure dated October 4, 1978 for flushing the thorium nitrate tanks at the 204-S facility, 

where the product solution was transferred into railcars for shipment to Fernald (Flushing, 1978). 

Other examples of post-1972 thorium-handling operations at Hanford noted in historical 

accountability data include a tank car shipment of thorium nitrate to Fernald on May 25, 1973 that 

contained 10.3 kg of thorium, and a shipment of PuO2-UO2-ThO2 scrap to LANL on August 8, 1974 

(Shipping, 1973; ARH-2327 BK1). Seven drums containing a total of 533 kg of thorium oxide were 

shipped from Hanford to Fernald in September 1980 (Shipping, 1980).

Work with thorium in the 300 Area during the period under evaluation included reactor fuels research 

involving thorium oxide powders (thoria). In August 1978, construction began on the Thorium Oxide 

Fuel Development Laboratory (TOFDL) in Building 306-W. The TOFDL was completed in 

mid-1979, but reactor fuel research with thorium oxide powders was already going on in 306-W and 

in the 325 Building (PNL-2549; PNL-2973). Also, there was a criticality safety specification issued 

on October 22, 1971 for “machining, handling, and storage of enriched uranium or thorium up to 5 

wt% U-235” at the 306 Building (CSS, 1971).
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A memo titled “Excess Thorium Oxide” dated April 13, 1977 states that PNL has approximately 609 

kg of thorium oxide contained in 17 drums at 209 East (the Critical Mass Laboratory). PNL requested 

that the material be reserved for possible use in a potential alternate fuel cycle study (Excess, 1977). 

A memo dated May 25, 1979 mentions that an initial shipment of U-233/thorium fuel rods was 

expected at the 209-E Building (Critical Mass Laboratory) in August 1979 (Rods, 1979).

4.2 Radiation Exposure Potential from Operations 

This evaluation responds to a petition based on NIOSH determining that internal radiation exposures 

could not be reconstructed for a dose reconstruction referred to NIOSH by the Department of Labor 

(DOL). As such, it is not necessary for NIOSH to fully evaluate the feasibility of reconstructing 

external radiation exposures for the class of workers covered by this report; this report concentrates on 

the relevant aspects of internal exposures and internal exposure monitoring during the specified time 

period. 

The potential for internal and external HEU, U-233, thorium, and neptunium radiation doses 

associated with this evaluation existed at the 200 and 300 Areas. Based on the site operations outlined 

in Section 4.1 and its subsections, sources of internal exposure relevant to this SEC evaluation 

included inhalation, and possible ingestion, of HEU, U-233, thorium, and neptunium during hands-on 

and remote activities in support of weapons-related research, development of advanced reactor fuels, 

chemical separations of irradiated nuclear fuels, packaging of product materials, maintenance and 

waste-handling operations, and facility decontamination and decommissioning efforts. Examples of 

such internal exposures are: 

Potential HEU Exposures 

200 Area: As presented in Section 4.1.1, HEU was used in defense-related research activities 

performed in the 231-Z facility in the 200 West Area until those operations ceased in FY 1977. 

However, a precise date when the potential for HEU intakes no longer existed cannot be 

established given subsequent facility clean-up activities and the fact that much of the equipment 

used in defense-related research activities remained in place throughout the period under 

evaluation (to the end of 1983). 

300 Area: As presented in Section 4.1.1, multiple reactor fuel research and fabrication projects 

involving HEU took place in the 300 Area during Hanford’s operational history. Precise start and 

end dates for projects involving HEU in the 300 Area are not known, but chest count data for 

U-235 are seen for 300 Area workers through 1983. 

Potential Neptunium Exposures 

200 Area: As presented in Section 4.1.2, neptunium was used in defense-related research activities 

performed in the 231-Z facility in the 200 West Area until those operations ceased in FY 1977. 

However, a precise date when the potential for neptunium intakes no longer existed cannot be 

established given subsequent facility clean-up activities and the fact that much of the equipment 

used in defense-related research activities remained in place throughout the SEC evaluation 

period. 
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Potential Thorium Exposures 

200 Area: As presented in Section 4.1.3, a substantial quantity of thorium nitrate solution was 

stored in the 241-WR Vault and 204-S facilities and shipped to Fernald. These shipments 

continued through 1978. Procedures for vault clean-up and tank-flushing operations imply that 

these activities were performed post-1978 after the transfer project was complete. An earlier tank 

car shipment of thorium nitrate to Fernald took place in May 1973, and seven drums containing 

533 kg of thorium oxide were shipped to Fernald in September 1980. Work with thorium oxide 

fuels at the Critical Mass Laboratory (Building 209-E) in the mid-to-late 1970s is also indicated. 

The Hanford Radiological Exposure database shows sporadic chest counts for Th-232 for workers 

in both the 200 East and 200 West Areas in 1983, implying the potential for thorium intakes in the 

200 Area throughout the period under evaluation (to the end of 1983). 

300 Area: As presented in Section 4.1.3, research and development work with thorium reactor 

fuels is known to have occurred in the 306-W and 325 Buildings. This work predates the Thorium 

Oxide Fuel Development Facility that began operating in mid-1979. A 1971 criticality safety 

specification for 306 Building suggests work of this nature was taking place as of July 1972. 

4.3 Time Period Associated with Radiological Operations 

As stated in Section 3.0, in 2009 HHS designated a class of Hanford employees for inclusion in the 

SEC for the period from October 1, 1943 through June 30, 1972, thus enveloping two previouslyenacted classes. Based on its ongoing dose reconstruction and continued data capture efforts since 

2009, NIOSH determined that work with HEU, U-233, thorium, and neptunium continued beyond 

June 30, 1972, and that only mass-based uranium bioassay data are available until late 1983. These 

conditions complicated the NIOSH assessment of potential HEU, U-233, neptunium, and thorium 

exposures for the Hanford site. NIOSH determined that data conditions and dose reconstruction 

methodologies for the HEU, U-233, neptunium and thorium operations discussed in Section 4 of this 

report warranted continued evaluation after the end of the currently-designated SEC class (June 30, 

1972). Thus, the time period associated with this NIOSH evaluation is from July 1, 1972 through 

December 31, 1983. 

4.4 Site Locations Associated with Radiological Operations 

Consistent with the NIOSH, DOE, and DOL determinations associated with the evaluation of 

SEC-00152 in 2009 (NIOSH, 2009), NIOSH has determined that the Hanford site-specific and 

claimant-specific data available for the time period under evaluation continue to be insufficient to 

allow NIOSH to characterize worker movements between the 200 and 300 Areas and other areas of 

the Hanford Engineer Works during the period under evaluation (July 1, 1972 through December 31, 

1983). NIOSH is unable to accurately assess whether an energy employee, or class of employees, did 

or did not potentially enter specific Areas of the Hanford site having the potential for HEU, U-233, 

neptunium, and thorium exposures during defined periods of time; therefore, NIOSH cannot define 

individual worker exposure scenarios based on Hanford Engineer Works Areas or specific work 

locations during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983. 
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4.5 Job Descriptions Affected by Radiological Operations 

As stated in Section 4.4, and consistent with the findings associated with the evaluation of 

SEC-00152, NIOSH has determined that the Hanford site-specific and claimant-specific data available 

for the period under evaluation continue to be insufficient to allow NIOSH to characterize worker 

movements across the site, or between the 100, 200, and 300 Areas. The data available to NIOSH on 

a claim-specific level are also often insufficient for NIOSH to limit a worker’s potential exposure 

scenarios based on job titles and/or job assignments. NIOSH is unable to eliminate any specific 

worker from potential HEU, U-233, neptunium, and thorium exposure scenarios based on worker job 

descriptions. 

5.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class

The primary data used for determining internal exposures are derived from personal monitoring data, 

such as urinalyses, fecal samples, and whole-body counting results. If these are unavailable, the air 

monitoring data from breathing zone and general area monitoring are used to estimate the potential 

internal exposure. If personal monitoring and breathing zone area monitoring are unavailable, internal 

exposures can sometimes be estimated using more general area monitoring, process information, and 

information characterizing and quantifying the source term. 

This same hierarchy is used for determining the external exposures to the cancer site. Personal 

monitoring data from film badges or thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) are the primary data used 

to determine such external exposures. If there are no personal monitoring data, exposure rate surveys, 

process knowledge, and source term modeling can sometimes be used to reconstruct the potential 

exposure. 

A more detailed discussion of the information required for dose reconstruction can be found in 

OCAS-IG-001, External Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline, and OCAS-IG-002, Internal 

Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline. These documents are available at: 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocasdose.html. 

5.1 Data Capture Efforts and Sources Reviewed 

In addition to examining its Site Research Database (SRDB) to locate documents supporting the 

evaluation of the proposed class, NIOSH identified and reviewed numerous data sources to locate 

information relevant to determining the feasibility of dose reconstruction for the class of employees 

proposed for this petition. This included determining the availability of information on personnel 

monitoring, workplace monitoring, and radiological source term data. 

NIOSH data capture efforts for the Hanford Engineer Works focused on site and DOE databases, 

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), DOE OpenNet, NRC Agencywide 

Document Access and Management (ADAMS), and worker interviews. NIOSH conducted three 

organized site visits in 2010, six in 2011, and one in 2012 in an attempt to gather documents and data 

relevant to dose reconstruction of Hanford claims. NIOSH’s SRDB currently contains over 32,000

documents and subdocuments associated with the Hanford site. Attachment 1 contains a summary of 

Hanford data gathering efforts and documents. 
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5.2 Worker Interviews 

To obtain additional first-hand information, NIOSH conducted in-person interviews with 19 current or 

former Hanford Engineer Works employees. 

Personal Communication, 2011a, Personal Communication with PNNL Security Officer, In-person 

communication by ORAU Team; February 1, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112041 

Personal Communication, 2011b, Personal Communication with Retired 231-Z Worker, In-person 

communication by ORAU Team; February 2, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112043 

Personal Communication, 2011c, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Security Officer, 

In-person communication by ORAU Team; February 2, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112056 

Personal Communication, 2011d, Personal Communication with Current Hanford Worker, Inperson communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112039 

Personal Communication, 2011e, Personal Communication with Retired Building 231-Z 

Metallurgist, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112045 

Personal Communication, 2011f, Personal Communication with Retired Nuclear Fuels 

Development Worker, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 

112052 

Personal Communication, 2011g, Personal Communication with Retired Instruments & Controls 

Specialist, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112050 

Personal Communication, 2011h, Personal Communication with Retired Critical Mass Laboratory 

Manager, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112049 

Personal Communication, 2011i, Personal Communication with Hanford Documentation Staff 

Member, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112040 

Personal Communication, 2011j, Personal Communication with Retired PUREX Worker, 

In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112057 

Personal Communication, 2011k, Personal Communication with Retired Materials Accountability 

Officer, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112051 

Personal Communication, 2011l, Personal Communication with PNNL Security Officer, Followup in-person communication by ORAU Team; September 13, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112042 

Personal Communication, 2011m, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Program 

Manager, In-person communication by ORAU Team; September 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112055 
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Personal Communication, 2011n, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Program 

Manager, Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; November 8, 2011; SRDB Ref 

ID: 112054 

Personal Communication, 2012a, Personal Communication with Retired Building 231-Z 

Metallurgist, Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; January 24, 2012; SRDB Ref 

ID: 112044 

Personal Communication, 2012b, Personal Communication with Retired Critical Mass Laboratory 

Manager, Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; January 24, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 

112048 

Personal Communication, 2012c, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Program 

Manager, Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; January 24, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 

112053

Personal Communication, 2012d, Personal Communication with Retired Chemical Separations 

Worker, In-person communication by ORAU Team; January 25, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 112046 

Personal Communication, 2012e, Personal Communication with Retired Chemical Separations 

Worker, In-person communication by ORAU Team; January 25, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 112047 

5.3 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data 

This section describes internal personnel monitoring data contained in the Hanford Radiological 

Exposure (REX) database. 

5.3.1 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data for HEU or U-233 

Prior to October 1983, the only method available for in vitro bioassay of uranium for Hanford workers 

was a mass-based (fluorometric) method. These analyses determined uranium concentrations on an 

elemental basis and could not differentiate between different uranium isotopes. In vitro bioassay data 

for uranium are available in the REX database for all years of the period under evaluation, but the data 

are not isotope-specific and are not associated with specific areas of the plant or otherwise 

characterized in a manner that would allow differentiation between natural or slightly-enriched 

uranium and HEU/U-233. 

Table 5-1 summarizes the number of in vitro bioassay results for uranium in the REX database for the 

period July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983. Nearly all of the results are for total (elemental) 

uranium, which is consistent with the fact that the uranium bioassay program was designed to monitor 

individuals who worked with natural or slightly-enriched uranium. None of the uranium in vitro

results for 1983 are indicated as being radiometric (i.e., isotope-specific) analyses. Radiometric 

results for uranium are shown in REX for 1984 forward. There are also 19 radiometric results 

reported for samples collected in 1978, 1 for 1979, and 14 for 1982. The distinction between 

elemental (fluorometric) and radiometric analyses is made based on the units code associated with 

each result. Results with mass-based units were considered elemental analyses and those with 
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activity-based units were considered radiometric. There are anomalous entries in the REX database, 

such as those showing an isotopic analyte but a mass-based result, so defining the analysis type based 

on the unit code should be considered tentative. 

Table 5-1: In Vitro Data for Uranium in the REX Database

Year No. of In Vitro Results for U in REX

 1972* 77

1973 65

1974 190

1975 265

1976 116

1977 169

1978 320

1979 267

1980 261

1981 348

1982 303

1983 185

*Beginning July 1, 1972

The REX database contains in vivo monitoring data (primarily chest counts) for U-235 for all years of 

the period under evaluation. Table 5-2 summarizes the in vivo bioassay data for uranium in the REX 

database for the period July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983. Though they are reported as U-235, 

nearly all of these counts are from individuals who worked with natural or slightly-enriched uranium. 

For most years all of the uranium in vivo counts were chest counts. Other types of in vivo counts are 

seen for some years, as shown in the table. The in vivo count data given in Table 5-2 do not include 

wound counts. The REX database shows eight wound counts for uranium during the evaluation 

period: two in 1981, two in 1982, and four in 1983.

Table 5-2: In Vivo Data for Uranium in the REX Database

Year Total No. of In Vivo Results 

for U in REX No. of Chest Counts No. of Other Counts

 1972* 88 88 0

1973 137 137 0

1974 1409 1409 0

1975 4 4 0

1976 774 774 0

1977 876 873 3 (2 whole body, 1 skeletal)

1978 1353 1353 0

1979 1556 1552 4 (1 abdominal, 3 hand)

1980 1618 1616 2 (whole body)

1981 1668 1668 0

1982 1501 1501 0

1983 1412 1411 1 (whole body)

* Beginning July 1, 1972
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5.3.2 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data for Thorium 

There are only 11 in vitro bioassay (urinalysis) results for elemental thorium or Th-232 in the REX 

database in the July 1972 through December 1983 period. There is one record in 1979, seven in 1980, 

and three in 1981 (the years reflect the sample collection dates). 

The REX database contains 16 in vivo bioassay results for Th-232 during the period under evaluation: 

one in 1972, one in 1973, two in 1977, seven in 1979, and five in 1983. The four counts from 1972 

through 1977 were whole body counts. All of the others were chest counts. 

5.3.3 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data for Neptunium 

The REX database contains four in vitro monitoring results for Np-237 for the July 1972 through 

December 1983 period. All four are baseline urinalysis samples collected on September 6, 1972. 

The only in vivo analysis result for Np-237 in the REX database during the period under evaluation is 

a wound count performed on April 24, 1981. 

5.3.4 Summary of Evaluation-Specific Internal Personnel Monitoring Data 

In Vivo Analyses 

There are chest count data for uranium (reported as U-235) in the REX database for all years under 

evaluation. However, the lack of worker location information and the NIOSH determination that the 

majority of Hanford workers who were monitored for uranium labored with natural or 

slightly-enriched uranium precludes using the uranium chest count data for assigning intakes of HEU. 

The REX database contains 16 in vivo bioassay results for Th-232 during the period under evaluation. 

Four of these are for whole body counts performed in 1972, 1973, and 1977. The remaining results 

are for chest counts performed in 1979 and 1983. 

The only in vivo analysis result for Np-237 in the REX database during the period under evaluation is 

a wound count performed on April 24, 1981. 

In Vitro Analyses 

In vitro bioassay data for uranium are available in the REX database for all years of the period under 

evaluation; however, the data are not isotope-specific and are not associated with specific areas of the 

plant or otherwise characterized in a manner that would allow differentiation between natural or 

slightly-enriched uranium and HEU/U-233. Radiometric results for uranium are routinely shown in 

REX beginning in 1984, thus allowing for the assessment of intakes of enriched uranium for such 

samples. 

There are only 11 in vitro bioassay (urinalysis) results for elemental thorium or Th-232 in the REX 

database for the time period under evaluation. There are no in vitro results for thorium prior to 1979 

or after 1981. 
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The only in vitro analysis results for neptunium in the REX database for the period under evaluation 

are for four baseline urine samples collected on September 6, 1972. 

