I 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6010 

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Chinese Government and Communist Party with respect 

to the United States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 5, 2018 

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. 

PERRY, Mr. HULTGREN, Mr. PITTENGER, and Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a 

period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 

consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 

influence operations of the Chinese Government and 

Communist Party with respect to the United States, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be referred to as the ‘‘Countering the 

5 Chinese Government and Communist Party’s Political In6 fluence Operations Act’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—Unless otherwise specified, the term ‘‘appro5 priate congressional committees’’ means— 

6 (A) in the House of Representatives— 

7 (i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs; 

8 (ii) the Committee on Armed Services; 

9 (iii) the Committee on Appropriations; 

10 (iv) the Committee on the Judiciary; 

11 (v) the Committee on Education and 

12 the Workforce; and 

13 (vi) the Permanent Select Committee 

14 on Intelligence; and 

15 (B) in the Senate— 

16 (i) the Committee on Foreign Rela17 tions; 

18 (ii) the Committee on Armed Services; 

19 (iii) the Committee on Appropriations; 

20 (iv) the Committee on the Judiciary; 

21 (v) the Committee on Health, Edu22 cation, Labor, and Pensions; and 

23 (vi) the Select Committee on Intel24 ligence. 

25 (2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—Un26 less otherwise specified, the term ‘‘political influence 


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1 operations’’ means efforts to coerce and corrupt 

2 United States interests, institutions, or individuals 

3 and foster in the United States attitudes, behavior, 

4 decisions, or outcomes favorable to the Chinese Gov5 ernment or Communist Party through coordinated 

6 and often concealed application of disinformation, 

7 press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted in8 vestments, corruption, or academic censorship. 

9 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

11 (1) The Chinese Government and Communist 

12 Party employ a wide range of political, informa13 tional, and economic measures to influence, coerce, 

14 intimidate, or undermine United States interests or 

15 the interests of United States partners and allies. 

16 (2) According to the December 2017 National 

17 Security Strategy of the United States of America, 

18 ‘‘[A]lthough the United States seeks to continue to 

19 cooperate with China, China is using economic in20 ducements and penalties, influence operations, and 

21 implied military threats to persuade other states to 

22 heed its political and security agenda.’’. 

23 (3) The political influence operations efforts of 

24 the Chinese Government and Communist Party have 

25 received less scrutiny than the efforts of the Russian 


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1 Government, but given China’s economic strength 

2 and the growing apparatus being used to spread its 

3 influence globally, efforts to promote its authori4 tarian ideal pose significant and consequential long5 term challenges to United States interests and val6 ues. 

7 (4) The Chinese Government and Communist 

8 Party use both overt and covert means to target the 

9 political and economic elite, the media and public 

10 opinion, civil society and academia, and members of 

11 the Chinese diaspora. 

12 (5) The Chinese Government and Communist 

13 Party employs an array of government entities, 

14 friendship and exchange organizations, and govern15 ment funded foundations, think-tanks, educational 

16 and other projects to carry out political influence op17 erations, often called ‘‘united front work’’. 

18 (6) The Chinese Government and Communist 

19 Party’s political influence operations aim is to secure 

20 the regime’s political stability domestically and 

21 spread globally its political and economic model as 

22 superior to those of Western democracies. 

23 (7) The Chinese Government and Communist 

24 Party’s political influence operations take advantage 

25 of the open and democratic nature of the United 


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1 States, including constitutional protections for free 

2 speech and a free press, and the desire by some indi3 viduals or institutions to attract Chinese investment, 

4 gain access to Chinese markets, or attain greater 

5 global influence. 

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con7 gress that the Chinese Government and Communist Par8 ty’s political influence operations are not ‘‘soft power’’ in9 tended to persuade, but ‘‘sharp power’’ intended to pene10 trate or corrupt democratic countries, foster attitudes and 

11 behavior favorable to the Chinese Government’s interest 

12 through disinformation, coercion, and other means, and 

13 to widen the scope of authoritarian influence globally. It 

14 is further the sense of Congress that Congress and the 

15 American public need reliable and current information to 

16 understand the malign goals of these political influence op17 erations, identify the key institutions, individuals, entities, 

18 and ministries that carry out such operations, and distin19 guish them from the cultural, educational, and people-to20 people exchanges which benefit both the United States and 

