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CHECKLIST FOR GSI ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL

March 29, 2013

Revised April 14, 2013

FILENAME: 04_CkListGSIadmin_appeal6F.doc

1. Timeline:

Final Board vote to deny SEC-00105 by 7 Aye to 6 Nay on 12/11/12

Final vote with 4 absentees included was 9 Aye 8 Nay on 12/20/12

Board letter about SEC-105 action to HHS Secretary dated 1/31/13

HHS Secretary decision on SEC-105 in a letter dated 3/6/13; her letters

to Congressional leaders dated 3/6/13:

• Posted to DCAS website 3/11/13;

• FedEx letter received by SEC co-petitioner: 3.12.13 PM. Cover letter

from Stuart Hinnefeld/NIOSH dated 3.11.13 directs to correspond

only with Jennifer Cannistra, HHS Executive Secretary. This turns out

to be incorrect advice and results in 17 day delay in getting AR

procedural questions partly answered;

Co-petitioner PUBLIC COMMENT to ABRWH on 3/12/13 expressed concerns he

had regarding secrecy surrounding administrative appeals process in

general and the GSI SEC in particular;

Co-petitioner learned 3.13.13 petitioner did not get FedEx letter

from HHS on 3.12.13. Co-petitioner told NIOSH 30 day clock would not

start until got her official HHS notice that SEC-00105 had been

denied. The packet was routed to her old NJ address by the SEC

Counselor, an easily avoided mistake;

SEC petitioner receives her HHS-NIOSH packet on 3/18/13;

Last date to deliver administrative appeal to HHS: 4/17/13;

Co-petitioner Certified US Mail with 6 procedural questions to HHS Executive

Director Cannistra mailed 3/16/13; receipt confirmed at HHS by Lawrence

Savoy on 3/22/13;

Co-petitioner Fax #1/calls to Cannistra with 3/16 questions on 3/22/13

Co-petitioner Fax #2/call to Cannistra with 3/16 questions on 3/26/13

Co-petitioner Fax #3/call to Cannistra with 3/16 questions on 3/28/13

Wanda Jones OASH answers first 6 questions via FAX on 4/2/13

Follow up Faxes Jones to and to Jones 4/2/13 and 4/4/13; Jones

assures that future AR questions will be directed to her OASH

office by NIOSH. The Administrative Review request should be sent to

her office. Her two Faxes to on 4/4/and 4/5/13

Jone’s HHS hard copy reply letters arrive Van Buren P.O. 4/8, 4/9, 4/13/13

 SEC petitioner signed administrative review papers to 4/10/1

GSI SEC-00105 Administrative Appeal is filed US Express Mail or FedEx

target date Monday, April 15, 2013 (copies also to be e-mailed)

2. Key error categories:

(1a) DCAS’ Lavon Rutherford, who oversees the SEC program, and Battelle

under Task 16, refused to designate GSI for a 83.14 SEC petition, prior to

January 2008, when NIOSH had zero (no) external or internal monitoring data

or site wide, process or breathing zone air monitoring data for any GSI

worker. This is the foremost ERROR OF NEGLIGENT OMISSION the SEC-00105

petitioners wish to bring to the attention of the GSI SEC00105 administrative

review panel members.

IL Senator Durbin wrote to the Board in 2007 and 2009 about timeliness

and slow pace of processing GSI claims and SEC. [EXHIBIT 1]

Four IL Congressional delegation members—senator Barack Obama, Senator

Dick Durbin, Congressman Jerry Costello, and Congressman John Shimkus wrote

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to the NIOSH Director Howard on 8/08/05 protesting the time it was taking to

start GSI dose reconstructions. The four Congressman argued in favor of an

83.14 SEC for GSI as something that was obviously merited for a site with

zero monitoring data and a unique array of radiation source terms, including

two 24-25 Mev particle accelerators used to perform nondestructive testing on

AEC/Mallinckrodt uranium. [EXHIBIT 2]

(1b) Missing GSI monitoring, process, medical & safety data that was said to

have been burned except for three file cabinets. The surviving GSI file

cabinet data was never tracked further and was never located by NIOSH.

Many of the missing, lost or destroyed GSI records were documents known to be

in existence 1952-1973 by former workers affidavits and NRC FOIA 2010-0012

records. These included sealed source leak test results, Betatron shot and

maintenance records, 1952 to 1958 MCW/AEC purchase orders for GSI uranium NDT

work, NDT x-ray films and reports (check list) that GSI returned to MCW, MCW

to and from GSI shipping manifests, uranium weight records at GSI (all

castings and metal entering and leaving the GSI facility were weighed and the

weights for both rail and truck shipments were recorded), source and survey

instrument calibration records, and radiation safety test results.

(a) NIOSH to the petitioner’s knowledge never actively sought the GSI

Betatron NDT reports related to MCW NDT from MCW itself. Co-petitioner 

sought these records in FOIA requests to DOE that led to the 1952 NovemberDecember process reports that detailed active AEC MCW and GSI collaboration

involving Betatron uranium R&D. Amy Rothrock, DOE FOIA officer and EEOICPA

coordinator, sent a CD-ROM with the 1994 RHPG sanitized database. The

CD-ROM and Ms. Rothrock’s cover letter both stated the CD-ROM contained an

index of MCW boxes of records that were related to an extensive 4 year study

of thorium use at Rocky Flats DOE site. However, the CD-ROM did not contain

this Index, another omission error. Without assigning motive, the GSI

petitioners were misled again.

(b) NIOSH never availed themselves of invoking §7384w that allows DOL

to subpoena important files. NIOSH can ask DOL to submit subpoenas for

records NIOSH needs to have for DR and SEC implementation of Part B of

EEOICPA. The petitioners urged NIOSH and the Board and TBD-6000 work group to

use this powerful tool to obtain crucial GSI records. There was no compliance

or effort by NIOSH to invoke the subpoena power of DOL on behalf of GSI

claimants and potential SEC00105 class members. Petitioners regard this as

negligence and malfeasance on the part of NIOSH. The ABRWH and more

specifically the TBD-6000 work group should have encouraged NIOSH in this

regard, but never did so to our knowledge.

(c) Co-petitioner urged NIOSH to seek the St. Louis Testing

Laboratories (SLTL) and Nuclear Consulting Corporation (NCC) AEC contemporaneous By-Products materials source licenses for Ir-192 and Co-60 the

companies allegedly used at GSI 1962-1966. finally had to file a

FOIA for this purpose (NRC FOIAs 2013-00142 and NRC 2013-00191). No license

records were found for either facility, and thus this result has been

appealed. The basis for the appeal was knowledge that those licenses must

have existed for NCC and SLTL to be in compliance with federal (AEC/NRC) and

state of IL radiation source regulatory rules. obtaining NRC FOIA

2010-0012 GSI license records was his second FOIA request for this material.

The first search revealed no responsive GSI AEC license records.

(d) Co-petitioner further urged NIOSH to seek 1963 and earlier

GSI film badge records from other vendors than RS Landauer. This was not done

by NIOSH to my knowledge, even though two GSI workers ( and 

) produced partial summary exposure records marked “AEC” and “Nuclear

Consulting Corp” in one instance. This is another example of NIOSH negligence

for not doing seeking these earlier GSI film badge records in the four years

and 5 months that have elapsed since SEC00105 was submitted. This is a

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particularly egregious error, because NIOSH and SC&A told the full Board in

September and December 2012, before the final SEC00105 vote took place on

12/11/12, that an active film badge program definitely existed at GSI during

the first ten years of the operational period. Petitioners disbelieve the

NIOSH/SC&A “evidence” of a letter from GSI management and a single belt

object photograph. SC&A alone believed the object was a film badge.

Petitioners, site experts, and workers believed the object was more likely a

GSI ID badge because film badges were almost always worn on the chest hanging

from a shirt pocket. SC&A and NIOSH and the TBD-6000 work group chose to

ignore the worker eye witness testimony and more heavily weighted a

management letter and a challenged SC&A film badge identification. NIOSH made

a mistake the petitioners assert definitely and adversely affected the SEC00105 final vote of 9 Aye and 8 Nays to support a denial on 12/11/12.

(e) NIOSH never actively pursued, to my knowledge on the record, the

missing AEC technical reports from Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (MCW) uranium

Division, Destrehan Street plants and Weldon Spring plant, to document the 13

year (10/1/52 through June 30, 1966 uranium Betatron NDT program at GSI.

(2) Personal legal animus to and by some NIOSH,

ABRWH and SC&A members:

(a) and in June 2006 provided

each member of the Board, Battelle, NIOSH, SC&A and DOE with FedEx’d hard

copies of a 400 page work book of GSI Information they had assembled with

careful and time consuming personal research, and at significant personal

expense. This well intentioned altruistic intent and effort was rewarded by

NIOSH and SC&A by never adequately attributing or citing this GSI

Work Book in any ABRWH or work group meeting or in the any white paper posted

to Docket 140 to my knowledge. Further, is not aware that NIOSH

ever assigned this book an SRDB number, an error in itself.

