c. b.

Figure 19. (a,b) “Let us ‘rays’ our glasses.” Toasting with liquid sunshine cocktails at the 1904 banquet of
the New York Technology Club (c) Recipe for the radium cocktail. (Reproduced, with permission, from the
Hammer Collection, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution.)

A favorite means of gaining the much- away with radium toothpaste (Fig 21). After-
touted health benefits was to ingest radium- dinner entertainment might include a glow-
impregnated water, known bucolically as “lig- ing game of radium roulette (Fig 22) or per-
uid sunshine.” Hailed not only as salubrious haps just evening prayers before an ever
tonics (Fig 18), radium beverages were an luminous crucifix (Fig 23). American business
instant hit as fluorescent cocktails on the ban- _loved radium (Fig 24).

| quet circuit (Fig 19). Dinner could be served
on radioactive china (Fig 20), then cleansed



restejete sia

ae

Figure 7. Cram course or sham course?
One could become a radiologist, radiogra-
pher, and radiation therapist in just 6 weeks.
Advertisement from AJR 1917; 4:XVii.)

few Bonk
‘Post-Graduate

| MEDICAL SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL
FALL SESSION, ror7

Special opportunities for tharough, complete scientific
dastruction in Roentgenology. =.
For macriculates with limited time at choir disposal
the following courses may be combined, and compl

ered.
im a period of six weeks: .

Roentgenological Technique.
Fluoroscopy and Plate Reading.
Roentgen Therapy,

For Farther detailed particulars concerning special. |
305, apply co a“ :
‘THE SECRETARY OF THE FACULTY
Eat 20th Snect *

Figure 8. Photograph shows lower back scar caused
by an xray burn from a single gastrointestinal tract
fluoroscopic examination. The fluocoscopist burned
three more patients that same day (9). (Reproduced,
with permission, from reference 9.)

1124 RadioGraphics © DiSantis and DiSantis

Volume 12 Nunaber6



28.
Figures 27, 28. (27) Photograph shows the work area of the radium dial painters. Note the street clothes
and the complete absence of shielding. (Reproduced, with permussion, from ceference 17.) (28) Autoradio-

graph obtained by placing the teeth of a radium poisoning victim atop photographic film. (Reproduced. with
permission. from reference 18)

DiSantis and DiSantis m RadioGraphics 1135

November 1991



2

ROLE OF THE CHICAGO HEALTH
DIVISION

FIRST TASKS:
The Health Division Issued its first report on 15 August 1942, little more
than a week after Robert Stone arrived. It merely noted the need for
radiation safety.” Serious discourse on what needed to be done and
how it should be done appeared only a month later. Simeon Cantril
and Kenneth Cole opened the second report with a statement stressing,
the division’s dual role. Part of the job was project health and safety.
‘These concerns were clinically focused; the division bore “direct re-
sponeibility for the heaith of the personnel and the public.” The other
part was research on “the effects of physical and chemical haz-
ards . . . to provide both a basis for clinical measures and fundamental
understanding of the phenomena.” These statements in essence de-
fined the goals of Cantril’s medical section and Cole's biological re~
search section,” ,
The health physics section supported these efforts, Within the di-
vision it measured, analyzed, and computed “the factors involved in
the clinical and experimental aspects.” Outside the division it had two
main jobs: first, to judge and measure future as well as present hazards
. throughout “the project—research and development, plants and pro-
duction, and military”; second, to design and oversee safety measure:
In practice these statements did not draw sharp limits for the sections;
rather they defined centers of concern. Bach section did research, just
as each became involved in health and safety, guided by the central
aim "to eliminate physical and chemical hazards before they reach clit
ically detectable proportions.”* -
“The first tasks,” however, Cantril and Cole noted, center d on “inde
medigle surveys of the hazards to peraonnel on the Project ag ¢

a ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALTH DIVISION 35 it }

whole.”* Two especially seemed to require prompt action, Uranium
handling was one. Suspected of being highly toxic in animals, the metal
was feared so iri humans as well. No proven case of a worker poisoned 1
by uranium had yet appeared at Chicago or in plants that supplied fuel
for the pile. Yet the Health Division had to assume uranium to be as
toxic as other heavy metals, and so it altered handling routines to re-
duce dust workers might breathe or swallow. At the same time it spon-
sored research to find how toxic ingested uranium really was. Albert
E, Tannenbaum, a cancer expert at Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago,
received a contract and began work in September 1942, His findings '
ptoved most réassuring. Uranium toxicology later became the subject |
of independent research at the University of Rochester.* :

Uranium wag not regarded as a radiological hazard. The hall-lif
uranium. 238 was measured in billions of years, of uranium 235, in
hundreds of millions. Radioactivity of neither was thus high or intense \
enough to pose much threat, even if ingested, This points, up.an aspect
of Manhattan Project safety problems easy to miss, As it became a large.

i i it of new techniques and substances, most

nothing to do with radiation. Workers may well

ey ever did from gamma rays, neutrons, or ac-
ion was nonetheless the “special hazard.” It was

divs
the other one of the two earmarked for prompt action in the September
report.”

Even before heading the health physics section, Ernest Wollan had
begun to survey the laboratory for radiation hazards. Leon Jacobson
had likewise taken a health role in the project since early 1942. Both
believed “some radical changes must be made at once in working con-
ditions to avoid unnecessary exposure to radiation.”* Cantril
systematic survey of the health status of project workers, Aided by
3 ity of Chicago clinics, he began examining several
workers a day. They hoped to correlate their findings with each per-__
son’s past and: current work on the project and thus perhaps devise
slan it ine te m-

age. They_were disappointed, Although routine screening of project _
workers persisted throughout the war, it proved of little use, for normal,
results varied too widely and were affected by too many factors, Rou-.
ling testing sintply provided ny basis for early warning,” .-

Meanwhile, ail workers in areas where gamma radiation levels might JR |

pr



EBSCOhost Page 8 of 9

Following the Windscale (Sellafield) accident in 1957, a researchers, uses a modified
household vacuum cleaner samples of air- and wind-borne dust,

By lan Fairlie & Marvin Resnikoff

lan Fairlie is a researcher at the Centre for Environmental Technology, Imperial College of Science,
Technology, and Medicine, in London. Marvin Resnikoff is a senior associate at Radioactive Waste
Management Associates in New York City.

Copyright of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is the property of Educational Foundation for Nuclear
Science. Copyright of PUBLICATION is the property of PUBLISHER. The copyright in an individual article
may be maintained by the author in certain cases. Content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites
or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's exoress written permission. However, users may
print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec97, Vol. 53 Issue 6, p52, 5p

Item: 1302557

of P.

Formats: [i Citation 2 HTML Full Text

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Sl save “9 Add to folder

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3 S Soom

Figure 23, Advertisement for a crucifix with 2 decidedly unheavenly glow. (Reproduced, with permission,
from the Hasamer Coblection, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian institu.
tion.)

Figure 24. A business card not
conducive for maintaining long-
term customers. (Reproduced, with
permission, from the Hammer Col-
lection, Archives Center, National
Museum of American History,
Smithsonian Institution.)



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REFERENCES
DiSantis Dj. Early American radiology: the
pioncer years. AJR 1986; 147:850-853,
Grigg ERN. The trail of the invisible fight.
Springfield, Ill: Thomas, 1965..
Bruwer AJ. Classic descriptions in diagnos-
tic roentgenology. Vol 1. Springfield, Ill: Tho-
mas, 1964.
BrecherR, BrecherE, The rays: a history of
radiology in the United States arid. Canada.
Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1969.
Caulfield C. Multiple : a chronicle
of the radiation age. New York: Harper &
Row, 1989.
Brown P. American martyrs to science
through the roentgen rays. Springfield, itl:
Thomas, 1936.
Codman EA. No practical danger from the
xray (letter). Boston Med Surg J 1901; 144:
197.

Mr Edison and the x rays (abstr). Arch Roent-
gen Ray 1903; 8:45,

Gatland LH. Xray burns resulting from fluo-
roscopy of the gastrointestinal tract. JAMA
1945; 129:419-421.

Braasch NK, Nickson MJ. A study of the
hands of radiologists. Radiology 1948; 51:
N19-726.

i.

12.

13.
14.

is.

16.
7.

18.

20,

Schubert J, Lapp RE. Radiation: what it is
and how it affects you. New York: Viking,
1957.

Cipollaro AC, Einhorn MB. ‘The use of xrays
for the treatment of hypertrichosis is danger-
ous. JAMA 1947; 135.349-353,

tion in beauty shops. AJR 1930; 23:409-412.
Kopp H. Radiation damage caused by a
shoe-fitting fluoroscope. Br Med J 1957;
2113441345,

Mould R.A bhistory of xrays and radium,
With a chapter on radiation units: 1895-1937.
London; IPC Building and Contract Journals,
1980.

Macldis RM. Radithor and the era of mild
radium therapy. JAMA 1990; 264:614-618.
Kathren RL. Radioactivity in the environ-
New York: Harwood Academic, 1984,
Gentler A, Nortis C. Poisoning from dri
radium water. JAMA 1933; 100:400-402.
Rollins W. Note on x light: on the impor-
tance of treating the generative organs of de-
generates by x light to prevent their increase
(absts}. Arch Roentgen Ray 1905; 9:296,
Hegar Wiesloch A. Sterilization in the inter.
est of race betterment (abstr). AJR 1916; 3:46,

1138 @ RadioGraphics @ DiSantis and DiSantis

Yolume11 Number 6


‘Was radium a panacea or Pandora's box? Its
discoverers found they could not escape it
ig 25), and its proponents and partakers
came to rue its advent (Fig 26). In the 1920s,
the popularity of radium was unabated, with
glowing radium paint particularly ubiquitous
in products from fish bait to doll eyes. As Dr
Sabin von Sochocky, developer of “Undack”
radium-based paint observed in 1921, “The
time will doubtless come when you will have
in your own house a room lighted entirely by
radium . . . like soft moonlight” (6).

