MPC Values for Thorium Page 2
J. A. Quigtey; M.D.
August 17, 1965

a phone call to Dr, Walter S. Snyder, ORNL, who works with
Ds, K. Z Morgan, Chairman of the NCRP subcommittee on Permissible
Internal Dose.

Atter a few minutes of consideration, Dr, Snyder returned the call and
said that the footnote in NBS Handbook 69 also applied to Th-Z30.

R, Heatherton later discussed this by.phone with Joe Lenhard, OROO,
who then discussed the matter, by phone, with Carl Welty and Don Ross
in Washington, D, C, The Washington AEC members agreed that the
provisional values should apply to Th-230 and their comment was relayed
to us by a retarn call from Joe Lenhardf,

Joe agked that we request written confirmation of the Th-230 provisional
value when we are certain that we will be.processing the TNT now at
Middlesex. Joe indicated that this request will be used as a vehicle to
bring about a correction in the Th-230 mpc given in AEC Manual Chapter
0524, In the Chapter tables, Th-nateral and Th-232 have the same mpc
that Is given as a provisional mpc in the HB-69 foomote. Th-230, in the
Chapter tables, has the same mpc that is.given in the HB -69 tables. The
correction of Chapter 0524 would change the Th-230.mpc to the same
limit ag that now.given for Th-nataral and.Th-232,

These.phone calls cleared the uncertainty surrounding the.provisional
values for Th-230, However, Dr. Snyder.presettted us with a new.problem
with hig comments on fature thorium mpc values. The.problem is worthy
of our attention if we are to continue thorium operations with reasonable
mpe values, His story.goes like this:

..&t one-time, the. mpc values.for thoriam were. those. values .
which are now.given In the HB-69 footote, Then, the Uni-

.. 2:0. ¥erelty.of Rochester.found a few dogs which were left from ~...-—...~.-
a thorium inhalation study which was conducted seven years
Previously, The dogs were sacrificed and their organs ana-
lyzed for thorium, By comparing these results with results
from dogs sacrificed seven.years.previously, the University
of Rochester investigators concluded that the inhaled Th
stayed in the lungs and that only a small fraction had been
removed daring the seven years. Members of the Inter-
national Committee on Radiological Protection took this data
and assigned to Th a biological half-life of four years, as
compared to the previously assigned half-life of 120 days,
This Increased biclogtest half-life, when ased in the ICRP
calculations, resaited in a lowering of the thorium mpc in
aix, The ICRP members realized that Industry would have
a difficult time adjusting to the lower mpc vaives, For this
reason, the ICRP added the provisional values for Th-232
and Th-natoral with the idea that the provisional valces



t

c.

2.

Recomnendation that the health physics aspects of "ree,
eyele material® should be evaluated and adjustments to
the personnel monitoring program made as necessary.

The NLO study shows that external radiation problems in-
volved in processing recycle material are not significactly
different from other feed materizis. “The-controlling is-
pority from an internal standpoint appears to be Pu which
has an upper linit of 10 ?P3 in the uranium. In sir,

this limit would represent about 1.5% of the recomended
fete for Fo when the air concentration for uranium is at
the plant allovable limit. The specific activities of

the various product streans (e,g., U0s, UF 4, etc.) are
around 132% of virgin materiel. A few by-product streams
will also be evaloated for sdditienal information. The
study indicstes that the RLO processes do not significantly
reconcentrate the impurities. Bence, adjustments to the
personnel monitoring progres are not necessary at this time.

Recommendation that KLO should continue its efforts to
test and develop containers offering improved safety with
econcuic gains in the transport of fissile material.

Considerable progress has been made in this area to effect
economic transport of fissile waterial, perticubrly vith
regard to Henford and BMI shipsents, With the implemen-
tation of AEC and ORO 0529, containers and shipping methods
have been evaluated, approved and documented.

Récommendation that MLO consider the possibility of using
ers and available criticality codes. for ¢!
nuclear safety parameters and limits.

Staff personnel vere sent to Oak Ridge to discuss criticality
calculations with personnel at the Data Processing Center.
‘The accuracy of such calculations will best be kenewn follow-
ing wetal lattice experiments pisnned at the Onk Ridge Cri-
tieal Experiments Pacility this year. It is expected thet -
couputer facilities will be used to greater advantage follow
ing these experivents.



i ;
Dan

We reject as unreasonably low the estimates of unmonitored sources, both fram process
sources and not-point sources, presented in Table 1 of the Addendum to the Official
History, which is included in the documents appendix here for reference. We have not
included any estimate of losses from the about 280 unmonitored emissions source,
particularly the non-point sources. ‘As one illustration of the kyporbesis that such releases
may have been very large see the section below on working conditions and uranium
releases.

We have made an estimate of bout 60 metric tons fram the 50 uamonitored sources
discussed above. This is admittedly a low confidence estimate. Ibis impossible at this stage
to produce an estimate of higher quality, given the poor monitoring practices at FMPC.
However, we should note that while the expected variability of the year to year estimates
will be high, the variability of the total is Hikely t0 be considerably lower. Tf additional
documentation on estimates of unmeasured losses.can be obtained from the period when
these losses were actually oceurring it would be possible to considerably improve both the
estimate and the confidence one would have in it.



R. C. Heatherton

Plant4

E. V. Barry

CENTRAL Fiteg

August 17, 1355

2132411

Occasionally maintenance and ‘roduotion work in Plant is sf

sucha nature that the personnel are grossly overexposed to

sarborne uranium materials, as-wéll as to°géses_sich a$ UE.
personnel of plant use Dust-fee or Comfo tyoe resviri-

tors and occasionally resort to
cannister masks.

Recent urinary levels tave been
believe the installation of Air
is urgently required to protect
concentrations of urani=m. The
tors have not been installed is

that HF will back up into the air liné system
be thoroughly investigated to see whether this st. rem:
true or not. It may be advisable, if this is tme, *>

the use of chemical tyre

of such a magnitude trat C
Tine respirstors in “ant
the personrel from the *Lrr
resson that Air “ine vesmira-
that Plant 4 nergonrel

separate air line system he installed or-thet "lant : frersen: el
resort to the use of bottled breathine nir when joins Jobs
where the uranium concentrations are rreatly in excess of ‘te

maximum allowable concentration.

evB/og

ect A. J. Stefanec
Je Ae .ulgley
3. Ziecler
Central File

E. V. Bavry



NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY m3

7 OF OHIO | . ae
@ 0. vox vas, mr, HEALMEY sTATION
: CINCINNATI 31. OHIO
|
SUBJECT = Live DUST - URANIUM ALLOY PROGRAK - PLANT $ 2119748
TO co. ¥. Mehaffey
FROM A.J. Stefanec
REFERENCE
Attached are results of air dust samples collected sco determine
the concentration of airborne beryllium resulting from its use |
—

in the alloy program.

Following is a summary of those operations which are above cone
¥AC of 2 mc/¥3, with comments and recommendations.

° Operation: Removing mixer dlade from beryliir
compound mixture outside of dry tox.

mH

Type of Sample: Breathing Zone

Avg. Concentration: 6 times MAC

Comment: This operation was necessizated when
the operator drovped the xer blade
@ into the can of beryllium compew.c. |

Recommendation: Operators should be made aware cha
the ventilated hoods should te use:
for any similar incidents.

Pet

II. Operation: Mixing of the beryllium compound Dy
hand inside the burnout coating sta-
. tion.
Type of Sample: Breathing Zone

Avg. Concentration: 5 times MAC

Recommendation: An elecsric mixer shoul eu
inslée the burnout enclosure t
the beryllium compound.

Applying first and second cost
to the crucible inside the Sur
coating station.

0046017



8. 12. 40088

. . Que

Or

NSALTH PROTECTION REVIEW GF NATICHAL LEAD COMPANY CF CHIO
WAY 19-21, 1966 -

te Introduetion and Sumary

Representatives of the (RO Research and Development Division
conducted the annual on-site health protection review of MLO
during the period of May 19-21, 1964. Thie review gave de-
tailed consideration to implementation of last year's recan-
mendations, transportation of fissile materials, nuclear

. safety, monitoring programs, and the treetuent and sampling
of off-ges effivents,

lt ig the epinion of the reviewers that the health protection
programs reviewed are effectiveand satisfactory to cope with
the problems of NLO. Observations and recommendations for
program improvement are included in the finsl sections of the
Feport.

e TI. Implementation of Previous Recommendations

A. Recommendation that counting equipment for KAD and file
‘badge components be wade functions] as expeditiously as

possible.

Action: The recommandarion has been satisfectorily
implemented and is discussed in HLO's reply dated

August 20, 1963, to last year's report. The counting
equipment, sow fully operational, is checked pericdically
for calibration. Two HAD*s and 2 few film badges exposed
at the ORNL Health Physics Reactor and-counted in this
equipment indicated deviations within_5Z of appropriate
values such as the Pu curve.

3B. Recommendation that the 1290 high range gamaa file
. be routinely calibrated co insure effective use in
the evaluations of high personnel exposures.

action: The recommendation has been satisfactorily im-

pigqmenced, and films exposedTMfrom 6 to 500 r at 100

increments will be used for calibration purposes. Sets
. of calibration film are exchanged at six-month intervals.

Ey ase



oduction Area Security. Pence ct Area PMC Area

onth Uraniuy Beta Uranium s Beta Uranium ‘Beta Usenlug “beta 2 Stack Losses
ug/ft a/nffe2 ue/ft? d/m/ét2 pe /ft? a/n/ft2 ug/tt” a/nte —

26t / c

. 29,200 43,541 7,271 7,138 1,249 2,026 576 397 47 gz

. 15,333 13,116 4,848 - 6,255 967 1,144 377 374 197 4
14,917 13,092 4,781 3,637 1,246 1,775 493 407 195 8
10,083 11,611 3,897 6,429 1,208 1,717 32k 518 M41 a
3,000 4,040 1,434 2,267 716 1,872 4ui 501 171 =

e 3,000 9,374 5,538 6,644 1,450 1,658 586 506 258 =

Y 10,083 12,306 2,731 4,409 1,072 1,558 657 647 285 fm
11,500 13,123 4,284 6,541 829 1,014 625 1,284 134

t 8,447 14,729 1,441 7,258 958 3,023 1,127 3,459 294
6,583 45,140 3,153 9,264 592 6,059 310 3,805 161
11,333 19,558 3,659 13,986 904 9,503 664 8,549 166
6,333 20,038 1,548 8,563 493 5,979 382 4,978 224

al 119,782 159, 668 44,585 82,381 11,683 36,928 6,528 25,495 2,273
9,982 13,306 3,077 544 2,119 189



2.

3.

4,

ate

Recomsendation that the training program for production
supervisors and operators, particularly in the refinery,
be strengthened emphasizing the importance of following
nuclear safety controls. -

On November 16, 1967, a full-time “Training Coordinator”
was appointed for the purpose of establishing a for-
malized training program at NLO. As reported ina
Jetter from J. H. Noyes, NLO, to C. L. Kari, CAO, on
danuary 18, 1968, a training program was scheduled to
begin January 22, 1968, for refinery personnel, emphasiz~
jing nuclear safety. Further, in a memorandum dated

dune 21, 1968, from C. L. Karl, CAO, to Jd. A. Lenhard,
Director, Safety Division, ORO, it was reported that a
review of 8 programmed instruction courses was performed
by refinery foremen. An additional course wes completed
on a pre-test basis. Other training sessions have been
held for the Maintenance Department on nuctear safety.

Recommendation that all noise areas be surveyed and
necessary corrective measures be implemented.

The noise survey has been completed. Evaluation of the
survey data in conjunction with previous audiometric
data ts underway. A report of this evaluation will be
compiled and the satisfactory implementation of the
recommendation will. be contingent on the successful
resolution of problems and recommendations resulting
from the NLO evaluation. The jolters in the Metals
Plant and the Ball Mill operation in Building 55 are
currently recognized as potential problem areas.

A new audiometric booth has been installed and should
‘improve the quality of audiometric examinations.

Recommendation regarding emergency planning and readiness.

Two high range radiation instruments are now available
for use. It appears that some definite procedure for
periodically vertfying the workability and quasi-calibra-
tion of the high range scale was yet to be firmly
established.


NATIONAL LEALCOMPANY OF OHIO
INTER OFFICE: ROUTING SLIP

ro jae Diiglye

> v_”,
_ PROM: DS Are
wt

‘The

pahers ore referred for the purpose indicated by the check
onorica:

LlPiecse prepare sepky for my signature
[Submitted for signature or approval.
Please note and file.

Please acte and return to me.
Please answer, sending me o copy of your letter,
Please foltow up.

mmO-OEN-a56 (9/25/96) 1m LIEU OF mt

2615497

sof mw



URINARY URANIUM INVESTIGATIONS
R. C. Heatherton 2132432

5 8. Shurkin

The following urinary uranium results were investigated first
because there were no apparent reasons. for the high uranium
reaults. care otal, tele i aan taaea,

The investigati. failed to show why these urinssamples were
high uranium.

Following are the results of the investigations:

(1) ° works for.
ase into any. area that
would result josure. e n6
Sle sop ge se epeteies Bee ae erases tar i
(2): "works for

e
+ Offies where

t -

he is working to the present time. 1 Me a re ram

for the high uranium result of Oehb6 mg 0/2 given the
urine sample of 1/29/55. - ve :

(3) ' "worked as

RadSochemistry Lab, in the Laborstory Building.
Her principle job was

7 mF eibils of her getting
an exposure which woulda result in 0.' mg U/l is very

qeuetes
(hy) 5 . aisa
Ber duties cecasionally take her to
the reproduction room in the Laboratory Building. I sould

fina ni for urinary result Saf 0-053 be U/L
te eee eee! et 5/2/55.

WSS tbg W. 8. Shurkia
se: J. Ao Quigley
R. Hoover

W. 3, shurein
Central Viles u



OFFICIAL USE ONLY
eo :
April 19, 1972

2 Plate

REFINERY URANIUM EXPOSURES
S. F. Audia

J. A. Quigley, M.D.

During January, Refinery personnel were soheduled to submit
&@ quarterly urine sample for uranium analysis. When the
first samples were analyzed it became clear that there had
been, prodsnged esDOsursS to high concentrations of airborne
ur q @ attached summary, conclusions are given
regarding the sources. Recommendations are made to avoid
the recurrence of such unacceptable exposures.

The exposure conditions have continued despite abatement
efforts made so far. During the week of April 10, fresh
layers of dust were noted around the north side screw con~
—_ ‘yeyor and one drum dumper operator was observed without @
@ respirator. In view of anticipated Refinery operations,
these exposures and possible corrective measures are
matters of major concern.

Die. of Health & Satety

Py J. As Quigley, M.D.
ris
- MWB/vvs
attach.
co: W. J. Adams
3. E. Beokelheimer

P. G. DeFazio - w/o printout
A. PF. Pennak - w/o printout

Kova de Bath title IP d/ 22
Pavticmned dy Hows re F/5/7 2.

a7a1ae7 3481864



8.

Se

4. General

The nuclear safety staff functions and responsibilities
are essentially unchanged from that previously noted.

A significant portion of the staff time is devoted to
‘field observation and- inspection of the potential
hazard locations, such as the refinery. As evidenced by the
Tow frequency of nuclear safety violations, about three
minor ones being reported during the year, operator
personnel are more cognizant_of nuclear safety pro-
cedure. This may be in part attributable to the for-
malized training program initiated since the last
appraisal.

Transportation

All fissile materials are being transported in DOT approved
containers which have OR-0529 approval. One future shipping
problem has arisen which will require container(s) outside
those currently used. This involves the transport of 3.85%
U-235 enriched 2.6" diameter x 30" metal? rods from NLO to
the 9213 Critical Experiments Facility. Plans are in effect
to provide the ORGDP Unirradiated BONUS Fuel Shipping Con-
tainer on a loan basis for this use. This container has
OR-0529 approval for BONUS fuel with a DOT Special Permit .
pending. This permit will need to be modified to cover NLO
as a shipper and the new package contents. The package as
now approved meets “all requirements as a Fissite Class I

package. .
Internal Exposure Evaluation —

Recent in vivo monitoring of NLO emplo'
Frdicated sight emoToyees’ apparer loyees.

sible lung burden of uranium., These employees
were c ng in their regular work assignments at the time”
ofthe appraisal. Four of these employees were from the
Metals Plant; including the highest, two are from the Scrap
Plant and two from Plant 9. NLO appears to recognize the need
to expedite the verification of these lung burden levels and
to take appropriate restrictive action as needed to insure

that none of the employees exceeds the lung exposure guide.

A serious question has been raised regarding the validity of
job weighted at ist sampling approach tong u: yy NLO,



7 beet OFFICIAL USr Gina

lJocations. Results, given below, were as expected~-the dust
above tends to come down.

Location Daily Dust Fall
ug U/ft?

} - exposure source. In February, gumpapers were placed in five

Near operator's desk, Digestion

bottom level 1,160
Above D1-7, 2nd level, Digestion 25,600
Above screw conveyor, 3rd level,

Digestion 11,250
On girders, Ath level, Digestion 750
North of center door, Denitration 7,500

AS noted earlier, there were few actual dusty operations
observed; the only one sampled was the drum dumping operation.
Results, given below, show that a respirator is required during
the entire dumping job, including any waiting periods after the
dumping has started.

Location pes Eadioncttvitg
5 xn &

e@ GA. Drum Dumper Building 1956 20
B%. Dumping 4 drums 6600 66
GA. Digestion, Operator's desk 170 1.7
GA. 607 Level 140 1A
GA. At West Dust Collector 130 1.3
BZ. Drum Dumper Buifding 4500 45

GA. 596 Level. Hot side near
digest_tank west 240 2.4

In _ Vivo Count: Resuits. According to in vivo counts made
this year, most Refinery workers have uranium lung burdens well
below the permissible level. ‘The employee who had the highest
urine results during January and February also had the highest
lung burden. His most recent count indicates that the uranium
in his chest area is 78% of the maximum permissible lung burden
(MPLB). Three other Refinery workers have MPLB‘s of 67%, 63%,
and 55%. All others are less than 50% of the MPLB.

We see no immediate concern over any of these results. How-
ever, we would be concerned if the employees with the higher

e@ burdenga continued to have the exposures they had earlier in

the year.

TOT re a

3481867



OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HIGH ATR DUST EXPOSURE CPERATIONS

To Be Reviewed 3/23/62

SLANT 1

Operation xX BAC
Riffling ore in Petersen
Blending Room 3.3
Washing sample drums ee
Weighing reject drums 8

Scooping ore from drum and
= placing into Patterson Blender 10.0

PLANT 2
Dumping ore {Hot Side) 20.0
Dumping ore (Cole Side) 6.7
-Loading crop ends at
Metal Dissolver 8.0
Emptying Hoffman vacuum

i cleaner 45.0
PLANT 3

Gperator changing sample jars 5.5
Operator raising chute from fuli
hopper, etc. and disconnecting

.

©

Operator removing lid from
, empty hopper anc conrecting

it up. 6.5
“Phar & . :
+ Dumping rebdiené UF: 5.9
‘
~ PLANT 5

+ Adjusting weights at the

residue erib 3.0
ngelter operetion 12.0
i elidéing furmace pats 10.0

Operating breakout station 5.5

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

2637891

Zanuary 23, 1962

Status

Request for Production Engineering
Services to be submitted for re-
designing ventilation facilities
where needed.

Ore Handling CP is being prepered
and is to be submitted in the near~
future. All four of these
operations should be either
eliminated or improved with this
cP.

Idee Letter is being written by
Production Engineering to enclose
and ventilate this operation.

Dropped from 6.2 x MAC, Other
minor revisions have since been:
made. H&S will again re-evaluate
early in 1961. ve

Agreed that respizetory protection:
is most practiczi method for con-
trolling ezposcres at this
operation.

Rothing in progress te improve.
idee Letter for revision tG break-
owt station shovid improve.

Idea Letter for revision to presk-
out station should. improve.

.. OFFICIAL USE ONE

3110874



OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH STANDARDS, PART 1910.86,
IONIZING RADIATION

D. L. Dunaway

October 19,1972 Page 2

Most likely.these requiren.ents for labels and signs were intended for
small users whose work with radioactive material is a small part of
their total work and where there is s need to constantly remind those
coming into the area of the presence af radioactive material. Such
requirements seen out of place for this plant where work with source
materials is the principal work.

