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[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1453 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 410

106th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1453

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            November 8, 1999

                       Reported with an amendment

                                                       Calendar No. 410
106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1453

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 28, 1999

  Mr. Frist (for himself, Mr. Johnson, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Santorum, Mr. 
   Cleland, Mr. Bunning, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Feingold, Mr. 
Brownback, and Mr. Lieberman) introduced the following bill; which was 
     read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

                            November 8, 1999

                Reported by Mr. Helms, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace 
Act''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) With clear indications that the Government of 
        Sudan intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against 
        areas outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 
        2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a 
        sustained and coordinated international effort to pressure 
        combatants to end hostilities and to address the roots of the 
        conflict offers the best opportunity for a comprehensive 
        solution to the continuing war in Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally 
        sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents 
        the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, 
        protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining 
        Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief 
        operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to 
        bring an end to the war.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Continued leadership by the United States is 
        critical.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Regardless of the future political status of 
        the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of 
        Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions 
        is a major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the 
        Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable 
        peace process.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries 
        among peoples in areas outside their full control, the 
        Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer 
        techniques to subjugate their population, and Congress finds 
        that internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have 
        played a critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness 
        and human suffering.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly 
        utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and 
        other irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas 
        outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort 
        to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain 
        themselves. The tactic is designed to replace the overt use of 
        bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war 
        through selective starvation and to minimize the Government of 
        Sudan's accountability internationally.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated 
        that it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil 
        sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against 
        the areas outside its control.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) Through its power to veto plans for air 
        transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, 
        Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has 
        been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese 
        people from the United States and other donor countries as a 
        devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the 
        Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the 
        Government's control.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) The United States and other donors' efforts 
        in delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS 
        have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in 
        OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
        donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas 
        in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near 
        term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control 
        of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme 
        disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al 
        Ghazal, Upper Nile, and southern Blue Nile regions have been 
        excluded completely from relief distribution by OLS, 
        consequently placing their populations at increased risk of 
        famine.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) At a cost of more than $1,000,000 per day, 
        and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate 
        food needs of the recipients, the current international relief 
        operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long 
        term.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) The ability of populations to defend 
        themselves against attack in areas outside the Government of 
        Sudan's control has been severely compromised by the 
        disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the 
        belief within officials of the Government of Sudan that success 
        on the battlefield will be achieved.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) The United States should use all means of 
        pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to 
        the war, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the maintenance or strengthening of 
                sanctions against the Government of Sudan;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the support or creation of viable 
                democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of 
                Sudan outside government control;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) continued active support of people-to-
                people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas 
                outside of government control;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to 
                provide relief to those areas;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) cooperation among the trading partners 
                of the United States and within multilateral 
                institutions toward those ends; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) the use of any and all possible 
                unilateral and multilateral economic and diplomatic 
                means to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end their 
                hostilities and again assume a constructive stance 
                toward facilitating a comprehensive solution to the 
                ongoing war in Sudan.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this Act:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of 
        Sudan'' means the National Islamic Front government in 
        Khartoum, Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) IGAD.--The term ``IGAD'' means the Inter-
        Governmental Authority on Development.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United 
        Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF and the World 
        Food Program known as ``Operation Lifeline Sudan''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 
              AND NEW TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress hereby--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) condemns--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) violations of human rights on all 
                sides of the conflict in Sudan;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Government of Sudan's overall 
                human rights record, with regard to both the 
                prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human 
                and political rights to all Sudanese;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and 
                the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and 
                tolerating the practice; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the Government of Sudan's increasing 
                use and organization of ``murahalliin'', Popular 
                Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units 
                into organized and coordinated raiding and slaving 
                parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper 
                Nile, and southern Blue Nile regions; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on 
        air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the 
        use of raiding and slaving parties has largely replaced total 
        bans on such flights as the primary tool for creating food 
        shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
        societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka and Nuba peoples 
        in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) declares its support for the efforts by 
        executive branch officials of the United States to lead in a 
        reinvigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace process;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European 
        Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key 
        states to support the peace process; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) urges Kenya's leadership in the implementation 
        of the process.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Relation to United States Diplomacy.--It is the sense 
of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward resolution of the 
conflict in Sudan are best made through IGAD and that the President 
must not create any process or diplomatic facility or office which 
could be viewed as a parallel or competing diplomatic track.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of 
State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State 
for the support of--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the secretariat of IGAD;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the ongoing negotiations between the 
        Government of Sudan and opposition forces;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried 
        out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners' 
        Forum (IPF); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) other United States diplomatic efforts with 
        respect to Sudan.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting 
through the United States Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, should--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations 
        Security Council to investigate the practice of slavery in 
        Sudan and provide recommendations on measures for its eventual 
        elimination;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights 
        practices of the Government of Sudan at the United Nations 
        conference on human rights in Geneva in 2000;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) press for implementation of the 
        recommendations of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for 
