SEC Petition Evaluation Report 

Petition SEC-00066 

Report Rev #:_0 Report Submittal Date___12/04/06__________ 

Subject Expert(s): Cindy W. Bloom, James Mahathy, Janet L. Westbrook, Kenneth 

Fleming, and Michael Kubiak 

Site Expert(s): Not Applicable 

Petitioner Administrative Summary 

Petition Under Evaluation 

Petition # Petition 

Type 

Petition A 

Receipt Date DOE/AWE Facility Name 

SEC-00066 83.14 July 24, 2006 Harshaw Chemical Company 

Proposed Class Definition 

All Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE) employees who were monitored or should have been monitored while 

working at the Harshaw Harvard-Denison Plant located at 1000 Harvard Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio for a 

number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days from August 14, 1942 through November 30, 1949, or 

in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in 

the SEC.

Related Petition Summary Information 

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status 

None

Related Evaluation Report Information 

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility Name 

None None

ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: 

James M. Mahathy

ORAU Review Completed By: 

Michael S. Kubiak

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on file] 12/05/2006 

LaVon Rutherford Date 

SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By: [Signature on file] 12/05/2006 

Jim Neton Date 

SEC Evaluation Approved By: [Signature on file] 12/05/2006 

Larry Elliott Date 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

2 of 24

This page intentionally blank 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

3 of 24

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00066, Harshaw Chemical Company 

This evaluation report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

addresses a class of employees proposed for addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) per the 

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7384 et seq. (EEOICPA) and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees 

as Members of the Special Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 

Compensation Program Act of 2000. 

NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition

The NIOSH-proposed class includes all Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE) employees who were 

monitored or should have been monitored while working at the Harshaw Harvard-Denison Plant 

located at 1000 Harvard Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio for a number of work days aggregating at least 

250 work days from August 14, 1942 through November 30, 1949, or in combination with work days 

within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 

Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.14(b), NIOSH has established that it does not have sufficient 

information to complete dose reconstructions for individual members of the class with sufficient 

accuracy. 

Health Endangerment Determination

NIOSH’s evaluation did not identify evidence from the petitioners or from other sources that would 

establish the class was exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have involved 

exceptionally high-level exposures, such as nuclear criticality incidents or other events involving 

similarly high levels of exposure. However, the evidence reviewed in this evaluation suggests that 

some workers in the class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures through intake of 

radionuclides and from direct exposure to radioactive materials. Consequently, in accordance with 

42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3)(ii), NIOSH has determined that health may have been endangered for those 

workers covered by this evaluation who were employed for a number of work days aggregating at 

least 250 work days within the parameters established for this class or in combination with work days 

within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

4 of 24

This page intentionally blank 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

5 of 24

Table of Contents 

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00066, Harshaw Chemical Company ............................................. 3 

1.0 Purpose and Scope....................................................................................................................... 7 

2.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7 

3.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition and Petition Basis................................................................ 8 

4.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class ........................................................... 8 

4.1 Harshaw Chemical Company Plant and Process Description ............................................ 8 

4.1.1 Uranium Tetrachloride Production......................................................................... 9 

4.1.2 Uranium Hexafluoride Production ......................................................................... 9 

4.1.3 Uranium Tetrafluoride Production ....................................................................... 10 

4.1.4 Uranium Trioxide (UO3) and Uranium Dioxide (UO2) Production.................... 10 

4.1.5 Uranyl Nitrate Hexahydrate Production............................................................... 11 

4.1.6 Operations Involving Other Radiological Materials ............................................ 11 

4.1.7 Summary of Potential Exposures ......................................................................... 11 

5.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class.............................................. 12 

5.1 Harshaw Chemical Company Internal Personnel Monitoring Data ................................. 12 

5.2 Harshaw Chemical Company External Personnel Monitoring Data................................ 13 

5.3 Harshaw Chemical Company Workplace Monitoring Data............................................. 13 

5.3.1 Air Monitoring...................................................................................................... 14 

5.3.2 Dose Rate Measurements..................................................................................... 14 

5.3.3 Surface Contamination Measurements................................................................. 15 

6.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class ...................................................... 16 

6.1 Feasibility of Estimating Internal Exposures ................................................................... 17 

6.2 Feasibility of Estimating External Exposures .................................................................. 18 

7.0 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00066........................................................ 18 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00066................................................... 18 

9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00066 ...................................................................... 19 

10.0 References ................................................................................................................................. 21 

Table 

Table 5-1: University of Rochester Survey Results.............................................................................. 15 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

6 of 24

This page intentionally left blank 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

7 of 24

 

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for SEC-00066

1.0 Purpose and Scope 

This report evaluates the feasibility of reconstructing doses for employees who worked at specific 

facilities during a specified time. It provides information and analysis germane to considering a 

petition for adding a class of employees to the Congressionally-created SEC. 

This report does not provide any determinations concerning the feasibility of dose reconstruction that 

necessarily apply to any individual energy employee who might require a dose reconstruction from 

NIOSH, with the exception of the employee whose dose reconstruction could not be completed, and 

whose claim consequently led to this petition evaluation. The finding in this report is not the final 

determination as to whether or not the proposed class will be added to the SEC (see Section 2.0). This 

report will be considered by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (the Board) and by 

the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Secretary of HHS will make final decisions 

concerning whether or not to add one or more classes to the SEC in response to the petition addressed 

by this report. 

This evaluation, in which NIOSH provides its findings on both the feasibility of estimating radiation 

doses of members of this class with sufficient accuracy and on health endangerment, was conducted in 

accordance with the requirements of EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.14. 

2.0 Introduction 

Both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 require NIOSH to evaluate qualified petitions requesting the 

Department of Health and Human Services to add a class of employees to the SEC. The evaluation is 

intended to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether or not it is feasible to estimate, with 

sufficient accuracy, the radiation doses of the proposed class of employees through NIOSH dose 

reconstructions.1

NIOSH is required to document its evaluation in a report. In doing so, NIOSH relies on its own dose 

reconstruction expertise as well as technical support from Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

(ORAU). Upon completion, the report is provided to both the petitioners and to the Advisory Board 

on Radiation and Worker Health. The Board will consider the NIOSH evaluation report, together 

with the petition, comments of the petitioner(s) and such other information as the Board considers 

appropriate, to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on whether to add one or more classes 

of employees to the SEC. Once NIOSH has received and considered the advice of the Board, the 

Director of NIOSH will propose a decision on behalf of HHS. The Secretary of HHS will make final 

decisions, taking into account the NIOSH evaluation, the advice of the Board, and the proposed 

decision issued by NIOSH. As part of this final decision process, the petitioner(s) may seek a review 

of certain types of final decisions issued by the Secretary of HHS.2

1

 NIOSH dose reconstructions under EEOICPA are performed using the methods promulgated under 42 C.F.R. pt. 82 and 

the detailed implementation guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 

2

 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 for a full description of the procedures summarized here. Additional internal procedures are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

8 of 24

3.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition and Petition Basis 

This NIOSH report summarizes the methods and findings of the NIOSH SEC evaluation for all AWE 

employees who were monitored or should have been monitored while working at the Harshaw 

Harvard-Denison Plant located at 1000 Harvard Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio from August 14, 1942 

through November 30, 1949. 

The evaluation responds to Petition SEC-00066, which was submitted by an EEOICPA claimant who 

was employed as a chemical mixer at the facility during this period, and whose dose reconstruction 

could not be completed by NIOSH because of a lack of sufficient dosimetry-related information. The 

NIOSH determination that it is unable to complete a dose reconstruction for an EEOICPA claimant is 

a qualified basis for submitting an SEC petition pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 83.9(b). 

4.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class 

The following subsections summarize the radiological operations at the Harshaw Chemical Company 

during the period of AWE operations from August 1942 to September 1955, and the information 

available to NIOSH to characterize particular processes and radioactive source materials. During this 

period, employees at Harshaw were involved with research and production activities using multiple 

forms of uranium, including uranium tetrachloride, uranium tetrafluoride, uranium hexafluoride, 

uranium dioxide, uranium trioxide, and uranyl nitrate hexahydrate. From available resources, NIOSH 

has gathered process and source descriptions, information regarding the identity and quantities of each 

radionuclide of concern, and information describing the process through which the radiation 

exposures of concern may have occurred and the physical environment in which they may have 

occurred. The information included within this evaluation report is meant only to be a summary of 

the available information. 

4.1 Harshaw Chemical Company Plant and Process Description 

The Harshaw Chemical Company site in Cleveland, Ohio received uranium in a variety of forms 

including milled ore or black oxide (U3O8), sodium diuranate (soda salt), and uranyl nitrate 

hexahydrate. The milled uranium feed products were further processed by various chemical and 

extraction methods from 1942 to 1955 under contract to the U.S. government. The site also did 

business under the name Harshaw Filtrol Partners, but this appears to have occurred after 1955 (when 

radiological operations had ceased). 

Uranium production operations for the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) war effort began in 

August 1942 when Harshaw produced laboratory quantities of uranium tetrachloride. This work 

would have been done using ore material. Harshaw Chemical Company also produced uranium 

tetrachloride for the National Bureau of Standards. After 1943, other research contracts followed, 

including a contract to research methods of improving uranium capture and recovery (Harshaw, 

1945). 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

9 of 24

From March 1942 and continuing until 1951, Harshaw produced uranium hexafluoride (DOE, 1997, 

Stefanec, 1951). In 1944, under contract to MED, Harshaw built and operated a full-scale uranium 

hexafluoride pilot plant (Harshaw, 1945). 

In May 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contracted with Harshaw to convert uranium 

concentrate to uranium trioxide and then to uranium oxide (NYOO Medical Division, 1949 and 

Mayer, 1949). In 1951 AEC discontinued conversion of uranium trioxide to uranium dioxide and 

production of uranium dioxide ceased. At that point, Harshaw began to produce uranium trioxide 

only from milled ore (DOE, 1997). Production of uranium trioxide continued until about September 

1955 when the plant was shut down. Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) activities were 

conducted under AEC supervision starting in November 1951. 

The entire Harshaw Chemical Company operational area for AEC work was referred to as “Plant C,” 

or “Area C” (Velten, 1949). Plant C included all of the individual production operations using 

radiological materials (uranium dioxide-to-uranium tetrafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride-to-uranium 

hexafluoride plus distillation, and ore-to-uranium dioxide or -uranium trioxide). The locations where 

these three individual production operations were performed were also referred to as “plants.” The 

common usage of the time may have referred to the ore-to-uranium dioxide operations as the "brown 

plant" or "new brown plant" and to the rest of the operations as “Plant C.” 

4.1.1 Uranium Tetrachloride Production 

Harshaw shipped its first order of uranium tetrachloride to the National Bureau of Standards in March 

1942. Harshaw began larger-scale laboratory production of uranium tetrachloride in November 1942; 

by April 1943, Harshaw was producing up to 100 pounds of uranium tetrachloride daily (Harshaw, 

1945). Harshaw set up a new production area in October 1944. This new production area was 

initially used to process up to one ton per day of uranium tetrachloride, with the production rate 

continuing to increase monthly thereafter (Harshaw, 1945; Ferry, 1944; and MED, 1945). In January 

1945, MED ordered an additional amount of 65,000 pounds of uranium tetrachloride. This was the 

final order of the material (Simmons, 1945). Harshaw stopped production of uranium tetrachloride in 

February 1945 and dismantled the uranium tetrachloride production area. Parts were shipped to Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee (Harshaw, 1945). 

