RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0895-MR

DR. JOHN R. TODD, IV APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-006765

HILLIARD LYONS TRUST 

COMPANY, LLC, IN ITS CAPACITY 

AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE WILL OF 

ANNE P. TODD AND ALSO AS 

TRUSTEE UNDER THE RUCKER 

TODD LIFE INSURANCE TRUST APPELLEE 

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Dr. John R. Todd, IV (“Dr. Todd”) appeals the Jefferson 

Circuit Court’s July 1, 2020 opinion and order granting Appellee Hilliard Lyons 

Trust Company’s (“Hilliard”) motion for judgment on the pleadings and denying 

his motion for summary judgment. Upon careful consideration, we reverse the 
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Jefferson Circuit Court and remand for further proceeding in accordance with this 

Opinion.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves the interpretation and application of the Rucker 

Todd Life Insurance Trust (“the Trust”). Specifically, it requires determining 

whether the Trust authorizes Dr. Todd to exercise his power of appointment under 

the Trust to benefit his adopted children. 

Rucker Todd (“Rucker”) and his wife, Anne P. Todd, had two 

biological children: Dr. Todd, born in 1947, and Katherine,

1 born in 1951. Neither 

Dr. Todd nor Katherine has biological children. However, in the late 1970s, Dr. 

Todd adopted his now-deceased wife’s two daughters, Karen and Stephanie.

Karen was eighteen and Stephanie was sixteen when they were adopted. 

Rucker created the Trust in 1996, and it has been amended five times 

throughout the years. Hilliard serves as trustee. In short, the relevant portion of 

the Trust was established for the initial benefit of Dr. Todd, with provision for his 

“issue” to benefit should he predecease Rucker. The Trust also vested in Dr. Todd

the power of appointment. Under Paragraph 13(c), he could exercise such power

 

1 Katherine is not a participant in these legal proceedings and has taken no position on the issues 

before this Court. (Trial Record (“T.R.”) at 152-55.)
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by will, directing Hilliard to pay any principal and undistributed income at the time 

of Dr. Todd’s death to an appointee of his choosing. 

However, in 2011, Rucker amended the Trust a fourth time. This 

amendment prohibited Dr. Todd from exercising his power of appointment to 

benefit any adopted persons or their descendants or their ancestors. The Fourth 

Amendment to the Trust Agreement amends Paragraph 13(c) to include 

subparagraph (3), which states:

Notwithstanding any provisions of subparagraphs (1) and 

(2) of this paragraph 13(c), under no circumstances shall 

any power of appointment granted to any beneficiary of 

the separate trust estate administered under this 

paragraph 13 be exercisable for the benefit of any person 

adopted by another person, the issue of any person so 

adopted by another person, or the ancestors of any person 

so adopted by another person.

(T.R. at 101-02.)

Rucker passed away in 2015. Dr. Todd subsequently filed the instant 

action seeking, among other things, a judicial declaration that he may exercise his 

power of appointment to benefit adopted persons and their descendants and that 

any provision treating adopted persons differently than natural children is invalid.

2

 

 

2 Dr. Todd also sought a declaration that he may exercise his powers of appointment under the 

Anne Todd Trust to benefit adopted persons. The Anne Todd Trust otherwise had similar 

provisions as the Trust; however, it was never amended to limit the beneficiaries’ powers of 

appointment concerning adopted persons as was the Trust. Accordingly, an agreed order was 

entered on March 6, 2018, acknowledging Dr. Todd’s right to name adopted persons as 

beneficiaries under the Anne Todd Trust. 
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Hilliard filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting the 

language of the Trust legally and unambiguously prevented Dr. Todd from 

exercising his power of appointment to favor adopted persons. Dr. Todd 

responded and moved for summary judgment. He asserted that Paragraph 13(c)(3) 

did not divest him of his power to appoint adopted persons as beneficiaries and that

any such restriction was illegal and unenforceable. He also asked the circuit court 

to order that his attorney fees be reimbursed from the Anne Todd Trust and the 

Trust. The circuit court granted Hilliard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

concluding as follows:

