Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 1 of 100

FACILITY NAME: A.O. Smith Corporation 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

TIME PERIOD: 1948-1950

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

A.O. Smith studied methods for protecting beryllium carbide-matrix bodies for the Nuclear 

Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft (NEPA) project. 

DISCUSSION:

Telephone contacts were made with current company (A.O. Smith and Tower Automotive)

officials. A. O. Smith officials could not locate any specific records for the listed dates. The 

Tower Automotive officials provided the following information: (1) Tower Automotive 

bought a Division of A.O. Smith in 1997, which is the location where the AEC/DOE contracts 

took place; (2) this is a 150 acre location, with numerous current buildings—over the years 

various buildings have been torn down; and (3) there is no way to determine in which 

buildings the AEC/DOE work took place. It could not be determined if the beryllium 

activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from 

work for other customers. No specific information could be found concerning 

decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

The documentation reviewed and the information provided by current company officials do 

not indicate that beryllium decontamination was ever performed, nor were there any records 

regarding whether or not the work areas for the AEC/DOE contracts and other clients were 

separate. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H 

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contacts with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1951-present 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 2 of 100

FACILITY NAME: AC Spark Plug

Flint, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: AC Spark Plug

TIME PERIOD: 1946-1947 

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

AC Spark Plug performed beryllium work for the AEC. Records indicate that approximately 

10 men worked with beryllium at this location in 1947. Information about AC Spark Plug is 

found in health hazard surveys, shipping reports, and in a MED history. The company 

continued to receive hundreds of pounds of beryllium for use under government contract into 

the 1960s. It is possible that some or all of this beryllium was being used for other, non-AEC 

projects. 

There was also a small amount of thorium procurement related to AC Spark Plug in the 1946-

1947 time frame.

DISCUSSION:

The specific name of this site is AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors, Dort Highway 

Plant. The time period for AEC involvement with this site goes back as far as 1943, but it 

appears that activities involving beryllium did not start until the Fall of 1946. At this time, 

they were asked to research the possibility of fabricating beryllium oxide (BeO) into the form 

of hexagonal bricks. They were to get 5,000 pounds of SP grade BeO from the Brush 

Beryllium Company. It appears that between Fall 1946 and February 1947 small quantities 

were obtained for the purpose of conducting research to see if the fabrication of the bricks 

was possible. This research was conducted by three employees in what probably was a 

specialized area. In February 1947, an AEC site visit was conducted and various 

recommendations were made including the need for improvements in working conditions and 

reducing beryllium exposures. By March 1947, the site had received about 900 pounds of 

BeO. In May 1947, another AEC site visit was conducted, mainly dealing with a safety and 

health evaluation. After the May 1947 information, there is no further documentation of 

further work with the fabrication project, other AEC involvement, or decontamination efforts. 

There is documentation that in 1961 the site had obtained about 900 pounds of BeO from 

DOD. It can not be determined how this material was used.

Telephone contact with current company officials from General Motors provided the 

following information: (1) mention of the AEC beryllium contract work was found in their 

records but there was no documentation about decontamination or special work areas for the 

AEC contracts; and (2) the facility still exists on Dort Highway and is owned by Delphi

(facility is know as Delphi Flint East)—it is not clear exactly when the facility was bought by 

Delphi. 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 3 of 100

The documentation reviewed indicates that the AEC/DOE beryllium contract work probably 

cannot be separated from the other beryllium work. No record of beryllium decontamination 

could be found or was provided by current officials at General Motors. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and contact with current 

General Motors officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1948-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 4 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Accurate Machine & Tool 

Albuquerque, New Mexico

TIME PERIOD: 1987-2002

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Accurate Machine & Tool provides machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, 

California. This work has included the use of beryllium-copper materials. 

DISCUSSION:

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) 

Provided machine shop services on beryllium copper materials from 1985-2002 in an existing 

building (still used as a machine shop) at the current address of the company; (2) there is a 

difference in start date (1985 vs. 1987), and there possibly was AEC/DOE beryllium contract 

work conducted in the 1960-70s in a different location on Yale Boulevard; (3) beryllium work 

was only conducted for AEC/DOE and was not conducted in any special work area; and (4) 

no specific decontamination for beryllium took place after the contracts were terminated.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium

contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2003-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 5 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Aeroprojects, Inc.

West Chester, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Sonobond Ultrasonics

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1973

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Beginning in 1951, Aeroprojects Inc. performed research and development for the AEC. The 

company's work included investigation of the use of ultrasonic energy in the areas of 

instrumentation, welding, filling of tubes with powders, extrusion, solidification and cleaning. 

Materials used by the company include alloys and compounds of aluminum, beryllium, 

mercury, thorium and uranium. 

DISCUSSION:

In the AWE files, it was noted that the exact quantities of the materials mentioned above are 

not known. It was noted that work for the AEC decreased in the mid-1960s and that the site 

began doing research and development work under other government contracts. The AEC 

contracts were closed out in 1973, and there is no mention of decontamination activities. A 

report shows that workers: (1) in the late 1950s buried welding shavings and rags that were 

involved in an accident involving beryllium and other materials; (2) in 1966 buried in a 

concrete container air filters that were used to monitor beryllium and other welding activities; 

and (3) in 1976 buried in a glass jar small quantities of beryllium wire and other materials. 

Telephone contact with current company officials (Sonobond Ultrasonics) provided the 

following information: (1) AEC/DOE contract work might not have extended until 1973 but 

no documentation could be located; (2) the facility where beryllium work was conducted was 

vacant from 1981-2001, at which time it was destroyed by fire in 2001; (3) beryllium work 

was conducted in a separate room with special ventilation; (4) no other beryllium work was 

conducted; and (4) at the end of the contracts all material, equipment, clothing, etc. was 

returned to AEC/DOE.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicate 

that, even though all beryllium contract equipment was returned to AEC/DOE, no record of 

beryllium decontamination was found after the contracts ended. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 6 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium

contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1974-2001
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 7 of 100

FACILITY NAME: American Beryllium Co. 

Sarasota, Florida

TIME PERIOD: 1967-1992

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

American Beryllium Company machined parts for Y-12 and Rocky Flats. Generally, the 

beryllium for these parts was supplied by Kawecki Berylco Industries, Inc.

DISCUSSION:

OSHA measured beryllium at this location sometime between May 1979 and December 1999. 

No other records pertaining to beryllium could be identified. 

The following information was obtained from newspaper articles and Federal and State 

documents. A more correct name for the facility at the time of the AEC/DOE contracts was 

Loral American Beryllium Company. In 1996, it was bought by Lockheed Martin; it closed 

shortly thereafter. However, it has been determined by sampling at the site, which still exists,

by Federal and State agencies that significant beryllium contamination remains.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and current Federal and State 

agency documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium

contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1993-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 8 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Atomics International 

Los Angeles County, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Energy Systems Group

TIME PERIOD: 1955-1966

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Atomics International Division of North American Aviation is a statutory beryllium 

vendor under the EEOICPA. Atomics International worked with beryllium and radioactive 

materials under contract with the Atomic Energy Commission at numerous locations. These 

locations include, but are not necessarily limited to, Area IV of the Santa Susana Field 

Laboratory, portions of the Downey facility, the Vanowen Building at the Canoga facility and 

the De Soto facility.

DISCUSSION:

A beryllium inventory dated 1949 and a document dealing with beryllium hazards was all that 

could be found. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work 

were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. Even 

though DOE remediation ended in 1999, there is no indication this included beryllium 

decontamination. 

Telephone conversations with current company officials (Boeing Company) provided the 

following information: (1) beryllium work involved research for and production of beryllium 

reflectors at three different sites—(a) Vanowen Building (#38)-demolished in 2004; (b) 

DeSoto Avenue Building (#101)-demolished in 2004; and Santa Susana site-most buildings 

demolished over the years; (2) no records were provided about beryllium decontamination; 

and (3) current remediation mainly deals with sodium.

Since there is no documentation regarding beryllium decontamination, the presence of 

residual beryllium contamination cannot be ruled out.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and contact with current 

company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1967-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 9 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Battelle Laboratories - King Avenue

Columbus, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Battelle Columbus Laboratories-BCL

Battelle Memorial Institute-BMI

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1961; Department of Energy, 1986-2000

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

Information As Printed On Worker Advocacy Website:

From 1943 to 1986, Battelle Memorial Institute performed atomic energy research and 

development as well as beryllium work for the Department of Energy and its predecessor 

agencies. The Battelle Laboratories have two separate locations in Columbus - King Avenue 

and West Jefferson. Battelle's research supported the government's fuel and target 

fabrication program, including fabrication of uranium and fuel elements, reactor 

development, submarine propulsion, fuel reprocessing, and the safe use of reactor vessels and 

piping. 

The following activities were performed at the King Avenue location: processing and 

machining enriched, natural, and depleted uranium and thorium; fabricating fuel elements; 

analyzing radiochemicals; and studying power metallurgy. Beryllium work was conducted 

from 1943 until at least 1961.

DISCUSSION:

The reference to “beryllium work” in the foregoing description could not be further defined 

by a review of the available records. The following passages were noted: (1) This project 

concerned itself with developing methods for fabrication of beryllium oxide hexagons, 

research in making beryllium metal of high purity and the alloying of beryllium with uranium; 

(2) Research is conducted to furnish information on beryllium; (3) General metallurgical 

research and development is conducted; and (4) Beryllium and its compounds were supplied 

to the Manhattan Engineer District. The following information also was noted: (1) Beryllium 

deliveries were made in 1945/46; (2) There was a March 1947 beryllium inventory; (3) There 

was a February 1948 request to the AEC for various beryllium compounds; (4) Beryllium 

fabrication was briefly mentioned in an April 1948 document; (5) There was an August 1949 

request to the AEC for beryllium compounds; and (6) There was a March 1950 inventory of 

beryllium stocks. No information was found on beryllium beyond 1950. In the 1986 DOE 

elimination report, beryllium concerns were not raised. 

Current company officials did not provide any information about the AEC beryllium work 

and beryllium decontamination.

The fact that this facility is listed as an AWE facility between 1943 and 1986 and then is 

classified as a DOE facility from 1986-2000 indicates that work was being performed for the 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 10 of 100

weapons production program during these time periods. The documentation reviewed 

provides no evidence that beryllium decontamination has taken place. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium

contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1962-1985
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 11 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Beryllium Corp. of America-Hazelton

Hazelton, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Cabot Corporation

Beryllium Corp.of America-Ashmore

Berylco

Kawecki-Berylco

TIME PERIOD: 1957-1979

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 

contracted with the facility for the production of beryllium metal, beryllium oxide, and 

beryllium powder. The AEC contracted with the facility for the refining and fabrication of 

beryllium. Later, the facility produced beryllium blanks for the Y-12 plant and Dow (Rocky 

Flats).

DISCUSSION:

Very little information about this facility was found. There was one reference in March 1960 

to this site’s specific activity at that time. It was stated that the operation included production 

of high grade metal and oxide from beryl ore, and the metal was used for vacuum cast billets 

and sintered compacts. Also, final machining of the metal was performed there. Two 

references were found (June 1961; 1970) that worker exposures to beryllium were extremely 

high and a serious problem. No information is presented regarding decontamination efforts 

after the MED/AEC contract period, nor is there any documentation that this work was 

conducted in areas separate from work for other customers. 

Telephone contact with current company officials (Cabot Corporation) provided the following 

information: (1) the AEC/DOE contracts only went from 1957-1962, not through 1979 as 

listed on the Website; (2) the facility continued processing beryllium for other clients from 

1962-1979; (3) the facility closed in 1980, was not used after that date, was torn down in 

1995, and the land is currently vacant; (4) during the AEC/DOE contracts the beryllium work 

was not conducted in special areas of the facility; and (5) no records were available regarding 

beryllium decontamination after the AEC/DOE contracts ended.

No records of beryllium decontamination could be found or were provided by current 

company officials. The beryllium work conducted for the AEC/DOE cannot be separated 

from the beryllium work conducted for other clients. It should be noted that current company 

officials stated that the end date for AEC/DOE contract work was 1962.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 12 of 100

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1980-1995
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 13 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Beryllium Corp. of America-Reading

Reading, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Kawecki-Berylco

Berylco

NGK Metals Corp.

Cabot Corporation

Beryllium Corp. of America-Tuckerton

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1979

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

In 1947, the Beryllium Corporation plant at Reading produced highly distilled and pure 

beryllium oxide on a small scale for the AEC. By 1960, the plant focused on alloy and oxide 

work. In 1961, the plant supplied beryllium parts to the Y-12 plant and produced beryllium 

powder for the AEC from government inventory beryllium ingots. Although all major Berylco 

Contracts (beyond 1961) and purchase orders reviewed to date show that the final product 

shipped from Hazelton, it has been clarified that but for the alloy and oxide work performed 

in Reading, the contracts and purchase orders fulfilled for the AEC by Hazelton could not 

have been completed.

DISCUSSION:

Very little information regarding this facility was found. There was one reference in March 

1960 to this site’s specific activity at that time. It was stated that the operation included 

alloying and oxide work. Two references were found (June 1961;1970) indicating that 

worker exposures to beryllium were extremely high and a serious problem. There was no 

indication that the MED/AEC contract work was conducted in an area separate from 

beryllium production for other customers and there was no information about 

decontamination activities after the contact periods.

Telephone contact with officials of the current company (NGK Metals Corporation), which 

bought the facility in 1986, provided the following information: (1) beryllium work was 

conducted for the AEC/DOE and other clients throughout the facility—no separate areas were 

used for the AEC/DOE work; (2) operations at the facility continued until 2000; (3) parts of 

the facility still exist; and (4) the site is currently undergoing environmental remediation for 

beryllium contamination. 

ATSDR and EPA documents confirmed that beryllium remediation work is continuing.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicate 

that remediation is still ongoing, no record of beryllium decontamination after the contracts 

ended has been found, and the AEC/DOE work cannot be separated from beryllium work for 

other clients 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 14 of 100

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, telephone contact with 

current company officials, and ATSDR and EPA documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1980-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 15 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Beryllium Metals and Chemical Corp.

Bessemer City, North Carolina

ALSO KNOWN AS: BERMET

TIME PERIOD: 1962-1969

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Purchase orders from Y-12 indicate that Beryllium Metals and Chemical Corp. (BERMET) 

did some beryllium work for Y-12, beginning in 1963 and continuing at least through 1965. 

Beyond that, records indicate BERMET was responsive to an invitation to submit 100 pounds 

of beryllium metal to the AEC in 1968 for purposes of qualifying for further work, as part of 

the AEC's beryllium metal study group. According to a May, 1969 memo, BERMET chose not 

to participate beyond this initial 100 pound qualifying round.

BERMET’s corporate successor has indicated that the sale of beryllium to the AEC began in 

1962 and continued through 1969.

DISCUSSION:

It appears that the specific time frame for BERMET’s involvement in the beryllium metal 

study group was March 1968. Between July 1964 and April 1965, BERMET bought about 

4,000 pounds of beryllium scrap from the AEC. The information about the work for Y-12 

could not be confirmed.

Telephone contact with current company officials (FMC-Lithium Division) provided the 

following information: (1) Beryllium Metals and the Lithium Corporation of America (FMC

bought the Lithium Corporation in 1985) conducted the AEC/DOE beryllium work as a joint 

venture from 1963 -1969, but beryllium work continued until 1971; (2) the beryllium work 

was conducted in a separate building at the site and there was no beryllium work for other 

clients; (3) once the AEC/DOE beryllium work ended (1971), the building was 

decontaminated; and (4) the building was torn down in 1980. 

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicates 

that AEC/DOE beryllium work continued through 1971. At this time beryllium 

decontamination took place. There was no documentation available to support this assertion 

therefore it is assumed that potential for residual contamination existed until demolition in 

1980. 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 16 of 100

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1970-1980
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 17 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Beryllium Production Plant (Brush Luckey Plant)

Luckey, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Brush Beryllium

Luckey Site

TIME PERIOD: 1949-1959; DOE 1949-1961; 1992-present (remediation) 

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

From 1942 through 1945, National Lead operated a magnesium processing facility on the 

Luckey site for the U.S. Government. In 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) built a 

beryllium production facility at the site. The government built the plant to replace the 

production that was lost when the Brush Beryllium Loraine plant was destroyed by fire. The 

Brush Beryllium Company (now Brush Wellman,) under contract to the AEC, produced 

beryllium pebbles at this site until 1958. Records indicate that the facility produced between 

40,000 and 144,000 pounds of beryllium. In 1959, the AEC contracted with Brush to close 

down the facility. The site was sold to the Vulcan Materials Company in 1961. 

In 1951, AEC sent approximately 1,000 tons of radioactively contaminated scrap metal to the 

Luckey site. This material was to be used by the Diamond Magnesium Company to resume 

magnesium processing at the idle facility. Former Brush Wellman employees report that the 

magnesium facility never resumed operations; however, some records indicate that the 

facility operated in the 1950s under contract by the General Services Administration (GSA). 

The radioactively contaminated scrap metal remained stored at the site.

DISCUSSION:

A 1991/1992 FUSRAP report provides a history of the ownership of the site—(1) in 1961 

GSA transferred the property to Aluminum and Magnesium, Inc., (2) in 1967 the property 

was transferred to Vulcan Materials, (3) in 1968 the property was transferred to Goodyear 

Tire and Rubber, and (4) in 1987 the property was transferred to Motor Wheel Corporation. 

This report does not mention anything about beryllium decontamination efforts during the 

initiation of the remediation work. However, beryllium remediation work is ongoing by state 

and Federal officials. 

There was AEC/DOE beryllium contracted work between 1949 and 1959, with DOE 

involvement during this time period and continuing into 1961. The AEC/DOE beryllium work 

conducted at this facility cannot be differentiated from beryllium work conducted for other 

clients. There is no indication that there was any beryllium decontamination after the 1959 or

1961 date. Remediation began in 1992 and is ongoing.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 18 of 100

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1962-1991
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 19 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Brush Beryllium Co.-Cleveland

Cleveland, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Brush Wellman Co.

Motor Wheel Corp.

Magnesium Reduction

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1967

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Brush Cleveland facility conducted research on a process for producing uranium metal 

(1942-1943) through magnesium reduction of molten green salt (uranium tetrafluoride). The 

facility later conducted research and development with uranium (1949-1953) and extruded 

thorium billets into slugs which were placed in Hanford production reactors (1952-1953). 

The Brush Cleveland facility also produced beryllium metal and beryllium oxide for the MED 

(1943-1946) and later for the AEC (1947-1965?).

DISCUSSION:

References were made to high levels of worker exposures to beryllium. It could not be 

determined if the beryllium activities for the MED/AEC work were conducted in separate 

parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of 

decontamination activities after the MED/AEC contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company (Brush Wellman) officials provided the following 

information; (1) the listed dates for production of beryllium (beryllium vendor) seemed 

accurate and the facility still exists; (2) the production work for the AEC/DOE contracts took 

place in separate areas of the facility along with beryllium work for other clients—these areas 

are still used for beryllium production for non-AEC/DOE clients; and (3) beryllium analytical 

work was conducted for DOE as recent as four years ago.

The documentation reviewed and telephone contact with current company officials indicate 

that AEC/DOE beryllium work cannot be separated from work for other clients, and this 

beryllium production continues to the present for non-AEC/DOE clients. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 20 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1968-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 21 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Brush Beryllium Co.- Detroit

Detroit, MI

ALSO KNOWN AS: Brush Wellman Co.

Motor Wheel Corp.

Magnesium Reduction

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1950s

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Brush Beryllium Company in Detroit, MI, was one of several companies that rolled or 

extruded uranium rods for Hanford reactor fuel in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1950, 

Hanford began making rolled uranium rods onsite, but the Atomic Energy Commission 

shifted the rolling work to the Fernald, OH, Feed Materials Production Center and its 

supporting contractors in 1952. A number of private companies, including Brush Beryllium 

Company, contracted with Fernald to provide Hanford with these rolled rods. 

Due to Brush Wellman’s status as a statutory beryllium vendor, all employees of Brush 

Wellman in the U. S., regardless of location, are covered for the entire period for which Brush 

Wellman and its predecessors supplied beryllium to the U. S. Department of Energy or its 

predecessor agencies. That period is defined as August 18, 1943 and continuing. 

DISCUSSION:

No information was available for this review therefore it is assumed that the site has the 

potential for significant residual beryllium contamination outside the period in which 

beryllium metal was processed, produced, or provided to DOE.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1950s-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 22 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Brush Beryllium Co.-Elmore

Elmore, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1957-2001

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Brush Beryllium plant in Elmore, Ohio was built in 1953. It began producing beryllium for 

the AEC in 1957 after operations at the Brush Luckey, Ohio, facility ended. (Prior to1957, it 

produced beryllium for the commercial market only.) The plant supplied beryllium to the Y12 plant in 1990 and Brush purchase orders show that shipments from its Elmore location 

continued to Los Alamos and Sandia through April 2001.

DISCUSSION:

References were made to high levels of worker exposures to beryllium. It could not be 

determined if the beryllium activities for the AEC/DOE work were conducted in separate 

parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention in the 

Beryllium Vendor files of decontamination activities after the DOE contracts were 

terminated, if in fact there is no longer DOE work there (i.e., beyond 2001). However, in the 

AWE files, there is a report dated December 2000 that states a 1987 evaluation of the site 

indicated there was little likelihood of contamination.

Telephone contact with current company (Brush Wellman) officials provided the following 

information; (1) beryllium production is still ongoing for DOE and the EEIOPC of DOE has 

issued EEOICPA Circular No. 03-01, dated October 1, 2002, that states that this facility 

currently still is a Beryllium Vendor; and (2) the production work for the AEC/DOE contracts 

takes place in separate areas of the facility along with beryllium work for other clients—these 

areas are still used for beryllium production for AEC/DOE work and non-AEC/DOE clients.

The listed period could well go through the present, rather than just 2001, since the current 

company officials substantiated that the facility still conducts beryllium production for DOE. 

For the issue at hand, the documentation reviewed and the information provided by current 

company officials indicate that AEC/DOE beryllium work cannot be separated from work for 

other clients, and beryllium production continues to the present for AEC/DOE work and nonAEC/DOE clients. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 23 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2002-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 24 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Brush Beryllium Co. - Loraine

Loraine, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1948

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Loraine plant produced beryllium metal and beryllium oxide for the MED and the AEC. 

The plant was destroyed by fire in 1948. 

DISCUSSION:

A report dated December 2000 states that a 1987 evaluation of the site indicated there was 

little likelihood of contamination. It is not clear what was evaluated since the facility was 

destroyed in 1948. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 25 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Burns & Roe, Inc.

Maspeth, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1949-1950

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

In 1949, under AEC contract AT (30-1)438, Burns & Roe constructed a pilot plant in 

Maspeth on Long Island. The plant was constructed as a means of determining the potential 

value of the Sheer-Korman process in the manufacture of reactor materials. At least one test 

run involving beryllium was conducted in 1949. The New York Operations Office Health and 

Safety Laboratory sampled for beryllium in the air in 1949 and 1950, when the plant was 

dismantled.

DISCUSSION:

No additional documentation was found. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 26 of 100

FACILITY NAME: BWX Technologies, Inc.- Virginia

Lynchburg, Virginia

ALSO KNOWN AS: Tubular Products Div., Lone Star Tech

Babcock & Wilcox-Virginia

BWXT

TIME PERIOD: 1995-2001

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Babcock and Wilcox Company's Nuclear Facilities Plant in Lynchburg, VA, performed work 

for a variety of AEC and DOE projects. Babcock and Wilcox Company's Nuclear Facilities 

Plant in Lynchburg, VA, participated in the AEC's Oxide Pellet Fabrication Program, which 

was managed by the New York Operations Office. Records indicate that shipments of 

enriched uranium were made to and from the Fernald facility during the years 1968-1972. 

The company also recovered highly enriched uranium from weapons scrap received from the 

DOE's Oak Ridge facility between 1985 and 1996. In 1997 the Babcock & Wilcox Company 

facility in Lynchburg, VA became the BWX Technologies facility. From 1998 to 2000, the 

company fulfilled a contract for the recovery of enriched uranium from scrap materials 

containing beryllium. The Lynchburg plant also participated in a DOE-sponsored program 

called Project Sapphire, under which the plant had responsibility from 1995 to 2001 for 

downblending enriched uranium obtained from the government of Kazakhstan.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Office of Health, 

Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE ES&H Group 

consisting of written communications by or for the DOE (including Reference: USAEC 

(NYOO) Health and Safety Laboratory - Occupational Exposure to radioactive Dust, Babcock 

and Wilcox Company, Lynchburg Va., Oct. 26, 1959).

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2002-present 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 27 of 100

FACILITY NAME: C.L. Hann Industries

San Jose, California

TIME PERIOD: 1985-1994; 2000

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

C. L. Hann Industries provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, 

California. This work involved beryllium materials.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) 

machine shop services were provided to DOE as indicated in the Website for the listed dates 

of 1985-1994, but not for the year 2000; (2) the facility where the DOE contract work was 

conducted was vacated in 1997 and torn down in 2000—there is a soccer field there now; (3) 

beryllium work was not conducted for other clients; and (4) the DOE contract was not 

conducted in a specific area of the facility and there was no beryllium decontamination after 

the DOE contract work. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1995-2000
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 28 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Ceradyne, Inc.

Santa Ana, California

TIME PERIOD: 1977-1988

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Ceradyne provided beryllium parts, and possibly powder, to the Y-12 plant.

DISCUSSION:

Only one reference to the listed time period was located consisting of a handwritten note. 

Also, there were three purchase/delivery orders for this time. It could not be determined if the 

beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, 

away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination 

activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: 

(1) beryllium oxide ceramics were made for DOE during the listed dates on the Website; 

(2) Ceradyne vacated the facility in 1988 after the contract work was completed and beryllium 

decontamination was conducted; and (3) the facility still exists and houses two manufacturing 

companies. 

No documentation of decontamination was available for review therefore it is assumed that 

the site continues to have the potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1989-present 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 29 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Ceradyne, Inc.

Costa Mesa, California

TIME PERIOD: 1987; 1990-1996

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Ceradyne sold beryllium-graphite composite materials to the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge in 1987 

and between 1990 and 1996. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) 

ceramic materials were made for DOE and other clients during 1990-1996; (2) no mention 

was made of the 1987 date; (3) beryllium decontamination was conducted at the end of the 

DOE contract in 1996; and (4) the facility still exists and is used for production of ceramic 

materials.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicates 

that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found for the years between the 1987 

contract work and the restart in 1990.

No documentation of decontamination was available for review therefore it is assumed that 

the site continues to have the potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1988-1989, 1997-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 30 of 100

FACILITY NAME: City Tool & Die Manufacturing

Santa Clara, California

TIME PERIOD: 1985-2001

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

City Tool is a precision machine shop that provided services to Sandia National Laboratory, 

California. The work involved machining beryllium-copper materials. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

correct name of the company is City Tool Die and Manufacturing; (2) machine shop services 

involving beryllium copper material were provided to DOE twice per year during 1985-2001 

and the work was done in a separate area of the facility on one machine ; (3) no beryllium 

work was conducted for other clients; (4) no beryllium work was conducted for any clients 

after 2001; (5) no beryllium decontamination was conducted after the DOE contract work; 

and (6) the facility still exists as a machine shop.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by the current company officials

indicate that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contacts with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2002-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 31 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Clifton Products Co.

Painesville, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1952

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

In the 1940s, Clifton had at least six large contracts with the AEC to supply beryllium 

products. By 1949, at least eight beryllium-related deaths had occurred at Clifton. 

DISCUSSION:

There is a well-documented file on this facility that contains information on the production 

and process operations that were ongoing during the MED/AEC contract periods. (This site 

was one of the major producers for MED/AEC.) This file includes information on workplace 

conditions and worker exposures to beryllium. It apparently was a very hazardous place to 

work because of high exposure levels and documented cases of beryllium disease and 

fatalities. The contracts ended in 1952; however, information on a specific start date was not 

found, except that work was in progress in 1942. It could not be determined if the beryllium 

activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from 

work for other customers. In 1952, after the contracts were terminated, a beryllium survey 

was conducted. Exposure levels were significantly lower than during production operations, 

but beryllium contamination was detected. It was mentioned that beryllium contaminated 

equipment was being removed from the site.

Telephone contact with current company (Lubrizol Corporation) officials provided the 

following information: (1) Lubrizol bought the Clifton Products Company in 1956; (2) the 

facility still exists; and (3) there is no record that either company conducted any beryllium 

decontamination at the facility.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicate 

that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 32 of 100

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1953-present 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 33 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Connecticut Aircraft Nuclear Engine Laboratory-CANEL

Middletown, Connecticut

ALSO KNOWN AS: Pratt and Whitney Corp.

Connecticut Advanced Nuclear Engineering Lab.

United Aircraft Corp.

TIME PERIOD: 1958- July 8, 1966

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

The Connecticut Aircraft Nuclear Engine Laboratory (CANEL) worked on an AEC program 

to develop a nuclear reactor with which to propel aircraft. Specifically, CANEL worked on 

developing high temperature materials, fuel elements, and liquid metal components and 

coolants. CANEL consisted of a hot laboratory facility, a nuclear physics laboratory, a fuel 

element laboratory, a nuclear materials research and development laboratory, and other 

buildings. The AEC Annual report for 1959 indicates that approximately $4 million in AEC 

equipment was at CANEL. Plutonium, mixed fission products, and probably uranium were 

handled at CANEL. A former ORNL employee who had worked at CANEL stated that 

beryllium metal and oxide in a powdered form were also handled at CANEL. Although 

President Kennedy canceled the aircraft nuclear propulsion program in 1961, AEC work 

apparently continued at CANEL until 1965.

DISCUSSION:

Telephone contact was made with the Army of Corps of Engineers, New England District,

and they indicated they had no active information, except the information presented in the 

FUSRAP Considered Sites Database. This Database indicated the site was eliminated from 

consideration by FUSRAP based on the fact that the AEC removed all contaminated 

equipment from the facility in 1966. This included the removal of equipment and ventilation 

systems. This likely refers to radioactive contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, telephone contact with the 

Corps of Engineers.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Information discussed herein indicates that there is little potential for significant beryllium 

residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 34 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Coors Porcelain

Golden, Colorado

ALSO KNOWN AS: Coors Ceramic

TIME PERIOD: 1947-1975; 1985 (remediation)

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Coors Porcelain performed beryllium work for the Atomic Energy Commission. An early AEC 

document makes reference to Coors Porcelain’s involvement in beryllium work during the 

period from 1947-1948. Coors Porcelain had an earlier contract with the Clinton Engineer 

Works but it is unclear whether beryllium was involved. 

From 1957 through 1964, the company worked as a subcontractor with Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory on Project Pluto, a project undertaken to determine the feasibility of 

using heat from reactors as the energy source for ramjet engines. Coors developed fuel 

elements from beryllium ceramics for the project, which began in 1957 and ended in 1964. 

Coors Porcelain performed other beryllium work for DOE after the completion of Project 

Pluto. A 1993 health study of Coors workers indicated that the company produced beryllia 

ceramics though 1975, presumably for the AEC/DOE. In 1985, the vendor discovered 

residual beryllium contamination in the building where it had done beryllium work for the 

AEC, and hired a private contractor to remediate and demolish the building. The contractor 

completed this remediation work by the end of 1985.

DISCUSSION:

Air samples for beryllium were taken in 1961 and the levels were low at that time. In the 

1987 DOE evaluation of this site, including a site visit, no mention is made of beryllium 

contamination. It is important to note that the 1993 health study mentioned above does show 

that workers from this facility had chronic beryllium disease. It could not be determined if the 

beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, 

away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination 

activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials (Coors Tek) provided the following 

information: (1) beryllium ceramics were produced from beryllium oxide in Building 16 and 

beryllium work was not conducted for other clients; (2) Building 16 was used for research and 

development from 1975-1983; (3) during 1983-1984 , the building was decontaminated, torn 

down and disposed of as hazardous material; and (4) no other records were provided about 

beryllium decontamination between 1976 and 1984.

The documentation and information provided by current company officials indicate that no 

record of beryllium decontamination could be found for 1976-1984. 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 35 of 100

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1976-1984
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 36 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. 

Quapaw, Oklahoma

TIME PERIOD: 1988-1996

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Eagle-Picher's Quapaw, Oklahoma plant machined beryllium-alloy parts for the Department 

of Energy's Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, during the 1980s and the 1990s. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility still exists (2) the DOE beryllium work was conducted in a separate area of the 

facility; and (3) decontamination took place in 1996 after the DOE beryllium contracts ended.

No documentation of decontamination was available for review therefore it is assumed that 

the site continues to have the potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1997-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 37 of 100

FACILITY NAME: EDM Exotics

Hayward, California

TIME PERIOD: 1990-1997

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

EDM Exotics provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, California, 

working with beryllium-copper materials using an electrical discharging process. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

DOE contract work was not done in a separate area of the facility and beryllium copper 

materials were/are done for other clients—this work for other clients has continued since 1997 

on an intermittent basis; and (3) decontamination was not conducted after the 1997 DOE 

contract was completed. 

The documentation reviewed and the information provided by current company officials

indicate that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found, and the DOE beryllium 

work was not conducted in a separate area of the facility; nor away from beryllium work for 

other clients.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1998-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 38 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Electrofusion Corporation 

Fremont, California 

ALSO KNOWN AS: Brush Wellman Electrofusion Products

TIME PERIOD: 1986-2002

FACILITY DESCRIPTION: 

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: Electrofusion Corporation provided 

beryllium products to Sandia National Laboratory, California. Electrofusion was acquired by 

Brush Wellman in 1990 and is currently part of the Brush Wellman Engineered Products 

Division. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. It could not be determined 

if contract work continues beyond 2002. There is no specific mention of decontamination 

activities.

Telephone contact with current company officials (Brush Wellman, Inc.) provided the 

following information: (1) between 1986 and 1995, the DOE beryllium work was conducted 

in two facilities at different addresses (South Grimmer Boulevard and Ardenwood 

Boulevard)-in 1995 the Ardenwood facility was no longer used and it was decontaminated 

when the company moved out that year; and (2) in both facilities the DOE contract work 

was(is) not conducted in separate areas and the beryllium work areas are continually 

decontaminated.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company indicates that the 

Ardenwood Blvd facility was decontaminated in 1995. However, it should be noted that 

current company officials stated that the South Grimmer facility still conducts beryllium work 

for DOE.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 39 of 100

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2003-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 40 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Ethyl Corporation

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

TIME PERIOD: 1967-1971

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory purchased beryllium from the Ethyl Corporation, 

Baton Rouge, LA. The beryllium was used in laboratory research work. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) 

they have no record of this facility in Baton Rouge (which was part of the administrative 

headquarters) having ever handled beryllium; if they did it might have been as a purchasing 

agent only; and (2) the facility shut down in the early 1980s and was demolished in the mid 

1980s.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1972-1989
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 41 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Fairchild Hiller Corporation 

Farmingdale, Long Island, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Republic Aviation Division 

Fairchild Industries

TIME PERIOD: 1969-1970

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Republic Aviation Division of the Fairchild Hiller Corporation produced beryllium 

products for the AEC's Rocky Flats facility in 1969 and 1970.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) no 

documentation was provided about the AEC/DOE beryllium contract work; and (2) the 

facility closed in 1986 and there currently is a shopping center at that location.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicate 

that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. It is reasonable to conclude that 

there was no beryllium residual contamination after 1986 because of the unknown use of the 

site at that time and the fact that there currently is a shopping center at the location.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1971-1986
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 42 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 

North Chicago, Illinois

TIME PERIOD: 1944; 1950

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. performed beryllium work for the Manhattan Engineer District 

under Contract No.W-7425 eng-27 for the fabrication of beryllium into sintered shapes and 

for the manufacture of 600 bricks for delivery to Los Alamos. Fansteel also worked with 

"approximately 150 pounds of nominal grade beryllium carbide powder" for use in the 

Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft (NEPA) project. This work is reported to have 

occurred between April and June of 1950.

DISCUSSION:

A report was filed in December 2000 describing that an evaluation of the site (without a site 

visit) had been conducted in 1987 and contamination (undefined) was not listed as a problem. 

A more specific description of the site and its operations also was documented in these files. 

The site was under contract with the University of Chicago from June 1944 through June

1945. The facility conducted studies and experimental investigations and developed 

processes for making chemicals and fabricating metal powder. They were the sole source of 

columbium metal for MED/AEC. Tantalum, tungsten and beryllium products were also 

purchased. No information was found regarding whether the beryllium activities for the 

contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from work for other 

customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were 

terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) 

there is one large building and various connecting smaller buildings at this location; (2) most 

of the AEC/DOE contract work during these time periods dealt with tantalum and tungsten, 

with smaller amounts of beryllium; (3) during these time periods work was not done with 

these materials for other clients; (4) no information was available concerning beryllium 

decontamination; (5) all operations ceased in 1990; only corporate offices still exist there; 

and (6) the City of North Chicago purchased the facility in March 2005, as part of a 40 acre 

development site, and currently leases the office space back to Fansteel.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 43 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1945-1949; 1951-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 44 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Foote Mineral Co.

East Whitehead Twp., Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Exton Cyrus Foote Mineral Co.

Formil

Cyprus Foote Mineral Company

TIME PERIOD: 1947 

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Foote Mineral had a pilot plant at its East Whiteland Township location which processed 

monazite sands. Monazite sands are known to have a very high thorium content. Because the 

AEC needed fairly large quantities of thorium, they were very interested in different methods 

of extracting it from monazite sands. 

Other work performed by Foote Mineral on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission, 

including their work with zirconium, is not covered under EEOICPA. 

Foote Mineral Company was also a major importer of beryl ore from Brazil. Under contract 

to the Atomic Energy Commission, Foote Mineral Company procured 500 tons of beryl ore in 

1947.

DISCUSSION:

The only reference to beryllium is the purchase of beryl ore by the AEC in 1947. The DOE 

elimination report of 1987 indicates there would have been little likelihood of contamination 

at that time. No documentation is provided about decontamination efforts after the AEC/DOE 

contracts, nor is information provided regarding where the AEC/DOE work was conducted in 

relation to work for other customers.

This is a U.S. EPA Superfund Site. In their proposed plan for dealing with this site, dated 

October 2005, it is stated the Foote Property had 52 buildings during the height of operations. 

The facility closed in 1991 and the buildings remaining at that time were demolished down to 

the foundation slabs. EPA is still remediating the site in regard to radiation-contaminated soil 

and water and various other hazardous wastes. However, no mention of beryllium is made.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE’ and US EPA Superfund 

documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 45 of 100

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1948-1991
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 46 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Franklin Institute

Boston, Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD: 1962

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Franklin Institute conducted a study for the Division of Reactor Development in 1962. 

No information has been located on this facility to date.

DISCUSSION:

There are several documents relating to contracts with the AEC in the 1950s and 1960s 

dealing with reactor and rotor bearings. No mention is made of beryllium work.

Telephone contact with current Institute officials indicated that they have no records that 

indicate any such study was conducted by them.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current Institute officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 47 of 100

FACILITY NAME: General Astrometals

Yonkers, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1963-1965; 1970

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

General Astrometals supplied beryllium metal and parts to the Y-12 plant and to Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory. It also purchased beryllium chips and contaminated powder 

from Oak Ridge. In 1970 they analyzed some beryllium samples for Rocky Flats.

DISCUSSION:

A September 1965 trip report indicates that the AEC was considering further production work 

for this company; however, it apparently never came to pass. The trip report mentions that 

this company was being supported by Anaconda and was also doing other beryllium work 

with NASA, Franklin Institute, Watertown Arsenal and Pratt and Whitney. This report states

the facility was crowded and limited in terms of production. No specific information was 

found regarding whether the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

No current company contact could be located. DOE, State and Federal EPA, and ATSDR

Websites were reviewed and no information was found. Using the Thomas Registry, it was 

determined that the company at a Yonkers, New York address existed until at least 1974. 

Based on information provided by the Yonkers Public Library and the current occupant, the 

building is old and probably is the original facility. Currently the facility houses a night club, 

which started in 2003. Prior to that it was a skating rink and a steak house; there could have 

been other occupants. 

No record of beryllium decontamination could be found. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, the Thomas Registry, Federal 

and State agency databases, local telephone directories, and contact with the Yonkers Public 

Library and the current occupant of the facility.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1966-1969; 1971-present 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 48 of 100

FACILITY NAME: General Atomics

La Jolla, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: GA

Division of General Dynamics

John Jay Hopkins Laboratory for Pure and Applied Science

TIME PERIOD: 1959-1967; DOE 1996-1999 (remediation)

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

General Atomics was one of a number of private contractors that processed unirradiated 

scrap for the Atomic Energy Commission in the 1960s. In addition, the Hot Cell Facility was 

used for numerous post-irradiation examinations of Department fuels, structural materials, 

reactor dosimetry materials, and instrumentation. The Department-sponsored activities at 

the General Atomics Hot Cell Facility primarily supported the High Temperature Gas Cooled 

Reactor and the Reduced-Enrichment Research Test Reactor programs. In December 1994, 

General Atomics notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of California 

Department of Health Services of its intent to cease operations in the Hot Cell Facility.

General Atomics was also the operating contractor for the AEC's Experimental Beryllium 

Oxide Reactor (EBOR). General Atomics manufactured EBOR fuel elements (UO2-BeO) on 

site and examined them in the site's hot cell. 

DISCUSSION:

It appears that the research effort regarding EBOR can be better defined. Initial planning 

started in late 1950s, active work was ongoing in 1964, and the project was terminated in the 

Fall/Winter of 1966. No information was found regarding whether the EBOR work was

conducted in separate parts of the facility away from other activities. There is a considerable

amount of discussion about decontamination activities for radiation, but little about beryllium.

Since no evidence of decontamination could be found, the potential for significant residual 

contamination exists outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred

until the DOE remediation began, specifically between 1968 and 1995.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 49 of 100

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1968 -1995
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 50 of 100

FACILITY NAME: General Electric Company-Ohio

Cincinnati/Evendale, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: GE Evendale

GE Cincinnati

GE Lockland

Air Force Plant 36

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1970

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Evendale Plant's major mission is to build aircraft engines. The AEC used this facility to 

work with a variety of radioactive materials, including uranium and thorium. This facility 

was also involved in the refining or fabrication of beryllium or beryllium oxide.

DISCUSSION:

This was a facility that was operated by the AEC and the Air Force. Very little information on 

beryllium was found in the Beryllium Vendor files. In the AWE files, it was stated that the 

facility was involved in the refining or fabrication of beryllium or beryllium oxide, but no 

details were given. In 1970, the facility was turned over to the Air Force, since the AEC work 

terminated.

Written correspondence from current company officials provided the following information: 

(1) beryllium metal and beryllium oxide obtained from Brush Beryllium were processed for 

the AEC in specific labs in the Laboratory Area of Plant 36, referred to as Building D, which 

was isolated from the rest of the Evandale complex; (2) the AEC beryllium work was 

concluded in 1970; (3) beryllium decontamination was conducted in 1970 at the end of the 

AEC contract and continued through 1983 as necessary; (4) in 1983 researchers from the 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health conducted a health hazard evaluation of 

Building D and found no hazards in excess of current evaluation criteria; and (5) Building D 

was demolished in 1995. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and written correspondence 

from current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 51 of 100

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1971-1983
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 52 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Gerity-Michigan Corp.

Adrian, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: Successor to Canton Drop Forging and Manufacturing

TIME PERIOD: 1949-1950s

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Gerity-Michigan operated a 2200/550 ton tube and rod extrusion press and performed the 

first extrusion of beryllium there on May 11, 1949 for the AEC. Documentation, specifically 

accountability reports, indicates that work continued there through the 1950s. 

Gerity-Michigan was also under contract to the AEC to put extrusion presses into operating 

condition at the Adrian, Michigan facility. 

DISCUSSION:

Information was found for a contract with AEC to conduct extrusion of beryllium and other 

reactor materials for April 11, 1949-November 30, 1949. No other contract information was 

found for later dates, but there was an inventory for beryllium dated June 30, 1950. It is not 

clear whether this inventory pertained to this facility or to work being done at MIT. No 

specific information was found regarding whether the beryllium activities for the contract 

work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. 

Concerns about national security were mentioned in one document regarding how and where 

the beryllium work should be done. There is no specific mention of any decontamination 

activities. 

Telephone contact with a former employee of Gerity-Michigan and employees of the current 

owner of the facility where the AEC beryllium work was conducted; use of the Thomas 

Registry; and review of newspaper articles and current literature provided the following 

information: (1) the facility still exists; (2) there have been several occupants of the facility 

since the AEC contracts ended, and it probably stood vacant for several years in the late 1950s 

or early 1960s; and (3) no records are available regarding beryllium decontamination.

The documentation reviewed and contacts with several individuals indicate that no record of 

beryllium decontamination could be found. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, a former employee, 

employees of the current owner of the facility, newspaper articles, current literature and the 

Thomas Registry.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 53 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1960-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 54 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Hafer Tool

Oakland, California

TIME PERIOD: 1965-1985

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Hafer Tool is a machine shop that provided services to Sandia National Laboratory, 

California. Some of this work involved the use of beryllium materials. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility still exists, as a machine shop, at the address where the AEC/DOE beryllium contract 

was conducted; (2) the facility is a small one-person shop that provided limited services 

involving beryllium to AEC/DOE from 1965-1985. Beryllium work was not done in a 

separate area of the facility and was not conducted for other clients; and (3) no 

decontamination was conducted after the contracts ended in 1985.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1986-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 55 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Hexcel Products, Inc. 

Berkeley, California

TIME PERIOD: 1964-1965

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Hexcel produced a small number of corrugated beryllium sheet panels for the AEC in the 

mid-1960s. The finishing process involved vapor blasting and scrubbing of the beryllium 

panels with steel wool and cleansing powder. At the termination of the experimental project 

in 1965, the company sent the sheet panels and all related equipment to the AEC's Lawrence 

Livermore Laboratory. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility performed a quality control role which involved checking the finish of the sheet 

panels, but they had no record that the panels were produced at the facility; (2) the work was 

not performed in a separate area of the facility nor was there any beryllium work conducted 

for other clients; (3) no records are available about decontamination efforts; and (4) no 

records are available about the disposition of the facility or what is now located at the address 

of the facility at the time of the contracts.

Using the Thomas Registry and information provided by the Berkeley Public Library, it was 

determined that the company at a Berkeley, California address could have existed until 1969, 

but maybe only to 1966. Currently there appears to be a commercial building at this location. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, telephone contact with 

current company officials, the Thomas Registry, the Berkeley Public Library, and local 

telephone directories.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1966-present 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 56 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Jerry Carroll Machining, Inc. 

San Carlos, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Electrocut Pacific 

TIME PERIOD: 1985-1991

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Jerry Carroll Machining provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, 

California, including the machining of beryllium-copper materials. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility machined beryllium copper materials for DOE from 1985-1991, although the volume 

of work was small; (2) they also may have conducted beryllium work for DOE from 1991-

1995; (3) the work was not conducted in separate areas of the facility; (4) no specific 

decontamination was conducted since they didn’t believe there would be any hazard because

there was no grinding of the materials; and (5) the facility was sold in 1995 and currently has 

five tenants.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1992-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 57 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Kettering Laboratory, University of Cincinnati

Cincinnati, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1947-1950

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The AEC funded a Kettering Laboratory researcher's investigation of the biological effects of 

beryllium and its compounds. Kettering was also working on analytical methodology for 

beryllium for the AEC.

DISCUSSION:

Telephone contact with current University officials provided the following information: (1) 

the AEC contracts dealing with animal research did not end in 1950 but went into the 1960s; 

and (2) upon completion of the contracts, the research areas were decontaminated.

The nature of the work performed would have involved small quantities of material and 

would have been controlled in a laboratory setting. Because of this, it is determined that the 

potential for residual contamination is low.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current University officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 58 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Ladish Co.

Cudahy, Wisconsin

TIME PERIOD: 1959-1965

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Ladish supplied beryllium metal and parts to the Y-12 plant. 

DISCUSSION:

No specific information about the exact work that was done, contract dates, facility 

description, or decontamination efforts were found. However, there is a brochure in the files 

about the company which is dated 2001. This brochure indicates that the company has been 

in business since 1905 and has conducted extensive work in metal working. 

Written communication from current company officials provided the following information: 

(1) medical and industrial hygiene programs and beryllium air monitoring took place during 

the AEC/DOE contract work; (2) nothing was presented about beryllium decontamination 

after the AEC/DOE contracts ended; and (3) the facility still exists.

The documentation reviewed does indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination 

could be found. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE and current 

company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1966-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 59 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Lebow

Goleta, California

TIME PERIOD: 1977-2002

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Lebow Company produces ultra-thin metal foils for Sandia National Laboratory, 

California, some of which contain beryllium.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. It could not be determined 

if contract work continues beyond 2002. There is no specific mention of decontamination 

activities. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the

company cut metal foils (some of which contained beryllium) sent to them by various 

companies with special equipment; (2) the AEC/DOE work was not conducted in separate 

areas from work for other clients; (3) the company still does this work for DOE; (4) the

company never conducted any special beryllium decontamination because they believe the 

potential for exposure is low; and (5) the AEC/DOE beryllium work was conducted at two 

different facilities during the listed dates—Facility 1 operated during 1977-1990; during 

1991-1995 it was owned by someone else; in 1995 it was demolished. Facility 2 still exists 

and conducted the beryllium work for the rest of the years of the listed dates, and still does the 

same work for DOE to the present.

The documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination could be 

found or was provided by current company officials.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE. 

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2003-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 60 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Machlett Laboratories

Springdale, Connecticut

TIME PERIOD: 1952

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Beginning in the 1940s, Machlett Laboratories worked with beryllium in its commercial 

business as a supplier of x-ray and electron vacuum tubes. Machlett produced a handful of 

brazed beryllium window assemblies in 1952 under an AEC contract.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials (Raytheon) provided the following 

information: (1) listed dates could not be confirmed; (2) beryllium was handled in a separate 

area of the facility; (3) the facility was 60% demolished in 1990 and equipment was 

decontaminated and sent to a landfill; and (4) the remaining structure served as a skeleton for 

a new building which houses an ice skating rink.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1953-1990
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 61 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Manufacturing Sciences Corporation

Oak Ridge, Tennessee

TIME PERIOD: 1992-1994

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Manufacturing Sciences Corporation performed beryllium work for Los Alamos National 

Laboratory.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

listed dates are correct, at which time they performed casting, rolling and sizing of beryllium 

stock from another company; and (2) beryllium decontamination was conducted pursuant to 

the DOE contract.

No documentation of decontamination was available for review therefore it is assumed that 

the site continues to have the potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

No documentation of decontamination was available for review therefore it is assumed that 

the site continues to have the potential for residual contamination.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1995-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 62 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: MIT, Hood Building

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1946

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) began experimental work on producing 

uranium metal in the spring of 1942 using a process involving melting and casting. It is this 

uranium metallurgical work which took place on the MIT campus by MIT employees that 

supports its designation as an Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE). 

MIT is also designated as a beryllium vendor. MIT's work with beryllium started on August 

31, 1943 when it entered into contract W-7405-eng-175 with the Manhattan Engineer District 

(MED). This project involved studying the characteristics of beryllium metal and attempting 

to make a satisfactory beryllium-uranium alloy. In addition, beryllium oxide crucibles were 

made for use by the MED. 

After a number of its employees contracted beryllium disease, MIT consolidated the activities 

described above in an off-campus site known as the Hood Building, which is a separate 

covered facility under the EEOICPA. The transition to the Hood Building was complete by the 

fall of 1946. 

DISCUSSION:

A more detailed description of beryllium activities was found in a May 1947 document. It 

indicates that MIT was studying the characteristics of beryllium metal and attempting to make 

a satisfactory beryllium-uranium alloy. In addition beryllium oxide crucibles were made for 

use in the MIT activities. There were apparently over-exposures to beryllium because a 

number of the AWE files dealt with worker claims for beryllium disease. These cases 

supposedly were the result of the fact that the work had been conducted in buildings (not 

specified) scattered throughout MIT. The operations were consolidated into one building 

(Hood Building?) in the fall of 1946 that had been “carefully ventilated.” Other documents 

corroborate the fact that the last MED/AEC work was completed in 1958, and the contractor 

moved out at that point with the building remaining vacant until it was demolished in 1963. 

There is no mention of any decontamination activities in the other areas of MIT where 

beryllium work was being conducted or in 1958 at the Hood Building.

Telephone contact with current Institute officials provided no additional information.

There is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in 

which weapons-related production for areas (not specified) of MIT outside the Hood 

Building.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 63 of 100

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and contacts with current 

Institute officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1947-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 64 of 100

FACILITY NAME: McDanel Refractory Co.

Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Vesuvius McDanel

Vesuvius Division of Cookson Group

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1949

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Manhattan District History indicates that the McDanel Refractory was used to fabricate 

oddly shaped beryllium crucibles or beryllium crucible stopper rods for the Manhattan 

Project, but was not used on a large-scale production basis. 

DISCUSSION:

No additional specific information about the exact work that was done, facility description or 

decontamination efforts were found. It appears that the contracts for this site were from the 

mid-1940s. 

Telephone contact with current company (McDanel Ceramics) provided the following 

information: (1) the facility has changed ownership three times since the 1940s and the 

original two buildings from the 1940s are still in use to produce ceramics; and (2) they have 

no records regarding AEC/DOE beryllium work.

The documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination could be 

found.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1950-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 65 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Metallurgical Laboratory

Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Eckhardt Hall

West Stands

New Chem. Lab and Annex

Ryerson Physical Lab

Kent Chem. Lab

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1946; DOE 1982-1984, 1987

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab) was involved in early 

uranium metallurgical work as part of the Manhattan Project. The first self-sustaining 

nuclear chain reaction was achieved at the university in a "pile" called the Chicago Pile 1, 

built by Enrico Fermi and his Met Lab colleagues. The Met Lab is the direct predecessor of 

Argonne National Laboratory into which all Met Lab functions were transferred in 1946. 

