In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 03-2669

ERIC JOELNER, FISH, INC. d/b/a XXXTREME

ENTERTAINMENT, FREE SPEECH, INC.,

and FIRST AMENDMENT, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

VILLAGE OF WASHINGTON PARK, ILLINOIS,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 03 C 325—G. Patrick Murphy, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2003—DECIDED AUGUST 4, 2004

____________

Before COFFEY, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

I. Background

A. The Parties

Eric Joelner, a resident of the Village of Washington

Park, Illinois, is president and sole shareholder of Fish, Inc.
2 No. 03-2669

1 Joelner claims to have been doing business at the 2226

Kingshighway location since 1990 or 1991. But on the record, we

can know affirmatively only that Joelner has been licensed to

operate such a business since 1995.

d/b/a XXXtreme Entertainment, Free Speech, Inc., and First

Amendment, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Joelner”). All

of these entities conduct, or seek to conduct, adult entertainment business within the corporate limits of Washington Park. Joelner, through Fish, Inc., has owned and

operated an adult video and bookstore located at 2226

Kingshighway since at least 1995.1

In an effort to balance Washington Park’s revenue needs

and its desire to protect its citizens from what ostensibly it

views as the negative effects of adult entertainment businesses, the municipality has enacted ordinances, which

limit the number of adult entertainment outlets within its

corporate limits, including both “bookstores” and “cabarets,”

see infra Part I.B., and impose license fees for such establishments. However, with a population of only 5,300

covering 2.5 square miles at the confluence of two interstate

highways leading into St. Louis, Missouri, adult entertainment has been the industry of Washington Park. As of May

2003, there were four licensed, one unlicensed, and two

newly licensed adult cabarets. Each licensed cabaret

generates around $100,000 annually in licensing and other

fees for the Village. And because the population of Washington Park decreased by more than 2,000 residents between

1990 and 2000, with a corresponding loss of about $300,000

a year in state funding, the income which the adult entertainment industry generates for the Village is critical. John

McCormick, Cash-strapped Town Relies on Strip Clubs to

Pay Bills, Chi. Trib., Apr. 29, 2003, at A1. (R. 1, Ex. 11.) 
No. 03-2669 3

2 All ordinances referred to herein are included in the appendix.

3 Problematically, neither Ordinance 01-00 nor Ordinance 01-22

explicitly refer to the relevant prior ordinances. But since each of

these ordinances includes the word “amending” in its title, we are

left to presume that, to the extent that the later ordinances

conflict with prior ordinances, the prior ordinances no longer have

effect. In addition, Ordinance 01-22 almost entirely subsumes the

original ordinance, No. 069-99. However, because Ordinance 01-22

refers repeatedly to “adult entertainment,” but nowhere defines

it, we also presume that the definition of “adult entertainment”

proffered in Ordinance 069-99 still has effect.

B. The Ordinances

Ordinance 069-99, adopted by the Village Board of Trustees

on September 7, 1999, defined “adult entertainment” as

anything “featuring acts, performances, videos, and/or movies,

involving nudity, or partial nudity, but within the permitted

community standards of the Village of Washington Park . . . .”

It limited the number of such establishments to four, imposed

an annual license fee of $3000, prohibited the sale or other

transfer of licenses, set hours of operation, and included a

severability clause.2

Then, four months later on January 11, 2000, Ordinance

01-00, although making no express reference to the prior

ordinance, increased the annual licensing fee tenfold to

$30,000. The stated goal of the increase was to protect the

“public health, safety, and welfare” and to defray the increase in police, fire, and other costs associated with adult

entertainment establishments.

Ordinance 01-22, adopted two years later on November 6,

2002, differentiates between “adult entertainment” establishments.3

 It defines “adult bookstores” as “[a]ny

business which sells what is commonly known as adult entertainment books, magazines, other reading materials,

movies, novelties, or paraphernalia” and “adult cabarets” as
4 No. 03-2669

“[a]ny business with adult entertainment which includes live

persons performing adult entertainment and which includes

nudity.” The annual licensing fees were altered as well:

$10,000 for an adult bookstore, and $30,000 for a cabaret

($30,000 was the annual fee for either type of adult business

under Ordinance 01-00). A permissible quarterly fee payment

schedule was established in section 4, and the following provisions from Ordinance 069-99 were preserved in their entirety, although renumbered: the numerical “[l]imitation and

[p]urpose” (now as section 5), the license transfer prohibition

(section 6), hours of operation (section 7), and the severability

provision (section 8).

C. Joelner’s Clashes With the Village

In January of 2003, the first in a series of disagreements

over these ordinances began between Joelner and the Village.

Joelner objected to the “increase” in annual licensing fees to

$10,000, established in November of 2002 through Ordinance

01-22, for his existing bookstore at 2226 Kingshighway. Apparently, notwithstanding both Ordinances 069-99 and 01-00

which had, prior to Ordinance 01-22, set license fees for adult

bookstores at $3000 and $30,000 respectively, Joelner had

only been paying $100 per year to operate his business, without any documented objection. But in a letter dated December

23, 2002, the Village informed him of the “new” annual adult

bookstore fee and requested that he make a first-quarter

payment of $2500. On or around January 24, 2003 Joelner did

so, but also remitted in the same check an additional $7500

first-quarter payment for an adult cabaret license.

The Village returned the $10,000 check to Joelner on

February 20, informed him that his existing business was

licensed only as a bookstore, not as a cabaret, and requested

that Joelner forward his first-quarter bookstore fee as soon

as possible. However, he made no further payment.

Notwithstanding this dispute with the Village over the fee

for his bookstore’s annual license, Joelner, through various
No. 03-2669 5

4 We cannot discern whether Joelner, personally or through his

various corporate entities, had an ownership interest in the properties located at 2226 Kingshighway, 2215-2221 Kingshighway,

and 5900-6000 Bunkum Road sufficient to meet the standing

requirement. See also R. 2, Ex. 10, pp. 16-17 (transcript of Village

Board meeting on April 15, 2003 where questions of ownership

were raised). It appears likely that Joelner at least has standing

with respect to the 2226 Kingshighway location as he has been

doing business there since 1995, but given that the resolution of

this question is not central to the outcome here, we cannot and do

not now make even a preliminary determination regarding

standing.

5 Ordinance 01-27 specifically states in its title that it “Amend[s]

the Village of Washington Park, Illinois Ordinance No. 01-22,

Section 5.” Hence, we presume that the other sections of Ordinance 01-22 (and, by implication, section 3 of Ordinance 069-99,

see supra note 3) remain in full effect. Ordinance 01-27 can be

found in the appendix.

corporate entities, attempted to obtain three new adult

entertainment licenses for properties located at 2226

Kingshighway, 2215-2221 Kingshighway, and 5900-6000

Bunkum Road.4

 At the April 15, 2003 Village Board of

Trustees meeting, Joelner, as Fish, Inc., sought a license to

expand his current bookstore business at 2226 Kingshighway

to include cabaret entertainment, and, as First Amendment,

Inc., sought a license to open a new combination cabaret

and bookstore at 2215-2221 Kingshighway. As Joelner’s

requests were the final item on the Board’s agenda, before

any discussion or mention of his license applications,

Ordinance 01-27 was adopted, increasing the number of

adult businesses allowed in Washington Park from four to

six.5

After the Board approved the ordinance, it then immediately granted the two newly available licenses—but not to

Joelner. One license was awarded to a former village police

chief’s son, a convicted felon, whose application did not ap-
6 No. 03-2669

pear to be on the agenda, and the other to the owner of a

trucking firm in the Village, whose application was on the

agenda, immediately preceding Joelner’s.

The Board then temporarily denied Joelner’s two applications, accused Joelner of having past-due license fees for his

currently operating bookstore (whether the Board was

concerned with only the November 2002 fee increase or other

arrearages is unclear), discussed revocation of Joelner’s

bookstore license, and finally voted to hold a hearing at a

later time about the 2226 Kingshighway business.

Before the Village Board next convened, Joelner reached

an informal agreement with the Village whereby he agreed

to postpone the filing of any lawsuit against the Village

until after June 1, in exchange for the Village’s assurances

that they would not seek to terminate his bookstore license

during that same time. The Village continued to urge

Joelner to “pay his delinquent adult bookstore fees.”

Then at the next meeting on May 6, the Board briefly

discussed the status of Joelner’s 2226 Kingshighway business, and was informed by its attorney that negotiations

were proceeding between Joelner and the Village regarding

the disputed arrearages. The Board took no further action

regarding the 2226 Kingshighway business, and then later,

during that same meeting, considered Joelner’s third license application seeking to open a combination adult

cabaret and bookstore at 5900-6000 Bunkum Road, as Free

Speech, Inc. Based upon the alleged arrearages and the

Board’s claimed desire to avoid an over-saturation of adult

businesses at that particular location (another adult entertainment outlet was licensed for a property immediately

adjacent to that proposed by Joelner), the Board denied this

third and final application.

After negotiations regarding the 2226 Kingshighway

business apparently failed, Joelner filed suit against the
No. 03-2669 7

Village on May 23, 2003 in the Southern District of Illinois

and asserted that the ordinances at issue were unconstitutional restrictions of protected speech both on their face

and, with respect to the numerical restriction, as applied.

Joelner also filed a preliminary injunction motion to prevent enforcement of the ordinances, and to force the Village

to grant the three requested licenses. Again Joelner and the

Village reached an informal agreement, whereby Joelner

was allowed to continue to operate his existing bookstore

pending a ruling on the preliminary injunction.

After a hearing on June 12, 2003, the district court

granted in part and denied in part Joelner’s request for a

preliminary injunction. The court found the ordinances

constitutional and refused to prohibit the Village from

enforcing the ordinances with respect to both the numerical

limitations and licensing fees imposed on adult entertainment outlets. It also refused to require the Village to issue

any cabaret licenses to Joelner for the new locations.

However, the court did order the Village to allow Joelner to

continue to operate his current bookstore business at 2226

Kingshighway, and also to consider in a new hearing

Joelner’s application for a cabaret license for that same

location, so long as he paid any arrearages and the newly

approved November 2002 fees. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

For the reasons set forth below, we find that the district

court correctly refused to preliminarily enjoin the Village

from enforcing the two ordinances, and we further find that

the court appropriately granted the preliminary injunction

requiring the Village to allow Joelner to continue to operate

his bookstore business at 2226 Kingshighway. However, we

also determine that the district court erred in granting the

injunction requiring Joelner to pay the disputed fees and/or

arrearages in order to continue operating his bookstore and
8 No. 03-2669

requiring the Village to conduct a new hearing to consider

Joelner’s cabaret license application for the 2226

Kingshighway location.

Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. Const.

amend. I. The Free Speech Clause applies to the states by

operation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.

E.g., Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 707 (7th

Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

 In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving

party must show that: (1) they are reasonably likely to succeed on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; (3)

they will suffer irreparable harm which, absent injunctive

relief, outweighs the irreparable harm the respondent will

suffer if the injunction is granted; and (4) the injunction will

not harm the public interest. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre,

Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 1994). If the movant can

meet this threshold burden, then the inquiry becomes a “sliding scale” analysis where these factors are weighed against

one another. See AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,

311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002); Connection Distrib. Co. v.

Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998); Erickson, 13 F.3d at

1067; see also Nat’l People’s Action v. Vill. of Wilmette, 914

F.2d 1008, 1110-11 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a district

court’s denial or grant of a preliminary injunction, we examine

legal conclusions de novo, findings of fact for clear error, and

the balancing of the previously noted factors for abuse of

discretion. Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d

470, 474 (7th Cir. 2001).

When a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis

of a potential First Amendment violation, the likelihood of

success on the merits will often be the determinative factor.

Connection Distrib. Co., 154 F.3d at 288, cited in ACLU of

Ken. v. McCreary, 354 F.3d 438, 445 (6th Cir. 2003); see,

e.g., Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin,
No. 03-2669 9

137 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1998). “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury,” Elrod v. Burns, 427

U.S. 347, 373 (1976), and money damages are therefore

inadequate, Nat’l People’s Action, 914 F.2d at 1013. Concomitantly, there can be no irreparable harm to a municipality when it is prevented from enforcing an unconstitutional statute because “ ‘it is always in the public interest to

protect First Amendment liberties.’ ” Connection Distrib.

Co., 154 F.3d at 288 (citing G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich.

Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir.

1994)); cf. Homans v. Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240, 1244

(10th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e believe that the public interest is

better served by . . . protecting [ ] core First Amendment

right[s]”), cited in Newsom v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd.,

354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Surely, upholding

constitutional rights serves the public interest.”).

However, it is sometimes necessary to inquire beyond the

merits, see MacDonald v. Chicago Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355,

358 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), particularly when the

challenged statute regulates the adult entertainment

industry. “[E]ven though we recognize that the First

Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic

materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is

manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of

expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude

than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . . .” City

of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000) (emphasis

added) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, the

purpose of adult entertainment regulations often is to

minimize the deleterious secondary effects that may accompany adult entertainment businesses (e.g., increased

crime rates, decreased property values). See City of Renton

v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). Indeed,

Washington Park proffers that very rationale here. Therefore, Joelner’s request for a preliminary injunction based
10 No. 03-2669

upon his claim that the Village’s adult entertainment ordinances are unconstitutional implicates two conflicting

public interests—protecting First Amendment liberties and

minimizing any harmful secondary effects of such businesses. Cf. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 294.

We note that this interlocutory appeal of a preliminary

injunction (granted in part and denied in part) cannot

result in a conclusive determination of the constitutional

merits of Joelner’s claims. See, e.g., MacDonald, 132 F.3d at

357-58 (citing Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1013

(7th Cir. 1997)). The appellate record contains only three or

four items that contribute substantially to the factual

background of this case: Joelner’s complaint and request for

a preliminary injunction, the Village’s motion in opposition

to the preliminary injunction, and the preliminary injunction hearing transcript and evidence. As a result, numerous

critical factual ambiguities plague the record, including, but

not limited to: what inquiries were conducted by the Village

and what findings were made to support its adult entertainment ordinances; exactly how many adult establishments

are currently operating—with or without licenses—in

Washington Park; whether subsequent ordinances abrogated prior ordinances; the total amount of licensing fee

arrearages allegedly owed by Joelner and the basis for that

number; which license applications were and were not on

the April 15 agenda; why applications were considered in a

particular order by the Board on April 15; and the justification(s) for the denial of Joelner’s applications, other than

the alleged arrearages. Moreover, the question of standing

remains, see supra note 4. All of these issues may be more

fully explored when the district court, upon remand, takes

up Joelner’s request for a permanent injunction and

declaratory relief.

Because a definitive determination on the merits is not

now possible, we will consider the relative strength of

Joelner’s constitutional claims based on the skimpy appel-
No. 03-2669 11

late record and then balance the possible negative impacts

of the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction on (1)

Joelner’s business(es), (2) the Village, and (3) the aforementioned two-fold public interest.

A. Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Here we must decide, in the context of a preliminary injunction, whether a municipality can constitutionally limit

the number of adult entertainment venues and impose

annual licensing fees for such businesses. Specifically, Joelner

posits that both the numerical restriction and licensing fees

are facially unconstitutional, and that the numerical

restriction was unconstitutionally applied. With respect to

the facial challenges, it is an uphill battle because, absent

overbreadth and/or vagueness challenges, he can only prevail if he demonstrates “ ‘that no set of circumstances exist

under which the [regulation] would be valid.’ ” Ben’s Bar,

316 F.3d at 708 n.11 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481

U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (brackets in original) and citing Horton

v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir.

2001)). See also Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 227 F.3d

921, 923 (7th Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 534 U.S.

316 (2002). We recently conducted an exhaustive review of

First Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence in Ben’s

Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 708-722 (7th

Cir. 2003), and need not repeat that analysis here.

1. The Numerical Restriction

a. Facial Challenge

The primary thrust of Joelner’s facial challenge to the

numerical restriction is his assertion that because the

ordinance applies only to “adult entertainment” outlets, it

is a content-based restriction of erotic expression, subject to

strict scrutiny, and cannot pass constitutional muster. But
12 No. 03-2669

“content-neutrality” is a concept easily and oft confused. Cf.

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 444-48

(2002) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (discussing the difficulties

of the “content-neutrality” inquiry); Schultz v. City of

Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 845 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he fact

that the Ordinance definition is content-based on its face

does not necessarily dictate that the Ordinance is analyzed

as content-based and subject to strict scrutiny.”).

Ordinance 01-27 is clearly directed only at “adult entertainment.” Regulations which directly circumscribe a certain category of speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are

likely to be constitutionally impermissible. See, e.g., R.A.V.

v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Renton, 475

U.S. at 47; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69

(1931). But the First Amendment tolerates governmental

interference with general categories of expressive conduct,

as opposed to actual speech. Schultz, 228 F.3d at 841. Very

generally, whether conduct regulations will be subject to

intermediate or strict scrutiny most often actually hinges

upon the regulation’s intended purpose, rather than some

strained interpretation of content-neutrality. See Ben’s Bar,

316 F.3d at 723; Schultz, 228 F.3d at 845 (“[C]ourts often

called [regulations] content-neutral without explaining that

[they] are in fact content-based and only analyzed as

content-neutral when certain preconditions are met.”).

