available urinalysis bioassay data in favor of a blanket reliance on air concentration data to measure
internal dose exposures inevitably results in dose exposure estimates that are underestimated, unreliable

and not “claimant favorable.” NIOSH has now conceded this fact.

The Audit Report specifically addressed the dust problems within Building 30. The Audit Report states
that:

“Dust would come off the overhead rafters. Sometimes, they would fall right onto workers’
lunch. During the MED period, they stacked all the contaminated burlap bags in storage area of
Building 30, These contaminated burlap bags were kept in there until they were removed to be
burned in the incinerator in the late 1950s. Many people working in Building 30, including
operation personnel, secretaries, and maintenance workers, would sit on those bags resting or
eating their lunch. This went on for many years,”

NIOSH’s decision to ignore available urinalysis data covering the time period from 1947 through 1950
and the concomitant exclusive reliance on air concentration to evaluate dose exposure in the instant case
does not provide a “claimant favorable” dose exposure model. The fact that the Site Profile ignores
available urinalysis bioassay data in favor of a blanket reliance on air concentration data to measure
internal dose exposures inevitably results in dose exposure estimates that are underestimated, unreliable

and not “claimant favorable.”

Additionally, the Audit Report indicates that “[t]he site profile does not characterize or provide any
information on the potential missed worker external doses due to extremity exposure, skin contamination,
and whole-body exposure to residual contamination in used burlap bags stored in different locations, such
as Building 30. Internal exposure may have resulted from the inhalation and ingestion of radioactive dust
accumulating from the burlap bags. The external exposure potential would have resulted from any dust
coming in contact with skin as well as the dust that often covered employee’s clothing after working in
Building 30.”

Atan Advisory Board meeting held on March 26, 2007, the deficiencies identified in the Audit Report
were addressed with representatives from NIOSH. Dr. James Neton from NIOSH addressed the internal
and external exposure potentials resulting from the storage of the burlap bags in Building 30. Dr. Neton
stated:

If we look at it from the perspective of the ore itself, the progeny in the ore in addition to the
uranium. When the bags were empty, they stacked the bags up in piles, and the workers recollect
sitting and eating lunch on them because they were nice and comfortable outdoors, And I know

* Id at 112
1d.

18





| Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

under the Energy Employees Occupational
Uiiness Compensation Act

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007
Page 1 of 2

Tan —

instructions:

If you wish to petition HHS to consider adding a class of employees to the Special Exposure Cohort and you
are NOT either a member of that class, a survivor of a member of that class, or a labor organization
representing or having represented members of that class, then 42 CFR Part 83, Section 83.7(c) requires
that you obtain written authorization. You can obtain such authorization from either an employee who is a
member of the class or a survivor of such an employee. You may use this form to obtain such authorization .
and submit the completed form to NIOSH with the related petition. Please print legibly.

For Further Information: If you have questions about these instructions, please call the following NIOSH
toll-free phone number and request to speak to someone in the Office of Compensation Analysis and
Support about an SEC petition: 1-800-356-4674.

Authorization for Individual or Entity to Petition HHS on Behalf of a Class of Employees for
Addition to the Special Exposure Cohort

N urvivor

Str ber or Survivor Apt. # P.O. Box

City, State, Zip Code of Class Member or Survivor

do “= authorize:
7 ‘ vn = wi

Address of Petitioner Apt. # P.O. Box

City, State and Zip Céde of Petitioner

to petition the Department of Health and Human Services on behalf of a class of employees
that includes:

Name of Class Member (employee, not the employee’s survivor)

for the addition of the class to the Special Exposure Cohort, under the Energy Employee’s
Occupational IIIness Compensation Program Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385).

tion, | recognize that the petitioner named above will have all the rights

CER Part 83.
Yletshs J, 2005

Signature of Class Member or Survivor Date

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: | wc tree

In providing this authoriza



Description of Demese to Drme

. Beveral drums in etch lot bad heavy dents which appeer to heve been eee:
put in by the lift truck when the car was loaded, It was not apparent that "O” ,
any of the drums were damaged during the mlosding operation. In railroad = /¢
cers 2, b and 5 part of the losd ehifted in transit. Ae # result of this,
sowe of the drums eppestred to have buckled in the middle so that there was
slight bulging on both ends. The paint was probably removed from the roller
rime by the drums coming together in transit.

Padietion Measurenents
Gemma Radiation
"-" several radiation mensurezents vere made on the railroad cars and on

individual drums by spot check. A Zeus was used for gemma radintion measure-
pents. Cama rediztion levels in mr/br are given in the table below;

LOP NUMBER 2 2 3 4 5 6
Through sides of car 500 300 200 220 iso to 10 3S
Through ends of cer - 10 & - 5& 10 & 36

a 5s a (o,-)

Top of car - 1ko - - - -
Surface of drums 400 to = «700 to 200 to - 300 to 300 to

(spot checks) . 600 900 600 600 400

Higher readings were obteined on that end of the car to which the load
had shifted.

When the first thres lots had been stored in the igiog radiation
messurements were made, No radigtion was found to be coming from the back,
sides or top of the igloo. 10 mx/hr gemma radiation was measured on the
outer surface of the closed door at the Zront of the igloo.

Burfeace Contaminetion in Railroad Cars

"On the floor of. the railroad cars, after unloeding, contamination wes
found which emitted alpha radiation. From 20,000 to 50,000 dis/min/100 sa.cm, ©
_of surface was detected in the 4th, 5th, end 6th cars received, Bete end -sins .
gamma radiation three inches from eny surfece in the empty car meseured less”

view
then 2 o/hbr. ven tio
4

Thic document contains reste



Additionally, the increased radium and radon internal exposure potentials from these burlap bags are also
not addressed in the Site Profile” Due to the storage of the burlap bags in Building 30 and the resulting
dust accumulations, the internal and external exposure potentials resulting from the transport of African
ore in the bags increased the exposure potentials for both radium and radon gas. Such radon and radium
exposure from the burlap bags and the significant isotope exposure pathway potential from pro-actinium,
actinium and thorium have not been measured in the air data or from the available urinalysis bioassay
data cited in the Site Profile covering the time period from 1947 through 1950. This data collection
deficiency is particularly significant for Building 30 employees. Furthermore, the incineration of burlap

and paper bags may also have significant consequences for environmental exposure pathways.

In conclusion, the credibility of the Site Profile and NIOSH’s claim that all dose exposure data is
“claimant favorable” is compromised significantly by the lack of analysis of complete and authoritative
source material evidence. Moreover, the occupational internal radiation doses received by the members
of the proposed class cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy due to the lack of applicable

bioassay data, air monitoring data, and source term information.

1d,

12



athe tC. neji a! ale” lnc

@

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eae §. LL nt Sesh he T0 Yulee Cm
—| conta 2a tena: 08 _ te)

No,

a —— Qualified-In-Erie-Cou
: rr ~ Commission Expires Feb. 4 —

—+ —— _ - _



eo 6

I. The operational process for one complete furnace run at the Ceramics Plant
Step III building.

Ae

Be

Cc.

De
gr
F
G.

ER

I.

ve

P,

80 cartons of brow oxide (75# each) are dumped into drums on scale
at loading hood.

192 trays are filled with brown oxide and leveled,

192 trays are loaded onto buggies (each buggy carries 48 trays) and moved
to furnace oven.

192 trays are lifted from buggy and plased into furnace tubes.

Oven charged with hydrogen fluoride and then cooled.

192 trays of green salt are removed from oven and loaded onto buggies.
192 trays are dumped into hoppers at unloading hood.

4 hoppers are moved from hood and transported to chain hoist to blender
platform.

Gonnectiona are made end hoppers are lifted one at a time for weighing,
let down and comections broken,

Connection made a second time and hoppers raised to platform. Dust
removel devices are adjusted, and hopper emptied into pulverizer.

Small dust eollector emptied into hopper. This hopper too is lifted
to platform and emptied,

Sleeve ring unbolted from top rim of blender. Sleeve drawn up and top
lid bolted in place. Blender allowed to rotate for two hours.

Bottom plate unbolted and removed star valve bolted in place.

Nineteen cans of green salt aro filled on scales, roughly adjusted to
185 Ibs. not; can lid and rim put in place but not bolted down.

Weights are finally adjusted by Weighmaster and can rims tightened with
bolt and nuts.

Cans are green salt conveyed to storage area in Step I building for
further disposition.

From the monthly production figures available it was found that each shift per-
formed approximately 0.75 complete furnaces runs per 8% hour work day. All data
used in evaluating an employees exposure to radioactive dust has correoted to

the actual production figures.


Re-drumming of the captured soda salt was begun at Middlesex. To
date, approximately 75% of the entire amount of material has been re-crummed.
It is boing placed in reconditioned steel drums which are coated on the inside
with an asphaltum-type paint to increase corrosion resistance,

Radium Cako Handling end Storage

Technical representatives of the New York Operations Office conducted
a study of radium cake handling and associated probloms. This investigation re-
sulted from the African Metals Corporation's request that tho Commission store
all such cake produced after April 1, 1949. In the study it was concluded that
drum storage of radium cake in the "igloos" at Lake Ontario Ordnance Viorks is
the most economical sclution to the problem for the Commission.

In accordance with this decision, the first shipment of cake to Lake
Ontario for storage has already been mide. During tho month final arrangements
were made for the arrival of this shipment, and a technical representative of
tho New York Operations Offico attended the first unloading operations, Tho
condition of the drums and drum liners was checked, and various recommendations
for improvoment were mado to Mallinckrodt. The unloading crew from Lindo per-
formod their work satisfactorily, despite the limited temporary hindling facil-
ities, aA forledift truck equipped with special metal shielding for radiation
protection and with forks placed in vertical position for drum handling was
sent from Middlesex to tho Lake Ontario Ordnanco Works.to assist in unloading
the radium cake.

The drums which arrived in this first shipment were specially treated
to resist corrcsion. They contained a lacquer liner and a polyethylene bag.
Of the 96 drums which arrived, it was observed that approximately 12 wore dented.
Only one of these dents was serious enough to cause breakage of the lacquer
liner, It was observed that the polyethylene bags in the few drums checked had
small tears. It is believed that this can bo eliminated by an improved loading
technique which is now being followed at Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Studies
will continue at Lake Ontario as future cake shipments are received in order to
find the best solution to the materials handling, radiation, and radon evolution
problems involved.

Thorium and Uranium Recovery frem Monazite Sand

Progross is being made on research projects at Battelle Memorial
Institute dealing with the recovery cf thorium and ursnium from monazite sands.
These are two major steps in the treatment of the monazite raw material, In
the first step, the mineral is broken up and the phosphates are removed; in the
second, the resultant mixture of thorium, uraniun, and rare earth oxides is dis-
solved in nitric acid to provide a suitable sclution for solvent extraction steps.

Caustic Soda Dissolution, Proliminary studies show that treatment of
finely ground monazite sand with hot aqueous caustic soda represents an excel-
lent method of breaking up the mineral. The sodium hydroxide solution is re-
cycled; the sodium phosphate formed is removed by crystallization,

-10-

ae

1188851


t @

TABLE I + CERAMICS PLANT ~ LINDE AIR PRODUCTS

Occupation No, of Approx. % of Multiples of the
Employees Total personnel Preferred level

Foreman Step III 3 2.2 0.9
Group leader Step III 3 262 0.9
Firet “a Operator 3 202 0.6
Seoond "A" operator 8 2.2 0.9
Third “A" operator 3 242 2.5
Group “B" operetor 9 6.6 32.0
Group "Cc" operetor 6 AeA 32.0
Millwrights "A" and ‘c" 6 4.4 . 065
Janitor Step III * 3 262 0.9
Weighmster z 0.8 0.9
Labor group foremen 1 08 0.5
Loaders 4 3.0 0.6
Jenitor 1 0.8 0.8
Jaundry man 2 1.6 0.2
Maint. Foremen & group leader 2 106 0.36
Eleotricien 3 262 0.35
Painters, Welders, Pipefitter 6 4.4 04°
Time keeper 1 0.8 0.4
Tool crib attendant 3 0.8 0.2
Carpenters 2 1.5 0.08
Chemist 3 202 0.3
AEC & Linde office employees 45 33.0 0.09
First aid nurse 3 262 0.14
Guards 22 16.5 0.18
Fire marshall 1 0.8 0.14

* Air Samples used in evalueting exposures were general air samples of sreas,

It is apparent from these data that 13% of the total plant personnel are exposed to
hagardous concentrations of dust. These concentrations range between 2,5 and 32,0
times the preferred level of 70 a/m/m®, The remaining 87% of the Linde Plant are
exposed to 0.08 to .@ of the preferred level. The percent distribution ef personnel
by alpha dust concentration is showm in Figure I, This gives a breakdown of
personnel by department with their actual multiple of the preferred level, Figure 2
shows the distribution of occupations by duet coneentration levels with the number
of personnel involved in each cocupations

|
Length of exposure is an important factor in estimating possible incidence of disease.
An analysis of plant personnel records reveals that seventeen men have been exposed
to levels of 32 times the present mximum permissable level of alpha emitting dusts

for about five yearse

It was found thet when e tolerance concentration of alpha was present, the beta,
concentration wae never more than 0.001 times tolerance (40,000 beta dieint/m/m®),



LIWLE ALR PROM CTS

Yn this plant, which saploye 65 men in the process area, there is low
level exposure to beta redistion and a moderately severe ureniua dust
exposure. The plant process is cescribed in Appendix I.

Exposure Data

Bota Radiation. The weekly Pile badge exposures at this plant are
sumparized in Figure 12. It will be noted that except for one badge,
none wert Over S00 trop/sk and moat of the badges in this plant are oom~
Biatently less than 80 mrep/uk. The whole body exposure to radiation ia
this plant is considered to be antisfactory,

Yraniuma Dist. This plent has beea surveyed by the Ioduatrial Hygiene
Bection and the findings ere given in Algure 15. Fifteen omployeea are
shown to be exposed to 8% tines the preferred level of 70 slpha d/a per
cubic meter of air. Thia dust is dlepersed in operations such ma the
transfer of brovn oxide to weighing drums, sovoping the oxide onto trays,
transfer of the trays to and from the green aalt reactor, and other
wenuel operations involving powdered uranium compounds. Resosmandations
giving meana for reducing the dust concentrations have been subsitted ts
the Produotion Division but uncertainties as to the future of this plant
mako it do.btful thet any asjor plant improvements will be mace. Misor
changes sre being wade in the process area as @ result of the rocontandas
tions. Although no definitive figures are available, the few results re~
ceived to date indloste gone inprovenent. It is expected that in 18
months or leas this plant will be shut down snd maintained in a stand-by

condition. We have aigsussed with the frocuction Division the policy


II,

III.

vi.
VII.

