IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellant,

v.

JEREMY ALLEN MATLOCK,

Appellee.

No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0274

Filed May 27, 2015

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. CR20134266

The Honorable Richard S. Fields, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney

By Nicolette Kneup, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson

Counsel for Appellant

Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender

By David J. Euchner, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION

Judge Vásquez authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Howard concurred.
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

2

V Á S Q U E Z, Judge:

¶1 The State of Arizona appeals from the trial court’s order

dismissing criminal charges against appellee Jeremy Matlock. We 

are asked to determine whether a registered qualifying patient 

under the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA) is immune from 

prosecution pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-2811(B)(3) for selling marijuana 

to another registered qualifying patient. For the following reasons, 

we reverse the dismissal and remand the case for further 

proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 The relevant facts are undisputed. Matlock is a 

registered qualifying patient under the AMMA authorized to use 

and cultivate marijuana for medical purposes. In March 2013, an 

officer with the Tucson Police Department saw Matlock’s online

posting in which he offered to provide marijuana plants to other 

medical marijuana cardholders authorized to cultivate. In his post, 

Matlock requested a “$25 donation” per plant. Posing as a 

cardholder, the officer contacted Matlock and arranged a meeting.

¶3 At that meeting, the officer showed Matlock a medical 

marijuana card indicating he was authorized to cultivate. The 

officer then gave Matlock $75, and Matlock gave him three 

marijuana plants. Shortly thereafter, other officers arrested Matlock 

and searched his residence, where they seized marijuana, marijuana 

plants, and equipment used for marijuana cultivation. A grand jury 

indicted Matlock for sale of marijuana weighing less than two 

pounds, production of marijuana weighing less than two pounds, 

and possession of drug paraphernalia.1

 

1Matlock filed a motion to remand to the grand jury for a 

redetermination of probable cause. He argued an officer “falsely 

testified that . . . Matlock was not authorized to cultivate marijuana” 

and “the grand jury was incorrectly instructed that the AMMA does 

not permit patient-to-patient transfers for something of value.” 

After the state agreed to the remand “to correct the inadvertent 

omissions from the factual record,” Matlock withdrew his motion as 
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 Matlock filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Rule 16.6(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P. He argued the indictment was 

“insufficient as a matter of law” because, as a registered qualifying 

patient under the AMMA, he was protected by § 36-2811(B)(3), 

which he maintained allows “patient-to-patient transfers [of 

marijuana] in exchange for something of value.” Alternatively, he 

asserted that the rule of lenity applied and § 36-2811(B)(3) should be 

interpreted in his favor because it “does not give proper notice that 

the conduct of receiving something of value in a patient-to-patient 

transfer would be outside the protections of the AMMA.”

¶5 In response, the state maintained that Matlock violated 

the AMMA because § 36-2811(B)(3) only allows “patients . . . to offer 

or provide marijuana to another patient . . . if nothing of value is 

transferred in return.” It also asserted that the rule of lenity does not 

apply because the statute is unambiguous.

¶6 After hearing argument, the trial court issued its underadvisement ruling, granting Matlock’s motion and dismissing the 

case against him. The court determined that § 36-2811(B)(3) is 

ambiguous and that “there is no clear guidance from the rest of the 

AMMA of the exact . . . intent in this specific area.” The court also

pointed out that “no one has truly analyzed” whether the rule of 

lenity applies, noting that the AMMA “exempts from punishment” 

and “is not truly ‘penal.’” However, the court ultimately applied the 

rule of lenity and concluded that § 36-2811(B)(3) “does not give a 

person of ordinary intelligence notice as to how it can be violated.” 

The state appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4032(1).

Discussion

¶7 The state argues the trial court erred by granting 

Matlock’s motion to dismiss because, under the AMMA, “patient 

sales of marijuana are not protected and may be prosecuted.” It 

relies on § 36-2811(B)(3), as well as other provisions of the AMMA.

 

to the instructions. On remand, the grand jury returned an identical 

indictment.
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

4

Because this issue turns primarily on the interpretation of § 36-

2811(B)(3), our review is de novo. Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 

¶ 7, 136 P.3d 874, 875 (2006); see also State v. Malvern, 192 Ariz. 154, 

¶ 2, 962 P.2d 228, 229 (App. 1998).

¶8 In relevant part, § 36-2811(B) provides:

A registered qualifying patient or 

registered designated caregiver is not 

subject to arrest, prosecution or penalty in 

any manner, or denial of any right or 

privilege, including any civil penalty or 

disciplinary action by a court or 

occupational or professional licensing 

board or bureau:

. . . .

