*

  After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted May 14, 2008*

Decided July 1, 2008

Before

     FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

                  JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

                             DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐1774

JOHN E. DAVIS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

EDDIE SAMALIO and ODEIDA

DALMASI,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 04‐1389

Harold A. Baker,

Judge.

O R D E R

Federal inmate John Davis filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), claiming that the defendants, employees of the

Federal Correctional Institute in Pekin, were deliberately indifferent to his fractured wrist.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐1774 Page 2

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Davis appeals that

judgment and also challenges several discovery rulings. We affirm.

On October 27, 2003, Davis slipped on a chair in his prison cell and landed on his

wrist. X‐rays taken at the prison’s medical unit showed a wrist fracture, and so Dr. Odeida

Dalmasi, the prison physician, recommended that Davis be taken to the local hospital. At

the hospital, Davis saw Dr. Clark, an orthopedic surgeon. Davis received pain medication

and a long‐arm cast on his wrist. Dr. Clark also requested that Davis receive a second round

of x‐rays by November 6th for him to review, that Davis be provided with more pain

medication, and that Davis return in four weeks to change the cast.

Davis alleges that on October 31 he sent a written request for the prison to schedule

the second round of x‐rays. He provided no evidence of the request, and the prison has no

record of it. On November 10 Davis sent another written request to the prison concerning

his wrist, and later that day he received a response telling him to watch for a future “call

out.” Sometime between November 10 and 14, he went to the medical unit and confronted

the health‐services manager, Eddie Samalio, asking why his medical needs were being

ignored. On November 14 Davis saw Dr. Dalmasi, who noticed for the first time that Dr.

Clark had requested a second round of x‐rays and as a result immediately had the x‐rays

taken and prescribed pain medication. Davis alleges that Dr. Dalmasi also informed him

that his wrist had healed incorrectly, but Dr. Dalmasi denies ever saying this. The second

round of x‐rays were not sent to Dr. Clark.

On November 25 Davis saw Dr. Clark for his follow‐up appointment to replace his

cast. A third set of x‐rays were also taken; these films revealed that the wrist was healing

properly. Davis alleges that Dr. Clark told him that the wrist had not healed properly, but

nothing in the record supports this allegation. Two months later, the prison’s medical unit

gave Davis a fourth x‐ray and concluded that the wrist fracture had healed properly. The

medical staff also prescribed additional pain medication and extended Davis’s pass for a

lower bunk for three more months.

Davis filed suit against the defendants, alleging that they had violated the Eighth

Amendment because they were deliberately indifferent to his fractured wrist. He claimed

that the prison officials delayed his second round of x‐rays, causing his wrist to heal

improperly. Over the following year the district court extended discovery on three separate

occasions. After the second extension, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Davis

responded to the defendant’s motion but also moved to continue discovery and to subpoena

Dr. Clark. The district court denied Davis’s motions, but it nevertheless gave him an

additional 45 days to depose Dr. Clark by written questions under FED. R. CIV. P. 31 in lieu
No. 07‐1774 Page 3

of an oral deposition. Davis failed to take advantage of that opportunity; instead, he filed

yet another motion to extend discovery and to subpoena Dr. Clark.

The district court denied Davis’s motions and granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. The court found that Davis had presented no “verifying medical

evidence” that his wrist had failed to heal properly. And it determined that the defendants’

failure to perform a second round of x‐rays by November 6th or send the x‐rays to Dr. Clark

did not amount to deliberate indifference.

Davis initially argues that the district court erred in denying his motions to continue

discovery and to subpoena Dr. Clark. The court’s denials, he says, prohibited him from

providing “verifying medical evidence” of the defendants’ deliberate indifference. We

review a district court’s discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Reynolds v.

Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2007); Brosted v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 421 F.3d 459,

463 (7th Cir. 2005), and we will reverse if “the denial of discovery resulted in actual and

substantial prejudice,” Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2001).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s motions. The court

extended discovery three times, including a final 45‐day extension, at which time it

informed Davis that he could submit written questions to Dr. Clark. Following this third

extension, Davis did not seek discovery from Dr. Clark and, instead, filed yet another

motion to continue discovery and to subpoena Dr. Clark. Because Davis had over a year to

conduct discovery and was able to depose both defendants during that time, we cannot say

that he has suffered any actual or substantial prejudice.

Davis also argues on appeal that the district court incorrectly concluded that the

defendants’ actions did not amount to deliberate indifference. He contends that his wrist

never healed properly because of the defendants’ delay in procuring a second round of x‐

rays. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non‐moving party. Collins v. Seeman,

462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006).

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they display deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical condition. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104‐05

(1976); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830‐31 (7th Cir. 2007). To succeed on a deliberate‐

indifference claim, a prisoner must show both an objectively serious risk of harm and a

subjectively culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Edwards, 478

F.3d at 830‐31. Where prison officials delay rather than deny medical treatment, the delay

reflects deliberate indifference when it has a detrimental effect on the prisoner’s health.

Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002). We require that the prisoner offer
No. 07‐1774 Page 4

“verifying medical evidence” that the delay caused some degree of harm. Williams v. Liefer,

491 F.3d 710, 714‐15 (7th Cir. 2007).

Davis presented no competent medical evidence supporting the theory that the

eight‐day delay in procuring a second round of x‐rays had a detrimental effect on his

fractured wrist. Further, even assuming that Davis’s fractured wrist qualifies as a serious

medical need, he has presented no evidence suggesting that the defendants acted with

deliberate indifference. Dr. Dalmasi ordered x‐rays the day of the injury and sent Davis to

the local hospital to receive specialized care from Dr. Clark. At the hospital Dr. Clark gave

Davis a long‐arm cast, prescribed pain medication, and, four weeks later, replaced the long‐

arm cast with a short‐arm cast. And, between October 27 and January 27, Davis was given

four rounds of x‐rays, prescribed several types of pain medication, and offered various

recreational and work‐related restrictions. Davis’s dissatisfaction with the treatment of his

wrist notwithstanding, the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his condition.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Mere dissatisfaction or

disagreement with a doctor’s course of treatment is generally insufficient.”).

AFFIRMED.