The rapid fall of radium from grace began
with the deaths of several young women,
painters of luminous watch dials (Fig 27).
Their mysterious osteonecrosis and profound
anemia prompted a search of their workplace,
the U.S. Radium Company. The unshielded
work area and the painters themselves were
so thoroughly spattered with radioactive paint
that even the workers’ undergarments glowed
(5). Safety was such a nonissue that the
women painters sometimes applied the glow-
ing radium paint to their fingernails and teeth
for special occasions (5). To get the finest
point on the brush, the painters passed their
brushes between their lips and thus swal-
lowed minute amounts of radium-based paint
Cig 28). So permeated with radioactivity
were the dial painters that they could light a
fluoroscopy screen with their breath, and yet
an autopsy revealed that the lethal dose had
been less than 70 ceats worth of radium.
Amazingly, because of the long latency be-
tween exposure and disease, the U.S. Radium
Company nearly evaded culpability by invok-
ing the statute of limitations (5).

The deaths of the dial painters Plus the bur-
geoning casualty list of early x-ray workers
tolled the close of America’s uninhibited love
affair with radiation, But by then, some “ray.
vangelists” had already given in to tempta-
tion. Heady with newfound power thanks to

Vorked Fine Until
His Jaw Came Off —

eR

{Cancer Researcher Unearths
A Bizarre Tale of Medicine ‘
And Roaring ’20s Society
26.
Figures 25,26. (25) The Curies were to suffer
more than misspelling. Marie Curie died of radia-
tion-induced aplastic anemia. (From the New York
Journal, April 30, 1905. Reproduced, with permis.
sion, from the Hammer Collection, Archives Cen-
ter, National Museum of American History, Smith-
sonian Institution.) (26) The debt begins to come
due. as seen in the headline from a story detailing
the demise of a radium tonic user. From the Wall
Street Journal, August 1, 1990)

Volume 11 Number 6



WELLIANE JEAWOEER

tion.)

RAE TELLS HOWHE MADE
FE AWAKE IN RADIUM TEST

Abcidge Scientist Explains in Detail ‘to the “American” His Successful
-,. Experiment Which Prodi ced Spontaneous Generation. .

E.. rt. ; .
Rs o :
eee w Ae, TONE a 1908 173
Bi +

i

es

u
i

aay
fi

"cal wae Pyadabty Kops More Abyat Radian Stan Any Max is the

Figure 16. When radium could do ao wrong. (Article appeared in 1904; reproduced, with permission,
from the Hammer Collection, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian institu:

Figure 17. The most amazing
claim of all. In fact, quite the oppo-
site was to prove truc. (From the
New York Journal, Sune 21, 1905.
Reproduced, with permission, from
the Hammer Collection, Archives
Center, National Museum of Ameri-
can History, Smithsonian instivu-
tion)



- —e
64 RADIATION SAFETY AT LOS ALAMOS :

not a bone seeker. Polonium was very quickly absorbed by the bod;
But also sqley excreted, Other factors promoted the picture of a lesse,
san vga ler amount used, simpler technical operations. The avail.
quick, easy test for polonium in urine, some!
Se tenn only after strenuous efforts, also permite mages
of workers from the outset. Yet even at
mained unknown about the way bo! ium and plutei ae
y both polonium and plutoni
shaved in the body and about the full extent of the heeded *e

SAPETY AND RESEARCH

Meanwhile, however, safet

, safely demanded prompter action. With
Project doctors, Hempelmann Visited a radium-dial firm in Boston for
a firsthand look at hazard controls, His report set
up three committees to begin work on the problems,

mean obpenheimer stressed how much Los Alamos telied on Chicago.
® and resources put “your laboratory,” he noted, ”j t
better position than ours to undertake [this work}. The second on

vmittee began working on ‘designs for plutonium-handling equipment;

under Riad A. Popham Tnined as a botanist but diverted into other
the wat, Popham’s new job was to head the Chess
Metallurgy Division’s “central office for the control of the speed ee
; onetive health hazard.” The first task was to begin “regular moni
clivity of the dust in all laboratories.” Th :
could, Popham would enlist special r-up of rooms fn eh,
alists “for clean in whi
the hizard has gotten out of hand2? STEP Of room in wick

3 Knowledge about plutonium and
. “Sho check ee putonlum and proper means to detect it were both,
i Shr supply. Popham worked closely with Hempeimann to devi
expedient. One was the so-called swipe method of rubbing a T-squa
nicht Piece of oiled filter paper actoss a worki
the paper ina fixed alpha counter, Recorieg ere sting

tration, Both men would hi
more direct survey methods to this ea i

: is crade-‘makeahit
able alpha Counters Tinlte: sade nee

RADIATION SAFETY AT LOS ALAMOS" 65

samplers had as yet produced no results. That meant a second slopgap,.¥
nose counts. This technique involved swabbing inside a worker's no:

____or perhaps shifting him to a plutonium-free job, Nasal swabs provided

thls with filter paper, again measured in the fixed counter. Readings

igher than 100 counts per minute were somewhat arbilrarity deemed +
equize action, such as warning the worker to improve his technique

at best only a rough index of how much dust might have been inhaled.
The real problem, however, remained too little knowledge about the
ways plutonium behaved in the lungs and elsewhere in the body.

William Jesse’s Chicago instrument group was neither recalcitrant
nor incompetent. Radiological safety had not demanded alpha moni-
toring before the war. Although an alpha source, radium also emitted
much-easier-to-measure strong gamma rays. Fission products, (00,
tended toward strong gamma emission. As pile radiations and fission i
products seemed the most urgent problems during the project's first
years, the instrument group focused its limited resources on these
areas, Plutonium posed the first major hazard that could be detected, "»
essentially, only through its alpha activity. Methods existed, but largely
in the form of clumsy and touchy laboratory devices. Without com-y-
mercial sources to draw on, the Chicago group had not only-io désign,
and develop, but also to produce, what was needed, Los Alamos stood /
Jast in line. Chicago itself, the pilot plant in Tennessee, the production
plant at Hanford—all required instruments. Both more closely linked
to Chicago than Site Y, Sites X and W might well make demands easier
to hear. Their demands also came sooner. It was, after all, only when.
plutonium began io arrive from Tennessee and Hanford that Los Ala-
mos called for help.”

Shortages, however, accounted for only part of the problem. Each
site had special needs. Even when developed, the large, fixed alpha |
counters and air samplers suited for production plants scemed too
clumsy for Los Alamos. At Site Y concern centered on laboratory mon-__
ioring which cequited, GOGVE BI goo parable GaNGy melee. The {
only one yet available early in 1944 was the Met Lab’s Pluto, an ion- *
ization” chaniber sdapted tor alpha counting, {Tom_Los Algmosit j
looked far too insensitive. Pluto shortages thus only partly explained

why Site Y monitors persisted with the swipe methad. For ail the slow
and spotty results, swipes could detect much lower alpha levels.” Los
Alamos electronics experts strove to fill the gap. Their first effort
produced a new hand counter. Installed in Building D—where pluto- +



EBSCOhost Page 6 of 9

(N6.) National Radiological Protaction Board, “Risk of Radiation Induced Cancer at Low Doses and Low
Dose Rates for Radiation Protection Purposes,” Dacuments of the NRPB, vol. 6, no. 1.

(n7.) E. Ron et al., "Thyroid Cancer after Exposure to External Radiation, a Pooled Analysis of Seven
Studies,” Radiation Research, 1995, vol. 141, pp. 259-77.

{n8.) J. Stather, C. Muirhead, and R. Cox, "Radiation Induced Cancer at Low Doses and Low Dose
Rates,” Radiation Protection Bulletin, July 1995, no. 167, pp. 8-12.

(n9.) R. Edwards, "Natural Radiation May Kill Thousands,” New Scientist, May 4, 1996, p. 4.

(n10.) J. D. Shadley, V. Afzal, and S. Woolf, "Very Low Doses of X-rays Can Cause Human Lymphocytes
to Become Less Susceptible to tonizing Radiation,” Mutagenesis, 1987, vol. 2, pp. 95-97.

(n11.) "Sources, Risks, and Effects of lonizing Radiation," U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation (Vienna: United Nations, 1993).

(n12.) D. A. Pierce et al., "Studies of the Mortality of Atomic Bomb Survivors: Report 12, Part |, Cancer:
1950-1990," Radiation Research, 1996, vol. 146, pp. 1-27.

(n13.) "LNT Model Said Vindicated by New Data,” Nucleonics Week, November 14, 1996.

(n14.) Thomas P. Mancuso, et al., “Radiation Exposures of Hanford Workers. Dying from Cancer and —~
Other Causes," Health Physics, 1977, vol. 13, pp, 369-84; Stewart, "Radiation Dose Effects.”

(015.} B. Lindell, "Concepts of Collective Dose in Radiological Protection,” (Paris: Organization for

= Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agancy, 1984); Sfrahlen Sicherheit
Kommission, “Safety Codes and Guides, Possibilities and Limits of the Application of Collective Dose, A
Recommendation of the German Radiation Safety Commission, Edition 8," Gesellschaft fur
Reaktorsicherheit, 1985.

(n16.) For example, see "Estimating Extemalities of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Oak Ridge National
Laboratories and Resources for the Future (Washington, D.C.: McGraw-Hill, 1994); C.F. Guenther and C.
Thein, “Estimated Cost of Person-Sv Exposure,” Health Physics, 1997, vol. 72, pp. 204-221.

MAJOR SOURCES
(in person-Sieverts)
All bomb tests conducted in 30,000,000
the atmosphere worldwide
The Chernobyl accident 600,000
Worldwide nuclear power 400,000
production (to 1989)
Worldwide radioisotope 80,000
production and use (to 1989)
Nuclear weapons 60,000
fabrication (to 1988)
fen years of reprocessing 40,000

at Sellafield

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‘ , * EBSCOhost Page 3 of 9

contained many dissents from that January statement. One member pointed out that the society's
statement that low doses had no health effects was in conflict with the society's simultaneous
tecomimendation that risk estimates not be used for low doses. Another member pointed out that the
society's position sounded "mere political than scientific’. And a third correspondent predicted that the
statement “will ham the credibility of the [Society] as a radiation protection organization.”

