Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re C.C., 2015 IL App (1st) 142306

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re C.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellee, v. C.C., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. First District, Fourth Division

Docket No. 1-14-2306

Filed January 6, 2015

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

Where respondent, a 14-year-old minor who was convicted of 

first-degree murder in the shooting death of another minor was 

sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Juvenile Justice until 

his twenty-first birthday and he also was given a mandatory minimum 

45-year adult criminal sentence, which was stayed under the extended 

jurisdiction juvenile statute and will be vacated if he completes his 

juvenile sentence without any new offenses or violations of the 

juvenile sentence, the appellate court held that since the stay on 

respondent’s adult criminal sentence has not been revoked, the State 

has not sought its revocation and the sentence may never be imposed, 

respondent lacks standing to challenge the severity of that sentence at 

this time and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-JD-3853; the 

Hon. Lori Wolfson, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Heidi Linn Lambros, all of 

State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Kathleen Warnick, and Adam Meczyk, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of 

counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Howse and Epstein concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION 

¶ 1 Respondent C.C. was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of 

17-year-old Dejuan Jackson. Respondent was 14 years old at the time of the shooting. He 

was sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first 

birthday and also given a mandatory minimum 45-year adult criminal sentence. Under the 

extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) statute, the adult portion of his sentence is stayed, and if 

respondent completes his juvenile sentence without committing a new offense or violating 

the conditions of his juvenile sentence, that adult sentence will be vacated on completion of 

that juvenile sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(6), (7) (West 2012). 

¶ 2 Respondent appeals, arguing that his 45-year mandatory minimum adult-stayed sentence 

violates both the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportional 

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. 

¶ 3 The preliminary and ultimately dispositive issue in this case is whether a 

minor-respondent sentenced under the EJJ statute, who receives a juvenile sentence plus a 

stayed adult criminal sentence, has standing to challenge the severity of his adult sentence 

when it has not yet been imposed and when the State has not petitioned for its imposition. On 

at least two occasions, this court has expressed doubts about a minor-respondent’s standing 

in this context, but in neither of those cases was the standing issue raised by the State. In this 

case, the State has challenged respondent’s standing to assert his constitutional claims, 

presenting the issue squarely for our review. 

¶ 4 We hold that, because the stay on respondent’s adult criminal sentence has not been 

revoked, the State has not sought its revocation, and the sentence may never be imposed, 

respondent lacks standing to challenge the severity of his sentence at this time. We therefore 

affirm the judgment below. 

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 6 Respondent was charged with the first-degree murder of Jackson and the attempted 

first-degree murders of Robert Thompson and Andre Cribbs. On July 17, 2013, the trial court 

granted the State’s motion to designate respondent’s case as an EJJ prosecution under section 
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5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2012)). On March 20, 

2014, the State filed a notice of intent to seek an extended-term sentence under section 

5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 

2012)), which provides for a sentencing enhancement of 25 years to natural life 

imprisonment for a defendant who discharged a firearm that caused death to another person. 

¶ 7 The case proceeded to a jury trial. Since respondent is not raising any substantive 

challenges related to his proceedings, we will briefly summarize the facts adduced at trial. 

Thompson and Cribbs both testified for the State. They testified that, on September 26, 2012, 

they were walking to their friend Willie’s house with Jackson. A black sport utility vehicle 

(SUV) approached them, and they saw respondent leaning out the passenger’s side window 

with a revolver. Respondent fired several shots and Thompson and Cribbs ran. When they 

returned to the scene, they saw Jackson lying in a pool of blood. Jackson died from a gunshot 

wound to the back of his head. Both Thompson and Cribbs identified respondent as the 

shooter in a police lineup. 

¶ 8 Respondent was acquitted of both counts of attempted murder but found guilty of the 

first-degree murder of Jackson. The trial court sentenced respondent to imprisonment in the 

Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday. Additionally, the trial court 

imposed an adult-stayed sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections, the mandatory minimum for first-degree murder with a firearm. 730 ILCS 

5/5-4.5-20(a), 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2012). 

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 On appeal, respondent raises no challenge to his conviction, but he contends that his adult 

criminal sentence is unconstitutional. Specifically, he argues that the mandatory minimum 

adult-stayed sentence of 45 years violates both the eighth amendment of the United States 

Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. He asks this 

court to vacate that sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the juvenile 

court may impose a stayed sentence below the mandatory minimum. 

¶ 11 Here, as noted earlier, respondent’s case was designated as an EJJ prosecution under 

section 5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2012)). The EJJ 

statute provides that, upon a finding of guilt in an EJJ case, the trial court must impose a 

juvenile sentence under the Juvenile Court Act as well as a conditional adult criminal 

sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4) (West 2012). If the juvenile successfully completes his 

juvenile sentence, then the adult criminal sentence is vacated. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(7) (West 

2012). The statute provides two scenarios in which the stay on the adult sentence may be 

revoked, and the adult criminal sentence imposed, during the pendency of the juvenile 

sentence: first, if the juvenile commits a new offense, the stay “shall” be revoked; and 

second, if the juvenile violates the conditions of his juvenile sentence in some way other than 

by committing a new offense, the court may, in its discretion, revoke the stay. 705 ILCS 

405/5-810(6) (West 2012). 

¶ 12 Respondent’s adult criminal sentence is currently stayed. The State has not petitioned to 

revoke his stay for committing a new offense, and respondent has not been accused of 

violating the conditions of his juvenile sentence, which would subject him to discretionary 
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revocation. The State argues that, under these facts, respondent lacks standing to challenge 

the constitutionality of his adult sentence. Unless and until the stay on that sentence is 

revoked, the State claims, respondent has not suffered a sufficient injury to confer standing. 

¶ 13 The doctrine of standing precludes courts from ruling upon mere abstract propositions of 

law, rendering advisory opinions, or giving legal advice as to future events. Underground 

Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1977). “A party may question the 

constitutional validity of a statutory provision only if he or she has sustained or is in 

immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of enforcement of the statute.” 

People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 512 (1988). 

¶ 14 We first note that, in two decisions where the State did not challenge defendant’s 

standing, this court has questioned minor-respondents’ standing to challenge the length of 

their stayed adult sentences before those sentences are imposed. E.g., In re Vincent K., 2013 

IL App (1st) 112915, ¶ 43 (questioning the minor’s standing to challenge his stayed adult 

sentence because “respondent has not violated the provisions of his juvenile sentence and, 

accordingly, his adult sentence has not kicked in”); In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d 822, 832 

(2006) (though State failed to object to defendant’s standing, questioning the minor’s 

standing to challenge his stayed adult sentence because he “ha[d] it within his own power to 

determine whether the adult sentence will kick in”). Because the State failed to raise the issue 

in those cases, however, this court did not decide the standing question. In this case, the State 

has challenged respondent’s standing.

¶ 15 We agree with the State that respondent lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality 

of this adult criminal sentence at this juncture. Respondent has not committed a new offense 

that would trigger the imposition of his adult offense and, of course, may never do so. 

Likewise, he may never violate the terms of his juvenile sentence–and even if he does, the 

trial court may decide, in its discretion, not to order the execution of that adult sentence. 705 

ILCS 405/5-810(6) (West 2012). Thus, there is at least one, if not two, intervening events 

that must occur before this 45-year sentence will kick in–that is, before defendant will suffer 

any direct injury. The record before us reveals that none of these events have transpired, nor 

are they about to transpire. 

¶ 16 In In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the respondent lacked 

standing to assert a due process challenge to the revocation provision of the EJJ statute after 

the State, alleging that the respondent had committed a new offense, petitioned the court to 

revoke the stay on his adult sentence. Id. ¶ 34. The supreme court held that the respondent 

lacked standing because the language that he challenged as vague pertained to revocations 

based, not on the commission of a new offense, but on violations of the conditions of his 

juvenile sentence. Id. ¶ 36. Because the language he challenged was not the basis for his 

possible revocation, he could show no injury caused by that language. Id. 

¶ 17 Similarly, in In re Omar M., 2014 IL App (1st) 100866-B, ¶ 1, the respondent alleged 

that the revocation provision of the EJJ statute was unconstitutionally vague. At the time, the 

State had not filed a petition to revoke the stay on respondent’s adult sentence. Id. ¶ 10. 

Applying M.I., the court stated that the “vague fear” of the imposition of an adult sentence 

under the EJJ statute was insufficient to confer standing. Id. ¶ 11. 
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¶ 18 Finally, in In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3 (2004), the respondent was subjected to EJJ 

prosecution and given a stayed adult sentence. On appeal, the respondent claimed that the 

statutory provision providing for revocation of the stay on her adult sentence was 

unconstitutionally vague, even though her adult sentence had not been imposed. Id. at 14. 

The court found that the respondent lacked standing to challenge the revocation provision 

because her “claim [was] premature until a petition to revoke the stay [was] filed in 

accordance with the EJJ statute.” Id. at 15. 

¶ 19 Like M.I., Omar M., and J.W., this case involves a challenge to a statute that has not yet 

affected respondent and may never affect him. The stay on respondent’s adult sentence has 

not been revoked and he has not been required to serve his adult sentence. Like Omar M. and 

J.W., the State in this case has not even filed a petition to revoke the stay on respondent’s 

adult sentence. At this stage, respondent has not been directly or materially affected by the 

statute that provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years, and he is in no 

immediate danger of being affected by it. If a constitutional challenge to the procedure for 

revoking the stay is premature unless and until that procedure is instigated, it follows that the 

imposition of the adult-stayed sentence–which is one step further removed in time–is 

likewise premature. 

¶ 20 Respondent claims that Omar M. and J.W. support his contention that he has standing in 

this case, because, while those cases found that respondents lacked standing to challenge the 

EJJ revocation procedure, those decisions did consider the respondents’ challenges to their 

adult sentences based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Respondent misreads 

those cases. The Apprendi challenges in those cases did not concern the adult sentence 

imposed; respondents challenged the fact that their cases were designated as EJJ 

prosecutions, which they claimed subjected them to enhanced penalties based on facts that 

should have been tried before a jury under a reasonable-doubt standard. In re J.W., 346 Ill. 

App. 3d at 10-11; Omar M., 2014 IL App (1st) 100866-B, ¶¶ 18-21. It does not even appear 

that the State challenged the respondents’ standing to raise those claims, nor did the court 

question it, and for good reason–the respondents clearly had standing to challenge the 

constitutionality of the proceedings in which they had been engaged at the time of their 

appeals. The Apprendi challenges were not directed at something that had not happened and 

might never happen–the revocation of the stay on the adult sentences or the sentences 

themselves–but rather at something that had already happened, the designation of their cases 

as EJJ prosecutions. There was nothing remote or speculative about that injury; the 

respondents had already suffered it. 

¶ 21 For this same reason, respondent’s reliance on In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276 

(2002), is misplaced. See id. at 286-87 (respondent raised Apprendi challenges directed at 

EJJ designation, after respondent’s case had been designated as an EJJ prosecution and 

respondent had been tried and convicted). Matthew M. is also distinguishable because it 

concerned ripeness, an admittedly related doctrine that often overlaps with standing (see 

Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 252 (2010)), but a distinct doctrine 

nevertheless, and not one raised in this case by the State. 

¶ 22 People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209 (1991), cited by respondent, likewise does not support his 

position. In P.H., the defendant was in the midst of a hearing in which the State sought to 
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transfer him to adult criminal court. Id. at 217. Part of the defendant’s argument at the 

transfer hearing was that the adult-transfer provision, itself, was unconstitutional. Id. The 

defendant unquestionably had standing to challenge that provision, as he was in immediate 

danger of being injured–the injury there being a transfer to adult court, which the State 

sought both below and on appeal. Id. at 220. 

¶ 23 In contrast, in this case, the injury respondent asserts is a cruel and unusual sentence–but 

he is not serving that sentence, nor is he in immediate danger of serving it. He very well 

might never serve it. His asserted injury, at this stage, is too remote to confer standing. 

¶ 24 By no means should our opinion be construed as limiting respondent’s ability to 

challenge his adult sentence if he is required to serve it or if he is in imminent danger of 

serving it. We express no opinion on respondent’s standing should those circumstances arise. 

We simply hold that, because the stay on his adult sentence has not been revoked and it is 

currently in no jeopardy of being revoked, respondent lacks standing at this time to challenge 

the severity of his sentence. In light of our decision, we express no opinion on the merits of 

defendant’s constitutional challenges to his adult sentence.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 26 For the foregoing reason, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 27 Affirmed.