5.4 External Personnel Monitoring Data 

This evaluation responds to a petition based on NIOSH determining that internal radiation exposures 

to purified HEU, U-233, thorium, and neptunium could not be reconstructed. In light of this 

conclusion, NIOSH did not perform an exhaustive evaluation of external monitoring data for the 

evaluation period of July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983. Although this evaluation draws no 

specific conclusions about the external data and the ability to bound external dose for the class under 

evaluation, NIOSH has drawn the following general conclusion: available external monitoring data 

may be used in accordance with existing procedures on a case-by-case basis for the purpose of partial 

dose reconstructions. This determination is consistent with NIOSH’s previous evaluation of SEC00152 for the period through June 30, 1972 (NIOSH, 2009).

5.5 Workplace Monitoring Data 

NIOSH has found no workplace monitoring records specific to HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium 

from the period under evaluation that could be used to bound the dose. There are numerous memos 

that indicate that a workplace air monitoring program was in place in the 300 Area and at 231-Z as of 

the mid-1970s, but little information generated by this program is available for evaluation. Both 

routine and incident-driven air sampling data are seen, but the documentation is intermittent and is not 

sufficient to allow the assigning or bounding of radionuclide intakes during the evaluation period. 

Most of the available data are gross alpha concentrations. No radionuclide specific air sampling data 

were observed for HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium. However, there is mention of an air sampling 

system for the thorium facility in 306 Building in 1979 (Monthly Report, 1979). Limited radiation 

survey data are also seen in miscellaneous memos, but NIOSH has determined that this information is

insufficient for estimating or bounding intakes. 

5.6 Radiological Source Term Data 

The source term information available to NIOSH that is relevant to this evaluation was presented in 

Section 4.1. NIOSH lacks sufficient source term information that would allow it to estimate all 

potential HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium exposures to which the proposed class may have been 

exposed. 

6.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class

42 C.F.R. § 83.14(b) states that HHS will consider a NIOSH determination that there was insufficient 

information to complete a dose reconstruction, as indicated in this present case, to be sufficient,

without further consideration, to conclude that it is not feasible to estimate the levels of radiation 

doses of individual members of the class with sufficient accuracy. 

In the case of a petition submitted to NIOSH under 42 C.F.R. § 83.9(b), NIOSH has already 

determined that a dose reconstruction cannot be completed for an employee at the DOE or AWE 
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facility. This determination by NIOSH provides the basis for the petition by the affected claimant. 

Per § 83.14(a), the NIOSH-proposed class defines those employees who, based on completed 

research, are similarly affected and for whom, as a class, dose reconstruction is similarly not feasible. 

In accordance with § 83.14(a), NIOSH may establish a second class of co-workers at the facility for 

whom NIOSH believes that dose reconstruction is similarly infeasible, but for whom additional 

research and analysis is required. If so identified, NIOSH would address this second class in a 

separate SEC evaluation rather than delay consideration of the claim currently under evaluation (see 

Section 10). This would allow NIOSH, the Board, and HHS to complete, without delay, their 

consideration of the class that includes a claimant for whom NIOSH has already determined a dose 

reconstruction cannot be completed, and whose only possible remedy under EEOICPA is the addition 

of a class of employees to the SEC.

This section of the report summarizes research findings by which NIOSH determined that it lacked 

sufficient information to complete the relevant dose reconstruction and on which basis it has defined 

the class of employees for which dose reconstruction is not feasible. NIOSH’s determination relies on 

the same statutory and regulatory criteria that govern consideration of all SEC petitions. 

6.1 Feasibility of Estimating Internal Exposures 

NIOSH has evaluated the available personnel and workplace monitoring data and source term 

information and has determined that there are insufficient data for estimating internal exposures, as 

described below. 

As presented in Section 5.3, NIOSH has no indication that the Hanford Engineer Works implemented 

routine or special bioassay programs sufficient to detect intakes of purified HEU, U-233, thorium, or 

neptunium until the end of the period under evaluation. NIOSH determined that work areas were not 

associated with bioassay analysis records until 1982, and that only mass-based uranium bioassay data 

are available until late 1983. 

Prior to October 1983, the only method available for in vitro bioassay of uranium for Hanford workers 

was a mass-based (fluorometric) method. These analyses determined uranium concentrations on an 

elemental basis, could not differentiate between different uranium isotopes, and were therefore 

inadequate for NIOSH assessment of potential exposures to HEU and U-233. The bioassay data 

available to NIOSH in the Hanford REX database begin to indicate the use of radiometric (i.e.,

isotope-specific) analyses for uranium in October 1983. NIOSH has determined that by the end of 

1983, available Hanford isotopic uranium analysis records are sufficient for the differentiation of HEU 

and U-233 exposures from exposures to natural or slightly-enriched uranium. 

In the absence of adequate in vitro or in vivo bioassay, NIOSH also lacks sufficient workplace 

monitoring or source term data (as presented in Sections 5.5 and 5.6) to estimate potential internal 

exposures to HEU, U-233, neptunium, and thorium in the 200 and 300 Areas of the Hanford Engineer 

Works.

With the initiation of radiometric uranium in vitro bioassay analysis in October 1983, and allowing 

the last months of 1983 for the site’s full implementation, NIOSH has determined that the internal 

monitoring data in the Hanford REX database is adequate to support sufficiently accurate dose 
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reconstruction for HEU and U-233 beginning January 1, 1984. Furthermore, NIOSH believes that 

maturation of Hanford work practices and programs as well as the nature of work performed after 

1983 were such that dose from potential intakes of thorium or neptunium can be bounded with 

sufficient accuracy. 

NIOSH has evaluated the available information and determined that it does not have access to 

sufficient personnel monitoring, workplace monitoring, or source term data to sufficiently estimate 

potential internal exposures to HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium during the period from July 1, 

1972 through December 31, 1983. Consequently, NIOSH finds that it is not feasible to estimate, with 

sufficient accuracy, internal exposures to HEU, U-233, thorium, or neptunium and resulting doses for 

the proposed class of employees under evaluation. 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct internal radiation doses for the 

period from July 1, 1972 through December 31 1983, NIOSH intends to use any internal monitoring 

data that may become available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing 

NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or procedures). Dose reconstructions for individuals employed 

at the Hanford Engineer Works during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983, but 

who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate. 

6.2 Feasibility of Estimating External Exposures 

This evaluation responds to a petition based on NIOSH determining that internal radiation exposures 

to purified HEU, U-233, thorium, and neptunium could not be reconstructed for a dose reconstruction 

referred to NIOSH by DOL. As noted above, HHS will consider this determination to be sufficient 

without further consideration to determine that it is not feasible to estimate the levels of radiation 

doses of individual members of the class with sufficient accuracy. Consequently, it is not necessary 

for NIOSH to fully evaluate the feasibility of reconstructing external radiation exposures for the class 

of workers covered by this report. 

Although this evaluation draws no specific conclusions about the external data and the ability to 

bound external dose for the class under evaluation, NIOSH has drawn the following general 

conclusion: available external monitoring data may be used in accordance with existing procedures on 

a case-by-case basis for the purpose of partial dose reconstructions. This determination is consistent 

with NIOSH’s previous evaluation of SEC-00152 for the period through June 30, 1972 (NIOSH, 

2009).

Consistent with previous NIOSH determinations associated with the evaluations of SEC-00057 and 

SEC-00152, NIOSH has determined that adequate reconstruction of medical dose is likely to be 

feasible by using claimant-favorable assumptions in the technical information bulletin Dose 

Reconstruction from Occupational Medical X-Ray Procedures (ORAUT-OTIB-0006) and the 

Hanford site profile documents. 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for all workers 

for the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983, NIOSH intends to use any external 

monitoring data that may become available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using 

existing NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or procedures). Dose reconstructions for individuals 

employed at the Hanford Engineer Works during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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1983, but who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC may be performed using these data as 

appropriate. 

6.3 Class Parameters Associated with Infeasibility 

As stated in Section 3.0, in 2009 HHS designated a class of Hanford Engineer Works employees 

associated with SEC-00152 for inclusion in the SEC for the period October 1, 1943 through June 30, 

1972, thus enveloping two previously-enacted classes. Through the course of ongoing dose 

reconstruction and continued data capture efforts after the implementation of SEC-00152, NIOSH has 

determined that, due to work with inadequately-monitored radionuclides such as purified forms of 

HEU, U-233, thorium, and neptunium in the 200 and 300 Areas of the Hanford site, additional dose 

reconstruction infeasibilities exist through December 31, 1983. By 1983, Hanford had fully 

implemented isotopic analysis for uranium bioassay. Also prior to 1983, Hanford began populating 

the location fields in the REX database, allowing NIOSH to confirm that the available bioassay results 

for HEU, U-233, neptunium, or thorium are associated with the work areas of the likely highestexposed individuals. NIOSH therefore recommends that the class include the period from July 1, 

1972 (the end of the previous designated SEC period) through December 31, 1983. 

Consistent with the determinations of the SEC-00152 evaluation, NIOSH has determined that there 

continues to be insufficient access control information and worker movement data to accurately assess 

whether an energy employee, or class of employees, did or did not potentially enter specific Areas of 

the Hanford Engineer Works having the potential for HEU, U-233, neptunium, and thorium exposures 

during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983. Consistent with the NIOSH, DOE,

and DOL determinations associated with the 2009 evaluation of SEC-00152 (NIOSH, 2009), NIOSH 

recommends that the class definition include all buildings and all Areas of the Hanford Engineer 

Works during the proposed time period. 

Consistent with the determinations of the SEC-00152 evaluation, NIOSH has determined that the data 

available to NIOSH on a claim-specific level continue to be insufficient for NIOSH to limit a worker’s 

potential exposure scenarios based on job titles and/or job assignments during the period from July 1, 

1972 through December 31, 1983. NIOSH therefore recommends that the class include all workers, 

regardless of job titles or job/work descriptions during the proposed time period. 

7.0 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00201

This report evaluates the feasibility for completing dose reconstructions for employees at the Hanford 

Engineer Works from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983. NIOSH determined that members of 

this class may have received inadequately monitored internal radiation exposures from purified HEU, 

U-233, thorium, and neptunium. NIOSH lacks sufficient information, which includes biological 

monitoring data, sufficient air monitoring information, or sufficient process and radiological source 

information that would allow it to estimate the potential internal exposures to which the proposed 

class may have been exposed. 
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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NIOSH has documented herein that it cannot complete the dose reconstructions related to this petition. 

The basis of this finding demonstrates that NIOSH does not have access to sufficient information to 

estimate either the maximum radiation dose incurred by any member of the class or to estimate such 

radiation doses more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal and external monitoring data that may become 

available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed at 

the Hanford Engineer Works during the period from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983, but 

who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate. 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00201

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.14(b) and § 83.13(c)(3). Pursuant to these requirements, if 

it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, NIOSH 

must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered 

the health of members of the class. The regulations require NIOSH to assume that any duration of 

unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of members of a class when it has been 

established that the class may have been exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If 

the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then NIOSH is 

required to specify that health was endangered for those workers who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 

NIOSH has determined that members of the class were not exposed to radiation during a discrete 

incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear 

criticality incidents. However, the evidence reviewed in this evaluation indicates that some workers in 

the class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures through intakes of radionuclides and 

from direct exposure to radioactive materials. Consequently, NIOSH is specifying that health was 

endangered for those workers covered by this evaluation who were employed for a number of work 

days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for this class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC.
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00201

The evaluation defines a single class of employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses 

with sufficient accuracy. This class includes all employees of the Department of Energy, its 

predecessor agencies, and their contractors and subcontractors who worked at the Hanford Engineer 

Works in Richland, Washington, from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1983, for a number of work 

days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort. 

10.0 Evaluation of Second Similar Class

In accordance with § 83.14(a), NIOSH may establish a second class of co-workers at the facility, 

similar to the class defined in Section 9.0, for whom NIOSH believes that dose reconstruction may not 

be feasible, and for whom additional research and analyses are required. If a second class is 

identified, it would require additional research and analyses. Such a class would be addressed in a 

separate SEC evaluation rather than delay consideration of the current claim. At this time, NIOSH has 

not identified a second similar class of employees at the Hanford Engineer Works for whom dose 

reconstruction may not be feasible. 
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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11.0 References

42 C.F.R. pt. 81, Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule, Federal 

Register/Vol. 67, No. 85/Thursday, p 22,296; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 19391 

42 C.F.R. pt. 82, Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 

19392 

42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special 

Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000; Final Rule; May 28, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 22001 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385 [EEOICPA], Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program Act of 2000; as amended; DCAS website 

Accountability, 1988, Accountability of a Selected Nuclide, D. L. Bouse and D. H. Nichols 

(Westinghouse Hanford Company); March 4, 1988; SRDB Ref ID: 100918 

ARH-2127, PUREX Process Operation and Performance, 1970 Thoria Campaign, R. L. Walser, R. 

R. Jackson, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company; March 1977; SRDB Ref ID: 64807 

ARH-2327 BK1, Historical Data for 741 Shipments, J. G. Murphy, Atlantic Richfield Hanford 

Company, Richland, Washington; January 3, 1972; SRDB Ref ID: 112058 

Authorization, 1977, Authorization to Ship SS Materials, National Lead Company of Ohio; January 

24, 1977; SRDB Ref ID: 43586 

Concurrence, 1992, Disposition of Np-237 Nitrate Solution Stored in the PUREX Plant, memo to J. R. 

Hunter from C. G. Halsted (U.S. Department of Energy); September 9, 1992; SRDB Ref ID: 100961 

CSS, 1971, Criticality Safety Specification 306-2.1, Rev. 2, Battelle-Northwest; CSS for 306 Building 

Specialty Machine Shop and Storage Pad; October 22, 1971: SRDB Ref ID: 100849 

CSS, 1976, Reactivation of Criticality Safety Specification 306-1.17, Rev. 0, 5/17/74, reactivation of 

CSS titled: Fabrication of Fuel Rods for the Neutron Multiplier Facility; Battelle Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories; July 20, 1976; SRDB Ref ID: 100850 

Excess, 1977, Excess Thorium Oxide, memo to U.S. Energy Research and Development 

Administration, Richland from Battelle Northwest Laboratories; April 13, 1977; SRDB Ref ID: 

110474 

FEMP History, 1997, History of FEMP Thorium Process Operations, Robert Kispert, Fernald 

Environmental Management Project; April 18, 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 31337 
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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Flushing, 1978, Flushing Thorium Nitrate Storage Tanks at the 204-S Facility, RHO, PUREX Plant; 

October 4, 1978; SRDB Ref ID: 106487 

Inventory, 1977, Nuclear Materials Inventory, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories; April 1977; 

SRDB Ref ID: 91028, pdf pp. 5-12 

Monthly Report, 1979, Monthly Report – June, 1979, letter to Technical Support File from D. E. 

Hadlock; Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories; June 26, 1979; SRDB Ref ID: 67987, pdf p. 98 

NIOSH, 2007, SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00057-1, Hanford; National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); May 15, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 72279 

NIOSH, 2008, SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00057-2, Hanford; National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); March 26, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 72305 

NIOSH, 2009, SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00152, Hanford; National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); September 28, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 106105 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Dose Reconstruction from Occupational Medical X-Ray Procedures, Rev. 4, 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities; June 20, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 98147 

Personal Communication, 2011a, Personal Communication with PNNL Security Officer, In-person 

communication by ORAU Team; February 1, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112041 

Personal Communication, 2011b, Personal Communication with Retired 231-Z Worker, In-person 

communication by ORAU Team; February 2, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112043 

Personal Communication, 2011c, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Security Officer, Inperson communication by ORAU Team; February 2, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112056 

Personal Communication, 2011d, Personal Communication with Current Hanford Worker, In-person 

communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112039 

Personal Communication, 2011e, Personal Communication with Retired Building 231-Z Metallurgist, 

In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112045 

Personal Communication, 2011f, Personal Communication with Retired Nuclear Fuels Development 

Worker, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112052 

Personal Communication, 2011g, Personal Communication with Retired Instruments & Controls 

Specialist, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112050 

Personal Communication, 2011h, Personal Communication with Retired Critical Mass Laboratory 

Manager, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112049 

Personal Communication, 2011i, Personal Communication with Hanford Documentation Staff 

Member, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112040 
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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Personal Communication, 2011j, Personal Communication with Retired PUREX Worker, In-person 

communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112057 

Personal Communication, 2011k, Personal Communication with Retired Materials Accountability 

Officer, In-person communication by ORAU Team; June 15, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112051 

Personal Communication, 2011l, Personal Communication with PNNL Security Officer, Follow-up inperson communication by ORAU Team; September 13, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112042 

Personal Communication, 2011m, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Program Manager, 

In-person communication by ORAU Team; September 14, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112055 

Personal Communication, 2011n, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Program Manager, 

Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; November 8, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 112054 

Personal Communication, 2012a, Personal Communication with Retired Building 231-Z Metallurgist, 

Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; January 24, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 112044 

Personal Communication, 2012b, Personal Communication with Retired Critical Mass Laboratory 

Manager, Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; January 24, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 

112048 

Personal Communication, 2012c, Personal Communication with Retired PNNL Program Manager, 

Follow-up in-person communication by ORAU Team; January 24, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 112053 

Personal Communication, 2012d, Personal Communication with Retired Chemical Separations 

Worker, In-person communication by ORAU Team; January 25, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 112046 

Personal Communication, 2012e, Personal Communication with Retired Chemical Separations 

Worker, In-person communication by ORAU Team; January 25, 2012; SRDB Ref ID: 112047 

PNL-2549, Safety Analysis Report, 306-W Building, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory; January 

1979; SRDB Ref ID: 112065 

PNL-2973, Thoria Development Activities Annual Report – Fiscal Year 1978, Battelle Pacific 

Northwest Laboratory; February 1979; SRDB Ref ID: 112066 

PNL-D-1241, Nuclear Materials Safeguards Appraisal Survey 55 of Battelle, Pacific Northwest 

Laboratory, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington; 

March 4, 1975 (for FY 1974); SRDB Ref ID: 112059 

PNL-D-1242, Survey 51 – A Review of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Practices, Procedures, and 

Information System (NMIS), U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; January 25, 1974; SRDB Ref ID: 

112060 
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Radiation Survey Cards, 1981, Radiation Survey Cards for Hanford PUREX Facility, cards for March 

1-11, 1981, including cards for Q cell; Hanford; various dates in March 1981; SRDB Ref ID: 109604, 

pdf pp. 13-14 and 17-19 

Request, 1982, Request to Discard Neptunium Solution – Project Number HE-022101U – Request 

Number RR-179, letter to G. J. Miskho (U.S. Department of Energy – Richland) from M. P. Larson 

(Rockwell Hanford Operations); April 6, 1982; SRDB Ref ID: 100501 

Rods, 1979, Monthly Report – May 1979, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Technical Support 

Group; discussion of U-233/Th fuel rods for 209-E Building; May 25, 1979; SRDB Ref ID: 67987, 

pdf p. 230 

Shipping, 1973, Nuclear Material Transfer Report, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; shipping 

documents for thorium nitrate solution from Atlantic Richfield Hanford to Nation Lead of Ohio; May 

25, 1973; SRDB Ref ID: 43561 

Shipping, 1980, Nuclear Material Transaction Report, documents related to shipping thorium oxide 

from Battelle-Richland to National Lead Co. of Ohio; September 17, 1980; SRDB Ref ID: 43554 

SOP, 1971, PUREX Plant: Neptunium Purification Product Handling - Product Loadout to Bottles, 

SOP No. 14-28; Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company; October 10, 1971; SRDB Ref ID: 105830 

Thorium Shipping, 1976, Storable Thorium Product, National Lead Company of Ohio; December 10, 

1976; SRDB Ref ID: 28877 

NLO, 1977, U-233 as a Contaminant in Hanford Thorium Nitrate Solution, letter to H. D. Fletcher 

(U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration – Oak Ridge) from S. F. Audia (National 

Lead Company of Ohio); May 19, 1977; SRDB Ref ID: 43563 

Vault, 2010, Waste Information Data System General Summary Report: 241-WR Vault, GE-HAPO; 

June 4, 2010; SRDB Ref ID: 99781 

Vault Cleanup, 1978, WR Vault Cleanup and Tank Flush, Standard Operating Procedure PO-700-160; 

RHO; November 13, 1978; SRDB Ref ID: 106490 

WHC-SD-WM-ER-350, Historical Tank Content for the Southeast Quadrant of the Hanford 200 

Areas, Rev. 0; Westinghouse Hanford Company; June 1995; SRDB Ref ID: 112067 
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

Page 33 of 48 

Attachment 1: Data Capture Synopsis

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

Primary Site/Company Name: Hanford Engineer Works 

(HEW) DOE, 1942-present

Alternate Site Names:

Hanford

Physical Size of the Site:

The full Hanford site is approximately 586 square miles. 

SEC00155 involves all workers at the Plutonium Finishing 

Plant complex, which is in Area 200 (approximately 60 

square miles and encompasses more than 60 buildings).

Site Population:

The entire Hanford workforce in September 1990 was 

nearly 9,000.

Air sample data, ALARA program, americium and neptunium 

recovery processes, internal dosimetry program reports and 

procedures, chest X-ray requirements, concentration of NP-237 

relative to PU-239, departmental reports, particle size determination, 

dose data from Hanford DuPont personnel applicable to the Mancuso 

Study, diethylentriamene pentaacetate (DTPA) treatment data, 

environmental data, highly enriched fuel program, history of Hanford 

exposure limits, hot particle data, internal exposure sources at 

Hanford, neutron and gamma field surveys, neutron badge data, 

process descriptions, radiation incidents, radiation protection 

standards, radioactive shipment records, reactor power levels, 

retrospective evaluation of data submitted by US Testing, review of 

US Testing annual quality report, safety analysis reports, special work 

permits, stack gas particulates report, US Testing records, US Testing 

audits, feed stock records, N Reactor training videos, fuel processing 

videos, neptunium shipment reports, and trip reports. Personnel 

interviews with former and current site workers have been conducted. 

Awaiting information identifying the material balance areas that were 

under PNNL control, logbooks or lab notebooks created by the PNNL 

Criticality Laboratory, a search of all available systems for the 

Handwritten Accountability System for 231-Z, access to the 360 

degree photo gallery of the 231-Z building, and a listing of 

accident/incident reports prepared by PNNL.

OPEN 5,232

State Contacted: NA NOTE: Contacting the state was not considered necessary since 

Hanford is an active DOE site and cooperates with relevant data 

collection. 

09/03/2009 0

Battelle Memorial Institute Procurement of thorium for U-233 separation studies, material 

inventories, and personnel monitoring record of a former Hanford 

employee.

02/01/2012 3

Cincinnati Public Library (Interlibrary Loan) Radiation safety in the Manhattan Project and environmental levels of 

radioactivity at AEC installations.

07/02/2010 13
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

Claimant Provided Environmental monitoring data, study of uranium losses, in vivo cross 

comparison studies, how plutonium specimen disintegrates under 

pressure, and information on reducing the concentration of 

radioisotopes in effluent water.

08/18/2010 10

Curtiss-Wright Plutonium Fuel Development Laboratory special procedure, packaging 

archive waste containers for shipment, shipping records and orders, 

and methods of separating U-233 from thorium.

04/26/2009 11

Dade Moeller Investigation of personal monitoring film, accidental irradiated fuel 

discharge from N Reactor, radiation exposures of Hanford workers 

dying from cancer and other causes, Hanford historical production 

history of all reactors, separations at the Purex Plant, departmental 

descriptions and organizational charts.

08/11/2008 36

Department of Energy (DOE) The guide for good radiological practices at plutonium facilities. 05/27/2011 1

Department of Labor / Paragon Vitrification of Niagara Falls Storage Site residues, progress reports, 

shipment of thorium oxide slugs, tabulation of Sylvania's outstanding 

orders, disposition of 763 reject Hanford slugs, complex-wide mixed 

waste, and an environmental impact statement.

01/23/2012 28

DOE Albuquerque Operations Office Hazard level classification. 04/15/2010 1

DOE Ames Laboratory Industrial Medicine on the Plutonium Project 1977. 07/25/2006 1

DOE Argonne National Laboratory - East Evaluations of intake and deposition based on bioassay data, meetings 

on proposed high temperature oxide pile, and plutonium scrap 

processing.

04/04/2008 7

DOE Brookhaven National Laboratory Compilation of ambient air monitoring parameters at DOE facilities. 10/23/2011 2

DOE Carlsbad, NM Threshold helium generation reaction rate measurements in FFTF and 

SP-100/SP-2 irradiation test. 

08/12/2010 6

DOE Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) Hanford Uranium Bioassay Program and reference to the 1962 

criticality incident.

01/21/2011 2

DOE Germantown Calculations and poisonous effects of various materials, 

communications between AEC and Westinghouse, procedures and 

policies, oxide fuel materials, feasibility of Hanford to provide U-233, 

fission distribution in uranium oxide pellets, forecast for discharge of 

thorium, Hanford codes, irradiation of thorium, Manhattan District 

history books, monthly material accountability, NYOO uranium 

operations flow chart, organizational charts, radiation exposures, 

thorium as pile flattening material, trip reports, U-233 production, 

waste recovery centrifuge test, and radiation surveys.

05/01/2009 70
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

DOE Hanford / SC&A Incident reports, technical section reports, and a waste encapsulation

report.

09/22/2008 4

DOE Legacy Management - Grand Junction Office Mixed waste oil by Hanford, C and D materials produced at Hanford, 

contract documents, plutonium in soil, production reports, elimination 

of feed production at Linde and Electro Metallurgical, enriched 

uranium account report, extrusion of uranium for Hanford, history of 

refinery operations and site material accountability, Manhattan District 

history, metal requirements for X-10, monthly progress reports, waste 

characterization data and management of radioactive tank waste, rolled 

uranium and fabrication yields, scrap material from Chapman Valve, 

shipment of rods, spent nuclear fuel project 324 and 327 Buildings 

material classifications, Tonawanda progress reports, slug production 

report for AEC including canning, coating, and treating, billet 

requirement schedule, plutonium concentrations in soil, off-site waste 

disposal, and thorium shipment information.

08/30/2011 172

DOE Legacy Management - Morgantown Accomplishments of the National Lead Company of Ohio in operating 

the AEC facilities at Fernald, bibliography of epidemiological papers, 

control technology for radioactive emissions, environmental survey, 

preliminary summary report of the defense production facilities, health 

and mortality study, monthly reports, plutonium content information, 

quality assurance report, activities of the Center for Epidemiologic 

Research, recycled uranium reports, Fernald shipment reports, an 

update of quantity in storage for radioactive mixed wastes, material

transfer reports, and GJOO dosimetry reports with some Hanford data. 

12/01/2011 151
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

DOE Legacy Management - MoundView (Fernald 

Holdings, includes Fernald Legal Database)

Personnel at risk in plutonium-238 operations, re-irradiation of radium, 

effluent information system/onsite discharge information system, 

evaluation of high assay Pu-238 oxide for use in fabrication of plasmafired microspheres, external radiation levels, development and use of 

actinium, Hanford wastes, production machining of uranium, 

incineration of radioactive solid wastes, Battelle occupational exposure 

history, production reports, radiological incidents, shipping 

documents, standard operating procedures, thorium accountability 

documents, U-233 as a contaminant in thorium nitrate solution, 

monthly progress reports, summary of production orders, assessment 

of the health and mortality studies of federal nuclear workers, U-233 

concentration in thorium residues at Fernald, and quality assurance 

activities.

01/17/2011 105

DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Isotopic content and specific activity of pile-produced plutonium, 

radioactive waste disposal and related issues, monitoring of certain 

personnel for internal plutonium contamination, human studies, 

radiological incidents, radiological releases, and quantities and 

characteristics of the contact handled low-level mixed waste streams 

for the DOE complex.

12/13/2007 22

DOE Nevada Test Site Photographs of workers in protective clothing. 04/26/2005 2

DOE Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education 

(ORISE)

Chelation DTPA data for DOE Employees - REAC. 08/06/2009 94

DOE Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Safe handling of unprocessed metal, DuPont employee roster, 

Mancuso Study data, and spills of Hanford material at ORNL.

09/13/2011 33

DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office Paducah hazardous waste disposal, internal dosimetry, and industrial 

hygiene documents which refer to Hanford.

12/22/2011 3

DOE Oak Ridge Operations, Records Holding Task Group Film badge and exposure correspondence, material requirements and 

transfers, Np-237 recovery, and NIOSH researcher notes.

04/08/2011 19

DOE Oak Ridge Public Reading Room Nationwide accountability of source and fissionable materials. 04/08/2011 1
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information

(OSTI)

Ionium, uranium-232, and thorium-228 properties, applications, and 

availability, survey of irradiation facilities, meeting on collection and 

measurement of radioactive air contaminants, preliminary hazards 

report for a reactor experiment at CANEL, a proposed Purex 

Separations Plant study, trip report, Mallinckrodt reports on Hanford 

feed material and cross-checking of samples, zirconium cladding 

information, breeder fuel development, progress reports, laboratory 

surfaces decontamination, film badge modifications, and UO2 pellet 

fabrication.

03/26/2012 28

DOE Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL) Hanford environmental surveillance, ORAU Team project 

spreadsheets, radiation protection procedures, whole body counter 

activities, measurement and evaluation of internal exposure, in vivo 

bioassay methods and sensitivities, preparation of project proposal for 

new rolling mill, and fixed time estimation of counting rates with 

background corrections.

04/26/2011 15

DOE Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Radioactivity analysis reports, air samples, trace element analysis, ash 

results, power results, and sample data unspecified.

09/18/2006 5

DOE Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site 

(RFETS)

External dosimetry technology technical basis document. 05/17/2006 2

DOE Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore Various employee exposure reports. 03/28/2007 1

DOE Savannah River Site Irradiation of thorium slugs, use of pocket dosimeters, progress 

reports, thorium irradiation program, exposure to gamma radiation, 

thorium slug failures, production summary 100 and 200 areas, 

dosimetry visitors cards, polonium production, health physics 

procedures, exposure data for Hanford test badges, Hanford film 

badges exposed in the plutonium facility at the Savannah River Site, 

Savannah River Site lab notebook, a health physics methods logbook, 

monthly status reports which refer to Hanford, thorium and U-233 

reports, and an ORAU Team researcher's notes.

03/19/2012 61

DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Battelle West Jefferson transuranic waste shipments to Hanford. 11/05/2010 5

DOE West Valley Demonstration Project Shipping of Pu product to Hanford, waste processing description, and 

references to Hanford's internal dose assignment protocol.

01/17/2010 4

Federal Records Center (FRC) - Chicago A working group meeting on radioactive waste management. 09/27/2006 1

Federal Records Center (FRC) - Denver Radiation exposure reports. 06/15/2010 5

Federal Records Center (FRC) - Kansas City / Bannister Task proposals for ANL fuel cycle and waste management field work. 08/15/2008 1

Federal Records Center (FRC) - San Bruno Air sampling equipment and procedures at reactor sites throughout the 

United States.

01/10/2006 1
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

General Atomics Nuclear material shipping and receiving reports, health physics 

reports, and Medical Department reports.

01/09/2006 2

General Electric Vallecitos TLD and film badge technical information. 05/18/2007 2

Hagley Museum and Library Activity of DPW-100 slugs, bioassay manual, canning enriched slugs 

and Li-Al alloy slugs, continuous incineration of plutonium-bearing 

scrap, fission product activity, fuel element failures, gamma activity of 

tritium slugs, monthly reports, slug failures, plutonium button 

fabrication, plutonium coupling - neutron monitoring, plutonium waste 

recovery, postum production, radiation readings, reactor shielding, 

continuous monitor for I-131 in stack gases, thorium program, trip 

reports, U-237 in UNH processing, uranium isotope analyses, 

comparison of Chalk River and Hanford slugs, Hanford history, 

monthly reports, radiographic inspection, reactor operation following 

slug failures, report of meeting Battelle Memorial Institute, aid of new 

fuel elements, status of P-10 program, and waste management tank 

design.

10/01/2010 108

Health Physics Society Bioassay criteria for environmental restoration workers. 03/22/2007 1

Internet - Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) Annual reports to Congress, DOE internal dosimetry standard, mixed 

oxide and breeder reactor reports, and a toxicological profile for 

plutonium. NOTE: Documents were added by Site Association 

Review.

01/09/2012 14

Internet - DOE An analysis of airborne radioactivity release fractions. 12/04/2008 1

Internet - DOE Comprehensive Epidemiologic Data 

Resource (CEDR)

No relevant data identified. 05/12/2010 0

Internet - DOE Environmental Management Linking Legacies, Chapter 3 - Wastes. 10/28/2007 1
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

39 of 48

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

Internet - DOE Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval 

System (DDRS)

Alpha hand monitoring, americium recovery, radiological surveys, 

attenuation of a neutron and gamma ray beam, calibrated neutron 

sources and area monitoring chambers, power levels versus Po-210 

production, dosimetry and spectrometry of fast neutrons by radioactivation, dosimetry in the Hanford gamma irradiation facilities, 

double moderator neutron dosimeter, iodine release, sensitivities of 

reactor neutron flux monitors at B Reactor, measurements produced 

neptunium, integrated thermal neutron exposure, determination of the 

radon content of water, neptunium recovery, neutron dosimetry and 

irradiation of solids, neutron flux monitor detector, power and 

exposure levels of Hanford reactors, notes on dosimetry problems, 

production statistics of N Reactor operations, radiation exposure data, 

radiological incidents, safety analysis report, slow and fast neutrons, 

scintillation count-rate and dose-rate meter, monthly and weekly 

reports, thorium U-233 separation, and tritium exposures. NOTE: 

Documents were identified by previous research or Site Association 

Review.

05/05/2011 1,456

Internet - DOE Legacy Management Considered Sites Decontamination and decommissioning of the Westinghouse Nuclear 

Fuel Facility at Cheswick, PA and progress reports. NOTE: 

Documents were identified by previous research or Site Association 

Review.

05/12/2010 4

Internet - DOE Oak Ridge National Laboratory ORNL operations and technical reports which refer to Hanford. 03/15/2012 61

Internet - DOE OpenNet Absorption and translocation by plants of radioactive elements from 

"jangle" soil, human radiation experiments information, air pathway 

report, Columbia River pathway dosimetry report, fission product 

iodine during early Hanford operations, hematological effects on 

heavily irradiated Japanese fishermen, history of the Inhalation 

Toxicology Research Institute, Manhattan District history book, 

monthly activities, products, operations and progress reports, Newell 

Stannard interview, Bikini fall of 1978, plutonium release estimates, 

radiation dose estimates from Hanford radioactive material releases to 

the air and the Columbia River, radiological incidents, a thyroid 

disease study, purchase order, and status reports. NOTE: Documents 

were identified by previous research or Site Association Review.

03/30/2012 85

Internet - DOE OpenNet / Hanford C.C. Gamertsfelder interview. 11/26/2007 1

Internet - DOE OSTI Thorium metallurgy and ORIGEN reports. 05/30/2007 3
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

Internet - DOE OSTI / SC&A A summary of radiation accidents and incidents, 1945-1955. 02/21/2007 1

Internet - DOE OSTI Energy Citations Pinellas Plant feasibility study, radioactive waste shipments to 

Hanford, characterization of Uo-2 and Pu-O2 powders, process 

description for the retrieval of earth-covered transuranic waste 

containers, decontamination and decommissioning information, wrap 

module 1 sampling and analysis plan, monthly activity reports, beta 

treatment of uranium, fuel fabrication and irradiation. NOTE: 

Documents were identified by previous research or Site Association 

Review.

04/03/2012 31

Internet - DOE OSTI Information Bridge Risk of transporting plutonium oxide and liquid plutonium nitrate, 

early reactor waste, contaminated sites within the DOE complex, 

environmental management report, external dosimetry technical basis 

information, americium recovery and purification, monthly reports, 

hazard analyses, human radiation experiments, plutonium safety 

evaluation report, hazards evaluation for enriched uranium-thoria, 

processing E-metal in the 200 areas, production tests, protective 

measures for personnel manual, radiation control standards and 

procedures, radiation survey report, reprocessing uranium -

molybdenum alloy fuels, 300 area history, low-level waste vitrification 

melter, iodine-131 releases, an ionium for radioisotope preparation 

status report, buried waste integrated demonstration program DOE 

complex buried waste characterization assessment, hazardous waste 

shipment data collection from DOE sites, incineration of DOE offsite 

mixed waste at the INEEL, intercalibration of counting laboratories, 

N-Reactor monthly reports, shipment of TRU waste from West 

Jefferson, Ohio, spent fuel background report, summary of the 

environmental dose models, surface radiological investigations, 

tritiated wastewater treatment and disposal evaluation, fuel reports, 

reactor research reports, a stockpile management report, a safety 

analysis report, thoria development activities, and a tank content 

estimate. NOTE: Documents were identified by previous research or 

Site Association Review.

04/20/2012 271

Internet - DOE OSTI Information Bridge / Hanford A fuel element technical manual and a report of a plutonium oxide 

storage container rupture.

10/22/2009 2

Internet - DOE OSTI Information Bridge/ SC&A 324 building closure waste assessment and closure plan, heat source 

processing, and a waste classification sampling plan.

03/15/2012 5

Internet - Global Security Weapons of Mass Destruction Website: Polonium. 09/14/2009 1
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

Internet - Google Radiological surveys, B Reactor museum association history of 100-

B/C reactor operations, separation of the uranium isotopes by gaseous 

diffusion, General Atomics hot cell facility decontamination, monthly 

reports, health-physics, instrumentation, and radiation protection, 

history of the department of nuclear science and engineering, nuclear 

weapons data-book, Project Trinity information, FUSRAP reports, site 

operating report, annual site environmental report, US nuclear 

weapons research, development, testing, and production, long-term 

management of nuclear materials, annual report on waste generation 

and minimization, environmental restoration and management, 

Manhattan Engineer District history, low-level radioactive wastes, 

practices and problems in disposal of radioactive wastes into the 

ground, subsurface behavior of plutonium and americium, summary of 

contaminated sites and initial cleanup work, mission transition reports, 

a timeline of the Manhattan Project, general environmental reports, 

storage of Rocky Flats material, technology trends of DOE sites, and 

building histories. NOTE: Documents were identified by previous 

research or Site Association Review.

04/15/2012 217

Internet - Google/ SC&A The dry cask storage project and planning for hot cell closure. 03/28/2011 2

Internet - Health Physics Journal An airborne radioiodine dispersion study. NOTE: Document was 

identified by Site Association Review.

12/06/2011 1

Internet - Journal of Occupational and Environmental 

Health 

No relevant data identified. 07/20/2010 0

Internet - National Academies Press (NAP) Tank waste retrieval, processing, and on-site disposal at three DOE 

sites and complex-wide improving waste characterization and 

treatment.

07/11/2010 2

Internet - National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) - Nevada Site Office

No relevant data identified. 05/12/2010 0

Internet - NIOSH A beryllium report and SEC Petition Evaluation reports. 01/09/2012 3
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

42 of 48

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

Internet - NRC Agencywide Document Access and 

Management (ADAMS) 

NRC's decommissioning procedures and criteria, environmental 

statement on the use of recycled plutonium in mixed oxide fuel in light 

water cooled reactors, a survey of waste solidification process 

technologies, an evaluation of potential recycling scrap metals from 

nuclear facilities, waste tank remediation reports, waste disposal 

reports, environmental impact statements, basalt waste isolation 

reports, I-129 in groundwater reports, storage and disposition of 

weapons-grade material, storage and leaching from spent fuel, 

improving confinement ventilation systems, special form capsule 

testing, audit reports, quality assurance for waste repositories, waste 

retrieval criteria, and weld inspections of Pu sealed sources. NOTE: 

Documents were identified by previous research or Site Association 

Review.

03/25/2012 194

Internet - SC&A / DOE Hanford Declassified Document 

Retrieval System (DDRS)

Monthly reports, radiation monitoring manual, and a radiological 

incident investigation.

11/05/2008 6

Internet - USACE/FUSRAP No relevant data identified. 05/12/2010 0

Internet - Washington State University (U.S. Transuranium 

and Uranium Registries)

No relevant data identified. 05/12/2010 0

Metals and Controls Corporation, Attleboro, MA Documentation that Metals and Controls supplied fuel to Hanford. 08/24/2004 1

Missouri Department of Natural Resources Individual interviews, history of the St. Louis Uranium Processing 

Plant, and a feasibility study for the St. Louis site.

10/03/2008 4

Mound Museum Plutonium shipments and control, 1949 liquid waste disposal and 

biological research.

07/25/2008 3

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) -

Atlanta

Annual reports, review of the existing reactor confinement program at 

Hanford, assay of uranium by-product materials, contamination of 

express cars (Hanford shipment), Dragon Project irradiations, human 

chromosome aberrations, investigative report on X-ray overexposure, 

list of commission and contractor personnel by professional category, 

Madison Square area monthly accountability reports, employee 

monitoring, monthly progress reports, report on health and safety 

aspects of recycle material, DOE indoor radon study, summary of 

work done at Berkeley, fission of uranium-235 or plutonium-239, and 

product specifications.

05/14/2010 39

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) -

College Park

Handling of radioactive waste materials, shipment of Sr-90 and Cs137, criticality accident analysis, actions related to tank leak, US 

Transuranium Registry summary report, personal notes, thorium 

requirements, fission product distribution, test rolling, and trip reports.

08/19/2010 38
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

National Technical Information Service (NTIS) Feasibility studies of the correlation of lifetime health and mortality of 

AEC and AEC contractor personnel.

08/21/2006 2

New York State Department of Environmental 

Conservation

Nickel plating of uranium slugs at Sylvania for Hanford. 02/25/2008 2

NIOSH Analysis of ignition testing on K-west basin fuel, storage of highly 

enriched uranium, DOE Ohio sites recycled uranium project report, 

effects of rolling on the crystallography and metallography of uranium, 

excretion of Pu-239 in a patient with a plutonium contaminated injury, 

generation and flow of recycled uranium, highly enriched uranium 

working group report, list of classified documents, production and 

recovery of U-233 from thorium, reactor production tests, 

standardization of gold and indium foils and the absolute neutron flux 

determination, technical activities, research and development reports, 

testing prediction capabilities of an I-131 terrestrial transport model, 

worker outreach meeting documents, and USTUR active registrants 

living and deceased.

04/26/2011 89

NIOSH (SC&A) DOE Ohio Field Office recycled uranium report, personnel interview, 

highly enriched uranium working group reports, and generation and 

uranium information.

02/16/2006 6

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Non-Publicly 

Available Records Collection

Documents related to the construction of the military compact reactor. 09/22/2011 1

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Public Document 

Room

Trip and inspection reports, operating licenses, basalt waste storage 

units reports, reviews of license applications, audits of waste disposal 

plans, environmental release assessments, and the transfer of irradiated 

TRIGA fuel elements to Hanford.

03/28/2012 43

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Public Document 

Room / Internet - NRC ADAMS

Comparison of Hanford environmental models. 1

Oak Ridge Library for Dose Reconstruction ORNL and K-25 operational, RALA, and waste disposal reports which 

refer to Hanford, 200 area stack contamination, evaluation of Hanford 

soil contamination, release of radioiodine during metal dissolution, and 

the 1984 atmospheric sciences report. 

06/14/2011 52

Oak Ridge Public Library Construction for Atomic Bomb production facilities. 05/12/2011 6
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

ORAU Team Basis for thoron concentration and doses for thoria processing, 

bounding estimate of neutron dose based on measured photon dose 

around single pass reactors at Hanford, correspondence on the 

Mallinckrodt badge program, documented communication, dosimetry 

data, human radiation exposures related to nuclear weapons industries, 

annual reports, ORAU Team generated spreadsheets, radiation dose 

estimates and hazard evaluation for inhaled airborne radionuclides, 

Savannah River Site thorium processing timeline, study of 

atmospheric contamination in the Melt Plant, technical basis 

documents, workplace measurements of neutron and photon doses, 

documented correspondence related to US Testing, trip reports, an 

SEC Petition Evaluation Report, and documented communications.

03/08/2102 131

Richland, WA Federal Building Documented communications with process knowledge experts, 

weapons development reports, nuclear materials safeguards. All are 

sensitive documents.

04/18/2012 34

S. Cohen & Associates (SC&A) Mortality study, review of low-level waste management ES&H 

vulnerabilities, highly enriched uranium report, recycled uranium mass 

balance project, bioassay at Hanford, description of Hanford personnel 

dosimeter program from 1944-1989, laboratory measurement error in 

dose estimates, progress reports, radioactive contamination environs 

report, combination neutron dosimeter in plutonium environments, 

retrospective assessment of personnel neutron dosimetry, summary of 

recorded external radiation doses for Hanford Workers 1944-1989, and 

a personnel interview.

08/05/2011 56

SC&A / DOE Hanford Monthly reports, control of ground contamination, personnel 

interview, KW Reactor incident report, radiation incident 

investigation, removal of ruptured slugs, examination of selected 

ruptures, divisions reports, interview with petitioners/former and 

current Hanford workers, reactor effluent water disposal, ruptured 

slugs, stack gas decontamination - separations plant and stack gas 

decontamination, and a review of tritium control symposium.

08/05/2011 31
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

SC&A / DOE Idaho National Laboratory Slug shipments to Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP), summary 

of stack gas discharge, iodine calculations for Radioactive BariumLanthanum (RALA) production, RALA program and problems, 

RALA project specification letter, shipments to the ICPP, kilogram 

quantities of UO2-233 for the light water breeder reactor 

demonstration program, and xenon calculations.

06/24/2010 98

SC&A / NARA - Atlanta Health and safety report and UO3 specifications. 03/17/2004 2

SC&A / NIOSH Recycled uranium generation and flow and plutonium storage 

vulnerabilities.

02/16/2006 2

Santa Susana Field Laboratory History of Nuclear Materials Development Facility. 12/18/2007 1

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Radiation exposures by AEC Operating Office and summaries of 

whole body radiation exposures.

09/02/2004 8

Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, IL Mallinckrodt uranium information, disposal of radioactive wastes in 

the metropolitan St. Louis area, metal billets for Hanford, inspection of 

uranium casting facilities, shipments of uranium hexafluoride to 

Hanford, and remelting of Hanford uranium scrap at Mallinckrodt.

11/01/2008 12

University of Colorado Norlin Library Background measurements of alpha particle emitters at Rocky Flats 

where the radiochemistry was performed by Hanford.

08/20/2003 1

University of Rochester Miner Library Quarterly review report. 10/14/2008 1

University of Tennessee Library Inhalation program, case studies of uranium, and thorium uptakes, 

Hanford whole body donors to the Uranium and Transuranium 

Registry, and Hanford airborne particle releases in 1947 and 1948.

10/10/2011 14

Unknown Nuclear track emulsions and analysis of urine for very low level 

plutonium, bioassay procedures, calculation of neutron flux and 

exposure, film badge comparison, decontamination and 

decommissioning, detection limits, bioassay data, environmental 

reports, estimation of plutonium lung burden by urine analysis, 

external dosimetry manual, fast neutron dose, gamma dose 

measurement with film badges, external dosimetry program, monthly 

reports, site history, medical X-ray exposure study, neutron exposures, 

waste tank inventories, radiation protection aspects of work with 

promethium-147, radioactive contamination reports and investigations, 

radionuclide releases, nuclear track dosimeters exposed to plutonium 

sources, shipping documents, site maps, stack release data, Tiger Team 

assessment, Mancuso study progress report number 9, and whole body 

counter activities.

04/14/2011 573

Unknown / DOE Hanford Fifth semiannual report of the AEC. 03/09/2004 1
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hanford Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded

To SRDB

Washington University Libraries - St. Louis Fast neutron monitoring of personnel. 04/27/2007 1

TOTAL 9,886

Table A1-2: Databases Searched for Hanford Engineer Works

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases Hits Selected

NOTE: Database search terms employed for each of the databases listed below 

are available in the Excel file called “Hanford Rev 05 (83 13) 04-23-12”

DOE CEDR

http://cedr.lbl.gov/

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 0 0

DOE Hanford DDRS

http://www2.hanford.gov/declass/

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 168 2

DOE Legacy Management Considered Sites

http://csd.lm.doe.gov/

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 0 0

DOE OpenNet

http://www.osti.gov/opennet/advancedsearch.jsp

COMPLETED 05/14/2010

See Note above 23 1

DOE OSTI Energy Citations

http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 288 0

DOE OSTI Information Bridge

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/advancedsearch.jsp

COMPLETED 05/11/2010

See Note above 528 2

Google

http://www.google.com

COMPLETED 05/11/2010

See Note above 2,261,772 40
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

47 of 48

Table A1-2: Databases Searched for Hanford Engineer Works

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases Hits Selected

HP Journal

http://journals.lww.com/health-physics/pages/default.aspx

COMPLETED 07/20/2010

See Note above 0 0

Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 

http://www.ijoeh.com/index.php/ijoeh

COMPLETED 07/20/2010

See Note above 1 0

National Academies Press

http://www.nap.edu/

COMPLETED 07/11/2010

See Note above 36 2

NNSA - Nevada Site Office

www.nv.doe.gov/main/search.htm

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 0 0

NRC ADAMS Reading Room

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 15 0

USACE/FUSRAP

http://www.lrb.usace.army.mil/fusrap/

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 0 0

U.S. Transuranium & Uranium Registries 

http://www.ustur.wsu.edu/

COMPLETED 05/12/2010

See Note above 0 0

Table A1-3: OSTI Documents Requested for Hanford Engineer Works

Document Number Document Title Requested

Date

Received

Date

PNL-2080-10 AFCT/TFCT/ISFS Program. Technical Progress Report for the Period 

April 1, 1978--June 30, 1978

11/22/2011

BNWL-2080-8 AFCT/TFCT/ISFS Program. Technical Progress Report for the Period 

January 1, 1978--March 31, 1978

11/22/2011

BNWL-2080-7 AFCT/TFCT/ISFS Program. Technical Progress Report for the Period 

October 1, 1977--December 31, 1977

11/22/2011

PNL-2080-17 AFCT/TFCT/ISFS Program. Technical Progress Report, July 1, 1978-

September 30, 1978

11/22/2011
SEC-00201 05-31-12 Hanford Engineer Works 

48 of 48

Table A1-3: OSTI Documents Requested for Hanford Engineer Works

Document Number Document Title Requested

Date

Received

Date

PNL-2080-11 Criticality Research in Support of Chemical Reprocessing in the 

Thorium Fuel Cycle Technology Program: Basic Process Description

11/22/2011

HW-65518 A Study of the Feasibility for the Large Scale Recovery of Ionium 

(Thorium-230) From the Uranium Ore Milling Industry in the United 

States

11/22/2011

HEDL-TC-1550-Vol 2-Bk 1 Alternative Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program. Volume II, Book 1. Fuel 

Cycle Characterization Study. Summary

11/22/2011

HEDL-TC-1550-Vol 2-Bk 10 Alternative Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program. Volume II, Book 10. 

Reprocessing of Uranium-Thorium Fuels

11/22/2011

HEDL-TME-73-84 Performance Tests of Metal Oxide Insulated Coaxial Cables for 

Reactor Instrumentation Application

11/22/2011

DOE/RL-95-55

Ref ID: 110605

Hanford Site Background: Evaluation of Existing Soil Radionuclide 

Data

11/22/2011 03/26/2012

PNL-4305

Ref ID: 111017

Pellet-Fabrication Development Using Thermally Denitrated UO{sub 

2} Powder

11/22/2011 03/26/2012

ARH-1508-Del

Ref ID: 68428

200 Areas Operation Monthly Report, August 1970 11/22/2011 11/29/2011

ARH-61-Del

Ref ID: 68542

200 Areas Operation Monthly Report, November 1967 11/22/2011 11/29/2011

HW-81964

OSTI ID: 4020618

Ref ID: 59951

Beta-Gamma Dose Rates From U232 in U233 Dated 1964 01/05/2009 02/24/2009