Draft 

MASTER INTERVIEW SUMMARY 

FOR THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE CONSTRUCTION TRADES 

WORKERS SPECIAL EXPOSURE COHORT REVIEW

Contract No. 200-2009-28555

Revision 1 

Prepared by 

Kathryn Robertson-DeMers and Lynn Ayers 

S. Cohen & Associates 

1608 Spring Hill Road, Suite 400 

Vienna, Virginia 22182 

Saliant, Inc. 

5579 Catholic Church Road 

Jefferson, Maryland 21755

April 2012 

Disclaimer 

This document is made available in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Advisory Board on 

Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH) to maintain all possible openness in its deliberations. However, 

the ABRWH and its contractor, SC&A, caution the reader that at the time of its release, this report is predecisional and has not been reviewed by the Board for factual accuracy or applicability within the 

requirements of 42 CFR 82. This implies that once reviewed by the ABRWH, the Board’s position may 

differ from the report’s conclusions. Thus, the reader should be cautioned that this report is for 

information only and that premature interpretations regarding its conclusions are unwarranted.
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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Document No. 

Revised SRS Master Interview Summary 

Effective Date: 

Draft – April 04, 2012 

S. Cohen & Associates: 

Technical Support for the Advisory Board on 

Radiation & Worker Health Review of 

NIOSH Dose Reconstruction Program Revision No. 

1 (Draft) 

MASTER INTERVIEW SUMMARY FOR 

THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE 

CONSTRUCTION TRADES WORKERS 

SPECIAL EXPOSURE COHORT REVIEW 

Page 2 of 66 

Task Manager: 

________________________ Date: ___________ 

Arjun Makhijani 

Supersedes: 

 Rev. 0 

Project Manager: 

________________________ Date: ___________ 

John Stiver, MS, CHP 

Reviewer: 

 Arjun Makhijani 

Record of Revisions 

Revision 

Number Effective Date Description of Revision 

0 (Draft) 01/14/2011 Initially issued as Attachment A of Incident Records at Savannah River Site: 

Discussion of the Special Exposure Cohort Issue Number 12 Related to 

Incidents, SC&A, January 14, 2011. 

1 (Draft) 04/04/2012 Issued as a standalone document, with the addition of notes from interviews 

conducted in August and September 2010 and an Addendum documenting 

observations noted by the site in January 2012. 
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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Acronyms and Abbreviations ..........................................................................................................5 

Introduction......................................................................................................................................9 

Construction, Maintenance, and Construction Trades...................................................................12 

Work Logistics...............................................................................................................................16 

Worker Status.................................................................................................................................17 

Site Operations...............................................................................................................................18 

Tritium Operations At The Tritium Facilities................................................................................20 

Tritium Research and Development ..............................................................................................24 

Zirconium and Zirconium Compounds..............................................................................26 

Palladium and Palladium Compounds...............................................................................27 

Lanthanum Nickel Aluminum ...........................................................................................27 

Other Tritium Compounds.................................................................................................28 

Tritium Focus Group......................................................................................................................29 

Radiological Control......................................................................................................................30 

Radiological Hazards and Controls ...................................................................................31 

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) ...............................................................................33 

Egress.................................................................................................................................34 

Alarms................................................................................................................................34 

Training..............................................................................................................................35 

Environmental/Waste Management...................................................................................35 

Tritium Facilities Radiological Controls ...........................................................................36 

Tritium Facilities Radiological Hazards and Controls.......................................................36 

Tritium Diffusion/Permeation............................................................................................38 

Tritium Facilities Administrative Controls........................................................................39 

Tritium Facility Surveillances............................................................................................40 

Tritium Facilities Personal Protective Equipment .............................................................41 

External Monitoring.......................................................................................................................41 

Internal Monitoring........................................................................................................................43 

Tritium Internal Dosimetry................................................................................................44 

Solubility............................................................................................................................45 

Dose ...................................................................................................................................46 

Tritium Dose ......................................................................................................................46 

Incidents and Accidents.................................................................................................................46 
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NOTICE:

Tritium Incidents................................................................................................................51 

Databanks and Database ....................................................................................................51 

Medical ..........................................................................................................................................54 

Radiological and Medical Records................................................................................................54 

SEC Petition and EEOICPA Process Comments...........................................................................56 

Worker Outreach............................................................................................................................57 

CPWR Comments..........................................................................................................................58 

SEC Evaluation Report Comments on Specific Passages .............................................................61 

Miscellaneous ................................................................................................................................61 

Recommended References.................................................................................................62 

References......................................................................................................................................63 

Addendum......................................................................................................................................64 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

Advisory Board Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health 

atm atmosphere 

AVLIS Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation 

BSRC Bechtel Savannah River Company 

BTC Building Trades Council 

CAM Continuous Air Monitor 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

cm2 Centimeters squared 

CNN Cable News Network 

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 

CPWR Center for the Protection of Worker Rights 

CTS Central Transfer Station 

CTW Construction Trades Worker 

D&D Decontamination and Decommissioning 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOL Department of Labor 

DWPF Defense Waste Processing Facility 

dpm Disintegrations per minute 

E&I Electrical and Instrument 

EEOICPA Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 

EPD Electronic Personal Dosimeter 

ER Evaluation Report 

ES&H Environmental Safety and Health 

ETF Effluent Treatment Facility 

FOIA Freedom of Information Act 

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

HP Health Physicist or Health Physics 

HPAREH Health Physics Annual Radiation Exposure History 

HSV Hydride Storage Vessel 

HT Hydrogen-tritium 
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HTO Tritiated Water 

HTV Hydride Transport Vessel 

ICRP International Commission on Radiation Protection 

ITP In-Tank Precipitation 

KCP Kansas City Plant 

LaNiAl Lanthanum-Nickel-Aluminum 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LLC Limited Lifetime Component 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

LLW Low-level waste 

LSC Liquid Scintillation Counter 

μ micro/micron 

μCi microcurie 

μCi/cc microcurie per cubic centimeter 

MOX Mixed Oxide 

mrem millirem 

MTF Material Test Facility 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NNSA National Nuclear Safety Administration 

NRF Naval Reactor Fuels 

O&M Operations and Maintenance 

OBT Organically Bound Tritium 

OGM Open Glovebox Maintenance 

ORAUT Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team 

PAAA Price Anderson Amendment Act 

PAS Personal Air Sampler 

PCM Personnel Contamination Monitor 

PDRD Plant Directed Research and Development 

PdT Palladium Tritide 

PIC Personal Ionization Chamber 

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
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PPE Personal Protective Equipment 

psi Pounds per square inch 

PTFE Polytetrafluoroethylene 

PuF4 Plutonium tetrafluoride 

QA Quality Assurance 

R Roentgen 

R&D Research and Development 

RadCon Radiological Control 

RBA Radiation Buffer Area 

RCO Radiological Control Operations 

RCT Radiological Control Technician 

RDZ Radiation Danger Zone 

rem roentgen equivalent man 

RMA Radioactive Material Area 

RMCU Radiological Material Containment Unit 

RSLS Radiation Survey Log Sheet 

RSO Reservoir Surveillance Operations 

RTF Replacement Tritium Facility 

RW Radiation Worker 

RWP Radiation Work Permit 

SAR Safety Analysis Report 

SC&A S. Cohen and Associates (SC&A, Inc.) 

SEC Special Exposure Cohort 

SEM Scanning Electron Microscope 

SLT Stockpile Laboratory Test 

SMT Stable Metal Tritide 

SNL Sandia National Laboratory 

SRNL Savannah River National Laboratory 

SRNS Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC 

SRP Savannah River Plant 

SRS Savannah River Site 

STC Special Tritium Compound 
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NOTICE:

SWPF Salt Waste Processing Facility 

T2 Tritium gas 

T&T Transportation and Traffic 

TA Technical Area 

TAM Tritium Air Monitor 

TBD Technical Basis Document 

TCAP Thermal Cycling Absorption Process 

TCE Trichloroethylene 

TFG Tritium Focus Group 

TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter 

TORC Tritium Operations Review Committee 

TPBARS Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods 

TRU Transuranic 

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

WSMS Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions 
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INTRODUCTION 

As a technical support contractor supporting the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health (Advisory Board), S. Cohen & Associates (SC&A) has been tasked with reviewing 

NIOSH’s Evaluation Report on the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) Petition for Savannah River 

Site (SRS) construction trades workers (CTWs). One component of SC&A’s review is a series 

of interviews with site experts, including current and former site workers, petitioners, and worker 

representatives. The purpose of these interviews was to hear first-hand accounts of past 

radiological control and personnel monitoring practices, and to better understand how operations 

and safety programs were implemented at the site over time. In the case of SC&A’s independent 

interviews, participants were identified through available site reports, public meeting transcripts, 

local advocates, and other interviewees. The interviews conducted in August/September 2010 

were organized by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team (ORAUT); the participants were selected by NIOSH. 

This report summarizes the results of site expert-approved interviews. 

SC&A personnel conducted several sets of interviews in conjunction with the CTW SEC petition 

evaluation report review. 

 January 25, 2009 – Columbia, South Carolina [Kathryn Robertson-DeMers (SC&A)] 

 January 26, 2009 – January 28, 2009, Augusta, Georgia, with one participant via phone 

(SC&A staff members Arjun Makhijani, Harry Pettengill, Kathryn Robertson-DeMers, 

and Abe Zeitoun) 

 July 9, 2009 – Telephone Interview with a former worker (Kathryn Robertson-DeMers) 

 August 18, 2009 – Savannah River Site (Kathryn Robertson-DeMers) – Classified 

 August 31, 2010 – September 2, 2010, Savannah River Site, (Kathryn Robertson-DeMers 

and NIOSH staff members Brad Clawson, Phil Schofield, Tim Taulbee, and Mel Chew) – 

Classified 

 September 9, 2010 – Telephone Interview with a former worker (SC&A staff members 

Kathryn Robertson-DeMers and Lynn Ayers) 

Interviews conducted in January 2009 were attended by Brad Clawson. Interviews conducted in 

August/September 2010 were attended by Brad Clawson and Phil Schofield. A total of 42 site 

experts participated in these interviews. 

The workers whose interviews are summarized below represent the time period from 1952 

through the present (i.e., July 8, 2011). They collectively worked in the 100, 200, 300/700, and 

400 Areas, TNX, and at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Several individuals' 

responsibilities took them throughout the site. Interviewees participated in new construction, 

maintenance and repair, demolition, remodeling activities, production, and Research and 

Development (R&D). Some participants have assisted other workers with medical issues, 
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claims, and/or petitions. The work categories collectively represented by the interviewees 

include the following: 

 Administration 

 Construction Engineering 

 Construction Maintenance and Crafts (Electrical, Iron Work, Boilermaking, Pipefitting, 

Supervision, etc.) 

 Crane Operations 

 Decontamination and Process Operations 

 Department of Energy (DOE) Oversight 

 External Dosimetry 

 Facility Evaluation Board 

 Foreman/Supervisor 

 Hydrogen Energy 

 Hydrogen Processing 

 Internal Dosimetry 

 Laboratory Technical Support 

 Materials Accountability 

 Mechanical Systems 

 Metal Hydride Technology 

 Process Engineering 

 Project Management 

 Quality Control Inspection 

 Quality Control Engineering 

 Radiological Control Management 

 Radiological Control (RadCon) Operations 

 Radiological Training 

 Research & Development 

 Reservoir Surveillance 

 Respiratory Protection 

 Risk Analysis/Risk Assessment 

 Rotovator Operations 

 Separations Technology 

 Solid Waste 

 Tank Farm Operations 

 Transportation 

 Tritium Operations/Programs 

 Tritium Processing 

 Union Representation 

 Weapons Technology 

Workers were briefed on the background of the Energy Employee Occupational Illness and 

Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) dose reconstruction and SEC programs, and the purpose 

of the interviews. For NIOSH/ORAUT-sponsored interviews, the introduction was presented by 
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NIOSH. For SC&A-led interviews, the workers were asked to supply names and contact 

information in case there were follow-up questions. 

Onsite interviews were conducted in a secure location, with subsequent submittal of interview 

notes for classification review. Offsite interviewees were directed not to disclose classified 

information, and interviewees were reminded that all interview notes would be reviewed for 

classification. For classified interviews, interview summaries and interviewee-provided 

comments were submitted for an additional review by the SRS classification office. This 

interview summary does not reflect information redacted from interview notes by DOE. 

Individuals interviewed were offered the opportunity to review their individual interview 

summaries for accuracy and completeness. This is an important safeguard against missing key 

issues or misinterpreting some vital piece of information. Approximately 20% of the participants 

did not respond to the request for review; the information obtained from non-responders has been 

withheld from this master summary. 

The information provided by the workers and site experts is invaluable in helping SC&A to 

better understand the operations at SRS. This summary report is not a verbatim presentation of 

the material contained in the interview notes, nor is it a statement of SC&A findings or 

opinions—it is a consolidated summary of statements, opinions, observations, and comments that 

the interviewees communicated to SC&A. The sole intent of this summary is to communicate to 

the SRS Work Group, the Advisory Board, and other interested parties information acquired by 

SC&A during these interviews. Comments are included in brackets where SC&A has provided 

clarification on a statement. 

Information provided by the interviewees is based entirely on their personal experience at SRS. 

The site experts’ recollections and statements may need to be further substantiated; however, 

they stand as critical operational feedback and reality reference checks. These interview 

summaries are provided in that context. Key issues raised by site experts are similarly reflected 

in our review discussions, either directly or indirectly. Interviews from all workers who 

reviewed and approved their individual interview summaries were consolidated into a single 

summary document. The information has been categorized into topical areas: Construction, 

Maintenance, and Construction Trades; Work Logistics; Worker Status; Site Operations; 

Tritium Operations at the Tritium Facilities; Tritium Research and Development; Tritium Focus 

Group; Radiological Control; External Monitoring; Internal Monitoring; Incidents and 

Accidents; Medical; Radiological and Medical Records; SEC Petition and EEOICPA Process 

Comments; Worker Outreach; CPWR Comments; SEC Evaluation Report Comments of Specific 

Passages; and Miscellaneous comments. Where conflicting observations and statements have 

been received, both perspectives have been retained in this summary report. 

With the preceding qualifications in mind, this summary has contributed to SC&A’s 

understanding of issues raised in the petition review report. 
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CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES 

[The interviewees involved with the construction and maintenance, collectively, provided a 

description of the maintenance structure at SRS, a description of job responsibilities of CTWs 

and DuPont Construction, areas of the site where jobs were performed, and examples of CTW 

tasks.] 

[There were two maintenance organizations supporting SRS: in-house personnel employed by 

SRS and the CTWs.] 

 

DuPont Construction hired carpenters, laborers, iron workers, and painters through the unions. 

Miller Dunn Electric, B.F. Shaw, J.A. Jones, M.K. Ferguson, and Norton Brothers were 

subcontractors to DuPont Construction. In more recent years, Bechtel Savannah River Company 

has brought in CTWs. When there were not enough in-house maintenance workers, they called 

in CTWs. SRS had in-house maintenance crews in every building who were primarily 

responsible for maintaining existing equipment. They did everything that could be done. CTWs 

filled in when they did not have enough people, or when heavy equipment was involved. If an 

in-house foreman could not get a maintenance crew, he would bring in CTWs to get the job 

done. A Construction Liaison served as a go-between. For example, say a foreman wanted to 

pull filters on Tank 33. The foreman would ask the Construction Liaison for resources. The 

Construction Liaison did the paperwork. Once he had the funds assigned, then he and the 

foreman worked together to get the job done, like changing the filter and taking [the old one] to 

the burial ground. There was a lot of overlap in job descriptions. For example, painters were 

available in-house and through the construction trades. 

At SRS, the only union workers were the CTWs. The production workers were not part of a 

union at SRS and did not have a voice like a union did. DOE does not have anyone to oversee 

former workers’ concerns. 

When there was new construction, it was the responsibility of CTWs. When it came to new 

equipment or if bigger cranes were needed, then CTWs would be involved. Some of the big 

radiation jobs at SRS would be done by CTWs. New equipment does not mean clean. It could 

be highly radioactive work, unless they were building something new. They might be taking out 

a contaminated gang valve and installing a new one, or installing an automatic gang valve in 

place of a manual valve. CTWs were in radiological areas on a daily basis. 

While those involved in production work were employed by SRS, no construction worker is 

hired full time. Construction workers go out with the belief that they will be there for a short 

period of time. Some people went to SRS and stayed out there for many years. Some went in 

and out like a swinging door. Some interviewees worked on specific projects for several months 

to a year or two. Most people have been laid off at some time. It was the luck of the draw, and 

if someone got into supervision, then that person would not get laid off. In lean times, 

supervisors might work with their hands and go back to supervision when there were more 

workers. 
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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

One interviewee worked at SRS for 2 years, then worked at another DOE site until the latter part 

of the following year. He came back and worked at SRS for 3 years. The interviewee worked 

on and off for a subcontractor for several years. A lot of individuals bounced between different 

DOE sites. Some have worked all over the place. It would be hard to give a percentage, but 

some move around, some do not. 

There is a $2,500 floor for federal contracting rules to kick in. Under the Davis Bacon Act, the 

prevailing wages are set by the federal government. That is designed so that the Feds should not 

undercut local wages—so federal contractors should not bring in workers from low-wage areas 

and undercut the local workforce. It is to ensure that local contractors would pay fair wages. 

But contracts under $2,500 were exempt. So SRS operations would break it down into less than 

$2,500 jobs and give it to their maintenance crew. There are rules that make Davis Bacon 

applicable. If it is building up or tearing down, then it applies. If it is routine maintenance, it is 

not Davis Bacon. 

There were about 8,000 people at SRS in 1982. There were a lot of people at SRS from 1983 to 

1990, and then they started to have major layoffs and voluntary retirements. Construction trades 

experienced a peak employment period when they were working on DWPF [Defense Waste 

Processing Facility] and reworking the reactors at the same time. At that time, the electricians 

alone numbered over 1,000. 

[CTWs interviewed described the work responsibilities of various crafts.] 

 Iron Workers were part of the construction trades, working through the union. They 

worked with heavy metals—anything heavier than sheet metal would be handled by the 

Iron Workers. Iron Workers at SRS did mainly maintenance work. In the early 1990s, 

they would remove the lead shielding from in front of the cabinets (i.e., gloveboxes or 

fume hoods), modify the handles and whatever was supporting the shielding, and go back 

in to install the shielding, so operators could come back and use the gloveboxes. In the 

100 Areas, Iron Workers were involved in installing and removing heat exchangers from 

the minus 20 (-20) level, butting out concrete, installing rebar and steel, welding, drilling 

holes, and so on. Iron Workers were also involved in constructing new buildings. 

 Boilermakers were tradesmen who worked on heat exchangers and other metal 

components with water inside. In the 1980s, Boilermakers and Iron Workers worked 

together on removal, refurbishment, repair, and re-installation of reactor heat exchangers. 

 Electricians did all sorts of jobs, like installing conduit, conduit supports, cables, 

terminations, installation of temporary lighting, instrumentation and motor change-outs, 

and electrical equipment. They worked in stainless steel hoods with glove ports in 

B-line, including dismantling and removing the gloveboxes. Supervision may be 

involved in going out and pre-scoping jobs, laying out work for the electricians, 

conducting walk downs, and safety inspections. In the early 1990s, electricians were 

working with the safeguards and security group at the reactors to install security alarms. 

They were redoing all the reactors at the time; one superintendent had about 100 

electricians working the job. 
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 Heavy Equipment Operations operated cranes, elevators, and sometimes other equipment 

like forklifts. Crane operators commonly worked in radiologically controlled areas, 

including tank farms, separations, and tritium areas. Cranes were used in various areas, 

including the separations area and the S Area. They worked in the F Area, working the 

elevator inside the separations buildings. They ran overhead cranes in the S Area. They 

were responsible for running overhead cranes. Crane operators used 1400s, Grove 

Cranes, and Cherry Pickers. A Class A crane operator can run all sizes and types of 

cranes. An operator test was required to qualify for Class A. There was also equipment 

in the Naval Reactor Fuels (NRF) building. This was a mockup building where they did 

the jumpers. There was also work with stainless steel and welding. 

 A Quality Control Inspector did quality assurance/quality control inspections of electrical 

construction and equipment. An inspector went everywhere the electricians went. 

A job steward had responsibility for a particular craft’s workers across the whole site. One job 

steward had as many as 1,100 electricians at SRS at one time. A steward covered the whole site. 

If a person needed to talk to the job steward, he had to go to them. A job steward was in every 

area, sometimes 8 or 10 times a day. He was in the Central Shops area a fair amount, because 

construction workers were based there. He went out from there as needed. The job steward was 

“a priest one day and a devil the next.” Sometimes he could go and take care of a personal 

problem workers may have with families, and other times he was trying to prevent someone from 

being fired. The job steward defends the contract. Sometimes workers are at fault or the 

management is at fault, so someone is going to be mad at him every time. 

Laborers were one of the craft unions. There are also production laborers, but there is no 

occupational classification for that. There are only construction laborers at SRS [as a job 

classification]. This is specific to SRS; it may be different at other sites. 

[Examples of locations where CTWs were involved in work included:] 

 Burial Grounds 

 Central Shops 

 Reactor buildings (C, L, K, P, R) 

 F and H Canyons 

 F Tank Farms 

 H Tank Farms 

 Tritium facilities in H Area 

 Mock-up facility (~1980) 

 Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) 

 Naval Reactor Fuels 

 M-Area Waste Plant 

 Maintenance shops 

[Interviewees provided many examples of the specific job activities CTWs were involved in at 

SRS.] 
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Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

 Painting every pipe in the Tank Farms. 

 Electricians installed temporary lighting, including in the huts [at F Tank Farms]. They 

had explosion-proof lights that they put down in certain areas around the tanks. 

Sometimes lighting was put inside the tanks for inspection purposes. 

 Electricians worked on tank tops and changed out instrumentation and motors. They had 

to take out conduits sometimes. 

 Crews would have to work during an outage to do things before a reactor could be started 

up. They worked at the -20 and -40 levels in the 105 buildings, where pumps and other 

equipment are located. 

 In the 1980s, Iron Workers and Boilermakers removed heat exchangers from the 

100 Areas, refurbished and repaired them at the Central Shops, and returned to re-install 

them in the reactor buildings. 

 

 CTWs worked on the huge HEPA [High Efficiency Particulate Air] filter pots (i.e., 

teapots) at the tank farms. They were building the structure that went out on the tank so 

they could start emptying the tanks. 

 Crane operators ran cherry pickers up at H Area and F Area tank farms up on the Hill. 

During one job, they had to move lead shielding. They ran the crane, set jumpers, 

worked down in the cells, moved the covers off the cells, and worked with the diversion 

boxes. This was like a pumping station for high-level waste. Diversion boxes were in 

the tank farm and a crane would come in and lift the covers off. They would run a 

camera remotely from inside the crane. 

 In March 1997 through November 1997, wiremen in the M Area were involved in 

building a melter for low-level waste (LLW) to put it in a glass medallion about the size 

of a half dollar. 

 In the 200 F Area, electricians were tearing down conduit and removing asbestos. The 

workers would drill holes in asbestos-containing transite and put conduit through the 

holes. It was a demolition activity. The workers received training to remove the 

asbestos. 

 During the Waste Remediation Program, drums from the B-line were opened in 

gloveboxes, the trash was sorted, and the drums were repackaged. 

 CTWs did some large equipment removal in the older tritium facilities. They would also 

assist in the construction of containments (i.e., building huts) and the moving of large 

material. 

Workers entered normally unoccupied areas. For example, workers would go inside tanks in the 

F Areas. In areas where they moved the slurry pumps, the tank top would be open. Electricians 
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were up in the ceilings or moving around equipment where there was residue material 

everywhere. 

CTW Involvement with Tritium Operations 

There have been jobs that CTWs have been leery of. For example, they did a job down in the 

evaporator. There were unknowns, but there were controls. They don’t always like what they 

have to do. 

CTWs may work in areas where they were adjacent to radiological areas. There can be a barrier 

breach on occasion. The objective is that CTWs are treated equivalent to operations. 

At the tritium facilities, in general, the construction group followed instructions from RadCon 

technicians better than any other set of workers. They tend to ask a lot of questions. A lot of the 

in-house maintenance guys have to have their hands held. 

There is a dedicated maintenance crew for the tritium facility. 

The CTWs handle contaminated material on occasion. 

WORK LOGISTICS 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided a description of how jobs at SRS were completed with 

SRS staff and CTWs working side by side.]

Some site experts indicated that CTWs don’t work side by side with the operations personnel. 

CTWs have their work to do and operations personnel have their work to do. CTWs and 

operations may be in the same room, but not working on the same job. In the tritium facility, 

they worked more closely. 

In contrast, other site experts said CTWs worked side by side with site operations personnel on 

the same jobs. Typically, there was a mix of in-house and CTW personnel. For example, 

sometimes they had to pull out a heat exchanger weighing a hundred tons. There was a feed 

pump job on Tank 13 in H Area. The pump was about 20 ft long and 3 ft in diameter, and it sent 

high-level waste to the evaporator. It could be a rigger crane that pulled the pump, or CTWs 

could do it. There was a spill. Workers had to dig up the pavement around the tanks, with 

CTWs and operations working side by side. At other times, riggers were handling fuel rods that 

would be blue under the water. Everyone was being exposed. On a shutdown in B-line, there 

would be 100 pipefitters (construction workers) and 15 operators building huts and doing 

standby (assistance) for Construction. Site operators got to know the construction workers pretty 

well, because they worked as a team. 

Production workers in a given area stayed there. But this was not the case with maintenance 

workers, who went everywhere. There were mobile maintenance crews (e.g., painters) on the 

SRS site that would go to any area as needed. In the 100 Area, there was an operations crane 
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crew. When any reactor went down, the crew went there to provide services. There were also 

CTWs working there at the same time. 

Maintenance [in-house and CTWs] worked site wide out of the Central Shops in the early 1970s. 

Workers from the Central Maintenance Shops were assigned to various areas. They retrieved 

equipment from the field and brought it back to the Central Shops. They went to a lot of the 

areas to retrieve equipment, such as welding machines. CTWs worked in the same area while 

production was going on. A lot of times, the operations people did not have the skills to do their 

jobs. As a result, CTWs would be straightening out their mess. 

DuPont Construction also employed non-construction workers (e.g., administrative and payroll 

staff), whose job responsibilities took the workers all over the site, including entering 

radiological areas. Individuals based out of the SRNL went from one area to another to do 

inventories of nuclear material. At least two workers were present when they went out to do 

these inventories. 

WORKER STATUS 

[The interviewees representing the CTWs, collectively, provided a description of the attitude 

toward CTWs at SRS.] 

Interviewees indicated that the CTWs were treated as second-class citizens and that CTWs were 

called in particularly when they had nasty work to be done. This included some low-cost jobs 

normally done by in-house personnel. Even in recent years, interviewees reported not being 

treated the same as Bechtel workers. In fact, in places that were very hot, CTWs were often sent 

there because operations people did not want to go. If the in-house foreman had two jobs to be 

done, he would give the nastier job to the CTWs. These jobs were not just radiation work, but 

included working in suits, at high or low temperatures, or working at heights. They did not call 

the union hall just to get people to do the dirty work, but they used CTWs already on the site. 

They would use them for the nasty job and send them back to the same place they were before. 

Construction workers were eager, because they needed the work and wanted to get paid. 

Whatever CTWs needed to do, they did it when the supervisor asked them to. The production 

side was cherry-picking the work. Production workers got their share of nasty jobs, but they 

gave a lot away to CTWs. Production workers were also asked to help CTWs on overtime jobs. 

[Interviewees gave examples of how construction workers were treated.] Production workers 

had their own kitchens, microwaves, luxuries of life, and cookouts. Construction workers—if 

they did not take their own food, they did not eat. Construction workers were not even allowed 

to have hot lunches. Production workers had showers and lockers. Construction workers were 

not allowed to use those; they had to take the muck home. They could not use bathrooms, but 

had to use porta-potties. They were always in the farthest parking lots. They would have to step 

aside for operations people to check in, and that would often make CTWs late. These details 

may seem irrelevant, but job stewards got pulled into many battles over such matters. An 

interviewee once got locked into the H Area tank farm and waited out the day (and into the 

night) in a shack. 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, there was no difference in treatment of minorities. There was a 

hierarchy in work assignments in the early years. This is the South. Older black gentlemen were 

put where they should not have been. For example, a maintenance supervisor assigned some 

uneducated black gentlemen (a plant painting crew) to paint a contaminated gang valve corridor 

in F Canyon. They wanted to decon it so the Plant Manager could walk there in his street 

clothes. The workers chipped, chiseled, and filed anything contaminated. They rolled the whole 

gang valve corridor, everywhere they thought the Plant Manager would be going. 

There were no minorities in the locals until the 1970s, and then they were let in. So there was no 

discrimination from that point on. Prior to that, the only crafts that had minorities were the 

laborers and bricklayers. The CTW union made a special effort not to let discrimination happen, 

once minorities were in the union. 

SITE OPERATIONS 

[The interviewees directly employed by SRS in operations and supervision, collectively, provided 

a description of site activities they were involved with, and the interaction they had with, the 

CTWs.]

[SRS has two separations facilities.] The HB-line produced Pu-238 for the space program. The 

FB-line produced material for weapons. The materials looked different. Loading of fuel in the 

canyon was under water. They would put the fuel in the canyon and dissolve it in the dissolver. 

Other activities at the B-lines included pulling samples. The needle on the sample holder 

punctured a diaphragm, and the product would go into the “peanut.” A lot of the times, the 

sample would not pull if there was a pig in there. Workers had to open the air valve and get it to 

pull enough vacuum—that was called milking it. This was an unmentioned habit. It was a “no 

no,” because a worker’s hand was exposed to the needles with the waste in them. If workers said 

they were milking a sample, they would be fired. It had to be done, but they did not say so. 

There were a variety of jobs and skill levels within Operations; workers might get in at a lowpaying position and advance from there. One low-paying job was Laundry Truck Helper; these 

workers went to every area of the plant, loading laundry bags on and off the truck. 

Riggers were usually DuPont workers, but they were mobile. They were a part of the 

Transportation and Traffic (T&T) group. DuPont Riggers were treated similarly to the CTWs; 

they worked the whole plant. They would haul B-25 boxes (metal boxes introduced in 1983 to 

start cleaning up the plant) to fill with nuclear waste. These boxes were around 4 ft by 6 ft by 

4 ft deep. The workers would fill the boxes, stake down the metal lids, put radiation stickers on 

it after HP [Health Physics] had surveyed it, and then send the box to the burial ground. 

Operations workers at the tank farms included Control Room Operators and Field Operators. 

These were decent money jobs. Workers in the canyon loaded fuel in the canyon and dissolved 

it in the dissolver. In F Canyon, Decon and Process Operators could get radiation overtime or 

process overtime. They had to get process-qualified in order to work process overtime. When 

overtime lists came around, a lot of employees refused radiation overtime, like decon work in the 

gang valve. 
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[At the tank farms] in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was probably a 50% mix of 

production and construction workers. Construction was cleaning out the 20-series of tanks (i.e., 

Tanks 25 and 29) and cleaning out Tank 17 down in the hole. Production was digging up lines 

and running new lines. Operations did line breaks. Construction would put up its own tents. 

Construction would not break a line. They would build the hut, but operations would break the 

line. That could lead to incidents inside the hut. Most foremen who were supervisors did the 

line break. Usually they had maintenance men as well. The production foremen would drill into 

the line, but the CTWs may be on the line. 

Once a month, the supervisor received a tickler to do a required work procedure. These were 

work procedures that must be routinely done by a specified period. For example, the tickler 

would say to inspect 40-series tanks, to take delta P readings, or to take a dip sample. 

Dip samples at the tank farms were taken from an 8-in opening in the riser. The proper way to 

do it is to build a hut around the area and lay plastic down on the floor, and the operator would 

manually lift the port. The operator would take a rope with a valve and pull the dip sample out 

of the opening. The workers pulled two dip samples from every tank, and then they would walk 

from one tank to another. It was very physical work, and workers were saturated with sweat in 

their protective clothing. 

SRS did a mock-up of DWPF within a million-gallon tank. There was a new heel evaporator 

control room. The system was designed to process salt. The design was a tank within a tank. 

As it would process, the waste would go through the filters in 680-gallon tanks. Workers would 

fill them with light stuff. They would fill the tanks, and the rest went back to the bottom of the 

tank. Then they had to pull dip samples as part of the job. They pulled 1-liter samples out of 

this tank. Workers involved had low radiation [to date] and were good at working at the tanks. 

There were 12 or 20 inches of stuff at the bottom of the tanks, and the dip samples were very 

hot—as hot as it gets. One person held the sample and another cut the string. 

The ITP (In-Tank Precipitation) facility at the Tank Farms is where all of the really hot waste 

from the canyons and B-lines and the processing system in the plant is pumped into the milliongallon tanks. The material includes a mixture of all radionuclides and all chemical elements that 

come from the site. It’s the garbage disposal of the liquid waste. It is hotter than probably 

anywhere but DWPF. In the ITP facility, they evaporate the liquid off the sludge to concentrate 

it, and then they ship it over to DWPF to have glass made. Some of the tanks are very 

concentrated, with really high radiation and contamination levels. The tanks have slurry pumps, 

which are mixers to keep the material consistent throughout the tank. When they turn these off, 

the heaviest material settles to the bottom of the tank and is referred to as sludge. As it settles to 

the bottom, the liquid rises to the top, so there is a separation of levels. A measurement is taken 

of the sludge at the bottom of the tank using a several hundred foot measuring tape. To make the 

measurement, the riser plug (a concrete plug like a manhole cover) is removed. This exposes the 

tank. Operators take the measuring tape and bounce the tape, which has a bobbin, on the bottom 

until it goes slack and gives them a reading of how far down the sludge is. This allows SRS to 

determine how much sludge and how much liquid are in the tank. There is a negative pressure 

on the tanks, which is supposed to move air from the outside of the tank into the tank. 
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Shipment of nuclear material included natural and enriched uranium. There were a couple of 

plutonium shipments from the 300 Area. Tritium inventories maintained for the Manufacturing 

Building included the material, the quantity, and where the shipment was going. WIPP [Waste 

Isolation Pilot Plant] refused to accept some waste from SRS, because it had too much TRU 

[transuranic]. 

TRITIUM OPERATIONS AT THE TRITIUM FACILITIES 

[The interviewees directly involved in tritium operations and research, collectively, provided a 

description of site activities at the tritium facilities, particularly work with metal hydrides.] 

Building 232F housed the original tritium facility. The purpose of this facility was to extract 

tritium from reactor targets. Other tritium facilities include: 

 Old Extraction Facility used for separations, extraction and purification (232H) 

 Replacement Tritium Facility (RTF) or New Reservoir Facility (233H) 

 Old Reservoir Facility or Reservoir Processing (234H) 

 Small Hot Shop and inert work and characterization (238H) 

 Helium Bottling (236H) 

 Tritium Enrichment Facility (264H) 

Tritium Bed Change-Out 

The beds were installed in 1993, and the first beds were changed 10 years later. As the He-3 

grows in, it degrades the material in the bed, requiring a change-out. There are a total of four 

recovery beds, two feed beds, and two product beds (each with three vessels). SRS has taken out 

a total of 12 canisters over time. Six were completed within the last 2 years. 

The hydride material is designed so that the particulates stay in the bed and are not dispersible. 

The bed is made of stainless steel and is approximately 4 ft long. It is a pipe-within-a-pipe 

design, with a 4-in outer pipe and a 3-in inner pipe. There is a flanged connector. There are 

Mott filters (i.e., 5 micron sintered metal filters) incorporated into the design of the tritium beds. 

The beds contain seven smaller filters, rather than one large filter, to increase flow across the 

filter. These filters remain in place during the change, so the hydride material is always 

contained within the bed. There should be no potential for exposure to tritides during this job. 

The presence of HTO [tritiated water] is a concern during this process. Prior to changing a bed, 

workers heat up the beds to bake out the tritium. They run deuterium through the bed to 

isotopically exchange the tritium. Regardless, there is a heel left on the bed. Workers do 

nitrogen flushes, backfill the line with nitrogen, and lock out the line. 

To remove the beds, the entire room is turned into a hut with an airlock. A flow inside the hut is 

established. The Carpenters are responsible for building the hut, with assistance from the 

Laborers. RadCon certified the huts. Ventilation is run 24-hours before the glovebox panels are 

taken off. 
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The workers participated in a pre-job briefing and a plan of the day every day. All the 

individuals involved in the process are put in air supplied plastic suits because of the tritium offgassing, regardless of the presence of STCs [Special Tritium Compounds]. Interviewees 

participating in hands-on operations recall wearing a personal air sampler (PAS) placed under 

the plastic suit for some jobs. These workers only wear a PAS if it is required by the Radiation 

Work Permit (RWP) and it is mentioned in the pre-job briefing. 

For a bed change, the Cajon (now known by the name Swagelok VCR®) connector is loosened. 

Maintenance breaks the flange (i.e., line to the bed) and steps back to make sure they do not have 

a release of tritium. The bed connections are capped off. Capping of the vessel is done by the 

Plumbers and Steamfitters or the Boilermakers. Workers place the bed in a plastic bag or sleeve. 

These beds are usually off-gassing. The metal is completely saturated in the process, so it offgasses once it is exposed to the air. If there is not enough room in the glovebox, the lines are 

taped up initially and capped after the bed is moved. All of this is performed with the glovebox 

under normal glovebox confinement. The line break and recapping of the system is completed 

within 1 hour and is also performed prior to the glass panels being removed from the glovebox. 

To remove the bed, the glass panels on the glovebox are removed. This open glovebox work 

requires a shutdown of the processing in that particular glovebox. Under Open Glovebox 

Maintenance (OGM) conditions, there is a hut around the open glovebox windows, and workers 

are in air suits. Maintenance is performed to open a hole in the glovebox for removal of the bed. 

Workers cut off 2–4 gloves. The glass panels of the glovebox are removed and replaced with 

temporary aluminum panels to optimize the airflow velocity at the work location. There is an 

ion chamber in the glovebox that monitors the glovebox atmosphere until glass panels are 

removed, when it is taken out of service. 

CTWs are responsible for handling larger items and are responsible for removal of the beds. 

Painters remove the glass from the gloveboxes. Ironworkers remove any metal. Electricians/ 

Insulators are responsible for removing insulation and transducers. The Boilermaker is 

responsible for moving the bed, because it is considered a vessel. 

Two lift and loads are located up top. There are only a few inches available to get the bed out of 

the glovebox. The bed weighs about 600–700 pounds. Workers use a hand crank to bring the 

bed out. The bed is wrapped in B-bags one time then placed in a saddle. The Boilermaker wraps 

the bed in a clean bag after it is removed to the air lock. The RCOs [Radiological Control 

Operations workers] take smears on the bag. If the bag is hot, the bed is bagged and taped again. 

It can take up to 10 to 12 layers of plastic to contain the tritium gas. 

Installing the bed works in the reverse. The new beds are staged in the hut. Workers pick up the 

new bed and put it back in the bed location. They have to be careful not to bump into a line 

because of the sensitivity of the equipment. Pipefitters/Boilermakers bolt up the new bed. After 

the beds are changed out, there may be some piping work remaining. 

It took about a week to change out three beds. It is much slower work with all the PPE a worker 

has to wear. Wearing the plastic suit tires you out. 
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Tritium is controlled through ventilation (building and glovebox), which pulls the tritium away 

from the worker. The principal concern is HTO, but HT or T2 [hydrogen-tritium or tritium gas] 

can be present. When the beds are removed, there are Kanne chambers running. A filter on the 

Kanne chamber keeps particulates out of the chamber. RadCon can monitor the room air 

concentration from outside the room. If there is a problem, the workers are asked to leave the 

room. Some interviewees reported there were a couple of times when they were asked to leave 

the room. 

The area is decontaminated down to less than 1,000 dpm. Laborers are responsible for the 

decontamination, clean-up after insulation removal, and clean-up of plastic suits. Personnel stay 

in the prescribed PPE until the area is cleaned up. 

After an STC job, smears are conducted around the hut area with Whatman smears and counted 

in a Liquid Scintillation Counter (LSC). Any contamination is minimal compared to the offgassing of the tritium. The swipe data are available by building. The buildings of interest would 

be 234-H, 233-H, TEF, 264H and 232-H. 

All of the CTW interviewees recall collecting bioassay samples during the bed change-out. 

Bioassays were taken 90 minutes after exit from the area and were submitted each shift. These 

workers recall RCO telling them the bioassays for the bed change-out were okay. 

Weapons Program Operations 

Reservoirs were designed at other DOE sites. Reservoirs are considered robust containers. They 

must verify that tritium reservoirs are empty once the tritium has been removed. This provides 

protection against a tritium incident. 

The Metal Tritides System was controlled for temperature and pressure. The optimal 

temperature might be -20o

C to 150 oC. The pressure at the original plant was at 2 atm, and work 

there was exclusively at room temperature. A low pressure was needed to prevent leaking, 

which would lead to HTO formation. Zeolite absorbers were used to trap tritiated water. 

The tritium facility is under high pressure from the military to make reservoir shipments on time. 

A reservoir is received at SRS for loading/reloading. In the Gas Transfer System, the gas is 

removed out, purified to recover the tritium, and reused. The process of handling reservoirs is 

protective. For example, workers are required to wear gloves when they handle a reservoir to 

protect the unit from the oil on the hands. In some cases, exotic tritides are used as neutron 

generators. The limited lifetime component (LLC) is sent to Pantex. Returns are shipped to SRS 

from Pantex or from the military. 

After a certain number of reclamations, the container is discarded. Welding is done on reservoirs 

in a [fume] hood with doors. The reservoirs are transported in 5-gallon buckets. 

SRS is/was involved in Reservoir or Gas Transfer Surveillance. Reservoirs are/were stored 

under ambient conditions established by the design authority [e.g., Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) or Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)]. Production line samples are taken to 
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determine load and function. Other tests on reservoirs have been performed, such as 10-ft drop 

tests. 

The Weapons Technology is responsible for the development of methodology for loading/ 

unloading and testing of new designs, and for generating surveillance reports to design agencies. 

The Materials Test Facility (an SRNL organization within the Tritium Facility, MTF) is involved 

with destructive analysis of reservoirs in 234-7H as a part of Weapons Surveillance and the 

reservoir Life Storage Program. 

In 2002, a new Metallurgical Laboratory (part of 234-7H, Met Lab) was put in. The Met Lab 

consists of a series of air hoods for sample preparation and stereo-microscopes and 

metallographs for examining the reservoir samples. In addition, there is a scanning electron 

microscope for more extensive analysis. 

Reservoirs to be tested are either burst tested (a stem is brazed on and then pressurized with 

water to failure) in another building or have a metallurgical exam to look at all of the welds, heat 

affected zones, and parent metal. A burst reservoir is measured at the point of failure to 

determine the thinnest wall section and the thin wall section removed for examination in the 

scanning electron microscope. Reservoirs undergoing metallurgical exam are not burst tested, 

but have metal samples removed for examination. 

The process of sample preparation [for metallurgical examination] involves cutting up the 

stainless steel reservoir using saws. This is done through glove ports with the hood windows 

closed. A band saw may be used for initial cuts on large reservoirs for initial size reduction, then 

the water-cooled enclosed abrasive saws are used for the final cuts. After the final cuts are 

made, samples are stored in open vials (pill bottles) for identification and to allow the metal to 

off-gas tritium. The samples are later mounted in plastic using standard Met Lab practices (hot 

mount press or cold mounted in epoxy). The samples are then ground and polished on 

polisher/grinder equipment through open hood windows, either by hand or using machine 

holders. This operation is water cooled as well. Anti-contamination gloves and personal 

protective equipment (PPE) are worn for this evaluation. After polishing, the samples are etched 

using nitric or oxalic acid to reveal the grain boundaries of the sample. 

After etching, the samples are checked by RadCon to verify they are not off-gassing tritium 

before they are removed from the hood, and then examined on the stereo-microscopes and 

metallographs for image capture. 

Burst samples are not ground, polished or etched, but may be mounted. After imaging, the 

samples may have autoradiography performed. This involves manually applying a photographic 

emulsion on the cross-section of the sample and waiting to allow the beta-decay from diffused 

tritium to expose the emulsion. The emulsion is then developed like a photograph to reveal the 

depth of penetration of tritium permeation. 

Samples are held for 6 months after the issuance of the surveillance report. When there is a can 

full of samples, they campaign out the can and ship it off as waste. 
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There are a total of 3–5 individuals working in the Metallurgical Laboratory at any one time on 

the destructive testing. Testing is done during the day shift. RadCon is present with a sniffer 

when anything is pulled from a glovebox. They also perform routine rounds in the area. 

Radiation exposure issues are very low. At the upper end, ~10–15 Curies could be driven off the 

stainless steel containers as they are cut up. This is during the cutting operations performed in an 

air hood through gloves. If the hood tritium monitor alarms, hands are removed from the gloves 

until it clears. 

The Stockpile Laboratory Tests (SLTs) involve reservoirs from fielded weapons returned to the 

plants for testing. SRS typically tests 2 to 4 reservoir systems from each of the 8 weapons 

system types each year. When the Mound Plant closed, SRS picked up stockpile laboratory 

testing from Mound. 

Prior to loading reservoirs for the military, the Life Storage area stores loaded reservoirs to look 

for age-related failures, identifying them before they happen in the field. Both SLT units and 

Life Storage units are examined as described above. 

Building 238 is where the reservoirs go after examination for storage and staging for disposal in 

a B-12 waste container. 

[Note: There was some classified discussion of reservoir design that is not included here.] 

TRITIUM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

[The interviewees directly involved with tritium R&D, collectively, described research activities 

involving metal hydrides.] 

SRNL conducted numerous studies associated with metal hydrides. These studies included the 

investigation of the Thermal Cycling Absorption Process (TCAP) using Palladium metal 

hydrides for hydrogen isotopes separation, metal hydride for storage, pumping and compressing 

of tritium. Research into the metal hydride process investigated hydrogen isotherms (i.e., 

pressure as a function of temperature) for the process. The Metal Hydride Technology group 

designed beds and set up test rigs. They were involved in setting up systems for testing solid 

storage reservoirs and defining the process testing requirements. Metals chosen for 

experimentation had little data. 

In the development work, SRS really did not consider the metal tritides an issue, because of the 

containment and filters installed in the vessels. In addition, during the early R&D period, 

researchers did not know if it would work. At the Advanced Hydride Laboratory, the staff put 

all the systems together and tested it as a system. The pilot project, lasting for a couple of years, 

operated with protium and deuterium, not with metal tritides. SRNL had a hood to work with the 

palladium beds/compressor beds, mostly because of the potential for hydrogen release. 

Although the R&D had to be done, the goal was to work with the material in the production 

setting. Operations/production needed to actually be able to use the material. A team was put 

together to develop a new process. There was benchtop testing followed by full-scale prototype 
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testing. The process SNRL developed was implemented in the field by the Tritium Processing 

group, which was responsible for taking the tritium process from the bench scale to the process 

scale. 

 

Research into the metal hydride process involved the development of hydride technology, getters 

(i.e., zirconium-based alloys), and the cold development testing (non-tritium). 

 Titanium was evaluated for storage. They analyzed particle sizes or cycled hydride to 

determine the required filter size. The filters had to be designed so that the titanium 

would not get into the process piping. Metal hydrides can store tritium at low pressure 

and near ambient temperature. SRS has also worked with Lanthanum-Nickel-Aluminum 

(LaNiAl), titanium, and getters. 

 The getter beds are part of the stripper system. The getters react with oxygen to keep the 

oxygen down. They are used to remove impurities and crack tritiated methane, tritiated 

ammonia, and tritiated water from the tritium process. 

 For the tritium exchange stripping system, SRNL designed an apparatus and tested it with 

protium and deuterium. Then the research moved to the tritium lab at the tritium 

facilities when using tritium. Tests were conducted on stripper systems in a glovebox. 

The worked involved testing of palladium coated on a zeolite material and a zirconiumiron alloy. They circulated the tritium through the getters to collect the tritium. The Pd 

on zeolite was dried in an air hood before use. The material was bagged and passed out 

of the hood and into the glovebox. The tritium was introduced into the glovebox for the 

test and the bed was passed out of the glovebox after the test. In the pass chamber, the 

material was bagged. They had to pump down the pass chamber to reduce off-gassing 

from the bagged material before it was released from the glovebox. Health Physics 

papered the floor and provided coverage during the job. The fines were controlled by the 

filters installed or part of the bed design. There were two individuals involved with this 

work. 

Storage beds were linked together and hydrogen gas was transferred between the beds by heating 

and cooling. Personnel cycled the temperatures 1,000 times and opened the lines to see if any 

metal hydride powder had gotten out of the beds. The results showed none. 

Research and Development studies involving hydrogen storage or metal hydrides at SRNL were 

limited to protium and deuterium. Storage beds are activated using deuterium and protium. 

There was no exposure to metal tritides in the 773A Building. The SRNL did not have a safety 

basis document to handle tritium in this capacity. 

The Material Technology group conducted the metal hydride work involving tritium at the 

tritium facilities in the MTF. There are several laboratories in one of the wings of this building 

for conducting tritium experiments. In this area, the beds are loaded up with tritium. 

The analysis of gas samples from hydride beds is conducted in a laboratory in the tritium 

facilities. It requires a hot mass spectroscopy unit. 
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The filter of the process hydride beds prevents the powder from exiting the bed. Any particles in 

the filters are flushed back into the bed when the tritium is put into the bed. Researchers have to 

prove to users that the particles will not get out of the bed. There is/was no potential for 

exposure. Also, researchers have to demonstrate to the plant that the metal hydrides will not 

plug the filters. They limit the linear flow rate to prevent the filters from being plugged. The 

filters use a porous media grade 5 and a specified surface area to get the appropriate limit linear 

flow rate. 

Whenever a new material is evaluated, researchers look at the particle size. The metals are 

300 micron with some dust. Personnel handled some powders in very small amounts (i.e., gram 

quantities) in ventilated hoods with a dust mask. After numerous cycles of absorption and 

desorption reactions, the metal hydride will break down into smaller particle sizes (1 μ the 

smallest, 5 to 10 μ size generally). The particle size and the maximum linear flow rate of a 

particular system are the basis of filters designed for use in the bed system. From early on, 

personnel are careful to confine these powders (fines). 

Researchers seldom opened the beds and take the metal hydride powder out. The materials are 

put into the bed and it is sealed off. The material is then hydrided. One site expert indicated the 

chance for exposure to hydrides was zero. Staff would remove samples for analysis after the bed 

was hydrided with protium or deuterium. As a part of R&D work, they pulled material out of a 

storage bed to do some characterization work. There was no micro-structure work. Gas transfer 

vessels were used to test the fracture toughness, etc. 

Zirconium and Zirconium Compounds 

In April or May 2010, SRNL did a job involving some zirconium samples. Personnel received 

zirconium tritide samples for metallographic testing on the material. They drafted a job-specific 

procedure. SRNL Radiological Control Operations (RCO), Safety, and Industrial Hygiene 

personnel did a job hazard analysis, and RCO developed a job-specific RWP. Prior to the work, 

a mock-up was completed, and there were pre-job briefings. 

The work was going to be done in one hood. This hood was used every day for stainless steel 

work. The work areas (air hoods) were decontaminated down to <1,000 dpm before and after the 

job. The workers wore yellow laboratory coats and gloves, primarily because of the hydrofluoric 

acid. Workers wore laboratory coats and Radiological Material Containment Unit (RMCU) 

plastic shoulder-length sleeves for this job. The job lasted about 2–4 days. In addition to the 

PPE, the workers wore a PAS and submitted bioassay samples. 

Three zirconium tritide samples (20 grams) and 13 zirconium hydride samples were received. 

The sample containers or test cells were first opened in a glove bag located inside a glovebox for 

initial visual inspection. Then they were removed from the glove bag and glovebox and 

transported to laboratory hoods, where the remainder of the analysis work was performed. One 

hydride sample was degraded, so staff had to revise the RWP to accommodate this. After the 

containers were opened initially, they were transferred to a laboratory hood. 
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The workers did the grinding to smooth out the sample for evaluation on the scanning electron 

microscope (SEM). The samples were sniffed to see if they were off-gassing. They looked at 

the samples on the SEM. Following the evaluation, the zirconium samples were discarded as 

waste. The hood was decontaminated to less than 1,000 dpm. The worker’s personal air 

samples were sent to the B-area for further analysis at the Health Physics Central Counting 

Facility. 

During the work, the hoods were wiped down on a daily basis. The individuals involved 

submitted daily bioassay samples upon conclusion of the work and 1 follow-up bioassay 3 weeks 

after the work. There were no positive bioassay samples. The smear samples taken from the 

evolution are available in the Visual Survey Data System. 

Palladium and Palladium Compounds 

Palladium tritide research was done on thermodynamics and the isotope separation process with 

the Palladium tritide system. It was used in isotope separation and vacuum work. To cut down 

on emissions, the system was put into a glovebox. Hundreds of pounds are used. Palladium/ 

Rhodium tritide is also used in tritide research. 

The palladium on Kieselguhr was developed for the separation process. Kieselguhr is plated 

with palladium, and the palladium serves as the getter for tritium. This material would allow the 

H-3 to be trapped and let the He-3 flow through. Kieselguhr does not break down, and it keeps 

the palladium intact. Respirators were used when we loaded the palladium/Kieselguhr. 

There was an experiment where researchers wanted to get a sample of palladium for modeling of 

He-3 bubbles. The material was 8–9 years old. The Palladium Tritide (PdT) sample was taken 

out of one vessel and put into a new vessel. In order to do this work, calculations based on the 

Brodsky number were completed. For inhalation considerations, a worker working for a year 

would be potentially exposed at 10-6 of the material processed through the facility. There was a 

known amount of tritium. Staff was working for 9 hours with 1 gram of material. For a worker, 

the dose would be ~1 mrem total dose. The calculation used the dose conversion factor for 

hafnium, which is considered the most insoluble form of tritide. The transfer of the tritide from 

one vessel to another was done in a glove bag in a glovebox. There was no possibility of contact 

between the metal tritide powder and the technician. The sample was transported to Argonne in 

a can. 

Lanthanum Nickel Aluminum 

Lanthanum-Nickel-Aluminum (LaNiAl) was developed for storage of H-3. The tritium

processing group was looking at accountability issues. They developed a technique using a 

calorimeter to determine how much hydrogen was left behind in the bed. The initial LaNiAl was 

a coarse powder, but later became a fine powder after cycling. As you load hydrogen on the 

LaNiAl, the particle size decreases to a point where it is stabilized. The beds were not reused. 

All of the development work in my group was with protium and deuterium and not with tritium. 
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LaNiAl tritide was a workhorse in the tritium facilities at the SRS. There are various amounts of 

aluminum in these materials. SRS staff adjusted the aluminum content in the mixture to affect 

the pressure as needed. They fabricated the three different materials at different pressures. It 

was easier to maintain a temperature range constant. Other than titanium tritide, palladium 

tritide was probably the most studied tritide. Hundreds of pounds of LaNiAl tritide are used in 

tritium storage beds. Storage options for tritium include uranium beds for HT, and palladium 

hydride. LaNiAl was used as a storage material or for pressure work. SRS is trying to eliminate 

the use of depleted uranium tritide to eliminate mixed-waste issues. LaNiAl does not have this 

disadvantage. 

Building 233H operations are based on a temperature range of 50o

C to 500oC to generate all 

pressures. If you change the amount of aluminum in the storage material LaNiAl, you can affect 

the vapor pressures. You can adjust the amount of aluminum by replacing nickel with 

aluminum. The metal hydride storage and process beds reduced the releases of tritium to the 

environment. Prior to this, the tritium went out the stack. [See Addendum for comment.] 

There was some testing of beds after aging (tritium exposure). Researchers used 1-kilogram size 

beds. At one point, the storage beds sat for 21 months. Analyses of these beds were conducted 

at the Tritium Facility and at Mound. There was some metal hydride material degradation. They 

conducted isotherm and other measurements and did some filter testing. They took the bed into 

an air hood and took some of the material out. The numbers are available in a report [see 

reference below]. 

The amount of He-3 that came out at Mound determined the average H-3 concentration during 

operation. Lanthanum-Nickel-Aluminum (LaNiAl) has a huge capacity for He-3. It is an 

isotope purifier. The He-3 causes the material to swell. Even with the degradation, there was a 

delivery of pure H-3. Palladium beds also hold on to He-3 until very late in their life. This 

observation was made during palladium tritide studies. 

Other Tritium Compounds 

Mischmetal is a mixture of rare earth materials that is not further separated and is used as is. 