There are two distinct, yet overlapping, lines of Supreme

Court jurisprudence addressing the degree of First

Amendment protection afforded to adult entertainment, a

particular type of expressive conduct. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d

at 712-13. One group of cases addresses public indecency

regulations. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560

(1991); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). The

other considers adult entertainment zoning ordinances. See

Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (“AMT”);

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41

(1986); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
No. 03-2669 13

425 (2002). However, the analytical framework underpinning both strains of jurisprudence is rooted in United

States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-82 (1968). Ben’s Bar,

316 F.3d at 714. Consequently, the Supreme Court has held

that the distinctions between the test used to assess the

constitutionality of public indecency statutes, see Pap’s

A.M., 529 U.S. at 289, and that used to evaluate adult entertainment zoning ordinances, see Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-

47, are irrelevant. 316 F.3d at 714.

Ordinance 01-27 cannot neatly be categorized as either an

indecency regulation or zoning ordinance, similar to the

statute at issue in Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 722-28. Thus, we

will analyze Ordinance 01-27 just as we analyzed the Ben’s

Bar statute—by using the “road map” provided in 44

Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 316

F.3d at 722. A restriction placed upon the number of adult

entertainment outlets is constitutional if:

(1) the State is regulating pursuant to a legitimate

governmental power; (2) the regulation does not completely prohibit adult entertainment; (3) the regulation

is aimed not at the suppression of expression, but rather

at combating the negative secondary effects caused by

adult entertainment establishments; and (4) the regulation is designed to serve a substantial government

interest, [is] narrowly tailored, and reasonable alternative avenues of communication remain available . . . .

Id. at 722 (citations omitted). Step four encapsulates the

intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable in First

Amendment challenges to adult entertainment regulations.

See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; AMT, 427 U.S. at 61.

However, if a regulation fails to satisfy either steps two or

three, strict scrutiny applies and, in order to be constitutional, the statute must be “necessary to serve a compelling

state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”
14 No. 03-2669

Schultz, 228 F.3d at 848 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.

Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105

(1991)).

First, Ordinance 01-27 is an exercise of the Village’s

general police power because it is purportedly justified as

an effort to protect the public’s health, welfare, and safety.

See, e.g., Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 722-23. Therefore, the

Village is regulating pursuant to a legitimate government

power and prong one is met.

Second, Ordinance 01-27 is plainly not a complete

prohibition of adult entertainment. It explicitly allows six

venues for such expression. Because no additional adult

cabarets or bookstores can be licensed after the maximum

number of licenses are issued, Joelner asserts that the

Ordinance therefore operates as a “complete ban.” See, e.g.,

Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 443 (mentioning that the Ninth

Circuit had rejected a similar argument advanced below by

the adult bookstore/arcade owner, but not reaching the issue). We find this characterization unpersuasive. Because

adult entertainment venues are not prohibited entirely in

Washington Park, it is more appropriate to view the ordinance as a limitation, rather than a ban. Joelner is unable

to point us to any case which says otherwise. Thus, as

Ordinance 01-27 does not eliminate erotic expression in

Washington Park, prong two is met.

The third prong of the analysis, which considers whether

the regulation is aimed at reducing the negative effects of

adult speech and not the suppression of speech, when

coupled with the second, concerns the level of scrutiny that

must be applied to Ordinance 01-27. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at

723. In Ben’s Bar, although we concluded that the statute

was “content-based,” we nonetheless applied intermediate

scrutiny. Id. at 724. The focus was solely upon the municipality’s purpose in enacting the statute.

If an ordinance was enacted to restrict certain viewpoints or

modes of expression, see Schultz, 228 F.3d at 844-47, it is
No. 03-2669 15

6 “[An ordinance restricting factories to areas far from residential

neighborhoods] might, like a speech restriction, be ‘content based.’

It might, for example, single out slaughterhouses for specific

zoning treatment . . . . Without knowing more, however, one would

hardly presume that because the ordinance is specific to that

business, the city seeks to discriminate against it . . . . One would

presume, rather, that the ordinance targets not the business but

its particular noxious side effects. The business might well be the

city’s most valued enterprise; nevertheless, because of the [negative

side effects] it causes, it may warrant special zoning treatment.

This sort of singling out is not impermissible content discrimination; it is sensible urban planning.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at

446 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

subject to strict scrutiny and is presumptively invalid. But

if an ordinance is a “time, place, and manner” restriction,

enacted “predominant[ly]” to address the negative secondary effects caused by such expression and not to suppress

the content of erotic speech, it is subject to intermediate

scrutiny.6 Id. at 841-42.

The “content-neutrality” inquiry is therefore subsumed by

the inquiry into a municipality’s purpose in enacting the

regulation. See 316 F.3d at 724 (citing Alameda Books, 535

U.S. at 432-39 (plurality opinion); id. at 448-49 (Kennedy,

J. concurring); Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 294-96 (plurality

opinion); and id. at 310 (Souter, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part)). In evaluating a municipality’s underlying regulatory motivations, we may consider a “ ‘wide

variety of materials including, but not limited to, the text of

the regulation or ordinance, any preamble or express

legislative findings associated with it, and studies and

information of which legislators were clearly aware.’ ” 316

F.3d at 723 n.28 (quoting Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238

F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001)). And while a municipality

need not conduct new studies or produce evidence independ-
16 No. 03-2669

7 In Ben’s Bar, we discussed the slight variations between the

views of Justice Kennedy and the plurality in Alameda Books regarding the correct evidentiary burden which must be met by a

municipality in the third prong of the analysis. 316 F.3d at 720-

22. As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the narrowest opinion

joining the judgment of the Court in Alameda Books, it controls.

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Hence, although

“very little evidence is required,” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451

(Kennedy, J. concurring), the municipality’s inference that the

ordinance “may reduce the costs of secondary effects without

substantially reducing speech,” id. at 450, must appear reasonable. Given the particular nature of this appeal, the distinction

here is inconsequential, but we note that it may not be upon

remand for a full adjudication.

ent of that already generated by other cities, id. at 716-17

(citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52), there still must be some

reasonably relevant evidentiary basis for a municipality’s

action.7

In the instant case, Ordinance 01-27 limits the number of

“places” providing adult entertainment at any one “time” to

six, but includes no guidelines to restrict the mode by which

erotic messages are conveyed. See, e.g., Schultz, 228 F.3d at

847 (holding unconstitutional a statute which “restrict[ed]

the particular movements and gestures of the erotic dancer”

and thereby “depriv[ed] the performer of a repertoire of

expressive elements with which to craft an erotic, sensual

performance.”) Hence, Ordinance 01-27 is a type of time,

place, and manner restriction.

The preamble to Ordinance 01-27 states that it was enacted

“[i]n order to promote the public interest in the preservation

of public health, safety and welfare . . . .” In addition, the

ordinances which were adopted prior to No. 01-27, Nos. 069-

99 and 01-22, both cite “public health, safety, and welfare”
No. 03-2669 17

8 Although the Village nowhere expressly references secondary

effects, for the sake of argument, we presume that its interest in

the “public health, safety, and welfare” is spurred by a concern

over the negative effects which may accompany adult entertainment businesses.

as the basis for the restriction.8 But it is not enough for the

Village to indicate that the secondary effects of adult

entertainment were one concern underlying its enactment

of Ordinance 01-27, such effects must be the “predominant

concerns.” Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 723.

The record does not contain any legislative findings or

any indication that the Board considered studies or other

information before enacting Ordinance 01-27, or its precursor

ordinances. Without this information, we cannot now determine if intermediate scrutiny applies. But we also note

that when the matter is fully considered upon remand, if

the Village is unable to point to any legislative findings,

other than the preamble noted above, or some outside information upon which the Board relied, the evidence indicates

that the Village’s decision to increase the limitation from

four to six seemed to be motivated predominantly by concerns

about revenue and/or political patronage, not secondary

effects and hence, strict scrutiny would apply. And if so, the

Ordinance would likely be unconstitutional because the

Village’s general statements about public welfare would be

insufficient to demonstrate that the ordinance was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly

drawn to that end.

Moreover, even if the Village can point to other legislative

findings or outside information relied upon by the Board,

such that Ordinance 01-27 is subject to the less demanding

intermediate level of scrutiny, the Village still must satisfy

the fourth prong of the analysis—the regulation must serve

a substantial governmental interest, be narrowly tailored,
18 No. 03-2669

9 Joelner also asserts that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its

face because it provides no guidelines for the allocation of the

limited number of licenses allowed. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v.

Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-58 (1988), cited in

MacDonald, 132 F.3d at 361 n.6. However, we do not address this

issue here because we are fairly convinced that the numerical

restriction is otherwise constitutionally flawed.

and cannot unreasonably limit alternative avenues of

communication. Id. at 724. And since a municipality “ ‘may

not assert that it will reduce secondary effects by reducing

speech in the same proportion,’ ” id. at 725 (quoting

Alameda Books, 122 S. Ct. at 1741 (Kennedy, J. concurring)), it is doubtful whether Washington Park will be able

to meet this final prong of the analysis, absent some

showing that there was no other regulatory means available

(aside from the numerical restriction) which would have

effectively curbed any deleterious secondary effects of adult

entertainment outlets.

In sum, we agree with the district court that based on the

limited appellate record, Joelner has a strong likelihood of

success on the merits of his permanent injunction and

declaratory judgment action as to the facial constitutionality of the numerical restriction. However, our inquiry

cannot end here as we must proceed to the balancing of the

harms, see infra Part II.B., after a brief review of Joelner’s

other constitutional challenges.9

b. As Applied

Joelner argues that the Village’s application of the numerical restriction was unfounded, arbitrary, and capricious

and thus, unconstitutional. As a preliminary matter, we

point out that the Board based its rejections of his licenses,

at least in part, upon his alleged failure to pay applicable

licensing fees. This can hardly be considered an “arbitrary
No. 03-2669 19

and capricious” reason for denying Joelner the requested

licenses. However, because the record does not reveal what

the Board based these allegations upon, how the license

applications came to be ordered as they were on the April

15 agenda, or how an application not on the April 15

agenda was considered at all, and particularly how it was

considered before Joelner’s, we refrain from making any

determination with respect to this assertion and leave the

issue for a more full examination upon remand.

2. Facial Challenge to the Licensing Fees

The main focus of Joelner’s facial challenge to the licensing

fees is his argument that Ordinance 01-22 is content-based

and therefore unconstitutional. But a statute imposing licensing fees is not “content-based” simply because it is directed at

a certain category of activities, such as regulations of parades,

rallies, assemblies, and other demonstrations held on city

streets or city property. MacDonald, 132 F.3d at 361;

Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 446. See, e.g., Church of the

Am. Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d

676, 680-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (“KKK”) (treating regulation

affecting only parade and demonstration activities as “content-neutral”); Forsyth County v. Nationality Movement, 505

U.S. 123, 130-132 (1992) (same). Rather, an inquiry into the

constitutionality of a fee ordinance is two-fold: (1) does the

regulation in question vest the public officials in charge of

enforcing or applying the ordinance with a constitutionally

impermissible amount of discretion, see, e.g., Forsyth, 505

U.S. at 130-32; and (2) is the fee amount based upon the

costs of administering the ordinance, maintaining public

order, and relieving the other burdens on public services

stemming from the matter licensed, see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943); KKK, 334 F.3d at 682 (citations omitted); Thomas, 227 F.3d at 925; MacDonald, 132

F.3d at 362-63.
20 No. 03-2669

Turning to the first issue, Washington Park vests its

public officials with no discretion at all regarding the application of the licensing fee. Every “adult entertainment”

venue or proposed venue is subject to Ordinance 01-22, and

the license applicant himself, rather than public officials,

determines which fee will apply, either by applying for a

“bookstore” or a “cabaret” license. MacDonald, 132 F.3d at

362. This ordinance does not create the “unbridled discretion” the Supreme Court condemned in Forsyth, 505 U.S. at

135-36.