4.1.2 Uranium Hexafluoride Production 

In February 1942, Harshaw Chemical Company first produced uranium hexafluoride and maintained a 

production rate of five (5) pounds per day throughout 1942. By 1943, Harshaw was producing as 

much as fifty (50) pounds of uranium hexafluoride per day in a pilot plant. Harshaw operated the 

pilot plant until February 1944, producing a total of 9,000 pounds of uranium hexafluoride (Harshaw, 

1945). 

In 1944, Harshaw built a new uranium hexafluoride production facility containing three units. 

Harshaw erected electrolytic cells to obtain the fluorine that was used to produce uranium 

hexafluoride (Quigley, 1951). By July 1944, Harshaw was producing as much as 3,300 pounds of 

uranium hexafluoride per day, and as much as 4,500 pounds per day of uranium hexafluoride by April 

1945 (AEC, 1951 and Harshaw, 1945). Still, further increases in production were requested and 

achieved. Although not produced on a regular monthly basis, by December 1947 Harshaw was 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

10 of 24

producing up to 46,000 pounds of uranium hexafluoride per month. In December 1951, Harshaw 

Chemical Company stopped producing uranium hexafluoride. 

4.1.3 Uranium Tetrafluoride Production 

In 1942, at the request of Standard Oil, Harshaw Chemical Company began to produce uranium 

tetrafluoride from uranium dioxide. The first uranium dioxide material processed at Harshaw was 

supplied by Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company (Medical History of Harshaw 

Chemical Company). In July 1942, MED asked Harshaw to produce 1,200 pounds of uranium 

tetrafluoride per day from uranium dioxide produced and supplied by DuPont and Mallinckrodt 

(Harshaw, 1945). 

In September 1942, Harshaw implemented large-scale production using a new facility with a 

production capacity of 50,000 pounds (25 tons) of uranium tetrafluoride per month (Medical History 

of Harshaw Chemical Company and AEC, 1951). By December 1943, continued improvements in the 

conversion process increased the production level to 60 tons per month (Harshaw, 1945 and AEC, 

1951). 

In December 1944, Harshaw moved production of uranium tetrafluoride to Building G-1 where the 

production rate was about 3,000 pounds daily (Medical History of Harshaw Chemical Company). In 

February 1946, anticipating a later full production of 28,000 pounds (14 tons) per week, MED 

authorized an increase to 15,000 pounds per week. 

Although discrepancies in production quantities exist and are likely due to the reporting of theoretical 

capacity versus actual production, the final full production level for uranium tetrafluoride (in February 

1948) appears to have been 81 tons per month (AEC, 1951). In October 1951, Harshaw stopped 

producing uranium tetrafluoride (DOE, 1997). 

4.1.4 Uranium Trioxide (UO3) and Uranium Dioxide (UO2) Production 

In 1947, Harshaw Chemical Company constructed an ore-to-uranium trioxide-to-uranium dioxide 

batch production facility for AEC use (Velten, 1949). This facility was constructed so that Harshaw 

could produce uranium dioxide on-site, alleviating the need to bring in uranium dioxide from other 

suppliers. “Ore” was typically received as milled ore. 

By July 1949, the ore-to-uranium trioxide-to-uranium dioxide batch production facility was operating 

(AEC, 1951). In 1951, through process modification that included a switch to the use of tributyl 

phosphate-kerosene rather than ether, uranium dioxide production increased (AEC, 1951). However, 

the uranium trioxide-to-uranium dioxide portion of the operation was stopped entirely in 1951 

although the AEC implies this occurred as of October 1952 (DOE, 1997; Stefanec, 1951; and Termini, 

1952). 

The uranium trioxide contractual amount was 200,000 pounds per month from October to December 

of 1952 (Neumann, 1952). Harshaw continued to produce uranium trioxide from ore until August 

1953 when uranium trioxide production was placed on standby and the AEC directed Harshaw to end 

all processing except for a final conversion of all leftover feed materials to uranium trioxide 

(Neumann, 1953). 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

11 of 24

4.1.5 Uranyl Nitrate Hexahydrate Production 

Throughout the 1950 through 1951 timeframe, uranyl nitrate hexahydrate, which is an intermediate 

liquid produced in the initial processing of ore and uranium extraction, was reportedly produced as 

“Research Material” along with UO2(NO3)·6 H2O. Documentation available to NIOSH does not 

indicate if the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate was produced for use at Harshaw or elsewhere. Beginning in 

1952, Hanford sent uranyl nitrate hexahydrate to Harshaw, sometimes via the Brush Beryllium 

Company, to be converted into uranium trioxide (Klevin, 1952; Termini, 1952; DOE; 2000). Hanford 

produced uranyl nitrate hexahydrate using a tributyl phosphate chemical process and transported it in 

tank cars to Harshaw. 

4.1.6 Operations Involving Other Radiological Materials 

Between 1943 and 1944, Harshaw Chemical Company manufactured a number of special radiological 

materials, including uranium oxyfluoride (UO2F2), sodium uranate (Na2UO7) at 84%, and uranium 

nitrate (U(NO3)x) at 56% (presumably the percentages were of U3O8 equivalent) (Harshaw, 1945). 

However, NIOSH has not located documentation describing how Harshaw processed these materials. 

Between February 1947 and August 1950, Harshaw prepared short-lived thorium-234 (known as 

UX1) from a residue of the uranium tetrafluoride-to-uranium hexafluoride conversion process 

(Stefanec, 1951). Thorium-234 (UX1) was produced in a laboratory in bench quantities (Stefanec, 

1951) 

. 

On at least two occasions, Harshaw Chemical Company processed some low-enriched uranium, in the 

form of uranium hexafluoride, from Hanford (Kelley, 1946). In 1945 and 1946, Harshaw was asked 

to mix natural uranium hexafluoride with uranium hexafluoride that had been slightly enriched. The 

resulting slightly enriched uranium hexafluoride, now referred to as low-enriched uranium 

hexafluoride, appears to have been enriched to less than 1% uranium-235 by weight and was shipped 

to the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plan in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Kelley, 1946). 

