IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JAMES REED, ET AL. v. JAMIE HAMILTON, ET UX.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Obion County

No. 18,378 and No. 18,434 W. Michael Maloan, Chancellor 

No. W1999-00440-COA-R3-CV - Decided May 4, 2000 

This appeal arises from a dispute between neighboring landowners regarding whether there

is an easement across the real property of Defendants Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton for the benefit of

Plaintiffs Hulon O. Warlick, III, James Reed, and Wayne Matthews. Mr. Warlick filed a complaint

and Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews filed a similar complaint against the Hamiltons asking the trial

court to declare the existence of such an easement. The court issued a number of orders in the

Warlick and Reed/Matthewsmatters enjoining the Hamiltons from interfering with the easement and

from obstructing or preventing Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, or Mr. Matthews from accessing their

properties. The Hamiltons nevertheless performed a number of acts in violation of these orders.

Consequently, the trial court found the Hamiltons in civil contempt and assessed sanctions and

damages against them in the amount of $25,156.80, which is equal to the attorney’s fees incurred

by Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews. On appeal, the Hamiltons argue that the trial court

was without authority to assess attorney’s fees against them. We hold that, under the circumstances

of the case at bar, the trial court had the authority to assess attorney’s fees against the Hamiltons

pursuant to section 29-9-105 of the Tennessee Code Annotated. We therefore affirm the ruling of

the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; and

Remanded

FARMER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HIGHERS and LILLARD, JJ. joined.

T. Larry Edmondson, Nashville, Tennessee and Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the

appellants, Jamie Hamilton and wife, Bonnie Hamilton.

James M. Glasgow, Union City, Tennessee, for the appellees, James Reed and Wayne Matthews.

John M. Miles, Union City, Tennessee, for the appellee, Hulon O. Warlick, III.

OPINION
1Mr. Warlick’s complaint did not include a request for attorney’s fees but did include a

request for “such other, further and general relief as [he] may be entitled to under the pleadings and

proof.” 

2

The complaint filed by Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews also did not contain a request for

attorney’s fees, but it did include a request for $100,000.00 in punitive damages and “such further

and general relief as they may show themselves entitled to at the hearing.” 

3Both of these petitions included a request for attorney’s fees. 

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Mr. Warlick is the owner of a piece of real property located immediately south of and

adjacent to a piece of real property owned by the Hamiltons. Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews are the

owners of a piece of real property that is located south of both Mr. Warlick’s property and the

Hamiltons’ property. There is a field road on the Hamiltons’ property which serves as the sole

means of ingress and egress to and from the Warlick and the Reed/Matthews properties. 

In November of 1994, Mr. Warlick filed a complaint against the Hamiltons asking the trial

court to declare that there is an easement across the Hamiltons’ property and seeking a temporary

order restraining the Hamiltons from interfering, obstructing, or preventing him from using the

easement in order to gain access to his property.1 Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews filed a similar

complaint against the Hamiltons in December of 1994.2

 The trial court granted the temporary

restraining orders requested by Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews. Mr. Reed subsequently

filed a petition alleging that on December 4, 1994, he had attempted to gain access to his property

but was prevented from doing so because the cable gate at the entrance of the easement across the

Hamiltons’ property was locked. Consequently, Mr. Reed requested in the petition that the

Hamiltons be required to show cause why they are not in contempt of court and that they further be

required to pay his attorney’s fees. After a hearing on Mr. Reed’s petition, the court did not find the

Hamiltons in contempt, but instead issued a temporary injunction requiring the Hamiltons to furnish

Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews with a key to the cable gate and prohibiting the Hamiltons from

interfering with their use of the easement. In November of 1997, Mr. Warlick and Mr. Reed filed

separate petitions alleging that the Hamiltons were in contempt of court because they had performed

a number of acts with the intent to prevent Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews from using

the field road and to deprive them of access to their properties, including (1) moving the field road,

(2) grading the field road, (3) removing water drains or culverts from the field road, (4) chisel

ploughing the field road, (5) placing posts and a barbed wire fence in the middle of the field road,

(6) digging trenches or ditches across the field road, and (7) causing to be arrested an employee of

Mr. Warlick who attempted to use the field road.3 After a hearing on the matter, the trial court found

that the Hamiltons had willfully violated its previous orders and stated that, in a subsequent hearing,

itwouldconsider argument regarding appropriate punishment, requests for attorney’s fees, and proof

of damages. At the conclusion of this subsequent hearing, the court found that Mr. Warlick, Mr.

Reed, and Mr. Matthews had not sustained any actual damages as a result of the Hamiltons’ actions,

took the matter of appropriate punishment under advisement, and requested that counsel for Mr.

Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews submit updated affidavits documenting their fees and
4

The court divided these sanctions and damages $8,215.00 to Mr. Warlick and $16,941.80

to Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews. 

5

Section 29-9-102 provides as follows:

The power of the several courts to issue attachments, and inflict punishments for

contempts of court, shall not be construed to extend to any except the following

cases:

(1) The willful misbehavior of any person in the presence of

the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of

justice.

(2) The willful misbehavior of any of the officers of said

courts, in their official transactions.

(3) The willful disobedience or resistance of any officer of the

said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person, to any lawful

writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of said courts.

(4) Abuse of, or unlawful interference with, the process or

proceedings of the court.

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expenses. The court then entered an order (1) declaring an easement across the Hamiltons’ property,

(2) permanently enjoining the Hamiltons from disturbing, obstructing, hindering, or changing the

easement and from preventing or interfering with the use of the easement by Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed,

or Mr. Matthews, (3) finding that the Hamiltons were in civil contempt of its previous orders, and

(4) imposing sanctions and damages for contempt against the Hamiltons in the amount of

$25,156.80, which is equal to the amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and

Mr. Matthews.4

 This appeal by the Hamiltons followed.

On appeal, the Hamiltons challenge the trial court’s authority to assess $25,156.80 in

sanctions and damages against them after having previously determined that Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed,

and Mr. Matthews had not sustained any actual damages as a result of the Hamiltons’ conduct. To

the extent that this issue involves questions of fact, our review of the trial court’s ruling is de novo

with a presumption of correctness. See T.R.A.P. 13(d). Accordingly, we may not reverse the court’s

factual findings unless they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Randolph

v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. 1996); T.R.A.P. 13(d). With respect to the court’s legal

conclusions, however, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Bell ex

rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen and Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn.

1999); T.R.A.P. 13(d).

The courts of Tennessee have inherent authority to order punishment for acts of contempt.

See Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1996); Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 53

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). This authority is limited, however, in that the courts may only punish as

contemptuous the types of acts described in section 29-9-102 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.5
(5) Willfully conversing with jurors in relation to the merits

of the cause in the trial of which they are engaged, or otherwise

tampering with them.

(6) Any other act or omission declared a contempt by law.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102 (1980).

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See Black, 938 S.W.2d at 397-98; State v. Turner, 914 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

A contempt may be either civil in nature or criminal in nature. See Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d

898, 906 (Tenn. 1998)(Birch, J., dissenting); Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398; Turner, 914 S.W.2d at

954. Civil contempt occurs when a person does not comply with a court order and an action is

brought by a private party to enforce his or her rights under the order that has been violated. See

Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398; Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co., 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. 1964);

Turner, 914 S.W.2d at 955. Punishment for civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with

the court’s order and is imposed at the insistence and for the benefit of the private party who has

suffered a violation of his or her rights. See Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398; Turner, 914 S.W.2d at 955;

Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 786 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Criminal contempt, on the other

hand, occurs when the dignity and authority of the court has been offended. See Black, 938 S.W.2d

at 398; Turner, 914 S.W.2d at 955; Sherrod, 849 S.W.2d at 786 n.4. Punishment for criminal

contempt is designed to vindicate the court’s authority and maintain the integrity of its orders and

thus is generally punitive rather than remedial in nature. See Wilson, 984 S.W.2d at 904; State v.

Winningham, 958 S.W.2d 740, 746 (Tenn. 1997); Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398; Turner, 914 S.W.2d

at 955; Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d at 53. 

In the case at bar, the Hamiltons concede that the trial court had the power to hold them in

contempt of court but maintain that the court exceeded its statutory authority with respect to the

punishment that was imposed upon them. Section 29-9-103 of the Tennessee Code Annotated sets

forth the general rule regarding punishment for contempt, as follows: 

(a) The punishment for contempt may be by fine or by imprisonment, or both.

(b) Where not otherwise specially provided, the circuit, chancery, and

appellate courts are limited to a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00), and imprisonment not

exceeding ten (10) days, and, except as provided in § 29-9-108, all other courts are

limited to a fine of ten dollars ($10.00).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103 (Supp. 1999). The trial court in the instant case is a chancery court and

thus was not authorized by section 29-9-103 to impose a fine for contempt against the Hamiltons in

excess of $50.00. As stated above, the trial court ordered the Hamiltons to pay “sanctions and

damages” in the amount of $25,156.80, an amount obviously in excess of $50.00. Mr. Warlick, Mr.