3. For offering or providing 

marijuana to a registered qualifying patient 

or a registered designated caregiver for the 

registered qualifying patient’s medical use 

or to a registered nonprofit medical 

marijuana dispensary if nothing of value is 

transferred in return and the person giving 

the marijuana does not knowingly cause 

the recipient to possess more than the 

allowable amount of marijuana.

This statute is part of the AMMA, which was passed by Arizona 

voters in 2010 as part of a ballot initiative. State v. Gear, 236 Ariz. 

289, ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 1034, 1035 (App. 2014).

¶9 In State v. Fields, 232 Ariz. 265, ¶ 14, 304 P.3d 1088, 1092 

(App. 2013), this court explained that registered qualifying patients

under the AMMA “may be prosecuted for marijuana-related 

offenses” if they improperly transfer marijuana under § 36-2811(B). 
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

5

This case requires us to determine whether a transfer between 

registered qualifying patients for something of value is improper.2

¶10 “Our primary objective in construing statutes adopted 

by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the electorate.” State v. 

Gomez, 212 Ariz. 55, ¶ 11, 127 P.3d 873, 875 (2006). If a statute’s 

language is clear and unambiguous, it is the best indicator of that 

intent, and we apply it as written without resorting to other 

methods of statutory interpretation. Id.; State v. Siplivy, 228 Ariz. 

305, ¶ 6, 265 P.3d 1104, 1106 (App. 2011). However, if the language 

is ambiguous, we attempt to determine the electorate’s intent by 

looking to the statutory scheme as a whole and considering the 

statute’s context, historical background, effects and consequences,

and purpose and spirit. See State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, ¶ 22, 151 P.3d 

1261, 1264 (App. 2007).

¶11 We begin our analysis by considering the language of 

§ 36-2811(B)(3) to discern whether the electorate intended to allow 

patient-to-patient sales of marijuana under the AMMA.3 See Gomez, 

212 Ariz. 55, ¶ 11, 127 P.3d at 875; Siplivy, 228 Ariz. 305, ¶ 6, 265 P.3d 

at 1106. The parties present two different interpretations of § 36-

2811(B)(3). The state acknowledges the statute provides that a 

“patient cannot be arrested or prosecuted for offering or providing 

marijuana to another patient or caregiver” but asserts that “there are 

two caveats.” It contends “[n]o patient should exchange marijuana 

with another patient or caregiver for anything of value” and “no 

 

2Matlock devotes a considerable portion of his answering brief 

to arguing that § 36-2811(B)(3) is constitutional because “protecting 

patient-to-patient sales has a rational basis.” However, we need not 

address this argument because the state has not challenged the 

constitutionality of § 36-2811(B)(3).

3 Although Matlock requested a “$25 donation” for the

marijuana plants, we characterize the exchange as a “sale,” like the 

parties do, using that term in its broadest sense. See Webster’s Third 

New Int’l Dictionary 2003 (1971) (defining “sale” as “transferring . . . 

ownership of property . . . to another for . . . a sum of money or any 

other consideration”).
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

6

patient should knowingly give another patient or caregiver more 

marijuana than they are allowed to have under the [AMMA].”4

¶12 In contrast, Matlock argues that “patient-to-patient 

transfers are permitted so long as the patient giving the marijuana 

does not knowingly cause the recipient patient to possess more than 

the allowable amount under the AMMA.” He maintains that “[t]he

prohibition of receipt of anything of value in return for marijuana is 

only attached to patient-to-dispensary transfers.” He reasons that 

“if the conditional statement regarding ‘nothing of value is 

transferred in return’ was meant to apply to patient-to-patient and 

patient-to-caregiver transfers, then there would not be a second ‘to’ 

. . . preceding ‘a registered nonprofit medical marijuana 

dispensary.’” See State v. Arthur, 125 Ariz. 153, 155, 608 P.2d 90, 92 

(App. 1980) (“Whenever possible, a statute will be given such an 

effect that no clause, sentence, or word is rendered superfluous, 

void, contradictory or insignificant.”). We disagree.

¶13 The plain language of § 36-2811(B)(3) provides that a 

registered qualifying patient can offer or provide marijuana to 

another registered qualifying patient, a registered designated 

caregiver, or a registered nonprofit medical marijuana dispensary.