4.1.7 Summary of Potential Exposures 

Harshaw AWE employees could have received internal and external radiation exposures from 

uranium and non-uranium contaminants, including radium, thorium, and lead in the milled and 

composite materials. The uranium content of mined uranium ores varied based upon the quality of the 

rock being mined. Natural conditions also resulted in varying degrees of disequilibrium between 

decay series radionuclides within particular ore deposits. A majority of the 226Ra and thorium 

isotopes would have been removed by the milling processes. 

While the activity of the 226Ra and thorium isotopes was reduced, much of the potential for external 

exposure to AWE workers at Harshaw was likely due to uranium progeny. Radium-226, a gamma 

emitter, likely produced some of the external whole body dose received by the Harshaw workers. 

Thorium-234 and 234mPa, both primarily beta emitters, likely produced whole body skin and extremity 

dose for workers involved in handling the fluorination ash or decontaminating equipment used to 

contain or transport the bed ash (ORAUT-TKBS-0044). 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

12 of 24

Internal exposures would have included alpha radiation resulting from uranium and uranium progeny 

emissions. Workers involved in the UX-1 operation were potentially exposed to alpha emissions from 

thorium. AWE workers were also likely exposed to elevated levels of radon. The concentration of 

radium (and radon) and other daughters present in the ore concentrates, processed uranium, and 

processing residue at any given time depended on various factors, including: the concentration of 

uranium in the original ore body; how much uranium progeny remained in the U3O8 product received 

from the mill, the total amount of U3O8 product processed, and how long the U3O8 was stored prior to 

use as feed at Harshaw. 

5.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class 

The primary data used for determining internal exposures are derived from personal monitoring data, 

such as urinalyses, fecal samples, and whole-body counting results. If these data are unavailable, the 

air monitoring data from breathing zone and general area monitoring are used to estimate the potential 

internal exposure. If personal monitoring and breathing zone area monitoring are unavailable, internal 

exposures can sometimes be estimated using more general area monitoring, process information, and 

information characterizing and quantifying the source term. 

The same hierarchy is used to determine the external exposures. Personal monitoring data from film 

badges or thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) are the primary data used for determining external 

exposures. If there are no personal monitoring data, exposure rate surveys, process, and source term 

modeling can sometimes be used to reconstruct the potential external exposure. 

A more detailed discussion of the information required for dose reconstruction can be found in 

OCAS-IG-001, Internal Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guide and OCAS-IG-002, External 

Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guide. These documents are available at: 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocasdose.html. 

5.1 Harshaw Chemical Company Internal Personnel Monitoring Data 

Radiological uranium urinalysis at Harshaw appears to have first occurred in 1944 as part of a 

screening experiment conducted at several MED sites (Ferry, 1944). Urinalysis samples were sent to 

the University of Rochester for processing. However, by January 1946, this screening program was 

abandoned (Medical History of Harshaw Chemical Company; Mears 1946). 

In August 1947, AEC asked Harshaw to implement a routine urinalysis program for uranium and 

fluorine (Kelley, 1947). Some results are available for August 1947, June 1948, December 1948, and 

July 1949. However, all samples taken in 1947 were reportedly contaminated. More frequent results 

were found for the period from December 1949 through 1953. NIOSH has not identified any results 

for dates after 1953 (AEC, 1958). A document titled Harshaw Chemical Co.—Occupational 

Exposure to Radioactive Dust in Green to Hex Plant, states that 200 workers were subject to 

urinalysis, which appears to have included workers at all three major areas of Plant C (Klevin, 1950). 

In 1951, Harshaw estimated that several hundred terminated employees had potentially been exposed 

to uranium for more than a year and that these employees were unlikely to have been monitored. 

NIOSH has obtained results of Harshaw employee urinalyses and blood analyses. One hundred 

twenty-five (125) results are for the period prior to December 1949. There are 5,898 results for the 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

13 of 24

period from December 1949 through December 1953. NIOSH has identified results of 1950 and 1951 

blood analyses analyzed for uranium for sixteen people including one AEC worker (Tabershaw, 

1951). 

5.2 Harshaw Chemical Company External Personnel Monitoring Data 

NIOSH has identified film badge results for 187 workers for the time period of August 1944 through 

March 1948. These worker results were part of a weekly badge exchange program initiated by MED 

in 1945. The early film badge results are summaries, by worker, of the total beta dose, gamma dose, 

and total weeks exposed (Mears, 1946). Documentation available to NIOSH showed that Harshaw 

maintained a routine film badge program from 1948 through 1953. No specific descriptions of the 

film badge, quality assurance measures, or reading process used for this dosimetry have been 

identified. Because the University of Rochester, and later AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory 

(HASL), processed the film badges, the film badge design was likely similar to the film badge used at 

other AEC sites. 

In 1948, some badges were stored near cylinders of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride that added a 

spurious gamma dose. In 1949, the AEC reviewed some gamma badge results from various sites 

(Blatz, 1949). The review showed that although Harshaw generally had no measurable gamma 

exposures, occasionally all badges for a particular week would range from 50 to 100 mR. The AEC 

believed this was due to poor handling rather than real dose indication (Blatz, 1949). At one point, 

Harshaw reported that the seal holding the clip to the back of the film badge frequently failed, 

allowing the badge to fall onto the floor and other places. As a result, films were potentially ruined. 

Extremity monitoring was performed infrequently. In 1946, a MED Sergeant was monitored for a 

four-day period while he worked as a temporary low-enriched uranium hexafluoride tray loader and 

ash handler. Some information on the potential for extremity exposure was gathered, but some of the 

films were unreadable due to a heat problem caused by perspiration (Engel, 1946). Ink fingerprinting 

and photographic fingerprinting were used in an AEC study to determine if changes to workers’ skin 

ridges could be related to radiation exposure, but the results of these studies have not been located. 

Neutron exposure at Harshaw was not monitored. The forms of uranium that would produce neutrons 

at the highest rates would have been uranium tetrafluoride and uranium hexafluoride; however, 

uranium oxide (yellow cake), U3O8, and the soda salt from Na2U2O7 would also have potentially 

generated neutron reactions from alpha-neutron reactions. 

Uranium processing workers at Harshaw were given pre-employment physicals that included a chest 

X-ray (AEC, 1958). These workers also were given annual physicals that included a chest X-ray and 

a pelvic X-ray (Ferry 1944; Kelley, 1947; and Quigley, 1951). The rationale for the pelvic X-ray was 

to detect bone effects due to fluoride exposure; thus, it is likely that only the workers in the uranium 

tetrafluoride-to-uranium hexafluoride process area received pelvic examinations. 

5.3 Harshaw Chemical Company Workplace Monitoring Data 

Workplace monitoring data have been identified and reviewed by NIOSH for the purposes of 

assessing the exposure hazards and potential for exposure, and to determine if these data can be used 

to reconstruct internal and external doses with sufficient accuracy. 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

14 of 24

5.3.1 Air Monitoring 

The milling of uranium ore at Harshaw was a primary source of airborne dust. Operations involving 

the loading, grinding, and crushing of uranium tetrafluoride were a routine and sustained source of 

airborne contamination. Operations involving the production of uranium hexafluoride contributed to 

concentrations of airborne radioactivity as well. Some controls, including the use of damp filter 

cakes, were used to reduce the release of airborne radioactivity; these controls had limited success. 

For example, contaminated dust could become airborne when filter cakes dried. 

In addition to the chemical processes that generated airborne radioactivity, other tasks such as 

sweeping contributed to airborne contamination. Some systems intended to control dust could 

actually result in increased worker exposure. For example, prior to the installation of the central 

vacuum system in 1950, the portable vacuum cleaners discharged a considerable amount of unfiltered 

dust back inside the room in which they were being used (Hunter, 1949 and Stefanec, 1951). 

In 1944 and 1945, Harshaw performed some limited air sampling and these data are available to 

NIOSH (Ferry, 1944 and Tybout, 1945). The mass of uranium in the sample was determined by 

multiplying the mass of uranium in a standard by the ratio of instrument response measured for the 

sample to the instrument response measured for the standard, and dividing by the volume of air 

sampled. 

By the latter part of 1949, a permanent air sampling program was implemented (Mayer, 1949 and 

Wolf, 1949). This permanent program consisted of four general area air samples from each of the 40 

sample stations, which were to be taken every month; about 100 breathing zone samples, which were 

to be taken each month; and four samples, which were to be taken from each of 13 stack locations 

(Wolf, 1949 and Harris, 1949). This program monitored dusts and emanations. While Harshaw 

intended to implement the permanent program in September 1949, the air sampling program was not 

fully operational in September 1949. In December 1949, only 130 samples per month were being 

collected. Harshaw told the AEC that the sampling manifold did not work properly, that there were 

pump troubles, and that the lines were too long to permit sufficient volume intake. The AEC 

inspected the system and found that the manifold was not installed according to the layout provided to 

Harshaw by the AEC New York Operations Office. As a result, there was a significant increase in the 

amount of tubing, elbows, and tees, which resulted in pressure losses (Klevin, 1950). These 

deficiencies were corrected under AEC direction (Sargent, 1950). The air sampling results were 

reported alpha activity. The alpha activity was equated to uranium activity. Although Harris (1949) 

reported that the refined ores contained “no radium content,” the refinery operations were not 100% 

efficient, especially with the early refinery operations. Radon concentrations in air were not formally 

measured at Harshaw. Uranium and radium progenies were not considered in the airborne monitoring 

results. 

Results of air monitoring at Harshaw are available for the period 1948 through 1953, with most results 

being for 1950 and thereafter. Some breathing zone results are available from 1950 through 1953. 

5.3.2 Dose Rate Measurements 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

15 of 24

There are records of many dose rate measurements throughout the operational period (Quigley, 1951 

and Stefanec, 1951). Gamma dose rates were recorded in mR/hour while beta dose rates were 

recorded in mrep/hour; Beta plus gamma dose rates were sometimes also recorded in units of 

mrep/hour (Stefanec, 1951). 

5.3.3 Surface Contamination Measurements 

Early information regarding specific contamination levels is limited, but the available records indicate 

that contamination was a major issue at Harshaw. Process areas were not always well-enclosed or 

well-ventilated. It does not appear that there was any designation between clean and contaminated 

areas for change rooms and other pass-through areas until at least 1949. There was a considerable loss 

of uranium dust through stacks, after which the dust could eddy back into the building. A 1946 

Harshaw operating manual implies that contamination was being tracked from work areas. In 

addition, visitors were not issued cover clothing until 1949 (Morgan, 1949). 

In order to assess contamination, the University of Rochester performed a general contamination 

survey at Harshaw in 1947 (Ray, 1947). The survey included smears of surfaces inside the plant, 

collection of ten soil samples, and one sample each of paint, rust, bark and grass outside the main 

plant building. The smears were counted at Rochester using an alpha counter. The University of 

Rochester assumed that the counts represented half of the total alpha disintegrations (ignoring 

absorption in the sample). No information regarding the total area smeared was available. Results of 

the University of Rochester survey are presented in Table 5-1. 

