Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

NANCY M., 

Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN M., 

Appellee. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-14791 

Superior Court No. 3AN-09-07901 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 6823 - September 13, 2013 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Anchorage, Eric A. Aarseth, Judge. 

Appearances: Robin A. Taylor, Law Office of Robin Taylor, 

Anchorage, for Appellant. Allen M. Bailey, Anchorage, for 

Appellee. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and Bolger, 

Justices. [Stowers, Justice, not participating] 

BOLGER, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The parties to this custody dispute initially lived together in Alaska, but 

their relationship ended before the birth of their daughter, and the mother relocated to 

California to attend graduate school. After lengthy litigation, the superior court awarded 

the father primary custody based on its findings that: (1) the father was more likely to 

foster a close and continuing relationship between the mother and the child; (2) the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

stability factor slightly favored the father; and (3) the mother’s flexibility in caring for 

the child would be slightly limited due to the impending birth of her second child. 

The mother appeals, arguing that the superior court’s findings are clearly 

erroneous. She also argues that the court erred in its application of the custody statute, 

in disregarding the custody investigator’s recommendations, and in formulating various 

aspects of the final custody order. We affirm the custody order, but we remand on the 

issue of visitation costs to clarify ambiguity in the court’s order. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. Facts 

John M. and Nancy M. are the parents of four-year-old Nina.1 The couple 

had an on-again, off-again relationship between 2007 and 2009, when Nina was born. 

In 2010, Nancy relocated to California to attend graduate school. She 

resided in an apartment in Los Angeles. At the time of trial, Nancy was in the process 

of completing her master’s degree and had applied to various doctoral programs in 

California. Nancy became pregnant again in 2011, and she was due to give birth 

sometime in the spring of 2012. 

John continued to reside in Alaska, employed as a professor at the 

University of Alaska. His job involved occasional travel to conferences outside of 

Anchorage. In 2011, John purchased a home in Anchorage. John has family in the Los 

Angeles area, including his mother, father, and brother. 

B. Proceedings 

Shortly after Nina’s birth, John initiated legal proceedings to obtain sole 

legal and physical custody of Nina. Although Nancy wished to relocate with Nina to 

California to attend graduate school, the superior court prohibited Nancy from taking the 

1 Pseudonyms have been used to protect the privacy of the parties. 

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child out of Alaska until the custody hearing had taken place. Following hearings in 

February and August 2010, the court issued an interim custody order awarding the 

parties joint legal custody and John primary physical custody of Nina. In October 2010, 

the superior court issued another interim order stating that the parties had agreed to share 

interim legal and physical custody of their daughter until trial. It provided that Nina 

would spend alternating three-month periods with her parents in their respective homes, 

which were now in different states because Nancy had relocated to California. 

The superior court appointed a custody investigator. The investigator’s 

final report recommended that the parties continue to share physical custody equally 

(continuing the then-current schedule alternating three-month periods of custody) until 

Nina began kindergarten in 2014. The custody investigator acknowledged that once 

Nina began attending school, the schedule would need to be altered so that one parent 

had custody during the school year and the other during the summer, but declined to 

recommend which parent should take which role. 

The final, two-day custody trial occurred on January 31 and February 1, 

2012. The court heard testimony from both parties, as well as from the custody 

investigator and from John’s mother, Lisa. John argued at trial that he was the more 

stable parent and was more willing to foster a close and continuing relationship between 

Nina and the other parent. He proposed a custody schedule that would gradually 

increase his custodial time over the next three years until he had primary custody once 

Nina began school. 

Nancy proposed that the parties continue to share custody equally, 

alternating custody every three months until Nina began kindergarten. But she argued 

that once school started, she should be awarded primary custody. The custody 

investigator’s testimony echoed her 2012 report. She recommended that the parties share 

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custody equally until 2014, when Nina began kindergarten; at that point, she proposed 

that the court determine which parent should have primary custody. 

The superior court granted the parties joint legal custody and shared 

physical custody of Nina. The order provided that over the next three years, physical 

custody would transition to a schedule under which John had primary physical custody. 

The superior court considered the statutory custodial factors under AS 25.24.150(c).2 

2 AS 25.24.150(c) provides: 

The court shall determine custody in accordance with 

the best interests of the child under AS 25.20.060--25.20.130. 

In determining the best interests of the child the court shall 

consider 

(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and
 

social needs of the child;
 

(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet 

these needs; 

(3) the child’s preference if the child is of sufficient 

age and capacity to form a preference; 

(4) the love and affection existing between the child
 

and each parent;
 

(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, 

satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining 

continuity; 

(6) the willingness and ability of each parent to 

facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship 

between the other parent and the child, except that the court 

may not consider this willingness and ability if one parent 

(continued...) 

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It found that Nina had no special needs and that the second, fourth, and seventh factors 

favored neither party. It gave no weight to the third and eighth factors. But the court 

found that the fifth and sixth factors — the length of time that the child has lived in a 

stable environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity, and the desire and 

ability of each parent to allow an open and loving relationship between the child and the 

other parent — both favored John. Finally, the court noted that due to the impending 

birth of her second child, Nancy’s flexibility to meet Nina’s needs was slightly more 

limited than John’s. Nancy appeals. 

III.	 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“The superior court has broad discretion in determining custody awards so 

long as the determination is in the child’s best interests.”3

 We will not reverse a custody 

order unless the superior court abused its discretion or its controlling factual findings are 

2	 (...continued)
 

shows that the other parent has sexually assaulted or engaged
 

in domestic violence against the parent or a child, and that a
 

continuing relationship with the other parent will endanger
 

the health or safety of either the parent or the child;
 

(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or 

child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history 

of violence between the parents; 

(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or 

other members of the household directly affects the emotional 

or physical well-being of the child; 

(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent. 

3 Stephanie F. v. George C., 270 P.3d 737, 745 (Alaska 2012) (quoting 

Misyura v. Misyura, 242 P.3d 1037, 1039 (Alaska 2010)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

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clearly erroneous.4 The superior court abuses its discretion if it “considers improper 

factors in making its custody determination, fails to consider statutorily mandated 

factors, or assigns disproportionate weight to particular factors while ignoring others.”5 

“Factual findings are clearly erroneous if a review of the record leaves us ‘with a definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ”6 “We give ‘particular deference’ 

to the trial court’s factual findings when they are based primarily on oral testimony, 

because the trial court, not this court, performs the function of judging the credibility of 

witnesses and weighing conflicting evidence.”7 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

A.	 The Superior Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That John Was 

More Likely To Facilitate A Relationship Between Nina And The 

Other Parent. 

Nancy argues that the superior court’s finding that John was more likely to 

facilitate a relationship between Nina and the other parent is clearly erroneous. John 

replies that the record supported the superior court’s finding. 

The court’s conclusion was based primarily on John’s behavior throughout 

the proceedings. The court noted that John had a strong track record of supporting 

Nancy’s relationship with Nina, and it stated that “[a]t almost every turn, [John] has 

taken the extra step to afford [Nancy] opportunities to visit[] with Nina that she might 

not otherwise have enjoyed.” The record supports this finding. While John allowed 

Nancy visitation time with Nina in addition to court-ordered visitation, Nancy never 

4	 Id. (quoting Misyura, 242 P.3d at 1039) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

5 Id. (quoting Misyura, 242 P.3d at 1039). 

6 Misyura, 242 P.3d at1039 (quoting Jenkins v. Handel, 10 P.3d 586, 589 

(Alaska 2000)) (alteration omitted). 

7 Id. (quoting Ebertz v. Ebertz, 113 P.3d 643, 646 (Alaska 2005)). 

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offered John extra time with Nina — and she even shortened John’s court-ordered 

visitation. There also was evidence that John was more likely to facilitate open 

communication between the parties regarding Nina. Between July 2010 and January 

2012, John sent Nancy 18 update emails regarding Nina’s progress, but only received 

four update emails from Nancy. 

