2011 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

7-19-2011 

# L a ur ie S t e r nb e r g v

. C omm S o c i al S ec ur it y
P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al
D ock e t N o . 10-4445

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2011

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2011 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du

. R e c omme nde d C it a t ion

" L a ur ie S t e r nbe r g v

. C omm S oc i al S e c ur it y " (2011). 2011 D e cisio n s . P a pe r 854. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2011/854NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________ No. 10

- 4445

_______________ LAURIE STERNBERG ,

Appellant

v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

_______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court F or the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3 : 0 9

- C V

- 2263 ) District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano

_______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 2 3 , 2011

_______________ Before: HARDIMAN and GREEN BERG , Cir cuit Judges , and POLLAK, District Judge * (filed : July 19, 2011 )

_______________ OPINION

_______________ POLLAK , Distric t Judge

* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.2

Laurie Sternberg appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (―ALJ‖) to deny Sternberg‘s claim for disab ility insurance benefits . For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 13, 2005, Sternberg filed an application for disability insurance benefits ; s he alleged that knee and spinal problems had ren dered her d isabled since March 18, 2004. A.R. 30. The Social Security Administration denied Sternberg benefits on April 12, 2006, and, after reconsideration, on Oc tober 13 , 2006. A.R. 32, 38. A hearing was held on March 17, 2008, before A LJ Daniel Shel lhamer. A.R. 827

. On August 11, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision which held that Sternberg had not been disabled under the relevant sections of the Social Security Act between March 18 , 2004 , and December 31, 2005. A.R. 13. Sternberg‘s request for revie w was denied by the Soc ial Security Appeals Council. A.R. 5. Sternberg sought review by the District Court

. App. 25

– 27. On September 30, 2010, the District Court , in an opinion, affirmed th e ALJ‘s decision. App. 1.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Sternberg alleg es that various knee and spinal problems have rendered her disabled since March 18, 2004. Sternberg first sought medical help for her k nees during or prior to 1998. A.R. 891. On September 28, 1999, Dr. Robert Grossman performed arthroscopic surg ery on Sternberg‘s left knee. On December 3, 1999, Dr. Grossman performed a similar surge ry on Sternberg‘s right knee. A.R. 54 6

– 49. Dr. Vincent DiStefano treated Sternberg post

-3

operatively

. During a visit on September 18, 2001, Sternberg told Dr. DiStefano th at an unloader brace had ―signifi cantly helped‖ her left knee. A.R. 550

– 58

. Records from another treating physician, Dr. Mark Seckler, indicate that Sternberg did not show significant improvement from November 13, 2001 , t o April 2, 2002. Dr. Seckler indicated that Sternberg had degenerative changes, patellofemoral syndrome bilaterally , a nd medial hemi

- joint changes. Sternberg received five Hyalgan injections in each knee be tween January and April 2002. A.R. 559

– 69. On April 22, 2004, Dr. Seckler no ted that Sternberg‘s knee problems wer e ―minimal, almost resolved.‖ A.R. 194. On April 26, 2004, an MRI of Sternberg‘s left knee was suggestive of a recurrent tear of the medial meniscus . A.R. 386

– 87. At another visit on May 4, 2004, Dr. Seckler noted that Sternberg was ―very histrionic al ‖ and that ―[h]er complaints [were] grossly disproporti onate to objective findings.‖ A.R. 19 2

– 9 3. On July 27, 2004, Sternberg visited Dr. Manuel Banzon complaining of left knee
p ain. Dr. Banzon diagnosed Sternberg wit h left medial compartment arthritis. Sternberg received three injections of Synvisc betwe en August and September 2004. On October 12, 2004, Dr. Banzon performed arthroscopic surg ery on Sternberg‘s left knee. When Sternberg was discharged from physical t herapy in December 2004, records indicate she had ―minimal complaints of pa in and difficulty‖ and ―exhibit[ed] a good prognosis.‖ Dr. Banzon noted on January 7, 2005, that Ste rnberg was ―doing very well.‖ A.R. 219

– 23

. Sternberg saw Dr. Craig Israelite from Aug ust 17 to September 27, 2005. Dr. Israelite‘s impression was that of underlying degenerative joint disease of the lef t knee.
A.R. 397

– 99. On March 9, 2006, Dr. Ronald Bagner examined Sternberg at the request4

of the So cial Security Administration

. Dr. Bagner‘s impression was of degenerativ e arthritis of the left knee. A.R. 532

– 34

. Sternberg also alleges spinal pain. In July 2004, Dr. Michael O‘Hara diagnosed Sternberg with cervical herniated nucleus pulposus, thoracic myofascitis and lumbar herniated nucleus pulposus. A.R. 19. In July 2004, Sternberg was treated with spinal manipulation under anesthesia. Dr. O‘Hara noted that Sternberg‘s prognosis was ―good‖ because of her ―overall improvement in fu nction and diminishing pain.‖ A.R. 195

– 2 18

. Dr. Banzon‘s records from September 2, 2004, indicate Sternberg exhibited diminished range of motion in her lower back with spasm in the paralumbar area. Dr

. Banzon noted on January 7, 2005, that Ste rn berg was ―doing very well. She has responde d to c onservative treatment.‖ A.R. 755

– 58

. In December 2004 and January 2005, Sternberg received lumbar epidural ste roid injections. A.R. 510

– 12. On April 15, 2005, Ste r nberg underwent lumbar disco graphy followed by a CT scan ; the scan showed small disc hern iation at L5

- S1, disc herniation at
L4

- 5 , and annular tears on the right side at L3

- 4, L4

- 5 and L5

- S1. A.R. 349, 351. Sternberg saw Dr. Bruc e Rosenblum on June 14, 2005. Dr. Rosenblum‘s impression was that Sternberg had clinical lumbar

- sacral radiculop athy. After viewing an MRI of Sternberg‘s spine , Dr. Rosenblem reported that he was ―not clear wh ere her pain [was] coming from.‖ A.R. 37 6

– 77

. On July 13, 2005, Dr. Paul Marcotte reported that Sternberg had a negative leg raising test. A.R. 400

– 01.
Dur ing an examination on March 9, 2006, Dr. Bagner reported that: ―[Sternberg] ambulates without difficulty. Gets on and off the exami ning table without difficulty

. . . .5

Does not use a cane or crutc hes. Can heel and toe walk.‖ Dr. Bagner‘s impression was of cervical sprain/s train and lumbosacral strain. A.R. 532

– 33. On April 10, 2006, Dr. Eden Atienza, a state agency medical consultant, assessed Sternbe rg‘s functional capabilities. Dr. Atienza concluded that Sternberg was capable of light work, includin g lifting 10 pounds frequently, and sitting and standing for up to 6 hours in an 8

- hour work day. A.R. 183

– 90

. III. THE ALJ’s DECISION On August 11 , 2008 , the ALJ denied Sternberg‘s c laim for disability benefits.
A.R. 28

. In so doing, the ALJ followed the fi ve - step sequential analysis required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Step one of the analysis calls on the ALJ to consider whether the claimant is engaged i n substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b). If the claimant is so engaged , then the clai mant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Here, the ALJ found that Sternberg passed step one because she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 2000. A.R. 14

. At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant suffers fr om a severe me dical impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (c). If not, then the claimant is not disabled, and t he inquiry ends. Here, the ALJ concluded that Sternberg had several sever e impairments through the date last insured: bilateral knee osteoarthritis, lumbar and ce rvical degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy, pelvic pain/dislocation, right arm weakness/pain , and rheumatoid arthritis. A.R. 15

. S tep three of the analysis requires the ALJ to consider whether the impairment is equivalent to or exceeds those im pairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,6

Appendix 1

. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so , then the claimant is automatically considered disabled, and the inquiry ends. If not, the inquiry moves on to step four. Here, after comparing Sternberg‘s ai lments to those listed, the ALJ concluded that Sternberg‘s impairments did not meet or medically exceed any of the listed impairments.
A.R. 1 6 . Thus, t he ALJ moved t o step four of the analysis

. Step four focuses on whether the claimant‘s residual funct ional capacity (―RFC‖) sufficiently permits her to perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)

