Illinois Official Reports 

Supreme Court

People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872

Caption in Supreme

Court:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

DONTA MOSLEY, Appellee.

Docket No. 115872

Filed

Rehearing denied

February 20, 2015

June 5, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Michael 

Brown, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Cause remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita M. 

Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle 

Katz, Annette Collins and Noah Montague, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, 

Deputy Defender, and Gilbert C. Lenz, Assistant Appellate Defender, 

of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for 

appellee.
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Justices JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, 

and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION 

¶ 1 At issue in this case is the constitutionality of certain sections of the aggravated unlawful 

use of a weapon (AUUW) statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2012)). Defendant was convicted 

in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, of, inter alia, six counts of AUUW. The 

circuit court entered a written order holding that due to its findings of statutory 

unconstitutionality, both facially and as applied to defendant, all six AUUW convictions 

would be vacated and, instead, a conviction of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) under section 

24-1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2012)) would be 

entered. In line with the written order, the trial court imposed a Class A misdemeanor sentence 

for the UUW conviction. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1(b) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55 (West 

2012). Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), the State’s appeal from 

the circuit court’s finding of statutory unconstitutionality comes directly to this court.

¶ 2 PRINCIPAL STATUTE INVOLVED 

¶ 3 At the time of proceedings herein, the AUUW statute provided, in pertinent part: 

“§ 24-1.6. Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. 

 (a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon when he 

or she knowingly: 

 (1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle or concealed on or 

about his or her person except when on his or her land or in his or her abode, legal 

dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of 

another person as an invitee with that person’s permission, any pistol, revolver, 

stun gun or taser or other firearm[1]

; or 

 (2) Carries or possesses on or about his or her person, upon any public street, 

alley, or other public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village or 

incorporated town, except when an invitee thereon or therein, for the purpose of the 

display of such weapon or the lawful commerce in weapons, or except when on his 

or her own land or in his or her own abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of 

business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with 

that person’s permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm[2]

; 

and

 (3) One of the following factors is present: 

 (A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible 

at the time of the offense; or 

 

1

For purposes of simplicity, hereafter, the language of subsection (a)(1) of the AUUW statute will 

be summarized as “carrying on his person or in any vehicle, outside the home, a firearm.”

2

Similarly, the language of subsection (a)(2) will be summarized as “carrying or possessing on his 

person, upon any public way, a firearm.”
- 3 - 

 *** 

 (C) the person possessing the firearm has not been issued a currently valid 

Firearm Owner’s Identification Card; or

 * * * 

 (I) the person possessing the weapon was under 21 years of age and in 

possession of a handgun as defined in Section 24-3, unless the person under 21 

is engaged in lawful activities under the Wildlife Code or described in 

subsection 24-2(b)(1), (b)(3), or 24-2(f). 

 * * * 

 (d) Sentence. 

 (1) Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon is a Class 4 felony[3]; *** 

 (2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection 

(d), a first offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon committed with a 

firearm by a person 18 years of age or older where the factors listed in both items 

(A) and (C) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) are present is a Class 4 felony, for 

which the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than one 

year and not more than 3 years.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2012). 

¶ 4 Background 

¶ 5 On March 7, 2012, Chicago police officers received a call about a person with a gun at a 

local park. Upon arrival at the park, the officers noticed a group of children playing and a 

group of teenagers standing together in the park. When officers approached defendant, who 

was then 19 years of age, and the other teenagers, defendant walked away. The officers 

demanded that defendant stop walking, but instead he continued to exit the park. Officers then 

pursued defendant, noticing his hand was on his right waist. When officers got closer to 

defendant, he began to run. While in pursuit, an officer witnessed defendant reach inside his 

waistband and pull out a .32-caliber revolver, which he dropped to the ground. Officers 

recovered the weapon and found that it was fully loaded with six live rounds. The pursuing 

officer testified at trial that when she saw defendant pull the weapon out from his waistband, 

the weapon was loose and not enclosed in any type of gun case. Officers were able to 

apprehend defendant and place him under arrest. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he had not 

been issued a valid Firearm Owner Identification (FOID) card. 

¶ 6 The State charged defendant in count I with UUW in a public park (720 ILCS 

5/24-1(a)(10) (West 2012)) and with six counts of AUUW; count II, carrying on his person or 

in any vehicle, outside the home, a firearm which is “uncased, loaded and immediately 

accessible” (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2012)); count III, carrying on his person 

or in any vehicle, outside the home, a firearm without a valid FOID card (720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (West 2012)); count IV, carrying on his person or in any vehicle, 

outside the home, a firearm which is “a handgun” while under 21 years of age unless “engaged 

 

3The term of imprisonment for a Class 4 felony “shall be a determinate sentence of not less than one 

year and not more than 3 years” and, notwithstanding certain exceptions inapplicable here, “the period 

of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 30 months.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a), (d) (West 

2012). 
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in lawful activities under the Wildlife Code” (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2012)); 

count V, carrying or possessing on his person, upon any public way, a firearm that is “uncased, 

loaded and immediately accessible” (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) (West 2012)); count 

VI, carrying or possessing on his person, upon any public way, a firearm without a valid FOID 

card (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(C) (West 2012)); and count VII, carrying or possessing 

on his person, upon any public way, a handgun while under 21 years of age unless “engaged in 

lawful activities under the Wildlife Code” (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(I) (West 2012)). 

¶ 7 On December 10, 2012, following a bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of all 

seven counts. The case was continued for posttrial motions and sentencing. On February 6, 

2013, the trial court heard defendant’s motion for a new trial alleging, inter alia, that the State 

failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the seven counts. The court 

granted defendant’s posttrial motion as to count I, UUW in a public park, and entered a finding 

of not guilty on that count. The trial court denied defendant relief as to the remaining six 

AUUW counts, finding the evidence sufficient for a guilty verdict on counts II through VII. 

The State asked that defendant be sentenced to “time in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections,” acknowledging that he had no previous felony convictions or juvenile 

adjudications. The following colloquy then occurred: 

“THE COURT: State, your understanding is that the law requires that [defendant] 

be sentenced to the penitentiary? 

 [PROSECUTOR]: Correct. 

 THE COURT: Because the charges that remain, Count 2 to Count 6, are 

non-probationable Class 4 felonies? 

[PROSECUTOR]: Correct.”4

Thereafter, the trial judge, sua sponte, expressed his concerns as to whether the 

“non-probationable” Class 4 felony sentence required to be imposed upon defendant under the 

AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d)(2) (West 2012)) was constitutional, questioning 

whether that sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and whether there were 

proportionality problems where “[t]he only non-probationable Class 4 felon[ies] in the State of 

Illinois are the charges against the defendant.” The court therefore continued the sentencing 

hearing to allow the parties to prepare arguments as to these constitutional concerns. 

¶ 8 On March 8, 2013, the trial court heard oral arguments by counsel for defendant and the 

State regarding what the court termed as the “constitutionality of the mandatory sentencing 

provision for the aggravated unlawful use of weapon charge that the defendant is facing.” 

Thereafter, on March 15, 2013, the court entered its written order, as required by Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006), finding that “the offense established by 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(a)(1) & (a)(3)(A) & (C), and the punishment prescribed for the offense by 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(d)(2), are unconstitutional based on the proportionate penalties clause of Article I, 

 

4The prosecutor erred in responding to the court’s question, as only counts II, III, V and VI charged 

Class 4 offenses which required sentencing under the “non-probationable” section of the AUUW 

statute. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d)(2) (West 2012). Both counts IV and VII, the latter of which the court 

failed to mention, charged offenses requiring Class 4 felony sentencing, which allows for a sentence of 

probation. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d)(1) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(d) (West 2012). This error, 

as we shall explain, is not relevant to our decision. 
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section 11 of the Illinois Constitution and the due process clause of Article I, section 2 of the 

Illinois Constitution.” The court further found that “as to these provisions, the aggravated 

unlawful use of weapons statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the 

defendant because it cannot be reasonably construed in a manner that would preserve its 

validity.” At defendant’s March 15, 2013, sentencing hearing, the transcript states that the trial 

court found unconstitutional “720 ILCS 25-41.6a [sic]” of the AUUW statute, “as well as the 

sentencing provision of a2 [sic],” and in an “Addendum” order dated March 15, related to bail 

and sentencing matters, the first line reads: “Court finds 720-5/24-1.6(A) [sic] 

unconstitutional.”5

The trial court held at sentencing that, “[f]or the reasons stated in the [Rule 

18] order,” it was “going to vacate the convictions on those counts which is [sic] counts two 

through seven.” Further, and consistent with its Rule 18 order, the trial court found defendant 

guilty and entered a conviction on the uncharged offense of UUW set forth in section 

24-1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2012)). That section states that 

the UUW statute is violated when, as applicable here, one knowingly “[c]arries or possesses in 

any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land *** any *** firearm.” 

720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2012). Defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail and 15 

months probation for this Class A misdemeanor. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1(b) (West 2012); 730 

ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a), (d) (West 2012). This direct appeal to our court by the State followed. Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 Initially, we address the discrepancy as to which portions of the AUUW statute the trial 

court actually found unconstitutional. In the trial court’s discussion portion of its Rule 18 

order, the court at times refers to the entirety of section 24-1(a) as being unconstitutional, 

which is in line with our interpretation of the court’s statements at sentencing and in the 

Addendum order. However, in the specific portion of the order entitled “Findings Under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 18,” the trial court confined its findings of unconstitutionality to 

those sections under which defendant was charged and subject to sentencing, and which were 

the only matters before the court, although it neglected to specifically mention section 

24-1.6(a)(2) and subsection (a)(3)(I). In their briefs, and at oral argument, the parties also 

confine their contentions regarding the propriety of the trial court’s judgment to those 

subsections of the AUUW statute of which defendant was originally convicted, as well as 

subsection (d)(2) of the statute’s sentencing provision. The parties may have proceeded in this 

manner in recognition of the fact that the trial court had, at times, found unconstitutional the 

entirety of section 24-1.6(a), which it had no jurisdiction to do. We agree with the parties’ 

actions, as the subsections setting forth offenses of which defendant had not been charged or 

convicted were not justiciable matters before the trial court. 

 

5Both the statutory sections set forth in the sentencing transcript and in the Addendum order are 

apparently scriveners’ errors. Reviewing the record as a whole, we believe that the trial court was 

actually referring to section 24-1.6(a) of the AUUW statute and the sentencing provision set forth in 

subsection (d)(2), and we will proceed accordingly. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a), (d)(2) (West 2012). See 

McKay Plating Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 91 Ill. 2d 198, 206-07 (1982) (Court agreed with petitioner 

that discrepancy in date stated in decision of Commission and date as shown by the record was 

attributable to scrivener’s error and correct date should be the latter.).
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¶ 11 Article VI, section 9 of the Illinois Constitution grants circuit courts original jurisdiction 

over all justiciable matters. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9; Slepicka v. Illinois Department of 

Public Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 32. “Generally speaking, a ‘justiciable matter’ is ‘a 

controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to 

hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal 

interests.’ ” In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 301 (2010) (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota 

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (2002)). More importantly, courts do not rule on 

the constitutionality of a statute where its provisions do not affect the parties (Klein v. 

Department of Registration & Education, 412 Ill. 75, 87-88 (1952)), and decide constitutional 

questions only to the extent required by the issues in the case. Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport 

Co., 412 Ill. 179, 201 (1952); see also Illinois Municipal League v. Illinois State Labor 

Relations Board, 140 Ill. App. 3d 592, 599 (1986). Here, therefore, the trial court’s 

pronouncement as to the constitutionality of any offense-based subsections of the AUUW 

statute other than subsections (a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(C), and (a)(3)(I), as applicable under 

subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), were advisory opinions, which Illinois courts are not permitted to 

render. See In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351 (2009) (“As a general rule, courts in Illinois 

do not *** render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected 

regardless of how those issues are decided.”).

¶ 12 Accordingly, we limit our discussion to those subsections under section 24-1.6(a) of which 

defendant was convicted, and subsection (d)(2) of the statute’s sentencing provision, which 

was applicable to defendant. See People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22 n.3 (“[O]ur finding 

of unconstitutionality in this decision is specifically limited to the [statutory section at issue]. 

We make no finding, express or implied, with respect to the constitutionality or 

unconstitutionality of any other section or subsection of the AUUW statute.”). Further, to the 

extent that the trial court’s orders or statements could be interpreted as finding any other 

portion of section 24-1.6(a), which is not at issue in this case, as being unconstitutional, such 

finding is vacated. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a) (West 2012). 

¶ 13 As an additional preliminary matter, we now must address defendant’s claim that this court 

does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the trial court’s actions prior to 

sentencing amounted to an unappealable acquittal of each of his six AUUW convictions. In 

People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1998), this court held that an acquittal occurs when the 

trier of fact renders a verdict or finding of not guilty. The Quigley court further stated: “An 

acquittal generally requires some resolution of a defendant’s factual guilt or innocence.” Id. 

(citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-99 (1978)); see also People v. Henry, 204 Ill. 2d 

267, 283-94 (2003) (entry of a directed verdict in favor of the defendant is an acquittal for 

purposes of double jeopardy when there was insufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of 

law, some or all of the essential elements of the crime). Here, however, no acquittal occurred 

where, at the conclusion of defendant’s bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of, 

inter alia, six counts of AUUW (counts II through VII), three of which involved combining 

statutory section 24-1.6(a)(1) with subsections (a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(C), and (a)(3)(I), while the 

other three involved combining section 24-1.6(a)(2) with subsections (a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(C), and 

(a)(3)(I). Additional support for a finding that no acquittal occurred lies in the fact that the 

court later denied defendant’s motion for a new trial challenging the factual sufficiency of 

those six AUUW convictions, while it granted defendant’s posttrial motion as to count I, UUW 

in a public park, and entered a finding of not guilty on that count. It is therefore uncontroverted 
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that the court, as trier of fact, convicted defendant of six counts of AUUW after concluding that 

each element of the offense set forth in those subsections was proven and, posttrial, affirmed 

the sufficiency of the evidence as to those convictions. 

¶ 14 We note that a trial court’s act in vacating a defendant’s convictions as a remedy for its 

posttrial finding that those convictions were based upon unconstitutional statutory sections, as 

occurred here, is quite different from a trier of fact acquitting a defendant of an offense due to 

an insufficiency of evidence to convict. In People v. Williams, 279 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25-26 

(1996), the appellate court stated: “The fact that a conviction is later vacated for constitutional 

reasons is generally not considered to be the functional equivalent of an acquittal, absent some 

suggestion that the evidence was insufficient to convict.” Here, as we have indicated, neither 

the court’s convictions of defendant at trial nor its denial of defendant’s posttrial motion 

suggests any insufficiency in the evidence, and there is no claim by defendant that the court’s 

order finding sections of the AUUW statute unconstitutional are based on any evidentiary 

concerns. Thus, for purposes of determining jurisdiction in this case, we conclude that where 

defendant’s six AUUW convictions were vacated based solely on constitutional grounds, and 

where the sufficiency of the evidence as to those convictions is clear, no acquittals occurred. 

See id.

¶ 15 Next, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court’s posttrial entry of a conviction 

on a lesser-included offense, ipso facto, constitutes an acquittal of the greater offense. It is true 

that when the trier of fact enters a conviction for a lesser-included offense before jeopardy 

expires, an acquittal of the greater offense occurs. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 

190-91 (1957) (for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, a conviction of a lesser-included 

offense constituted an acquittal of the greater offense because the finder of fact was given the 

choice to convict defendant of the greater offense and chose not to before jeopardy ended); 

People v. McCutcheon, 68 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1977) (“The finding of guilty on a lesser charge by 

the trier of fact is presumptively a finding of not guilty on the greater offense since the trier of 

fact has the opportunity to find the defendant guilty of the greater offense.”). However, in this 

case, the court, sitting as trier of fact, found defendant guilty of all six counts of AUUW with 

which he was charged, and only vacated those convictions and entered a conviction on a 

lesser-included offense during posttrial proceedings. Under these circumstances, the question 

of whether an acquittal has occurred is dependent on whether the posttrial ruling is based on 

the State’s failure of proof as to the greater offense, or on the establishment of a legal 

conclusion which does not support the greater offense. See People v. Zeisler, 125 Ill. 2d 42, 

44-45, 48-50 (1988) (holding that a conviction for a greater offense, later voided as 

unconstitutional by the circuit court following a postconviction hearing, does not bar a second 

trial for a lesser offense under the double jeopardy clause). 

¶ 16 Here, the trial court’s posttrial ruling vacating defendant’s AUUW convictions was based 

on its legal conclusion that the subsections of the statute under which he was convicted and 

sentenced could no longer support those convictions. See People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, 

¶ 28 (the effect of finding a statute facially unconstitutional is to render it “void ab initio,” and 

thus incapable of being enforced); see also People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 398 (1990) (“this 

court has expressly held that a defendant cannot be prosecuted under an unconstitutional act”). 

Therefore, the trial court’s decision to enter a conviction on a lesser offense, based on its 

posttrial legal ruling, was not an acquittal and may be reversed by this court. See People v. 

Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 358-59 (2009) (reversing the circuit court’s erroneous decision, based 
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on its posttrial finding that the felony disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutional under the 

proportionate penalties clause, to vacate the defendant’s felony conviction and enter a 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction).6

¶ 17 Additionally, as no acquittal of any AUUW charge occurred in this case, defendant’s claim 

that the State’s appeal is barred by article VI, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution must also be 

rejected. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (“after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, there 

shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal”). Similarly, we reject defendant’s contention 

that the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions bar this court 

from hearing this appeal or reinstating defendant’s convictions. This court has held that the 

double jeopardy clause prohibits appellate review of a judgment of acquittal where, if the 

government’s appeal is successful, the defendant will be subject to a second trial for the same 

offense. People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1990) (citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 

332 (1975)). However, in the case before us, we have established that defendant was not

acquitted of his AUUW convictions and the record shows that the State has not requested a 

second trial. Thus, where neither the bar on appeals from acquittals under the Illinois 

Constitution nor double jeopardy principles is implicated herein, this court has jurisdiction. 

See Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 1 (exercising 

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 603 on the State’s appeal from the circuit court’s sua sponte

finding that a statute was unconstitutional). 

¶ 18 Because we have rejected defendant’s contentions that this court lacks jurisdiction over the 

State’s appeal, we now address its merits. To convict a defendant under the AUUW statute, the 

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that a defendant was carrying on his person 

or in any vehicle, outside the home, a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2012)), or was 

carrying or possessing on his person, upon any public way, a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2) 

(West 2012)) and that one of the factors set forth in subsection (a)(3) exists. See 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(a)(1)-(a)(3) (West 2012); People v. Zimmerman, 239 Ill. 2d 491, 499 (2010) (the 

factors in subsection (a)(3) transform the crime from “simple” unlawful use of a weapon to 

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon). The following factors are relevant to this case: 

subsection (a)(3)(A), the firearm was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible; subsection 

(a)(3)(C), the person possessing the firearm had not been issued a valid FOID card; and 

subsection (a)(3)(I), the person possessing the firearm, a handgun, was under 21 years of age 

and not engaged in lawful activities prescribed under the Wildlife Code (520 ILCS 5/1.1 et seq. 

(West 2012)). See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(3)(A), (C), (I) (West 2012). Additionally, section 

24-1.6(d), entitled “Sentence,” provides that AUUW is a Class 4 felony unless certain 

circumstances exist which mandate a greater sentence. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d) (West 2012). 

 

6While this case was pending, defendant filed a “Motion for Judicial Notice of Appendix to State’s 

Brief in People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337 (2009),” asking that we consider statements made by the trial 

court therein to clarify ambiguity in its judgment. We ordered defendant’s motion taken with the case 

and now allow that motion, as we may take judicial notice of briefs filed in another case. See People v. 

Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 190 (2009) (“at defendant’s behest, we have reviewed the briefs filed in 

[People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984),] and take judicial notice [of the issues raised]”); see also People 

v. Mata, 217 Ill. 2d 535, 539 (2005). 
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¶ 19 Here, as outlined above, defendant was charged and originally convicted of six counts of 

AUUW. The following chart explains the statutory subsections upon which these counts were 

based:

AUUW Subsections Under Which Defendant Was Charged/Convicted

720 ILCS 5/24-1.6: (a)(1)—Person or 

Vehicle

(a)(2)—Public 

Way

(a)(3)(A)—Uncased, Loaded Firearm count II count V

(a)(3)(C)—No FOID Card count III count VI

(a)(3)(I)—Under 21 and Not Engaged 

in Lawful Hunting Activities count IV count VII

¶ 20 Constitutionality of the AUUW Statute 

¶ 21 We are asked in this case to decide whether the subsections of the AUUW statute under 

which defendant was originally convicted, as well as a sentencing section, violate 

constitutional principles such that the trial court properly vacated those convictions. Here, in 

holding portions of the AUUW statute unconstitutional, the trial court found that certain 

subsections of the statute violated, both on their face and as applied, one or more of the 

following: (1) defendant’s right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the second 

amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II); (2) his due process 

rights under both the United States (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and Illinois Constitutions (Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. I, § 2); or (3) the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution 

(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). On appeal, defendant raises additional contentions that certain of 

his original convictions were unconstitutional based on violations of both his equal protection 

and due process rights under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 

50, 61 (2003) (a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute can be raised at any time).

¶ 22 All statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 

112116, ¶ 15. This court will find a statute constitutional and, therefore, valid if it can be 

reasonably done. Id. To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must 

clearly establish its invalidity. People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (2005). The question of 

whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.

Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 15; People v. Dinelli, 217 Ill. 2d 387, 397 (2005). We apply these 

principles in reviewing the propriety of each of the constitutional violations found by the trial 

court, or argued by defendant. 

¶ 23 The Right to Keep and Bear Arms 

¶ 24 During the pendency of the State’s appeal, this court in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, 

¶ 21, held the Class 4 form of AUUW set forth in section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d), which 

prohibited carrying on one’s person or in any vehicle, outside the home, a firearm which was 

uncased, loaded and immediately accessible, to be a comprehensive ban that categorically 

prohibited possession and use of a firearm for self-defense outside of the home. Accordingly, 

this court held the subsection at issue to be facially unconstitutional because it violated the 

second amendment right to keep and bear arms. Id. ¶ 22. Although the trial court herein did not 

have the benefit of our decision in Aguilar in making its Rule 18 findings, because defendant’s 

conviction under count II involves the same subsection of the AUUW statute found 
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unconstitutional in Aguilar, that portion of the trial court’s judgment vacating count II is 

affirmed. See People v. Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, ¶ 11 (where Aguilar squarely 

resolved issue presented by declaring same section of statute facially unconstitutional, the 

ultimate outcome would be to vacate defendant’s conviction based upon that statutory 

section); People v. Jamesson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 446, 451-52 (2002) (citing People v. Zeisler,

125 Ill. 2d 42, 48 (1988) (noting that the doctrine of void ab initio declares an unconstitutional 

statute null and void as of the date of its enactment, “which results in the court’s vacating a 

conviction based upon such statute”)).

¶ 25 We next address whether, in light of Aguilar, defendant’s conviction under count V, for 

violating section 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A), was properly vacated where this count also concerns 

carrying, outside the home, a firearm which is uncased, loaded and immediately accessible.7

In Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 19, we adopted the holding in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 

940 (7th Cir. 2012), which held that Illinois’s “flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside 

the home,” as embodied in the Class 4 form of section 24-1.6(a)(1), is unconstitutional. The 

only distinction between the section invalidated in Aguilar and the section under which 

defendant was originally convicted in count V is the location where one possesses an uncased, 

loaded and immediately accessible firearm. See People v. Akins, 2014 IL App (1st) 093418-B, 

¶ 11. If, under Aguilar, a person cannot be barred from carrying an uncased, loaded and 

immediately accessible firearm while in a vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person 

based on the second amendment of the United States Constitution, it is logical that the same 

conduct should not be barred when the alleged offender similarly carries a firearm on a public 

way. Indeed, we determined in Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 18, that neither District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), nor McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 

742, 791 (2010), expressly limited the second amendment’s protections to the home. We 

therefore agree with the appellate court in Akins, 2014 IL App (1st) 093418-B, ¶ 11, that the 

reasoning in Aguilar extends to a conviction under section 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) for 

possession of an uncased, loaded firearm on a public way. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) 

(West 2012). As that section of the AUUW statute cannot be reasonably held constitutional, 

the trial court’s judgment vacating count V is affirmed. Akins, 2014 IL App (1st) 093418-B, 

¶ 11 (vacating, as void ab initio, defendant’s AUUW conviction based on section 24-1.6(a)(2), 

(a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute). 

¶ 26 Severability 

¶ 27 Next, defendant argues that the subsections of the AUUW statute set forth in counts III 

through VII are not severable from section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), which this court declared 

unconstitutional in Aguilar. Given that we have now additionally found section 24-1.6(a)(2), 

(a)(3)(A), as charged in count V, to be unconstitutional, we consider the severability of the 

remaining four subsections at issue to determine if they are severable from both (a)(3)(A) 

subsections. 

 

7We repeat that while the court failed to specifically cite the basis for its vacation of certain 

subsections of the AUUW statute in its Rule 18 order, it attempted to clarify its holding by later stating 

that it found the entirety of section 24-1.6(a) unconstitutional. Regardless, we may affirm or reject the 

lower court’s holdings based on any reason supported by the record. Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 

61 (2008) (“[T]his court may affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any basis contained in the record.”).
- 11 - 

¶ 28 As stated, defendant was charged in counts III and VI with possessing a firearm while, 

respectively, outside his home and on a public way, and without a valid FOID card. 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (West 2012); 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(C) (West 2012). He 

was charged in counts IV and VII with possessing a firearm while, respectively, outside his 

home and on a public way, and being under 21 years of age and not engaged in lawful hunting 

activities. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2012); 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(I) 

(West 2012). Without citing any authority, defendant argues that the purpose of the AUUW 

statute is a comprehensive ban on gun possession and that the statute would not have been 

enacted without the portion struck down in Aguilar, because the legislature “operating under 

the erroneous assumption that Illinois could categorically ban the possession of operable 

firearms outside the home.” The State, however, argues that both subsections (a)(3)(C) and 

(a)(3)(I) continue to set forth constitutionally valid offenses, regardless of whether subsection 

(a)(3)(A) creates an operable offense or not. That is, the State—citing People v. Pomykala, 203 

Ill. 2d 198, 209 (2003), and People v. Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, 

¶¶ 22-26—contends that those subsections are individually complete and capable of being 

executed wholly independently of whether subsection (a)(3)(A) is an operable offense. Based 

on the following case law, we agree with the State’s proposition.