The language of the Trust is not ambiguous. The 

intent of Rucker Todd, as made clear by the express 

terms of the Trust as amended, was to prevent the 

distribution of trust assets to Dr. Todd’s adopted 

children. While the Court very much recognizes and 

appreciates how and why Dr. Todd may feel genuinely

aggrieved as a result, the question before the Court is not 

whether the intent made clear by Rucker Todd is laudable 

or reprehensible. The only question is whether it is 

enforceable. In keeping with the plain meaning of the 

Trust, the Trust clearly, effectively and legally

accomplishes Rucker Todd’s intent through Paragraphs 

32 and 13. As such, and even when viewing the evidence 

of record in the light most favorable to Dr. Todd, the 

Court is obliged to find that there are no genuine issues 

of material fact which would make it possible for him to 

prevail as a matter of law. 

(T.R. at 263-64.) This appeal followed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A judgment on the pleadings “should be granted if it appears beyond 

doubt that the nonmoving party cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle 

him/her to relief.” Schultz v. Gen. Elec. Healthcare Fin. Servs. Inc., 360 S.W.3d 

171, 176 (Ky. 2012) (citation omitted). “Appellate review of a summary judgment 

involves only legal questions and a determination of whether a disputed material 

issue of fact exists. So we operate under a de novo standard of review with no 

need to defer to the trial court’s decision.” Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc’y,

Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ky. 2013) (footnotes omitted).

ANALYSIS

We interpret trusts using the same rules applicable to the construction 

of wills. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Kentucky Tr. Co., 313 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Ky. 

1958). “The most basic rule of will interpretation is that the testator’s intent must 

be the ‘polar star’ toward which all interpretive efforts are guided, and this intent 

will be controlling, absent some illegality.” Benjamin v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,

N.A., 305 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Ky. App. 2010) (citations omitted). “As in any case 

where a court is called upon to interpret a document, the first and most important 

guide is the plain language of the instrument.” Id. “If the language used is a 

reasonably clear expression of intent, then the inquiry need go no further.” Clarke

v. Kirk, 795 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky. 1990). “However if the instrument’s provisions 
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are susceptible to more than one different–yet reasonable–interpretation, they are 

ambiguous; and, we may look to extrinsic evidence during our interpretation.” 

Williams v. City of Kuttawa, 466 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Ky. App. 2015). We do not 

examine provisions of the trust in isolation, rather we “construe the drafter’s intent 

from a consideration of the whole document.” Benjamin, 305 S.W.3d at 452.

Dr. Todd challenges the circuit court’s interpretation of the Trust, as 

well as the validity and enforceability of Paragraph 13(c)(3)’s restriction. Before 

addressing these concerns, however, we note that both parties’ briefs partially rely 

on extrinsic evidence supporting their interpretation of Rucker’s intent–an affidavit 

filed by Dr. Todd and the Anne Todd Trust. This Court concludes that it need not 

consider language beyond the four corners of the document to resolve this appeal.

Accordingly, we decline to consider any argument premised on extrinsic evidence.

In determining Rucker’s intent, we first look at Paragraph 32. This 

paragraph serves a single purpose—it excludes adoptees and their descendants 

from being considered Rucker’s issue, or lineal descendants. More specifically, 

Paragraph 32 effectually prevents Dr. Todd’s adopted daughters, Karen and 

Stephanie, from benefitting, either directly or indirectly,

3

from the Trust.

 

3 Paragraph 13 states: “To whatever extent the then remaining principal and undistributed 

income of the separate trust estate are not effectively appointed by the beneficiary, the then 

remaining principal and undistributed income shall be distributed to the beneficiary’s then living 

issue per stirpes or if the beneficiary has no then living issue to the Settlor’s then living issue per 

stirpes[.]”
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However, before a subsequent amendment of the Trust, Dr. Todd 

could have still provided for Karen and Stephanie from the Trust by utilizing his 

power of appointment through his own last will. Paragraph 13(c) granted Dr. Todd 

the power to appoint his adopted daughters as beneficiaries. Rucker later amended 

the Trust to add Paragraph 13(c)(3). Paragraph 13(c)(3) serves only one purpose–it 

prevents a Trust beneficiary with the power of appointment from exercising the

power to benefit any adopted person or any ancestors of an adopted person or any 

descendants of an adopted person.

