United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-40524

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Ravinder Reddy Gudipati; Harsh Jaggi; Neeru Jaggi; 

Luis Montes-Patino; Adrian Arciniega-Hernandez, 

Defendants—Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:17-CR-560

Before King, Dennis, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

A jury convicted Ravinder Reddy Gudipati, Harsh Jaggi, Neeru Jaggi, 

Luis Montes-Patino, and Adrian Arciniega-Hernandez of charges related to 

money laundering, including conspiracy. All five defendants appealed, 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 24, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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bringing a variety of challenges to their convictions and the district court’s 

rulings. We affirm.

I.

This appeal involves a conspiracy to launder illegal drug proceeds 

from the United States by turning them into legitimate commercial proceeds 

in Mexico using the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). The BMPE is a 

trade-based money laundering scheme, which works by concealing the source 

of illegal money through what appear to be legitimate business transactions

between American exporters and Mexican importers. A Mexican drug 

trafficking organization (DTO) sells drugs in the United States for dollars 

with the goal of bringing the value of those dollars to Mexico as “clean” 

pesos. To accomplish this, a DTO connects with Mexican importers through 

a “peso broker.” The broker places an order for dollars with the DTO using 

pesos from the Mexican importers. Then, the broker directs couriers in the 

United States to pick up money from drug traffickers and deliver it to 

American exporters, who ship goods to the Mexican importers. 

All five defendants played a role in the BMPE. Defendant MontesPatino was a money courier who brought cash to Laredo, Texas to be 

laundered through American export businesses. He admitted that he knew 

the cash was from an unlawful source. Defendants Harsh and Neeru Jaggi 

owned El Reino, and defendant Gudipati owned NYSA Impex. Both stores 

received drug proceeds as payment for their perfumes, which they shipped 

to Mexican importers. Defendant Arciniega-Hernandez worked for Carlos 

Velasquez-Flores, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money 

laundering. Velasquez-Flores owned a shipping company, Velasquez 

Transportes, which packaged and transported drug proceeds. The 

government infiltrated the conspiracy using undercover officers, wiretaps,

and an informant, Corina Blake, who recorded phone calls and transactions 

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with suspected members of the conspiracy. Consequently, the government 

was able to observe dozens of Bulk Currency Transactions (BCTs) involving 

Montes-Patino, Arciniega-Hernandez, Gudipati, and the Jaggis. 

In 2018, a grand jury indicted, inter alia, Arciniega-Hernandez, Harsh 

Jaggi, Neeru Jaggi, Gudipati, and Montes-Patino for their roles in the money 

laundering scheme. All five defendants were charged with conspiring to 

commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Additionally,

some of the defendants were charged with various substantive money 

laundering offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) and

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) and (C).1

 The jury found Harsh Jaggi, Neeru Jaggi, 

Gudipati, and Montes-Patino guilty on all counts. The jury found ArciniegaHernandez guilty on all counts except his additional count of money 

laundering. After the government’s case-in-chief, Defendants moved for 

judgments of acquittal, which the district court denied. Defendants renewed 

their motions at the close of all the evidence. Again, the district court denied 

them. 

II.

There are five issues on appeal, each argued by a different defendant 

or group of defendants.

A.

First, Arciniega-Hernandez, Harsh Jaggi, Neeru Jaggi, and Gudipati

each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their conspiracy and 

money laundering convictions. Because Defendants moved for judgments of 

acquittal before the district court, we review insufficiency-of-the-evidence 

1 Gudipati was also charged with three counts of causing a business to fail to file or 

file incorrect monetary transaction reports, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(b)(1) and (2). 

He was convicted on all three and does not challenge them on appeal.

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claims de novo. See United States v. Harris, 666 F.3d 905, 907 (5th Cir. 2012). 

We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and [will] 

uphold the verdict if, but only if, a rational juror could have found each 

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Brown, 

186 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1999). Our “inquiry is limited to whether the 

jury’s verdict was reasonable, not whether we believe it to be correct.” 

United States v. Scott, 892 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States 

v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 601 (5th Cir. 2013)).

Each defendant was charged with conspiring to commit money 

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The government had to show 

“(1) that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit 

money laundering and (2) that the defendant joined the agreement knowing 

its purpose and with the intent to further the illegal purpose.” United States 

v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 906 (5th Cir. 2006).

Here, the government alleged conspiracy to commit both 

concealment and avoidance money laundering. For concealment, the 

government must prove that the transactions “had the purpose, not merely 

the effect, of ‘making it more difficult for the government to trace and 

demonstrate the nature of the funds.’” United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 

690 (5th Cir. 2013) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brown, 553 

F.3d 768, 787 (5th Cir. 2008)). For avoidance, the government must prove 

that the defendant was aware of certain reporting requirements and knew the 

transaction was designed to avoid those requirements. See, e.g., United States 

v. Bronzino, 598 F.3d 276, 281 (6th Cir. 2010).

Additionally, Arciniega-Hernandez, the Jaggis, and Gudipati were 

each charged with a substantive money laundering offense under 18 U.S.C. § 

1956(a)(1)(B). Arciniega-Hernandez was charged with an additional count of 

concealment money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 

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The government needed to prove that they actually conducted or attempted 

to conduct a financial transaction with proceeds of a specified unlawful 

activity with knowledge that its purpose was to conceal the source of the 

proceeds or avoid transaction reporting requirements. United States v. Cessa, 

785 F.3d 165, 173–74 (5th Cir. 2015).

Finally, Harsh Jaggi and Gudipati were each charged with one 

substantive count of laundering money represented to be the proceeds of 

drug trafficking (sting money laundering), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1956(a)(3)(B) and (C). The government needed to prove that they 

conducted or attempted to conduct “a financial transaction involving 

property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” with 

the intent either “to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 

ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of specified 

unlawful activity” or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(3)(B) & (C). See also United States v. Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d 

1325, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994).

After hearing oral argument and a careful review of the record, briefs,

and applicable legal standards, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient 

to convict Arciniega-Hernandez, Harsh Jaggi, Neeru Jaggi, and Gudipati of 

all charges. We briefly summarize the relevant evidence.

Arcinega-Hernandez received large sums of money in commercial 

parking lots; delivered large sums to others in bags; counted, separated, 

marked, and packaged money in various denominations; referred to the 

money using code names; and knew the amounts of money to be delivered 

and picked up and the identity of the people making the drops. The Jaggis 

regularly received tens of thousands of dollars in cash, packaged in small 

denominations, and wrapped in rubber bands, and were told it was “narco 

money.” The Jaggis failed to report cash in amounts greater than $10,000 

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(in violation of federal law); denied knowing the courier, Blake; kept two sets 

of ledgers to underreport cash transactions; structured transactions to avoid 

reporting requirements; failed to report certain transactions; and concealed 

the identity of transaction participants. Similarly, Gudipati regularly 

received tens of thousands of dollars in cash, packaged in small 

denominations, wrapped in rubber bands, and carried in plastic bags. 

Gudipati was told it was “narc money” and that the courier “was at risk with 

the police bringing this [money] like that.” Gudipati consistently failed to 

report cash deposits greater than $10,000; concealed that a courier was 

bringing in the cash deposits; and knew that his actions violated federal 

reporting requirements. In light of this evidence, a rational juror could find 

all the elements of conspiracy to commit money laundering and substantive 

money laundering beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Second, Arciniega-Hernandez argues that the district court’s jury 

instruction pursuant to Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), 

constructively amended his indictment.

Arciniega-Hernandez was charged with several counts of substantive 

money laundering. Under Pinkerton, a member of a conspiracy may be 

convicted of any foreseeable substantive offense that a co-conspirator 

commits in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Sanjar, 876 

F.3d 725, 743 (5th Cir. 2017). The proposed jury instructions did not include 

a Pinkerton instruction. The government requested one, and defense counsel 

objected, arguing that the instruction was “not required” because there was 

evidence Arciniega-Hernandez “conducted a transaction.” Notably, 

defense counsel did not argue that a Pinkerton instruction would 

constructively amend the indictment. The court noted that the instruction 

was necessary to uphold a defendant’s conviction under an agency theory of 

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liability and gave the instruction. United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 619 n.4 

(5th Cir. 1995) (“[A] substantive conviction cannot be upheld solely under 

Pinkerton unless the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction.”).

We review a preserved claim of constructive amendment de novo. See

United States v. Jara-Favela, 686 F.3d 289, 299 (5th Cir. 2012). ArciniegaHernandez argues that de novo review applies because he “specifically 

objected” to the Pinkerton instruction. While he did object, he argued only 

that the instruction was “not required” because he “conducted a 

transaction.” He did not specifically argue that the instruction would 

constructively amend the indictment, so he did not preserve that argument. 

We review unpreserved claims of constructive amendment for plain error, 

which first requires a defendant to identify an error. See, e.g., United States

v. Chaker, 820 F.3d 204, 213 (5th Cir. 2016).

Arciniega-Hernandez doesn’t identify any error with the district 

court’s Pinkerton ruling. Constructive amendment occurs when a court 

“permits the defendant to be convicted upon a factual basis that effectively 

modifies an essential element of the offense charged” or upon “a materially 

different theory or set of facts than that with which [he] was charged.” 

United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 451 (5th Cir. 2010). We reverse a 

conviction only if the difference between the indictment and the jury 

instructions “allows the defendant to be convicted of a separate crime from 

the one for which he was indicted.” United States v. Nuñez, 180 F.3d 227, 

231 (5th Cir. 1999). The “key inquiry is whether the jury charge broadened

the indictment.” United States v. Griffin, 800 F.3d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 2015).

Here, the instruction did not broaden the indictment. It merely 

permitted the jury to convict Arciniega-Hernandez of Counts Three, Four, 

and Five of the indictment if it found him guilty of the conspiracy charged in 

Count One of the indictment. See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 692 

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(5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that when there is sufficient evidence to prove 

that a defendant was a knowing member of the conspiracy, “no additional 

evidence is necessary to warrant a conviction on a substantive count which 

charges him with an event which occurred while he was active as a member 

of the conspiracy”). Thus, Arciniega-Hernandez fails to demonstrate that 

the district court erred in giving the Pinkerton instruction. Accordingly, we 

need not consider the other prongs of plain error review.

C.

Third, Gudipati argues that the district court improperly calculated 

the loss amount attributable to him at sentencing. The PSR states that the 

total loss amount caused by Gudipati’s offense conduct is $262,900. The 

amount included the money from several BCTs and one other transaction as 

relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Consequently, the PSR 

increases Gudipati’s offense level from 8 to 20. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). 

The PSR also reflects a six-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1) 

because Gudipati knew the money was from drug proceeds. Gudipati 

objected to the § 2S1.1(b)(1) adjustment before and during sentencing, 

arguing that he did not know the money was from unlawful activity until the 

final transaction.

We review a district court’s determination of a loss amount for clear 

error. See United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 384 (5th Cir. 1996). We 

also review a district court’s factual determination of what constitutes 

relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing for clear error. Id.

Gudipati argues that, if we reverse on Count Three but affirm on 

Counts One and Six, we should remand the case for resentencing. Since we 

affirm Gudipati’s conviction on Count Three, we do not need to address this 

conditional challenge to his sentence. In any event, the district court did not 

clearly err in calculating Gudipati’s loss amount.

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D.

Fourth, Gudipati, Harsh Jaggi, and Neeru Jaggi argue that they were 

improperly sentenced before a district judge who did not preside over their 

trial. The court originally scheduled sentencing for Gudipati and the Jaggis 

before Judge Maria Garcia Marmolejo, who presided over the trial. Harsh’s

defense counsel moved to reschedule sentencing due to a conflict. 

Sentencing was rescheduled and was reassigned to Judge Micaela Alvarez. 

Later, Judge Marmolejo explained she was absent from the district and 

unable to preside over the sentencing. 

Gudipati and the Jaggis moved to reconsider the reassignment, 

arguing that Judge Marmolejo was in the best position to consider the legal 

and factual arguments to be raised at sentencing given the complexity of the 

case. Judge Alvarez denied the motions. We review decisions to reassign a 

case for sentencing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(b) for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bourgeois, 950 F.2d 980, 988 (5th 

Cir. 1992).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(b)(1) provides that “[a]fter a 

verdict or finding of guilty, any judge regularly sitting in or assigned to a court 

may complete the court’s duties if the judge who presided at trial cannot 

perform those duties because of absence, death, sickness, or other 

disability.” Because Judge Marmolejo was absent at sentencing, 

reassignment here complied with Rule 25(b)(1). See United States v. Dowd, 

451 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because [the trial judge] became 

absent at the time of sentencing, reassignment of the case to [another judge] 

was proper under Rule 25.”).

We have held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a successor 

sentencing judge to sentence a defendant where the judge “displayed a 

familiarity with the record at the sentencing hearing that reflects such a 

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thorough review.” Bourgeois, 950 F.2d at 988. The record shows that Judge 

Alvarez adequately familiarized herself with this case. Accordingly, the 

substitution of Judge Alvarez and her decision to proceed with sentencing 

was not an abuse of discretion.

E.

Fifth, Montes-Patino argues the district court erred in sentencing him 

in absentia. Montes-Patino repeatedly failed to appear for sentencing and 

counsel could not contact him. The court delayed sentencing several times. 

The Marshals Service reported that Montes-Patino’s family had not seen 

him since spring 2019 and did not know where he was. The Marshals Service 

concluded that he was in Mexico and did not intend to return to the United 

States. The government asked the court to sentence Montes-Patino in 

absentia, and the court agreed because Montes-Patino had been given the 

opportunity to show up, had no contact with his attorney, and was considered 

a fugitive. 

We review a district court’s factual finding that a defendant has 

voluntarily absented himself from sentencing for clear error. See United 

States v. Ornelas, 828 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016). We review a decision 

to sentence a defendant in absentia for abuse of discretion. Id.

Typically, a defendant’s presence is required at sentencing. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 43(a)(3). But a defendant in a noncapital case waives the right to 

be present “when the defendant is voluntarily absent during sentencing.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(1)(B). The advisory committee note to the 1995 

amendments states that they “make clear that a defendant who, initially 

present at trial . . . but who voluntarily flees before sentencing, may 

nonetheless be sentenced in absentia.” Id., advisory comm. note (1995). 

Montes-Patino’s argument depends on pre-1995 case law. Based on our 

review of the record, the district court did not clearly err in finding that 

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Montes-Patino was voluntarily absent. Consequently, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in sentencing Montes-Patino in absentia. Rule 43 

specifically allows it.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of all five 

defendants.

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