¶ 29 The issue of severability involves a question of statutory construction, which primarily 

involves ascertaining and giving effect to the intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Chicago 

Bar Ass’n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 534 (1990). In determining whether a 

statutory provision containing an unconstitutional portion may be severed from the rest of a 

statute, we first look at the statute’s own specific severability provision. People v. Alexander, 

204 Ill. 2d 472, 484 (2003). If no specific severability clause is in the statute, we look to the 

Statute on Statutes’ general severability provision, which states in pertinent part: “ ‘If any 

provision of an Act *** is held invalid, such invalidity does not affect other provisions *** of 

the Act which can be given effect without the invalid *** provision, and to this end the 

provisions of each Act *** are severable, unless otherwise provided by the Act.’ ” Alexander, 

204 Ill. 2d at 484 (quoting 5 ILCS 70/1.31 (West 2000)). 

¶ 30 Here, the AUUW statute at issue (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2012)), does not contain its 

own specific severability provision. Thus, pursuant to the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/1.31 

(West 2012)), we must determine whether the valid and invalid portions of the statute are 

essentially and inseparably connected in substance, such that the legislature would not have 

passed the valid portions of the statute absent the invalid portion. Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d at 484; 

see also Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 531, 540 (1968) (subsections are not severable if it is this 

court’s belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all could not be carried into 

effect the legislature would not pass the residue independently). Consequently, we may 

remove an unconstitutional portion of a statute and preserve the remainder if what remains is 

complete in and of itself, and is capable of being executed wholly independently of the severed 

portion. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 209-10 (concluding that section 9-3(b) of the Criminal Code 

of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2000)) may be severed from the remainder of the statute); 

People v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524, 534 (1998) (finding section 2(c) of the Hunter Interference 

Prohibition Act (720 ILCS 125/2 (West 1996)) severable from the remaining statute). 

¶ 31 In Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, ¶ 22, the appellate court used the above 

reasoning when considering a severability question in the aftermath of Aguilar: 
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“From our reading of the [AUUW] statute as a whole (e.g., People v. Lloyd, 2013 

IL 113510, ¶ 25), we find that the invalidity of subsection (a)(3)(A) by Aguilar is not 

fatal to the balance of the statute, particularly the FOID card requirement in subsection 

(a)(3)(C), which forms the basis for defendant’s conviction on count V. Although 

Aguilar did not expressly pass on the issue of whether subsection (a)(3)(A) is severable 

from the balance of the statute, we are mindful of our obligation to uphold legislative 

enactments whenever reasonably possible, and we believe that subsections (a)(1), 

(a)(2), and the remaining factors in subsection (a)(3) can stand independently of 

subsection (a)(3)(A), which is only one of several factors that operate in conjunction 

with subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) to comprise the substantive offense. People v. Sanders, 

182 Ill. 2d 524, 534 (1998). Because the removal of one factor (subsection (a)(3)(A)) 

by application of Aguilar ‘undermines neither the completeness nor the executability of 

the remaining subsections’ (Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d at 534), we cannot conclude that it is 

‘so intertwined with the rest of the statute that the legislature intended the statute to 

stand or fall as a whole’ (People v. Singmouangthong, 334 Ill. App. 3d 542, 547 

(2002)). Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 313 (1996).” Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 

113294, ¶ 22. 

See also People v. Akins, 2014 IL App (1st) 093418-B, ¶¶ 12-13 (applying the reasoning of 

Henderson to reject defendant’s argument that subsection (a)(3)(C) cannot be severed from 

provision of AUUW statute found unconstitutional in Aguilar).

Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, ¶ 26, further noted that the “balance of the [AUUW] 

statute,” was a continuing reflection of the statute’s legislative purpose to protect the police 

and public from dangerous weapons. Thus, given this court’s proviso in Aguilar, 2013 IL 

112116, ¶ 21, that “we are in no way saying that [the second amendment right to keep and bear 

arms] is unlimited or is not subject to meaningful regulation,” and the finding by the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th 

Cir. 2012), that the Illinois legislature could implement sensible requirements for the public 

carriage of handguns without running afoul of the second amendment, the appellate court 

therein declined to accept the defendant’s assertion against severability of the unconstitutional 

section of Aguilar. Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, ¶¶ 24-26. We again find the 

reasoning in Henderson sound and, therefore believe that the legislature would find that 

subsections (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I) can stand independently without the inclusion of subsection 

factor (a)(3)(A). This severability from subsection (a)(3)(A) undermines neither the 

completeness of, nor the ability to execute, the remaining subsections of section (a)(3). See 

Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d at 534. 

¶ 32 Second Amendment Rights of 18- to 20-Year-Olds 

¶ 33 Next, we address the trial court’s findings, and defendant’s contentions, that his AUUW 

convictions under the “FOID card” subsections, (a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(2), (a)(3)(C), as well 

as the “under 21” subsections (a)(1), (a)(3)(I) and (a)(2), (a)(3)(I), unconstitutionally disarm 

young adults who are 18 to 20 years old in violation of the second amendment. U.S. Const., 

amend. II. Again, the FOID card subsections prohibit the possession of a firearm while outside 

one’s home or on a public way and without a valid FOID card, while the under 21 subsections 

prohibit the possession of a firearm while outside one’s home or on a public way while under 
- 13 - 

21 years of age and not engaged in lawful hunting activities. Defendant claims that adults 18 

and over are among “the People,” protected by the second amendment. In support of this 

proposition, defendant cites District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), and its 

discussion of the First Militia Act, enacted by Congress in 1792, which created the organized 

militia and provided in the definition of “able-bodied men,” to include males as young as 18. 

Heller, 554 U.S. at 596 (citing Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271). Accordingly, defendant argues 

that subsections (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I) impose burdens on those, like himself, aged 18 to 20 

which amount to an unconstitutional flat ban on their second amendment rights. 

¶ 34 When analyzing the constitutionality of a restriction on the second amendment right to bear 

arms, we apply the two-part approach this court adopted in Wilson v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 

112026, ¶ 41. Under this approach, the court first conducts a textual and historical inquiry to 

determine whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct that was understood to be 

within the scope of the second amendment’s protection at the time of ratification. Id. The 

regulated activity is categorically unprotected if the challenged law applies to conduct falling 

outside the scope of the second amendment right. Id. However, if the historical evidence is 

inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected, then the 

court, applying the appropriate level of means-ends scrutiny, conducts a second inquiry into 

the strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of 

second amendment rights. Id. ¶ 42; see also People v. Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, 

¶ 29; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701-04 (7th Cir. 2011). 

¶ 35 Therefore, in determining whether the conduct set forth in subsections (a)(3)(C) and 

(a)(3)(I) infringes on the second amendment rights of 18- to 20-year-olds, we must first 

examine whether that conduct is at the core of the right to bear arms. Once more, we find 

relevant the reasoning of the appellate court in Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, which 

relied upon our decision in Aguilar in applying the Wilson approach to the FOID card 

subsection (a)(3)(C), of the AUUW: 

“[I]n Aguilar, the supreme court expressly agreed with the ‘obvious and undeniable’ 

conclusion of those courts, since Heller, which have undertaken a comprehensive 

historical examination of ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures,’ e.g., laws 

proscribing the carriage of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 

buildings, and cited with approval several cases, all of which concluded that the 

possession of handguns by minors is conduct that falls outside the second amendment’s 

core protection. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 26-27 (citing National Rifle Ass’n of 

America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 

204 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that ‘[m]odern restrictions on the ability of persons 

under 21 to purchase handguns—and the ability of persons under 18 to possess 

handguns—seem, to us, to be firmly historically rooted’), United States v. Rene E., 583 

F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that the ‘right to keep arms in the founding 

period did not extend to juveniles’), and Powell v. Tompkins, 926 F. Supp. 2d 367, 

387-90 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that a Massachusetts law proscribing the carry of 

firearms by persons under the age of 21 ‘comports with the Second Amendment and 

imposes no burden on’ the right to keep and bear arms)). We thus reject defendant’s 

contention that the public carriage of handguns by those under 21 is core conduct 

subject to second amendment protection.” Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, ¶ 30. 
- 14 - 

¶ 36 Indeed, we find the FOID card requirement of subsection (a)(3)(C) is consistent with this 

court’s recognition that the second amendment right to possess firearms is still “subject to 

meaningful regulation.” Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 21; see also People v. Taylor, 2013 IL 

App (1st) 110166, ¶¶ 28-32 (holding subsection (a)(3)(C) does not violate the second 

amendment where it contains a reasonable restriction on firearm possession, i.e., the restriction 

is limited to those lacking a FOID card and is not a flat ban); National Rifle Ass’n of America, 

Inc. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding, after conducting an extensive 

historical analysis, Texas statutory ban on persons under 21 years of age from possessing guns 

in public because that conduct “falls outside the Second Amendment’s protection” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)); National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 n.17 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding defendant’s 

militia-based argument unavailing for various reasons). Furthermore, because we agree with 

the reasoning of Henderson, we find it unnecessary to repeat the historical evidence set forth in 

the decisions cited by Aguilar. See Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 27. Rather, we simply conclude 

that where “the possession of handguns by minors is conduct that falls outside the scope of the 

second amendment’s protection” (id.), subsection (a)(3)(C) passes the first half of the Wilson

analysis, and we are not required to undertake the second half analysis. See Wilson v. County of 

Cook, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 41. 

¶ 37 Next, in considering whether subsection (a)(3)(I) is constitutional under Wilson, we 

similarly find that the restriction on persons under the age of 21 who are not engaged in lawful 

hunting activities is both historically rooted and not a core conduct subject to second 

amendment protection. Moreover, the restriction included in subsection (a)(3)(I) provides for 

multiple exceptions and exemptions to protect the rights of law-abiding persons under the age 

of 21. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/24-2(b)(1), (b)(3), (f) (West 2012). Therefore, subsection (a)(3)(I) 

also passes the first part of the Wilson analysis and, as with defendant’s challenge to subsection 

(a)(3)(C), a second half analysis under Wilson is unnecessary. See Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, 

¶ 41. 

¶ 38 Accordingly, we conclude that, under the Wilson approach, neither subsection (a)(3)(C), 

nor subsection (a)(3)(I) violates the second amendment rights of defendant or other 18- to 

20-year-old persons. 

¶ 39 Equal Protection Challenges

¶ 40 Defendant also argues on appeal that the AUUW statute’s distinction between those over 

and under 21 years of age, as found in subsections (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I), violates the equal 

protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., 

amend. XIV), by placing an additional burden on the fundamental right to bear arms of those 

aged 18 to 20 than that placed on those over the age of 21. The constitutional right to equal 

protection under the law requires the government to treat similarly situated persons in the same 

manner. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 361 (1996). The guarantee of equal protection of 

the United States and Illinois Constitutions does not preclude the state from enacting 

legislation that draws distinctions between different categories of people, but it does prohibit 

the state from according unequal treatment to persons who have been placed by a statute into 

different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. 

People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441 (1998). A court uses the same analysis in assessing equal 
- 15 - 

protection claims under both the state and federal constitutions. People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 7 

(1992). We repeat that statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality and we are 

required to uphold the constitutionality of a statute whenever reasonably possible. Aguilar, 

2013 IL 112116, ¶ 15. The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute has the burden 

to prove its invalidity. Id. 

¶ 41 We disagree with defendant’s argument that strict scrutiny applies to this equal protection 

claim because the FOID card and under 21 subsections impinge on a fundamental right. When 

analyzing legislation under equal protection, the level of scrutiny to be applied depends on the 

type of legislative classification at issue. In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 561 

(2000). As discussed above, the challenged statutory provisions do not burden a fundamental 

right at the core of the second amendment. Accordingly, both Illinois and federal courts have 

routinely held that because age is not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis, 

this court applies the rational basis standard. See People v. M.A., 124 Ill. 2d 135, 140 (1988); 

see also National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & 

Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 212 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying rational basis to equal protection 

challenge of Texas gun law where persons under 21 had no fundamental right under second 

amendment and age was not a suspect classification). Thus, we evaluate the age restrictions of 

the AUUW statute merely to determine whether they rationally relate to a legitimate 

government interest. See People v. Alcozer, 241 Ill. 2d 248, 262-63 (2011); In re Detention of 

Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 562 (judicial review of legislative classifications under the rational 

basis test is limited and generally deferential).

¶ 42 As mentioned, Illinois appellate courts have upheld the validity of the AUUW statute since 

its enactment, finding that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the public and the 

police from the possession and use of dangerous weapons. See Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 

113294, ¶ 26; People v. Pulley, 345 Ill. App. 3d 916, 924 (2004); People v. Marin, 342 Ill. 

App. 3d 716, 723-24 (2003); see also People v. Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d 726, 727 (1978) (the 

unlawful use of a weapon statute demonstrates a “legislative intent to regulate the possession 

and use of weapons for the safety and good order of society”). Additionally, other courts have 

upheld age restrictions placed on those under 21 years of age by concluding that, given the 

immaturity and impulsivity of youth, prohibiting the public carrying of handguns for 

individuals under age 21 is substantially related to that important public interest. See National 

Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc., 700 F.3d at 207-10 & n.21 (cataloging congressional findings 

about the disproportionate arrest rate for violent crimes among those under age 21 and stating 

that “[a]mong murderers, 18- to 20-year olds were more likely to use a firearm than adults 21 

and over” and that “modern scientific research supports the commonsense notion that 

18-to-20-year-olds tend to be more impulsive than young adults aged 21 and over”); see also 

People v. Alvarado, 2011 IL App (1st) 082957, ¶ 53 (finding, inter alia, that subsections 

(a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I) of the AUUW statute did not violate defendant’s equal protection 

rights), vacated on other grounds, No. 113757 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2014) (supervisory order). 