Table 5-1: University of Rochester Survey Results 

Area Range 

(alpha dpm) 

2nd Floor (UO2-UF4) 34–680 

Worker shoes, top and bottom 5,840;1,692 

Stair landing 938 

Floor around cooling rack 382–1,240 

Floor around furnaces 314–816 

Operator's desk 676 

Tube filling rack 1,614 

Tray loading bench 2,478 

Tray loading bench, floor 1,640–2,602 

Paste bench 1,084 

Green salt bench 6,504 

Green salt bench, floor 1,260 

Work bench 8,364 

Used trays 2,164 

1st floor, receiver area 1,118–1,326 

Panel board area 910–1,260 

UF4/ash powder on floor 4,550 

Hood, near reactors 1,262–7,082 

Floor around cells 160–746 

Top of cells 70–92 

Cell doorways 150–182 

Near cell rooms, floor painted, hosed 30–316 

In cell rooms, floor hosed down 16–94 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

16 of 24

Table 5-1: University of Rochester Survey Results 

Area Range 

(alpha dpm) 

Reactors 460–2,016 

Floor around reactors 266–1,450 

Still room floor 392–576 

Pipe rack in receiving room 556–952 

Doorways in receiving room 460–574 

Repair room, walls/windows 24–92 

Repair room, floor 116–544 

Repair room workbench 302 

Receiving room desk 250 

Receiving room floor 392 

Loading room floor 938 

Loading room doorway area 122–382 

Guard shack area 100–186 

Filter shack 46–288 

Inside doorway of Supt's office 440 

Floor at filing cabinet, office 420 

Other floor areas, office 8–256 

Box of pipes outside Supt's office 214 

Doorway to Plant Manager's office 8 

Mail table floor area, hall 12–18 

"Girls'" shower room floor 250 

"Girls'" locker room floor 778 

"Girls'" lunchroom floor 702 

Men's shower room floor 846 

Men's locker room floor 1,040–2,083 

Men's lunchroom floor 958 

Main lunchroom, kitchen 2–26 

Survey results are available from the last year of operation. A memo regarding a radiation survey of 

the Harshaw Refinery reported that after nominal cleaning of contaminated floors, beta readings 

averaged one (1) mrep/hour in many locations. Some beta results exceeded twenty (20) mrep/hour 

(McAlduff, 1956). Photon radiation was minimal in all surveyed floor locations, averaging 0.05 

mR/hour. 

6.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class 

42 C.F.R. § 83.14(b) states that HHS will consider a NIOSH determination that there was insufficient 

information to complete a dose reconstruction, as indicated in this present case, to be sufficient,

without further consideration, to conclude that it is not feasible to estimate the levels of radiation 

doses of individual members of the class with sufficient accuracy. 

In the case of a petition submitted to NIOSH under 42 C.F.R. § 83.9(b), NIOSH has already 

determined that a dose reconstruction cannot be completed for an employee at the AWE facility. This 

NIOSH determination provides the basis for the petition by the affected claimant. NIOSH has further 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

17 of 24

considered defining the extent of the class of employees who are similarly affected, as indicated by 

the completed research, and hence, as a class of employees, found that dose reconstruction is similarly 

not feasible. 

In accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 83.14(a), NIOSH also considered whether or not the completed 

research provides a basis for evaluating an additional class at the facility for whom NIOSH may 

believe that dose reconstruction is unlikely to be feasible. If NIOSH were to identify such a basis, it 

would undertake a separate SEC evaluation regarding the additional class. This would allow NIOSH, 

the Board, and HHS to complete, without delay, their consideration of the class including a claimant 

for whom NIOSH has already determined a dose reconstruction cannot be completed, and whose only 

possible remedy under EEOICPA would be adding a class of employees to the SEC. 

This section of the report summarizes research findings where NIOSH determined that it lacked 

sufficient information to complete the relevant dose reconstruction and on which basis it has defined 

the class of employees for which dose reconstruction is not feasible. The determination relies on the 

same statutory and regulatory criteria that govern consideration of all SEC petitions. 

6.1 Feasibility of Estimating Internal Exposures 

As indicated in Section 5.1, prior to initiation of routine bioassay monitoring for uranium in December 

1949, results from Harshaw bioassay monitoring have serious deficiencies, and as described 

previously, the results from 1947 were contaminated. NIOSH has 104 results for 1948 through early 

1949, but NIOSH has no documentation regarding the methods used for sample collection and 

analysis prior to the onset of routine monitoring in December 1949. NIOSH has found no indication 

that monitoring was performed for exposures to uranium progeny resulting from the processing of 

milled ores. 

NIOSH has obtained general area air monitoring data beginning in 1944. However, as discussed in 

Section 5.3.1, NIOSH does not have adequate air monitoring program documentation or breathing 

zone air monitoring data prior to 1950. While the available general area monitoring data are useful in 

demonstrating airborne radiological conditions, air monitoring data obtained prior to 1950 are not 

adequate to evaluate worker intakes due to uncertainties in sampling flow rate, sampling duration, 

sampling locations, and analysis methods. It is not feasible to use available general air monitoring 

results to adequately support reconstruction of uranium progeny and uranium-specific doses at the 

Harshaw plant prior to 1950. 

Due to the lack of personnel and area monitoring data for uranium progeny, NIOSH concludes that the 

available workplace and bioassay data do not provide the information necessary to assess with 

sufficient accuracy the non-uranium intakes at Harshaw Chemical Company prior to December 1949. 

NIOSH can likely reconstruct uranium-specific internal doses for monitored AWE workers for the 

period August 14, 1942 through September 30, 1955 using the uranium bioassay data, known uranium 

production source term data, and techniques applied to other AEC sites that processed uranium during 

the same period. NIOSH expects to generate co-worker intake data to reconstruct uranium-specific 

doses for AWE workers who were not monitored 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

18 of 24

6.2 Feasibility of Estimating External Exposures 

This evaluation responds to a petition based on NIOSH determining that internal radiation exposures 

could not be reconstructed for a dose reconstruction referred to NIOSH by the Department of Labor. 