Both NIOSH and SC&A did, however, make use of photographs and other

materials in this GSI compendium that listed and provided invaluable early

insights into GSI processes, radiation source terms, work practices, safety

issues, site photographs, photographs of castings undergoing NDT inspections,

of the Eddystone GSI Division that moved from Pennsylvania to Granite City,

IL, in 1963, and most all, to the two Allis-Chalmers Betatrons that GSI used

to do NDT inspections of steel casting and MCW Uranium owned by the AEC. This

was a negligent, rude and unprofessional treatment of two foremost early GSI

site experts. and were both instrumental in setting up,

arranging with SimmonsCooper, and recruiting GSI workers to attend the series

of four 2006 GSI worker meetings that SINEW conducted in 2006 on 7/7, 8/11,

8/21 and 8/26. These four transcripts are posted on the DCAS website under

Docket 140 at www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/gsi.htm

(b) alone was limited to 10 minute SEC presentations by Board chair

Melius at 9/19/12 and 12/11/12 ABRWH GSI SEC presentations. Other SEC

petitioners at those same or other meetings were never so time limited.

(c) NIOSH, SC&A and the ABRWH have never properly attributed the fact that

 first obtained GSI Landauer film badge data a more than a year earlier

than NIOSH did. They refused to share their FB data while asking to

provide copies he obtained from Landauer in Jan. 2007. (reciprocation error)

(d) Chairman Paul Ziemer of TBD-6000 work group rarely tasks SC&A to

review 38 white papers (539 pages) delivered to the TBD-6000 WG and

Board from 2007-2012. The only major exception was the 3/15/12 WG meeting

that attended in person with site expert 

(e) Dr. Robert Anigstein of SC&A on the record stated missed

obtaining the GSI By-Products license on his first try by using wrong site

names (not true). later obtained 1,016 pages of unredacted GSI AEC

license materials (NRC FOIA/PA 2010-0012) that NIOSH or SC&A should have

requested and obtained in the first place.

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(f) Dr. Anigstein broke agreement that could be a silent

observer at the interview. Dr. Ziemer and perhaps DFO

Ted Katz apparently concurred in this decision. was principal in

the firm and became a of

 where taught as a 

 with publications and funded federal grants from 

through when he retired after years of service. 

was instrumental in assisting GSI with their 1962 AEC By-Products Co-60

sources license 12-08271-1 that is the subject of NRC FOIA 2010-0012 obtained

first by . SC&A, NIOSH and the Board would not have known about 

 had it not been for initial research.

 (g) HHS/NIOSH: DCAS Director Hinnefeld in his HHS FedEx packet cover

letter stated must correspond only with HHS Exec. Sec. Jennifer

Cannistra, where Wanda Jones HHS/ASH was the correct person who handles AR

requests for denied SECs under 42 CFR § 83.18 of EEOICPA 2000. This mistake

on the part of NIOSH caused a 17 day delay in getting initial

procedural questions about the administrative review for SEC-00105 answered.

(3 new) NIOSH and SC&A GSI Betatron, Co-60, and Ra-226 source models failed

to include measured experimental data for proper validation.

(a) The petitioners made this assertion to the TBD-6000 WG and Board

repeatedly. Dr. Ziemer erred in defending NIOSH and SC&A practices to rely

on models with no validating real measured data from the GSI site.

(b) Co-petitioner challenged the TBD-6000 WG directly at its

3/15/12 meeting to cite any existing Allis Chalmers 24-25 Mev Betatron real

measured data and the Board, NIOSH and SC&A were unable to do so.

(c) Co-petitioner repeatedly challenged NIOSH and SC&A GSI Betatron

source model agreement with measured film badge data as being scientifically

unacceptable. The range of agency discrepancy of Betatron MCNPX models was

12-fold in 2008 and only 2-fold in 2012. Model-test data agreement should be

± 10 to 20%. contended that peer reviewed scientific journals insisted

that all computer models must include test (i.e., experimental, measured,

real or actual) data that agreed with computer modeled data within plus or

minus 10 to 20%. Petitioners supplied the WG and Board with several

literature examples of this principle (see (d) for another example.

(d) An article By Leone J et al. from the Nuclear Engineering and

Engineering Physics program at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy NY,

“Dose mapping using MCNP5 mesh tallies,” Health Physics 88(Supplement 1):

S31-S33, 2005, illustrates this point nicely. The authors modeled a 137Cs

(cesium) source using MCNP5 mesh tallies. Table 1, column 5 is labeled

“Difference between MCNP and measured results using an ion chamber (%).”

Values representing measured and MCNPX data ranged between 2.19 and 5.32%

at 60 to 200 cm from the cesium-137 source supporting contention.

(4) Anti-GSI and derogatory comments about certain AWE nuclear workers

deserving an SEC by Board members including Wanda Munn and Paul Ziemer that

carried over to the TBD-6000 Ziemer led work group and GSI SEC00105.

(a) The ABRWH transcript of meeting 73, dated 11/5/10, before the Texas

City Chemical final vote on SEC-00088, page(s) and line numbers, illustrates

Board bias existed for that AWE site as shown in transcript EXHIBIT 4.

(5) Factual errors that adversely affected claimants.

(a) Vincent Kuttemperoor PhD, Professor of Physics at MSOE, addressed

the ABRWH on 2/7/07 at its 44th meeting in Mason, OH (pp. 119-121; 127-141).

VK was the GSI petitioner’s chief physics expert because he was the first

scientist to use a 25 Mev A-C Betatron similar to the GSI models to measure

activation products on industrial castings. Professor Kuttemperoor

characterized such photon and neutron activation products in two key

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publications in 1973 and 1974. He was also the first person to delineate harm

that could occur if Betatron operators approached activated castings. In

particular, the t1/2 of activated nickel steel daughters was 36 hrs. A GSI

metallurgist testified that several types of Ni-steel were used at GSI. In

addition, the x-ray film cassettes used for Betatron X-ray NDT radiography

were made of nickel bearing stainless steel, a fact GSI site expert 

 confirmed for himself at St. Louis Testing Laboratories on 6/08/07.

Dr. Kuttemperoor’s Board testimony disclosed that MSOE Betatron operators did

not approach activated castings for 1 to 2 days after s shot had been

completed. NIOSH erred is assigning 2 hours as the safe time limit when

activated GSI Betatron castings could deliver measurable dose.

(b) Petitioners contributed peer reviewed scientific literature to the

TBD-6000 WG and Board that showed a number of Betatron and high Mev

accelerator activation radionuclides had half lives greater than 2 hours. One

such specific citation was from former Board chair and current TBD-6000 WG

chair Paul Ziemer, PHD, retired Professor of Nuclear Engineering at Purdue

University: Guo S, Ziemer PL. Health physics aspects of neutron activated

components in a linear accelerator. Health Physics Journal, 2004 May(66)(5

Suppl), pp S94-S102.

(6) Factual omissions that adversely affected claimants Dose Reconstructions

and Probability of Causation Percentages

(a) Admitted failure of NIOSH to bound with sufficient accuracy

external radium doses to Building 6 inside radiographers during 1953-1962.

(b) Failure of NIOSH to bound with sufficient accuracy any external or

internal doses during the extended GSI operational period of October, 1952

through December 31, 1952. The documents to prove this were in the DOE 1994

sanitized DHRG database, and had been captured by ORAU 11 months prior to

being disclosed to through a FOIA request to DOE that he had to

initiate. A crucial document was part of the official GSI DOE/FUSRAP

Administrative Record as IL.28-5 for many years. All of these resources were

known to DCAS/NIOSH for years. SC&A also called the attention to 1952

Betatron operations to the Board in 2009. Yet NIOSH did not act on this

volume of information until two days after submitted his

documentation on 12/3/12 for GSI collaboration in NDT Betatron radiography of

MCW uranium with the AEC for November and December 1952. According to a

letter to from DOL/DEEOIC Rachel Leiton dated 4/08/11, NIOSH submitted

their October 1952 GSI Betatron NDT data regarding the MCW-AEC uranium NDT

collaboration two days after submitted his information.

• The Co-petitioner therefore asserts that NIOSH deliberately withheld their

GSI 1952 information for months after data capture by ORAU. This withholding

was to the detriment of potential SEC00105 class members and claimants under

part B of EEOICPA 2000. This rivaled and expands the type of behavior that

led to the complaint ANWAG recently filed against David Allen of DCAS with

the HHS IG.

(c) Petitioners proved by NRC FOIA 2010-0012 documents and a 1973 GSA

property auction of GSI equipment, that GSI possessed two industrial 250 KVP

x-ray units that were portable. NIOSH, SC&A and the Board (TBD-6000 WG) only

accounted for one of these units. NIOSH never successfully bounded external

dose for operators or bystanders for either unit as they are mandated to do

by OCAS-IG-003. An overexposure incident as defined in 42 CFR §83.9 with one

of these 250 KVP x-ray units was testified to in GSI worker affidavits.

(7) Inadequate and poor scholarship “failure to locate,” and “errors of

omission” caused by this inadequacy. NIOSH showed a marked reluctance to

assertively locate missing GSI records that were known to be highly pertinent

to SEC00105. Prime examples include the following information that was first

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brought to Board, SC&A and NIOSH attention by SEC-00105 co-petitioner 

. This is a NIOSH error of negligent omission:

(a) The existence of RS Landauer film badge program #2084 started in

1963 and ending in 1973 for 108 GSI radiographers;

(b) The existence of 1,016 pages of GSI AEC By-Products materials

license #12-8271-1 for two Co-60 sources in 1962 (NRC FOIA 2010-0012);

(c) The two Ra-226 sources used 1953-1962 (NRC FOIA 2010-0012);

(d) A second Co-60 small (less than a Curie) Co-60 source;

(e) A second 250 KVP industrial portable x-ray source at GSI;

(f) A Nuclear Consulting Corporation (NCC) 18 month film badge

summary for a single GSI part-time radiographer, metallurgy lab worker

( );

(g) The date of the GSI stolen Radium plumb bob incident (October

1953). Site expert did this vital research: he found 3

independent newspaper sources and confirmed this evidence with former GSI

workers;

(h) The proof that AEC and MCW were actively collaborating with GSI to

perform Betatron NDT work on MCW uranium ingots in November and December

1952;

(i) The existence of the GSI Bldg. 6 radiography room prior to 1962,

and the fact that at one point it lacked a door altogether.

(j) Many other examples could be cited of information the site expert

and petitioners obtained that could/should have been obtained by NIOSH and

SC&A.

Petitioners would also cite in this regard that NIOSH did not accept an

invitation from SINEW to tour the GSI site during GSI worker outreach

meetings in 2006 and 2007. NIOSH did not invoke the subpoena power of DOL

under §7384(w) of the Act. NIOSH did not seek By-Products materials licenses

for St. Louis Testing and NCC Co-60 and Ir-192 sources in order to confirm

the source strength known only through the 45 year past memory recollections

of one SLTL individual ( ). There was no corroboration of the NCC

source type and strength mentioned in the NCC 1962 survey of the Bldg 6

radiography facility (NRC FOIA 2010-0012). These survey data were included in

NRC FOIA 2010-0012 obtained originally by , not by NIOSH.

(8) Failure to interview key GSI workers with pertinent knowledge about

incompletely characterized radiation source terms and radiologic and

radiation safety issues at GSI. Over the years, site expert and

 directed NIOSH, Dr. Ziemer and the TBD-6000 work group, and SC&A

to interviews with , , to 

, to , and to twelve GSI workers at the 10/9/07 Collinsville

SC&A satellite outreach meeting that were not followed up upon. These workers

NIOSH and SC&A did not interview included: , the GSI

 who and 

during uranium NDT inspections; and , GSI 

who handled GSI ; , GSI 

; , GSI ;

, who was employed and worked at the GSI site from through

 as a and testified about GSI records he

personally was ordered to burn by management, and , who

testified to site expert that radium and uranium sources were

stored with (possibly thoriated, most were) welding rods in a locked “cage”

in GSI building #5. NIOSH failed to bound Building 5 external doses at GSI.

(9) Misrepresentation of non representativeness of GSI film badge data. By

tradition, in the implementation of part B of EEOICPA, NIOSH, the Board and

SC&A assesses monitoring data pedigree, integrity, completeness, and

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representativeness. That analysis includes: film badge monitoring data for

photons, neutrons and beta; urinary bioassay data for uranium (and thorium

and plutonium); assays for “exotic” radionuclides; and general air samples,

process air samples and breathing zone air sampling data.

The only such measured data for GSI from October 1, 1952 through

12/31/92 includes Landauer film badge weekly data for 108 male NDT

radiographers from November 1963 through 1973 when GSI in Granite City, IL,

ceased castings production operations. (The St. Louis Car Division continued

operations) The badged workers wore their badges only in the Betatron

buildings and Building 6 roofless concrete block building, while operating

Radium-226 and Co-60 sources at GSI, and at American Steel operating their

one (1) million volt KVP x-ray machine and Ir-192 source on a leased basis.

The rest of the 3,200 person work force at GSI holding other jobs, and

GSI radiographers prior to November 1963, did not have weekly film badge

data. These film badge data were only for photons. Neutrons and beta dose

were not measured at GSI by film badges. There was no GSI air sampling data

of any of the 3 types named above. No urinary uranium bioassay intake samples

were ever taken on any GSI worker. No measured GSI ingestion data exists.

Petitioners conclude the GSI Landauer film badge data was insufficient

to be representative, even of the radiographers. Film badge data was not

available for but one worker (who had summary FB data for quarters prior

to 1963) for October 1, 1952 through October 1963. NIOSH made the most

serious ERROR OF COMMISSION by judging the sparse film badge data (Nov. 1963

to 12/31/73 only for 108 radiographers) was representative, sufficiently

complete, and of sufficient integrity to bound with sufficient accuracy

external doses for photons for the entire GSI 3,200 male and female 163 job

category work force. In fact, the GSI FB data was so sparse it should have

been declared non-representative and inadequate to bound even radiographer

doses except for Nov. 1963 through the end of 1973. Petitioners regard this

as an SEC00105 determinative factual error of analysis on the part of NIOSH,

the Board and SC&A, a very major error.

Footnote: Based on worker testimony, approximately 40-65% of the total

GSI work force were African Americans, and 1-2% were women. Based on a 1967

listing provided to the NIOSH and SC&A by GSI site expert on

10/29/2007, there were 163 official jobs at GSI.

(10) Failure to comply 100% with OCAS-IG-003. This key guidance states that

at AWE sites during the AEC contract or operational period, all radiation

source doses must be calculated and bounded with sufficient accuracy. As we

note in Errors #6(a), 6(b), 15(a)-(f); 21, 22, 23, 33, 34 (radon), and 38,

NIOSH failed to assign definite doses with sufficient accuracy for many GSI

source terms, either not at all, or they relied on SC&A not validated MCNPX

computer models. Too often NIOSH erred in extrapolating badge dosimetry to

1952-1958 with no MCW purchase orders for uranium and no film badge data.

(11) Failure to settle all SEC matrix issues; instead transferring

then to Appendix BB matrix based on faulty scientific interpretation.

Paul Ziemer, chair of the TBD-6000 work group, at

the 3/28/12 TBD-6000 WG meeting (soon after the 3/15 meeting), as it was

drawing close to the adjournment time, summarily rushed through the GSI SEC

issues matrix and assigned many unresolved SEC issues to become Appendix BB

issues ( 5/21/12 e-mail to Ted Katz and the Board). Although other WG

members did not strenuously object, the closing session of this WG meeting

was exceedingly disorganized. There was little discussion over important SEC

issues as to why they suddenly, after years of deliberation, could become

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Appendix BB issues. There was general agreement in this WG, and by other

ABRWH WGs, that the distinction between SEC and site profile matrix issues is

often blurred and there is considerable overlap between them.

It was clear to the co-petitioner , who participated in this

3/28/12 TBD-6000 WG meeting by phone, that the chairman was rushing to “clear

the decks” of troublesome SEC issues. The first SEC issue was whether GSI

deserved an SEC for the first 10 years. That issue was not voted on per se by

the full Board. We consider this SEC-to-Appendix BB rushed transfer to be a

striking negligent error of commission and factual distortion that inured to

the detriment of GSI SEC-00105 potential class members. The petitioners hope

the review panel will read this part of the transcript and will agree with

our assessment that Dr. Ziemer and NIOSH failed to spend sufficient time

deliberating on these highly important SEC-00105 matters. Instead, Dr.

Ziemer, with the concurrence of other WG members and NIOSH, improperly

transferred unresolved GSI SEC findings to the unresolved Appendix BB SC&A

findings matrix (latest version is dated 11/26/12) and thereby forced a

premature WG vote on SEC-00105. This maneuver had a major determining effect

on the final negative outcome, that is, for the TBD-6000 WG, at its 11/28/12

meeting, to recommend denial by 2 to 1 of the first ten years of the GSI SEC00105 petition.

