SEC Petition Evaluation Report 

Petition SEC-00101 

Report Rev #: 0 Report Submittal Date: February 4, 2009 

Subject Expert(s): James Mahathy 

Site Expert(s): N/A 

Petitioner Administrative Summary 

Petition Under Evaluation 

Petition # Petition 

Type 

Petition A 

Receipt Date DOE/AWE Facility Name 

SEC-00101 83.14 November 1, 2007 Hood Building 

NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition 

All employees of the DOE, its predecessor agencies, and their contractors and subcontractors who worked in 

the Hood Building in Cambridge, MA, from May 9, 1946 through December 31, 1963, for a number of work 

days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with 

work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees included in the SEC. 

Related Petition Summary Information 

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status 

NONE 

Related Evaluation Report Information 

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility Name 

NONE 

ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: James Mahathy ORAU Review Completed By: Michael S. Kubiak 

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on file] 

Sam Glover 

2/5/2009 

Date 

SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By: [Signature on file] 

J. W. Neton 

2/5/2009 

Date 

SEC Evaluation Approved By: [Signature on file] 

Larry Elliott 

2/5/2009 

Date 

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SEC-00101	 02-04-09 FINAL Hood Building 

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00101, 

Hood Building 

This evaluation report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

addresses a class of employees proposed for addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) per the 

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7384 et seq. (EEOICPA) and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as 

Members of the Special Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 

Compensation Program Act of 2000. 

NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition 

Within the EEOICPA facility description for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the 

Hood Building is designated as a Department of Energy (DOE) facility during the period from 1946 

through 1963. The NIOSH-proposed class includes all employees of the DOE, its predecessor 

agencies, and their contractors and subcontractors who worked in the Hood Building in Cambridge, 

MA, from May 9, 1946 through December 31, 1963, for a number of work days aggregating at least 

250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days 

within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees included in the SEC. 

Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction Findings 

NIOSH lacks sufficient information, which includes dosimetry data, workplace monitoring data, and 

source term data, to allow it to estimate with sufficient accuracy the potential internal exposures to 

enriched uranium and thorium to which the proposed class may have been subjected. 

NIOSH finds that it is likely feasible to reconstruct occupational medical dose for Hood Building 

workers with sufficient accuracy. 

•	 Principal sources of internal radiation for members of the proposed class included exposures to 

uranium, enriched uranium, and thorium. Operations conducted at the Hood Building included 

metallurgical research with uranium and thorium, extrusion of uranium and thorium, disintegration 

studies involving radioactive tracers, studies of thorium alloys, and alloying of zirconium with 

uranium and thorium. 

•	 NIOSH has obtained uranium bioassay results for some workers for 1952, 1955, 1957, and 1958 

and breathing-zone air-monitoring results for less than twenty workers. NIOSH has also obtained 

limited urinalysis results for enriched uranium for the years 1957 and 1958 only. NIOSH has not 

obtained thorium bioassay results; nor has NIOSH obtained bioassay results measuring exposure 

to fission products for which exposure would have been limited to laboratory releases. 

•	 NIOSH can likely reconstruct doses received from exposure to natural uranium metal. However, 

given the lack of monitoring data, doses received from potential intakes resulting from exposure to 

enriched uranium cannot be bounded given the lack of appropriate bioassay data and 

documentation of source term amounts and percentage enrichment. 

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•	 NIOSH cannot reconstruct doses received from potential intakes of thorium given the lack of 

personal monitoring data, workplace monitoring data, and complete source term data for thorium. 

•	 Principal sources of external radiation for members of the proposed class included exposures to 

uranium, enriched uranium, and thorium which could have been received during operations at the 

Hood Building. 

•	 NIOSH has identified external monitoring data for Hood Building workers for May 1947, and the 

period from 1951 through 1958. 

•	 NIOSH considers it feasible to reconstruct external doses for individuals having personal external 

monitoring data. NIOSH has found sufficient film badge results and data supporting the processes 

to likely allow for development of external dose co-worker distributions for portions of the SEC 

period, if appropriate. 

•	 Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), NIOSH determined that there is insufficient information to 

either: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer for which radiation 

doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred under plausible circumstances by any 

member of the class; or (2) estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely 

than a maximum dose estimate. 

•	 Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for 

employees working in the Hood Building, NIOSH intends to use any internal and external 

monitoring data that may be available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using 

existing NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or procedures). Furthermore, NIOSH has 

determined that occupational medical dose for all workers can be reconstructed. Therefore, dose 

reconstructions may be performed using these data, as appropriate, for individuals with nonpresumptive cancers or fewer than 250 days employment during the class period. 

Health Endangerment Determination 

The NIOSH evaluation did not identify any evidence supplied by the petitioners or from other 

resources that would establish that the class was exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely 

to have involved exceptionally high-level exposures, such as nuclear criticality incidents or other 

events involving similarly high levels of exposures. However, the evidence reviewed in this 

evaluation indicates that some workers in the class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures 

through intakes of uranium and thorium and from direct exposure to radioactive materials. Therefore, 

42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3)(ii) requires NIOSH to specify that health may have been endangered for those 

workers covered by this evaluation who were employed for a number of work days aggregating at 

least 250 work days within the parameters established for this class or in combination with work days 

within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 

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Table of Contents 

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00101, Hood Building..................................................................... 3 

1.0 Purpose and Scope....................................................................................................................... 7 

2.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7 

3.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition and Petition Basis................................................................ 8 

4.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class ........................................................... 8 

4.1 Operations Description ....................................................................................................... 9 

4.2 Radiation Exposure Potential from Operations ................................................................ 11 

4.3 Time Period Associated with Radiological Operations.................................................... 11 

4.4 Site Locations Associated with Radiological Operations ................................................ 12 

4.5 Job Descriptions Affected by Radiological Operations ................................................... 14 

5.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class .............................................. 15 

5.1 Data Capture Efforts and Sources Reviewed ................................................................... 15 

5.2 Worker Interviews ............................................................................................................ 16 

5.3 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data ................................................................................. 16 

5.4 External Personnel Monitoring Data ................................................................................ 16 

5.5 Workplace Monitoring Data............................................................................................. 17 

5.6 Radiological Source Term Data ....................................................................................... 17 

6.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class ...................................................... 18 

6.1 Feasibility of Estimating Internal Exposures ................................................................... 18 

6.2 Feasibility of Estimating External Exposures .................................................................. 19 

6.3 Class Parameters Associated with Infeasibility................................................................ 20 

7.0 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00101........................................................ 20 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00101................................................... 21 

9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00101 ...................................................................... 21 

10.0 Evaluation of Second Similar Class .......................................................................................... 22 

11.0 References ................................................................................................................................. 23 

Attachment 1: Data Capture Synopsis................................................................................................... 29 

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Figures 

4-1: The Hood Building at MIT ............................................................................................................ 12 

4-2: Layout of MIT’s Hood Building.................................................................................................... 13 

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SEC Petition Evaluation Report for SEC-00101
 

ATTRIBUTION AND ANNOTATION: This is a single-author document. All conclusions drawn from 

the data presented in this evaluation were made by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team Lead 

Technical Evaluator: James Mahathy, Oak Ridge Associated Universities. These conclusions were 

peer-reviewed by the individuals listed on the cover page. The rationales for all conclusions in this 

document are explained in the associated text. 

1.0 Purpose and Scope 

This report evaluates the feasibility of reconstructing doses for employees who worked at a specific 

facility during a specified time. It provides information and analysis germane to considering a petition 

for adding a class of employees to the Congressionally-created SEC. 

This report does not make any determinations concerning the feasibility of dose reconstruction that 

necessarily apply to any individual energy employee who might require a dose reconstruction from 

NIOSH, with the exception of the employee whose dose reconstruction could not be completed, and 

whose claim consequently led to this petition evaluation. The finding in this report is not the final 

determination as to whether or not the proposed class will be added to the SEC. This report will be 

considered by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (the Board) and by the Secretary 

of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Secretary of HHS will make final decisions concerning 

whether or not to add one or more classes to the SEC in response to the petition addressed by this 

report. 