– (f). This first requires the ALJ to determine the claimant‘s RFC , which is defined as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limi tations caus ed by his or her impairment(s)

. Fargnoli v. Massanari , 247 F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001). If , after determining the claimant‘s RFC, the claimant is found capable of retur n ing to her previous line of work, then she is not ―disabled‖ and not en tit led to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)

– (f). Here, the ALJ concluded that Sternberg had the RFC to perform a full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.157 (a)

. 1 Specifically, the ALJ found that Ste r nberg had relatively minor postural limitations that restricted her to only occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and climbing of stairs and ramps, and precluded her from crawling and climbing on ladders and scaffolds. A.R. 17 . However, the ALJ found that Sternberg was unable to perform her

1 ― Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. ‖ 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).7

past r elevant work because it was determined that she had performed it at the medium exertional level. A.R. 26 . The analysis thus moved on to the fifth and final step.
A t step five, the ALJ considers whether there is suffic ient work available in the national economy based on the claimant ‘ s residual function al capacity, age, and education

. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)

. If there is sufficient work available , the claimant is not disabled. Here, the ALJ found that jobs did exist i n significant numbers in the national economy that St ernberg could have performed. A.R. 27

. Sternberg was therefore not disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act, 2 on or prior to her last date insured, December 31, 2005. IV. DISCUSSION 3
O ur review o f the Dis trict Court‘ s order affirming the ALJ‘s denial of benefits is plenary. Allen v. Barnhart , 417 F.3d 396, 39 8 (3d Cir. 2005). However, ―our review of the ALJ ‘ s decision is more deferential as we deter mine whether there is substantial evidence to s upport the decision of the Commissioner. ‖ Knepp v. Apfel , 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000)

. Substant ial evidence is defined as ―  ̳ more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. ‘ ‖ Ventura v. Shala la, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389,

2 The Social Security Act requires the claim ant to demonstrate an ―inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous pe riod of not less than 12 months ‖ in order to be eligible for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

3 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the ALJ‘s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.8

401 (1971))

. Where the ALJ‘ s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided t he factual inquiry differ ently. Hartranft v. Apfel , 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) . The court looks at the whole record in making such a determination. Smith v. Califano , 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981).
To show th at the ALJ‘s finding was not supported by substantial evide nce , Sternberg makes two main arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence; and (2) that the ALJ erred in finding that Sternberg retained the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work. 4 We disagree. A. The ALJ Proper ly Evaluated the Medical Evidence Sternberg argues that the ALJ committed several errors in evaluating the medical

e vidence , including that he : (1 ) discounted, ignored, or misinterpreted compelling medical evidence and instead relied on his own medical op inion ; (2 ) failed to give proper credence to Sternberg‘s subjective complaints of pain; (3 ) failed to giv e sufficient weight to Sternberg ‘s treating p hysician ; and (4) reached contradi ctory findings in his decision

. We reject each of these arguments becau se the ALJ‘s decision is supported by substantial evidence

.

4 Sternberg‘s brief states that the District Court improperly evaluated the medical evidence and erred in finding that Sternberg could perform the full range of sedentary work. This mischaracterizes the nature of our review. As stated above, like the District Court, we independently review the ALJ‘s decision. Despite this imprecision, Sternberg‘s brief, in its substantive arguments, makes specific attacks on the ALJ‘s decision.9

1. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Ignore Medical Reports b ut Reached a Decision Sup

ported by Substantial Objective Medical Evidence Sternberg ar g u es that the ALJ ignored or discounted compelling object ive medi cal evidence and instead relied on his own interpretation of the evidence and isolated
stat ements from doctors‘ notes. In determining whether a claimant is entitled to disability insurance benefits , we have held that ―[u]nless the [ALJ] has analyz ed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that his decision is supported by substantial evidence approa ches an abdication of the court‘ s duty . . . .‖ Benton v. Bowen , 820 F.2d 85, 89 ( 3 d Cir. 1987) (quoting Gober v. Matthews , 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. Thus, ―[w]here the [ALJ] is faced with conflicting evidence, he must adequately explain in the record his reasons for rejecting or dis crediting competent evidence.‖ Id . at 88.
I n arguing that the ALJ disregarded important findings, Sternberg cites the results of several medical examinations from 2004 and 2005

. 5 However, t he ALJ‘s decision thoroughly recounts Sternberg‘s medical treatment, in cluding the findings that Sternberg claims the ALJ disregarded. 6 The ALJ did not ignore this eviden ce

— he explicitly addressed it in his decision.

5 The cited objective evidence includes: positive straight leg testi ng in 2004 and 2005, Appellant‘s Br. 28; findings of neck and lower back problems in 2004 and 2005, id . at 28; and MRIs and X

- rays of Sternberg‘s spine taken in 2004, id . at 29.

6 These findings recited by the ALJ include positive straight leg testing, A. R. 20, 22; findings of neck and back pain, A.R. 18

– 26; and the MRI and X

- ray reports on Sternberg‘s spine, A.R. 18, 21.10

Sternberg further alleges that the ALJ ―relied heavily on his own interpretation of the medical evidence an d isolated statements in the vario us doc tors‘ notes.‖ Sternberg cites treatment records of Dr. Israelite from July to September 2005, which state the possibility that Sternberg could need a knee replacem ent sometime in the future. Sternberg claims that t he ALJ misinterpreted this evidence in his decision and should not have use d it to support his conclusion denying benefits because , ―Dr. Israelite was not saying that [her ] knee was not bad enough for replacement, [but] was merely wanting to put off the in evitable . . . .‖ However, Dr. Israelite‘s report states that a knee replacement may be needed ―down the road‖ if Ste r nberg‘s symptoms ―become disablin g at a much later date.‖ A.R. 397 . Dr. Isr aelite then strongly recommended conservative trea tment. T h is piece of evidence

— a finding in September 2005 that Sternberg‘s knee condition was not considered ―disabling‖

— can fairly be read to weigh against S ternberg‘s claim of disability. While Sternberg may disagree with the ALJ‘s ul timate conclusion, the ALJ d id not ignore or wrongly interpret evidence, but comprehensively considered the record and balanc ed all the evidence before him. 7
T he result of this balancing

— the ALJ‘s conclusion denying disability benefits

— is also well supported by the record, d espite Sternberg ‘s contention that ― no objective medical findings ‖ s upport it

. In regard to evidence concerning Sternberg‘s knee s , in April 2004, near the alleged onset date, Dr. Seckler reported that Sternberg‘s knee problems were ―minim al ,

7 When making a disability determination, the Commissioner will weigh ―all of the evidence‖ if any of the evidence is inconsistent. 2 0 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).11

[ and ] almost resolved ‖ after a course of conservative treatment. A.R. 19 4 . In June 2004, Dr. Seckler explained to Sternberg that ―orthopedically she is fine.‖ A.R. 192 . A July 2004 EM G of the left leg was normal. A.R. 357

– 58 . A fter left knee arthroscopic surgery in Octob er 2004, the record demonstrates that Ste rnberg had ―minimal complaints of pain and difficulty‖ as of December 2004 and was ―doing very well‖ as of January 2005 after

a cour se of conservative treatment. A.R. 223, 219

. Numerous doctors‘ reports throughout 2005 continued to show that Sternberg was respond ing well to conservative treatment and physical therapy. In March 2006, shortly after the expiration of Sternberg‘s insured status, Sternberg underwent a physical examination by Dr. Bagner in which she got on and off the examination table, dressed without difficulty, and was able to walk and stan d without a cane or crutches. A.R. 533

. I n regard to Sternberg‘s back and neck pain, Sternberg references an April 2004
MRI o f her lumbar spine finding a disc hern iation. However, this herniation was d esc ribed by her physician as ―very subtle,‖ and a nother MRI in June 2005 showed it was no longer evident. A.R. 382

– 83 . In May 2005, an EMG of the lumbar spine was essentially normal. A.R. 352

– 56 . In July 2005, Dr. Marcotte, a neurosurgeon, observed that Sternberg had a normal gait and saw no indicat ion for lumbar surgery. A.R. 400