VIII.

118884)

MONTHLY STATUS

ADMINISTRATION

PUBLIC INFORMATION

mii

aND_PRCGRESS_ REPORT,

ath Dee

" FOR MARCH 1949

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRODUCTION - - ---- ee err ttre

ENGINEZRING

RESEARCH &ND DEVELOPMENT

BROOKHAVEN NaTIONAL LABCRsTORY

MEDICAL ~

LICENS ING

25

27

30

32

35



and 38 at Linde Ceramics from an “AWE facility” to a “DOE facility”. Consequently, the NIOSH
defined residual radiation contamination time period for Linde workers employed in these four buildings
is now eliminated from compensation coverage under the Part B Program of the EEOICPA." Any Linde
worker who began working at the Linde facility in one of these four buildings after 1953 is no longer

eligible for compensation under the Part B program.

The only way a Linde employee who began working at Linde after 1953 would now be eligible for
compensation under the dose reconstruction program is if that employee can prove “affirmatively” that
they worked in Building 14 at the Linde site. Building 14 is now the only building at Linde that remains
defined as an “AWE facility” and eligible for residual radiation compensation coverage under Part B.
The presumption is that any Linde worker submitting a Part B compensation claim for work in the
residual radiation time period worked in one of the four buildings now designated as a DOE facility. The
DOL has not provided any explanation for the residual radiation coverage distinction between Buildings
30, 31, 37 and 38 versus Building 14 beyond the fact that the DOE had a proprietary interest in these
buildings during the 1940s but did not have such an interest in Building 14. Why such a proprietary
interest should translate into workers being denied their right to submit a claim for development of a

radiogenic cancer has not been explained by the DOL.

Practically, the majority of Linde workers employed at Linde during the residual radiation time period
worked in Buildings 30, 31, 37 and 38. These workers primarily participated in renovation work within
these four buildings that were highly contaminated from uranium ore processing for the Manhattan
Project during the 1940s. Workers inhaled and ingested dangerous levels of uranium dust during
renovation work and were never provided with protective equipment that would have reduced their

exposure to dangerous levels of residual radiation.

NIOSH cannot make reliable distinction to differentiate between workers in Buildings 30, 31, 37 and 38
without an evaluation of bumping policy and the proper evaluation of worker exposures within Building
14. This cannot be accomplished without interviewing surviving Linde workers or Linde “site experts” as
they are termed in the Linde Audit report. The re-designation of Buildings 30, 31, 37 and 38 also does
not account for the fact that Building 14 had a lunch room and unless NIOSH assesses how many residual

radiation workers regularly ate lunch in Building 14 during the residual radiation time period, NIOSH

6! The NIOSH defined residual radiation time period for the Linde Ceramics facility is 1954-1987; 1993-1995;
1997- July 2006.

22



Se NN NED OEES adew it Ula

Windows Live” Home Hotmal] | Spaces OneCare MSN [

Inbox ' New Reply Reply all — Forward
Junk Delete Junk

Drafts :

Sent - Move to Options @
Deleted perenne es me Se
Current.news FOIA Request 08-006
halpern ; .

jobs Erom: Shirer, Frank Mr CMH

i (Frank.Shirer@hqda.army.mil)
orders Sent: Wed 3/05/08 7:09 AM

Totsy
i

Contacts _ [have completed coordination with the National

: Archives concerning your request for the
declassification and release of “Manhattan District
History, Book VII, Vol. 1: Feed Materials, Special
Procurement, and Geographical Exploration” by Mr.

| Gavin, Hadden, Armed Forces Special Weapons
Project, Department of Defense, 1947.

Calendar

| The NARA FOIA office has determined that they are

, indeed the owner of the history volume with the

' authority to declassify and release it. | have formally
forwarded your request to them in today's mail and am
sending you formal notification via regular mail.

: Respectfully,

Frank R. Shirer

Chief, Historical Resources Branch
U.S. Army Center of Military History
202-685-3098; DSN 325-3098 _
202-685-4593 (Fax) :

Exhibit 3. -.

S

OC ee



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The current Linde Site Profile has resulted in dose reconstruction decisions that have underestimated dose
exposures with the use of unreliable and incomplete dose exposure pathways and estimates. Furthermore,
the use of this underestimated, unreliable and incomplete Linde Site Profile dose exposure data
demonstrates NIOSH’s inability to reconstruct “sufficiently accurate” dose exposure potentials in direct
contradiction of the EEOICPA legislative mandate. NIOSH has conceded many areas in need of revision
in the Linde site profile. Many of these deficiencies created the potential for the underestimation of dose

exposure estimates used in dose reconstruction denial decisions for Linde claimants.

The Linde Site Profile represents an overall dose exposure analytical model that is not “claimant
favorable.” The Audit Report identified repeated instances of unreliable and underestimated dose
exposure data in the Site Profile. Reliance on the Site Profile yields arbitrary and unreliable probability of
causation (POC) calculations that cannot be defined as “sufficiently accurate.” The Linde Site Profile is
based on unsupported assumptions and repeated instances of a failure to evaluate trace radionuclide
internal dose exposure pathways as well as repeated instances where employee radiation dose exposure
estimates are underestimated.’ NIOSH cannot reconstruct “sufficiently accurate” dose exposures for
Linde employees by relying on the Linde Site Profile. The Audit Report concluded that “[t]he credibility
of the site profile and its claim to be claimant favorable appear to be compromised by the many

unsupported or poorly justified assumptions that are made throughout.”
Trace Radionuclide Dose Exposure

Trace radionuclides identified in the Audit Report, including pro-actinium and actinium, were not
considered or evaluated in any manner by NIOSH. This incomplete and unreliable dose exposure
analysis is not “claimant favorable” since it did not rely upon a “worst case” scenario dose exposure
model. The potential for underestimated dose exposure estimates in the Linde Site Profile was identified
repeatedly in the Audit Report. NIOSH has conceded that this failure to account for these dangerous
radio-isotopes in individual bioassay data forecloses the ability to reconstruct internal dose exposures,
Moreover, this type of radio-isotope data is simply nonexistent for the Linde facility and therefore there is
no way for NIOSH to cure this deficiency in the revised site profile. Both the Mallinckrodt SEC and the
Ames SEC for its residual radiation renovation workers were in part granted based upon the absence of
such crucial bioassay data - the absence of this daia prevents NIOSH from reconstructing “sufficiently

accurate” internal dose exposures for Linde workers as well.

Sid. at 38
° Td.



bidgs. On the Linde property, including blgds. 30 and 14.

As a lift truck operator one job comes to mind in particular. It was in bidg
30. There was a room in back of 30 where they stored African Uranium ore
during the Mahattan Project. The walls of this room were about a foot to a
foot and a half thick made of cement. It took a special torch to cut them up. A
maintance man cut them up and as he cut them up, dust filled the area we
were in. We were not given any protective clothing or equipment. So the dust
went with us wherever we went including home. The blocks were lifted out
by a rigging crew and placed on the forks of my lift truck. I took them to yard
70, a storage area. This job took us considerable length of time to complete.
We were exposed to radiation dust, which we unaware of.

As arigger when I worked in bldg 14, we had to move large tanks aroud
inside the bldg.. We had to climb on top of the tanks to hook up the chains
and cables and came in contact with and breathed the dust on top. Some of
these tanks we laid down and transported them to an outside storage area.
When we tipped them over the dust flew all over.

I loaded and unloaded the annealing furnace numerous times. The furnace
along with bldgs. 38, 31, 6, 14, 19, 30 were contaminated and have since
been dismantled and sent out for decontamination. I worked in everyone of
these bldgs.

At one time during my time at Linde, I was laid off as a rigger and went to
the maintenance dept., where I was a trades helper. In this capacity I was a
pipe fitters helper, working Vit J I were assigned the
job of removing piping from a tunnel which ran from the lab. To the power
house, [a very unpleasant job ]. This tunnel also ran along side of bldg. 14.
The tunnel was very damp. We had to cut some of the piping out with a torch,
blowing dust and water all over us. We had to carry these pipes by hand
outside and replace them with new ones. We were on this job a Jong time.

This tunnel has since been dug up and replaced by the Corp. of Engineers,
because of high readings of radioactivity.

After that I was recalled to the rigging dept.. In this capacity of rigger and
crane operator ,I worked in yard 70 which was a storage area for plates of
steel and aluminum. We would work in this area loading and unloading trucks
plus moving the plates around the area onto support blocks. This area has also
been declared as showing high levels of radiation. A couple of feet deep has
been dug up and sent for decontamination.

Then I went into the fabrication shop as a utility man. My job was to work
on press brakes and punch presses, metal cutting shears, etc.. In this capacity
I worked with material from bldg 30 and yard 70.


My name is and I worked at Linde from IN 951 to
HE 9°52 (I 1954 to MMMM 955 and from [1955 to 1992.
I was diagnosed with bladder cancer [NO4.

I requested my medical records from I Linde ] and all I received was
notices to my foreman that I had taken a physical. There were no results of
any of my physicals.

Prior to going into the service I worked as an inventory clerk and a lift truck
operator which took me into bldg. 30 and other bldgs on the property.

Upon returning to Linde from the military service I was afforded a job as a
material handler along with [who also had returned from the
service. There had been a layoff and as a result we were afforded this
position. This was in bldg 30 also known as the truck shop. Our job was to
issue parts for trucks as requested by fabricators and mechanics. We were
stationed in a wire enclosed area. Above our area was a large heater unit, and
when it was turned on [ heat in winter and cool in summer | the dust would
fly out of it covering us and the material. All this dust had to be cleaned up.
When there was a loud noise or when a fabricator using an overhead crane hit
the crane stops, again the dust from the rafters would rain down on us. We
had to eat our lunch in these conditions. During this time they were installing
more overhead cranes. As they were installed more dust was knocked down
on the workers and they complained about all the dust

As A point of interest, J bas been diagnosed with lung cancer
and had one lung removed.

Also there have been 8 people that I know of that have been diagnosed with
bladder cancer that worked in bldg. 30. Two or more have passed away from
it.

I then went to lift truck operator and was stationed in bldg. 30. I also
assisted the store keepers with material issues there.

At one time there were people in bldg. 30 wearing disposable coveralls and
carrying Geiger counters. When asked if they found anything they ignored the
question.

I then went into the rigging dept. where I worked as a lift truck operator,
Rigger B, Rigger A, and crane operator. In these positions I worked in all the


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\ Prankabirerryete. Sache, Pirticethey tl wcoe
|

|

Ake kage. We Heel ane hay woe daarrperd tilt 0 Inigo bond

Pruigeds wp tant we Aveda ATRL A yar Vsyntn AL

lin Lhe hack oa hraha tv Auatolrig &
Dente ite Akt Comey was gouty of 1953 + DO Comms

heh te Lrke 42v 954. Wedin D gprchacd Bitlig Be

Poo ark
1! MO neta 2) 1993. Phe chive etalirnten® fe) Tie
(Ok decunatin tthe. Aa tof muy Aenaorbedlye

RUDOLPH A. DeMARCO, JR,
Notary Public, State of New York
Reg. No. 01DE6135080
My Commission Expires Oct. 11, 2000



Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Illness Compensation Act National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007
Page 1 of 2
zs

Petitioner Authorization Form

eee

Instructions:

If you wish to petition HHS to consider adding a class of employees to the Special Exposure Cohort and you
are NOT either a member of that class, a survivor of a member of that class, or a labor organization
representing or having represented members of that class, then 42 CFR Part 83, Section 83.7(c) requires
that you obtain written authorization. You can obtain such authorization from either an employee who Is a
member of the class or a survivor of such an employee. You may use this form to obtain such authorization
and submit the completed form to NIOSH with the related petition. Please print legibly.

For Further Information: If you have questions about these instructions, please call the following NIOSH
toll-free phone number and request to speak to someone in the Office of Compensation Analysis and
Support about an SEC petition: 1-800-356-4674.

Authorization for Individual or Entity to Petition HHS on Behalf of a Class of Employees for

Addition to the Special Exposure Cohort

Name of Class Member or Survivor

Street Address of Class Member or Survivor Apt. # P.O. Box

City, State, Zip Code of Class Member or Survivor

P.O. Box

to petition the Department of Health and Human Services on behalf of a class of employees

Name of Class Member (employee, not the employee's survivor)

for the addition of the class to the Special Exposure Cohort, under the Energy Employee’s
Occupational Iliness Compensation Program Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385).

In providing this authorization, | recognize that the petitioner named above will have all the rights
of a petitioner as provi r under 42 CFR Part 83.
} 33-06
Signaturé $f Clase Member or Survivor Date
Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: —— lt



the bags were supposedly empty, but since it’s burlap, and they’ve got a lot of uranium dust, they
probably had some activity which may be small for one bag, but if you’ve got lots of bags and
your sitting on it, maybe that’s an important contributor... ham

Additionally, the increased radium and radon internal exposure potentials from these burlap bags are also
not addressed in the Site Profile.” Due to the storage of the burlap bags in Building 30 and the resulting
dust accumulations, the internal and external exposure potentials resulting from the transport of African
ore in the bags increased the exposure potentials for both radium and radon gas. Such radon and radium
exposure from the burlap bags and the significant isotope exposure pathway potential from pro-actinium,
actinium and thorium have not been measured in the air data or from the available urinalysis bioassay
data cited in the Site Profile covering the time period from 1947 through 1950, This data collection
deficiency is particularly significant for Building 30 employees.

The failure to monitor these employees for radioactive dust exposure is a deficiency in data collection.
Additionally, the Audit Report indicates that “...the site profile is deficient in evaluating many potential
exposure pathways to workers, including rooftops and parking areas contaminated by uranium dust

emitted from unfiltered ventilation systems on top of Buildings 14, 30, 31, 37, and 38."

Employees conducted renovation work in Building 30. They broke up concrete for hours at a time and
subsequently inhaled and ingested the resulting high levels of airborne dust. Furthermore, employees

also cleaned and removed renovation debris from Building 30.°°

The Audit Report described the work involved in the first attempt to renovate Building 30 in 1957,

including “.... jack-hammering the contaminated concrete floor. Dust was kicked up everywhere.”**

Additionally, “Building 30 underwent a second renovation from 1961-1968. During renovation, there
were [sic] jack-hammering of the concrete/dirt floors, removal and replacement of beams, shearing or

cutting of steel and aluminum materials, and spray painting over previously existing paint... The primary

51 Statement from James Neton, NIOSH representative at the Advisory Board Linde Working Group Meeting on
March 26, 2007, Advisory Board Meeting Transcript at page 98
52

Id.
Id.
5 Testimony of co-worker EME before the NYS Workers’ Compensation Board, dated July 30, 1996,
pages 13-98.
°5 Testimony of co-worker EEE before the NYS Workers’ Compensation Board, dated July 30, 1996,
pages 13-98.
* Audit Report at page 114

19



quantities of the residues as well. However, lacking this source term, residue information, and lacking
information to characterize the extent and duration of dust generation associated with manual processes,
NIOSH does not have adequate information to estimate reasonably maximum internal radiation doses of

members of the class associated with dust exposures.

The K-65 residues remaining after uranium extraction contain many of the uranium decay products that
had been in secular equilibrium with the 238U and 235U [uranium] isotopes.” But because the Belgian
Congo pitchblende (ore) that was processed at the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works in the late 1940s
contained such high levels of uranium (60 to 65% pure, as compared to one percent found in American
ore), the rare isotopes of the uranium-235 decay chain that are not detected in United States’ uranium ore

residues are detected in the Belgian Congo.

The monitoring data might still have utility for dose reconstructions if NIOSH had access to information
on the source terms (the specific quantities and contents of the uranium feedstock) being processed at the
facility during the time periods of the dust samplings, and such information on the quantities of the
residues as well. However, lacking this source term, residue information, and lacking information to
characterize the extent and duration of dust generation associated with manual processes, NIOSH does
not have adequate information to estimate reasonably maximum internal radiation doses of members of
the class associated with dust exposures for renovation/remediation work in 1957 and throughout the
1960s.

Linde Ceramics SEC Petitions Addendum

Td. at 13-14
81d.

25



with the lack of personnel monitoring for radiation exposure, the lack of protective safety equipment, and
the failure to enforce safety procedures during renovation work all demonstrate the radiogenic cancer risk
for Building 30 workers. These workers were exposed to varying high levels of surface and airborne
contamination of uranium and its progeny. They were not monitored for internal intakes of uranium and

were not supplied with effective respiratory protection equipment.

NIOSH's approach to dose reconstruction no longer relies on individual monitoring and does not measure
isotope specific dose exposure from thorium, actinium and pro-actinium. Instead, NIOSH relies on plant-
wide air monitoring data, which is not isotope specific. Accordingly, NIOSH has not demonstrated that it

can conduct individual dose reconstructions with “sufficient accuracy.”

Members of the proposed class for the renovation and remediation operations were potentially exposed to
varying high levels of surface and airborne contamination of uranium and its progeny. They were not
monitored for internal intakes of uranium and were not supplied with effective respiratory protection

equipment.

Furthermore there is a significant degree of a lack of information and data collection regarding personal
monitoring, source term from the site where the members of the proposed class worked. Occupational
internal radiation doses received by the members of the proposed class cannot be reconstructed with

sufficient accuracy due to the lack of applicable bioassay data, air monitoring data, and source term

information.

The fact that NIOSH has not reviewed and evaluated the most authoritative source of information of the
types and grades and percentages of uranium content ore that were processed at Linde forestalls any
accurate depiction of source term information for the Linde site, either for the residual radiation time

period or during the operational time period.
Re-Designation of Linde Site — AWE Facility Versus DOE Facility

The EEOICPA only provides for residual radiation coverage for AWE facilities and not for DOE
facilities.” On September 5, 2007 the Department of Labor (DOL) re-designated Buildings 30, 31, 37

© “AWE facility” and “DOE facility” definitions referenced by the Department of Labor in EEOICPA Bulletin 07-
07 are defined in the EEOICPA at 42 USC 73841 (5) and (12), respectively.

21



.

[Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Iliness Compensation Act National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

| OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007
Petitioner Authorization Form Page 2 of 2

Public Burden Statement

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 3 minutes per response,
including time for reviewing instructions, gathering the information needed, and completing the form. If you
have any comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, send them to CDC Reports Clearance Officer, 1600 Clifton
Road, MS-E-11, Atlanta GA, 30333; ATTN:PRA 0920-0639. Do not send the completed petition form to this
address. Completed petitions are to be submitted to NIOSH at the address provided in these instructions.
Persons are not required to respond to the information collected on this form unless it displays a currently
valid OMB number.

Use of this form is voluntary. Failure to use this form will not result in the denial of any right, benefit, or
privilege to which you may be entitled.

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: Sti‘



model. The potential for underestimated dose exposure estimates in the Linde Site Profile was identified
repeatedly in the Audit Report. NIOSH has conceded that this failure to account for these dangerous
radio-isotopes in individual bioassay data forecloses the ability to reconstruct internal dose exposures.
Moreover, this type of radio-isotope data is simply nonexistent for the Linde facility and therefore there is
no way for NIOSH to cure this deficiency in the revised site profile. Both the Ames SEC for its residual
radiation renovation workers and the Mallinckrodt SEC were in part granted based upon the absence of
such crucial bioassay data — the absence of this data prevents NIOSH from reconstructing “sufficiently

accurate” internal dose exposures for Linde workers as well.

At the Mound facility, NIOSH concluded that dose reconstruction was not feasible for the SEC time
period at issue because the internal dose exposure cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy absent

bioassay data addressing raffinate exposure isotopes, including radium, actinium and thorium.

The radionuclide intake routes, including both inhalation and ingestion of selected radionuclides, should
have included uranium, thorium, radium, pro-actinium and actinium. The Audit Report concluded that
the lack of measurement and consequent dose exposure assessment for actinium and pro-actinium

resulted in an incomplete and unreliable dose exposure analytical model.”

Moreover, the inhalation
and/or ingestion of even small amounts of these radionuclides significantly increase the probability of the

development of a radiogenic cancer.”’

Additionally, the Audit Report determined that the Site Profile failed to consider and evaluate worker
exposure to pro-actinium and actinium in the data presented in the section entitled “Dose Reconstruction
Summary, 1955 to present.” This section of the Site Profile summarized the guidelines for

reconstructing internal and external dose exposures after 1954."

Finally, the Audit Report concluded that the “[p]ossible doses from raffinate-related exposures have not

been evaluated in the site profile. Inhalation of even small quantities of some raffinates...could result in

significant doses to the workers.”

“Id. at 19 and 45

“1d.

Td, at 68

*® Linde Site Profile at page 76
* Audit Report at page 68

16



I was then promoted to foreman where I stayed until I retired in 1992.
Having worked in these various positions and areas for all those years and I
was never told that I was in dangerous areas that could affect my health in the

future. I never questioned my job assignments or sites.

Respectfully

preg.

KRISTEN MU, MeDONOUGH
No. 01MC6135115
Notary Public, State of New York
Qualified in Eric County
My Commission Expires 10/41/2009



WEALTH HazaRDs IN YOO FacLITERS FRODIC

“aD PROCESSING URANIUM

Hos TE! 2 copies.

any manner to
c )

tosul REALS Aoa9

Qn unavthorised

ew York Operations Office

CLASSIFICATION:
Bate pa. Jie/7/
For The Atomi¢e Energy Commission

Vi Kicbene Jiemd,
Special Rereview’* x

Final Determinatio . i Chist, Dectassification Branch
1 Unciassitied . i DWISION OF CLASSIFICATION
By: KA. Walter nen

Date: Aug. 6, 1980
~ TR avis

NPR



It is not possible to conduct “sufficiently accurate” and “claimant favorable” dose reconstruction
determinations if raffinate exposures cannot be accounted for in dose exposure estimates, when baseline
uranium content is dubious, when air concentration data is used and urinalysis bioassay data is ignored
and when the Site Profile fails to account for the accurate uranium oxide content processed after 1943 and

during green salt processing.

At the Mallinckrodt facility the approval SEC status for the time period from 1942 through 1957 was
based in part on the pitchblende ores contained high levels of Radium-226 (Ra-226) and Thorium-230,
resulted in a significant gamma radiation source and thus produced most of the external whole-body dose
received by the workers. Thorium-234 and Protactinium-234, both beta emitters, would have produced
most of the skin and extremity dose. The storage and processing released radon and radioactive dusts,
potentially resulting in internal doses to the lung and other tissues due to inhalation. The levels of radon
releases correlate to the radium content of the ore and its derivatives. Because the concentration of radium
and other daughters present at any given time in the ore, in the processed uranium, and in processing
residue, depended on the concentration of uranium in the ore, the levels of radiation doses received by
workers would have depended, in part, on the particular uranium ore being processed at a particular
time. The principal source of internal radiation doses for members of the class was radioactive dusts

aerosolized through processing of radioactive materials and re-aerosolized after settling on surfaces.

At Mallinckrodt the monitoring data might still have utility for dose reconstructions if NIOSH had access
to information on the source terms (the specific quantities and contents of the uranium feedstock) being
processed at the facility during the time periods of the dust samplings, and such information on the
quantities of the residues as well. However, lacking this source term, residue information, and lacking
information to characterize the extent and duration of dust generation associated with manual processes,
NIOSH does not have adequate information to estimate reasonably maximum internal radiation doses of
members of the class associated with dust exposures.”* These issues are raised again for the proposed
SEC time period for the Linde facility from 1947 through 1953.

oxide, producing 300 tons of brown oxide. From 1942 through the duration of the war Linde produced 2060 tons of
green salt. [Page 316]; Linde processed the tailings from 50 percent uranium oxide into a 20 percent oxide sludge
into uranium oxide in 1943 from the US Vanadium Corporation and late in 1943 Linde began to process Congo

pitchblende exclusively until the end of 1944. [Page 292, chapter 9]

24 Mallinckrodt SEC Petition Evaluation Report Petition SEC-00012-1 Uranium Division 1942-57 pages 10-11
25
Id. at 13-14



protective equipment and specifically without the benefit of respirators stands in
direct contradiction of the directive presented by the NYOO AEC in this 1954 report.

Respectfully submitted,

SEC Designated Representative for the Linde Ceramics SEC Petitioner Class

Dated: March 19, 2008

31


SECTION C



March 13, 2008

To whom it may concern:

| EEE worked as a MMM in Bldg. #14 Tonawanda Laboratory. This
was at that time the Silicone Proving Lab department from 1953 through 1957.

This Bldg. #14 and its entire infrastructure were loaded with dust and debris left over.
from the Manhattan Project. This dust & debris was on every piece of equipment and
infrastructure I touched while fastening and installing piping.

The Utility tunnel running under ground the entire length of the Tonawamda
property (Linde Site). This tunnel required a PM program of a walk through inspection
weekly. Two maintenance personnel were required to perform this inspection and report
any problems. One Job assignment I had was removing rusted steel un-strut and replaces
them with stainless steel en-struts, These supports keep all the steam, condensate lines,
electrical conduit lines, and other utility piping. Away and above the ground surface
water that filtered into the Utility tunnel on its way to the various sump pumps pits.

Bldg. #30 some time in the 1970 or 1980 as a maintenance foreman my crew or
Millwrights and maintenance mechanics had an assignment to remove four (4) gravity
ventilators from the roof of Bldg. #30. With the assistance of the Rigging Dept. we
moved them to Bldg. #53 tank car assembly building. There I was instructed by the safety
engineers to have my maintenance personnel to scrape off the green paint and expose the
metal underneath. Then a technician was called from Bldg. #52 by the name of —
to take readings with his Geiger counter of the paint chips and the exposed metal of the
ventilators. He got some readings as I recall but I and m Maintenance personnel were
never informed what those readings were.

Bldg. #38 during the Blizzard of 1976 a fire main supplying water to the sprinkler
system was fractured when a window was blown out from the strong and sub-zero cold.
This fractured water main strayed water all over and all the dust and debris was sprayed
all over the personnel including me the Forman who was directing the maintenance
personnel.

Asa Millwright in the 1967 thru 1974 on a least six (6) occasions my assignments
were to replace or rotate the shear blades on the 25# ton Niagara shear located in the bar
stock area of Bldg. #30.After the shear blades were replace or rotated and operator would
test the shear to make sure the blades were aligned orrectly. When the shear was tested
and cut large flat steel sheets of various thicknesses. The hammering and down ward
thrust of the shear would cause vibrations through out the Bldg. and this would cause dust
and debris to come raining down from overhead.

Bldg. #31 was the same as al the other Bldg loaded with dust and debris just
waiting to come raining down on all the personnel who were assigned to work there as
maintenance of chemical operators.

None of these buildings has lunch rooms or bread rooms so all the personnel took
lunch and breaks on the job site. There was a cafeteria located in Bldg #1.This was a
good ten minutes away from most job sites and with only a 30 minute lunch so most
every body took there breads on the job.

When we asked Safety engineers about how dangerous it was to work in the
various building were uranium was refined was there any danger from radiation. One


Engineer told me not to be concerned we would get more exposure from radiation from
the radium on the luminous dial of a wrist watch.

Another Safety Engineer told me the remedial clean up took care of any radiation left
over from the Manhattan Project. Later on in my career I asked another Safety Engineer
in his office about any radiation danger he then pointed to some technical manuals
located on a shelf behind his desk and said I should read all the information printed in
these manuals. I am not familial with all the techicinal jargon and I could not understand
much of the printed information or was he about to clarify this information. We were all
left in the dark and continued to work in the contaminated waste dump with very little
protection if any and keep in the dark until personnel started to come down with various
Cancers and other problems.

nk, KS J 00%
poorly ppd Fi,

wt fe ge

RUDOLPH A. DeMARCO, JR.
Notary Public, State of New York
Reg. No. 01DE6135080
My Commission Expires Oct. 11, 2009

Get O Cf



permitted and established by the NYOO were arbitrary in nature and not based on specific
safety guidelines that were verifiable to assess whether these workers were exposed to safe
doses that actually protected workers from the high levels of exposure from both the K-65

residues and the radium cake and the associated exposure to radon from both the K-65 and
the radium cake. [Exhibit 9: Dated April 7, 1949: Monthly Status and Progress Report for
March 1949}

The incomplete assessment of the radiological source term in the Linde Site Profile is a data deficiency
that translates into missed and ultimately underestimated and unreliable internal and external dose
estimation. The reliance on such unreliable dose estimation for individual internal dose reconstruction for
uranium and its progeny during the SEC proposed time period from 1947 through 1953 and the residual
radiation time period, results in reconstructed doses that do not satisfy the “sufficiently accurate” standard

for dose reconstruction determinations.

The foregoing exhibits demonstrate the incomplete assessment of source term data, worker dose
exposures both on-site and off-site at the LOOW and the consequent extent to which the current Linde
Site Profile is an incomplete and unreliable document to be used for any dose reconstruction

determinations for the proposed SEC class of petitioners presented herein.

5. Ihave also attached affidavit statements from former Linde workers that further illustrate
these deficiencies within the current Linde Site Profile. The statements are from the

following Linde workers}

. Significant! is the SEC designated representative for the SEC class defined by the

time period from November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953 and EE +:

provided details regarding the work of conducted by the SEC designated representative for the
SEC class defined by the time period from January 1, 1954 through July 31, 2006, .

ma: is deceased. ee : represented by his widow, |

. Finally .; provided a statement detailing his recollections regarding the

regular procedures at Linde for the incineration of unknown boxes of documents. The documents

were incinerated off-site at Kenmore Mercy Hospital and not at the on-site Linde incinerator.

28



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sampling data and neglecting bioassay data could lead to significant uncertainties in worker
intakes and underestimation of missed inhalation doses.”"

NIOSH’s decision to ignore available urinalysis data covering the time period from 1947 through 1950
and the concomitant exclusive reliance on air concentration to evaluate dose exposure in the instant case
does not provide a “claimant favorable” dose exposure model. The fact that the Site Profile ignores
available urinalysis bioassay data in favor of a blanket reliance on air concentration data to measure
internal dose exposures inevitably results in dose exposure estimates that are underestimated, unreliable

and not “claimant favorable.” NIOSH has now conceded this fact.

The Audit Report specifically addressed the dust problems within Building 30. The Audit Report states
that:

“Dust would come off the overhead rafters. Sometimes, they would fall right onto workers’
lunch. During the MED period, they stacked all the contaminated burlap bags in storage area of
Building 30. These contaminated burlap bags were kept in there until they were removed to be
burned in the incinerator in the late 1950s. Many people working in Building 30, including
operation personnel, secretaries, and maintenance workers, would sit on those bags resting or
eating their lunch, This went on for many years,”

NIOSH’s decision to ignore available urinalysis data covering the time period from 1947 through 1950
and the concomitant exclusive reliance on air concentration to evaluate dose exposure in the instant case
does not provide a “claimant favorable” dose exposure model. The fact that the Site Profile ignores
available urinalysis bioassay data in favor of a blanket reliance on air concentration data to measure
internal dose exposures inevitably results in dose exposure estimates that are underestimated, unreliable

and not “claimant favorable.”

Additionally, the Audit Report indicates that “[t]he site profile does not characterize or provide any
information on the potential missed worker external doses due to extremity exposure, skin contamination,
and whole-body exposure to residual contamination in used burlap bags stored in different locations, such
as Building 30. Internal exposure may have resulted from the inhalation and ingestion of radioactive dust
accumulating from the burlap bags. The external exposure potential would have resulted from any dust
coming in contact with skin as well as the dust that often covered employee’s clothing after working in
Building 30."

61d,
"Id. at 112
id.



At the Mound facility, NIOSH concluded that dose reconstruction was not feasible for the SEC time
period at issue because the internal dose exposure cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy absent
bioassay data addressing raffinate exposure isotopes, including radium, actinium and thorium.

The radionuclide intake routes, including both inhalation and ingestion of selected radionuclides, should
have included uranium, thorium, radium, pro-actiniun and actinium. The Audit Report concluded that
the lack of measurement and consequent dose exposure assessment for actinium and pro-actinium

resulted in an incomplete and unreliable dose exposure analytical model.’

Moreover, the inhalation
and/or ingestion of even small amounts of these radionuclides significantly increase the probability of the

development of a radiogenic cancer."

Finally, the Audit Report concluded that the “[p]ossible doses from raffinate-related exposures have not
been evaluated in the site profile. Inhalation of even small quantities of some raffinates...could result in

significant doses to the workers.”

NIOSH POC Analysis is Not “Claimant Favorable” Because
Internal Dose Exposure Analyses Based Solely on Air Concentration Data Result in

Underestimated Dose Exposure Estimates

The use of ait concentration data has been criticized by experts as unreliable due to a tendency to
underestimate internal dose exposure.” Accordingly, the exclusive reliance on air concentration data
cannot be considered “claimant favorable.” The Audit Report concluded that the “...air concentration
data used in the site profile do not appear to be claimant favorable, due to significant expert criticism
regarding using air concentration data to estimate worker inhalation intakes at uranium processing
facilities”"* Several studies, including a 1993 Nuclear Regulatory Commission study, “...demonstrate
that using air concentration data could lead to underestimating the worker intakes and, subsequently, the

internal exposures.”'> The Audit Report also stated that:

“., the sensitivity of survey instruments, locations of the air samples, and air flow studies of the
buildings are not presented in the Linde Site Profile report. It is also important to point out that
the air concentration data used are based on results of random grab-air samples in general areas
and breathing zones, and not the results of continuous area sampling. Lack of more complete air

"Id. at 19 and 45

"Yd,

” Audit Report at page 68
S14, at 71-72



The available Linde dosimetry data for the residual radiation time period at the Linde site is not isotope
specific for trace raffinate radionuclides. The absence of isotope specific monitoring data forestalls
NIOSH's ability to reconstruct a credible dose reconstruction determinations. Accurate individual internal
dose reconstructions for uranium and its progeny during the residual radiation time period is not possible
under the dose exposure data presented in the Linde Site Profile. Consequently, the dose exposure data
that NIOSH has relied on does not present a reliable or accurate depiction of worker dose exposures by

the fact that the data is not isotope specific.

NIOSH POC Analysis is Not “Claimant Favorable” Because
Internal Dose Exposure Analyses Based Solely on Air Concentration Data Result in

Underestimated Dose Exposure Estimates

The internal dose exposure estimates that solely rely on air concentration dose data for the renovation
time period for Building 30. The use of air concentration data has been criticized by experts as unreliable
due to a tendency to underestimate internal dose exposure.’ Accordingly, the exclusive reliance on air

concentration data cannot be considered “claimant favorable.”

The Audit Report concluded that the “...air concentration data used in the site profile do not appear to be
claimant favorable, due to significant expert criticism regarding using air concentration data to estimate
worker inhalation intakes at uranium processing facilities.”"° Several studies, including a 1993 Nuclear
Regulatory Commission study, “...demonstrate that using air concentration data could lead to
underestimating the worker intakes and, subsequently, the internal exposures.”"” The Audit Report also

stated that:

«._.the sensitivity of survey instruments, locations of the air samples, and air flow studies of the
buildings are not presented in the Linde Site Profile report. It is also important to point out that
the air concentration data used are based on results of random grab-air samples in general areas
and breathing zones, and not the results of continuous area sampling. Lack of more complete air
sampling data and neglecting bioassay data could lead to significant uncertainties in worker
intakes and underestimation of missed inhalation doses.”

NIOSH’s decision to ignore available urinalysis data covering the time period from 1947 through 1950
and the concomitant exclusive reliance on air concentration to evaluate dose exposure in the instant case

does not provide a “claimant favorable” dose exposure model. The fact that the Site Profile ignores

Sd, at 71-72
“1d.
"Id.
81d.

17



Source Term Data Collection

The incomplete assessment of the radiological source term in the Linde Site Profile is a data deficiency
that translates into missed and ultimately underestimated and unreliable internal and external dose
estimation. The reliance on such unreliable dose estimation for individual internal and external dose
reconstruction for uranium and its progeny during the residual radiation time period, results in
reconstructed doses that do not satisfy the “sufficiently accurate” accurate standard for dose

reconstruction determinations.

The failure to account for numerous sources of both internal and external exposure pathways including
Vanadium tailings from concentrated sludge in 15-20% black uranium oxide, yellow-cake concentrated
sludge containing between 10 to 15% U308, and the incineration of burlap bags and paper bags resulting
in increased environmental exposure pathways. Moreover, the New York Operations Report from March

1949 noted the presence of radium cake residues at Linde stored in steel drums at Linde.

Significantly, the fact that NIOSH has not reviewed and evaluated the most authoritative source of
information of the types and grades and percentages of uranium content ore that were processed at Linde
forestalls any accurate depiction of source term information for the Linde site, either during the
operational time period or during the residual radiation time period.” This deficiency has consequences
for all Site Profile dose exposure estimates and the overall adequacy of the Site Profile for use in dose
reconstruction and probability of causation determinations. Research indicates that higher yield uranium
ore was processed at Linde after 1943 and all low grade forms of uranium ore were no longer being
processed at Linde after 1943. This evidence is in direct contradiction with the Linde Site Profile. The
Linde Site Profile’s baseline dose exposure data estimates cannot be considered credible. This evidence
also provides additional bases for direct comparison to the Mallinckrodt facility and consequently for

granting SEC status for Linde from 1947 through 1953.”

2 The best single source on feed materials is MD History, Book VII, Volume 1, entitled “Feed Materials, Special
Procurement, and Geographical Exploration” Endnotes page 687 — Note 2, Chapter 9 [Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar
E. Anderson, Jr., 1962 Pennsylvania State University Press, Volume I, A History of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission, The New World 1939/1946]

3 Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb by Vincent C. Jones, Center for Military History 1985: “At the end
of 1942,..Linde expanded its black oxide production facilities, but, by late 1943, was phasing out domestic ores and

using its facilities to refine higher-yielding African ores.” [page 314]; Linde processed black oxide into brown



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cannot presume that residual radiation workers were only exposed or worked in Buildings 30, 31, 37 and
38.

The renovation/remediation workers from the late 1950s and 1960s were never monitored for radiation
exposure or inhalation/ingestion of uranium dust. Moreover, there were no industrial safety procedures in
place during these periods of renovation/remediation. Consequently, the internal exposure potentials
from re-suspension of alpha particles from uranium dust exposure and trace radionuclide isotopes were

not evaluated and cannot be evaluated for these workers.

NIOSH has conceded that the failure to account for uranium progeny exposure from residual surface
contamination is not possible under current Linde Site Profile. New data from November 30th ORAU
report to the Linde Working Group addressed the internal exposure from dust and debris inhalation and

will be used in the revised Site Profile.

Source Term Data Collection Deficiencies

The incomplete assessment of the radiological source term in the Linde Site Profile is a data deficiency
that translates into missed and ultimately underestimated and unreliable internal and external dose
estimation. The reliance on such unreliable dose estimation for individual internal and external dose
reconstruction for uranium and its progeny during the residual radiation time period, results in
reconstructed doses that do not satisfy the “sufficiently accurate” accurate standard for dose

reconstruction determinations.

The failure to account for numerous sources of both internal and external exposure pathways including
Vanadium tailings from concentrated sludge in 15-20% black uranium oxide, yellow-cake concentrated
sludge containing between 10 to 15% U308, and the incineration of burlap bags and paper bags resulting
in increased environmental exposure pathways. Moreover, the New York Operations Report from March

1949 noted the presence of radium cake residues at Linde stored in steel drums at Linde.
Significantly, the fact that NIOSH has not reviewed and evaluated the most authoritative source of

information of the types and grades and percentages of uranium content ore that were processed at Linde

forestalls any accurate depiction of source term information for the Linde site, either during the

23



93-25-07P00915-ARy

Linde Ceramics SEC Petitions

SEC00106 November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953

SEC00107 January 1, 1954 through July 31, 2006

Linde Ceramics Facility - Tonawanda, New York



Other times were elso recorded. The averege time required to load the

tredler with 12 drums et the reiiroad siding by the igloo,

the igloo, unload ané return was

223 minutes.

move the drums to

To load 22 drums at the open air storege, move to igloo, unload and
return required approximetely 1 hour. : :

By: K. A. Walter
Date: Aug. 6, 1$8C

Recorded Exvosures to Personnel

. T. F, Davis.
Nine Linde employees heve been exposed to rediation during ‘the K-65
unloeding operation. Three employees were exposed as lift truck operetors,
five were exposed es movemen using hand trucks ané one @8 health physics
supervisor on the unloeding and storege operations. Exposures in milli-
roentgens recorded by pocket meters and dates they were received ere given:
3/23 3/307 4/8 4/11 4/20 Total
H. Seyfeng Lift Oper. 110 120 60 160 50 ~O 540
FR. Marcinkowski " " ve) 60 - - . 45 180
], Bullock " " - - 60 190 “4O - 290
R. Cook Moveman - 210 240 = 320 - 120 «890
L. Pape " 190 - 2h0 = 300 - 70 800
L. Selva " - 130 100 370 - 120 720
S. Bellomo " - - - - 90 - 90
R. Backert " - - - - 80 - 80
Heatherton Realth Physicist 100 70 70 120 50 40 450

Highest exposures were on April 7 end 8

when material was béing stored
in the igloo. :

Discussion of Rediation Exposures

’ Exposures to personnel are ‘undoubtedly higher then is necessary. To
hesten the work ené to e}iminate @ very great safety hezard which would be

present if a Lift truck were used entirely to unload a cer, the men were re-

guired to move érums
the open air storege

with e hend truck.
area to the igloo,

To seve time in moving meterial from
men were egein placed on the trailer

to move the drums so that the size of the load could be doubled. Peinting
‘the drums with a brush contributed greatly to exposures.

It is estimated that one “person unloeding one carload lot with e barrel
truck should not receive more then 250 mr. to any pert of the body. The hends
will receive about the same exposure as the feet end slightly lese to the rest
‘of the body. The totel exposure to any part of the aft truck operator's body
should not exceed 80 to 90 mr. from henéling 96 drums once. .

The driver of the tractor which wes used to pull the trailer received
practically no exposure. The ceb wes epproxinately 20 ft. from the front of
the load. Radietion in the cab was less then 1 wr/nr with e full load
treiler. . ‘ a

wt


The credibility of the Linde Site Profile and NIOSH’s claim that the data analyses relied on are “claimant
favorable” and based on “worst case” scenarios is compromised significantly by the foregoing
deficiencies. Internal radiation doses cannot be reconstructed with “sufficient accuracy” with NIOSH’s

sole reliance on air monitoring data and a failure to evaluate available urinalysis bioassay data.

The incomplete assessment of the radiological source term in the Linde Site Profile is a data deficiency
that translates into missed and ultimately underestimated and unreliable internal and external dose
estimation. The reliance on such unreliable dose estimation for individual internal and external dose
reconstruction for uranium and its progeny during the residual radiation time period, results in
reconstructed doses that do not satisfy the “sufficiently accurate” accurate standard for dose

reconstruction determinations.

Significantly, the uranium content of the ores processed by the facility varied substantially, as did other
radiologically significant daughter products. Pitchbiende ores contained high levels of Radium-226 (Ra-
226) and Thorium-230. Radium-226 (in equilibrium with its progeny) constitutes a significant gamma
radiation source and thus produced most of the external whole-body dose received by the workers, while
Thorium-234 and Protactinium-234, both beta emitters, would have produced most of the skin and
extremity dose. In addition, storage and processing released radon and radioactive dusts, potentially
resulting in internal doses to the lung and other tissues due to inhalation. The levels of radon releases
would have correlated closely to the radium content of the ore and its derivatives. Because the
concentration of radium and other daughters present at any given time in the ore, in the processed
uranium, and in processing residue, depended on the concentration of uranium in the ore, the levels of
radiation doses received by workers would have depended, in part, on the particular uranium ore being

processed at a particular time.

If NIOSH does not have reliable and complete internal monitoring data for members of the proposed
class, and it does not have enough source term or process information, then NIOSH cannot develop a

sufficiently accurate model for dose reconstruction. This is the case at Linde as well as at Mallinckrodt.

Research indicates that higher yield uranium ore was processed at Linde after 1943 and all low grade
forms of uranium ore were no longer being processed at Linde after 1943. This evidence is in direct
contradiction with the Linde Site Profile. The Linde Site Profile’s baseline dose exposure data estimates
cannot be considered credible. This evidence also provides additional bases for direct comparison to the
Mallinckrodt facility and consequently for granting SEC status for Linde from 1947 through 1953.

10



The Audit Report Calls into Question the Overall “Claimant Favorable” Estimated Exposure
Foundation of the Linde Site Profile

The Linde Site Profile represents an overall dose exposure analytical model that is not “claimant
favorable.” The Audit Report identified repeated instances of unreliable and underestimated dose
exposure data in the Site Profile. Reliance on the Site Profile yields arbitrary and unreliable POC
calculations that cannot be defined as “sufficiently accurate.” The statistical analyses used to establish the
dose exposure estimates in the Site Profile are suspect. The Linde Site Profile is based on unsupported
assumptions and repeated instances of a failure to evaluate trace radionuclide internal dose exposure
pathways as well as repeated instances where employee radiation dose exposure estimates are
underestimated.° NIOSH cannot reconstruct “sufficiently accurate” dose exposures for Linde employees

by relying on the Linde Site Profile.

The Linde Site Profile deficiencies cited in the Audit Report establish that the Site Profile is not a

“claimant favorable” reference tool to rely on for dose reconstruction determinations. The Audit

concluded that “[t]he credibility of the site profile and its claim to be claimant favorable appear to be
27

compromised by the many unsupported or poorly justified assumptions that are made throughout.”

The failure to monitor these employees for radioactive dust exposure is a deficiency in data collection.
Additionally, the Audit Report indicates that “,..the site profile is deficient in evaluating many potential
exposure pathways to workers, including rooftops and parking areas contaminated by uranium dust

emitted from unfiltered ventilation systems on top of Buildings 14, 30, 31, 37, and 38.8

The Audit Report also emphasized that “...the air concentration data used are based on results of random
grab air samples in general areas and breathing zones, but not on continuous area sampling measurements
in high-risk or high-dose areas. Therefore, SC&A believes that using air concentration data only in the
Linde Site Profile can lead to significant uncertainties in worker inhalation intakes, and the eventual
underestimation of missed internal doses.”” Consequently, even the precision of the Site Profile air
concentration data is at issue because the data is only based on random air samples and does not take into

account air samples from high risk or high dose areas throughout the Linde facility.



For this reason it is felt that exposure to beta emitting dusts is of negligable
consequence compared to any concomitant alpha dust exposure.

One operation performed by groups “BTM and "C" employees has not been included

in the exposure evaluation of these employees. In this operation the employee
oarries 2 + 75# cartons of brown oxide and dumps their contents into a barrel
located in the brown loading hood, A visual observation of operations during the
time of sampling did not reveal any air concentrations which could conceivably be
interpreted at the levels which were found. Excluding those samples, groups “BY
and "C* employees receive concentrations of 32 times the preferred alpha level for
an 8% hour day. With this operation included, the same group receives an exposure
of 106 times the preferred level during the same time.


vu

oS
am aa a THIS DOCK
a NUMBER... Z

Subject: Experimentation on high-grade oer oe the
Linde Air Products Company. 26 Febpia.
. oO . q\8

1944.)

‘ EIDM T-12 | a, ast. Ind.

Office of the Aree Engineer, Tonawenda Aree, Tonawanda, N.Y.,
2 March 1944. To: The Area Engineer, Madison Square Area, -
New York, N.Y. (Attention: Major Canfield Hadlock).

1. Reference paragraph 2 basic commmication, exhaust
ventillation was installed and first operated about 13 February.

2. Reference paragraph 3 basic communication, first dis-
tribution of film-containing badges was made on 31 Jenuary.
Seventeen badges were issued to thoseworkers who were most
likely to come in contact with tolerance doses of exposure.
Issuance of new badges is made weekly to the followings

2 Moore Operators

1 Moore Tailings Operator
Ball Hill Operator
Foreman

9 Loaders

1 Loader Foreman

1 Sampler

1 Pachuca Digest Operator

3.  Laboretory experiments on the 65% ore have been ten-~
porarily discontinued. It is possible that no more experinents
will be done, but if work is resumed, it will probably continue
no longer than three or four weeks. We, therefore, feel that
establishment of a film-containing badge survey*yvould hardly be
worthwhile.

Final Ce!

f Uncles 4
Ed Ge. ian

E. L. VAN RORN,
Captain, Corps of Engineers,

Area Engineer. AnK
x Ne
or REPL 3%

ie Hj2) 12,3, 4156 S

F/5-

mS. z Davis

astiet) J





NYOO Report dated April 1, 1949: Health Hazards in NYOO Facilities Producing
and Processing Uranium, pages 12, 23-24]

2. This fact is never mentioned in the current Linde Site Profile and represents yet
another instance of dose exposure underestimation potential for the exposed workers
in the 1947 through 1953 time period as well as for the residual radiation workers

exposed to alpha emitting dust during the time period from 1954 through 2006.

3. Additionally, the memorandum dated July 13, 1948, speaks to the inhalation of dust
hazards associated with Step III production resulting from “brown oxide dumping
operations” and how the air samples “indicate an extremely high concentration of

radioactive material.” [See Exhibit 12]

4, Furthermore, the residual radiation workers that conducted renovation work were
exposed to dangerous levels of alpha emitting dust that would have resulted from the
uranium processing from the Linde operational time period. In the excerpt from the

attached report entitled “Decontamination of Buildings Used for Processing Alpha

Emitters” prepared by the NYOO AEC and authors, nl
a: April 29, 1954, the report indicates at page 19:

Decontamination operations such as sandblasting, vacuum cleaning, pneumatic jack hammering,
should be performed with extreme care. Dust protective respirators should be worn by operators
during all dry cleaning operations to prevent the operator’s exposure to excessive radioactive
airborne dust concentrations. Work clothing, gloves, etc. should be specially issued, laundered or
even burned after use to prevent spread of airborne radioactive contamination. [Exhibit 13]

5, The renovation work described in the attached affidavit statements from former
Linde workers, inchudin_
indicates how these workers performed renovation work throughout the 1960s and
1970s without any protective equipment, without any work clothes, and how they
would go home with there regular clothing covered in dust and wash their clothes at
home. These workers performed many of the renovation activities identified in the
Klevin, et al. report including vacuum cleaning and jack hammering. These workers
were exposed to radioactive airborne dust and re-suspended airborne alpha emissions.

The inhalation and ingestion of these particles by workers without the benefit of any

30



Prescribed Method of Unloading end Storing K-65 BE KA, vate
: Caid. Aug. 6, 1980

. To keep rediation exposures at a minimm, it would be desireble to TE Davis ;

unicef 211 drums at the igloo area to eliminate extra handling. This is

not possible at the present time since neither the igloos nor the unloading

platform are within: the fenced area. The platform by the railroad siding,

if repeired, could easily accommodate four cerloed lots. Either a lift truck

or hand’ truck could be used to remove the drums from the cars to the pletforn,

end from the platform to the treiler. Two lift trucks should de used at the

igloo, one to carry the drims to the door of the igloo and the other working

inside removing the drums from the door and storing them in the igloo. A rise |

of about 12 inchee before the igloo and the nerrow dimensions of the doorway

make ita difficult task to carry each drum inside and store it with the seme

truck. a . : Sut :

“ If the radon concentrations in the igloo one month efter storage of the
firet drums would permit the lift truck operetor to enter the igloo, it would be
better to store eech lot in the igloo as it is unloeded. In this manner, ~

six lots per month could be unloaded and stored by four men with no person
receiving more then 600 mr. of gamma rediation per month. This essumes that
extreme care will be exercised by each person s0 as not to expose himself

“more than is necessary. :

R. C. Heatherton
Health Physicist

RCH:mo

cc: Dr. B. S. Wolf
Mr. M. Eieenbud

F. J Epp

APATITE RIVE PETE OR


Linde Ceramics SEC Petition - SEC Tracking Number: SEC00107

Linde Ceramics SEC Petition — January 1, 1954 through July 31, 2006

The incomplete assessment of the radiological source term in the Linde Site Profile is a data deficiency
that translates into missed and ultimately underestimated and unreliable internal and external dose
estimation. The reliance on such unreliable dose estimation for individual internal dose reconstruction for
uranium and its progeny during the SEC proposed time period from 1954 through 2006 encompassing the
NIOSH defined residual radiation time period, results in reconstructed doses that do not satisfy the

“sufficiently accurate” standard for dose reconstruction determinations.

The K-65 studies conducted at Linde during 1944 and possibly beyond 1944, would have affected the
degree and nature of the residual contamination in the MED buildings where the studies were conducted,
including the uranium progeny dose exposure that workers would have been exposed which would have

affected the radiological exposure potentials for Linde residual radiation workers.

Ihave also included worker statement detailing instances where requested medical records were missing.
Moreover, records for sick workers were often missing or incomplete whereas requests from workers who
were not sick were generally not subject to any significant delays and the requests were often granted

without any problems with missing or incomplete records.

1. Air study results from 1948 and 1949 NYOO Report indicate that Linde workers
were exposed to as much as 33 times the acceptable levels of alpha emissions and
may have been exposed to levels as high as 106 times the acceptable levels of alpha
emissions. The NYOO Report also notes that since the “acceptable levels” have been
established based upon animal studies, there is no way to determine whether these
levels of exposure will provide enough protection for the exposed workers.
Specifically, the report states “The preferred alpha level of 70 disintegrations per
minute per cubic meter (d/m/m3) for alpha emitting dust is based on animal studies.
To date there has been insufficient industrial experience with uranium to make it
possible for us to state to what extent this level affords a margin of safety for the
workers.” [See Exhibit 10: NYOO Report at page 5, dated January 1949 and air
sampling studies conducted from October 1948 through November 1948; Exhibit 11:

29





Additionally, the increased radium and radon internal exposure potentials from these burlap bags are also
not addressed in the Site Profile.” Due to the storage of the burlap bags in Building 30 and the resulting
dust accumulations, the internal and external exposure potentials resulting from the transport of African
ore in the bags increased the exposure potentials for both radium and radon gas. Such radon and radium
exposure from the burlap bags and the significant isotope exposure pathway potential from pro-actinium,
actinium and thorium have not been measured in the air data or from the available urinalysis bioassay
data cited in the Site Profile covering the time period from 1947 through 1950. This data collection
deficiency is particularly significant for Building 30 employees.

The failure to monitor these employees for radioactive dust exposure is a deficiency in data collection.
Additionally, the Audit Report indicates that “...the site profile is deficient in evaluating many potential
exposure pathways to workers, including rooftops and parking areas contaminated by uranium dust

emitted from unfiltered ventilation systems on top of Buildings 14, 30, 31, 37, and 38."

The Audit Report also emphasized that “...the air concentration data used are based on results of random
grab air samples in general areas and breathing zones, but not on continuous area sampling measurements
in high-risk or high-dose areas. Therefore, SC&A believes that using air concentration data only in the
Linde Site Profile can lead to significant uncertainties in worker inhalation intakes, and the eventual
underestimation of missed internal doses.””! Consequently, even the precision of the Site Profile air
concentration data is at issue because the data is only based on random air samples and does not take into

account air samples from high risk or high dose areas throughout the Linde facility.

The credibility of the Linde Site Profile and NIOSH’s claim that the data analyses relied on are “claimant
favorable” and based on “worst case” scenarios is compromised significantly by the foregoing
deficiencies. Internal radiation doses cannot be reconstructed with “sufficient accuracy” with NIOSH’s

sole reliance on air monitoring data and a failure to evaluate available urinalysis bioassay data.

NIOSH's approach to dose reconstruction no longer relies on individual monitoring and does not measure
isotope specific dose exposure from thorium, actinium and pro-actinium. Instead, NIOSH relies on plant-
wide air monitoring data, which is not isotope specific. Accordingly, NIOSH has not demonstrated that it

can conduct individual dose reconstructions with “sufficient accuracy.”

Pid.
20 id.
21 Audit Report at page 18



concern with Building 30, which processed uranium during production years, during this period was the

residual contamination both in and outside the building.”*””

NIOSH’: failure to evaluate the available urinalysis bioassay data from 1947 through 1950 to estimate the
dose exposures for the Building 30 renovation workers from the 1960s precludes the accurate evaluation
of exposure to and inhalation of radioactive uranium dust. This Site Profile data deficiency is another

example of NIOSH relying on underestimated dose exposure data in dose reconstruction decisions.

At the Advisory Board meeting evaluating the Linde Site Profile on March 26, 2007, a NIOSH
representative conceded that the use of urinalysis bioassay data is more reliable to assess dose exposure
potentials than the sole reliance on air concentration data.* The NIOSH representative indicated that the
potential availability of newly uncovered urinalysis bioassay data would establish a preferred dose

exposure analytical model.

The Audit Report also emphasized that “...the air concentration data used are based on results of random
grab air samples in general areas and breathing zones, but not on continuous area sampling measurements
in high-risk or high-dose areas, Therefore, SC&A believes that using air concentration data only in the
Linde Site Profile can lead to significant uncertainties in worker inhalation intakes, and the eventual
underestimation of missed internal doses.””” Consequently, even the precision of the Site Profile air
concentration data is at issue because the data is only based on random air samples and does not take into

account air samples from high risk or high dose areas throughout the Linde facility.

The credibility of the Linde Site Profile and NIOSH’s claim that the data analyses relied on are “claimant
favorable” and based on “worst case” scenarios is compromised significantly by the foregoing
deficiencies. Internal radiation doses cannot be reconstructed with “sufficient accuracy” with NIOSH’s

sole reliance on air monitoring data and a failure to evaluate available urinalysis bioassay data.

The MED/AEC buildings at Linde remained contaminated despite repeated attempts over a number of
years during the 1950s and 1960s to renovate these buildings, The ORNL 1978 radiological survey
established the necessity of designating Linde as a FUSRAP site in 1980. The resulting dust exposure

from these failed renovation activities and the daily inhalation and ingestion of uranium dust combined

Td,

58 Statement from Cindy Bloom, NIOSH representative at the Advisory Board Linde Working Group Meeting on
March 26, 2007, Transcript at page 38

*® Audit Report at page 18

20



® 6

In addition, the average alpha concentration as obtained from the sample record
sheets sre recorded, This average alpha concentration multiplied by the total
time is depioted in the last colimn, The average alpha concentration per By
hour day is determined by deviding elphe concentration times total time by the
total number of hours (minutes) per shift.

Finelly assuming that the average mn inhales 10 cubic meters of air per dey,
the daily alpha inhalation can be determined by multiplying the average alpha

concentration by 10 cubic meters.

The intensity of the beta activity of the radioactive dust present was noted,
However, these dusts present a minor hygienic hazard as compared with the alpha

emitting dust.

Disoussion

The information contained in the job analysis sheets is summerized in Table I
pelow. It should be recognized that in evaluating the quantity of dust inhaled
we estimate the relationship of any given sample to the worker's total exposure
time, We have ondeavored to obtain complete job analysis for all operations, but
it is woderstood that errors in judgment and irregulerities of operations sre apt
to introduce deviations of more or legs importance. However, we are of the
opinion that the data, as summerized, represent a fair estimate of the levels

to which employees are exposed, and that such revisions as may be required with
the accumulation of more date should not effect the order of magnitude of the
results reported heres

The preferred alpha level of 70 disintegrations per minute per cubic meter (4/m/m®)
for alpha emitting dust is based om animal studies. To date there has been
insufficient industrial experience with uranium to make it possible for us to
state to what extent this level affords a margin of safety for the workers.



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oF a COPIES, . SERIES. AL, :

“Te. Be. “Atonte Baergy Commission. °
_ Office of the Yew York Directe Opera tions

F, H.Belmore

Gontienen 2.

Reference is ‘made to y ye of “Jang_29-and 4 he Sr
theretd on. the subject of dust hnesards in the. Ceramics (Puente

writer agrees: that the results of sir. sanple .
the brow oxide’ dimping operation andthe} hooper dumping and
eration indicate an extrensly high concentra tion of radioactivs
bhese results were passed along to opr Urs Heatherton’e month
@.Ssituation in these

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pisas to report thet as ® conse: dence of revisions

recently made to th t. collecting equipment around the Ropper dumping and
pulverizing operati the eir contamination in this are Shown, Teadings
.as low as 31] alpha mp es meter. This is a cons gable improvement
over the readings taken in May which reached as teh as

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receiving the brown oxide *
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SPECIAL RERE SVIEV

{ . FINAL DETERMINATION ‘Very truly yours,.

Rete

Te LINDE AIR PRODUCTS COuPaNY
: CERAMZCS PLANT

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“Exhibit ) 9
a ae Linde: Burlap Bag Issue
Technical Call Notes

February 13, 2008

Teleconference Participants
I roca arr | Advisory Board |).
SC&A NIOSH/ORAUT . Linde Workers Others
Linde WG

K. R-DeMers C. Crawford J. Beach | oo ti(<‘(i‘<ééiésr

J. Mauro J. Guido G. Roessler
S. Ostrow

Notes

1. Steve Ostrow began the teleconference by stating that it was a “technical call” between
SC&A and NIOSH/ORAUT as planned at the January 8, 2008 Advisory Board Linde
Working Group meeting in Las Vegas, to discuss the open item concerning uranium ore
containing burlap bags at the Linde site. He then summarized some of the background
information leading to this teleconference.

2. Joe Guido summarized the findings related to the bags presented in the “NIOSH
Response: Linde TBD Issues” report of November 29, 2007, which establishes a time-
line for the disposition of the bags, primarily based on written records.

3. The participants discussed what other than African ore (Step 1 material) might have been
present in burlap bags, which, apparently, were covered by paper bags. Joe Guido noted
that the records indicate that uranium oxide concentrate (Step 3 material) arrived at the
site in drums. He explained that there is a radiological distinction between the Step | and
the Step 3 material since the former contains uranium progeny (especially, radium, which
is important to external dose), while the latter contains relatively little.

4. Kathy Robertson-DeMers questioned whether NIOSH/ORAUT had examined
transportation records or classified records for Linde and Mr. Guido said that he “didn’t
think so” to the former and “no” to the latter.

5. | former Linde worker, presented some background information about his
employment at the site, from [951 to IJ1993 (with some breaks in
service) and recounted his recollection of the burlap bags. He remembered that there were
two pallets of bags containing some material in Building 30 in the time period around
August 1951. He and his friends would get drinks, stand by the pile of bags, and place
their cups on the bags. He was told by one co-worker that the bags were feft over from
the Manhattan project. He was asked about the appearance of the bags and he replied that
they looked like large canvas sandbags.

] SC&A, 2/15/08


- Exhibit 10
Ae

Be

D.

Ae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Purpose of Report 1
Results of Study 2
Method of Study 1
le operational Process for Complete Furnace Run 2

II, Major Job Location and Breakdown 3

III. Job Analysis Sheets - Purpose 4
Disoussion 6
Ie Teble I, Alpha Exposures by Occupation 6

II. Figure 1 7

III. Figure 2 8

. APPENDIX A
Job Analysis Sheets 10
APPENDIX B
Alpha end peta Air Dust Samples 34
, APPENDIX C
list of Persomel 50
APPENDIX D
Diagram, Plant Lay veoueal eal al
DATE_ >
For the Atomic! Energy Commission
for the ve
£, Daclass: ication Branch /é



SEC Tracking Numbers: SEC00106 and SEC00107

Additional Issues and Supplementary Evidence Supporting Linde Ceramics SEC Petitions
SEC00106 and SEC00107

Linde Ceramics SEC Petition - November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953

1. Source Term Data Deficiency: Joe Guido (ORAU) indicated during the “Linde Burlap Bag
Issue” technical conference call held on February 13, 2008 in response to a question from
Kathy Robertson—DeMers that NIOSH/ORAU had not reviewed any classified documents for
Linde. The most authoritative document available detailing the feed procurement for the
Linde facility during the 1940s is a classified document identified as Manhattan District
History, Book VII, Volume 1, Section 1°, This document published by the MED identifies
all of the feed material procurement at Linde during the operational time period. The
document remains classified at the National Archives. Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this classified
document have been declassified. These declassified sections detail the U.S. government’s
contractual agreements to purchase pitchblende uranium ore from the Belgian Congo during

the 1940s.

This source term data deficiency forms the foundation for the Linde Ceramics SEC Petitions for the
time periods encompassing November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953 and January 1, 1954
through July 31, 2006.

[have attached three exhibits detailing this issue:
e Exhibit 1: The Linde Burlap Bag Issue Technical Call Notes, dated 2/15/08, provided by
SC&A

e Exhibit 2: The first page of the declassified material received from the National Archives for

the Manhattan District History, Book VII, Volume 1, Sections 2, 3 and 4

66 The best single source on feed materials is MD History, Book VII, Volume 1, entitled “Feed Materials, Special
Procurement, and Geographical Exploration” Endnotes page 687 — Note 2, Chapter 9 [Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar
E, Anderson, Jr., 1962 Pennsylvania State University Press, Volume I, A History of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission, The New World 1939/1946]

26



9. Dumps trays of greon salt from bugey into hopper at unloading hood.

10. Moves and weighs portable hopper containing green salt at pulverizer
platform,

11, Makes and breaks connections placing hopper cover on hopper.
‘12, Pushes at greon salt at pulverizer with stick forcing same down,
13, Empties dust collectors to portable hopper.

14, Removes sleeve connections from pulverizer and blender. Pleces lid
on blender.

18. Removes lid from blender and connects green salt feed to blender.
16, Loads green salt into can and places lid on can. Doss not geal.
17. Removes cans of green salt to weight adjustment area.

B. Group "C" operators - located in Step III ares, 2 men/shift, 3 shifte/day
total 6 mene

1. Same operations as group “BY operators.

F. Mill Wrights "A" and “c" - located Step III building, M.A. building.
2 mon/shift, 3 shifts/day, total 6 mon.

Do maintenance and install mchinery.

G, Weighmaster - located in Step III area, M.A. building, Receiving Step I
end office. 1 man /shift, 1 shift/day, total 1 mn.

1. Weighs 135} cans of green salt and seals, Step III building.
2. Weighs incoming brown oxide at receiving platform step I building.

The other jobs considered in this report are the foremen, group leaders, janitors,
loaders, maintenance personnel, laundry men, chemists, first aid nurse, AEC and
Linde office personnel and Fire Marshall, etc. for which there are no breakdown.
available other than those shown on the job analysis sheets in Appendix A of

this report.

II1, Job Analysis Sheets - Purpose

‘Ths job analysis sheots give a detailed analysis of the operational - time
relationship of each employee at the Ceramics Plant. This consists of a state-
nent of the total time spent on a partioular job with an additional breakdowm
as to the number of minutes and numberd? times each task is performed each shift.





Department of Energy.” Moreover, “[dJuring the early 1950s, the dust levels in Building 31 were so high

confirmed that the dust levels were high and not safe for inside workers. In Building 30, they had the

same dust problems.”

The incomplete and unreliable Linde Site Profile forecloses NIOSH’s ability to conduct “sufficiently
accurate” dose reconstruction determinations due to the potential for the underestimation of dose
exposure estimates in violation of NIOSH’s “claimant favorable” dose reconstruction analytical

framework.

NIOSH is currently in the process of revising the Linde site profile due to the fact that the available Linde
dosimetry data is not isotope specific for trace raffinate radionuclides. The absence of isotope specific
monitoring data forestalls NIOSH's ability to reconstruct a credible dose for dose reconstruction
determinations, Consequently, the dose exposure data that NIOSH has relied on does not present a

reliable or accurate depiction of worker dose exposures.

Furthermore, the internal dose exposure estimates that solely rely on air concentration dose data for the
residual radiation time period has been criticized by experts as unreliable due to a tendency to
underestimate internal dose exposure.’ Accordingly, the exclusive reliance on air concentration data
cannot be considered “claimant favorable.” NIOSH has conceded this fact and will cure this deficiency in
the revised site profile. Specifically, NIOSH has conceded that at Linde the internal exposure model
based upon air data concentration data mistakenly ignored available urinalysis bioassay data from 1947
through 1950 and created the potential to underestimate internal exposure dose estimates for dose

reconstruction claimants.

The source term data deficiencies also foreclose defining the dose reconstruction determinations based on
the current Linde site profile as being claimant favorable and does not allow NIOSH the baseline data
exposure estimates needed to overestimate dose exposure or apply a “worst case scenario” analytical

framework.

5 Linde SC&A Audit Report, pages 112-113; Linde Site Profile at page 41
© Yd. at 112
"Yd. at 71-72



EF. Reichard

" ROADHLIEATION OF LAKE ARE or DARIO ODEANCE ORES

As you know, Hr. A. Levine has studied:the probleas tovolved tn’ the |
‘pubject project and has drawn up several elternate provosals for”

: rehabilitation work.. Those proposels haye been discussed with tho
* Sduinistrative Operations aad Health * Safety Divisions:
: ‘The minisun = conteaplated work would be for factiit ties to porsd + pro~
secution of our present radioactive warte disposal program and local
supervision of A&C aotivities in tho Buffalo-Niarura Falla@Lockport
Area, This minima (alternate A) work vould include the following,

with high Bpot costs ostinated by A. Levine. .

wee ae ua ve  -bitornate tan
. "2. raprovenouts to Bldg. i704 - $6,000 ~ .
steam ea tb eses ” . (Supervisor's Office) : :
2. .Inprovenents to Bldg. #716 4,500

(Parking Garage) including
small doller dnstullation:

mo. ; 3. Patoh Bldg. #717. (Large |
. storage warohouso)

4. Patch Bldg. #723, (Small 4,100 .
bldg. for storage of perish- :
able equipaent)

5. Modification to elootrical, 4,000
water and sewnge systecs

6. Contingencies 2,900
Motel $22,000
The ebove work wotiid acoommodats the aroa office activition, guarding,

end unloading end storage of K-65 and other radioactive processing
residues and surplus AEC equipment.

Uran.



ce oe Crassification Cancelled.
: or Cea} 29 “— TheT sass
0 By abepeg pe "ts

Dats,

i ‘
ig Te sa ai Production Division, New York
i-
NDUING OKs Sti wa

oh nN

REFER TO: .
SYMBOL: PUIES

As previously mentioned, it will be necessary to handle the above-~

nontioned drums with extreme care, It nay be necessary to hold

thess drums in storage for a period as long as 25 years and the

drums have been prepared in buch # manner that they should last

this long if handled carefully. +

fhe inside surface of the drums which you will receive has been
Coated with a corrosion resistant lacquer liner. As additional
protection, the K-65 cake will be enclosed in a plastic bag,

Recent tests at St, Louis have indicated that with poor handling

by the fork 1ift operator, it is possible to dent the drims to the
extent that the liner ie broken. Such # break in the liner exposes
an area to rapid corrosion. Such corrosion would mean early failures
of the drum and would necessitate a costly re-barreling operation.

It is, therefore, recommended that you impress on ©®11 operators the

need for careful handling. It is also recomended that vou be on

hand during the start-up of operations at the Leko Ontario Ordnence tee
Works to see that the operators are carrying out the following

instructions:

1. Fork lift trucks will approach the drums slowly and accurately.

2 Drums are to be lowered gently.
i 3. Drums left on outside paved areas are to be covered with

tarpaulins. Ta PB
Special Rerevier” a Such outside storage arees should be well drained so that cae ‘
Finat Determing@r = there will be mo possibility of the drums standing in pools of water,

BR Unciassitied t 6 Any drums which arrive in a damaged condition or which are un-
gy KA Walter f evoidebly demaged in handling are to be separated and marked,

: 6, he forks of the trucks should be padded to lessen the chance
of denting. It is suggested that lengths of inner tube would serve .
this purpose, oa
7 #|Qhe fork lift operators should practice their handling operations
on a few old barrels before commencing operations with the cake drums.

7 8
ceo: J. J. Noenig, St. Louis Area
Classification Cancelled 7. °



) woh goo Smale
branch of Unerm Caheole ted 6 Zs Deagoi

Dei Ff coe te thes padiberre i
ti ae Sede Lind

AL Aepe’ fom Bll, 70
“f
OG gh Ore as

atogl Wa) or)

proba. de YP aint wv sii tte ey oo
oe ts lapel al Ly
ment. Mor,» nek

ow LSet,

3/13 |e

iy

NICHOLAS WILLIAM BOUC:
Notary Public, State of Now yore
My Commission Expires Jan. 7, 2012



Linde Ceramics Special Exposure Cohort Application: January 1, 1954 through July 31, 2006

This petition is based upon the following issues that demand SEC status be approved due to the inability
of NIOSH to conduct “sufficiently accurate” dose reconstruction determination under the current Linde
Ceramics Site Profile, published on January 19, 2006. The current Linde Site Profile is being revised by
NIOSH based upon deficiencies that form the basis for this SEC application. These deficiencies must be
cured by NIOSH due to the dose reconstruction consequences that underestimate radiation exposure for

workers,

This SEC petition for the residual radiation time period is based upon the following issues: the incomplete
analysis and review of all available source term information available to NIOSH. This is an example of a
data collection deficiency that forecloses the ability of NIOSH to reconstruct accurate dose exposure
estimates due to the inability to evaluate the precise grade levels of the pitchblende African ore processed
at Linde during its operational period from 1942 through 1953. The deficient, unreliable and incomplete
dosimetry data available to NIOSH for Linde residual radiation workers. The destruction of documents in
a regular process of the off-site incineration of Linde documents performed by Linde workers and attested

to by Linde workers in attached affidavit statements.

‘The residual radiation workers performed renovation work in MED buildings without protective
equipment, without supervision from safety personnel and without any dosimetry monitoring of the
workers to measure internal exposure to uranium dust exposure from inhalation and ingestion of uranium
and uranium progeny dust that was aerolized and re-aerolized during renovation practices that included
jack hammering of concrete floors and daily exposure to dust that had settled on rafter, equipment and
throughout the ventilation system of the former MED buildings that were renovated, including Buildings
30 and 38 which were the most contaminated buildings on the Linde site according to a 1976 Department
of Energy radiological survey conducted after much of the renovation work had been conducted by
workers in 1957 and from 1961 through 1964.

The employees involved in renovation work were never provided with work uniforms or respiratory
protective equipment. Moreover, these employees were not monitored for dust exposure during the

renovation work in the 1960s.

Finally, the incomplete and unreliable Linde Site Profile forecloses NIOSH’s ability to conduct

“sufficiently accurate” dose reconstruction determinations due to the potential for the underestimation of

13



e @

II, Major job location and breakdown, Ceramics Plant - Linde Air Products.

Ae

Be

Firet group "A" operator - located in Recovery Room, Step III building,
Ammonia room, Step II building. 1 wan/shift, 3 shifte/day, total 3 mon.

1, Operates recovery uit equipment such as primary and secondary
condensers, absorption tower, filter presses, oid receiving tanks,
conductivity cell, eto.

2. Operates ammonie refrigeration system.

3. Fill acid weigh tanks.

4. Control temperatures as specified by technical staff.

Second group “A operator = same location. 1 man/shift, 3 shifte/day,
total 3 men.

1, Same operation as first group “a" operator except that duration of
stay in each building varies.

Third group “A” operator - located in Step III building. 1 man/shift,
3 shifts/day, total 3 mon.

1, Opens furnace tubes in furnace oven.

2, Pulls treys from tube and loads onto buggy

3. Loads 8 trays fras buggy into tube.

4, Puts doors on tubes and fastens in place with wedges.
5. Aots as utility operator in process area.

Group "B" operstors - loeated in Step III building. 3 men/ehift, 3 shifts/
day, total 9 mon.

1. Opens 24 - 764 cartons ef brown oxide per shift. Removes lid and
tears paper liner.

2. Cerries brow oxide cartons from storage basket to brown oxide scale,
3. Straightens out metal trayse

4, Loads trays with brown oxide and loads onto buggy.

5, Opens 12 furnace tubes of oven.

6. Pulls 72 trays green salt from oven and loads onto buggy.

7. Loads 72 trays brown oxide from buggy into tubes.

8. Puts doors on tubes and fastens in place with wedges.

-~-3-



(@

3.

Volatilizee lvaving behind aa “ash” having 0.2% of the wigiral
masa, but containing practiowlly all of the TH, UX,» This

residue thus has @ beta activity of approxiontely 1 mllitcurie

per gram. A peviowe beta hasard arises out.of the feet thet fn -
& typlosl. day, 2500 grams of Sits Gch contadning. 2.f-coriee.of
Tk, ~ttg: aire: prodused. from the. precems..;

4A pinller seperation cocurs 4n the processes at Mallinckrodt
Chenical Works Plant 4 and Zlegtre Rotsliurgical Company. In
these plants, uranium metal, with UX “ky in approximates equilie
briws ts purified by vacuum roosting at 2 tenparature which
volatilisges variow tupurities in the netal, tneludiag the
WXy~ Wye These impurities condense onthe cooler nurfices of
the furnmise intertor and this dopoott ia the sourse of intense
beta exposure during charging, Atocherging, oleening and repair
of the furnaces.
Radtoagtive Dust
‘The Gooupsaticast exposure to alpe emitting durt appears to be
the most serious potentis] medioal problan Presented by the
operation of those plants. Beet of the process steps are Inv
herently dusty because ary, finely Givided uranium compounds
are handled in larre a end there hag been, in gonoral,
Little or no machanical hendling dosipned into the pronesses,

{

“Be

é


Section 2.7 of the Linde Site Profile entitled “Post MED/AEC Operations” states “[t]he highest indoor
radiation levels were found in the principal production buildings, 30 and 38.”°° Cleanup and renovation
of the MED/AEC buildings occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite attempts to reduce contamination
to acceptable levels of radiation, the buildings were still found to be contaminated in radiological surveys
after the 1978 ORNL report, and the failure of the renovation work to reduce that contamination,

including Building 30, led to the eventual need to demolish these buildings.”

The current Linde Site Profile has resulted in dose reconstruction decisions that have underestimated dose
exposures with the use of unreliable and incomplete dose exposure pathways and estimates. Furthermore,
the use of this underestimated, unreliable and incomplete Linde Site Profile dose exposure data
demonstrates NIOSH’s inability to reconstruct “sufficiently accurate” dose exposure potentials in direct
contradiction of the EEOICPA legislative mandate. NIOSH has conceded many areas in need of revision
in the Linde site profile. Many of these deficiencies created the potential for the underestimation of dose

exposure estimates used in dose reconstruction denial decisions for Linde claimants.

The Linde Site Profile represents an overall dose exposure analytical model that is not “claimant
favorable.” The Audit Report identified repeated instances of unreliable and underestimated dose
exposure data in the Site Profile. Reliance on the Site Profile yields arbitrary and unreliable probability of
causation (POC) calculations that cannot be defined as “sufficiently accurate.” The Linde Site Profile is
based on unsupported assumptions and repeated instances of a failure to evaluate trace radionuclide
internal dose exposure pathways as well as repeated instances where employee radiation dose exposure
estimates are underestimated.** NIOSH cannot reconstruct “sufficiently accurate” dose exposures for
Linde employees by relying on the Linde Site Profile. The Audit Report concluded that “[t]he credibility
of the site profile and its claim to be claimant favorable appear to be compromised by the many

unsupported or pootly justified assumptions that are made throughout.”
Trace Radionuclide Dose Exposure

Trace radionuclides identified in the Audit Report, including pro-actinium and actinium, were not
considered or evaluated in any manner by NIOSH. This incomplete and unreliable dose exposure

analysis is not “claimant favorable” since it did not rely upon a “worst case” scenario dose exposure

36 | inde Site Profile at page 74
57 Audit Report at pages 112-113
8 Id, at 38

id.



Linde Ceramics SEC Petition Application: November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953

This petition is based upon the following issues that demand SEC status be approved due to the inability
of NIOSH to conduct “sufficiently accurate” dose reconstruction determination under the current Linde
Ceramics Site Profile, published on January 19, 2006. This SEC petition is based upon the following
issues: the incomplete analysis and review of all available source term information available to NIOSH.
This is an example of a data collection deficiency that forecloses the ability of NIOSH to reconstruct
accurate dose exposure estimates due to the inability to evaluate the precise grade levels of the

pitchblende African ore processed at Linde during its operational period from 1942 through 1953.

Additionally, the current Linde Site Profile is being revised by NIOSH based upon deficiencies that form
the basis for this SEC application. These deficiencies must be cured by NIOSH due to the dose
reconstruction consequences that underestimate radiation exposure for workers. The underestimation,
incomplete and unreliable dose exposure data in the current Linde site profile is based upon unreliable
personnel dosimetry monitoring data collection as well as incomplete dosimetry data, worker accounts of
document destruction and incomplete personnel/medical records. The destruction of documents in a
regular process of the off-site incineration of Linde documents performed by Linde workers and attested

to by Linde workers in attached affidavit statements.

The Linde Ceramics facility was first designated as a FUSRAP site in 1980, after a radiological survey
was conducted by the Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) in 1976. The ORNL findings were published in
1978 and confirmed that significant on-site residual contamination existed at Linde as a result of uranium
ore processing from MED/AEC activities for the Manhattan Project.’ In 2004, the Army Corps of
Engineers estimated that the remediation work at the Linde site would be completed by 2006.7 The Army
Corps continues to remediate the Linde site and is expected to continue to remove contaminated materials
from Linde through 2009.> To date, the Army Corps estimates that over 263,000 tons of contaminated

materials have been removed from the Linde site.’

Building 30 was identified as the most contaminated building at Linde according to dust exposure studies

from the 1950s and according to the comprehensive radiation survey conducted in 1976 by ORNL for the

» USACE Linde FUSRAP webpage: www.|rb.usace.army.mil/fusrap/linde/index.htm#Documents

? USACE Linde Site Fact Sheet March 2004
3

Id.
"Id.



Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Iliness Compensation Act National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

. . OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007
Petitioner Authorization Form Page 2 of 2

Public Burden Statement

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 3 minutes per response,
including time for reviewing instructions, gathering the information needed, and completing the form. If you
have any comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, send them to CDC Reports Clearance Officer, 1600 Clifton
Road, MS-E-11, Atlanta GA, 30333; ATTN:PRA 0920-0639. Do not send the completed petition form to this
address. Completed petitions are to be submitted to NIOSH at the address provided in these instructions.
Persons are not required to respond to the information collected on this form unless it displays a currently
valid OMB number.

Use of this form is voluntary. Failure to use this form will not result in the denial of any right, benefit, or
privilege to which you may be entitled.

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: i



Pe tht. Seat vena ee

Atri Ste aT

HELL Mica stats



operational time period or during the residual radiation time period.” This deficiency has consequences
for all Site Profile dose exposure estimates and the overall adequacy of the Site Profile for use in dose
reconstruction and probability of causation determinations. Research indicates that higher yield uranium
ore was processed at Linde after 1943 and all low grade forms of uranium ore were no longer being
processed at Linde after 1943. This evidence is in direct contradiction with the Linde Site Profile. The

Linde Site Profile’s baseline dose exposure data estimates cannot be considered credible.

It is not possible to conduct “sufficiently accurate” and “claimant favorable” dose reconstruction
determinations if raffinate exposures cannot be accounted for in dose exposure estimates, when baseline
uranium content is dubious, when air concentration data is used and urinalysis bioassay data is ignored
and when the Site Profile fails to account for the accurate uranium oxide content processed after 1943 and

during green salt processing.

At the Mallinckrodt facility the approval SEC status for the time period from 1942 through 1957 was
based in part on the pitchblende ores contained high levels of Radium-226 (Ra-226) and Thorium-230,
resulted in a significant gamma radiation source and thus produced most of the external whole-body dose
received by the workers. Thorium-234 and Protactinium-234, both beta emitters, would have produced
most of the skin and extremity dose. The storage and processing released radon and radioactive dusts,
potentially resulting in internal doses to the lung and other tissues due to inhalation. The levels of radon
releases correlate to the radium content of the ore and its derivatives. Because the concentration of radium
and other daughters present at any given time in the ore, in the processed uranium, and in processing
residue, depended on the concentration of uranium in the ore, the levels of radiation doses received by
workers would have depended, in part, on the particular uranium ore being processed at a particular
time. The principal source of internal radiation doses for members of the class was radioactive dusts
aerosolized through processing of radioactive materials and re-aerosolized after settling on surfaces.”