And as to the second issue, we cannot now make any

determination regarding the underlying basis for the amount

of the fee. Permit or license fees which restrict constitutionally protected speech must bear a rational relationship to

the public services involved with the matter licensed. S.-

Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of

Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 898 (7th Cir. 1991). The Village

generally indicated the basis for the fees in section 1 of

Ordinance 01-22:

[I]t is in the best interests of the health, safety, and

welfare of its citizens to increase the license fees for

adult entertainment establishments operating within

the corporate limits of the Village. After careful consideration of the size of the Village and the number of

businesses, the expenses involved in maintaining law

and order, the vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the

Village, the income and number of problems and difficulties that arise from the aforesaid businesses, and the

desire to provide a safer, cleaner, and more aesthetically pleasing Village for its residents, the Board has

determined that license fee rates should be increased.

Standing alone these are valid reasons for the imposition of

a fee. But the $10,000 and $30,000 fees imposed by Washington Park are certainly not nominal. See Forsyth, 505

U.S. 138-40 (dissenting opinion) (discussing whether the
No. 03-2669 21

Constitution limits a license fee to a nominal amount).

Furthermore, the Village chose to differentiate between

“cabarets” and “bookstores.” Without more, the statement

of purpose included in the statute is insufficient to support

the fees, particularly considering the differentiation between establishments and the large cabaret fee. However,

the record has not been sufficiently developed for a reliable

assessment to be made as to this issue, and thus, the Village

will have the opportunity on remand to more adequately demonstrate its justification for these fees. S.-Suburban Housing

Ctr., 935 F.2d at 898 (stating the burden is on the municipality to make this “rational relationship” showing).

B. Balancing of the Harms to the Parties and the

Public Interest

Our discussion of Joelner’s likelihood of success on the

merits generally supports a preliminary injunction to prevent the Village from enforcing the ordinances. Yet our

conclusions do not necessitate that outcome. As noted earlier,

see supra Part II, because this case involves adult entertainment regulations, which implicate conflicting public

interests, and because lingering factual questions make a

definitive resolution on the merits impossible, the relative

harms to the interested parties stemming from a grant or

denial of a preliminary injunction must be weighed against

the merits. Although we are fairly convinced that there are

serious constitutional problems with both the numerical

restriction and, to a lesser extent, the licensing fees, a

preliminary injunction may nonetheless be inappropriate if

the relative harms strongly disfavor such relief. See, e.g.,

MacDonald, 132 F.3d at 363 (vacating a preliminary

injunction where the relative harms mediated against it).
22 No. 03-2669

1. The $30,000 Cabaret Fee and the Numerical

Restriction

Regarding the $30,000 fee portion of the ordinance and

the numerical restriction, if an injunction were refused,

there would be no direct harm to Joelner because he does

not have any currently operating licensed cabaret businesses.

We also note again our concern about whether Joelner

actually owns the relevant properties, see supra note 4.

Generously, we do acknowledge that Joelner would suffer

some opportunity costs if an injunction were refused and

these ordinances were later found unconstitutional. But

such opportunity costs are too speculative for us to consider

here. For example, if we were to enjoin the enforcement of

these ordinances, who is to say that Joelner’s proposed

business would find adequate staff or operate at a profit?

However, if the Village was forced to hold new hearings

on Joelner’s applications, the Village would incur costs,

admittedly nominal. And if the Village was compelled to

grant Joelner the licenses he requested, as he urges us to

do, the Village would bear the not insignificant increase in

police, infrastructural, and other related costs. 

Moreover, if the injunction were refused with respect to

the $30,000 fee and numerical restriction, Washington Park

would still have six currently licensed and operating adult

entertainment outlets, including Joelner’s bookstore at 2226

Kingshighway. Put differently, there would be no shortage

of forums for this type of communication. And as mentioned

previously, the opening of each additional outlet may be

accompanied by deleterious secondary effects (e.g., increased crime rates, diminished property values, deterioration of neighborhoods, see, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47).

In sum, given that there is an abundance of adult entertainment venues in Washington Park, that Joelner does not

currently operate any cabaret, and that the Village and the

public would bear both direct and indirect costs if even one
No. 03-2669 23

additional outlet were opened, despite the constitutional

hurdles that must be overcome by each ordinance, a

preliminary injunction requiring either new hearings or the

issuance of any new licenses to Joelner is on balance

disfavored. The district court’s order, to the extent it

required the Village to conduct a new hearing for Joelner,

must be vacated.

2. The $10,000 Bookstore Fee

With respect to the $10,000 portion of the fee ordinance,

if an injunction were refused and Joelner were forced to pay

the fee in order to continue to operate his bookstore, Joelner

could suffer significant irreparable harm. It is true that,

assuming Joelner ultimately succeeds in establishing the

invalidity of the fee provisions, his injury could be compensated through an award of money damages. MacDonald, 132

F.3d at 358 n.4. However, $10,000 is a relatively onerous

amount to pay to continue operate a business previously

licensed for only $100 annually. Second and relatedly, if

Joelner cannot afford such a hefty fee, he would be forced to

shut down his bookstore. Hence, there is a threat that these

allegedly unconstitutionally excessive fees could cause Joelner

significant irreparable harm. See id. at 363 n.8. 

In contrast, if the injunction is granted, allowing Joelner

to continue to operate his bookstore without paying the

$10,000 fee, the possible harm to the Village is minimal.

The Village would be deprived of $10,000—and only temporarily, assuming, arguendo, the fee is later found to be

constitutional. Even for a small municipality like Washington

Park, the harm from such a temporary deprivation of capital

cannot outweigh the possible harm to Joelner. Also, Washington Park licensed Joelner’s bookstore for only $100

annually from at least 1995 until January 2003, despite the

fact that Ordinance 069-99 (enacted September 1999) and

Ordinance 01-00 (enacted January 2000) authorized the
24 No. 03-2669

10 We make no explicit or implicit determination regarding the

constitutionality of either of these ordinances. The only ordinances

challenged in this suit are Nos. 01-22 and 01-27.