(12) Failure to weight eye witness worker testimony properly. GSI workers

believe, and the petitioners strongly agree with them, that their eye witness

testimony was weighted by NIOSH, the Board and SC&A, too low unless their

testimony agreed with a position held by the agencies. The workers refer to

this deplorable but common practice as “cherry picking.” Two notable examples

of such worker testimony denigration can be noted here as examples:

(a) Six GSI radiographers testified they either assisted or operated an

80 Curie cobalt-60 gamma source at GSI between 1964-1966. The AEC GSI 1962

license No. [12-8271-1], first obtained in 1962, was not amended to show an

80 Curie Co-60 source as being purchased at GSI until 1968 (amendment 8).

However, TBD-6000 WG chair Paul Ziemer acknowledged to GSI site expert 

, on the record [TBD-6000 WG 10.12.10, page 92, line 13, through page

94, line 8], that he was aware that sealed sources often arrived at his

university, Purdue University, that were not re-licensed for some months or

years. Despite this acknowledgement, the TBD-6000 work group Board members

and SC&A members never insisted that NIOSH calculate external Co-60 80 Curie

doses during the GSI operational period years 1964-1996 as the petitioners

assert should have been done. We regard this as another major negligent NIOSH

omission error.

(b) Six GSI former workers gave affidavit testimony that GSI owned and

used its own Iridium-192 source. A GSI 1968 AEC license amendment document,

that was part of NRC FOIA 2010-0012, stated that “this facility is licensed

for iridium-192 and cobalt-60.” Yet, NIOSH, the Board and SC&A decided to

cherry pick one of these workers testimony ( , see NIOSH Error

#13) and accept the part about his quarter monitoring summary report, yet

reject his testimony about the Ir-192 GSI owned sealed source.

(13) Uncritical acceptance of unconfirmed GSI management statements about the

GSI radiation safety program. At the end of deliberations, before they voted

to recommend supporting NIOSH’s recommendation to deny SEC-00105, NIOSH

possessed only four pieces of real data for the GSI radium era that extended

from 10/1/52 through December 31, 1962. These data included: (a) a film badge

summary from one worker ( ) that covered quarters; (b) some

knowledge of two Ra-226 NDT gamma sources but no actual monitoring data from

them, (c) a letter signed by Gordon McMillin, VP and General Manager, in the

GSI By-Products material license NRC FOIA 2010-0012 material, that alleged

AEC safety limits had not been exceeded for 25 years and the average badge

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readings never exceeded 25% of the limits; and (d) a belt object worn by a

GSI Betatron operator ( ) shown in a 1953 GSI magazine that SC&A

interpreted as a film badge. GSI workers and petitioners stated was more

likely a GSI identification (ID) badge worn by company officials as well as

Betatron operators and general workers. concluded the belt

object he had first brought to everyone’s attention was an identification

badge rather than a film bade]ge (formal retraction e-mail dated 6/04/12).

The petitioners challenge the validity of company management statements

for several compelling reasons: 1) the postulated 25 years worth of pre-1963

film badge data was never found by DOE or NIOSH; 2) workers could not

identify the film badge vendor (Only Landauer was identified and proven for

the 2084 Nov. 1963 through 1973 film badge program), (c) Gordon McMillin did

not appear in lists of GSI company officers of Board members in 1961 and 1962

annual reports, which should have been the case if he really held the titles

of VP and General Manager on the AEC 1962 license (raises the question is

this akin to “grade inflation?”), (d) we have Internet evidence that Gordon

McMillin had departed from GSI in the 1950s and was employed by a Canadian

steel company, thus casting doubt on his accurate knowledge of the past 25

years of GSI radiation safety program history; and (e) the AEC did not

regulate radium sources or Betatrons or 250 KVP industrial x-ray units in the

United States before 1963; (f) GSI company literature stated that

radiographers were tested annually for proficiency, a “fact” GSI Betatron and

Co-60 radiographers uniformly denied was true; and (g) there is absolutely no

hard evidence of a film badge or radiation safety program of any kind at GSI

from 1952 through 1962 when the radium era ended.

(14) NIOSH hiding captured data that caused the GSI operational period

period start date to be changed in 2013 from 1/1/53 to 10/1/52.

NIOSH held the October 1952 document at least 11 months after ORAU capture

before notifying DOL. These data were discoverable by DOE from the inception

of EEOICPA 2000 and should have been part of the original site description in

the DOE facilities database. The key information, IL.28-5 (1993), was in the

FUSRAP Considered sites database and the 1994 sanitized DOE RHPG database

kept by FOIA officer Amy Rothrock at DOE Oak Ridge operations office, the

long time repository for MCW EEOICPA records.

(15) Failure to bound all source terms with sufficient accuracy before

the full Board voted on 12/11/2012; violates OCAS-IG-003:

(a) Two 250 KVP industrial portable x-ray machines;

(b) Radon gas from two potentially leaking Ra-226 sealed sources;

(c) GSI owned large (80 Curie) cobalt-60 source 1963-66, as testified

to by six GSI radiographers.

(d) GSI owned Iridium-192 gamma source;

(e) American Steel Ir-192 source used by badged GSI radiographers;

(f) Leakage from the two Betatron heads and chronically activated

internal Betatron components;

(g) Rebound (scatter) photons and neutrons from chronically Betatron

irradiated, high Mev concrete walls of the two Betatron buildings (Carroll

REF)

(h) American Steel 1 million KVP x-ray source used by badged GSI

Betatron operators and radiographers: sent by management to do

this work, being paid to do so by GSI. Three worker affidavits confirm.

Comment: The petitioners admonished NIOSH and the TBD-6000 work group that

all of the above GSI source terms must be assigned definite doses with

sufficient accuracy under OCAS-IG-003. Repeatedly these valid admonitions

were ignored by NIOSH and Dave Allen and SC&A in their white papers posted

under Docket 140 on the DCAS website. Not being able to demonstrate to the

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Board that all sources can be bounded with sufficient accuracy is integral to

the SEC 83.13 and 83.14 petitioning process. Petitioners believe that two

negligent, egregious, omission and commission error were therefore made by

the NIOSH (Error 1) and the Board Error 2, below) that should have led to an

SEC being assigned to GSI years ago.

• ERROR 1. The petitioners assert that NIOSH failed to do bound all of the

above source doses, and more, for all of the above sources, before the final

SEC-00105 vote was taken on December 11, 2012.

• ERROR 2. The petitioners strongly further assert that ABRWH Chairman Dr.

James Melius and TBD-6000 work group chair Dr. Paul Ziemer, acting in

concert, thus also erred in acting prematurely to bring SEC-00105 to a final

conclusive vote at the December 11, 2012, Knoxville, TN meeting. At that

time, NIOSH and SC&A were in broad disagreement on final external and

internal doses to be assigned during the radium era (1953-1962) and during

the residual period, without having in place a definite method to determine

inhalation intakes of airborne uranium.

(16) Deliberate misrepresentation of the facts about the benefits if AWE

sites being awarded an SEC. David Allen addressed the Board before its final

SEC-00105 vote on 12/11/12 in Knoxville, TN.

[See EXHIBIT 6, annotated 12/11/12 ABRWH transcript: Melius pages

321,322,327; Ziemer pp 328-329; Allen pages 326-327]

(17) Deliberate misrepresentation by DCAS (Dave Allen) and TBD-6000 WG

members Beach and Ziemer to full ABRWH on 12/11/12 that all GSI workers would

be assigned 12 to 15 REM dose per year under the “highest dose” exposure

scenario (not true for Appendix BB Rev 0). David Allen of DCAS addressed the

Board before its final SEC-00105 vote on 12/11/12 in Knoxville, TN. Dr.

Ziemer and TBD-6000 WG/Board member Beach echoed these same falsehoods.

[See EXHIBIT 6, annotated 12/11/12 ABRWH transcript: Melius page 281 “have

data”; Allen pages 326-327; Ziemer 328-329]

(18) Deliberate SEC delays caused by prioritizing SEC work based on

political heat (GSI assigned a deliberate “low” by Board DFO). David Allen of

DCAS addressed the Board before its final SEC-00105 vote on 12/11/12 in

Knoxville, TN. Board DFO Ted Katz was encouraged by DCAS Director Stuart

Hinnefeld in a 12/19/10 e-mail obtained through FOIA to prioritize various

sites with active SECs according to “political interest” or “heat.” “General

Steel” (GSI) was assigned a priority by Mr. Katz of “low,” while the Texas

City Chemicals site (SEC-00088), on which is also a SEC copetitioner, was assigned the highly derogatory priority of “never mind.”

Texas Congressman Pete Olson had written to the Surrogate Data work group

advocating for TCC workers and SEC-00088, for example. This type of

prioritization was insulting to this well intentioned US Congressman and has

no valid place in SEC deliberations.

The petitioners strongly believe that such use of “political heat”

prioritization is improper and offensive to the spirit and letter of original

Congressional intent in enacting EEOICPA 2000. We contend this quoted passage

betrays a mindset at NIOSH and DCAS, held also by the DFO, that explains in

part why the GSI Appendix BB and SEC-00105 have been handled as a “low

priority” matter both in amount of effort expended to gather missing GSI

data, and with respect to processing these key documents (Appendix BB, SEC00105) in a timely way. Our present concern harks back to the Illinois

delegation letter to NIOSH Director John Howard in 2005 (see Error 1a).