Paragraph (c) (3} of this part does not allow application of particle size
data or use of respirators in determination of exposure to airborne
radioactivity. Thus, the only means of control are reduction of the
airborne concentration to which workers are exposed or reduction of
their time of exposure so that the average concentration for 40 hours
does not exceed the concentration guide. It can be concluded that
bioassay and in vivo monitoring data are not acceptable evidence of
compliance with exposure criteria.

Because of the impracticality of these requirements for operation of _
this plant and evidence of many years of operation with adequate radiation
exposure control, we should ask for a variance in these n atters unless
we are considered to be in compliance.

Original Signed By
RC. HEATHERTON
Asst. Dir. of Health & Sately
R. C. Heatherton
RCH/ fh

cc: J. A. Quigley, M.D. - M. W. Boback

3417098



' 2132018

CENTRAL 42
Fe
dune 18, 195)
JUSTIFICATION OF BASIC NEED FOR VENTILATION SYSTRIS IN NACHOITIG
AREA PLANT 6
- = Pe Ge- DeFazio -

3. FP. Andie
Latter to 3, FP. Andia from J. A. Quigley Subj, "Exposures in Plannt 6",
dated 1/1/5k.v
Letter to 8. F. R. C. Hextherton, Subj. "Plant 6 Air
purvey* dated 3/u/sbew” ,

4 recent survey condusted by the Industrial Hygiane Department
disclosed many areas in the Machining ares of Plant 6 where ex-
posures exceeded the presently accepted maximm allowable concen- -
trantion (MAC) of seventy alpha disintegrations per minute per

cubie centimeter. These locations and exposures recorded were a3

LoLLowss
i 2) Acne up to AC
 ) £3} tarvet Lathe tp to rd
(3) CenterIsss Grinders up te 15 sac
8 Medart Straighteners up to 20 Mac
* Peerless Saws (no reading given Yat stated
excassive in refcrence let <r
above).
a During the-sapp period of tine, LSS urine saxples were talon from
employees working on and these machines. 27h, or 59 of

ttiee gevlas were shove th sasim petsana level of uranium
contente

This overexposure and resulting presence of execssive urerium in
uring seaples has been caused chicfly by lack of sufficient venti-
lation systems om machines in the cachining area,

(1) Ventilation systems for Ace Sridleys are of insufficient
capacity to draw off all dust carried by coolont -ist and
any additional fumes created by minor fires in bases of
these machines, Hooding on Acre Gridleys is very in-
efficient.

@ 090841



é

7:

G. DUST COLLECTOR LOSSES

“There is ample evidence that losses from dry dust collectors have been underestimated.
We have discussed this in great detail in the report to which this is an addendum. There is
considerable additional evidence about this in the new documentation, which confirms our
original conclusion. ‘As one example we cite the case where 2 portion of the Pam 5
serviced and was therefore disconnected. Workers inhaied uranium which wes present in
the air at levels up to a 100 times the maxim allowable concentration. ‘The document
also discusses the installation of an emergency ventilation system, similar to the one for
scrabbers discussed above, which would have resuited in unfiltered uranium dust being
discharged directly from the plant into the atmosphere. We do not know whether such a
system was eventually installed.

However, in the limited time available to swudy and analyze the new documents, we
bave not yet been able to come up with 2 way to use the scattered dara t0 make now
estimates for dust releases from the monitored dust collectors. The only changes that we
have made are for the 1970-1982 period, as desctibed in Section B above, where official
figures have been replaced by estimates based on an earlier operating period (1957-1965).
For the other years we have not adjusted the data, in spite of considerable evidence that
the present official estimates are bizsed in the direction of underestimation. This is one of
the reasons we recommend that considerable additional work anrst be done to revise the
estimates-we present here. .

3-~RE. Starkey 0 CR Kar, "Operation of Plant 5 Burmout Without Versilation’,
December 24, 1962. PE FAD GA)



/
®

E. SCRUBBER LOSSES

In his recent deposition, Michael W. Bobeck, head of Industrial Hygiene and Radiation
at FMPC during 1969-1982, admined some startling things which cast_donbt on, the
integriy ofall stack data during 1969-1962 and of Plame 8 scrubber data daring the etre

pefiod of operation. _

which are appended to this addendum, and which are cracial primary documentation in
evaluating scrubber losses from Plant 8. He was not able to cite a single reference for the
estimates of scrubber losses which he presented in the successive versions of the official

i MP fiom: scharges. Nor was he able to provide any explanation of
why the mumbers were consitemly s9 mach lower than those clearly indicus by Plas

‘There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the official estimates of losses from the
five Plant 8 scrubbers ‘are far below the actual releases. Farther, the method of estimation
of the losses was incorrect. ‘the combination of optimistic estimates of scrabber efficiency
with an incorrect approach to calculating scrubber losses from analytical data have resulted
in systematically erroneous estimates for scrubber cases.

A memo from EW. Randle to AF. Peanak, March 12, 1971,)5 explains that the
scrubber losses were estimated “by weighing end analyzing the quor from the scrubber
cach time it is drained” and’ then sssuming that the. scrubber was operating at @ Constant
elficiency of 83%, This figure is in the mtiddle of the manufacturers suggested of

. efficiencies of 709% to 95% expected fram the equipment ‘under ordinary cuditions.

‘The simation can be depicted as follows:

‘Assume that the produetion level and conditions are such that 100 kilograms per week
is being sent to the scrubber. If the scrubber operates at an efficiency of 83%, then &
kilograms will be captured in the scrubber liquids and 17 kilograms will be exhausted to the
anmosphere,

Now assume that the scrubber was operating at 50% efficiency due to a partial
deterioration. The actual siteation would be that 50 kilograms would be captured in the

bad Deposition Of Michael W. Boback, taken by the plaintiffs Wait
Scimeder, Bayless and Chesley, April 18, 1989. ” a the affee of Wate

15 BW. Randle memo to AF. Pennak, “Investigation of Methods of Meanwing and
6 safe Uenan ame teAmap aes ot



- | Dear -MP.-Travis:— —-.

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO

A SUBSIDIARY OF NL >INOUSTRIES. NC. 2159291

? CINCINNATI, OHIO 4523

AL} K PHONE: AREA GOODE: 612-725-1181

Me. W. H. Travis, Director
Safety & Snvironnental Control Division

Oak Ridse Operations
Departaent of Eneray

P. 0. Box B

Qak Ridse, Tennessee 37330

TMTERNAL RADIATION EXPOSURE EVALUATION
econ oe on ass

Ref: Letter, W. H. Travis to Multiple. Addressees, same subject,
. dated July 12, 1579

Uranias sis. SS. sre not used to evaluate internal. md
tion exposure at the FNPC, order to da sc, an employee would
brave to be removed from all exposure until transient uranium was
eliminated from the upper respiratory tract and the gut. Only when
all urinary uranium was due to the ceposit in the organ of interest,
usually the lung, could an estimate be made of organ burden and
internal radiation exposure. Removal of employees from regular work
duties for this purpose. would..not.-be-practical. :

&ll estimates of uranium lung burdens are provided by in vivo count-
ing. Urinalysis results are only used az an indication of the
adequacy of basic exposure control measures. We assume that uranium
in urine will generally not exceed 6.040 mg/L when airborne uranium
is within the conesntration guide limit. This assumption is based
ou many years of air sampling and urinalysis data. When a urinalysis
Tesult exceeds 0.640 ug/t, the employee is immediately requested to
submit additional urins samples et the start of shift on three con-
secutive work days. An investigation of the work ares is made if
the hish concentrations persist.

a some sursacran roe reg ceseeruevr or G PLANIEFS DP



@

21,068

tf oduction Area Security Pence = ot Arca eG Area

onth Va anim Beta Uranium = ,_-Beta Urans wt Beta Urandun Beto Stack Le. 3s
ue/ft2 d/njtt? —g/ft2 sd /m/ ft? ug/et2 a /n/Ft? ug/ft? afnffe® mr

260 / / - @

. 13,563 14,531 4,379 4,981 1,010 2,896 354 474 532 3

. 11,333 211,598 2,691 5,213 1,903 10,431 287 m4 279 Fz
28,917 12,901 1,574 2,147 945 A50 a4 208 329 2
19,500 18,058 5,359 6,043 1,075 5,423 469 536 3280S
15,667 13,526 3,369 3, 660 1,092 3,122 422 422 357 =

e 13,333 12,932 4,097 3,680 1,463 2,892 625 534 nos

y 31,833 28,714 6,125 . 6,013 2,871 4,925 672 534 199 TM
47,000 15,471 4,500 2,662, 2,350 4,380 850 593 205

t 13,250 15,705 4,419 © 3,509 1,275 2,743 614 51 155
27,583 19,647 3,344 4,610 1,825 2,929 1,768 479 122

' 38,500 17,832 12,625 7,142 3,125 2,082 1,082 625 1,662

: 22,333 9,798 5,086 4,122 1,783 2,224 900 669 265

tal 252,812 190,731 57,568 53,772 19,777 44,497 8,287 6,299 4,748



REFERENCE

ane

3a

6%

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO

- CINCINNATI, OHIO 45239

March 29, 1973

WRIST BADGE EXPOSURES USING ALL-PLASTIC BADGE IN PLANT 5
"BY AREA

M. W. 3oback

K. N. Ross

ix of the all-plastic badges prepared in the Bioassay
maintenance shop were used in a test to determine if con-
tamination of the badges could be minimized. The results
of this test are compared to two previous tests in Table I.
The numbers in the table are the exposures indicated by the
film exposed in the contaminated film badges and plastic
badges after wearing.

It appears that use of the all-plastic badges does decrease
the contamination of the wrist badges in most cases. It
will be necessary to increase the number of tests and to
make sure the badges are rinsed off twice a shift to see
how much of a decrease we can get.

The wrist exposure for the people involved in the test is
shown in Table II. It appears that 1623L badge was quite

contaminated during the working exposure period. This

exposure should be deleted. > ~
K. N. Ros:

KNR/vvs

attach.

ec: A. E. Abbott

ME CONTRACTOR FOR TKE U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMIssiON

2705540 3439324

~



/
@

‘Tims, the present official estimate of unmeagured process losses is clearly wrong,

"perhaps by two or more orders of magnitude.

Finally, there were a mmber of non-point sources of releases from poorly operating
equipment that was located outdoors. ‘These may have resulted in enormous discharges to
the air, and there is considerable evidence towards just such a conciusion. Yet such sources
were not evaluated besed on any evidence that relates to the history of FMPC operation in
the Addendum to the Official History.

‘We cite a few examples from copious documentation. Consider the following statement
in a 1959 docament:

High levels of
iy Heal aad
various product

‘There are many other documents which show similar conditions, in the context of both
uranium and thorium processing. Take for example the following from a 1968 document
discussing possible thorium processing methods:

“As you wall know, most of our six dat probleme atthe EMEC ove

‘years have resulted from drumming and dumping dry materiais.
Any time that we can eliminate either pf these ous our air
become greatly .

gizboms contaraination in Plant § are being reports’
drumming y. The major seats: ten

Presumably, some improvements in conditions have been made by 1987 a3 2 result of
considerabis public scrutiny.

‘S"Production Enguesring Docanent, “Short Term Completion Report; Project Title: Air
Sees eination’ ta Plan a document muraber 2225948, 2-17-99

9 pH GR ‘Problems Associated with Thorium ing - Plans 8",

10
1970.



High Air Dust Exposure Ooeretions Continued

Page 5

einuary <3, Td6L

Operation X mac
Charging UFR 13.0
Bottom reduction charging |
operation toll
Lowering “spent” crucible into
burnout and reroving it. 4.0
Installing nex mold and

bottom tank section 26
Unloading centrifugal dryer and
loading wegnetic separator oe
Transporting bottom moid sank
section ts separesion booth 8
Hand cleaning furnace pots 3.0

Breaking brick and mortar

. ; from Remelt furnace coil 356.0
: @. ¢ Shoveling brick and mortar

\ from Remelt furnace coil
Knocking off and stamping
sample 24.0
Capping charged furnace pot 5.5
Separating mold from ingot 3.2
DEVELOPMENT MACHINE SHOP
Operating Bullard lathe 3

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

958.0

States .
Nothing in progress to improve,

Nothing in progress to improve.
Hothing in progress to improve.

Dropped from 3.0 x MAC. Will be

dropped from list.

Dropped from 8.2 x MAC.
aropped from list.

Dropped from 3.0 x MAC.
dropped from list.

Nothing in progress to improve.

Will be

WiLL be

Nothing in progress to improve.
Nothing- in. pregress-to- improve.

Design for ventilating this station
complete, and is to be installed
with Plant 9 major expansion.

Up from .7 x MAC in 1959 - Nothing
“Deprogress-to “improves ~~ -

Up from 2,4 x MAC in 1959 - Entire
separation to be remodelled in
NPR and I&E Revisions.

Dropped from 23. x MAC ag 2 result
of minor enclosure modifications.
W311 be dropped from List.

3110878



/
® High concentrations of uranium in working areas and the poor working conditions
indicate several things:
° large sections of the FMPC were operated in violation of radiation standards, which
indicates a substantial degree of technical negligence, especially as these problems

3 poor ventilation and working conditions resulted in suspension of large quantities of
‘uranium into the air which did not pass through any stack monitoring systems.

° due to the poor coverage of the site by environmental air monitors, it is quite
possible that the air monitoring system picked up only 2 small fraction of such
particies; .

° an unknown quantity of such suspended particles might have made it ofisite 25
- airborne particles, while some may have been deposited onsite and made their way .
. to surface or ground water. .

@ Due to the poor record-keeping and lack of information it is not possible at the preseat
time to arrive at estimates of the quantities of uianium and other radionuclides witich
might have been suspended duc to poor ventilation. But 2s we have noted above, such

releases over 2 period of more than three decades may well bave been enormous. tis
neither posible xt the present time to estimate the figures, nor what fraction of such
_ airborne uranium might have wound up offsite, .



Mr. G L. Kari Pagez

‘The overall imaprovement in Plant § conditions cannot be completely
evaluated, as our 195 air dust survey has not been completed. However,
the air dust samples taken to date indieste significant improvement has
béen made. For instance, the operators having the three highest Dally
Weighted Exposures (DWE) showed redactions from 1$ NOG*to 1.5 NOG,
13 NOG to 2.5 NOG, and 9.6 NOG te 1.9 NOG, Also the plant-wide
average of general sir samples shows ¢ significant reduction from 1.8
NOG in 1964 to approximately 1. 0 NOG in 1965.

"NOG - National Lead Company of Ohio Concentration Guide

both NBS Handbook 69 and AEC Manual Chapter 0824 list the maximum permis-
sible concentration for thorium as 3 x 1071! ye/ce (133 « d/m/m3). We have
ewtablished an NOG for thorium at 100 « d/m/m3, the same as for uranium.

We realise this does not give us as much leeway ag our uranium NOU; however,
the nature of the thorium operation, in our opinion, gives our operating personnel

is required at this time. There d is-procedure for tho
avaliable and at this time we need fo body countin
by air dust surveys, If seem to be in: we can

advisability of whole-body counting at that time. if a suitable urinalysis proce-
dure is dnveloped, it too will be evaluated.

RHS/mjs/mb

ee: G L. Karl J

3% A, Quigley, M.D.
R H. Starkey



OFFICIAL USE ONLY ger
NATIONAL LEAD COPARY

e : : cinctanat! 39, Ohto GENTRY FILES

Bovyerber 3, 1960

swt REEVALUATEON OF SCRAP MELTING OPERATION - BUILDING 70” ? plat @

To «J. As Gurigtey, M.D. .

ne ae

‘the attached Table I sumerizes the results of air dust samples that were

3 ‘taken on November 2, 1960 to see if a lowered furnace would

. adequately reduce the air dust levels as found on October 6, 1960, A -
copy of the October evaluation is attached as Appendix A.

‘The atteched sample results seeu to be somevhst higher than those of the
previous evaluation. ‘This wes probably caused by the ack of air move-
ment during the November 2 sanpies (colder weather - doors closed).
Regatdless, the results indicate that large sources of ait contaxination
continua to exist, — .

I In-addition, process saaples were taken at two suspected sources of

£ contaminstion, Results of these samples indicate both sources are

= contributing to high air dust levels, As shoun, one is 3 much larger . .
source than the others however, both require improved control. n

© Since the previous evaluation seems to be correct the recommendations

4 therein will not be changed. However, it is further recommended that any
steps to improve air dust levels in this area be immediate, The air dust
levels indicated on the attuched table are much too bigh to allow for any

s delay.

2 In addition, the utinary uranium levels of employees routinely working in

. this area eppear to be inéze Some of the more recent
mS reaults have been an the“ = i Limit — 25 ps/l), - -
ry - further substentisting the magnitude of the personnel exposure levels -

5 found through air sampling.

a 4 perchtocetiylene exposure, problen 2150 Crises oe eee it can be
. shovel 3B, With the winter months alnost vpon us it can be
ce expected that this aspect will worsen umless corrective action is taken.
Already there have been complaints from some of the employees in this area

2 of itimess from the perchlorethylene exposure.

a : (ph hg, 8

fd eal See aachmeri

OFFICIAL USz ONLY PE
; . Z0oc

RECT APY AVAH ARIF DezTARS 2471N910



TABLE IE

e@ 7 WRIST EXPOSURE
ganuary 1973

mp mr/shift . mr/quarter . r/a .
_ ot - dackgrcund
1427R 24.0% Gawusyedamy = 1560 e120
1427L 23.3 1515 mm 7
1679R 59.3 3854 3113, -?
1679L 82.3 5284 45430 F
1623R 96.6 6279 5538 22
1623 saleby 215.0 . 13975 13227. #%
Test 1 10.0

Test 2 10.4

~ par marae | eh

BEST COPY AVAILABLE 3439326



uw 5. Deparment of Commerc ‘Sinclair Weeks, Secretary
‘National Bureau of Standards 4. v. Astin. Director

' Maximum Permissible Amounts of

{::°- Radioisotopes in the Human Body
7 “ and Maximum Permissible

Concentrations in Air and Water

| Natioaaf Bareau of Stendsids Handbook $2 fete

7 ts Superturmacomt of De 25, D.C. - Prien 29 cones

“PE S544



r ateg

sranpaenn rome od. 60

: Office { andum + ONITED STATES GOVERNMENT ;

€

70 + 3. &. Sapirie, Manager, Oak Ridge Operations DATE:
. AUG 22 1958 2185445

FROM : C. L. Karl, Area Manager, Ferneld Area

SUBJECT: DISPOSAL OF FERUALD THORIUM PRODUCTION RESIDUES

SGEOL: SEG

In June 1956, all production of massive thorium metal at the Fernald

site was terminated. Residves accumulated during the years of pro-

éuction nave been stored in and adjacent to two storsge buildings which

are north of the thorium production plant. These residues are stored

in 30 gellon and $5 gallon steal drurs, and.in 30 gallon cardboard

varrels.’ Due to space liniteations it was possible to store only the :
cardboard barrels inside the storage wuildings, and the steel drums ;
have been stored outside on concrete pads adjacent to the buildings. H
Neng of the steel druns have been completely destroyed by the effects

of weathering and the physicul and chesical action of their contents.

Were are approximately 20,000 drums. and parrels ox these residues ir

the Shorium storage area, fhe thorium content of the residues very fron

5 to_100%. ‘The redioactivity range 1s 0-204 ureps/br and is essentially

geuie radiation. eine

Yith che conversion of the thorium production plant +9 production of
enriczed ureniun the storaze of the thorium residues hes become @ very
serious probler., ‘he space occupied iy the residues is weeded fer stor-
age of enriched urenium production residues and product. The, rapid {
deterioration of thoriun residue drums in outside storage bes resulted Ha
in continuous: redrurming end some loss- of residues -to- the..storn_ savers.

In eddition certein of the residues, due to their finely divided state,

heve © tendenc; to exhibit pyrophoric cimracteristics and numerous snell

Fires tave resulted which, elthough damege wes Light, require the entire

fire brigade to extinguish ‘ther and to prevent spreading to other durms.

Jnce there appeers to be no irmediate future requiremert for these resi-
S$, and since recent offers of the weterial to private industries Te
only mildly successful, it is the desire of ‘ie Fernald Area OF
9 consider disposal of the thorium, residues by burisl in a soverntert or
private disposel area. It is concluded thet the experse oF dispose} will
be far less then the costs of redrumming, fighting fires, and tie con-
struction of new storage tuildings.

tre

2 effort to locate sites for disposel of the residues, the P&O con-

In
- tucted O30 Feed Materiels Division and inquired about the disposel of



Type ps3
Ouepation of Location Sueis 3938 3987
BE 2O BOE.
1. Surge & weigh hopper area a AT
2 grem, surge hopper to digest GA ie ef
3. Demver crusher area CA 34
4 Oliver filter stea oA 2% #26 ie
5. Rimco filter ares CA 326 07 .
6, Mueking aveast
a. By weigh hopper wan ist 27%
be By Oliver fitter aA ae ed
c. In front of generater room cA x ete
7. Raking material on Oliver filter 3z 68
BERANE RRICE
1. Casting station eres io 70 4
2. Sueking aren by panel boarc a OT
3. Secend floor GA 2.40 230
4. Wwhing material off top hearth BZ 263
5. Checking dvua for fullness Bz 4.73 2.94
6, Seeop sampling oxide at canning station BZ 29.18 33.74
i 7. Chnmping. drum Bz 9S. 2.68
EARP AG TTI PORES.
2. General area, ist floor CA 250 10
2. Seeaping:cake from filter heaves BZ 2.54 +50
3. Shoveling cake inte deus BZ 1.77 394
a press Bz 27 AL
Maintenance Ares, 2nd floor GA 209
Lime & Precont Make-up Tank Area GA tL
pe 84
1, General xrea, ist floor cA 47
2. Charging area, 2nd floor a 1.83
. Charging with contaminated oi) BZ 5,81
4. Operating controls, ist floor BS
EGE IE
1. General ares, ist floor 17
2. General arez, 2nd floor PJ 07
sl

i
i
RRREe

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

3187863 |



Security :Pence

ct Arca

of xluct ion Area PPC Arca
onth Urandug Beta | Uraniuy * Beta Uranauy Reta 2 Uren ium Beta | Stack Lovses
wg /ft d/n/ft? ng/ft d/n/ft up/fit d/m/ft up/fe afm/te? TM ~
962 “ “6
17,329 2,250 9,686 679 7,693 $32 7,281 71 «OB
417,220 82,153 8,436 506 6,420 407 “$,889 361 2
13,092 4,783 3,637 1,246 1,775 493 407 ata ae
29,127 4,703 9,879 1,808 5,765 654 4,340 368 =
26,917 32,374 3,091 13,133 1,196 9,613 1,832 9,154 167 =
e » 36,250 46,400 5,580 15,340 1,550 12,310 940 11,990 179 w
y 2,988 15,132 1,956 7,642 627 4,573 251 5,624 zas
20,833 36,812 26,168 10,962 9,646 4,929 4,030 4,18L 375
t 36,067 44,463 8,740 13,148 2,438 5,883 1,077 3,995 473
16,250 27,905 4,704 13,429 1,230 8,655 72 7,508 325
32,290 196,190 4,996 21,950 1,014 12,103 613 12,428 315
32,916 168,305 5,950 35,650 1,573 14,041 1,523 9,382 634
al 249,402 644,348 155,072 162,892 23,513 93,760 13,064 82,149 4,647
20,784 53,696 12,923 13,574 1,959 7,813 089 6,845 400



Oe rs

4 since. that data would not s!
Saployees at the in vivo indicat t 15 understood
that further in vivo measurements bé made, and in-
creased surveillance of work areas involved will be effected.

exposure for these

“No:significant--thorium: exposures..were found by the IVRML
program.

Thorium Operations

Inspection of Plant 8 revealed xabty..poorly-contained
and makeshift-type operations. For the most part, it
appears that the thorium materials when handled in dumping
or shoveling operations are wet sludges and present a
minimal potential for increased air activity levels.
However, some such operations were noted to be left with
gross amounts of material deposited in an unkempt fashion
which lead to significantly elevated thorium air levels,
particularly at the feed station for the rotary kiln. It
@ ig understood that thorium operations at NLO may be in-

creasing and that planning for improved facilities will be
. Tequired.

E. Raffinate Storage Area

The raffinate pits were visited, and the previously noted
problem of leaching of liquid through the west levy was
discussed. NtO-postulated: that: the Jeach had: stopped. by.
some self-plugging effect from the shifting pit residue...
The water level in Pit 3 was within one foot of the top of
the west levy pointing up the rather urgent need for the
new pit. The construction status of the new pit was
observed. A line connecting the new pit to the clear well
was laid in the top of the west levy of Pit 3, and at the
time of the appraisal no ground cover existed atop this
Tevy. NLO agreed to the need to reestablish ground cover
and to assure the stability of the levy especially in view
of the high water level in the pit.

Reviewers: Lh f hae Poem G
~ Thornton

° + AS inson
 ) Health Physicist Nuclear Safety Spectalist
wl hy

+ We tts
Health Physicist

Sow
1
Deal
ahs
cw
day
t



Me. William H, Travis, Director . Page 2

e@ Im response to your request (ref.), the following goals are proposed for

CY-1982:

Initiate the reporting of person-rem totals and averages by cost |
center. This information would be reported to enable individual
supervisors to follow the results of their own ALARA efforts.

Data would be reported for whole body, skin of the whole body .

and hand exposures.

Initiate the reporting to supervisors of lung burden in vivo
results as a percentage of the maximum permissible level. Many
lung counts are made for screening purposes and are msde under
circumstances which require interpretation of the count result

by someone familiar with the vagaries of in vivo measurements.
While all count data are retained in the employees’ files, not all

results are useful as an expression of the true lung burden.

Initiate the reporting to supervisors of all urine uranium results
above 0.025 mg U/%. For many years we have considered this level

as en indication that work conditions could be improved.

Conclude all testing to determine 1f ingot cleaning, by acid pickling
or other means, should be pursued as a means of reducing beta
exposures in remelt operations.

x | Please inform me or members of my staff 1f these draft goals meet the

objectives of the ALARA goal program,
Sincerely yours,

OFsinel
R.
RM. S
~ ‘Manager
MwB/f£b
ce: M, We. Boback
V. J. D'Amico
R, C, Heatherton
N. R, Letst
M. OR. Theisen
Central Files

0188b98



x

Vv
Cf . C. 2138200 -

Yerril Zisentud, Paneer April 17, 1956

MW, Be Uarriss Chief, Industrial
Hygiene Branch, AASL

THORIUM AT FERNALD

HSHWBH

I talked te Joe Quirlery this morning about the Fernald thorium
exposures, and picked up the following facts.

The thortum plant which consists of 2 wet purifying step, & derby
production, sawing the derbies into 2" squares, welding the squares
into lorg clectrodes, and are melting with consumable electrodes
43 no longer in operation. [rior to last winter, the piast was
operating at a lew rate, bet a Lerge orce~ for renelted therim
cane in, am! the croduction rate wi stenzed un very hich. Dv
Decerber, however, the order had heen substantially cormleted, 5
mangement shut down at <csiglerts benent.

Drier to shutdown, during the seriod 5 vroductiion rate, the
expozures were very high, vith several exposures exceeding
15,000 nicrocrans per-eubdic neter, the hest vein: close to
30,000, Indiviiual sample resalts ran up as high as 1/2 gram per
cubic meter. :

Vhen this was daternined, Joe nersuadud them at least to reduce

the oroduction rate. Cperating at the lewer rate they were able

to bring tost of the exposures cown helow 20 micrograms per cubic
meter, with some ss high as 500, but the tad spots which previously
had been st 50,UG0 vere now reduced to an averzze exposure of lu, WO.

At thst point, as T rentioned hefore, the order was about complicted,
end George Wunder arreed that the only thing to co wes to shut tho
plant down until the Comission was wiiling to sepoort the approxi-
rately £250,000 irproverent which had been recommeniod by Sations]
Lesa. .

Incicentally it nieht intcrest you to know that “ational ‘cd has
taken over the Tonticelle plant, and they called Joe out 1 to
advise on health controls (I wonder who paid for his time). Also,
“ational Lead is aparently seriously considering the construction
of a ¥TR. Ther called Joe on this as well.

0414288 estan ee
PE 58



To 3

FROM =

SUBJECT:

SYMBOL:

t

peor me ‘,
Ww
3

Office Memorandum + onrrep states GOVERNMENT

R. L. Kirk, Director, DATE: . a:

Production Division

W. B. Harris, Cuief, Industrial Hygiene
Health and Safety Laboratory 2285130 q

HEALTH HAZARDS INVOLVED IN PROCESSING MATERIALS

HSH:WBH

INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that thorium is very similar to uranium in its radio-
activity and not too different in its possible chemical toxicity,
there are certain inherent features of the material which make the
health hazards involved in its processing somewhat different. The
purcose of this memorandum is to attempt to define these differences
in order that plant and process design may be directly compared with
these for uranium processing with specific exceptions. These excep-
tions, I shall attempt to clarify so that noedifications may be. made
in the design to permit safe handling throughout. ©

1. Radioactivity

Unlike uranium, the extent of the direct radiation and radioactive

dust hazards of thorium processing depend in large measure on the
history of the thorium being bandied. This is because of the con-
di te: 3 of the thorium chain. When

one ‘takes these charac’ account, it is obvious
that it is ea sticlt Lo preeSt expected activity with the sane

degree of a33 ous and accuracy as can be done for uranium end
” dts compounds.

In order to simplify considerations of activity, it can be seid
that whereas in uranium processing the uranium is in equilibrium
with its daughters only in the raw ore, thorium mst be considered
to be in radioactive equilibrium throughout the processing. There-
fore, the same type of precautions mist ve followed in all steps
of the thorium plant as are observed in the initial processing
areas of uranium.

AS 2 result of the above consideration, it can be seen that the
thorium sludge materials and rafinnates, as well as the condensed
ash from the remelt operations, are both similar in activity
content to the K-65 material resulting from uranium refining.



a

RS

eocd panies

revennoromanas .

© Office Memorandum « UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
To :W. Be darcis DATE: August 5, 1953
FROM ‘A, ie Breslin

susyect: COMMENTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF FMPC PLANT #5 PERSONNEL TOWARD ATR HYGIENE
smieate HSH:AJB

In ths course of the recent occupational exposure study conducted at
Plant #5, many operating proctices vere cbearved sich vere of a nature

Supervisory personnel admitted that these practices were undesirable
but excused then on the basis that the large mumber of mechanical dif-
ficulties being met render the proper use of dust control facilities
impossible. This excuse is invalid, It is true that the legendary

" ta the report on the Pilot Plant (FIE0-2) theoe tame improper
were noted and dt was gredicted that these habiter if bot porrerted,
wee pe caret into the production plants.’ the, Problem now sxishs

It is essential that corrective action be Sndtinted at the supervisory
level. the present negligent attitude is # liability to clean operation.

Supervisory persomel mist be made to understand that bealth 1s of equal
to production and that overexposures to airborne dust, even
if omy of a transient, are to be avoided, ‘They should personally en~
force these rules: (2) (2), ie event af ecuipemnt Zatlnre, erailable dost
control equipment should be used to the best advantage. If the permanent _

Seslin/gxt

4

373
emo) s23r



Justification of Basic Need “or Ventilation Systens in Machining
area Plant 6

P. G. DeFasio

June 18, 195k

Page 2

(2) No ventilation sustem has been installed for the turret lathes
and for the future Heald facing and radiusing
carried by coolant mist ‘and fumes fron minor fires are thore~
fore allowed to disperse and mix into air in Machining Area,

*(3) Present furmeletype ends of draft ducts above
and eplash guards for these sane are very
cients & large amount of dust is being carried away via
the coolant mist,

(k) No ventilation system has been installed for the Medart Bar
straighteners or for the saws, Dust, oil fumes, ‘and fumes
minor fires are dispersed into the air,

It is proposed to ourchase and install ventilation equiznent as
fLoliows and thereby eliminate the sajority of causes for over=
exposures of employees in the Machining Area of Plant 6:

(1) Aventilation system (or systens) of sufficient capacity and
with properly designed hooding to insure almost 10% draw-off
of dust and fumes fron scue Gridleys. This systen (or
gustens) would replace present thres (and fourth for 2 5/3

Acme Gridieys) which are now.of insufficient capacity.

(2) & ventilation system above the turret lathes and the Heald
facing and radiusing machine of sufficient capacity and
with ortictent hooding to carry aff almost 100% of dust, and
fumes fron these machines.

(3) One piesce hoods for Centerless Grinders to replace present

y eas of chicts wid splash’ gird. ffodds dre to”

be properly. designed for quick removal or raising to facil-
itate set-up work and mrintenance work on these machines,

(4) & ventilation system above or near the Nedart Straishteners
and Peerless Saws, System to be of sufficient capacity and
to have efficient hooding to cary off dust and f.mes created

wae a enines. ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
Ss. F. AUDIA
METALS PLANT SUPERINTENCERT
S. F, Audia
S¥4/ec
ce: De J. Hythe 4. S. Yocco §=— Ge G Coon;
Me J. Goebel =-R. Heatherton Je Ae Quighey
Office File tral Files

030842



Me. #. H. Travis, Director Page 2

For chronic uranium exposures, we consider the lung as the critical
organ and base the permissible burden on radictoxicity. -Chemical
toxicity would be the controlling factor, and kidmey the critical
organ, if shere was an acute intake of a large amount of soluble

UR.

Sincerely yours,

Grigizsi 5



/
6

D. WORKING CONDITIONS AND RELEASE ESTIMATES
‘There is much documentation which shows that large amounts of uranium (and thorium
during thorinm processing) was prevalent in many working areas due to poor or sometimes
non-existent ventilation. “The following is typical of a large mumber of documents depicting

“High levels of exist in Plant 8 2 large
portion of which is attributed to aati a ow GST and
ventilation systems which are served collector

the caustic scrubber."

‘The highest Jevel of dust that ia mentioned ia the documents that we have coms across
isa high a8 1,261 times the maximum sllowable concentration.” Some documents:

showing the existence of such conditions are appended to this addendum.

Isis ioseresting to do some rough calculations on what such air dust level might mean
for airborne contamination ouside plant buildings. In the last mentioned document

88,277 alohs-disintegrations per minute per cubic meter of air, Assuming an average wind
speed of 10 kilometers per hour (6 miles per bout), and 2 value of 10,000 disimegrations

use the fall year here for the purpose of illustration only). ‘This indicates the possibility that
non-point sources may have contributed significantly to airborne releases. In addition to
data on outside non-point sources, 2 great deal of analytical and modelling work will be
needed to get even rough estimates of this figure.

Caacion Promasal Number CP--59-5?, Additional Dust Collector Capacity - Plant
4 & Novenber 3, 1959; p.t.
12" RE, Starkey

SAL Quis “Compilatic it ions",
amy,” Quigley et ai, spilation of High Air Dust Concentrations

13 LR Wing to ALM. Sears, Air Dust Samples at the Qurside Mil, Plant 3°, August 1, 1958.



High Air Dast Exposure Operations Continued

Page 3

e Sanuary 23, I96r

operat
PLANT 6
Gag shear operation

Hedart straightener
operation .

rods down rollers
to scales |

Loading rods into tote pans
Stamping rods —

Drumming crop ends

PLANT 8
Removing and lidding drum

~ r ) from Rotex

Feeding box furnace

Removing and iidding drum
trom muffle furnace

Removing and lidding érum
from UAP furnace

Drumming UAP cake
Dumping MgFo into leach tank

Feeding muffle furnace

BEST. COPY AVAILABLE

3.8
3.0

13.0

4.3

6.0
4g

12.0

22.0

18.0

1.7

6.5

Ventilation now being designed by
Engineering.

°

Nothing further in progress to
4mprove. . fhe transfer point is
now being ventilated...

Nothing in progress to improve.

Nothing in progress to improve,
Spray quenching tests by fPechnical
Division unsuccessful. More tests
are planned.

Nothing in progress to improve.

. New or reconditioned drums would

reduce still further,

opped from 88 x MAC largely by
more operator care. CP-59-57 ~
should improve still more.

Appreciably reduced in new drumming
station, but high level cleaning
orev was working at the time these

- samples were-taken-and-undoubtedly

effected the results.

Dropped from 43 x NAC largely by
more operator care. Engineering
Project 8-78 (UAP Furnace Off~Gas
Revision) is awaiting electrostatic
precipitator test before further
york is done on it.

Revisions to ventilation resulted
an 2 Grop from 21. x MAC. Will be
dropped from list.

Appreciably reduced, bat ampossibie
to tell just how mach as high level
cleaning effected samples.

3110876



OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. ‘Thoroughly remove the uranius dust and residues which have
been deposited on the floors and overhead structures such
as girders, ducts, pipes, and walls.

4, Continue to emphasize the use of respirators and the need
for prompt cleanup of material spilled on floors, walls,
or equipment.

Discussion

Urine Results. Attached ts a print-out of the 1972 urinalysis

data for Refinery workers. Persistent results over 0.025 mg/h
indicate moderate exposures and results over 0.040 mg/f are
considered due to excessive exposures which require follow-up.
During January and February, results above 0,100 mg/L were -
-somton,

Action Taken. On January 19, the urine results were discussed
with J. Beckelheimer. It first appeared that employees with

—high results had worked on the breaking of tubes containing vo,
pellets. At that time the job hed just been completed and it
was agreed to see if the next results were lower. They were not.
In addition, other men who did not work on the U0, job also had
high results. On January 26, another discussion fas held with
W. J. Adams and Mr. Beckelheimer. No pattern could be seen in
the urine data and it was egreed to have all Refinery workers
submit daily samples until January 31.

A follow-up meeting was held February 1. Messrs. Adams, .
Beckelheimer, Ross, and Boback were present. At this time it
was clear that most workers in the Digestion and Denitration
Areas had high results. It was agreed that one man who had

the highest urine results would be moved to the Extraction Area.
He was moved one week later. Supervision was to stress the use
of respirators at any dusty job and the prompt cleanup of spills.
We were asked to bring to the attention of the Foreman or Super-
intendent any situation which might have a bearing on the exposure
levels. In response, the.Health and Safety. Diyision submitted 13
reports to Mr. Adams between the period of February 4 and
February 24, noting such items as leaks, abnormal dust collector
eonditions, and use or lack of use of respirators.

Observations. On only a few occasions did we actually find dusty
Conditions. However, enough residual dust has been seen to
indicate that the system from the drum dumper to the digest tank
is the major source of airborne uranium in the Digestion Area.
Rodding out the screw conveyor and freeing blocked feed lines
has scattered dust all over the upper levels of the NW corner of
the Refinery.

The upper floors in the Digestion Area were cleaned several
times during the period of concern. However, the dust remains
on the overhead structure and does sift down to provide an

3481866



R. L. Kirk -h-

arises from the burning of the naterial. ‘This would be largely
eliminated because of the lesser pyrophoricity of thoriun. It
should be pointed out that with the exception of centerless
grinding these operations are being satisfactorily carried out

at Fernald.

6. Inspection

We are not yet in a position to define inspection procedures.
Fadiation exposures to the hands will undoubtedly be more severe
from the inspection of thorium slugs than the present uranium
practices would show. It may be possible to handle this either
with more mechanical operation or with time. Samples are being _
obtained for surface dose measurencnt. After the evaluation of
the metal, more definitive information will be presented,

7. Storage

More shielding will have to de provided for the storage of com-
pleted material. As a matter of fact, all inplant storage showid
pe shielded or at least adequately removed from operating areas.

In the event that specific information is desired on individual opera-
tions, I am enclosing a copy of @ memorandum from Mr. P. B. Klevin to

me which discusses each operation in detail and presents dust and theron
concentrations and radiation exposures which were actually measured at
Ames, Lindsay and FHPC.

