March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E 

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or 

Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH (or their technical support and review 

contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by 

NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

cleared for distribution.

NIOSH Draft White Paper

Investigation of “Hot Particles” and the Health 

Physics Programs at the Idaho National Laboratory 

(INL) 

Author – Jodi Jenkins

Revision 0-E 

March 18, 2014 

This white paper has been generated to support the

NIOSH Response to Comments 9 and 23 in SCA-TR-TASK1-0005
March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or 

Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH (or their technical support and review 

contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by 

NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

cleared for distribution.

Investigation of “Hot Particles” and the Health Physics Programs at the INL

1.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this white paper is to summarize the results of an investigation that was 

performed by NIOSH in regards to the presence of “hot particles” and the likelihood that these 

particles would go undetected on workers. The results of this investigation are intended to assist 

NIOSH with its response to Comments 9 and 23 in SCA-TR-TASK1-0005 (SC&A 2006). 

2.0 BACKGROUND

Comments 9 and 23 were made in regards to the information provided in Revision 00 of the 

document titled Technical Basis Document for the Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) – Occupational External Dosimetry (ORAUT 2004). Even 

though the current version of this document is Revision 03, Comments 9 and 23 are still 

considered to be valid comments, since no significant changes have been made to the method in 

which “hot” particles are addressed. However, it should be noted that the title of this technical 

basis document has been changed to Technical Basis Document for the Idaho National 

Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory West – Occupational External Dosimetry for 

Revision 03. 

In addition, to simplify identifying and/or referring to this technical basis document (TBD) in the 

subsequent sections of this white paper, all versions of this document will be referred to as the 

INL TBD. 

2.1 Summary of the Issue

Comment 9 as stated in the INL Issue Resolution Matrix for Findings and Key Observations (i.e. 

Attachment 5 of SCA-TR-TASK1-0005) (SC&A 2006).

Issue 9: (5.1.2.6) Skin and Facial Contamination - This TBD does not consider incidents 

with workers having skin contamination, facial contamination, and positive nasal swipes 

in the INL facilities. These kinds of problems would be compounded by the deficiencies 

in air sampling systems and ineffective respiratory protection programs. Guidance should 

be provided to a dose reconstructor to account for the missed dose due to the unaccounted 

uptake.

Comment 23 as stated in the INL Issue Resolution Matrix for Findings and Key Observations 

(i.e. Attachment 5 of SCA-TR-TASK1-0005) (SC&A 2006).
March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E

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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

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Issue 23: (5.1.4.1.8) High-Risk Jobs (Beta/Gamma Exposure) - Site experts interviewed

by SC&A classified INL as an “acute dose” site, with a significant number of facilities, 

operations, experiments, and occurrences providing the possibility of personnel receiving 

dangerous levels of radiation. NIOSH did not evaluate comprehensively the facility and 

field data to identify and separate out the high-risk or high-dose jobs for worker external 

exposures. This information is essential for dose reconstructors to fill in the data gap 

when dose records in a claimant’s file are not complete.

Section regarding Comment 9 that is in the main body of the INL site profile review (i.e. Section 

5.1.2.6 of SCA-TR-TASK1-0005) (SC&A 2006).

5.1.2.6 Skin and Facial Contamination

This TBD does not consider incidents with workers having skin contamination, facial

contamination, and positive nasal swipes in the INL facilities. These kinds of problems 

would be compounded by the deficiencies in air sampling systems and ineffective 

respiratory protection programs, some of which have been discussed previously. 

Consequently, a bioassay may not be triggered for the workers. Guidance should be 

provided to a dose reconstructor to account for the missed dose due to the unaccounted 

uptake.

Section regarding Comment 23 that is in the main body of the INL site profile review (i.e. 

Section 5.1.4.18 of SCA-TR-TASK1-0005) (SC&A 2006).

5.1.4.1.8 High-Risk (Dose) Jobs

The TBD indicates that there are facilities at INL (e.g., INTEC) where high beta fields 

exist. NIOSH should develop a list of high-risk (dose) jobs and provide corresponding 

beta/gamma dose rates and worker job doses. This information will be helpful for dose 

reconstructions for personnel who had worked in such jobs and areas. Working in areas 

where there are fragments or “hot particles” of fission products, for example, during the 

cleanup of a reactor destruction experiment or SL-1 accident, may lead to the deposition 

of hot particles with high beta dose rates (above 50 rad hr-1) on the clothing and, 

possibly, directly on the skin of the face or hands. The beta radiation emitted from these 

hot particles will not be detected by the film or TLD dosimeters.

For workers at fuel element or reactor cleanup operations, for small localized areas, the 

beta dose could be as high as 100–1,000 rads when calculated over a working day. For 

claimants with skin cancer, location and job-specific information should be taken into 

account.
March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E

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Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH (or their technical support and review 

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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

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2.2 Actions from 2011 Working Group Meeting

SC&A agreed that comments 9 and 23 dealt with “hot particles” and were to be merged into the 

same issue.

NIOSH: Look into the possibility that a “hot particle” could be deposited on the skin and go 

undetected by investigating the facility health physics practices.

3.0 NIOSH INVESTIGATION RESULTS

ICPP

Concern was expressed regarding the potential for “hot particle” exposures at INTEC also 

known as ICPP and CPP. In addition, to simplify identifying and/or referring to this area in the 

subsequent sections of this white paper, all versions of this document will be referred to as the 

ICPP.

It was expected that ICPP employees would be exposed to radiation and work in areas where 

radioactive contamination was present. For this reason, employees were issued plant clothing to 

wear in lieu of personal clothing and additional protective clothing to be worn over this was 

issued to personnel working with radioactive materials and in contaminated areas. Plant clothing 

was only worn eight hours per day and laundered frequently (ACC 1952). Employees were 

required to survey themselves and their clothing when leaving areas and when contamination 

was suspected.

Special work permits were required to perform maintenance in all areas where radiation and 

contamination was present. Surveys of the work area, equipment and personnel were required 

upon completion of work (ACC 1952).

The contamination control program detailed in the CPP Health Physics Manual served to 

prevent inadvertent worker contamination incidents. Measures were in place to prevent worker 

contamination incidents and to detect them in a timely manner should they occur. Portal 

monitors were present at the plant exits to prevent contamination being spread from the plant on 

clothing or equipment (Stroschein and Maeser 1967). These portal monitors were capable of 

detecting hot particles on employees entering and exiting the facility.

When contamination incidents occurred, they were identified, documented, rectified and 

measures were taken to prevent recurrence. Some examples of this follow.
March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E

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Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH (or their technical support and review 

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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

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A report issued in 1973 (ANC 1973) reviewed the potential hazards of radioactive particles. It 

was noted that particles were found on the facility buses with activities as high as 2x105 dpm. 

Most particles had activities in the range of 2,000 – 20,000 dpm. 

An internal report issued in 1974 identified a deterioration of the health physics program at the 

ICPP (Rich 1974). Contamination control and personnel attitude and adherence to procedures 

were cited as issues. The study identified the comingling of personal and plant protective 

clothing in the locker rooms as an issue. A detailed plan involving area contamination control 

improvement, upgraded facilities, enhanced protective clothing control, improved 

instrumentation and worker training was devised and implemented to remedy the situation. 

It was noted that radioactive particles were released from the ICPP stack in February of 1972 and 

that ground surveys conducted in April of 1972 showed a heavy concentration of particles on

sidewalks, at the entrance of the cafeteria and on facility buses (AEC 1972). An AEC-appointed 

committee studied the problem and determined that the particles did not present a significant 

hazard. A report was not issued (Rich 1974). As part of the 1974 assessment of the ICPP health 

physics program, particles emitted from the stack were again evaluated. Part of the health 

physics program upgrade was to improve effluent control.

Health and safety manuals for later years continue to address access control, personnel surveys, 

area surveys, training, protective clothing, contamination control and decontamination (WINCO 

1990).

A report detailing the status of the ICPP health physics program and upgrades was issued in 1979 

(Rich 1979). INL management issued annual reports documenting the status of ongoing 

activities on site. The report issued in 1979 indicated that major progress had been made on the 

ICPP upgrade and that many action items were completed.

SL-1

Concern was expressed regarding the potential for “hot particle” exposures during the cleanup of 

the SL-1 accident.

Entry into the SL-1 facility after the accident exposed individuals to high levels of radiation and 

contamination. In order to protect workers from contamination, detailed entry procedures were 

followed. Following exit from the contaminated area, protective clothing was removed, 

individuals were surveyed and decontamination was performed as necessary (AEC 1961).

After initial recovery operations were completed, more detailed surveys were performed of the 

area. A contamination control zone was established and entry procedure developed. This 
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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

cleared for distribution.

procedure involved access control, limited vehicle access, protective clothing, respiratory 

protection as deemed necessary by health physics personnel, exits surveys and decontamination 

as necessary (Gammill 1961).

A detailed report on the health physics aspects of the SL-1 accident was compiled. This report 

summarized the doses received by those individuals responding to the incident. Both internal 

and external doses and thyroid doses were provided. No “hot particle” contaminations were 

noted (Horan and Gammill 1961).

“Hot particles” were discovered on site roads and U.S. Highway 20 in the aftermath of the SL-1 

accident. An extensive road survey and decontamination process was implemented. One 

hundred particles were collected from U.S. Highway 20 and 75 were collected from site roads. 

Dose rates from particles on U.S. Highway 20 were estimated to range from 10 mR/hr to 5 R/hr 

and dose rates from particles on site roads were estimated to be from 10 mR/hr to 15 R/hr (Horan 

1962).

Because entry procedures were developed after the initial response to the SL-1 accident, SL-1 

first responder claims are looked at very closely and the special circumstances for their 

exposures are handled on a case by case basis. Also, SL-1 first responders were surveyed upon 

exiting the building. 

ANP

Specific information on the health physics practices at the air craft nuclear propulsion (ANP) site 

was not available; however, the general operating rules state that health, safety and fire 

protection control are vested in the Idaho Operations Office (Levine 1959). This indicates that 

the same controls present at the rest of the site would be present at ANP.

Contamination Incidents

Personnel contamination surveys were conducted and documented at the TRA in 1974. Multiple 

instances of personnel contamination were documented. Of these, the highest was 100,000 cpm 

on an employee exiting the ATR. There was no indication that “hot particles” were discovered. 

In response to these occurrences, management implemented additional training on personnel 

contamination protocols and required that explanations be provided as to why the contamination 

was not found by the employee during his personal exit survey and what actions are being taken 

to prevent recurrence (ANC 1974b).

Contamination incident reports for the ICPP for 1979 and 1980 were reviewed. Personnel and 

area contaminations were documented. All incidents were investigated and corrective actions 
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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

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implemented. Hand contaminations were the most prevalent; however, foot, knee, upper arm, 

chest and facial contamination incidents also occurred (ACC 1980). 

On August 31, 1979 a WCF operator alarmed the portal monitor as he was entering the plant. A 

survey revealed 20,000 cpm on the left knee of the employee’s underclothing. The 

contamination was fixed in the clothing requiring that a portion be cut away. The clothing had 

been laundered at the employee’s home prior to wearing. A survey of the home showed no 

additional contamination. Later in the report the contamination is referred to as a “particle” and 

identified as being cesium-134 and cesium-137. The incident was investigated and corrective 

actions were implemented (ACC 1980).

On September 17, 1979 a pipe fitter alarmed the portal monitor as he was entering CPP 669. A 

100,000 cpm particle was discovered on the chest area of his undershirt. A survey of his home 

revealed no contamination. The subsequent investigation revealed that the employee was 

involved in a job the previous day in which he was contaminated. A miscommunication resulted 

in the employee being allowed to leave the facility with fixed contamination (ACC 1980). 

Management reviewed the incident and the involved parties were retrained on survey and

decontamination procedures. Also, higher quality protective coveralls were procured and 

protective clothing usage and survey procedures were modified.

On July 1, 1991, a discrete radioactive particle was discovered on the outer surface of the plant 

coveralls being worn by an equipment operator. The operator was involved in the movement of 

a cask at the TRA. The particle was estimated to have been on the garment for a maximum of 

1.25 hours. Skin dose to the employee was calculated using several different accepted 

methodologies. Based on technical judgment, a dose of 60 rem/cm2 was assigned to a three 

square centimeter area on the front of the left shoulder. The “hot particle” was believed to have 

originated from capsules of iridium that were irradiated at the ATR and transferred to the TRA 

Hot Cells. An iridium capsule was known to have ruptured in May. Subsequent handling of the 

capsule resulted in the contamination of the cask the operator was moving (WINCO 1991).

The incidents listed above are examples of contamination incidents that occurred, were 

identified, quantified and documented. If one of the energy employees involved in one of the 

incidents above were to develop a skin cancer on the location that the contamination occurred, 

the dose reconstructor would calculate the dose to the affected area from the contamination 

incident and the document Technical Information Bulletin: Interpretation of Dosimetry Data for 

Assignment of Shallow Dose. 

Hot Particles on Roadways and Buses
March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E 

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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

cleared for distribution.

In addition to the hot particles found on roadways due to the SL-1 accident and 1972 ICPP 

ruthenium release, five hot particles were discovered on roadways in August of 1963. The 

particles consisted of the radioisotopes cobalt-60, cerium-144, ruthenium-106, cesium-134 and 

cesium-137. The maximum dose rate recorded was 75 mrad/hr, beta (AEC 1963).The semiannual bus surveys for 1974 were performed in June and November. One hundred six buses 

were surveyed in June and 222 particles were found. The total activity of all the particles was 

1.22 μCi. In the November survey, one hundred ten buses were surveyed. There were 122 

particles found. The total activity of all particles was 0.57 μCi. The predominant isotopes were 

cesium-137, cerium-144, cobalt-60, ruthenium-106 and cesium-134. The highest particle 

identified was 10,000 cpm (ANC 1974a). Additional survey data from 1974 was analyzed (ANC 

1974a). Figure 1 shows the distribution of the particles as a function of cpm. Sixty five percent 

of the particles discovered were less than 1000 cpm. 

28

46 45

23 24

11

5 

8 9 

1 2 

4 

8 

1 

3 2 1 1 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Number of Particles

Particle Activity in CPM

Number of Particles Based on Activity
March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E 

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Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH (or their technical support and review 

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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

cleared for distribution.

Figure 1. Number of Particles Based on Activity.

Figure 2 illustrates the number of particles found on each area’s buses. The most particles were 

found on spare buses that serviced all areas. NRF and CPP buses had particle counts of 39 and 

37, respectively. 

3 3 

6 

4 

37

3 

6 

21

39

2 3 4 

46

5 4 

26

6 

4 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Number of Buses/Hot Particles

Area

Number of Contaminated Buses and Hot Particles by 

Area

No. of Buses

No. of Particles

Figure 2. Number of Contaminated Buses and Hot Particles by Area.

General INL Health Physics Practices

From the beginning of operation, the INL Radiological Control Manuals have had provisions for 

personnel surveys, area surveys, access control, protective clothing and contamination control. 

Later versions of the manual specifically address “hot particles” and their control. Periodic 

personnel monitoring and additional protective clothing are utilized as methods to prevent 

personnel exposure. In addition, all access to “hot particle” areas is controlled by radiation work 

permits. Facility buses and vehicles are surveyed multiple times per year. Response to “hot 

particle” skin or clothing contamination is specifically addressed and includes the following: 
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immediate removal of the particle, particle analysis, worker dose assessment and evaluation of 

work controls to prevent recurrence (Bechtel 1999). In 2011, INL issued a procedure that 

specifically addressed ”hot particles.” This procedure included area controls, such as the use of 

sticky pads, enhanced personnel monitoring, area surveys and response to “hot particle” 

contaminations (INL 2011). 