        Sudan with respect to human rights monitors of the United 
        Nations High Commission for Refugees in areas of conflict in 
        Sudan; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of 
        the Red Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and 
        Red Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international 
        organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those 
        individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in 
bondage or servitude in Sudan.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 7. SUPPORTING SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Until the President determines, and so certifies to 
Congress, that the Government of Sudan has--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) fully committed to and has made verifiable 
        progress toward a comprehensive, peaceful solution to the war 
        within the IGAD-sponsored peace process or has otherwise 
        committed to and made verifiable progress in a good faith 
        effort with both northern and southern opposition toward a 
        comprehensive solution to the conflict based on the Declaration 
        of Principles reached in Nairobi Kenya, on July 20, 
        1994,</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) made substantial and verifiable progress in 
        controlling the raiding and slaving activities of all regular 
        and irregular forces, including Popular Defense Forces and 
        other militias and murahalliin,</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) instituted credible reforms with regard to 
        providing basic human and civil rights to all Sudanese, 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) ceased aerial bombardment of civilian 
        targets,</DELETED>
<DELETED>the following are prohibited, except to the extent provided in 
section 203(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses 
that may be issued pursuant to this section:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) The importation into the United States 
                of any goods or services of Sudanese origin, other than 
                information or informational materials.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) The exportation or reexportation, 
                directly or indirectly, to Sudan of any goods, 
                technology (including technical data, software, or 
                other information), or services from the United States 
                or by a United States person, wherever located, or 
                requiring the issuance of a license by a Federal 
                agency, except for donations of articles intended to 
                relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, and 
                medicine.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) The facilitation by a United States 
                person, including but not limited to brokering 
                activities of the exportation or reexportation of 
                goods, technology, or services from Sudan to any 
                destination, or to Sudan from any location.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) The performance by any United States 
                person of any contract, including a financing contract, 
                or use of any other financial instrument, in support of 
                an industrial, commercial, public utility, or 
                governmental project in Sudan.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) The grant or extension of credits or 
                loans by any United States person to the Government of 
                Sudan.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) Any transaction by a United States 
                person relating to transportation of cargo to or from 
                Sudan; the provision of transportation of cargo to or 
                from the United States by any Sudanese person or any 
                vessel or aircraft of Sudanese registration; or the 
                sale in the United States by any person holding 
                authority under subtitle 7 of title 49, United States 
                Code, of any transportation of cargo by air that 
                includes any stop in Sudan.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) Any transaction by any United States 
                person or within the United States that evades or 
                avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or 
                attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth 
                in this section.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the sanctions in subsection (a), and in the President's Executive Order 
of November 4, 1997, should be applied to include the sale of stocks in 
the United States or to any United States person, wherever located, or 
any other form of financial instruments or derivatives, in support of a 
commercial, industrial, public utility, or government project or 
transaction in or with Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
application of any of the sanctions described in subsection (a) if he 
determines and certifies to Congress that it is important to the 
national security of the United States to do so.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Report.--Beginning 3 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the President 
shall submit a report to Congress on--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the specific sources and current status of 
        Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation 
        infrastructure and pipelines;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the extent to which that financing was secured 
        in the United States or with involvement of United States 
        citizens;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) such financing's relation to the sanctions 
        described in subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 
        4, 1997;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the 
        Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its control, 
        including targets, frequency, and best estimates of 
        damage;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the number, duration, and locations of air 
        strips or other humanitarian relief facilities to which access 
        is denied by any party to the conflict; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace 
        process, including the specific and verifiable steps taken by 
        parties to the conflict, the members of the IGAD Partners 
        Forum, and the members of IGAD toward a comprehensive solution 
        to the war.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
prohibit--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) transactions for the conduct of the official 
        business of the Federal Government or the United Nations by 
        employees thereof;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) transactions in Sudan for journalistic 
        activity by persons regularly employed in such capacity by a 
        news-gathering organization; or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) legitimate humanitarian operations.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Definitions.--In this section--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, 
        association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other 
        organization;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the term ``Government of Sudan'' includes the 
        Government of Sudan, its agencies, instrumentalities and 
        controlled entities, and the Central Bank of Sudan;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the term ``person'' means an individual or 
        entity; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the term ``United States person'' means any 
        United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity 
        organized under the laws of the United States (including 
        foreign branches), or any person in the United 
        States.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
organize and maintain a formal consultative process with the European 
Union, its member states, the members of the United Nations Security 
Council, and other relevant parties on coordinating an effort within 
the United Nations to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of 
the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief 
flights.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF 
              EFFORTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the progress made by 
officials of the executive branch of Government toward greater 
utilization of non-OLS agencies for more effective distribution of 
United States relief contributions.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies 
in the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to 
Congress describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection 
(b).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
              FLIGHTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a detailed and 
implementable contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations 
auspices, the greatest possible amount of United States Government and 
privately donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the 
Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and southern Blue Nile, in the event the 
Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS 
air transport relief flights.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Element of Plan.--The plan developed under subsection 
(a) shall include coordination of other donors in addition to the 
United States Government and private institutions.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Report.--Not later than 2 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a classified report 
to Congress on the costs and startup time such a plan would require in 
the event of a total ban on air transport relief flights or in the 
event of a partial or incremental ban on such flights if the President 
has made the determination required by subsection (a)(2).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection 
(a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds 
available for support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for 
the purposes of the plan.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID'S SUDAN TRANSITION ASSISTANCE 
              FOR REHABILITATION (STAR) PROGRAM.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby expresses its 
support for the President's ongoing efforts to diversify and increase 
effectiveness of United States assistance to populations in areas of 
Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, especially the 
long-term focus shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for 
Rehabilitation (STAR) program with its emphasis on promoting future 
democratic governance, rule of law, building indigenous institutional 
capacity, promoting and enhancing self-reliance, and actively 
supporting people-to-people reconciliation efforts.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available to 
carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating to development assistance) for the period 
beginning on October 1, 1999, and ending on September 30, 2002, 
$16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable civil 
authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in Sudan, including 
the provision of technical assistance, and for people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER 
              AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
              FLIGHTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes that civilians in the 
Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and southern Blue Nile regions of Sudan 
are not receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions by the 
Government of Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the President should--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the 
        humanitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and 
        Blue Nile regions of Sudan;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) respond appropriately to those needs based on 
        such assessment; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on 
        efforts made under paragraph (2).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 13. PROTECTING HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, SEPARATING 
              CIVILIANS FROM COMBATANTS, AND REDUCING FOOD 
              DIVERSION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) diversion of food assistance from civilians to 
        combatants is a hindrance to an effective and comprehensive 
        relief effort;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the proximity of combatants to humanitarian 
        operations for noncombatants poses a security risk for both 
        humanitarian relief personnel and for those they 
        serve;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the lack of a reliable and adequate means of 
        securing food is a major factor in the ability of populations 
        in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan to 
        defend themselves from aggression by Government of Sudan forces 
        and related militias or paramilitary groups, thus resulting in 
        diversions of food; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) options to address the situation are very 
        limited.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Authority To Provide Direct Food Assistance.--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Authority.--For the purpose of minimizing 
        diversions of food assistance and to insulate noncombatants and 
        the relief operations which serve them from combatants in areas 
        outside the control of the Government of Sudan, the President, 
        acting through appropriate Federal agencies, is authorized to 
        provide food assistance directly to the National Democratic 
        Alliance participants or other groups engaged in the protection 
        of civilian populations from attacks from regular government 
        forces, associated militias, or other paramilitary groups 
        supported by the Government of Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Supersedes existing law.--The authority of 
        paragraph (1) supersedes any other provision of law.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Limitation.--The assistance described in subsection 
(b) may only be provided in such a way that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) does not endanger, compromise, or otherwise 
        reduce the United States' support for existing unilateral, 
        multilateral, or private humanitarian operations or the 
        beneficiaries of those operations; or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) compromise any ongoing or future people-to-
        people reconciliation efforts in Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Relation to Current or Future Humanitarian 
Operations.--The assistance described in subsection (b) shall be 
implemented separate from and not in proximity to current humanitarian 
efforts, both within Operation Lifeline Sudan or outside of Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, or any other current or future humanitarian operations 
which serve noncombatants.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Determinations of Eligibility.--In determining the 
eligibility of potential recipients described in subsection (b), the 
President shall take into account the groups' respect for human rights, 
civil authority, civil institutions, and the integrity of ongoing 
humanitarian operations.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Report.--The President shall submit a report to 
Congress, in classified form if necessary--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) describing the effectiveness in preventing 
        diversions of such food assistance;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) whether or not the provision of such food 
        assistance has resulted in or has the potential to 
        inadvertently allow for the enrichment of any individual or 
        organization by the resale or other transfer of the assistance 
        for other purposes, either to the intended recipients or other 
        parties;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) whether such operations have affected ongoing 
        humanitarian operations described in subsections (c) or 
        operations described in subsection (d); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the extent to which the provision of 
        assistance in subsection (b) has impacted respect for human 
        rights and rule of law.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) With clear indications that the Government of Sudan 
        intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against areas 
        outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 2,000,000 
        lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a sustained and 
        coordinated international effort to pressure combatants to end 
        hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict offers the 
        best opportunity for a comprehensive solution to the continuing 
        war in Sudan.
            (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
        peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
        chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
        human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
            (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief 
        operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to 
        bring an end to the war.
            (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
            (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
        of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the 
        absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major 
        impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people 
        and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
            (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
        peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of 
        Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to 
        subjugate their population, and Congress finds that 
        internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a 
        critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human 
        suffering.
            (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing and 
        organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other 
        irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas 
        outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort 
        to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain 
        themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans 
        on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through 
        selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's 
        accountability internationally.
            (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
        intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
        increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
        outside its control.
            (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
        flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to 
        manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from 
        the United States and other donor countries as a devastating 
        weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan 
        to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.
            (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
        delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have 
        played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS 
        and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
        donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
            (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
        facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
        population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
        Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
        of their ability to sustain themselves.
            (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
        Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely 
        from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their 
        populations at increased risk of famine.
            (13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and 
        with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food 
        needs of the recipients, the current international relief 
        operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long 
        term.
            (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
        against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
        control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
        the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
        officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
        battlefield can be achieved.
            (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
        available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war, 
        including--
                    (A) the maintenance and multilateralization of 
                sanctions against the Government of Sudan with explicit 
                linkage of those sanctions to peace;
                    (B) the support or creation of viable democratic 
                civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan 
                outside government control;
                    (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
                reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside 
                of government control;
                    (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
                humanitarian relief to those areas;
                    (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the 
                United States and within multilateral institutions 
                toward those ends; and
                    (F) the use of any and all possible unilateral and 
                multilateral economic and diplomatic tools to compel 
                Ethiopia and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again 
                assume a constructive stance toward facilitating a 
                comprehensive solution to the ongoing war in Sudan.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
        means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
            (2) IGAD.--The term ``IGAD'' means the Inter-Governmental 
        Authority on Development.
            (3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
        operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
        participating relief organizations known as ``Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan''.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW 
              TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

