UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ CEDRIC GREENE; VALERIE STEPHEN, Plai ntiffs - Appellants,

v. ACCESS SERVICES, INC., De fendant - Appellee. No. 19-1447 (D.C. No. 1:19- CV-02050-LTB) (D. Colo.)

__________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________ Before LUCERO , BACHARACH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ This appeal grew out of Mr. Cedric Greene’s unsuccessful state-court suit. Mr. Greene and his common-law wife, Ms. Valerie Stephen, did not like the result and moved in federal di strict court for re view of the state appellate decision. The federal distri ct court “closed” the action because

* Oral argument would not ma terially help us to d ecide this appeal. We have thus decided the appeal based on the appellate briefs and the record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment does not co nstitute binding pr ecedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgmen t may be cited for its persuasi ve value if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 5, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Mr. Greene was subject to filing restri ctions. Mr. Greene and Ms. Stephen appeal and seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We dismiss Mr. Greene’s appeal an d deny his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For Ms. Step hen, we remand with instructions to dismiss the action based on the ab sence of subject-ma tter jurisdiction and grant her application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 1. Mr. Greene’s Appeal Mr. Greene’s present appeal grew out of an earlier appeal involving an injury to Ms. Stephen. Ms. Stephen sued in state court, but her suit was dismissed and the dismissa l was affirmed in the state appellate court. Though Mr. Greene was not a party to the state-court su it, he sued in federal district court to overturn the state-cour t decisions. The federal district court dismissed the suit, r easoning that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to overturn state-court decisions. Undaunted by that ruli ng, Mr. Greene started over, filing a new suit in federal district court to overturn the unfavorable decisions in state court. The federal district court cl osed his case, and he wants us to consider that ruling. Bu t we can consider his ap pellate argument only if Mr. Greene has satisfied our own filing restrictions. See Greene v. Sprint Nextel Corp. , 750 F. App’x 661, 666-67 (10th Cir. 2018 ) (imposing filing restrictions). These restrictions pr ohibited Mr. Greene from appealing a case involving issues si milar to those arising out of the facts and3 circumstances in a series of earlier appeals, includin g one (Case No. 17- 4150) that involved the same incident involved here. Id. Mr. Greene’s new arguments are just like the ones he made in Case No. 17-4150, so he ha sn’t satisfied our filing restrictions . Given hi s failure to satisfy our filing restrict ions, we dismiss his appeal. 2. Ms. Stephen’s Appeal But Mr. Greene is not the only appellant. Ms. Stephen has also appealed the dismissal, an d she is not subject to fi ling restrictions. So she is free to sue and to a ppeal. Even so, the federa l district court could consider her argument only if subject-ma tter jurisdiction existed. It didn’t. Ms. Stephen sued in federal court to obtain a ruling that the state courts had erred in its rulings. When an appellant seeks reversal based on an error in state co urt, the federal district cour t lacks jurisdic tion under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp , 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005) (R ooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional); Miller v. Deutsche Bank Na t’l Tr. Co. (I n re Miller) , 666 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to challenges involving the correct ness of a state-court judgment). Because the federal dist rict court lacked ju risdiction, the court shouldn’t have just “closed” Ms. Step hen’s case. The court should have dismissed the case without prejudice. Garner v. Gonzales , 167 F. App’x 21, 24 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp. ,4 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction must be without prejudice). 3. Motions for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Appellants must ordinari ly prepay the $505 filing fee. But when they can’t afford prepayment, they can pr oceed only by obtaining leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). But federal law prohibits leave to proceed in forma pa uperis when the ap peal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), see Clark v. Oklahoma , 468 F.3d 711, 714–15 (10th Cir. 2006). Ms. Step hen has appealed in good faith, but Mr. Greene hasn’t. Mr. Greene has abused th e litigation process, resulting in filing restrictions in both federal district court and in our court. His prior litigation experience in th ese courts should have re vealed his in ability to appeal on precisely the same ground brought in a prior federal appeal. But we don’t question Ms. Stephen’s good faith. She is n’t subject to filing restrictions, and th e district court didn’t ad dress her separate claim or explain why her case should be clos ed. The federal dist rict court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her clai m, but she is a layperson and could understandably lack fami liarity with the constr aints on subject-matter jurisdiction.Mr. Greene’s prior federal suit was dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, but Ms. Stephen was not a pa rty to that suit. So we5 have no reason to ques tion Ms. Stephen’s good fa ith despite the clear absence of subject-matte r jurisdiction in district court. Given Ms. Stephen’s good faith and in ability to pr epay the filing f ee, we grant her application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge