NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0578n.06 Case No. 08- 5913/5929 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. JOSHUA SMITH and MICHAEL V. SM ITH , De fend ant s- App e lla nt s.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF OR E: BA TC HELD ER , C hie f Judg e ; M OORE and CO OK , C ir c uitJudg e s. ALICE M . BATCHEL DER, Chief Ju dge. Joshu a Smit h ( “ Joshu a ” ) a

nd Mic ha e l Smi th (“Micha el”) wer e convic ted of va rious fede ral off

enses f or their pa

rt i n a multi-defe ndant drug conspirac y

in Tennesse e and n o w ap peal their convictions and sente nces. F or the re asons that fo llo w, we a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g s a nd de fe nd ants ’ c on vic tio ns and se nte nc e s. BACK GR OUND I. THE CONS P IRACY The c o n s p ir a c y

b e g anin

e ar ly 2 0 0 6 w it

h ana g r e e me n t b e tw e e nB r ia nM a ld o nado (“ M al d o n ad o ”) an d Br i an M at h en y (“ M at h en y ”)
. M al d o n ad o p ro v i d edt h e c o n s p i ra cy wi t h dru gs throu g h h is A tl an ta
- b a s e d s u p p li e r , K ir

k Sp e n c e , a ls o kn o w n a s “ Cato
. ” O n c e th e dr u g s wer e obtained fr om Cato, they

wer e divided equa lly

betwee n J os h

u a a nd Matheny

who, in turn, distributed the drug s to a number of underling s. J oshua had at least five distributors who re ported to him: four08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

M at heny t est i f

i ed t hat , at s o m e p o i nt , he s t art ed gi vi ng “ a l i t t l e b i t of t he q uant i t i es” t o a group of t he 1 c od e f e n da n t s , a s w e l l , bu t do e s n ot s pe c i f y f u r t h e r h ow mu c h h e g a v e t h e m.

2 individuals known only

by their first name s—A.G., S h aky , Craig , and Jessie; and his girlfr iend, Natasha Thompson (“Thompson”)
. I n J anuar y 2006, J oshua and Matheny made their first trips to Atlanta to obtain drug s from Cato. On ea ch of thre e trips, they purcha sed both coc aine a nd marijuana . After

those first three trips, and beg inning in Fe bruar y 2006, Matheny beg an making the trips to Atlanta by himself, but the drug s were still split between Mathe ny and Jos h u a upon Mathe ny ’s re turn. On at lea st one
occa sion, the drug s were temporar ily stored at J oshua’s house beca use Matheny considere d it a safe location. B y

April or May , the conspira cy was succ essful enoug h t h at Matheny beg an making multipl e trips t o Atlanta every wee k, sometimes as m any as four trips. Each trip ty

pically y ielded
on e kil o o f c oc a ine and

a pp ro xima te ly

40 -5 0 p ound s o f m ari

jua na , and th os e amounts we re sp lit
e v e n l y b e t w e e nJ o s h an d

M a t h e n y. 1 Michae l entere d the conspira cy in March, 2006, w hen he be came one of Matheny ’s distributors. I nitially , he re ceive d 10-15 pounds of mar ijuana at a time and, at some point in Marc h or April, 2006, he a lso beg an rece iving small mounts of cocaine eac h wee k. His wee kly allotment of marijuana

incre ased to twe nty

pounds of marijuana during the same time pe riod. The mar ijuana was “ fronted” to Michael, allowing Michae l to rec eive the drug s without pay ing, so longas Michae l returne d with the money

once it wa s sold. Michael re mained a distributor for Matheny until J anuar

y 25, 2007, when Matheny

was a rre sted.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

3 II. THE I NV ESTI G AT ION The g overnme nt had investig ated the c onspiracy almost f rom its inception. On J anuar y 21, 2006, J eff

Cessna (“ Cessna”) , an under cover law enf orce ment office r, purc hased ma rijuana from Robert R ob in s o n( “ Ro b in s o n ” ) , w h o r e c e iv e d it f r o m Jo s h u a . O nJa n u ar

y 3 0 , 2 0 0 6 , Ce s s n a

and R o b i n s o n m et wi t h J o s h u a, wh o R o b i n s o n s ai d wa s h i s “m an . ” Du ri n g t h e J an u ary 3 0 m e e t i n g, J oshua sold one ounce of coc aine to Robinson, w ho then sold it to Ce ssna. On Fe bruar y 16, 2004, Ce ssn a re qu e ste d co c a ine fr om Th omp so n, wh o indi c a te d tha t she wo uld have to w a it f

or Joshu a to bring the coc aine be fore the sale c ould be completed. Once J oshua arrived, the sale oc curr ed. On F e br ua ry 24 , 2 00 6, Ce ssn a

re qu e ste d tw o o un c e s o f c oc a ine fr om T ho mpson, and Joshu a a g a in delivere d t h e co ca i ne in per son. Cessna purc hased c ocaine from Joshua, using Thompson as an int e rm e dia

ry , a numbe r o f a dd iti on a l time s, inc lud ing on e purc ha se of fi ve ounc e s. I n M arc h o r A pr il 2006, Cessna and Joshua g ot into an argument, and J oshua told Cessna never to c ontact him ag ain. Othe r e ff or ts at in ve sti g a tio n w e re a tte mpt e d, bu t w ith ou t mu c h s uc c e ss. III. THE WI RETAP On Novembe r 7, 2006, Special Ag ent Mike B urnette ( “B urnette” ), of the T ennesse e B urea u of Investig ation, and Assistant District Attorney J oshua Parsons (“Parsons”) , reque sted and obtaine d an orde r from state J udg e L eon Burns, authoriz ing the use of wireta ps to interce pt J oshua’s phone
c a lls . A s p art

of that or de r, a

me mbe r o f t

he inv e sti g a tiv e te a m wa s “ re qu ir e d to a pp e ar a nd re po rt , e xpa rte , to [ J udg e B urns] every ten (10) da

y s . . . on the prog ress towa rds the ac hievement of

the authorized objectives a

nd the nee d fo r continued inter ception.” T he orde r wa s rea uthorized on Dec ember

11, 2006. On December 6, 2006, as a result of information obtained f rom the wire taps08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

T h e wi r et aps on M al don ado an d M at h en y w er e r ea u t h or i ze d by J u dg e B u r n s on J an u ar y 6, 2007. 2
T he f i nal r eport s ubmi t t ed was , appare nt l y , not s i gn ed as r equi r ed, but i t was s ubmi t t ed af t er t he wi r et ap 3 h ad ce as ed. 4 of Joshu a ’s ph on e , the g ov e rnme nt o bta ine d a n o rd e r f ro m Judg e B ur

ns to i nte rc e pt t

he ph on e c a lls of Maldana do and Mathe ny . On J anuar y 4 , 2 0 0 7 , J udg e B urns sig ned an or der a llowing the 2 g overnme nt to intercept the phone ca l l s of Cato. These subsequent orde rs also included the
re qu ir e me nt t

hat a me mbe r of the g ov e rnme nt’ s inve sti g a tiv e te a m app e ar an d re po rt to Jud g e B ur

ns . I t is un dis pu te d that wr itt e n re po rt s we re su bmi tte d, a s r e qu ir e d, e ve ry te n d ay s. Th e re po rt s

3

we re ha nd -d e liv e re d to Judg e B ur ns ’ o ff ic e by e ither Burn ett e or

Pars on s. Ea c h ti me B ur ne tte delivere d a re port, he a lso met face -to-f ac e wi th J udg e B urns and discusse d the prog ress of the wi re ta ps . Pa rs on s, on the oth e r h and , c ou ld n ot r e c a ll w he the r he sp ok e wi th Judg e B ur ns e a c h ti me he de liv e re d a

re po rt . H e te sti fi e d, ho we ve r, that he sp ok e wi th Jud g e B ur ns a t le a st on c e e ve ry

six
o r s ev en d ay s , k ee p i n g J u d ge B u rn s ap p ri s edo f t h e p ro gre s s o f t h e w i re t ap s . At n o t i m e di d J u d ge Bur ns complain about the for m in w h i ch t he re ports wer e pre sented, a nd he author ized additional wireta ps and re authorized the initial wiretap a fter a number of r eports had be en pre sented. IV. TRIAL The wire tapped c onversations proved ver y useful to the prosec ution dur ing trial. Michae l’s identity was re vea l edi nh i s co m m u n i ca t i o n s wi t h M at h en y an d i nco m m u n i ca t i o n s betwee n Matheny and Mald o n a d o . V ar io u s dr u g d e a ls w e r e d is c u s s e d o nth e w ir e ta

p s . M ic h a e l w a s r e c o r ded
c omp la ini nga

bo ut h is a pp are nt i na

bil ity to re c e ive pr od

uc t and de c lare d tha t he ha d sold “ on e ha lf milli on dollars” f

or the c onspiracy

during the pre vious y ear ; the product at issue sold at a pric e of $625 per pound during the re levant time per iod. Maldonado complaine d repe atedly that Matheny08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

5 owed him money , Matheny complained that Micha el owed him money , and Joshua stated that he owed Ma ldonado and Matheny money , all related to drug transac tions. J oshua volunteer ed to take
a c t i o na g a i n s tan o t h e r

dr u g d e a l e r w h o m i g h th av e b e e na t t e mp t i n g t o s e l l dr u g s i nt h e i r

t e r r i t o r y. Ev ide nc e a t tr ia l in dic a te d th a t so me of the se ce ll -ph on e c a lls we re re lay e d thro ug h c e ll tow e rs in t

he Ea ste rn Di str ic t of Te nn e sse e , a nd B ur ne tte te sti fi e d th a t c e ll p ho ne s u til ize the c los e st cell tower
. Utiliz ing the evidenc e conta ined in the interc epted c ommunications, l aw enfor ceme nt obtained a se arc h war

rant for J oshua’s re sidence . When office rs executed the se arc h war rant, they fo un d mar iju ana , d

ru g le dg e rs , a

nd dig ita l sc a le s w ithmari

jua na re sid ue . D ur ingthe ini tia l e ntr

y int o the re sid e nc e to e xec ute the se arc h w arr ant, Joshu a br ie fl y po int e d a g un a t on e of the of fi c e rs . Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress the wireta p communications arguing, a mong other thing s, that the police ha d failed to a bide by the wire tap orde rs’ requireme nt that the 10-day repor ts be prese nted in person. The district c ourt denied the motion to suppress and the c ase w ent to trial. At trial, the g overnme nt c alled Matheny as a witness to inter pret the meaningof the phone calls for the jury
. J oshua was convicted of conspirac y

to distribute more than 5 kilog rams of c ocaine and 100 kilog rams of marijuana, in viol ation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1), (b) (1)( A) a nd (B ), and 846,
and tw o co un ts of us ing a c omm un ic a tio n fa c ili ty to co mmi t a dru g of fe ns e , in vi olatio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. §§ 843(b) a

nd 846. Michae l was convic ted of conspirac y to distribute less than one-ha lf kilogr am of coc aine a

nd more tha n 1 0 0 k i l o grams of ma rijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) a nd (b )( 1 )( B)
. T h e c as e t h en p ro ce ed edt o s en t en ci n g.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

6 V. SENTE NCING The pre sentenc e re port for Joshua established a ba se off ense le vel of 34. Joshua was assessed a

two point enhance ment un d er U. S
. S
. G. § 3B 1.1 for having a leade rship role in the conspirac y

and a two point enha

nceme nt under § 2D1.1(b)( 1) for possession of a firea rm. J oshua
was a lso determined to be a car eer offe nder, pr edicated on a pr ior drugconviction and a prior conviction for attempted kidnaping . The pre sentenc e re port relates the following reg arding the ci rc u m s t an ce s o f t h e a t t em p t edk i dn ap i n g: On Dec ember

18, 2000, J oshua Smith we nt to the home of Carlo Spac car otelli and attempted to forc e him into a motor vehicle at gun point while be ing a ssisted by four oth e r i nd ivi du a ls. Th e de fe nd ant’ s ac tio ns re su lte d in Mr. Spa c c aro te lli be ingsh ot. J oshua Smith was orig inally arr ested for

Attempted Espec i al l y

Ag g ravating Kidnaping and Attempted 1st Deg ree Murder
. He was later indicted with four other i n d i v i d u al s fo r At t em p t ed 1 s t De gre e Mu rd er an d At t em p t edAggr av at edKi dn ap i n g. He wa s a llo we d to ple a d to a re du c e d c ha

rg e a t se nte nc ingand

the Atte mpt e d F ir st Deg ree Murder

char g e wa s nolled. J oshua’s fina l offense level wa s 38, with a criminal history cate g ory of VI , leadingto a g uidelines rang e of 360 months to life. After consideration of all releva nt criteria , the district court sente nced Joshu a to 3 80 mon ths
. The pre sentenc e re port fo r Michae l established a ba se off ense le vel of 26. Micha el was assessed a 2-point enhanc ement for

obstruction of justice, due to his re peate d false te stimony during trial. Michae l had one pr evious d ru g co n viction, along with a host of minor convictions, but was de te rm ine d to have a c ri min a l histo ry of on ly I
. Hi s g uid e lin e s rang e wa s 78 to 97 month s, bu t hi s conviction was subjec t to a statutory minimum o f 1 2 0 m o n t hs, and the district cour t imposed the statutory minimum . Michae l objected to the 2-point enhanc ement for obstruction of j ustice, but the dis tr ic t c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t th e re wa s su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e that Mi c ha e l ha d p e rj ur e d him se lf a t tr ia l.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

T he onl y s uppo r t f

or t hes e l as t cl ai ms a r e l et t er s f r om M i cha el t o hi s at t orn ey , r el at i ng t he al l ege d 4 co m m un i ca t i o ns b etwe en M athe ny an d M i ch ae l an d M athe ny an d o t he r co - d efen d an t s. 7 T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt al s o n o t edt h at t h e m an d at o ry m i n i m u m wa s gre at er

t h an t h e g u i d el i n e r an ge
re gar d l es s o f t h e e n h an ce m en tan d wa s , t h er ef

o re , co n t ro l l i n g. VI . NE W A F F ID AV ITS After sentenc ing, the g overnme nt reve aled that it was in possession of an af fi d av it from Matheny that contained statements that contra dicted the testimony that Matheny had offere d at the
se pa rate tr ia l of

oth e r c o- c on sp ir a tor s. Spe c if ic a lly , M a the ny state d that the qu anti ty of dr ug s so ld to o ne John

Pa ul H a ssl e r w a s le ss t

ha n th e a mou

nt Mathe ny te sti fi e d to a t Mr
. Ha ssl e r’ s tr ia l. Th is aff idavit had bee n rec eived by the g overnme nt after

Michae l and Joshua had been c onvicted but befor e their se ntencing . A similar aff idavit has since be en submitted to the court by counsel for Mic ha e l, wh e re in Ma the ny state s tha t the a mou nts of dr ug s he sol d to one Ric ha

rd Ko nto ur wa s le ss than the amount Mathe ny testified to at Mr. Kontour’s trial. Michae l also claims that Matheny was incar cer ated with him for a time, and that Matheny rec anted his entire trial testimony to Michael, a s well as to other c o-def

endants. No inde pendent e vidence corr oborate s this allegat i o n . Michae l 4

mov e d f or a ne w tri a l ba se d o n th e fi rs t a ff ida vit , b ut t hat mo tio n w a s d e nie d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt
. J oshua and Micha el filed timely appea ls of their convictions and sentenc es. They both arg ue that the district court e rre d in not suppressing the wireta p communications , and that there wa s insuffi ci ent evidence to support their c onvictions. J oshua sepa rate ly appea ls the two point
e nh anc e me nts fo r l e a de rs hip and po sse ssi on

of a fi re arm and his de sig natio n a s a c are e r c ri min a l. Michae l appea ls the t wo poi nt enhanc ement for obstruction of justice and the denial of his motion fo r a ne w tri a l.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

U nder f eder al l aw, an au t hor i zi ng j udge “ m a y re q u i re r eport s t o be m ade .
. . s howi ng wh at progr es s ha s 5 b e e n m a d e to w a rd a c h ie v e m e n t o f t h e a u tho riz e d o b je c tive a n d the ne e d fo r c o n tinu e d inte rc e p tio n . S u c h re p o rts shal l be m ad e at s uch i nt erval s as t he judge m ay requir e. ” 18 U
. S.C
. § 2 5 1 8 (6) (emp hasi s ad d ed ). 8 AN AL YSI S I. M OTI ON TO SU P P RE SS “On a ppeal f rom the denia l of a mot i o n t o s u p p re ss, this court review s the district court’s finding s of fa ct for c lear

err or and its conc lusions of law de novo.” Un ite d Stat es v . S mi th , 594 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2010). All evidenc e is to be consider ed in the li gh t m o s t favorable to the g overnme nt, as the pre vailing pa rty below. Id. “ I n r e vie wi ngthe va lid ity of an el e c tr on ic surveillance order , we will ac cord ‘ g reat defe renc e’ to the de terminations of t h e i s suing judg e.” United States v. Corrado , 227 F.3d 528, 539 ( 6th Cir. 2000). I n this c ase, defe ndants do not a ppeal the orde rs authorizing the wireta ps, but instead argue that th e g ov e rnme nt v iol a te d th e e xpre ss t e rm s o f t he or de rs wh e n th e y fa ile d to pr e se nt o ra l r e po rt s to the issuing judg e at the time that the w ritten repor ts were submitt ed. We disag ree . J udg e B urns, in issuing his order s authorizing the use of wire taps, requir ed Par s o n s , B u r n ette, or some other

member of

their investig ative team to “appea r and r eport” every

ten day s. Under T en n es s ee l aw , an au t h o ri z at i o no rd er fo r a wi re t ap “s h al l re qu i re t h at re p o rt s b e m ad e t o t h e j u d ge who issued the orde r showing what prog ress has bee n made towa rd ac hievement of

the authorized objective a

nd the nee d for continued interce ption. Reports shall be made at ten-da y intervals . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 6-308(c ) (2006)
. Def endants’ arguments rest upon the alleg ed re quirement 5 that the re ports to J udg e Burns be made orally , in person, y et such a require ment is neither statutory nor cle arly

included in the languag e of Judge Bur ns’ orde r.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

9 De fe nd ants of

fe r no fa c tua l or

le g a l su pp or t f or the ir argume nt t

hat th e “ a pp e ar a nd re po rt ” lang uag e re quired a

n oral pre sentation of the repor t. There is no evidenc e that the phrase i s a ter m of art wi th s pe c ia l me anin g a

nd it i s su sc e ptibl e to a

numbe r o f r e a so na

ble a lte rn a tiv e de fi nit ion s. For example, the “appe ar a

nd repor t” lang uag e may

have be en intended sole ly as a r equire ment that a member of the investig ative team hand-de liver the re port eve ry t en d ay s , i n o rder

to assure that J udg e B urns was in posse ssion of the repor t in a timely manner . Whil e Judge B urns’s pre cise intent may be uncle ar, it is perf

ectly clea r that Judge B urns, himself, did not interpret the “ appea r and repor t” lang uag e to re quire an oral presentment of the 10-day repor ts. There is no evidenc e that he
was e ver displea sed with submission of only written re ports, on those occ asions when Par sons alleg edly failed to spea

k direc tly with the J udg e. To the c ontrary , J udg e B urns re authorized the initial wiretap orde r for

J oshua and authorized additional wiretaps a g ainst Matheny , Maldonado, a nd Cato. The ac tions of the authorizing judge provide strong evidenc e reg arding the compliance of the investigative team with the wiretap order
. See In re De Mo nte , 674 F.2d 1169, 1174 ( 7th Cir. 1982) (“In the pre sent ca se the re ports wer e found to be sufficie nt by [t he super

vising] judge . Thus they satisfied the c ondition of the authorizing orde r.”)
. I t is undisput ed that Parsons a nd Bur nette complied with t he statutory require ment that repor ts be filed eve ry

ten day s. I t is also undisputed that Parsons and B urnette ha d regular c ontact with J udg e B urns, repor

ting to him on the prog ress of the wireta ps no less than eve ry

six or seve n day s. These or al re ports and the wr itten reports fulf illed, in every

meaning ful wa y , even the de fe nd ants ’ q

ue sti on a ble re a din g of

Judg e B ur

ns ’s or de rs . De fe nd ants , ho we ve r, argue that be c a us e08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

10 the g overnme nt could not prove that it had made an ora l report c ontemporane ous t o t he wr itten repor t, the results of the wir etap must be suppre ssed. That a rg ument cannot be sustained. Te nn e sse e la

w p ro vid e s th ree g ro un ds up on wh ic h a de fe nd ant m ay

mov e to s up pr e ss interce pted communications: (1) “the communication was unlaw fully interce pted;” (2) “the or der of authorization under w hich the evide nce w as interce pted is insufficient on its fac e;” or (3) “ the interce ption was not made in conf ormity with the order of authorization.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6- 304(h)( 1) (2006)
. This lang uag e is virtually identical to the lang uag e of 18 U .S.C. § 2518(10), which g overns suppre ssion of wiretap c ommunications, s o u n d er either Te nnessee or fe dera l law, suppression of interc epted c ommunications is appro p ri ate only if it meets one of the se three
e le me nts
. Def endants a rg ue that the Supre me Court decision in Gelbard v. U nited States , 408 U.S. 41 (1972), r equire s courts to c onstrue wire tapping provisions narrow ly , in order to f urther Cong ress’s intent of protec ting pr ivacy
. Id. at 48. B ut the Court’s statements to this effe ct wer e dicta a nd draw n exclusively

from leg islative histo ry , rathe r than the statutory text . Moreove r, the Ge lba rd Court expressly stated that it w as d ea l i n g with a “na rrow que stion, . . . whether . . . the w itnesses may inv ok e the pr oh ibi tio n o f [1 8 U .S. C. § 25 15 ] as a de fe ns e to c on te mpt

c ha rg e s b ro ug ht o n th e ba sis of their r efusa l to obey

court orde rs.” Id. a t 47 . ASup re me Cou rt c a se mor e dir e c tly

on po int is United States v. Chave

z , 416 U.S. 562 (1974), in which the Court de clined to re quire suppre ssion of interc epted c ommunications for “e very failure to c omply fully with a ny require ment.” Id. at 574- 75. To do so, the Court rea soned, “w ould be at odds with the statute itself,” due to the fac t that the statute expressly

lists t hose circ umstances unde r which suppr ession is appropriate. Id. at 575.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

11 Def endants’ a rg uments rest entire ly

on a determination of whether the g overnme nt’s alleg ed failure to make an oral presentation ever y time a 10-day written report was submi tted constituted a violation of the authorizing or der. D ue to the ambig uity of the “ appea

r and r eport” l anguag e, the
re g ula r o ra l c omm

un ic a tio n th a t oc c ur

re d b e tw e e n the g ov e rnme nt an d J ud g e B ur ns duri ngthe tim e pe ri od of the wi re ta

ps and , mo st i mpo rt antl y , th e fa c t th a t Judg e B ur ns , th e a uth or izin g jud g e , c le a rl y found the g overnme nt’s repor ting e ffor ts to be sufficient, we find that there was no viol ation of the authorizing orde r and the district court di d not err in r efusingto suppress the interc epted
c omm un ic a tio ns . II. SUF F ICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

“ Whe n a c on vic tio n is a tta c ke d f

or ins uf fi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , th e e vid e nc e is vie we d in the light most favor able to the pr osecution to deter mine whether

any rational trier

of fa ct could have found each essential element of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt.” Un ite d S tat es v . B ar

ne tt , 398 F.3d 516, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2005). We will rever se a judg ment for insuff iciency of the e vidence
on ly if the jud g e me nt i s n ot s up po rt e d b y su bs tanti a l and c omp e te nt ev ide nc e up on the re c or d a s a whole. Id. at 522. A. Michael’s Convict ion Michae l claims that there w as insufficie nt evidence to support a j u d gment that he had distributed over 100 kilog rams of ma rijuana. I n making that argument, he relies on the fa ct that the total amount of marijuana discussed on the interce pted phone calls amounts to betwee n 48 and 58 pounds, which translates to somewher e betwee n 22 and 27 kilog rams. Howe ver, Matheny testified that he sold Michae l up to 30 pounds in March 2006, and t h en s o l d M i ch ael up to 15 pounds per08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

12 we e k b e g inn ingin Apri l 2006 . O ve r t he c ours e of

the ir de a lin g s to g e the r, ne arl y 11 mon ths , th is would have y

ielded a c umulative total of over 500 pounds, or well over 200 kilograms. Moreover , in one of the inter cepte d communications, Michae l complains that he had sold half a million doll ars worth of dr

ug s for the c onspiracy during the l ast y ear and indi cate s that the price of the mar ijuana was $650 per pound. A simple c alculation indicates that half a milli on dollars worth of ma rijuana, at that price , would be well over 700 pounds, or over 300 kilogr ams. Take n toge ther, this evidenc e is substantial and competent, a nd sufficie nt to support Michael’s c onviction. B. Joshu a’s Conviction 1. Dr ug

am ou nts Joshu a argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s insu ff ic ie nt to sup po rt his c on vic tio n f or c on sp ir a c y

to distribute over 100 kilog rams of ma rijuana a nd 5 kilogr ams of coc aine, a nd his conviction on two counts of using a communications facility to fac ilitate a drugtransac tion. W ith reg ard to the dr ug
c on vic tio ns , th e re is s ub sta nti a l and c omp e te nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the jud gment. Whil e it i s true—a s J oshua empha siz es—that the sea rch of his residenc e uncove red only a small am ount of
mari jua na , th e re is s uf

fi c ie nt a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e wh ic h s up po rt s th e jud g me nt. J oshua provided the drug s sold to Cessna during Marc h 2006, providing the initial basis for the wi re ta ps . M a the ny

te sti fi e d th a t Joshua

pa rt ic ipate d in

purc has in g d rugs f

ro m Cato o n th os e
occa sions where J oshua ac companied Matheny to Atlanta during March. Matheny also testified that
ever y shipment of drug s from Atlanta w as split eve nly betwee n Matheny

and Joshua, and that there
wer e at lea st two shipments a week, a nd sometimes as many

as four , begin n i n g i n April or May 2006. Acc ording to Matheny , the s hipments ty pically consisted of one kil og ram of coca ine and 5008-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

13 po u n d s o f m ar i

j uana. A t two trips per we ek, Joshua would have re ceive d, as his share of the shipments, one kilogr am of coca ine and 50 pounds of m arijuana per w eek. O ver the course of the period be tween A

pril 2006 and Decembe r 2007, J oshua would have rec eived over 30 kilogr ams of
coca ine and ove r 1,000 pounds of mar ijuana. 2. Existenceof a Conspir acy There is also sufficient evidence to support the exist ence of a c onspiracy , and Joshua’s part in the conspirac y . Specifica lly , Matheny ’s t estimony indicates that J oshua wa s a par tner in the drug tr a de , r e c e ivi nga

50 % s ha re in a ll d ru g sh ipm e nts . T he re are a lso a numbe r o f r e c or de d p ho ne c a lls in which the revolving de bts betwee n Maldonado, Mathe ny , J oshua, and va rious distributors are mentioned, ty

pically in connec tion with the purchase of drug s. Finally , while J oshua contends that the drugconspirac y

consisted of Maldona do and Mathe ny , one re corde d phone ca ll indicates that M a l d o n a d o c o n s i d e r e d

J o s h u a t o b e o n an e qu a l f

o o t i n g w i t h M a t h e n y, i nt e r m s o f t h e c o n s p i r a c y. 3. Us e of a Com mu nic ati on Fa c ili ty J oshua also cha lleng es, on two sepa rate g rounds, the suff

iciency of the e vidence supporting his c on vic tio n on two c ounts of us ing a c omm un ic a tio n fa c ili ty

to f a c ili ta te a dr ugtr ans a c tio n. F ir st, Joshu a argue s th a t th e c on te nt of the ph on e c a lls ind ic a te s th a t no dr ugtr ans a c tio ns too k p la c e , in that the phone calls were dominated by complaints that Maldonado and J oshua had neither drug s nor money . The g overnme nt responds that the phone calls i n question wer e clearly related to the drug conspirac y . Second, Joshua arg ues that there is no evidenc e that either J oshua or Maldonado was in the Easter

n District of Tenne ssee, e ven thoug h the undisputed evidenc e showe d that the ca lls used
a ce ll tower located in the Easter n District. J oshua treats the location of the individual plac ing the08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

14 phone ca ll as an ele ment of the c rime, and a rg ues t h at the g overnme nt was re quired to prove the loc a tio n b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. T he g ov e rnme nt re sp on ds that the loc a tio n of the ph on e c a lls i s ani s s u e o f

v e n u e o n l y, n o tane l e m e n to f t h e c r i m e , an d

t h a t v e n u e w a s s h o w nt o b e p r o p e r b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. J oshua’s fir st ar gu m en t fails because it is well-e stablished that the g overnme nt need not pr ov e that a

sp e c if ic dr ugtr ans a c tio n r e su lte d fr om a co mmunic a tio n in ord e r to pr ov e that th e us e of a c ommunication fac ility “fa cilitated” the transac tion. United States v. Mc Lernon , 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984). I n McLernon , the cour t held that a telephone s tatement indi catingthat “all [the
c o- c on sp ir a t o r s ] c an d o i s w a i t , ” w h e n t a k e n i n c o n t e xt o f t h e e n t i r e c o n s p i r a c y , w a s s u f f i c i e nt t o show that the phone call made fulfillment of t he conspiracy ’s goals ea sier. Id. Other Circ uits have
rea ched the same c onclusion. See United St ats v. Dixon , 132 F.3d 192, 200 ( 5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he g overnme nt o n ly is r e qu ir e d to e s ta b li s h th a t [th e d e f

e n d an t] u s e d th e te le p h o n e to f a c il it a te an
a tte mpt to d istri bu te dr

ug s. ” ); United States v. Milton , 6 2 F
. 3 d 1 2 9 2 , 1 2 9 4 ( 1 0 th Ci r . 1 9 9 5 ) ( “ [T ]o sustain a fa cilitation conviction under [21 U.S.C.] § 843(b), it was not nece ssary to prove a n actua l distribution, at least where the def endant wa s also convicted o f conspiracy .”). Joshua’s communications with Maldonado w ere clea rly connec ted to the drugconspirac y and, as suc h, fac ilitated the conspira cy . See United States v. Slayton , 366 F. App’ x 650, 655-56 (6th Cir. 2010). Joshu a ’s se c on d a

rgume nt f a ils be c a us e the loc a tio n of the a lle g e d vio la tio n of § 8 43 (b ) i s
a qu e s t i o no f

v e n u e , n o tane l e m e n to f t h e c r i m e . A s s u c h , i tn e e d o n l y b e p r o v e d b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. United St ates v. Crozier , 259 F.3d 503, 519 (6th Cir. 2001). J oshua argues that he and Maldonado both live in the Middle D istrict of Tenne ssee, but whe n the def endant08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

15 is c harg ed with c onspiracy , venue is pr oper in a ny district w here an over

t act in furthe ranc e of the conspirac y

was pe rfor

med. Id. At trial, Bur

nette testified that the phone calls betwe en Joshua and Maldonado utiliz ed a c ell tower in the Eastern District of Tennessee, a nd testified that ce ll phones will u t iliz e the ne are st cell tower. Joshua complains that the g overnme nt failed to ca ll an expert witness to offe r t his testimony , but there is no indication he e ver obje cted to the introduc tion of the evidenc e throug h Bur

nette, rather than by

calling an expert witness, so this objection is wa ived. See Bowman v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 350 F.3d 537, 548 ( 6th Cir. 2003). Viewing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favora

ble to the g overnme nt, a rational trier of fac t c ould easily have c oncluded that the phone calls fa cilitated the conspira cy and that venue was prope r. This evidence is substantial and competent, a nd is sufficie nt to support J oshua’s c onviction. III. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE We reviewa denia l of a ne w t ri al b as ed o n newly discovere d evidenc e under an abuse of discretion standa

rd. United States v. Dailide , 3 16 F .3 d 6 11 , 6 20 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) . T he g e ne ra l te st for g r an ti n g a n e w tr ia l r e qu ir e s th e p arty s e e k in g a n e w tr ia l to s h o w th a t: ( 1 ) th e evidenc e wa s discovere d afte r trial; (2) the evidenc e wa s not discovera ble ea rlier throug h due dilige nce; ( 3) the
e vid e nc e is o f t

he natur e that mig ht have le d to a dif fe re nt r e su lt; and

(4 ) t he e vid e nc e is m a te ri a l, not mere ly

cumulative or impea ching
. Un ite d S tat es v . O ’D e ll , 805 F.2d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 1986). We h a ve a lso state d th a t: A n e w tr ia l s h o u ld b e g r an te d w h e r e th e c o u rt is r e a s o n a b ly w e ll s a ti s f

ie d th at the testimony g iven by a m at er i al wit ness is false; that, without it, the jury might have rea ched a differ ent co n cl u sion; that the party seekingthe new tr ial was take n by surprise whe n the fa lse testimony was g iven and wa s unabl e t o m eet it or did not kn owof its fa lsi ty un til a ft e r t

he tr ia l.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

16 Gordon v. United States , 1 7 8 F. 2 d 8 9 6 , 9 0 0 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 4 9 ) ( ci t i n g Larris on v. United States , 24 F.2d 82, 88 (7th Cir. 1928)). I t is clear that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing a new tr ia l ba se d o n th e Mathe ny a ff ida vit s. Michae l ar g u e s th a t t

h e a f f id a v it s o f M a th e n y , s u

b mi tt e d a f te r tr ia l, ar e g r o u n d s f

o r a new trial, and that the district c ourt err ed in r efusing to g rant a new tria l or eve n an evide ntiary hear ing on the matter. N one of the alleg ed ev i d en ce, however , is sufficient to war rant a new tria l under either O’ De ll or Gordon . I t is clear that the aff idavits were discovere d afte r t rial, but the re maining
e le me nts e ith e r d o n ot s tr on g ly fa vo r e ith e r s ide or

e lse the y argue str on g ly

a g a ins t a ne w tri a l. I t is not known the ex act c ircumstance s under which the Matheny aff idavits w ere procur ed
an d , t h er ef

o re , i ti s n o tcl ea r t h at t h ey co u l d n o th av e b ee no b t ai n edp ri o r t o t h e c l o s e o f t ri al t h ro u gh
an e xer c ise of

du e dil ige nc e . M ic ha e l argue s th a t Mathe ny ha s sa id t

hat he fe lt p re ssu

re d to
e xag g e rate the a mou

nt o f d ru g s in or de r t o o bta in a

do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e , y e t th is b it o f h e ars a y is
n o tco rr o b o ra t edb y

an y s u b s t an t i v e e v i d en ce . M o re o v er , t h e M at h en y af fi d av i t s , t h em s el v es , al l ege only that Matheny

offe red f alse tes timony

during the sepa

rate trials of other c o-conspirators, not during Michae l’s trial. T h er e i s , t here fore , no admissible evidence to support a conc lusion that Matheny ’s testimony

during Michae l’s trial was f alse. More importantly , t he af fidavits are not materia l to Michael’s c onviction, beca use neither

a f f id a v it im p li c a te s M a th e ny ’ s te s ti mo ny

r eg arding his int e ra c tio n w ithMic ha e l, a nd ne ith e r d isa

vo ws the e xiste nc e and

purp os e of

the c on sp ir a c y

wi th
re gar d t o t h e tw o o t h er i n d i v i d u al s . I n t h e af

fi d av i t s , M at h en y

d o es n o td i s p u t e t h at h e s o l d dru gs to the individuals li sted in the affi d av i t s , but merely disputes the total amounts sold. Even08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

17 Matheny ’s alleg ed conf

ession to Mic hael perta ins only to amounts, not to t he existence or ope ration
o f t h e dr u g c o n s p i r a c y. The only useful purpose of t he affidavits would be to impeach Matheny ’s t estimony , a fa ct
e ff e c tiv e ly c on c e de d b y

Mic ha e l in

arguin g that th e a ff

ida vit s show “ a c omp le te la c k o f c re dib ili ty as to Mr. Matheny” and that “Mr. Mathe ny [i s ] t o tally

corr upt . . . call[ing] into questi on the ob je c tiv e ne ss a

nd fa ir ne ss o f t he wh ole tr ia l.” Un fo rt

un a te ly fo r Mic ha e l, w e have e xpre ssl y he ld that a new trial may not be g rante d if the newly discovere d evidenc e is mere ly impeaching
. O’

De ll , 80 5 F .2 d at 640
. We the re fo re a ff ir m the dis tr ic t cou

rt ’s de nia l of Mic ha e l’ s motio n f or ne w tri a l. IV. SENTE NCING B oth de fe nd ants argue that th e dis tr ic t court imp ro pe rl y imp os e d s e nte nc inge nh anc e me nts
. Michae l claims that a two-leve l enhanc ement for obstruction of justice, pur s u an t t o U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, was i ncorr ect. J oshua cha lleng es: (1) the two-leve l enhanc ement for possession of a fir ear

m pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)( 1); (2) the two-leve l enhanc ement for leade rship in the conspirac y purs ua nt t o U .S. S.G . § 3B 1. 1( c ); and (3 ) h is d e sig natio n a s a

c are e r c ri min a l. A. M ic hae l’ s Se nt e nc ing Whe n s e nte nc ingMic ha e l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

imp os e d a tw o lev e l e nh anc e me nt, purs ua nt t o § 3 C1. 1 be c a

us e it fo un d tha t the re wa s suf fi c ie nt ev ide nc e to co nc lud e that Mic ha e l had re pe a te dly perjure d himself during trial. Michae l does not challeng e the rig ht of the district cour t to impos e an enhanc ement for

obstruction of justice in the ca se of pe rjury , but me rely argues that the fac ts do not support a finding of per

jury . As the district c ourt noted, howeve r, the c rime for which Micha el was convicted c arr ied a statutory minimum sentenc e that wa s g reater than the upper limit of the08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

18 g uid e lin e s r ang e e ve n w ith the e nh anc e me nt inc lud e d. Th e re fo re , e ve n if the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in imp os ing the e nh anc e me nt, it w a s h arm le ss e rr or and we n eed no t c on sid e r M ic ha e l’ s argume nts
re g ard ingthe e nh anc e me nt. Ev e n if we we re to c on sid e r t

he mer it s of Mic ha e l’ s argume nts , h ow e ve r, we wo uld sti ll uphold his sentence be cause it is clea r that the district c ourt did not err in imposing the sentenc ing enhanc ement. We review t he dis trict court’s factua l finding s relating to the application of § 3C1.1 for c lear err or. United States v. Zajac , 6 2 F.3d 145, 148 ( 6th Cir. 1995). The district cour t
co n cl u d edt h at M i ch ae l h ad p er j u re d h i m s el f b y

t es t i fy i n g t h at h e h adb ee ni n v o l v eds el l i n g dru gs fo r o n l y a c o u p l e o f m o n t h s , r a th e r

t h ana p p r o xi m a t e l y

a y e ar ; b y t e s t i f y i n g t h a th e h a d

o n l y de a lt with an individual named Hoss Craw ford, r ather than the re maining me mbers of the conspirac y ; by te sti fy ingthat a sca le se ize d at his re sid e nc e wa s use d o nly fo r w e ig hin g tom a toe s, rathe r t ha n d ru g s; and by testify ing that the seven pounds of marijuana seized at his r esidenc e was only for his per sonal use, as h e had suff

icient supply

for 56 months of ty

pical use by

a sing le user. T here is sufficient
e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s r e g ard ingMic ha e l’ s f a lse te sti mony , a

nd its de c isi on to i mpo se the ob str

uc tio n o f j us tic e e nh anc e me nt w a s n ot c le arl y e rr on e ou s. B. Jo shua ’s Se nt e nc ing 1. Career Criminal Designation Jo s h u a r a is e s an o b

je c ti o n to h is d e s ig n a ti o n a s a c ar e e r c r im in a l, p u r s u an t to U
. S. S.G. § 4B1.1, w hich was based on two prior convictions. J oshua conc edes that the first conviction, a f elony drug char g e, qualifie s under§ 4B 1.1, but he appe als the district court’ s holding that the se cond conviction, for attempted kidnapping , is a “c rime of violenc e” unde r § 4B 1.1.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

19 We review de novo a district c ourt’s deter mination that an offe nse is a crime of violence, a s define d in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 5 8 F .3 d 1 11 7, 11 20 (6 th Ci r. 19 95 ). Th is Court fi rs t mu st d e te rm ine wh e the r the pr ior c on vic tio n “ is f

or a c ri me that is a mon g tho se
s p ec i fi ca l l y

enumer ated in the guidelines.” United States v. W ood , 2 0 9 F
. 3 d

8 4 7 , 8 5 0 ( 6 th

Cir. 20 00 ). Se c tio n 4 B 1. 2 d e fi ne s a c ri me of vio le nc e a s: any offe nse under

fede ral or state l aw , p u nishable by imprisonment for a ter

m exceedingone y ear , that (1) has as an e lement the use, attempted use, or thre atene d u s e o f p h y s i ca l fo rc e a gai n s tt h e p er s o no f a n o t h er , o r (2 ) i s b u rgl ary o f a dwe l l i n g, arson, or extorti on, involves use of e x plosives, or otherwise involves conduct that prese nts a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4 B 1
. 2 ( a )
. I f an o f f e n s e is s p e c if

ic a ll y e n u me r a te d , th e n “ it is a c r im e o f v io le n c e for sentenc ing pur

poses,” a nd the court need not ana ly ze whether

it qualifies under the other c riteria. Id. The a pplication notes to § 4B1.2 make clea r that kidnaping is a crime of violence, a point that J oshua conc edes. H owev er , J o s h u a arg ues that attempted kidna ping is not listed and that the omission i s an indication that attempted kidna pping should not be considere d a cr ime of violence
. This argument is without m erit, for the application notes also expressly indicate t h at “‘ C ri me of violence’ . . . include[s] the offe nses of aiding and abe tting, conspiring , and att e mp tin g to c om mi t such off enses.” Id. , comment. (n. 1) ( emphasis adde d). Be cause attempted kidnapingis an enumer ated c rime of violence, the district court did not
e rr in d e sig natin g Joshu a

a s a c are e r c ri min a l. 2. Leadership Enhance ment Joshu a a lso c ha lle ng e s th e imp os iti on of a tw o- le ve l le a de rs hip e nh anc e me nt, purs ua nt t o U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. This Circuit has not established th e s t an d ar d of re view for sentenc ing08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

20 enhanc ements under

§ 3B1.1. Un ited St at es v. Monc iv ais , 492 F.3d 652, 660 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (e xpla ini ngwh y

the state of

the law i s unr e so lve d) . We ne e d n ot ma ke su c h a det e rm inatio n in th is
case either, be cause we would uphold the district cour t’s imposit ion of

the leade rship enhanc ement under e ither cle ar e rror

or de novo r eview. Th e e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t Joshua wa s a se c on d- tie r l e a de r of the c on sp ir a c y , an sw e ri ngon ly to Maldonado and distributing coca ine and mar ijuana to at least five distributors and his g irlfriend. Thompson a

nd Robinson, two of Joshua’s distributors, purchase d drug s from Jos hua and sold the drug s to Cessna. Thompson had to phone Joshua and wait for him to arr ive with the drug s befor e she could c omplete a number of the tra nsactions. The e vidence also shows t h at J oshua had f our other distributors, A.G., S h ak y , Craig , and Jessie. W e have upheld a r ole enha nceme nt under § 3B1.1( b) whe n the def

endant dire cted the a ctions of only one individual. See Un i t ed Stat es v. So lor io , 337 F.3d 580, 600–01 ( 6th Cir. 2003). The e vidence here indicates that Joshua directed the activit y o f no l ess than six other individuals in further ance of the c onspiracy , including r equiring direc t involvement by

J oshua be fo re cer

tain transac tions could take plac e. The district court
corr ectly imposed a lea dership enha nceme nt on J oshua. 3. Us e of a Fi re ar

m Finally , J oshua ar g ues that the imposition of a two-leve l enhanc ement for use of a fire arm during a drugcrime w as improper . We will uphold a finding by the district c ourt that a def endant possessed a f

irea rm during a drugcrime unle ss it is clea rly err oneous. Id. at 599. The gove rnment must first show that the defe ndant possessed the f irea rm, but J oshua conc edes that he pointed a firea rm at a police office r duringthe execution of a sear ch wa rrant on his residence . The burde n,08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

21 there fore , falls on J oshua “to de monstrate that it was c lear ly improbable that t h e we apon was
connec ted to the offe nse.” Id. I nstead of attempting to meet his burde n, J oshua attempts to chang e the subjec t , fi rst by
arguin g that th e se nt e nc inge nh anc e me nt i s im pr op e r b e c a

us e he wa s n ot c ha

rg e d w itha

fi re a rm s offe nse and, se cond, bec ause the alleg ed possession took place in the Middle District of Tenne ssee, not in the Eastern D istrict, where the trial wa s held. These fac ts a re irrele vant to our re view of the district court’s imposition of a two-leve l firea rms enhanc ement. Notably , J o s h u a o ff ers no lega l support for his ar g ument s and, in fa ct, cites no c ase la w at all, and the g overnme nt expresses frustration in not being able to f ind c ase law direc tly on point. The lack of rele vant ca se law is not
surp ri sin g c on sid e ri ng

the c omp le te la c k o f l e g a l me ri t to Joshu a ’s c la ims
. The Seve nth Circuit appear s to have come closest t o this iss ue in Un ite d S tat es v . D awn , 129 F
. 3 d 8 7 8 ( 7 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 7 )
. I n Da wn , the d e fe nd ant w a s c ha rg e d w ithpr od

uc tio n o f c hil d pornog raphy . He objec ted to ce rt ain finding s, made at sentencing , reg ardingfilms which he produce d outside of the g eog raphic al boundar ies of the United States. H e claimed that, be cause the
a c tiv iti e s o c c ur

re d o n f or e ig n s oil , th e y

sh ou ld n ot h a ve be e n c on sid e re d b y th e sent e nc ingc ourt
. Th e Se ve nth

Cir c uit dis a g re e d, statin g that: [n] one of the g uidelines
. . . makes the rele vance of t he defenda nt’s conduct turn on whether th at conduct took place within or without the border s of the United States

. . . [but] fo c us ins te a d up on the fa c tua l and log ic a l r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e of fe ns e of convic tion and the def

endant’ s other ac ts, where ver the y may have oc curr ed. Id. at 882. Simil arly , U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 does not make the r eleva nce of J oshua’s conduct turn on wher e possession of the f

irea rm took place , so imposit ion of the firearms enhance ment was prope r.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

22 CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

23 KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge, concurr ing on ly in th e judgm ent. Iconcur in t he jud g me nt a ff

ir min g the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. Withre sp e c t to Mic ha e l Smith’ s c ha lle ng e to t he su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , I

wo uld up ho ld his conviction for c onspiracy to distribute over 100 kilog rams of ma rijuana ba sed on the e vidence pr e se nte d to and a c c e pte d by the jur y . A s w e have ob se rv e d p re vio us ly , “ [t]he re le va nt q ue sti on in
a sse ssi nga

c ha lle ng e to t

he su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is wh e the r a ny ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the essential e lements of the cri me beyond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. Mc Au lif fe , 4 9 0 F
. 3 d

5 2 6 , 5 3 7 ( 6 th

Cir.) , cert. de nied , 552 U.S. 976 (2007). Micha el ca nnot challen ge t h e sufficie ncy of the e vidence mere ly

by contra dicting the amounts prese nted at trial throug h Matheny

and the tape d conver sations. See United States v. Gardne r , 4 88 F .3 d 7 00 , 7 10 (6 th Cir. 2007) ( “ [T ]h is c o u rt d o e s n o t w e ig h th e e v id e n c e , c o n s id e r th e c r e d ib il it y o f w it n e s s e s , or
su bs tit ute its jud g me nt f

or tha t of the jur y .” (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ); United States v. Paige , 470 F.3d 603, 608 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“ [ A] t t ac k s on witness cre dibilit y are simple challeng es to the quality

of the g overnme nt’s evidenc e and not the suf ficienc y of the e vidence .” (inter

nal qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) ); se e als o U

nit e d S tat es v . D e itz , 5 7 7 F
. 3 d 6 7 2 , 6 8 1 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 9 ) ( “ [O ]n appea l, there is no plac e for argumen t s reg ardinga g overnme nt witness’s lack of cre dibilit y .” (interna l quotation marks and alter ations omitt ed)) , cert. de nied , 130 S. Ct . 1720 (2010). Sufficient evidence supports J oshua S mith’s convictions for violating 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), kn ow ing ly

and int e nti on a lly us ing a c omm un ic a tio n fa c ili ty to fa c ili ta te the c on sp ir a c y to d istri bu te
c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e s. Vi e we d in the c on te xt of the e nti re c on sp ir a c y and in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the g overnme nt, the two phone ca lls refe renc ed in t he indictment pre sent sufficie nt circumstantial08-5913 /5929 , U SA v. Sm ith

24 evidenc e of the ong oing r elationship betwee n J oshua and Ma ldonado from whic h a re asonable jury
c ou ld c on c lud e tha

t Joshu a vio la te d § 84 3( b) —h e kn ow ing ly us e d h is c e llu lar p ho ne to c a ll Maldonado to inquire a

bout incoming dr

ug shipments that he needed to distribute to his customers and to discuss the money

that he owed to Ma ldonado for outstanding shipments a nd that others owe d to him. The Supreme Court h as re ce n tly narr owed the de finition of “fa cilitate” in § 843(b)
. Abuelhawa v. United States , 129 S. Ct . 2102 (2009). As w e re cently explained, I n defining “fa cilitate,” the Supre me Cou rt rec ently stated that Cong ress ha d so m e t h i n g i n m i n d a k i n t o a i d i n g , a b e t t i n g , o r a s s i s t i n g w h e n i t u s e d th e te rm . Abuelhawa v. United States , 1 29 S. Ct
. 21 02 , 2 10 6 ( 20 09 ). Thus , a c c or din g to Ab ue lha wa , a buy er’ s use of a telephone to arr ang e the purc hase of small quantities of drug s for pe rsonal use doe s not constitute “fac ilitating the commission” of a drug -re lated fe lony

for the pur

pose of § 843( b). Id. at 2107. United States v. Slayton , 366 F. App’ x 6 5 0 , 6 5 5 –56 (6th Cir. 2010). I n Ab ue lha wa , the Court
ex p l i ci t l y d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h e “ l i t er al ” m ea n i n g o f “ fa ci l i t at e” b ec au s e i tco n cl u d edt h at u t i l i z i n g a br oa de r def

initio n w ou ld i nc re a se the pe na lti e s f or a larg e r c la ss o f d

ru g c ri me s th an Co ng re ss intended. Ab ue lha wa , 129 S. Ct . at 2105 (re jectinglower c ourt’s expansive def inition of “f ac i l i t at i n g” t h at wo u l d

i n cl u d e a bu y er ’s u s e of a te l ep h o n e to m ak e tw o s m al l p u rc h as es o f d ru gs on basis that “they

‘undoubtedly

made . . . di s tribution easier’ ”). Joshua’s phone c alls here wer e more than mere ly “conne cted to the dr ug conspirac y ” and did more than just “ma[k] e fulfillment of the conspirac y ’s g oals easie r.” His phone ca lls satisfied the Ab ue lha wa definition of “f acilitating .” B e c a us e Iwo uld

a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt, Ic on c ur in t he jud g me nt.