21 China. 

22 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

23 United States to— 

24 (1) clearly differentiate between the Chinese 

25 people and culture and the Chinese Government and 


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1 Communist Party in official statements, media, and 

2 messaging, and to ensure that efforts to curtail Bei3 jing’s political influence operations do not lead to 

4 the targeting of Chinese-Americans or the Chinese 

5 diaspora, as they are most often the victims and pri6 mary targets of political influence operations; 

7 (2) take steps to ensure that Chinese nationals 

8 who are legally studying, living, or working tempo9 rarily in the United States know that intimidation or 

10 surveillance by the Chinese Government and Com11 munist Party is an unacceptable invasion of their 

12 rights while they reside in the United States; 

13 (3) enhance cooperation and coordination with 

14 Australia, Canada, and Taiwan (Republic of China), 

15 whose governments and institutions have faced acute 

16 pressure from the Chinese Government and Com17 munist Party’s political influence operations, and 

18 with other allies globally, to counter such operations, 

19 curtail advances of authoritarian ideals that chal20 lenge democratic values and international human 

21 rights norms, and create strategies to ensure coun22 tries in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast 

23 Asia, and elsewhere are aware of China’s ‘‘sharp 

24 power’’ and work collaboratively to counter coercive, 

25 covert, and corrupting elements; 


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1 (4) develop a strategic assessment and long2 term strategy to counter the Chinese Government 

3 and Communist Party’s political influence oper4 ations, censorship, propaganda, and disinformation 

5 that undermines democratic institutions, targets 

6 United States citizens or nationals or intimidates 

7 their families in China; and uses economic tools, 

8 market access, cyberattacks, or other capabilities to 

9 undermine the freedoms of speech, expression, press, 

10 association, assembly, religion, or academic thought; 

11 (5) implement more advanced transparency re12 quirements concerning collaboration with Chinese 

13 actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, 

14 and government officials, among others, and raise 

15 awareness, through various forums about the goals 

16 and methods of the Chinese Government and Com17 munist Party’s political influence operations and 

18 common patterns and approaches used by Chinese 

19 intelligence agencies or related actors; 

20 (6) require Confucius Institutes, and any other 

21 think tanks, academic programs, or nongovern22 mental organizations funded primarily by the Chi23 nese Government or Chinese Government-affiliated 

24 entities and operating in the United States, to regVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:32 Jun 06, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6010.IH H6010

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1 ister under section 2 of the Foreign Agents Reg2 istration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 612); 

3 (7) seek ways to increase Chinese language pro4 ficiency among mid-career professionals; and 

5 (8) create more flexible tools to screen invest6 ments from Chinese Government or Chinese Govern7 ment-backed sources to protect against the takeover 

8 of United States companies by Chinese state-owned 

9 or state-driven entities, and to protect institutions or 

10 business sectors critically important to United States 

11 national security and the viability of democratic in12 stitutions. 

13 SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND COM14 MUNIST PARTY’S POLITICAL INFLUENCE OP15 ERATIONS. 

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

18 in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal depart19 ments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate con20 gressional committees an unclassified report on Chinese 

21 Government and Communist Party political influence op22 erations with respect to the United States, including ef23 forts to corrupt United States governmental or nongovern24 mental institutions or individuals, efforts to coerce or 

25 threaten United States citizens or legal permanent resiVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:33 Jun 06, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6010.IH H6010

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1 dents or their families or relatives living in China, and 

2 efforts to undermine democratic institutions and the free3 doms of speech, expression, press, association, assembly, 

4 religion, or academic thought. 

5 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub6 section (a) shall also include recommendations for the 

7 President and Congress relating to the following: 

8 (1) Whether additional resources or authorities 

9 are needed to counter Chinese Government and 

10 Communist Party’s political influence operations in 

11 the United States, including in concert with allies. 

12 (2) Ways to use existing resources to develop 

13 core competencies among Federal agencies and the 

14 Armed Forces in the subject area of Chinese polit15 ical influence operations. 

16 (3) The advisability of establishing, within the 

17 Department of State, a permanent office relating to 

18 Chinese Government and Communist Party’s polit19 ical influence operations. 

20 (4) Whether regular public reports on the Chi21 nese Government and Communist Party’s political 

22 influence operations are needed to inform Congress 

23 and the American public of the scale and scope of 

24 such operations. 

Æ 


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