– 01

. Such evidence constitutes ―more than a mere scintilla ‖ in support of the ALJ‘s
determination and enough for a reasonable mind t o conclude as the ALJ did here

. Ventura , 55 F.3d at 9 01

. Consequently, there is substantial objective medical evidence in the record to support the ALJ‘s conclusion denying disability.12

2. The ALJ Gave Proper Credence to Sternberg’ s Subjective Co mplaints of Pain
T he ALJ determined that Sternberg‘s statements regarding ―the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms [were] not entirely credible ‖ because they were not consistent with the objective medical evidence. A.R. 26

. Sternb erg argu es that the ALJ erred in this determination and did not give her claims of sub jective pain enough weight. Furthermore, Sternberg argues that t he ALJ made ―no valid findings‖ in rejecting her subjective testimony. In evaluating a claimant‘s subje ctive complaints, t his Court has held that ―[i] n order for an ALJ to reject a claim of disabling pain, he must consider the subjective pain and specify his reasons for rejecting these claims and support his conclusion with medical evidence in the record.‖ Matullo v. Bowen , 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1990)

. In his review of the record, t he ALJ comprehensively recounted Sternberg‘s subjective complaints of pain and properly po inted to evidence in the record to support his conclusion that they were n ot entirely credible

. T he ALJ cited evidence that in Jun e 2004 , Dr. Seckler described St ernberg as ―very histrionic al , ‖ noted that her concerns and complaints were ―grossly disproportionate to objective findings ,‖ and stated that her pain specialis t agree d with this assessment. The ALJ also referred to several examinations regarding Sternberg‘s back pain in May and June 2005 that revealed essentially normal results, lead ing Dr. Rosenblum to state he was ―not clear where her pain is coming from.‖ The ALJ further recounted that Sternberg responded well to conservative treatment and physical therapy throughout 20 04 and 2005. Finally, t he ALJ cited that in March 2006,13

shortly after Sternberg ‘s last insured date , Dr. Bagner indicated that Sternberg was able t o walk at a reasonable pace, and in April 2006, a state agency doctor found that the alleged severity of Sternberg‘s impairments were not fully consistent with the objective evidence.
A.R. 18

– 23

. Thus, the ALJ considered Sternberg‘s testimony, weighed i t against various conflicting evidence in the record, and spe cified his reasons for finding her subjective complaints of pain not entirely credible

. Consequently, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ‘s conclusion regarding Sternberg‘s subjecti ve complaints. Relatedly, Sternberg claims that the A LJ failed to consider her medication as
suppor t for her allegations of pain

. However , the ALJ specifically discussed the medications Sternberg received. A.R. 19

– 22, 24

– 26 . Furthermore, t he decision does not rely on a finding that Sternberg received only ―conservative treatment,‖ as Sternberg also claims. The decision considers Sternberg‘s surgeries, injections, knee braces, chiropractic treatment, physical therap y, and psychological cons ultations, in addit ion to her medications. T he ALJ did not disregard the fact that Sternberg took various medications , or ignore her broader course of treatment, in determining that her subjective complaints of pain were not entirely credible. 3. The ALJ Gave Sufficient Weight to the Opinion of Sternberg’s Treating Physician Sternberg argues that the ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to the opinion of one of her tre ating physician s , Dr. O‘Hara. Sternberg specifically points to the f act that Dr. O‘Hara, who has treated Sternberg for her back, leg, neck and arm pain since April 2004,14

wrote in April 2008 that Sternberg ―should be considered unemployable/disabled ‖ due to her condition. A.R. 861

. In his decision, however, the ALJ assign ed ― little or no weight to the opinion of this treating physician‖ because it was ―simply not supported by the
pr eponderance of the evidence.‖ A.R. 24

. As Sternberg correctly notes, this Court has held that ―[t] reating physicians‘ reports should be acc orded great weight, especial ly when their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a contin uing observation of the patient‘ s condition o ver a prolonged period of time. ‖ Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) ( citation and internal quotation m arks omitted )

