COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Koontz,* Bray and Annunziata 

ALBERT V. DOUGHERTY 

v. Record No. 0368-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION**

 PER CURIAM 

ELIZABETH C. DOUGHERTY AUGUST 29, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 

 (John M. DiJoseph; Sattler & DiJoseph, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 No brief for appellee. 

 Albert V. Dougherty (husband) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court awarding spousal support to Elizabeth C. Dougherty 

(wife) and deciding other issues. Husband raises the following 

issues on appeal: (1) whether the award of attorney's fees to 

wife was appropriate; (2) whether the chancellor erred in 

awarding wife a portion of husband's pension; (3) whether the 

chancellor erred determining husband's income; and (4) whether 

the award of spousal support was improper. Upon reviewing the 

record and husband's opening brief, we conclude that this appeal 

is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

chancellor's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Justice Koontz participated in the decision of this case 

prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of 

Virginia. 

 **Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

 I. Award of Attorney's Fees

 An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the 

sound discretion of the chancellor and is reviewable on appeal 

only for an abuse of discretion. Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 

326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper award 

of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the circumstances. 

McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 338 S.E.2d 159, 162 

(1985). 

 The chancellor considered the circumstances of the 

litigation, including husband's refusal to participate in 

discovery and his contest of the proposed fee award requiring 

wife to retain the services of an expert witness, and the 

relative positions of the parties and made an award of fees in 

favor of wife appropriate to the case. Based on our review of 

the record, we cannot say that the award of attorney's fees and 

costs for an expert witness was unreasonable or an abuse of the 

chancellor's discretion. 

 II. Pension

 The chancellor is vested with broad discretion in fashioning 

an equitable distribution award. 

 Unless it appears from the record that the 

chancellor has abused his discretion, that he 

has not considered or has misapplied one of 

the statutory mandates, or that the evidence 

fails to support the findings of fact 

underlying his resolution of the conflict in 

the equities, the chancellor's equitable 

distribution award will not be reversed on 

appeal. 
 3 

Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 244-45, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368 

(1987)(citation omitted). 

 The chancellor calculated the marital share of husband's 

pension as eighty percent of the total, based upon thirty-five 

total years of husband's pension accumulation and twenty-eight 

years of marriage during husband's employment. The marital 

share, thus calculated, satisfied the provisions of Code 

§ 20-107.3(G)(1). The chancellor also awarded wife no more than 

fifty percent of the marital share. Id. Therefore, as the 

chancellor's award to wife of forty percent of husband's pension 

satisfied Code § 20-107.3, we cannot say the chancellor abused 

his discretion in making the award. 

 Nor did the chancellor err in failing to require a present 

value calculation for husband's pension. "A present value 

calculation is of direct use only where payment of the portion of 

the monetary award attributable to the pension is to occur 

immediately rather than over a period of time." Zipf v. Zipf, 8 

Va. App. 387, 397, 382 S.E.2d 263, 269 (1989). The parties did 

not intend to make an immediate monetary award in this case. 

 III. Determination of Income

 "The weight which should be given to evidence and whether 

the testimony of a witness is credible are questions which the 

fact finder must decide." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 

523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). "[T]he judgment of the 

trial court on questions of fact is entitled to great weight and 
 4 

will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it." Smith v. Board of Supervisors, 201 Va. 

87, 91, 109 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1959). Husband asserted a 

significant decline in income in the months prior to the final 

hearing. Wife also introduced evidence of husband's income. We 

cannot say the chancellor's factual determination that husband's 

income in previous years more accurately reflected husband's 

actual earnings was plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it. Accordingly, we affirm the chancellor's decision to compute 

spousal support using $53,000 as husband's annual income. 

 IV. Spousal Support

 In awarding spousal support, the chancellor 

must consider the relative needs and 

abilities of the parties. He is guided by 

the nine factors that are set forth in Code 

§ 20-107.1. When the chancellor has given 

due consideration to these factors, his 

determination will not be disturbed on appeal 

except for a clear abuse of discretion. 

Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 

(1986). The chancellor noted those factors, evident on the 

record and appropriate to the determination under the statute, 

upon which he based his award. We cannot say the chancellor 

abused his discretion in awarding wife $200 a month in spousal 

support. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.