Beryllium use at the Metallurgical Laboratory is linked with experimental studies in 

determining whether to use graphite, heavy water or beryllium as a pile moderator. Graphite 

was the ultimate choice for Fermi's pile. 

DISCUSSION:

These files confirmed the general research and development work that is presented on the 

Website. There is no mention that the work was performed in separate areas from other 

research and development. It was also mentioned that there was beryllium disease and deaths 

in workers at this site in the 1940s/1950s. The final FUSRAP report, dated 1989, does not 

specifically mention beryllium decontamination, but other DOE documents indicate that nonradiological impacts for the 1987 remediation were expected to be minimal. 

Telephone and written correspondence from the current (Argonne National Laboratory-ANL) 

group of interest provided the following information: (1) all activities were transferred to 

ANL, which is located 30 miles from this facility, but no records could be found that 

documented AEC work continued until 1952—the facility had closed in 1946; (2) extensive 

beryllium work for the AEC did occur at this facility, but there are no records available about 

the specific nature of this work, in which buildings the work occurred, and if beryllium

decontamination was conducted; (3) documents regarding the 1987 DOE remediation do not 

mention beryllium; and (4) of the buildings where the AEC work was conducted, Eckhardt 

Hall, Ryerson Physical Laboratory, Kent Chemical Laboratory and Jones Laboratory are still 

buildings listed as currently being used by the University of Chicago, and were part of the 

DOE remediation. The West Stands were demolished in 1957 (a plaque and sculpture are at 

that location), the Chemistry Building is now a Historic Landmark with a plaque and 

interpretive display, and Ricketts Laboratory is no longer listed as a University of Chicago 

building, but a demolition date could not be determined.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 66 of 100

While no information was found regarding beryllium decontamination, the documentation in 

the DOE files indicates that non-radiological impacts for at least the 1987 remediation were 

expected to be minimal.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contacts and 

written correspondence from ANL 

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1947-1981, 1985-1986
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 67 of 100

FACILITY NAME: National Beryllia

Haskell, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: Cercom Quality Products

General Ceramics

TIME PERIOD: 1968-1973; 1983-1986

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

National Beryllia performed a demonstration of its capabilities for production of parts for Y12 beginning in late 1968, with delivery in March 1969. Additionally, National Beryllia 

delivered some parts to Union Carbide (Y-12), though the records indicate that there was 

only partial performance for this purchase order, which was terminated in April of 1973.

Between 1984-1986 the National Beryllia division of General Ceramics had a series of 

purchase orders through Martin Marietta, which was operating Y-12 at the time. These 

contracts involved the shipment of beryllium from Brush Wellman to National Beryllia with Y12 being the ultimate customer.

DISCUSSION:

The documents in the Beryllium Vendor files indicated that an AEC contract to produce 

beryllium parts was let in April 1969 after a successful demonstration project. This contract 

was in place until Fall 1973. In terminating the contract, AEC agreed in a “settlement” to pay 

for beryllium decontamination to meet EPA standards and facility restructuring (i.e., to return

the facility to its former status before the AEC security requirements). No documents 

concerning activities between 1983-1986 were found.

Telephone contact with current company (American Beryllia) and a former worker provided 

the following information. This facility always has been a beryllium oxide producer, with the 

following history: (1) National Beryllia conducted work for the AEC/DOE from 1968-1973 in 

separate areas of the facility along with beryllium oxide work for other clients—no records 

are currently available concerning beryllium decontamination at the end of these contracts; (2) 

National Beryllia continued to produce beryllium oxide, including AEC/DOE work from 

1983-1989—then in 1989 a Japanese company (Tokuyama) bought the facility and the 

AEC/DOE work was contracted out to Cercom Quality Products because Tokuyama was not a 

U.S. company—the AEC/DOE contract work ended in 1992 and the areas of interest were 

decontaminated and some equipment was sent to DOE/Oak Ridge, while beryllium oxide 

production continued for other clients; and (3) in 2000, American Beryllia bought the facility 

and continued beryllium oxide production. 

The information provided indicates a potential for significant beryllium residual 

contamination between 1974-1982 and 1987- present.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 68 of 100

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials and former employees.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1974-1982; 1987-present.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 69 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Northwest Machining and Manufacturing

Meridian, Idaho

ALSO KNOWN AS: Santa Clara Machining 

TIME PERIOD: 1996-2000

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Northwest Machining provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, 

California. This work involved beryllium materials.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility still exists; and (2) no specific beryllium decontamination was conducted since there 

was no grinding of the materials.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by company officials indicates that no 

record of beryllium decontamination could be found.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2001-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 70 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Norton Co.

Worcester, Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD: 1944-1956

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website

Norton manufactured refractory products from boron, beryllium, uranium, thorium, and 

magnesium oxide for the MED and the AEC. 

As early as 1943, Norton was providing boron to the SAM laboratory. Documents show that 

Norton began working with beryllium for the MED in approximately September 1944 and that 

work with beryllium continued through 1956. Work with thorium and uranium continued 

through 1957 at Norton's Worcester location. 

Norton continued to manufacture refractory products until at least 1965 for the AEC weapons 

complex, including Rocky Flats, Hanford and Y-12. However, after 1957 these contracts 

specified that the refractory products were to be made out of magnesium oxide. Since 

magnesium oxide is not radioactive, Norton's work with it does not qualify it as an Atomic 

Weapons Employer for these years. 

DISCUSSION:

Files reviewed contained a considerable amount of information about over-exposures to 

beryllium and potential beryllium disease. No specific information was found regarding 

whether the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the 

facility away from work for other customers, nor was there any mention of any 

decontamination activities.

Telephone contact with current company (St. Gobain Abrasives) officials provided the 

following information: (1) the facility still exists; (2) grinding and beryllium oxide work was 

conducted in their research area; (2) no information was provided about beryllium 

decontamination after the AEC/DOE contracts; and (3) they are currently still sampling for 

beryllium to identify any problem areas.

The documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination could be 

found. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 71 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1957-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 72 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC)-Apollo

Apollo, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Babcock & Wilcox

Atlantic Richfield Corp. (ARCO)

TIME PERIOD: 1960-1968

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

The Nuclear Material and Equipment Company (NUMEC) began operations at the Apollo 

and Parks Township facilities in the late 1950s. The Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) 

purchased the stock of NUMEC in 1967. In 1971, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) purchased 

NUMEC and is the current owner of the Apollo and Parks Township facilities.

NUMEC processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC in the 1960s. This facility also 

provided enriched uranium to the naval reactors program and included a plutonium plant, 

plutonium plant storage area, highly enriched uranium fuel facility, metals and hafnium 

complex and a uranium hexafluoride storage area. The facility also fabricated plutoniumberyllium neutron sources.

The B&W Apollo facility ceased manufacturing nuclear fuel in 1983. 

DISCUSSION:

No information was found about the fabrication of plutonium-beryllium sources. Instead, 

there was documentation about conducting research on using beryllium (and other metals) to 

coat uranium oxide spheres. Information also was presented about beryllium powder 

metallurgy. There was no mention of decontamination efforts after the AEC contract periods, 

nor was there any indication that the AEC work was being conducted in separate areas of the 

facilities away from work for other customers. A 1960 document indicated that the company 

was doing beryllium work at that time in a restricted area because of concerns for worker 

safety.

NRC decommissioned the Apollo site in 1995

The documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination could be 

found, until the NRC decommissioning was completed in 1995.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Office of Health, 

Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE ES&H group 

consisting of written communications by or for the DOE (including NRC document SECY97-015, Removal of the Babcock & Wilcox Apollo Site from the Site Decommissioning 

Management Plan, January 17, 1997.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 73 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1969-1995
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 74 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC)-

Parks Township

Parks Township, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Babcock & Wilcox

Atlantic Richfield Corp. (ARCO)

TIME PERIOD: 1960-1968

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

The Nuclear Material and Equipment Company (NUMEC) began operations at the Apollo 

and Parks Township facilities in the late 1950s. The Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) 

purchased the stock of NUMEC in 1967. In 1971, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) purchased 

NUMEC and is the current owner of the Apollo and Parks Township facilities. 

The primary function of the NUMEC Parks Township facility was the fabrication of 

plutonium fuel, the preparation of high-enriched uranium fuel, and the production of 

zirconium/hafnium bars. The Parks Township facility ceased fuel fabrication activities in 

1980. 

DISCUSSION:

All operations and cleanup apparently ceased in 1980, but there was no mention of beryllium 

decontamination.

The documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination could be 

found. NRC decommissioning was completed in 2004.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE (including U.S. 

NRC document, SECY-04-0163, Weekly Information Report - Week Ending August 27, 

2004.)

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1969-2004
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 75 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Nuclear Metals, Inc.

West Concord, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: NMI

Starmet, Inc.

MIT Met Lab

Whittaker Corp., Nuclear Metals Division

TIME PERIOD: 1954-1986

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Nuclear Metals, Inc. was incorporated in 1954. It's work evolved out of the MIT Metallurgical 

Laboratory. In 1958, the company moved from Cambridge (where the MIT lab had been) to 

Concord. The company's current name is Starmet.

In 1958, Nuclear Metals began operating as a facility that produced depleted uranium 

products, primarily as penetrators for armor-piercing ammunition. It also supplied copperplated uranium billets that were used to fuel Savannah River's production reactors. Other 

work at this facility included the manufacture of metal powders for medical applications, 

photocopiers and other applications. Thorium and thorium oxide were also handled at the 

site under license to the NRC. 

During the period from 1962-1986, Nuclear Metals was the sole source supplier for beryllium 

alloy end closure fuel element rings used in the “N” Reactor in Richland. 

DISCUSSION:

The location of the facility seems to be in Concord, not West Concord. There was and is 

work going on at this site for DOD and other groups. There was no indication that the AEC 

work was conducted in separate areas, nor that any decontamination took place.

This site is on the EPA National Priority List and final remedial action started in 2004 and is 

still underway.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, including 

information from the U.S. EPA Waste Site Cleanup and reuse in New England, Nuclear 

Metals.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 76 of 100

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1987-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 77 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Philco-Ford Corporation

Newport Beach, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Ford Aeronutronic

TIME PERIOD: 1967-1972

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Aeronutronic Division of the Philco-Ford Corporation engaged in research on beryllium 

manufacturing techniques for the AEC between 1967 and 1972. The overriding goal of the 

program was to demonstrate the feasibility of shear spinning technology for beryllium 

production. The production process involved drilling and grinding of beryllium cones.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Current company (Space Systems/Loral) officials could not provide any records involving the 

AEC/DOE beryllium contracts.