There is a lot of lanthanum, praseodymium, etc. The exact rare earth composition depends on 

where the material is mined. Most of the material at SRS comes from China. SRS uses a 

cerium-free mischmetal because cerium reduces the efficiency. The SRS material is pretty heavy 

in lanthanum. One of the metal hydrides used contains mischmetal. The compressor materials, 

unlike the storage materials, are used to move gas and are not exposed to tritium for long periods 

of time. One use of mischmetal is its use in metal hydride batteries. 

NiZr tritide is a new material being handled. The new MOX [Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication] 

Facility will have plutonium tritide. [See Addendum for comment.] 

There was an actinide separation program involving photochemistry R&D work with actinides in 

about 1983 or 1984. 
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TRITIUM FOCUS GROUP 

[The interviewees serving on or contributing to the DOE Tritium Focus Group, collectively, 

provided a description of the group’s mission and how it impacted SRS operations and staff.] 

Historically, the main concern at the tritium facilities was HTO. The STCs are really more of a 

recent issue. The STC issue [i.e., Stable Metal Tritides (SMTs) and Organically Bound Tritium 

(OBT)] first came to the attention of the complex as a result of what was happening at the 

Mound Plant with metal hydrides. They were raised in relation to Decontamination and 

Decommissioning (D&D) at the Mound Plant. A Tritium Focus Group (TFG) was established 

by DOE. Several individuals from SRS served as members of the focus group, with one 

individual responsible for the MathCad work used in the development of the [STC] standard. 

From the dosimetry side, STCs became an issue in 2004, resulting in a change to the SRS 

technical basis document (TBD) and the bioassay program. SRS became aware of the different 

dissolution rates for different compounds and the fact that the dose was higher [from some 

STCs] than traditional forms of tritium. The TFG invited Dr. Yung-Sung Cheng from Lovelace1

to do a presentation on his [solubility] studies from about 1998 to 2000. Presentations are 

available from the focus group. 

When the STC working group was put together, it was widely acknowledged that a good bit of 

work was needed to fully characterize STCs and develop a proper monitoring program. The one 

example that is most vivid is the need for a fecal analysis method. To the knowledge of internal 

dosimetry staff, it still does not exist. 

There was a questionnaire sent to all of the SRS site facilities to evaluate whether STCs were 

present. After the standard came out, SRS did a survey of the site. Historically, SRS was using 

uranium beds (HTV [Hydride Transport Vessel] beds, U-beds). U-beds were used for the 

transport vessels. The HTVs were reused without restriction and were surveyed for alpha 

activity each time they were unloaded. Radiological Control (RadCon) didn’t see any 

contamination. The HSV [Hydride Storage Vessel] beds (titanium beds) were designed so that 

the titanium would not get out. To test for rust/dust, they pulled air samples in several areas in 

the older tritium facilities, including the Kanne rooms. The filter papers were counted, and no 

contamination was found. There were also LaNiAl and palladium Kieselguhr beds in the tritium 

process. The review of rust/dust did not include an assessment of this material at the reactor 

areas. 

A few of the site experts interviewed were responsible for the tritide evaluation for the tritium 

facility. Additional information on tritides handled at SRS is contained in Special Tritium 

Compounds in the SRS Tritium Facility, DPD-TED-2000-00081 [SRS 2000]. A separate 

evaluation was conducted for the reactor area. 

DOE came to the conclusion by repeatedly conducting assessments of the 13 components of the 

RadCon program that SRS was effectively addressing the tritide issue. DOE assessed various 

1

 The Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is involved in numerous 

studies for the federal government. 
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facilities to evaluate their program. There generally were few, if any, noncompliance issues with 

the requirements. In the tritium facilities, the occasional findings were quickly resolved by the 

operating contractor. If there was an issue that escaped their knowledge, they would bounce it 

off of Mound. They also talked to older HPs about the tritium operations and their experience 

over the past decades. 

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided their characterization of the radiation protection 

processes in place at various onsite facilities. General, plant-wide radiological controls are 

discussed first, followed by subsections focused specifically on tritium facilities.]

Production and HP had a love/hate relationship. Workers tried to do most jobs without HP. 

Production wanted to do whatever had to be done. Day shift did not attend to maintenance that 

often; much of it was done at night. Operations spent time avoiding HP, and HP tried to avoid 

them. Operations had work to do, and HP’s attitude was not conducive to getting the job done. 

It could take days to get the job done if HP was involved. The production side tried to avoid HP. 

Some of the HPs worked more like operators; they would work with you. If an HP trusted you, 

he would not go with you. For example, operations would know that there were some things to 

be done at the first of the month. They would get the ticklers, go get an HP, and get the job 

done. If a worker was an old-school person, and if they could go without HP, they would do it. 

In the early days, a supervisor would manipulate HP to get the work done. Workers who were 

more production- and work-oriented leaned on HPs, so they could get the work done. 

On the shift, there was only one HP, and it is not like the HP could cover the area. Also, the HPs 

would take their breaks, and then there was no one there. Eventually, they did put an HP 

manager on shift. This was part of the change in the late 1980s—it started with the quality 

assurance, and it took some time. 

One former RCT was assigned to various areas at SRS, including F-Area Tank Farms, H-Area 

Tank Farms, F & H Canyons (including the B-lines), DWPF, NRF, RTF (during construction), 

S Area, the Outside Facilities (i.e., outside the facility security fence), 300 Area, and the 

laboratories. When assistance was needed or when there was overtime, he could be assigned to 

any location on the site. Overtime occurred about once every 2 weeks. 

A Limited Duty Inspector was limited in what jobs he could cover. He was assigned to a shift 

job with a more qualified inspector to give him additional experience. 

HP couldn’t cover everything at the tank farms, because there were not enough personnel. In the 

early 1980s, there were 6–7 [HP] people on the day shift covering a couple hundred workers. 

One HP would stay in the trailer. They were short-staffed all the time. The HP techs did not 

come out several times when some CTWs worked with radiation. For example, workers at the 

tank farms would commonly load the cars and take things from H Area to F Area without an HP. 
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At the tank farms, a maintenance crew worked about 50% of the time without an HP tech. You 

would not take an HP tech when you were going to do things your way. The DuPont procedures 

did not have sign-off steps in them, and workers could use the procedures the way they wanted 

them. Before workers needed a sign-off, the boss told the worker what was to be done and the 

worker could decide how they were going to do it. If, for instance, a worker was asked to 

decontaminate a sample box, he might go down himself and take permanganate or 

trichloroethylene (TCE) and do it himself. If the worker could get the contamination down, they 

would call HP for a survey. The workers were trying to get contamination down so they could 

work in lab clothes. If they could not get the contamination down, then they may not bother 

calling HP. 

One interviewee did a job that they had a safety complaint on. Before you can put [in] a jet or 

sparge, you have to put in well-drilling equipment. There were complaints that it was too hard 

because of the physical work. Workers dropped a piece of the pipe into the tank. RadCon 

people were around to survey the area workers were getting into. 

In 1989, Westinghouse brought in Rent-a-techs who were not experienced or trained. For a 

period in the early 1990s, workers did not feel protected. With DuPont, the RadCon technicians 

were more experienced. 

Operating engineers on the construction side were considered support crafts, and they did not 

have procedures. When PAAA [Price Anderson Amendment Act] came out, DuPont left and 

Westinghouse came in. Westinghouse did things better in many ways and started Quality 

Assurance (QA). Only under Westinghouse did they begin to have procedures that required 

written sign-offs. The site did not get going on RWPs until Westinghouse was well established. 

A construction worker stated that they never had classes until Bechtel came on site. 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were people who were fired, because they were doing 

things the old way. They were high-performing people, but they could not change and adapt to 

the new ways. Westinghouse did literacy tests, and older foremen could not pass, because they 

were not good at taking tests, and they were humiliated and they retired. A lot of them left; it 

was humiliating for them not to be the shift supervisor. During the transition, [a supervisor] had 

to pull more prints and create more computer-generated reports. Many workers could not or 

would not do it. The subcontractors have changed several times since then. 

 

Radiological Hazards and Controls 

Radiation conditions in the tank farms and canyons were not always well documented. Surveys 

were taken near the entrance to areas, but not where the workers were. H Area was a little more 

lackadaisical than F Area and was worse as far as monitoring. 

[At the Tank Farms, a RadCon worker] used an AS-2 for alpha surveys, a Victoreen 496 for 

beta/gamma surveys, and an RO-2 for dose rate surveys. Surveys were not done over the riser 

hole where the highest dose rate would occur. 
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Huts were commonly used at the tank farms. For example, they used huts when pulling dip 

samples, replacing an air sparge, and working on the lines. When they would take the huts 

down, the alpha contamination sometimes escaped. There were contaminated areas in the huts 

and outside the huts. The contamination areas were marked with a rope boundary. 

When pulling dip samples at the tank farms, workers had to put a cap on the sample while 

wearing gloves. The cap had coarse threads. It was not unusual to drop a cap in the tank or drop 

the cap and contaminate a riser with high-level waste. Old-school people would come and clean 

up. This was not thought of as an incident. If workers made a mess, they cleaned it up. That 

was the way they worked. 

If you were not working in your primary facility, you were more susceptible to higher radiation 

that you did not know about. The new people learned from the old timers. Going into an 

unfamiliar area without a buddy who knew what was going on was asking for trouble. Workers 

protected their own group by word of mouth. They were told to stay away from this or that area 

because it was hot. Some contaminated areas did not get roped off. For example, a worker was 

aware of a contaminated crane at the Silver Springs lay-down yard in an area that did not have a 

rope around it. Sometimes they would be working in an area that was not marked, and someone 

would inform them that the area was contaminated. For example, electricians once went out to 

investigate the diversion boxes to prepare for a job. An HP came along and told them to get out 

of the area, because they were about ready to do a tank transfer. The workers were lucky he had 

come along. A mobile worker with a radio could find out about work conditions in the middle of 

the day, but not everyone had radios on the job. 

[Between 1984 and 1986, a building addition was constructed above the FB-line.] There was an 

extra floor added to the top of the building. The original building is concrete, but the additions 

were made out of blue metals. There were hundreds of construction workers, all crafts, working 

on that addition. It was considered new construction and the area was considered a clean area. 

There were no radiological postings and the workers were not monitored. Although it was 

considered a clean area, there was hot air coming out of the stacks of the FB-line. The chutes 

coming out of the FB-line (a tremendously hot area) were opened periodically to the vents. All 

the air in the hot canyon area came out on the ladders right next to the vents. There were all 

kinds of construction workers that worked out there that received doses that were not monitored. 

[See Addendum for comment.] 

The Central Shop itself was not considered a hot shop. There were several portions that were 

contamination areas for a limited time. The equipment sent to the Central Shops for servicing 

came out of the hot buildings. 

The reactor heat exchanger refurbishment project (in the 1980s) was a very hot job involving a 

tremendous amount of contamination. At the Central Shops, repair and refurbishment was 

performed in a separate building that was not being used at the time (690G). The building got so 

crapped up from this project that it was roped off afterwards—no one was allowed back in it for 

several years. 
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The people who worked in the HB-line would approach the 2.0 R [dose limit]. There were four 

operators who usually worked in the hood. Once they had received 2.0 R, newer, lessexperienced operators were brought in. On the last day of the month, they could burn you up. 

The next day, you were right back in. They would move people from other areas of the site to 

receive the dose. When less-experienced operators were brought in, this is when the construction 

workers’ uptakes would go up, because of lack of experience of the operators. 

There were lead shields everywhere. There would be radiation streams that would come through 

areas like where pipes went through walls, so lead blankets were put around it to block the 

radiation. Many of the jobs RadCon covered involved piping, which was very radioactive. They 

would place lead blankets over them, or there would be lead from previous jobs already there. 

Part of RadCon’s job was to find the area with the highest dose rate, so operations could put lead 

over it or to survey where the lead was already placed. 

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 

In F Tank Farm, workers wore protective clothing made of cotton. The site did its own cleaning 

and washing. Laundry Helpers, who went to all areas of the site and loaded laundry bags on and 

off trucks, dressed in lab coats and street clothes. 

CTWs learned to check their clothing, because a lot of it was hot before they put it on. It came 

back from the laundry that way. So the workers learned to run a hand monitor over the clothes, 

especially gloves, which were often contaminated [after laundering]. The workers did not have 

their own monitoring instruments. The areas where they worked and dressed out had the 

equipment. The portable monitors were there. The workers picked one up and used it. 

Sometimes workers had to dress out when they went into a Radiation Danger Zone (RDZ). 

CTWs had to dress out to work with heat exchangers (removal, refurbishment, repair, and 

installation). For work on the HEPA filter pots, workers wore one pair of protective clothing, 

unless they were working on the tank itself. Pipefitters would be in the hut with supplied air and 

they were burned out after 2 minutes for the whole month. But electricians were not in the huts 

so often. Sometime between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, when lifting covers off diversion 

boxes at the tank farm, crane operators dressed out and worked under a time limit. Some of the 

filter houses were very hot—workers could only stay in there 1 minute. 

At the B-line, SRS was more concerned with contamination, rather than radiation. In the RDZ 

on B-line, workers wore a plastic suit and/or hood on a daily basis. Work in the warm canyon 

maintenance cell in H Canyon was all bubble (plastic) suit work. Bubble suits were also used on 

top of the reactor in the 100 Area. In the F Area, workers moved the slurry pumps with the tank 

top open while various workers were present in the general area. Direct hands-on workers were 

in plastic suits, but individuals outside the rope were not suited up. 

Workers wore lead aprons in the 200 Area in the 235 Building. When electricians worked in 

gloveboxes in certain areas, they had to dress out and sometimes wear a lead apron. Sometimes 

jobs on the hot gang valve corridor at the canyons required the use of lead aprons. The 

equipment did not fully shield your entire body. 
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Egress 

At SRNL, CTWs were up in the ceilings and around the equipment, and residue material was 

everywhere. These were areas that were not normally occupied. There was self-monitoring in 

this building, but workers had to go elsewhere to monitor, because it was hot. There was no one 

telling them to go monitor. 

In the HP monitoring building in F Tank Farm area, it was possible to go through the radiation 

zone and come out unmonitored, because of the way the entrances were placed. 

Alarms 

There were nuclear incident monitoring [radiation] alarms and criticality alarms. Workers were 

involved in situations where alarms were going off. Some alarms were drills or false alarms, but 

others were the real thing. When there was an evacuation, workers had to gather in the parking 

lot. They were not told what it was all about. At the time, you just had to leave; but then they 

never told you anything about it. When there was a shift change and the alarm went off, workers 

just went home. Workers were normally not told why the alarms would go off. They would call 

HP as they were leaving. Sometimes [HP] would come and check; a lot of times, they said it 

must be radon. These alarms were not specific to any area, but the waste areas were bad. They 

never said where the radon was coming from. 

An interviewee recalled a couple of dozen alarms over the course of his employment. One of the 

worst areas for alarms was H Area waste. A number of times when the interviewee was there, 

workers would have to seek shelter, because the alarms were going off. In the H Canyon, the 

alarms would go off because of air reversals about every month or two. 

When CTWs removed the teapots (huge HEPA filter pots) and the alarms would go off 

throughout the tank farms, HP told them to just keep working. They didn’t want to slow them 

down one bit. 

 

In about 1994 or 1995, construction electricians were digging outside (to put in telephone lines) 

and the CAMs [Continuous Air Monitors] outside would go off. After further research, they 

found that the whole area had high readings. They found out why after they interviewed oldtimers. There were 55-gallon drums stacked up on the asphalt that had gotten contaminated 

during the early heavy production days. The shipments out on the pad were leaking. The 

electricians were wearing just one pair [of protective clothing] and no respiratory equipment. 

The area is a CERCLA [Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 

Act] area now and it is contaminated. 

When a worker went out of a zone and a worker set off a PCM 1 [Personnel Contamination 

Monitor], RadCon was supposed to come out and survey you. Sometimes RadCon would not 

come and would say it is radon, or that the background is high. In one case, a worker insisted 

that they come and found that his shoes were contaminated. A CTW who set off alarms on the 

hand and foot counters at the FB-line had to bring in all kinds of samples. When a machine went 

off, workers were also told the machine was not properly calibrated. 
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Training 

[Construction Trades Workers interviewees described the RadCon training they received.] The 

first training one site expert received was watching someone dress out. In 1991, there was a 

4-hour training course in the H-canyon. Later, Radiation Worker (RW) II training involving 

several days of training was required. RW II training is completed every 2 years. Initially, this 

training was conducted over in Augusta. After the formal training, the dress-out procedure was 

more consistent. Other training includes respiratory protection, glove bag, plastic suit, and 

Hazardous Waste Operations training. In conjunction with respiratory protection training, 

respirator fit-testing using a smoke chamber test is completed. 

Some areas gave/give area-specific training. For example, there was training associated with the 

new and old B-lines, the H-canyon, and the tritium facilities. As a result of contamination in the 

old B-line in the F-canyon, there was special training for dressing out in this area. Training at 

the tritium facilities did not include formal training on the forms of tritium, according to one 

interviewee. One interviewee mentioned specific training for work in 232H around 1997/1998. 

Part of the training involved pixie dust training. A worker had to try to get out of an area without 

getting pixie dust on them. The RCOs have always made workers aware of hazards, so they can 

take precautions. With tritium, a worker is dealing with something that was more in the air. In 

addition, interviewees mentioned weekly safety meetings called “Tool Box Target.” To 

supplement training, there are pre-job briefings, including direction from the RCO. 

When CTWs were asked if they had received about the right level of training, one interviewee 

said 30 years ago, they did not know that asbestos was bad for you. As far as radiation is 

concerned, you cannot be over-trained. You don’t know what is going to happen down the road. 

Another interviewee said a lot of the training is not applicable to our job. They do not go 

anywhere without RCO. There are a lot of things that we do not do that are on the test (e.g., 

figuring out total dose from a dose rate.) 

RadCon personnel indicated they make sure the training programs are adequate. Managers at the 

first line levels are making sure the line supervisors are having their folks implement their safety 

training. Training has always been equivalent for the CTWs. 

Environmental/Waste Management 

In environmental monitoring, the OBT is included with the tritiated water. The amount of OBTs 

released is minimal, compared to other forms of tritium. 

SRS did not have self-boiling tanks like other locations. They always had open holes that had a 

high-waste transfer line. The operators would get exposed when they went by them. There were 

some feral cats and skunks in the area. DuPont patrols would try to catch them and shoot them. 

The animals would go in the huts to keep warm. 

At the Burial Ground, water from the water truck was mixed with kaolin clay. Rotovator 

Operators drove heavy equipment over the wet kaolin to compact the clay in place as a cap (to 

prevent seepage of the radioactive material that was buried there). 
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SRS is federally controlled property. An interviewee was not aware if South Carolina and 

Georgia have done any sampling onsite, but [the states] have complained about it. 

Tritium Facilities Radiological Controls 

The tritium programs, MOX, and waste solidification are under the National Nuclear Safety 

Administration [NNSA]-portion of the site. There are about 35 individuals in HP, Industrial 

Hygiene and Industrial Safety at the tritium facility, including 4 first line managers and 26 HP 

Inspectors. There is a separate Quality Assurance function within tritium that is not connected to 

ES&H [Environmental Safety and Health]. 

RadCon has gotten a whole lot better over time. Everything changed at one time around 

1990/1991. This included postings, Radiation Buffer Areas (RBAs), and double ropes. RadCon 

is more accountable than they used to be. They do have more paperwork to complete. They 

have learned a great deal over the years. The site got better at explaining things to workers. 

Prior to 1990/1991, workers had to rely on the people around them. 

Tritium Facilities Radiological Hazards and Controls 

Each tritium building is specific with different issues to look out for. 

Forms of tritium present at SRS are HTO, elemental tritium or tritium gas (i.e., HT, T2), tritiated 

methane, uranium deuterium tritide, titanium tritide, lithium tritide, zirconium tritide, lanthanum 

nickel aluminum tritide, palladium tritide, and tritiated waste. The special tritium compounds 

used included LaNiAl (in the primary stage compressor, as well as the storage vessels), Ca 

Mischmetal nickel (in the second stage compressor), and titanium chromium manganese (in the 

R&D third stage compressor). Titanium tritide was used to determine when helium would be 

released from this material. There were no tritides in the older tritium facilities (i.e., 232H and 

234H). There are no dispersible STCs in the workplace. 

Palladium black was used as an absorber at the 232F facility from 1955 to 1958. For 232H, there 

was some testing of palladium black involving the fractional absorption of the material. A site 

expert does not recall any incidents associated with this material. There were also zeolite beds in 

the 232H Building. 

There was no special program for treating powders or solids, because the hazards of tritides were 

not necessarily understood early on. LaNiAl.75 was treated as though it was like any other form 

of tritium up until about 2007. Prior to this, staff was not aware of the tritium standard [i.e., 

DOE Technical Standard, DOE-HDBK-1184-2004, Radiological Control Programs for Special 

Tritium Compounds (DOE 2004)]. One of the key controls implemented for hydrides is that the 

tritiated compounds are treated with the same methods as HTO. The personnel at the tritium 

facility are most concerned about liquids. Sometimes a line is evacuated, and this may cause 

liquids to form. If HTO forms, operations personnel are informed and it is cleaned up. HTO is 

considered a bad thing at SRS. It does not take much to kill you. 
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There was a job involving titanium tritide. There was a concern about the degrading of the 

titanium powder that needed to be investigated. The job used a glove bag and a glovebox. 

Individuals involved wore PASs. The Reservoir Surveillance Operations (RSO) personnel were 

responsible for conducting the work. RSO is responsible for the functional testing of the beds. 

The controls seemed excessive for a 10-minute job. 

Organically Bound Tritium (OBT) is frequently associated with vacuum pump oil. The Mercury 

pumps used in the older tritium facilities used to leak and off-gas so badly, they were kept in 

containment. Workers tried to avoid oils; however, there were residual oils. Workers had to be 

in plastic suits to work on these pumps. Organics would rapidly permeate the plastic suits. 

Pipefitters and maintenance were responsible for changing the pumps. Workers were trained to 

avoid oils or condensate in the tritium facilities’ systems. They were on a daily bioassay 

protocol for the older facilities. There was a lot more tritium exposure in the older facilities. 

As a part of the Watts Bar project, Tennessee Valley Authority irradiated TPBARS [tritiumproducing burnable absorber rods]. Zirconium tritide will be handled as a part of the tritiumproducing absorber rods. The TPBARS were received as waste from Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory (PNNL). The TPBARS were now in the form of fines. PNNL and SRS worked 

together to come up with an accident scenario for this. This was the last update to the 

authorization basis. This project has been delayed due to leakage of targets.

There are some secret activities conducted where the Radiological Control Inspector does not 

have a need-to-know. At times, they smear items that are unknown to them.

In 232H and 234H, there are some air flow hoods. Things were less contained in 232H and 

234H than in 233H. For jobs in 236H, they work in hoods. In Building 232H, there are 

42 grams of tritium bound up in beds and pipes. The worst bed had less than 1 gram of tritium. 

There were LaNi beds in Building 232H, which were not in gloveboxes, but in hoods with doors 

on the front, prior to the 1989 time period. 

In 232H and 234H, all the process areas were contamination areas (i.e., >1,000 dpm/100 cm2

). 

At a level of 10,000 dpm/100 cm2

, Radiological Worker II training and PPE is required. 

In the old buildings, some rooms were posted as Airborne Radioactivity Areas and the workers 

wore plastic suits. There were Kanne monitors for the hoods, personal monitors, and room 

monitors. Sometimes they had a suspension guide that was exceeded because of activity in the 

hood. In this case, the workers were pulled out of the hood. There was usually a burp and the 

activity would settle out. Although this example was related to changing zeolite beds, in the old 

process buildings, the same conditions could happen for nearly any kind of process line break, 

such as replacing a valve. 

The RTF, Building 233, went into operation in the mid-1990s, resulting in the shutdown of older 

facilities. There was a phased implementation of the RTF facility. The different sections within 

the building were separated both administratively and physically. At RTF, work was/is done in 

gloveboxes. The gloveboxes have oxygen monitors that indicate oxygen in-leakage. This may 

indicate that gloves need to be changed. Each glovebox is on a stripper system. Operations 
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personnel have the capability to lock out all sources of the process system. The gloves are also 

routinely surveyed for tritium contamination and replaced if found to be above established limits. 

Titanium beds are used at RTF, but because of strong engineering controls, all the tritium is kept 

away from the workers. 

There are areas in all tritium buildings where permeation problems are present. These areas are 

posted as contamination areas. Over time, SRS started to see permeation, which shows up as 

contamination on the glovebox gloves and is caused by high concentrations in the gloveboxes. 

There have been a few occurrences when the HTO permeated the gloves. This is indicative of a 

leak from a process system inside the glovebox. 

Tritiated pump oil was an issue at the old tritium facilities. In the newer facilities, they use dry 

pumps. Any of the gaskets can absorb tritium-producing tritiated organics. At RTF, they 

implemented a metal-on-metal design to avoid issues with gaskets. The tritium facility uses onepiece neoprene gaskets for glovebox panels. There is no spalling of the gaskets, according to one 

site expert. 

There are gaskets that tend to leak in some processes. The issue is that workers tend to add 

vacuum grease when there is a leak versus replacing gaskets and determining the cause of the 

leak. This has led to certain areas within the gloveboxes having excess vacuum grease on 

equipment. The workers are the cause of this problem, rather than the gaskets. 

In the purification process in the older Tritium separation facility, there were Zn-65 contaminants 

associated with the tritium operations. Once it was separated from the tritium, the Zn-65 was not 

a problem. 

There is concern regarding special tritium compounds in D&D activities. 

The waste is left in the gloveboxes until they are ready to bag it out. There are waste campaigns, 

where they bag the waste out and prepare it for shipment to solid waste. None of the hydrides 

ended up in the tank farms. These metal tritide storage beds are put in the burial grounds. 

There is some tritium handled at SRNL. There are areas where tritium has diffused into the 

metal, such as the stainless steel. 

Tritium Diffusion/Permeation 

Multiple studies on the diffusion of tritium into stainless steel are available. There have been 

diffusion studies conducted involving autoradiography and depth of permeation studies. The 

experimental measurements are made and a diffusion calculation is run. At room temperature 

and atmospheric pressure, the tritium mainly stays on the surface with very little penetration. To 

get tritium into stainless steel, you would have to heat it to 500o

C and [pressurize it to] 

10,000 pounds per square inch (psi). At 500oC and 10,000 psi, tritium saturates the stainless 

steel wall in 2–3 hours. 
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The tritium on a surface will be a hydroxide. You can clean it so it is not smearable, and two 

days later you can get smearable tritium. Tritium diffuses back to the surface from the bulk 

when the surface concentration is reduced. 

The structural material of the reservoir is stainless steel. Tritium diffuses through stainless steel 

as an atom based on the properties of hydrogen. There are low-level contaminants. If you wait 

long enough, it will establish steady-state equilibrium. The form of hydrogen in the stainless 

steel will be atomic tritium. Tritium diffuses isotropically. The migration of tritium will not 

produce iron hydrides, chromium hydrides, etc. 

When SRS loads a reservoir, the fill tube is pinched off with a pinch weld. The tube is under 

pressure, and tritium will diffuse through the metal. The tritium contamination would occur on 

the walls of the tube and away from the reservoirs. If you know how much H3

 you started with 

and correct for decay, you could tell how much is leaking out. Tritium will not produce 

corrosion on a weld. 

All hydrogen-containing material absorbs tritium. The absorption/desorption dynamics for all 

types of hydrogen [i.e., protium, deuterium, tritium] is roughly the same. 

Tritium diffuses through polymers as a diatomic gas based on the properties of hydrogen. 

Tritium Facilities Administrative Controls 

Safety analysis is conducted for processes to assure the hazards are characterized and controls 

are put in place. The O&M [Operations and Maintenance] contractor developed a special safety 

basis/hazards analysis for tritides. SRS did a lot prior to this time period to include engineering 

controls for tritides. For example, hydride bed designs include the presence of filters close 

coupled with the bed to prevent release. In the hazards analysis, SRS assumes all the tritides are 

Type S for the dose analysis. This prevents you from having to track each type of tritium. 

Assuming Type S provides a bounding analysis. Loss of confinement, fires, explosions, etc., are 

used for theoretical analysis. An exposure criterion of 100 rem for a worker is applied for the 

theoretical analysis. A safety-significant component is determined for each potential accident 

scenario (for example, sprinklers for fires or gloveboxes for explosions). SRS does an annual 

update of the authorization basis. When there is a new evolution outside the authorization basis, 

an update of the analysis is completed. 

There is a Tritium Operations Review Committee (TORC) that reviews special evolutions. The 

facility treats operations with tritides in a special manner. The controls for tritide jobs are on a 

case-by-case basis. For example, for a particular tritide extraction job, SRNL was responsible 

for conducting literature research. HP did special personal air sampling monitoring for the 

evolution. Glove bags were used inside gloveboxes to protect the cleanliness of the piping. 

Filters are present, because they don’t want particulates getting into the reservoirs. 

A hazard analysis is completed for a procedure, and a job hazard analysis is completed for a job. 

Workers have input to the work packages, the pre-job briefing, and some input into safety. They 

do not work a whole lot with the procedures. CTWs interviewed indicated they have the right to 
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stop work at any time, and in fact did stop work in other facilities onsite. Any work that is 

invasive will involve RCO coverage. For routines, workers will not always have an RCO with 

you. 

Tritium Facility Surveillances 

The RCT’s responsibility is to come in, perform turnover, conduct routines (i.e., surveys, source 

checks, read rotometers, read stack releases every 12 hours, etc.). There are routine surveys of 

the step-off pads, hallways, etc. The routines are broken up between the shifts. We take dry 

smears. The smears are put into Ultima Gold and counted on an LSC. We are responsible for 

counting our own smears, with the laboratory as a back-up. 

Monthly RCTs smear the rooms, hoods, the hood fronts and 10% of the glovebox gloves in 

Radiological Buffer Areas (RBAs). Quarterly, we smear 100% of the glovebox gloves. 

Glovebox gloves in 233H are maintained below contamination area limits <10,000 dpm/100 

cm

2

. In other buildings’ RBAs, glovebox gloves are maintained at <1,000 dpm/100 cm2. 

Habitable areas (all tritium facility RBAs/RMAs [Radioactive Material Areas], including those 

in 233H, 234H, 236H, 238H and 264H) are maintained to <1,000 dpm/100 cm2. There are areas 

of the building where you have >1,000 dpm. If RCTs find an area with >1,000 dpm/100 cm2

, the 

area is roped off and cleaned up. The operations personnel are responsible for decontamination. 

In the unloading area in 233-H, RCTs have observed some permeation of tritium. 

For a period of time, RCTs only used PC-5s. The PC-5s could see down to 150 dpm/100 cm2, 

which was the limit for free release or “clean” (uncontrolled) areas at that time. Historically, the 

routine smears were scanned with a PC-5, and then counted in the laboratory using their 

counters. The results less than this level were reported as “150 dpm/100 cm2.” The program at 

the laboratory still records “less than 150 dpm/100cm2

.” In the mid-1990s, we changed from the 

PC-5s. The new instrument has a detection level of <1,000 dpm/100 cm2. There is a shipment 

of igloos that is currently releasable to <1,000 dpm/cm2

. 

Each survey was documented on an RSLS [Radiation Survey Log Sheet]. Each survey was 

numbered. The survey log sheet provided a survey number, a brief description of the job, and 

the name of the RCT(s) conducting the survey. The survey report could be pulled up by survey 

number or by any of the names [RCTs] listed. The actual report included the survey number, a 

description of the job, a diagram of the area, contamination readings, radiation readings, and air 

sampling results, if required for the job. All survey results were recorded on the RSLS. The 

diagram was marked to indicate areas with the highest readings or contamination. 

The contractor filed an authorized limits request for higher release criteria. They wanted a less 

restrictive release limit for tritium, because the release limit was restraining their operational 

activities. The higher release limit was based on the premise that there was less of a dose from 

tritium than from equivalent rates of other contaminants. With contamination levels in the 

thousands of dpm, they had to put excessive controls in place. 

The procedure for routines is 5Q.1.1-147. For the tritium facility, they also follow SOP-TRIT311. 
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Tritium Facilities Personal Protective Equipment 

Most of the RTF is an RBA and does not require PPE. In the new facilities with nitrogen-inerted 

gloveboxes, PPE for maintenance and other activities are based off of the glovebox activities. 

There are systems within systems. There can be a line break with no PPE if there is less than 

0.1 μCi/cc. If the glovebox value is above 0.1 μCi/cc, there are lab coats and gloves required. 

There is a one-time use policy for gloves. In the older facilities that utilize flow-through hoods 

and plastic suits to protect workers, a worker is supposed to change his outer gloves every 

15 minutes. 

CTWs reported wearing bubble suits when working with tritium when there was an airborne 

hazard. An interviewee indicated that, historically, they were more concerned about the stay 

time depending on the type of suit that was worn (i.e., 6 mil or 12 mil suit). 

There was concern raised by CTW site experts about the rope and how it stopped potential 

airborne exposure. For example, the welder welds the reservoirs. There was a rope across the 

room. On one side of the rope, there were individuals with plastic suits. On the other side of the 

rope, the individuals were not wearing any PPE. 

RadCon site experts indicated there are jobs where individuals standing back from the job 

monitoring the work, such as Radiological Protection, are not in bubble suits, while those on the 

job performing the hands-on work have bubble suits. When engineered controls such as airflow 

are utilized, monitoring for tritium with Kanne chambers is in place and continuous Radiological 

Protection job coverage is provided. Work is permitted to occur in this manner as long as it is 

safe for those without plastic suits. 

EXTERNAL MONITORING 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided their characterization of how external monitoring was 

performed historically at SRS, as follows.] 

[External monitoring reported by interviewees was variable.] Workers who were not expected to 

encounter radiation hazards did not have routine dosimetry. If an area was considered a clean 

area, workers may not be badged. In the 1950s, a worker with new construction was not 

assigned a dosimeter. Workers who worked outages in the 100 Areas (reactors and reactor 

controls) had a badge and a pencil [dosimeter]. On the B-line, workers had to wear a regular 

TLD [Thermoluminescent Dosimeter], a pencil [dosimeter], and a neutron button. Those 

required to dress-out in the Central Shops recalled having TLDs. In the mid-1970s, workers had 

TLDs. 

Belly button [neutron] dosimeters were assigned to those who worked in the HB-line. This 

included those who worked in the hoods (i.e., stainless steel hoods with glove ports), dismantled 

or removed gloveboxes, entered the vaults where they stored fissile material, or entered rooms 

that were on respiratory protection. Belly button dosimeters were worn at the belt. HP used to 

exchange them by the month. One interviewee who operated the elevator to the B-line in mid- to 

late-1980s did not have a belly button badge. Workers in the HB-line had a criticality dosimeter 
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that they kept on their lanyards. In the earlier badges, there was a “dead man’s chip;” they were 

read only if a criticality accident occurred. 

People generally wore badges when required, but there were lots of exceptions. It is not unheard 

of for someone to pick up another worker’s badge, because workers would not get overtime if 

they had overexposure. There were several examples of situations where people did not wear 

TLD badges where they should have them. 

 

 While working for DuPont Construction, a worker was not on a routine program for 

external dosimetry, although the individual conducted work at 100R after it was up and 

running and in 400 Area. The same worker was routinely monitored after transferring to 

DuPont Operations. 

 When new CTWs went looking for materials, like in R Area, where they scavenged parts, 

they did not wear TLDs. 

 There was a crane in the woods and workers would prop up against the crane. They went 

there to get out of the sun, and then one day, there were radiation signs all over there. 

And these guys previously did not have TLDs. 

Riggers reported not being badged for a period of time. 

Workers knew how to work around radiation—putting badges on the waist or on the other side of 

the chest [away from the source]. Workers could keep their badges out of the shine when they 

were working at a tank and in the canyons, also. The lead door of the sample box would shield 

part of the body, and a worker would put the badge there to shield the TLD if they were trying to 

keep their radiation down. 

The workers stored their badge or TLD in a badge rack. In the F Area, the TLDs were stored 

inside the badge house. The H Area badge house was real small and there were no sides. It was 

an aluminum shed with a roof and no walls. The TLDs were exposed to the weather. [Also at 

tank farms], there were always trucks leaking radioactive liquids. The trucks would pass the 

badge racks and wipe out the TLD badges. When workers went to H Area from F Area, they 

picked up a temporary badge. They had a row of leftover badges. No one signed out the badges. 

HP had a truck equipped for changing films and preparing film badges. The technicians assigned 

to this task traveled around the site in this truck to change badges (including neutron films). All 

films, including all neutron films, were read. TLD badges were supposed to be changed every 

month. Day people changed out the badges. If the month ended on the weekend, then there may 

be confusion, and a worker may not even pick up a badge. 

Pencil dosimeters were used in some areas, in addition to the regular film or TLD badge. A 

single Personal Ionization Chamber (PIC) was worn at the pocket level. These dosimeters were 

the kind that you zeroed before you go on the job. If the pencil [dosimeter] read more than a 

certain amount, a worker would have to come out of the area. Workers filled in a daily form that 

had a place to record a date and a dose. These forms were used as far back as 1975 at F Canyon. 

Other areas, such as when CTWs worked reactor outages in the 100 Areas (prior to 1965), did 
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not use forms. Some comparison studies between pencil dosimeters and TLDs may have been 

done during the French Fuel job. Some site experts noted there are discrepancies between the 

electronic dosimeters (i.e., EPDs [Electronic Personal Dosimeters]) and the dosimeter badges. 

Pencil dosimeters would go off-scale. For example, when an interviewee worked on hot crane 

maintenance, the pencil dosimeter would peg out. When workers were changing anything out in 

the tank farms, they would run up the pencil [dosimeter] very quickly. Workers were told, “If 

you get radiation, you’re going to get your foreman in trouble.” An interviewee received a 

pencil dosimeter that was off-scale. The HP asked: “Did you drop it?” The individual said, “No, 

you just gave it to me.” The HP told the individual to go to work and he would bring another 

one. He did not return. 

Workers were told to wear the badge on the chest, but the source is not directly in front of the 

badge. For example, someone working on the crane bay would have his back towards the open 

canyon and his back would be exposed, in contrast to other times when his front is exposed. 

There were situations where hands were exposed to radiation. Finger rings and multiple 

dosimetry were worn for collecting hot dip samples at DWPF. The practice of “milking” 

samples in HB- and FB-lines exposed the hands to radiation from hot needles with waste in 

them. Individuals did not have ring dosimeters, because this practice was a no-no. They knew a 

lot of this was going on and they allowed it to go on. It was carelessness with workers’ bodies 

and lives. Many other interviewees reported not wearing finger rings. 

INTERNAL MONITORING 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided their characterization of how internal monitoring was 

performed historically at SRS, as follows.] 

The internal dosimetry program director developed the basis for the internal dosimetry program 

and was responsible for setting up the program based on current standards at that time. 

Several interviewees were concerned about “clean” areas that were suddenly posted as 

radiological areas. A lot of times, they were supposed to be working in clean areas and all of a 

sudden the area was hot. 

Over the period of coverage by the interviewees, they reported routine, special, and job-specific 

bioassay participation. If there was a special job, samples were collected for the day of the job. 

Workers reported giving routine bioassay samples during their work in the tritium and reactor 

areas. Routine bioassay samples were collected in the tritium area. The frequency was weekly, 

but daily if they went into the facility. If the result was greater than 1 μCi/ml, the worker was 

told to drink liquid. Samples were submitted monthly or every 3 months for reactor area workers 

in the late 1980s/early 1990s for about 3 to 4 years. In the 100 Areas, individuals submitted 

tritium samples when they worked at the minus 40 (-40) level or when they suited up. 

Individuals in the 100 Areas who were not in a tritium-specific area would leave weekly 

bioassay samples. There were also samples collected from personnel who worked at ETF 

[Effluent Treatment Facility]. Some individuals reported routine monitoring in the 200 Areas, 

while others did not remember giving samples while at the tank farms, the canyons, and even the 
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B-line. If an individual was on a routine program, they left a sample approximately monthly. 

When air reversals occurred in the canyon, bioassay samples were left. There were also areas in 

772F where samples were left daily, and workers had to take a shower when they left. Although 

a worker entered radiological areas, they were not on a routine bioassay program when working 

for DuPont Construction. 

An interviewee was working in the D-Area on the pumping station and came up positive for 

Cs-137. The technician attributed it to eating deer meat. The worker was sent home as a result. 

The whole-body counts started up later [with variable frequencies reported by interviewees.] 

One individual reported having a baseline chest count and another count after he quit and 

returned to SRS. Today, if an individual has worked under an RWP, there is a quick scan. 

Workers reported having initial chest counts in the late 1970s and 1980s. Some interviewees 

reported receiving annual counts, while others reported only a few counts done. Whole-body 

counts started up later. In one case, one interviewee did not have a whole-body count until 1990. 

Extra counts were sometimes performed when workers were assigned to hot areas. CTWs were 

supposed to have a count when they quit, but that did not always happen. Whole-body counts 

were reported after medical treatment in one case. 

Several interviewees reported that they did not wear personal air samplers. 

Tritium Internal Dosimetry 

The routine radiobioassay program at SRS is triggered by respiratory protection use. The 

determination of which radionuclides to sample for is based on process knowledge and waste 

characterization data. This is true for all parts of SRS, including the tank farms. 

The tritium in the tank waste is all treated as oxides. There isn’t much monitoring for tritium in 

the tank farms. One site expert does not recall seeing any positive samples. Most of the tritium 

dose at SRS since the shutdown of the reactors comes from the tritium facilities. 

There is no external monitoring of personnel in the tritium facilities; a worker is only required to 

leave a bioassay sample. 

Site experts involved with metal hydride research reported leaving a bioassay sample when 

working with tritium. The results were provided to them. 

There is no routine monitoring for tritides. When this type of monitoring is needed, there is an 

interaction between the field and internal dosimetry. This special type of monitoring began in 

2004 or 2005 when the tritides issue became hot. 

There are Kanne chambers throughout every room where tritium is processed, handled, or stored. 

The alarm set point inside the glovebox is 0.2 microcuries per cubic centimeter (μCi/cc). 

Historically, this set point was 0.1 μCi/cc. The alarm set point for the room in which personnel 

are working is 4E-5 μCi/cc. The Tritium Air Monitor (TAM) is a flow-through ionization 

chamber. 
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SRS has come up with a way to detect tritides on a PAS. Monitoring for tritides is treated like 

other particulates. When there is work with tritides, the field uses PASs with PTFE 

[polytetrafluoroethylene] filters, which hold the tritide but not the tritium gas. The batterypowered unit is worn on the belt inside the plastic suit. The PAS remains on the worker through 

the doffing process. The RCT collects the sample and sends the filter up to the lab for analysis 

on the Protean detector (a windowless proportional counter). The personal data are put on an air 

sampling form that accompanies the PAS filter to the lab for analysis. The filters are held for 

24 hours to allow the radon to decay. The Protean is calibrated for tritium using a National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) traceable source. The laboratory does not account 

for absorption by the metals. The air sampling form is not put into the personal radiation 

exposure file. 

You cannot discriminate OBT, tritiated water, and metal tritides in urine. It would be helpful to 

have solubility study information and a fecal method developed that is specific for STCs. 

Solubility 

The Plant Directed Research and Development (PDRD) program is designed to take the science 

that is known and apply the technology to operations. SRS does not know the solubility for all 

tritides handled. As a result, the project responded to a PDRD request. The tritium facilities 

wanted to look into solubilities for various compounds. The site started working with Lovelace. 

A study is proposed to look at the solubility of the following tritides: 

(1) Titanium tritide 

(2) Lanthanum/Nickel tritide 

(3) Magnesium tritide 

(4) Zirconium/magnesium tritide. 

The first tritide to be studied is lanthanum/nickel tritide. Dr. Eduardo Farfan2

 will be developing 

the dose factor. The funding is in place for fiscal year 2011. It takes about 3 months to conduct 

a study for each tritide. The study requires microgram quantities of the tritium compound. 

Obtaining the samples of tritium for this research will be conducted at the tritium facility. SRNL 

is considering developing a capability to conduct these and other tritium studies in A-Area, but 

this would require meeting National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants and 

Environmental Protection Agency requirements. 

The steps required for the study include (1) creating the lung equivalent tissue material, 

(2) attaching the tritium to the lung tissue (implantation), and (3) monitoring the release of 

tritium over time. 

While not all tritides have been studied, SRS does not/did not handle hafnium tritide. After the 

evaluation [of tritides at SRS], it looks like the more insoluble forms (e.g., hafnium) of SMTs 

are/were not at SRS. Part of the findings regarding tritides was that SRS had Type M tritides. 

Preliminary results from a solubility study indicate LaNiAl tritide appears to be more like 

uranium in solubility. 

2

 Dr. Farfan is an Associate Professor at Idaho State University. 
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One interviewee recommended that dissolution studies be conducted with deuterium and 

confirmed with a metal tritide. He is not aware of any metal deuteride solubility studies. 

Often times, internal dosimetry does not have particle size or solubility information. The 

technical standard [on STCs] says to be conservative when accessing exposure potential from 

STCs without solubility studies. If SRS does not know the solubility of the tritide, they treat it as 

Type S. For unknown particle size, a default International Commission on Radiation Protection 

(ICRP) value is used, unless there is information that contradicts this. With internal dosimetry, 

staff is trying to fit data points to models. 

Dose 

An interviewee who received dose at the K Area storage area commented that they did not 

receive the same exposure as individuals do at a nuclear plant. The laborers work more with 

decontamination, so their doses could be higher. The pipefitters do their own access ways and 

drilling through holes. 

As a result of work in Room 17, Building 233, one interviewee was put on work restriction for 

2 days. It only took a small assimilation to get out. If you receive 100 mrem, they want to pull 

you out of the 100K Area. 

When asked if they believe the information in the annual dose reports provided to them, one 

interviewee said it seems his dose rates go up each year slightly, but he does the same thing 

every year. Other interviewees indicated their doses correspond with where they were on site, 

and the jobs they were working. The CTWs interviewed indicated there are some nay-sayers 

who believe there are paper whippers to make the dose appear like they are going down. One 

interviewee doesn’t believe CTWs receive less than natural background. 

Tritium Dose 

Over the last 5 years, the collective dose at the tritium facility has been less than 100 mrem. 

Most individuals have received around 1 mrem or less. There has been a decrease in tritium 

exposure over time. From 1998–2005, there was more tritium exposure, because 232H was in 

operation. At the time, the collective dose was about 300–400 mrem for 400 radiological 

workers in the facility. The last individual dose above 100 mrem from tritium occurred about 

20 years ago. 

INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided their recollection and understanding of what incidents 

occurred at SRS, and how they were handled and documented, as follows.] 

An interviewee was not aware of a procedure for documenting incidents [prior to the 

mid-1980s]. There was a big paper trail when there was a recorded incident. If supervisors did 

not have to report it to upper management, then there was no paper trail. In the mid to late 

1980s, they started the emergency operations center. In the late 1980s, they started [defining] 
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reportable items; any contamination greater than a certain level had to be logged in. Before that, 

workers did not report anything that did not have to be reported. If you look at incident reports, 

the incidents are mostly during the daytime. Operations would just clean up other spills at night, 

and a lot of stuff never got reported. There were a lot of times when workers got crapped up 

when there was no HP. In some cases, workers deconned themselves. 

Workers might know about the incidents and they might not. Sometimes they found out after the 

fact. For example, in approximately 1979, [an interviewee’s] wife was at home watching CNN. 

All day, CNN had been running the news that SRS had just had the largest tritium release in the 

history of the site from the Manufacturing Facility. The interviewee was working in the building 

at the time, and the site did not notify him of this release; he had to learn the details from TV and 

the newspaper. There was no bioassay sample requested as a result of this occurrence. In about 

1989, another interviewee was working in the 100F Area Tank Farm. He came home and his 

wife asked if he had heard about a release at SRS. There was a sand filter release in the F Area. 

They did some sort of investigation. 

[Interviewees provided several examples of incidents and unusual occurrences at SRS.] 

 There were radiation conditions in the tank farms and canyons that were not documented. 

One interviewee requested his personnel file to see if there were incidents included. 

Once there was an increase in the tank level when they were not transferring anything. 

The stuff from the canyon, still in the acidic state, was sent by mistake to the tank farm. 

The interviewee stopped it and diverted it into his pump tank, which was made of 

stainless steel. This was just after the releases of tritium that affected the place all the 

way down to [the city of] Savannah. When he stopped the plutonium product from 

getting into the tank, the interviewee got awards and dinners, and even that incident was 

not in his personnel file. When asked if he had told NIOSH about this incident during his 

interview, the interviewee could not remember. He did not know what they were looking 

for in the interview. A worker representative has requested records, including incidents, 

on behalf of workers. He has noted that in hundreds of cases, he has not gotten them. 

 Air reversals occurred in some areas, most commonly in the B-lines. In the H Canyon, 

the alarms would go off because of air reversals. This occurred about every month or 

two and should be documented in the Operations Shift Log. The B-lines had more of a 

tendency to produce air reversals. This was because there was more air turnover in this 

area. They were trying to keep one room under positive pressure and the next under a 

vacuum. An air reversal would bring radioactive material into the room, causing it to get 

blown around, so there was more of a potential for contamination. When an air reversal 

occurred, workers had to exit the buildings. [RadCon] sent a decon crew into the area. 

The length of the evacuation was different at different times. Once, the workers could 

not go back in until the next day, because their clothing got contaminated. 

 There was an incident in 1979 or 1980, where there was an air reversal on the fourth level 

of H Canyon B-line. The interviewee was working in Room 410 Cell bagging out the 

plutonium. There were some newer operators who opened the doors before they had 

reached a certain point in the process. The inexperienced people did not call the B-line 

before opening the crane door. There was an air reversal when they opened up the door. 
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The people packaging were in respiratory protection. HP came in with a respirator on 

and told them to get the hell out of there, so the interviewee and his coworker evacuated 

the building. They learned that there had been an air reversal when the door was opened, 

resulting in plutonium being drawn from the gloveboxes and spreading to Room 410. 

The interviewee and coworker did not have respirators. [An HP] called them in a few 

hours later and did nasal smears. One of the men had contamination in his nostril. The 

interviewee was not asked to submit a bioassay sample. The HP who warned them 

earlier started logging the incident in the log. The HP Supervisor said he did not want 

him to write the incident up, because it would look bad, but the individual logged it 

anyway. The HP logging the incident had to go to the Army Reserves. During this time, 

his desk was broken into and the logbook was removed. 

 In the older tanks in the F Area Tank Farm, there is one tank that has a hole 40 inches 

down, and liquid cannot be put in the tanks above that level. There was an extraordinary 

rain. The storm waste-water drains were blocked with materials. Water did not run into 

drains; water ran off the parking lot into the F Area Tank Farm. Some of the storm drains 

were covered with pallets, and it was actually going into the tanks. Operations foremen 

got every pump they could find in the tank farm to move that water. Operators were in 

the water while they were pumping. 

 Workers changed out a jet or sparge on a high-heat waste tank. A supervisor went on 

overtime to change out the air sparge with the new Health Protection and Production 

foremen. The air sparge was put in to cool the tank temperature-wise. They built a hut 

and had a crane lined up. Workers built a pipe sleeve on top of the riser, and the man 

inside would pull the plug and pull the pipe sleeve close to the riser, pulling the air sparge 

through the sleeve. In the procedure, it said to swipe the bottom of the air sparge and let 

it drip for 5 minutes. Workers were required to get rid of all liquid in equipment before 

sending it to the burial ground. In this tank, the temperature was much greater than 

outside, especially on a cool night. The supervisor bagged it up without letting it drip for 

5 minutes. The production foreman and the HP came in and insisted that it needed to drip 

for 5 minutes according to the procedure. They opened the riser back up and let it drip. 

This crapped up the sleeve, the HP foreman, the production foreman, the tank, the hut, 

and the area outside the hut. 

 In L Area around 1990 or 1991, two electricians were core drilling. Workers cut a hole 

through concrete wall. They had to keep the bit cool with liquid. A laborer was asked to 

get some water and returned with a bucket, and it was heavy water. It became a major 

incident and everyone on the plant heard about it. 

 At DWPF, there were some line breaks and some bad incidents; sometimes they could 

not re-enter the facility for a week. 

 On the HB-line, there was a leak in an expansion joint. They had to paint it every couple 

of years to keep the dose down. 
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 An incident occurred with a new crane operator on shift. He tried to lift a jumper in the 

canyon without undoing the jumper and it caused a leak. The crane operator ripped the 

pipe in the riser loose. 

 In the P Area, they discovered a neutron beam. Operations had an E&I [Electrical and 

Instrumentation] shop on the other side of the hall. 

 One interviewee heard that Little Hector (a test reactor) went critical. It had a crack in 

the core, and they had to shut it down. 

 There was a meltdown in 105 K that is not mentioned in the evaluation report. A fuel rod 

melted down. An interviewee who was present said the reactor shut down. The incident 

was during scramming of the reactor. Workers never received any more information 

about the 105 K incident. 

 R Area was contaminated and shut down due to a major incident in the 1960s. People 

said it was a reactor meltdown, but the interviewee cannot verify the story. Even 

10 years ago, they still had radiation contamination signs posted there. 

 An interviewee had worked with an old gentleman who got blinded out there. He was 

hurt by a crane and could only see out of the sides of his eyes. They said they had not 

seen eye damage like that except for Japanese bomb blasts and long-term welders. There 

were no records of the incident. [See Addendum for comment.] 

Interviewees provided some examples of incidents that are not being considered in dose 

reconstruction. There are incidents that are not reported in the radiation exposure files, incidents 

where critiques were held. Any time there was a trigger limit exceeded, there should have been a 

critique. The lack of incident records seems to be an SEC issue, because a claimant 

representative runs into the same problem with every case he has dealt with. If they had the 

incident records, [the claimants] could show exposures far exceeding the estimates NIOSH is 

using in the dose reconstruction. Even when they do get something on an incident, it is usually 

just an acknowledgement that the incident occurred and a statement that they have accounted for 

it in the dose reconstruction. The records do not include any safety meeting minutes, log sheets, 

or investigation reports. As far as the interviewee can determine, NIOSH does not make the 

specific request for these records and DOE does not produce them in response to the general 

request from NIOSH. 

There were quite a few incidents that occurred at the site when limits were exceeded, either for 

contamination or radiation or a combination of the two or the scope of the job just got out of 

control. An RCT was involved in several incidents where monitors would go off scale and he 

would be called in to assist. These would all be documented with DOE critiques, because DOE 

was over the entire process. Any time there was a trigger limit, where something was exceeded a 

certain amount, they would have to do a critique, so that they could find causation for whatever 

the problem was. There are quite a few of these that are not included in the file [NIOSH claim 

file]. 
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 There was an incident during a job to put blanks into the chromate cooling lines. The 

chromate lines, a contained system that ran through the radioactive waste tanks to cool 

off the superheated sludge in the bottom of the tanks, obviously had leaked. These 

chromate lines corrode, have gaskets that leak or disintegrate, or blow out. The 

contamination actually got into the chromate cooling line and through the leak. When 

they unbolted the pipe, the chromate line was contaminated, so they had to exit the area. 

The entry requirements for the job were one pair of Anti-contamination clothing and no 

respiratory protection. The initial survey of the area exceeded the limits on the RWP and 

the respiratory protection limits. At that point, the RCTs were already in the area 

(without respiratory protection) and the survey was done, so they just had to exit the area 

and get the workers out. The operations workers would not have been in there before 

RCTs had done the initial survey, but the RCTs got out and got the workers away from 

the area. The incident was reported to supervision and subsequently reported to bioassay 

and dosimetry. The workers were required to collect a bioassay sample and probably 

nasal and saliva smears. There was quite a bit of paperwork to go along with this 

job/incident; they spent many days in meetings to try to find the cause. 

 There was another incident that occurred at the ITP facility at the Tank Farms. An RCT 

was covering an operator who was doing sludge founding. The RCT was in Anti-Cs and 

no respiratory protection. Surveys were conducted. A masslin wipe was taken and the 

results saturated the portable contamination instrument. They had to use a dose rate 

instrument to get the reading on the wipe. The supervisor did not readily accept the 

survey levels, so they had to go back in and survey the same thing when they knew the 

limits were already exceeded. After the initial entry, they had to enter the area dressed 

out in respirators because of the radiation contamination/radiation levels. There were no 

chemical surveys done during this period. 

 There was an incident in the H-Tank Farm involving the CTS [Central Transfer Station]. 

This is a concrete building with various pipes and valves. They rotate the valves to ship 

the waste through a diversion box, where it goes to a central area and then gets diverted 

into different pipes going in different directions. Workers were conducting a job in 

respiratory protection when an operator in the control room inadvertently transferred 

sludge directly through the building where they were. The sludge went the wrong 

direction and came out of a pipe that was not joined to the correct place. The area should 

have been locked down so this could not occur. The sludge was inadvertently dumped 

outside the building where they were working. The radiation monitors and the 

contamination monitors immediately went off. When any of the alarms go off, you have 

to exit the area immediately. [The workers inside the building] were unaware of the spill 

outside because they could not see it, and they had no radio communication because of 

the concrete building. They proceeded to the step-off pad where they took off their outer 

layer of clothing and respirator. Protective clothing was removed per the normal 

procedure, because they did not know they were actually moving into a higher level than 

they were leaving. The material had spilled all over the ground, and workers were 

coming out with no respirators and not enough protective clothing. They exited into a 

more contaminated area with airborne contamination. The instruments were off scale 

because of the radiation levels, so they could not survey. There were weeks of critiques 
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associated with this incident. There were bioassay samples, nasal smears, and saliva 

smears collected. It was a major incident that caused untold millions of dollars worth of 

damage. 

 Another incident occurred in 1992/1993; the job involved pulling a slurry pump. [Slurry 

pumps] continually circulate the sludge and help with the cooling and keeping the tank 

contents consistent. The slurry pump was going to come out of the tank covered with 

contamination and sludge, which made it a very hot job to cover. The levels that were 

encountered during the job were far beyond what the limited duty inspectors were 

allowed to do, and beyond the scope of what the job had originally started at. All of the 

workers received doses. The instruments would not read the radiation levels. They had 

to bring in Teletectors from other areas that have probes that extend 12 feet from your 

body to get an estimate of the levels. There were no bioassay results for this job [in the 

claimant’s file], but bioassay samples were collected. 

These incidents are not reflected in NIOSH dose reconstruction. [A claimant] gave NIOSH 

names of coworkers, hoping they could locate incident records through them. There has been no 

response from NIOSH; they have not followed up. NIOSH has two incident reports from 1997 

in [a claimant’s] file, and they assume that information is enough for the dose reconstruction. 

The CTF incident is not reported. These incidents [in the file] are not at all equivalent to the 

CTF incident; it’s like comparing apples and oranges. There would have been follow-up 

documentation and critiques for the above described incidents. Incident information can be 

obtained from the radiation survey log sheets, also. After an incident, someone would enter to 

check levels and record it; they were all dressed out in the highest level of protection. There are 

records that would back up everything that happened, because they had to document everything, 

but [claimants] cannot get those records. 

Tritium Incidents 

Several site experts stated they were not aware of any incident or job in which there have been 

unexpected exposures associated with tritides. This is based on the PAS and the bioassay 

program since 2004. Some site experts reported asking about incidents, because they wanted to 

know about any legacy problems so they were aware of them. 

There was an instance in 233H where the tritium level became very high in the glovebox, 

because there was a line breakage and the piping came loose. They screwed it back together, but 

it was too late. The material permeated through the gloves and into the room. After line breaks, 

there are surveys of gloves for permeation. 

Databanks and Database 

In about 1975, an individual with a background in deterministic risk assessments for the [SRS] 

reactors was asked to head up a group of five people to do risk assessment for the other facilities 

at Savannah River Plant (SRP, later called Savannah River Site). The group needed to compile 

failure and accident data, which is necessary for viable risk assessment studies. [This work led 

to the development of fault tree databanks.] The 200 Area Fault Tree Databank was originally 

put together as a research project under SRNL. Safety analysis was later moved under the 
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Engineering Department, and eventually to WSMS [Westinghouse Safety Management 

Solutions], along with the databanks. 

The WSMS database [along with its predecessor/component databanks] was used for many 

purposes, primarily [to evaluate the] frequency and consequences of events for use in safety 

analyses. You could do a lot of statistics with the databank. There was a thesaurus of similar 

words that it would recognize (i.e., plug, plugged, clogged, etc.). Based on the data, you could 

determine the frequency, consequences, and recovery time based on a proper sort and analysis of 

the data. The database also generated error factors. The risk assessors looked at the minimum, 

maximum, and average numbers associated with consequences of the events. [The data were 

used for other purposes as well.] It was used in verifying claims that individuals were involved 

in specific incidents. The database could be used to look up the incident, if they knew when and 

where [it occurred]. The database developer worked very closely with the lawyers on individual 

cases claiming incident involvement. The interviewee never found a case where [the database 

verified the individual’s claim]. Another use of the databank was to try to prevent accidents 

from occurring. For example, operations would call up and say that steam was coming out from 

around a cell cover. The databank could be used to indicate the probable causes (e.g., plugged 

equipment) and the situation could be remedied before it became a major failure. [The data were 

also used for] trend analysis and to aid designers in improving equipment stability. The 

developers shared the databank with anyone who wanted to have the data, including individuals 

at other DOE facilities and even anti-nuclear interveners. 

When the group started the 200 Area Fault Tree Databank, they searched primarily published 

information (i.e., daily teletypes, incident reports, fire records, monthly reports, Works Technical 

reports, Health Protection reports, etc.). They found that the detail in the published report was 

frequently too general to use for analysis; the reports talked about single major failures, and most 

events are caused by a series of minor failures. At this point, the group started to review the shift 

turnover logbooks, which were handwritten logbooks prepared by shift supervisors. They read 

through the logbooks, filled out a datasheet, and initially put the information on punch cards. 

There were about a million of these punch cards. Later, they started to enter the data into a 

mainframe computer via personal computers. 

The incidents in the databank ranged from minor leaks, which could lead to safety failures, to 

major incidents. Each incident was assigned codes, which included a source of data code, the 

date of the incident, the area, the facility (e.g., canyon, tank farms, burial ground, etc.), the unit 

operations, and keywords (e.g., leaks, explosions, fires, etc.). They assigned these codes to make 

the data more easily retrievable. When they entered an event, they tried to combine all input 

(e.g., operations, engineering, health protection) into a single entry to gain everyone’s 

perspective and to eliminate duplication. 

[Several databanks were developed for various areas and facilities at SRS.] Each of the 

databanks is structured the same way. The 200 Area Fault Tree Databank includes data for the 

separations facilities, tank farms, outside facilities, A-line, burial grounds, and support facilities. 

It does not include data for the tritium facilities in 200 H area. There are separate databanks for 

Fuel Fabrication (300 Area Fault Tree Databank), Tritium, and SRL. Waste Management events 

were entered as the facility “W” in the fault tree databanks for both F and H areas. Major 
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incident reports should all be in there. There was no fault tree databank for the reactors, but 

there was a collection of incidents for the reactor areas. This [reactor incident collection] would 

include only major incidents. 

The information in the 200 Area databank goes back to the startup of the facilities. [The number 

of incidents per year increased in the mid-1970s. For example, there were 590 entries in the 

database for 1960, whereas there were 18,708 entries for 1980. The increase in the number of 

incidents was related to changes in information sources.] Data from 1954–1973 were based 

primarily on published reports [generally limited to major incidents, as described above]. Data 

from 1973 to 1995 were based on all sorts of data types, but primarily came from logbooks. The 

use of logbooks increased the number of minor events put into the database. They tried to go 

back and get a couple of years of old logbooks, but many of them were already transferred to 

archives. When the interviewee left in 1995, data continued to be added to the databank for at 

least 2 years. The last entries after 1995 may not be well edited. 

Some superintendents were more prone to issue formal incident reports than others, but 

information was available from other sources. There are several incident reports generated on an 

incident (i.e., operations, health protection, fire protection, etc.). Generally, the shift supervisors 

were extremely honest and did not cover up anything. The logbooks in general were fairly 

consistent. Some areas had more facilities in the area. F Area had the A-line and the burial 

grounds. Tritium facility in H Area was a separate database. This could explain why F Area has 

more entries than H Area. 

Routine external radiation exposures will not be listed in the databank, but they did try to 

account for all the internal uptakes. The database included Health Protection department data, 

although individuals’ names were not used. The entry always contained a reference to the 

incident report from which individuals could be identified. By doing this, and by not putting the 

blame on anyone, they got an extreme amount of cooperation from operations. The 

interviewee’s best recommendation for locating radiation-related incidents is to run searches for 

keywords, such as ingestion, inhalation, uptake, etc. 

With respect to incidents in the tritium facilities, the Special Hazards Investigations are not the 

best source. For a more detailed list of incidents, you need to look at the Separations Incidents 

prior to 1983–1984 and Tritium Facilities Incidents from 1984 through the mid-1990s. The 

tritium fault tree databank has been converted to a Filemaker Pro database to make it more 

usable. It is available through the tritium facilities on the classified network with a Q-clearance 

and demonstrated need-to-know. 

The group issued annual reports on the databanks for the benefit of the production people. The 

Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) and the Systems Analysis Reports would be a source of 

information. The Systems Analysis Reports were non-legal documents that contained a lot of 

detail. The SARs contained only what information DOE requested. The SAR for the canyon 

facility started out as one volume, but with comments from DOE, ended up being 15 volumes. 

The 15-volume version was rejected, because it cost too much to generate, even though it 

contained the information DOE requested. 
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MEDICAL 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided their characterization of how medical monitoring was 

performed historically at SRS, as follows.] 

Up to 1985, subcontractors had to go through Medical. After this, the subcontractor was 

responsible for the physical. Direct hires still used the onsite Medical Facility. Since then, there 

were no onsite physicals, just referrals to a public hospital to get a certificate that you are 

physically able to do work. Even at offsite medical clinics, the doctor does not give you a 

physical. Parsons requires a fitness-for-duty check if you work at Salt Waste Processing Facility 

(SWPF). 

There was a lax process [for documenting incidents] on the part of the Medical department. An 

interviewee explained that the safety record was a big deal at SRS. “You didn’t want to hurt 

yourself on the job.” A CTW was injured on the job and required surgery. The worker was fired 

during the hospital stay and hired a lawyer to force the issue and get his job back. After 

returning, the individual sat in an office for weeks. So long as you reported to work, they did not 

record the injury. 

RADIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL RECORDS 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided knowledge of their understanding of the completeness 

and adequacy of radiological and medical records, as follows.] 

Workers had to fill out all security clearance forms to obtain security clearance. Every 

contractor, no matter how small, had to go through Medical and Security. Workers all got 

assigned a number when they came on site. Each craft had a specific prefix (25 – Electrician, 21 

– Sheetmetal Worker, etc.). They also had a user ID when Bechtel came on site, which was used 

to check training records. An interviewee had one payroll number for a while. When he went 

back out after a break in employment, they assigned him a different payroll number. The worker 

told them this was not the right payroll number. They said they could not find the original 

payroll number, so he had to use this new one. This was not an isolated case. 

A worker representative has sent hundreds of records requests to SRS on behalf of workers. 

When they would get the records, they would see there were gaps in the records. They would get 

a summary, but would not see the details. There would be an indication that a sample was given, 

but nothing in the records as to the result. NIOSH has requested records, and they have more 

records than are made available to the claimants, but they are still not complete. Even now, 

people who worked for the contractors have no records of employment out there. They want to 

know how they can verify that they worked there. Some of them have income tax records, or 

they can get signed affidavits from someone who knew that they worked out there. In one case, 

an individual was at SRS off and on from the early 1980s to about 2002. When he returned to 

SRS, they did not seem to have records of where he had worked. They said they could not find 

when he was there. 
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[SC&A observed that one interviewee’s DOE records (collected by NIOSH) did not include any 

data for several years scattered over a 15-year period when the worker was employed at SRS 

(late 1950s through mid-1970s).] The worker reported no significant changes in work activities 

that would explain these gaps. The interviewee was still entering radiological areas during these 

years, and does not know why there are no data. Worker representatives are concerned that 

NIOSH does not have all the records. If they do have all the records, then the monitoring 

information is incomplete. 

Westinghouse at one time had retrieved logbooks and they were stored at the cotton warehouse. 

As a result of an incident requiring medical treatment, an individual requested logbooks from the 

site to prove an incident had occurred. These logbooks were from the F Area canyon and the 

tank farms for certain years. There are inconsistencies between records. If you were to take a 

canyon control operations logbook, the HP office logbook, a lab area logbook, and the DOE 

morning report, that would tell you everything that happened in the area. If you were to try to 

match them, there would be discrepancies; for instance, in the number of the samples. To say 

that HP was on every job is not right. 

There were all kinds of records destroyed from the offices of subcontractors after they left the 

plant. In 1989, the subcontractors started leaving the job as their contracts expired. The 

personnel were transferred to BSRC [Bechtel Savannah River Company]. The crafts were 

transferred at various times starting in September 1989. In 1989, the electricians changed from 

Miller Dunn to BSRC. In the early 1990s, the fitters changed to Bechtel. Sometime in the early 

1990s, crews of 6–8 laborers went around to the office buildings that the general contractors had 

left. It was the records in their offices that were destroyed. Laborers went in and shredded the 

records; they loaded the stuff on pickup trucks and left. The interviewee is not sure whose 

laborers were doing the shredding; they were either DuPont construction laborers or Bechtel 

construction laborers. They shredded all kinds of records (e.g., monitoring records, time cards) 

after the subcontractors left the plant. The interviewee observed this when he had a maintenance 

crew out there to fix the electricity for the building. He went out to see why the electricity was 

out. There were laborers in there cleaning out file drawers to be shredded. If the interviewee is 

not mistaken, it was the heavy equipment office [where he observed this occurring], but he is not 

positive. The interviewee asked the laborers what they were doing, and they said they were 

shredding records. 

[In the 1980s,] every day they would print out radiation reports, so they could prevent people 

from getting overexposed. That would be the monthly reports. The supervisor would assign a 

job based on the radiation levels. Supervision would come up and talk to workers about their 

dose. 

Annual radiation reports were provided to some interviewees, particularly in the last few years. 

Others recalled getting a report when they left the site. Annual exposure reports were not 

reviewed with, or explained to, the workers. Although they received annual reports, some 

workers do not believe the numbers reported on them. 

One worker stated that a lot of things are missing from the Medical file. He once had an incident 

where he was nauseous while working in the F Area canyon. They thought he was having heat 

stroke. This was last-minute overtime, and they were working on the hot gang valve corridor all 
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night. They were doing a transfer. The worker called the foreman and said he was going to 

Medical, including the route he was taking. He called the foreman when he reached Medical. 

The nurse treated him for heat exposure. The worker went to a private doctor, because he 

developed and had a [redacted] for 2 years. This incident was not in the medical records. This 

was a unique exposure that required a visit to the infirmary. There was no triage in the file. The 

safety record was a big deal at SRS. A worker did not want to hurt himself on the job. 

Another worker indicated there are gaps in the exposure data. There were dosimeters on our 

extremities, ankles and wrists. Electronic dosimeters were also used. These are not available in 

the records. All of this information is linked to a particular job. NIOSH has used coworker data 

in the dose reconstruction, but they have not looked at specific jobs. 

SEC PETITION AND EEOICPA PROCESS COMMENTS 

The petition went in for construction workers and all other workers, but NIOSH narrowed it to 

construction workers. The petitioners defined the class to include all workers who worked at 

SRS from 1951–2007. Two of the three petitioners were from operations, not construction. 

NIOSH’s initial letter to the petitioner indicated that supporting documentation was available for 

qualifying SRS construction workers; however, no supporting documentation was provided or 

identified by NIOSH to qualify SRS non-construction workers. The letter stated, “We have 

completed the evaluation process,” and that the class definition was narrowed to all construction 

workers. This decision was provided in March 2008. 

Petitioners claim that there is inadequate monitoring. There were numerous occasions when 

people were not properly monitored. A lot of times, a worker was supposed to work in clean 

areas and all of the sudden, the area was hot. There were tons of times when records were 

inaccurate or not kept properly. SRS would give workers a 6-month or quarterly report on how 

many rems they received. It was never right. People would get more in one session than they 

were told they got in the quarterly report. For example, a CTW working on the B-line got more 

rems in one day than the report says he got in the quarter. He knew this, because he read his 

self-reading pencil [dosimeter]. NIOSH just took the dose records as is. 

NIOSH said that the production workers were in a set area. There were monitors in the area. 

They did not move around. This was absolutely false. There were affidavits signed by 

production personnel where the men worked all over the plant on the weekends. There were not 

any monitors to go around. There was no supervision around. Another said they were not 

monitored on the weekends. 

One non-construction petitioner and his representative requested an administrative review. 

Before issuing a proposed finding that non-construction workers failed to meet the specific 

requirements needed to qualify for evaluation, it was the responsibility of NIOSH according to 

its Petition Evaluation Plan (Plan) to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether it is 

feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses of the class of employees 

through NIOSH dose reconstructions. NIOSH was obligated to review available data, including 

documents and information, which supported the basis of the petition, and in fact, NIOSH 

solicited additional information at outreach meetings in May 2008. 
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If a review has been requested, three Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 

personnel who were not involved in developing the proposed finding are appointed by the 

Director of NIOSH to complete the reviews and report to the Director. The Director of NIOSH 

considers the results of the review and then makes a final decision as to whether the submission 

satisfies the requirements for evaluation. 

The petitioner received a letter from Dr. Howard [John Howard, M.D., Director of NIOSH] 

stating that a panel of three had presented findings and said the non-construction petitioner did 

not provide sufficient information to extend the class definition. The petitioner requested 

another review, because it was obvious that NIOSH had not complied with the requirements of 

its own Plan and the requirements set out in the regulations for the first review. For example, the 

29 pages of minutes of the May 2008 meetings were not available to the panel, as far as the 

petitioner was able to ascertain. Also, there is no credible evidence in the FOIA [Freedom of 

Information Act] material [provided to the petitioner] that NIOSH found a way to make an 

independent determination about which hazards employees were most likely to be exposed to 

during their employment at SRS, because of the uncertainty and gaps in the monitoring data, as 

mentioned in the assessment. 

In order to view what materials were reviewed by the panel, the non-construction petitioner 

requested that he be given the material relating to the decision of the panel, including a copy of 

the panel’s report to Dr. Howard. There were no panel findings, reports, or recommendations 

contained in the material. There are also no records of the workers who gave information at the 

May 22, 2008, meeting. Because the Director withheld four pages of information that were 

presented to him from the panel, the petitioner has been prevented from determining whether or 

not the panel complied with regulations. 

WORKER OUTREACH 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided comments on their experiences with worker outreach 

meetings, as follows.] 

At the November 2003 meeting, NIOSH was soliciting information to write the site profile. An 

interviewee never did understand what NIOSH’s purpose was. Workers thought they were here 

to help, but they were disappointed. The Building Trades Council (BTC) had been screening and 

found out that the guys were exposed to beryllium. SRS said that there was no beryllium onsite. 

The BTC wanted to protect its workers. When [the meeting was over], this was the last the 

participants heard from NIOSH. The BTC never got any minutes of the meeting. 

A NIOSH representative indicated to the CTW petitioner they had been able to obtain all the 

records they needed to prove electricians were monitored adequately. During a worker outreach 

workshop in Cincinnati, Ohio, one individual said DOE had agreed to furnish the records. DOE 

said the records would not be complete. If the records are incomplete, why doesn’t NIOSH 

approve the petition? One of NIOSH’s people said they had to go through the records. The 

petitioner was also told that NIOSH does not determine the SEC status. At the time, it sounded 

like NIOSH was going to approve the petition. It was an about-face when the petitioner got the 

letter. 
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In May 2008, NIOSH held a meeting to get information about construction and other workers, 

and to get information about missing monitoring data. Information was read into the transcript 

of testimony from a responder. They provided statements concerning surveyors. A participant at 

the meeting also talked about going out on the site without a badge. All of this information was 

there. They said, “...present information to get these people [operations workers] back.” The 

non-construction petitioner and others did provide the information. NIOSH did not consider any 

of the other evidence that was presented, and they did not do any follow-up on what workers and 

representatives said. 