As noted above, HHS will consider this determination to be sufficient without further consideration to 

determine that it is not feasible to estimate the levels of radiation doses of individual members of the 

class with sufficient accuracy. 

However, it is likely that NIOSH could estimate external exposure to electrons and photons for 

employees in this class. Usable external exposure data, as discussed in Section 5.2, include results of 

beta and gamma monitoring recorded by film badges and results from work area dose rate 

measurements. In addition, it is likely that NIOSH could also estimate significant neutron doses using 

the document titled Estimation of Neutron Dose Rates from Alpha-Neutron Reactions in Uranium and 

Thorium Compounds (ORAUT-OTIB-0024). NIOSH considers adequate reconstruction of external 

dose possible by using individual dosimetry records, claimant-favorable assumptions, and the relevant 

protocols specified in various complex-wide Technical Information Bulletins (TIBs). 

Similarly, NIOSH is able to reconstruct medical doses for Harshaw Chemical Company workers by 

using claimant-favorable assumptions as well as applicable protocols specified in the document titled 

Technical Information Bulletin: Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray 

Procedures (ORAUT-OTIB-0006). 

7.0 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00066 

This report evaluated the feasibility for estimating the dose, with sufficient accuracy, for all AWE 

employees working at the Harshaw Chemical Company from August 14, 1942 through November 30, 

1949. NIOSH determined that it lacks bioassay data and air monitoring results needed to reconstruct 

internal exposures to uranium progeny at the facility during this time period. Consequently, NIOSH 

finds that it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses resulting from 

internal exposures received by members of this class of employees. 

NIOSH has documented herein that it cannot complete the dose reconstruction(s) related to this 

petition. The basis of NIOSH’s finding is explained in this report, which demonstrates that NIOSH 

does not have access to sufficient information to estimate either the maximum radiation dose incurred 

by any member of the class or to estimate such radiation doses more precisely than a maximum dose 

estimate. Members of this class at the Harshaw Chemical Company may have received internal 

intakes from exposure to uranium and uranium progeny at the plant. NIOSH lacks sufficient 

information, including biological monitoring data, air monitoring information, and process and 

radiological source information that would allow it to estimate the potential intake(s) of uranium 

progeny, and the resulting dose to which the proposed class may have been exposed. 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00066 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

19 of 24

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.14(c) and § 83.13(c)(3). Pursuant to these requirements, if 

it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, NIOSH 

must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered 

the health of members of the class. The regulations direct NIOSH to assume that any duration of 

unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of members of a class when it has been 

established that the class may have been exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If 

the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then NIOSH is 

required to specify that health was endangered for those workers who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 

NIOSH has determined that members of the class were not exposed to radiation during a discrete 

incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear 

criticality incidents. However, the evidence reviewed in this evaluation indicates that some workers in 

the class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures through intakes of radionuclides. 

Consequently, NIOSH is specifying that health may have been endangered for those workers covered 

by this evaluation who were employed for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days 

within the parameters established for this class or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 

9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00066 

The evaluation defines a single class of employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses 

with sufficient accuracy. This NIOSH-proposed class includes all AWE employees who were 

monitored or should have been monitored while working at the Harshaw Harvard-Denison Plant 

located at 1000 Harvard Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio for a number of work days aggregating at least 

250 work days from August 14, 1942 through November 30, 1949, or in combination with work days 

within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

20 of 24

This page intentionally left blank 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

21 of 24

10.0 References 

42 C.F.R. pt. 81, Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule, Federal 

Register/Vol. 67, No. 85/Thursday, p 22296; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 19391 

42 C.F.R. pt. 82, Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 

19392 

42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special 

Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000; Final Rule; May 28, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 22001 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385 [EEOICPA], Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program Act of 2000; as amended 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray 

Procedures, Rev. 03 PC-1, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; December 21, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 

20220 

ORAUT-OTIB-0024, Estimation of Neutron Dose Rates from Alpha-Neutron Reactions in Uranium 

and Thorium Compounds, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; April 7, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 19445 

ORAUT-TKBS-0005, Technical Basis Document: Basis for Development of an Exposure Matrix for 

the Mallinckrodt Chemical Company, Rev. 00-C, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, March 10, 

SRDB Ref ID: 

AEC, 1947, Health Program at "Area C". Letter from W. E. Kelley of AEC to K. E. Long of Harshaw;

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); August 5, 1947; SRDB Ref ID: 12472 

AEC, 1951, The Production of Uranium Feed Materials; Atomic Energy Commission; May 22, 1951; 

SRDB Ref ID: 4125 

AEC, 1958, Correlation of Urine Data and Medical Findings with Environmental Exposure to 

Uranium Compounds, In: Symposium on Occupational Health Experience and Practices in the 

Uranium Industry, proceedings of an Atomic Energy Commission Conference; 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 

15010 

Author unknown, date unknown, Medical History of Harshaw Chemical Company; SRDB Ref ID: 

10641, page 186 

BJC, 2000, Recycled Uranium Mass Balance Project, Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site 

Report; Bechtel Jacobs Company; June 2000; SRDB Ref ID: 16497 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

22 of 24

Blatz, 1949, Review of Gamma Film Badge Readings at Harshaw, Plant Four (MCW), Linde, and 

Electro Met, Memorandum to B. S. Wolf from H. Blatz; Atomic Energy Commission; March 25, 

1949; SRDB Ref ID: 10641, page 82 

DOE 1997, Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to 

Their Environmental Consequences, Appendix B; Department of Energy, Office of Environmental 

Management; January 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 11930 

DOE 2000, Review of Generation and Flow of Recycled Uranium at Hanford; Department of Energy, 

Richland Operations Office; June 30, 2000; SRDB Ref ID: 4971 

Engel, 1946, Visit to Harshaw Chemical Company, Cleveland, Ohio, Memorandum to B. J. Mears 

from B. Engel; Manhattan Engineer District; February 19, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 11662 