. However , an ALJ may reject a treating physician‘s opinion on the basis of contradictory medical evidence and ― may afford a treating physician‘s opinion more or less weight depending up on the extent to which support ing explanations are provi ded. ‖ I d . Also, i n the case of a treating physician‘s opinion regarding a claimant‘s ability to work, as Dr. O‘Hara gave here, Social Security
regu lations state: We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the stat utory definition of disability. In so doing, we review all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source ‘ s statement that you are disabled. A statement by a medical source that you are ―disabled‖ or ―unable to work‖ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1)

. Thus, an ALJ does not give any ―special sign ificance‖ to a source who gives his opinion regarding a claimant‘s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(3 )

.15

Here , the ALJ did not act improperly in affording Dr. O‘Hara‘s opinion ―little or no weight.‖ There was medical evidence in the record

— the objective medical evidence cited above

— that contradicted Dr. O‘Hara‘s opinion

. Furthermore, his opinion that Sternberg was ―unemploya ble/disabled‖ was not entitled to any special significance , as it
i s a determination explicitly left to the ALJ

. T he ALJ‘s treatment of Dr. O‘ Hara‘s opinion was consistent with the regul ations and our prior decisions , and it was supported by substantial e vidence

. 4. The ALJ’s Findings Are Not Contradictory Sternberg also argues that the ALJ‘s findings were contradictory because his decision states that Sternberg‘s impairments caused ―significant‖ limitations on her ability to perform basic work activities, b ut later refers to her limit ations as ―slight‖ or ―minor.‖ There is no contradiction in the ALJ‘s statements. In describing Sternberg‘s limitations as significant, the ALJ was referring to his finding of St ernberg‘s severe impairments. By definition, se vere impairments cause significant limitations in carrying out the physical activities that ―most jobs‖ require, activities such as lifting, pushing, and pulling as described by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. 8 In later describing Sternberg‘s limitations as ―slight ‖ or ―minor,‖ the ALJ was referring to Sternberg‘s limitations for purposes of

8 In relevant part, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 states: ― An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities

. . . . When we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. Examples of these include

. . . [p] hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushi ng, pulling, reaching, carrying , or handling . . . .‖16

performing sedentary work, or in other words, her postural, n on - exertional limitations. It is not contradictory to state that an individual‘s physical limitations are ―signific ant‖ in relation to the physical demands of most jobs, but are only ―minor‖ in relation to sedentary jobs. We therefore reject Sternberg‘s argument and uphold the ALJ‘s findings.
B. The ALJ’s Determination of Sternberg’s RFC Is Supported by Substantial Evidence Sternberg also challenges the ALJ‘s finding that Sternberg retained the RFC to perform the full range of sedent ary work. For the following reasons, we conclude that the ALJ‘s finding was supported by substantial evidence. Sternberg argues that t he ALJ‘s RFC determination was conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ did not consider all the relevant evidence when making the RFC determination. To support this argument, Sternberg cites Social Security R uling 96

- 8p, which states that an A LJ must consider ―all of the relevant evidence‖ when determining a claimant‘s RFC. Moreover, the RFC dete rmination should be accompanied by ―a clear and satisfactory expl ica tion of the basis on which it rests.‖ Far

gnoli , 247 F.3d at 41 (quoting Cotter v. Harris , 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981) )

. As discussed above, the ALJ‘s determination was supported by medical evidence, which was cited throug hout his opinion. The ALJ gave a thorough recitation of Sternberg‘s medic al history, including the doctors she saw, the diagnoses they gave , and th e treatments they prescribed. The ALJ‘s opinion also makes clear how much weight he assigned to each doctor‘s assessment. Far from being co nclusory, the ALJ cited the17

opinions and observations of numerous medical professionals to reach his determination, incl uding Dr. Seckler, Dr. Bagner , and Dr. Atienza. A.R. 18

– 26. Accordingly, t he ALJ‘s determination of Sternberg‘s RFC i s supported by substantial evidence. In addition, we hav e reviewed Sternberg‘s other arguments and find them unpersuasive

. V. CONCLUSION For the preceding reasons, we affirm the decision of the District Court in its determination that the ALJ‘s finding was supported by substantial evidence.