In describing the recipients, the statute classifies patients and 

caregivers together because caregivers necessarily are receiving 

marijuana for a patient. See A.R.S. § 36-2801(5) (defining 

“[d]esignated caregiver”). The phrase “for the registered qualifying 

patient’s medical use” applies to both patients and caregivers 

receiving marijuana. Thus, “to a registered qualifying patient or a 

registered designated caregiver” represents the first class in this 

series, and “to a registered nonprofit medical marijuana dispensary”

is the second. The “to” preceding the “registered nonprofit medical 

 

4 “Two-and-one-half ounces of usable marijuana” is the 

“[a]llowable amount of marijuana” for a qualifying patient to 

possess under the AMMA. A.R.S. § 36-2801(1)(a)(i). If the 

qualifying patient is allowed to cultivate, he can also possess 

“twelve marijuana plants contained in an enclosed, locked facility.” 

§ 36-2801(1)(a)(ii).
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

7

marijuana dispensary” gives the two classes of recipients a parallel 

construction and is not superfluous.

¶14 Section 36-2811(B)(3) further explains that, when 

offering or providing marijuana to those two classes, a registered 

qualifying patient cannot receive anything of value in return or

knowingly cause the recipient to possess more than the allowable 

amount of marijuana. Cf. Pawn 1st, L.L.C. v. City of Phx., 231 Ariz. 

309, ¶ 18, 294 P.3d 147, 150 (App. 2013) (“‘When there is a 

straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or 

verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally 

applies to the entire series.’”), quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 

Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, at 147 (2012).

¶15 Notably, the dependent clause of § 36-2811(B)(3) 

beginning with the word “if” is essential to the meaning of the rest 

of the sentence. If the first part of the dependent clause—“if nothing 

of value is transferred in return”—applied only to dispensaries, as 

Matlock contends, and we removed that portion of the sentence, the 

remainder would not make sense:

A registered qualifying patient or 

registered designated caregiver is not 

subject to arrest, prosecution or penalty in 

any manner, or denial of any right or 

privilege, including any civil penalty or 

disciplinary action by a court or 

occupational or professional licensing 

board or bureau:

. . . .

3. For offering or providing 

marijuana to a registered qualifying patient 

or a registered designated caregiver for the

registered qualifying patient’s medical use 

or to a registered nonprofit medical 

marijuana dispensary . . . and the person 

giving the marijuana does not knowingly 
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

8

cause the recipient to possess more than the 

allowable amount of marijuana.

§ 36-2811(B)(3). Thus, based on the plain language of the statute, we 

conclude § 36-2811(B)(3) does not provide immunity from 

prosecution for a registered qualifying patient who provides

marijuana to another registered qualifying patient in return for 

something of value.

¶16 Our conclusion is bolstered by the statutory scheme as a 

whole. See State v. Wagstaff, 161 Ariz. 66, 70, 775 P.2d 1130, 1134 

(App. 1988) (“[S]tatutes should be explained in conjunction with 

other statutes to the end that they may be harmonious and 

consistent.”). Of particular import, § 36-2811(E), (F) explicitly

addresses the sale of marijuana. Those subsections provide 

immunity to registered nonprofit medical marijuana dispensaries 

and registered dispensary agents for “sell[ing] . . . marijuana . . . to 

registered qualifying patients.” Id. The drafters of the statute—and 

the electorate that approved it—thus knew how to specify that a 

registered qualifying patient could not be prosecuted for selling 

marijuana to other such patients.

¶17 However, § 36-2811(B), which addresses registered 

qualifying patients’ immunity, does not contain language similar to 

§ 36-2811(E), (F) protecting them for selling marijuana to other 

registered qualifying patients. Cf. Darrah v. McClennen, 236 Ariz. 

185, ¶ 6, 337 P.3d 550, 551-52 (App. 2014) (“If Arizona voters had 

intended to completely bar the State from prosecuting authorized 

marijuana users under [A.R.S.] § 28-1381(A)(3), they could have 

easily done so by using specific language to that effect.”).

¶18 Matlock nevertheless relies on A.R.S. § 36-2815(C) in 

support of his argument that patient-to-patient sales are permitted. 

That statute provides: “Any cardholder who sells marijuana to a 

person who is not allowed to possess marijuana for medical 

purposes under this chapter shall have his registry identification 

card revoked, and shall be subject to other penalties for the 
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

9

unauthorized sale of marijuana and other applicable offenses.” 5

§ 36-2815(C). Matlock asserts that if “no patient may ever sell 

marijuana to another patient, then this entire subsection of the 

statute would be rendered a nullity.” See Arthur, 125 Ariz. at 155, 

608 P.2d at 92 (we interpret statutes so no provision is rendered 

superfluous, void, contradictory, or insignificant). We disagree.

¶19 Section 36-2815, titled “Revocation,” details the

penalties—revocation or criminal liability—that are available when 

the AMMA is violated. See § 36-2815(A) (agent’s card revocation), 

(B) (dispensary’s certificate revocation), (C)-(D) (cardholder’s card 

revocation and “other penalties”). It further clarifies when those 

penalties are mandatory or discretionary. Compare § 36-2815(A), (B), 

(C) (using “shall”), with § 36-2815(D) (using “may” and “shall”). 

Section 36-2815(C) simply provides that cardholders who sell 

marijuana to those who are not allowed to possess it are subject to 

both card revocation and criminal liability. Merely because 

subsection (C) does not mention patient-to-patient sales does not 

mean such sales are permitted. 6 Different penalties apply 

depending on the circumstances and severity of the particular 

violation. And, contrary to Matlock’s argument, the fact that § 36-

2815(C) does not refer to patient-to-patient sales does not mean such 

transfers are implicitly authorized. Section 36-2815(D) provides that 

“[t]he department may revoke the registry identification card of any 

 

5Under the AMMA, a cardholder is defined as “a qualifying 

patient, a designated caregiver or a nonprofit medical marijuana 

dispensary agent who has been issued and possesses a valid registry 

identification card.” § 36-2801(2).

6 The trial court similarly reasoned that, because a 

“cardholder” includes a qualifying patient, § 36-2815(C) “necessarily 

implies that a qualifying patient can sell marijuana.” See § 36-

2801(2). We disagree with this logic for the same reasons that we 

reject Matlock’s argument. Section 36-2815(C) provides 

consequences for any cardholder—qualifying patient, designated 

caregiver, or dispensary agent—who sells marijuana to someone 

who is not allowed to possess it; the statute does not suggest that 

patient-to-patient sales of marijuana are therefore permitted.
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

10

cardholder who knowingly violates this chapter, and the cardholder 

shall be subject to other penalties for the applicable offense.”

¶20 Matlock maintains the purpose and spirit of the AMMA 

support his interpretation of § 36-2811(B)(3). To the contrary, these 

secondary canons of statutory interpretation, even if we were 

required to apply them, support our conclusion that patient-topatient sales are not permitted. The AMMA’s purpose is “to protect 

patients with debilitating medical conditions, as well as their 

physicians and providers, from arrest and prosecution, criminal and 

other penalties and property forfeiture if such patients engage in the 

medical use of marijuana.” Arizona Publicity Pamphlet, Ballot 

Propositions & Judicial Performance Review 73 (2010); see also Heath 

v. Kiger, 217 Ariz. 492, ¶ 13, 176 P.3d 690, 694 (2008) (“To determine 

the intent of the electorate, courts may also look to the publicity 

pamphlet distributed at the time of the election.”). To that end, the 

electorate “required” the Arizona Department of Health Services “to 

adopt and enforce a regulatory system for the distribution of 

marijuana for medical use.” Arizona Publicity Pamphlet, supra, at 

83. The sale of medical marijuana only through closely regulated 

dispensaries is consistent with that purpose. Cf. A.R.S. §§ 36-2806.02

(directions for dispensary agents before distributing marijuana), 36-

2807 (verification system for use by dispensary agents, law 

enforcement, and employers).

¶21 Also consistent with its purpose, the AMMA evinces a

spirit of permitting patients to acquire the medicine they need, not 

creating a profitable medical marijuana industry. The AMMA 

makes clear that medical marijuana dispensaries must be “not-for 

profit” and can only receive payment for “expenses incurred in 

[their] operation.” § 36-2801(11). Similarly, designated caregivers 

“may not be paid any fee or compensation” for their services but can 

only be reimbursed their “actual costs.” § 36-2801(5)(e). Allowing 

registered qualifying patients to provide marijuana in exchange for 

something of value would therefore be the exception. And, allowing 

such patient-to-patient transactions would, as the state points out,

create an “incentive to embark on a sales enterprise.”

¶22 In sum, we conclude the electorate did not intend to 

provide immunity from prosecution to a registered qualifying 
STATE v. MATLOCK

Opinion of the Court

11

patient who offers or provides marijuana to another registered 

qualifying patient in exchange for something of value.7 See § 36-

2811(B)(3). The trial court therefore erred by granting Matlock’s 

motion to dismiss. See Mejak, 212 Ariz. 555, ¶ 7, 136 P.3d at 875; 

Malvern, 192 Ariz. 154, ¶ 2, 962 P.2d at 229.

Disposition

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s 

ruling dismissing the criminal case against Matlock and remand the 

case for further proceedings.

 

7 Because we have reached this conclusion based on our 

canons of statutory interpretation, we need not determine whether 

the rule of lenity applies to the AMMA. See State v. Sanchez, 209 

Ariz. 66, ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 891, 893 (App. 2004) (rule of lenity applied only 

when ambiguity remains after applying other rules of statutory 

interpretation).