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(19a) Dave Allen and DCAS/NIOSH’s use of the “throw them a bone” method to

confuse SC&A and work groups from fully investigating NIOSH

dose reconstruction methodology. David Allen of DCAS made this very

concerning statement in e-mails dated 12/19/10 to “Timothy D. Adler” that

were obtained through the FOIA process and were circulated by the Hooker

Electrochemical petitioner, and by ANWAG on its eecap.org blog.

These revealing e-mails resonated with the GSI petitioners because 

 has seen Mr. Allen employ the same tactic during Board and TBD-6000

work group meetings where GSI SEC-00105 matters were being discussed. The

ABRWH at its March 12, 2013 had a 20 minute discussion about their “serious

concerns” over Mr. Allen’s conduct. DCAS Director Hinnefeld allegedly

expressed his consternation at Mr. Allen’s behavior and allegedly vowed that

such behavior would not be tolerated in the future. , of

, has filed a complaint with the HHS Inspector General over the matter.

(19b) There is added evidence that Mr. David Allen of DCAS engaged in another

highly questionable practice. This behavior came to light in

e-mail correspondence David Allen carried on with DCAS colleagues Dr. James

Neton to the effect that he drafted two sets of justifications defending use

of surrogate date sources at Hooker Electrochemical AWE site. The URL link

for this 3.28.12 ANWAG blog is:

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The petitioner’s believe this matter is so serious that Mr. Allen’s

contributions to TBD-6000 work group and ABRWH presentations and discussions,

and all his contributed white papers, should be disqualified. We further

believe that Allen’s disqualifications should nullify (abrogate) the Board’s

final vote to recommend denying SEC-00105 to the HHS Secretary on 12/11/12.

Together, errors 16 through 19 above that the GSI SEC-00105 petitioners

can definitively attribute to Mr. Allen and to DCAS, the agency which

condoned this behavior by Mr. Allen for years, should be sufficient reasons

in and of themselves for HHS Secretary Sebelius to reverse her decision to

deny GSI SEC-00105.

(20) Improper use of surrogate data at GSI that conflicted with Board SD

criteria.

(a) Dave Allen had e-mail correspondence with Dr. James Neton of NIOSH that

he constructed two surrogate data analyses for Hooker Electrochemical, only

one of which was given to the Hooker work group (see Error #19b, above). Mr.

Allen used airborne uranium surrogate data at GSI that was strongly

challenged at first by SC&A at the 8/12/12 TBD-6000 WG meeting and by the GSI

petitioners. SC&A’s Dr. Robert Anigstein’s 7/16/12 white paper titled “Review

of the use of surrogate data for estimating uranium intakes at General Steel

Industries” found the NIOSH surrogate data failed to meet 4 of 5 Board SD

criteria.

Allen then added additional surrogate data of the same type that caused

the petitioners to have similar concerns about stringent justification of

processes and source terms. SC&A, for unclear reasons, then reversed

position, and agreed that all 5 Board SD criteria had been met by the “new”

NIOSH dataset as revised and modified by SC&A. Petitioners believe this was a

factual error of commission.

Specifically, Allen cited uranium slug and derby data. Uranium slugs

and derby Ur metal were not subjected to Betatron NDT inspection at GSI. None

of the Allen surrogate sites performed Betatron NDT of uranium, or even had

Betatrons to perform such activities. Thus, the GSI MCW uranium underwent

Betatron 24-25 Mev x-ray bombardment for at least 8 hours (Not 1 hour as Mr.

Allen claimed; see following affidavit #2).

Betatron operator 7/7/06 GSI outreach meeting

testimony (basis for GSI affidavit 2) posted on the DCAS website was as

follows:

Petitioners showed conclusively that 24-25 Mev energy levels of

Betatron photon and neutron energy caused enhanced fission of natural U-238

as well as photon activation with generation of daughter activation products.

Mr. Allen continued to insist that his surrogate sources, similarly to GSI,

only handled “cold uranium.” Petitioners challenged this designation for GSI

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Betatron irradiated MCW uranium-238, citing DOE ORNL long time research into

x-irradiation molecular and structural damage to uranium and other materials

[REF: G.D. Kerr et al. A Brief History of the Health and Safety Division at

Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Ch. 3. Accelerating Projects. Radiation

Effects in Materials: Cultivated at Oak Ridge. July 1992].

(21) Failure of NIOSH to bound Ra-226 doses inside of the Bldg. 6

radiography room. Dave Allen and DCAS/NIOSH gave no excuse at the TBD6000 WG 11/28/12 and 2/21/13 meetings for not performing this dose assessment

that is required of them under OCAS-IG-003 guidance. That guidance for dose

reconstructors states that all radiation source terms must be determined with

sufficient accuracy during the AEC operational period at AWE sites. This is

another NIOSH negligent omission error.

(22) Failure of SC&A to verify NIOSH bounding of Ra-226 dose outside of the 6

Bldg radiography room because they believed this scenario was

“unlikely.”

(a) GSI testified that both Ra-226

and both Co-60 small (less than a Curie each) sources were used “all over the

plant, including buildings 6 and 10.” Other worker testimony also alluded to

this having taken place.

• Petitioners regard this as a NIOSH factual error and a commission

error in ignoring eye witness testimony.

(23) Failure of Board, SC&A and NIOSH for 3-4 years to recognize and act upon

the fact that GSI “plumb bobs” were Ra-226 NDT sealed sources that leaked and

generated radon gas. The GSI stolen plumb bob testimony emerged during GSI

worker affidavit/outreach meetings that SINEW arranged at SimmonsCooper law

firm and in Collinsville, IL, during 2006 (7/7, 8/11, 8/21, 8/22). Given

former Board chairman and now TBD-6000 work group chair Dr. Paul Ziemer’s

record of publications and Board comments about dangers of leaking radium

sources, the petitioners believe the mere mention of a stolen GSI plumb bob

in 2006 in GSI worker affidavits should have alerted both NIOSH and Dr.

Ziemer and the Board, and through DR. Ziemer SC&A, that the term plumb bob,

used correctly, is synonymous with a radium sealed source. Ra-226 plumb bobs

were known to be used during the 1930s and 1940s with the fish pole technique

to perform industrial nondestructive testing radiography (see ORAU Museum

online article). Sealed source terms referred to as “pills” were more likely

to be Cobalt-60 or Iridium-192 or Cs-137 (see another ORAU Museum online

article). ORAU references are:

1. To Radium plumb bob and fish pole NDT method, the URL is:

http://www.orau.org/ptp/collection/Sources/radiumradiog.htm ( pages)

2. To the cobalt-60 pill and “pig tail” connectors, the URL is:

http://www.orau.org/ptp/collection/Sources/industrial.htm (1 page)

(begin quote) These types of sources have been responsible for a number of radiation

injuries (including deaths). A typical accident scenario involves the pigtail

detaching from the crank-out cable and being left behind at the job-site. Later,

someone not knowing what it is picks it up and possibly takes it home. Early

industrial radiography sources, like those shown above, carried no indication that

they were radioactive or dangerous. As such, this type of mistake was all too easy.

Pigtails with the old "eye and hook" connectors (lower image) were particularly

prone to detaching and being lost. (end quote)

 of St. Louis Testing Labs provided testimony that a GSI

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overexposure Co-60 incident occurred in the Bldg. 6 NDT room in 1965.

This date was corroborated to by . The source

became disconnected and lay open for 16 to 24 hours. was

called in by GSI to fix the problem, which he did. However, according

to knowledge, GSI kept the dangerous hook-and-eye Co-60

“pill” connectors from 1964 through 1973 when plant operations creased.

The GSI managers thus ignored AEC NDT safety guidelines. This is added

evidence of a very lax and ineffective radiation safety program at GSI

during 1964-1973 under . It was who headed the new

GSI #2084 film badge program after the GSI Eddystone Division moved in

1963 to the GSI Illinois Commonwealth Division in Granite City, IL.

(24) Failure of NIOSH to locate GSI film badges for 10/1/52 through 1962. To

the best of the petitioner’s knowledge, based on the official GSI SEC-00105

written record, NIOSH made absolutely no effort to obtain the missing film

badge records from other film badge vendors besides Landauer, for the 1952

through 1963 periods, before Landauer GSI film badge program #2084 was first

initiated in November 1963. Petitioner’s regard this as an error of negligent

omission of the highest order. It is a primary mission of NIOSH and their

contractor ORAU to attempt to recover monitoring data at all AWE and DOE

sites under EEOICPA. As mentioned, they have the powerful §7384w subpoena

power invested in Dept. of Labor, the lead EEOICPA agency, at their disposal.

Yet NIOSH, again to the petitioner’s knowledge, ever used this tool to obtain

missing GSI film badge data.