At Mallinckrodt the monitoring data might still have utility for dose reconstructions if NIOSH had access
to information on the source terms (the specific quantities and contents of the uranium feedstock) being

processed at the facility during the time periods of the dust samplings, and such information on the

® The best single source on feed materials is MD History, Book VII, Volume 1, entitled “Feed Materials, Special
Procurement, and Geographical Exploration” Endnotes page 687 — Note 2, Chapter 9 [Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar
E. Anderson, Jr., 1962 Pennsylvania State University Press, Volume I, A History of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission, The New World 1939/1946]

Mallinckrodt SEC Petition Evaluation Report Petition SEC-00012-1 Uranium Division 1942-57 pages 10-11

24



Linde Ceramics SEC Petitions ~- SEC00106 and SEC00107

Table of Contents

Linde Ceramics SEC Petition —- November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953 - SEC00106:
Pages 1- 12

Linde Ceramics SEC Petition ~ January 1, 1954 through July 31, 2006 — SEC00107: Pages 13 -
25

Linde Ceramics SEC Petitions Addendum Statement: Pages 26 ~ 31

Section A: Linde Ceramics Form B SEC Authorizations

Section B: Exhibits 1 through 13

Section C: Former Linde Worker Affidavits



Exhibit 8

February*26, "195k?

he , dediga and® feteear er "a 'gethintsm for renoving ring clazps
and covers from drums may take several weeks. I co not think wa
should wait! for*this drid-theréty -sacrifice® ‘prot ction witch can’ bé

had much sooner?” It‘would be safisfactory' to ‘continue removing the
covers.by hand if more shielding were provided.

Hits. 23°06 saepeay od sor cates and eliztnate teevc
The temporary“barriér can-ve ' ‘amp roved" by Edding an additional 1% to 2"
of steel or 3/; to 1" of lead on the conveyor side. In addition,
Uis-shield should-bé“extendéd ‘to“ the wall-of -the-thayhouse on the work-
erg right. The other side of the barrier should be higher, | thicker
pasibly“wider.~ Awall“Sf*concreté block 6r‘brick eduld-ba- built
up ‘this side.’ AtGhest“shield designed to give maximm protection
without greatly sacrificing freedom of arm and body movement should

be attached to the face of the barrier. This can be Sone by slopizg
the shield toward *he = conveyor. : ° :

Pinally, “padiation expoaire can be reduced by shielding the quire trucks. ,

The type of shielding which was proposed by the Production Division

. would be unnecessarily unwieldy and expensive. We have advised against
it. Equipping the trucks with shields which move with the forks on
the other hand would give the necessary protection and would be satis-
factory from the standpoint of operation. Three-eizhts of an inch of
lead or 3/k" of steel would reduce the radiation exposure to the fork
Lift operator by about SOZ. Two such thicknesses would reduce the
original exposure by Whe. 7 ;

Yost of: the dust exposure yesults from a ‘single cause, the hand-dumping
- of residual K-65 from drums, Tirectly, there is a very high dust
exposure from the operation itself; indirectly the operation is reg-
ponsible for general contamination, which eventually becomes airborne.
Either the practice should be discontinued or a dumping hood should be
installed at the earliest possible date. .

Recommendations

Because of the dust exposure and high raciation exposure, the follow-
ing recommendations are repeated. We strongly urge their completion.

* Rec. fll made Nov. i, 1950 pertaining to conveyor motorisation.

* Rec. #15 * * * a dumping hood.

# Reo, f1B *% Nov. 27 " 8 * shielding for dram.

% Rec. #19 "7 . “ " facilities for drum storage.
ae Rec. f2l % Jan. 22, 1951 " ® supplied air respirators.

% Yo action has been taken on these to date,

#4 «6This recomencation has been partially complied with.

wr


SECTION A


This ducument consists of i ages

Ho of *f sobies, Serid’ 44

26 Februizy igi = TET'ff

v..). Tnformation hag been ‘received frou tha Medical Section to
the effeot that the use of 65% ores in piace of tho 104 ores effectively
increasae the radiation to personnel and the 4g content of the at~
.. Bosphere by approxinately aight times. . Ia general, 4% is considered

by the Medical Section thet laboratery operations vill de quite safe
“and that the problem of rediation #12) not be éreat; the present fila
‘»- monitoring will provide assurance of. vafoty for the.vorknan.

» RO Te kw understood that a previous visit by the Medical . “7

' Section resulted’ in a recoamendation that additional exhaust vontils~ :
tion be provided at the ball atl ‘This resomiendation should be

pat in effact. | | * : cane 2 - .

3. Tt fo requested. that inforsation ba forvarded to thig nffice 4
0m whether or not tho wesring of film badces has been instituted. It |
‘48 falt that any, laboratory vorkara axperinenting on the 655 area
should be. cautioned that’the vearing of such fila Dadges ig an esaential
safety moasare : . ee

~ “gayi HADLOCE: .
zt, Corps ox Engineers,
“Agniatant.

1 Copies 1&2 - Addressee
- Ji -Read. File |
an 4. Class. File



Ex

: The FOIA request response letter for Manhattan District History, Book VI,
Volume | submitted to the Center for Military History and now being processed by the

National Archives

The second set of attached exhibits includes two memoranda dated February 26, 1944 and
March 6, 1944 [marked at Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5, respectively]. These declassified
memoranda provide information regarding the K-65 studies conducted at the Linde facility,
most probably within Building 14, although the precise MED buildings where the studies
were conducted is not clear. This evidence further illustrates the extent to which NIOSH has
not assessed the complete source term information for the Linde facility and the types and

grades of pitchblende ore that were processed at Linde during the operational time period.

According to the November 29, 2007 NIOSH Response report provided to the Linde
Working Group, NIOSH planned to assess whether there were any high risk or high dose
tasks unaccounted for in current Linde Site Profile. The attached exhibits are memoranda
detailing that Linde workers conducted off-site work at the Lake Ontario Ordnance Works
(LOOW) including the unloading of steel drums containing K-65 residue from the
Mallinckrodt facility. These memoranda indicate that Linde crews were assigned to this
unloading work at the LOOW in 1949 and 1951. The exposure potential of this “high dose
work” is noted in the memoranda, particularly with respect to exposure to leaking drums that
had been dented or otherwise damaged upon receipt at the LOOW. [Exhibit 6: Dated, March
11, 1949; Exhibit 7: Dated, October 14, 1949; Exhibit 8: Dated, February 26, 1951]

Additionally, Linde workers were also exposed to steel drums containing radium cake as is
noted in the March 1949 NYOO Progress Report at pages 6 and 10. These radiation
exposures time frames and the resulting radiation doses incurred by Linde workers are not
accounted for in the current Linde Site Profile. The SEC proposed class encompassing the
time period from November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953 were affected by these
exposure incidents. There is no clear indication from the attached memoranda and NYOO
report that all of the Linde workers that participated in this off-site work were monitored in a
consistent manner. Consequently, there is no evidence that any monitoring procedures were
complete or reliable. Additionally, there is no bioassay data available for these LOOW
workers that would have provided a truer depiction of exposure to K-65 residues or radium

and radon dose exposures. Moreover, the allowable concentrations of dose exposures

27



It is not possible to conduct “sufficiently accurate” and “claimant favorable” dose reconstruction
determinations if raffinate exposures cannot be accounted for in dose exposure estimates, when baseline
uranium content is dubious, when air concentration data is used and urinalysis bioassay data is ignored
and when the Site Profile fails to account for the accurate uranium oxide content processed after 1943 and

during green salt processing.

The monitoring data might still have utility for dose reconstructions if NIOSH had access to information
on the source terms (the specific quantities and contents of the uranium feedstock) being processed at the
facility during the time periods of the dust samplings, and such information on the quantities of the
residues as well. However, lacking this source term, residue information, and lacking information to
characterize the extent and duration of dust generation associated with manual processes, NIOSH does
not have adequate information to estimate reasonably maximum internal radiation doses of members of

the class associated with dust exposures.””

NIOSH’s decision to ignore available urinalysis data covering the time period from 1947 through 1950
and the concomitant exclusive reliance on air concentration to evaluate dose exposure in the instant case
does not provide a “claimant favorable” dose exposure model. The fact that the Site Profile ignores
available urinalysis bioassay data in favor of a blanket reliance on air concentration data to measure
internal dose exposures inevitably results in dose exposure estimates that are underestimated, unreliable

and not “claimant favorable.”

The potential for internal as well as external radiation exposure for employees working in Building 30 and
in particular for employees that participated in the renovation work in Building 30 emanating from the
storage of thousands of contaminated burlap bags and paper bags is not addressed in the Site Profile.
Internal exposure may have resulted from the inhalation and ingestion of radioactive dust accumulating
from the burlap bags. The external exposure potential would have resulted from any dust coming in
contact with skin as well as the dust that often covered employee’s clothing after working in Building
30."

3 Td. at 13-14
id.

1]



question of whether suffiaiont changes should be made in factiltios -
wilch ere to be in stesd-by status so that eetiefeciory standards of
plant hygiene oan be achieved if aad shen operations are resumed. io

conolurion hes teen reached on this question.



Sa ee ——
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Exhibit 9

BOX No, Rothe 7 2 BEA

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KONTHLY STATUS AND_PROGRESS REPGRT

FOR MARCH 1949

WPM Suoooesay *

727210

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

& Report Submitted

by the

New York Operations Office

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DEPARTMENT Of ENERGY DECLASSIFICA"

1ST REVIEW-DATE:

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DETERMINATION {

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2. CLASSIFICATION C1
COORDINATE Witt

7. OTHER (SPECIFY):

April 7, 19%49

Vi. B, Kelley, anager



eee

III. PRODUCTION

A new plan for distribution of uranium feed materials was developed,
A special conveyor unit for unloading powdered pitchblende ore from tank cars
is being tested to determine the feasibility of this method of shipping, Con~
struction plans for Middlesex feed material Warehouse are being pushed to
completion. The first shipment of radium cake was made from Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works to Iake Ontario under the new plan of handling and storage.

Methods of speeding design work on the new Mallinckrodt Chemical
Works metal plant were discussed. Cost studies are being conducted to deter~
mine optimum metal and green salt production rates. The graphite procurement
situation improved considerably during the past month. Metal rolling opera-
tions are proceeding as scheduled. Harshaw submitted engineering proposals
for new green salt and process gas reactors,

Considerable progress was made in research projects at Battelle
Memorial Institute on the recovery of thorium and uranium from monazite sands.

Acceptable beryllium castings from the bottom-pull type furnaces
were produced last month by The Beryllium Corporation. A conference vas
held in Washington to plan production of boryllium assemblies for uso in the
Materials Development Reactor. A survey was mado of the extrusion plant at
Adrian, Michigan, to arrange for installation of facilities to de AEC work.
A survey is boing made to locate suitable shops for machining beryllium shapes.
Attention has been given to health problems in boryllium flake production.
Plans for the new Brush Beryllium Co, plant at Luckey, Ohio, are going forward,
and considerable surplus equipment has beon secured from Y-12. Work has be~-
gun on the pilot plant for the Sheer-Korman process.

Considerable progress has been made in the powder metallurgy re-
search program, and various techniques of beryllium production and fabrication
are being investigated. The construction of zirconium casting apparatus has
been authorized, Increased AEC requiroments of zirconium have necessitated
_nev arrangements with Foote Minoral Co. and the Bureau of Mines. Rohn and
Haas oxpressed optimism as to the potentialities of the ion exchange method
for the separation of hafnium from zirconium. The third formal mecting of
tho Zirconium Advisory Committee was held in Net: York on March 23, 1949,

NYOO Accountability Branch records were audited by Washington repre~-
sentatives, Tho Vulcan Crucible Steel Co. was visited by an NYOO representa -
tive and SF matcrial accountability procedures wore reviewed. Procedures were
set up to code all government bills of lading for control of costs. NYOO
confirmed to Washington the draft of rovised rules on classification of SF
forms.

Now arrangements have been made for gold analyses of radium sludge.
A largo part of the flew of analytical work to the National Bureau of Stand-
ards vas stopped during the month. This work will be diverted to the New
Brunswick Laboratory, The Harshaw Chemical Co. was visited by an NYOO analy-
tical representative and recommendations were made to improve procedure,

-6-
Shame
1188842



dose exposure estimates in violation of NIOSH’s “claimant favorable” dose reconstruction analytical

framework.

NIOSH is currently in the process of revising the Linde site profile due to the fact that the available Linde
dosimetry data for the residual radiation time period is not isotope specific for trace raffinate
radionuclides. The absence of isotope specific monitoring data forestalls NIOSH's ability to reconstruct a
credible dose for dose reconstruction determinations, Accurate individual internal dose reconstructions
for uranium and its progeny during the residual radiation time period is not possible under the dose
exposure data presented in the Linde Site Profile. Consequently, the dose exposure data that NIOSH has

relied on does not present a reliable or accurate depiction of worker dose exposures.

Furthermore, the internal dose exposure estimates that solely rely on air concentration dose data for the
residual radiation time period has been criticized by experts as unreliable due to a tendency to
underestimate internal dose exposure. Accordingly, the exclusive reliance on air concentration data
cannot be considered “claimant favorable.” NIOSH has conceded this fact and will cure this deficiency in
the revised site profile. NIOSH has conceded that at Linde the internal exposure model based upon air
data concentration data mistakenly ignored available urinalysis bioassay data from 1947 through 1950
and created the potential to underestimate internal exposure dose estimates for dose reconstruction

claimants.

The source term data deficiencies also foreclose defining the dose reconstruction determinations based on
the current Linde site profile as being claimant favorable and does not allow NIOSH the baseline data
exposure estimates needed to overestimate dose exposure or apply a “worst case scenario” analytical

framework.

Building 30 was identified as the most contaminated building at Linde according to dust exposure studies
from the 1950s and according to the comprehensive radiation survey conducted in 1976 by ORNL for the
Department of Energy.** Moreover, “{dJuring the early 1950s, the dust levels in Building 31 were so high
that Linde brought in to evaluate the work areas. He
confirmed that the dust levels were high and not safe for inside workers. In Building 30, they had the

same dust problems.”*°

81d. at 71-72
* Linde SC&A Audit Report, pages 112-113; Linde Site Profile at page 41
954d. at 112

14