This evaluation, in which NIOSH provides its findings both on the feasibility of estimating radiation 

doses of members of this class with sufficient accuracy and on health endangerment, was conducted in 

accordance with the requirements of EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.14. 

2.0 Introduction 

Both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 require NIOSH to evaluate qualified petitions requesting that the 

Department of Health and Human Services add a class of employees to the SEC. The evaluation is 

intended to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether it is feasible to estimate, with 

sufficient accuracy, the radiation doses of the proposed class of employees through NIOSH dose 

reconstructions.1 

NIOSH is required to document its evaluation in a report, and to do so, relies upon both its own dose 

reconstruction expertise as well as technical support from its contractor, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU). Once completed, NIOSH provides the report to both the petitioners and the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. The Board will consider the NIOSH evaluation 

report, together with the petition, comments of the petitioner(s) and such other information as the 

Board considers appropriate, to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on whether or not to 

add one or more classes of employees to the SEC. Once NIOSH has received and considered the 

1

 NIOSH dose reconstructions under EEOICPA are performed using the methods promulgated under 42 C.F.R. pt. 82 and 

the detailed implementation guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 

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advice of the Board, the Director of NIOSH will propose a decision on behalf of HHS. The Secretary 

of HHS will make the final decision, taking into account the NIOSH evaluation, the advice of the 

Board, and the proposed decision issued by NIOSH. As part of this final decision process, the 

petitioner(s) may seek a review of certain types of final decisions issued by the Secretary of HHS.2 

3.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition and Petition Basis 

The NIOSH-proposed class includes all employees of the DOE, its predecessor agencies, and their 

contractors and subcontractors who worked in the Hood Building in Cambridge, MA, from May 9, 

1946 through December 31, 1963, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, 

occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees included in the SEC. During this 

period, employees at this facility engaged in: (1) metallurgical research involving uranium, thorium, 

and beryllium; (2) movement of equipment to a new site in Concord, Massachusetts; and (3) building 

demolition. 

The evaluation responds to Petition SEC-00101 which was submitted by an EEOICPA claimant 

whose dose reconstruction could not be completed by NIOSH due to a lack of sufficient dosimetryrelated information. This claimant was employed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a 

Machinist from 1951 through 1954. NIOSH’s determination that it is unable to complete a dose 

reconstruction for an EEOICPA claimant is a qualified basis for submitting an SEC petition pursuant 

to 42 C.F.R. § 83.9(b). 

4.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class 

The following subsections summarize the radiological operations in the Hood Building from May 9, 

1946 through December 31, 1963 and the information available to NIOSH to characterize particular 

processes and radioactive source materials. Using available sources, NIOSH has attempted to gather 

process and source descriptions, information regarding the identity and quantities of radionuclides of 

concern, and information describing processes through which the radiation exposures of concern may 

have occurred and the physical environment in which they may have occurred. The information 

included within this evaluation report is meant only to be a summary of the available information. 

2 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 for a full description of the procedures summarized here. Additional internal procedures are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 

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4.1 Operations Description 

The DOE has assigned three classifications to its facility designation for the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology (MIT). This report evaluates the DOE-covered period only (Item 3): 

1.	 Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE) Site: From 1942 to 1946, MIT is classified as an AWE Site 

because of Manhattan Engineer District (MED) research in uranium extraction conducted in MIT 

locations other than the Hood Building. 

2.	 Beryllium Vendor: From 1943 to 1946, MIT is also classified as a Beryllium Vendor because of 

research on beryllium metal and a beryllium-uranium alloy, and production of beryllium oxide 

crucibles. 

3.	 DOE Facility: From 1946 though 1963, the Hood Building is classified as a DOE Facility because 

of research involving uranium, thorium, and beryllium performed by both MIT and Nuclear 

Metals, Inc. (NMI), personnel. 

MIT began its work as an AWE site for the MED on August 13, 1942 when it was contracted to 

perform uranium extraction studies (DOE, 2009). MIT’s mission was expanded in July 1944 with the 

establishment of the Raw Materials Development Laboratory (National Lead, 1954-59). In that role, 

MIT researched and tested processes for melting and casting uranium metal, and for extracting 

uranium from small quantities of low-grade ores. As research evolved, MIT deduced that uranium ore 

of a much lower grade required treatment in order to increase uranium production (National Lead, 

1954-59). Consequently, the project was increasingly focused on the effective processing of relatively 

low-grade materials. As the scope of uranium production increased in variety and significance, 

routine uranium processing was moved in 1946 to the Watertown Arsenal in Watertown, 

Massachusetts (Watertown, unknown date; National Lead, 1954-59). 

MIT's work as a Beryllium Vendor started on August 31, 1943 when it entered into MED contract 

W-7405-eng-175. The ensuing project studied the characteristics of beryllium metal and attempted to 

create a satisfactory beryllium-uranium alloy. This period also led to one of MIT’s largest 

contributions to the MED effort: the design of a beryllium crucible that permitted plutonium to be 

reduced to metal without introducing light-element contaminants (DOE, 1997, pdf p. 15; Garrelick, 

1995). The resulting crucibles were shipped to Y-12 and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (MIT 

Shipping, 1946). In 1946, MIT’s government-funded research of enriched uranium, uranium alloys, 

and thorium materials was continued by the newly-created Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (AEC, 

Dec47, pdf p. 45; MIT, 1949; MIT MiscLetters, 1946; Gordon, 1948; Various authors, Mar63­

Dec70). 

MIT's work as a DOE Facility began in 1946. After a number of cases of beryllium disease at MIT, 

the AEC consolidated the activities described above into a single building. AEC purchased the Hood 

Milk Company building located at the intersection of Massachusetts Avenue and Albany Street (155 

Massachusetts Avenue). NIOSH has found reference to a memo dated May 9, 1946 that addresses the 

“planned move of MIT to Hood Milk Co. Building” (Randall, 1947, pdf p. 137). The earliest 

indication found by NIOSH that MIT was working out of the Hood Building is a memo dated August 

14, 1946 with a Hood Building return address (MIT MiscLetters, 1946, pdf p. 3). The Hood Building 

was designated Building 12 by MIT and adjoined another MIT building that housed an 

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instrumentation shop. Section 4.3 presents the NIOSH conclusions regarding the time period 

associated with radiological operations at the Hood Building. 

From 1946 through 1963, employees at the Hood Building were involved with metallurgical research 

involving uranium (including uranium extrusion) and thorium, movement of equipment to a new site 

in Concord, Massachusetts, and demolition of the building. MIT also developed and manufactured 

extruded beryllium bars for use at Los Alamos (Garrelick, 1995). Beryllium crucible research and 

production continued under the AEC on the first and second floor of the Hood Building (Cammann, 

1949; ORAU, 2008a). The Hood Building incorporated 300-pound and 1000-pound presses on the 

first floor to extrude both uranium and beryllium (ORAU, 2008a). In 1948, Hood Building staff 

(using a specifically-designed hood) experimented with powdered beryllium-natural uranium alloys 

(Belmore, 1948). Throughout the course of later operations in the Hood Building, the potential for 

beryllium exposure existed due to AEC activities. 

Tracers were used in disintegration studies and organic property studies; radioactive tracers included 

Cd-95, Co-60, Cs-134, Na-24, Hf-181, I-131, Sc-46, and Zn-95 (MIT Requests, 1947-48). 

In 1947, Hood workers extruded thorium powder obtained from Westinghouse into metal rods and 

performed studies of thorium alloys (MIT, no date; Santangelo, no date). In 1952, Hood Building 

staff performed tests, including heat extrusion, annealing and density checks, on thorium rods for use 

at the Savannah River Site (Hayes, 1952; Loewenstein, 1952). After receiving thorium from Fernald 

(AEC, 1954), work with thorium continued through at least 1955 (ORAU, 2008c). 

On July 1, 1954, MIT and AEC privatized all work done at the Hood Building under contract to 

Nuclear Metals, Inc. The staff of 121 MIT employees at the Hood Building (Garrelick, 1995) became 

employees of NMI on that date. The following on-going activities were transferred to NMI (Klevin, 

1954): 

• Routine fabrication of beryllium crucible and stopper rods 

• Reduction and purification of zirconium 

• Alloying of zirconium with uranium and thorium 

• Casting of thorium containing 2 weight percent uranium 

• Extrusion cladding of uranium with zircalloy and cladding and scaling ends by co-extrusion 

• Extrusion of uranium 

MIT also conducted radiochemical analysis of AEC radium samples in the Hood Building from 1946 

through 1953 under contract W-022-075eng013 (MIT, 1951; Rodden, 1952; MIT, 1953a). This 

analytical work was performed by MIT; however, this analytical work was not continued by NMI 

after MIT vacated the Hood Building. 

Hood Building staff manufactured fuel elements for Savannah River, Hanford, and Idaho National 

Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, and later developed processes so that those sites could 

manufacture elements (ORAU, 2008a; ORAU, 2008b). Work was also performed for Brookhaven 

National Laboratory (ORAU, 2008b) using enriched uranium. Hood Building staff performed 

research of enriched uranium-beryllium alloys containing U-235 up to 10 percent weight (AEC, 

Dec47, pdf p. 52; Randall, 1947, pdf p. 24; Santangelo, no date). Alloy development work not 

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involving radioactive materials was conducted at the Hood Building as well as part of the fuel element 

research. 

NMI continued metallurgical research and production of beryllium crucibles in the Hood Building 

until NMI vacated the Hood Building in 1958 and moved to a new facility in Concord, Massachusetts. 

Two hundred sixty-five employees worked for NMI at the time of the move to Concord (Garrelick, 

1995). No additional AEC activities were performed in the Hood Building after 1958. The General 

Services Administration deeded the Hood Building to MIT by early 1963 for the purpose of MIT 

demolishing the building and constructing an educational facility (The Tech, 1963; MIT Press 

Releases, 1962-63). The building was demolished in 1963 by MIT and their contractor, P. R. Mallory 

(ORAU, 2008b). MIT paid the costs of demolition (MIT Press Releases, 1962-63). 

4.2 Radiation Exposure Potential from Operations 

The potential for external radiation dose existed in all locations of the Hood Building where 

radioactive materials were handled, used, or stored. Sources of potential external exposures included 

beta radiation and photon radiation from the decay of uranium and thorium daughters and from X-ray 

radiographic testing. Exposure to fission products may have resulted from the use of isotopic tracers 

and from the testing of radiation shielding and heat transfer conditions. 

During Hood Building operations, potential radiological internal exposures resulted from operations 

using uranium ore and metals, enriched uranium, and thorium. Indications are that Hood Building 

operations also included exposures to some quantity of fission products. NIOSH has documentation 

to establish portions of the source terms for some radionuclides; however, there are insufficient data to 

reconstruct the total source term for any radionuclide, or to identify all chemical forms of 

radionuclides encountered at the Hood Building. 

4.3 Time Period Associated with Radiological Operations 

Per the DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security, the time period associated with DOE operations is 

from 1946 through 1963 (DOE, 2007). As discussed in Section 4.1, NIOSH has found reference to a 

memo dated May 9, 1946 discussing MIT’s planned move to the Hood Building (Randall, 1947, pdf 

p. 137). The earliest indication found by NIOSH that MIT was working out of the Hood Building is a 

memo dated August 14, 1946 with a Hood Building return address (MIT MiscLetters, 1946, pdf p. 3). 

NIOSH has determined that the consolidation of AEC operations within the Hood Building likely 

occurred between May 9, 1946 and August 14, 1946. Because NIOSH has no information to confirm 

when during this period actual radiological operations began in the Hood Building, this evaluation 

report assumes that DOE operations in the Hood Building began on May 9, 1946 and continued 

through December 31, 1963 (the year Hood Building demolition was completed). 

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4.4 Site Locations Associated with Radiological Operations 

The Hood Building was acquired by the AEC for use by MIT in performance of Metallurgical Project 

6825. The Hood Building was constructed in the early 20th century and served as an ice cream plant 

and warehouse for the Hood Milk Company. The building was located at the intersection of 

Massachusetts Avenue and Albany Street (155 Massachusetts Avenue) in Cambridge. While the 

building was owed by AEC, MIT assigned Building Number 12 for identification. A photo of the 

building is provided in Figure 4-1. 

Figure 4-1: The Hood Building at MIT 

The Hood Building was constructed of brick and wood without reinforcement to support heavy loads. 

The foundry was located on the first floor which also supported 300- and 1000-pound presses in the 

extrusion area. During OCAS interviews, previous employees indicated that uranium was stacked in 

many accessible locations throughout the building (ORAU, 2008b). Worker interviews further 

indicated that the building did not contain mechanical ventilation systems other than some hoods that 

were added to limited areas and which vented to the roof; workers frequently vacuumed ash and dust 

from the roof as a consequence of the exhaust. Respirator use was based on the job being performed, 

but was sporadic according to the testimony of former workers. Although there was a lunch area on 

the second floor, former workers indicate that it was common practice to eat in the production areas. 

A layout of the Hood Building is provided in Figure 4-2. 

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Figure 4-2: Layout of MIT’s Hood Building 

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There was at least one recorded incident of an extrusion press expelling a piece of material through 

the wall of the Hood Building and into the MIT Instrumentation Lab next door. Workers have 

described those projectiles, and fires caused by the presses, as common occurrences (Santangelo, no 

date). In 1956, interviewees indicated that three hurricanes came through Cambridge and flooded the 

Hood Building. Water flowed through the elevator into the area where enriched uranium and thorium 

were stored, requiring the materials to be moved. Controlling the material was a major concern as 

well as the spread of uranium and thorium contamination. The storage area had already been flooded 

in 1954 though it is not clear if radioactive materials were present during that event (ORAU, 2008b). 

In 1955, NMI was cited by the state of Massachusetts for the crowded condition of Hood Building 

work rooms which was a handicap to the control of health hazards (Elkins, 1955). There were 225 

employees working at the Hood Building in September 1956 (Bavley, 1956). In 1956, NMI expanded 

operations into a second building about 1⁄4 mile away at 224 Albany Street. This building was used to 

manufacture and ship fuel elements for use at Savannah River Site (SRS) (ORAU, 2008a; ORAU, 

2008d). An SRS representative had an office in the 224 Albany Street Building (ORAU, 2008a). 

Materials were carried and trucked between the Hood Building and 224 Albany Street on a frequent 

basis. The current DOE Facility Description for MIT and the Hood Building does not include 224 

Albany Street; therefore, exposures from that location are not considered in this evaluation report. 

While worker testimony and Figure 4-2 established that some areas were office areas, stable metal 

areas, and laboratories, worker testimony and available documentation also have established that the 

spread of radioactive materials was not controlled and limited to certain areas. Consequently, the 

entire Hood Building is included in the proposed SEC class for the DOE operational period. 

4.5 Job Descriptions Affected by Radiological Operations 

NIOSH has limited documentation that associates job titles and/or job assignments with specific 

radiological operations. NIOSH has a roster of all people hired by Nuclear Metals, Inc., since July 

1954 (NMI Employees, 1954-2004). From former worker interviews, NIOSH has established that 

poor controls were used to limit the spread of radioactive contamination in the Hood Building. Due to 

the lack of information regarding worker job descriptions, and lack of knowledge concerning worker 

movements within the Hood Building during the DOE operations period, NIOSH is not able to rely 

solely on worker job descriptions to determine the potential for DOE-period radiological exposure. 