    Congress hereby--
            (1) condemns--
                    (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the 
                conflict in Sudan;
                    (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights 
                record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war 
                and the denial of basic human and political rights to 
                all Sudanese;
                    (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role 
                of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating 
                the practice; and
                    (D) the Government of Sudan's increasing use and 
                organization of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', 
                Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army 
                units into organized and coordinated raiding and 
                slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, 
                Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and
            (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
        transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of 
        raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
        shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
        societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba 
        peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby--
            (1) declares its support for the efforts by executive 
        branch officials of the United States and the President's 
        Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a reinvigoration of the 
        IGAD-sponsored peace process;
            (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European Union, the 
        Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to 
        support the peace process; and
            (3) urges Kenya's leadership in the implementation of the 
        process.
    (b) Relation to United States Diplomacy.--It is the sense of 
Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward resolution of the 
conflict in Sudan are best made through a peace process based on the 
Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, 
and that the President should not create any process or diplomatic 
facility or office which could be viewed as a parallel or competing 
diplomatic track.
    (c) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of State is 
authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the 
support of--
            (1) the secretariat of IGAD;
            (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
        Sudan and opposition forces;
            (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried out by the 
        National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF); 
        and
            (4) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a 
        peace process in Sudan.

SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the 
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should--
            (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security 
        Council to investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and 
        provide recommendations on measures for its eventual 
        elimination;
            (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights practices of 
        the Government of Sudan at the United Nations conference on 
        human rights in Geneva in 2000;
            (3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the 
        United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to 
        human rights monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan;
            (4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red 
        Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
        Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international 
        organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those 
        individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in 
        bondage or servitude in Sudan;
            (5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each 
        time it subjects civilian populations to aerial bombardment; 
        and
            (6) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations General 
        Assembly condemning the human rights practices of the 
        Government of Sudan.

SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and 
every 3 months thereafter, the President shall submit a report to 
Congress on--
            (1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan's 
        financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure 
        and pipelines;
            (2) the extent to which that financing was secured in the 
        United States or with involvement of United States citizens;
            (3) such financing's relation to the sanctions described in 
        subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 3, 1997;
            (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of 
        Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, 
        frequency, and best estimates of damage;
            (5) the number, duration, and locations of air strips or 
        other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is denied 
        by any party to the conflict; and
            (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace process and any 
        other ongoing effort to end the conflict, including the 
        specific and verifiable steps taken by parties to the conflict, 
        the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD 
        toward a comprehensive solution to the war.

SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should organize and 
maintain a formal consultative process with the  European Union, its 
member states, the members of the United Nations Security Council, and 
other relevant parties on coordinating an effort within the United 
Nations to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the 
Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief 
flights.

SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.

    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the progress made by officials of 
the executive branch of Government toward greater utilization of non-
OLS agencies for more effective distribution of United States relief 
contributions.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in 
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress 
describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (b).

SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a detailed and implementable 
contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices, the 
greatest possible amount of United States Government and privately 
donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba 
Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of 
Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport 
relief flights.
    (b) Element of Plan.--The plan developed under subsection (a) shall 
include coordination of other donors in addition to the United States 
Government and private institutions.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 2 months after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit a classified report to Congress on 
the costs and startup time such a plan would require in the event of a 
total ban on air transport relief flights or in the event of a partial 
or incremental ban on such flights if the President has made the 
determination required by subsection (a)(2).
    (d) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the 
President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for 
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of 
the plan.

SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID'S SUDAN TRANSITION ASSISTANCE FOR 
              REHABILITATION (STAR) PROGRAM.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby expresses its support for 
the President's ongoing efforts to diversify and increase effectiveness 
of United States assistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of 
the control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long-term focus 
shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) 
program with its emphasis on promoting future democratic governance, 
rule of law, building indigenous institutional capacity, promoting and 
enhancing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts.
    (b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available to carry 
out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating to development assistance) for the period 
beginning on October 1, 2000, and ending on September 30, 2003, 
$16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable civil 
authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in Sudan, including 
the provision of technical assistance, and for people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts.
    (c) Additional Authorities.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the President is granted authority to undertake any appropriate 
programs using Federal agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct 
support of indigenous groups, agencies, or organizations in areas 
outside of control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide 
emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil 
authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the development 
of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts, or implementation of any programs in support of 
any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or national level.
    (d) Implementation.--It is the sense of Congress that the President 
should immediately and to the fullest extent possible utilize the 
Office of Transition Initiatives at the Agency for International 
Development in an effort to pursue the type of programs described in 
subsection (c).
    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that enhancing 
and supporting education and the development of rule of law are 
critical elements in the long-term success of United States efforts to 
promote a viable economic, political, social, and legal basis for 
development in Sudan. Congress recognizes that the gap of 13-16 years 
without secondary educational opportunities in southern Sudan is an 
especially important problem to address with respect to rebuilding and 
sustaining leaders and educators for the next generation of Sudanese. 
Congress recognizes the unusually important role the secondary school 
in Rumbek has played in producing the current generation of leaders in 
southern Sudan, and that priority should be given in current and future 
development or transition programs undertaken by the United States 
Government to rebuilding and supporting the Rumbek Secondary School.
    (f) Programs in Areas Outside Government Control.--Congress also 
intends that such programs include cooperation and work with indigenous 
groups in areas outside of government control in all of Sudan, to 
include northern, southern, and eastern regions of Sudan.

SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER AREAS 
              SUBJECT TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes that civilians in the Nuba 
Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan are not 
receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions by the Government 
of Sudan.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should--
            (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian 
        needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile 
        regions of Sudan;
            (2) respond appropriately to those needs based on such 
        assessment; and
            (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on efforts made 
        under paragraph (2).

SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE FOR NATIONAL 
              DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report, in classified form if necessary, detailing 
possible options or plans of the United States Government for the 
provision of nonlethal assistance to participants of the National 
Democratic Alliance.
    (b) Consultations.--Not later than 30 days after submission of the 
report required by subsection (a), the President should begin formal 
consultations with the appropriate congressional committees regarding 
the findings of the report.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on 
International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives.
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