SEC-00105 co-petitioner did pursue two FOIA requests to NRC

(2013-00142/191) to obtain the NCC 1962 and St. Louis Testing Laboratories

1964-1973 By-Products material AEC licenses. McKeel hoped that, as in the

case of the GSI 1962 Co-60 license material, the responsive documents would

reveal more source information, perhaps including the vendor who furnished

the “AEC/NCC” gamma photon dose summary for quarters before

November 1963. That report had the words “Atomic Energy Commission” at top

and “Nuclear Consultants Corporation” at the bottom of the page.

Also, sent the TBD-6000 WG a spreadsheet of several dozen

USA film badge vendors. He also sent the same WG information that NCC had

been purchased and absorbed by Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. Thus, MCW records

would be a logical place to search for NCC film badge records. NIOSH never

undertook such a search for NCC film badge data to the best of my knowledge.

In fact, NIOSH never acted on any of this information. Whatever investigation

on the matter was done by SC&A, neither NIOSH nor SC&A produced any other

film badge data than the Landauer data alerted them to in the

first place. This is another negligent omission error.

(25) Failure of NIOSH and DOE to locate any GSI shot records, NDT reports or

check lists MCW required of film readers, calibration records, leak test

records, air sampling data, Betatron dose monitoring data, or radon data. The

information in Error (24) is pertinent here as well. NIOSH through ORAU and

the §7384w DOL subpoena power tool should have vigorously pursued GSI uranium

NDT related records with DOE at ORO, and also Mallinckrodt private records,

including corporate information about the acquisition of NCC assets including

film badge records data. This was a serious NIOSH/ORAU error of negligent

omission.

(26) No real (measured at the site, surrogate, or from the scientific

literature) GSI-generated data was available to validate Betatron computer

models, using MCNPX and ATILLA code, for photons, x-rays, beta (electrons)

and neutrons (see Error #27] during the operational period. The values

generated by code were simply listed in Tables as facts by Dave Allen and

DCAS and by SC&A in their technical papers. On many occasions, including in

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person extensive discussion at the 3/15/12 TBD-6000 WG meeting, 

stated that peer reviewed journals insist on having experimental, that is

real measured, data to validate computer models. further asserted and

still maintains that models and measured data should agree with one another

within 10 to 20%. The closest agreement between NIOSH and SC&A Betatron

external dose photon models was 200% with many comparisons being much larger.

Early SC&A and NIOSH computer models differed from film badge readings by 12

to 15-fold. DCAS then “normalized” the Betatron computer models to agree with

film badge readings. SC&A did not condone this type of methodology and stated

so on the record. This issue is still not resolved to this day. Given the

striking degree of variance between NIOSH and SC&A computer values and the

film badge readings for radiographers, the petitioners assert that NIOSH made

a very serious COMMISSION ERROR in accepting computer model values that were

not validated by actual measured (real) data from the same modeled sources.

(27) No relative biologic effectiveness determined experimentally for GSI

neutrons (RBE can vary between 2 and 20). NIOSH at first claimed in the SEC00105 evaluation report, on page 30, they had GSI photon-to-neutron ratio

data “in place.” SC&A agreed with the co-petitioner that this was not true.

Neutron fluxes were not measured by film badges or directly (Bonner spheres)

from the Betatrons or other sources at GSI. The MCNPX assumptions for

NIOSH/SC&A modeled RBE values were not addressed at all to my knowledge.

(28) NIOSH concluded that New Betatron external photon, neutron and beta

doses, by extrapolation, also bounded Old Betatron doses without actual

measurements of photons, beta or neutrons for either facility. Petitioners

contest this decision, and they have pointed out the two facilities and

machines were not structurally and electromechanically not identical. Details

have been provided in the form of photographs and worker affidavits and floor

plan drawings. NIOSH has stubbornly denied this evidence. Petitioners regard

this as a particularly egregious omission and negligence error by NIOSH that

has adversely affected GSI claimants and potential SEC Class members.

(29a) Board member Griffon resigned from TBD-6000 work group, and was so

uninformed GSI basic documents that he stated on 12/11/12 that he was

assessing the FUSRAP 1993 remediation report in “real time” (read “first time

for me”). This performance is emblematic of the petitioner’s contention the

ABRWH members not on the TBD-6000 work group, and even past members thereof,

gave no indication they had read , NIOSH’s or SC&A’s large numbers of

GSI technical papers that are evident on Docket 140. Few, if any, questions

were asked of him at GSI full Board meetings in September and December 2012

prior to the final SEC-00105 vote.

(29b) On 12/11/13, the petitioner’s learned for the first time that Board

member Bradley Clawson, according to his testimony, had been an NDT

radiographer “for 10 years.” Yet the TBD-6000 work group never sought his

advice as a consultant or a participant in any of their 15 meetings.

Petitioners regard this failure to get consultative advice from Mr. Clawson

as a most serious negligence error of omission that contributed to the denial

of SEC-00105.

(29c) Fourth present TBD-6000 work group member Dr. John Poston missed an

unusually large numbers of meetings and parts of GSI related meetings to the

extent his contributions to WG deliberations in 2011 and 2012 were limited.

(30a) Final dose “bounding” assignments were not established with clarity by

the end of the 2/21/13 TBD-6000 work group meeting on GSI Appendix BB issues

that should have been clarified before the full Board voted on 12/11/12.

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, formerly with the ,

once noted to Dan McKeel that “bounding” was a “construct” of NIOSH’s Dr.

James Neton, and was not part of the language of EEOICPA 2000. is

now a Congressional staff person and is very knowledgeable about the

legislative history of EEOICPA 2000.

(30b) The use of the word “such” in §7384n(c,d) of the EEOICPA 2000 Act,

according to Richard Miller, in a statement he made to the ABRWH on

2/11/2010, precludes the use of surrogate data in determining SEC outcomes

and for use in NIOSH dose reconstructions. NIOSH and HHS OGC disputed this

contention. The petitioners agree with Mr. Miller’s view, and believe NIOSH

has made a most serious COMMISION ERROR at GSI in relying primarily on

surrogate data such as TBD-6000 and OTIB-0070 to determine inhalation doses,

and OTIB-9 to determine ingestion doses, during the residual period at GSI

from 7/1/66 through 12/31/92. None of these data have been subjected to

rigorous scrutiny under the Board or NIOSH (OCAS-IG-004) surrogate data

criteria. (See McKeel views cited on page 11 of 17, Sarah Ray Docket 194

comment dated 03/09/10 on NIOSH Ten Year Plan). The relevant excerpt follows:

(31) Co-petitioner 38 white papers to the TBD-6000 work group and

full Board were not sent to NIOSH Director Howard or to HHS Secretary

Sebelius with the Board’s recommendation letter dated 1/31/13. Ted Katz in a

2/14/13 e-mail told the Board transcripts would convey the

petitioner’s view. That statement was not true because the TBD-6000 WG and

full Board never discussed most of the papers. They usually listened

to his 10 minute presentations and asked him few, if any, questions

thereafter. Full ABRH & WG transcripts confirm these facts.

• 39th paper, his transcription of the 2/21/13 TBD-6000 WG meeting

and comments thereto, as well as a full ABRWH bibliography was not

allowed to be transmitted to NIOSH Director Howard or to HHS Secretary

Sebelius before the final decisions on SEC-105 were rendered. Petitioners

view this as a mistake that caused their viewpoints and concerns not to be

adequately represented. (see related SEC00105 error 32)

(32) The SEC review process is faulty because hard copies of all 15 TBD-6000

WG transcripts were not provided to NIOSH Director Howard and to HHS

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Secretary Sebelius. The petitioners plan to file FOIA requests to obtain the

materials that were provided to Dr. Howard and HHS Secretary Sebelius along

with the ABRWH letter dated 1/31/13 notifying them of the Board

recommendation to uphold NIOSH and to deny SEC-00105. addressed his

concerns in a Public Comment at the ABRWH 3/12/13 meeting in Augusta, GA.

(33) GSI radiographers wore GSI film badges to operate and perform NDT

inspections on GSI castings at American Steel using their 1 million KVP x-ray

machine and Iridium-192 sources. This 2006 outreach meeting GSI worker

affidavit testimony showed that the categorical statement that GSI

radiographers badges were not always kept in the Betatron buildings and “were

never worn outside” is not true. NIOSH failed to this date to model or bound

with sufficient accuracy either of the American Steel sources as the

petitioners assert they should have done as an SEC-00105 issue and to be

complaint with OCAS-IG-003.

(34) The TBD-6000 WG ignored and failed to act on chairman Ziemer’s

revelation on 10/12/10 that radium sealed sources often leaked, the reason

that leak tests were mandated, and that radium daughter products including

RADON gas were given off. We know that NCC and SLTL both allegedly performed

leak tests for GSI in 1962-1966 and perhaps thereafter. NIOSH never produced

those records. NIOSH also never bounded RADON doses at GSI despite knowing

about this added source probably being present. The TBD-6000 WG never

discussed this RADON matter after the October 12, 2010, meeting despite the

fact that chairman Paul Ziemer’s C.V. has a number of citations of papers he

co-authored about radium sealed sources, radon, and the dangers therefrom.

