UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

KEVIN R. BLAND,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

SF-0752-16-0368-I-1

DATE: January 31, 2023 

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Joel J. Kirkpatrick, Esquire, Plymouth, Michigan, for the appellant. 

Lawrence Lynch, Esquire, Joint Base San Antonio, Randolph, Texas, for 

the agency. 

BEFORE 

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman 

Raymond A. Limon, Member 

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 

FINAL ORDER 

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the 

following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of 

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 
2

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the 

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial 

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of 

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and 

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due 

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully 

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not 

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, 

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant was a Criminal 

Investigator with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and an Air Force 

reservist. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 133-50, Tab 6 at 7. From October 

2009 to June 2011, the appellant was assigned to the Criminal Investigative Task 

Force (CITF), a multi-agency task force headquartered in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

IAF, Tab 5 at 133, Tab 6 at 75. In June 2011, he was transferred to the agency’s 

Los Angeles Air Force Base (LAAFB) and assigned to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. IAF, Tab 5 at 140, Tab 6 at 68.

¶3 In April 2015, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal, alleging that, 

on multiple occasions between November 2009 and May 2014, he made deliberate 

misrepresentations concerning his time and attendance by indicating that he was 

performing his regular civilian duties when he was, in fact, serving in his capacity 

as a military reservist, which resulted in him receiving unauthorized dual 

compensation of approximately $40,000. IAF, Tab 4 at 62-64. After the 

appellant submitted written and oral responses to the proposed removal, the 

agency replaced the original deciding official with a new deciding official, who 
3

provided the appellant additional documentation in support of the proposed 

removal and afforded him a second opportunity to submit oral and written replies. 

Id. at 32-55; IAF, Tab 5 at 4-7, Hearing Transcript, Day 1 (HT1) at 47 (testimony 

of the original deciding official). Following the appellant’s written reply, IAF,

Tab 4 at 26-31, the agency removed the appellant effective February 24, 2016, id.

at 11, 15-18.

¶4 The appellant filed an appeal of his removal with the Board, and he 

requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. The appellant raised affirmative defenses of 

harmful procedural error and a due process violation resulting from replacing the 

original deciding official with a new one, as well as a race discrimination claim. 

Id. at 6.

After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision 

that affirmed the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 25.

The administrative judge found that the agency proved its charge, that its action 

promoted the efficiency of the service, and that the penalty of removal was 

reasonable. ID at 4-15, 22-25. The administrative judge also found that the 

appellant failed to prove his affirmative defenses. ID at 15-22.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, the 

agency has responded in opposition, and the appellant has replied to the agency’s 

response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 3, 5-6. 

ANALYSIS

The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved the charge.

¶6 To establish a charge of misrepresentation, falsification, or lying, an agency 

must prove that the appellant: (1) supplied wrong information; and (2) knowingly 

did so with an intent to defraud, deceive, or mislead the agency for his own 

private material gain. Boo v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 

100, ¶¶ 10-12 (2014). The intent to defraud or mislead the agency may be 

established by circumstantial evidence and also may be inferred when the 
4

misrepresentation is made with a reckless disregard for the truth or with 

conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. Id., ¶ 10. Whether intent has been 

proven must be resolved by considering the totality of the circumstances, 

including the appellant’s plausible explanation, if any. Id.

¶7 In finding that the agency proved the charge, the administrative judge 

rejected the appellant’s following two arguments, which were reiterated on 

review: (1) the appellant’s receiving dual compensation was unintentional 

because he relied on others to ensure that his timekeeping was accurate, ID 

at 12-14; PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-19; and (2) pursuant to his supervisor’s approval, 

the appellant performed both his civilian and military duties during his tours of 

reserve duty at Langley Air Force Base (Langley) in Hampton, Virginia, and 

Andrews Air Force Base (Andrews) in Maryland in 2010, ID at 7-12; PFR File, 

Tab 3 at 7, 19-20.

¶8 Regarding the first argument, the administrative judge noted that in most 

instances when the appellant was on reservist duty, he continued to personally 

certify his civilian timecards, each of which reflected that he was on regular 

civilian duty, not on military or annual leave. ID at 13; IAF, Tab 7 at 10-11;

Tab 8 at 109-10, 119-28, 132-33, 135-36. The administrative judge also noted 

that, although the appellant admitted that he was told when he started at the CITF 

that he would have up to 30 days of military leave available each year to use 

during his reservist assignments, he never took any military leave while at the 

CITF, despite the fact that he was on reserve duty for 124 civilian workdays

during his tenure there. ID at 12-13; see 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a)(1) (authorizing a 

civilian employee to use up to 15 days of military leave per fiscal year, with the 

right to carry over any unused military leave into the succeeding fiscal year). The 

administrative judge further noted that, for each of the nine tours of reserve duty 

that the appellant served during the relevant time period, he completed a form in 

which he certified that he had applied for appropriate leave as a civilian, even 

though he did not request any type of leave while in an active duty status. ID
5

at 13-14; IAF, Tab 5 at 99, 101, 104, 107, 110, 115, 118, 124, 128. Based on 

these circumstances, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the 

appellant’s assertion was not credible. ID at 12.

¶9 Turning to the second argument, the administrative judge did not credit the 

appellant’s assertion that he continued to perform his civilian duties at the CITF

with his supervisor’s express authorization while he was on military reserve duty 

at Langley and Andrews in 2010. Id. The administrative judge found the 

appellant’s testimony that he did so “improbable,” “fraught with inconsistencies,” 

and “wholly unpersuasive.” ID at 10-11.

¶10 By contrast, the administrative judge credited the appellant’s supervisor’s 

testimony that he did not recall seeing the appellant at the CITF during his 

reserve tours of duty, nor did he recall any discussions about the appellant 

simultaneously working for the agency as a reservist and a civilian. ID at 7-8. 

The administrative judge found that the supervisor’s testimony was both 

internally consistent and consistent with the record. ID at 8; see Hillen v. 

Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (discussing the relevant 

factors in making credibility determinations). The administrative judge further 

found it unlikely that the appellant’s supervisor would not recall approving such 

an arrangement if he had done so. ID at 8.

¶11 The appellant challenges this finding on review, arguing that, because his 

supervisor testified that he did not recall approving the appellant’s proposal to 

simultaneously perform his civilian and military duties, the appellant’s testimony

that his supervisor authorized such an arrangement is unrefuted and, therefore, the 

administrative judge erred in not crediting his testimony. PFR File, Tab 3

at 19-20. The appellant further asserts that, given his unrefuted testimony that his 

supervisor approved his plan to simultaneously perform his military and civilian

duties, the agency cannot establish that he “misrepresented information with the 

intention to deceive,” and, thus, it cannot prove the charge. Id.
6

¶12 This argument is unavailing. The Board must defer to an administrative 

judge’s credibility determinations when, as here, they are based, explicitly or 

implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the 

Board may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” 

reasons for doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002). Under Hillen, one of the relevant factors in making credibility 

determinations is the inherent improbability of the witness’s version of events.

See 35 M.S.P.R. at 458. Thus, in assessing the appellant’s credibility, the 

administrative judge appropriately considered the improbability of the appellant’s

claims that he simultaneously performed his civilian and military duties during 

his reserve tours of duty at Langley and Andrews with his supervisor’s express 

approval. The appellant has not shown a sufficiently sound reason for 

overturning the administrative judge’s explained credibility determinations.

¶13 We also find unpersuasive the appellant’s argument on review that the 

agency failed to prove the charge of deliberate misrepresentation by alleging that 

he intentionally falsified his timesheets from 2009-2014; however, he could not 

have falsified his timesheets during his entire 3-year tenure at LAAFB. PFR File, 

Tab 3 at 16. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the agency alleged that the 

appellant falsified his time cards “on multiple occasions” during the period 

between November 2009 and May 2014; it did not allege that he falsified his 

timecards throughout that whole period. IAF, Tab 4 at 62. Thus, the appellant 

has shown no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the agency 

proved its charge by preponderant evidence. ID at 15.

The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to prove his 

affirmative defenses.

