UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4476

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NOE DE JESUS ORDONEZ-MEDINA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior 

District Judge. (3:09-cr-00387-RLW-1)

Submitted: October 25, 2010 Decided: November 9, 2010

Before DAVIS and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David R. Lett, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. S. David 

Schiller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Noe de Jesus Ordonez-Medina appeals his conviction and 

forty-six month sentence for illegal reentry after being 

convicted of an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a), (b)(2) (2006). Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there 

are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Counsel questions, 

however, whether the district court erred in enhancing OrdonezMedina’s sentence based on his status as an alien whose removal 

was subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction. Despite 

being advised of his right to do so, Ordonez-Medina has not 

filed a pro se supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, 

we affirm.

In the Anders brief, counsel argues that Form I-294 

failed to specifically advise Ordonez-Medina of the enhanced 

punishment for illegal reentry after conviction for an 

aggravated felony. Counsel also argues that the Government 

waived its right to prosecute Ordonez-Medina under the enhanced 

provision set forth in § 1326(b)(2) because it failed to 

criminally prosecute him under this provision at the time of his 

2005 deportation. To the extent that counsel raises challenges 

to Ordonez-Medina’s conviction, we conclude that such arguments 

are waived. When a defendant enters a voluntary plea of guilty, 

he waives his right to challenge antecedent, nonjurisdictional 
3

errors not logically inconsistent with the establishment of 

guilt. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975); 

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Because our 

review of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy reveals that OrdonezMedina’s guilty plea was both knowing and voluntary, he has 

waived appellate review of these issues.

To the extent that counsel asserts a sentencing error 

and argues that the district court erred in imposing a sixteenlevel enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“USSG”) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2009), we conclude that this 

argument lacks merit. We review a sentence for reasonableness, 

applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Id. We assess whether the 

district court properly calculated the advisory guidelines 

range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). If 

there is no procedural error, we review the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the 

circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its 
4

discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied 

the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. 

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the 

sentence is within the guidelines range, we apply a presumption 

of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56

(2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for withinguidelines sentence).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively 

reasonable. The district court properly calculated the advisory 

guidelines range, and correctly imposed the sixteen-level 

enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (providing 

that “[i]f the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully 

remained in the United States, after . . . a conviction for a 

felony that is . . . a crime of violence . . . increase by 16 

levels”). The district court also properly considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors, made an individualized assessment based on 

the facts presented, and adequately explained the reasons for 

its chosen sentence. Moreover, Ordonez-Medina has failed to 

overcome the presumption of reasonableness we accord his withinguidelines sentence. See United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 

(4th Cir. 2008).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

and found no meritorious issues on appeal. We therefore affirm 
5

the judgment of the district court. At this juncture, we deny 

counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel 

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the 

client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately expressed in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED