Tritium and Nickel-63 

at the 

Kansas City Plant

White Paper 

Rev. 1 

National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health 

May 7, 2015 

Robert Morris, Billy P. Smith and Pat McCloskey 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team

- 

Reviewed by Peter Darnell and Grady Calhoun

Division of Compensation Analysis and Support 

Page 1 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

PURPOSE

Since writing the SEC-00210 Kansas City Plant (KCP) Petition Evaluation Report (ER), NIOSH 

has been made aware of KCP operations involving tritium and nickel-63. This white paper 

establishes exposure scenarios intended to bound worker dose resulting from use of these 

radionuclides. 

At its June 10, 2014 meeting, the Work Group added Issues Matrix Item # 20 to ascertain the 

nature of tritium operations, potential worker exposures, and timeframes involved. As an action 

item from that meeting, NIOSH staff, members of the Board, ORAU Team staff, and SC&A 

staff visited KCP in October 2014 to review weekly activity reports and other documents. 

As a result of the above visit and document reviews, it was discovered that radioactive Ni-63 had 

been used at KCP to electroplate Ni-63 sources for use within the tritium monitors manufactured 

at the facility. This Ni-63 electroplating operation was limited in scope and involved between 

four and eight workers (SRDB 138161, PDF pp. 7).

This white paper will address, in turn, bounding exposure scenarios for the following work 

involving tritium and Ni-63:

• Tritium: Using luminescent paint to fill engraved markings on the “HI-LO” switch plates

• Tritium: Manufacturing instrumentation for tritium analyses in air, urine, and water

• Nickel-63: Fabrication of a Ni-63 plated coupon for use as an internal calibration standard

TRITIUM: CONTAMINATION ON “HI-LO” SWITCH PLATES

NIOSH’s first indication that tritium was being used, or was being considered for use at KCP, is 

a February 8, 1963 internal KCP memo from an industrial hygienist, [redacted for privacy] 

(SRDB 137154, PDF p. 16). This memo states that activated phosphor is associated with 

negligible radiation exposure. An unspecified Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) study on the 

topic was cited, but based on similar wording, the study was almost certainly the June 14, 1960

publication USAEC Radiation Safety Evaluation of Tritium Activated Dials in Luminous Watches 

and Clocks (SRDB 128438). This document was released just prior to the June 30, 1960 

announcement “AEC to Permit Use of Tritium on Luminous Timepieces” which requested 

Page 2 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

comments on a general license for up to 25 mCi per device (SRDB 128438). Consistent with the 

AEC evaluation, the February 8, 1963 Industrial Hygiene memo said that no monitoring or 

protective clothing is required when working with this material, but that Industrial Hygiene 

should be notified in the event of breakage or destruction of the plastic matrix.

An April 16, 1964 interdepartmental KCP memo from [redacted for privacy] regarding tritiated 

phosphor is available (SRDB 137154, PDF p. 8). This memo discusses the need to expedite 

production of luminescent dials. The luminescent dial vendor, U.S. Radium, had a radioactive 

materials license condition that required a 7-day curing time prior to shipment. This curing-time 

requirement interfered with the production schedule that required 70 housings and 70 dials 

before the cure period would be completed. Each housing contained 10 μCi of tritium and each 

dial contained 25 μCi of tritium. The housings and dials were coated and shipped from U.S. 

Radium to Sargent and Greenlease Company in New York for assembly into a combination lock. 

Upon completion, this assembly was to be shipped to KCP.

A May 18, 1965 letter is available from U.S. Radium to [redacted for privacy] (with the Bendix 

Scintilla Division) regarding “tritium filled self-luminous plate” (SRDB 137154, PDF pp. 12-

15). [Note: Bendix Corporation was the KCP site operator; Bendix Scintilla Division was 

located in New York.] This letter documents conversations establishing the KCP position that 

the luminous plates are unacceptable if contamination appears during their use. The letter 

documents wipe-test results, performed at U.S. Radium prior to shipment to KCP, on three 

batches (27 total luminous items) that showed increasing contamination over a one-week period. 

Each batch was wiped with one composite swipe on day zero, then again seven days later. Batch 

1 increased from 0 to 1500 background-corrected counts per minute (cpm), which was equivalent 

to 0.0014 μCi. Batch 2 increased from 0 to 300 ccpm, which was equivalent to 0.0003 μCi. 

Batch 3 increased from 400 to 3500 ccpm, which was equivalent to 0.0032 μCi. U.S. Radium 

stated that these contamination levels were inconsequential, and that it was not possible to 

predict future performance without more testing. 

On May 26, 1965, [redacted for privacy] wrote a letter to [redacted for privacy] of KCP (SRDB 

137154, PDF p. 11) documenting discussions that had occurred during the prior week. The letter 

offered three options concerning the switch plate: (1) delete the requirement for the plate; (2) 

specify plates with improvements; or (3) remove the radioactivity.

A May 27, 1965 KCP interdepartmental memo regarding the “MC1831 Cable assembly (Hi-LO 

plates, tritiated phosphor)” documented a plan to develop a means to cover the plates via epoxy 

Page 3 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

or polyurethane at Bendix Scintilla Division as a way to contain loose contamination (SRDB 

137154, PDF pp. 7). The plan called for a site visit to U.S. Radium after the coating method was 

developed so that the coating could be applied by the vendor.

A May 28, 1965 internal KCP memo is available from [redacted for privacy] to [redacted for 

privacy] regarding “tritium filled self-luminous switch plate for assembly CF-1831” (SRDB 

137154, PDF p. 10). The Bendix Scintilla Division was due to ship the next lot of assemblies in 

early June; however, the contamination level exceeded the vendor’s license limit. The memo 

also notes that KCP was faced with handling problems. Advice was requested by June 1, 1965.

A July 1, 1965 internal KCP memo is available from [redacted for privacy] to [redacted for 

privacy] regarding “Hi-Lo Switch Plates” used in the MC 1931 cable assembly (SRDB 137154, 

PDF p. 9). The memo states that tritiated phosphor filled the engraved letters so they could be 

read in the dark, and that the phosphor was a tritiated organic compound mixed with zinc sulfide 

and adhesive. It also states that the plates are covered with a protective coating. The radiation 

hazard was discussed and the memo pointed out that tritium contamination exposure involves a 

weak beta emission and no external dose. The activity of each plate was 40 mCi, which created 

no significant health problem handling the plates. The memo also notes that plates were marked 

with radiation labels to provide for better controls. The memo stated that the vendor, U.S. 

Radium, was placing a double coating of protective material on the plates.

NIOSH reviewed a patent filed by U.S. Radium on December 5, 1962 for their invention of the 

tritiated phosphor used on KCP’s Hi-Lo Switch Plates (SRDB 141145). This patent was 

reviewed to understand the nature of the phosphor, its characteristics, and designed uses. The 

patent indicated that the phosphor was contained in a “Tung oil” matrix, which provided 

information that any personnel exposures would have been from organically-bound tritium 

(OBT) in the mixture rather than tritiated water (HTO) or tritium gas.

A report dated November 19, 1965 provides detailed removable-tritium-contamination results 

from swipe tests on Hi-Lo switch plates, made both after receipt and prior to use at KCP (SRDB 

137063). A PAC-3A internal gas proportional counter was used to count the swipes. Each 

tested plate was swiped on the front with one swipe and on the back with another swipe. It was 

noted that the design specification for removable tritium on the switch plates was 10,000 dpm. 

Three hundred thirty Hi-Lo switch plates were received in four batches, and 55 of those were 

tested for contamination. Of the 55 tested, 13 (24%) exceeded 10,000 dpm. The highest 

observed contamination level was 35,395 dpm. The report concluded that the measured 

Page 4 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

contamination levels presented no significant radiation exposure while handling the plates. 

Table 1 summarizes the results. No additional information is available on whether or not 

additional switch plates received at KCP were routinely swipe-tested.

Table 1: Tritium Swipe Results from Luminescent Hi-Low Switch Plates

Set No. Receipt 

Date

Number 

Received

No. of Plates Tested 

Front and Back

Mean

(dpm)

Standard 

Deviation

(dpm)

Min

(dpm)

Max

(dpm)

Std Dev

Mean

Set 1 10/21/1965 153 25 4796 6815 0 35395 142%

Set 2 11/12/1965 67 15 7044 5184 1810 24341 74%

Set 3 10/18/1965 4 4 2073 1148 0 3988 55%

Set 4 08/09/1965 106 11 7099 6380 1369 27142 90%

Summary N/A 330 55 5672 6179 0 35395 109%

In a March 2, 1966 memo to [redacted for privacy], Sandia Livermore [redacted for privacy] 

documented a February 10, 1966 site trip to the U.S. Radium Corporation in Bloomsburg, 

Pennsylvania (SRDB 128439, PDF pp. 4-9). Also attending the site visit were [redacted for 

privacy] from KCP and U.S. Radium. The memo discusses the tritium contamination experience 

at U.S. Radium and the applicable AEC contamination limits (see Table 2). Allowable tritium 

contamination levels at the U.S. Radium facility in the areas where tritium was processed were 

200 cpm on a 100-cm2 swipe. The memo also discusses methods of counting and difficulties in 

obtaining reproducible swipe results. The consensus was that in the future, all contamination 

surveys would be counted using the liquid scintillation counter method. A summary of tritium 

removed in submersion water tests was reported. Acceptance sampling and vendor test 

certification requirements were defined. The acceptance test for contamination was to be done 

by the vendor between 5 and 7 weeks after the final protective coating was applied to the plate. 

The trip report documents that the Bendix Scintilla contract with U.S. Radium would be 

terminated and that KCP would initiate a purchase contract with U.S. Radium to obtain the 

remaining plates originally ordered by Bendix Scintilla. A recap of the Bendix Scintilla 

procurement showed that:

• 181 units had already been shipped to Bendix Scintilla; 

• 125 units were ready for shipment, pending leak test;

• 90 units were ready except for final coating;

Page 5 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

• 42 units were ready for tritium application; and

• 62 units were in progress, having only been machined and engraved.

A May 27, 1966 internal KCP memo from [redacted for privacy] to [redacted for privacy] 

regarding “Inspection of Hi-Lo Switch Plates in Department 212” found that handling the switch 

plates should present no health hazard and that no special protective measures were indicated. 

The requirement was to contact Health and Safety in the event that phosphor paint was removed 

by accidental chipping or during any intended testing methods. Otherwise, hand-washing was 

the only routine required action (SRDB 128439, PDF p. 2). On the same date, [redacted for 

privacy] wrote a six-point set of health and safety requirements for “Handing Tritium Luminous 

Compound 115 GT” (SRDB 128439). The requirements included performing powder-mixing 

under a fume hood, properly labeling containers, covering work surfaces, requiring paper shop 

coats and rubber gloves, smoking restrictions, eating and drinking rules, hand-washing 

requirements, and instructions to bag waste and contact Health and Safety for disposal.

Shipping documents show that on June 26, 1967, KCP shipped 30 Hi-Lo plates to Seneca Army 

Depot (SRDB 137154).

An October 14, 1968 letter is available from [redacted for privacy] (KCP H&S [redacted for 

privacy]) to [redacted for privacy], Bendix Corporation, South Montrose, Pennsylvania) (SRDB 

128438). This letter explains the regulatory analysis and framework associated with general and 

specific licensing of luminescent dials containing tritium. The referenced documents were 

included as attachments. These documents included Military Specification MIL-T-46343 

(tritium solid form), 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection against Radiation, 10 CFR 30, Rules

of General Applicability to Licensing of Byproduct Material, and other tritium applicable notices. 

The radiological requirements in these documents applied to all organizations in the supply and 

user chain for possession, handling, or using these tritiated products.

Supervisor [redacted for privacy] stated, “We have handled these materials at the Kansas City 

Division and the following basic requirements were established....” Work rules describing 

“Preparation of Tritiated Phosphor” and “Handling of dials subsequent to painting...” were 

included. These appear to be similar to the work rules established by U.S. Radium (SRDB 

128438). However, the first item under the KCP rules for preparation of tritiated phosphor is 

“Tritiated phosphor and adhesive binder were mixed in an exhausted hood to control airborne 

and surface contamination.” 

Page 6 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

Three methods were used at U.S. Radium to determine the tritium contamination on the switches 

after the curing of the final cover coating. 

1. A smear survey that involved removing any contamination from the part with filter paper and 

counting it on an internal proportional counter.

2. A water survey in which the part to be tested was immersed in 100 ml of distilled water for 

24 hours at ambient temperature and pressure. Afterwards, a measured sample of the water 

was evaporated and counted with an internal proportional counter.

3. The same water-immersion method listed above except that the immersion water was 

counted in a liquid scintillation counter. 

These methods were patterned after methods described in 10 CFR 32.101 (in place during that 

era and later).

The final criteria established for tritium contamination determination was: “Each plate of the 

sample size shall be immersed in 100 ml of distilled water for 24 hours at ambient temperature 

and pressure. The activity of tritium in the water shall be measured by a liquid scintillation 

detector that has been calibrated for tritium efficiency with a National Bureau of Standards 

tritium standard. The maximum allowable activity of tritium in the water shall be less than 

5.5E8 dpm” (SRDB 128439, PDF p. 9). 

Table 2 shows data reviewed by Lovell during his visit to U.S. Radium (SRDB 128439, PDF p. 

5) and provides a comparison of the some of the standards of the day to the agreed-upon 

contamination criteria.

Table 2: Allowable Tritium Limits Established by the Military and AEC

Source Description of Item and 

Quantity of H3

Allowable H3 Loss

in 100 ml of Water

Allowable H3 

Removable by 100 cm2

Smear

10 CFR 32.40 Auto Locks: 15 mCi 3.2E7 2.2E3 dpm

10 CFR 32.14 Watch Dials: 25 mCi 2.8E9 Not required

10 CFR 32.101 Aircraft Exit Signs: 4 mCi 8.8E9 2.2E3 dpm

Mil. Spec. Luminous Signs 1.1E5 1.1E5 dpm

Page 7 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

A November 6, 1968 memo is available from J[redacted for privacy] to Lt. Col. Edwin Engram 

(U.S. Army Seneca Army Depot) regarding Hi-Lo switch plates. The memo replies to a question 

regarding the required marking based on activity. The memo states that each plate contains 

approximately 40 mCi of tritiated phosphor mixed with adhesive binder for attachment to the 

aluminum. It states that markings and controls are appropriate considering the low hazard level 

of tritium. The memo also notes that, during fabrication, the plate is over-coated with clear 

plastic resin and cured. The luminosity design criteria is also reported (SRDB 137154).

TRITIUM: EXPOSURE BOUNDING SCENARIO FROM “HI-LO” SWITCH PLATES

This section describes a bounding scenario for exposure to tritium associated with 

radio-luminescent “Hi-Low” switch plates. Based on the period during which it is known that

the switch plates were used, NIOSH assumes that tritium exposure occurred continuously 

between 1963 and 1968. It is also known that KCP had a formal method for controlling 

employee access to work areas via security guards, medical screenings, and qualifications.

In this bounding exposure scenario, only those workers who received, inspected, installed, tested,

and packaged the switch plates may have been exposed to the tritium incorporated in the zinc 

sulfide scintillator. The chemical form of the tritium as it was incorporated into the phosphor 

was an organic compound known as Tung Oil, also known as China Wood Oil (used as a finish 

in woodworking). NIOSH reviewed a Sigma-Aldrich safety data sheet (SDS) that states that 

Tung Oil is an ester of eleostearic acid and other fatty acids (SRDB 140801). It is a waxy solid 

with a near-zero vapor pressure at room temperature, making inhalation unlikely. The SDS gives 

no precautions and instructs the user to wash it off with soap and water if it gets on the skin. In 

addition, NIOSH is aware that Eucerin pH5 hand cream contains stearic acid as a thickening 

agent. Since the tritium was also in a stearic acid similar to those used in common hand creams,

with properties that would cause it to coagulate/thicken and dry on the skin, this provides a 

plausible skin-contact mechanism for transfers of OBT through workers' skin.

In consideration of these physical characteristics and KCP’s operations, the most probable 

exposure pathway would have been through skin absorption. However, there would have been a 

slow and incomplete translocation of surface contamination across the skin membrane. In lieu of 

calculating the absorbed quantity, NIOSH will employ a claimant-favorable strategy and assume 

a bounding, instantaneous, and 100% activity transport across skin.

Page 8 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

A February 1966 trip report recapping the order status from the prior year, states that 500 units 

were ordered and 181 were shipped prior to the report date. It is also known from swipe test 

records that 330 switch plates or components were received in four batches in 1965. This 

suggests that two different orders for switch plates were made in 1965. NIOSH can use this 

information on items received to estimate the daily chronic exposure that would have occurred.

Data collected in 1965 from 110 swipes used to assess the contamination level on 330 switch 

plates were fitted to a lognormal distribution. The data were found to have a geometric mean of 

4,246 dpm/100 cm2 and a geometric standard deviation of 2.32. The upper 95th percentile value 

of this distribution is 16,900 dpm/100 cm2. NIOSH assumes this value for the contamination 

level in the bounding exposure scenario. 

NIOSH has not found documentation on the size of the Hi-Lo switches other than their thickness 

of 3/16 of an inch. It is assumed they are approximately the size of a plate covering a light switch 

or standard wall outlet, two-sided (front and back), and nominally 100 cm2 on each side for a 

total of 200 cm2. NIOSH considers this a reasonable assumption based on the documentation 

that each plate was soaked in 100 ml of distilled water for the 24-hour leak test determinations. 

A plates of this size would have been covered and soaked in this volume of water. Thus, each 

switch plate would have had 33,800 dpm distributed over the entire surface. 

NIOSH assumes that each switch plate was handled enough for all of the surface contamination 

to be transferred to the worker’s skin where it was completely absorbed. Procurement records 

indicate that at least 500 of the plates were ordered by KCP; therefore, the handling could have 

been several per day over the intermittent tritium monitor manufacturing periods. Based on these 

procurement records, NIOSH will assume that a worker handled three switch plates each day.

This means that the bounding intake rate of organically bound tritium through skin absorption 

would be 101,400 dpm (1690 Bq). This bounding intake rate would have been chronic through 

the year, for the period 1963 through 1968. Using the OBT ICRP 68 dose conversion factor of 

4.19E-9 rem/Bq, the worker dose would be 7.08E-6 rem/day or 1.77E-3 rem/year (250 

workdays).

Page 9 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

TRITIUM: MANUFACTURING TRITIUM MONITORS

There is evidence that tritium-in-air instruments and tritium-in-urine monitors designed by 

Sandia were manufactured by Bendix at KCP over an extended period. This manufacturing 

involved use of tritiated water as a calibration standard. Radioactive Ni-63 was plated on a 

component of one of the tritium-in-air instrument models; exposure to Ni-63 at KCP is discussed 

later in this report. 

Manufacturing of the instruments began in 1959 (SRDB 137065). Four monitoring kits were 

produced in February 1960 (SRDB 137065). Manufacturing of the tritium monitoring 

equipment continued in campaigns through the 1970s. This manufacturing effort was not in 

response to tritium used programmatically at KCP; rather, the manufacturing was done under 

contract to Sandia. The instruments were used by military organizations and by the U.S. AEC 

during nuclear testing.

The identification of the instrument models changed with time. In 1964, the U.S. Navy had the 

Model T-289 tritium-in-air monitor permanently installed on surface ships and submarines. 

Model T-290 was a less-sensitive, battery-powered, portable tritium-in-air monitor that was also 

on each monitored ship. Both could be used with the tritium-in-urine bioassay instrument called 

the Model T-329 Urinalysis Test Kit. In 1964, procurement of the next generation of 

instruments was in progress (SRDB 137822). Two each of the Model T-289 and the Model 

T-329A were available for use during atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific theater during 

the Operation Dominic series conducted during1962 (SRDB 77532). By 1972, the Tritium in 

Air Monitor Bendix/Sandia Model T446 and the Tritium Urinalysis Monitor Bendix/Sandia 

Model T449 were available, as documented in Instrumentation for Environmental Monitoring, 

published by Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (SRDB 137183).

No evidence was found indicating that tritium gas or tritiated water vapor was used at KCP in 

direct association with the ion chamber production. Tritium-in-air monitors do not necessarily 

require tritium gas or water vapor to be available during the manufacturing process. These 

monitors are based on ion chamber technology. Ion chambers respond to any ions in the 

chamber, regardless of the source. They can be operationally challenged and functionally 

calibrated with minimal uncertainty using a standardized gamma radiation field. Typically, a 

cesium-137 source and a set of calibration jigs, used to reproducibly fix the source to detector 

distance, are used for this purpose. Therefore, the lack of documentation concerning tritiated gas 

and tritiated water vapor at KCP is not necessarily a data gap, but instead may reflect the fact 

that ion chambers were simply fabricated but not tested or calibrated at KCP, which is also 

Page 10 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

suggested in a March 27, 1965 memo (SRDB 137065). Sandia, known to have had extensive 

tritium-handling capabilities at their Livermore site, could have tested and calibrated the ion 

chambers with gamma rays and with high concentrations of tritium as part of a procurement 

acceptance test (SRDB 137065).

The tritium urinalysis instrument was not actually a radiation detector. It was a purposedesigned reaction system to disassociate hydrogen from water and inject that hydrogen into an 

ion-chamber air monitor where the tritium concentration could be accurately measured. This 

instrument reacted calcium metal with 7 ml of water or urine to produce hydrogen. If tritium 

were present in the water, it would also be proportionally-present in the evolved hydrogen. Due 

to uncertainties about the chemical reaction efficiency, the tritium bioassay instrument required 

tritiated water for testing and calibration. Consequently, KCP procured standardized tritiated 

water from Sandia. Initially, in 1959, the bottles were received and inspected without opening, 

then stored under ventilation until they were installed in instrument kits (SRDB 137065). This 

seems to have been thoroughly planned to the point of instructing Sandia to place a note on the 

exterior of the tritium package saying “Not to be Opened – Contact Health, Safety and Fire 

Departments.” A hand-written note indicates that 14 bottles were received. An operational 

procedure for the Model T-329 requires that suitable standard solutions ranging from 5 to 250 

μCi/l be prepared. The unit was reported to have a precision of ± 5% over the range of one to 

150 μCi/l (SRDB 137065). 

By 1964, the procurement practice had changed and the standard 250 μCi/l tritiated water 

solution was procured in gallon containers from Sandia and repackaged into smaller 400 ml 

bottles for inclusion in the monitoring kits (SRDB 137860). Eight gallons of tritiated water were 

purchased in August 1964 and seven gallons were purchased in November 1964. Nice and 

Weinstein (SRDB 137822) mentioned that standard tritium water was included in the Model 329 

for calibration purposes and that the maximum permissible body-burden for tritium was 60 μCi 

per liter.

The market for the Model 329 and Model 449 tritium urinalysis instruments presumably ended 

by early 1970s when liquid scintillation counters became widely available. Direct counting of 

tritium in urine by liquid scintillation methods eliminated the need for the relatively complex 

equipment and reactive metal reagent, and so the method naturally fell out of favor.

Page 11 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

TRITIUM: EXPOSURE BOUNDING SCENARIO FOR MONITOR WORK

This section describes a bounding scenario for exposure to the tritiated standard solution while 

handling and using the solution to test and calibrate the Model T-329 Urinalysis Test Kit and the 

Tritium Urinalysis Monitor Bendix/Sandia Model T449. 

Initially, in 1959, small-sized bottles of standard solution (400 ml of 250 μCi/l) were purchased 

from Sandia and stored under ventilation until they were used or packaged for shipment with a 

completed urinalysis kit. Although it is unknown when the procurement policy changed, it is 

known that by 1964 the standardized tritiated water was purchased in one-gallon units and 

repackaged at KCP into 400 ml bottles. In 1964, there are records of two shipments of 8 gallons 

of standardized tritiated water for a total of 16 gallons (60,600 ml). A 400 ml bottle of the 

calibration standard solution was shipped with each urinalysis kit. Decanting the gallon-sized 

units into 400 ml bottles would result in nominally 150 bottles of standard solution. Based on 

this, it is reasonable to assume that approximately 150 decanting operations occurred in 1964. 

To ensure claimant favorability, it is assumed that some part of the decanting operation occurred 

in KCP’s chemistry lab every workday (250 days per year) beginning in 1959 and ending in 

1975.

Based on the care that went into the procurement process and cautionary notes about handling 

that were included in the purchase order, it is assumed that the chemistry technicians that 

handled the standardized tritiated water would have been careful with it due to its value and

hazardous nature. It is known that the unopened bottles procured in 1959 were stored under 

ventilation when not in use; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that any process associated with 

standard tritiated water, including decanting from one bottle to another, would have taken place 

under a ventilated enclosure such as a fume hood.

Although decanting could have occurred on a single day soon after each shipment was received, 

it is possible that smaller bottles were filled in separate operations. The process of receiving and 

transfer tritiated water from Sandia in gallon bottles and transferring some of the liquid to 

smaller volumes (i.e., 400 ml and ~2.5 ml vials), could have provided reasonable opportunity for 

losses through splashes or spills that went unreported. It is plausible that these small 

splashes/spills occurred during the liquid-transfer processes that were used in the preparation of 

the final standard’s volumetric configuration. 

For this bounding scenario, it is assumed that the total volume of a 400 ml bottle of tritiated 

water was spilled over the course of a year and was absorbed by a worker. This is a claimantPage 12 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

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information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

favorable assumption since NIOSH has not located Unusual Occurrence Reports (UORs) that 

describe incidents or spills that occurred during the tritiated water decanting transfers to other 

containers. It is also assumed that none of the water evaporated, which would have removed the 

tritiated water vapor from the room/hood through the ventilation systems. This assumption 

allows the entire spilled volume (i.e. 400 ml volume of 250 μCi/l tritiated water) to be absorbed 

through the skin of the worker. The activity in the 400 ml of standardized tritiated water is 100 

μCi. A fully-efficient wipe test of the spill areas would yield a total removable contamination 

level rate of 2.22E+08 dpm. In this bounding scenario, this tritium contamination is completely 

transferred to the skin of the hand of the chemistry technician during the year. Thus, in this 

bounding scenario, the chemistry technician’s skin is contaminated with 2.22E+08 dpm 

(3.7E+06 Bq) of tritiated water on an annual basis. This activity would be completely absorbed 

as tritiated water through the skin and into the blood stream. Using the tritiated-water ICRP 68 

dose conversion factor of 1.8E-9 rem/Bq, the worker dose would be 6.66 mrem/year.

NICKEL-63: FABRICATION OF NI-63 CALIBRATION STANDARDS

There is evidence that KCP/Bendix used Ni-63 over an extended period of time in the 

manufacturing of tritium-in-air and urine monitoring instruments designed by Sandia National 

Laboratories. This manufacturing involved plating Ni-63 on a small aluminum metal coupon for 

use as an internal calibration standard.

Exposure to Ni-63 occurred during small-scale chemical-plating operations. Radioactive Ni-63 

was included in the nickel-plating solution. A one-square-inch (SRDB 138164, PDF p. 8) 

Ni-63-plated area was incorporated into the precipitator plate (SRDB 138157, PDF p. 3) of the 

Tritium in Air Monitor, Bendix/Sandia Model T446 (SRDB 138159, PFD p. 2).

The nickel-plating solution was modified by adding the radionuclide Ni-63, as a liquid, from the 

standards prepared from the purchased Ni-63 dissolved in hydrochloric acid. Ni-63 is a 

low-energy beta-emitter with average beta energy of 17.4 keV, maximum beta energy of 66.9 

keV (Figure 6) and half-life of 100.1 years. It emits no X-rays, gamma rays, or alpha particles. 

For comparison, the beta emission from tritium has an average energy of 5.7 keV and maximum 

energy of 18.6 keV. Based on waste records, the total activity of each one-square-inch 

nickel-plated spot was nominally 0.5 μCi (SRDB 138164, PDF p. 4). The plating process 

resulted in the plated portion of the precipitator plate to emit detectable amounts of beta 

radiation. Because of its low-energy beta emission, the Ni-63 plate can be used as a 

Page 13 of 28

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

self-contained calibration source in the Model T446 to simulate the beta radiation associated 

with tritium decay (SRDB 137183, PDF p. 2). 

On at least four different dates, KCP engineering staff procured Ni-63 in 1 molar hydrochloric 

acid solution from ORNL. Three of the four orders referred to ORNL “Product 47,” which has a 

nominal Ni-63 activity of 198 mCi/ml (SRDB 138157, PDF p. 3; 138151). Product 47 was 

reported to have two radioactive contaminants in trace concentrations: (1) “Silver (Au) 110” 

[sic], which most likely means silver-110, at a concentration of 0.03 mCi/ml [0.015% of the 

Ni-63 concentration]; and (2) an unspecified isotope of scandium in a concentration of 0.04 

mCi/ml [equivalent to approximately 0.02% of the Ni-63 concentration]. The four documented 

purchase orders were (SRDB 138151, PDF pp. 2-6):

• 20 mCi at a concentration of 50 mCi/ml on April 25, 1967, referencing ORNL Product 47

• 120 mCi on June 20, 1967, ORNL Product 47

• 120 mCi on March 21, 1969, ORNL Product 47

• 1000 mCi on September 21, 1970

Each order placed with ORNL included instructions that ORNL mark the exterior package. A 

typical set of instructions is found on the April 25, 1967 order: “Do not open in receiving –

radioactive material – notify health and safety, ext. 2638 for internal routing of material.”

The Ni-63 plating operation occurred in the small volume-plating bath of the Finishes 

Development Facility. Floor plans and facility location maps are available (SRDB 138155, PDF

pp. 3). A plan for upgrading the Finishes Development Facility was presented to KCAO-AEC 

on December 18, 1969 (SRDB 138155, PDF p. 2). The justification for the plan described safety 

issues that prompted KCAO-AEC to direct that the plating shop be immediately shut down. By 

December 23, 1969, corrections had been made and the Supervisor, Health and Safety, 

recommended that the facility could be restarted (SRDB 138155, PDF p. 5). On November 25, 

1970, a project directive modification request for the Finishes Development Facility was 

submitted to AEC-KCAO (SRDB 138161, PDF p. 3). This document described the existing 

facility and the safety issues that were to be addressed by the capital improvement. It also stated 

that four chemical engineers, chemists, and engineering technologists worked in the facility 

full-time and another four personnel worked part-time. The time-frame of projects done in the 

facility ranged from a few days to a few years.