Information found in the Thomas Registry and in newspaper articles provided by the Newport 

Beach Public Library showed that the facility/site in question was demolished around the end 

of 1995. The property was then converted to residential zoning, with construction beginning 

sometime in 1996. No records were found dealing with beryllium decontamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, the Thomas Registry, and six 

newspaper articles.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1973-1995
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 78 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Pleasanton Tool and Manufacturing 

Pleasanton, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Thomas Tool & Die

TIME PERIOD: 1989-2002

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Pleasanton Tool provides machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, California.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. It could not be determined 

if contract work continues beyond 2002. There is no specific mention of decontamination 

activities. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) 

they had no comments about listed dates, except they conduct machine shop work for DOE 

but had no indication from DOE that the materials contained beryllium; (2) the DOE work 

was not conducted in separate area of the facility; (3) they still do small machining jobs for 

DOE.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicate 

that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. The facility still is a DOE 

contactor.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2003-present

 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 79 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Poltech Precision

Fremont, California

TIME PERIOD: 1999

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Poltech Precision did machining work for Sandia National Laboratory, California. 

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with company officials provided the following information: (1) the correct 

name of the facility is Pol-Tech Precision; (2) the listed dates are correct; (3) beryllium copper 

machining work was not conducted in separate areas of the facility; and (4) and there was no 

beryllium decontamination work after the contract because they believed their collection 

techniques prevented any beryllium contamination.

 

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials indicate 

that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2000-present.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 80 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Radium Chemical Co. 

New York, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Joseph J. Kelly 

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1950

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Beginning in 1943, the Radium Chemical Co. supplied most of the radium required for the 

Manhattan Engineer District. Combinations of material supplied and/or mixed by the Radium 

Chemical Company included radium bromide and radium bromide mixed with powdered 

beryllium. Brass was also used. 

DISCUSSION:

A site disposition report dated December 15, 2000 does not mention beryllium. It could not 

be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate 

parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of 

decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

From the mid-1950s through 1983, the facility remained an active source for specially 

packaged radium for hospitals. Starting in 1983, New York State required the company to 

conduct cleanup activities. In 1989, the US EPA became involved, and dismantling and 

disposing of the appropriate buildings was completed in 1994. While no mention is made of 

beryllium, it is reasonable to conclude that 1994 is an appropriate end date for residual

beryllium contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and the US EPA

Region 2 Superfund Radium Chemical Company data sheet.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1951-1994
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 81 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 

Troy, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1952; 1963

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Under an AEC contract in the early 1950s, researchers at the Rensselaer Polytechnic 

Institute investigated methods for improving the ductility of beryllium by coating the material 

with copper. The Brush Beryllium Company supplied the beryllium powder for the project. 

RPI also borrowed 400 lbs. of beryllium for AEC-sponsored research from Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory in 1963. 

Scientists at RPI conducted a number of AEC-sponsored research studies in the 1950s and 

1960s using enriched uranium obtained from commercial sources. Available records provide 

no evidence of a link between RPI research and the AEC weapons program. 

DISCUSSION:

A site disposition report dated January 2000 does not mention beryllium. It could not be 

determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts 

of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of 

decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Documentation from current Institute officials provided no information on the AEC/DOE 

contracts and beryllium decontamination, other than a few references about powder 

metallurgy research. 

The documentation reviewed indicates that the contract work involved sources of beryllium 

that could be airborne and deposited on surfaces and no record of beryllium decontamination 

could be found

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and current 

Institute officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1953-1962; 1964-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 82 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Revere Copper and Brass 

Detroit, Michigan

TIME PERIOD: 1946-1950

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Between 1943 and 1946, Revere Copper and Brass extruded uranium rods in its Detroit plant. 

During the late 1940s and early 1950s Revere rolled or extruded uranium rods. 

Revere also extruded beryllium ingots and billets into rods at its Detroit plant between 1946 

and 1950. Revere had a contract with the AEC for beryllium work, but not with the MED. 

Revere also worked with beryllium alloys. Some of the beryllium work was done on parts or 

components for the Materials Testing reactor. 

DISCUSSION:

A DOE FUSRAP elimination report was completed in 1990 which indicated the facility was 

eliminated from FUSRAP actions based on 1981 preliminary survey results and the fact the 

facility closed in 1984 and was demolished sometime prior to 1989. There is also a document 

that indicates the beryllium contract work extended into 1951. There is no documentation 

about any decontamination work in 1950/1951, after the beryllium contracts ended, nor after 

1954 when the AWE work ended. Also, there is no indication that the AEC work was 

conducted in separate areas of the facility.

The documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination could be 

found. It is reasonable to conclude that the beryllium hazard was removed upon demolition of 

the facility in 1984. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1951-1989
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 83 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Robin Materials 

Mountain View, California 

TIME PERIOD: 1985-1997

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Robin Materials provided metal materials to Sandia National Laboratory, California. This 

material included beryllium-copper.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility still exists and the company may still have contracts with DOE; (2) the company did 

and still purchases and sells beryllium-containing material to DOE; however, processing or 

machining of the material is not conducted; and (3) contact with the purchased material is not 

limited to one area of the facility, nor is any decontamination work conducted. 

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company indicates that 

beryllium decontamination is not conducted. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and information provided by 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1998-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 84 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Ron Witherspoon, Inc. 

Campbell, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: RWI

TIME PERIOD: 1990-1995

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Ron Witherspoon, Inc. produced beryllium springs for Sandia National Laboratory, 

California.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility still exists; (2) beryllium work was conduced on EDM machines under water—

machines were cleaned after the termination of the DOE contract, and all materials and filters 

were disposed of as hazardous waste; (3) some testing for beryllium was conducted with 

negative results—no records are available to confirm this; (4) no beryllium work was 

conducted for other clients.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and information provided by 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant beryllium 

residual contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, 

or provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 85 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Speedring Systems, Inc. 

Detroit, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: Axsys Technologies 

Speedring Systems Inc.

TIME PERIOD: 1963; 1968; 1973-1975; 1992 

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Speedring machined beryllium-containing parts for Rocky Flats and Y-12. The Detroit 

Speedring office designation covers both of the locations to which the Detroit forwarding 

office sent work, including their locations in Warren, MI and Rochester Hills, MI. There is a 

separate Speedring facility in Culman, Alabama.

DISCUSSION:

Nothing of significance was found in the Beryllium Vendor files. There was a brief mention 

of the 1968 AEC work in the AWE files; however, nothing was found about the 1963 date. 

There was no DOE elimination report and no documentation of decontamination activities or 

where in the facility the beryllium work for the AEC was conducted. 

Telephone contact with current company (Axsys Technologies) officials and a former 

employee provided the following information: Warren facility--(1) the facility still exists—

Axsys sold the facility in 1975 and the owner has leased it to two different occupants since 

then; (2) there is no information about beryllium decontamination between 1964 and 1968 and 

between 1969 and 1973; (3) there was cleanup performed when the facility was sold in 1975; 

and (4) AEC/DOE beryllium work was conducted in the same area as work for other clients.

Rochester Hills facility--(1) the facility still exists; and (2) the work (1992) probably involved 

polishing activities and would have been conducted in a well controlled area, where similar 

work was/is done for other clients.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current company officials and a 

former worker indicate that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found for all of 

the non-covered time periods. Therefore it is assumed that the potential for residual 

contamination continues to exist.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials and a former worker.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 86 of 100

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1964-1967; 1969-1972; 1976-1991;1993-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 87 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Speedring, Inc. 

Culman, Alabama

ALSO KNOWN AS: Axsys Technologies

TIME PERIOD: 1971-2009

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Speedring has performed work using beryllium for Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratory, 

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. There was 

another Speedring facility in Detroit, MI. 

DISCUSSION:

Documentation indicates that this facility has a history of worker exposures and beryllium 

disease. For example, OSHA has measured beryllium exposures in this facility sometime 

between May 1979 and December 1999 and there is a document in the AWE files relating to 

chronic beryllium disease in workers from this facility. No mention is made about whether

the beryllium production activities for DOE take place in areas separate from other customers. 

Telephone contact with current company (Axsys Technologies) officials provided the 

following information: (1) the facility continues to operate at the same location; (2) the 

AEC/DOE beryllium work started in the late 1960s and the facility still conducts beryllium 

work for numerous DOE sites; (3) the company conducts this work in separate areas of the 

facility if required for security reasons; and (4) the company meets OSHA standards for 

beryllium.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

2010 to present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 88 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Stevens Institute of Technology 

Hoboken, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1959-1960

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Stevens Institute of Technology performed beryllium research and development for the 

AEC. Researchers at the school's Powder Metallurgy Laboratory experimented with slip 

casting production techniques as a replacement for the conventional vacuum-hot-pressed 

block process. Beryllium powder was the primary ingredient in the production process. The 

laboratory's working inventory during the course of the contract included approximately 50 

pounds of beryllium metal powder produced by the Brush Beryllium Company.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated. 

Telephone contact with current Institute officials provided no records pertaining to the 

AEC/DOE beryllium contracts.

The documentation reviewed and information provided by current Institute officials indicate 

that the contract work involved sources of beryllium that could be airborne and deposited on 

surfaces, and no record of beryllium decontamination could be found

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current Institute officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1961-present.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 89 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-Bayside Laboratories 

Bayside, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-Bayside Laboratories; 

Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.; Metallurgical Laboratory; 

Sylvania Electric Company, Atomic Energy Division; 

Sylvania Bayside Laboratories; Sylcor

TIME PERIOD: 1947-1962

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The Metallurgical Laboratory of the Sylvania Electric Company investigated uranium and 

thorium powder metallurgy. It also produced powdered metal slugs, developed bonding 

techniques, and plated uranium slugs with nickel. The work with slugs included the 

conversion of uranium metal to uranium hydride using hydrogen. A February 1948 AEC 

Monthly Summary of Activities indicates that the Lab's “initial program will involve 

determining the physical properties and the health hazards of beryllium and uranium powders 

and the applications of powder metallurgy to these metals and their alloys.” In 1948, the 

work required 315 pounds of raw beryllium metal. Beryllium was handled first in the regular 

metallurgical building and then, after the objections of the AEC medical division, in a special 

AEC metallurgical development laboratory.

DISCUSSION:

At some point (no dates were given), the beryllium work was isolated in a “metallurgical 

building.” There is no mention of decontamination at the point when the AEC contracts were 

terminated, nor are there documents that provide insight as to whether the AEC work was 

isolated from that of other customers. The site was declared decontaminated by the State of 

New York in 1985; nothing is mentioned about beryllium, just radioactivity. All original 

buildings were destroyed by 1980 and condos were built on the site by 1986.

The documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium decontamination could be 

found. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 90 of 100

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1963-1980
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 91 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Tapemation 

 Scotts Valley, California

TIME PERIOD: 1990-1995

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website: 

Tapemation is a machine shop that provided services to Sandia National Laboratory, 

California. Several small jobs involved the precision machining of beryllium-copper 

materials.

DISCUSSION:

It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in 

separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific 

mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

facility still exists and still does occasional beryllium-copper work for DOE; and (2) the

company does not conduct the DOE beryllium work in separate areas of the facility nor is any 

special beryllium decontamination performed since they do not believe there is a potential for 

beryllium exposures

The documentation reviewed and telephone contact with current company officials indicates 

that no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. The company officials indicated 

they still conduct beryllium work for DOE.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1996-present 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 92 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Trudeau Foundation 

Saranac Lake, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1950-1957

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The AEC Division of Biology and Medicine supported beryllium research studies at the 

Trudeau Foundation. 