Enclosure: .
Meno to Harris fr Klevin, dtd 3/5/5h.

oC: C. L. Karl, Fernald (2)
D.C. Moore, NYOO
PF. Huke, NYOO
Me C. Kells, wf0o (2)
P, B. Klevin, NYOO



voPy

NATIONAL, LEAD COMPANY OF CHiO
HEALTH § SAFETY DIVISIO

INCIDENT OBSERVATION REPORT

Te P. Klein } 2215786

To Ee

From 2 _D,_ Jones

Locotion_Phemny 8

Subject _NPR Dust Collector ote 2/16/68
BY If NP:
black oxide art of o} od
the floor. An opergtor who was covered with 0308 told ma that he had juat  _
ided 9 materi f: ic
a aq caused t)

matorial and cause it to cake up inside the smitz collector.

sas with me and sent the operator to the Locker _

_ Room for clothing change. explained that the collector was not working |
right yesterday (Sunday) and thet he had inspected the bags
them and causing two or three of them to pull loose at the t Ce

— showed me a newly installed section of downcomer fram the dust — |

colisctor., He said that apparently a fork truck . Las er

and next caved it in on one side so badly thet it severely raatrictad the flow
of material through it. (The BPR dust collector canning station and the NPR

drum dumping station are on the seme enclosure.) At any rate, & piece of poly-

ethylene was placed over the enclosure a3 best they could with the mounds of

later checked the collector bags end found

5309 izing inthe -way Maintenance —
two ST them with holes in them, so they were replaced.

rsiful estimates there to be 2,000 pounds of black oxide in the drumming

. “There might be more." ‘The material is .96% enriched. I hed the

H1eso

aift superintendent check the rating of this system in regard to enrichm
ad it to be rated for 1.25% of limited uranium compounds and at 1.952%

nited category materials.
As 2,000 pounds is the maximm safe mas. for uranium compounds, had this

ie eee see eer?



3.

TI. Observations

Ae

3.

ce

At the Pilot Plant, steap hoods are used for veporising
UFg from 10-ton feed cylinders. In the event of e Ug
release, the procedure calls for sisnual ectustion by an
operator of a water valve to “freeze-down” the cylinder
whereupon the water, a8 well as the steam condensate
under normal conditions, drains te the storm sewer systen.
Tt was observed, for the current U-235 enrichment involved,
that unsafe collection geometries are available for accu.
mulation of resultant cranium solution. It was also

thet no instrumentation exists for sutomatic Te-
lease detection and/or centrel. ~

In general, the approach ro Nuclear Safety at NLO appears
to be changing in that greater exphasis is being given to
eliminsting unnecessary or overly-restrictive conditions
or limits. During the past year, economic gains without
sacrifice of criticality control have been made with re-
gard to in-plant storage and process Limits and to off-
plant shipoent limits. a

The formal MLO presentations during the review on criti-
cality and sccountebility control are being documented at
Fernald and, hence, will not be included in this report.
The presentations were considered excellent and did clearly
indicate good management support for the health protection
programs, an awareness end respect for the problens in-
volved.and @ continuing esphasis on education and training.

Although information obtained from the study of current re-
eycle materials may not be valid for material from other
sources, such as Nuclesr Fuel Services, the information may
be of value in identifying future potential probles areas. .
Both U-235 enrichment and impurities in materiel from other
sources could be markedly higher than thet presently handled.
‘This could necessitate plant modifications based upon healch
protection considerations. These potential problem areas
need consideration in en early stage of planning. Rente,
10's continued awareness and understanding of the overall’,
problem is inportant, particulerly if and when commercially
reprocessed materis] is handled at BLO.



. ~8-

G. The design and testing of shipping contsiners for V-%
cores to effect improved sefety and econcsical transport
of fissile materials is considered highly jmportant,
and ft would be of considerable value if.similar prin-
ciples for nuciesr safety control could be applied te
other materisls with uneconomic aass restrictions.

8. The lack of experimental data for low U-235 enrichment
. end unit dimensions peculiar to BLO production opera-
tions has necessitated conservation in the application
of appropriate sefety factors to calculated data. If
may be advantageous for BLO to svail itself of computer
fecdlicies, such as thst at the ORGOP, where personnel
exe avaiieble and experienced in the use of the latest
codes ‘for criticality calculations. The use of these
codes usy give trends, curve shape factors, etc., which
could, by comparison with known experiments, justify
relaxation of some paramatric Limits derived by straight
I. line extrapolations. Hence, favorable results would
e offer, perhaps, economic gains in the application d less
restrictive limits to the overell HLO production process.

¥. ‘Racoumendattons:

As ds evaluation should be made to explain the recent trend
of increased personnel exposures end to inplement-corrective
action when practical to lower such exposures. .

Be The ‘pealeh, physics aspects of “re-cycle materiai® whould ve
evaluated and adjustments to the personnel monitoring program
made as necessary.

C. MLO should continue its efforts to test and develop cos-
tainers offering improved safety with economic gains in the
transport of fissile materinl as soted in Observation G.

* . B. the possibility of using computers and available critic
. eality codes for checking basic nuclear safety parameters
and limics, as noted in Observation 8, should be explered.



gh’ 23% Suat Exoosure Operations continues : 2age 2
nuary <3, OL

Operation > EMAC... Status - a a
eating pots into breakout idea Letter for revision to breakout
station.- 44 station should izporve.

Rough cleaning derbies 6.5 Tdea Letter for revision so breaisout
Sealing derbies 25.0 station shouid improve east station,
Weighing and marking derbies 1.0 however, nothing is in progress for

improving the west station which is
periodically used. Sefore completely
. satisfactory air dust levels can be

- realized, however, another method

of derby cleaning and scaling must

be found.
Cleaning mold tank and ‘setting Respirator appears to be the best i
in new mold and placing mold answer at this time although a .
cup. . 12.0 permanent solution is highly ‘
desirable. -
Removing moids from separatio) CP-59-45 should improve this :
booth . 42.0 operetion. Testing is now underway

in an attempt to develop design
eriteria for spray coating cd.

Cleaning molds with steel wool 38 Sketches and job order have been
Painting molds with MgO 0 completed end approved by this
‘ : committee for the redesign of the :
@ , mold reconditioning table. This will .

4nclode the use of the Sly dust:
oeliector on loan from Plant 8 as
ventilation and dust collection.

Removing drum from burnout P-60-31 should greatly isprove this

canning station 10.0 operstion.

“Emptying Hoffman units ~~ * -HCW-has been contacted with no . .
= "A Ares . 17.0 success. . It. appears as though we

Emptying Hoffman units ~ will have to start from scratch on

*S* Ares 22.0 this project again.

Crucible break-up are2 €.8 Should be improved by CP-60-31.

Cleaning Rockwell furnaces 18.0 Respirator appears to be the most

practical anawer.

Removing crucible lids from oP-60-31 should improve, or if at

purnout enclosure and placing ail possibile should eliminate this

into ventilated drum 466.0 operation.

Dumping oversize liner
material at East breakout
"sakeshift" dumping station 3.5

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Nothing in progress to improve.

3110875



“ge

2. Current Refi and General Plant Operation with
Enriched Rateriels :

Production requirements are somewhat ower than that
observed in previous appraisals. Currently, the
Refinery is processing normal enrichment uranium while
only a small production campaign of 2.1% U-235 metal
4s in progress in other plant areas. Inventories of
pads and general storage areas are significantly re-

duced from that observed in former reviews. Hence, |
with the fmplementation of previous recommendations

and the status of current operations, the criticality
potential is considered lower than that observed in

past appraisals.

3. Projected and Anticipated U-235 Enrichment Processing

Discussions with CAD and NLO personnel have indicated
e that Fernald will probably reprocess cold fuel from

several reactor sites including Hallam, BONUS, EGCR,
Piqua, and perhaps from SRO. Significant portions of
. the fuel will range from 3% to 7% U-235 enrichment.

. In this regard, a campaign is scheduled to begin in
February 1969. To upgrade the safety and economy for
processing these materials, studies are underway for
equipment modification in Piant 4 and in the Refinery
Denitration Area. With regard to the latter, the ORO,
NLO, and CAO staffs have been working together in
statistical studies and computational efforts for
establishing an upper safe enrichment limit for operating
the 500-gallon denitration units without batch restric-
tions. Since water mustbe excluded from the denitration
pots to utilize the “nitrogen poison-moderation control”
principle under consideration, further studies are under-
way regarding the use of scrubbers, water cooling systems,
etc., which could become sources of water inteakage into
the units. Detailed discussions and plant inspections
with NLO engineering and operating personnel were held on
these aspects during the appraisat.

858

ie
Aw
mo



Be
.
- C2453 |
7 ‘TIONAL LEAD COMPANT OF OHIO
e NA Cincimmati, Ohio 45239 ates
Avgast 17, 1965 MA,
iP

SUBJECT: MPC VALUES FOR THORIUM
TO: J. A. Quigley, M.D. “a
FROM: R, CG, Heatherton and M, W. Boback

Recently, Be. Marshall asked about the heatth and safety aspects of
handting nataral thorium which contained thoriem-230 {ioniem}. As
you know; his question was.prompted by current AEC interest in some
French-produced thorium nitrate tetrahydrate which is now stored at
Middlesex. The lonium content of the TNT varies up to 5, 5.parts per
million.

We conclude that this material can be handled Like natural thorium, and
no special precautions are required, A Th-230 content of 5.5 ppm in
: aged natoral thorium will increase the alpha activity by 16%. In freshly
e@ separated thorium the alpha activity will be increased by about 48%. —
Thus, the presence of Th-230 wilt not be reflected in a significant
increase in the airborne alpha activity at any.point in the process.

In the past, we never had reason to be concerned about the mpc for

Th-230, However, Dr. Marshall's question changed that, and also

resulted in an interesting situation, The mpc tables in Handbook 69
~ Hist 2x 10712 pe/cc.as.the mpc fora 40-hour work week for natural
thorium, Th-232, and Th-230, However, a foomote gives a pro-
visional va .. 11 pes c¢ for Th-232 and natural thorium.
Thorium-~ je not mentioned in the footnote. These mpcs are listed
below in the more familiar units of disintegrations.per minute per ~
cubic meter (d/m/m°}. The special curle allowance has been applied
to the mpc for naturai thorium.

Nuclide mpc,_HB tables zppc._HB. footmate
Th-natoral 8,8 dpm/m> 132 dpm/m®
Th-232 44 4 66
Th-238 aS {none given}

The mpc values given in the Handbook seemed unrealistic. The balf-ife
© and decay echeme of Th-230 indicates that Th-230 would.probably be lees
hazardous than Th-232 or Th-natural. This pertarbing situation prompted

MPC-T-65



t/ .oduction Area Security Bynce ‘EO 2¢t Area PHIG Area

onth Uranium Beta Ur anit Beta Uran.un Beta Uranium Beta Stack Losses
wg/ft2 any ug/tt d/n/ft wg/ft? dl /u/Et? ug/ft? anf?

03 y : . wo
147,370 314,868 8,316 42,816 3,000 18,622 1,060 10, 804 1,650 a
14,574 37,096 1,946 10,692 6,542 9,480 418 3,489 438 ey
20,312 42,037 4,133 20,466 1,244 14,872 $24 14,384 585 3
21,563 34,820 7,531 20,122 1,802 10,983 979 10,737 on
24,062 39,753 7,277 18,938 1,844 10,014 629 7,738 1,488 =

© 23,437 36,079 9,829 20,233 2,927 8,098 1,065 6,278 ono

y 14,400 27,000 3,800 13,588 1,450 8,283 648 6,360 ass
18,450 35,140 6,187 + 12,375 1,800 6,066 1,020. 4,040 at2

+ 0,625 37,100 8,113 14,263 1,877 3,933 684 1,700 332
46,950 70,400 9,363 21,675 2,233 5,383 600 1,970 302
31,900 44,475 8,900 15,975 2,726 7,033 840 3,172 S41
14,100 18,252 3,875 6,763 1,375 3,366 384 800 323

al 407,743 737,020 79,270 217,906 28,810 106,133 8,851 71,471 8,129
33,978 61,418 6,606 18,159 2,410 8,844 738 5,956 677



leaks, etc., rather then & tighter routine production
operation. WLO management is avare of these conditions and
+ feels that corrective action will be taken as necessary

IV. . Recommendations -

ae

A. It is recomended that corrective measures be taken to eli-
. inate the potential hazards arising out of the use of water
. for UF, release contro} at the Pilot Plant cylinder feed
. unit as pointed out in Observation "A",

B. MLO should evaluste the need for better control of the ine
creasing uranium air concentrations fn Plant 8, and for
inereased study and control ef thorium operation.

Reviewers: x2 Z leper W
L. Hervin - We Ae
Health Physicist Nuclea¥ Safety Specialise



Comparison of Pisnt 8 Air Dust Samples

1956 = 1957
Type X MAC
Seeretion or Location Sesple 2238 3332
ese
1, Onteide Wiliiams Mitt GA 44.3
2, Breaking salt at orteide xill Bz 2.8
3, Showeling onto conveyor at outside Bz 137.8
mill
4. Cuanging drums at outside mill Bz 122.9
oEDe Bot
i. Juice aren GA 65
2. Conveyor silo to calciner aren ca 1.48
3. Conveyor silo to bucket elevator oA 3.48
4. Willians Mil2, 20d floor a 65
5. furmace, drum dumping ares cA 2.67 1.56
6, Retex cumping area Gh 65
7. Rotex drumming station area «A 74
5. Dumping crus of C~Liner BZ 3.21 33.2
Feeding material to Rotex BZ 4.01 15.4
b annie rms at Rotex crumeng station bed 6.90 9.14
LL, Checking Rotex drua for fullness 3.94 5.40.
Boe piace
1. Bex furnace area cA 3.07 205
2. Beeding box furnace BZ ° 1.61
3. Checking crom for fullness Br 6.87  Fidh
4, Changing drums at box furnece Bz 6.12 3.79
SRTDATTON BRACE
1. Qxddetion furnace area, ond floor ica 53 oh
2. Smoking aren, lst floor CA 1.83 1.3
3. Spreading material on feed tray & BZ
reuoving foreign objects

4. Feeding exidation furnace BZ 1,00

¢5. Checking drum for fuliuess BZ 123

z drums at oxidstion furnace 2-06

S:_ Chaneing coms ot oe mm tnpeeh TM
WORE RRNACE
1. Muffle furnece area, Ist floor a 1,03
2, Moffle furnace are, 2nd floor a 86 3
3. Charging muffle furnace BE 29.06
&e matetizl in muffle furnace Ba 1.99 3.96
5. Checking drum for fullness BZ 5.8% 58,20
6 Cbanging drums at canning station Bz 15.4 227,07

BEST COPY AVAILAZ!

3187861



HL RELEASE ESTIMATES AND AIR MONITORING DATA

In the report to which this is an addendum it was pointed out that there is litde or 0
correlation between the official release estimates (as of May 1987) and air monitoring data.
indicates that, for various reasons, 2 large, but unknown proportion of the releases
happened in shart bursts or short periods compared to overall plant operating time. For
example, the denitration and guiping process in Plant 2/3 lasted 7.5 hours, but the gulping
process itself during which roughly half the dust releases occurred lasted for only 1 hour. bid
one includes the time berween denitration pot loading and down time, then it is apparent
that gniping releases, which are routine process releases (as distinct from accidental
releases) occurred over rougitly 159% of the time. ‘This short period over which losses
occurred makes the effect of such lomes on uranium concentration in the air more
comparable to that in accidents than to uniform releases over time.

Another example of frequent severe sudden releases is provided by the releases via the.
emergency system when the scrubber systems were pinged. Sach vents released large
quantities of uranium and possibly other radionuctides in sudden barst, with effects on air
quaiity very mmach like accidents, even though the releases were in these cases deliberate.

Since the network of monitoring stations was inadequate to detect accidents”, a large.
‘wut unknown proportion of the routine releases which happened in bursts or over relatively
short periods of time would also be likely to be undetected, Another way of stating the
sincation is that, over a long period, a fraction of the short-period releases would be picked

up by the monitor, but a considerable proportion, which cannot be determined from the
* data that we have, would go undatected.

2 ——ernd ‘Franke, Preliminary Assessment Radiation, Exposures, Associmed Wi
Releases of Radioactive Maseriais jrom - 195i to 1986, Instinae for Energy and
Exvironmental Research, Takoma Park, Md, May 1983.



w/ @ ‘xoduction Area

Security Fence . ject Arca PNG Area
fonth ve andy Beta Uraniug’ Beta 5 Uransam Beta Uraniug Beta Stack Losses
Hg/ft d/n/ft? ug/et~° —d/m/Et ug/ét? d/n/ft? ug/ét Afaffe2
284 ¥ . ‘ ‘ . Kd
mu 24,525 39,850 6,800 10,787 2,433 4,116 757 1,714 a7
> 51,750 59,575 11,350 17,413 3,983 6,450 1,456 “3,014 2
22,975 42,025 5,275 13,163 1,428 5,217 621 4,272 379 3
. 25,950 52,975 4,306 16,887 1,342 7,083 539 5,529 330
‘ 29,125 45,500 7,150 29,475 1,467 4,533 614 2,887 215 =
re 49,350 62,000 11,000 18,212 2,917 6,150 921 4,086 wo
y 13,650 19,700 4,194 9,000 1,247 2,817 620 1,660 we TM
: 25,500 42,250 6,706 12,300 1,282 2,000 558 851 255
at 32,975 41,750 6,450 10,087 1,933 2,683 TAL 1,54). 197
22,950 48,000 7,238 14,250 1,563 3,533 1,401 2,087 803
' 13,750 %,750 5,413 23,575 1,857 4,717 487 1,052 948
: 8,850 60,750 2,788 19,488 718 6,038 210 830 326
al 321,350 555,425 78,670 194,637 22,070 55,337 8,895 30,092 4,805
26,779 46 ,260 16,219 1,839 4,611 741 2,508 387



TABLE I

Convamination of Badges Worn in Plent § "BY Area

1679

1623

Total

Soft Plastic

All Plastic and Cloth
Jan. Cloth Oct.
1973 Nov. L972

1972
mr/day mr/day mr/day
7.5 66.5 aI
5.2 49.2 34.6
17.2 71.5 31.2
33-0 35.2 25.7
17.2 40.5 37.9
54.4 32.1 41.4
134.5 294.5 212.1

3439325



/
e

In reality, we saspect that both of the sess of estimates we have made (assuming 83%
and 70% efficiency) misy yield secious underestimates of the acml releases, since scrubber

vent in the unmeasured losses, this document (attached) indicates that scmbbers were
being operated in conditions and with materials for which they may not bave been
designed. :
Further evidence indicates that for at least some af the period, scrubbers were in poor

condition. For example, 2 1970 docament states:

"Present scrubber is corroded and does not tequired

‘Freene scabs it bal oad ons #2 Craton farce

thus allowing product to be exhausted to the atmosphere.’

‘This document indicates that scrubber efficiency might have been zero, and thas all the
efficent from this oxidation furnace may have. been exhausted to the atmosphere. We
cannot at this time estimate the period or the mumber of scrubbers which might ave
operated at very low or even zero efficiencit.. But clearly, such operation for any
significant length of time would enormously increase loss estimates.

Estimates based on the actual inlet and scrubber fluid enalysis data would yield much
better estimates. ‘We do not have any way of estimating scrubber efficiencies at present.
We have only one document which shows actual analytical deta - that is for the month of

7 October 1959.. However, an analysis of the dats in the document and a comparison with
other data an calcuistions yields information which is very difficult to interpret, implying

eHicenies which ringe frm anywhere near perfect (highly unlikely, given of the
docamentation) to below 50%. :

we make it here only for illustration) that 5,189 pounds was a typical monthly loss for 1959,
we get a discrepancy of over five times in the loss estimates. If 28.2 tons was an actual loss

2G. Noyes, “dea Leer - Revisions 0 UAP Parace Veriaion

Services, 11-24-70, document munber 2225077.

Systems Piet Fe fae 18
21 Request for Engineering



BERYLLIUM DUST - URANIUM ALLOY PROGRAM ~ PLANT 5
J. ¥. Mahaffey .

March 1h, 1956

Page 3

In the short period of time that beryllium compound has been
used as a coating for crucibles, it has presented 2a health
problem to operating personnel. Although attempts have been
made to make the use of beryllium safe, they have not teen
extensive enough to keep the levels of exposure below the MAC
of 2 mc/M3. Serious consideration should be given to providing

more ’xtensive controls or to finding a less toxic substitute
material for coating crucibles.

Tana
c Qh Stcferer—
A. {q. Stefgziec
AISibg
ec: S. Le. Reese
Cc. Lowery

R. C. Heatherton
Central File

Attach.

0046019



sigh aip Dost Exposure Operations Continued

Page 4

Jenuary 3, iyol

Removing ‘and lidding drum -
rom box furnace .

Removing and lidéing drum
from oxidabion furnace

Feeding oxidation furnace

Feeding rotary kiln from
feed tray

Removing and lidding dru
from rotary kiln

‘Feeding oil centrifuge
Washing ott drims”

Raking material in box
’ fornece -

Dumping to silo

Changing drums at outside
erusher

PLANT 9
Delidding furnace pots

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

3.0

14.0

6.0

6.0

8.5

i]

Status
from 16 x MAC. Should be

eliminated with compietion of
CR-59-5T. .

Up from 12 x MAC. Should be
eliminated with completion of

CP-59-5T.

Up from 5 x MAC, Should be
eliminated with compietion of
CP-59-5T. .

from 16 x MAC. CP-60-52
for new feed trays has been
completed, but not being used for
keeping dry feed wet as had been
originally planned. Air dust
problem will remain under present
operating conditions. Engineering
Project 8-69 will still need to be
completed to provide more and
etter ventilation. This project
ig being held up awaiting
electrostatic precipitator. test.

Dropped from 6.7 x MAG. Engineering
!

project 8-69 - alno awaiting

precipitatar test.

Non-routine operation. Nothing in
progress to improve. ‘

-Non-reutine operation, Nothing in

progress to improve.

Dropped from 16 x HAC. Should be
eliminated with completion of
CP=59-57.

Nothing in progress to improve.

flew drumming station has been
installed. Health & Ssfety will
re-evaluate.

Dropped from 17 x MAC 25 2a result
of CP-59-28. Will be dropped from
list.

3110877



OPPT Chemical Fact Sheet EPA 749~F-94-020

CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT: PERCHLOROETHYLENE (CAS NO. 127-18~4)
prepared by
OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
August 1994

Chemicals can he released to the environment as a resuit of their
manufacture, processing, and vse. EPA has developed information

summaries on selected chemicals to describe how you might be exposed to
these chemicals, how exposure to them might affect you and the environment,
what happens to them in the environment, who regulates them, and whom to
contact for additional information. EPA is committed to reducing
environmental releases of chemicals through source reduction and other
practices that reduce creation of pollutants.

WHAT IS PERCHLOROETHYLENE, HOW IS IT USED, AND HOW MIGHT I BE EXPOSED?

Perchloroethylene (also called PERC) is a colorless, nonflammable
liquid, It does not occur naturally but is produced in large amounts (310
million pounds in 1991) by three companies in the United States. US demand
for PERC declined about 35% from 1989 to 1991, and is likely to continue to
fall. Solvent recycling and reduced demand for chlorofluorocarbons are
major reasons for this trend. The largest US user of PERC is the dry
cleaning industry. It accounts for 80% to 85% of all dry cleaning fluid
used, Textile mills, chlorofluorocarbon producers, vapor degreasing and
metal cleaning operations, and makers of rubber coatings also use PERC. It
can be added to aerosol formlations, solvent soaps, printing inks,
adhesives, sealants, polishes, lubricants, and silicones. Typewriter
correction fluid and shoe polish are among the consumer products that can
contain PERC.

Exposure to perchloroethylene can occur in the workplace or in the
environment following releases to air, water, land, or groundwater.
Exposure can also occur when people:. . :

* use products containing PERC,

* spend time in dry cleaning facilities that use PERC,

* live above or adjacent to these dry cleaning facilities, or
* bring dry cleaned garments into their home.

PERC enters the body when breathed in with contaminated air or when
consumed with contaminated food or water. It is less likely to be absorbed
through skin contact. Once in the body PERC can remain, stored in fat
tissue.

WHAT HAPPENS TO PERCHLOROETHYLENE IN THE ENVIRONMENT?

Perchloroethylene evaporates when exposed to air. it dissolves only
Slightly when mixed with water. Most direct releases of PERC to the
environment are to air. It also evaporates from water and soil exposed to
air. Once in air, PERC breaks down to other chemicals over several weeks.
Because it is a liquid that does not bind well to soil, PERC that makes its
way into the ground can move through the ground and enter groundwater.
Plants and animals living in environments contaminated with PERC can store
small amounts of the chemical.


a

MPC Values for Thorium Page 3
. J. A. Quigtey, M.D.
e@ Augast 17, 1965

could be used while industry took five years to adjust to the
table values, The five.years were up several years ago but
the ICRP Committee did not care to make an issue of the
matter, A new table of mpc values Is now being considered

by the ICRP and they may be.published in sbout two. years, - |
The mpcs for Th-230, Th-232 and Th-nataral will not be
. changed in the tables. However, the provisional values |
will be dropped or made more restrictive.

Dr, Snyder seemed certain that the University of Rochester had under-

taken new inhalation studies after the long biological half-life of thorium |
was noted. He indicated that this new work.ylelded findings which were
the basis for the ICRP decision to stick with the lower mpc values.

This matter was discusséd with Bob Thomas of the Lovelace Foundation
who previously worked at the University of Rochester and is a recognized
authority on thorium deposition and toxicology. Bob was not aware ofany
new work at the University of Rochester. He sald that work at other
places, such as the University of Utab, wes primarily concerned with
animal studies using injections of soluble thorium, He. pointed out that
. these injections of large amoants of soluble thorium were causing tumors

@ bat that this could not be compared to the inhalation of small amounts of
thorium under industrial conditions, Bob said that he had discussed this
matter with Dr, Snyder many times but that.Dr, Snyder would not acknow!-
edge the difference between laboratory Injection stadies and industrial
inhalation exposures,

The Lovelace Foundation and the Sandia Corporation are sponsoring the

next meeting on Bio-assay and Analytical Chemistry, which will be held

In Albuquerque, October 7-8, 1965. Bob Thomas Is willing to add the sub-
ject of. thorium mpcs to the program. Dr, Joim Hersh-of-the University ef.--
Rochester was told of these plans. He is in sympathy with our argament
and has agreed to help if he can, We cannot present any data on thorium
studies but we can discuas the problem, and try to show why the lower
thoriam mpc values are not realistic.

CO tote

R. C. Heatherton

277. ty. Coback,

@ M, W. Boback



S. R. Sapirie 3+ .
"Aue 22 1958
Representatives of the PAO visited this site at the sene time they
23 a a at Blairsville. Contact
wes rade with a john Hy Stevens; ry joodtury Cley

Company. Mr. Stevens informed the group that he had app: for en
ASC license early in 1956 and that it was not approved. Information
developed latter was that Mr. Stevens' application wes so general in
its description of his propose) for burial of residues that the AEC
could not approve it. Mr. Stevens is currently preparing @ new pro-
posal and has hired a consultant on health paysics to edvise kim and
to bendle technical details of its preparation. He is very interested
in the use of bis property for disposal of PAO residues, and hes
visited Ferneld with his consultant and lawyer to inspect the residues
and to discuss details of a proposal to FAO for disposal of these resi-
dues. A proposal from the Woodbury Clay Company is expected before

tke end of August,

At the time the Pennsylvania Railroad withdrew its approval of the
residue shipment to Blairsville, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad was
approach-d with an inquiry on possible sites along their right-of-way.
Their Industriel Development Division hes contacted numerous private
owners and state government officials in the search for new sites. A
result of tais search was a call from Mr. James H. Phalan, State Con-
rdssioner of Mines, State of Kentucky, who contected the FAO and re-
guested that representatives call on hin for the purpose of discussing
the disposal of redioactive residues in Kentucky. He stated thet the
nev Strip Mining Law in Kentucky would create many sites where residues
could be buried in the restorations required by tne law. He feels thet
vate mine owners will be interested because they will be able to
over past of the cost of the restoretions by contract burial of res-
s before starting the restoration work. Representatives of FAC and
n¢ Feed Materiels Division will visit Mr. Phalen during August to dis-
cuss deteils of the thorium residue dispose) progrem.

The above history of the Fernald Area's activity in the program of
thorium residue disposel is related for background purposes. ‘he cur-
rent status of tae program and the limited success of efforts to locate
Giszosal sites Gave caused the FAO to request sterf assistence fron
appropriate ORO divisions. This essistence is needed to guide the dis-
posal program elong legel end acceptadle channels to its conclusion.
Phe Ferneld Area hes a definite requirement for the storage areas now
occupied dy the thorium residues, and considers their removal of prine
importence to furnish much needed storage area for enriched product

and residues generated in enriched production. The prospect of redrumming
a lergze percent of the resicues in outside storage and the essociated
costs Torm edcitionel pressures which force the FAO to seek © permanent
solution to the theriunm residue prodlen.



ce

ke

Routine ussge of respiratory. protection devices for
various extended operations is recommended on a job
evaluation basis by THSED. 4 detatled-review of the
respitatory protection program was not made a8 IN&ED
is currently evaluating and revising their program in
view of recent publications. The program will be
based on the recently revised Title 30, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 14, concerning the Bureau of Mines
tequiresents aod s recent book published by the American
Industrial Bygiens Association entitled “Raspiratory
Protective Devices Manual.”

Nuclear Safety

The organization wxi staffing, committee activities, cri-
teria and functions as related to nuclear safety ere
essentially unchanged from thosa- indicated in previous
Feviaws. However, a recent change was effected in che
FMRC Manufacturing Standerds Manual Format concerning the
prey and review of Standard Operating Procedures
(80P). In this regard, temporary SOPts will be eliminated,
and @ more general nuclear safety section included in
SOPts will be prepared to give more letitnde to line supar-
vision. It will be the responsibility of operations to
request nuclear safety evaluation fer oparational changes
involving enriched material. This change gives more re-
sponsibility to line orgsnization with the anticipetion

of markedly reducing time required for SOP modifications
herecdfore considered excéssive. °

Current in-plant nuclear safety problems of special in-
terest include the design of « metal dissolver and prep-
geattons for handling « limited amoune of- 20% U-235
enriched metal in the Plant 6 Bloaming Mill. Procedures
for the latter bave been sutmitred to ORO for review and:
concurrence.

Teansportation of fissile Materials

Moat fiasile materials shipped to and from X10 tavoive ov
assay wanium eetal in a variety ms consis! largel:
ofilgorss btilets, and'fual caves’ ‘ie belt of ae
material is normal snd 0,955 U-235 enriched uranium with a
-limited. amount of 1.25% usterial. The uranius is packed
ta wooden bexes of two basic designs, 3 of E No. 265 and



CENTRAL FILES

NOV 2 5 wot © 4a-l

Mr, William H. Travis, Director

Safety & Environmental Control Division 2154338
Department of Energy

Oak Ridge Operations

P. 0. Box B

Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830

Dear Mr. Travis:
GOALS FOR CY~1982

Reference: Letter, W. H. Travis to Multiple Addressees, 10/14/81, "Health
Physics ALARA Goal Program” i o-1

Both internal and external radiation exposures are encountered in FMPC

Se operations:

Airborne uranium may be inhaled and deposited in the lung. If
insoluble, there may be a gradual buildup and long-term retention.
oS
Vacuum remelting of uranium metal causes 4 separation of impurities
which concentrate on ingot surfaces. Beta-emitting daughter products
also separate and are present in above-equilibrium amounts. During

_ ingot, handling, this enhanced radioactivity can produce significant
doses to the skin of the whole body. Remelt crucibles and other
Femélt equipment also become exposure sources because of the accu-—
mulation of daughter products.

Above-equilibrium daughter products will also cause significant hand
and forearm exposures in remelt operations and subsequent ingot
machining.

Moderate whole body (gamma) exposures may occur in remelt operations.
Low exposures occur in other uranium processes

g1geed

N-28-81



R. L. Kirk -3-

3

5.

as a single residue or a5 two separate residues, it can be

‘to have a fairly high radicactivity- This activity
is comparable to that ‘encountered from the K-65 material. it
should de pointed out, therefore, that thronghout the areas

‘ghee this material is stored or handled levels of

activity may be ‘ted. These levels will Lar to se
found in ar fertieeeredt plant in the vicinity of the Feine

filters.

Dry Processing

Here again, the direct radiation from in-process and stored mate-
rial 4s significantly more severe than that encountered from
ureniur operation. However, these radistion levels are not so
high that they cannot be met by interposing distance between the
operator and the material.

Ca: erat:

‘The present furnace in use at Fernald creates excessive radiation
exposures to personnel and a high degree of contamination through-
out the area when used with the ‘present operating procedures. It
should be pointed out, however, that the activities which have
been measured recently at FMPC are higher than would be found in
normal processing. The reason for this is that the operstions

which have been seen at FUPC have involved the use of sc: metal
1 will praduce ex Le) of than deri
aL Shes a. een fot to be true for wu fum, but
Hot to~she.same extent). It will be necessary either that a furnace

be designed which will permit more remote operation, or if the
present furnace mist be used, operating procedures willbe neces-
sary which will insure that the operator not enter the furnace
enclosure. Measurement which were taken at the vacuum casting
furnace at Fernald show some areas which would the weekly
dose in 1 ho Rs e
é55e in_h hoarsy was found that the present method of © ing
scrap e gave the operators in 7 minutes about 10%
of the weekly gamma dose, and 25% of the weekly deta dose. In
addition, the disassembly of the molds and the removal of the
ingot created very high dust exposures.

Metal Febrication -

If carried out in a manner similar to the handling of uranium,
these operations should create no emesual problem. As a matter
of fact, ‘the most serious hazard in metal fabrication of uranicn

)



BSERYLLIUM DUST - URANIUM

J. We uahetfey
March 1h, 195

ALLOY PROGRAM - PLANT 5

Page 2
Recommendation: More caution must be used by che
oa operators performing this ogeravicn
to keep the level below the XAC
IV. Operation: Charging derbies and molybdenun “to

V.

Vie

Type of Sample;
Avg. Concentration:

Recommendation:

Operation:

Type of Sample:
Avg. Concentration:

Recommendation:

Location:

Type of Sample:
Avg. Concentration:

Comment:

the crucible.
Breathing Zone
4.5 times MAC

Provide more ventilation to the
charging station so the velocity
over the crucible is adequate to
prevent the escape of dust during
the charging. (This will requize
the services of the Engineering
Division Ventilation Engineer).

Changing residue drum at the Hoffman
canning station.

Breathing Zone

5 times MAC

Extreme caution must be used for
this operation, in addition to
wearing an Air Line respirator.

General areas where the operations
from I through V are cerforned.

General Air

Less than one-half MAC

These general air samples indicate
the operations listed above sre not

contributing to the contamination
of the general areas.

General Comments

In determing exposure of personnel to beryllium contemination ne
compensation is made for the respiratory protection used. it

can be assumed that respirators will provide adequate protection
Af they are worn properly at all times. It would be presumpruous,
however, to assume that 211 personnel working with beryllium ere
faithfully wearing resvirators properly. For this reason,
exposures are determined without compensating for respiratory |

e protection.

0046618



aor?

@

values should bo moro or leas conservative, can be
adjuatud before anyone hes been unduly inconveni or
‘pafore damage oan ho in any cass,
bovauan of tha uncortaintics involved ‘in tho present values
and in datornialng the actual sccumul
hosard of sediatsatopes in the human
rocomiundod that axposure be kepb
on tt & practicable, Hearing in mind thot ia the sett K
may become navessory wor ome
spent that o faolor of safety thet be
inn in acl inthe design and operatio of perenne, Instaliae *
Hong where ura quantities of loncth
lavolvad. his is particularly important in easee ji pich
provlainn of additional protection later would be very: vation It
hin vale a fi taslbt © the
ho values of maxiinum perm le amounts of

-variona raillolgatopes in tho human body and taxt-
mim penunial be concentrations wer theese ay in
air and walor a8 given in Mla
Subuommitten aa the mowb sce)
siileriig & prolininary report to "Gomi ‘aivieg ne vals
rocomemonted by vaviong fadiation tection committacs,
as Hated under seotion F rejorth and fer making
compuriinna with value eal ¥ wae of tho date sum-
moar ea fa tal ble 4. tia f . Tr iba a of only 9. ier
padiolantoy ond partioularly those

“other 1a 1 etc in aut,

te ngoded

interest, Other radiolotopes will
auqnont reparts when stitch es wile ‘about thom fa
and ag data bocomn available Lo acrve as basis of aycoptance
a ne racommonded values. Likewise, valuoa given in
york mut bo revised from time to timo .as more
Mil afro ly obtained,
Bifurle should be mado to provent tho acoumuation ot
danyoruay quanto of rjiolgotopee i] the .
opis may

ris piysteal stats
8 he one help
doterm a "iho typo of vaatalion rant ‘ant o some extent
the degres af ott In Uke body and magn
Olhor important factors thes determine the ihe ravlistion fhozard
era tho quantities of radioactive matorial involv rod, the
faciltios antl equipment available for er haing rdaledopes
tho. training and experienon of tose
toilonctive motatial, ahd Wiel ey bavelorayproprnie
radiation protection atariasda and procedures,

2

"8. Radloleotopes More Hazardous Inside the Body

‘Than Outelde
Radioisotopes whon oostained insila the baily present
scape dan, won te ay ‘are td We. teri
soutcas, for the f
1. invadiate the body body eontinuoualy until me are

FP

joal half-life ia
po and nt ‘Pot ina vail,
ieotopon ny ie i 5 y ult, I wot innpnaal te

inorenss appreciably rain

3. Souroge. inside. gh lottnante rot eat bd
the body Ussue. low-onargy «|
radiation (which, benntas of ie mane et mntan

tation sae (wl
hhaxand) to reash
and to diesl a, saat ean ‘ praia as ad
Ty oS,

abi i i if ou
jean of lle, et ono th heard
Methods of urine and focal analysis have hoon

developod for some railicizotopes, but mast of these anulyses
are very todious, Hime const ing, and expensive,

G. Methods of Estimating Maximum Permissible
Aasounts and Concentrations

‘Thore aro various motlods of cetimating maxinury
miscible leyole ‘of caulintion expoauro, maximum parmixstble
amount t radiok inate bady, and magimuen

isaible concent in wir and walor. “ome of these
Prethods are given ° the following parngraphs.

1. Comparteon with gnarl or row damage

Wo have hed considerable ox} Sea
youre with these i or Sure ‘the Me thro a om
mieeible Dose frorn from Nath |

a Ol Mie on
al ene ore tH ume

national Commmiasion-
in London (duly “o

SS Sa



S. 2. Sapirie +2- AUS 22 1958

the Vitro uranicn residues which were dumped into the ri a

a at Bled: ‘hi . ‘The Vitro disposal was
yy Fee 2 Divisioa after surveying several sites,
and 2 total of 12,000,

arranged
Pesigusn were diszosed of
in the dump during and eerly 1957. § office contac’ ei

railroed ané sext representatives to the dump site to arrange for dis-
posal of zero assay residues. As the Pennsylvania Reilroed hes no
interest in obtaining an AEC license, the legal limitation of less
then 0.054 SS content was placed on any disposal considered for this
site. By agreenent the redioactivity of the residues was limited to
equal or less than the 10 mreps/hr (maximum) seesured in the Vitro
wastes. Residues vith activities higher than 10 urepe/nr were held
back for disposal with residues having thorium contents above 0.054.

421 arrangements with the railroed were thought to be complete. They
had verbally inetructed the FAO to loed the cars with the residues

which qualified under the agreements. The PAO initiated a rate request
to the Chesapeake and Ohio Reilroad and was reedy to direct shipment as
soon as the rate was esteblished. The Chesapeake and Ohio Railrosd re-
guested the Ferinsylvania te quote their part of the rate for the part
of the shipment over the Pennsylvanie system. This rate was never
quoted es the Pennsylvaria Traffic Manager at Pittsourg refused to quote
& vate stating that the railroad would be unwilling to unloed the resi-
Sues et Eleirsville. It developed that the Pennsylvania contact ren pad
cleared the shipment with all of the derartments of the reilroad, out
hag failed to notify the Traffic Manager at Pittsburg of the intended
Gisposel shipment. This department apparently hed borne most o? the
veilroad and private criticism Zor permitting the Vitro waste disposal
in 1556 and 1957, and wes determined to stop any future shipments and
Gisposal on railroed property. The specific reesons for their ection
were never stated. Tae withdrawal of approval for shipment and dis-
posal of these zero assay residues at Blairsville has forced: the P40 tc
seke irsediate steps to locate other sites which can be used for the

purpose. ~

he Feed Materials Division in their survey of 1956, had contacted 2
in Hollidaysourg, Pennsylvania which had indicated en interest
uriel of radioactive residues on their property. This conmreny is
actively engeged in strip mining for a high quality clay which is used
for refractory purposes in steel production. As this high ouelity cley
is in isolated pockets throughout the company property, a great emount
of stripping is required to reach the cley. Once the pocket is worked
out the pit is abandoned and a new stripping is started. These aben-
donee pits nake en ideel site for buriel of residues and are loceted
SO veat control oF access to them would be very simple. In adGition,
there is a track scur to the property which vesses within 50 feet of
severel large pits and is within short trucking distance of several

other very lerge pits.



_sesubber liquids and 50 kilograms would be exhausted to the atmosphere. ‘That is, the
release to the atmosphere would go up almost three-fold; due to the reduction in scrubber
efficiency. .

However, the calculational procedure uséd by NLO was such that it would show a
reduction in emissions. ‘The procedure was to measure the uranium captured in the liquids.
This would be 50 kilograms in this example. ‘Then, ir wes assumed that the scrubber was
operating a design efficiency - even though the efficiency was not measured. Thus the
NLO calculation would proceed as follows. 1f $0 kgs. were in the liquid and the efficiency
was 83%, the incoming uranium must have been 50/0.83 = 60.24 kilograms. Thus, the
quantity released to the atmosphere would be calculated as the quantity going into the
semubber less the amount retained in the scrubber. In this case, the NLO estimate of
yelease would be about 10 kilograms, a decrease from 17 kilograms.

Similarly, if the efficiency went down to 10%, for 2 severely deteriorated scrubber, the
acmal loss would be 90 kilograms, since only 10 kgs would be retained in-the scrubber.
‘Bowever, NLO would proceed on the assumption that if 10 kys were found in the scrubber
then the incoming quantity would be only 10/.83 = 12.05 kgs. Thus the estimate of losses
would be only about 2 kgs. : Loe

‘At the very extreme, if the scrubber were totally inoperative, as sometimes happened,
all 100 kilograms of incoming uranium would be released to the atmosphere. But. NEO,
finding nothing in the scrubber liquids would assume that there was no incoming uranium
(0/83 = 0), and therefore no releases.

: ‘The approach is manifestly absurd and the results of the above examples summarized in
Table 1 below show that in sharp relief: :

Table 1

Scrubber Losses to the Ammosphere, Actual and NLO estimates
for an 100 kgs of uranium sent into the scrubber

Inlet Quantity Efficiency actual Loss NIO
Estinate

kgs 3 baad kgs

100 83 17 17

100 70 30 u

100 i) so 10

100 10 90 2
2100 a 100 . to)



2, @
Tr/ "roduction Area

e@ 2t Area

Security Fence BMIG Area.
Bionth andym Beta, —-Uraniyn Beta Ura. a Beta Uraniug Reta Stack I es
o ug/ft* adnéet ug/ft din/ft? mg fet? ddnsft2 uZet dfn/£2.
Sass
we
>: 602
=
zB. 610
Es wat 1,195
2
fn a K y s%
U 19,070 1,862 7,169 6794 64756 423 + 2,570 339
e 19,256 1,314 3,463 161 3,819 3,386 3,449 482
y 13,746 3,342 3,629 920 3,832 488 639 464
: 19,335 12,290 3,640 900 3,821 2,089 1,372 267
at 21,961 3,889 3,203 2,150 7,768 547 206 333
21,553 4,597 5,374 1,449 4,844 478 417 467
, 14,264 1,691 3,069 994 3,058 272 316 536
21,784 2,689 4,274 so 1,832 335 473 231
— ——
sal 112,024 150,969 31,674 33,821 8,558 35,730 8,018 9,943 6,416
te 14,003 18,871 3,959 4,228 1,070 4,466 1,002 1,243 535 vo Jus



on

rR

te

; aor h

oiand would give more reliable fesults. The whole bor

abe

The staff of the Industrial Hygiene and Radietion Depart-
ment (IBGRD) was reduced by two employees since the lest
review, This has resulted in an increased degree of intro-
apection and self-evaluation of various programs (eeBe,
fitm badge, sir sampling, ete.) over that noted in previous
years. Changes may be proposed in certain programs to pre-
wide for wore efficient -survetllence activities with the
reduced staff.

‘The loss of uranius via the storm sever increased from an
average of 660 pounds per wonth for 1963 to 800 pounds per
month for 1964. MLO és continuing its exphasis of the last
few years concerning the ground and storm sever contamination

problem.

The daily job weighted air sample results for Plant 8 were
reported as 1.7 tines the Plent Allovable Limit (PAL) for

1963 and increased to 4.2 PAL for 1964, Respiratory pro-

tection is required for most of those operations exceeding
1 -

Hew operations st MLO include the poutine processing. oF
tm in the Pilot Plant on a production schedule.

bas incveased its surveillance sctivities of the thoriua

proc over similar uraniva operations Oe eee Arenal

heserd of thosiua and the distienley in evalust: ist ene
sures. it is noted it anslysis of urine, for feces

ip tine consuming and in-vivo monitoring my be as practicable

‘et-¥-22--te-routinel

AO Ig evaluating whether nproved
ternal dose determination other than oceasions! spot sir
semples are desirable at WO.

— I. The plant tour of a few facilities show that the housekeeping

of the general plant srea is good. However, as noted in last
%3 review, the Project Labor Pool! Operations ‘eontinee te
be unsatisfactory es personnel are not following recomends-
tions of IBGRD concerning health protection precautions. The
facilities end equipment involved in the thorius operations
resenble a pilot plant type operation with accompanying spilis,

emma



Time
Sample
Date ‘ Location Taken ugm/M*
3/5/75 In stairwell on top deck level 2100 ~ 1400 1660
: NW corner of plant
3/13/75 East of door to HF area outside 1000 ~ 1100 10,370
wall of HF area about 10 feet
NW of Dust Collector Drumming
Station while leak is being
repaired
3/18/75 Same location as above; no 1000 - 1500 1750
leaks
3/27/75 (1) Center of Dust Collector 0900 ~ 1100 2740
Drumming area NE on 619
level
(2) On downcomer from Dust 0900 - 1100 1560
Collector G4~9 to
Drumming Station
m ) 3/18/75 (2) Same as (1) above 0930 ~ 1300 6029
oe (2) Same as (2) above 0930 ~ 1300 5570

HF TLV = 2000 vem/M?



Incident Involving Uranyl Nitrate Burn Page 2
J. A. Quigley, M.D.
April 10, 1988

Analysis of urine for uranium:

~ 3/29/68

3/29/68
3/29/68
a/ 1/68
af 1/68
4/ 2/68
af 2/68

5245 pm
8:30 pm
13:20 pm
8:00 pm
12:00 pm
9200 pm
12:00 pm

According to Refint
dumpster contained 83.

acid.

MWB/vvs

eo: Re

¢. Heatherton
CG. Mick, M.D.
H. Regan

HR, Starkey

Injury occurred

Urine sample, 0.190 mg U/1, 120 ml
Urine sample, 0.220 mg U/l, 140 ml
Urine sample, 0.010 mg U/1

Urine sample, 0.009 mg U/1

Urine sample, 0.018 mg U/1

Urine sample, 0.013 mg U/l

gonnel, the solution in the portable
grams U/liter, and was 5.04 N nitric

M. W. Boback
(for} The Blo-Assay Committee

SEG nolothon?
Th -tive urinetest hadu't been done

ramediotely Hee exposere woulda
pave been detected Sdays laier.

3104019

oe



be

Special off-site shipments of enriched material are
authorized by use of NLO H&S Form 2043 requixing the
signatures of representatives of the Trangportation
Department, Procurement Division, Ruclear-Safety De-

» and the Health and Safety Division. In
addition, sign off by a nuclear safety representative
de obtained on routine in-plant end out-of-plant transfers
of enriched materiel. ‘In-Plant transfers of” enriched
uranium are scheduled in advance where possible.

Wore detailed aspects of shipping philosophy and criteria
are described in appropriate CRO-RIO correspondence ead
in minutes of Enriched Feed Materiels Transportation Meet~-
ing, March 3, 1964, and are not reiterated herein.

TY, Qhearvations,

a A. The hesith protection programs are well orgenized and
@ . receive adequate attention from upper management. The

¥ summary reports of survey date, annual

sed by IHSRD for documentation and in-

ing groups. of conditions throughout the
plant are exceiient. Liaison and cooperation between
THERD and operating groups appear effective. .

Be The plane tour of the facilities showed that che house. -

grea

the status.of this problem. It is noced in the body of
the report that the predlem is still significant as evi-
danced by the quantities of recent urenitm lost viz the
storm sewer. Hence, it is felt thet che emphasis by MLO
concerning the ground and storm sewer conteminaticn should

e D. Personnel exposures to external penetrating radiatice hsve

Significantly increased in both nueber sad magnitude as



wo 22804387

. HEALTH PROTECTION APPRAISAL
9 NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO
BY

WILLIAM T, THORNTON
RICHARD D. SMITH

WILLIAM A. PRYOR

SEPTEMBER 1970



8. R. Sapirie whe a NEATNg .
gS ot AUG 22 1958

The FAO proposes to invite bids from private companies for the disposal
of these residues, subject to AEC licensing, on sites vhich are now or |
may be developed 28 disposel grounds. We are aware thet such en inyita-~-
tion vill create problems with state and local goverrments which will
involve both the Oek Ridge end the Washington offices of the az. BeYore
entering into this program this office desires to gain expressions from
interested parties on the proper procedures and regulations which wight
be applicable.

a

way

Cc. L. Keri

na



oreo es
=

fon : UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

Cc. L. Kari, Area Manager

DATE: June 16, 1965 |
Cincinnat$ Area Office

Berman M, Roth, Director
Research- and Developnent Division, G20

LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO ~ APRIL 1965

‘ORB:RLE

Siz copies of the subject report are enclosed for your
information and action. The cooperation and assistance
ef your office and National Lead Coupany during the con-
duct of this review are appreciated.

te is suggested that your contractor be authorised and
dustructed to proceed with the implementation of the mstters
covered by the recoumendations unless there exist sound
reasons why a particular recommendation is not warranted

tn whole or part. In any event your couments and those of
your contractor with regerd to the conduct of the review,
the general content of the report, and the detailed plans
for implementing or otherwise handling the recommendations
are requested by August 1, 1965.

aswayere Fori~
tele | .

CC: BR. C, Armstrong
Mills, w/encl.
jo Ruch, w/enc}.



mes

@ SWHARY OF AIR DUST SAMPLE RESUETS
Concentrat:
Type, Semple Description - "ious Average «= - RAC
BZ Dumping salt from mld on - - 3,952 28.0 . J
grated table, . .
BZ Domping billet from mold on - - 6,769 97.0
gested table. :
. BZ Operating hoist controls | -«'14,627" 4,235 8,529 222.0
* while quenching billet. .
BZ Operating furnace controis - - 37924 56.0
waile charging chips into
pot.
Furnace area while heating 3,358 1,020 1,967 28.0
pot. Doors closed,
- Furnace area while charging. 2,370 588 1,386 7.0
£ Doors closed. ye
4 . : . ;
. GA Furnace area while pot is 1,150 661 905 © 33.0 |
a charged and awaiting . {
pouc, Doors open, Strong
éreft.
GA Furnace area while pouring 53549 406 5.8
Selt and metal into molds.
* Doors open, Strong draft.

Burmace area while scraping 719. it 432 6.2
out pot efter pour has beex :

made. Doors open, Good ‘
dssft. : .

7

oe
oc)

Pump sitting om top of Cyclore 9,059 7,737 8,398 120,0

drumming station. Leak in

chip drying Line 3* over head . -
tad slightly SB. .

P Pump sitting on rail above 686 6OL 643 9.2
ehip drumming station.

SHC Otaximm Aliowabie Concentration - 70 ¢ d/a/i3

Type Sample: BZ - Breathing Zone
GA = General Air
P + Process

@..

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

3110912



a) of?
) of

@ ~ October 19, 1972

g
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH STANDARDS, PART 191 0. $6,
IONIZING RADIATION

D. L. Dunaway
R. C. Heatherton

Paragraph (p) (2) of this part relates to AEC contractors. Although it

states that such contractors shall be deemed to be in compliance with

respect to possession and use of source materials, we do not c

with m of the nts, Major areas of noncompliance are in
‘signs, labeling of containers, and exposure to airborne

radioactive materials.

Strict compliance with the sign posting regulations would require a
“Radiption Area" sign in each area accessible to personnel where they
could receive radiation of 5 mrems in one hour or 100 mrensin any
five consecutive deys. Also, each area or room in which 34 pounds

- or more of natural uranium, 100 pounds or more of thorium, or any

: eo quantity of enriched uranium is used or stored would require posting

. with a "Caution - Redioactive Materials" sign. Each area or room. in

which airborne radioactivity exceeds for any time the concentrations
given in the guide for industrially exposed people or any area in which |
the concentration for time spent by an individual in one week averages
25% of the guide value requires a "Caution - Airborne Radioactivity
Area” sign.

‘There ia-nothing in-the regulation regarding one sign taking precedence
or the frequency for use in large areas. It is conceivable that our
process areas would require all three types of signs in each area and
each production building would require several of euch type of sign.

In addition to posting the areas, strict compliance with the regulations -
would require that each container in which enriched uranium in any
quantity, natural uranium in excess of 3.3 pounds, or natural thorium

in excess of 10 pounds is processed, stored, or transported would require
a label bearing the radiation symbol and these words, "Caution -
Radioactive Materials."

i 2702082 3417097



io

April 19, 1976

CHIP FIRES, PLANT 5 EAST DVGOT SAW
3. 2. Soniits
R. C. Heatherton

At the Plant 5 east ingot saw, burning chippiles cause
airborne uranium concentrations which exceed the permis
sible limit and add unnecessarily to the saw operator
lung burden. in engineering request should be submitted
for alterations to reduce this source of exposure,

yespite the addition of a collection pan at this saw,
chips continue to collect out of the coolant where they
are easily ignited. During observations made 4/15/76,
the operator removed chips fron the pan after every two

q ingots. ‘hips in the pan began to appear above the cool-

= ant level midway through the second cut. Once ignited,
the exposed chips burned steadily until removed at the

- end of the cut,

Chips also collect on a small ladge in the blade canyon.
This ledge 1s not reached by the coolant spray during the
final three minutes of each cut. “urning chips from the
saw easily ignite the pile which then burns until drenched
by coolant at the start of the next cut.

Original Signed By
RC. HEATHERTON
Dir, of Health & Safety

R. C. Heatherton

BEST COPY AVAILABLE a71az6e

3481131



NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO

- CINCINNATI, OHIO 45239

April 10, 1968

SUBJECT INCIDENT INVOLVING URANYL NITRATE BURN

TO ° J. A. Quigley, M.D.
FROM Bio-Assey Committee
REFERENCE

On March 29, 1968, a Refinery employee received an acid burn
when he was sprayed with a uranium solution. ‘Two urine
samples were collected during the shift; follow-up samples
were collected several days later, after an intervening
weekend. The information is documented here because of our
interest in exposure incidents.

fhe following information was taken from the "Supervisor's
Report of Injury," sent to the Fire & Safety Department:
Name of injured - ° - .

Badge number -

Date of injury -

6 What happened? "A portable dumpster containing decoppering
solution from Plant 9 was unloading from the lst shift into

the NE storage tank. ? ad checked the progress of
this periodically and at 5:45 PM he stated only air was
coming out of the unloading line. He then unhooked the air
line which was padding the dumpster, bled the air off, and
then removed the wire securing the Chicago fitting on the
unloading hose. The unloading hose had a twist in it and
when the wire was removed the hose twisted. from.the coupling
and the acid material sprayed him in the face. He was wearing
his chemical goggles and he stated that either the acid got in
behind his goggles or he moved the goggles with his hands when
it sprayed him on reflex. He washed himself off at the shower
station in the Metal Dissolver building, and then we washed
him again in the Digestion area."

The Medical Department supplied the following information:
Second-degree burns covered a 2" x 2" area under the right eye
and a 2" x 2" area along the right side of the neck. Material
also caused a burn of the right eye. Some material wes
swallowed.

@ A pniue cowTaacroR rom THE Us: ATOMIC ExERcyY commission

zezsen4 3104018

.



NLDSs-LOTE

a NATIONAL Lean CoMPANYEENTRAL TILES

OF OXH1D
. P.O BOA 155
MT, HEALTHY STATION
CINCINNATI 31. CHIO

ww
Sr

Auguss 11. 2

"2132095

TO

D. Nelson
FRO

A. J. Stefanec
REFEPENCE

Recently we have noticed a sudden increase in the numcer of
y the film badge.
§ are to operaters’

the follewing.

In the crucible disassemble section, the glass shield
with arm ports 1s broken out allowing 100 ‘iarenghour ) -
of beta to irradiate the operator doing this Work.

In the crucible assemble section where the shield is

usually raised there is emitted 20 mrep/hour to the

operator.

“
Since our present limit of exposure is. 300 mrep/week it can
readily be seen why we have these overexposures Te (Tis |

particular group of men.

Having the above information it is therefore recommended thay
all shields be replaced and used properly.

Yours truly.
er oa ee)
te SUE Lhe

A. J. Stefanec

eet

AIS3bE a
ce: D. J. Blythe *

W. Hill
J. A. Quigley, M. D.

090892 -



2280490

HEALTH PROTECTION APPRAISAL
NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO

SEPTEMBER 1968

1. _ Purpose and Scope

‘The annual health protection appraisal of the Nationa Lead
Company of Ohio was conducted September 10-11, 1968, by
members of the ORO Safety Division, Health and tluclear Safety
Branch. The appraisal covered the NLO health protection
programs in general and emphasized the implementation of
previous recommendations, nuclear safety and personnel ex- ~
posure data evatuation.

i Summary °

It is concluded from, this appraisal that NLO continues to be
operated in a safe manner with a health protection program
consistent with the hazard potential of the operation. Satis-

r t factory action has been initiated toward the implementation

: of last year's recommendations and should be pursued to com=
pletion at the earliest practical time. No new recommendations
are made in this report. The findings of the appraisal were
discussed with M. S. Nelson of NLO and W. T. Warner of AEC-CAO.

Ti, Recomnendattons

A. Implementation of Previous. Recommendations, October _1967
Appraisal

1. Recommendation that materia] above 5% U-235 ene
richment be placed in storage rather than be
processed through the refinery on a patch basis.

As reported in 2 letter from 3. H. Noyes, -NLO
Manager, to C. L. Karl, CAO Manager, on December 26,
1967, a moratorium on the digestion of materials
above 5% U-235 enrichment was declared by NLO
management on October 20, 1967. In addition, an
ad hoc committee, consisting of representatives for
the Technical, Engineering and Health and Safety
Divisions, was appointed to recommend and/or design
a method for processing this material. Additional
information on results of this committee is contained
rT in Section IV-A.1 of this report.

ot
red
or
WO
ra}



¥F. PLANT 2/3 GULPING LOSSES

in February 1989, FMPC released estimates of uranium losses from the sniping,
operation in Plant 2/3. Losses from these operations had not been included in previous
official toral because they bad not been monitored. ‘Three measurements in the scrubber
gysiem and three measurements on total emissions were petformed: In each case one
vrvorement was discarded os uneitable, so that only two measurements resained,
Making an estimate on the basis of only two measurements results in estimates of rather
low confidence. Further, the meammrements were obtained by using anly one probe in the
stack ~ a procedure which is not recommended, since the of conditions
at one-point cannot be assessed. Finally, no account was taken of the possible variability
introduced by varying scid concentrations. ‘Thus poor procedures were used which yielded
low confidence estimates of Plant 2/3 losses.

‘We have attempted to reanalyse the data. Té.one makes the questionable assumption of
normal distribation of the measurements, a 95% upper confidence bound estintate for
Plant 2/3 losses based on the measurements would be about 75 tons, even if we ignore the
variability inroduced by uncertainty in the acid concentrations.“



Dooley end M. ‘Wittman.
presentetives were not present. -.

potentially hazardous forms
ate a5 was recorded in the minutes
ing prepared by Production Engineering. .
wag also discussed, and will be brought
a.

e, the numbers have not been painted on” -_-
ued to the.Procuremént, Division from | .
r Safety Com-  .

- BEST COPY AVAILABLE



o~

figure, and 5.3 tons 2 loss figure using an assume deficiency of 83% , we could impute 2 a
serubber efficiency of only 48%.

).



. 245
NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO ose89
2117069
ED a
TEE
P.O, SOX 39158 * CINCINNATI, OHIO 45239
MAR § (972

Me. C. L. Karl, Area Manager
U. 8. Atomic Energy Commission
P. 0. Box 39188

Cineinnatt, Ohie 45239

Subject: RSPORTING REQUIREMENT POR INTERNAL EXPOSURES

Reference: 1. Letter, C. L. Karl to M. S$. Nelson, dated 2/28/72,
same subject :

2. Letter, J. A. Lenard to C. L. Keri, dated 2/24/72,
same subject ~. :

-@ Dear er. Karl: a
Following is information Pequested in the reference letters:

y

donee in
expressed sof”: 25%" to 50% of- the-annual~
We_believe urine are of no value for this purpo!

e-believe urine assay results urpos:
Assessments based on single in vive counts for an individual
subject to considerable error. If we choose to overlook this .
difficulty we can, by additional in vivo monitoring, Teport indi-
viduals whose in vivo counts can be equated to 253 of a lung burden.
This would be ac ished at some additional expense. in both money
spent and tine Tost rom production and other endeavors.

It must be assumed that anyone who works in the production saree

has the potential for acquiring 25% of a permissible lung burden.
At present there are 353 wage euployees working in the production
area. Also, there are about 50 salaried employees who have the
potential for acquiring 25% of @ permissible lung . Conse-
quently, approzimately 400 employees would require routine in vivo
monitoring in order to determine which employees have a lung burden
of 25% or more of the permissible aszount.

002308

a mere faurearene ene tur We aT nun Berea COUMIRCOM


<5.

1091, for cores end larger units, respectively, Mass
limits are used where applicable with intermizing of
relatively non-reactive materisis to effect uaxinun
loading for shipping economy. Sssentially, 211 transport
is by truck and rail under controlled conditions. All
shipments are covered by Standard Operating Procedw es or
by apecial approvals.

A recent shipping incident involving load shift and break-
age of wooden shoring has necessitated a re-evaluation of
baste shoring aethods on trailers and a change in tie-down
technique. The change involves the use of two LkY steel
verticle bands wrapped around the boxes in @ lengthwise
direction, Additional horizentel bands are used to bind
the boxes as s unit, and “each vertical band passes

devices known as “brakeman plates” fastened to the truck
floor. Tiiis type of shoring, known a2 meating the con-
trolled floating losd principle, was recommended by the
Signode Steel Strapping Company as being superior to wooden
shoring. SOP's NICO 828, Reve 2 and IED 902 are being
revised to reflect this change.

The mass limits imposed for criticality control are based
upon enrichment, specific piece geometry (1.¢., wall thick
ness, length, diameter, etc.) and optimum.conditions of
water moderstion end reflection as could be postulated under
severe accident conditions. In this regerd,.the lattice

possible moderating ratios is a very sensitive parameter. .
To capitalize on this fect, LO has recently nodisted © the
VeR shipping box by supplying two 1" thick plywood tt

abeets to space individual elements. (these beim specifteatty
Mark V-Z fuel cores) out of the optimum region. The spacing
de evfficient to assure a Volume Weter/Volume Uranium Ratio
of five which, for these particular elements, will prevent
criticality if an unlimited number of boxes are flooded.
with water. Hence, although the individual mass per box
will be reduced from about 1,000 lbs. to 300 lbs. by use of
the internal tube sheets, the maximum losd pernitted will
be increased from about 12,000 lbs. to the load init of the
reilroad car or truck. The boxes inon sheen o» survive

re



eo:

o

orcs
-_

‘UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT . 213223

"Memorandum

tO 3

G. L. Karl, Axen Manager” parE:
Cineinneri Area Office” ety 35, 1968

Werman M, Both, Director
Research and Development Division, ozo

SEPCRT OF TUE ANNUAL HEALTH PROTECTION REVIEW AT RATIONAL
LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO - MAY 1966 : :

oS se

Bix copies of the subject report are enclosed for your
fnforeation end action. The cooperation and assistance
of your office end National lead Compeny during the con-
duct of this review are appreciated.

It is suggested thst your contractor pe authorised end ine
structed to proceed with the iaplementation of the matters
covered by the recomendations tnless there exist sound
reasons why a perticular recoumendetion is not warrtented in
whole or part. ‘In any event yout coments end these of
your contractor with regerd to the conduct of the review,
the general content ef the report, and che dataildd plans
for implementing or otherwise handling the recommendations
are requested by September 1, 1964.

aod B Waiter,
a M. Roth
Report (6)

et: B.C. Armstrong.
B. B. Mills, w/encl.
J. W. Ruch, w/ensl.



e

‘Another way to illustrate the absurdity of this simation is to ask: witat are the factors
which determine the quantity of uranium which would be sent into the scrubber. Evidentiy
this would depend on the quantity of materials being processed, and the efficiency with
which orenium was being recovered, the ventilation conditions, and so on. The quantity of
‘serubber, Yet that is how the NLO calculation was set up. If there was nothing in the
scrubber, then it was assumed that there was ao ufanium at the inlet, evea if large
quantities of materials were being processed. .

‘The 1971 NLO memo makes it clear that NLO was aware that this procedure was wrong, becense it
describes tho extimates derived using it as “inherently deceptive, becawes 2 scrubber operating at 2 very low
efficiency for 2 mouth would collect little urasinm, thus showing 2 low loss," (p2).

The memo also shows that NLO was sware that the amoust of uranium going into the scrubber wes

- dependent on the process conditions and not on the scrubber efficiency for the very next seatencs 227s: tk

{the scrubber] wars repeired and operated carefully for tha sexx sonth, thet calculations would show's high
Jom, purided the nrocens conditions did not. change.” (Ezsphacia edided.) ‘Thus, Randle is clearly saying that
the amount of waniess going into ties scrubber depuads on the process and act on the scrubber efficiency, end,
foschaz, that wing scrubber efficiencies t0 estimate this would yield results which ware exctiy backwards frocs
the (rus estimates, .

Even with the ssmmption-of an efficiency of 83%, which would presume good
maintenance and condition of the equipment (often not a good sssumption for FMPC),
there is evidence that scrubber losses were far higher than reported. A June 4, 1964 memo

_ on unaccounted for materials states:

pounds per month might be a as 1,000
Te at ees Pema eel ad

_ ‘These estimates would put 1961 scrubber losses at 5.4 metric tons and 1964 scrubber
losses at 73 metric tons. Yet, the official estimates for these years as of May 1987 were far
lower: 2.4 metric tons and 2.9 metic tons respectively. We are not able to explain these
discrepancies. But they do clearly indicate that the present official estimates may be two to

Ek Gestnes © CR Chapman and S. Marshall, “Report on the investigation of B-PID
in Plane 8," ane 4, 1964. ” of



‘March 27, 1975

HYDROGEN PLUORIDE IN prasn(t)
M. He. Boback

K. 4. 208s

On 3/7/75 a Plant 4& employee reported to the Medical
Department with a complaint of excess hydrogen fluoride
in the Plant 4 Dust Collector Drumming area on the 619
level. An inspection of Plant 4 on this date indicated
excess HF in the Reactor area on the 619 level. An
attempt was made to obtain samples with Drager tubes but
the tubes were unreadable.

Two days previously an all-:lastic sample bubbler was
used at the top of the stairwell to obtain a sample. The
results of that sample and others taken during the period
are on the attached table.

These results indicate that the air in the area around
the dust collector drumming stations at the northeast of
the 619 level frequently has more than the Threshold Limit
Value (TLV) of HF. On some occasions the HF concentration
is above the Excuzsion Limit (EL) of 4000 ugm/M’.

It is recommended that:

1) All leaks be repaired promptly; : |

2) When a leak is discovered the area around the leak
should be marked and no work should be done in the
area without air-supplied respiratory protection.

nai $1,080 By

K. MN. Joss
XNR/vvs

attach.

2607913



e°

i

bo

HEALTH PROTECTION REVIEW
RATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO
APRIL 1965

Introduction and Summery

The annus] health protection review ofthe National Lead
Coupany of Ohio was wade April 20-23, 1965, by Messrs. Re Le
Hervin and W. A. Johnson of the O20 Research and Development
Division. Muclear Safety and Health Physics were exphasised
during the review which included plant tours of operating
facilities end formal presentations by HLO.on accountability
and nuclear safety contrel. During the review, a nuclear
safety problem concerning the UF vaporization step of the
Pilot Plant operations was observed and called to the atten-
tion of MLO and CAO personnel. The NLO Piant Manager ordered
this phase of plant operations discontinued until corrective
action is taken, A recommendation concerning this situation
is contained in the final section of this report.

It is the opinion of the reviewers that the health protection
programs reviewed are, in general, satisfactory. More de-
tailed analyses of the progress are contained in the Observa-
tions section of this report.

Implementation of Previous Recommendations

A. Recomendation that an evaluation should be made to
ezplein the recent trend of increased personnel exe
posures and to implenent corrective action when
practical to lower such exposures.

BLO-has subuitted a report, encitied "Ceame Radiation
Exposures,” which explains the recent trend of in-
creased exposures, The major probles involves the
build-up of Uy and UX2 daughters due to the processing
of aged mstertal. Other than more frequent rotation
of personne] on s few operations, no additions! con-
trol measures were necessary to significantly reduce
personne] exposures. Exposure results for 1964 show
a 50% decrease in the number of personnel (1963-331,
1964-376) above 1 rem but less than 5 rem of pene-
trating radiation.



7) Urani uM

. Sa04 448 014 LB. -whade. aa
ay ® aac. Sonata hoot park jor Ot | Oct 1959..
—«&sa Ube. pasted es .

i ene



NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO

ScnneEtneneenreees lanemisnatentiaiheseee
meena >

P.O. BOX 39158 CINCINNATI 39, OHIO

JUL 16 1965 2117917

Mr. C. L. Karl, Area Manager
U. S Atomic Energy Commission
P. O, Box 39188

Cincinnati, Ohio 45239

SUBJECT: REPORT ON HEALTH PROTECTION REVIEW - NATIONAL
LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO - APRIL, 1965

Dear Mr. Kar}:

We have reviewed the report on the He: Program Review con-
ducted by ORO Health & Safety 8 OD April 20-23, 1965. As in
the past, aes eae on the topics covered, and
we feel that the two re:
corrective messures on each ee and the status is as follows:

lemaed nindations to correct unsatisfactory conditions. Thia committee
issued a report on 5/14/65 entitled "Interim Report; Investigation of

B, Starting shortly after the completion of the 1964 Plant 8 air dust survey
and before issuance of the final survey report, & series of meetings was
held concerning the rise in Plant 8 air dust levels, These meetings, the
first of which was held on 11/11/64, were attended by the Plant 8 Super-
intendent and representatives of Maintenance, Engineering and Health &

meeting.
each of the subsequent meetings. After four such meetings, the last
heid on 2/24/65, it was decided that conditions had been improved to
the point where no further formal meetings were required.



L ME Ie Ween

UNITED STATES Sh 37
ATOMIC ENERGY a onanssion > (EC Unf of
- on CINGINNATI ae | CAS as Yay, (4 -
P..0. BOX 39168, CINCINNATI, OHIO 45239 aat

HRW ‘ater t}ihis
JUL 1 4 1964 bse File

: DECLASSIFIED - PER AUTHORITY
Mstionsl Lead Company ef Ohio wa.weren, co, SLY/4G2—

Cimeinnati, Okie 45239 BY: bose Si
‘ea

Enclosed herewith is ene copy of 2 memorandes received fren the Manager,
Oak Ridge Operations Office, dated July 9, 1964, regarding the large
quantity ef usterial wnsccounted fer at the FMRC. The attached meme-
rendun fercher cuphasises the concern of the Commission ever the large
quantities ef material eusccounted fer at the FMFC.

We suggeat that the charter ef the formal fnvestigeting coumittec
which yeu heve sppeinted be expanded te include the entire acceunte-
bility complex at the FNEC due te the intersection of all materiel
® balances end enrichments. The wenerandwa should be studied by your
Seeestigating comsittee te see if there are any comments or suggestions ~
contained therein which weuld assist in their activities.

We will be gled te assist yeu in any way pessible, We would
receiving reports of the pregress ef the comeittee for the ese o!
office and Oak Ridge.

Very truly yours,-

earned OA

Originat
WiLtray 9 ted By
Acting area y

C, b. katt anager

eae | sn rhs A
° —

RFST-PNPY AVAILABLE

3362751



HOW DOES PERCHLOROETHYLENE AFFECT HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

Effects of perchloroethylene on human health and the environment
depend on the amount of PERC present and the length and frequency of
exposure. Effects also depend on the health of a person or the condition
of the environment when exposure occurs.

Breathing PERC for short periods of time can adversely affect the
human nervous system. Effects range from dizziness, fatigue, headaches and
sweating to incoordination and unconsciousness. Contact with PERC liquid
or vapor irritates the skin, the eyes, the nose, and the throat. These
effects are not likely to occur at levels of PERC that are normally found
in the environment.

Breathing perchloroethylene over longer periods of time can cause
liver and kidney damage in humans. Workers exposed repeatedly to large
amounts of PERC in air can also experience memory loss and confusion.
Laboratory studies show that PERC causes kidney and liver damage and cancer
in animals exposed repeatediy by inhalation and by mouth. Repeat exposure
to large amounts of PERC in air may likewise cause cancer in humans.

Perchloroethylene by itself is not likely to cause environmental harm
at levels normally found in the environment. PERC can contribute to the
formation of photochemical smog when it reacts with other volatile organic
carbon substances in air. These reactions tend to eliminate PERC before it
reaches the upper atmosphere in amounts sufficient to damage the ozone
layer.

WHAT EPA PROGRAM OFFICES REGULATE PERCHLOROETHYLENE, AND UNDER WHAT LAWS IS
IT REGULATED?

EPA OFFICE LAW PHONE NUMBER
Pollution Prevention Toxic Substances Control Act (202) 554-1404
& Toxics Emergency Planning and Community

Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)

Regulations (Sec. 313) . (800) "424-9346

Toxics Release Inventory data (202) 260-1531
Air Clean Air Act (919} 541-0888
Solid Waste & Comprehensive Environmental

Emergency Response Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (Superfund) /
Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act / EPCRA (Sec. 304/311/312) (800) 424-9346

Water Clean Water Act (202) 260-7588
Safe Drinking Water Act (Drinking

Water Standard: 0.005 mg/L) (800) 426-4791

A technical support document can be requested from the TSCA Assistance
Information Service, (202) 554-1404.

WHAT OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES OR GROUPS CAN I CONTACT FOR INFORMATION ON
PERCHLOROETHYLENE?>

AGENCY /GROUP PHONE NUMBER

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (404) 639-6000





@ OPE USe cuki 4

: Apedd. 11, 1962 CENT?
BAND PICKING 33" ATRIAL ~ PLANT 8 Heal FILES
XK. @. Ross
A. D. Work
® Om March 29, 2902, on aie dust eveization
® of band picking ivr Watecial (Gecsinay flees cecoy canges)s “A tas

necessary.

é readity ecceasihie. % either case, on airfeupplied respirator shoulé be

. Gh Pawp 4¢ west of operation 2,768 0 10sz- as

a Gh. Pump. St east of operation - 4m. 24230 $s

: x eling saterish beck inte 23,249 SIS... 7,408 206
Wary Uistle hand picking,

5 WOERe : :

* BE Hand picking metal 3, §, i

tramp . AAS S22 5,328 coy

ve

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

* &. D. Mevkim
4 ADM for
e- Orin tai: Gan witht
BEST COPY AVAILABLE

2637762



All- OB

sponsible

Foren 2A RIGHT _ dawe21-1T=71 Accounting Charge .
Sofety ” TQ Emergency OD Urgent (7] Routine BA-12-72.
Normal Marnt. ( Extracrdinory Maint. CO Alteration (J Operation (3 Capita!

~ Job Detaiis:

Pe: m necessary re Ss or modifications\ to incr&ase 7
velocity of Quantoheter Lab Q35).-
“iO. ..on_Minok Work: RB 8t-AN-48 not p: -neces: a t
_ velocity If netessery, lace wer with lar, unit,

Replace motor and blower sheaves and drive belt as follows:~ :

Motor Sheave: 3.00" P.D. for "A" belt,

- Blower Sheave: 6,00" PJD. for “A* belt, pes bore
1/2" bore”
ore Belt: #4-320 Browning a.

c-35 fome Exnausr-lnw Tve LAG,

Justification: eee a . Loo.
“Exhaust velocity 1s not sufficient to remove corrosive vapors
generated when U30, and ThO2 samples are analyzed on the Quantometer,
Personnel have been complaining of throat irritation during and

after operating. the Quantometer, Increased exhaust velocity is
urgently needed to assure safe working conditions. teed

NO] _OSTRIBUTION OF COPIES
T | Mechanica! Deperrment ECD

MLG-BiGe193~2 (ReK. 1012/63)

4

i

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

2637568



UiiiCiAL USE ONLY

REFINERY URANIUM EXPOSURES

Since the revision of the urinalysis schedule in 1970, Refinery
workers have gubaitted samples for uranium analysis on a quart-
erly schedule. In October, 1971, results were acceptable. In
January, 1972, resuits indicated that excessive exposures had
ocourred. The problem was discussed with Refinery supervision
and efforts were made to reduce the exposures.

Conclusions,

Refinery workers have been exposed to unusually high con-
centrations of airborne uranium, ‘The exposures began between
the quarterly urinalysis samples analyzed in October, 1971,
and this January.

The greater-than-usual exposures resulted from the greater-
gbensusual production rate in December, January, and
ruary .

Measures taken to reduce the exposures, while worthwhile,
are not enough to prevent excessive exposures when the
Refinery returrs to the production rate maintained during
December to February.

Major exposure sources were:

a. Excessive dust levels in the drum dumper building.

b. Leaks around the screw conveyor.

ec. Rodding out jammed conveyor and plugged feed lines.

a. Dust and residues from {b), (c), leaking valves and
flanges, and tank spillage is spread all through the
Digestion Area and provides a constant supply for air
entrainment.

e. Leaks from the UO, mills.

f. General spills ardund the vo, drumming station and the
denitration pots.

Recommendations

Initiate a request for the Engineering Division to deter-
mine equipment changes required to properly feed the digest
tanks at the desired rate, The survey should include the
system from drum dumping to digest tanks, including associ-
ated dust collectors, scrubbers, and quick draft.

Revise SOP 2-C-102, "Continuous Digestion System," to
specify that the door of the drum dumping enclosure be
towered before the drum grabs are closed for dumping. Also,
specify that the dumper operator wear a respirator con-
tinuously while in the building, This would include any
waiting period after the first drum 1s dumped.

3481865



GOUPI MER Salting
KCsvcrs



-2-

122, General Information on Programs Reviewed
*_g. Induserial Hygiene end Radiation Department (TREND)

ORILD Ho. 0500-3 concerning posting requirements ves
implemented by ‘posting the “Notice to Baployees" on
the bullecin bosrds at the two main entrances ani the
main locker room. Information contained in the Appendix
to AEC Menual Chapter 0526 is included as « Piant
Manufacturing Standard. In addition, e¢ letter con-
the directive-was sent to al) division directors
and boldera of the Plant Manufecturing Standards Manvel
and the Technical Procedures Manusl. Some modifications
were necessary to meet the requirements of OR-0525 con-
cerning Occupations! Redistion Exposure Information.
The modifications involve the preparation of s form
letter for notification of visitors with exposures ex-
ceeding 50 mrem, and the compilation of required in-
6 formation on those Ares Office personnel whose recorded
sn yearly exposures exceed 50 aren.

Procedures concerning the sale of contaminated scrap
and/or equipment are in sccordance with Menual Chapters
OR-S182 and $170. Prior to any sale, a stumary letter
concerning the conrents thereof and certifying that cen~
tamination levels are within the specified Limits is sent
2 to the Aves Office for approval. Contaminated 55 gallon
drums which are no longer useable end other scrap not
meeting the ‘limits are sold to a licensee such as the
Biioxville Iron Company.

(4960-12, 1961733, 1962-120, 1963-331). The highest skiz
exposure for 1963 was reported as 22.9 rem which includes
4.4 rem of penetrating radiation. The beta plus gamms to
gemma ratio for the plant population bas decreased gignif-
deantly since ‘1960 when the ratio was 20.7 to 1 as conpered
to a ratio of 5.4 to 1 for 1963. MIO feeis that a partial
. explanstion of the exposure problem would be the incresse
in the Ux; and Ux; dsughter build up in the uranium "feed?
e and the increased storage of uranium in various sreas.



OFFICIAL SE ONLY

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO

2215398

TT

~<—?- ©. SOX 39158 CINCINNATH, CHIO 45239

U

DEC 12 1966

Mr. C. L, Karl, Ares Manager
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
P,Q. Box 39188 -

Cincinnati, Ohte 45239

SUBJECT: IDEA LEPTER - REVISIONS TO UAP FURNACE FACILITY - PLANT &

Dear Mr, Karl:
PROBLEM c

‘The UAP Furnace ts in-need of & major overhaul due to extensive
cormesion damage to the furnace shell, hearths, burners, and
rabble arms.

Because of the present inadequacy of the furnace's wet scrubber
offgas syaten, frequent blow-backs of fumes and dust occur

the feed nozzle, These fumes attacked the dry coliector which -
serviced the dumping. station.and sade:.it tnoperable... Since that .
time the dumping station has had no exhaust ventilation. High
personnel air dust exposures have re ‘Tom the rou’ dump-
ing operation and from the furnace blow-bdacks.

Continued Refinery faed difficulties have effected further changes
in Plant & processing so that at this time is is not clear i? &
ec&lcius precipitate, a UAP or an ADU preduct will be fed to this
furnace. In any case, due to the low grade halogen contaminated
residues wsich Plant 8 is scheduled to process, the feed to the
UAP Furnace is apt to be sticky or muddy in consistency. A
redesigned feed and rentilation system is required to handle any
ape of material (wet or dry) that uay be processed through the
Furnace.

SomTion

1. Rebuild the UAP Furnace by providing complete new steel
shell including doors, new refractory end insulatica,
new gas burners, new rabble arms and rabble teeth. .

2. Provide a new UAP Furnace feed system similar to thi
original design with the exception that the Moyno 5



aTe

exposures are within recommended limits, it is felt
that scae exposures in excess of ABC manual chapter
limits Would oceur if this trend continues for a fer
years. Also, such a continuing trend would indicate
a need for modification of besic health physics cone
trols for mgintaining exposures as low es practical.

rable amounts of re-cycle material from CE-HAPO -
a¢e being: processed in several plant areas. This material.
may Contain impurities (e.g., increase in alpha, beta _
and/or gemma emitters) which are not found in other feed

materials processed at this facility. The concentrations
Of such impurities could change depending on the number

of cycles .and other considerations concerning the process
at GEeHAPO. Therefore, criteria and/or limits currently,

used for air and/or water concentrations may not be

_ applicable for processes involving re-cycle materiel.

¥

The following itens were not reviewed, in decail but are
considered worthy of NIO studys

1. Completion of a detailed survey of the Neutron
Ganerator is needed for formulating adequate
bealch and safety operational procedures prior
to routine operations. The detailed survey
sbould consider the need for additional per-
sonnel monitering (0.g., neutron film, etc.),
potential sir contamination problems from triz-
‘dim im target snd control room, radiation levels
iu and around target room, interlocks, and similer. _
matters unique to such a fscility. The initial
survey by IRD indicated health poysics problems
mininal and facility design excellent. .

2. The dfo-essay sampling frequency is important in
obtaining good estimates ef internal uranium dep- Ko wetnod £
- opstion.. Recent publicstions indicate that the estimating,
quarterly sampling frequency easy be inadequate for wierna\
e at some exposure potentisis. It is also. deposition ot
" aéted that a sethod for estimating internal deposi- *<horium
tion of thorium-is needed before thorius is ageis 6 1G
processed in significant quantities. 7 dubs or

3. The method of spot sir sampling of « periodic basis Thorium
used for estinating the general sod breathing sone emits

ne continuous samples of. the general air, and such Sung,



eo

R. L. Kirk 7 2-

2. Air wast
The air dust hazaré& from thorium processing is somewhat more than
_it is from urdniom. This, however, should not necessitate any

basic change in handling procedures. As far as we have been able
to determine the only area where dust hazards are significantly

different is in the metal recasting step.

3. Radioactive Gas

gas
x .of the thorium :
whereas once the radium has been removed from uranium,
no longer is a problen. What this meens in vranium pro~
cessing is that operations involving concentrates only never
result in any significant radon concentrations. This cannot be

e expected in a thorium plant.

Lk. Fre
Because thorium is much less pyrophoric than uranium, the metal

finishing procedures can be operated with mach less concern. The
nain difficulty with such operations as machining of @ranium)lies

in the fact that chips readily burn. Ths tunes. From nese a
_ are 2 to greats a Basty. Snhalation hazard. This type o. zard

SPECT ITC OPERATIONS
1. Ore

‘The general procedures for handling ore will not differ signifi- a
cantly from those employed in the processing of pitchblente ores.

Tf the initial operations up to the sulfating step are treated

in a vanner similar to the treatment of Q-11 at Fernald, no un-

usual hazards would result.

2. Wet Processing

After the grocnd sand has been mixed with sulfuric acid, anc
through solvent extraction, tne only unusual hazards will come
from the gangue material o> the reffinate. Whether this occurs



Type tmwe

Searation oc Location Semple 3936 pirrg
SBARHETE_FUUCE
1. Graphite furnace area, 20d floor GA 376 292
2, Dumping feed material on tray Bz 4.0
3. Charging & BZ 1.64 12.7%
4. Peshing chips into furnace, south side BZ 1.08 ‘
5. Hoeing material in Bz 1.20 73
6, Checking drums for fullness BZ 1,36
‘A cums Bz 17.41 31.46
‘BORART XIN
1. Retary kiin seen, 1st floor aA 1.04
2. Smoking area by panel board fer Blin GA 97
3. Reed tray aren Gh
4. Reeding kiln foc fs Bz 20
5. Checking drum for fuliness at ‘acalping* BZ 5.94

camming station
6. Changing dows at kitn Station BZ 34.97
7, Checking acum for foliness at product BEf 33,00
8. Changing drums st product caning BZ 27.47

station

6 9, Pumping through kiln drum dumper BZ 4.59

EBL AAS REVERTER
i. Dumping area GA Tt 2,94
2. Meesanine aren aA 3.82 olf
3. Caming station ares cA 4,07 2t
4. Reading at reverter dumping station Bz 9.04
5. Checking drum for fuliness at caming Bz 47.79 17.23

station . .
6, Sampling oxtde at canning station Bz : 12,43
7. Changing drums at reverter camming BZ 29.37 1.37
2G AREA, 18T_LOe
1. Dump trailer ares aA 4 02
2. Feweman's office a 2d 16
3. Contrel room CA 7 07 7
4. Mashrooa GA -53 209
3. Moyne pusp area aA 36 ad
6, Demver crusher canning station ares CA Alt
7. Digester area, ist floor a 54 10
8. Sampling dump trailer BZ 233

e

BEST COPY AVAILABLE : 3187862



-3-

Initial steps were being taken at the time of the
appraisal to develop the NLO program of off-shift
supervision and emergency planning. Meetings of

the newly appointed NLO shift supervisor with the
Y-12 Plant shift supervisor and emergency coordinator
are planned. It-is anticipated that the influence
and impact of this planning at the higher levels of
supervision at NLO will be felt in emergency training
throughout the NLO organization.

Recommendation that corrective action should be taken
to eliminate the refinery fume problem.

This problem has received a high priority at NLO, and
conceptual engineering for correcting the problem
appears to be adequate. Preliminary measures have been
taken which have reduced the excessive fuming frequency
somewhat; however, it was noted during the inspection
tour that inattention to proper procedure continues to
permit higher than desired fume concentrations, partic~-
ularly at Digester 01-7.

B. Recommendation ~ September 1968 Appraisal

None.

Vv. Findings
A. Nuclear Safety

7

Safe Digester

As noted in Part III-A.1 of this report, action has been
initiated for handling U-235 enrichments above 5%. Cur-
rent plans include the installation in Plant 1 of a
geometrically safe continuous digester for ichments
to1O%. It is expected that this facility wilh be
operational by March 1969. The installation of this
equipment outside the Refinery is considered desirable
and in keeping with recommendations of the NLO Health
and Safety Division. :



ey

o3-

‘The IH&RD ennusi report shove # significant increase in.
the general sir levels for yarious operations in Plants. 5,
9, and and the surrounding erea of the rod cooling bed
in Plant Modifications to various operations (e.ge, =.
breakout station Plane 5) are planned for inproving the Apne
overall air levels-throughout.the plant. Although there _

was en increase in the general eir levels,. results of the : 8 ae
Sio-assay prograa show thet 26 employee exceeded the B10, //) “af
Grfteria (50 ug/1 avg. in urine) for reporting internal _ Op Gi
exposures.to the ABC. - fe 99

All routine operations requiring ventilation are exhausted &, yy.
through sixty stacks throughout the variuus plants. Pre- Fey?
‘

treatment prior to exhaust to the atmosphere is primarily
Hersey Raverse Jet type filters (40 units) and

through

through Sly Fiat lope type or Shaking Tube Wheelabrator
type filters. of the stacks is led cont: ly
using a type pleated type filter for co! cies the
semple. About eight stacks serve operations which have

an off-ges with « bigh heat and/or moisture content. These
off-gas streams utilize primarily a S6K Venturi Wet Scrubber
for clean up end some use # cyclone separator before the
scrubber on furnace off-gas streams. These stacks are spot-
checked on & periodic besis using « Greenburg Saith Inpinger
type sampler. Results from the-stack monitoring system
show leveis to be within appropriate health protection limits
and the results are primarily used for monthly estimates of
the smounts of uranium lost via the stack system.

Follow-up of last year's report concerning the clean up of
the storm sewer and ground contamination problems show thet
considerable improvements have been made in 1963. The
improvements are sumerized in thé "Minutes Ground Con~
tamination Study Committee Meeting beld on March 3, 1964, and
March 10, 1964." Monthly reports entitled "Incidents De~
tected and Corrective Action Teken in Stora Sewer Syston”

by che Engineering Division and "Comments on Ground Contamina~
tien in Process.Areas" by IHSED sre submitted to sppropriate
supervisors for action. is. MLO bas resulted in
a €ifty percent reduction in the amount of uraniom (i.6+,
1230 Ibs/moath 1962 to 660 Ibs/month 1963) losses vis the
storm sewer system. Hovever, results for the first part of
1964 show an increase by s factor of about two in the amount
of uraniws lost vis the storm sewer system. This increase is
due in part to a rather dry latter part of 1963 and a wet
Zire quarter of 1964.



une ws an

2132893

October 26, 1954

COMTAMIMATION OF PLANT 3 HEATER TUBES
W. C, Hill - Maintenance
R. C. Heatherton

On the morning of Monday, October 25, an inspection was made
of the KC-2 Area where the Brown Fin Tube Company heater tubes
were moved from the Plant 3 Combined Raffinate Area. The
inspection revealed that the area is extremely contaminated.
nis resulted from the equipment not being cleaned before it
left the Combined Raffinate Area.

A phone call to you by 3. ¥. Barry of this department revealed
that according to you someone from this department had monitored
the equipment and instructed J. Wallace that no cleaning was
necessary. An investigation by E. Barry revealed that the
technician who monitored had given J. Wallace verbal instructions
and written instructions as well, These instructions were that
gince. the equipment had a tremendous amount of loose material,
it should te cleaned before removal from the Plant 3 area. The
persons doing the cleaning would wear respirators. A visit to
the fe-2 Area revealed that several pieces of this equipment are
still tegged with these instructions on the tag. It is evident
that this sie . Therefore,
we suggest uation be inves order to pre~
vent recurrence of such discrepancies. : we

With regard to the present situation, the following recommenda-
tions are made :

{21) Rope off the area that is contaminated. This area will be
pointed cut to you or a member of your department by an
Industrial Hygienist.

(2) The equipment should be cleaned vefore any further moving.

(3) The area where the equipment is stored at present should be
Cleaned so that no contamination remsins.

BvB/mb R, C. Heatherton
ect H. Martin
Se tgiey
pean

090633 * -



thres times lower than estimate based on even optimistic assumption about plant operating
conditions.

> om.

Another document cites a typical momthly’loss of 1,500 pounds from Plant 8 scrubbers
based on an assumption of 83% efficiency and 2 uranium loading at the scrubber inlet of
123 pounds per hour. 8

Yet another document shows that UAP furnace losses were 4 small proportion of the
total Plant 8 scrubber losses. ‘The losses from three of the five scrubbers during 1961 were
estimated as 1,005 pounds per month. Oftthese the UAP furnace losses were about 15%.9
Of course, UAP losses would be a smaller percentage, when the losses from the other Two
scrubbers are included in the total.

‘The above, and similar evidence in other documents, plus the failure of Michael
Boback the principal author of the official History of FMPC Radjomsclide Discharges to
docament even single figure for scrubber losses or even 10 explain bow documents such
as the zbove-quoted ones were taken into account, leads us to discard all the official
estimates of scrubber losses from Plant 8 scrubbers, and substitute them with our own,
based on the above documentation.

. ® ‘We have used the figure of 1,340 pounds per month for 1964, of 7.3 metric tans for the
whole year as the loss figare for 1964 besed on ax assumed operating <fficiency of 83%,
which is in the middle of the manufacturer specified range of efficiency af 70 to 95%.

Using the production data for Plant 8, we then recalculated the scrubber losses for all
- other years weighted according to production in that year. This procedure gives us a low.
_ estimate. af sembber losses, since, there is considerable evidence, that scrubber were
operating well below design efficiency.

‘We have also calcalated a set of values corresponding to the low end of mamufaccurer
specified efficiencies of 70%, ‘We chose not use the upper end of the manufacturer's
specified efficiencies to make yet another estimate became pisnt documentation clearly
shows that scrubbers were being operated in a manner they were not designed for. There is
alto evidence that at least one utterly deteriorated scrubber was in operation for some
time.

WT Noyes CL Ke, Ropes fr Apmovel fovemary Wraps Normal and
9 GR Chapman to P.G_Defac, "Request for Feasibility Study - Re: Reduction of



NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY
OF OHIO
>. ©. BOK IBA. MT, REALTHY STATION

‘TH St OMI Seotenber 26, 1957

SUBJECT AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION - PLANT 8 -
TO L. W. Kessler
FROM J. A. Huesing
REFERENCE
As per your request, attached is a copy of the comparison table of
air dust samples taken in Plant 8 for 1956 and 1957, After
Septenber 17 any further information you may need on the subject
way be obtained from J. Wing, Extension 691, who will be in charge
of our survey section.
a
j. A. Huesing
JARzbg
Attach.
ces Central File
. 2 t A
Sec, note & anges
Lrom lyr to the wexy
NLO-GEN-655.1 (12.14.55)

ananwzaeca


B. Forearm Exposures

MLO has performed a stuéy of exposure to the forearms of
some Plant 5 employees. ‘The results of this study showed
projected ennual forearm exposures from about 14,000 to
46,000 mrem. In view of this, it is evident that AECM 052k
monitoring requirements have not been met. According to
NLO estimates, about 300 employees would require extremity
monitoring because of potential exposure to the hands. It
appears necessary that further attention be given-by NLO to
this matter. Extremity dosimeters should be provided as
appropriate end en evaluation of involved operations shovid
be made to assure compliance with 0524 guides.

—

The study does not indicate the level of hand exposure for
these employees. From previous experience at other uranium
facilities, it would be expected that the hend exposure

r ¢ could be 2-3 times the wrist exposure.

c. IVRML
‘The IVRML visited NLO on two occesions during eY 1970. It
vas on site for two weeks, beginning March 30, and egein
from early July through the end of September. During the
first counting period, about 24 employees vere counted and
during the second period 103 employees (including the 24

vs

‘9 previously counted) were monitored. On the basis of date
ae w . generated during these monitoring periods, 23 employees’ are
e calculated to have average lung burdens for 1970 equal to or
wigs greater then one-half the AEC guide, It is estimated thet
about 200 employees are currently working in production sarees

and have a generally comparable potential for ureniun lug

exposure. It is therefore noted with concern that only sbout

half of those potentially subject to exposure heave been

monitored by IVRML during this year. It ia further Roted that
ion (approximately 20-25 percent). of, the

‘i férce hes nor received et least one IVEML |

Scuit since the coumter first vent, to LO in 1968.

Based on the above data, it would appear that about 15-20

percent of those counted in 1970 vere found to have more than
50 percent of the AEC suide criterion. Of the number excesd-
ing the 50 cent level, one-third yas. coun’ ea for, only the |

2A¢ percen
| 3 Fitct cine during the July-September IVRML visit.



NATIONAL LEAD COMMANY 1OF OHIO

- MEALTN 0 SAPETY Orvmnet ROUTE TS
e INCIDENT OBSERVATION REPORT RW>
~yy____3._2: beininger Bul. | __K nit
Free ¢. wW. Zimber : 2214098
(ceatten__ Plant 8 Leet
3/20/58

Subjecr _Exptying of fotex Dust Colleecos Ho. 6016 Care
The present method of amptying the rotex dust collector is not compact

(with the objectives stressed the Industriel Fygiene & Radiation Derar=ne

During this operation the dust collector material is hendled in a manner wh
gromotes maximum smmloyee exposures to harmful radioactive dust. The dust i

sa 2: esi or_on the second and falis down ac! toa

nonventiiated drum om the first 2is0>- The overetor on the first floor sis

3 hs

sure les inte etayld a eamemni tas

tom aware shat the sly collsese> seovisins she motte unis is ected:

z a weols mare 2 fff ntene yeis tmecetied: haysven, "S38" sees 2:
: : \
La necessary to provide remsorars nolis’ Some she aossens unescenceS ls
sicast a te saiurtar vould bs co sxcans she daywnsomes Seem at:
st eolleston is maver dmmmine soghian anayrise a nigs> sass 5 sh
sue Siege Ainge saenn + Meus sf% she Slow, eno use 2 Porte wines:
supply semssrery ve! iss 4 we Oftic f een ame. Mets ehoyit mma:

improve the srnhi hi cise



"Sage 2 e
|

bo Karl

: we assume that it might be sufficient to count those groups of
eupioyees, some of whoa might show lung burdens of 25 to 50%, only
@ once @ year. Those groups in whieh lung burdens of 50% or grester

pequire that we have of the mobile body counter at least six
ponths & year. ‘Te Gost) of this counting program, including $35
gount counter charge, wages “Of NLO Health and Safety. personnel,

and lost working time of those being counted, would be about
36,000. This is more than twice the gost of approximately $15,000
2 the counting program planned for 1972. .

qne above estimate of the economic impact is conservative. Several
factors could have the effect of greatly increasing the cost of the
pody sounting program. One of these factors would be the need to
gount those in the 25 to 50% lung burden groups more than once &
years ‘Also, it may be necessary to impose the “at least two days
away from exposure” criteria to all body counting in order to
eptain satisfactory date at the 25% lung burden level. Sueh factors
gould lead to the necessity of having body ‘eounting facilities
available on a full-time basis. .

gince uranium and thorium both have long biological half-lives of

at least 100 days, our program for 4n vivo monitoring,

ther with the urine assay progres for exposure control, has deen
rt ficient to assure our meeting the quarterly dose standard. No

@ apefieulties are expected with this in the future.

RCH TAD/fD vs

eo: CG. Le Karl
6 J. A. Quigley, wv.

Central Piles

002303