Page 14 of 28

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ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

An August 31, 1970 memorandum documented the safety controls associated with Ni-63 plating 

operations (SRDB 138154, PDF p. 2). These were essentially no different from normal 

operational controls except for waste disposal and labeling requirements. The following is an 

edited summary of these controls:

• The solution will have to be stored in proper containers and identified

• Eventually, the solution will have to be disposed of in a method prescribed for radioactive 

wastes

• There is no danger for an operator using the small volume plating bath beyond the normal 

precautions that apply to handling and using acid solutions

• No special handling is required for rinse waters

• No special handling of parts except to identify radioactive parts in packaging

A September 29, 1970 memorandum more thoroughly documented the radiological safety 

controls associated with Ni-63 plating operations (SRDB 138163, PDF p. 2). The following is 

an edited summary of these controls:

• Workers will be given an orientation by Health and Safety prior to handling the material

• Workers will wear protective equipment including eye protection, gloves, and apron

• Workers will not eat, drink, or smoke while working with the material and will wash their 

hands at appropriate times

• The stock and plating solution will be identified and labeled with radioactive warning tape;

• Spills will be cleaned up immediately and Health and Safety will be notified to provide 

monitoring

Radioactive waste disposal records dated May and June 1984 show that at least five, and perhaps 

up to nine, Ni-63 panels with one-square-inch radioactive areas were disposed (SRDB 138164, 

PDF p. 8). 

In summary, the records shows that both management and Health and Safety staff took careful 

interest in the procurement and use of the Ni-63 material during plating operations. Ni-63 was 

handled in liquid form until it was essentially immobilized in the form of durable metallic nickel 

plating. The radiological hazard was evaluated as operations progressed and was judged 

negligible, similar to the non-radiological hazards of metal plating. Other than waste 

management, spill response, and material labeling, no special controls or personnel dosimetry 

were required. 

Page 15 of 28

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

NICKEL-63: BOUNDING EXPOSURE SCENARIO FOR NI-63 ELECTROPLATING

The plating operations were all wet processes and offered minimal opportunity for exposure. 

The stock solution and the plating solution containing Ni-63 were considered chemical irritants 

because they were hydrochloric acid solutions. As with any plating-shop, adequate room 

exhaust ventilation can be assumed. The intake potential of the stock solutions of Ni-63 

purchased from ORNL was minimal since they were delivered to KCP as liquids, most likely in 

sealed glass ampoules. The intake potential from the plating solutions was also minimal due to 

routine controls established for the plating shop.

Although there is no direct evidence or descriptions of the plating system used at KCP, the size 

of the coupons plated (1 in2) is an indication of the size of the plating system required.

A plating technique for Ni-63 on small copper coupons, nominally one-square-inch, was reported 

by ORNL in 1989 (SRDB 128975, PDF p. 8). The ORNL plating cell system drawings are in 

Figures 1 and 2 (SRDB 128975, PDF pp. 10, 18). Assuming the width of the copper coupon 

shown in Figure 2 is one inch, the illustration can be scaled and the volume of the plating bath 

estimated to be one cubic inch, or 16 ml. This report documents how small bubbles, nominally 

1 mm in diameter, were used to induce turbulence into the bath and achieve mixing. NIOSH 

finds this to be a plausible mechanism for creating and maximizing airborne radioactive material 

concentration in the air surrounding the plating bath. 

The bounding dose scenario applied in this white paper is the calculation method shown below, 

derived from an U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) publication that estimates the 

solute emissions from aeration and electrical energy used in electroplating tanks or cells

(http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/ch12/final/c12s20.pdf). Equation (1) in the EPA model can 

be used to predict uncontrolled emissions (EFm) of nickel from electroplating tanks in units of 

grains/dscf (grains per dry standard cubic foot). Equation (4) uses the amount of air that was 

used to induce turbulence in the ORNL plating cell. It is estimated that 600 one-millimeter 

diameter bubbles per minute for 60 minutes created a volume of 38 milliliters of air through the 

plating solution during plating. It is important to note the instruction at the bottom of Equation 

(4) indicating that the E2 emissions are calculated in per volume units of aeration air. The 

emissions from the NIOSH calculation are therefore normalized to the volume (38 ml) of 

aeration air through the ORNL plating cells shown in Figures 1 and 2. 

Page 16 of 28

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

Figure 1: ORNL Plating System

Note that the operation occurred in a hot cell, probably due to the airborne activity release during 

the process.

Figure 2: Detailed Drawing of ORNL Plating Cell

Assuming the copper coupon is one inch wide, NIOSH estimates the volume of the plating 

solution as 16 ml.

Page 17 of 28

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with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

Equation (4) from the EPA equations (see Figure 3) was evaluated using an Excel spreadsheet 

with the following specific parameters and other general conversions factors:

Calculation of the constant “a” in Equation (4) below:

• Constant = 0.072

• Rb (in) = 0.02

• Sigma (lb-ft) = 4.96E-03

• a = 5.81E-03

Other constants used in calculations:

• ICRP breathing rate (m3/hr) =1.2

• Volume of air breathed in one hour (ml) =1.20E+06

• Ni-63 DAC (μCi/ml) = 1.0E-06

• Duration of one plating operation (hr) = 1

• Number of plating operations in one year = 100

• Volume of air aerated through the plating solution during one hour of plating (ml) =38

Calculation of E2 in Equation (4):

• Constant = 1.9

• Calculation of coefficient in front of large square brackets = 4.71E-01

• E2 (grains/ft3) = 3.61E-02

• E2 (mg/m3) = 8.38E+01

E2 normalized to the volume of air aerated through the plating solution during one hour of 

operation (mg/m3) = 1.12E-01

Calculation of activity in normalized E2:

• Specific activity of Ni-63 (mCi/mg) = 5.67E+01

• Activity of 1.12E-01 mg/m3 of Ni-63 into 75 m3 of room air (μCi/ml) = 8.49E-11

• Room air concentration in DAC = 8.49E-5

• Activity breathed during one plating operation (μCi) = 1.02E-04

• Activity breathed after 100 platings per year as an annual intake (μCi) = 1.02E-02

• Annual intake rate (DAC-hr) = 8.49E-3

Page 18 of 28

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

Emissions from plating operations other than chromium electroplating can be estimated using

emission factors and operating parameters for chromium electroplating. Equation (1) below

provides an estimate of uncontrolled emissions from non-chromium plating tanks from 

energy used to perform plating.