At the meeting, the attendees cited the TBD and individuals working at SRS when badges were 

not worn on weekends. When participants gave the information at the May 2008 meeting, they 

showed names redacted, but they gave NIOSH tracking numbers for each one of these people, in 

order to get the records. The cases included someone who had been sent home in booties and 

raincoat without his clothes, and those records are not in his dose reconstruction. The 

interviewee expected that NIOSH would ask for the records of the people who spoke. In 

December 2008, NIOSH said that they had not requested the records, because they had other 

records that they said were sufficient. 

NIOSH did not contact the CTW petitioner about the evaluation report. NIOSH has not paid 

attention to what workers say in the meetings. They never gave participants responses to their 

individual comments. The interviewees never saw anything that NIOSH incorporated into the 

site profile. 

CPWR COMMENTS 

[Interviewees working with the Medical Surveillance Program, collectively, provided 

information on their involvement in EEOICPA, information they have gained on SRS, their 

understanding of the NIOSH analysis of CTW dose, and the difficulties associated with 

determining CTW dose, as follows.] 

The Center for the Protection of Worker Rights (CPWR) has a contract with the DOL 

[Department of Labor] to verify employment for construction workers when a DOE site does not 

have any records. It is not unusual that the DOE not only has no information on the worker, but 

also no information on the contractor. It is not unusual for the DOL to not be able to identify the 

company. Presumably, the central records database can be found from Atlanta. CPWR has 

established a database of contractors and subcontractors for the DOL. They can verify the name 

of the contractor, the contractor’s presence at the specific site, and the time period when that 

contractor was at the site. They have various ways to verify employment, like dispatch records, 

health records, and so on. CPWR can usually get verification for 80% of the requests. For SRS, 

they have 399 specific verifications. 

CPWR conducts interviews as the first part of a health-screening program to see if a worker is 

eligible for a medical examination, and to tailor the examination to the needs of that worker. 

This is a screening calculation to identify if they have a significant risk, and to try to help them 

medically. All interviewers are workers who know these sites in and out. This is done at every 

site. It is important for retired workers to do these interviews. It is proving to be a very good 

approach. 
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CPWR’s computer program can calculate the exposures that workers were getting from their 

workplace, say to asbestos, or as a bystander near others working nearby. They have modules 

for beryllium, mercury, lead, asbestos, and silica exposure. Nearly everyone has asbestos 

exposure, so essentially everyone gets to go for a medical screening. They pick the chemicals up 

with blood tests and other tests. They do not have a radiation module, because there is nothing 

they can do for a radiation cancer that makes it unique. This is not a research project, so CPWR 

does not go into details about radiation. They go into details about trade, employer, period, 

areas, tasks, materials, and exposure incidents. They have identified 50-odd high-risk work 

tasks. For most of these things, they consider how much is the worker’s own work and how 

much from people working around them. They have a five-point scale for exposure. 

When asked if self-reported exposure information is reliable, a CPWR representative stated that 

they have done a lot of work on this. Workers do report low exposures to hazards. Electricians, 

for instance, will say “one” for silica or “zero” for beryllium. Ten years ago, 99% did not know 

what beryllium was. An interviewer can tell when a worker is not telling the truth. They have 

been provided with training. If an electrician says he was doing sandblasting, then the 

interviewer knows it is not right. But if he says he was near someone who did and says a “two” 

for silica exposure, then the interviewer’s judgment is that it is right. Ninety percent (90%) of 

the people give you accurate information. CPWR interviewers do not question what the workers 

say in terms of writing it down. CPWR works with a doctor who looks at the statistical 

reliability of the data. Two epidemiologists are a part of the CPWR team serving as 

epi[demiological] advisors. 

CPWR has supplied 83 significant site history documents to NIOSH, as was communicated in 

Attachment A of the petition. They have a repository of site history at the University of 

Cincinnati, which was developed so that interviewers would have an understanding of the sites 

for their interviews. CPWR has done 3,300 worker interviews at SRS. From the interviews, 

they have learned a lot about the site. They identified a list of additional radionuclides for 

NIOSH in 2003. They have given NIOSH everything they asked for. Cooperation with NIOSH 

is very tense, because CPWR keeps pushing the differences that construction workers have with 

operations workers. 

A CPWR representative does not think anything they have given to NIOSH was incorporated 

into the SRS site profile with regards to the construction workers. This is part of CPWR’s 

problem. CPWR raises an issue and NIOSH says, “We are working on it” or “We are 

developing a model.” So CPWR is fighting a moving target, and it is impossible for them to 

keep track of all the changes. The interviewee has no idea as to whether NIOSH applies those 

changes to the cases and goes back to rework them. One group from NIOSH is going around 

telling workers to file SECs, while another part of NIOSH is saying they can do dose 

reconstruction. 

NIOSH says if persons were not wearing monitoring in radiologically controlled areas, they were 

in violation of the procedures. This issue does not place a barrier on NIOSH to bound dose 

(page 69 of the ER). NIOSH says they are evaluating a coworker model on page 70 of the 

evaluation report. [Several questions and concerns were raised about this coworker model.] 

How do you define a coworker? NIOSH is very vague about how they define a coworker for 
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dose reconstruction. There have been more construction workers than production workers. One 

of the critical failures of NIOSH’s approach is not to classify people by occupation. When they 

have to identify workers as construction workers, they do a text search to determine that. It is 

hard to understand how they can exclude production workers from the SEC petition, because 

they themselves decided not to go through and identify by production and construction. At one 

point, they agreed that their general model for dose reconstruction was not valid for construction 

workers, and they agreed to re-do the SRS dose reconstruction procedure. They went and 

defined where the trades workers were. They use [text search] terms, and anyone they have a hit 

on is called a construction worker. Everyone else is a production worker. 

At SRS, NIOSH says they can take an all-worker average, make an adjustment, apply it to 

construction workers, and everything should work out just fine. They can come up with a dose, 

but whether it is valid or not is anyone’s guess. The coworker model says SRS had monitoring 

data in Health Physics Annual Radiation Exposure History [HPAREH] and those data are also 

similar to other workers. Construction workers are much more episodic than production 

workers. In one sense or another, all construction work is improvised. It is not routine in any 

way. Construction workers discuss work on the spot and work by experience and skill. NIOSH 

has not understood that or was not willing to accept that there was something special about 

construction workers. NIOSH says that unmonitored construction workers must also be similar 

to monitored workers. But just because monitored construction workers were similar to 

monitored operations workers, it doesn’t mean that unmonitored construction workers are like 

monitored construction workers. 

It is unreasonable to expect that claimants should define something that NIOSH itself has not 

defined. There is a gray area in main, renovation, or repair work. That can be in-house or 

construction workers. DuPont had full-time construction workers on site. DuPont said they 

would operate this site if they can do production with non-union and construction with union 

workers. See the 1946 and 1947 hearings; DuPont won that argument. DuPont directly hired 

people from union halls. There were also specialized subcontractors, like Miller Dunn, who did 

electrical work. 

OTIB-52 [Construction Worker Procedure ORAUT-OTIB-0052] does not adequately cover the 

differences with construction workers. And so far as the SC&A review is concerned, the 

summary is favorable to the procedure, but this is different than the content of the review. 

The 1999 hearings referenced [in the petition] by CPWR were the hearings that David Michaels3

held as part of the law being passed. 

3

 David Michaels, PhD, MPH, was the DOE Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety, and 

Health from 1998 to 2011. 
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However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

SEC EVALUATION REPORT COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PASSAGES 

[An interviewee provided specific comments on statements in the NIOSH SEC evaluation 

report.] 

Page 20, paragraph 2: The independent ventilation system that they talk about failed at one time. 

Reversed air came into the room and people (office workers and such in the K Area) had to stay 

out for 3 weeks before they could go back in there. The ER missed that. 

Page 20, bottom of page: The bubble tower crew was 9 to 12 people, and they were told to cut it 

and get out. There were all kinds of contamination in those bubble towers—radiation, asbestos, 

and all kinds of contamination. There was no monitoring equipment and no dress up—nothing. 

Electric Motor Service, the company they worked for, is not in business, and there is no record of 

it. Four of the people have claims; some others are dead. 

Page 21, Tritium facilities (5.1.5): Buildings 236 and 238 are not mentioned. These are tritium 

buildings, as well. 

Page 22, next to last paragraph: The list does not mention Building 321, where the final stages 

of the fuel rods were put together. It is now torn down. It was contaminated, and there was a 

tremendous amount of beryllium contamination there. Some people were checked and they took 

blood samples at 15 to 30 minutes and said there was none. So far as [the interviewee] knows, it 

takes 2 or 3 weeks to do a blood culture to check for beryllium. 

Page 26, last paragraph: The Naval Reactor Fuels facility was crapped up at first start-up and 

never restarted. It has been torn down for some time; it is now a parking lot. The 

decontamination was done by production, and construction workers did the work. 

MISCELLANEOUS 

[The interviewees, collectively, provided additional comments they wished to include in the 

summary for consideration, as follows.] 

 Until Hazel O’Leary [Secretary of Energy, 1993–1996], workers did not even know how 

much product was being produced. 

 The Naval Reactor Fuel facility was started in 1985 or 1986 and is decommissioned now. 

The facility backed up to the F Canyon. A lot of people who worked in Naval Reactor 

Fuels have a nasty cancer, and a lot of those workers have large non-cancerous tumors in 

their organs. 

 Each subcontractor’s main goal is to get their bonus money and get contracts renewed, 

not help previous workers with problems that did not happen on their watch. 

 All of the reactors used to drain out into those outfalls. There were mutated frogs and 

fish and all kinds of things. 
Effective Date: 

April 04, 2012 

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 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

NOTICE:

 In 1981, one interviewee was sent out to LANL to work on the Molecular Laser Isotope 

Separation project with the Laser Isotope Separation Group in Technical Area (TA)-55. 

LANL and LLNL were developing an AVLIS [Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation] 

technique for separation of plutonium metal. This involved vaporizing the plutonium 

into a gas phase, ionization, and subsequent separation. The interviewee was conducting 

cross section, spectroscopy, and physical experiments with plutonium tetrafluoride 

(PuF4). The interviewee spent about one-fourth of the time handling PuF4. LANL was 

responsible for his personnel radiation monitoring. He received an exit whole-body 

count, which was negative. The program ended in 1983 or 1984. 

 A release of beryllium was documented during the meltdown in 105K. There is some 

beryllium locked up in a vault. 

 One interviewee indicated he came back positive for beryllium sensitivity. In 2002, they 

flew him to Colorado for a test of his lung fluid. The doctor indicated the beryllium was 

not in the lungs. He did not think he would pick up beryllium with all the precautions 

taken. 

Recommended References 

Special Tritium Compounds in the Savannah River Technology Center, WRC-RP-2000-00705, 

August 3, 2000. 

Metal Hydrides for Pumping and Storing: Studies of LaNi4 After Twenty-one Months of Tritium 

Exposure (U), DPST-89-366 

Drawing of the Bed (Provided to NIOSH) 

Tritium Focus Group presentations (available through Bob Rabun) 

Personal tritium files of Bob Rabun 

Tritium Facilities Incident No. 88-1-7, DPSP-88-1085 

Tritium Training 
Effective Date: 

April 04, 2012 

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NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

REFERENCES 

DOE 1993. Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, DOE 5400.5, U.S. 

Department of Energy, Washington, DC. January 7, 1993. 

DOE 1994. Radiological Control Manual, DOE/EH-0256T, U.S. Department of Energy, 

Washington, DC. April 1994. 

DOE 2004. Radiological Control Programs for Special Tritium Compounds, DOE-HDBK1184-2004, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC. September 2004. 

ORAUT 2007, Parameters to Consider When Processing Claims for Construction Trade 

Workers, ORAUT-OTIB-0052, Rev. 00 PC-1, Oak Ridge Associated Universities Team, Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee. January 16, 2007. 

SRS 2000. Special Tritium Compounds in the SRS Tritium Facility, DPD-TED-2000-00081, 

Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina. August 25, 2000. 
Effective Date: 

April 04, 2012 

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NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

ADDENDUM 

SC&A submitted a draft of this interview summary to Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, L.L.C. 

(SRNS) for classification review in December 2011. When the document was returned to 

SC&A, a letter from Karen Brown, Worker Health Studies Program Manager for SRNS to Lynn 

Ayers of Saliant, Inc. (subcontractor to SC&A) was enclosed. Ms. Brown’s letter states, “During 

the course of the review, personnel in the Classification Office familiar with the history and 

operations of the Tritium Facilities identified concerns about the accuracy of certain information 

presented in the summary.” The concerns are listed in an attachment to the letter (Brown 2012). 

With CDC approval, SC&A forwarded the letter and a draft version of this Addendum to the 

three interviewees involved to inform them of the concerns and questions raised, as well as 

SC&A action taken. One of the interviewees provided a response. 

Where conflicting observations and statements about a site are received from site experts, 

SC&A’s typical practice is to retain both perspectives in the summary report. This Addendum 

presents the concerns and questions verbatim from Ms. Brown’s correspondence and describes 

the actions SC&A has taken in regard to each issue, as well as contextual material and the 

interviewee’s response. We are finalizing this interview summary, since it contains a great deal 

of material that is under discussion in the SEC petition relating to the site that is under review. 

We will issue a revision of this interview summary if any further interviewee responses are 

forthcoming. 

For each comment sent by SRNS, SC&A created a set of entries in the following table (Table 1): 

 “Reference:” The referenced item, page, and paragraph. 

 “Quote from Draft Summary:” This reproduces the passage from the draft interview 

summary to which SRNS made reference. 

 “Accuracy Concern:” This reproduces verbatim the concern expressed by SRNS. 

 “SC&A Action:” This states the action that SC&A took in response to the concern. 

 “Response from Site Expert:” This presents an interviewee’s response concerning one of 

the issues.
Effective Date: 

April 04, 2012 

Revision No. 

0 (Draft) 

Document No. 

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Page No. 

65 of 66 

NOTICE: This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table 1: Context, SRNS Concern, SC&A Action, and Interviewee Response (if applicable)

Reference Page 18, first paragraph under “Weapons Program Operations” 

Quote from 

Draft Summary 

“Reservoirs are designed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 

and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The Rocky Flats Plant design 

(reservoir design on the early bottles) was built at the Kansas City Plant (KCP).” 

Accuracy Concern The Rocky Flats Plant and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) did 

not design reservoirs. Reservoirs were designed at Sandia and Los Alamos.

SC&A Action Because the reservoir design site information does not make any particular point 

about radiological hazards or controls at Savannah River, SC&A revised the text 

to read: “Reservoirs were designed at other DOE sites.”

Reference Page 24, third paragraph 

Quote from 

Draft Summary 

“Building 233H operations are based on a temperature range of 50oC to 500oC to 

generate all pressures. If you change the amount of aluminum in the storage 

material LaNiAl, you can affect the vapor pressures. You can adjust the amount 

of aluminum by replacing nickel with aluminum. The metal hydride storage and 

process beds reduced the releases of tritium to the environment. Prior to this, the 

tritium went up the stack.” 

Accuracy Concern Concerning Building 233-H, the reason stack releases are almost non-existent is 

due to the use of a closed glovebox system with a stripper system. The use of 

hydride beds will greatly decrease the tritium that escapes the atmosphere in the 

event of a catastrophic failure (e.g., earthquake) during which the piping is 

opened up to the atmosphere.

SC&A Action SC&A inserted a note in square brackets at the end of the sentence to direct the 

reader to this Addendum. 

Reference Page 25, first sentence 

Quote from 

Draft Summary 

“NiZr tritide is a new material being handled. The new MOX [Mixed Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication] Facility will have plutonium tritide.” 

Accuracy Concern MOX will not have plutonium tritide.

SC&A Action SC&A inserted a note in square brackets at the end of the sentence to direct the 

reader to this Addendum. 

Reference Page 26, top of second paragraph 

Accuracy Concern Should STS be SRS instead?

SC&A Action SC&A corrected the typographical error. 
Effective Date: 

April 04, 2012 

Revision No. 

0 (Draft) 

Document No. 

Revised SRS Master Interview Summary 

Page No. 

66 of 66 

 This report has been reviewed for Privacy Act information and has been cleared for distribution. 

However, this report is pre-decisional and has not been reviewed by the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health for factual accuracy or applicability within the requirements of 42 CFR 82.

Table 1: Context, SRNS Concern, SC&A Action, and Interviewee Response (if applicable)

NOTICE:

Reference Page 28, next to last paragraph 

Quote from 

Draft Summary 

“[Between 1984 and 1986, a building addition was constructed above the FBline.] There was an extra floor added to the top of the building. The original 

building is concrete, but the additions were made out of blue metals. There were 

hundreds of construction workers, all crafts, working on that addition. It was 

considered new construction and the area was considered a clean area. There 

were no radiological postings and the workers were not monitored. Although it 

was considered a clean area, there was hot air coming out of the stacks of the FBline. The chutes coming out of the FB-line (a tremendously hot area) were 

opened periodically to the vents. All the air in the hot canyon area came out on 

the ladders right next to the vents. There were all kinds of construction workers 

that worked out there that received doses that were not monitored.” 

Accuracy Concern Air from the hot canyon did not exhaust to the roof. It went out the stack via 292-

H fan house and through the sand filter.

SC&A Action SC&A inserted a note in square brackets at the end of the paragraph to direct the 

reader to this Addendum. 

Response from Site 

Expert 

The site expert responded by telephone to provide clarification about the situation 

described in the interview summary. SC&A recorded the response as follows: 

The site expert agreed with the SRNS observation regarding the stack location. 

The air exchange described in the interview summary was from roof vents that 

could open and close, not from a stack. When the vents opened, workers felt air 

coming up from below, so people working close to the vents were exposed to the 

same air as the workers below. The workers below were dressed out to work in a 

hot area. The workers on the roof were uneasy about this. They had no way to 

know if they were exposed or not, because they were not monitored. 

Reference Page 45, last bullet 

Quote from 

Draft Summary 

“An interviewee had worked with an old gentleman who got blinded out there. 

He was hurt by a crane and could only see out of the sides of his eyes. They said 

they had not seen eye damage like that except for Japanese bomb blasts and longterm welders. There were no records of the incident.” 

Accuracy Concern It is unclear what is being described here. There is a reference to an “old 

gentleman” being hit by a crane. His eye damage was compared to a Japanese 

bomb blast. Was the eye damage described a result of radiation exposure or some 

other trauma?

SC&A Action SC&A inserted a note in square brackets to direct the reader to this Addendum. 

The inquiry was directed to the interviewee. 

Reference:

Brown, K. 2012. Letter from Karen Brown, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, L.L.C., to Lynn 

Ayers (Saliant/SC&A), ESH-WHS-2012-0016, January 24, 2012.