2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-28-2009

Wrench Transp Ser v. Bradley

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 07-4817

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Recommended Citation

"Wrench Transp Ser v. Bradley" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 928.

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The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International 1

Trade, sitting by designation.

 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 07-4817

_____________

WRENCH TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC.;

JAMES MALONE, JR.,

 Appellants

 v.

FRANK BRADLEY; JOHN F. KENNEDY;

MARIANNE LEWICKI; LEAH ANN MCMAHON

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(No. 95-cv-06203)

District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 20, 2008

Before: BARRY and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges and RESTANI, Judge1

(Filed: July 28, 2009)

OPINION OF THE COURT
2

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Wrench Transportation Systems, Inc. and its sole stockholder, James

Malone, Jr. (“Malone”) appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendants John Kennedy and Leah Ann McMahon (“Kennedy” and “McMahon”). 

Because we find that Malone is not entitled to substantive due process protection for his

purported interest in either his right to “engage in business” or his personal property

ownership of his trucks, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Kennedy and McMahon. 

I.

Because we write only for the parties, we will only address the facts that are

relevant to our analysis. This case arises out of the civil forfeiture of certain Malone

trucks seized in connection with a New Jersey state criminal investigation about the

illegal transport of waste oil. Malone claims that the defendants violated his substantive

due process rights when they allegedly refused to return the Malone vehicles unless

Malone signed a release and provided testimony for them in connection with the criminal

investigation. 

To pursue this claim, Malone sued Frank Bradley (a New Jersey state investigator)

(“Bradley”), Marianne Lewicki (a New Jersey state investigator) (“Lewicki”), Kennedy,

and McMahon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 2003, the District Court granted summary

judgment to defendant Marianne Lewicki on the grounds of absolute immunity. See
3

Appendix (App.) 14-15. Malone did not appeal that decision. In Wrench Transp. Serv.,

Inc. v. Bradley, 136 F. App’x 521 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Wrench I”), we found that Bradley

was entitled to qualified immunity because Malone was unable to show a causal

connection between Bradley’s actions and the return of the Malone trucks. See Wrench I,

136 F. App’x at 522. At that time, we declined to decide whether Malone had a

protectible substantive due process interest. Id. 

In Wrench Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Bradley, 212 F. App’x 92, 98-100 (3d Cir. 2006)

(“Wrench II”), we found that Kennedy and McMahon were not entitled to absolute

immunity for their alleged actions in connection with their post-seizure conduct regarding

Malone’s property, because they were acting in an investigatory, rather than a

prosecutorial, capacity. We also held that there was no evidence that Kennedy or

McMahon tried to coerce false testimony from Malone in exchange for the trucks. Id. at

100. 

The case then returned to the District Court, where Kennedy and McMahon argued

both that Malone had failed to show that his substantive due process rights were violated,

and that, even if Malone’s rights had been violated, Kennedy and McMahon were still

entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Kennedy and McMahon. It found that, with regard to Kennedy, Malone had failed to

establish a causal connection between Kennedy’s actions and his alleged injuries, as he

was required to do, and that Kennedy was entitled to summary judgment. See Wrench
4

Transp. v. Bradley, No. 95-cv-06203, 2007 WL 4233011 at *4, *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 2007)

(“Wrench III”). In addition, the District Court noted that even if Malone had established

a causal connection between Kennedy’s actions and his alleged injuries, his failure to

establish that he had a property interest that is protected by substantive due process would

result in the failure of his claim. Although the District Court held that McMahon’s

actions met the causal connection standard, it nevertheless found that McMahon was

entitled to summary judgment because Malone failed to establish a substantive due

process violation, a showing which is required for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Id. at *8. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court reviews the grant of summary

judgment de novo. Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). “Summary

judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted). See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). When analyzing a summary judgment claim, “we must view the facts in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences

therefrom in that party’s favor.” New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Harsco Corp., 497 F.3d

323, 326 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

III.

 Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
5

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .” It is a remedial statute; it does not create rights. Kneipp v.

Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To succeed on a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff

must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff’s federal

constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore

v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Thus, we first look to see

whether Malone was deprived of a constitutional right. The District Court found that he

was not. We agree.

Malone contends that Kennedy and McMahon violated his rights under the

substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they failed to return

the Malone trucks. He argues that “ownership of trucks, which are used to support [a]

business, is a property interest protected by the Constitution . . . .” Appellant Br. at 27-28. 

 He also contends that he has a fundamental right to “conduct business.” Id. at 30. 

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . ” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 

Substantive due process is a “component of the [Fourteenth Amendment] that protects

individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
6

procedures used to implement them.’” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,

125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). The Supreme Court

explained in Collins that “[a]s a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to

expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible

decisionmaking in this . . . area are scarce and open-ended.” Id. (citation omitted). See

also Nicholas v. Pa. State. Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)

(“The history of substantive due process ‘counsels caution and restraint.’”). 

Whether the property right asserted is entitled to substantive due process protection

depends on whether it is considered “fundamental.” Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 140. 

Fundamental rights are rights that are “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions

. . . . [and] interests implicit in the concept of ordered liberty like personal choice in

matters of marriage and family.” Id. at 143 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

While this Court has found that there can be a fundamental interest in real property,

interests like “a low bidder’s entitlement to state contract” as well as an entitlement to

public tenured employment are not fundamental. Id. at 142. Indeed, Malone concedes

that this Court has held that employment is not a protected property interest under a

substantive due process analysis. 

Here, we agree with the District Court’s finding that Malone’s asserted interests —

the right to “engage in business” and his right to the ownership of the trucks — are more

similar to the type of intangible employment rights that this Court has rejected as not
7

protected by substantive due process than the real property interests which can be

protected by substantive due process. Cf. Leib v. Hillsborough County Pub. Transp.

Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 n.4 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that while the plaintiff

“abandoned” his claim that he was deprived of the “right to earn a living” nevertheless it

“would have failed in any event given . . . that employment rights do ‘not enjoy

substantive due process protection . . . .’”); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,

234 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To the extent [plaintiff’s] substantive due process claim was

based not only on loss of his job, but also on reputational injury that decreased his ‘ability

to earn a living,’ it also fails.”); Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) 

(“The right to ‘make a living’ is not a ‘fundamental right’ . . . for substantive due process

purposes.”). In addition, while we have stated that “ownership is a property interest

worthy of substantive due process protection,” DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53

F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Cir.,

Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003), in Nicholas, we noted: 

“we have so far limited non-legislative substantive due process review to cases involving

real property ownership.” 227 F.3d at 141 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude

that Malone has failed to establish that his personal property interest in his trucks is

“fundamental” for purposes of our Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

analysis.

We therefore find that Malone has failed to establish that he has a property right
Because we find that Malone’s claim does not establish the deprivation of a 2

Constitutional right, we need not determine whether Kennedy and McMahon are entitled

to qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-18 (2009)

(upholding the two prongs of qualified immunity analysis — that a plaintiff must show a

“violation of a constitutional right” and that the right was “clearly established”— but

finding that they do not necessarily have to be examined in a particular order). 

8

which is protected by the Constitution. Because Malone has failed to establish any 2

substantive due process right here, regardless of the any causal connection between

Kennedy and the return of the trucks, the arguments that Malone makes in his brief

regarding potential genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether Kennedy

caused a deprivation of his rights are rejected. Accordingly, the District Court did not err

in granting summary judgment in favor of Kennedy and McMahon.

We briefly note that Malone also argues that the District Court erred when it found

that Malone was barred from challenging a protective order that had been issued by the

Magistrate Judge in this case because Malone had not filed timely objections. This Court

has previously considered and rejected Malone’s argument on this issue. Wrench II, 212

F. App’x at 100-01. We are not inclined to disturb our prior decision, and will therefore

affirm the District Court’s ruling.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.