Reed, and Mr. Matthew contend, however, that the trial court was authorized to order the Hamiltons
6Unpublished opinions are generally considered persuasive authority. Supreme Court Rule

4(H)(1) as amended November 1, 1999.

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to pay $25,156.80 in “sanctions and damages” by section 29-9-105 of the Tennessee Code

Annotated, which provides as follows:

If the contempt consists in the performance of a forbidden act, the person may

be imprisoned until the act is rectified by placing matters and person in statu[s] quo,

or by the payment of damages.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-105 (1980). 

We are aware of no reported cases in Tennessee specificallyaddressing whether section 29-9-

105 authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees in cases of civil contempt. However, this Court

considered this exact issue in the unreported case Keeley v. Massey, No. 02A01-9307-CH-00159,

1994 WL 59556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1994).6 In Keeley, a post-divorce domestic relations case,

the trial court found that Mr. Massey was in willful civil contempt of an order previously entered by

the court regarding Mr. Massey’s visitations with the parties’ minor sons. See id. at *1. The court

held, however, that Mr. Massey could purge himself of this contempt by precisely following the

court’s future visitation orders and by paying $1,500.00 of Ms. Keeley’s attorney’s fees. See id. On

appeal, Mr. Massey argued that the trial court lacked the authority to assess a portion of Ms. Keeley’s

attorney’s fees against him. See id. This Court upheld the award of attorney’s fees, noting that

damages awarded under section 29-9-105 are compensatory in nature, that the appropriate measure

of damages under section 29-9-105 is actual loss, and that damages under section 29-9-105 may

include attorney’s fees. See id. at *5 (citing In re Crabtree a/k/a West Knoxville Inv. Co., 60 B.R.

147, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986)(“An award of attorney’s fees and expenses to a successful

movant in a civil contempt proceeding may be appropriate.”)). Similarly, in the unreported case of

Kuykendall v. Latham, 1991 WL 10178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1991), the trial court enjoined the

Lathams from engaging in certain activities that would violate a covenant not to compete that the

Lathams had entered into with Ms. Kuykendall. See id. at *1. Ms. Kuykendall subsequently filed

a motion alleging that the Lathams had violated the injunction and thus were in contempt of court.

See id. After hearing the motion, the trial court agreed that the Lathams were in contempt and

ordered them to pay Ms. Kuykendall $1,750.00 in damages and $350.00 in attorney’s fees. See id.

On appeal, this Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, stating as follows:

First, the Lathams assert that the court erred in awarding Kuykendall her

attorney fees because, in the absence of a statutory provision or contractual

agreement providing for attorney fees, the award is not a proper element of damages

and goes against the public policy of this State. See Goings v. Aetna Casualty and

Surety Company, 491 S.W.2d 847 (Tenn. App. 1972). However, it has been held

that an award of attorney fees may be appropriate to a successful movant in a civil

contempt proceeding. See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 722 F.2d 1261, 1273 (6th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied 479 U.S. 852 (1986). Although there is no contractual
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agreement or statutory provision which addresses attorney fees in a contempt

proceeding, the trial court is vested with much discretion in the allowance of attorney

fees. Threadgill v. Threadgill, 740 S.W.2d 419 (Tenn. App. 1987). Likewise, the

appellate court will not interfere with the trial court’s award of attorney fees except

upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. We do not find that the

trial court abused its discretion and we affirm the award of attorney fees.

Id. at *2.

Consistent with the opinions of this Court in Keeley and Kuykendall, we agree with Mr.

Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews that the trial court had the authority to assess their attorney’s

fees against the Hamiltons pursuant to section 29-9-105. Almost immediately following the

commencement of the case at bar, the Hamiltons willfully violated the temporary restraining orders

issued by the trial court. The Hamiltons’ acts of contempt continued throughout the pendency of the

case, as they willfully violated the temporary injunction subsequently entered by the trial court. As

a direct result of the Hamiltons’ actions, Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews were forced to

incur attorney’s fees associated with the filing of petitions for contempt and hearings subsequently

held thereon. As noted by this Court in Keeley, damages under section 29-9-105 are compensatory

in nature. The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees served to compensate Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed,

and Mr. Matthews for the loss that they sustained as a result of the wrongful and contemptuous

actions of the Hamiltons. Under such circumstances, we think that the court properly concluded that

the attorney’s fees incurred by Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews are among the types of

damages that are compensable under section 29-9-105. We therefore affirm the order of the trial

court imposing “sanctions and damages” for contempt against the Hamiltons in the amount of

$25,156.80. 

Based on the foregoing, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed

against the Hamiltons, for which execution may issue if necessary.