¶14 We next consider the appellant’s affirmative defenses. Regarding the 

appellant’s harmful procedural error and due process claims, the administrative 

judge found that the evidence did not support the appellant’s allegation that the 

agency replaced the original deciding official to ensure that the appellant would 
7

be removed from Federal service. ID at 15-19. As for the appellant’s claim of 

race discrimination based on disparate treatment, the administrative judge found 

that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that his race was a 

motivating factor in the agency’s decision to remove him. ID at 19-22.

¶15 On review, the appellant reiterates his argument below that the agency 

violated his due process rights and committed harmful procedural error by 

replacing the original deciding official to prevent him from issuing a decision that 

was favorable to the appellant.2PFR File, Tab 3 at 27-30; IAF, Tab 18 at 20-21, 

23. In support of this claim, the appellant relies on the following statement in a 

July 2015 email from the original deciding official to agency personnel: “My 

thought is that we start the settlement discussion at [the appellant] repaying 

$87,040.48, 97 days suspension [without] pay, a last chance agreement and waive 

all appeal rights . . . .” IAF, Tab 18 at 37. The appellant contends that this 

statement shows that the original deciding official did not intend to remove him, 

and he asserts that, once the agency learned of the original deciding official’s 

intention, it replaced him with another deciding official, who “rubberstamped” 

the agency’s decision to remove the appellant. PFR File, Tab 3 at 29-30.

¶16 In finding that the appellant failed to prove these affirmative defenses, the 

administrative judge rejected the appellant’s argument that, as of July 2015, the

original deciding official had determined that removal was not appropriate. ID

at 16-17. The administrative judge credited the testimony of the original deciding 

official that he was planning to remove the appellant before he was replaced as 

deciding official, and that his reference to a suspension instead of removal in the 

 

2 On review, the appellant does not specifically challenge the administrative judge’s 

finding that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of race discrimination based on 

disparate treatment. See generally PFR File, Tab 1; ID at 19-22. We have reviewed the 

record and discern no reason to disturb this finding. Because we discern no error with 

the administrative judge’s motivating factor analysis, we do not reach the question of 

whether discrimination was a “but-for” cause of the removal action. See Pridgen v. 

Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 22-25.
8

email discussing possible settlement was merely a “what if” scenario in the event 

that the appellant chose to appeal the removal. ID at 16, 19; HT1 at 51, 55-56 

(testimony of the original deciding official). The administrative judge found that, 

while the email evinces the original deciding official’s willingness to discuss 

settlement in lieu of removal, it does not support the appellant’s assertion that the 

agency replaced the original deciding official because he felt that removal was 

not appropriate. ID at 17.

¶17 The administrative judge further found that there was no evidence that the 

deciding official was merely a facilitator for a predetermined decision, or that he 

failed to properly consider the evidence before him. Id. In making this finding, 

the administrative judge credited the deciding official’s testimony that he 

carefully considered all of the evidence and made his own determination in 

deciding to remove the appellant. Id.; HT1 at 155, 166, 177, 187-88 (testimony 

of the deciding official). Therefore, the administrative judge found, the appellant 

did not offer sufficient evidence to support his allegation that the agency replaced 

the original deciding official in an effort to prevent him from issuing a decision 

that was more favorable to the appellant. ID at 17.

¶18 The appellant argues on review that the evidence does not support the 

administrative judge’s finding that the original deciding official would have

removed the appellant if he had remained the deciding official. PFR File, Tab 3 

at 27; ID at 17. As noted above, in making this finding, the administrative judge 

credited the original deciding official’s testimony that he was planning to remove 

the appellant when he was replaced as deciding official. ID at 17 (finding that the 

testimony of both deciding officials was unequivocal, detailed, consistent, and not 

inherently improbable); HT1 at 55 (testimony of the original deciding official).

Thus, the appellant is challenging the administrative judge’s determination that 

the original deciding official credibly testified that he always felt that removal 

was an appropriate penalty.
9

¶19 This argument is unpersuasive, as the appellant has failed to identify a 

sufficiently sound reason for overturning the administrative judge’s credibility 

findings, and we discern no basis to disturb those findings. Likewise, we find no 

basis to disturb the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant failed 

to prove his due process and harmful error claims. ID at 18-19. As the 

administrative judge found, the appellant received notice and opportunities to 

respond to the charge against him, ID at 18, and failed to identify any applicable 

procedures that the agency failed to follow, id.; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r) (to prove 

harmful procedural error, the appellant must prove that the agency’s error in 

applying its procedures is likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion 

different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error).

The administrative judge correctly found that the penalty of removal was 

reasonable.

¶20 When, as here, all of the agency’s charges, or its sole charge, have been 

sustained, the Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if 

the agency considered all of the relevant factors and exercised management 

discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Adam v. U.S. Postal Service, 

96 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 5 (2004), aff’d, 137 F. App’x 352 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Douglas v. 

Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981). In doing so, the Board 

must give due weight to the agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee 

discipline and efficiency, recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace 

management’s responsibility but to ensure that managerial judgment has been 

properly exercised. Adam, 96 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 5. Thus, the Board will modify a 

penalty only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or 

that it clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in determining the penalty. 

Id.

¶21 In finding that removal is a reasonable penalty for the sustained charge, the 

administrative judge determined that the deciding official considered the relevant 

Douglas factors in reaching his decision. ID at 23; IAF, Tab 20 at 10-15. 
10

Specifically, the administrative judge found, and the record clearly shows, that 

the deciding official considered the nature and seriousness of the offense, the 

appellant’s position as a Criminal Investigator, and the appellant’s loss of 

credibility resulting from his falsifying his timecards for his personal gain. ID 

at 23-24; IAF, Tab 20 at 10-11. The administrative judge also noted that the 

deciding official considered the appellant’s 6 years of service with the agency and 

his acceptable performance, but found that these factors were insufficient to 

outweigh the seriousness of the charge. ID at 25; IAF, Tab 20 at 11. The 

administrative judge also considered the deciding official’s testimony that, given 

the seriousness of the charge and its relationship to the appellant’s position as a 

law enforcement officer, no lesser penalty than removal would be appropriate. ID

at 25; IAF, Tab 20 at 24; HT1 at 150, 152-54 (testimony of the deciding official).

¶22 The appellant argues on review, as he did on his Board appeal form, that the 

Douglas factors do not support his removal because other employees who 

engaged in misconduct that was at least as serious as his misconduct were not 

removed, and the agency failed to sufficiently explain why he received a 

significantly harsher penalty than those employees. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5, 30-33; 

IAF, Tab 1 at 6. This argument is an allegation of disparate penalty. In the 

prehearing conference summary, the administrative judge did not address the 

appellant’s disparate penalty claim, explicitly stated that any claims not 

specifically identified were to be considered withdrawn, and provided the parties 

7 days to object to the accuracy of his summary. IAF, Tab 21 at 5, 7-8. The 

appellant did not object to the excluding of his disparate penalty claim from the 

prehearing conference summary. Therefore, this issue is not properly before the 

Board on review. Crowe v. Small Business Administration, 53 M.S.P.R. 631, 

634-35 (1992) (holding that an issue is not properly before the Board when it is 

not included in the administrative judge’s memorandum summarizing the 

prehearing conference that states that no other issue will be considered, unless 

either party objects to its exclusion from the summary).
11

¶23 In any event, even if we were to consider the appellant’s argument, it 

provides no basis to disturb the initial decision. In assessing a claim of disparate 

penalty, the relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably 

treated employees who engaged in the same or similar offenses differently. Singh 

v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶¶ 14, 17. The appellant has not provided 

evidence of any similarly-situated employee being treated differently than he was; 

therefore, his disparate penalty claim must fail. We thus find no basis to disturb 

the administrative judge’s determination that the deciding official considered the 

relevant Douglas factors and exercised his discretion within the tolerable limits of 

reasonableness. ID at 25.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS3

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By 

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such 

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). 

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit 

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most 

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a 

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their 

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should 

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all 

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time 

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. 

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

 

3

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 
13

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a 

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before 

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of 

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling 

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and 

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 
14

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), 

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of 

competent jurisdiction.4The court of appeals must receive your petition for 

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

 

4

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
15

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board