The superior court contrasted John’s actions with Nancy’s; it noted that 

while there had been no “overt efforts” to exclude John, Nancy had “consistently, albeit 

subtly[,] demonstrated a posture that does not include [John] or his family in [Nina]’s 

life.” The court cited the questionnaires both parties filled out as part of the custody 

investigation as an example of this. In response to the question, “Who else is important 

in each child’s life?” John identified Nancy; but Nancy only named members of her own 

family and did not mention John or his family. 

Nancy correctly points out that the custody investigator testified that it is 

common for parents to interpret that question as asking about people other than the 

parents themselves: “I actually have that happen a lot. And the question probably needs 

to be reworded so that I specifically say someone other than Mom and Dad, who’s 

important in the child’s life.” The custody investigator further testified that it was clear 

from her discussions with Nancy that Nancy “recognizes that her daughter loves her dad, 

has a good relationship with him[,] and that he needs to be part of her life.” With respect 

to this finding and others, Nancy argues that the superior court erred in disregarding the 

custody investigator’s testimony and recommendations and in failing to make findings 

explaining why it rejected those recommendations. But a trial court is not obligated to 

adopt a custody investigator’s recommendations or opinion,8

 nor must it make specific 

Chesser v. Chesser-Witmer, 178 P.3d 1154, 1159 (Alaska 2008) (citing 

Ebertz, 113 P.3d at 647). 

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8 
 

 

 

 

 

findings regarding those recommendations as long as it considers the appropriate 

statutory factors when making a custody determination.9

 We have identified the “critical 

question” as “not whether the superior court erred in rejecting the custody investigator’s 

proposed decision, but whether the evidence as a whole supports the court’s decision.”10 

In this case, there is significant evidence in the record supporting the 

superior court’s conclusion. John testified that even before Nina’s birth he was 

concerned Nancy would not allow him to be involved in his daughter’s life. John 

testified that Nancy would not permit him to see Nina from the time that Nancy moved 

out of his house in late June 2009 (a month after Nina’s birth) until the court ordered that 

John receive visitation about a month later. He further testified that once supervised 

visitation had been ordered Nancy would interfere with his visitation time by demanding 

that he return Nina to her if the baby needed to be fed or changed, or if she became fussy 

and needed to be soothed. 

There was also evidence that Nancy was somewhat unsupportive of the 

relationship between Nina and John’s family in California — particularly with John’s 

mother, Lisa. Lisa, who lives about an hour from Nancy, testified that she had requested 

visitation time with Nina six times, and that Nancy had refused to permit visitation 

except on one occasion, for three hours. Lisa also testified that Nancy did not make her 

feel welcome to visit her home to see Nina and that Nancy never spoke to her during 

exchanges. 

Nancy testified that Lisa was hostile to her and refused to tell Nancy where 

she was taking Nina. She also testified that her “door is always opened” to John’s 

extended family, though she admitted that she had never contacted any of his family 

9 Chase v. Chase, 109 P.3d 942, 946 (Alaska 2005). 

10 Ebertz, 113 P.3d at 647-48. 

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members with an opportunity to spend time with Nina. Perhaps most revealing of 

Nancy’s attitude toward facilitating a relationship between Nina and John’s extended 

family, though, was her testimony that it would be “impossible” to give members of 

John’s family their own personal time with Nina during Nancy’s custodial time: 

I think right now given both of our limited time with [Nina] 

with the three-months-on/three-months-off that it is 

impossible for [John’s] extended family to have their own 

personal time because that would require a lot of time taken 

away from me because I’m out here with both extended 

families. And I’m already splitting my time with Nina six 

months out of [the] year plus . . . school. And for extended 

family to spend time with her while she’s with me would 

require us all to be together. 

We have explained that the close and continuing relationship factor takes 

on “increased significance” when the parties reside in different cities, and thus it is 

reasonable for the court to place “enhanced importance” on this factor in a custody 

determination.11 There was ample support for the court’s conclusion that this factor 

favored John: The evidence indicated that John was more willing to facilitate visitation 

between Nina and Nancy and that he was more likely to foster open communication. 

The court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. 

B.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err In Finding That The Stability Factor 

Favored John. 

The superior court found that the stability factor “slightly favor[ed]” John. 

It explained: 

11 Blanton v. Yourkowski, 180 P.3d 948, 951 (Alaska 2008) (“It is essential 

to have a custodial parent willing to foster an open relationship with the other parent 

when a great distance separates the children from the non-custodial parent, and it is 

reasonable for the superior court to place enhanced importance on this factor when 

making its decision.”) (quoting Silvan v. Alcina, 105 P.3d 117, 121 (Alaska 2005)). 

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[John] lives in a house in a quiet residential neighborhood. 

[Nancy] lives in a an apartment in a busy urban area. Neither 

is necessarily better-suited to meet [Nina]’s needs. The 

choice between these two neighborhoods is more a matter of 

personal preference than of [Nina]’s needs. That said, 

[John]’s home is better-suited for long-term stability as he 

owns his home and has lived and worked in the area for a 

long period of time. In addition, [Nancy] has some unknown 

variables in her life regarding her future college and work 

career. Considering those factors, [John] is in a better 

situation to provide a more certain forecast of educational 

options for [Nina]. This factor slightly favors the father. 

Nancy argues that the superior court determined that Nancy’s status as a 

graduate student and a renter evinced a lack of stability. She contends that favoring a 

home owner over a renter and penalizing a parent for attending graduate school is error.12 

John replies that the superior court did not determine that the stability factor favored him 

merely because he owned his own home; rather, the court considered a variety of factors 

indicating that John would be able to provide long-term stability — including John’s 

long residence in the community and his tenured position at the university. He contends 

that the court appropriately contrasted these indicators of stability with the unknown 

variables in Nancy’s life, including where she would live, work, and attend graduate 

school over the next several years. 

Nancy primarily relies upon Veselsky v. Veselsky, 

13 which concerned a 

mother who desired to move out of state to attend graduate school and was nonetheless 

awarded primary custody of the parties’ children. But Nancy’s reliance on Veselsky is 

12 Nancy also frames her argument as a challenge to the superior court’s 

factual findings, contending that its finding under subsection .150(c)(5) was clearly 

erroneous. But her brief only discusses the alleged error in the court’s legal reasoning, 

and she does not identify any evidence the superior court failed to consider. 

13 113 P.3d 629, 631 (Alaska 2005). 

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misplaced. The Veselsky court recognized that graduate school and the desire to be 

closer to extended family are legitimate reasons for a move,14 but the legitimacy of 

Nancy’s motivation to move to California is not disputed. The superior court addressed 

this issue in an earlier order, when it recognized that Nancy had legitimate motives for 

her move to California, and that the move was a “non-factor” in determining custody. 

We have recognized that stability and continuity “can encompass a 

multitude of factors, including, but not limited to, the relationship with the custodial 

parent, the home provided by the custodial parent, the children’s school, the community 

of friends and family, the cultural community, the children’s relationship with the noncustodial parent[,] and stability of place.”15 “It is the trial court’s task to examine all of 

these factors and determine, in each case, which predominate.”16 

Because the continuity factor includes both emotional stability and 

geographical stability,17 courts must consider both geographical and emotional 

18 19 continuity. And as Justice Rabinowitz cautioned in Craig v. McBride, “[a]though the 

14 Id. at 633 (citing House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Alaska 1989); 

Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 379 (Alaska 1996)); see also Williams v. Barbee, 243 

P.3d 995, 1000 (Alaska 2010) (“In cases involving a parent’s relocation out of state, as 

long as the relocating parent’s reasons for moving are legitimate, the trial court must 

examine the best interests of the child.”) (citing Eniero v. Brekke, 192 P.3d 147, 150 

(Alaska 2008); Barrett v. Alguire, 35 P.3d 1, 7 (Alaska 2001)). 

15 Williams, 243 P.3d at 1006 (quoting Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch, 99 

P.3d 531, 534 (Alaska 2004)) (alterations omitted). 

16 Id. (quoting Barrett, 35 P.3d at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

17 Blanton, 180 P.3d at 954 (citing Meier v. Cloud, 34 P.3d 1274, 1279 

(Alaska 2001)). 

18 Moeller-Prokosch, 99 P.3d at 535 (holding that failure to consider 

(continued...) 

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stability of the home environment is one of the factors that must be considered in making 

a custody decision, the fact that the physical location of a child’s home changes may 

have little or no bearing on the stability of the home.”20 Justice Rabinowitz also noted 

that “[s]tability is often a function of parental attitude and not of geography . . . . [T]he 

fact that a parent remains rooted in one community provides no guarantee that his or her 

21 22 child will have a stable, loving home.” Moreover, in Evans v. Evans, we held that the 

trial court properly “broadened its consideration” of the stability factor “to encompass 

the children’s more general needs for stability in their overall living environment . . . not 

just in relation to each parent, but in relation to the totality of the circumstances they 

were likely to encounter in their respective parents’ homes.”23 

But we have also held that a trial court did not err in concluding that the 

stability factor favored the father where the father had resided in the same community 

for a long period of time and his living arrangements were “settled” and the mother’s 

future living situation was unclear in light of a potential move.24 And in Craig v. 

18 (...continued) 

emotional stability was abuse of discretion); Blanton, 180 P.3d at 954 (“[A] court 

considering the child’s need for continuity and stability in this context must examine not 

only the desirability of maintaining geographical continuity, but also the importance of 

maximizing relational stability.”) (quoting Meier, 34 P.3d at 1279). 

19 639 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1982). 

20 Id. at 308 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring). 

21 Id. 

22 869 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1994). 

23 Id. at 482. 

24 Blanton, 180 P.3d at 954-55. 

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McBride, we recognized that “the fact that the mother had only recently attempted to 

create a stable home environment was entitled to consideration.”25 In this case, we do 

not interpret the superior court’s remarks to suggest that it gave home ownership an 

overriding preference over home rental. The court explained that the choice between 

Nancy’s home and John’s home was “a matter of personal preference” and noted that 

Nancy’s future plans with respect to her education and career were still undetermined. 

The superior court’s finding on the stability factor is supported by the record. 

C.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err In Considering The Birth Of 

Nancy’s Second Child. 

At trial, John argued that the birth of Nancy’s second child would interfere 

with her ability to care for Nina. The superior court noted that “[a]lthough a new and 

additional child certainly introduces a new challenge into [Nancy]’s life, whether that 

new baby will have a significant impact either positive or negative is not measurable at 

this time.” Accordingly, the court simply noted that Nancy’s “flexibility to meet [Nina]’s 

need is slightly more limited” than John’s due to the newborn, second child. Nancy 

contends that this finding is clearly erroneous; she notes that no evidence was offered 

that the addition of a sibling would negatively impact Nancy’s ability to care for Nina. 

She also argues that, to the extent that this factor weighed against her in the custody 

determination, it was legal error. Nancy does not cite any case law in support of her 

argument. 

A court should not determine custody based on the number of children a 

party is caring for; the determination should be based on case-specific evidence of each 

639 P.2d at 305. 

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parent’s capability to care for the child or children in question. 26 But we do not read the 

superior court’s comment to mean that it gave this factor improper significance; it was 

careful to state that the impact of Nancy’s new baby “is not measurable at this time.” We 

interpret the court’s comments to be largely responsive to — and dismissive of — John’s 

argument at trial that Nancy’s newborn would negatively impact Nina. We therefore 

conclude that the superior court did not err. 

D. Other Issues 

1. The custody schedule 

The superior court ordered that Nina spend gradually increasing time in 

John’s custody until 2014, when an approximate nine-month/three-month division would 

begin when Nina began to attend kindergarten. Nancy argues that the superior court 

erred by failing to explain how this custody schedule was in the best interests of the 

child. She correctly points out that the court’s order regarding the changes in the custody 

schedule are at odds with the custody investigator’s recommendations. The custody 

investigator recommended continuing the alternating three-month periods of custody 

until 2014, and she testified that gradually increasing John’s custodial time with Nina 

over a period of several years was potentially more disruptive to Nina. 