Therefore, it is clear that an extensive relationship exists between reasonable restrictions on the 

use of firearms by persons under the age of 21 and the state’s interest in protecting the public 

and police. As such, we cannot find that defendant has carried his burden of proving 

subsections (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I) of the AUUW statute do not rationally relate to a legitimate 

government interest, and we reject defendant’s equal protection claims.
- 16 - 

¶ 43 Due Process Violations 

¶ 44 We also reject defendant’s argument that, under due process, subsection (a)(3)(C) and the 

Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act) (430 ILCS 65/0.01 (West 2012)) are 

unconstitutional, both facially and as applied. Defendant relies on the trial court finding that 

subsection (a)(3)(C), in combination with the FOID Card Act, violates due process by placing 

special burdens on the ability of defendant, and all similarly situated 18- to 20-year-old adults, 

to obtain a FOID card. The relevant portions of the FOID Card Act states as follows: 

“(a) Each applicant for a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card must:

 ***

(2) Submit evidence to the Department of State Police that: 

 (i) He or she is 21 years of age or over, or if he or she is under 21 years of age 

that he or she has the written consent of his or her parent or legal guardian to 

possess and acquire firearms and firearm ammunition *** provided, however, that 

such parent or legal guardian is not an individual prohibited from having a [FOID] 

Card ***[.] 

 (ii) He or she has not been convicted of a felony under the laws of this or any 

other jurisdiction[.]” 430 ILCS 65/4(a)(2)(i), (ii) (West 2012).

¶ 45 Defendant contends that in order to avoid prosecution under subsection (a)(3)(C) of the 

AUUW statute, he must obtain a FOID card, i.e., that the FOID Card Act places additional, 

special burdens on adults aged 18 to 20 by requiring them to first get permission from a parent 

before they can successfully apply for a FOID card. However, under the FOID Card Act, 

because he is under 21 years of age and both his parents have felony convictions, thus 

prohibiting them from having a FOID card, he cannot obtain their consent and, consequently, it 

is impossible for him to obtain a FOID card. 

¶ 46 The State, in response, argues that the trial court’s as applied finding of unconstitutionality, 

made without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, is flawed where no evidence of record 

supports a finding that defendant: (1) ever applied for a FOID card; (2) was ever denied a 

FOID card or ever appealed that denial; did not have a legal guardian who could have given 

valid consent to apply for a FOID card, or could not have had such a guardian appointed. See 

430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2012). The State points to the trial court’s assumption that 

defendant’s constitutional rights were violated based on the presentence investigation report 

statement that defendant was unable to get a FOID card because his parents had been 

“incarcerated.” However, the fact that a person has been “incarcerated” does not, without more 

information, establish that they have been convicted of a felony, but may simply mean that 

they have been in jail. See People v. Riley, 2013 IL App (1st) 112472, ¶ 10 (finding that 

“incarceration,” which is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Code of 

Corrections or any other relevant statute, is limited to “ ‘ “[i]mprisonment; confinement in a 

jail or penitentiary.” ’ ” (quoting People v. Kuhns, 372 Ill. App. 3d 829, 839 (2007) (Gilleran 

Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 760 

(6th ed. 1990)). Further, at the March 8, 2013 hearing, the State questioned whether defendant 

had any potential legal guardian who might be eligible to consent to his FOID card application, 

but the court failed to consider the State’s question in its order. The State, therefore, contends 

that because there is no evidence that defendant ever actually applied for a FOID card and was 

rejected, he lacks standing to make a due process claim. Thus, the State contends that under the 
- 17 - 

record before this court, defendant cannot challenge the constitutionality of subsection 

(a)(3)(C). 

¶ 47 We agree that it is improper for this court to render a decision on this issue given the lack of 

evidence presently before us. Indeed, we have stated: 

“A court is not capable of making an ‘as applied’ determination of 

unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings of fact. 

[Citation.] Without an evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is unconstitutional 

‘as applied’ is premature. [Citations.] Nor would it be appropriate for this court, sua 

sponte, to consider whether [a] statute has been constitutionally applied since we, as a 

reviewing court, are not arbiters of the facts.” In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 

253, 268 (2004). 

¶ 48 Additionally, “[t]o have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, one must 

have sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of 

enforcement of the challenged statute.” Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of 

Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000). We cannot make such a finding 

in this case without the trial court conducting an evidentiary hearing setting forth a factual 

foundation. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 228 (2010) (reversing 

the circuit court’s as applied ruling when there had been no evidentiary hearing and no findings 

of fact). Therefore, we hold that defendant has not upheld his burden to establish that the 

AUUW statute, as applied to him, violates his due process rights. 

¶ 49 When there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings of fact, the constitutional 

challenge must be facial. Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 228 (citing In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 

2d 253, 268 (2004)); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993). To find a statute facially 

invalid, no set of circumstances may exist under which the statute would be valid. Lebron, 237 

Ill. 2d at 228. 

¶ 50 Contrary to the trial court’s order, the FOID Card Act (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 

2012)), however, does not amount to an outright prohibition against those under the age of 21 

who wish to obtain a FOID card. In fact, the Act mandates individualized consideration of a 

person’s FOID card application and circumstances by the department of state police and the 

judiciary. Coram v. State, 2013 IL 113867, ¶ 58 (citing 430 ILCS 65/5, 8, 10 (West 2010)). 

Minors aged 18 to 20, and even younger, have an opportunity to obtain a FOID card by 

supplying a parental signature. 430 ILCS 65/4 (West 2012). Even if a parental signature is 

unavailable, an applicant can appeal to the Director of the Department of State Police. 430 

ILCS 65/10 (West 2012). Furthermore, the Department of State Police has promulgated rules 

setting forth procedures for such appeals and providing that the Director may grant relief to 

persons under the age of 21 (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1230.70(d)(3) (eff. Dec. 31, 2013)) and the 

Director’s decisions are subject to judicial review (430 ILCS 65/11 (West 2012)). These 

provisions demonstrate that it is not impossible for a person under the age of 21 to obtain a 

FOID card without his or her parents’ permission or signature. As such, the fact that the FOID 

Card Act could be found constitutional under some set of circumstances, i.e., appeal a 

prohibition to the Director of the Department of State Police, defendant’s facial challenge must 

fail. See Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 261 (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, 

joined by Garman, J.) (citing In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d 517, 536-37 (2006)). 
- 18 - 

¶ 51 Constitutionality/Severability of Sentencing Subsection (d)(2) 

¶ 52 Under the statute applicable here, due to defendant’s age and his convictions based on 

subsections (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(C) of the AUUW statute, he faced a mandatory term of 

imprisonment under subsection (d)(2) of the statute’s sentencing provision. See 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(d)(2) (West 2012). As noted, following posttrial proceedings, the court held 

subsection (d)(2) unconstitutional. We find that section (d)(2) is invalid, as it incorporates 

subsection (a)(3)(A), found to be unconstitutional in Aguilar. 

