UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

CAMPANELLA, SALUSSOLIA, and FLEMING 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist VINCENT P. DEGREGORI III 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20150581 

Headquarters, Fort Drum 

S. Charles Neill, Military Judge 

Colonel Steven C. Henricks, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Mary J. Bradley, JA; Captain Heather L. Tregle, JA; Captain 

Matthew L. Jalandoni, JA (on brief); Major Christopher D. Coleman, JA; Captain 

Matthew L. Jalandoni, JA (on reply brief); Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany M. Chapman, 

JA; Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Carrier, JA; Captain Timothy G. Burroughs, 

JA (on brief following remand); Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Carrier, JA; 

Captain Timothy G. Burroughs, JA (on reply brief following remand). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie III, 

JA; Major Michael E. Korte, JA; Captain Austin L. Fenwick, JA (on brief); Colonel 

Tania M. Martin, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Stafford, JA; Major Michael E. 

Korte, JA; Captain Austin L. Fenwick, JA (on brief following remand). 

30 November 2017 

-------------------------------------------------------------- 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ON FURTHER REVIEW 

--------------------------------------------------------------

CAMPANELLA, Senior Judge: 

 The finding of guilty of Specification 2, The Charge is reversed in light of 

United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016) and United States v. Hukill, 76 

M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2017); the sentence is set aside; and a rehearing is authorized. 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

contrary to his plea, of one specification of sexual assault, in violation of Article 

120 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012). The convening 

authority approved the adjudged sentence of a dishonorable discharge, confinement 

for five years, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 
DEGREGORI—ARMY 20150581 

2

On 10 January 2017, this court affirmed the findings and sentence in this case. 

United States v. Degregori, ARMY 20150581, 2017 CCA LEXIS 19 (Army Ct. Crim. 

App. 10 Jan. 2017) (sum. disp.). On 26 July 2017, the Court of Appeals for the 

Armed Forces (CAAF) set aside this court’s decision and remanded the case for a 

new review under Article 66, UCMJ, in light of United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 

(C.A.A.F. 2017). United States v. Degregori, 76 M.J. 439 (C.A.A.F. 2017). 

BACKGROUND 

The government charged appellant with two Article 120, UCMJ, 

specifications involving two different soldiers, Private First Class (PFC) SN and 

PFC JE. The military judge convicted appellant of the specification involving PFC 

JE, which alleged sexual assault, but found appellant not guilty of the specification 

involving PFC SN, which alleged abusive sexual contact. 

The government asked the military judge to consider, under Military Rule of 

Evidence [hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.] 413, evidence that appellant committed abusive 

sexual contact on PFC SN as propensity evidence that he sexually assaulted PFC JE. 

The defense objected, but the military judge ruled in favor of the government. The 

military judge found PFC SN was credible and that the evidence of abusive sexual 

contact was strong. He also found the probative value very high because of the 

similarities between the two charged offenses. 

While initially sketchy, PFC JE’s recall of the evening enlarged over time. 

The government entered into evidence testimony of an exchange between appellant 

and an acquaintance on staff duty occurring after the incident wherein appellant 

stated he was concerned he would be accused of rape. The government also entered 

into evidence an exchange of text messages wherein appellant admitted having sex 

with PFC JE; appellant, however, did not indicate the sex was nonconsensual. Trial 

Counsel compared and contrasted the similarities between the incidents with PFC JE 

and PFC SN throughout his closing argument. 

With regard to the specification of which appellant was found guilty, the 

defense raised consent as a defense and asserted PFC JE had a motive to lie. There 

was also evidence of public displays of affection between appellant and PFC JE. 

 

Appellant now cites Hukill to assert the military judge abused his discretion 

by granting the government’s motion to use charged offenses for Mil. R. Evid. 413 

purposes. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

After appellant's court-martial, our superior court held it is constitutional 

error for a military judge to give an instruction to a panel under Mil. R. Evid. 413 
DEGREGORI—ARMY 20150581 

3

that permits evidence of charged sexual misconduct to be considered as propensity 

evidence when considering other charged sexual misconduct. United States v. Hills, 

75 M.J. 350, 352 (C.A.A.F. 2016). Recently, in Hukill, the Court of Appeals for the 

Armed Forces explained the Hills reasoning also applies to trials by military judge 

alone. Hukill, 76 M.J. at 220. In that case, the military judge allowed the charged 

sexual offenses as propensity evidence used against each charged offense for which 

appellant was convicted. Id. 

If instructional error is found when there are constitutional dimensions at 

play, this court tests for prejudice under the standard of harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States v. Wolford, 62 M.J. 418, 420 (C.A.A.F. 2006). The 

inquiry for determining whether constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the 

defendant's conviction or sentence. United States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293, 298 

(C.A.A.F. 2005). An error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when there is 

a reasonable possibility the error complained of might have contributed to the 

conviction. United States v. Moran, 65 M.J. 178, 187 (C.A.A.F. 2007); United 

States v. Chandler, 74 M.J. 674, 685 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2015). 

Having reviewed the evidence in light of the military judge’s ruling, even if 

we believe the evidence factually sufficient to support appellant’s finding of guilty 

to sexual assault of PFC JE, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the Mil. R. Evid. 413 error did not contribute to that finding of guilty. Accordingly, 

Specification 2 of The Charge cannot stand. We grant relief in our decretal 

paragraph. 

CONCLUSION 

The finding of guilty and sentence are SET ASIDE. A retrial is authorized. 

The case is returned to the same or a different convening authority. 

Judge SALUSSOLIA and Judge FLEMING concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: