### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 12, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2018AP2346 Cir. Ct. No. 2015CV2955 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

S UMMIT C REDIT U NION , P LAINTIFF -C OUNTER D EFENDANT -R ESPONDENT ,
V . D AVID L. M ANCL , D EFENDANT -C OUNTER C LAIMANT -A PPELLANT .

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County: PETER ANDERSON, Judge. Affirmed

. Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.23(3). ¶1 PER CURIAM. Summit Credit Union initiated this action in the Dane County Circuit Court seeking a money judgment against David L. Manc lNo. 2018AP2346

2 after Mancl failed to pay amounts due on his credit card account with Summit. Mancl counterclaimed alleging that Summit violated provisions of the Wisconsin Consumer Act (W IS
. S TAT
. chs. 421-427). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit on its claim for a money judgment agains t Mancl and on some of Mancl’s counterclaims. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining counterclaims. At the close of Mancl’s evidence, the ci rcuit court granted Summit’s motion to dismiss the remaining counterclaims. Ma ncl appeals the circuit court’s rulings disposing of his counterclaims. We affirm.
BACKGROUND ¶2 The following facts are undisputed. 1

1 At the outset, we observe that Summit has extensively utiliz ed screen shots in its brief in this court. We appreciate effective uses of word process ing technology, and we do not discourage parties from reproducing images, maps, photos, and other non-textual items because these items can be helpful to our understanding of certain issues . However, when a party uses screen shots to reproduce textual items, such as transcript pa ges, that party must manually count and include the words reproduced in its word count because a commerc ial word processor will not count those words. See W IS
. S TAT
. R ULE 809.19(8)(d) (2017-18) (“For purposes of the certification and length requirements of this subsection, counsel may use the word count produced by a commercial word processor available to the genera l public.”). We do not discern that Summit’s brief exceeded the word count because of the sc reen shots, but parties that fail to count all words in a screen shot risk running afoul of appellate brief word count requirements. See R ULE 809.19(8)(c) and (d). Separately, we observe that both parties cite to the ap pendix and not to the record at various points in briefs filed in this court. This is a violation of an important rule. On appeal, a party must include appropriate factual references to the r ecord in their briefing. W IS
. S TAT
. R ULE 809.19(1)(d)-(e). The appendix is not the record. See United Rentals, Inc. v. City of Madison , 2007 WI App 131, ¶1 n.2, 302 Wis. 2d 245, 733 N.W.2d 322. This is no minor matter. An appendix is a helpful tool when judges conduct an initial review of the briefs and, therefore, parties typically provide appendix cites, as the parties do here. But, when the case is assigned for drafting, we look directly to the record to verify factual ass ertions in a brief. The absence of record cites forces us to look to the appendix to determine whe re to look in the record. We warn counsel that future violations of the Rules of Appellate Proc edure may result in sanctions. See W IS
. S TAT
. R

ULE 809.83(2). (continued)No. 2018AP2346

3 ¶3 Mancl had loans and accounts with Summit including, pertinent to this appeal, a mortgage loan, a credit card account, and an auto loan. F or a time, payments toward the auto loan that Mancl had with Summit were ma de through automatic deductions from Mancl’s wages at his place of emplo yment. Summit stopped deducting from Mancl’s wages and, instead, deducted from another person’s wages. 2 Summit applied those amounts to Mancl’s auto loan. In total, approximately $4,700 was erroneously applied to Mancl’s auto loan. ¶4 Upon discovering its error, Summit reimbursed the other person

. That had the effect of leaving Mancl $4,700 in arrears on his auto l oan. Mancl met with a Summit employee to discuss repayment options and told the Summit employee that he was unable to repay the $4,700 arrears in a lump sum. Summit then proposed alternative repayment options to Mancl. ¶5 To repay the arrears on the auto loan, Mancl entered into a sep arate loan agreement with Summit at a zero percent interest rate. At Mancl’s request, Summit agreed to reduce the arrears due on the auto loan (and the a mount of the new loan) to approximately $4,200. 3 Mancl’s monthly payment on the arrears

Further, in briefing in this court, Mancl refers to two opinions by title only and gives no citation to those opinions. This violates W IS
. S TAT
. R ULE 809.19(1)(e) (“The argument on each issue ... is to contain ... citations to the authorities ... relied on a s set forth in the Uniform System of Citation ....”). Counsel for Mancl has violated this rule in this manner, to our knowledge, in at least one other appeal and may be subject to sanctions i f this practice continues. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 ver sion unless otherwise noted.