EFm = 3.3 x 10-7 x (EEm/em) x Cm x Dm Equation (1)

Where:

• EFm = Emission factor for metal "m" in grains/dscf

• EEm = Electrochemical equivalent for metal "m", A-hr/mil-ft2 = 19.2

• em = Cathode efficiency for metal "m", percent = 50%

• Cm = Bath concentration for metal "m", oz/gal = 2.34E-01

• Dm = Current density for metal "m", A/ft2 = 2.55.

The above inputs lead to the following result:

EFm = 7.56E-06 grains/dscf

The air concentrations produced by the two process methods and models can now be compared: 

• EFm = 7.56E-06 grains/dscf ≡ 7.56E-06 grains/ft3 [emission value from electrical energy 

input using Equation (1)]

• E2 = 3.61E-02 grains/ft3 [emission value from air sparging/bubbling [using Equation (4)]

These air concentrations show that the E2 concentration is approximately 5000 times larger than

the EFm concentration. This means that the E2 method air concentration would produce 5000 

times the exposure to workers than the other model. It would be more claimant-favorable to use 

the higher air concentration to calculate worker exposures. Although the E2 value is several 

thousand times larger than the annual exposure (2.83E-02 DAC-hr/yr), the dose consequences of 

this air concentration are very small. Thus, the Ni-63 plating process employed at KCP

represented a very insignificant source of exposure to workers.

Page 19 of 28

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Figure 3: Calculation of the Emission Factor from Air Sparging/Bubbling

Page 20 of 28

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Ni-63 Internal Dose Bounding Scenario

The bounding dose to workers involves the potential inhalation of Ni-63 from a micro-aerosol 

that can be created in the laboratory room from aeration of the plating solution. It is assumed 

that the plating shop where the work occurred operated without ventilation. This assumption is 

very favorable to the claimant.

It is assumed that the plating bath was stirred using a bubbler, as shown in Figure 2. Bursting 

hemispherical bubbles at the surface of the plating solution provide the mechanism for the 

generation of aerosolized droplets of Ni-63, as illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. 

Picture adapted from Sergio Blanco http://pixelado08.deviantart.com/art/water-bubble-drop-183430991

Figure 4: Photo of Bubble Bursting from Water Surface and Ejecting Droplets from the Surface

Page 21 of 28

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Photos from Nature Communications 2, Article number 367 doi:10.1038/ncomms 1369, 

http://www.nature.com/ncomms/journal/v2/n6/fig_tab/ncomms1369_F2.html

Figure 5: Photographic Sequence Showing Small Bubble Formation and Droplet Ejection

For a bounding scenario, it is assumed that the radioactivity is uniformly mixed into the air of a 

5 m x 5 m room with a 3 m ceiling height (75 m3 volume) that is occupied by the worker who is 

breathing at the standard ICRP 66 occupational breathing rate of 1.2 m3/hour. To be claimantfavorable, it is assumed that neither local exhaust ventilation nor room exhaust ventilation 

reduces the air concentration. 

When 6.37E-03 μCi of Ni-63 is diluted into this air volume, the airborne activity concentration is

8.49E-11 μCi/ml. The Derived Air Concentration (DAC) for Ni-63 is 1.0E-6 μCi/ml. The air 

concentration predicted during a plating operation is 8.49E-5 times the Ni-63 DAC.

During the 60-minute plating operation, it is estimated that the worker will inhale 1.02E-01 nCi, 

which is equivalent to 3.8 Bq. Assuming this operation occurred 100 times each year, the annual 

intake rate would be 377 Bq. This is equivalent to an annual exposure of 8.49E-3 DAC-hr, and a 

dose of 2.1E-2 mrem/year. 

Page 22 of 28

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

Ni-63 External Dose Bounding Scenario 

Figure 6 is derived from data in Radiological Toolbox. The average beta energy is 17.4 keV and 

the maximum beta energy is 66.9 keV. The half-life of Ni-63 is 100.1 years. 

Figure 6: Ni-63 Exposure Rate vs Beta Energy

Page 23 of 28

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The Katz-Penfold equation predicts the range of an electron in units of g/cm2. For electron 

energy below 0.1 MeV, Equation 5 applies. (http://holbert.faculty.asu.edu/eee460/IonizationRange.pdf)

Equation (5) 

Using this equation and the maximum beta energy emitted by Ni-63 (0.0669 MeV) gives a range 

of 0.0067 g/cm2

. This value can be divided by the ICRP soft tissue density of 1.060 g/cm3 to 

calculate that the range of the maximum energy beta in soft tissue is 63 μm. Since the maximum 

energy beta cannot reach to depth of 70 μm, where skin dose is calculated, no external dose from 

a Ni-63 source can occur. 

TRITIUM AND NICKEL-63 BOUNDING CONCLUSIONS 

KCP SEC Issue #20 reflects the Working Group’s desire to better understand tritium operations 

and worker exposures. This paper provides details to respond to Issue #20 and provides 

additional details to address associated Ni-63 operations. 

• Tritium Bounding Scenario for HI-LO Switch Plate Handling: A worker’s skin is 

contaminated with 1690 Bq of organically bound tritium (OBT) each workday. This 

bounding intake rate would have been chronic through the year (250 workdays). Using the 

OBT ICRP 68 dose conversion factor of 4.19E-9 rem/Bq, the worker’s dose would be 1.77 

mrem/year.

• Tritium Bounding Scenario for Tritium Monitor Manufacturing: The chemistry technician’s 

skin is contaminated with 3.7E+06 Bq of tritiated water on an annual basis. This activity 

would be completely absorbed as tritiated water through the skin and into the blood stream. 