4
Meanwhile, the American nuclear waste industry also became concerned. In duly 1996, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission was petitioned by its own advisory committee on nuclear waste, most of whose
members are representatives of industry, waming that there would be significant "societal" costs if the no-
threshold positron was adopted.(n4) In addition, the petition argued strongly against the idea of
“collective” or population-wide dose estimates when calculating risks.

The scientific debate

Epidemiological studies. Both sides agree that studies of Japanese bomb survivors show strong evidence
of adverse effects at a dose of 200 milliSieverts for adult survivors and 100 milliSieverts in the case of
children. Below that, the Health Physics Society says, there is an "inability fo detect any increased health
detriment.”

But most others disagree. They cite Alice Stewart's pioneering Oxford studies, which revealed that
children whose in utero exposures were as little as 10 to 20 milliSieverts had 40 percent more childhood
leukemias than those who were not exposed—a statistically significant increase in risk at low doses.(n5)

Although Stewart's work, published in 1970, was long attacked by nuclear industry proponents, |
‘subsequent studies have supported its main findings and govemment radiation authorities now quote the
Oxford studies without caveat.(n6)

in addition to Stewart's work, a 1995 study that pooled the resutts of seven epidemiological investigations |
showed a statistically significant increase in the incidence of human thyroid cancer in groups that received
doses of between 10 and 100 milliSieverts.(n7) .

Carcinogenesis, Perhaps more important than epidemioiogical studies, where there is always room for
argument, are recent advances in understanding how cancers are triggered. Radiobiologists now agree
that cancer can be initiated as a result of a single radiation track passing through a single cell nucleus.
(8) Most damage to cellular genetic material is corrected by repair enzymes. When cellular DNA is
misrepaired, however, it can result in a mutation that, years later, may develop into cancer.

= ” And if'a single track through’a single nucteus~the lowest possible radiation dose—can cause cancer,
then any exposure to radiation is hazardous. Of course, the odds that a particular individual will develop
cancer from a particular exposure are extremely low. Still, it means that one can no longer speak of a
“safe” dose level. A more troubling problem arises if one calculates the chance that some members of a
_ popuiation—not a particular individual—will develop cancer (calculated by adding all the individual
risks).

Background radiation. Everyone in the United States is exposed to 4 io 5 milliSieverts per year of
natural, or background, radiation from a variety of sources—radon, cosmic rays, and the nuclides found in
soil, diet, and in the body. Individuals may also be exposed to additional radiation through medical
diagnostic and treatment programs.

No-threshold opponents argue that because emissions from nuclear installations are already well below
background levels, there is no reason to worry. But this argument has always assumed that natural
radiation is safe, an assumption that is no longer tenable, given what we now know about carcinogenesis
at the cellular level. Background radiation has already been calculated to cause some 4-5 percent of
Britain's cancer deaths.(n9) Similar rates occur in the United States and other countries. The Intemational
Committee on Radiation Protection does not use background radiation as a criterion for acceptable
radiological practices.

DNA damage. The integrity of a cell's DNA is constantly under assault, mostly by thermodynamic

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38 ROLE OF CHICAGO HHALTH DIVISION
, fo hand. Confronted with der way and workers already %
atzisk, Woll choice. The radiation to which

workers were exposed should be “less than what is agreed on as being
safe (at present 0.1 r per day) )."* In another sense, however, the Pprob-_

Jem _was not so easy to resolve. What was agreed to be safe in the fall

‘0f_1942 could be regarded as only a atapgap. “Established tolerance
doses for X and gamma. xaye when the project began, Stone later ex-

plained, “rested on rather poor experimental evidence.

Unreliable though their basis might be, X-ray and gamma-ray stan-

dards existed; the Health Division at least had a body of accepted usage
for coping with the danger. For other hazards, even that was lacking,

Little or nothing was known about tolerance for neutrons or for alpha

and beta particles. For internal emitters—active substances swallowed,
inhaled, or otherwise taken into the body etained—the_problem
radium and radon Ted

ans

swaa more complex, The well-known hazards of
fo the first published standards in 1941. Less was known about radio-
Phosphorus and radiostrontium, nothing at all about tolerance for other
active nuclides. A tolerable burden of some active substance was the”
amount lodged in the body which could be borne without seeming
harm. Measuring body burdens in living subjects was tricky, and then
it_ provided only an_after-the-fact notice that, something had gone
wrong. The best measure of body burden, in any event, revealed noth-

about intake when metabolic path email esti ks.

“Intake not burden, was the crucial safety problem, but no one knew

qpuch about the relation of amounts taken in to amounts retained. As.

intake was almost al (ways inadvertent, measured daia scarcel i

‘The very meaning of tolerance dose for internal emitters, was unclear.
Repeatedly Stone insisted that the only safe practice was to try to avoid.
anyintake at all.”

Enough was known in 1942 to provide, in Cantril’s phrase, “base
fevels on which to build.” That was vital. Time pressed, and plans to
produce plutonium had to proceed from “calculation of hazards based
on such knowledge as already existed,” Stone recalled. Yet no one
questioned the need, he added, to check the assumed biological effects
“by experimentation as rapidly as possible.” Other steps also could
be taken. One seemed merely semantic. Althotigh “tolerance dose”
remained in use well into the postwar era, the preferred term changed
during World War Il, The new usage, “maximum permissible expo-
sure,” had begun to challenge the older term after the mid-1930s, In

ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALTIL DIVISION 39

one sense, changing new words for old meant little. Numbers at first
stayed the same. Maximum permissible gamma exposure was the same
0.1 roentgen per day the tolerance dose had been, In other ways, how-
ever, the shift was crucial. As the words themselves suggest, the new
term connoted a ceiling, an upper limit to exposure, in contrast with
the looser notion of tolerability implied bythe term it replaced.”

At the outset, no new findings supported the change. It was rather
a response to the clouded issue of radiation effects on living systems.
Biological intuition and medical experience, in fact, suggested that per-
sons exposed below some level would suffer no lasting damage. Given
the large number of workers and the huge scope of the project, how-
ever, Stone and most of his colleagues preferred the prudent course,
They acted almost as if they believed any exposure could be harmful,
as if no threshold existed, as if any body burden might cause damage.
They hoped research would provide better data than they had in 1942, ,
but the project was too urgent to wait upon final results. Time enough
later to raise the limits if research findings permitted. This course un-
doubtedly kept worker exposures well below what they might other-
wise have been.

HEALTH DIVISION RESEARCH

Much Health Division research was more applied than basic: testing +

and proving the tools and methods required to meet the project’s im-

mediate health and safety needs. Typical was health physics work on

film badges and pocket ionization chambers. But research was not lim-

ited to finding ways to measure individual doses. Instruments were
a

needed to detect and monitor the whol rays
i i ms were challenging, Each
sadionuclide had its own characteristic decay mode. Each kind of ra-

<dliation_presented its own problems and hazards, Fach workplace im-

‘posed its own special demands, Principles were all known before the
war, but few had been reduced to the kind of rugged, standard, and

-Feasonably easy-to-use instruments the project necded. The hard and
complex task of tuming theory into working tools lasted throughout -

the war and after.”

This effort was crucial to the entire project. Instruments were not
only designed and tested at the Met Lab, but in many instances they
were also produced in large numbers for use throughout the project.



16 ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALTH DIVISION

be troublesome received pocket ionization chambers, Readings were ¥
‘Fiken and recorded daily. Although a decade old, pocket chambers
yemained neither handy to use nor easy to buy, A prewar market

tadiation detection or monitoring devices of any kind scarcel ed.
Ordinarily, users made their own or did without, but pocket chambers

were modest exceptions. Victoreen Instrument Co. of Cleveland,

Offered the first commercial model in 1940, It was a simplified version
af the well-known Victoreen R-Meter, widely uged during the 1930s in.
X-ray therapy. Victoreen called the new system the Minometer. Com-
monly, however, workers used the name only for the separate instru-
ment required to charge and read the pocket chamber."

The chamber itself was an air-filled tube the size of a fountain pen.
it worked as a capacitor. A thin wire running through the center of
the tube and insulated from its walls stored an applied electrical charge.
fons produced in air by radiation neutralized the charge; the difference
between initial and final charge indicated how much radiation the
chamber had been exposed to. Requiring both charging and reading
on_a_ separate. ice, t) se, It was_alsi
none too reliable because other factors, like shock or moisture, might
affect _regults, Problems in volume manufacturing to Health Division
specifications were also slow to be resolved. To sidestep these draw-
backs, Herbert Parker suggested giving each worker two chambers. *
Using them in pairs became standard practice, sharply reducing the
ratio of bad readings. Since all errors increased apparent exposure, the
lower reading was taken as correct. By 1945 the pocket dosimeter was
far_more convenient than the chamber, Basically similar to the simple
chamber, it still required charging, but its wearer could read a built-in
dose scale directly through a system of magnifying lenses. Instruments
of this kind became one mainstay of personnel dosimetry throughout
the Manhattan Project.7~ .

+ Photographic film was the other mainstay of personnel dosimetry.
Pocket dosimeters provided direct monitoring of individual exposures.
Wearers could read them at any time and they were recharged daily.
Film served a different purpose. It recorded Cumulative exposure over
days or weeks, although film, too, might be processed on a daily sched-
ule. In September 1942 the use of film was still only in the planning
stage for the Metallurgical Project. Dental X-ray, film packets had been
on the market for two decades; for nearly as long, they had been used f
to warn workers against pending overexposure. By 1942 the technique

ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALTH DIVISION 37

was well known if not widespread. Standardization presented prob- 15
lems, as did questions about how photographic emulsions responded
to different kinds of rays."* Film's value thus remained chiefly quali-_
fative, as one dosimetry pioneer suggested in 1939: “If after a week of
‘exposure and standard development, none of the films is so dark that,
when it is put on a printed page in good light, the letters cannot be
distinguished through it, then protection is adequate.”

Quantification of film-recorded doses, however, made progress. Ther
greatly increased demands and resources of the wartime project pro-
moted still more. Film had drawbacks. Heat or moisture could distorty
readings. It was more sensitive to some kinds of rays than to others.
It could not provide immediate readings, ag it had to be process
it also promised a simple, cheap, and reasonably reliable way to check
the very large numbers of workers who might be exposed."* Wollan
planned to issue film packets “to all those for which there is any pos-
sibility of a radiation hazard existing,” He also intended “to have these
attached to the back of the badge.” All workers in the highly secret
project had to wear and display security badges. ‘the union of film and
badge, he noted, increased “the probability of the film and the indi-
vidual being together." It has remained a common pra

Wollan’s plans took unexpectedly long to mature. y 2
was that film response varied with energy of, gamma radiatio
Lower-energy rays produced more jons 8 than_higher-e:
ergy tays.. The same number of roentgens, in other words, at lower
energies iced darke “The answ. filters.
to flatten the response curve. The right choice of film and filter coul
give fairly even results over a useful range of energies. Linding the
right mix took time, A year of research on films, filler materials, and
filter thicknesses led the decision on an acceptable design, The
‘choice was a cadmium filter 1 millimeter thick packaged with two types
of film. One of the films carried a very sensitive emulsion which al-
lowed darkness to be measured wilh reasonable reliability over a range
from 0.03 to 3 roentgens. The second covered 1 to 20 roentgens. Only.
late in 1943 did film begin to join pocket chambers in tracking the. X-+

iad gamma-ray exposures of project workers.””
t the outset the most urgent question facing the Health Division
was the most basic one from a safety standpoint. Tohow much radia- %

tion might workers safely be exposed? In one sense, setting protection
standards was easy. The widely accepted prewar standards were ready



fadium per bottle. (c) This guarantee assureq
Radithor customers that they were getting the
real thing. Iconically, it was the manufacterers
Whose tonics contained too little radium thar fan
afoul of the law. (Figs 18b and 18¢ reprinted,
with permission, from reference 16.)

Radithor Guarantee

We Guarantee that every bottle of Radithor contains genuine
Radium and Mesothorium elements in triple-distilied water,

We Guarantee the strength of each bottle of Radithor.

We Guarantee that Radithor is produced under strictly sanitary
conditions in thoroughly sterilized bottles

We Guarantee that Radithor does not depend upon any drugs what-
og ter its efficacy and that any physiological revues ascribed
i Gadithor are due entirely to the action of the rave produced
by the radioactive elements contained therein

We Guarantee that Radithor is harmless in



42 ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALTH DIVISION

2Kenergy absorbed per unit ‘mass (ergs per gram) equivalent at a point

in the Body to exposure in roentgens, jological ef ied

with kind of ray, Parker derived a second
, factor, Termed ROE (Relative Biological B veness), it was found by
experiment for each kind of radiation, The measure of biological dose
was then the product of rep times RBE. Parker called it the “rem”
(roentgen equivalent mammal or man). “Roentgen equivalent biologi-
cal” might have made better logic; he rejected that term when he
learned that hearers might confuse rep and reb.® Parker completed the
4 new system in early 1944, Stone proposed it for the project at a Met
Lab meeting on 7 March.” Simple, thoughtful, and convenient, Par-
ker’a system won many users during the war. Security prevented its

« public dissemination until 1948, but not until the late 1950s did rem,
ihe dose unit, fully displace roentgen, the exposure unit,. as.the_basic.

measure in radiological safety.”
The Health Division’s medical section provided health services, but

Tike the health physics section it conducted research as well. Clinical
needs directed research chiefly in response to the project's direct health
and safety demands. Leon Jacobson’s blood studies and Albert Tan-
nenbaum’s toxicological work were typical. The research program also
included other contracted studies on human subjects. Participating
«were Memorial Hospital in New York, the Chicago Tumor Institute,
and the University of California Hospital in San Francisco, The subjects
were patients not expected to survive more than a year or two. They
received massive single, repeated, or continuous X-ray doses.” These
studies, as Cantril explained,

will give some useful information which we do not have on the effects
of whole body irradiation, They may permit an appraisal of the effects
after... at most 1-2 years, ... They also serve to judge the mag-
nitude of an exposure to which a man could be subjected in an emer-
gency and the length of time before restoration (as well as can be
judged from present laboratory methods).”

Researchers sometimes used themselves as guinea pigs; in one study
of the effects of external radiation on white blood cell counts, four
volunteers received up to 50 roentgens whole-body X-irradiation.
Other research was pursued outside the Chicago laboratories. The
Health Division sponsored or supported such efforts from the outset.
Some of these emerged as major programs in their own right, At the
National Cancer Institute in Washington, Egon Loren and his col-

ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALCH DIVISION 43

leagues began a small-scale study in the spring of 1941. They exposed
mice and other animals to relatively low levels of gamma tays over
extended periods of fime. Shortly after he joined the Health Division,
Stone visited Lorenz. Cooperation between the two groups followed.
Met Lab support allowed Lorenz, and his co-workers to expand theit
studies with a much more elaborate experimental facility. Barly in 1943
they could begin a new series of experiments using far larger numbers
of animals.”
The project at the University of California in Berkeley also had pre-
war roots. Joseph G, Hamilton had worked with Stone on studies of
cyclotron-produced active nuclides, later found to be fission products
as well. After Stone went to Chicago, Hamilton pursued the work un-
der Health Division auspices, Such studies were badly needed, as
Hamilton observed in his first report: “Of the 17 or more elements . . .
produced by uranium fission, only a few have been studied with regard
to their biological disposition.”*’ Little was known about the fate of
Sssion products once they entered an animal's bady. One question had
special bearing on tolerance. Did other radicelements share iodine’s
well-known trait of concentrating in a single organ or tissue? Biochem:
istry ignored radioactivity and thyroids collected all isotopes of iodine
indiscriminately. Many fission products, however, were isotopes of rare
elements with unknown biochemistry. What impact an active nuclide
might have remained guesswork. Using micrograms of radioclements
from the Berkeley cyclotron, Hamilton began tracing metabolic path-
ways of the products and their compounds.”"
‘The line between applied and basic research often bl
obseryed, “the clinical study of the personnel at exper
before large a collection of individuals been exp. >
{much itradiation.”@ Kenneth Cole’s experimental biology section,
however, was clearly intended to focus the division's basic research.
‘ilone was not the only one who believed that “beneath all of
»y which radiations, no matter wi

was tl their
«rigin, caused the changes in biological material. If this mechanism
stilt have been discovered, many of the problems would have been.
-tlapler."" Whether a full-scale basic research program could have been
tlosigned in 1942 must remain an open question. The dearth of sure
knowledge may have been too large a handicap.

In any event, wartime pressures precluded such an approach. As,
Canteil and Cole noted early, “work directly connected with immediate

lo



Figure 29. The selérighteous employ the aew science in attempts to foist dubious
with permission, from the Hammer Coll
Smithsonian Institution.)

sings. (Reproduced.
fection, Archives Center, National Museum of American History,

|
| |
|
|

136 E RadioGraphics @ DiSantis and DiSantis

Volume 11 Number6



vili

FOREWORD

complex task tha:
to be reviewed by DOE/NV staff and a Peer review iproup cag

completion, it was evident that at
had to be made available to the
legal claims had
with the nuclear
contained in this
counsels an accu

Teast some of the completed chapters

ce the late 1970s many
ernment in connection
& Program. Information
both plaintiff and defense

public soon, Sin
been placed against the gov
weapons atmospheric testin
manuscript could provide
irate perspective o, iologi
voy eg a ti n radiological safe ices it
ae “ ing foe Tt was decided that the condlusioe of the Mani ion

aKe & Boos it ded.
Plete the final review preesen oe Point em

ind efforts
ea , Proceeded to com-
1902 thru ee Process of the history of radiation safety from

on Devember fund 6, t9 panel f scene 2 fevew
‘inne of scientists and histo-

A nywetat note of nt and
prove Jadivihuls whe have given of the i
t {big Who reviewed the munuscript,
tO thanagement of the Nevada Opera

acknowledgmer

<' appreciation is extended t

it time to be interviewed and
The continued support from
ralions Office and DOE Head-
 PFORCAN supervision exter

Physics Division stat has been ¢ ‘tear
chael A, Marelli eI
tensive o

mation to Temoy
dlerment often expressed about

ve much of the spec-
testing of nuclear weapons,

the radiological safety

Health Physics Division

Nevada Operations Office
Las Vegas, Nevada

Bruce W. Church, Director

Preface

This volume benefits from the institutional and financial support of the
United States Department of Energy, successor to the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion. In 1977 officials from DOE’s Nevada Operations Office conceived
the need for a complete and reliable historical account of radiological
safety in nuclear weapons testing. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering
Co., Inc. (REECo), the support firm that has operated the Nevada ‘Test
Site for the Atomic Energy Commission and its successors for more
than three decades, hired me in 1978 to write that history. ft has grown
into a far larger project than any of us anticipated, this volume having
become but the first of two. The second, which is well under way,
traces the history of radiation safety in testing nuclear weapons from
the formation of the AEC after World War U until the present,

T have received much guidance from participants in the events 1 de-
scribe, not only in Nevada but everywhere in the country. Many in-
dividuals have allowed me to interview them, have read and com-
mented on all or part of the manuscript, and have encouraged or
otherwise aided me in this work. The names of those J have inter
viewed, many of whom also commented on drafl chapters, appear in
the list of interviews at the back of the book, but I here wish to extend
my heartfelt thanks for their help.

For reading the manuscript and otherwise contributing to the en-
deavor, the following members of REECo’s Environmental Sciences De-
partment deserve acknowledgment: Arden E, Bicker, Department Man-
ager; B, Lee Brown, former Dosimetry Research Project Manager:
Mernard B, Eubank, Technical Information Officer; Linda K. Jensen, Do-
simetry Research Project Staff Assistant; Linda M. Rakow, Dosimetry
Research Project Manager; Roger C. ‘Thompson, former Laboratory
Analysix- Superintendent; and fra, J. Wells, Senior Health Physicist.



Figures 1-3. (1) “Rourgen’s”
reuazing rays, announced by the Sp
Louts Post Dispatch on January 7,
1896. Reproduced, with perms.

ic examinations

in 1896. Little did
they suspect tha

t the test was

©xpOse the public t0 “the new

Sarvel.” Reproduced, with permis:
sion, from reference 3.)

Figure 4. Deawin,
for recreational ho,
Permission, from

8 of the Edison Vitascope, intended
ne BuOrOscopY. (Reproduced, with

Teference 4)

neem

Prermaenis sett 9 ap an

Volume 11 Number6



eigen smeyete n

Radiologic History

Exhibit  ~

Wrong Turns on Radiology’s

Road of Progress* .

David]. DiSantis, MD * Denise M. DiSantis, BS

w INTRODUCTION

Radiology has been blessed with remarkably insightful proponents and practitioners
since its inception. Consequently, the first century of radiologic practice has been
cone of unparalleled advance. Not unexpectedly, given this rapid ascent, American
radiology has occasionally suffered a mild case of the intellectual “bends.” Chroni-
cled herein are some of the missteps along the way.

mw AMERICA LEARNS OF X RAYS

Even the introduction of the new science to Americans was a bit off-key. The New
York Sun touted the mysterious “light that never was” on January 6, 1896 (Fig 1),
crediting its discovery to Professor Routgen [sic]. “Roentgen ray fever” promptly
became an American epidemic. With nearly 1,000 presentations and:articles dealing
with x cays appearing within the first year (2), it was obvious that both the medical
community and lay public were thoroughly enamored of the new marvel. Extended
(unshielded) fluoroscopy became de rigueur during physical examinations (Fig 2).
Long lines formed at public exhibitions where subjects underwent fluoroscopy for
hours (Fig 3) to amuse the customers (4). Advertisements for ladies’ x-ray-proof un-
derwear appeared, as did a (perhaps-tongue-in-check) bill in the.New Jersey legisla~
ture banning incorporation of x rays into opera glasses (5).

‘The popularity of.x rays can be traced in part to the efforts of Thomas Edison. Edi-
son’s entrepreneurial interest in x rays was aimed at increasing their public availabil-
ity, and so in 1896 he introduced a recreational home fluoroscopy unit (4) (Fig 4).
He anticipated even wider appeal for his new type of light bulb—an x-ray tube
coated with fluorescent paint (4) Fig 5).

mw ARE THESE RAYS SAFE?
Reports of skin damage after exposure to x rays began to appear as carly as 1896.
But the controversy regarding the injurious effect could not have been more heated.
Nikola Tesla blamed ozone for the daroage (3), while others thought it was some
sort of electrical burn. Dogmatic wrong-headed pronouncements did much to
muddy the issue (Fig 6). But danger lurked on both sides of the fluoroscopy screen.
After his assistant, Clarence Dally, became the first American x-ray casualty, Tho-
mas Edison observed, “Experimental work with x-rays will be but slightly affected by

Todex terms: Radiations, injurious effects + Radiology and radiologists, history
RadioGraphics 1994; 11:1121-1138

+ From the Deparment of Radiology, DePaul Medical Center, Eastern Virginia Medical School, 150 Kingsley Ln, Norfoll,
VA 23505. Recipient ofa Certifieate of Merit fora scientific exhubit ar the 1990 RSNA scienufic assembly. Received August
7, 1991; accepted August 22. address reprint requests to DJ.D.

RSNA, 1991

See also the articfe by Sirr (p 1068) in this issuc.



‘ " EBSCOhost Page 5 of 9

or doses to small populations living near nuclear facilities.

‘Two reports in the mid-1980s provide theoretical underpinning to the concept of collective dose. Both
reports recommended that, since radiation protection practices are concerned with the protection of the
population as whole, potential collective as well as individual harm should be calculated.(n15) The ICRP
has also endorsed the use of collective dose: “Radiation detriment should be explicitly included,” and
“collective effective dose is an adequate representation of the collective detriment.” The ICRP is also
concerned that collective dose be kept "as low as reasonably achievable," as the regulations of most
European countries require.

Death and money

if the practice of calculating collective dose is adopted, there will be great controversies over attempts to
transiate from dose to detriment—that is, to calculate damages in terms of deaths or their money
equivalents. For instance, one can predict that the collective doses from Britain's Sellafield fuel
reprocessing plant will cause 200 excess cancer deaths worldwide each year (over all future time) for
every year that Sellafield’s emissions remain at the present level.

Cost-benefit studies may use collective dose to caiculate whether it is worthwhile to carry out remedial
work or to end certain processes. For instance, if the ICRP’s per-Sievert risk factor and an estimated
value of $3 million for each loss of life were used, the global cost of Selfafield’s annual estimated
emissions would be $615 million.(n16)

Despite their uncertainty, the global effects of collective doses and their monetary costs should be
calculated for discharges from military and civilian nuclear facilities, and they should be included in
environmental impact statements for proposed nuclear facilities, nuclear waste dumps, and final
repositories,

‘Such caiculations will undoubtedly raise questions about the environmental costs of proposed nuclear
facilities. This concern is reflected in the opposition to collective dose measurements expressed by the
Health Physics Society and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's nuclear waste advisory committee.

The inescapable problem for the Health Physics Society and the nuclear industry is that, as knowledge of
radiation’s effects continues to increase, it becomes more and more apparent that those effects must be
taken more seriously than once thought.

Over the past 100 years, exposure limits steadily have been tightened as more knowledge has been
acquired about radiation effects. Whether they like it or not, global collective dose estimates will
increasingly become a part of the language of both environmental agencies and pressure groups, and

they will make their way into environmental impact statements and other assessments of nuclear
operations.

(n1.} 1990 Recommendations of the ICRP, ICRP Publication No. 60, Intemational Commission on
Radiation Protection, 1991.

(n2.) "Risk of Radiation Induced Cancer at Low Doses and Low Dose Rates for Radiation Protection
Purposes,” Documents of the NRPB, vol. 6, no. 1.

(n3.) "Radiation Risk in Perspective, Position Statement of the Health Physics Society," HPS Newsletter,
January 1996.

{n4.) "The Health Effects of Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation,” press release, Office of Public Affairs,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1996.

(n5.) Alice M. Stewart and George W. Kneale, "Radiation Dose Effects in Relation to Obstetric X-rays
and Childhood Cancers,” Lancet, 1970, vol. 42, pp. 1185-88.

http://0-web8.epnet.com iii.sicl.org/citation.asp?tb=1&_ug=sid+28424B03%2D2443%2D4..._ 1/26/2006



+ | * EBSCOhost Page 4 of 9

instabilities or attacks by chemical radicals. Because almost all of the resulting DNA breaks are repaired
with great fidelity, those who adhere to the idea of a safety threshold claim that a few more breaks pose
an insignificant risk.

But this claim ignores the nature of repair. Damage caused by heat instability or chemical radicals affects
only one of the two strands that make up the DNA; in repairing the break in a single strand, the other
strand is used as a template. Radiation, however, is more likely to cause double-strand DNA breaks,

f which have a greater risk of misrepair.

“Adaptive response." Many nuclear proponents point to research findings that appear to show that cells
given smail doses of radiation suffer tess damage when subsequently given larger doses than cells that
Feceived no preliminary dose.(n10) In other words, they say that cells benefit from low doses in some
circumstances.

‘They postulate that a low priming dose of radiation may increase the number of enzymes available to
repair subsequent radiation damage. But this argument ignores the enormous capacity already available
for repair, and the fact that it is fidelity of repair, not the number of repairs, that is critical. The U.N.
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation examined the notion of “adaptive response” in
1993, and concluded that while it was an interesting phenomenon that occurs in some cell systems at
Various stages of development, it had litte relevance in radiation protection.(n11)

The latest word

In 1996, the latest mortality data from the continuing study of Japanese A-bomb survivors was published,
revealing a statistically significant upward trend of risk with doses in the region of 50 milliSieverts.(n12)
Warren Sinclair, president emeritus of the U.S. National Committee for Radiation Protection, concluded
that these new results vindicated the position the ICRP took in 1991.(n13) The results are another blow to

the Health Physics Society's claim that there is no scientific proof of negative effects at exposures below |
100 milliSieverts. The Academie des Sciences has concluded that these new results require it to
reconsider its position on the no-threshold theory.

Three important findings come out of the latest study of survivors: on effects at low exposures, on the
shape of the dose-response curve, and on gender and age differences in response to radiation, The
increasad statistical power of the study, with five added years (to 1990) and 10,000 additional subjects,
allowed the authors to divide the population that received lower exposures into three groups that received
estimated doses of no more than 20, 50, or 100 milliSieverts. | . a an

Excess cancers occurred in each group, and the authors conclude that the “data do not suggest the
existence of a threshold below which there is no excess risk.” Their results are also consistent both with
Stewart's study on fetal exposures, and Thomas Mancuso's study of workers exposed at Hanford, both of
which involved low exposures. Indeed, Stewart's study of pregnant women showed a linear relationship
down to 10 milliSieverts.(n14) (It should be noted that all the subjects in these studies were exposed to
similar rates of background radiation.)

Although the latest survivor study suggests a straight dose-response curve the authors also raise the
possibility of a “superiinear" relationship~that is, that the incidence of some solid cancers increases more
steeply at lower doses.

‘The latest survivor study also found important cancer mortality differences by gender and age at the time
of the bombing: Generally, risk dropped as age at exposure increased. Women were at twice the risk as
men when exposed af the same age, and children under 10 were at greatest risk.

Collective dose

The ICRP'S adoption of a no-threshold model for radiation effects has stimulated renewed interest in
calculating collective dose. Until recently, this concept was used mainly for collating occupational doses

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40 ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALTH DIVISION

They also served many purposes beyond health and safety. Health
physics, in fact, worked closely with William P, Jesse’s instrument
group in the Met Lab’s Physics Division. Jesse had received his Ph.D.
in physics from Yale in 1924 and joined the University of Chicago a
decade later. His research centered on X-ray crystallography, cosmic
rays, and the ionization of gases. Like others engaged in such research,
he learned a great deal about making instruments. He was among the
first members of the Chicago faculty tapped for the Metallurgical
Project.”

Ionization of gases, Jesse's specialty, was by far the most common
basis for instruments. Nuclear radiation can be detected only through
some effect of its interaction with matter. Of such effects, ions
produced in gas are often the most useful. A device like the pocket
chamber described above works electrostatically; the ions neutralize the
charge. Connecting a power supply—normally a battery—attracts ions
to the electrodes and allows the ion charges to flow in a circuit. This
current flow can be precisely measured even at very low levels. This
process in turn provides a measure of the radiation intensity that
caused the ionization. Ionization chambers were one of the two main
classes of instruments used at the Met Lab. They had been widely
employed before the war in X-ray work. Commercial models were on
the market and could be adapted without too much trouble to measure
gamma rays, and they could also serve for beta radiation.

The second class of instruments comprised proportional and Geiger-
Miller counters. At voltages higher than those used by ionization
chambers, freed clectrons acquire enough energy to create new ions.
The effect is called gas amplification. Over a certain voltage range, it
increases current flow in proportion to initial ionization events. Devices
working in’ this range are called proportional counters, At still higher
voltages, proportionality fails. A single ionizing event may trigger an
avalanche of electrons throughout the detector gas and produce a large
electrical pulse. This is the working region of Geiger-Miller counters,
named for the two German scientists who perfected the first such de-
vice in 1928. Proportional counters were, for the most part, still hand-
made laboratory devices when the war began,” ‘The Manhattan Project
changed that because their major use was alpha detection, a special
project concern, Plutonium is chiefly an alpha emitter. Massive and
highly charged, alpha particles present little threat outside the body;

even a sheet of paper will block them, But plutontum, like y

ROLE OF CHICAGO HEALTH DIVISION AL

proved to be a_bone seeker. It might produce the same “horrible re-

sults... . [as] radium salts taken into the body.”” Alpha counters be-
came, the subject of intense work throu; shout the war, The result was
an array of devices to check workers and to survey workplaces: hand,

face, and foot counters, air samplers, and survey meters.with. nick-
Aames like Pluto, Sneezy, Poppy, Zeus, and Juno,

Neutrons presented the most difficult

, makers. Electrically neutral, their effects on matter differed widely from

hose“of charged particles. From a safety standpoint, the hazard also
depended closely on their speed and en hich vary over a'wide

range: Monitoring Tigh-spéed neutrons in the presence of gamma rays
presented special problems. One answer was a device called Chang
and Eng, named after the famous Siamese twins because of its twin
chambers; the first chamber measured the combined neutron-gamma
effect, the second, gamma only. The current from the gamma-only
chamber subtracted from the other chamber’s current gave the neutron
reading. Slow (low-energy) neutrons required a different technique,
based on their reaction with boron to form lithium and alpha particles.
Filled with a gaseous boron compound or fined with boron, alpha
counters could thus be adapted to count neutrons.”

In a sense, instruments themselves might define the hazards. The
Health Division adopted a tolerance dose for neutrons of 0.01 neutron
unit per day. The unit was “that quantity of fast neutron radiations
which will produce a reading of one roentgen on a Victoreen condenser
' meter when using the 100 r chamber.” Exposure levels were often
expressed as instrument readings. Thus the maximum permitted alpha
level on work surfaces became 50 units on Pluto, the first alpha survey
meter produced at the Met Lab, Five units on an alpha hand counter
slefined the limit for hands, 50 counts per minute on another device,
that for faces. In the health Physics section, research fell chiefly to
‘terbert Parker's protection measurements Sroup. Instruments were
hot the sole concern. Parker alsa faced the old problem of findi a
iubrctory units to relate the physics of ionization to biological effects.” 7?

‘The roentgen was defined only for Xand gamma rays, but the project
laced, Parker noted, the “practi ing the doses_re-
ceived by a large group of workers from quantum radiation, alpha,
hota, and neutron radiation.” The answer was a common unit. The
key choice was t6 base ion energy absorbed. rather than on_ions
3 ra “produced. ‘The “rep” (roentgen equivalent physical) mea: dose as

roblem for the instrument~ 4



Figures 20-22. (20) “Hot” plate. Scintigram ofa
Fiestaware dessert dish. These uranium-glazed dishes
were produced from 1935 10 1971. Acidic foods can
leach traces of uranium out of the glaze (5). (Courtesy
of Claude Hesselman, DePaul Medical Center, Not:
folk, Va.) (23) A perky German advertisement (ca
1935) for radioactive toothpaste. The rays were said
to provide a “healthful massaging of the gums.”
(Courtesy of Ben Z, Swanson, Jc, MD, Baltimore.)
(22) Participants gambled with higher stakes than
they imagined. The wheel, balis, and chips were
coated with luminescent radium paint. (Article ap-
peared in 1904; reproduced, with permission, from
the Hammer Collection, Archives Center, National
‘Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institu-
tion.)

,
4
ai

Doramad Lebpaste cxpeitzt uabadiche Frtche!
21.

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Formats: Ea citation BauTML Full Text

Title: NO DOSE TOO LOW, By: Fairlie, lan, Resnikoff, Marvin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
00963402, Nov/Dec97, Vol. 53, Issue 6
Database: MasterFILE Premier

“Choose Languag

NO DOSE TOO LOW
Contents A high-stakes battle rages over the risks of low-level radiation.
Ye current
controversy IS THERE A SAFE LEVEL OF RADIATION? \s there some standard belong
. which exposure is harmless? Maybe even "good for you?” Years a;
French complaints _ragjation scientists believed just that. Very low doses of radiation were harmless
The United States to human health, they said. and some argued that very small exposures actually
The scientific debate had a positive effect
E- The latest word Over time, however, those views have lost favor, and they are now aired mainly

Collective dose by those who appear to have a pro-nuclear bias. Today, most of the world's

radiation scientists believe that even very small doses of radiation—those that
Death and money are well below background levels and whose effects are difficult to detect

s MAJOR SOURCES _ increase the risk of developing cancer, however slightly.
That view was officially endorsed in 1991, when the Interna! vemational Commission on Radiation Bratecition.
ba oe (IGRP}adopted the "linear-no-threshald” fhodél, a theory that hi been around, io various fomms,for
decades. A wide variety of studies—of Japanese A-bomb survivors, nuclear workers_and children who
had been exposed with medical equipment—are often cited in support of the no-threshold theory, as well

as regent studies that implicate “natural” or background radiation as the cause of many cancers.
Although the no-threshold theory is now widely accepted by every major intemational organization
concemed with radiation risks, it continues to be a matter of controversy becaus:

radiation scientists, particulary inthe Unfed States and France, cil hold to the eater view that low
doses-ere-harmtess-/ And the views of American scientists in particular remain influential in setting
radiation standards in the U‘S. nuclear industry.

Fave serous onc implications for the neclear indetry, ond they, could have implications in Taweultee aver

The current controversy

: http://0-web8.epnet.com iii.sicl.org/citation.asp?th=1&_ug=sid+28424E03%2D2443%2D4... 1/26/2006



4 INTRODUCTION:

"Health and safety, in fact, may well have posed some of the least

baffling problems tw contront the Manhattan Project. Routine industrial.

safety proved to 1 e the more intensive effort, though deeper con-
special hazards, Jn the event, prewar standards _

spite the host of new and exotic active substances _

produced in the piles. Aithough applied on a vastly larger scale, the.

INTRODUCTION 5

Protecting laboratory workers became the first task of the small Los
_Alamos Health Group.

trial-and-error methods devised dver four decades to protect radiation

4 workers mostly met The ne . Radiation sources were shielded, careful

Laboratory crises, however, paled before other strains on Health 2
Group resources when the first plutonium-bomb design proved un-

work habits instilled, workplaces closely watched, workers screened to
detect carly signs of damage. Setting standards and seeing them en-
forced were the first tasks of the Health Division,
Those responsible for project health and safety had other concerns
as_well. Much Health Division research addressed urgent questions
about handling and using the Inany unfamiliar substai ji
required.’ Researchers also explored problems more likely to matter in
the longer run. How valid were extant standards? Were all the risks,
toxicological as well as radiological, fully perceived? Did new and
strange substances pose unknown risks? Were there better ways to de-
tect radiation? Could radiation-caused damage be treated if not pre-
vented? Such questions evoked a wide-ranging research Program that
sometimes threatened to overshadow ‘more routine work in clinical
medicine, health physics, and industrial safety. Health Division opin:
ion was itself Mivided about the wisdom of spending scarce resources
on_basic research while war raged; army officers running a crash pro-_
gram_showed even less enthusiasm. Although research produced re-_.
sults——better instruments, enhanced knowledge, even new protecti
concepts——safety remained closely modeled on prewar theory and prac-
fice. The main difference was the vastly Jarger scale of the wartime
work, which meant vastly enlarged -hapter 2 recounts Chi-
cago Health Division efforts to balance wartime demands against long-
term safety,

& Throughout the Manhattan Project, radiological safety began with

good housekeeping. Car housekesping. Carera handling ‘of active subtances and proper
i inst radiation largely protected workers from dangerously,
hi, tamination or ex,

sure. But turning fissile metals into.
-bombs posed new, and sometimes greater, dangers people as-
signed to the weapons labora ory at Los Alamos in noi New Mex-
ico first fac unprecedented hazards of making a nuclear bomb,

Starting from scratch under intense wartime pressures, they struggied

ee

in mid;1944. Developing new designs entailed a series of haz-
wcriae aa experiments in the canyons around Los Alamos during.
the next six months, A young scientist likened one of those experi-
ments to “tickling the tail of a sleeping dragon.” Probably no more
than a casual quip, the comment nonetheless tapped a deep vein of
meaning. In the lore of dragon hunting, the septile’s potent tail pose
a special danger: Its thrashing might inflict unexpected damage on the
unwary hero even after the animal itself had received its death wound,
Metaphorically, the dragon's tail aptly symbolizes the “special hazards
of the Manhattan Project and, perhaps even more aptly, the key pro-
es ting nuclear weapons,
“the esperieontl findings in late 1944 and carly 1945 resolved some sp
doubts, but not all. Bomb makers felt compelled ta test their gadget.
“Gadget” was the word they used. One reason, of course, was secrecy,
Pethaps 50 homely a word also eased the minds of men and ‘wonien
facing a monstrous unknown. In any event, esting the first bomb
-posed safety problems far more serious than even the broadest mean--
ing of good housekeeping might span. Planning had been under way
for a year when the decision for a full-scale field test, code-nam
inity, was made in March 1945, Although the desert site in southern
New Mexico was chosen, in part, for the sparsity of its nearby pop-
«lation, the most violent man-made explosion in history would still +
pose public danger. Radioactivity might pose even more serious hi i
utds, and workers at the test site might not be the only ones at risk.
" Clouds of plutonium dust or fission products could threaten health and
| fives miles downwind from the blast. When they decided to conduct,
"the test, planners judged other factors to outweigh the potential dan-
* _yers. Minimizing the risks fell to the Health Group. Chapter 3 descibes
“how the group planned to do so, and how it coped with the other
* challenges that carried Los Alamos to the brink of Trinity, oh
Initially at least, testing the gadget seemed a difficult but straight-



Figure 9. Photograph shows multiple, ulcerating
squamous cell carcinomas on the hand of an early
radiologist. (Reproduced, with permission, from
reference 3.)

.  \ieror X Ray CORPORATION Hsnyiiel ad

manuracrunens oF e Victor X- TPO
nan reece arora X-RAY AppARATUS.CooLioce Tuaes ANS vncstazen easonaronits the Victor X-Ray Co.
"ewienes, PHYSIOTHERAPY APPARATUS sexggeengens ration, just $385. (Re-
ee . " produced, with permis-
my enicaco sion, feo the Hammer
iG) prin oot, 192. Collection, Archives
. . - Center, National Mu-
The Kempsmith Mfg. Ce., 7 . seum of American His-
silwankee, Wee. : tory, Smithsonian Insti-
me tation.)
Gextienen:

groa your letter of april 2lst, w¢ sestme
thet you are interested ia suall portable high fre~
quoney oatfits for we in veaaty parlore, fhe snall~
Toe type of outfit whicd we santtacture tor high tre-
qancy and teeatcent work 19 degoribeé in the salie-
Hin exclogsd. he price is $965.00, std is arreaged
for sluerneting scrvent, thie outfit of ocarse 10
Geosgued prinorsiy Zor ace by the pkystesens, ant
Seale possibly be too high in prise to perait of its |
ise by your eastexer, i

ever, if we cea be of any earvice te yor,
please do not hesitate ic calling on use :

Yours very truly.

¥ CORBORSTION.

tae woe

DiSantis and DiSantis m RadioGraphics W 1125


hee su tates

Figure 15. Advertisement for a combination radium insecticide and furniture pol

tually no potential market escaped the assault of the radium entrepreneurs. (Reproduced,
with permission, from the Hammer Collection, Archives Center, National Muscum of
American History, Smithsonian Institution.)

Patras

1128 @ RadioGrapbics WM DiSantis and DiSantis

Volume 11 Number 6


2 INTRODUCTION

mittee assigned to evaluate the test. Dismayed salvage teams could
scarcely approach most of the target vessels for days; some ships re-
mained off limits much longer. Worse than aborted salvage plans,
spreading contamination began to threaten the task force’s own sup-
Port ships and crews, Vigorous efforts by the radiological safety section
forestalled apparent harm to any member of the task force, but many
safety experts saw too close a call for comfort,

Bombs bursting in air—like the one over Bikini lagoon in the first
Crossroads test—-caused few radiological safety problems. Radioactive
debris (little enough in any case) rose too high, stayed aloft too long,
and scattered too widely to pose any danger when falling finally to
earth. These results may have helped obscure the warning implicit in
the first test of an atomic bomb, Trinity, in July 1945, a warning already
muted by good luck and wartime secrecy, Detonated atop a hundred-
foot tower and sucking huge amounts of earth and other debris into
the rising fireball, it produced enough fallout to alarm those in charge.
Superficially burned livestock, however, suffered the only certain dam-
age. As the danger passed, urgent wartime demands discouraged
dwelling on might-have-beens. Crossroads Baker left no such easy exit.
Testing nuclear weapons clearly posed hazards more severe than even
the most expert scientists had fully anticipated.

Radiation safety had been recognized fifty years earlier as a far more
modest problem. Before World War Il, those chiefly at risk were limited
numbers of doctors and technicians working with X-ray machines or

radium. Safety centered on the concept of tolerance, the amount of ”

radiation living systems could absorb without irreparable damage. Tol-
erance doses measured in roentgens became the formal basis for self-
imposed X-ray safety codes by the mid-1930s. Concern aroused by the
fate of dial painters and other victims led to such codes being extended
to radium, then to radon. Standards for tolerable body burdens of ra-
dium and for air concentrations of active gases were published in 1941.
These three basic standards—for X rays and gamma rays, for ingested
radium, and for airborne radon—-framed the structure of safety in the
fission-bomb project. But much remained unknown or ‘uncertain as the
United States launched what the postwar world learned to call the
Manhattan Project, the bold venture to design and produce the first
atomic bombs.

When the project began in 1941, some basic Properties even of the
natural radioelements remained question marks; their effects on living

INTRODUCTION 3

things were still less clear. Yet they were well known compared with
Properties of the active materials used in the bomb project—pluto-
nium, enriched uranium, the products of fission—maierials that would
require handling in amounts vastly larger than all the radium ever
used. Special concerns centered on making plutonium and culling it
from fission products. Piles that converted uranium to plutonium
produced radiation levels far higher thar’ any met in the past. Pluto-
nium itself, discovered only in 1941, was a complete unknown. And
danger might now threaten not merely doctors and technicians by the
hundreds, but workers of all kinds by the tens of thousands. Most
would know little about the dangers, and few could be told much in
a highly secret project. Possible risks to the public compounded the
problem, as larger numbers of potential victims offset the presumably
lesser danger to any single person.

The bomb makers foresaw these problems. Knowing the hazards,
they accepted the need to protect workers and the public against undue
exposure, Soon after starting work on plutonium, therefore, the Met-
allurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago formed a health di
vision as full partner to its Physics, Chemistry, and Engineering di-
visions, The Health Division first adapted existing standards and
practices to safeguard Chicago project workers. It also launched re-
search programs to learn more about the hazards and the means of
coping with them. Ultimately, the entire Manhatlan Project modeled
its health and safety effort on Chicago practice and research, Chapter
I surveys the base upon which the Health Division built, the half cen-
tury of attempts before World War Il to counter the hazards of X rays
and radium and to devise workable standards for their safe use.

Health Division experts believed they could hold radiation risks, the

“special hazards" in project usage, to tolerable levels. Y a
i it whether they did or not might have-mattered_title-Health.

hazards _did_not_rank highest among the risks of gambling large

‘qmounts of

untested theories into working weapons. Early in World War JI, no risk

outweighed the threat of a Nazi bomb. A German laboratory was the

scene ofthe first recognized nuclear fission in 1939, After the war be-

1, Allied intelli cking
he prospect of seeing Nazi Germany first {o make so awesome

W_weapab was a horror against which almost any risk seemed worth,



i"

Bleaching the Negro to Bé Tried
with it at California
University,

X-RAY WILL BE USED, TOO.

| SAX FRANCISCO, Jan, 21—Radium wil!
be used with the X-ray in a serfes of statt-
Hag experiments at the University of Cxlt-
fornia. Anattempt will be made to ture
the skin of @ negro white. .
t The tests have been undertaken by Rob-
‘ert A. Rees. a senior in, the College of
i Chemistry, under the direction of - profes-
‘sore, ‘The X-ray will be combined with the
jradium in the experiments, and the effects
lof the taro on the coloring cells of the body
| will be" determined, a
Figure 30. More experiments in human “better-
ment." (Article appeared in 1904, reproduced, with
permission, from the Hammer Collection, Archives
Center, National Museum of American History,
Smithsonian Institution.)

_

Figure 31. As this photograph of 2
1990 cereal box attests, radiation
remains fully assimilated into cur-
rent culture. A careful look at the
hands of this famous threesome,
however, reminds us of the hazards
of “xray” viewer overase. (Cour
tesy of Kellogg Corporation.)

radiation, they sought to reshape society
more to their liking (Figs 29, 30). Even
William Rollins, the patron saint of early radia-
tion safety, succumbed briefly to the dark side
of the force, as evidenced by his article titled
“On the importance of treating the generative
organs of degenerates by X light to prevent
their increase” (19). Happily, the period was
brief when radiology journals’ pages were
sullied with titles such as “Sterilization in the
interests of race betterment” (20).

m CONCLUSION

Only the benefit of the “retrospectoscope”
permits a smug review such as this one. The
giants who piloted radiology through the
groping, formative years stand no less tall for
these brief detours from the true path. And
though the applause for the blessings of radia-
tion has been tempered by recognition of its
perils, the sheer fascination with it remains
undiminished (Fig 32).

Acknowledgments: Special thanks to Nancy
Knight, PhD, American College of Radiology, and
Thomas Xenakis, MA, Art in Medicine, Norfolk, Va.

Noveniber 1991

DiSantis and DiSantis M RadioGraphics

m 1137


PREFACE

Special thanks must go to William J. Brady, Department ‘Technical Ad-
visor, who shared with me his knowledge of nuclear weapons testing
and critically reviewed every one of my drafts; he saved me from more
mistakes than I care to contemplate,

Mr. Brady also chaired the review panel, all of whose members I
wish to thank for their painstaking and detailed examination of the
final draft of The Dragon's Tail for accuracy, integrity, and readability.
Other members of the review panel were Robley D. Evans, Professor
Kmeritus of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Louis H.
Hempelmann, [r., M.D., Professor of Radiology, University of Roches-
ter, and former Health Group Leader, Los Alamos National Laborator
Richard G. Hewlett, History Associates Incorporated, and former AEC
and DOE Chief Historian; John S, Malik, Scientific Advisor for under-
ground testing, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Test Panel mem-
ber, Nevada Test Site; and William H. McNeill, Robert A. Millikin Dis-
Unguished Service Professor of History, University of Chicago.