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5.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class 

The primary data used for determining internal exposures are derived from personal monitoring data, 

such as urinalyses, fecal samples, and whole-body counting results. If these are unavailable, the air 

monitoring data from breathing zone and general area monitoring are used to estimate the potential 

internal exposure. If personal monitoring and breathing zone area monitoring are unavailable, internal 

exposures can sometimes be estimated using more general area monitoring, process information, and 

information characterizing and quantifying the source term. 

This same hierarchy is used for determining the external exposures to the cancer site. Personal 

monitoring data from film badges or thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) are the primary data used 

to determine such external exposures. If there are no personal monitoring data, exposure rate surveys, 

process knowledge, and source term modeling can sometimes be used to reconstruct the potential 

exposure. 

A more detailed discussion of the information required for dose reconstruction can be found in 

OCAS-IG-001, External Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline, and OCAS-IG-002, Internal 

Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline. These documents are available at: 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocasdose.html. 

5.1 Data Capture Efforts and Sources Reviewed 

In addition to examining its Site Research Database (SRDB) to locate documents supporting the 

evaluation of the proposed class, NIOSH identified and reviewed numerous additional data sources, 

including worker interviews, to locate information relevant to determining the feasibility of dose 

reconstruction for the class of employees proposed for this petition. This included determining the 

availability of information on personnel monitoring, workplace monitoring, and radiological source 

term data. 

NIOSH searched available DOE data to find source term, workplace monitoring, and personnel 

monitoring information pertaining to MIT and the Hood Building. NIOSH has completed six data 

capture campaigns in search of information relevant to MIT’s covered activities at the Hood Building. 

During these data captures, NIOSH searched for records at: MIT, the state regulators, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (the ADAM electronic records repository), the DOE (the OpenNet repository 

and the Office of Scientific and Technical Information), and the National Archives record centers. 

NIOSH has located limited documents detailing the Hood Building operations and some very limited 

area and personnel monitoring data. Attachment One contains a summary of MIT-related documents. 

The summary specifically identifies specific data capture details for each document retrieved. 

NIOSH also examined the DOE records for the six MIT claimants in the NIOSH OCAS Claims 

Tracking System (NOCTS) and found limited urinalysis results for one of these claimants and 

external monitoring data for one other claimant. 

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5.2 Worker Interviews 

To obtain additional information, NIOSH interviewed sixteen former Hood Building workers from 

October 6 through October 8, 2008 in Concord, Massachusetts. These workers described work 

processes, work conditions, materials used, and health and safety measures employed at the Hood 

Building. Two of the former workers were former officers of Nuclear Metals, Inc., and one was a 

former NMI medical director. 

•	 Personal Communication, 2008, Documented Communication with Process Knowledge Experts 

Discussing the Hood Building; In-person interview by ORAU Team and NIOSH; October 6, 2008; 

SRDB Ref ID: 52732 

•	 Personal Communication, 2008, Documented Communication with Former Medical Director of 

Nuclear Metals, Inc.; In-person interview by ORAU Team and NIOSH; October 6, 2008; SRDB 

Ref ID: 52733 

•	 Personal Communication, 2008, Documented Communication with Process Knowledge Experts 

Discussing the Hood Building; In-person interview by ORAU Team and NIOSH; October 7, 2008; 

SRDB Ref ID: 52730 

•	 Personal Communication, 2008, Documented Communication with Process Knowledge Experts 

Discussing the Hood Building; In-person interview by ORAU Team and NIOSH; October 7, 2008; 

SRDB Ref ID: 52731 

•	 Personal Communication, 2008, Documented Communication with Process Knowledge Experts 

Discussing the Hood Building; In-person interview by ORAU Team and NIOSH; October 8, 2008; 

SRDB Ref ID: 52729 

5.3 Internal Personnel Monitoring Data 

The review of available monitoring records for the six NIOSH claimants having DOL-verified MIT 

employment revealed uranium urinalysis results for one of these claimants for 1952. NIOSH has 

obtained uranium fluorometric urinalysis results for 15 site workers in 1952 (AEC, Apr52-May52); 13 

results were non-zero. NIOSH has obtained uranium fluorometric urinalysis results for 41 workers in 

1955 (AEC, Nov55-Dec59); all 41 results were non-zero. NIOSH has obtained uranium fluorometric 

urinalysis results for more than 50 workers, some with multiple results, in 1957 and 1958; most of 

these results were non-zero (AEC, Nov55-Dec59). NIOSH has obtained results of about 70 urinalyses 

that were analyzed for enriched uranium in 1957 and 1958 (AEC, Nov55-Dec59). The enriched 

uranium urine results were reported in units of dpm/L and ranged up to about 200 dpm/L. NIOSH has 

obtained about twenty breathing zone air sample results obtained in 1952 analyzed for uranium by 

gross alpha determination (AEC, May52-Jun52). 

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5.4 External Personnel Monitoring Data 

NIOSH has identified external monitoring data for some Hood Building workers, including results 

reported for two workers in May 1947 (MIT Film, 1947). Film badge data for many workers have 

been identified for 1951 through 1958 (MIT, Aug52-Dec53; Nucleonic Corporation, Apr57-Sep57; 

Film Badge Reports, 1956; Film Badge Listing, 1956-59; Film Badge Reports, 1957-58a; Film Badge 

Reports, 1957-58b; Film Badge Reports, 1958-59; Film Badge Reports, 1957; Film Badge Report, 

1954-56; Film Badge Reports, 1956; Film Badge Readings, 1950s; Film Badge Listings, 1950s; Film 

Badge Reports, 1957-58c; Film Badge Reports, 1956-57b; AEC, Jan54-Jun57; Film Badge Reports, 

1956-57c; MIT, Dec1955-Nov56; MIT, 1953b; MIT, 1955; MIT, 1954). In September 1956, 120 of 

225 employees were being routinely monitored by film badge (Bavley, 1956). 

NIOSH has not obtained occupationally-required medical X-ray data for Hood Building workers 

although NIOSH has obtained documentation on physical examinations that included requirements for 

pre-employment and annual medical exams (Bavley, 1956). NIOSH interviewed a former NMI 

physician who confirmed that X-rays were part of those medical exams (ORAU, 2008e) 

5.5 Workplace Monitoring Data 

NIOSH has identified some workplace surface monitoring and air monitoring results analyzed for 

gross-alpha activity, reported as uranium, and for non-radiological beryllium (AEC, Dec48; AEC, 

Dec48- Jan55; Bavley, 1956). NIOSH has not identified any air or surface monitoring results 

analyzed for thorium and fission product contamination for the Hood Building. Of the available air 

monitoring data, there about 250 uranium air results reported between 1948 and 1955, all taken for 

crucible operations in the Hood Building (AEC, Dec48; AEC, Dec48- Jan55; AEC, Apr50-Dec51). 

Summary gross alpha air monitoring data for the Hood Building are reported for 1956, 1957 and 1958 

(Liberty Mutual, 1964; Elkins, 1955; Bavley, 1957a; Bavley, 1957b; Bavley, 1957c; Bavley, 1958). 

Air monitoring was dependent on the operation and was not routine (ORAU, 2008d). 

5.6 Radiological Source Term Data 

Some information on the quantities of uranium ore and thorium received and/or used at the Hood 

Building has been identified; however, the total amounts of uranium and thorium, and the forms of 

these isotopes, are unknown. License No. C-03429 was issued to NMI on December 2, 1955. It 

authorized possession of up to 100 pounds of natural uranium for use in the development of new fuel 

elements. Subsequent amendments to the license added enriched uranium and natural thorium 

(ORNL, 1998). One report shows maximum quantities of uranium and thorium permitted to be 

handled at the Hood Building as allowed by the State of Massachusetts in 1958 (DOL, 1958). 

NIOSH has identified some documentation that discusses the processes and equipment developed 

and/or used at the Hood Building by MIT and NMI. However, without additional documentation, 

NIOSH cannot make assumptions about particular radionuclides, quantities, or forms of source 

materials that may have been used. 

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6.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class 

42 C.F.R. § 83.14(b) states that HHS will consider a NIOSH determination that there was insufficient 

information to complete a dose reconstruction, as indicated in this present case, to be sufficient, 

without further consideration, to conclude that it is not feasible to estimate the levels of radiation 

doses of individual members of the class with sufficient accuracy. 

In the case of a petition submitted to NIOSH under 42 C.F.R. § 83.9(b), NIOSH has already 

determined that a dose reconstruction cannot be completed for an employee at the DOE or AWE 

facility. This determination by NIOSH provides the basis for the petition by the affected claimant. 

Per § 83.14(a), the NIOSH-proposed class defines those employees who, based on completed 

research, are similarly affected and for whom, as a class, dose reconstruction is similarly not feasible. 

In accordance with § 83.14(a), NIOSH may establish a second class of co-workers at the facility for 

whom NIOSH believes that dose reconstruction is similarly infeasible, but for whom additional 

research and analysis is required. If so identified, NIOSH would address this second class in a 

separate SEC evaluation rather than delay consideration of the claim currently under evaluation (see 

Section 10). This would allow NIOSH, the Board, and HHS to complete, without delay, their 

consideration of the class that includes a claimant for whom NIOSH has already determined a dose 

reconstruction cannot be completed, and whose only possible remedy under EEOICPA is the addition 

of a class of employees to the SEC. 

This section of the report summarizes research findings by which NIOSH determined that it lacked 

sufficient information to complete the relevant dose reconstruction and on which basis it has defined 

the class of employees for which dose reconstruction is not feasible. NIOSH’s determination relies on 

the same statutory and regulatory criteria that govern consideration of all SEC petitions. 

6.1 Feasibility of Estimating Internal Exposures 

NIOSH has evaluated the available personnel and workplace monitoring data and source term 

information and has determined that there are insufficient data for estimating internal exposures, as 

described below. 

NIOSH has obtained uranium bioassay for some workers for 1952, 1955, 1957, and 1958 and 

breathing-zone air-monitoring results for less than twenty workers. NIOSH has also obtained some 

urinalysis results for enriched uranium for 1957 and 1958. NIOSH has not obtained thorium bioassay 

results; nor has NIOSH obtained bioassay results sufficient to estimate exposures to uranium progeny 

or fission products for which exposure would have been limited to laboratory releases. AEC 

production operations ceased in the Hood Building by December 31, 1958 and the building was empty 

until it was demolished in 1963 (MIT Press Releases, 1962-63). NIOSH has not found information to 

define the amount of any radioactive contamination that existed after uranium or thorium operations 

ceased, or any data collected during building demolition. 

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NIOSH can likely reconstruct doses received from exposure to natural uranium metal. However, 

given the lack of monitoring data for most workers for most of the class period, and the lack of 

documentation of source term amounts and percentage enrichment, the doses received from potential 

intakes resulting from exposure to enriched uranium cannot be bounded. NIOSH cannot reconstruct 

doses received from potential intakes of thorium given the lack of personal monitoring data, 

workplace monitoring data, and complete source term data for thorium. 

NIOSH does not have access to sufficient personnel monitoring, workplace monitoring, or source 

term data to estimate potential internal exposures to enriched uranium and thorium during the period 

of DOE operations in the Hood Building. Consequently, NIOSH finds that it is not feasible to 

estimate, with sufficient accuracy, internal exposures to enriched uranium and thorium and resulting 

doses for the class of employees covered by this evaluation. 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct internal radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal monitoring data that may become available for an 

individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or 

procedures). Dose reconstructions for individuals employed at the Hood Building, but not qualifying 

for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data, as appropriate. 

6.2 Feasibility of Estimating External Exposures 

This evaluation responds to a petition based on NIOSH determining that internal radiation exposures 

to enriched uranium and thorium could not be reconstructed for a dose reconstruction referred to 

NIOSH by the Department of Labor (DOL). As noted above, HHS will consider this determination to 

be sufficient without further consideration to determine that it is not feasible to estimate the levels of 

radiation doses of individual members of the class with sufficient accuracy. Consequently, it is not 

necessary for NIOSH to fully evaluate the feasibility of reconstructing external radiation exposures for 

the class of workers covered by this report. 

NIOSH considers it feasible to reconstruct external doses for individuals having personal monitoring 

data. NIOSH has found sufficient film badge results and data supporting the processes to likely allow 

development of external dose co-worker distributions for portions of the SEC period, if appropriate. 

NIOSH considers adequate reconstruction of medical dose for MIT workers likely to be feasible by 

using claimant-favorable assumptions as well as the applicable protocols in the complex-wide TBD 

Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray Procedures (ORAUT-OTIB0006). 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any external monitoring data that may become available for an 

individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or 

procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed at the Hood Building, but not 

qualifying for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data, as appropriate. 

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6.3 Class Parameters Associated with Infeasibility 

Per the DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security facility description for the Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology, the time period associated with DOE operations in the Hood Building is from 1946 

through 1963. NIOSH has found indications that MIT was planning the move to the Hood Building 

as early as May 9, 1946. Because NIOSH has no information to define exactly when actual 

radiological operations began in the Hood Building, NIOSH recommends that the class include the 

period from May 9, 1946 through December 31, 1963. 

The acquisition of the Hood Building was specifically executed to consolidate many different types of 

radiological work. Due to the lack of knowledge concerning worker movements within the building, 

and because NIOSH has established that poor controls were used to limit the spread of radioactive 

contamination, NIOSH recommends that the class definition include all areas of the Hood Building 

during the specified time period. 

Due to the lack of information regarding worker job descriptions, limited documentation that 

associates job titles and/or job assignments with specific radiological operations, and lack of 

knowledge concerning worker movements, NIOSH is unable to rely solely on worker job descriptions 

to determine the potential for DOE radiological exposure in the Hood Building. NIOSH therefore 

recommends that the class include all Hood Building workers. 

7.0 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00101 

This report evaluates the feasibility for completing dose reconstructions for employees who worked in 

the Hood Building in Cambridge, MA, from May 9, 1946 through December 31, 1963. NIOSH 

determined that members of this class may have received radiation exposures from internal and 

external sources. NIOSH lacks sufficient information, which includes biological monitoring data, 

sufficient air monitoring information, and radiological source information, that would allow it to 

estimate the potential internal exposures to enriched uranium and thorium to which the proposed class 

may have been exposed. 

NIOSH has documented herein that it cannot complete the dose reconstruction related to this petition. 

The basis of this finding demonstrates that NIOSH does not have access to sufficient information to 

estimate either the maximum radiation dose incurred by any member of the class or to estimate such 

radiation doses more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. 

NIOSH has determined that it can likely reconstruct with sufficient accuracy internal doses received 

from potential exposure to natural uranium metal. NIOSH considers it feasible to reconstruct external 

doses for individuals having personal monitoring data. NIOSH considers adequate reconstruction of 

medical dose for MIT workers likely to be feasible by using claimant-favorable assumptions as well 

as the applicable protocols in the complex-wide documents. 

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Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal or external monitoring data that may become 

available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed at 

the Hood Building, but not qualifying for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data, as 

appropriate. 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00101 

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.14(b) and § 83.13(c)(3). Pursuant to these requirements, if 

it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, NIOSH 

must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered 

the health of members of the class. The regulations require NIOSH to assume that any duration of 

unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of members of a class when it has been 

established that the class may have been exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If 

the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then NIOSH is 

required to specify that health was endangered for those workers who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 

NIOSH has determined that members of the class were not exposed to radiation during a discrete 

incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear 

criticality incidents. However, the evidence reviewed in this evaluation indicates that some workers in 

the class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures through intakes of uranium and thorium 

and from direct exposure to radioactive materials. Consequently, NIOSH is specifying that health was 

endangered for those workers covered by this evaluation who were employed for a number of work 

days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for this class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 

9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00101 

The evaluation defines a single class of employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses 

with sufficient accuracy. This class includes all employees of the DOE, its predecessor agencies, and 

their contractors and subcontractors who worked in the Hood Building in Cambridge, MA, from May 

9, 1946 through December 31, 1963, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, 

occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees included in the SEC. 

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SEC-00101 02-04-09 FINAL Hood Building 

10.0 Evaluation of Second Similar Class 

In accordance with § 83.14(a), NIOSH may establish a second class of co-workers at the facility, 

similar to the class defined in Section 9.0, for whom NIOSH believes that dose reconstruction may not 

be feasible, and for whom additional research and analyses is required. If a second class is identified, 

it would require additional research and analyses. Such a class would be addressed in a separate SEC 

evaluation rather than delay consideration of the current claim. The NIOSH-proposed class already 

includes all employees of the DOE, its predecessor agencies, and their contractors and subcontractors 

who worked in the Hood Building; therefore, NIOSH has not identified a second similar class of 

employees at the Hood Building in Cambridge, Massachusetts for whom dose reconstruction may not 

be feasible. 

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11 .0 Re fe re nces 

42 C.F.R. pt. 81, Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule, Federal 

Register/Vol. 67, No. 85/Thursday, p 22296; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 19391 

42 C.F.R. pt. 82, Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 

19392 

42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special 

Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000; Final Rule; May 28, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 22001 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385 [EEOICPA], Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program Act of 2000; as amended; OCAS website 

OCAS-IG-001, External Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline, Rev. 1; Office of 

Compensation Analysis and Support (OCAS); Cincinnati, Ohio; August 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 22401 

OCAS-IG-002, Internal Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline, Rev. 0; Office of 

Compensation Analysis and Support (OCAS); Cincinnati, Ohio; August 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 22402 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray 

Procedures, Rev. 03 PC-1; Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); Oak Ridge, Tennessee; 

December 21, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 20220 

AEC, Dec47, Monthly Status and Progress Report for December 1947, AEC Office of New York 

Directed Operations; January 7, 1948; SRDB Ref ID: 6292 

AEC, Dec48, Air Sample Sheets; United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); December 16, 

1948; SRDB Ref ID: 8957 

AEC, Dec48- Jan55, Air Sample Reports; United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); 

December 5, 1948 through January 15, 1955; SRDB Ref ID: 9886 

AEC, Apr50-Dec51, Air Dust Sample Sheets; United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); April 

20, 1950 through December 11, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 11222 

AEC, Apr52-May52, Urine Sample Sheets, United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); May 

1952 through June 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 11250 

AEC, May52-Jun52, Air Sample Sheets; United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); May 1952 

through June 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 11924 

AEC, 1954, Production Order: Shipment of Thorium Billet to MIT; United States Atomic Energy 

Commission (AEC); May 12, 1954; SRDB Ref ID: 32749 

23 of 34
 
SEC-00101 02-04-09 FINAL Hood Building 

AEC, Jan54-Jun57, Monthly Film Badge Report of AEC Personnel, Radiological Safety Lab, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 1954-1957; SRDB Ref ID: 53726 

AEC, Nov55-Dec59, Urinalysis Reports; United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); 

November 1955 through December 1959; SRDB Ref ID: 24978 

Bavley, 1956, Nuclear Metals Site Visit, correspondence to Dr. Elkins; Harold Bavley; September 5, 

1956; SRDB Ref ID: 25090 pdf pp. 5-6 

Bavley, 1957a, Follow-up Site Visit, correspondence to Dr. Elkins; Harold Bavley; August 9, 1957; 

SRDB Ref ID: 25090 pdf pp. 19-20 

Bavley, 1957b, Follow-up Site Visit on November 5, 1957, correspondence to Dr. Elkins; Harold 

Bavley; November 12, 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 25090 pdf pp. 23-24 

Bavley, 1957c, Follow-up Site Visit on November 5, 1957, correspondence to Dr. Elkins; Harold 

Bavley; November 12, 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 25090 pdf pp. 25-26 

Bavley, 1958, Follow-up Site Visit on March 19, 1958, correspondence to Dr. Elkins; Harold Bavley; 

March 21, 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 25090 pdf pp. 30-31 

Belmore, 1957, Test Runs of Powdered Beryllium Uranium Alloy at M.I.T., correspondence to B. S. 

Wolf; F. M. Belmore; April 8, 1948; SRDB Ref ID: 44970 

Cammann, 1949, Proposed Layout of the Ceramic Area of the Ceramic Area of the Second Floor of 

the Hood Building, correspondence to Mr. William Harris; O. Cammann; April 18, 1949; SRDB Ref 

ID: 30752 

DOE, 1997, Linking Legacies, select text; U. S. Department of Energy; January 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 

8223 

DOE, 2007, DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security EEOICPA Web Page; 

http://www.hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/fwsp/advocacy/faclist/findfacility.cfm; last accessed on 

December 14, 2007 

DOE, 2009, DOE Office of Environmental Safety and Health website, Residual Radioactivity 

Evaluations for Individual Facilities—Appendix A-3; 

http://198.246.98.21/niosh/ocas/pdfs/tbd/rescon/appen-a3.pdf; last accessed on January 12, 2009; 

SRDB Ref ID: 37331 

DOL, 1958, Registration of Ionizing Radiation Sources; Department of Labor and Industries (DOL); 

February 27, 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 25090, pdf p. 44 

Elkins, 1955, Control of Health Hazards, correspondence to John Cammann; Hervey B. Elkins; 

March 16, 1955; SRDB Ref ID: 25090, pdf p. 2 

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SEC-00101 02-04-09 FINAL Hood Building 

Film Badge Listing, 1956-59, Film Badge Listing, Nuclear Metals, Inc.; Concord, Massachusetts, 

1956-1959; SRDB Ref ID: 25018 

Film Badge Listings, 1950s, Various Film Badge Listings, Nuclear Metals, Inc.; Concord, 

Massachusetts; various years in the 1950s; SRDB Ref ID: 29180 

Film Badge Readings, 1950s, Various Film Badge Reports, Nucleonic Corporation of America; 

Brooklyn, New York; various years in the 1950s; SRDB Ref ID: 28460 

Film Badge Report, 1954-56, Film Badge Service Radiation Dosage Report, Tracerlab, Inc.; Boston, 

Massachusetts; 1954-1956; SRDB Ref ID: 28457 

Film Badge Reports, 1956, Report of Film Badge Exposure, Nuclear Chicago Film Badge Services, 

Nuclear Instrument and Chemical Corporation; Chicago, Illinois; 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 28458 

Film Badge Reports, 1956-57a, Reports of Film Badge Exposure, R. S. Landauer, Jr. and Co., 

Radiation Safety, Film Badge Service; 1956 and 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 25017 

Film Badge Reports, 1956-57b, Reports of Film Badge Exposure, R. S. Landauer, Jr. and Co., 

Radiation Safety; 1956 and 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 29187 

Film Badge Reports, 1956-57c, Film Badge Reports (for MIT), Brookhaven National Laboratory; 

1956-1957; SRDB Ref ID: 53727 

Film Badge Reports, 1957, Film Badge Exposure Report, Nucleonic Corporation of America; 

Cambridge 39, Massachusetts; 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 28444 

Film Badge Reports, 1957-58a, Film Badge Gamma Exposure During Period of 1/1/57 – 1/1/58, 

Nuclear Metals, Inc.; Cambridge 39, Massachusetts; 1957-1958; SRDB Ref ID: 25030 

Film Badge Reports, 1957-58b, Cumulative Film Badge Exposure Reports, Nucleonic Corporation of 

America; Cambridge 39, Massachusetts; 1957-1958; SRDB Ref ID: 25034 

Film Badge Reports, 1957-58c, Film Badge Exposure Reports, Nucleonic Corporation of America; 

Brooklyn, New York; 1957-1958; SRDB Ref ID: 29182 

Film Badge Reports, 1958-59, Film Badge Data Report, Controls for Radiation, Inc., Cambridge 40, 

Massachusetts; 1958-1959; SRDB Ref ID: 25035 

Garrelick, 1995, M.I.T. Beginnings: The Legacy of Nuclear Metals, Inc.; Renee Garrelick; 1995; 

SRDB Ref ID: 45316 

Gordon, 1948, Line Drawing of Dry Box, correspondence to Dr. Bassett; E. Gordon; November 8, 

1948; SRDB Ref ID: 30747 

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SEC-00101 02-04-09 FINAL Hood Building 

Hayes, 1952, Trip Report-Thorium Meeting Division of Research, May 7, 1952; E. E. Hayes; July 16, 

1952; SRDB Ref ID: 49602 

Klevin, 1954, Visit to Hood Building, Cambridge, Mass., on June 9, 1954; P. B. Klevin; June 21, 

1954; SRDB Ref ID: 17008, pdf pp. 51-54 

Liberty Mutual, 1964, Cancelled Radiological Safety Survey, follow-up letter; R. G. McAllister, 

Liberty Mutual; September 8, 1964; SRDB Ref ID: 24995 

Loewenstein, 1952, Thorium Rods, various correspondence; Paul Loewenstein and E. E. Hayes; 

October 3-15, 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 49624 

MIT, no date, Proposed Programs for 1947-1948; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); no 

date; SRDB Ref ID: 13591 

MIT, 1949, A Study of Loss Due to Oxidation in Rolling of Uranium, B. J. Bergen; Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology, Division of Industrial Cooperation; September 16, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 

17595 

MIT, 1951, Reclassifying K-65 Radium Sludge Assay Reports to Official Use Only, correspondence; 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); June 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 32961 

MIT, Aug1952-Dec53, Monthly Film Badge Reports; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); 

August 1952 through December 1953; SRDB Ref ID: 11252 

MIT, 1953a, K-65 Sludge Radium Assay Comparisons, correspondence to R. Evans; Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT); July 6, 1953; SRDB Ref ID: 32969 

MIT, 1953b, 1953 Film Badge Reports; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); various dates 

throughout 1953; SRDB Ref ID: 53729 

MIT, 1954, 1954 Film Badge Reports; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); various dates 

throughout 1954; SRDB Ref ID: 53732 

MIT, 1955, 1955 Film Badge Reports; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); various dates 

throughout 1955; SRDB Ref ID: 53731 

MIT, Dec1955-Nov56, Film Badge Reports; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); December 

1955 through November 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 53728 

MIT Film, 1947, Values for Film Badge Readings for [names redacted] from MIT; University of 

Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry; June 13, 1947; SRDB Ref ID: 17354 

MIT MiscLetters, 1946, Letters to Major M. J. Barnett (MED); Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

(MIT); March through November 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 30739 

26 of 34 
51121 

SEC-00101 02-04-09 FINAL Hood Building 

MIT Press Releases, 1962-63; Copies of Select Former Building 12 MIT Press Releases; 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); various dates from 1962 through 1963; SRDB Ref ID: 

MIT Requests, 1947-48, MIT Requests for Radioisotopes from Oak Ridge (1947-48); Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT); various dates, 1947-48; SRDB Ref ID: 31809 

MIT Shipping, 1946, MIT Shipping Records from John Chipman (MIT Metallurgical Project) to Dr. 

E. R. Jette (Los Alamos); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); various dates 1945-46; SRDB 

Ref ID: 30738, pdf pp. 2-6 and 9 

National Lead, 1954-59, Summary Report 1954-1959, WIN-115; National Lead Company; 1954­

1959: SRDB Ref ID: 9113, pdf pp. 48-57 

Nucleonic Corporation, Apr57-Sep57, 1957 Film Badge Exposure Reports; Nucleonic Corporation of 

America; Various dates from April 15, 1957 through September 4, 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 25011 

NMI, 1958, Dedication of New Research and Development; Nuclear Metals, Inc., Archives of the 

Concord Public Library (accessible on site only – no copying allowed); October 24, 1958 

NMI Employees, 1954-2004, NMI Employee Names, Hire Dates, and Clock Numbers, and 

Departments, Nuclear Metals, Inc.; SRDB Ref ID: 26820 

ORAU, 2008a, Documented Communication with Former Worker, Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

(ORAU); October 7, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 52730 

ORAU, 2008b, Documented Communication with Former Workers, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU); October 8, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 52729 

ORAU, 2008c, Documented Communication with Former Worker, Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

(ORAU); October 6, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 52732 

ORAU, 2008d, Documented Communication with Process Knowledge Experts, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU); October 7, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 52731 

ORAU, 2008e, Documented Communication with Process Knowledge Expert, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU); October 6, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 52733 

ORNL, 1998, ORNL Sites-Summary; Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL); October 14, 1998; 

SRDB Ref ID: 44956 

Randall, 1947, Visit to Project at MIT, memo to the files; Raymond Randall; March 14, 1947; SRDB 

Ref ID: 16846 

Rodden, 1952, Radium Prepared from K-65 Material, correspondence to R. Evans; C. J. Rodden; 

April 7, 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 32966 

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SEC-00101 02-04-09 FINAL Hood Building 

Santangelo, no date, The Growth of a Company-A Brief History of NMI; John Santangelo; no date; 

SRDB Ref ID: 50804 

The Tech, 1963, Course 16 to Receive New Building, newspaper article on Hood Building at MIT; 

The Tech newspaper; February 6, 1963; SRDB Ref ID: 44976 

Various authors, Mar63-Dec70, Nuclear Material Transfer Reports; various authors; March 1963 

through December 1970; SRDB Ref ID: 19022 

Watertown, unknown date, Summary of MIT; Watertown Arsenal; unknown date; SRDB Ref ID: 

16846, pdf pp. 27-28 

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SEC-00101 02-04-09 FINAL 

Attachment 1: Data Capture Synopsis 

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for the Hood Building and MIT 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured 

Primary Site/Company Name: Massachusetts Institute of Technology AWE 1942-1946, BE 1943-1946, DOE 1946-1963 Other Site Names: N/A [Name Redacted], RSO, and [Name Redacted], General Counsel's Office, have been contacted numerous times between 03/05/2007 and 10/14/2008 

Hood Building floor plan, Hood Building line drawings and photographs. 

State Contacted: A letter was sent on 01/09/2007. On 01/23/2007 [Name Redacted], the Director of the MA Department of Public Health Radiation Control Program responded with an e-mail stating that he had no records for MIT from the covered period. 

No records were captured. 

Argonne National Laboratory - East ANL monthly reports. 

ORAU Team Data Completeness Verification. 

Comprehensive Epidemiologic Data Resource (CEDR) No relevant documents identified. Concord, MA Town Hall Pamphlet describing the formation of MNI, including MIT connection, 

received during process knowledge expert interview. 

DOE Feed Materials Production Center (FMPC) NYOO Health and Safety Division reports, May-June, 1951 and FY 1953. 

DOE Germantown 1948 air sample data, beryllium sampling data and hazards analyses, 

beryllium reports, injury reports, and uranium flow sheets. 

DOE Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System (DDRS) 

No relevant documents identified. 

DOE Legacy Management Considered Sites Database Winchester Engineering and Analytical Center 1954-1959 summary report 

including an index of MIT related topical reports. 

DOE Legacy Management - MoundView (Fernald Holdings, includes Fernald Legal Database) 

K-65, thorium, and radium shipment and process information, K-65 sludge assays and laboratory intercomparison. 

DOE Mound Laboratory Shipping papers for EU shipments from MIT to FMPC. 

DOE Office of Scientific & Technical Information (OSTI) Energy Citations 

No relevant documents identified. 

DOE Office of Scientific& Technical Information (OSTI) Information Bridge 

Stannard's "Radioactivity and Health", oral history of C. J. Maletskos, uranium heat treatment, ORNL site summary. 

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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for the Hood Building and MIT 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured 

DOE OpenNet AEC monthly summary, NYOO monthly status reports, reference to MIT in 

the Lovelace history. 

EML/HASL Hood Building inspection. General Atomics Nuclear materials transfer report. 

Google Overview of the history of MIT's Department of Nuclear Science and 

Engineering. 

Interlibrary Loan Book documenting the formation of NMI from MIT's Metallurgical Project. 

MIT Online Archive 1963 newspaper article reporting the planned demolition of the Hood 

Building. 

NARA - Atlanta Trip reports, safety and health safeguards, extracting Pu from urine and 

feces, radioactive hazards analysis, shipment records, results of metallurgic 

spectrographic determinations, beryllium research, inventories, thorium project requests and shipments, irradiation requests for byproduct material and reports, breath samples, and the Hood Bldg. ventilation upgrade. 

National Academies Press (NAP) No relevant documents identified. 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - Nevada Site Office 

No relevant documents identified. 

NRC Agencywide Document Access and Management (ADAMS) 

License SNM-986 renewal material and historical material regarding MIT and the Watertown Arsenal. 

Nuclear Metals, Inc. Health and Safety Program. ORO Vault 1947 film badge data. 

RMIS Reducing oxidation losses by rolling uranium at lower temperatures. 

SAIC AEC exposure summaries including MIT for 1960, 1961, 1964, 1970, 1972, 

1973. 

Savannah River Site Thorium metal working and irradiation. 

Unknown Beryllium uses and practices, NYOO monthly reports, beryllium surveys 

and cases, NYOO H&S reports, beryllium shipments, beryllium air samples, accelerator fire, urine samples, film badge report, air sample reports, and thorium R&D. 

Washington State University (United States Transuranium and Uranium Registries) 

No relevant documents identified. 

Washington University Library - St. Louis Uranium extraction form phosphates and 396-5 ore. 

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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for the Hood Building and MIT 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured 

TOTAL 

Table A1-2: Internet Database Searches for the Hood Building and MIT 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

CEDR http://cedr.lbl.gov/ COMPLETED 04/02/2008 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

DOE Hanford DDRS http://www2.hanford.gov/declass/ COMPLETED 04/02/2008 

MIT Massachusetts Hood building Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

DOE OpenNet http://www.osti.gov/opennet/advancedsearch.jsp COMPLETED 04/02/2008 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Nuclear Metals, Cambridge 

DOE OSTI Information Bridge http://www.osti.gov/bridge/advancedsearch.jsp COMPLETED 04/02/2008 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Nuclear Metals, Cambridge 

National Academies Press http://www.nap.edu/ COMPLETED 04/02/2008 

"producing uranium" and "uranium metal" 

NRC ADAMS Reading Room http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html COMPLETED 04/02/2008 

Nuclear Metals, Cambridge Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Uranium Metal SNM-0065 SNM-986 

U.S. Transuranium & Uranium Registries http://www.ustur.wsu.edu/ COMPLETED 04/02/2008 

MIT 

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Table A1-2: Internet Database Searches for the Hood Building and MIT 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

Google http://www.google.com COMPLETED 04/11/2008 

AEC, americium, Am241, Am-241, Am 241, 241Am, 241-Am, 241 Am, 

AEC, ionium, Th230, Th-230, Th 230, 230Th, 230-Th, 230 Th neptunium, Np237, Np-237, Np 237, 237Np, 237-Np, 237 Np, palm, Palmolive polonium, Po210, Po-210, Po 210, 210Po, 210-Po, 210 Po AEC thorium, thoria, Th232, Th-232, Th 232, 232Th, 232-Th, 232 Th, Z metal, Z-metal, myrnalloy, chemical 10-66, chemical 1066, chemical 10 66, chemical 18-12, chemical 1812, chemical 18 12, chemical 10-12, chemical 1012, chemical 10 12, UX1, UX2, Th-234, Th234, Th 234, 234-Th, 234Th, 234 Th tritium, H3, H-3, mint, HTO uranium, U233, U-233, U 233, 233U, 233-U, 233 U, U234, U 234, U-234, 234U, 234-U, 234 U, U235, U 235, U-235, 235-U, 235U, 235 U, U238, U 238, U-238, 238-U, 238U, 238 U, U308, U 308, U-308, 308-U, 308U, 308 U black oxide, brown oxide, green salt, orange oxide, yellow cake, UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6, C-216, C-616, C-65, C-211, U3O8 uranium extraction, uranium dioxide, uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride, uranium trioxide 

plutonium, Pu-238, Pu238, Pu 238, 238Pu, 238-Pu, 238 Pu, Pu-239, Pu239, Pu 239, 239Pu, 239-Pu, 239 Pu, Pu-240, Pu240, Pu 240 radium, Ra-226, Ra226, Ra 226, 226-Ra, 226Ra, 226 Ra, Ra-228, Ra228, Ra 228, 228Ra, 228-Ra, 228 Ra radon, Rn-222, Rn222, Rn 222, 222Rn, 222-Rn, 222 Rn thoron, Rn-220, Rn220, Rn 220, 220Rn, 220-Rn, 220 Rn protactinium, Pa-234m, Pa234m, Pa 234m, 234mPa, 234m-Pa, 234m Pa strontium, Sr-90, Sr90, Sr 90, 90-Sr, 90Sr, 90 Sr uranium dioxide, OR "uranium tetrafluoride", OR "uranium trioxide" uranium contamination Hood building radioactive air dust, OR "air filter", OR "airborne test" 

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Table A1-2: Internet Database Searches for the Hood Building and MIT 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

"belgian congo ore", OR bioassay, OR bio-assay, OR beta, OR body burden, 1942-1963 contamination, OR collimation, OR curie, OR denitration, OR "denitration pot" 1942-1963 dose, OR dosimeter, OR DAC, OR "derived air concentration" 1942-1963 dosimetric, OR dosimetry, OR electron, OR environment 1942-1963 exposure, OR "exposure investigation", OR "radiation exposure" "F machine", OR fecal, OR "feed material", OR femptocurie, OR fission, 

OR fluoroscopy Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program, OR FUSRAP, OR gamma-ray, OR "gas proportional", OR "gaseous diffusion" health physics, OR "highly enriched uranium", OR HEU "low enriched uranium", LEU, OR "lung count" maximum permissible concentration, OR MPC, OR metallurgy, OR microcurie, OR millicurie "nuclear fuels", OR "nuclear track emulsion" "occupational radiation exposure", OR "ore concentrate", "radiation work permit", OR "safe work permit", OR "special work permit", 

OR RWP, OR SWP Pitchblend picocurie, OR photofluorography, OR pitchblende, OR "pocket ion chamber radiation, OR radioactive, OR radioactivity, OR radiological "Radiological Survey Data Sheet", OR "RSDS", OR radionuclide, OR raffinate "Radiological Survey" "retention schedules", OR roentgen "air sample", OR "dust sample", OR "general area air sample" building survey, OR "routine survey", OR "special survey", OR "technical 

basis" 

DOE Energy Citations http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/ COMPLETED 04/17/2008 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

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Table A1-2: Internet Database Searches for the Hood Building and MIT 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

NNSA - Nevada Site Office www.nv.doe.gov/main/search.htm COMPLETED 04/17/2008 

MIT 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Table A1-3: OSTI Documents Requested for the Hood Building and MIT 

Document Number Document Title 

No documents requested. 

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