Dr. Todd argues that Rucker’s intention under Paragraph 13(c) was 

not to limit his power of appointment, but to protect his power to appoint his two 

daughters as beneficiaries. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) His argument centers 

around Paragraph 36A(b). The current language of Paragraph 36 was added to the 

Trust in 2002, and states: 

36A. Generation-Skipping Provisions.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this 

instrument:

(1) If a trust created under this instrument 

(the “original trust”) would only be partially exempt from 

federal generation-skipping tax after the attempted 

allocation of a GST exemption to it, then, before such 

allocation and as of the relevant valuation date under 

Section 2642 of the Code with respect to such allocation, 

the Trustee may (but need not) create instead two 

separate trusts of equal or unequal value which shall be 

funded fractionally out of the available property, and 
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which shall be identical in all other respects to the 

original trust, so that the allocation of GST exemption 

can be made to one trust which will be entirely exempt 

from federal generation-skipping tax. The two trusts 

created under this subparagraph (i) shall have the same 

name as the original trust except that the trust to which 

GST exemption is allocated shall have the phrase “GST 

exempt” added to its name, and (ii) are sometimes 

referred to herein as “related.” 

(2) If property which is held in, or is to be 

added or allocated to, a trust pursuant to this instrument 

is subject to different treatment for any reason for 

purposes of the generation-skipping tax under Chapter 13 

of the Code than other property being added or allocated 

to, or also held in, that trust, then the Trustee may (but 

need not) hold such property instead as a separate trust 

that is appropriately designated to distinguish it from the 

trust to which the property otherwise would have been 

allocated, but that is identical in all other respects to that 

trust. The identical trusts resulting from application of 

this subparagraph are also sometimes referred to herein 

as “related.” 

(3) It is the intent of the Settlor that the 

Trustee shall not be required to create or administer a 

trust herein that is only partially exempt from generationskipping taxes, or to commingle property subject to 

different treatment for generation-skipping tax purposes 

whether because the transferees with respect to the 

property are assigned to different generations or 

otherwise. The provisions of this paragraph (a) are 

intended to enable the Trustee to avoid such situations by 

empowering the Trustee to segregate trust property (i) 

that is entirely exempt from generation-skipping tax from 

trust property that is not exempt, or (ii) that is otherwise 

treated differently from other trust property for purposes 

of the generation-skipping tax, and that provisions of this 

paragraph (a) should be applied in a manner consistent 

with this intention.
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(b) To the extent it is consistent with the 

Trustee’s fiduciary obligations, the Trustee, in making 

discretionary distributions of net income and principal 

from the related trusts referred to in subparagraph (a) of 

this paragraph 36A, shall take advantage of the 

opportunities provided by the creation of such related 

trusts to avoid or delay generation-skipping tax when 

making discretionary distributions, and to maximize the 

amount of trust property that eventually may be 

distributed to the Settlor’s grandchildren or more 

remote descendants without transfer tax of any kind at 

the termination of all trusts created under this instrument. 

(T.R. 90-92) (emphasis added).

Dr. Todd asserts that Paragraph 36A(b)’s reference to grandchildren 

conflicts with Paragraph 13(c)(3), and that the Trust should be interpreted in such a 

way that Rucker’s desire to maximize eventual distribution to grandchildren is 

preserved by Dr. Todd having the right to use his power of appointment for their 

benefit.

Perhaps it was Rucker’s primary desire that his grandchildren benefit 

from the Trust or perhaps not. Perhaps it was Rucker’s primary desire that the 

Trust ultimately be distributed in such a way that the least amount of any 

inheritance or estate tax be paid. Dr. Todd’s argument is well taken that such 

intentions have not been presented with clarity and without ambiguity in reading of 

the Trust. 

When utilizing the plain language interpretation based on the four 

corners of the document, we would not consider whether Mr. Todd had biological 
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or adopted children or grandchildren or not. Whatever his intent, it should be 

made clear without the reader having knowledge of the actual specifics of Mr. 