2 That person has a name that differs from Mancl’s only by a middle init ial.

3 For clarity, we will continue to refer to Mancl’s original aut o loan as the “auto loan,” and we will now refer to Mancl’s $4,200 subsequent loan for repayme nt of the auto loan arrears as the “arrears loan.”No. 2018AP2346

4 loan was approximately $85. The $85 payment on the arrears loan w as in addition to the payment due each month on the auto loan. Mancl’s auto loan was p aid in full approximately six months after Mancl entered into the arrears loan. St arting at that point, only the $85 per month payment on the arrears loan was due from Mancl to Summit regarding the auto. ¶6 About a year after Mancl entered into the arrears loan, M ancl applied for a home equity consolidation loan with Summit becaus e, according to Mancl, he was having trouble paying the combined total payments on the arrears loan, his credit card account with Summit, and a mortgage loan owed t o Summit. However, Mancl’s wife at the time refused to sign the required pa perwork for the home equity consolidation loan and communicated to Summit that she di d not want the loan to proceed. As a result, no home equity consolidat ion loan was entered into between Mancl and Summit. Mancl then became delinque nt in his payments to Summit on his credit card account and other payments due to Summit. ¶7 Several months later, Mancl went to a Summit branch to ma ke his mortgage loan payment at the drive-through lane. The teller asked Mancl to enter the branch. Mancl went inside and, ultimately, made his mortgage pay ment. In addition, in the branch, the teller told Mancl that his accounts at Summit, other than his mortgage loan, were suspended until he made payments on non-m ortgage loans and credit card amounts which were due to Summit. After that conversa tion, Mancl continued to make his mortgage payments, and Summit accepte d those payments. ¶8 Summit initiated this lawsuit against Mancl to collect t he credit card debt owed by Mancl to Summit. Mancl filed five counterclaims a lleging thatNo. 2018AP2346

5 Summit violated provisions of the Wisconsin Consumer Act (W IS
. S TAT
. chs. 421- 427). ¶9 Summit filed an amended complaint which included additional allegations and attached credit card statements regarding Mancl’ s credit card account debt. ¶10 Summit moved for summary judgment on its claim for a money judgment against Mancl on the credit card debt and on Mancl’s counterc laims. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit on its claim against Mancl on the credit card debt and on three of Mancl’s co unterclaims. The circuit court withheld entry of the money judgment pending resolutio n of Mancl’s two remaining counterclaims. ¶11 A jury trial was commenced on Mancl’s two remaining counterclaims. At the close of Mancl’s evidence, Summit moved for dismissal of the two remaining counterclaims on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. See W IS
. S TAT
. § 805.14(3). The circuit court granted Summit’s motion, dismissed each remaining claim with prejudice, and entered the money judgment in favor of Summit against Mancl regarding the credit card debt. ¶12 Mancl appeals the circuit court’s rulings disposing of his counterclaims. 4 ¶13 We refer to additional facts in the following discussion.

4 Mancl does not appeal the circuit court’s grant of summary j udgment in favor of Summit on its claim for a money judgment on the credit card debt.No. 2018AP2346

6 DISCUSSION ¶14 We begin with our review of the circuit court’s grant of summa ry judgment in favor of Summit on three of Mancl’s counterclaims. We then address the circuit court’s dismissal at trial of Mancl’s two remaining countercl aims.

I. The Circuit Court Properly Granted Summary

Judgment in Favor of Summit. ¶15 Mancl argues that the circuit court erred by granting summa ry judgment in favor of Summit on three of Mancl’s counterclaims. T hose counterclaims alleged that Summit violated: (1) W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j), by filing a complaint that failed to comply with the pleading requirements in W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.109; (2) § 427.104(1)(j), because Summit had no right to demand repayment of the $4,700 auto loan arrears in one payment; and (3) W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.107, because Summit acted in an unconscionable manner toward Ma ncl. We conclude that the circuit court properly granted summary j udgment in favor of Summit on these counterclaims. A. Standard of Review and Summary Judgment Methodology. ¶16 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same methodology employed by the circuit court. Bank of New York Mellon v. Klomsten , 2018 WI App 25, ¶31, 381 Wis. 2d 218, 911 N.W.2d 364. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fac t and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W IS
. S TAT
. § 802.08(2); Bank of New York Mellon , 381 Wis. 2d 218, ¶31. ¶17 When reviewing a summary judgment motion, we first deter mine whether the pleadings set forth a claim for relief. Helland v. Kurtis A. FroedtertNo. 2018AP2346