Many other current and former members of DOE, the Defense Nu-
clear Agency, and their contractors have also assisted me in various
ways. So, too, have the many scholars and interested laypersons from
whose comments and other help I have further profited. All are in-
cluded in the list of reviewers, I wish to thank them, as well as those
named in the list of interviews.

Last and most important, I thank Sally L. Hacker, although thanks
seems too inadequate a word. Professional responsibilities, hers and
mine alike, have separated us physically, but distance has never di-
minished her support—emotional, spiritual, and intellectual—for a
Project that more than once might otherwise have seemed discourag-
ingly endless and thankless.

Whatever virtues this book may attain owes much to those who have
given 30 freely of their time and knowledge. Its flaws reflect, in part,
iny difficulty in taking full advantage of all the advice I have received.
In the final analysis, I bear full responsibility for what I have written,
but no one knows better than I that it could not have been done un.
aided.

Las Vegas, 1984 B.C. H.

Introduction

RADIATION SAFETY IN WORLD
WAR II

The central Pacific morning of 25 July 1946 dawned bright and clear-
ing over Bikini atoll. Scientists finished checking gear aboard barge
LSM-60 and left the lagoon just after six o’clock, Ninety fect below the
barge hung a watertight caisson holding an atomic bomb; it was the
fifth such device ever used, all in little more than a year, but the fast
for many months to come. Above the barge towered a radio antenna
to receive the coded firing signal at How hour, 8:35 A.M., two and a
half hours later. As the moment neared, only a few low-lying clouds
and scattered high cumulus lingered as reminders of predawn rain
squalls and lightning, On the lagoon‘s calm surface floated a mighty
fleet, seventy-four vessels ranging, from aircraft carrier and battleship
to concrete barge and landing craft. The vessels carried stores, muni-
tions, and fuel, but no voice broke the stillness, no human being
stirred. It was called the ghost fleet: an anchored armada arrayed to
show the effects of a shallow undexwater atomic explosion. A cautious
distance away at sea, Joint Army-Navy Task Force One awaited Baker,
the second test of Operation Crossroads.

Caution proved well advised. The bomb performed as expected, not
surprising for the same plitonium-fission model already tried near Ala-
mogordo and over Nagasaki the year before, and in Crossroads Able
carlier that July, The surprise came in what followed. As thousands
upon thousands of tons of water collapsed back into the lagoon, a
surging wall of radioactive mist blanketed the ghost fleet. "These con-
taminated ships became radioactive stoves,” observed the military com-



EBSCOhost Page 7 of 9

Ten years of reprocessing 30,000
at Le Hague

The Kyshtum accident, 1957 2,500
The Windscale (Sellafield) 2,000

accident, 1957

All underground nuclear 200
tests worldwide

The Three Mile Island accident, 1979 40

(*) Using a conventional risk factor of

5 percent per Sievert, it has been predicted
that the nuclear tests that were conducted in the
atmosphere will--over the next 10,000
years--cause 1.5 million people to contract
potentially fatal cancers.

The authors suggest that reprocessing at Sellafield, on Britain's northwest coast, will
cause 200 excess cancer deaths yearly.

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- . ° EBSCOhost Page 2 of 9

When the ICRP, a voluntary intemational commission that makes recommendations on radiation
dosimetry and limits, issued Publication 60, 1990 Recommendations of the ICRP, calling for lower limits,
it set off considerable controversy.(n1) The ICRP proposed that radiation doses to the general population
and to workers in the nuclear industry should be kept to very low levels below background. The proposal
was significant, because most countries, excluding the United States and Russia, follow the commission's
recommendations in setting national standards.

Publication 60 recommended reducing radiation limits for workers from 50 milliSieverts {5 rem) to an
average of 20 per year, and limiting permissible exposures to the general public from 5 milliSieverts to
one. These standards have now been adopted by a variety of other organizations, including the U.N.
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency, the
World Health Organization, Britain's National Radiological Protection Board, anid the European Union.

| {n the United States, the National Radiation Protection Committee, the National Research Council's

7 Committee on Biological Effects of lonizing Radiation, and the Environmental Protection Agency have all
endorsed the no-threshold theory, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has yet to adopt the ICRP'S
recommended exposure limit. The current U.S. standard for workers remains at 50 milliSieverts per year.
However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's standard for the public is already 1 milliSievert.

Meanwhile, the lower limits~and the no-threshold theory behind them--have provoked a heated debate in
some quarters~-in professional associations, radiation and nuclear industry conferences, radiation
Journals, and on various e-mail listservers. The controversy, which has continued for more than six years,
shows few signs of abating.

French complaints

initial complaints about the recommendations in Publication 60 came mainly from radiation authorities in
countries whose governments were strongly pro-nuclear—France, Canada, and Japan.

France is committed to nuclear power, with about 75 percent of its electricity capacity derived from
nuclear plants. The French government was particularly concerned about the effect that tighter limits
would have on domestic uranium mining; however, a siump in world uranium prices has since shut that
industry down.

Then, in 1995, the French Academie des Sciences issued a report criticizing the new standards,
consistent with the views of the powerful French nuclear industry-and research establishment. - - °

The Academie’s own report was heavily criticized, however, and the French government's Institute of
Nuclear Safety and Protection sided instead with the ICRP. Even more remarkable, the institute asked
Britain's National Radiological Protection Board to review the Academie's report for the French
parliament.(n2) Although the Academie opposed the conclusions of that review, the Academie itself
refused to make recommendations one way or the other. As a result, the French government has now
agreed to implement the recommendations in Publication 60.

The United States

In January 1996, the Health Physics Society, a professional association of radiation protection personne!

and scientists working in the U.S. nuclear power industry, weapans laboratories, and nuclear research
' establishments, issued a statement opposing the no-threshold theory.(n3) The society asserted that no
adverse effects had been observed in humans exposed to less than 100 milliSieverts, and further, that
below such a dose, radiation risks were either nonexistent or too small to be observed. Estimating the
risk of doses below 50 milliSievarts, the society said, was too speculative. The society also asserted that
applying the no-threshold theory without accounting for biological mechanisms like "cellular repair"
resulted in overstatements of risk. -

itwas soon clear that many of the society's members disagreed. The society's May 1996 newsletter

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L

oo Correspondence,

‘NO PRACTICAL DANGER FROM THE X-RAY.

Bosrox, February 18, 1903.
‘Nix. Eprror : — In your issue of February t4th is pab-
Taslied a letter from Dr. William Rollins, describing at ex-
Beriment which, if confirmed by future observers, seents to
Pe of very great importance. If the x-ray is capable ‘of
destroying life in the mammalia, the fact shodld certainly
“berbrought to the attention of the medical profession Dr
flollins dors aot give the details of his experiment, mately
isductions. Other experimenters have foode. 5
daeahable of. destroying even the cryptogamix fi
‘parielife, However, | do not propose to contrat
Raidessand leave to the physicists and clectriclaas
Figure 6. Venerable radiology pioneer &. A. Codman reassures
readers of the New England Journal of Medicine (then known as the

Boston Medical and Surgical Journal) that fears of x rays are over-
blown. (Reproduced, with permission, from reference 7.)

Figure 5. Edison, photographed by the light of
his x-ray tube light buib. (Reproduced with per-
jon. from reference 6)

my discovery of their harmful effects. I have
[lead] screen one-half inch thick in my labora-
tory, and would continue the experiments,
but my wife won't let me” (8). With the con-
sensus regarding the potential danger slow to
grow and bolstered by early successes in tu-
mor treatment, x rays were applied to an
amazingly wide range of maladies, from ring-
worm to frostbite.

‘Training for physicians who used x-ray
equipment was cursory at best (Fig 7), rarely
stressing safety. Consequently, gross overex-
posures by inexperienced practitioners con-
tinued well into this century (Fig 8). X-ray
physicians were in no less jeopardy than their
patients. A 1948 study of the hands of radiolo-
gists reveated radiation damage in 48% (10)
Fig 9)

ws X RAYS IN THE MARKETPLACE
American business was even more liberal in
its use of x rays. Beginning in the 1920s, xray
units were used in beauty parlors to remove
unwanted facial and body hair (Fig 10). The
largest operation, known as the Tricho Sys-

November 1991

DiSantis and DiSantis mTM RadioGraphics W 1123

r



mw ENTER RADIUM

Marie and Pierre Curie’s discovery of radium
in 1898 touched off a new round of “ray
mania.” The mystery and romance of a new
element (one discovered by a woman, no
jess) that produced constant abundant radia-
tion without the cumbersome apparatus
needed to generate x rays electrified the sci-
entific community and lay public as well. The
mystique was enhanced when it was revealed
that radium actually changed into other ele-
ments—alchemy come true. Despite the scar-
city of radium and the resultant spectacular
cost Gig 14), public fascination prompted the
incorporation of radium into everything. from
chocolate to contraceptive jelly (5) to cleans-
ers (Fig 15).

Fignre 13. Photo-
graph shows severe ra-
diodermatitis of the feet
of a shoe store em-
ployee whose fitting
fiuoroscope had fauley
shielding. Reproduced,
with permission, from
reference 14.)

Figure 14. The explosive popularity of radium made it
a “hot” commodity in more than one sense. (From the
New York American, May 8, 1904. Reproduced, with per-
mission, from the Hammer Collection, Archives Center,
National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Insti-
tution.)

To say that radium was viewed early on as a
godsend panacea is to understate the preva-
lent perceptions (Fig 16). Spectacular ac-
counts of radium-induced tumor shrinkage
prompted physicians to tcy it for maladies
ranging from hypertension to schizophrenia.
There seemed to be no reason for caution,
since, as the journal Radium declared in
1916, “Radium has absolutely no toxic effects,
it being accepted as harmoniously by the hu-
man system as is sunlight by the plant” (Ra-
dium 1916; 7:24). According to some, radium
might even be the source of life itself (Fig 17)!