DISCUSSION:

The specific research that was conducted dealt with Experimental and Clinical Studies 

Involving Beryllium and Berylliosis (1950-1954), Biochemical Aspects of Pulmonary 

Granulomatosis (1955-1957), and Studies on the Experimental Pathology and Biochemistry of 

Pulmonary Granulomatosis of Beryllium Workers (1954-1957). There was no documentation 

about decontamination activities after the research was ended or if the research was conducted 

in areas separate from research.

Documentation provided by current Institute (Trudeau Institute) indicated that: (1) the listed 

dates appear to be correct but they could find no records concerning beryllium 

decontamination; (2) in 1964, they moved from the laboratory where the research would have 

been done to their current location; and (3) the laboratory building still exists but has been 

renovated several times for different uses and is no longer owned by the Institute.

 

It is likely that this research was conducted in an appropriate laboratory setting with necessary 

controls and thus it would limit the potential for significant beryllium residual contamination. 

Therefore, the documentation reviewed does support the end date on the Website. 

 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE and current 

Institute officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 93 of 100

FACILITY NAME: U.S. Pipe and Foundry 

Burlington, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1943

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

A small amount of beryllium mesh (15 pounds) was sent to U.S. Pipe and Foundry by the 

MED. Some work was done, but it is unclear whether a satisfactory technique was ever 

developed beyond this initial attempt to manufacture beryllium tubes.

DISCUSSION:

Very few documents were located. The specific dates of MED/AEC involvement were listed 

as 1943-1944. No information was located on decontamination of the site after the 

MED/AEC work, or whether this work was conducted in areas separate from activities for 

other customers.

Telephone contact with current company (U.S. Pipe) officials and a former employee 

provided the following information: (1) the general location of the original site still exists; (2) 

the beryllium work would have been a research project (based on the amount of material 

mentioned on the Website) conducted in an attachment to the original owner’s mansion at the 

current site; and (3) since it was a research project, the area would have been decontaminated 

at the end of the project. 

Documents reviewed indicate that the period in which beryllium work occurred is 1943-1944.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials and a former employee.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1944
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 94 of 100

FACILITY NAME: United Lead Co. 

Middlesex, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: United Lead Co. 

TIME PERIOD: 1950-1967

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

From 1950 to 1955, United Lead, a subsidiary of National Lead Company, was the AEC's 

operating contractor for the Middlesex Sampling Plant. The Middlesex Sampling Plant 

sampled, assayed, stored, and shipped uranium, thorium, and beryllium ores. The plant 

discontinued uranium and beryllium assaying and sampling activities in 1955. Until 1967, 

the site was used as a thorium storage and sampling site.

DISCUSSION:

Documents reviewed indicate that: (1) the Department of the Navy was given the site by GSA 

in 1967 and there were ongoing Navy/Marine activities there until 1978 when DOE became 

the custodian of the property; and (2) remedial activities started in 1981. No decontamination 

activities are mentioned for the time period of the Navy activity (1967-1978).

An ATSDR Public Health Assessment and the EPA National Priorities List also were used as 

source documents. This documentation indicated that the site was leveled in the 1947/1948 

time period, but that the AEC continued to use the area for sampling, analysis, storage and 

shipment of uranium, thorium and beryllium ores until 1967. In 1968, the Navy took control

of the site; and the site transferred hands several times through 1997. In 1976, concerns about 

soil and waste contamination by radiological materials again became an issue. After the 

decontamination effort in 1967, no mention is made of beryllium contamination. Remediation 

continues at this site.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE and EPA and 

EPA Superfund Site Progress Profile Middlesex Sampling Plant.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1968-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 95 of 100

FACILITY NAME: University of Denver Research Institute 

Denver, Colorado

TIME PERIOD: 1963-1965

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The University of Denver Research Institute is listed as a processor of radioactive materials 

for National Lead of Ohio (Fernald). It appears that the University of Denver handled test 

quantities of radioactive metal in February 1965.

In 1963, a University of Denver Research Institute researcher (F. Perkins) held an AEC 

contract for work on intermediate-temperature oxidation of beryllides.

DISCUSSION:

There is no documentation about the AEC beryllides contract other than a bibliographical 

citation.

It is likely that this research was conducted in an appropriate laboratory setting with necessary 

controls, which would limit the potential for significant beryllium residual contamination.

 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 96 of 100

FACILITY NAME: University of North Carolina 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

TIME PERIOD: 1949-1954

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

The AEC Division of Biology and Medicine supported beryllium research at the University of 

North Carolina. 

DISCUSSION:

The specific research was a Radioautographic Study of Distribution and Retention of Be in 

the Rat. No documentation was found regarding decontamination activities subsequent to the 

AEC contracts, nor was information presented about where the research was conducted.

Written correspondence from current University officials provided the following information: 

(1) the covered dates appear to be correct; and (2) no records could be found pertaining to 

where the research was conducted or if beryllium decontamination activities took place after 

the AEC contract work was completed.

It is likely that this research was conducted in an appropriate laboratory setting with necessary 

controls, which would limit the potential for significant beryllium residual contamination. 

Therefore, the documentation reviewed does support the end date on the Website.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and written correspondence 

from current University officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 97 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Vitro Corporation of America (Tennessee) 

Chattanooga, Tennessee

ALSO KNOWN AS: Chattanooga Site now owned by W.R. Grace

Vitro Chemical is Subsidiary of Vitro Corp. 

Heavy Minerals Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1959-1965

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Records indicate that "Vitro Corporation" of Chattanooga, TN performed some beryllium 

work for Y-12 during the period 1959-1965. A 1962 document also mentions that the AEC met 

with members of the beryllium industry, including representatives from "Vitro Chemical" (no 

address), but does not mention whether any contracts were involved in these discussions. 

The original owner of this site was Heavy Metals Inc. and possessed an AEC license to 

process uranium and thorium products beginning as early as 1957. Documentation indicates 

that the company provided price quotes to the AEC for thorium products as early as 1954, but 

there is no indication that it received a contract for that work. Vitro Chemical of 

Chattanooga, TN, a subsidiary of Vitro Corporation, took over the site at the end of 1959 and 

was under contract to the AEC to produce thorium metal, thorium fluoride and thorium oxide. 

The current owner, W.R. Grace, purchased the site in 1965 and continued operations until 

1983, but records do not reveal any weapons-based link after 1968. The State of Tennessee 

took over licensing of this site in 1968. 

DISCUSSION:

There is no information on decontamination activities or work locations within the facility, 

nor did the FUSRAP documentation provide any useful information.

The facility still exists and the documentation reviewed indicates that no record of beryllium 

decontamination could be found.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1966-present
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 98 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Vitro Manufacturing (Canonsburg)

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Vitro Rare Metals Co.; Vitro Manufacturing (Canonsburg)

TIME PERIOD: 1948

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Starting in 1948, Vitro was under contract to recover uranium from scrap. In the period from 

1954-1956, Vitro had a contract to process production quantities of radioactive material 

(UF4) for National Lead of Ohio (Fernald). Vitro also received uranium scrap from the Tyson 

Valley Powder Farm sometime in 1949. After 1957 the site was used only for storage. 

Canonsburg was a major uranium milling facility and although the EEOICPA definition of an 

Atomic Weapons Employer excludes mining and milling, this site is covered because of its 

scrap processing activities performed under contract to the Atomic Energy Commission. 

A 1948 document indicates that General Electric shipped scrap containing beryllium to the 

Canonsburg site. The Canonsburg site is one of 24 former uranium mill sites designated for 

Department of Energy remediation by the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act 

(UMTRA). 

DISCUSSION:

There is no information on decontamination activities or work locations at the facility. DOE 

UMTRA and NRC Reports were reviewed and beryllium contamination problems were not 

mentioned. 

This was a reception point for scrap containing beryllium and there is no evidence of 

processing. There is no mention of beryllium contamination in the DOE or NRC documents.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE and NRC.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

 
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 99 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Wolverine Tube Division 

Detroit, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: Div. Of Calumet Hecia Consolidated Copper Co. 

Hermes Automotive

Mamif Corp.

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1946

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

In 1943, the University of Chicago subcontracted to Wolverine Tube of Detroit, Michigan, for 

help in extrusion of metals that were needed as part of the Manhattan Project. Wolverine 

Tube performed research on the fabrication of aluminum slugs and the process of aluminum 

canning and also experimented with thorium and beryllium. This contract ended in 1946. 

Wolverine Tube received other AEC contracts because of its extrusion expertise. 

DISCUSSION:

A 1990 elimination report mentions no contamination, but does not clarify if this includes 

beryllium. It is mentioned that the facility where the AEC work was conducted was occupied 

by several companies after the AEC contracts; it currently is a warehouse. Of specific 

importance is the notation that the subcontracting with the University of Chicago did end in 

1946, but this company probably continued work in the extrusion area through 1955 as a subcontractor with DuPont (Savannah River). No documentation is provided about 

decontamination activities subsequent to the end of the AEC work, nor is any mention made 

of whether or not this work was conducted in areas separate from work for other customers

However, a DOE FUSRAP report indicates that as of 1989 beryllium residual contamination 

was of no consequence.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, along with documentation provided by the 

DOE ES&H group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, including the 

FUSRAP Elimination Report for the Former Wolverine Tube Division, June 1990.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1947-1989
Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Page 100 of 100

FACILITY NAME: Wyman-Gordon Inc. 

Grafton, North Grafton Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD: 1959-1965

FACILITY DESCRIPTION:

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security Website:

Wyman-Gordon supplied beryllium powder forgings and beryllium blanks to the Rocky Flats 

plant and beryllium metal and parts to the Y-12 plant. 

DISCUSSION:

Nothing substantial could be found in either the Beryllium Vendor or AWE files. A 1961 

document states that approximately 50% of the beryllium work at this site is for the AEC, 

while the remainder is for DOD. No information is provided about decontamination activities 

after the AEC contracts, nor is there any mention of the AEC work being conducted in work 

area separate from work for other customers.

Telephone contact with current company officials provided the following information: (1) the 

Air Force owned the facility and Wyman-Gordon served as an on-site contractor for both 

DOE and DOD; (2) the listed dates seemed to be correct and the work (forging and grinding) 

for DOD and DOE was conducted in a separate area of the facility; (3) after the DOE and 

DOD work was completed in 1965, the area was decontaminated; and (4) Wyman-Gordon 

bought the facility in 1981 from the Air Force and forging activities still take place. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 

Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE 

Office of Health, Safety and Security Website, documentation provided by the DOE ES&H

group consisting of written communications by or for the DOE, and telephone contact with 

current company officials.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 

Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual beryllium 

contamination outside the period in which beryllium metal was processed, produced, or 

provided to DOE.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION:

1966-present