Todd’s heirs at law. However, it is not necessary to go to great lengths to make 

such determinations for purposes of this appeal since Paragraph 13(c)(3) is 

unenforceable and illegal for public policy reasons. 

The restrictions of Paragraph 13(c)(3) are not legal and are unenforceable.

Dr. Todd next argues that the Trust’s limitation on his power of 

appointment is unlawful and violates Kentucky’s public policy in favor of treating 

adopted children the same as biological children. KRS4 199.520(2) states:

Upon entry of the judgment of adoption, from and after 

the date of the filing of the petition, the child shall be 

deemed the child of petitioners and shall be considered 

for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all 

other legal considerations, the natural child of the parents 

adopting it the same as if born of their bodies. 

Additionally, in 2014, the General Assembly passed legislation 

enacting the Uniform Trust Code (the “UTC”) in Kentucky. The UTC is intended 

to provide a comprehensive set of rules for trust governance. It applies to both 

newly enacted trusts and to trusts which were in existence prior to the effective 

date of the legislation, such as the trust in question here. In pertinent part, KRS 

386B.1-030(2)(c) states, “The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this 

 

4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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chapter, except . . . [t]he requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of 

its beneficiaries, and that the trust have a purpose that is lawful, not contrary to 

public policy, and possible to achieve[.]”

What is very clear from the amendment added to the Trust in 2011, to 

wit Paragraph 13(c)(3) is that, “under no circumstances shall any power of 

appointment granted to any beneficiary of the separate trust estate 

administered under this paragraph 13 be exercisable for the benefit of any 

person adopted by another person, the issue of any person adopted by another 

person, or the ancestors of any person so adopted by another person.” The 

plain reading of this language goes far beyond just limiting Dr. Todd’s ability to 

designate his adopted children as beneficiaries. The plain reading of this language 

is that Dr. Todd cannot use his power of appointment for the benefit of anyone

who is an ancestor of an adopted person, a descendent of an adopted person, or is 

an adopted person. Such rejection of an entire class of people is, first and 

foremost, against public policy, both generally and specifically as to KRS 199.520.

It is the law in Kentucky that one may gift, bequeath, or otherwise 

distribute their assets to whomever they so desire, and may disinherit those who 

would otherwise be considered heirs at law. “The law permits a person to dispose 

of their property as they see fit.” Brummett v. Brummett, 331 S.W.2d 719, 722 

(Ky. 1960) (citations omitted). However, when one wants to do so from beyond 
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the grave, and with minimal and limited tax consequences, there is the small price 

to pay of at least a modicum of societal input. 

For argument’s sake, even if it is determined that Dr. Todd could not 

use his powers of appointment to benefit his children, under the terms of Paragraph 

13(c)(3), he would unlikely be able to use said powers for the benefit of any 

charitable cause as well. It would be nearly impossible, if not impossible, to find 

any charitable organization which discriminates between who it serves or benefits, 

and who it does not, based on a person’s status of being the descendent of someone 

who has been adopted, being the ancestor of someone who has been adopted, or 

simply by having been adopted themselves. 

To be very clear, this is not saying that people should not be allowed 

to disinherit anyone they want, including their own children or grandchildren, 

adopted or biological. The fact is, if Rucker’s intention was to ensure his 

grandchildren, Karen and Stephanie, or anyone else adopted by his children, did 

not benefit from the Trust, there are numerous other ways the Trust could have 

been drafted to make that intention clear without discriminating against an entire 

class of people–in this case, adopted people, their descendants, and their ancestors.

Additionally, contrary to the circuit court’s reliance on Vega v. Kosair 

Charities Committee, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. App. 1992), this Opinion does not

disagree with the ruling in Vega. The clear distinction between Vega and the case 
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sub judice is that since the ruling in Vega, Kentucky adopted the Uniform Trust 

Code, KRS Chapter 386B, and specifically pertinent here, section 1-030(2)(c).

There is no direct conflict between a finding that the term in Paragraph 13(c)(3) of 

this Trust is against public policy and the direct holding of Vega that, “[T]he 

principle that a person is permitted to pass on his property as he sees fit takes 

precedence over the policy expressed in KRS 199.520(2).” Id. at 897. 

In Vega, the appellant therein argued that his biological son, who had 

been adopted by his late wife prior to her death, should be considered the “issue of 

the body” of her. The deceased wife had been the recipient of a testamentary trust 

set up by her father where she was the lifetime beneficiary and where, upon 

termination of the trust, the remaining assets were to be transferred to the “issue of 

her body” or, failing such issue, to Kosair Crippled Children’s Hospital. Id. at 896. 

Certainly, the grantor in Vega had the right to insist that only his biological 

progeny could take or benefit from the trust he had funded, and failing that, the 

assets would be transferred to a charity he had chosen–a charity that no doubt 

served adopted persons. 

Certainly, if Rucker’s intent in arranging his Trust was to ensure that

only his biological descendants, or “issue,” could benefit from the Trust, or to 

ensure specifically that Dr. Todd’s adopted children did not benefit, such is 

certainly within his right and within the holding in Vega. However, it is not 
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completely clear whether his intent was simply to disinherit specifically Karen and 

Stephanie, disinherit any other adopted persons but not Karen and Stephanie, or 

rather to make sure only his biological descendants benefited from the Trust. What 

is clear, from the plain reading of the language used in Paragraph 13(c)(3) of the 

Trust, is that at least this portion of the Trust fails as being against public policy 

pursuant to KRS 386B.1-030(2)(c).

Further, we agree with the amicus curiae brief of Kentucky Adoption 

Coalition; there is no realistic way Paragraph 13(c)(3) of the Trust can be achieved.

The laws in the United States of America regarding the confidentiality and access 

to adoption records are as varied as the states and territories of which it is 

comprised. And this country, while inhabited by only a fraction of the worldwide 

population, is a population which consists of people from countries all over the 

world and each with their own laws regarding adoption records. Additionally, 

there are certainly a great number of people, at least historically, who are not even 

aware that they were adopted or descended from an adoptee.

As the argument put forth by the Appellant and the amicus supposes, 

it is likely that virtually anyone in America can be the issue of, ancestor of, or 

descendant of, any person so adopted by another person. The amendment would 

require that any possibility that the power of appointment exercised in favor of 

some distant relative of an adoptee would violate the Trust. Such pervasive risk of 
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the Trust being violated by simply acting on the power of appointment renders it

virtually impossible to achieve, further violating KRS 386B.1-030(2)(c).

For this, and all the reasons previously stated, we hold that Paragraph 

13(3)(c) violates the Uniform Trust Act as adopted by Kentucky. Therefore, the 

order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed, and this case is remanded with 

instructions that said term is to be stricken as void and Dr. Todd shall be allowed to 

utilize his power of appointment under the Trust as though such clause never 

existed. 

Regarding the denial of Dr. Todd’s request for legal expenses.

 We cannot necessarily say there is error in the circuit court’s denial of 

Dr. Todd’s request for legal fees as the applicable statute permits the award of 

legal fees, but does not demand such. “In a judicial proceeding involving the 

administration of a trust, the court, as justice and equity may require, may award 

costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to any party, to be paid 

by another party or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy.” KRS 

386B.10-040.

Here, Dr. Todd sought a judicial declaration vesting him with a power 

of appointment not encumbered by Paragraph 13(3)(c) of the Trust, which we have 

held violates the Uniform Trust Act as adopted by Kentucky. His suit against the

Anne Todd Trust was resolved by an agreed order, rendering any controversy
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therein moot. In light of this Court’s having reversed the circuit court as to its 

denial of a significant aspect of Dr. Todd’s suit, the circuit court may want to 

reconsider its ruling as to Dr. Todd’s request for legal fees to be paid from the 

Trust.

CONCLUSION

The Jefferson Circuit Court’s July 1, 2020 opinion and order is 

reversed, and this case is remanded for entry of orders consistent with this Opinion.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

M. Thurman Senn

Louisville, Kentucky

AMICUS BRIEF FOR KENTUCKY 

ADOPTION COALITION:

Jenny E. Scott

Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE HILLIARD 

LYONS TRUST COMPANY, LLC:

Griffin Terry Sumner

Cory J. Skolnick

A. Thomas Sturgeon III

Louisville, Kentucky