Using the tritiated-water ICRP 68 dose conversion factor of 1.8E-9 rem/Bq, the technician’s 

dose would be 6.66 mrem/year. 

• Nickel-63 Bounding Scenario: The annual intake rates to workers assigned to plating shop 

operations were 377 Bq, which amounts to a dose of 2.1E-2 mrem/year. The external 

exposure associated with any operation involving Ni-63 is zero because the range of emitted 

radiation is less than the depth of sensitive tissues in skin. 

Page 24 of 28

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White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

Considering the information regarding KCP operations documented here, the contamination 

conditions, and the potential for exposures discovered thus far, it is concluded that exposures to 

workers from tritium and Ni-63 can be bounded.

Page 25 of 28

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REFERENCES

SRDB 77532: Operation Dominic, April-November 1962

SRDB 128438, PDF pp. 2-4: Correspondence Regarding Tritium for Luminous Devices 

(October 14, 1968)

SRDB 128438, PDF pp. 57-67: USAEC Radiation Safety Evaluation of Tritium-Activated Dials 

in Luminous Watches and Clocks (June 14, 1960)

SRDB 128439, PDF p. 2: Correspondence Regarding Inspection of Hi-Lo Switch Plates in 

Department 212 (May 27, 1966)

SRDB 128439, PDF p. 3: Correspondence Regarding Health and Safety Procedure for Handing 

Tritium Luminous Compound 115 GT (May 27, 1966)

SRDB 128439, PDF pp. 4-9: Report on Trip to U.S. Radium Corp., Bloomsburg, Pa. February 

10, 1966 

SRDB 128975, PDF p. 8: Experimental Section of Plating Ni-63 on Copper Coupons, 

ORNL/TM-10989, 1989 Describing the Size of the Plated Area

SRDB 128975, PDF p. 10: Figure 1 of the ORNL Electroplating Assembly from ORNL/TM10989

SRDB 128975, PDF p. 18: Figure 4 of the ORNL Electroplating Setup in the Hot Cell from 

ORNL/TM-10989

SRDB 128975, PDF p. 16: Description of the Optimum Concentration of the Ni-63 Plating 

Solution

SRDB 128975, PDF pp. 15, 20: Tables 1 and 2 Show Experimental Plating Time on Coupons

SRDB 137063: Correspondence regarding Hi-Lo Switch Plates, CF 1831 Cable Assembly 

(November 19, 1965)

SRDB 137065: Various Documentation Regarding Tritium Handling and Monitoring

SRDB 137154, PDF pp. 2-3: Correspondence Regarding Hi-Lo Switch Plates (November 6, 

1968)

Page 26 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

SRDB 137154, PDF p. 7, Correspondence Regarding MC 1831 Cable Assembly (Hi-Lo Plates, 

Tritiated Phosphor) (May 27, 1965)

SRDB 137154, PDF pp. 5-6: Shipping Documents for Thirty Hi-Lo Plates to Seneca Army Depot

on June 26, 1967

SRDB 137154, PDF p. 8: Correspondence Regarding Tritiated Phosphor (April 16, 1964)

SRDB 137154, PDF p. 9: Correspondence Regarding Hi-Lo Switch Plates (July 1, 1965) 

SRDB 137154, PDF p. 10: Correspondence Regarding Tritium Filled Self-Luminous Switch 

Plate for Assembly CF-1831

SRDB 137154, PDF p. 11: Correspondence Regarding Identification Plate, Cable Assembly 

(May 26, 1965)

SRDB 137154, PDF pp. 12-15: Correspondence Regarding Tritium Filled Self-Luminous Plate 

(May 18, 1965) 

SRDB 137154, PDF p. 16: Correspondence Regarding Industrial Hygiene Handling Procedure 

(February 8, 1963)

SRDB 137183: Instrumentation for Environmental Monitoring: Tritium in Air Monitor and 

Tritium Urinalysis Monitor

SRDB 137822: Tritium Activity, Monitoring, Personnel Protection, and Decontamination

SRDB 137860: Weekly Activities at The Bendix Corporation, Kansas City Division, May 28, 

1964-November 15, 1964

SRDB 138151: Purchase Orders of Radioactive Material from Kansas City to Bendix 

Corporation, 1967-1970

SRDB 138154: Correspondence Regarding Handling Nickel 63 (NI-63) Solutions (August 31, 

1970)

SRDB 138155, PDF p. 2: Preliminary Proposal and Request for Engineering and Construction 

Directive for the Finishes Development Facility

Page 27 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.
White Paper: Tritium and Nickel-63 at the Kansas City Plant

SRDB 138155, PDF p. 3: Correspondence on the Shutdown and Upgrade Plans of the Aluminum 

Plating Activities at KCP

SRDB 138155, PDF p. 5: Correspondence to Restart the KCP Aluminum Plating Activities After 

Safety Corrections Implemented

SRDB 138157: Telecon for T446 (May 5 and 8, 1967)

SRDB 138159: Telecon for T446 (May 11 and 12, 1967)

SRDB 138160: Aluminum Plating Map

SRDB 138161, PDF p. 3: Preliminary Proposal and Request for Finishes Development Facility

SRDB 138161, PDF p. 7: Preliminary Proposal and Request for Finishes Development Facility, 

Section C, number of Operating Personnel

SRDB 138163: Correspondence Regarding Health and Safety Procedure for Handling Nickel-63

Plating Solutions and Parts (September 29, 1970)

SRDB 138164: Radioactive Solid Waste Disposal Record Forms and Radioactive Material 

Packing Information for May and June 1984

SRDB 138164, PDF p. 4: Radioactive Waste Packaging Information Form with Nominal Activity 

on a Ni-63 Coupon Being Disposed

SRDB 141145: U.S. Patent for Tritiated Phosphor Used on the Hi-Lo Switches

Page 28 of 28

This working document was prepared by NIOSH’s Division of Compensation Analysis and Support (DCAS) or its contractor for use in discussions 

with the ABRWH or its Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This document represents preliminary 

positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor. NOTICE: This report has been reviewed to identify and redact any 

information that is protected by the Privacy Act 5 USC §552a and has been cleared for distribution.