11 Ordinance 069-99, imposing a $3000 annual (or $250/month)

adult entertainment license fee, was enacted in September 1999.

Ordinance 01-00, imposing a $30,000 annual (or $2500/month)

license fee, was enacted in January 2000. Ordinance 01-22, imposing a $10,000 annual adult bookstore fee, was enacted in

November 2002. Thus, Joelner’s “back-fees” would equal approximately $1000 for September-December 1999 and $55,000 for

January 2000-October 2002, for a total of $56,000.

Village to impose fees of $3000 and $30,000, respectively.10

If the Village managed to get along without Joelner’s fees

for the approximately eight years prior to 2003, surely the

Village can survive without these fees for a few more

months, while the merits are fully adjudicated. And, as

noted earlier, there would be no harm at all to the Village

if the fee is later found to be unconstitutional. Cf. Connection Distrib. Co., 154 F.3d at 288 (“[T]he government presumably would be substantially harmed if enforcement of a

constitutional law . . . were enjoined[.]”).

Regarding the alleged arrearages owed by Joelner, the

record does not reveal the Board’s basis for these contentions, other than statements by the Village Clerk that Joelner

was “in the red.” But presumably, although there is no documentation of any objection by the Village to Joelner’s payment of only a nominal $100 annual fee prior to January

2003, the Board seeks to hold Joelner responsible for the

adult entertainment fees which ostensibly first became

applicable in 1999. Given that Joelner’s arrearages could

possibly total around $56,00011 and that the Village had

made no objection to his “nonpayment” until January 2003,

our above analysis with respect to the “new” $10,000 fee

likewise applies to the alleged arrearages. 

Furthermore, the bookstore is a forum for adult speech

known and presumably relied upon by the public. Because
No. 03-2669 25

the Village has licensed this business since at least 1995,

the Village had, without question, previously determined

that the secondary effects of this business were acceptable.

Therefore, consideration of the relative harms weighs in

favor of granting a preliminary injunction to prevent the

Village from collecting the alleged arrearages and enforcing

the $10,000 fee provision with respect to Joelner’s existing

bookstore business. To the extent that the district court’s

order required payment of these fees to the Village, it

should be vacated.

III. Conclusion

The district court’s denial of all injunctive relief requested

by Joelner save its order preventing the Village of Washington Park from interfering with the continued operation of

Joelner’s bookstore located at 2226 Kingshighway was correct

and appropriate. But it was error for the district court to

require Joelner to pay either the disputed arrearages or the

November 2002 fee in order to run this business. In addition, with respect to Joelner’s request for new hearings the

district court also erred—the Village need not hold any

rehearings on any of Joelner’s applications, nor grant any

new licenses to Joelner. 

Therefore, although it appears that the numerical

restriction on its face (and possibly as applied to Joelner) is

unconstitutional and that the fee requirement on its face

may be unconstitutional, after weighing the merits against

the interests of Joelner, the Village, and the public, the

request to preliminarily enjoin Washington Park from enforcing these ordinances was properly denied, but Joelner

should be allowed to continue to operate his bookstore without

the payment of any disputed fees pending final disposition

of the case. The district court’s order is AFFIRMED in part

and VACATED in part. The case is REMANDED for further

proceedings.
26 No. 03-2669

APPENDIX

Ordinance 069-99: Ordinance Limiting the Number of Adult

Entertainment Licenses in the Village of Washington Park,

St. Clair County, Illinois to the Number of (4) Four.

Be it ordained by the President and Board of Trustees of

the Village of Washington Park, Illinois, that there has

been and shall be a limitation of the number of adult entertainment licenses to the maximum limit of (4) four as

follows:

Section 1. Limitation and Purpose.

In order to promote a public interest in the preservation

of public health, safety and welfare, and to accord with the

historical fact that adult entertainment licenses are and

were limited to the number of (4) four, there is and shall be

a limitation on the number of adult entertainment licenses

and establishments limiting the number of such licenses

and establishments to a maximum of (4) four in the Village

of Washington Park. This maximum limitation is a reaffirmation of this Village’s limitation. The maximum limitation

shall apply retrospectively and prospectively. In the event

of the cessation of business of any licensed adult entertainment license, the adult entertainment license conferred to

the persons or corporation for that establishment shall

immediately lapse and no future adult entertainment

license shall be issued by any elected or appointed public

official, representative, employee, or body of the Village of

Washington Park to operate an adult entertainment

establishment on the geographic location of a prior existing

establishment or any other location within the Village

limits of Washington Park, Illinois. Thereupon, the maximum number of adult entertainment licenses shall be

immediately lowered to the number of adult entertainment

licenses remaining in effect.
No. 03-2669 27

Section 2. License Requirement for Adult Entertainment.

All persons or corporations involved in the operation of a

commercial use featuring [adult entertainment] shall be

required to have an adult entertainment license the fee for

which is set at $3000.00 and is limited by the number of

allowed establishments as set forth herein.

Section 3. Definition of Adult Entertainment.

Adult entertainment is the operation of a commercial use

featuring acts, performances, videos, and/or movies involving nudity, or partial nudity, but within the permitted

community standards of the Village of Washington Park,

the County of St. Clair and the State of Illinois, available to

persons over the age of (21) twenty-one years.

Section 4. Transfers Prohibited.

No entertainment licenses issued by the Village of

Washington Park shall be transferable by any means whatsoever, and such authority as an entertainment license confers

shall be conferred ONLY to the persons or corporation name

thereon.

Section 5. Authorized Time of Operation.

In order to promote the health, safety, and welfare of

the citizens of Washington Park, Illinois, all adult entertainment licensed establishments are only authorized to

conduct adult entertainment on the premises specified, between the time of 6:00 a.m. central time and 12:00 a.m.

central time on Sunday through Thursday; and, on Friday

through Saturday between 6:00 a.m. central time and 1:00

a.m. central time. Failure to comply with the authorized

time of operation shall subject the licensee to immediate re-
28 No. 03-2669

vocation of the adult entertainment license by the Village

Board. Upon revoking said license, the Village Board shall

state the reason(s) in writing to the holder of the revoked

license.

Section 6. Saving Clause.

Should any court of competent jurisdiction make a judicial

determination that any section, paragraph, provision or

sentence of this ordinance is unconstitutional, the validity

of the remaining sections, paragraphs, provisions or

sentences shall not be affected and shall remain in full force

and effect.

Ordinance 01-00: Ordinance Amending the Fee for Adult

Entertainment License.

Whereas, the president and board of Trustees of the

Village of Washington Park, Illinois believe that the public

health, safety and welfare of the residents of the Village

and those persons who enter the territorial jurisdiction of

the Village would be served by an increase in the annual fee

for an adult entertainment license within the Village; and,

Whereas, the cost, including police, fire, and other municipal

resources to the Village has steadily increased because of the

location of said adult entertainment establishments within the

Village;

Be it ordained by the president and board of trustees of

the Village of Washington Park, Illinois, that the fee for

maintaining an adult entertainment license within the

Village shall be increased to $30,000.00 [ ] annually.

Ordinance 01-22: Amending the License Fees and Other

Regulations Regarding Adult Entertainment Licensing.
No. 03-2669 29

Be it ordained by the Village of Washington Park as

follows:

Section 1. Purpose.

The Village Board has determined that it is in the best

interests of the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens to

increase the license fees for adult entertainment establishments operating within the corporate limits of the Village.

After careful consideration of the size of the Village and the

number of businesses, the expenses involved in maintaining

law and order, the vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the

Village, the income and number of problems and difficulties

that arise from the aforesaid businesses, and the desire to

provide a safer, cleaner, and more aesthetically pleasing

Village for its residents, the Board has determined that

license fee rates should be increased.

Section 2. Body of Evidence.

The license fees for engaging in adult entertainment

establishments within the Village shall be as provided in

the following schedule:

Business Fee/Year

2002

Fee/Year

2003

Adult Bookstore $10,000 $10,000

Adult Cabaret $30,000 $30,000

Section 3.

The following definitions apply to all Village of

Washington Park regulations.
30 No. 03-2669

Business Definition

Adult

Bookstore

Any business which sells what is commonly known as adult entertainment

books, magazines, other reading materials, movies, novelties, or paraphernalia.

Adult

Cabaret

Any business with adult entertainment

which includes live persons performing

adult entertainment and which includes

nudity.

Section 4.

The fees contained in Section 2 are annual fees. The businesses may pay the fees on a quarterly basis . . . .

Section 5. Limitation and Purpose.

In order to promote a public interest in the preservation

of public health, safety and welfare, and to accord with the

historical fact that adult entertainment licenses are and

were limited to the number of (4) four, there is and shall be

a limitation on the number of adult entertainment licenses

and establishments limiting the number of such licenses

and establishments to a maximum of (4) four in the Village

of Washington Park. This maximum limitation is a reaffirmation of this Village’s limitation. The maximum limitation

shall apply retrospectively and prospectively. In the event

of the cessation of business of any licensed adult entertainment license, the adult entertainment license conferred to

the persons or corporation for that establishment shall

immediately lapse and no future adult entertainment

license shall be issued by any elected or appointed public

official, representative, employee, or body of the Village of

Washington Park to operate an adult entertainment
No. 03-2669 31

establishment on the geographic location of a prior existing

establishment or any other location within the Village

limits of Washington Park, Illinois. Thereupon, the maximum number of adult entertainment licenses shall be

immediately lowered to the number of adult entertainment

licenses remaining in effect.

Section 6. Transfers Prohibited.

No entertainment licenses issued by the Village of

Washington Park shall be transferable by any means whatsoever, and such authority as an entertainment license confers shall be conferred ONLY to the persons or corporation

name thereon.

Section 7. Authorized Time of Operation.

In order to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the

citizens of Washington Park, Illinois, all adult entertainment licensed establishments are only authorized to conduct

adult entertainment on the premises specified, between the

time of 6:00 a.m. central time and 12:00 a.m. central time

on Sunday through Thursday; and, on Friday through

Saturday between 6:00 a.m. central time and 1:00 a.m.

central time. Failure to comply with the authorized time of

operation shall subject the licensee to immediate revocation

of the adult entertainment license by the Village Board.

Upon revoking said license, the Village Board shall state

the reason(s) in writing to the holder of the revoked license.

Section 8. Saving Clause.

Should any court of competent jurisdiction make a judicial

determination that any section, paragraph, provision or

sentence of this ordinance is unconstitutional, the validity
32 No. 03-2669

of the remaining sections, paragraphs, provisions or sentences shall not be affected and shall remain in full force

and effect.

Ordinance 01-27: Amending the Village of Washington

Park, Illinois Ordinance No. 01-22, Section 5.

Be it ordained by the Village Board of Trustees of the

Village of Washington Park, Illinois in regular meeting

assumed as follows:

Section 5. Limitation and Purpose.

In order to promote the public interest in the preservation

of public health, safety and welfare, there is and shall be a

limitation on the number of adult entertainment licenses

and establishments to a maximum of (6) six in the Village

of Washington Park. This maximum limitation shall apply

prospectively. In the event of cessation of business of any

adult entertainment establishment, the adult entertainment license conferred to the persons or corporation for that

establishment shall immediately lapse and no future adult

entertainment license shall be issued by any elected or

appointed public official, representative, employee, or body

of the Village of Washington Park to operate an adult

entertainment establishment on the geographic location of

a prior existing establishment or any other location within

the Village limits of Washington Park, Illinois. Thereupon,

the maximum number of adult entertainment licenses shall

be immediately lowered to the number of adult entertainment licenses remaining in effect.
No. 03-2669 33

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-4-04