Ferry, 1944, Progress Report of the Special Materials Division of the Medical Section, Memorandum 

to S. L. Warren from J. L. Ferry; Manhattan Engineer District; January 3, 1944; SRDB Ref ID: 14490 

Gamertsfelder, date unknown, Radiation Survey for Harshaw Chemical Co., Brief report of survey 

taken in two uranium processing areas; SRDB Ref ID: 13020 

Harris, 1949, Sampling Program at Harshaw Chemical Company, Memorandum to E. C. Sargent 

from W. B. Harris; Atomic Energy Commission; December 29, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 10641, page 1 

Harshaw, 1945, Brief History of Work on the Manhattan District Project at the Harshaw Chemical 

Company, Cleveland, Ohio; W. J. Harshaw, Harshaw Chemical Company; September 17, 1945; 

SRDB Ref ID: 11882, page 648 

Hunter, 1949, Harshaw Recovery System-Hex Plant, Memorandum to Files from D. Hunter; June 3, 

1949; SRDB Ref ID: 10641, page 63 

Kelley, 1946, Disposal of Slightly Enriched C-616, Memorandum to S. L. Brown from W. E. Kelley; 

February 4, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 11882 

Klevin, 1950, Harshaw Chemical Co.—Occupational Exposure to Radioactive Dust in Green to Hex 

Plant, September 13-16, 1949; Harshaw Chemical Company; February 14, 1950; SRDB Ref ID: 

10558 

Klevin, 1952, Harshaw Chemical Company—Visit of October 8, 1952, Memorandum to W. B. Harris 

from P. B. Klevin; Atomic Energy Commission; October 29, 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 11131, page 14 

Mayer, 1949, Visit to Harshaw Chemical Company, Cleveland, Ohio, on June 23, 1949-Preliminary 

Statistical Survey, Memorandum to F. M. Belmore from C. M. Mayer and F. Proschan; Atomic 

Energy Commission; June 28, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 11891, page 128 

McAlduff, 1956, Radiation Survey of Harshaw Refinery, Memorandum to F. R. Dowling from H. J. 

McAlduff; Atomic Energy Commission; November 20, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 4416, page 6 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

23 of 24

Mears, 1946, Badge Monitoring at Harshaw Chemical Company, Memorandum to the Rochester Area 

Engineer from B. J. Mears; April 16, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 7717, page 4 

MED, 1945, Supplemental Agreement Number 1 (to Contract No. W-26-021 eng-4), Agreement 

between the Harshaw Chemical Company and MED: Manhattan Engineer District; January 1, 1945 

Morgan, 1949, Meeting with Harshaw Chemical Company on January 24, 1949, Memorandum to 

Files from J. P. Morgan; Atomic Energy Commission; February 24, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 11891, page 

120 

Neumann, 1952, Harshaw Contract Feed and Production Schedule for Quarter Beginning October 1, 

1952, Letter to G. R. Fernelius from A. W. Neumann; August 1, 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 4125 

Neumann, 1953, Termination of Period of Work Performance, Letter to G. R. Fernelius from A. W. 

Neumann; Atomic Energy Commission; August 17, 1953; SRDB Ref ID: 11822, page 993 

NYOO Medical Division, 1949, Health Hazards in NYOO Facilities Producing and Processing 

Uranium; April 18, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 3931 

Quigley, 1951, Visit to Harshaw Chemical Company, Cleveland, Ohio, on June 6, 1951, 

Memorandum to M. Eisenbud from J. A. Quigley; Atomic Energy Commission; June 20, 1951; SRDB 

Ref ID: 11646, page 24 

Ray, 1947, Survey of Harshaw Chemical Company Unit at Cleveland, Ohio, July 9-10, 1947, 

Memorandum report to Dr. B. S. Wolf from W. H. Ray; Atomic Energy Commission; July 12, 1947; 

SRDB Ref ID: 11891, page 22 

Sargent, 1950, Medical Meeting at Harshaw, October 4, 1950, Memorandum to J. P. Morgan of the 

Production Division from E. C. Sargent; Atomic Energy Commission; October 5, 1950; SRDB Ref 

ID: 11895, page 41 

Simmons, 1945, Shipment Security Survey at Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Memorandum to the 

Officer in Charge from F. W. Simmons; Manhattan Engineer District; February 15, 1945; SRDB Ref 

ID: 7717 

Stefanec, 1951, Health Physics Activities November 15 through December 15, 1951; A. J. Stefanec; 

December 21, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 11137

Tabershaw, 1951, Contemplated Medical Program at Harshaw Chemical Company, Memorandum to 

M. Eisenbud from I. R. Tabershaw; Atomic Energy Commission, November 21, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 

11135 

Termini, 1952, Plant Visit: AEC Operations at Harshaw Chemical Company, Cleveland, Ohio, 

Memorandum to Files from J. P. Termini; Atomic Energy Commission; September 16, 1952; SRDB 

Ref ID: 11882, page 715 
SEC-00066 12-04-06 FINAL Harshaw Chemical Company

24 of 24

Tybout, 1945, Letter to F. Becker of Harshaw Chemical Company; March 1, 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 

10682 

Velten, 1949, Record of Negotiations for Definitive Supplemental Agreement No. 32 to Contract No. 

W-7405 eng-276 -- Harshaw Chemical Company, Memorandum to J. C. Clarke from E. H. Velten; 

Atomic Energy Commission; February 7, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 11882, page 683 

Wolf, 1948, Protective Clothing at Harshaw Chemical Company, Memorandum to W. A. Taussig 

from B. S. Wolf; Atomic Energy Commission; November 1, 1948; SRDB Ref ID: 10641, page 120 

Wolf, 1949, Visit to Harshaw Chemical Co., Memorandum to F. M. Belmore from B. S. Wolf; Atomic 

Energy Commission; August 9, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 10641, page 45