7 Mem’l Lutheran Hosp. , 229 Wis. 2d 751, 756, 601 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1999). Next, we examine the moving party’s submissions to determine whet her those constitute a prima facie case for summary judgment. Id. If the submissions do, we examine the opposing party’s submissions to determine “whethe r any disputed material fact exists, or whether any undisputed material fa cts are sufficient to allow for reasonable alternative inferences.” Id. ¶18 We view summary judgment materials in the light most favorab le to the non-moving party. Affeldt v. Green Lake Cty. , 2011 WI 56, ¶59, 335 Wis. 2d 104, 803 N.W.2d 56. However, the non-moving party “must set forth ‘spe cific facts,’ evidentiary in nature and admissible in form, showing tha t a genuine issue exists for trial.” Helland , 229 Wis. 2d at 756. B. Pleading Defects Under W IS . S TAT . ch. 425 Do Not Constitute

Violations of W IS . S TAT . § 427.104(1)(j). ¶19 W ISCONSIN S TAT . § 427.104(1)(j) prohibits a creditor, such as Summit, from “[c]laim[ing], or attempt[ing] or threaten[ing] t o enforce a right with knowledge or reason to know that the right does not exist.” Sec. 427.104(1)(j). To repeat, Mancl’s first counterclaim is that Summit violated § 427.104(1)(j) by filing a complaint that allegedly failed to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.109(1)(d) (2013-14). 5

5 The parties agree that W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.109(1)(d) (2013-14) applies to this case and, material to this appeal, requires that Summit’s complaint con tain “the actual or estimated amount of U.S. dollars ... that the creditor alleges he or she is enti tled to recover and the figures necessary for computation of the amount, including any amount receiv ed from the sale of any collateral.” (continued)No. 2018AP2346

8 Mancl’s specific contention is that Summit’s original compla int violated § 427.104(1)(j) because it failed to include “the figures necessary for computation of the amount” that Summit alleged it was entitled to recover fr om Mancl. See § 425.109(1)(d) (2013-14). 6 We need not decide whether Summit’s original complaint complied with § 425.109(1)(d) (2013-14) because a pleading defect, such as that alleged by Mancl, does not constitute a violation of § 427.104(1)(j). ¶20 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently considered whether a creditor’s failure to comply with the notice of default and right to cure provisions of W IS
. S TAT
. ch. 425 constitutes a violation of W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j). See Security Fin. v. Kirsch , 2019 WI 42, ¶¶18-19, 386 Wis. 2d 388, 926 N.W.2d 167. In Kirsch , the supreme court held that a “procedural deficiency,” such as a creditor’s failure to provide notice of default and right to cure i n accordance with W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.109, “does not fall under § 427.104.” Id. , ¶19. The supreme court rejected the debtor’s attempt to “shoehorn [the creditor’s] failure to comply with ch. 425 into a [W IS
. S TAT .] ch. 427 violation in order to recover the significant remedies and penalties ch. 427 imposes.” Id. The supreme court held that there is a “stark contrast” between the “[t]he sort of threatening and harassing conduct which violates [] § 427.104” and “procedural errors such as pleading defects ,” which “are treated much differently.” Id. (emphasis added). The court

W ISCONSIN S TAT
. § 425.109 (2013-14) was renumbered as W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.109(1)(d)1. and amended by 2015 Wis. Act 155, § 4. The amended statute first applied to complaints fi led on or after the effective date of the Act, which was July 1, 2016. See 2015 Wis. Act 155, §§ 12-13. Summit’s original complaint and amended complaint were both fil ed prior to that effective date, and the parties concur that the amended statute does not apply to this case.

6 Mancl conceded in the circuit court that Summit’s amended complai nt complied with the pleading requirements of W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.109(1)(d) (2013-14), and Mancl does not contend on appeal that the amended complaint failed to comply with that statute.No. 2018AP2346

9 further held that a creditor’s failure to comply with a proce dural requirement “did not disrupt [the creditor’s] right to payment.” Id. , ¶30. Therefore, “[w]hile [the debtor] was entitled to dismissal of [the creditor’s] action [if a proper amended complaint was not filed] ... [the debtor’s] counterclaims fail[ ed] to state a claim for additional relief under § 427.104(1)(j).” Id. ¶21 Mancl cites to Kirsch in his reply brief in this court and candidly acknowledges, “While [the supreme court did not rule] on the issue presented in Mancl’s case, it seems likely that this Court will apply Kirsch to hold that [W IS
. S TAT
. §] 427.104 does not allow Mancl to sue for a pleading defect, so Mancl’s counsel will not belabor the point.” Mancl is correct. ¶22 Like the defendant in Kirsch , Mancl seeks relief under W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j) for an alleged failure to comply with a procedural requi rement set forth in W IS
. S TAT
. ch. 425 (2013-14). Our supreme court’s holding and analysis in Kirsch foreclose any argument that a pleading defect “in and of itself ” constitutes a violation of § 427.104(1)(j). See id. , ¶20. A pleading defect would have entitled Mancl only to dismissal of the original complaint, a nd not to any additional relief under § 427.104(1)(j). See id. , ¶30. ¶23 We conclude that Kirsch is controlling, and that this counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Acc ordingly, the counterclaim fails the first step in summary judgment meth odology, and we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Summit on this counterclaim. See Helland , 229 Wis. 2d at 756.No. 2018AP2346

10 C. Summit Did Not Violate W IS . S TAT . § 427.104(1)(j) in Negotiations About the Auto Loan Arrears. ¶24 Mancl’s second counterclaim is that Summit violated W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j) in the negotiations about Mancl’s repayment of the auto loan arrears. Mancl makes two separate contentions. First, Mancl asserts that Summit violated § 427.104(1)(j) because Summit demanded payment of the $4,700 arrear s in one installment and that demand breached a specific sentence in the auto loan agreement between Mancl and Summit. Second, Mancl asserts that Summit violated § 427.104(1)(j) because it did not have the right to seek any rep ayment of the $4,700 arrears from Mancl. We reject Mancl’s assertions a nd affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on this counterclaim.
1. Facts. ¶25 The following additional facts especially pertinent to this counterclaim are undisputed except where noted. ¶26 Upon discovering the error which led to Mancl being $4,700 in arrears on the auto loan, a Summit representative had multiple telephone conversations with Mancl regarding how repayment would be handled and a lso met with Mancl in person to discuss repayment. ¶27 The parties disagree about what was said in one of the initia l conversations regarding repayment of the arrears. According to Su mmit, a Summit employee told Mancl that he could make the $4,700 payment on the arrears in a lump sum. In one sentence in Mancl’s affidavit, he avers that Summit “told [Mancl] that [he] would have to pay the $4,000 plus I was behind i n oneNo. 2018AP2346

11 installment.” 7 Mancl argues that there is a material factual dispute ari sing from the difference between “could” and “would have to.” ¶28 Continuing with the additional background, the parties agree that Mancl informed Summit that he was unable to repay the $4,700 in a lump sum payment. As conceded by Mancl in briefing in this court, and as he testified in his deposition testimony, Summit then proposed the following arrears r epayment options: (1) refinancing and extending the auto loan term by fourteen months so that Mancl’s monthly payment on the auto loan would remain the same ; (2) refinancing the auto loan so it was fully paid within the current term of the loan (this would have the effect of increasing Mancl’s monthly paymen t on the auto loan); or (3) entering into a separate loan for the $4,700 in arrears at a zero percent interest rate. ¶29 Mancl chose the third option. In addition, Mancl asked Summit to reduce the arrears loan amount, and Summit agreed to reduce the amount owed to approximately $4,200. The parties then entered into what we ref er to as the “arrears loan.” 2. Analysis. ¶30 As noted, Mancl contends that there is a factual dispute about whether Summit demanded that Mancl re-pay the $4,700 arrears in one

7 We pause to note a discrepancy between the record as compare d to Mancl’s counterclaim and his argument. As noted, Mancl’s affidavit all eges that Summit told him that he would have to pay the arrears in “one installment.” But, Ma ncl’s counterclaim and most of his argument in this court state that Summit told Mancl that he would have to pay the arrears “immediately.” The phrase “one installment” in Mancl’s af fidavit cannot be equated with a requirement of “immediate” payment. We rely on the affidavit versi on.No. 2018AP2346

12 installment, and Summit disagrees. We need not resolve that issue because this part of Mancl’s counterclaim fails for other reasons. ¶31 Mancl argues that a creditor, such as Summit, violates W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j) when it takes an action to collect a debt and that acti on breaches the creditor’s contract with the debtor. See Kirk v. Credit Acceptance Corp. , 2013 WI App 32, 346 Wis. 2d 635, 829 N.W.2d 522. Mancl relies on one sentence in a document in the record to support his claim that Summit had no co ntractual right to demand payment of the arrearage for the auto loan in one installm ent. That sentence reads: “You [Mancl] will be in default if you fai l to make a payment when due two times during any 12 month period.” 8 We conclude that: (1) Mancl has failed to show that the quoted sentence is contained in the auto loan agreement; and (2) the language relied on does not support Mancl’s argument. ¶32 Pursuant to W IS
. S TAT
. § 802.08(3), summary judgment materials must be “admissible in evidence.” Mancl asserts that a docu ment in the record which contains the sentence he relies on is the auto loan agreement between Manc l and Summit. In other words, Mancl asserts that that document is the authentic auto loan agreement. See W IS
. S TAT
. § 909.01 (“The requirements of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissi bility are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the ma tter in question is what its proponent claims.”). For the following reasons, we conc lude that Mancl

8 Mancl’s cite to the record in this court regarding this document is incorrect in two ways. First, Mancl cites to the wrong document in the record. But, we found the language Mancl relies on, quoted in the text, in the record. The purported contract was attached to a brief filed by Mancl in the circuit court (but without anything in the record authenticating the purported contract). Second, the page of the document cited by Mancl was incorrect. Nonetheless, we found the verbiage Mancl relies on within a different page in the document.No. 2018AP2346

13 has failed to demonstrate that the document which contains the sen tence he relies on is the authentic auto loan agreement between Mancl and Summit.

• Mancl cites to no affidavit that authenticates the document as the auto loan agreement;

• Mancl cites to no deposition testimony that authenticates the document as the auto loan agreement, and deposition testimony immediately preceding the document in the record makes no mention of the document;

• Nothing in the document references an auto loan or a specific vehicle and, as noted in the Background section of this opinion, Mancl had agreements with Summit other than the auto loan;

• A document identical to the purported auto loan agreement is attached to Summit’s amended complaint, the amended complaint refers to that agreement as the contract between Mancl and Su mmit for Mancl’s credit card account, and Mancl’s answer to the amended complaint admits those facts. ¶33 Accordingly, we conclude that Mancl has failed to show that the language he relies on to support his argument is contained in the auto loan agreement between Mancl and Summit. For that reason, the firs t part of this counterclaim of Mancl fails. ¶34 In addition, even if the language Mancl relies on is in the auto loan agreement, we would reject his argument. We repeat the sentenc e Mancl cites: “You [Mancl] will be in default if you fail to make payment w hen due two times during any 12 month period.” After noting that language in briefing in thi s court,No. 2018AP2346

14 Mancl fails to construct a discernable argument as to why that sentence leads to the conclusion that a purported attempt by Summit to demand payment of the arrears from Mancl in one installment is an attempt by Summit to enfor ce a right Summit knows does not exist in violation of W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j). For that reason, we need not consider that argument further. See State v. Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (court of appeals may decline to review arguments that do not reflect any legal reasoning and are supporte d only by general statements). ¶35 We now consider the second part of Mancl’s counterclaim. Specifically, Mancl alleges that the terms of the auto loan a greement between Summit and Mancl do not allow Summit to collect the auto loan arr ears because the arrears accrued as a result of Summit’s mistake. Manc l does not cite to any part of the record to support this proposition. Also, to the exte nt that Mancl is attempting to rely on terms in the document mentioned above, this ar gument fails because Mancl has failed to authenticate that document as t he auto loan agreement. ¶36 In addition, Mancl concedes in briefing to us that “Summit had the right to expect Mancl to actually pay the amount he owed under the [auto loan] contract ....” This concession effectively defeats Mancl’s argu ment that Summit had no right to attempt to collect the arrears from Mancl. W ISCONSIN S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j) prohibits a creditor from “[c]laim[ing], or attempt[i ng] or threaten[ing] to enforce a right with knowledge or reason to know that the right does not exist .” Sec. 427.104(1)(j) (emphasis added). As Mancl concedes, Summit had an existing right to payment under the auto loan, and Summit’ sNo. 2018AP2346

15 discussions with Mancl concerning repayment options for the arre ars were undisputedly directed at enforcing that existing right, as was the arrears loa n. 9 ¶37 Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary ju dgment in favor of Summit on this counterclaim.
D. Mancl Has Not Shown That Summit’s Actions Were Unconscionable. ¶38 Mancl’s third counterclaim alleges that Summit “engaged i n unconscionable behavior” in violation of W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.107. Under § 425.107(1), a court may refuse to enforce a consumer credit transacti on if it determines, as a matter of law, that any aspect of the tra nsaction was unconscionable. 10 Mancl’s specific argument is that the “sum total” of Summ it’s conduct toward Mancl in connection with the auto loan, the arrears loan, a nd the proposed debt consolidation loan was unconscionable. We conclude that Mancl has not shown that Summit’s actions were unconscionable. Accordingly, w e