• Dr. Ziemer made another Board comment about leaking Ra-226 sources

(Reference: TBD-6000 work group transcript 12/16/2009, page 137:

The petitioners regard NIOSH ignoring and not calculating radon doses

at GSI during the radium era (1952-1962 as a most serious SEC00105 error of

omission. Given the chair’s own research in this area, we regard the delay in

recognizing and acting on the radon issue at GSI to constitute negligent

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violation of OCAS-IG-003 guidance. NIOSH has historical trouble developing

valid radon intake models (Blockson Chemical, Texas City Chemicals SECs).

(35) NIOSH’s SEC Counselor and DFO failed to keep the GSI SEC primary

petitioner in the notification loop for meetings and new white papers in a

timely way for months and years during the SEC-00105 Board and WG

deliberations. The GSI petitioner had to keep reminding the NIOSH SEC

Counselor of this fact. The express primary mission of the Counselor is to

assist SEC petitioners. The DFO sent co-petitioner many documents

that were not also copied to the primary SEC-00105 petitioner as they should

all have been. We regard this as a serious omission error.

(36) NIOSH failed to do further research and investigation on radiation

overexposure incidents as mandated by 42 CFR §83.9.

(a) 1953 stolen plumb bob recovered one week later in October 1953

incident;

(b) 1965 (two affidavits) Co-60 in Bldg 6 radiography room 

 and incident where the pill became disconnected outside of

the “pig” lead shield. The badge recorded a dose of 38 REM.

Note: This incident was first called to attention in a letter from

Landauer’s in 2006. SC&A and Bob Anigstein later claimed that

the high 38 REM dose had been marked retracted on Landauer’s report, but this

alleged “fact” was not documented by putting the marked report on the written

record as it should have been [also see error 37]

(37) Dr. Robert Anigstein of SC&A improperly consulted with his colleague at

SC&A, Ed Zlotnicki, a former Landauer VP, about Error 36a. In turn, Mr.

Zlotnicki allegedly contacted Landauer and produced “evidence” the

petitioner’s never saw in toto. Dr. Anigstein presented to the TBD-6000 WG

that these highest two GSI doses, including the 38 REM a worker (

) received in one quarter dose, were later retracted by GSI workers

to their supervisor, and that Landauer had so marked these records. The

petitioners believe this 38 REM high dose is valid based on information we

know about the ~1963 or 1964 overexposure incident involving a disconnected

and out of shield Co-60 source in the Building 6 radiography room. Supervisor

 had to call in of to reconnect the

source and replace it inside the lead shield. WE believe the dropped and

later recovered film badge actually received the recorded dose. In this

sense, the value of 38 REM in one quarter was not a mistake and should not

have been retracted. Mr. Zlotnicki never placed his complete evidence about

this event on the record. and interviewed about

this overexposure incident several times. NIOSH did no further investigation

of the incident as they are mandated to do under 42 CFR §83.9.

 did not mention this fact to when he contacted her

much earlier than the SC&A revelation. Petitioner’s therefore challenge this

SC&A “evidence of highest dose retraction” as unsubstantiated, and being

false, and improperly obtained, and as not being released publicly on the

official record in full (secrecy, lack of transparency, false information).

The SC&A Anigstein-Zlotnicki evidence was not placed in toto on the official

record to be corroborated from other sources. The petitioners were given

improperly redacted, alleged retraction letters. and 

know the main individuals involved are all deceased and thus are not

protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. The petitioners have frequently brought

this fact to the attention of NIOSH and the CDC/ATSDR FOIA office, and the

HHS OGC lawyers who assist the ABRWH, all to no avail (see Error 03).

Source document reference: TBD-6000 work group transcript dated

10/14/2009, pages 102 through 137. Thorough discussion of the retracted film

badge reading that SC&A and Dr. Anigstein claim was after June 30, 1966 in

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the 1969 or 1970 time frame. pointed out that several hundred Bldg. 6

workers were potentially exposed to a Co-60 unshielded source for 16 to 24

hours. Two GSI workers put the Bldg. 6 overexposure incident

date as occurring in 1965-66, a major unresolved discrepancy.

38. NIOSH never modeled external doses in the busy outside area at GSI that

lay between the Old and New 24-25 Mev Betatrons. This was an SEC error in and

of itself. That is, Betatron doses beyond the containment building confines

were not modeled, nor did any GSI monitoring survey data of this area survive

to the present time. Workers testified that periodic radiation surveys of

outdoor areas surrounding the Betatron facilities were conducted. None of

this monitoring data is extant.

In addition, the following facts should be noted about this confluence

area between the Betatrons: David Allen and DCAS assumed the distance from

the Old Betatron building at GSI (circa 1951) to the closest building was

1000 feet. The petitioners demonstrated that this “fact” was incorrect, an

error, by producing a large and detailed 1957 engineering drawing (2-D map)

of the entire GSI complex in 1957. had obtained this map in a

visit to the present operator of a business on a portion of the GSI site

(Granite City Pickling Warehouse). The map was presented to the TBD-6000 WG,

in person by and , at its 3/15/12 meeting in Cincinnati. The

map demonstrated several important new pieces of GSI information:

(a) The Old and New Betatron buildings were only 300 feet apart. The

1957 map showed the two Betatrons and railroad tracks running into them and

in the space between the two NDT buildings. This fact was confirmed by the

scaled map and by former worker affidavits. Those affidavits indicated that a

number of different job categories of workers worked in that outdoor space.

These job categories included a yard crane operator, railroad engineers and

switchmen (yard men), and others. The area was quite heavily traveled every

day.

(b) The closeness of the two Betatrons has to be viewed together with a

sign on the OBB that read “Do not approach this building within 100 feet.”

 had taken photographs, which he provided to the TBD-6000 work

group, from a site visit he had made with SINEW members on September 26,

2006. This means that radiation zones surrounding the two GSI Betatron

facilities extended to within 100 feet of each other;

(c) had contributed other photographs that showed cars

and rail tracks next to Building 10 and the New Betatron. In addition, a main

road at GSI traveled by all workers ran through this narrow 300 foot space

between the two Betatron buildings;

(d) St. Louis Testing Laboratories in the 1963-68 time frame used a

large Co-60 source outside the GSI New Betatron near Building 10. This was a

large casting, and according to took several days to perform

isotope NDT radiography. This specific type of activity had been denied by

the Illinois Dept. of Health for GSI to use their own 80 Curie Co-60 source

due to safety concerns. Petitioners view this particular activity as an

overexposure incident as defined in 42 CFR §83.9, requiring further research

by NIOSH in addition to worker affidavits.

(39) Lavon Rutherford and NIOSH never told the TBD-6000 work group or the

full Board how many individuals would be potential class members with and

without presumptive cancers if SEC-0015 were awarded. had to

remind Mr. Rutherford that such information had been presented at Board

meetings in his regular “upcoming SEC” presentations. asked why this

was not done for GSI SEC-00105? was flabbergasted and appalled when

the answer came back, “this is not my responsibility,” an absurd and duty

shirking, demeaning to NIOSH, response. It should be noted the TBD-6000 WG

never asked for these SEC-00105 class member data, either. Mr. Rutherford

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eventually did provide some SEC class membership numbers to , but

these numbers were not put on the record at work group or ABRWH meeting

presentations including SEC Updates by Mr. Rutherford. Petitioners regard

this as another NEGLIGENT OMMISSION ERROR FOR GSI SEC-00105.

(40) ABRWH Chairman James Melius erred on December 11, 2012, by making a

single motion for the Board to take only one vote for the entire GSI

operational and residual periods (1953-1992). Moreover, he omitted having the

vote extend to the entire operational period that by then included Oct. 1,

1952 to December 31, 1952. This was a negligent commission error in the

petitioner’s view. The Board votes on the operational residual periods

separately in the majority of adjudicated SECs. The TBD-6000 work group on

11/28/12, had divided its votes on SEC-00105 into three periods that

corresponded with the GSI first ten years (the radium era 1953-1962), the

rest of the operational period through June 30, 1966, and the residual period

from July 1, 1966 through December 31, 1992. Petitioners believe the same

vote scenario should have been followed by the full Board. Dr. Ziemer

deferred to Dr. Melius on this matter. Petitioners assert the Melius final

SEC-00105 vote motion to consider 1953 through 1992 was driven by expediency

rather than by TBD-6000 work group precedent as the vote should have been.

(41) Improper Privacy Act of 1974 redactions, including deceased individuals,

of FOIAs and Public Comments and white papers:

(a) Private information on known deceased workers redacted.

(b) Deceased persons are excluded from PA 1974.

(c) NRC does not redact 1,016 pages of FOIA/PA 2010-0012, while

NIOSH heavily redacts same material.