¶ 53 At all times pertinent to this case, AUUW section 24-1.6(d)(2), stated as follows: 

“(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection (d), a 

first offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon committed with a firearm by a 

person 18 years of age or older where the factors listed in both items (A) and (C) of 

paragraph (3) of subsection (a) are present is a Class 4 felony, for which the person 

shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more 

than 3 years.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d)(2) (West 2012).8

The State contends that a defendant may be sentenced under subsection (d)(2) when the 

“factors listed in both items (A) and (C) *** are present.” (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(d)(2) (West 2012). Essentially, the State asks this court to find this language does not 

refer to the existence of the offenses stated in subsections (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(C), but rather 

that the facts identified in those “items” are “present,” i.e., that the facts of the case establish 

that defendant had an uncased, loaded weapon and was not issued a FOID card. We decline to 

do so. 

¶ 54 Indeed, to accept the State’s interpretation, this court would have to ignore the plain and 

ordinary language of the statute. People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 9 (the best evidence of 

legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and 

ordinary meaning). Here, the plain language of the sentencing provision in subsection (d)(2) 

directly references the AUUW offense stated in subsection (a)(3)(A). See People v. 

Zimmerman, 239 Ill. 2d 491, 499 (2010) (the factors in subsection (a)(3) transform the crime 

from “simple” unlawful use of a weapon to aggravated unlawful use of a weapon). Thus, under 

its plain language, a person may only be sentenced under subsection (d)(2) if the factors 

constituting the AUUW offenses identified in both subsections (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(C) are 

present. 

¶ 55 However, because subsection (a)(3)(A) has been found unconstitutional, the requirements 

for sentencing under subsection (d)(2) cannot be met, as a statutory section cannot be “present” 

if it is void ab initio. In People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 28, this court recently discussed the 

meaning of the void ab initio doctrine, stating, in part: “When a statute is held facially 

unconstitutional, i.e., unconstitutional in all its applications [citation], the statute is said to be 

void ab initio. Lucien v. Briley, 213 Ill. 2d 340, 344-45 (2004); Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 

156 (2002) [citations].” An unconstitutional statute is, literally, “void ‘from the beginning.’ 

See Black’s Law Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004).” Perlstein v. Wolk, 218 Ill. 2d 448, 455 

(2006). Therefore, as this court has found subsection (a)(3)(A) to be void from its beginning, it 

 

8While this version of the AUUW statute was replaced by Pub. Act 98-63, § 155 (eff. July 9, 2013), 

there is no change in the language of subsection (d)(2) which would affect our decision under the facts 

of this case. 
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was never validly incorporated into the sentencing subsection (d)(2). Accordingly, we find 

subsection (2) of sentencing subsection (d) of the AUUW statute to be invalid, as it requires a 

conviction based upon an unconstitutional and unenforceable statutory section. See Blair, 

2013 IL 114122, ¶ 30 (statute declared unconstitutional was infirm from the moment of its 

enactment and, therefore, unenforceable). We thus examine the severability of subsection 

(d)(2). 

¶ 56 As noted earlier, the AUUW statute is examined under the Statute on Statutes’ general 

severability provision, which states in pertinent part: “ ‘If any provision of an Act *** is held 

invalid, such invalidity does not affect other provisions *** of the Act which can be given 

effect without the invalid *** provision, and to this end the provisions of each Act *** are 

severable, unless otherwise provided by the Act.’ ” Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d at 484 (quoting 5 

ILCS 70/1.31 (West 2000)). Although general severability statutes carry less weight in 

ascertaining legislative intent than specific severability clauses, they do establish a 

presumption that the legislature intended for an invalid statutory provision to be severable. 

Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 165 Ill. 2d 25, 48 (1995) (citing 

People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 532 (1990)). This 

presumption will be overcome and the entire act held unconstitutional if the legislative body 

would not have passed the statute with the invalid portion eliminated. Id.

¶ 57 Here, we believe it is clear that the legislature would have intended that the AUUW statute 

remain in force despite the invalidity of sentencing subsection (d)(2). This portion of the 

sentencing provision is not such an interdependent and essential part of the statute that its 

severance requires the remainder of the statute to fail. As the appellate court found in 

Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, ¶ 26, the “balance of the [AUUW] statute,” is a 

continuing reflection of the statute’s legislative purpose to protect the police and public from 

dangerous weapons. Given the severability of the unconstitutional subsection (a)(3)(A), this 

legislative purpose is not defeated by the invalidation of a sentencing provision citing to that 

subsection, and we may leave the remainder of the statute in force. See Northern Illinois Home 

Builders, 165 Ill. 2d at 49. Thus, we find that defendant may properly be sentenced, on remand, 

to the applicable provision of section (d) of the statute. 

¶ 58 Proportionate Penalties Violation 

¶ 59 Finally, the trial court found, and defendant argues on appeal, that section 24-1.6(d)(2) of 

the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d)(2) (West 2012)), is unconstitutional because it 

violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 

§ 11. However, as we have held that the sentencing provision in subsection (d)(2) is invalid, it 

is unnecessary to address this issue. See People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 23. 

¶ 60 CONCLUSION

¶ 61 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment vacating defendant’s 

Class 4 convictions of AUUW under counts II and V, as the offenses charged therein are based 

on, respectively, statutory sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A), which 

we find to be unconstitutional. Further, we reverse the trial court’s judgment vacating 

defendant’s Class 4 convictions of AUUW under counts III and VI, as the offenses charged 

therein are based on, respectively, statutory sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C), and 24-1.6(a)(2), 
- 20 - 

(a)(3)(C), which we find to be constitutional and severable from the unconstitutional (a)(3)(A) 

subsection stated in counts II and V. We also reverse the trial court’s judgment vacating 

defendant’s Class 4 convictions of AUUW under counts IV and VII, as the offenses charged 

therein are based on, respectively, statutory sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I), and 24-1.6(a)(2), 

(a)(3)(I), which we find to be constitutional and severable from the unconstitutional (a)(3)(A) 

subsection stated in counts II and V. Additionally, we find that portion of the AUUW statute 

set forth in section 24-1.6(d)(2) to be invalid, as that sentencing subsection relies upon the 

unconstitutional and void ab initio (a)(3)(A) subsection. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d)(2) (West 2012). 

Finally, we vacate the trial court’s judgment convicting and sentencing defendant for one 

count of misdemeanor UUW under section 24-1.6(d)(2) of the Criminal Code. 720 ILCS 

5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2012). Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial court for sentencing. 

¶ 62 Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 63 Cause remanded.