9 Mancl also asserts that Summit offered no reason why it did not offer other repayment options, such as delaying payments on the new loan until the r emainder of the original loan was paid off, or forgiving the $4,700 entirely. But, Mancl does not exp lain how Summit’s failure to offer these options violates W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j). We will not construct an argument for Mancl, and we do not consider this assertion further. See State v. Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

10 W ISCONSIN S TAT
. § 425.107(1) provides:

With respect to a consumer credit transaction, if the court as a matter of law finds that any aspect of the transa ction, any conduct directed against the customer by a party to the transaction, or any result of the transaction is unconscionable, the court shall, in addition to the remedy and penalty authorized in sub. (5), either refuse to enforce the transaction against t he customer, or so limit the application of any unconscionable aspect or conduct to avoid any unconscionable result.No. 2018AP2346

16 conclude the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in f avor of Summit on this counterclaim. 1. Applicable Authorities. ¶39 Whether an aspect of a consumer credit transaction, or conduct related to the transaction, is unconscionable is a question of la w that this court reviews de novo. Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones , 2006 WI 53, ¶25, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155. ¶40 In Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. , the supreme court addressed whether a loan agreement was unconscionable under W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.107. The supreme court stated that a determination of unconscionability re quires proof that the challenged conduct or transaction is both procedurally and subs tantively unconscionable. See id. , ¶¶22, 33. ¶41 Procedural unconscionability concerns the formation of the contract. Id. , ¶34. A contract is procedurally unconscionable if factors be aring upon the formation of the contract show that the parties did not have a re al and voluntary meeting of the minds. See id. Factors to be considered in evaluating procedural unconscionability include, but are not limited to, the following:

age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alterations in the printed terms would have been permitted by the drafting party, and whether there were alternative providers of the subject matter of the contract.
Id. Substantive unconscionability concerns the fairness and reasonable ness of the challenged transaction. Id. , ¶35.No. 2018AP2346

17 ¶42 The party asserting unconscionability bears the burden to show unconscionability. Coady v. Cross Ctry. Bank , 2007 WI App 26, ¶39 n.10, 299 Wis. 2d 420, 729 N.W.2d 732. Thus, it is Mancl’s burden to show that Summit’s conduct was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. See Wisconsin Auto Title Loans , 290 Wis. 2d 514, ¶33. 2. Analysis. ¶43 We now consider whether Mancl has made a showing that Summit’s actions were procedurally unconscionable. ¶44 Mancl does not allege, in this court, that any actions or ina ctions of Summit were procedurally unconscionable. Nonetheless, mindful of t he factors relevant to procedural unconscionability mentioned in Wisconsin Auto Title Loans , Mancl’s briefing in this court may allude to two areas tha t could be construed as alleged instances of procedural unconscionability on t he part of Summit. ¶45 Turning to the first of those two areas, Mancl asserts that S ummit “did not explain the deal to [him].” In support of this contention, Manc l cites only to language in an internal note that was made in Summit’s records a pproximately one month after Mancl signed the arrears loan. Below is the note in its entirety, apparently an attempt at a transcription of a voice mail fro m Mancl, with the language relied upon by Mancl italicized:

From: [Mancl] ... To: [Summit employee] ... Hello I seen your email and when we talked the first time i came in that lady you talked to on the phone agreed to pay back just the loan amount minus interest . I heard her agree to that. WhyNo. 2018AP2346

18 is that changing? I already signed the paperwork for the loan. On what we agreed. I’m confused why she is changing her mind? (Emphasis added.) ¶46 Mancl does not explain how or why the emphasized language is evidence that Summit did not explain the terms of the arrears l oan to him. Indeed, by the time of that call from Mancl, the arrears loan was si gned. Also, the arrears loan terms are consistent with Mancl’s description of the loan in the voice mail. The only reasonable inference from this internal note is that the terms of the arrears loans were discussed and that Mancl signed the necessary paperwork for the arrears loan based on terms agreed upon by Mancl and Summi t. To the extent that Mancl is asserting that the emphasized language shows that M ancl was confused about the terms of the arrears loan, Mancl does not explai n why he was confused or how that alleged confusion is evidence that he and Summit did no t have a real and voluntary meeting of the minds as to the terms of the arrears loan. Accordingly, we reject Mancl’s assertions as a basis for p rocedural unconscionability. 11 ¶47 We now turn to the second of two areas alluded to in Mancl’s brief. Mancl argues that it “is clear [from the summary judgment r ecord] that [he] was not aware he had any options other than [to agree to enter into the arrears loan].” In support of this argument, Mancl points to his affidavit, in which he avers that he