(d) John Vance of DOL by accident transmits e-mail to with

unredacted personal private information on a claim from a person

who is unknown to ; Vance claims no PA violation because

claimant is deceased.

(e) Experienced SimmonsCooper (SC) law firm attorneys drafted PA 1974

and HIPAA waivers (releases) that SINEW sent to CDC/NIOSH for GSI workers who

provided affidavits, specifically so their names and jobs would not be

redacted and so that SINEW could review their Landauer film badge data;

HHS/CDC/NIOSH summarily rejected these perfectly legal waivers saying we do

not honor “universal waivers.” The meaning of this term is unknown to SC

attorneys and to .

Petitioners believe the declination by CDC of SC medical and PA waivers

was improper and amounted to censorship. The redactions that resulted

interfered with interpretation of information gleaned from deceased persons

and from workers with valid SC waivers (HIPAA medical and Privacy Act

releases). Petitioners and SINEW repeatedly stated to NIOSH that deceased

persons are not protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. CDC/ATSDR FOIA office

and Docket Offices ignored this fact, stating that family member

considerations led them to redact deceased persons names routinely in meeting

transcripts and GSI Docket 140 documents.

(42) In the entire GSI SEC-00105 full Board and TBD-6000 WG deliberations,

the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAP) SEC that involved four radiographers

who worked in the 1948-1949 period failed to be considered. Petitioners

believe this was a major omission error because this particular SEC was

precedent setting for how the ABRWH handled SECs involving NDT radiographers

with similar jobs to the GSI Betatron operators. [Transcript may be found at

URL: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/iop.html#SEC: ABRWH-31 7/5/05, pp 160-67]

(43) TBD-6000 work group (WG) member Dr. John Poston missed many crucial

WG meetings 2010 through 2012, and was absent at the final vote on 12/11/12.

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His serious conflict of interest problems with family members doing DR is on

the record (see Sarah Ray, comment on NIOSH Ten Year Review, Docket 194).

(44) We close this request with a compelling and serious sense of uneasiness

that the SEC-00105 TBD-6000 work group deliberations have a dark “secret”

force that has been operating behind the scenes at NIOSH and the Board and

SC&A since before October 2010.

As this passage illustrates, as recently as September 15, 2011, SC&A still

believed Allen’s use of the GSI administration’s statements about AEC limits

not being exceeded were not believable. Reference source: Text on Page 7 of

21, SC&A “White Paper: Review of NIOSH White Paper - GSI” (2/15/11).

Before then, during 2010 TBD-6000 WG meetings, SC&A’s John Mauro had

vigorously asserted to the TBD-6000 WG and Board on several occasions that a

GSI SEC for the 1953 to 1962 period appeared to be inevitable due to the lack

of necessary monitoring and process information, including uranium source

information (no MCW P.O.s). Then, to the chagrin of the petitioners, NIOSH

was allowed, even encouraged by the Board, to rewrite all of its GSI methods

and proposed ten new models in David Allen’s “Path Forward for GSI” new

program introduced in October 2010. He did this because both NIOSH and SC&A

computer models were far apart from each other and disagreed sharply with the

Landauer program #2084 film badge data. It was clear that Allen and DCAS were

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The time it would take to achieve this goal, argued for the

petitioners, was unreasonable given that NIOSH had already unsuccessfully

tried multiple methods to bound all doses with sufficient accuracy.

The need for 10 new NIOSH methods in the Allen Path Forward for GSI

proposal, we further argued, was strong proof that it was infeasible for

NIOSH to bound all internal and external GSI doses for all class members with

all types of cancers with sufficient accuracy. Therefore, the proper TBD-6000

work group and full Board action was to recommend an SEC for all years in

October 2010. We still believe that position was scientifically defensible

and reasonable for the SEC petitioners to take in the fall of 2010 two and a

half years ago. pointed out this DCAS Path Forward new effort

would greatly prolong revising Appendix BB Rev 0 (June 2007) for years. He

urged the WG to recommend an SEC for GSI at that time (October 2010) and not

allow any further NIOSH revision of failed DR methods. No one listened.

The following SC&A commentary on page 7 of 21, in September of 2011, is

diametrically opposed to positions that Drs. Anigstein and Mauro of SC&A have

taken more recently in 2012 leading up to the final ABRWH SEC-00105 vote on

12/11/2012. SC&A is commenting on Allen’s NIOSH information, as follows:

 (a) Re Exceeding AEC limits “...there is no documentation to substantiate

this statement.”

 (b) “There is no mention of any film badge dosimetry program until

1962...”

 (c) Re: “little radiation exposure”: “Little radiation exposure” is not

consistent with exposures up to the then-permissible limit.”

By December 2012, before the final SEC-00105 Board vote, all these

caveats and concerns that SC&A firmly held in October 2010 had completely

vanished, magically, like the wind, with no actual changes in the factual

basis for the SC&A or NIOSH positions having taken place.

It must be said here, the GSI SEC-00105 petitioners, site experts,

claimants and the many denied potential SEC class members, feel there has

been a backroom. non-transparent “accommodation” among the full Board and

the TBD-6000 members, SC&A and NIOSH leadership. We cannot pin this down

further, however, there is a strong sense we are being unfairly manipulated

to fit another hidden agenda. We know GSI deserved an SEC in 2005 and still

does today. The ANWAG complaint to the HHS IG in 2013 bolsters our suspicion.

No site has more input in the way of written documentation from the

petitioners, site experts and former workers, that has been bestowed on the

Board, NIOSH and SC&A, than has been the case at General Steel Industries.

As voluminous as our information is, we believe the administrative review

panel should make an earnest effort to go through all of our work group

testimony: Attachment A: 15 meetings on TBD-6000, GSI Appendix BB, and

SEC-00105; our many ABRWH meeting formal Public Comments starting in 2005,

our SEC session Powerpoint® presentations to the Board, especially the one

on 3/15/12 we made in person to the TBD-6000 work group, our 5 worker

outreach transcripts from 2006 and 2007, and the 41 white papers about

GSI, 2 42 CFR 83 SEC Rule comments, and 7 Docket 194 NIOSH McKeel comments on

the NIOSH Ten Year Review (see Attachment B). Every one of those papers deals

with a lengthy record of factual, scientific, personal bias, censorship,

and procedural errors we believe were made by NIOSH, the work group, the

Board and SC&A starting in 2005 and continuing even today.

In summary, collectively, we believe this long record of significant

errors forms a compelling basis for recommending the HHS Secretary reverse

her denial of GSI SEC-00105. The petitioners and those we represent thank you

for your consideration.

“When there is error, may we have truth”

- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

 Inaugural address

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References:

1. Kuttemperoor, Vincent Z. Photon activation of materials subjected to

Betatron radiography. Material Evaluation (1974), July issue:

pp. 153-156

2. Kuttemperoor, Vincent Z. Photon activation of alloys and elements used

in industrial parts requiring high-energy x-ray radiography. Materials

Evaluation. (1975), May issue, pp. 113-119

Respectfully Submitted,

 4/14/13

______________________________________________

Petitioner Date

 4/14/13

______________________________________________

C0-petitioner Date

Note: See attached formal signatures on following page

List of Exhibits and Attachments

EXHIBIT 8.1 IL SENATOR ROCHARD DURBIN LETTERS TO ABRWH 2007 and 2009

EXHIBIT 9.2 IL CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION to NIOSH DIRECTOR HOWARD 2005

EXHIBIT 10.3 DR. VINCENT KUTTEMPEROOR TO ABRWH (February 2, 2007)

EXHIBIT 11.4 MCKEEL [MARCH 11, 2012] status report on David Allen’s DCAS

 [Section B. Path Forward for GSI”] WHITE PAPER to TBD-6000

 work group (October 2010)

EXHIBIT 12.5 MCKEEL MARCH 15, 2012, Powerpoint® to TBD-6000 work group

EXHIBIT 13.6 ANNOTATED 12/11/2012 TRANSCRIPT, ABRWH final vote SEC-00105

EXHIBIT 14.7 MCNPX mesh VALIDATION PAPER (MCNPX agrees with measured data

 within ± 2.7-5.4 percent for a modeled cesium-137 source)

EXHIBIT 15.8 GSI site expert revised opinion that 1953 belt object was a

 GSI identification badge rather than a Landauer film badge

EXHIBIT 15.9 Landauer letter dated 2/05/2007 to stating

 regulatory radiation limits that applied to GSI prior to 1963

EXBIHIT 15.10 Board member Wanda Munn testimony at 11/5/10 ABRWH meeting

ATTACHMENT A TBD-6000 work group folders with transcript files on CD-ROM

ATTACHMENT B Listing of Dan McKeel GSI related white papers in Docket 140,

 SEC Rule Docket 42 CFR 83, and Docket 194 (NIOSH Ten Year

 Program Review)

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