4.0 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATONS

The claim made in Issue 9 that the INL TBD does not consider incidents with workers having 

skin contamination, facial contamination, and positive nasal swipes in the INL facilities is not an 

issue specific to INL. No other site-specific TBDs do this either. In addition, nasal smear data is 

uncommon for INL/ANL-W claims, and when there is nasal smear data for a claim, it is unlikely 

that the energy employee would not have a urine sample, fecal sample, and/or whole body count 

measurement performed after a positive nasal smear is reported. Given that 90% or more of the 

INL’s bioassay measurements were below their detection limits, it is unlikely that any significant 

intakes/uptakes were unaccounted for; since it appears that the site was monitoring the workers 

well above and beyond the requirements for monitoring.

NIOSH was to look at the possibility that a “hot particle” could go undetected on an employee’s 

skin by investigating the health physics practices at INL. There is no evidence that INL 

employees were contaminated with undetected “hot particles” for significant periods of time. 

This investigation has determined that INL’s health physics program stressed contamination 

control and personnel surveys. Employees were required to survey themselves prior to exiting 

areas and trained on proper survey techniques. In addition, portal monitors were in place as a 

final survey measure.

When contamination incidents (both area and personnel) occurred, they were discovered and 

documented. The documents reviewed contained personnel survey results that included 

employee name, location of contamination and activity. In addition to the examples of 

contamination documentation provided previously, ANC 1974b pages 12 and 15-18 provides 

examples of personnel survey results. This information is adequate to reconstruct dose to the 

contaminated area using the Technical Information Bulletin: Interpretation of Dosimetry Data

for Assignment of Shallow Dose.

When contamination control and personnel survey problems were identified, corrective actions 

were implemented to prevent recurrence and evaluations of the incidents were performed. 

Occurrences of employees entering or exiting the facility carrying “hot particles” on their skin or 

clothing were documented. These “hot particles” were detected by portal monitors at the area 
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entrances. The documentation of these types of incidents is an indication of the INL’s health 

physics program’s ability to detect “hot particles.” 

In general, skin contaminations are handled on a case-by-case basis, due to the intricacies of the 

calculations and how uncommon it is to encounter a skin cancer claim where that part of the 

worker’s skin was contaminated. The document Technical Information Bulletin: Interpretation 

of Dosimetry Data for Assignment of Shallow Dose provides a claimant favorable approach for 

situations in which the precise location of a skin contamination is unknown and it is unclear

whether the irradiated area included the skin cancer location (ORAUT 2005). Also, there is 

evidence that hot particle doses are less effective than whole body doses in inducing cancer 

(Merwin and Moeller 1989; Charles et al. 1988).

Based upon the above, NIOSH concludes that the likelihood of a “hot particle” going undetected 

on an employee’s skin for a significant period of time is remote. There is no evidence that INL 

employees were contaminated with undetected “hot particles” for significant periods of time. 

When contamination incidents occurred at the INL, they were discovered by area surveys and 

personnel monitoring and documented. Also, no other site-specific TBDs, with the exception of 

Hanford, provide guidance for undetected “hot particles.” The Hanford ”hot particle” situation 

is unique and the same issue did not exist at INL. In addition, there is complex wide guidance in 

place that addresses skin contaminations and “hot particle” exposures as they relate to skin 

cancers.

5.0 REFERENCES

ACC (Allied Chemical Corporation), 1980, Various Incidents and Contaminations, Idaho Falls,

Idaho. [SRDB Ref ID: 124534]

ACC (Atomic Cyanamid Company), 1952, CPP Health Physics Manual, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 

April. [SRDB Ref ID: 8095]

AEC (Atomic Energy Commission), 1961, Sequence of Events Related to the SL-1 Accident, 

Idaho Falls, Idaho, January 12. [SRDB Ref ID: 4492]

AEC (Atomic Energy Commission), 1963, Sample Results for Five Hot Particles, Idaho Falls,

Idaho, August. [SRDB Ref ID: 118756]
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Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH (or their technical support and review 

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NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

cleared for distribution.

AEC (Atomic Energy Commission), 1972, Ruthenium Particle Problem, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 

July 12. [SRDB Ref ID: 118860]

ANC (Aerojet Nuclear Corporation), 1973, Radiological Hazards of Radioactive Particles, Idaho 

Falls, Idaho, November 21. [SRDB Ref ID: 118994]

ANC (Aerojet Nuclear Corporation), 1974a, Particle Data from Contaminated Buses, Idaho 

Falls, Idaho, November. [SRDB Ref ID: 118917]

ANC (Aerojet Nuclear Corporation), 1974b, Radiological Contamination of Personnel, Idaho 

Falls, Idaho, August. [SRDB Ref ID: 119066]

Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC, 1999, INEEL Radiological Control Manual, PRD-183, Idaho Falls,

Idaho, October 1. [SRDB Ref ID: 117435]

Charles, M. W., J. P. Williams and J. E. Coggle, Skin Carcinogenesis Following Uniform and

Nonuniform Beta Radiation, Health Physics 55(2):399-406, 1988.

Gammill, W. P., 1961, Entry Into Surrounding SL-1 Contaminated Area, SOP-2-61, Idaho Falls, 

Idaho, January. [SRDB Ref ID: 84186]

Horan, J. R., 1962, Health and Safety Division Annual Report – 1961, Idaho Falls, Idaho, May 

21. [SRDB Ref ID: 8076]

Horan, J. R. and Gammill, W. P., 1961, 1961, The Health Physics Aspects of the SL-1 Accident,

Health Physics Society Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, June 16, 1961. [SRDB Ref ID:

12779]

INL (Idaho National Laboratory), 2011, Management Control Procedure – Hot Particles, MCP3347, Idaho Falls, Idaho, June 9. [SRDB Ref ID: 117430]

Levine, S. J., 1959, General Operating Rules for Nuclear Testing at the NRTS – ANP Site, Idaho 

Falls, Idaho, April 3. [SRDB Ref ID: 116908]

Merwin, S. E. and M. P. Moeller, Hot Particles: Risks, Regulations and ALARA, Radiation

Protection Management 6(6):52-57, 1989.
March 18, 2014, Rev 0-E

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or 

Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or ABRWH (or their technical support and review 

contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by 

NIOSH or its contractor. Not subject to FOIA. 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been 

cleared for distribution.

ORAUT (Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team), 2004, Technical Basis Document for the 

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) – Occupational 

External Dosimetry, ORAUT-TKBS-0007-6, Rev 00, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, April 6. 

[SRDB Ref ID: 19521]

ORAUT (Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team), 2005, ORAUT-OTIB-0017, Technical

Information Bulletin: Interpretation of Dosimetry Data for Assignment of Shallow Dose, 

Rev 01, October 11. [SRDB Ref ID: 19434]

Rich, B.L., et al., 1974, ICPP Health Physic Upgrade Program, Idaho Falls, Idaho, October 23. 

[SRDB Ref ID: 124516]

Rich, B.L., et al., 1979, 1978 Health Physics Annual and Upgrade Status Report, Idaho Falls, 

Idaho, May 3. [SRDB Ref ID: 124517]

SC&A (S. Cohen & Associates), 2006, Review of the NIOSH Site Profile for the Idaho National 

Laboratory, Idaho, SCA-TR-TASK1-005, January 25.

Stroschein, H. W. and Maeser, P. H., 1967, Health Physics Manual of NRTS Areas Operated By 

Idaho Nuclear Corporation, Idaho Falls, Idaho, April. [SRDB Ref ID: 1029]

Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company (WINCO), 1990, Health and Safety Manual for the 

Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, C86-131159, Idaho Falls, Idaho, September 7. [SRDB 

Ref ID: 119026]

Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company (WINCO), 1991, Dose Assessment for Iridium-192 

Particle, Idaho Falls, Idaho, August 12. [SRDB Ref ID: 125867]