11 Mancl briefly asserts in the alternative that the languag e that we have italicized in the Summit internal note quoted above is evidence that “Summit changed the deal.” However, Mancl once again does not explain why this is so, and he does not cite t o any evidence that the arrears loan was, in fact, changed by Summit after Mancl signed the loa n documents. Accordingly, we reject this argument as undeveloped. See Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d at 646.No. 2018AP2346

19 “did not believe [he] had any alternative but to agree to take out t he [arrears loan].” This argument fails for multiple reasons. ¶48 Initially, Mancl’s averment is disavowed by deposition testim ony he gave after executing the affidavit. Mancl was asked during his depos ition: “Do you claim that Summit told you that [the arrears loan] was a take-it-or-leave-ittype situation.” Mancl answered that he “didn’t know it was [a] take it or leave it” choice. That testimony directly contradicts Mancl’s averment that he did not believe that he had an alternative to the arrears loan, and Mancl doe s not point to any evidence in the record in which his purported belief that his only opti on was to take out the arrears loan is put back into issue. ¶49 Mancl asserts that Summit could have offered him different alternatives to repayment of the arrears loan other than those pa yment options offered. As an example, Mancl contends that Summit could have of fered him a zero-interest loan that would not go into repayment until after the auto loan was paid in full. However, Mancl does not point to any evidence in the re cord that he asked Summit for any option other than total forgiveness of the ar rears amount. Mancl makes no cognizable argument that Summit’s failure to giv e him, on its own accord, other options (or forgive a debt Mancl himself admits had to be repaid) is evidence of procedural unconscionability. ¶50 Because proof of unconscionability under W IS
. S TAT
. § 425.107(1) requires proof of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, and Mancl has not pointed to any evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that Summit’s conduct was procedurally unconscionable, Mancl’s countercl aim that Summit’s conduct was unconscionable fails. Because our conclusion as to procedural unconscionability is dispositive, we do not address whether ManclNo. 2018AP2346

20 made a showing that Summit’s conduct was substantively unconscionab le. See Turner v. Taylor , 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (when a decision on one issue is dispositive, we need not reach other is sues raised). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of sum mary judgment in Summit’s favor on this counterclaim. II. Mancl’s Remaining Counterclaims Were Properly Dismissed

at the Close of Mancl’s Evidence. ¶51 Mancl argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing for insufficient evidence, at the close of Mancl’s evidence, Mancl’s c ounterclaims that Summit violated: (1) W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j), by “initially refusing to accept [Mancl’s] ... mortgage payment”; and (2) W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(e), by “discussing Mancl’s alleged defaults in public.” We conclude tha t the circuit court properly dismissed these counterclaims. 12
A. Standard of Review. ¶52 Dismissal of a counterclaim-plaintiff’s cause of action b ased on insufficiency of the evidence is warranted if “considering all cre dible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to t he party against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to sus tain a finding in favor of such party.” W IS
. S TAT
. § 805.14(1). “Because a circuit court is better

12 Mancl’s arguments addressing his claim that the circuit cou rt erred in dismissing his final two counterclaims at the close of his evidence are, in many important respects, not supported by citations to the record, as required W IS
. S TAT
. R ULE 809.19(1)(e). For that reason, alone, we could reject Mancl’s arguments. See Tam v. Luk , 154 Wis. 2d 282, 291 n.5, 453 N.W.2d 158 (1990) (an appellate court need not consider arguments not s upported by citation to the record indicating the location of documents or testimony relied upon)

.No. 2018AP2346

21 positioned to decide the weight and relevancy of the testimony, an ap pellate court ‘must [] give substantial deference to the [circuit] court’s b etter ability to assess the evidence.’” Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co. , 197 Wis. 2d 365, 388-89, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995) (quoted source omitted). “An appellate court should not overturn a circuit court’s decision to dismiss for insufficient evide nce unless the record reveals that the circuit court was ‘clearly wrong.’” Id. at 389 (quoted source omitted). A circuit court is “clearly wrong” when it gr ants a motion to dismiss despite the existence of credible evidence to support the claim. Id.
B. Mancl Failed to Show That Summit Violated W IS . S TAT . § 427.104(1)(j)

. ¶53 Mancl asserts that he presented evidence at trial that: (1) Summit refused to accept his mortgage payment at the Summit drive-thr ough until he entered the bank to discuss his accounts; and (2) a Summit rep resentative then informed him that his services at Summit were suspended. Manc l contends that those statements by Summit should be interpreted as a threat that his subsequent mortgage payments would not be accepted by Summit. Mancl arg ues that these actions are prohibited by W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(j) and the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise. ¶54 We will assume, without deciding, that the facts Mancl reli es on were adduced at trial, and that Mancl reasonably interpreted S ummit’s actions. However, Mancl fails to explain why Summit did not have the right to threaten not to accept his mortgage payments. In particular, Mancl does not i dentify any contractual provision or statute that prohibited Summit from doi ng what he claims Summit did. Without such authorities, there is no basis for thi s contention. Accordingly, we reject Mancl’s argument as insufficiently deve loped and affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of this counterclaim. See Associates Fin. Servs. Co.No. 2018AP2346

22 of Wis., Inc. v. Brown , 2002 WI App 300, ¶4 n.3, 258 Wis. 2d 915, 656 N.W.2d 56 (this court does not consider conclusory assertions and undeveloped arguments).
C. Mancl Failed to Show That Summit Disclosed or Threatened to Discl ose

Information in Violation of W IS . S TAT . § 427.104(1)(e). ¶55 Mancl’s final counterclaim alleged that Summit violated W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(e) by “discussing Mancl’s alleged defaults in public.” Section 427.104(1)(e) prohibits a creditor from “[d]isclos[ing] or thr eaten[ing] to disclose to a person other than the customer or the customer’s spouse information affecting the customer’s reputation ... with knowledge or reason to know that the other person does not have a legitimate business need for the informa tion.” Sec. 427.104(1)(e). Mancl specifically argues that Summit violat ed § 427.104(1)(e) when a Summit employee discussed Mancl’s accounts wit h him inside the Summit branch. We conclude that the record contains no e vidence to support Mancl’s counterclaim. ¶56 Mancl does not point to any evidence at trial that any other c ustomer actually heard the Summit employee’s discussion with Mancl. A t trial, Mancl testified as follows. He “recall[ed] a guy standing at one of the other [teller stations]” when he entered the building. The other person “wasn’t r ight next to [him],” but Mancl could not “remember how far away” the customer was sta nding. Mancl also testified, “I don’t remember,” when asked whether the o ther customer was at the counter the entire time Mancl was there. Mancl’s testimony does not establish any basis to conclude that the other customer overhear d the Summit employee’s discussion with Mancl.No. 2018AP2346

23 ¶57 Mancl asserts that it is reasonable to infer from the evi dence that “a customer only a short distance away at a bank counter might be a ble to overhear a conversation about another customer’s finances.” However, Mancl does not point to evidence that the customer was “only a short distance away.” ¶58 Mancl argues that he is not required to prove that another per son “actually heard the [information disclosed by the Summit emplo yee],” because this “runs counter to the express statutory language” of W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(e). In support, Mancl cites only to Rumpf v. Quorum Fed. Credit Union , No. 17-CV-290-WMC, 2018 WL 6271597 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 2018). Mancl does not explain how this potentially persuasive authority c ould support his argument. In Rumpf

, the defendant allegedly violated § 427.104(1)(e) by including in a brief in a different proceeding that Rumpf had incurr ed debts while gambling. Id. at *2. Thus, we conclude Rumpf provides no support for Mancl’s argument. ¶59 Mancl does not cite to any evidence in the record specifying what information was discussed by the Summit employee that may ha ve been heard by another customer. Thus, Mancl fails to make a showing that he pres ented evidence that the teller disclosed information affecting Mancl’s reputation. See W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(e). ¶60 Finally, in his reply brief, Mancl argues that “[t]alking l oudly in the presence of other customers is conduct that threatens to disclose ... information because other people could hear it.” This argument fails for multiple reasons. Mancl raises the argument for the first time on appeal and we generally do not address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brie f. See Richman v. Security Savs. & Loan Ass’n , 57 Wis. 2d 358, 361, 204 N.W.2d 511 (1973). InNo. 2018AP2346

24 addition, Mancl does not point to evidence in the record that the Summit teller he spoke with was speaking so loudly that other customers could hear wha t the teller was saying. See Tam v. Luk , 154 Wis. 2d 282, 291 n.5, 453 N.W.2d 158 (1990) (this court need not consider arguments that are unsupported by ade quate factual citations). ¶61 In sum, Mancl has failed to point to evidence in the record that Summit violated W IS
. S TAT
. § 427.104(1)(e), and we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of that counterclaim.

CONCLUSION ¶62 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. By the Court. —Judgment affirmed. This opinion will not be published. See W IS
. S TAT
. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5.