As noted above, a trial court is not obligated to follow the recommendations 

of a custody investigator. Moreover, here the custody investigator acknowledged that 

gradual change often worked for children and sometimes made more sense than an 

abrupt change. John testified that he thought such a schedule would be in the best 

interests of his daughter, and the court may have chosen to credit such testimony over 

Id. at 953 (“The necessary inquiry requires an examination of ‘case-specific 

evidence’ of each parent’s capability to care for the child.”) (quoting West v. West, 21 

P.3d 838, 843 (Alaska 2001)). 

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the custody investigator’s. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it 

ordered this gradual change in the custody schedule. 

2. John’s travel 

Nancy contends that the superior court erred by failing to address John’s 

travel schedule — which she characterizes as “frequent[]” and “extensive.” Specifically, 

she argues that the court ought to have ordered that Nina stay with Nancy while John 

traveled. 

But Nancy mischaracterizes John’s travel obligations. John testified at trial 

that if he had primary custody of Nina, he would expect to travel to two or three 

conferences a year and that those conferences typically last three days. It would not have 

been reasonable for the court to order that Nancy take custody of Nina during these trips, 

especially considering the amount of travel and expense involved. The superior court 

did not err by failing to address John’s travel schedule in its order. 

3. Allocation of visitation expenses 

Nancy argues that the court erred in allocating the bulk of travel costs to 

Nancy because her income is significantly lower than John’s. John responds that the 

allocation of visitation expenses is appropriate because he has to pay for eight trips per 

year (adult and child tickets), while Nancy is only responsible for the cost of two to four 

trips per year (adult ticket only). 

We remand this issue for clarification because the superior court’s order is 

ambiguous with respect to travel costs. The section of the order concerning travel costs 

provided that Nancy was responsible for the first $500 of travel costs, John was 

responsible for the second $500 of travel costs, and Nancy was responsible for any costs 

exceeding $1,000. But in the section of the order dealing with physical custody, the 

court adopted the schedule as proposed by John in two trial exhibits. While one of the 

exhibits is simply a schedule, the other exhibit resembles a proposed order in that it 

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addresses topics such as the allocation of travel costs. The exhibit provides that John is 

responsible for the bulk of travel costs. It is unclear whether the court intended to 

incorporate in its order the allocation of travel costs proposed in the exhibit. 

John seems to read the decree to incorporate an allocation that is favorable 

to Nancy, and Nancy seems to agree with this reading. The superior court may wish to 

incorporate this reading on remand. 

4. Federal tax exemption 

Nancy contends the superior court erred in awarding John the entitlement 

to claim Nina as a dependent for federal tax purposes. She argues that the trial court was 

required to make specific findings explaining why this arrangement was “just and 

proper” and that its failure to do so is reversible error. 

Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(k) provides that, consistent with AS 25.24.152 and 

federal law, the trial court may allocate the federal tax exemption for a child between the 

parties “as is just and proper and in the child’s best interests.” Alaska Statute 25.24.152 

places limitations on the circumstances under which the court may grant a noncustodial 

parent the right to claim a child as a dependent under federal income tax laws, but does 

not otherwise restrict the court’s discretion.27 

27 AS 25.24.152 provides, in relevant part: 

(a) In an action for divorce, dissolution, or to declare a 

marriage void, the court may not unconditionally grant to a 

noncustodial parent the right to claim a child as a dependent 

under federal income tax laws . . . . 

(b) In this section, “noncustodial parent” means the parent 

who has actual physical custody of the child for less time 

than the other parent. 

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The court ordered that the parties share physical custody until John 

becomes the primary custodial parent in 2014. But John will actually exercise the 

majority of this physical custody as Nina approaches a school-year schedule. Moreover, 

John may be paying some amount of child support until he has primary custody of Nina 

due to the disparity in the parties’ incomes. We conclude that it was within the court’s 

discretion to award John the federal tax exemption. Under these circumstances, further 

findings on this issue were unnecessary. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We REMAND for the superior court to clarify its order with respect to the 

allocation of visitation expenses. We AFFIRM the superior court’s order in all other 

respects. 

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