THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


NEVADA TEST SITE
 

The verbatim transcript of the Working 


Group Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held telephonically on December 


19, 2007. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN AND ASSOCIATES 

NATIONALLY CERTIFIED COURT REPORTERS 

404/733-6070 
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C O N T E N T S
 

December 19, 2007 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. CHRISTINE BRANCHE, DFO 


INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR 10 


NTS SITE PROFILE MATRIX: 17 


COMMENT ONE: INCOMPLETE RADIONUCLIDE LISTS 18 


COMMENT TWO: LARGE HOT PARTICLES TO SKIN 


AND GI TRACT 51 


COMMENT THREE: INTERNAL DOSE 99 


COMMENT FOUR: INGESTION OF NON-RESPIRABLE 


HOT PARTICLES 106 


COMMENT FIVE: RESUSPENSION 141 


COMMENTS EIGHT/NINE: USE OF ‘67 DATA FOR 1963-1966 153 


COMMENT TEN: PRE-1963 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL DOSE 155 


COMMENT TWELVE: RADON DOSE IN G-TUNNELS 157 


COMMENT THIRTEEN: IODINE-131 160 


COMMENT FOURTEEN: INTERNAL MONITORING 166 


COMMENT SIXTEEN: USE OF PHOTON DOSE 171 


COMMENT SEVENTEEN: INGESTION DOSES 171 


COMMENT EIGHTEEN: OTIB-002 172 


COMMENT NINETEEN: PRE-1966 BETA DOSES 173 


COMMENT TWENTY: NON-USE OF BADGES 183 


COMMENT TWENTY-ONE: EXTREMITY DOSIMETRY 244 


COMMENT TWENTY-TWO: NEUTRON DOSES 246 


COMMENT TWENTY-FOUR: HIGH-FIRED OXIDES 253 


COMMENT TWENTY-FIVE: SITE EXPERT INTERVIEWS 254 


COMMENT ELEVEN: ENVIRONMENTAL DOSE 255 


WRAP-UP AND FUTURE PLANS 266 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 276 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL
 

BRANCHE, Christine, Ph.D. 


Principal Associate Director 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


SCHOFIELD, Phillip 


Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety 


Los Alamos, New Mexico 

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IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

ANSPAUGH, LYNN, SC&A 


ARENT, LAURIE, ORAU 


CHEW, MEL, ORAU 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


FIX, JACK, ORAU 


HARRISON-MAPLES, MONICA, ORAU 


HOFF, JENNIFER, ORAU 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


MAHATHY, MIKE, ORAU 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


OWENS, KATHLEEN, SEN. REID 


ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH 


ROLLINS, GENE, ORAU 


SMITH, BILLY, ORAU 


ZLOTNICKI, JOE, SC&A 

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P R O C E E D I N G S


 (11:00 a.m.) 

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS


 DR. BRANCHE: Mr. Presley --

 MR. PRESLEY: Yes -- Presley. 

 DR. BRANCHE: -- are you ready to get started? 

 MR. PRESLEY: I am. 

 DR. BRANCHE: Okay, then let's do this -- let's 

get this puppy rolling. This is a conference 


call for the working group of the Nevada Test 


Site site profile. I'm Dr. Christine Branche 


from NIOSH, Office of the Director. I'm going 


to call out the names of the members of the 


Advisory Board, if you could please acknowledge 


your presence. 


Mr. Robert Presley? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Here. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Mr. Clawson? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Here. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Ms. Munn? 


 MS. MUNN: Here. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Dr. Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Here. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Mr. Schofield? 

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 MR. SCHOFIELD: Here. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Mr. Rolfes from OCAS. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct, I'm here. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Dr. Makhijani from SC&A. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Here. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Okay. Are there other Board 


members who are participating in the call? If 


you can please acknowledge. 


 (No responses) 


NIOSH staff, other than Mr. Rolfes, who are 


also on the line, would you please acknowledge? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Larry Elliott. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Lew Wade, are you on the line 


yet? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Are there other ORAU staff? 


 MR. MAHATHY: Well, Mike Mahathy. 


 MR. CHEW: Mel Chew, ORAU team. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Good morning, Mel. 


 MR. FIX: Jack Fix, OR-- ORAU team. 


MR. SMITH: Billy Smith, ORAU team. 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible), ORAU team. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Okay. 


 MS. HOFF: Jennifer Hoff, ORAU team. 


MS. HARRISON-MAPLES: Monica Harrison-Maples, 

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ORAU team. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Gene Rollins, ORAU team. 


MS. ARENT: Laurie Arent, ORAU team. 


 DR. BRANCHE: I just realized -- again, please 


forgive me, this is -- I'm still getting used 


to this. Those of you from NIOSH and ORAU who 


mentioned your names, do any of you have a 


conflict with Nevada Test Site? If so, please 


sa-- please say so now. 


MR. SMITH: Billy Smith, conflicted. 


MS. ARENT: Laurie Arent, conflicted. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Are there other SC&A staff 


participating, and if so, would you please say 


so and if you have a conflict? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, this is John Mauro. I'm with 


SC&A and I have no conflicts. 


DR. ANSPAUGH: This is Lynn Anspaugh with SC&A, 


conflicted. 


 MR. ZLOTNICKI: Joe Zlotnicki with SC&A, no 


conflicts. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Are there staff members from 


other federal agencies who are participating on 


the call? If so, please state your name. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: This is Liz Homoki-Titus 


with HHS. 

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 MR. KOTSCH: Jeff Kotsch with Department of 


Labor. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Hi, Jeff. 


 MR. KOTSCH: Good morning. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Are there petitioners or their 


representatives on the -- on the call who would 


like to announce their names? If so, please do 


so. 


 (No responses) 


Are there workers or their representatives who 


would like to announce their names? 


 (No responses) 


Are there members of Congress or their 


representatives who would like to announce 


their names? 


MS. OWENS: This is Kathleen Owens with Senator 


Harry Reid's office. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Thank you. And are there others 


who would like to mention their names who are 


participating on the call? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Before I hand it over to Mr. Presley, 


I'd just ask that because this is a conference 


call, we do ask that if you are not speaking 


that you please mute your line, and then when 

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you are ready to speak please make sure you unmute. And so I thank you for that telephone 


courtesy. Mr. Presley, you're ready to begin. 


INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you very much. Larry, did 


you send the letter -- have you had time to 


send it to the Board members since they didn't 


get it? Did you send anybody an e-mail? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, Dr. -- Mr. Presley. This is 


Larry Elliott and I apologize. I had included 


everybody on your working group in that e-mail 


I sent on Monday afternoon at 2:07, but for 


whatever reason I guess it didn't get to you so 


I've resent it again here just a moment ago. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. Yeah, I'm -- I'm -- I've 


been looking for the cover sheet and yeah, 


everybody's on there. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And John Mauro, I cop-- I had you 


on that e-mail. I don't know if you got it or 


not, I didn't hear you say you didn't so I 


didn't include you on the one I sent this 


morning. 


DR. MAURO: No, I haven't checked my e-mail 


this morning but that -- I will check it now. 


I just sat down this moment. 

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 MR. ELLIOTT: Do you know if you got the one I 


sent Monday? 


DR. MAURO: Okay, hold on, I'll let you know -- 


on -- on Monday? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Monday at 2:07 in the afternoon 


is when my screen shows I sent it. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Larry, if it's about NTS, could 


you send it to me? This is Arjun. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Surely. 


DR. ROESSLER: Yes, Larry, this is Gen, I -- 


I'm getting other e-mails from you. I got one 


with regard to Bethlehem Steel and I got one -- 


it's the [Name redacted] response letter, but I 


don't have the one you're speaking of. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: That's the exact one I'm speaking 

of. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 

DR. ROESSLER: Oh, it's the --

 MR. ELLIOTT: But please let's not mention 

names here. 

DR. ROESSLER: Oh, I'm sorry, I was going by 

the subject line here. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: The one that we're talking about 


is a particular claimant's set of comments that 

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have been provided to us on Nevada Test Site, 


and our reaction to those comments. And 


there's three attachments. There's a letter to 


that individual, and then there are two 


matrices attached. 


DR. ROESSLER: I have it, and perhaps others 


haven't recognized it, either. 


 MS. MUNN: I do, too. 


DR. MAURO: I al-- Larry, I also have received 


it, yes. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: And John, would you send it to 


Arjun or do you want me to send it to Arjun? 


DR. MAURO: I will -- I will take care of that. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay. My apologies, Arjun. I 


just -- I assumed that Dr. Mauro would provide 


it to whoever on SCA staff needed it, but... 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No problem. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay. So everybody does have 


that bit of information. I apologize for the 


confusion about the subject line, but we should 


avoid using personal identifiers. But yet this 


information was provided to us as a worker 


comment about our site profile. And as you 


would see in our letter, we -- we told him we 


were going to present this information to the 

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working group and that person could listen in 


today if he so chooses to do so, but apparently 


he hasn't, and it looks like to me in my 


correspondence with him of late, he will see 


you all at the Board meeting. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Well, let's just make sure. Is 


there any petitioner or their representative or 


worker or their representative who's joined the 


call who would like to announce their name? 


 (No responses) 


Was that a response? 


 MS. MUNN: No, it wasn't. That was my computer 


saying (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. BRANCHE: Okay, thank you. Mr. Presley, 


please proceed. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty. 


 DR. WADE: This is Lew Wade. I'm with you. 


Sorry I was a bit late, but I'll be with you 


for some of the time but not all of it, but 


Christine is here. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I want it clearly understood that 


this individual we're talking about is a 


claimant, is not an active petitioner, but we ­

- whether petitioner or claimant, we still need 


to maintain that person's privacy unless he 

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wants -- or she wants to identify themselves. 


Thank you. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Larry, thank you very much. The 


letter states, and -- and I will read this and 


then we will go on to Mike Rolluf (sic) for the 


matrix. It says your input was provided to the 


health physicist for review and consideration. 


Relevant issues which may affect the outcome of 


the NIOSH dose assessments are actively being 


incorporated into the revision of the NTS 


Technical Basis Document which are used for 


dose reconstruction under the EEOICPA and that 


plainly states that the information that this 


gentleman sent was used, and we will so note 


that. 


Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, Bob. 


 MR. PRESLEY: If you would start, I would like 


for you to go through the matrix that you sent 


out. And one thing I want to say before we get 


started, Mark has done an excellent job on 


putting this matrix together and taking two 


matrix (sic) and putting them into one with all 


the -- all of the information on here. 


 MS. MUNN: It was very helpful. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Very, very helpful to read this 


thing. 


DR. ROESSLER: Bob, just to make sure we're 


looking at the right thing, tell me when -- I 


have two e-mails from Mark and on the 17th -- I 


want to make sure I'm looking at the right 


thing. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, this is the one that -- 


that I have that's marked 12/16/07, final 


document --


DR. ROESSLER: Okay --


 MR. PRESLEY: -- NTS --


DR. ROESSLER: -- I have it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- NTS site profile matrix. 


DR. ROESSLER: It's got -- I have it, thank 


you. 


 MR. PRESLEY: It's 18 pages. 


DR. ROESSLER: Uh-huh, okay, thanks. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, did you send that to me? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, I did as well. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Mark, this is Phillip 


Schofield. Could you resend that to me? For 


some reason I did not receive that. I've got 


Larry Elliott's -- the one he sent out. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: I've got your 3-page document 


with the doses from '63 to '66 -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- but I don't have a new 


matrix. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, let's see, I had sent one e-


mail at 9:30 a.m. on 12/17 and the other one at 


9:51 a.m. on 12/17. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Is there a different e-mail 


address? 


 MR. ROLFES: Is there a different e-mail 


address? 


 MS. MUNN: No, they were the same. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, no, I'm looking in the 


wrong file. Sorry. 


 MR. ROLFES: Let's see --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay, I was in the wrong 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Arjun, your e-mail address was on 


the 9:30 and the 9:-- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I -- I'm looking in the 


wrong box. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun -- Arjun's on here. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, let's see. I did just send 

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that --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, I -- I got it. I just --


sorry, I was looking in the wrong place. 


 MR. ROLFES: Phil, I did just resend that e-


mail to you. Please let me know if you don't 


receive it shortly. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, is everybody ready for -- 


for Mark to start? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, although I do have to apologize 


for not having downloaded the proper 


information at the right time. I haven't had 


an opportunity to read that e-mail that we were 


confused about with respect to the heading, so 


apologies for that, but carry on. We'll follow 


on the screen. 


NTS SITE PROFILE MATRIX:


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Well, if we'd like to go 


through the matrix items, we can certainly do 


that. I don't know, Bob, would you like to 


read the SC&A comment first and then we can 


provide our -- our NIOSH response and the 


status of that response? 


 MS. MUNN: So which matrix are we working from? 


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NTS -- it's titled "NTS Site Profile Matrix, 


12/16/07, Final," and -- 


 MS. MUNN: All right, very good, the one that's 


easiest to follow. 


 MR. ROLFES: The consolidated matrix. I do 


want to explain that we did take two separate 


matrices from the last meeting that we had with 


the Advisory Board and consolidated all those 


issues. Some of -- some of the issues were the 


same between the two matrices. However, one of 


the matrices was created in response to SC&A's 


comments on an expanded review of the external 


dose TBD. We have incorporated that separate 


matrix into the main matrix and consolidated 


things for -- to make things a lot more 


efficient, so... 


COMMENT ONE: INCOMPLETE RADIONUCLIDE LISTS


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, we'll start with the first 


find-- or the first comment, and number one is 


some radionuclide lists are not complete, and 


we had one finding and then we had an issue of 


5.1 SC&A put out, and Mark, I'll let you read 


the responses and we'll go from there. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. And within our Nevada Test 


Site Technical Basis Document Table 2-2 we 

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revised that to include chlorine-38, aluminum28 and scandium-46. Let's see, don't know if 


it's necessary for me to read through -- 


everybody is able to see what our response is. 


We feel that the status of this item is in fact 


closed. We did incorporate additional 


radionuclides into -- into the tables. 


Let's see -- let's see, I --


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, this -- we have talked 


about this three or four times, and on my last 


matrices we had marked that thing closed and I 


would presume that everything's been done. 


We've -- y'all have added or removed stuff from 


the -- Table 2.8 and -- that SC&A has asked 


about, and I think they -- you all have 


complied and SC&A has said that they agree with 


everything on this. Is this correct? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well -- well, we -- we haven't 


been authorized to review any of the changes 


except the external dose piece that you asked 


us to review. The -- the -- I know the -- the 


entire second -- volume two or chapter two of 


the TBD has been redone, but Mr. Presley, we 


haven't been authorized to review that so we 


haven't rev-- from -- from the point of view of 

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NIOSH having responded, it's correct, it's 


closed, but we have not reviewed it, just for 


the record. 


 MS. MUNN: Bob, my notes show me from our last 


meeting on October 25th, I believe -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Uh-huh. 


 MS. MUNN: -- that the only outstanding item 


there was for this group to check for 


completeness, and I don't know whether as a 


group that's occurred. I did take a very quick 


look at it looked complete to me, so... 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Bob, this is Brad. One of -- one 


of the questions I have is, you know, we have 


put these out and NIOSH has made these changes, 


but to me, SC&A has not still reviewed these 


items and they were the ones that brought up 


many of the issues on this. 


 MS. MUNN: Since we've responded to them -- if 


we had the response and the action was for us 


to check and feel that it was complete. And 


you know, we can go back and forth forever with 


-- with additional material for our technical 


contractor, but they've already looked at this, 


identified what they wanted to have happen, and 

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Mark has said that it's been done. We have 


looked at it. It's done. There's no --


bringing any other rock seems inappropriate. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, and I understand that, 


Wanda. That'd be like me taking my car in and 


telling them to fix something and then walking 


off and never making sure that the whole 


problem was ever really taken care of. I know 


that some of these radionuclides have been put 


in there, too, but in Table 2-A with the TBD -- 


you know, we -- I'm -- I'm sorry, I can't put 


all that much time into these and so forth like 


the -- and it's kind of interesting to me if we 


have SC&A raising these concerns, one of the -- 


one of the conclusions that we have to come to 


is as the Board members, correct, but we've got 


to make sure that also that their issues were 


addressed fully and to the -- to the 


satisfaction we can do, and that -- that's all 


I want to make sure. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, I guess I need to hear from 


SC&A on this point. Is this -- are you telling 


us that in order for you to agree that the work 


has been done that was requested, you have to 


perform an additional review function? Is that 

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what I'm hearing? 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. Maybe I could 


help out a little bit. 


 MS. MUNN: That would be helpful, John. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, as a precedent, I us-- I 


usually go back to the -- when we first engaged 


this issue and that was with Bethlehem Steel 


where we brought up -- identified six issues. 


The issues were dealt with by white papers. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: Eventually we all agreed yes, we've 


reviewed the white papers, they -- these do 


resolve all the issues and then we edited it at 


that point. Six months later a revised 


Bethlehem Steel site profile was issued that 


was represented as, you know, addressing -- 


containing all the new material that was in the 


white papers and we were never asked to review 


it. So this is really a matter that I guess if 


we want to go to precedent, that was found to 


be an acceptable way to achieve closure. 


However, certainly if at any point in time the 


working group or the Board says that, you know, 


please go back and take a look, I mean we would 


look at it. But no, we -- we -- to date, it's 

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really been on a case-by-case basis. 


With regard to procedures, in that working 


group when we find that the -- NIOSH has 


responded in a way that says yes, I have 


addressed the procedure in the following way 


and there's a white paper, I -- I believe what 


we call that now is it's in abeyance. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: Whereby that means that okay, looks 


like it's resolved, but it'd probably be a good 


idea to take a look at the procedure after it 


has been revised. 


So in a way we -- we have not really come to a 


uniform approach across the board on how we're 


going to deal with final closure. And 


certainly we will take our lead from you folks. 


Right now we have certainly reviewed the 


material that was exchanged and as Mark 


correctly points out, the issues have been 


resolved from that perspective. And really 


it's really a question now to the working group 


of whether or not you want to hold this in 


abeyance for review or -- or -- as we're doing 


sort of on the procedures, or -- or say really 


it's closed, as we did with Bethlehem Steel. 

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So I -- I think that sort of sets the 


framework. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, let me -- let me kind of 


maybe throw a specific in there -- Mark Rolfes 


might help me out. I'm looking at our original 


site profile review from December 2005 -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- and the three that you added 


are in that list which we -- of activation 


products which we said were not -- the original 


table. There were also a number of others, 


like neptunium-239. I don't know what happened 


with that one, for instance. So we haven't -- 


yeah, the three have been added. There were --


there were three that we called out, but we 


don't know what happened to the others or 


whether the list is complete or whether the 


Board wants us -- the working group wants us to 


investigate that. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. This was not meant to be a 


listing of all radionuclides that could have 


been produced, but these are the radionuclides 


that were of dosimetric importance based on 


REECo's historical information during the 


testing era. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, and what I'm saying is 


if -- that we've identified a number of them 


and we have not reviewed either your basis for 


concluding that these were the only ones of 


dosimetric importance and why the other ones 


that were called out were not included and what 


the relative merits of these things are. So 


for -- for example, the chlorine-38 has a half-


life of 37 minutes but neptunium-239 has a 


half-life of more than two days, and so -- 


anyway, we -- we -- we have not looked at the 


NIOSH basis from the point of view of NIOSH 


saying they've done something. NIOSH has done 


something, but we have not reviewed that and 


we've not been asked by the working group to 


review that. 


 DR. WADE: This is --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But the working group may 


itself review it, so this -- this is fine. I 


mean I'm just making a statement of fact. 


 DR. WADE: Well, this is Lew. Maybe I could 


speak just briefly to this issue generically. 


I mean the -- the final say on whether or not 


an item is closed or not rests with the working 


group. Eventually it rests with the Board. 

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SC&A is there to assist the working group as it 


feels it's necessary, and in some cases after 


one iteration it might be clear to the working 


group that an issue is closed and they could so 


decide. They might decide in another case to 


go back to SC&A and ask for another review. 


mean it's a -- it's a matter of judgment. The 


other thing turning against this is that we are 


looking at (unintelligible) that can strain 


SC&A's activity possibly as we -- as we go 


through this year, so working groups need to be 


mindful of that and decide -- issues rise to a 


certain level that they need to be looked at 


again, then so be it, they need to be looked at 


again. If the working group feels it can make 


the call, fine. Again, the -- the working 


group can differ on that and then the chair can 


decide if the chair would want to hear from 


each working group member to vote to try to 


reach some kind of consensus. But it's an 


issue that we'll face many times and, you know, 


working group members just have to decide if 


they're ready to make a call or if they need 


another iteration by their contractor. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. I wish I 


I 
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had my minutes in front of me from about four 


or five meetings back, but this is one of the 


issues that we took up first. It was 


completed, and if I remember correctly, this 


was one of the first issues that we marked off 


of this thing. 


Now you know, we were -- we've got our 


comments, and as far as I'm concerned, you 


know, SC&A has -- they have made their review 


of the comments and they made their 


recommendations. HHS has come in or CDC has 


come in -- and NIOSH and have made the changes. 


We have had a couple of meetings to talk about 


these changes and my estimation, this 


particular comment is closed. 


 MS. MUNN: It appears that the remaining issue 


really is whether or not SC&A can, without full 


review, accept the assertion here that the 


REECo nuclides that were identified of dose 


concern is a reasonable assessment. If that's 


a reasonable assessment, then there -- there 


does not appear to be any remaining issue. 


Does SC&A have a position with respect to the 


REECo information? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Ms. -- Ms. Munn, we haven't -- 

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we haven't -- you know, we haven't reviewed the 


basis of the statement that NIOSH is making 


that these are the only three that are of 


dosimetric importance among the activation 


products mentioned -- original list of 


activation products that SC&A had in its review 


was not drawn from -- was not an arbitrary 


list. It would -- it was drawn from the 


National Academy of Sciences' report on the 


Nevada Test Site. And so I presume that the 


National Academy's list was a well-considered 


list, and so all -- all I'm -- I'm just putting 


the facts before you that we had a list of 


radionuclides that was suggested for 


consideration for inclusion. We have not seen 


the technical basis for including or excluding 


certain radionuclides from that list. Of 


course it's the pleasure of the working group, 


you know, what to do with the list that we gave 


you and what to do with the list that -- that 


NIOSH has given you. It's -- it's -- I -- I 


just don't know how to comment more than that. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, I -- I think what I got from ­

- I believe what you just said was you're 


working from an NAS list and the suggestion of 

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the resolution works from the REECo list from 


1993. The only -- then that raises in my mind 


the question does our contractor not feel that 


the REECo list is acceptable? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: One would have to examine the 


technical basis of saying that the other 


radionuclides are not dosimetrically 


significant. We --


 MS. MUNN: But that's what REECo has said. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- we neither looked at the 


original -- when -- when we did the review we 


didn't go to the underlying calculations that 


the National Academy had done. We presumed 


that they had -- they had done a good job. Now 


maybe REECo had good reason to -- to reject 


certain ones. All I'm saying is that we 


haven't reviewed that and it would not -- it 


would be a little bit arbitrary for us to say 


REECo's right and National Academy's wrong, or 


National Academy's right and REECo's wrong, 


without actually going and looking at the 


technical basis. Now if the working group has 


done that and feels -- feels okay, then that's 


fine with us, but we haven't done that. 


 MS. MUNN: So you didn't look at REECo really 

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at the time that you were doing your review. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, this -- this is an-- this ­

- this is a list that has been added by NIOSH 


and we -- we presented a list from the -- well, 


it's -- the citations are there in our review 


from December 2005. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, and I -- I didn't go back to 


those other citations, but REECo is not 


included in those? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I don't know what all we 


looked at. The citation -- I'm just looking at 


the footnote to the table as to where this 


particular Table 1 on page -- let me see -- 25 


of our December 2005 review. That table 


certainly was footnoted NAS 1989, page 31. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, and then the REECo -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I don't know elsewhere -- I -- 


we looked at the REECo list, I don't recall 


right now because I have not -- I have not 


reread our review, unfortunately. 


 MS. MUNN: And I haven't -- I don't have the 


citations in front of me, either. I don't have 


the document here, but I -- it would be simple 


-- one would I think safely conclude that a 


report which follows the NAS one would be of 

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enough interest to have been reviewed during 


the period of the initial review. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well -- well, you know, I -- I 


do not know what -- what all radionuclides are 


on the list. I think -- I think that the 


question is that REECo found -- that NIOSH 


found them to be dosimetrically significant, 


and Mark has looked at it more recently and he 


should comment on that, but -- but clearly I -- 


you know, I personally don't feel comfortable 


in saying that -- one list or another. I don't 


know -- REECo examined the National Academy 


report thoroughly and -- and redid the 


calculations and made its evaluation, I just 


don't know that. And it's -- I'm -- I'm just 


trying to be as factual as possible -- 


 MS. MUNN: I understand. I understand. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- in terms of what we did and 


what the issue is. 


 MS. MUNN: I understand that, and I'm trying to 


define the -- the essence of the issue down to 


its very essence so that we can see what 


specific point we're talking to. And from my 


perspective right now, it looks to me the point 


is whether the original review by our 

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contractor included the REECo study; and if it 


did, whether it concluded that the REECo study 


was also a valid one. And I don't know -- 


Mark, can you speak to that at all? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, what I was going to comment 


on is that what our table does have within the 


site profile, the radionuclides of concern for 


various Nevada Test Site activities. There are 


approximately 80 radionuclides of concern, and 


each of those radionuclides we have documented 


the time periods that they're of concern, the 


time period following the test, and the area of 


Nevada Test Site where they are in fact a 


concern. If SC&A has additional information to 


provide to us, we will be sure to consider that 


as well. And also if we receive additional 


information regarding some other radionuclide 


that we do not currently have knowledge of, 


we'd be happy to incorporate that into our 


living site profile. So --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And I'd also supplement what 


Mark just said by noting that in NIOSH's own 


response it says these radionuclide lists of 


REECo may not be comprehensive, but the lists 


have been reproduced in this TBD as published 

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by REECo. So you know, I -- we're happy to 


stand pat as it is. I'm just trying to say 


factually what has happened and what NIOSH has 


put on the table is just a partial list, just 


comparing it to our original list. That's it. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I -- I understand that. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) a very 


satisfactory (unintelligible). 


 MS. MUNN: It seems that it's incumbent upon us 


as a workgroup to make the decision whether the 


assertion that the radionuclides that are of 


dose concern have been now incorporated in the 


table. That's really the bottom line, I 


believe. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. That's 


correct. And to my knowledge, they have been 


incorporated. 


 MS. MUNN: I have not done the calculations. 


I'm not capable of doing the calculations. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Me either. 


 MS. MUNN: But from the previous discussions 


that we've had, it would appear that -- that 


significant radionuclides have been included. 


And as the agency points out, these vary from 


one test to another and from one time frame to 

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another. I'm willing to accept it as-is. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Anybody else got any comment? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Bob, this -- this is Brad. 
I 


guess -- I guess maybe this is coming up 


because of a -- some of my issues in -- in 


Fernald and stuff like that. But part of my 


issue is -- and my frustration, I guess, from 


trying to figure out how -- how we really come 


to closure with these because when -- when we 


have a review and we have SC&A come in and 


review these things, and then we have NIOSH do 


-- you know, they may do 65 percent of what was 


said, they may do not -- they may say, you 


know, that they don't have to. I'm trying to 


figure out -- and excuse my ignorance, but I'm 


trying to figure where we come to a complete 


close on this to make sure that everything has 


been done because a lot of times when NIOSH has 


changed something, it's -- sometimes we get it 


changed two or three different places in a site 


profile or -- or anything else like that. And 


I realize that these are living documents, 


these -- the site profile is, but how -- how do 


we come to close on it when -- I'm trying to 


figure out -- you know, I guess I'm looking 

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back at SC&A and saying has this been done to 


your satisfaction, because I'm along with Ms. 


Munn, I cannot do all these calculations. But 


I want to make sure that we are doing the best 


job that we can and that I -- I'm getting -- 


that we're getting everything as clear as 


possible, that the -- the concerns that were 


addressed have been taken care of and that they 


were implemented properly. I guess that's 


where my -- I'm -- I'm coming to complete 


close. I guess -- I guess that's where I come 


to -- when are they really closed. 


 DR. WADE: Brad, this is Lew again. And again, 


some of this is semantics, but some of it 


isn't. The moment of complete closure will be 


judged by the working group, and the working 


group has to decide if it needs assistance in 


coming to that. SC&A's judgment as to whether 


the work has been done to their satisfaction is 


really not a key judgment. They answer the 


questions that the Board raises. They make 


comments and critiques on documents, and then 


it finally rests with the workgroup. Now the 


workgroup members should feel comfortable in 


voicing their view that they need their 

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contractor to view a certain issue or to go 


into more depth. That's perfectly reasonable. 


And if the working group decides it's fine, 


that's fine. But eventually it comes to the 


working group to say we're satisfied with this, 


using your contractor as you need to to make 


that judgment. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. One thing I 


want to -- I want to say again, and Brad said 


it, Wanda said it, this is a living document. 


This thing -- I hate to say it, but fortunately 


or unfortunately, none of these things will 


ever be closed. And if something else comes up 


in them, they're going to be re-opened, they're 


going to be re-looked at. What we have to do 


is decide if what we know today has been 


completed to the best of -- of NIOSH's ability 


with the -- I guess with the okay of SC&A. And 


I realize that each time -- SC&A doesn't always 


see exactly the same eye as -- as NIOSH sees, 


but -- and the reason for that is a lot of 


times there's more than one way to do this. 


And we have discussed these items and discussed 


them and discussed them and discussed them, and 


when we have written down here that this is 

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complete and this item is closed, at that 


point, that -- to me, that item is closed. And 


you know, if something happens down the road 


and we need to add another radionuclide, that's 


possible. It's not closed. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, and -- and Bob, this is 


Brad, and I understand that. But part of my 


problem that I have is the TBD is a living 


document, but an SEC petition is not. Once we 


say that it's not an SEC petition, it's not. 


And it's -- it's -- it's not a living document, 


and that's -- that's why -- and -- and all of 


us being from different areas into this, we all 


want to make sure that these are being done 


right and -- and I know as a -- as a Advisory 


Board we don't see eye to eye and I understand 


that, and I know that SC&A and NIOSH will never 


really see eye to eye on -- on some things, 


either. That's just the nature of the game. 


But -- but I sure re-- you know, as the TBD 


goes, I realize it's a living document, but we 


have certain parts out there that are not 


living documents and we need to make sure that 


we have covered everything we can to make sure 


that we're addressing -- especially the SEC 

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petitions -- to full potential. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Well, that -- that's 


great. But now this is not an SEC petition. 


This is a site profile document. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Right, and I realize that. But ­

- but that's what we base a lot of our SEC 


petitions on. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


 MR. CLAWSON: These TBDs. 


 MS. MUNN: But if there's additional 


information that can be presented, the SEC 


presents it, and that can very easily trigger 


another look at the TBD. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Correct. That's right. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: This is Phil. There's --


there's one other thing here. Some of the more 


obscure isotopes that -- they may appear or 


disappear off of this list -- really the one -- 


one down to is how -- what ones were the people 


monitored for? What ones do they actually have 


data saying we can safely say the people are -- 


you know, are exposed to this one or this 


particular isotope is covered by our analysis 


on another type of isotope or something, you 


know. What were the people actually monitored 

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for? 


 MR. ROLFES: Is that a question for me, Phil? 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yeah, I mean, you know, some of 


them may not really need to be on the list. 


Some of them may -- may need to be there 


because they weren't monitored for those, and 


that's something I think that needs to be 


worked out between NIOSH and SC&A. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Well, what I can do is 


explain a little bit on -- for example, if you 


take a look at the list -- do you have the list 


in front of you or... 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: No, I -- pull it up there. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Okay, for example, people 


were monitored based on the potential for 


exposure to a particular set of radionuclides, 


and that set was based on planning done for 


each individual shot, as well as air monitoring 


data associated with those shots. Based on the 


air monitoring results, if an air monitoring 


result came back high for a particular 


radionuclide or a set of radionuclides, the 


individuals would be assigned to a bioassay 


program based upon what they were potentially 


exposed to. 

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For example, if they were potentially exposed 


to fission products, the individual would have 


been requested -- would have had a bioassay 


sample requested of them for fission products. 


If that fission product -- fission product 


result came back non-positive, or negative if 


you would like to refer to it, then nothing 


further was done at that time, in the early 


days. If it did come back positive, more 


specific analyses and follow-up urinalyses were 


conducted. So each -- for each test, based on 


the data associated with that test, there were 


requests for urine samples following an unusual 


occurrence or a high air monitoring result 


associated with that test. And that was based 


on each -- the specifics of each test. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Now would this information be 


made to the claimants, too, so that they know 


what ones they were monitored for? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, the information would be 


contained within their DOE dosimetry response 


files, which are available to claimants under 


the Freedom of Information Act. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: So you're saying they would 


actually have to file FOIA? 

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 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Phil, this is Larry Elliott. 


Yes, if a claimant wants a copy of their entire 


file that has been developed while we've had it 


in our hands and been working it up, and that 


file would include the DOE dose information 


that we had requested and received, then we 


would ask them to provide a FOIA request to us 


to get that -- reason being that there are a 


large number of documents contained in these -- 


in these claim files and some of the documents, 


especially those that we get from the 


Department of Energy, have a lot of other 


individual workers' information in the document 


that's sent to us for that particular claim. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Uh-huh. Is there any way that 


in their file they could at least be notified 


these were the -- whatever element or isotopes 


you were monitored for, so at least that 


information is there, not necessarily tied to a 


particular shot, but they know that they were 


actually monitored for these things? 


 MS. MUNN: This is Wanda. Phil, can I -- can I 


make a stab at trying to -- trying to make a 


little sense out of what we're struggling with 

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here? You understand that what is really 


important is the dose the individual received. 


The dose will tell you what the biological 


effect is, regardless of what the isotope was, 


or group of isotopes were. What happens to you 


is what's important. What -- what gets to you 


is what's important. And if you have bioassay 


data, then you know that. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Right, but some of these are 


fairly short-lived isotopes that could have a 


fairly significant dose tied to them that maybe 


they needed to be monitored for, maybe they 


didn't need to be monitored for them. 


 MR. ROLFES: Phil, this is Mark again. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLFES: One of -- for example, if an 


individual was exposed to short-lived fission 


products, the most likely -- you know, at NTS 


external doses were the controlling factor 


rather than internal doses, and there are 


studies to support that. The -- if an 


individual was exposed to fission products, the 


dosimetric concern would be an external dose 


that the individual received. And I believe 


nearly 100 percent of the individuals that 

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entered the Nevada Test Site after the year of 


1957 were in fact monitored by a dosi-- using a 


film badge or dosimeter. So many of these 


radionuclides, rather than being of concern for 


internal dosimetry, are primarily an external 


dosimetry concern. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay. Well, see, that answers 


my question there. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: So that obviously eases my 


concern on some of this other stuff. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Now we're back to the basic 


question. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


 MS. MUNN: Is this or is this not a closed 


matter? Do we or do we not require SC&A to go 


back and do further calculations to identify 


that, in their mind, they are content with the 


list of nuclides that's presented to them as 


being those of adequate dose concern? 


 DR. WADE: And this is Lew. I could do a 


little bit of process talk, if you'd like me 


to. We have no rigorous mechanism for 


decision-making within a workgroup. The 

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workgroup really isn't so much a decision-


making body as it is a place where exploratory 


work is done and issues are explored. 


In a case like this the workgroup could decide 


that it will make a decision on an issue like 


this either by consensus, requiring everyone to 


support going back to SC&A. They could say -- 


could make it based upon a majority opinion of 


the workgroup. Or they could say if one 


workgroup member wants this inquiry to 


continue, that it would continue that way. You 


could stop now and decide how you'd like to 


make a decision generically, and then make it 


on this case. (Unintelligible) could consider 


to talk about this case and try and reach some 


consensus among you. That's really up to you. 


You could also delegate the responsibility to 


the chair. I mean there are various ways to 


make decisions. You know, we've not come to 


this point before where a workgroup had to 


hammer out its decision-making process. Maybe 


we're approaching that now, maybe we're not. 


But I leave that for your consideration, but 


those are options available to you. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, and Lew, this is Brad. 
I 

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don't mean to butt in there, Bob, but I -- I 


guess I'm looking on down the road because I -- 


I've seen -- as long as we realize that if this 


ends up in an SEC or whatever like that, that 


we may have to end up reviewing this. But 


maybe for this -- at this point, it -- it 


doesn't require that much digging back into. 


You know, they've addressed these radionuclides 


that SC&A brought up. I'm -- I'm just -- it 


seems like we -- what I've been seeing on these 


workgroups is we close it in this and then all 


of a sudden when we go into an SEC it gets 


opened back up and things change so much. And 


I realize these are living documents. I just ­

- I guess I'm trying to look a little bit 


further down the road than maybe what I need 


to. So Bob, I'll turn it back over to you. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. What I would really like 


to do on this is to be able for us to come to a 


consensus of yes, is this thing closed; or no, 


then we need to ask the contractor or we need 


to ask NIOSH to take a better look at this. In 


my estimation, you know, this thing is -- we 


have beat it to death. We've done what we were 


asked to do. And do y'all want to -- to have 

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this thing as a consensus or if one person or 


two people don't think it's closed, then you 


know, we can say that when we make our 


recommendation to the Board. 


DR. ROESSLER: Bob, this is Gen. I would like 


to see some sort of consensus within the 


workgroup because if we don't have it, it seems 


like it's something that's going to pop up 


again. When things pop up again, then we have 


delays that were not fair to the claimants and 


to the groups involved here. I -- I'm 


wondering just how much time it would take for 


Arjun or SC&A to look at this particular issue, 


the -- the radionuclides. It seems -- you 


know, Arjun's very knowledgeable about these 


radionuclides. He knows what the contribution 


would be to dose, and it seems to me it 


wouldn't take much time. I'd -- I'd really 


like to have it resolved before we go to Las 


Vegas. 


 MS. MUNN: I'd like to have it resolved before 


Las Vegas, too. I just feel that we have 


looked at it and talked about it before, and 


although there have not been -- as -- as Arjun 


indicates, we haven't had them specifically do 

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calculations to indicate that there isn't 


anything else on the NAS report that they feel 


is of major consequence with respect to -- or 


reasonable consequence of -- of dose concern, 


that -- I have no feel for how many items there 


are on that list, and I -- I have -- we talked 


about the REECo data many times. And it has 


seemed acceptable in the past. I'd really like 


to see us get this over and done with, but I -- 


I'd really much prefer for us to be able to say 


yes, this is acceptable, go. To me, it's -- it 


can't help but be like an engineering question. 


You know, at some point you have to say this is 


the design to which we're going to build. If 


major information arises that causes us to 


believe we cannot build in this way, then we 


can revise it. But this is our design. And I 


-- I see what we -- the work that has been done 


here is expensive. For me, I'm willing to say 


this is the design. Let's go with this unless 


we have major reason to believe that this is 


improper -- that this is not the best science, 


'cause that's what we're going for is the best 


science. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. Phillip, have 

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you got a comment on this? 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: I'm -- right now I don't really 


have a problem with the table as it -- as it 


stands. But then again, you know, there's a 


lot of these I'm not familiar with. I think as 


long as we hold that option that we can reopen 


it if for some reason there's things been left 


off the list, I feel comfortable at this point 


in going ahead and going with the list. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We can always reopen it. That's 


no problem. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's -- you know, if somebody 


comes up with -- with a -- a new wrinkle on 


something, it can always be reopened. So at 


this point what I'd like to say is, you know, 


we will -- on each item we will pool the Board 


as -- not the Board but the working group as to 


what their wish is, whether we can say the 


item's closed or -- or then we leave it open 


and we're going to ask somebody to do some more 


work on it. At this time that's what I would 


like to do is the Board to -- to -- to have a 


consensus on these things. Anybody got any -- 


or not the Board but the working group. 

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Brad, have you got a problem with that? 


 MR. CLAWSON: No, I -- I don't, Bob. I just --


I -- here's my own frustration and I feel it 


from all the -- the working groups that -- you 


know, we come to a closure on this when we're 


doing the TBD, but as we get back into it, just 


so that we all realize that this will come up 


again and we may have to do a little bit 


further in-depth inspection into it. I guess I 


was just trying to -- trying to put the cart 


before the horse a little bit there. I don't 


have a problem with -- with what we have, just 


as long as we realize that it'll probably rear 


its head again in another setting. 


 MS. MUNN: There's always an easy in, Phil. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, and -- and you know, you -- 


you could -- could have that list come out at a 


-- you know, even on -- on another site profile 


-- okay? -- that would -- that would add 


something to it somewhere else down the road. 


But for the -- for the NTS one, I would like to 


say that we feel like that -- that we have done 


as much as we possibly can and we accept the 


comment as completed. 


 MS. MUNN: Resolved. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: As resolved. 

 MR. CLAWSON: That'd be fine with me, Bob. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

 MR. SCHOFIELD: I'll agree with that, too. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: This is Lew. I'd like to make one 


general comment. The strength of this Board's 


process is -- and its workgroup processes, are 


the input the individual members bring to it, 


so these kinds of discussions and that broad 


process to discuss is very important and I 


thank Brad for raising the issue and I would 


thank the workgroup for its professionalism in 


resolving the issue. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Oh, yes. Okay, does -- does 


anybody have a -- a comment that -- that this 


should not be closed? 


 MS. MUNN: I think you've been -- that they've 


been polled. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: I think all of us have said consider 


it resolved. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty, I'm going to mark 


this one resolved. And I appreciate all the 


comments. 

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COMMENT TWO: LARGE HOT PARTICLES TO SKIN AND GI 


TRACT
 

We'll go on to number two, and it states that 


the TBD does not provide adequate guidance for 


dose estimations to the gonads, skin and 


gastrointestinal tract for the early reactor 


entry personnel. It has to do with large 


particles -- large hot particles to the skin 


and the GI tract. And this mentions then work 


that was done at the Naval Reactor as well. 


And Mark, do you want to -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, we --


 MR. PRESLEY: -- care to comment on this, 


please? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, thank you, Bob. We did 


consider the Naval Radiological Defense 


Laboratory information that was documented, 


associated with some of the nuclear rocket 


development station tests. Information is 


contained within the site profile now based on 


the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory 


document from 1968, and it is this information 


that will in fact allow us to bound potential 


doses to all of the organs listed. 


This has been addressed in the Nevada Test Site 

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site profile chapter five Revision 1 at Section 


5.6.5.3 and also in the Nevada Test Site 


chapter six Revision 1, page change one, 


Section 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Arjun, do you have a 


comment? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, we've -- we've given you 


our review of the -- of the external dose 


sections before, as requested, but we have not 


done any review of the internal dose revision ­

- this NTS volume five Revision 1. We have not 


been asked to review that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. I do -- there 


was one matter in your response -- in your 


matrix that I did want to raise that needed 


clarification. I fully agree that using a VAR­

- VARSKIN -- you know, you have the wherewithal 


to derive doses -- localized doses from hot 


particles --


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- that might land on -- so I -- I 


-- so I -- I agree with that. The question 


that I have is when are you going to -- on the 


one -- it's not really clear, and we've had 

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this discussion I believe related to one of our 


procedure reviews -- that is -- that if -- if 


you have an individual and he comes down with 


skin cancer and -- and -- there wa-- he was 


operating in a setting with potential for 


particles, for hot particles -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- could have been created and 


landed on his skin, the -- my understanding, 


and correct me if I'm wrong, is that whether or 


not you attribute that exposure scenario to 


that person is going to be based on his records 


of whether or not, you know, he -- he was found 


to have any contamination upon leaving a 


controlled area --


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- and that he required 


decontamination, and that usually comes out of 


-- of the CATI interview. And I think that 


whether you trigger using VARSKIN or not (break 


in transmission) on whether or not you believe 


that scenario applies to that person, and that 


determination is based on the CATI. My 


question that I raise is really not a -- it was 


a concern and a question -- is that if there 

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was a high level of assurance that those 


individuals that were involved in such exposure 


scenarios can be identified by the CATI 


interview, I would say great, then you know -- 


then you could triage, you can say who we're 


going to do this for and who we're not. But my 


concern was that -- that -- two things. One, 


it may not be -- that kind of information may 


not be in the CATI. In addition, even if 


there's no records that -- let's say a person 


was leaving an area and they did not detect any 


hot particles, and my question was -- and I 


don't have the answer to this -- is is it -- is 


there -- is there a high level of assurance 


that if a person did have a -- was contaminated 


locally that the exit survey would capture that 


so that he could be decontaminated, or is this 


a circumstance where it's -- you know, there's 


a fairly good chance a person could have a hot 


particle and leave with it on him and maybe not 


-- really won't be removed until he takes a 


shower at home. So it wasn't the method -- I 


agree that VARSKIN is the tool and it will 


allow you to do this. It's whether or not -- 


how you're going to ap-- when you're going -- 

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how you're going to go about choosing who 


you're going to apply that to. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah, there -- there's a -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Just so I can supplement that, 


Mark, a little bit, as I was saying, SC&A did 


submit on October 10th a response to Revision 1 


of external dose section, Nevada Test Site 


Technical Basis Document. And in that we 


addressed -- we reviewed the revisions that 


Mark has mentioned in -- in this matrix for 


volume six, for chapter six of the site profile 


only, and our comment was exactly that of John. 


We didn't have a comment with the technical 


approach, but we did say that issues remain 


outstanding as NIOSH has provided no 


substantial evidence that hot particle data 


actually exists. Rather NIOSH has argued that 


it would normally not exist, so that's just a 


quotation from the document that we gave you. 


So we've reviewed NIOSH's response and -- and 


not had a technical problem with it. We were 


in agreement with a portion of it, but -- but 


not in agree-- you know, not -- not in 


agreement with the idea that -- that data 


exists to know when this -- when the exposures 

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happened. 


DR. MAURO: I think we're halfway home. They ­

- that's the good news. The good news is -- 


it's really one now of, you know, do you have a 


robust method where there's a high level of 


confidence that you -- you will pick the -- 


you'll know when to apply these -- these 


techniques, to which claims. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, we have a high degree of 


confidence in the areas of concern where hot 


particle exposures could have been encountered. 


The individuals -- and this is pertinent to the 


Nuclear Reactor Development Station or Nuclear 


Rocket Development Station -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- and the individuals that would 


have been involved in re-entry were those who 


would have been potentially exposed to hot 


particles. These re-entry teams were 


documented and these are typically made up of ­

- of radiation monitors and other project 


engineers and scientists. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay, that -- that -- 


 MR. ROLFES: The individuals also would have 


been dressed in double anti-contamination 

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suits, had shoe covers on, gloves, respirators. 


The individuals following potential exposures 


would have been surveyed and dressed out to 


ensure that there was no contamination. And if 


a contamination was in fact found, as has been 


documented in some of the reports, the 


individual was appropriately decontaminated or 


de-- you know, if an individual -- there is 


documentation of some shoe contamination, as 


well, and the individual's shoes, it does say, 


were decontaminated or disposed of. So --


 MR. CLAWSON: Mark, this is Brad. I 


understand, you know, about the re-entry teams 


and everything else like that, but what I was 


somewhat a little bit nervous about was -- and 


we even have members on the Board that were 


involved in some of these -- was the outlining 


(sic) areas of some of these tests. I've heard 


a couple of comment about working -- they 


weren't working in the propulsion system, but 


they were a ways away from that and they 


couldn't leave their trailers and stuff like 


that until they'd been hosed down and so forth 


like that because of the -- the spread of this. 


And this -- this was my one area of worry is -- 

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I wasn't worried so much about the re-entry 


teams, but the surrounding areas that were 


subjected to some of this fallout. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, do you know a specific test 


or a specific time period? There were 


obviously -- what we're referring to in this 


discussion is hot particles. There were some 


occasions where, for example, fission product 


gases such as radioiodines were released into 


the atmosphere in --


 MR. CLAWSON: This was -- this was actually 


with Pluto and when -- when they fired it off 


and there was some of the outlining (sic) 


areas, if I'm -- recollection's right, some of 


the tests that was being done elsewhere, they 


weren't even at a test -- they weren't even a 


part of this rocket propulsion system, but that 


they were -- before they could fire that off, 


everybody had to go inside and -- before they 


could come back out and part of the thing was 


is -- you know, you wash those hot particles 


off the tops of trailers and stuff and when it 


dries out, where did they go and so forth like 


that. That was -- that was just one of my 


things that I was a little bit nervous about. 

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I understand about the re-entry teams. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, that's -- for example, with 


the Pluto reactor, I know we do have some 


people on the phone that were involved in that 


as well. The -- I -- I don't off the top of my 


head have the information if there were in fact 


potential hot particle exposures. But once 


again, there may have been fission product 


exposure potential from that reactor. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Maybe that's more what I'm 


(unintelligible) at because they were -- they 


were talking about that the -- before that they 


could even come out of these trailers, which 


had air -- air being pulled into them, which 


they found kind of a little bit interesting, 


but that they all had to be washed down and 


stuff like that because of -- and I guess 


possibly that's what it is, part of the fission 


product. 


 MR. ROLFES: Bob, do we -- do we have any ORAU 


people on the line that might be able to 


comment on this? 


DR. MAURO: That would be -- be -- Mark, I do ­

- I do want to hear they -- that response, but 


I'd like to also set another perspective that I 

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think is -- as we go through this process. 


This is a very important discussion now, and 


I'll tell you why I believe that. In effect, 


what I'm hearing is that the sce-- the scenario 


where a person might leave a site and have some 


particulate -- a part-- hot particle 


contamination on his hands, face or any pos-- 


possibly other parts of his body, on his 


clothing, is really not a scenario that could 


occur. I mean in effect -- tell me if I'm 


interpreting what I heard you say correctly. 


That scenario can't really occur because -- so 


that anyone that let's say comes down with a 


skin cancer and has a claim for that -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- what I'm hearing is that on-- it 


is not possible that that skin cancer was 


caused by a hot particle because you know -- 


because the controls were in place to avoid 


having a person having a hot particle deposited 


on him and him leaving the site with that hot 


particle, it's -- because I think that's what 


effectively you're saying. And it really does 


away with the possibility that that scenario is 


really one that could have resulted in a skin 

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cancer. I -- I know I just drew a very broad-


brush conclusion, but that's what I heard. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, true. In addition, if an 


individual is diagnosed with a skin cancer, in 


order for the hot particle to be of dosimetric 


importance to that individual, that hot 


particle would have had to have been deposited 


in the exact location that the individual's 


skin cancer was diagnosed. 


DR. MAURO: That's correct. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Now what happens when you don't 


know where the hot particle was lodged? 


DR. MAURO: But Arjun, what I'm hearing is that 


can't happen. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh. 


DR. MAURO: You see, the position is that sites 


where there were hot particles, such as these 


rocket test sites and other sites, are known 


and were known at the time that they had a hot 


particle potential. And as a result, the 


access and egress controls was such as to 


preclude the possibility that a person would 


receive direct contamination on his skin from 


the hot particle, and -- and after -- after 


going through -- exiting the site, there was a 

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the -- the decon process that would confirm 


that he's not walking off-site with any -- any 


-- any screamers, let's say, on his skin or 


something -- some strong beta emitter on his 


skin. And if that's the case and that's the -- 


and -- and you feel confident with that, that ­

- that's fine. But I think it's important that 


-- what I heard is that that scenario really 


can't happen and so therefore we're not going 


to have a circumstance where a person later on 


with a skin cancer could claim that well, the 


skin cancer was because of a hot particle. 


That's really off the table now. 


 MR. ROLFES: The probability of an undocumented 


exposure is so minuscule in such a scenario for 


an individual that was not directly involved 


with the test. I have documentation in front 


of me regarding ground particulate 


contamination and the number of particles 


produced per 100 square feet in relation to 


test cell A at the Test Site, and I believe 


this was area 25. There's survey information 


with radiation levels and the number of 


particles within a given area surrounding the 


test cell. And -- let's see -- the highest 

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documented number that I have in the closest 


position to the test cell for this particular 


test was 22 particles per 100 square feet. As 


the distance increases, it quickly drops off. 


That was the single highest value. The great 


majority of these values that are documented 


here are less than one particle per 100 square 


feet. 


So because of the access controls surrounding 


these tests, it's very unlikely that an 


individual would have been exposed to a hot 


particle or been in an area when a test was 


conducted, or following the test, other than 


individuals that were directly associated with 


radiation monitoring. 


DR. MAURO: You know, if in fact the case is 


made that that scenario where a person's skin 


cancer really could not have been due to an 


undetected hot particle, and you have -- you 


know, what I'm hearing is you have a -- a lots 


of analysis and evidence that that in fact is 


the case, that's an important conclusion 'cause 


it really goes toward, interestingly enough, 


the resolution of a concern we have on OTIB-17 


and -- and I think that -- this -- this 

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decision, this judgment that -- that we're 


making here has far-reaching implications and 


is very important. And I'm not saying that's 


not the right judgment, but I -- I would I 


guess alert everybody on the phone that I see 


it as a very important deci-- judgment and that 


will have far-reaching implications across the 


complex. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. I don't 


really know what to say except we have -- or 


NIOSH has gone back and looked at all the data 


and have probably hundreds of thousands of 


samples where they did actually go in and check 


the people as they egressed the areas after 


this. Is this not correct, Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, that's correct. The 


individuals that were involved in re-entry were 


in fact monitored and frisked on the exit of 


the area. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Then do -- how many people 


-- do we know that if -- say how many of these 


people have filed for compensation or if -- or 


-- or not? I don't know whether that would 


have any bearing on this or not, but I -- I 


think we could say that with -- you never can 

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say without a shadow of a doubt, but you know, 


within the best scientific field, we can say 


that all was done to make sure that these 


people didn't have hot particles and that if 


there was, somebody picked up one down the 


road, you know, we should know about it. 


 MR. ROLFES: The likelihood of someone picking 


one up down the road is very, very unlikely -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- and then there's just no -- no 


credible exposure scenario that I could think 


of where this could have occurred, just because 


of the very low number of hot particles 


downwind of the test area, very low number of 


people that would have been downwind of the 


test, and the very -- because -- because these 


particles are very radioactive, that means that 


they decay very, very quickly. And so if 


you're not in the area within that day or two 


following that test, those particles were not 


going to exist any longer. They decay very 


quickly and that's why they are so radioactive. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, this is Arjun. Are we 


taking the tunnel re-- comments two and three 

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and tunnel re-entry and atmospheric and reactor 


workers all in the same comment, or are we 


separating them? I just -- just so I'm not 


commenting on something we're not -- that's not 


on the table. 


 MR. ROLFES: Let's see here, what I've been 


speaking to right now was related to the RDS -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, right, I thought so. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- and that was comment two. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, okay. But the same -- 


same comments apply -- you know, your same 


responses -- I thought you gave a common 


response to points two and three, comments two 


and three. 


 MR. ROLFES: Oh, okay, let me --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I just wondered whether the 


position -- I just wondered whether the 


position was that tunnel -- early tunnel reentry workers could not have had any hot 


particle or that they were always monitored on 


-- on -- on exit. 


 MR. ROLFES: Let me see here, I'm taking a 


look. Well, the -- the Nuclear Rocket 


Development Station parameters would not be 


applicable to dose estimates for workers 

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associated with drill-backs -- well, if we'd 


like to get into that, we can go ahead and 


proceed with number three, if that's what 


you're asking, Arjun. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, I was just asking whether 


all the comments were -- to two and three and 


you said they were in relation to two, so I'm 


happy to hold. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, that's what I'm saying, we 


can move on to comment three if you'd like, if 


that's what --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, what-- what-- 


 MR. ROLFES: -- I was speaking to comment two. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- whatever Mr. Presley -- 


DR. MAURO: Am I correct that really the 


arguments are about the same, though. You have 


VARSKIN available to you if it's -- and if it 


turns out in case that you -- you believe that 


there might be a problem here, but the 


likelihood that such a scenario actually 


occurred and had gone on undetected at the time 


is virtual -- a -- virtually zero -- 


(unintelligible) it's extremely small. And I 


think it's important, whether we're talking 


about the ro-- the engine -- rocket engine test 

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or we're talking about underground tests at 


Nevada Test Site or at other sites. You know, 


the basic I guess view of this as being an 


issue is -- is being addressed right now in 


this setting. I think it's important. And I'm 


not saying that you -- you don't have your ar-- 


your case right. I mean it may turn out that 


this concern that's in OTIB-7-- that we raise 


regarding OTIB-17 is in fact really a non-issue 


because of the controls that are in place and 


the probability that -- I think your argument 


also is the probability that just so happens if 


the particle, you know, is responsible for 


that, it landed undetected, was there long 


enough and delivered a high enough dose that it 


would in fact be the cause of a skin cancer. 


So I -- I -- I know we're trying to focus in 


and resolve the issue here as it applies even 


to the tunnel workers in -- in number three or 


in the rocket engine tests in number two, but 


the judgment's got to be made right now -- I'll 


say it again, are -- will have applicability to 


OTIB-17 and to many other places where we're 


addressing hot particle issues, which includes 


Hanford and other -- other sites. 

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DR. ANSPAUGH: Well, this -- this is Lynn 


Anspaugh and I'd like to just comment that I 


think you're being a little optimistic. These 


-- the project (unintelligible) for example 


went on for 11 years and it's not clear that 


they had this (break in transmission) model-- 


monitoring in place in the early days, but 


there was one test that released 250,000 


curies, some of which was easily detected off-


site, so I -- I think there may not be a 


generic statement that you can just neglect 


this. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, Lynn -- this is Mark Rolfes 


-- and what we are speaking specifically to are 


hot particle exposures. We do acknowledge that 


radioiodine, other radioactive noble gases, 


were released, other radioactive halites were 


released. That -- that is not contested at 


all. We certainly acknowledge that and we do 


assign doses from potential exposures to 


personnel. What we are speaking specifically 


to is production of hot particles and potential 


undocumented exposures to individuals. 


DR. ANSPAUGH: That's what I am speaking to, 


too, and when you're in Las Vegas I'd like to 

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show you a movie of how one of these reactors 


blew up. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, the Kiwi TNT test. Is that 


the one you are referring to? 


DR. ANSPAUGH: I'm -- I'm not sure. I don't 


recall all of them by name. I --


 MR. ROLFES: Well, yeah, I certainly would be 


interested in seeing that, Lynn. 


DR. ANSPAUGH: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: Mark? Hi, this is Mel. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MR. CHEW: I just want to address Brad 


Clawson's comment. Brad, you were correct. 


There are two maj-- there were two major 


programs at the Nevada Test Site for the rocket 


development. One was Project Rover and what 


Lynn just talked about, and the other one was 


Project Tory* -- the -- Pluto, and the first 


reactor that the -- after Pluto was the Tory 


reactor and I happened to be, just by -- dates 


me right now -- was on the initial re-entry 


team to look at the nozzle of the reactor and 


the reactor stayed very much intact, and so 


what he was talking about was probably the 


mixed fission product from the Tory 1-A and the 

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Tory 2-A reactor experiments here. What Lynn 


is talking about is the Project Rover, which is 


the Kiwi reactors and Los Alamos experiments 


here, and they were separated from the sites by 


a few miles here. Just want to set the record 


that there was two programs here, Pluto and 


Rover. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, and Mel, this -- I would like 


to add also that we do have documentation of 


the environmental effects of the Kiwi TNT 


effluent, and this is a Los Alamos Scientific 


Laboratory document -- I'm trying to find the 


date -- but this reviews and evaluates the 


information regarding the test. The report is 


dated January 1968 and was distributed in April 


1968. There is information on radiation 


surveys, et cetera, following the test and -- 


let's see, this is a 68-page report that we 


have, Los Alamos 3449. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Hey, Mark, this -- this is Brad, 


and I don't want to show my ignorance or 


anything else like that, but when we're talking 


about hot particles, this is -- this is still 


part of the fission products or -- or am I 


wrong in that? 

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 MR. ROLFES: No, that's correct, these are 


short-lived fission products that are 


responsible -- fission and activation products 


that would be responsible for -- yes, it's -- 


it's short-lived fission products and 


activation products. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, and -- and I appreciate Mel 


chiming in on that because if -- if you 


remember right when we were in Nevada last time 


down there, we had some of the petitioners 


talking about these propulsion systems -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CLAWSON: -- and they weren't part of the 


re-entry team. And this is -- this is where 


some of this is coming from, but they were I 


guess -- be able to use the term downwinders or 


-- or whatever that -- like that that we're 


getting from this product, and that was my only 


concern, that -- I know that the re-entry teams 


were watched very well, but I was worried about 


the outside areas and so forth like that. 


 MR. ROLFES: Sure, okay. All right. For the 


people in the outside areas, the -- excuse me, 


the hot particle exposure potential is -- is 


very, very low. That -- however, the people 

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that are farther away could potentially be 


exposed to gaseous, volatile radionuclide 


releases such as radioiodine exposures, radio-- 


let's see, I believe krypton -- and there are 


some other radionuclides that were associated 


with some of those tests. As we understand -- 


we did speak with a health physicist that was 


directly involved with some of these tests, and 


there were mechanisms that were used -- I 


believe they were called "frogs" -- and they 


were essentially containment caps to prevent -- 


following the reactor test to prevent the 


continuous venting of fission products or 


gaseous fission products from the reactors. 


If we have Billy on the line, did -- did I get 


that correct? They were "frogs" I believe? 


MR. SMITH: Yes, that was the description that 


Bruce gave us. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. SMITH: I was not involved in those tests 


personally at that time because that was before 


my time, but --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


MR. SMITH: -- but that is what the person who 


was in charge of the health physics program at 

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NRDS at that time, that also operated the 


whole-body counter --


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah. 


MR. SMITH: -- indicated. 


DR. ANSPAUGH: And who is Bruce, Billy? 


MR. SMITH: Who is who? 


DR. ANSPAUGH: Who is Bruce? You mentioned 


Bruce; is that correct? 


MR. SMITH: No, I didn't mention Bruce, but -- 


DR. ANSPAUGH: Sorry. 


MR. SMITH: -- we -- we -- we did interview a 


person who was in charge of the health physics 


program during the time that some of the 


nuclear rocket development tests were going on 


at NRDS and he was indicating the degree of -- 


of hot particle contamination, both on the 


ground and on the fallout trays and the -- the 


control programs that were involved in people 


that made re-entries and that were up-wind of 


the testing activities when they took place. 


No persons, as I understand it, in the 


controlled areas -- which was -- the NRDS was 


the controlled area -- were downwind of a test 


as it took place, regardless of the outcome of 


the test, other than people that may have been 

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off-site. That -- that interview I believe is 


on the O drive. Is that right, Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: That's correct, and it has been 


provided to the Advisory Board members as well, 


so... 


 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, this is Bob. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Also, the Test Site had a large 


number of personnel that just as soon as 


something was over always went out and checked 


the area, even on-site and off-site. That was 


one of the reasons that they did plume studies, 


so that they would know where to go back and 


check after a -- after a release or a shot. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct, there was monitoring done 


both on-site and off-site. The -- the United 


States Public Health Service was in charge of 


off-site monitoring and did in fact track any 


potential releases or effluents from the site 


as well, so... 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. Is everybody -- 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Just one quick question -- this 


is Phil. That -- the monitoring was really the 


same for both the NRDS and the Project Rover? 


 MR. ROLFES: They -- the Nuclear Rocket 

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Development Station, I believe the Rover tests 


were conducted within area -- in the same area. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay, but the same rules and 


safeguards were handled in both the two 


different projects the same. Is --


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: -- this what I understand to be 


correct? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, that's affirmative. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Hey, Mark, this is John. I -- I --


I think that -- what I -- what I'm hearing is 


that on -- on I guess a case-by-- not a case 


but a site-by-site or operation-by-operation 


basis, in effect you're in a position to make a 


statement that says well, at least in these 


circumstances there's plenty of evidence that 


we -- you know, there was controls in place for 


access and egress and for -- for where people 


were down-- whether they were up- or downwind 


so that you -- you had the controls in place so 


that really the -- the people in the vicinity 


of the -- the activity, the operation or the 

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test, were -- were adequately protected from 


hot particle exposures and also, because of the 


-- these -- it sounds like that there were 


sticky-tape -- I forget what you -- those 


plates --


 MR. ROLFES: Fallout trays. 


DR. MAURO: -- fallout trays --


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- that you have pretty good data 


that says on the number per meter squared or 


per hundred square -- square meter of these 


particles that may have deposited as a function 


of distance, so in this circumstance you could 


really rule out that anyone could realistically 


have experienced a hot particle exposure on -- 


on skin that could have resulted in a skin 


cancer. Perhaps that line of argument with its 


associated documentation will need to be made 


every time we have a site or operation where 


hot particles are of concern, and so -- and -- 


and that's what I'm hearing, that the argument 


is here. That is, you have the evidence, the 


records, that show that there was controls in 


place that would effectively eliminate this as 


a plausible scenario for both workers who were 

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on-site and perhaps people who may have been 


off-site somewhere downwind. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That -- this is Bob Presley. 


That's what I see. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. Well, if that's the case and 


the case is made, and your -- your review of 


this work, at least in the case of Nevada Test 


Site and -- and the rocket program and tunnel 


re-entry, I -- I think after -- that -- if 


that's the strategy that you've adopted -- now 


Arjun, to what extent did we -- have we looked 


at that information? That is the records 


regarding access and egress controls and this 


deposition of hot particles as a function of 


distance from these different operations. Have 


we looked at any of that? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, John, this is -- this is 


new information. You know, we've reviewed new 


external dose site profile and made this 


comment and -- and NIOSH's response a few days 


later was to provide this information but we've 


not gone back and looked at it. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. Well, I would -- I would say 


-- I mean this is SC&A speaking as that -- the 


concept, the strategy that is outlined as -- 

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that -- described by Mark is conceptually 


powerful and valid. However, you know, the 


degree to which those controls were in fact in 


place and then -- and the data does in fact 


support that conclusion, we really haven't had 


an opportunity to review. And I also would 


like to say that if such a strategy is taken at 


other sites, it's -- go to -- this -- this is 


an important precedent is what I'm getting at, 


is that on a case-by-ca-- on a site-by-site 


basis if such controls and data are available 


that could put this issue to bed, this is the 


way it can be done. But it -- you know, and it 


sounds like we're pretty close to putting this 


issue to bed, at least at the Nevada Test Site. 


However, we -- we haven't looked 


(unintelligible) -- and what I would say is I 


think the strategy is valid and -- but we have 


not of course looked into the -- gone into the 


trenches and looked at the data itself. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well --


 MR. ROLFES: Now --


 MR. PRESLEY: Go ahead. 


 MR. ROLFES: I -- I do want to caution everyone 


that if, for example, we would see an 

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individual telephone interview report from a 


claimant, if we had information that an 


individual was exposed to hot particles or a 


hot particle and had information within their 


claim file, then that would certainly be 


considered in their dose reconstruction. So 


just because the information -- because based 


on our review we haven't found any indication 


of, you know, a widespread issue, that does not 


mean that we're not going to still consider 


this in dose reconstruction. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay, so -- then -- let's say 


we have a -- a claimant for skin cancer and in 


his CATI interview there is information that he 


had to be decontaminated, upon egress he was 


found to have contamination and went through 


decontamination. What would you do at that 


point in terms of specifically addressing dose 


reconstruction to that person? Would you 


assume that some hot particle did in fact 


deposited on the location where -- let's say it 


was on his face -- where the skin cancer was 


observed and do -- and assign to that -- that 


that dose to that location or would you somehow 


average it over his whole body? 

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 MR. ROLFES: That would be a policy decision. 


However, the dose -- as you are aware, the dose 


to the skin -- we are calculating doses based 


upon the entire -- entire mass of the skin. 


That I know has been discussed previously and I 


think that Jim Neton would probably be best to 


answer that question as a policy decision, 


so... 


DR. MAURO: Okay. I -- I mean what are -- did 


-- it sounds like then you do provide for doing 


that type of dose calculation. I just could --


not quite sure how you connect the -- a VARSKIN 


dose calculation to let's say a localized, one-


centimeter square area of the skin to the dose 


to the -- to the skin that's used for the 


purpose of probability of causation, but maybe 


that's a -- that's a separate subject. 


 MR. ROLFES: One of -- one of the most 


important things, I'll reiterate, is that for 


an individual that would have a skin cancer on 


their face and had a hot particle exposure, we 


would have to first make sure that the 


individual's skin cancer and hot particle 


exposure occurred to the same area. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, I understand. Okay. 

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 MR. ROLFES: The individual's hot particle 


would have had to have been deposited on the 


same area that developed cancer in order for 


that to become a significant issue. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, so you don't just 


automatically assume that yes, exposed to hot 


particle; yes, skin cancer; we're going to 


assume that hot particle landed right where the 


skin cancer originated. 


 MR. ROLFES: In a worst-case scenario, one 


could simply do that. However, based upon the 


facts of the case, if -- if that was the only 


information that we had indicating in -- in the 


file, for example, in the DOE dosimetry file, a 


blank statement saying a hot particle was 


deposited on this individual's skin and he was 


successfully decontaminated, say for example 


two hours after the exposure, we could do a 


worst-case scenario and assume that that hot 


particle was in fact deposited on the single 


location where the individual's skin cancer was 


diagnosed years later. 


DR. MAURO: And -- and let's say you get a -- 


you got a probability of causation above .5, 


would you go back and redo it and do a -- 

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something which takes into consideration the 


probability that that particle actually landed 


where it -- the worst possible place? In other 


words, I could see you using that approach as a 


maximizing approach for denial. Would you --


but if you wanted to -- if you found that you 


couldn't deny on that basis, would you -- are 


there other -- I guess I'm not familiar -- are 


there other procedures for how you would deal 


with that? 


 MR. ROLFES: One would have to take a look at 


the facts of the case and simply -- there's too 


many facts and too many different parameters 


that would need to be considered. First of 


all, you know, some of the most important 


pieces of information would likely be contained 


within the individual's dosimetry files, and 


that would be our first place where we would 


look in more detail. We would also take a look 


at some of the on-site rad safety reports and 


look at some of the areas that the individual 


was working in. There's just so many 


parameters that would be involved that we would 


have to take a look at and analyze in more 


detail. 

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DR. MAURO: I -- I thank you for indulging over 


this line of questions because this is 


something that has been on my mind for quite 


some time since we engaged OTIB-17, and I think 


this -- this discussion has gone a long way to 


resolving a lot of the concerns I had on that 


and -- not only on the issue we're talking 


about here, but also on OTIB-17. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, I'm certainly glad to hear 


that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yep. 


 MS. MUNN: There's one other thing before we 


leave this. Let's go back a little bit to some 


of the original comments, because -- 


 MR. CLAWSON: Hey -- hey, Wanda, this is Brad. 


I -- I can't -- I can just barely hear you. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, I'm just being too lighthearted, I guess. Let me see what I can do 


about speaking up here and -- here, I'll use 


the other phone. Just a moment. 


(Pause) 


Can you hear me better now? 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's better, Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: Okay, very good. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Thank you. 

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 MS. MUNN: I think what John said early on was 


very important with respect to making the case 


for adequate administrative oversight for many 


of these kinds of cases. It's been a long time 


since I read the entire document, and I do not 


recall -- Mark, can you tell us whether our -- 


our site description actually has any wording 


in it regarding the extent of monitoring and 


oversight that was given to these individual 


tests? Do we have adequate wording in there? 


 MR. ROLFES: Whether the site profile has 


wording on the oversight of each test? 


 MS. MUNN: Well, you recall as -- as John was 


saying, if the case has been made adequately 


that we do in fact have the kind of monitoring 


and the kind of individual oversight of each of 


these projects that we can say with a high 


degree of certainty that it's unlikely that hot 


particles would have been missed, then it's -- 


it's important for us to -- to see that that 


wording gets in the base document. I just 


don't know if it's there. 


 MR. ROLFES: I would have to go back and take a 


look. What I am referring to that I have been 


referencing are several on-site radiological 

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safety reports associated with each specific 


test. For example, I can just read a couple of 


the titles of them. One was the on-site rad 


safety report for the Nirva* test operations, 


NRX-A4. Another was Tory 2A operation, let's 


see -- see, additionally the environmental 


effects of the Kiwi TNT effluents. 


 MS. MUNN: And you feel there is wording in 


those specific documents that gives us the 


confidence that we need -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: -- with respect to hot particles? 


Now -- and are they -- is that fact 


appropriately referenced in the site profile, 


and should it be? I guess that's the real 


question. 


 MR. ROLFES: I'm going to ask Gene Rollins to 


comment as to whether -- what level of detail 


we have put into our site profile documentation 


regarding the monitoring (unintelligible) -- 


 MS. MUNN: I'd appreciate that because I simply 


don't remember. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Gene, do you happen to have 


that language in front of you? I know you 


probably are most familiar with it as of late. 

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Do you have a feel for what level of detail we 


have put into the site profile regarding 


monitoring and potential exposures at the 


Nuclear Rocket Development Station at Nevada 


Test Site? 


 MR. ROLLINS: Mark, I -- I don't think we have 


put a lot of text into the document regarding 


this particular issue. 


 MS. MUNN: I wouldn't think it would need to be 


a lot of text. I just think we need to be very 


specific here essentially, since our technical 


contractor is saying to us you need to tell us 


if you've done that. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And -- and Wanda, what -- what 


you would like -- what you might expect to see 


would be a discussion as to the radiological 


controls that were used for these tests? 


 MS. MUNN: A paragraph indicating that the 


information that's necessary exists and citing 


the reference. That would appear to be 


adequate to me. Is that your view, John? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, to me -- I think you're hot on 


the trail of resolving what I consider to be 


one of the lingering issues. And if in fact 


documentation exists that those types of access 

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and egress controls were in place at the time 


of these -- at least in these case, these 


experiments, or when it came to access and 


egress to the tunnels, then that type of 


documentation would go a long way to resolving 


this issue. 


 MS. MUNN: That's very important and it has 


ramifications on other sites. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And in addition to that, we also 


have documented an interview with the health 


physicist in charge with these controls about 


his direct experience. Maybe some of that 


would also be appropriate to put in there? 


 MR. ROLFES: I certainly think that would, if 


we haven't mentioned it. I know that we have 


detailed this within our Special Exposure 


Cohort evaluation report that -- 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- has been released. 


 MS. MUNN: But people don't see all the 


documents. 


 MR. ROLFES: Sure, exactly. If it isn't in one 


document, it may be in another. But -- let's 


see --


 MS. MUNN: If the site profile's going to be 

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our basic document, that's the best place for 


at least the indication that the information 


exists. 


DR. MAURO: And I would take it a step further. 


When -- when you are concerned, as you had 


mentioned earlier that maybe there is a hot 


particle exposure that -- let's say in the 


person's records from a CATI interview or what­

- whatever, and that you do -- if there's any ­

- right now I guess I haven't seen the guidance 


on okay, how do we do the dose -- you know, the 


dose reconstruction for this person when we are 


going to attribute to him some hot particle 


exposure. In this case I would assume that 


that would apply to either skin cancer or 


perhaps a breast cancer or -- or testic-- 


testicular cancer. You know, those cancers 


which theoretically could -- where the beta 


particles could find their way to the target 


organ. Is there -- I -- I have to say, it -- 


the -- the subject of using VARSKIN and the 


results of VARSKINs to what the dose would be 


likely, and then translating how you use that 


information in the dose reconstruction, I -- 


I'm not familiar with that. You may already 

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have something on that, but I -- I -- I haven't 


read it. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, the likelihood that an 


individual would receive a significant dose 


from a hot particle deposited on their skin or 


on their anti-contamination clothing to any 


organ other than the skin is very, very 


unlikely and just another additional thing that 


would reduce the likelihood of such an 


exposure. Keep in mind that individuals that 


would have been potentially exposed to hot 


particles were dressed in anti-contamination -- 


double anti-contamination clothing, as well as 


respirators, gloves, protective clothing, and 


were monitored following re-entry. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, no, no, and -- and I -- I agree 


-- that goes toward the access/egress controls 


that -- that the scenario can't happen. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: But I did hear you say, though, 


that under those occasions when there was a -- 


a -- a person was on a -- I guess on egress 


where it was determined that he -- there was a 


problem and he had to be decontaminated, that 


there are circumstances when you would run 

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VARSKIN. I get by your response also in wri-- 


in response to those two questions that VARSKIN 


is part of your suite of tools that will allow 


you to address these issues when they arise. 


So under those -- those circumstances where 


let's say it becomes a plausible scenario that 


a person might have received skin contamination 


and had to be decontaminated because of a hot 


particle, I -- what I understood was that you 


would use VARSKIN under those circumstances. 


And I guess my only concern is that -- and this 


may -- but this again is a more broadly 


applicable -- if I'm understanding this 


correctly, broadly applicable protocol that in 


fact you would do a dose reconstruction under 


those circumstances using VARSKIN and somehow 


use that information to determine a probability 


of causation, and I -- what I'm saying is given 


that you -- that is a possible scenario that 


you would address, I'm not familiar with any 


procedure or guidance on how you actually do 


that. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, sure. There's nothing that 


prevents a dose reconstruction from a hot 


particle being completed. Much of the 

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information is documented within the Naval 


Radiological Defense Laboratory documents, and 


the methodology essentially is there, 


information is there that would allow us to do 


a dose reconstruction for an individual. We 


would take that information and use information 


in VARSKIN in a hypothetical scenario when we 


have information indicating a potential hot 


particle exposure that is documented within the 


DOE response files. 


DR. MAURO: There are no Procs or OTIBs, 


though, that talk about this. I know OTIB-17 


doesn't. 


 MR. ROLFES: To my knowledge, I am not certain. 


I probably should not answer, you know, one way 


or the other as to whether there is a procedure 


on how to use VARSKIN that is within the NIOSH 


documentation -- technical documents. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Mark, this is Phil. I've got a 


quick question for you. You keep referring to 


the fact they were double coveralled. Do you 


know if they were wearing hoods and full face 


masks, or were they using half-face masks? 


 MR. ROLFES: I will ask if there's anyone on 


the telephone that could answer that specific 

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question. Is there anyone on the ORAU team 


that recalls whether these were full-face 


respirators or --


 MR. CHEW: Mark, I -- I can help you on that. 


Now I was not involved with the Kiwi reentries, but certainly the Tory re-entries was 


part of the Pluto project and I certainly was 


wearing a full-face mask with a canister, I 


remember that. The canister was marked pink, I 


remember that very carefully. 


 MS. MUNN: Funny how things --


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. Everything 


that I've seen, they all have full-face masks 


and headgear on. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay? 


 MS. MUNN: So -- so, before we leave it 


entirely, again, are we going to request that a 


small amount of verbiage be added to our site 


profile that clarifies the issues we've just 


been discussing and gives them a reference? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, before we commit to doing 


that, I would like to check to see whether that 


information may already be there. If there's 


someone on the ORAU team that is on the phone 

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call, if they could please take a look into our 


approved Technical Basis Documents and -- maybe 


they have already looked to see if that 


information is there and they could elaborate 


on it, if -- if they've already seen that 


information. 


 MS. MUNN: If it's there and we can identify it 


for location, that would be very helpful. If 


it's not there, it's almost crucial that we see 


that it gets there. 


 MR. ROLFES: Certainly. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I'll take a look at that while 


y'all carry on. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, great. Thank you, Gene. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: One more thing in this regard ­

- this is Arjun. I think this takes care of 


the external dose piece, but when I commented 


at the start of this conversation on this 


point, I'd mentioned that there's an internal 


dose piece to this which you say is addressed 


in NTS five Rev. 01. We have not looked at 


that at all. In fact I actually don't have 


Rev. 01, I just have Rev. 00, PC-1, or 


something like that. 

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 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Let's see, NTS six Rev. -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, five. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, NTS five --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And (unintelligible) reference 


to the internal dose piece to that. This --


this -- this discussion takes care of the 


external dose piece, but at the bottom you say 


address in NTS-5 Rev. 01, Section 5.6.5.3. 


That piece we haven't reviewed. In fact, I -- 


I don't have that piece, Rev. 01 NTS-5. I only 


have NTS-5 Rev. 00 PC-1, which I presume is 


different. I -- I'm not sure. 


 MR. ROLFES: 001 and 01 are the same. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, I have 00 PC-1, but I 


don't have --


MS. ARENT: This is -- this is Laurie Arent. 


can answer that question. Following the -- the 


matrix, at the very bottom if you scan all the 


way down, it gives you a status of where the 


NTS TBD sections currently are. You are 


correct, you don't have Rev. 01 of NTS-5 yet. 


It is currently at OCAS for final approval. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, so -- I mean the -- in the 


bottom of this -- not only have we not reviewed 


it, but we have not seen it. 


I 
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MS. ARENT: You have not --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I just wanted to make that 


clear. 


MS. ARENT: -- seen that, correct. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct, that -- that's correct, I 


apologize for that, and thank you, Laurie. 


MS. ARENT: You're welcome. 


 MR. ROLFES: Thank you. If everybody takes a 


look at the last page of the matrix, there's a 


small status table that we have put together 


and it documents the status of every Technical 


Basis Document section that is currently under 


revision or has been approved. And as Arjun's 


referencing, Nevada Test Site five, Rev. 00, 


Revision 01 is at OCAS for final approval. 


 MS. MUNN: It's been there for a while, hasn't 


it? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, this is Bob Presley. I 


need to call about a five-minute break, and 


what I want to do is we will come back and talk 


about the response for -- Arjun, you want to 


talk about internal. Is that correct? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, Mr. Presley. I mean if --


if we await both a document from NIOSH and your 


instruction, Mr. Presley, as to whether you 

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want us to look at that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Can everybody take about a 


five-minute break, if you'll mute your phone 


and let's leave them open -- 


DR. ROESSLER: Bob? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, ma'am. 


DR. ROESSLER: What is your anticipation, and 


this is probably an impossible question to 


answer, as to how long the call will still 


proceed? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, it's supposed to go to 


4:30. Is that not correct, Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: I'm available as long as we need 


to get this finished, so I will make myself 


available as long as everyone is willing to 


make theirselves (sic) available. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I would -- I would love to finish 


this thing up, if we can, today before -- a 


little before 5:00, and I'll tell you why. I 


have a doctor's appointment at 6:00 p.m. today. 


And so I would like to go and let's finish this 


thing before 5:00, if possible. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, that -- that helps, Bob. 


Thank you. 


 DR. BRANCHE: So Bob, you said a five-minute 

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break? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. Everybody mute their phone, 


we'll go on a five-minute break and then I'll 


be right back. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 


 DR. BRANCHE: Bob, have you already done a roll 


call or do you want me to do it again? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Christine, you want to go ahead 


and do that one more time? 


 DR. BRANCHE: Okay, I'll do it -- one sec. 


(Pause) 


All right, Mr. Presley? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 

 DR. BRANCHE: Brad Clawson? 

 MR. CLAWSON: Present. 

 DR. BRANCHE: Dr. Roessler? 

DR. ROESSLER: Yes. 

 DR. BRANCHE: Mr. Schofield? 

 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Ms. Munn? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Mr. Presley, you're free to 


continue. 


 MR. PRESLEY: We're all here. Thank you very 


much. 

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COMMENT THREE: INTERNAL DOSE
 

Now, we have gone through comments one and two, 


but Arjun had a comment for I believe it was 


three where he wanted to talk about external -- 


I mean, I'm sorry, internal dose. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, on two and three. It was 


just to say that we have not reviewed the 


internal dose because the document hasn't been 


published and we haven't been asked. So from 


our point of view -- you know, we read the 


NIOSH response, but have not done anything with 


it. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. So really --

 MR. ROLLINS: Bob, this is Gene Rollins. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 

 MR. ROLLINS: I have reviewed chapter -- 

chapters five and six of the most current 


version of the NTS TBDs and there's currently 


no information in there about the radiological 


controls that were in place around the NRDS. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: So we can certainly put that in 


there. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Can we say that these two items 


are closed, except that we need verbiage placed 

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in there to take care of -- of rad con-- to 


address the rad controls, and also I want to 


note that we are waiting for the internal 


documents from NIOSH. 


 MR. ROLFES: That's correct, these -- and 


you're referring to the site profile document ­

-


 MR. PRESLEY: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- Technical Basis Documents -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- that are in review. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So TBD, okay, and that is 00 -- 


is it 00 -- NTS-5, Revision 1 or 001? 


 MR. ROLFES: Let's see, it is NTS-5, Revision 


00, Revision -- oh, okay, I'm sorry -- Revision 


00 was the approved version. We are currently 


almost ready to approve the final version of 


Rev. 01 of NTS-5. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, NTS-5. Okay, and we're 


awaiting that. All right. 


Anybody have a problem with that? 


 MS. MUNN: Sounds good. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. When can we expect the 


verbiage? Can -- can we have a rough draft of 


this verbiage before we go to Nevada? 

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 MR. ROLFES: Mr. Presley, this is Mark. We 


have documented this in a formal communication 


with the health physicist associated with the 


Nuclear Rocket Development Station. I don't 


foresee any problems in referencing that report 


or that documentation of communication in the 


site profile, if that's necessary. However, I 


-- I did want to remind everyone that this 


documentation is included in the site research 


database and does serve as an official project 


document that can be referenced in a dose -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, can --


 MR. ROLFES: -- reconstruction. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- can we put that in there, 


Mark, please? 


 MR. ROLFES: I cert-- I certainly can do so. 


We can certainly do that. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Wanda, is that all right with 


you? 


 MS. MUNN: That's fine, yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: It's just that I think it's really 


important that we have the -- the words where 


they can be seen and referenced easily in the 


future because we will need them. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Let's go on to comment 


four. I think -- we have two and three on this 


matrix, but I think we've already taken care of 


those. Everybody agree? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We didn't address the tunnel 


workers, which we started to. Or is -- is that 


part of three? I don't remember. Let me just 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, that was mentioned -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, it is not. I'm sor-- or 


yes, it is part of three. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, three was related to 


atmospheric -- SC&A's comment on number three 


was dose from large particles to GI tract and 


skin for workers in atmospheric testing has not 


been evaluated. Let's see, how do -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That -- that -- three also 


talks about drill-back. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, correct. And I -- I hadn't 


completed reading the comment here yet. It 


said hot particle doses also need to be 


evaluated for early drill-back and other reentry workers during underground testing 


periods. And the -- excuse me, the NRDS 


parameters are not -- not applicable to the 

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underground testing period. It's a completely 


separate issue. But once again I'd like to 


reiterate that any documented hot particle 


exposures for individuals would be assigned in 


a dose reconstruction based on information 


documented by the DOE, such as a survey by an 


individual -- excuse me, a survey of an 


individual done by a radiation safety 


technician following exit of a re-entry team. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That would have to do with any 


re-entry team. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: So Mark, is the position that 


you also have documentation about -- similar to 


the -- the reactor tests for tunnel re-entry 


workers? 


 MR. ROLFES: I do have documentation that there 


were survey procedures following re-entries 


that would have detected any potential skin 


contamination or potential exposures to 


radioactive material associated with that reentry. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. We -- we didn't see them 


and -- let me see, I'm just trying to see what 


we said in that regard. I guess -- I guess 

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that -- the position was the same, that -- that 


we had no problem with the procedure, but 


didn't see the documentation. So maybe you're 


going to add that, too. 


 MS. MUNN: It would be helpful. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Mark, yeah, go ahead and add that 


wording in there, too -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- please, so we can cover 


everything. 


 MR. ROLFES: Before -- before we go on there, I 


would like to ask ORAU once again to make sure 


that we don't already have something in there 


so we don't get asked to do something that 


we've already done. If someone could take a 


look in the -- in the Technical Basis Documents 


to see if we have any information regarding 


exit surveys following tunnel re-entry. 


 MS. MUNN: Somehow I had thought we had 


something in there, but I don't know what it 


was. 


 MR. ROLLINS: This is Gene Rollins. I just 


went through these documents and I -- I don't 


believe that level of detail is currently in 


there. 

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 MR. ROLFES: Okay. All right. Well, we can 


certainly add something into the site profile 


to provide a little bit more detail following a 


re-entry. I do have a couple of technical 


documents here in front of me that I can read 


into the record if you'd like, just the titles. 


The first is a Lawrence Radiation Laboratory 


general re-entry procedure for underground 


nuclear events, CN-294, and this is dated 


November 9th, 1961. I also do have a Reynolds 


and -- Electrical and Engineering Company CNA 


SNL re-entry document for day plus one 


activities, and that is also available on the 


site research database I believe at this time. 


So what we can do is incorporate some of the 


language from these documents and others into 


the site profile to provide a -- a descriptive 


-- some descriptive information regarding these 


radiological control practices. 


 MS. MUNN: Wonderful. Again, I don't think 


that description needs to be lengthy as long as 


-- as long as the resource reference is easily 


available. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, and that's -- that's all I 


see, Mark. 

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 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Okay. All right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. I have no 


problems just --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, so we can put a couple of 


statements in there and reference these 


documents for --


 MR. PRESLEY: That's fine. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- for -- okay, great. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Just do that. All right, is that 


all right with everybody, all the working 


group, please? 


 MS. MUNN: It is with me. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Sounds good. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. CLAWSON: (Unintelligible) with me. 


COMMENT FOUR: INGESTION OF NON-RESPIRABLE HOT 


PARTICLES


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty, thank you. Let's go 


on to comment four, ingestion of non-respirable 


hot particles by reactor testing and nuclear 


weapons testing workers needs to be evaluated. 


Mark, do you want to comment on this, please? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, hang on just one second. 


am looking back at the -- let's see -- let's 


I 
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see -- I was just looking back at our combined 


comments two and three, and I did want to note 


that we do have mention of dose reconstruction 


for claimants who participated in the nuclear 


rocket re-entries incorporated as a page change 


into the revision of NTS-6 Rev. 1. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: I looked over that before and I 


apologize, and it appears that that was 


documented in Section 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Number four, the -- 


regarding the ingestion of non-respirable hot 


particles. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLFES: All right. We -- this is the 


individual that we spoke with, the health 


physicist that oversaw the operations at the 


Nuclear Rocket Development Station. He 


indicated that no hot particle ingestion 


occurred, to his knowledge -- or based on any 


of the information that he had associated with 


the monitoring following the events -- the reentry events. We believe that the status of 


this is closed as well. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Now we talked about this 


at extensive length. Arjun --


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, we sure did. Was this -- this 


was the one we had said there was new 


information, newly unearthed reports to be 


reviewed and an expanded OCAS response is -- is 


-- is this -- is this the newly unearthed 


reports that we had discussed (unintelligible) 


 MR. ROLFES: Many of the reports that we do 


have are on-site radiological safety reports 


for the specific nuclear rocket development 


work that was done at the Test Site, and also 


interviews with the health physicist that 


oversaw the -- the radiation exposure potential 


and controls of the site operations. 


 MS. MUNN: Sounds like a good expanded 


response. Thank you. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, thanks. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, for this item four -- 


well, again, it's the same thing. It's in the 


Chapter 5, Rev. 01, which we have not seen and 


have not been asked to review. 


DR. MAURO: And this is John, too. I -- in 

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effect, the case being made here is very 


similar to -- we talked about before. There 


are controls in place that would preclude a 


person from inadvertently ingesting a hot 


particle. But the last paragraph in your 


response also goes on to say however, if for 


some reason you decide that you would want to, 


for example, calculate the dose to the lungs 


from a hot particle -- we'll stick to the 


internal right now -- as you say in your write-


up, in that paragraph, that you know, there are 


methods to do that and you make reference to 


this -- an NRDL report. Now, again I would 


like to ask when -- when you're doing that -- 


this is exactly the same issue we talked about 


before with the skin, but now we're talking 


about a particle that might have been inhaled 


or ingested that -- recognizing that the 


controls are in place, that such a scenario 


really can't happen, but you do acknowledge 


that there may be certain cases, on a case-bycase basis, where you'll need to address that 


issue and use methodologies to derive those 


doses, as you indicated in your write-up. 


Again I would ask -- I'd like to know -- learn 

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a little bit more about how that's done. That 


is, when you derive dose to the lung from a hot 


particle, unlike -- you know, unlike an 


external dose or inhalation of a -- of a -- of 


a -- a plutonium, when a particle is 


distributed throughout the lung and you go 


through your standard dose reconstruction and 


standard IREP method. In this case we're 


talking about hot particles and I guess I'd 


like to hear a little bit about how the dose 


reconstruction's done and the probability of 


causation, just like we talked about with the 


skin. 


 MR. ROLFES: At this time the standard 


biokinetic models would be used to interpret 


bioassay data for estimating a dose to any 


particular organ in which a cancer would 


develop in the future. So right now at this 


time we have nothing that would change, 


essentially, on the interpretation of a 


particular piece of either direct or indirect 


radiobioassay. 


DR. MAURO: It's a (unintelligible), so in 


effect you're saying that if a chest count were 


taken or a bioassay sample were taken and you ­
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- you saw a positive result -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- you would -- you just 


(unintelligible) methods, IMBA, to determine 


the dose to the organ of concern -- let's say 


in this case the lung -- and there's be 


business as usual. This would apply whether or 


not there was reason to believe that that body 


burden or what was inhaled was -- was just a -- 


a fume or a vapor or very -- you know, a one -- 


a -- very small particles or you ingest it and 


possibly a -- now I'm not sure if you would 


inhale I guess a hot particle. I don't even 


know if that's a real scenario because the 


particle would have to be -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, it's not. We're talking 


about non-respirable ingestion. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, so this is -- okay, so the 


reference to the lung here doesn't really 


apply. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No. 


DR. MAURO: I guess it would be more a GI tract 


issue then. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. Then that goes to the GI 

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tract if -- I just wanted to make sure I 


understand the position you're talking, and I'm 


not saying that I agree or disagree with it, 


I'm just saying that -- so you're saying that 


if a person were in a circumstance where there 


was a possibility where he might have ingested 


a relatively large hot particle, you're say-- 


now I understand your argument is well, that 


scenario isn't very realistic, but then you do 


go on to say in the write-up that however, if 


there is there is something in his records that 


says that well, this might have occurred, 


you're going to treat the -- that person -- you 


know, let's say just use his bioassay data as 


normal and reconstruct the dose, let's say to 


his GI tract, the same way you would any other 


person that had a positive bioassay or whole 


body count. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, let me just make a 


comment to what Mark said, is in this last 


paragraph of item four --


UNIDENTIFIED: We haven't --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- we haven't reviewed this, 


I'm just responding to the last paragraph -- 


DR. MAURO: Me, too, yeah. 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- that doses could be 


calculated based on the NRDS approach, or if 


that information is not available on OCAS IG002, which is the IMBA EXPERT (unintelligible), 


which is the normal way of doing dose 


reconstruction for internal dose, I'm -- I'm -- 


on the face of it, from -- from having read the 


Naval reactor documents, I'm not convinced at 


all that these two methods are equivalent for 


the GI tract. In fact, I suspect that they 


would give you rather different answers for the 


same parameters for hot particle ingestion. 


 MR. ROLFES: The -- the likelihood, once again, 


of this occurrence is so, so minuscule, and 


that hasn't been reiterated enough because the 


number of people that were involved in these 


re-entries were typically about ten. So in 


comparison to the total number of individuals 


that worked on-site at Nevada Test Site and 


associated with a particular project where a 


hot particle exposure could have occurred, 


we've -- we've rapidly eliminated the -- more 


than 99 percent of individuals that worked on-


site. This -- you know, we -- we're talking 


about people that, once again, were in 

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respirators, so it's very unlikely that an 


individual could have potentially ingested a 


hot particle. Once again the bottom line is 


that we have methods to assign dose based on a 


-- a -- exposure, however unlikely it may be; 


the methodology does exist. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, all -- all I'm saying -- 


I'm not -- I'm not commenting on whether it 


would likely or not. All I'm saying is that 


you have proposed two approaches for 


calculating the dose for the same thing, and on 


the face of it, I suspect that they're not at 


all equivalents. That's all. If you ever have 


to calculate a dose and -- and you try to do it 


by these two methods, I don't think you'll come 


up with the same number. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. And --


MR. SMITH: Mark -- Mark, this is Billy. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. SMITH: Arjun is -- is absolutely correct. 


I've gone through the NRDL report in detail and 


looked at the model, and actually gone through 


sample calculations as to how an internal dose 


would be calculated using the NRDL model -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 

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MR. SMITH: -- and the IMBA code is a much more 


current code, you know, relying in ICRP-66 -- 


 MR. ROLFES: 66 and 68, yes. 


MR. SMITH: -- values. But yes, you would 


probably get different numbers. And I'm sure 


that if the case does occur, that the most 


conservative (unintelligible) against the 


higher dose would be applied to the particular 


claimant to give him the benefit of the doubt. 


There's no argument that the models are 


identical. They are not identical. But -- and 


we recognize that. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, we would certainly rely on 


the biokinetic parameters associated with the 


more recent ICRP models. However, there may be 


technical parameters regarding potential 


particle sizes, et cetera, and radionuclides of 


concern in the other -- in the other reference, 


such as the NRDL report that we're referring 


to. 


MR. SMITH: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: All I -- all I want to say is 


that I -- I have some reservations about this 


last paragraph. 


DR. MAURO: Me -- me, too. Me -- I -- I feel 

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as if -- right now if I were asked to do a dose 


reconstruction to a person that we have some 


bioassay data, but we also have reason to 


suspect that he may have ingested some hot par­

- hot particles that were relatively insoluble 


and -- and they -- that could have lodged in 


the GI tract, quite frankly I'm not sure how I 


would do that dose calculation. Certainly I 


don't think I would use the bioassay results to 


predict what the dose would -- localized dose 


might have been to the GI tract -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: -- see -- see my -- it's the same 


thing as the skin. 


 MR. ROLFES: Which insoluble hot particles 


would you be --


DR. MAURO: I -- I -- no, no, I --


 MR. ROLFES: -- referring to? 


DR. MAURO: -- I don't know if that's a real 


scenario. I mean I -- I'm prepared to accept 


your position that that scenario is nonexistent, it can't occur because of the access 


and egress controls, respiratory protection, et 


cetera. And if that's the case, that's fine, 


and you've made your case that that's the case 

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and this problem's put to bed. But if you do 


say that well, we do acknowledge that there may 


be certain cases, on a case-by-case basis, 


where we're going to have to deal with this 


problem, what -- and actually reconstruct the 


dose to the GI tract from the -- the ingestion 


of some insoluble hot particles. If that 


scenario does make its way to a dose 


reconstruction, it's not clear to me how you 


would do that. And now whether or not we -- 


you need to specify that at this time for this 


purposes or simply say that there are methods 


available that we would draw upon and use the 


ones most appropriate and make reference to 


what those methods are, that may be sufficient. 


But right now I just don't know what those 


methods are. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. So if we had to complete a 


dose reconstruction for an individual, a 


hypothetical individual, that ingested a hot 


particle, I think it would be more appropriate 


to address that issue when we come to it rather 


than trying to address something that has such 


a low likelihood of occurrence -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 

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 MR. ROLFES: -- right now. 


DR. MAURO: And -- and -- and I -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: It is in your -- it is in your 


revised site profile. Right? 


 MR. ROLFES: What's that? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I -- I'm just -- I'm just 


looking at what's on the paper here. It says 


addressed in NTS-5 Rev. 01, and I -- I think -- 


I think at the present time maybe -- maybe -- 


at least I would want to leave it right there 


and just to react to this paragraph and say 


that we have not reviewed -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- Rev. 01, that's it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Again, I think we have 


talked about this and talked about it. Working 


group, what's your wish on -- on comment four? 


 MS. MUNN: Well, this is Wanda. I'm prepared 


to accept it. I'm a little concerned that we 


don't have the revision to look at. That's --


you know, it's one of those things that we find 


ourselves taking from time to time when we all 


have time constraints and they don't fall out 


in the proper order. I'm certainly willing to 


accept the agency's statement that they have 

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addressed it in NTS-5 Rev. 1, if that -- Mark, 


do you feel that -- well, you and Gene are the 


experts on that. Are -- are the words 


essentially bearing the sense of what we just 


discussed? That is to say, this will be 


addressed on an individual basis in the 


unlikely occurrence that it should arise. 


 MR. ROLFES: Let's see -- Gene, do you have 


that section in front of you? 


 MS. MUNN: 5.6.5.3, yeah -- that... 


 MR. ROLFES: Gene? 


 (No responses) 


Hello, Gene? Sorry. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I wonder if he's muted his phone. 


 MR. ROLFES: Let's see here, if we could hang 


on just a second --


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- if I can have a minute I will 


pull up -- or actually Laurie Arent -- 


MS. ARENT: Yes, I'm here. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Do you recall if -- what 


language we have added to NTS-5 Rev. 1 -- 


MS. ARENT: It's essentially what it says on 


the matrix. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 

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MS. ARENT: As far as I can (break in 


transmission) looking at it right here, it 


looks verbatim. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: So the words, dose reconstructors 


may consider using the models and methods in 


the NRDL report (break in transmission) this 


information is available for NRDS workers, 


internal exposures can be addressed through 


OCAS IG-002 and the IMBA EXPERT codes. 


MS. ARENT: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: And is -- is that wording acceptable 


to our contractor? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, Ms. Munn, as I said, the 


last paragraph in that three-paragraph 


statement --


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- I'm -- I'm uneasy about 


because I don't think those two methods would 


be equitable in results, and I don't -- and I 


(unintelligible) that we -- we're not sure how 


you would calculate that dose, so -- so 


currently we're not comfortable with what's on 


the page and haven't reviewed any of the 


underlying reasoning. 

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121

 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Keep in mind, Arjun, that 


when we complete a dose reconstruction using an 


individual's DOE response information -- for 


example, when we interpret a whole body count 


result, we have the options of using ingestion 


or inhalation pathways as -- and additionally 


injection or wound entry. So when we complete 


a dose reconstruction we do consider all those 


pathways, and there's nothing that prevents us 


from -- you know, we wouldn't handle this case 


any differently than any other case. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well -- well, the -- the point 


of the review when we wrote it in December 2005 


was if you review the NRDL document, the -- 


it's quite persuasive that if such a thing did 


happen that you would have to treat it 


differently because you're -- you're producing 


very high doses locally in a way that would not 


be reflected necessarily in the way IMBA works, 


especially for urinalysis. And that's why I'm 


reiterating that -- that I'm uncomfortable with 


this because the whole point of raising this 


issue was that you would not pick up this kind 


of internal dose in your normal dose 


reconstruction. 

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DR. MAURO: You have to realize these -- the 


dose to the GI tract from a particle that may 


deposit in their -- the GI tract really should 


be thought of as part of -- is not internal to 


the body. It's -- in fact when I studied, you 


know, physiology and anatomy, it's always a 


good -- it's just a pocket that certainly -- 


that can -- it's like depositing on your skin. 


It's no different. Other words, if you ingest 


a particle that is relatively insoluble and 


let's say -- let's say that scenario does 


occur, it's the same exact problem as if it's 


deposited on your skin and -- and -- and the 


question is -- and -- and it's a -- as long as 


you consider that the scenario is plausible and 


you do have the wherewithal, the tools, the 


methodologies to calculate the dose, and then 


how you would use that dose to transfer that to 


a probability of causation, and let's say there 


are methods to do that, I -- I -- I'm not 


familiar with them, but if there are methods to 


do that and you're going to be adopting those 


methods on a case-by-case basis, that -- that's 


fine. But as Arjun pointed out, we -- we 


haven't looked at any of that and we're not -- 

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I -- I'm not familiar with it. It may be -- it 


may be techniques that are well established in 


the health physics community to -- to -- I know 


we can do the dose using VARSKIN. I -- I'm not 


going to -- I mean you could actually, in 


theory, apply VARSKIN to the GI tract, say 


listen, this particle of a certain dimension 


and certain activity was ingested and deposited 


someplace in the GI tract and you wanted to get 


a dose rate, you could run VARSKIN there also, 


in theory. But I'm more con-- I guess my 


question goes okay, you just calculated this 


very, very high dose to a very, very small area 


in the GI tract and the person -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Well --


DR. MAURO: -- does have GI tract cancer -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Well --


DR. MAURO: -- I'm not quite sure -- what do 


you do then? 


 MR. ROLFES: You need to --


DR. MAURO: To (unintelligible) probability of 


causation. 


 MR. ROLFES: You need to be very careful about 


making that statement because that particle is 


not going to stop and reside in one location 

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for any significant amount of time. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: Recall that as you ingest 


something, it moves from your stomach after 


about an hour --


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- and then moves into your small 


intestine, into the -- I believe it's the 


duodenum first, followed by the jejunum and 


then into the ilium. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. ROLFES: From there, after residence time 


of about six to eight hours, I believe it's 


moved into the large intestine and is moved 


into the large intestine -- it -- it may reside 


there for -- in between an hour and eight hours 


and --


DR. MAURO: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. ROLFES: -- this entire time period that 


this particle is moving through an individual's 


digestive tract system, it is undergoing 


radiological decay, and it is also being 


shielded by materials -- 


DR. MAURO: Right. 


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the GI tract. So this particle is not being 


deposited and residing within the GI tract. It 


is continuously moving. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: So it is not one localized area 


that is being continuously exposed -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay, so I --


 MR. ROLFES: -- through an ingestion. 


DR. MAURO: -- I -- you know what, that's good. 


I accept that. So in effect what you're 


describing is a model of how you would go about 


-- it certainly is not -- it's not -- it's not 


IMBA. I mean it -- what you're saying is now ­

- we've got this particle that may or may not 


be in contact with any given location as it's 


moving through the system. I haven't thought 


through the problem and I haven't seen it 


written it up, but what you just des-- 


described to me certainly makes sense and there 


probably is a way to come to grips with how 


we're going to derive the doses, whether we're 


talking about skin or talking about this 


particle moving through the GI tract. And it 


may turn out to be a -- a relatively 


straightforward way of dealing with this. And 

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then once you do get some kind of dose, maybe 


you come up with an average dose to the GI 


tract as the particle passes through and the 


bolus that it's associated with and the self-


shielding, so -- you would then of course -- 


then you have some estimate of the average dose 


to the -- to the -- whether it's the stomach, 


the esophagus or whatever different organ is 


the organ of concern, you're saying that you 


get a dose that way, not using IMBA nec-- I'm 


not sure that IMBA would do this for you or 


not, I'm not -- I'm not sure. And then from 


there you can get a probability of causation 


and so you're saying it is a tractable problem 


and you have the wherewithal to do it. 


 MR. ROLFES: That's correct. It can be done 


when necessary. And at this time we haven't 


seen a case where this is -- has become 


necessary. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh, yeah. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Be -- be -- I -- I -- you know, 


I -- John, occasionally have to -- we have to 


do a public -- I -- I think, you know, if you ­

- some people have looked at the Naval 


Radiological Defense Lab document and maybe 

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some haven't --


DR. MAURO: I haven't. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- and -- and there -- there is 


a method specified in there, it's not necessar­

- it isn't the one that is specified in IMBA. 


It's -- I don't see any one-to-one 


correspondence, especially for using IMBA with 


bioassay, to -- to do what that model does. 


And all -- all I'm saying right now is that we 


are in a position to say, and it's been 


reaffirmed by -- by ORAU, is that these two 


things are not equivalent and so the statement 


that is in the matrix is not internally 


consistent. How it should be modified or 


whether it should be modified, whether the 


working group wants us to review it and write a 


memorandum on it or however, it is a question 


of course that the working group should 


address. But at this stage all we know is -- 


is -- is that that statement is internally not 


consistent, or appears not to be consistent, 


and -- and I think we should leave it at that 


because we haven't even seen volume five. 


MR. SMITH: This is Billy. Arjun is -- is 


partially correct. I think what's not said in 

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this particular paragraph is that if people 


ingest hot particles from the rocket testing 


days -- because you need to be very careful in 


how you use the models that are described in 


the NRDL report, they are only -- that model is 


only specific to hot particles from the rocket 


test days. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


MR. SMITH: IMBA itself can be used to 


determine what the GI tract doses are from 


other than NRDS tests, hence drill-backs and 


tunnel re-entries. So you know, it comes down 


to the dose reconstructor making the kind of 


determination as to where did this guy work, 


where did the hot particle come from, was it 


NRDL rocket testing or was it Nevada Test Site 


testing, and then they would choose the 


appropriate model to apply. They don't have to 


be consistent. We would just apply the 


particular model from the source where the hot 


particles came from. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I -- I don't -- I only 


partly agree with that, because the point that 


was raised in our review is not that the test 


workers face an identical situation to reactor 

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workers. Of course not, there were -- there 


were different tests and different specific 


physical situations. But that -- there would 


be a similarity in that drill-back workers may 


ingest non-respirable -- non-respirable 


particles that contain short-lived 


radionuclides and therefore may produce high 


localized doses similar to what occurs with -- 


or what was postulated to be possible with the 


reactor tests, not that it would be identical. 


And under those circumstances, I think you'd 


have the same problem with using IMBA compared 


to -- because you've got significant localized 


doses, maybe not as high as calculated in the 


NRDL document, but significant. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun, this is Bob Presley. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, sir. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Your comments are noted. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Billy, appreciate your comments. 


I think that we can say that item four is 


closed based on the fact that this is for the 


NTS use. We've stated that one way will be 


used for the rocket tests and another way will 


be used for other internal exposures. And as 

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Mark said, there's not that many doses that 


will have to be done this way, so I would like 


to close this out, please. What -- what's the 


working group's thoughts on this? 


 MS. MUNN: Well, this is Wanda. I'm wondering 


if there is a simple way to revise the language 


of this last paragraph slightly in those last 


few sentences to better incorporate what I 


think I heard from Mark with respect to how 


these highly unlikely cases would be addressed 


if they do occur. It didn't sound to me as 


though there would be a cut and dried 


methodology that could be applied to all 


circumstances because each of these 


circumstances would be not only unlikely but 


quite different. Can we -- if there's -- if 


there's hesitance on anyone's part, can we fix 


it with language in the matrix, is my question. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Mark --


 MR. ROLFES: Bob --


 MR. PRESLEY: -- is there a simple fix to that 


last statement? 


 MR. ROLFES: Let's see, is this regarding if a 


worker who partici-- is it the last paragraph 


that you're referring to? 

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 MS. MUNN: Yes, (unintelligible). 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, as Laurie mentioned, this is 


what we have documented in the revision of the 


NTS-5 Rev. 1. If there is something that you 


would like us to look into or change in 


regarding to this language, then we could 


certainly take a look at doing so in order to 


resolve any potential outstanding comment. 


 MS. MUNN: I'm just not certain whether there's 


easy language to clarify that a little more in 


-- gosh, yeah. I -- I don't see that this has 


to be the same language as the report, although 


the report is the official document, is it not? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Correct. 


 MS. MUNN: That's what your dose 


reconstructor's going to look at? 


 MR. PRESLEY: You know, Wanda, with the 


language here, it says if this information is 


not available for the NRDS workers, then you 


know, internal exposures can be addressed 


through either OCAS IG-002 or the IMBA EXPERT 


codes, and the -- which are the -- the newest 


thing going. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I'm -- I guess the real 


question is, is this being interpreted 

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correctly by SC&A? I -- I -- when I read that 


I did not get the implication that the 


methodologies were likely to achieve similar 


results. I got the impression that different 


circumstances would require the use of -- of 


different methods. Is -- am I -- am I off-


course here? Is that -- is that what you were 


saying, Arjun and John? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, I -- well, the default to 


IMBA, lacking better methods or better 


information, doesn't seem to be the solution. 


That is, there are -- there are scenarios, as I 


understand it, where IMBA is really not going 


to serve us well and there may be other methods 


that may need to be applied, depending on the 


exposure situation for the ingested particle. 


So I guess -- my understanding -- so the 


language the way it is now really def-- 


eventually says well, listen, if worse comes to 


worst, just use IMBA. And my understanding is 


that IMBA may not serve us well when we're 


dealing with this ingested, relatively 


insoluble hot particle. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Do -- by the way, does -- does 

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NIOSH and ORAU agree that there are 


circumstances where IMBA may not be the best 


way to approach this problem? 


 MR. ROLFES: I would have to take a look at the 


facts of the case that we're dealing with and 


then make a decision based on the facts that we 


have at hand. 


DR. MAURO: I agree with that, and maybe that's 


the words we need. 


 MR. ROLFES: Then that -- that's an unwritten ­

- that -- that may not be documented but, as 


you know, that's the first piece of information 


that we would consider in an individual's dose 


reconstruction, and those pieces of 


documentation are contained within the 


claimant's files. 


DR. MAURO: The on-- the only concern is right 


now the words that really don't say that. They 


say default to IMBA. You know, push comes to 


shove, if you're at a loss, go to IMBA. And I 


guess the answer is well, not necessarily. 


There may -- there area circumstances where 


IMBA won't serve our purposes well here. 


 MS. MUNN: And that -- Mark, my primary concern 


here is the issue of our archives of what we 

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do. 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


 MS. MUNN: And if -- if the archive -- this 


matrix will turn out to be the archive of the 


workgroup. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


 MS. MUNN: And if we can in some way reflect 


the (unintelligible) of what this discussion 


has been about, and if we all -- if we're all 


in agreement that IMBA may not be the best 


default, that it's an individual issue, not 


necessarily a cut and dried decision with 


respect to which method to use, it -- if -- it 


just feels like it would make sense to choose 


our words for this closure matrix -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


 MS. MUNN: -- in a slightly different way so 


that it emphasized that it's such an individual 


thing that no specific direction can be given 


until the individual case is in hand. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Which I believe is -- is that right, 


SC&A? Am I saying the right thing? 


DR. MAURO: You -- my answer is yes, that -- 


that -- and it sounds like it -- pretty 

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straightforward. It's just some rewording here 


to alert the -- the dose reconstructor that -- 


that IMBA is not ne-- and as long as you folks 


-- you know, assum-- are in effect saying that, 


if -- if you believe that there are 


circumstances where IMBA really can't be used 


to do the dose reconstruction for this 


scenario, it should say that. Right now it 


doesn't say that. 


MR. SMITH: Yeah, but what it does say -- this 


is Billy --


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


MR. SMITH: -- it says that if there is a 


scenario where a person gets a hot particle 


from NRDS, they're going to use the NRDL model. 


DR. MAURO: Correct, but --


MR. SMITH: If for some reason the information 


is not available that the NRDL model can be 


used, then they will look at another 


alternative, which is the IMBA code. Now I 


think the concern may be -- on SC&A's part is 


that the -- the probability that the IMBA code 


is going to give a lower dose than the NRDL 


model is going to give, so if you can't use the 


IMBA codes, then what model is the dose 

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reconstructor going to use if the NRDL -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 

MR. SMITH: -- model is not appropriate -- 

DR. MAURO: Yeah, I --

MR. SMITH: -- (unintelligible) you don't have 

enough information. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I -- I mean I'm not 


disagreeing with any -- with -- with you folks. 


It's just a matter -- if you're comfortable 


that the IMBA code could be used in a given 


circumstance, great. But I guess I'm 


visualizing if someone is going through this 


without giving some thought to wait a minute, 


IMBA really doesn't apply here and we don't 


have suf-- the -- you know, it does not 


necessarily have to be the NRDL report. I'm 


more concerned about -- and -- and when you're 


doing a dose reconstruction to the GI tract and 


it's a scenario where a person may have 


ingested a hot particle, a relatively hot 


particle that's insoluble, that they simply ask 


themselves the question -- and maybe this is 


how it's done -- well, listen, I think under 


these circumstances IMBA may not serve us well, 


may not be claimant favorable, and there are 

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other ways to deal with this. If -- if -- if 


you believe that's true, then I guess those 


words should say that. If you believe no, IMBA 


will serve us well, then that's fine, too. But 


right now it's a bit ambiguous exactly what the 


dose reconstructor is supposed to do when 


confronted with this scenario. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. So it sounds like me this ­

- to me this is more of, you know, how we would 


go about assigning dose from a particular 


exposure, which I really don't feel is 


appropriate to put into the Nevada Test Site 


SE-- or, excuse me, site profile because it's 


something that could impact other -- other 


sites, and it refers to how we interpret 


bioassay data or how we assign dose from a 


given exposure. And this is something that I 


think is detailed within the OCAS 


Implementation Guidelines that we've referenced 


here in the -- in the response. 


 MS. MUNN: I wouldn't recommending -- recommend 


anything in the site profile. I'm just looking 


specifically at the wording in the matrix, 


personally. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, okay, so you would like 

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information specific to the matrix that would 


clarify --


 MS. MUNN: That was -- that was my thinking. 


I'm just --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: -- concerned about the long-term 


archive of this workgroup and what we've agreed 


to. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: And it -- there's been so much 


discussion on this -- on this situation that 


probably will never occur, but if it does 


occur, it would be helpful -- seems to me -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: -- if there's something here on the 


-- the matrix that said essentially this isn't 


likely, we can't foresee this happening, but in 


the unlikely event that it does, we'll have to 


use the method that's appropriate for that -- 


that circumstance. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, so that's the language that 


you would like incorporated into the matrix 


here? 


 MS. MUNN: That was just my opinion. 


DR. ROESSLER: Yes, I agree with Wanda. 
I 

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think the word "unlikely to occur" would -- as 


we come back to this and look at it again, 


would give a different perspective. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Would -- would that be okay 


then if we, you know, documented, you know, the 


probability of such occurrence within the 


matrix, would that be responsive to -- to what 


your concern is? 


 MS. MUNN: It would to me --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: -- and I'm not speaking of numerical 


or statistic probability, just -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: -- just indicating that this -- no 


one expects this to happen -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: -- given the controls that were in 


place. In the event that it did, it would have 


to be individual decision with respect to 


method for dose reconstruction. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Gene or Laurie, could we 


incorporate that information, the -- you know, 


the probability of this occurrence, could we 


add some -- a simple statement into the matrix 


to indicate that we have considered the 

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likelihood of such a scenario? 


MS. ARENT: Yes. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Mark, this is Gene. First I want 


to apologize for not responding to your last 


question. It wasn't that I'd fallen off the 


planet; there's just too many buttons on this 


telephone. 


 MS. MUNN: Phone technology is just a 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. ROLLINS: Yeah, I'm -- I'm marking up this 


matrix as we speak. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, and --


 MS. MUNN: That would be helpful and, from my 


perspective, if that rewording could just be 


sent out to -- to the working group, if the 


working group agrees on it, just add it to the 


matrix. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I have no problem with that. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's just more for Mark to do. 


 MS. MUNN: Yes, I know. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right here before Christmas. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, he has nothing to do between 


Christmas and New Year's. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I know better than that. Okay --

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141

 MR. ROLFES: That's what I'm here for, so if 


that's --


 MR. PRESLEY: What we -- what we will do then 


is we will -- will be looking for wording added 


to the matrix --


 MS. MUNN: Just clarification wording. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- right, about the likelihood of 


this happening. And then if Mark will send 


that out, we will look at the wording. And if 


everybody has -- says it's okay, Mark, we'll 


send that back to you and -- and it'll be a go. 


 MR. ROLFES: All right. Okay, Mr. Presley, are 


we ready to move on here? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, we are. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Let's go to --


DR. ROESSLER: Bob, I'm going to cut out for a 


minute -- this is Gen. I think I've burned out 


the battery on this phone. I'm going to switch 


to another one. So I'll bow back in shortly. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


DR. ROESSLER: But go ahead. 


COMMENT FIVE: RESUSPENSION


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty, we're going to start 


with -- or go back to 5-7, 15 and 23, has to do 

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with comments on the resumption (sic) model and 


resumption (sic) factors are not scientifically 


defendable (sic) or claimant favorable due to a 


variety of factors. Dose -- doses may be 


underestimated -- and then it goes through 


quite a few things here. Mark, I'm going to 


let you discuss this. This one that we have 


beat to death. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, and one more thi-- Mark, this is 


Wanda. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, Wanda. 


 MS. MUNN: I -- I'm not at all sure that I have 


done my homework. I'm not sure I've read the 


white paper. When -- when did Gene do that 


white paper? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, if you recall, there were 


several white papers or several drafts that we 


had put together. We had discussed and 


presented our initial methodology -- 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I remember seeing the drafts, 


I just don't remember whether I ever actually 


saw the final document. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay --


 MS. MUNN: Gene, when did that -- that final 

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come through, do you know? I'm wondering if I 


can track it back quickly on my -- my computer 


and --


 MR. ROLFES: Wanda, I can answer for Gene. 


There may not have been a final white paper 


sent on to the Advisory Board members. I'll 


let Gene respond to that in just a second, but 


the final version ultimately will be 


incorporated into the ambient exposure -- 


excuse me, the ambient -- excuse me, the 


environmental portion of the site profile, 


Chapter 4. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I -- I'm -- I think it's a 


moot question anyhow because my -- my memory is 


that we had resolved all of the outstanding 


issues with resuspension, but I just didn't 


remember whether I had actually seen the final 


document. So it's -- it's probably not worth 


discussing. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Wanda, this is Brad. Not to mock 


your memory or anything else, but I remember 


the same thing, but when we closed this this 


was pending on the white paper, the final of 


the white paper, and I don't know if I have 


seen it yet either. 

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 MR. ROLLINS: This is Gene Rollins. I believe 


the -- the initial draft was sent out because I 


can remember John Mauro asking me some 


questions, which indicated to me that he had 


read through it. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 MR. ROLLINS: There is going to be another 


revision I'm working on currently that's going 


to address enriching the near field with the 


refractories and some of the correction factors 


for early fission products, as I'm calculating 


right now, are going to increase substantially. 


So -- but those correction factors will be put 


into the -- into the TBD, Chapter 4. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, okay. When is that likely to be 


incorporated, do you know? Well, you don't 


know how -- when your new editions are going to 


be done. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I will say that the -- Chapter 4 


is now in review. When that version is 


approved, I will immediately initiate a page 


change that will incorporate these new fission 


activation correction factors, and page changes 


typically don't take that long to get through. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. Do we -- do we have any hope 

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at all of having that on deck by the time we go 


to Las Vegas? 


 MR. ROLLINS: I'll let Mark field that 


question. 


 MS. MUNN: That just way (unintelligible). 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, you know, we are around the 


holiday season --


 MS. MUNN: I know. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- and I know many people are in 


fact operating at a reduced budget right now 


and with a very high load of work. So I don't 


want to speak and say that we will be able to. 


We will certainly do our best to, as we always 


do. I -- I couldn't give you a -- a more 


detailed response as to a date that this might 


be finalized. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, well, I didn't want to press 


you. It's just -- it's just -- this is one of 


those key factors that we've worked with so 


long --


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


 MS. MUNN: -- it would really be nice to be 


able to say at Nevada that we've thrashed this 


one right down to the last nit and that it's 


all completely squared away and the documents 

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are currently updated as they should be. But 


if -- it's just a timing issue. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, Wanda, this is Larry 


Elliott. As Mark and Gene have indicated, if ­

- if we possibly can and it's simply a page 


change and we can get all of that and the logic 


behind the page change reviewed in a timely 


manner, we'll do so. But Mark's correct in 


pointing out that -- that we're operating here 


under constrained resources at this time of the 


year, so -- and I'm not sure when this came 


over to us for review, but you know, there's -- 


there's a series of reviews it has to go 


through, so we'll try to get it there if we 


can. 


 MS. MUNN: I understand. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: If not, we'll be ready to explain 


its status currently at that time. 


 MS. MUNN: Good. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. If I 


remember correctly when we were in Cincinnati 


on the 25th we discussed this and -- and you 


all told us at that point that the likelihood 


of this being done by the time we went to NTS 


was almost slim and none. So you know, I 

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understand. The only thing we can ask is to do 


your best, which I know you will do, and we can 


go from there. 


DR. MAURO: As a refresher -- this is John -- 


is Lynn Anspaugh still on the line? If he's 


not, I -- I'll -- I'll just -- 'cause he's been 


tracking this a little closer than I have, but 


I recall that there were three items that -- 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- we had discussed, and let's see 


if I -- there may be more, but the ones that I 


-- my recollection is the number one you 


mentioned, which I think was by far the most 


important, that is the -- the fractionation 


issue, sounds like you've got that well in 


hand. That's great. 


The other had to do with -- with -- I believe 


you were basing your model for inhalation on 


air sampling data that was collected at some 


time -- I (unintelligible) the year -- and then 


-- and I -- I remember one of our concerns is 


that, you know, when you were applying that to 


earlier years, let's say you wanted to go back 


to 1963, I think you were taking later data, 


air sampling data, and then sort of go back to 

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-- okay, what would the exposures be in 1963, 


'64, you know, and you went -- and the way I 


understood it is you went back in time and 


back-calculated what might -- what the mix 


would be for an earlier time using Hicks tables 


type approaches, know-- knowing if you have 


this much airborne activity, this mix of 


radionuclides in the air at this thumb, you'd 


theoretically go back to an earlier time and 


figure out not only the -- the ho-- your 


activity that would be because they decayed, 


but also other radionuclides that may have gone 


away. You could come -- you can reconstruct 


that. And I -- I believe -- I believe you -- 


did you do that in the white paper, or has that 


been done yet, this second issue? 


 MR. ROLLINS: This is Gene Rollins. John, the 


way we addressed -- we did address early 


fission activation products -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- using the -- using the Hicks 


data. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And then that -- and that's what 


I just mentioned, that once we -- we have gone 

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back now and enriched the near field -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay, that -- you -- you mentioned 


the -- the fractionation issue and that -- 


which were a different problem, and that was 


the fact that -- you know, there's the 


fractionation issue --


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, that all comes together 


because it also allows us to postulate what was 


there shortly after -- within months after 


detonation. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, good, so -- so in -- in one ­

- in effect those -- these -- these issues 


which I have separately in my mind, I can see 


how you could -- they really come together as 


really a single issue. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Ok-- okay, and you're addressing 


that. Now there was another problem that I 


recall that -- there was some cleanup between 


the time that the air sample was taken and -- 


let's say you're going backwards in time now, 


apparently -- at least some -- and this was an 


issue that perhaps the -- there was a cleanup 


operation that took place, let's say between 


the mid-1960s and the later time period when 

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you have your air sampling data, and we were 


concerned that that -- and from that 


perspective, you know, you've got a problem. 


You know, how do you go backward -- how do you 


use more recent data to go backward if there 


was some cleanup in between. Is that a -- am I 


-- first of all, is my recollection correct 


that that was an issue we discussed? And if 


so, how -- do you have a way to deal with that? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, John, we did discuss that a 


bit and the cleanup was limited to, for 


example, picking up pieces of structural steel. 


It wasn't necessarily linked in any way to 


reducing the radionuclide inventory -- 


DR. MAURO: Ah --


 MR. ROLFES: -- in the soil. 


DR. MAURO: -- okay, I see what you're saying. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: That's (break in transmission) -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. And if I 


remember correctly, on that discussion you all 


have all kinds of data on those later 


operations. 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) cleanup 


(unintelligible). 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) pretty specific. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, that -- I wanted to make sure 


that these various items that we talked about 


earlier are not on your plate and being taken 


care of in this -- the new analysis, and it 


sounds like -- at least the ones I can recall. 


There may have been others, I -- I -- that's 


why I asked if Lynn might have been on the 


line. He may recall some of the others that we 


brought up at that time. 


 MS. MUNN: The key ones, though, were the three 


-- the three comments, 7, 15 and 23. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. We have a -- what does 


everybody want to do on the closure on this, on 


item 5-7, 15 and 23? 


 MS. MUNN: Well, we've agreed on the technical 


issues. It's just a question of 


administratively getting it into the document, 


and that's in process. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Resolved. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I think this ought to be closed 


and let them get it into the document. Anybody 

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have a problem with that? 


DR. ROESSLER: No problem. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: No. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty. Mark that as such. 


 MR. ROLFES: I did also want to remind everyone 


that this exposure scenario, the internal doses 


resulting from environmental intakes, is purely 


limited to the 1963 forward time period, so -- 


because of the SEC that was designated for the 


1951 through 1962 time period. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, that -- that -- that -- yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That was one of the things that 


we discussed. Okay? 


 MR. ROLLINS: And this is Gene Rollins again. 


I -- I do want to mention that the ambient 


intakes that are discussed in the white paper 


and have been incorporated into Chapter 4 of 


the TBD also include an ingestion pathway of 


100 milligrams per day of contaminated soil, so 


I want you to keep that in mind as you move 


through this matrix 'cause I think that might 


come up again. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, that's good information. Thank 


you. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: It -- it will, later on. 


DR. MAURO: Good number, 100 milligrams a day. 


We're -- that has been a subject of 


longstanding disc-- debate and we've been 


pushing for that and that's certainly a 


bounding assumption. 


 MS. MUNN: It certainly would be a major 


bounding assumption. 


 MR. PRESLEY: It comes up, if I remember 


correctly, about 17, I think. 


COMMENTS EIGHT/NINE: USE OF 1967 DATA FOR 1963-1966
 

Okay, let's go on to 8 and 9, the use of 1967 


external dose data for 1963 through 1966 is not 


claimant favorable. There was no test in '67 


with measurable off-site fallout. Mark, do you 


want to comment on this, please? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, the information that we have 


put together is now in Nevada Test Site Chapter 


6, Revision 1, Page Change 1 -- and let me 


verify, I do believe that that has been 


approved. Let me check on my last page. 


Actually that is still internal as well, so it 


has not been approved yet formally. Let's see, 


the -- in our response in this category for 8 


and 9 is that unexposed control films and TLDs 

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were processed with personal dosimeters, and 


the readings from these control dosimeters were 


subtracted from personal dosimeter readings to 


attain a net reading for determining exposures. 


Beginning in April of 1957 all employees that 


entered NTS were required to wear a dosimeter 


while inside NTS. Because control dosimeters 


were maintained in environmentally-controlled, 


low background areas, exposure resulting from 


elevated ambient environmental levels from 


testing activities in other areas of the site 


would have been included in the individual 


exposure records. So ambient doses are no 


longer being assigned after 1957 due to capture 


by the universal badging and personal dosimetry 


that was in place. So we show that this is 


closed as well. 


DR. MAURO: Bob, let me just make sure I -- so 


the need to go -- to extrapolate backwards in 


time is no longer necessary. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, that's very important. You 


actually have data for the earlier years, I 


guess this 1963 to '66, so you're not going to 


use 1967 data, external data, to reconstruct 

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doses for people exposed from '63 to '66. You 


actually have real data. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Resolved. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes? Somebody holler "Bob"? 


 MS. MUNN: No, I just said "resolved." 


COMMENT TEN: PRE-1963 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL DOSE


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. Okay, let's move on to 


comment 10, TBD does not provide any guidance 


for pre-1963 external environmental dose, and 


we touched on that just a few minutes ago. 


Mark, you want to go back over that? 


 MR. ROLFES: I think this speaks to what we had 


just stated as well, so I think this could have 


been incorporated in the previous comment as 


well, and our response is essentially the same. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I agree. This is Arjun. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Arjun, you have any -- you agree? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, sir. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So we're going to call this one 


closed and resolved. 


And when we do -- when we redo this, Mark, how 

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about putting those together, 8, 9 and 10, 


could you, please? 


 MR. ROLFES: We certainly can. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I appreciate that. 


DR. MAURO: Now I know that there is an SEC 


issue dealing -- I just want to make sure 


there's no cross-wiring here -- there is an SEC 


issue that we're currently looking at very 


closely related to whether workers did not wear 


their -- their film badges. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That's separate, John. 


DR. MAURO: That's separate, so -- I just want 


to make sure everybody's comfortable that -- 


that issue's --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That's a separate issue. 


DR. MAURO: Clearly SEC, nothing to do here. 


Good, okay. Thank you. 


 MR. ROLFES: And we will address that in number 


20 of the matrix, and I did send out a separate 


e-mail with an attachment that will further 


elaborate on the analysis that we completed to 


determine if this was in fact a -- a -- you 


know, a -- an occurrence that was frequent or 


infrequent, so --


DR. MAURO: Oh, is that the separate e-mail 

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that had all the graphs on it? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, correct. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, I have that. Good, thank 


you. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mr. -- Mr. Presley, may I 


interrupt? I -- I did not realize this call 


was going to go on the whole day and I have 


scheduled something at 2:00 o'clock and I will 


need to go for about an hour. I just needed to 


say that item 11 we have not reviewed before 


and it is under review as we discussed in the 


previous working group meeting, and I'll submit 


that to you or SC&A will submit that to you 


before the end of the year -- or -- or in the 


first days of the next -- well before the next 


Board meeting. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And I will -- I hope to be back 


in about an hour. 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. PRESLEY: You want to skip 11 for the time 


being? 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) have Arjun on 


(unintelligible). 


COMMENT TWELVE: RADON DOSE IN G-TUNNELS
 
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 MR. PRESLEY: All righty. Let's go to 12, and 


that's radon dose in G-tunnels are not claimant 


favorable, has to do with the Gravel Gerties 


and, Mark, I'll let you go -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- do this, but if y'all will 


remember, we've had quite a few discussions on 


this and this was put to bed at the last 


meeting. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. I did want to indicate that 


we have addressed radon doses in G-tunnel. We 


did revise those and they are more claimant 


favorable than they previously were. We also 


have guidance to the dose reconstructors 


regarding Gravel Gertie radon exposures. That 


was also updated in the TBD and this 


information is contained in the Chapter 4, 


Revision 1, Section 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, and that 


is the section of the Technical Basis Document 


that is currently at OCAS for review. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Does anybody have a 


problem with that? John, you're all right? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I mean it sounds like that 


you actually have radon measurements. Could 


you just give me conceptually the solution? 

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Other words --


 MR. ROLFES: I'll let Gene speak to that. I do 


believe that we increased the concentration of 


the working level based on -- well, I'll let 


Gene explain. 


 MR. ROLLINS: This is Gene Rollins. What --


what -- what I had done previously was -- the 


work location was unknown. I had recommended 


using a lower value than the maximum value that 


was -- had been reported in G-tunnel -- 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- and so all I did was just 


change the document such that for unknown 


locations that we would use the maximum value. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, and approximately how many 


measurements were made that -- upon which you 


base that? Are we talking about a handful or a 


large number of measurements? 


 MR. ROLLINS: I -- I -- it was only one report 


-- or actually there were two reports that were 


done over a period of two years. I would have 


to guess -- they did them in each of the 


tunnels, probab-- I -- I'd have to guess maybe 


20 measurements per tunnel. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. Okay, so you had a large 

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number of measurements. That -- that strategy 


-- the idea of taking the high end value of the 


distribution of values is -- as your universal 


is -- is really appropriate. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Working group, anybody 


have a problem marking that closed and 


resolved? 

 MR. CLAWSON: This is Brad, I have no problem 

with it. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

DR. ROESSLER: No problem. 

 MR. PRESLEY: All righty. 

 MR. SCHOFIELD: No problem. 


COMMENT THIRTEEN: IODINE-131


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty, let's go to 13, the 


environmental dose due to -- doses due to I-1-- 


or -- not I --


 MR. ROLFES: Iodine-131. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- Iodine-131, I was having a 


senior moment there, needs to be taken into 


account for non-monitoring (sic) workers. This 


is also one that we looked at and, Mark, you 


want to comment on that? 


 MR. ROLFES: Sure. We did develop guidance for 


unmonitored workers that would bound potential 

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organ doses from radioiodine exposures, and we 


did incorporate a sample bounding calculation 


based on the highest concentrations that were 


measured -- for example, for the Baneberry 


event, the highest concentrations that were 


measured in Area 12 Camp following that release 


-- and these sample calculations -- excuse me, 


I can't speak, either, today -- are addressed 


in the NTS Chapter 5, Revision 1 in that 


Section 5.3.3.1. 


DR. MAURO: Mark, a quick question for you. 


When you used the measured data -- I presume 


the -- it was an air sample that looked 


specifically for iodine-131. Is that correct? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, I would have to take a look. 


However, as you know, there could have been 


other radioiodines that were involved in -- 


DR. MAURO: That's why I asked. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- in any venting. 


DR. MAURO: My -- my experience is that shortly 


after a test or an expl-- the major contributor 


to the thyroid dose -- or not -- is not iodine131 but iodine-132, 33, 34, 35 -- it's about a 


-- they contribute maybe as much as seven or 


eight-fold higher dose. 

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 MR. ROLFES: That's very possible, depending 


upon the time following -- 


DR. MAURO: You're tal-- exactly. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- the exposure. 


DR. MAURO: My only -- my only concern I guess 


is that when -- in this protocol that's been 


adopted, that it includes consideration of the 


time period following -- you know, when the air 


sample was taken, if it was an air sample, and 


-- and factored in there might have been these 


other shorter-lived iodines also that are -- 


not maybe, there certainly was, if it was soon 


after the event. They could be the major 


contributor to the dose to the thyroid gland. 


 MR. ROLFES: It -- once again, depending upon 


the time, those radioiodines would be 


detectable by gamma spectroscopy of an air 


filter. The -- for example, there are cases 


where an individual was exposed to a 


radioiodine and was surveyed, found to be 


contaminated and was taken for a whole body 


count following this exposure. And I have seen 


in the records that all three potential 


radioiodines that he was exposed to were 


accounted for and credited. He was in fact 

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credited with dose for those exposures. So 


that information is in fact known, so -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay, that -- yeah, as long as that 


protocol doesn't, you know, ignore the short-


lived, then we're fine. 


MR. SMITH: Mark -- Mark, this is Billy. 


Generally these people were either -- direct 


thyroid counting for sodium iodide crystals or 


whole body counted, but generally we -- we were 


evaluating the thyroid gland, we were looking ­

- I mean iodine-131 -- radioiodine in the 


thyroid, we did a thyroid count. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Thank you. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, but see, what we ran into is 


very often -- let's say a thyroid scanned for 


the correct count would be looking particularly 


for iodine-131, because several days later -- 


if that's when it's done -- you're going to 


lose a lot of the short-lived, and the exposure 


-- so therefore you end up seeing the iodine131 as being the only major -- only important 


contributor, when in fact the majority of the 


dose might have been delivered by the short-


lived iodines that he experienced and which 


have long since disappeared, you know, sev-- 

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'cause several days later they -- several of 


them are not going to be there. And that was ­

- those are only -- we're not saying that was ­

- wasn't factored in, but I'm just -- I guess 


my question is if you're basing your -- your 


dose reconstruction on either air samples or 


are based on a thyroid scan, that the short-


lived iodines are factored into the dose 


reconstruction. 


 MR. ROLFES: When exposures could have 


occurred, they certainly are incorporated into 


a dose assessment. Typically when we have a 


positive bioassay result for an individual that 


was exposed, I have seen sample calculations 


that were done for particular claimants from 


Nevada Test Site or particular workers from 


Nevada Test Site where -- essentially I believe 


it was isotopic data from like the Hicks tables 


that were used to assign intakes of other 


radionuclides associated with this individual's 


exposure at a given time following a test. 


DR. MAURO: Excellent, that -- that's -- that's 


-- you know, I -- I made reference to the 


shorter-lived iodines, but certainly the full 


suite of -- when you get to the shortly after ­
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- the air -- the radionuclides of airborne, 


going to the Hicks tables will allow you -- 


especially if you have only one radionuclide 


you measured, in theory you could predict what 


every other radionuclide was as a function of 


time that the person might have been exposed 


to. Yes. 


DR. ANSPAUGH: This is Lynn Anspaugh back for 


just a minute. You know, there -- there are 


REECo reports that calculated the doses, and I 


think the highest one was 4 rem to the thyroid. 


And I -- I believe REECo did a pretty good job 


of documenting all that and including short-


lived radioiodines (break in transmission) 


that's a little bit of concern is whether or 


not there might have been a dose to the GI 


tract that wasn't calculated and might be of 


some interest in some particular cases. 


(Unintelligible) on the phone he might have a 


few comments about that. I don't know what was 


an issue of concern at the time or not. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, Lynn -- this is Mark Rolfes 


-- and for example, if we do have doses 


calculated to the thyroid, our Integrated 


Modules for Bioassay Analysis program allows us 

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to calculate doses to any other organ within 


the body. So that really wouldn't be an issue 


that would belong in a site profile, but rather 


would certainly be documented in an IMBA 


calculation when necessary. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, does anybody -- anybody 


have a problem with this? I believe that's -- 


can I mark 13 closed and resolved? 


 MS. MUNN: Sounds resolved. 


COMMENT FOURTEEN: INTERNAL MONITORING


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, let's go to 14. There are 


no internal monitoring data till late 1955 or 


1956, some plutonium from then, and then it 


says plutonium from then on, some tritium from 


'58, plutonium, tritium and mixed fusion (sic) 


products from 1961. Mark, do you want to talk 


about (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Certainly. I do want to point out 


once again and reiterate that there is an SEC 


in place for the years 1951 through the end of 


1962, so the earlier internal monitoring issue 


is moot at this point. 


As it pertains to the 1963 time period forward, 


we do have bioassay data for individuals, and 


we have a claimant-favorable methodology to 

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interpret that bioassay data in place. 


So let's see, I believe we have -- let's see, 


I'm just taking a look at the rest of our 


response here, and we did agree to putting that 


guidance for interpreting those fission product 


bioassay results and gross alpha bioassay 


results into the site profile, or into the TBD 


this is addressed in, the Nevada Test Site 


Chapter 5, Revision 1, and it's specific to 


section 5.6.3. 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. PRESLEY: Good. Yeah, I remember 


discussing that last time. Okay --


 MR. ROLFES: And with one other thing -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- there are also -- whole body 


counting on site did become routine in 1967. 


Prior to 1967 there were (break in 


transmission) counts conducted as well, so that 


information is available. But I thought that 


that was appropriate to add that as well, so... 


DR. ROESSLER: Mark? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, go ahead somebody. 


DR. ROESSLER: It's Gen. The SC&A comment 


mentions plutonium from then on, so I assume in 

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the -- in your methodology you have handled 


that also. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, we -- we have indicated that 


we have a methodology to interpret gross alpha 


bioassay data, so that would incorporate a 


plutonium exposure such as plutonium-239, 240. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. Okay. 


DR. MAURO: So you -- so you -- what I'm 


hearing is you have data from '63 to '67 -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: -- it might be limited, but 


sufficient to build a coworker model. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, if needed, there is 


information to allow us to assign internal 


doses for the people that were directly 


involved with and had a potential for exposures 


to the radionuclides of concern. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, anybody else have anything 


else? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, Mark, this is just Brad. 


just want to make sure -- now the earlier years 


are under the SEC. Right? 


 MR. ROLFES: That's correct, up until the end 


of 1962. 


 MR. CLAWSON: '62, okay. I just wanted to make 


I 
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sure (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: '51 to '62. Okay? 


DR. ANSPAUGH: This -- this is Lynn Anspaugh 


again. I'm a little bit confused on this 


issue. If somebody didn't work there 250 days, 


then you still have to do a dose 


reconstruction. Right? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Now --


 MR. ROLFES: However we would not assign 


internal doses to that individual because of 


the SEC that was designated, so we would only 


be limited to assigning external doses to the 


individual. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I would be able to help out a 


little bit here. On the 250-day workgroup 


we're explicitly addressing the possibility and 


the plausibility of reconstructing doses for 


short-term exposures, so it -- it -- an 


interesting development is that it may be 


plausible to reconstruct short-term internal 


exposures, and it's being looked at right now 


as part of the 250-workday investigation, which 


is an SEC issue. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. CLAWSON: (Unintelligible), you know, I 

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understood that. But Bob, didn't we, with the 


250 days for NTS, wasn't it -- didn't we come 


up with a -- because the people were living out 


there 24/7, we did --


DR. ROESSLER: No, that was another -- I think 


that was another scenario, wasn't it? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, but it -- it had -- it had 


the same thing as this right here. Didn't we 


come up with --


 MR. CLAWSON: Like 89 days or --


DR. MAURO: 83, yeah. It's really not 250 


days, it's 83 work -- 83 calendar days. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, right, right, that's 


exactly what it was. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I just wanted to make sure 


(unintelligible) --


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Hi, this is Liz, I'm sorry 


to interrupt. That was actually a decision, 


just to be clear, that has to be made by the 


Department of Labor. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: It wasn't made by HHS. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


 MR. ROLFES: That's correct. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, that was made by the 

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Department of Labor, to go with an 83-day, as I 


remember -- correct. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. 


COMMENT SIXTEEN: USE OF PHOTON DOSE


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, let's move on to 16, use of 


photon dose as done by DTRA as a basis of 


estimating internal doses during periods when 


there are no data or scattered internal 


monitoring data. Mark, do you want to -- this 


is something that we -- again, that we've taken 


care of, but you want to -- 


 MR. ROLFES: That's --


 MR. PRESLEY: -- kind of elaborate on it just a 


little bit? 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct, and that was -- that was 


certainly investigated early on during the 


atmospheric weapons testing days or device 


testing days and we have not pursued that any 


further because we ended up designating the SEC 


for the 1951 through 1962 time period. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, we want to mark that 


closed. All righty. 


COMMENT SEVENTEEN: INGESTION DOSES
 

Go on to 17, ingestion doses need to be better 


evaluated, and you want to -- 

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 MR. ROLFES: And as Gene had indicated 


previously, the environmental section of the 


site profile does now include a very claimant-


favorable ingestion pathway of 100 milligrams 


per day of contaminated soil, so we feel that 


that issue is closed. 


 MR. PRESLEY: John, do you have a comment on 


that? 


DR. MAURO: I fully agree that's the way to 


close this one. 


COMMENT EIGHTEEN: OTIB-002


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty. Going to 18, 


recommended use of OTIB-002 for the post-1971 


tunnel re-entry workers, and Mark, do you want 


to --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- comment on that? 


 MR. ROLFES: We did change some of the language 


which indicates that dose reconstructors should 


observe the limitations of the approach 


contained in maximum internal dose estimates 


for DOE complex claims, and any contrary 


instructions have been removed from the site 


profile for Nevada Test Site. So we feel this 


issue is closed. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: And that's been addressed in 


Revision 5 (sic). 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, does anybody have anything 


about that? 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: No. 


 MR. PRESLEY: John, are you all right with -- 


DR. MAURO: Oh, absolutely. We were just 


concerned if they were applying OTIB-2 to a 


situation where it wasn't appropriate, and it 


sounds like that's been resolved. 


COMMENT NINETEEN: PRE-1966 BETA DOSES


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. Going to 19, there are no 


beta dose data until 1966, the TBD dose not 


specified or specifically a procedure for 


estimating pre-1966 beta doses. Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, I will read from what we've 


got here in our response, and we do have time-


dependent beta-gamma ratios that have been 


developed and were added to the Technical Basis 


Document. We're also looking into the 


development of a method using Hicks data for 


the tower and surface shots. Let's see, we 


also -- as I had reported to you at the last 


working group meeting, we had looked through 

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200 claimant external dosimetry files and 


evaluated their data to determine whether there 


were positive neutron, beta and gamma results. 


And of the 200 files that we reviewed, 23 


contained a total of 140 positive beta or 


shallow dose results. What was apparent from 


this review is that -- let's see, when there 


were positive beta results, they were not the 


norm, so it -- from this 200, a very low number 


of actual bad readings contained a positive 


dosimetry result. 


There was a total of 256 positive photon 


results for the years in which the positive 


beta results were located. And let's see, I -- 


as far as the beta-to-photon ratios that we 


have and observed in this review, based on the 


annual exposure dosimetry totals for the year 


in which the positive beta results were 


available, a review of 50 annual ratios found 


25 to be less than a one-to-one ratio, 13 


ratios were between one and two-to-one, and 


only three of the 50 ratios were equal to or 


greater than four-to-one beta to gamma. Right 


now our site profile has an indication that we 


can use up to a five-to-one beta to gamma 

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ratio. 


Furthermore, there are additional survey 


documents and rad safe reports that do have 


measurements, and these that I'm speaking of 


are particular to the NRDS tests as well, so... 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: Mark, this is John. I -- I have a 


question. It sounds like that there are two 


kinds of analyses that we have here to deal 


with this beta dose. One is a theoretical one 


where by looking at Hicks tables, if you know ­

- or given the point in time you're at 


following a test --


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- and you have your gamma reading, 


you could predict what the beta yield would be, 


and that would be a theoretical -- certainly 


one very reasonable approach to doing it, 


probably gives you pretty high estimate. 


 The other approach is to actually use your 


measurements that were taken -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- and my guess is you'll get 


substantially different results when you actual 


use measured data. What -- what approach are 

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you adopting? That is, for the purpose of 


reconstructing beta dose, are you going to use 


-- I be-- are you going to use the actual 


empirical measurements for the ratios -- 


 MR. ROLFES: In (unintelligible) --


DR. MAURO: -- or are you going to use the 


theoretical ones based on Hicks? 


 MR. ROLFES: Empirical data would always 


outweigh any theoretical calculation that could 


be done, and I believe we're just investigating 


the Hicks tables just to -- to see if we're 


right -- in the right ball park, excuse me. 


But certainly the recorded data would outweigh 


any theoretical calculations. 


DR. MAURO: I -- I would just caution -- you 


know, if -- let's say there's a big difference, 


a substantial difference between the ratios. 


You may want to check to see wha-- the 


reliability of the beta measurements, given 


some of the limitations of beta detection. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, and certainly we could look 


into that as well, as we previously discussed. 


And I guess to further elaborate on that, we 


did have a discussion at the last working group 


meeting about low energy beta particles. 

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However, when individuals have a potential for 


beta exposures, those individuals are likely in 


anti-contamination clothing plus their own 


personal clothing. And so any low energy beta 


emitters that wouldn't have been recorded by a 


dosimeter's open window would have not 


penetrated through that individual's -- 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- clothing to irradiate their 


skin at a depth of seven milligrams per square 


centimeter. Let's see -- 


DR. MAURO: By the way, I did notice an -- we 


believe that in making that determination -- 


you know, what might penetrate through the 


clothing, beta -- beta energy and -- and the -- 


the shielding effect of his clothing, I don't 


know if this has any play here, but we noticed 


that in a calculation that was done in OTIB-17 


there was an assumption regarding the density ­

- you know, the grams per centimeter squared -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: -- of clothing, and I think there 


might have been a six-fold error in that 


calculation, the reason being there was -- 


which is being discussed as part of TBD-17, but 

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if you use that factor, shielding factor -- 


maybe ought to take another look at that. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. And then also one of the 


reasons we are looking into the Hicks tables is 


to determine whether any of these lower energy 


beta particles were produced. Is that correct, 


Gene? Is that one of the reasons that we were 


reviewing the Hicks data, to determine any weak 


beta emitters? 


 MR. ROLLINS: That's part of what Richard's 


looking at -- Richard Griffith is -- that's 


what he's looking at. I haven't reviewed his 


results yet. I was more interested in how the 


refractories could be enriched so I -- yes, but 


that is part of what he's -- he's reviewing. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, if they -- you know, the idea 


circumstance would be if your empirical 


measurements are very compatible with the Hicks 


measurements -- Hicks theoretical relationship, 


you know you've got a rock solid case. If 


there is a large difference, then of course 


you're in that difficult situation of -- and 


let's say Hicks is more limiting, it becomes 


the bounding -- you're in a difficult situation 

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of, you know, demonstrating why you're going to 


go with the lower ratio for the reasons you 


gave. I mean in principle the arguments you're 


making are certainly valid. That is, you're 


going to get shielding effects. But -- but 


then you're in that position where you have to 


make that case. But ideally if the ratios come 


out equivalent, that would be -- in -- in my 


opinion, that would put this problem to bed. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


DR. ANSPAUGH: But again I think the ratios are 


not going to come out equivalent because the 


method that Griffith is using doesn't account 


for the self-shielding effect of surface 


roughness, so I think high priority really 


should go to the empirical data, as Mark 


mentioned. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, thank you. I sta-- I stand 


corrected. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. Anybody have a 


problem with 19 then? 


 MR. CLAWSON: This is just Brad, so -- 

 MR. PRESLEY: Go ahead. 

 MR. CLAWSON: -- (unintelligible) we come to a 

conclusion on this. I know -- to me, it seems 

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like we're still kind of up in the air about 


it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, John just agreed. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. I mean I -- my only concern 


was that if you're not going to use Hicks, you 


know, that means you may not be as 


conservative. But as Lynn pointed out, and I ­

- and I defer to Lynn certainly -- that the 


empirical data is the -- are the numb-- the 


data to rely upon and I'm fine with that. It 


sounds like you're going to come out with a 


ratio that may be somewhat different than the 


five-to-one that you've been using before. Is 


that correct? 


 MS. MUNN: It sounded lower. 


DR. MAURO: You're coming up with a higher or 


lower value? If -- if I understood correctly, 


the current guidance says a ratio of -- a beta 


to gamma ratio of about five-to-one? 


 MR. ROLFES: Current guidance -- I'm sorry, I 


didn't know if the question was guided to me, 


John, I apologize. The current Technical Basis 


Document has a range of beta-gamma ratios based 


upon essentially the facts of the case that we 


are working with and the individual's exposure 

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potential, and what we have in the site profile 


has right now a maximum of five-to-one, I 


believe, beta to gamma ratio. Does answer what 


you had asked --


DR. MAURO: Well, and -- but I'm hearing that 


you're revisiting that ratio right now. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, we were asked to take a look 


into -- we did indicate that we were going to 


look into the Hicks table and we were going to 


consider the refractory issue about adding 


refractories back in -- 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- and we had tried to set up the 


technical call, however we weren't able to do 


that prior to this call. From what it sounds 


like, though, the empirical data is the best 


path forward and would certainly be -- be most 


robust. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Mark, this is Gene Rollins, I -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, Gene. 


 MR. ROLLINS: I have in front of me the results 


that Richard Griffith sent to me yesterday. 


This -- this data has not been reviewed. I can 


only just tell you what I'm looking -- the 


graph that I'm looking at right now, and it's 

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basically beta to photon ratios based on the 


Hicks data --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: -- as a function of time after 


detonation. And it -- it -- at 


(unintelligible) zero, we're looking at about a 


ten-to-one beta to gamma. That falls -- after 


ten days it falls to about two-to-one, and then 


at 1,000 days after detonation it peaks at what 


appears to be about 80-to-one, and then at 


10,000 days it falls back to about 11-to-one. 


You can make of that what you will. I think 


what Dr. Anspaugh said certainly has to be 


taken into consideration, and I -- and I 


suspect a lot of this beta in here, although 


it's not documented what it is or what the 


energies are, I suspect a lot of this might be 


low energy beta. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: So take that with a grain of 


salt. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Sounds to me like that's all over 


the table. Okay, we got a problem -- anybody 


have a problem with that? I'm going to mark 

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that closed and -- and if -- if something comes 


up down the road, then we can -- we can 


certainly re-evaluate it. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Well, Bob, this -- this paper's 


still coming out. Correct? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 

 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. Well, I just -- that's 

fine. 

COMMENT TWENTY: NON-USE OF BADGES


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Go with 20, there appears 


to have been an internal non-use of badges in 


some circumstances. And Mark has gone back and 


looked -- and I'm going to let you go ahead and 


tell what you've looked at and what you've 


found on that. I find that data to be very, 


very informative. 


 MR. ROLFES: A picture says a 1,000 words. 


 MR. PRESLEY: You got that right. 


DR. MAURO: (Unintelligible) file so you're -- 


you're looking at that graph now? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, I -- I did just open the 


attachment that was sent to you in the second 


e-mail that I passed around. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Talk about figure 1 first? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, this -- I'm looking at figure 

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1, and this is the Nevada Test Site claimant 


exposure by quarter from 1963 through 1966. At 


the last working group meeting we had mentioned 


that we were going to go back and take a look 


into the claimant population to determine 


whether there were individuals that had a 


potential to be in a situation where they would 


need to remove their dosimeter to avoid 


exceeding an annual limit or a quarterly limit. 


And what we have done here, if you take a look 


at this first quarter -- or, excuse me, this 


first figure here shows the number of 


individuals that approached the 3,000 millirem 


limit. And if you take a look, there's 


approximately two individuals that were in a 


potential to be exposed to 3,000 millirem in a 


quarter. 


DR. MAURO: I'm sorry, I'm looking at the -- 


there's a figure here -- I may -- I'm not sure 


if I'm looking at the same thing you're looking 


at. It's not -- the file I'm looking at -- it 


starts off with a -- one of these three-


dimensional color pictures. 


 MR. ROLFES: Correct. 


DR. MAURO: Is that what you're looking at 

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right now? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, that is correct. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay, so I want to make sure -- 


 MR. ROLFES: If you take a look at the two 


highest peaks there, there's two peaks that 


exceed 2,500 --


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- millirem, and those are the two 


individuals that I was referring to approaching 


the 3,000 millirem quarterly limit. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: If you go on to the next figure 2, 


it goes on and shows that there were three or 


four individuals that were approaching the five 


rem annual limit from '63 through '66. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: And we've identified the 


individual's doses here to basically show you 


that there were not a large number of 


individuals that were in a situation where they 


would have needed to remove their badge to 


avoid exceeding an annual limit for dose. 


 Let's see, we've also prepared a small write-up 


as well, and if we have Mel on the line I guess 


I'd like him to speak. I'm starting to get a 

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sore throat from speaking here a little bit and 


my mouth's a little dry so -- actually before 


we get into that, if you wouldn't mind, Bob, 


could we take a break --


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- or sometime in the near future? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. No, let's do it right now. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, great. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Does everybody want to take a 


five-minute break and we'll start back up at 20 


till? You can just mute your phone and we'll 


not cut anything off. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Okay, 20 minutes till the hour, 

Bob? 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 

 DR. BRANCHE: Okay. 

 MR. CHEW: I'm on the line, Bob, Mark -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, thank you, Mel. I'll be 


back in about five. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: Thank you. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 


 MR. PRESLEY: Ready, Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Discuss this write-up. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. If Mel's available and is 


there back on the line, I'd like to have him 


summarize the review that was conducted, if you 


could, please. 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. The question -- the comment 


came is were there any systemic or intentional 


non-use of badges in some circumstances to 


avoid approaching or exceeding the occupational 


dose limits here. (Unintelligible) say this 


practice might have occurred until the mid1960s or even extended into the '97 -- the 


1970s. During the last meeting when this issue 


was brought up and was both the -- also both 


the -- a comment from SC&A and also it 


addresses one of the comments that came up on 


the SEC, so I think we're covering both 


situations here. The -- the question really 


comes up is that there was some -- there was a 


worker interviewed that made some allegations 


or assertions that this may have hap-- 


happened. NIOSH committed to look into how we 


would evaluate and analyze information and so 


we can addre-- properly address this particular 


question and issue here. 

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The qua-- the time frame in -- in -- in -- 


right now is between 1963 to 1967 time -- 1966 


time frame. And the reason why after 1966/'67, 


the dosimeters -- the badge were incorporated 


into the security badge and also was color-


coded and it was incumbent of the security 


force to assure that the NTS workers were 


wearing the latest color-coded badges that 


would represent probably their monthly change 


on their badge -- on their film badge. So 


we're talking about a period between 1963 to 


1966 where the dosimeters were worn as a 


separate item on the -- on the clothing or on 


the person here. 


So what we did is that we tried to examine the 


highest exposed NTS files that we have access 


to and look how many of the claimants -- how 


many -- how many of these particular files in ­

- were inclusive of those dates that we're 


looking at, 1963 to 1966 again. We came up 


with about 93 individual files that really 


represented a good cross-section of not only 


the workers involved but the radiation 


technicians and the -- some miners and the 


tunnel people, so we -- we analyzed the proc-- 

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the distribution of the people -- worker that 


it -- this is truly representative. And we 


came up with -- there was about 1,880 


datapoints that we looked at, so it was not -- 


so ev-- every -- many of -- all these workers 


and by and large who had their film badges 


changed on a monthly basis, if not more, you 


know, based on some specific incidents that 


they were working on, a particular shot or 


recovery that caused the -- the Reynolds 


Electric folks to go ahead and change their 


badge. 


And the only -- the only really plausible 


reason why a large group of workers would 


misuse their dosimeters is that it would 


preclude them from -- from working additional 


radiation -- high radiation areas -- all 


radiation areas and so therefore potentially 


lose their potential income here. And at that 


time, as you've shown on the graphs, the 


applic-- applicable dose limits were 3 rem per 


quarter and 5 rem per year. There were no 


administrative controls at that time in place 


during that particular time period here. And 


so only the workers really who had really an 

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incentive to hide their real true dose and the 


risk of being disciplined would -- would -- 


would probably have a reason for going ahead 


and not wearing their dosimeters here. 


 Our analysis clearly shows that -- and remember 


we looked at all these particular claims on a 


mon-- every time they changed the badge, so 


when you look at the particular file you can 


actually even see how often that badge was 


changed and -- and sometimes it was even more 


than the month -- on a monthly basis here, but 


certainly on -- when you look at their annual 


records you can see that -- that they were -- 


had their badges changed on a very regular 


basis here. 


So we're looking to see if there was any 


pattern and also to analyze what the maximum 


exposures might have occurred during a 


particular quarter which would give them an 


incentive to not wear their badges here. So --


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Mel --


 MR. CHEW: Yes? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Mel? 


 MR. CHEW: Yes, sir? 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. You all 

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continue. I have to go make another phone call 


right here in a second and I'll be right back. 


 MR. CHEW: Okay. All right, Bob, I'll continue 


here. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you. 


 MR. ROLFES: Go ahead. 


 MR. CHEW: So what we did is that -- to clearly 


demonstrate that the -- the -- the -- none of 


the people -- none of the folks that we 


examined even come cl-- will come close to 


exceeding their quarter limit and not 


(unintelligible) their annual do-- exposures, 


too. As Mark said, only a few even came close 


to on a quarter area, but the majority of them 


actually received very low exposures for that 


particular monthly change or on an annual basis 


or on a quarterly basis here. 


So the in conclusion, we'd like to propose that 


the analysis of the data clearly demonstrates 


that there was not a systemic pattern or any 


real reasons for the Nevada Test Site people 


that we looked at to remove their dosimeters to 


-- in -- in order to continue working in the 


radiation area. Not to preclude that there may 


be some exceptions in this particular area, but 

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there was certainly not a systemic pattern. 


 MR. ROLFES: And one other thing I think is 


important to point out, Mel, is that the 


exposures that these people typically received 


were received in a very short time period, 


typically involved with a re-entry that 


occurred over -- for example, a few hour time 


period or up to two-day time period sometimes, 


one or two days, rather than a chronic exposure 


that a person would continually be exposed -- 


these -- these are simply acute exposures, so 


there really wouldn't have been a time for an 


individual to develop a pattern of improper 


behavior and do this in a -- a continuing 


basis. 


 MR. CHEW: Yeah, let me add to that, Mark. 


Many occasions -- as you well know, the dates 


are well-defined. We know what experiments or 


what tests were conducted. You can certainly 


see, even on some of the hi-- higher exposure 


people that the badges were even changed either 


for one day or two days apart here -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


 MR. CHEW: -- and so that even validates what 


you were just saying here, Mark. 

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 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. I'm back, 


I'm -- I'm listening. 


 MR. CHEW: Uh-huh, I'm open to questions here. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, Mel, this is Brad Clawson. 


 MR. CHEW: Hi, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Explain to me how -- well, this 


claimant identifier, did you just use claimants 


that -- use their doses for this or was this an 


overall general over the Nevada Test Site? 


 MR. CHEW: Well, we have -- we had some access 


problems right now with the records center at 


the -- at Nevada and so -- however, we were 


able to certainly look at all the highest 


exposures, the highest exposure of the 160 from 


the direct claimant files. So yes, they are 


from the claimant files. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Those are the only ones that we're 


interested in, in any case. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


DR. MAURO: This is John, I -- I -- I'm going 


to be a bit of a skeptic, so bear with me a 


little bit. 

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 MR. CHEW: Sure, John. 


DR. MAURO: Now in looking at the data, it 


looks like you have individuals -- in other 


words, you -- I see there are about 100 claim-- 


claimant identifiers -- looking at the very 


first graph --


 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) 


DR. MAURO: -- and -- and looking at it, what 


it shows is that no one out of the 100 -- and I 


believe these may have been the highest exposed 


individuals out of the population of numbers 


you looked at? 


 MR. CHEW: That's correct. 


DR. MAURO: No one exceeded their -- the limit. 


Could -- couldn't someone argue that this is 


evidence that there was a practice of 


deliberately avoiding these exposures, 


especially when you say that the exposures may 


have occurred acutely? You know -- what I'm 


getting at is I don't know -- I mean -- please, 


I guess I feel as though -- I -- I don't -- I 


see what you've done here, and you're showing 


that look, we took the highest 100 claimants -- 


exposures that we -- we were able to find in 


the records out of I don't know how many 

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thousands you had mentioned that you looked at, 


and you plotted the data by quarter for these 


people, and no one exceeds the quarterly limit 


of 300 (sic) millirem. And somehow you find 


that as being compelling evidence that this 


practice of deliberately leaving their badges 


let's say back in their locker is -- that this 


somehow provides evidence that -- that they 


didn't do that. 


MR. SMITH: John --

DR. MAURO: I have a little trouble with the 

log--

MR. SMITH: John -- John, this is Billy. 

DR. MAURO: Yeah. 

MR. SMITH: If you look at table 1 -- 

DR. MAURO: Okay, let me go down to the table. 

MR. SMITH: -- I think that's a better -- 

DR. MAURO: Okay. 

MR. SMITH: -- description as to -- rather than 

looking at the graphs (unintelligible) there 


and seeing that nobody went over the limit. 


But if you can look at those -- 


DR. MAURO: I'm on table 1 right now. 


MR. SMITH: Yeah, table 1, if you look at the 


means, the median and the 95th percentile -- of 

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course the bottom line just shows the maximums 


that are shown on those particular plots. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. These are quarterly doses, 


distribution and numb-- okay, I'm looking at 


it, '60-- 1963, quarter number one. 


MR. SMITH: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. All right, let's -- let's 


walk through that. 


MR. SMITH: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, so -- okay, if you're looking 


at the arithmetic mean, I see the arithmetic 


mean out of the number of samples here is 131? 


MR. SMITH: Right. 

DR. MAURO: And the median is zero. 

MR. SMITH: Right. 

DR. MAURO: Okay, so 50 -- so basically what 

you're saying, half the people, at least, had 


no more than --


MR. SMITH: Doses were below zero. 


DR. MAURO: Say -- sorry? 


 MR. CHEW: Let him finish, Billy. 


MR. SMITH: Okay, go on. 


DR. MAURO: No, no, I just want to read the 


numbers and see if we're looking at the same 


thing and -- so what we're saying is that half 

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-- half of the workers that were in this first 


column had doses that were below the limits of 


detection, and the maximum out of all these 


people was 2 rem in that quarter. 


MR. SMITH: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, and there -- and there was a 


3 rem per quarter limit. 


MR. SMITH: Right. 


DR. MAURO: By the way, these numbers are very 


consistent with the graph. 


MR. SMITH: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. Now I guess -- now -- now 


that we're -- understand that we're -- we're 


looking at the same column, now you're saying 


that somehow this is evidence that there was no 


practice or systemic practice of -- of 


deliberately leaving let's say badges in -- in 


-- in the -- and I gue-- help me out with this, 


I -- I want to -- I want to be convinced but I 


haven't -- haven't yet. 


MR. SMITH: Okay, look at the -- look at the 


95th percentile column as you go across by 


year, as an example. You know, you could look 


at every quarter there and -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 

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MR. SMITH: -- if you start with '63, you have 


573, 730, 182 and 104. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


MR. SMITH: So that simply says of course that 


the doses that fall in that particular 


percentile category were significantly less 


than 3 rem a quarter numbers. I mean they 


don't even approach the 3 rem per quarter 


number. 


DR. MAURO: Right, right. 


 MR. CHEW: John, I -- we -- we need to have a ­

- an agreement that there -- there has to be a 


reason for the people to do that. Okay? And ­

- and -- and I think we addressed that as that 


the reason is that the potentially would have 


been received greater than the quarter exposure 


-- quarterly limit exposure and would take them 


out of potentially working and potentially loss 


of income. So I think we're fundamentally -- 


have addressed there's -- there's a reason for 


why the people want to do that. 


The next -- there's a level of detail that is 


not shown in this table that we actually 


analyzed was when we actually look at the 


individual files here. You could just see on a 

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given year or an -- on a given -- I'm sorry, on 


a given individual, on a year, you could see 


that that persons have the badges changed even 


on a monthly basis, so you see numbers that are 


on a monthly basis that -- and then adds up to 


the quarterly exposure, too. So the monthly 


one gives you really a -- a indication that if 


a person says, you know, gee, I just got 50 


this month and another 50 this month and 


another 50 this month here, you know, what -- 


what is the real reason for not -- for going 


over -- be concerned that they're going to go 


over the quarterly limit here. Okay? And so I 


think the fundamental thing we have to come to 


agreement is that we -- we're trying to show is 


that there was fundamentally not a real purpose 


and a reason for why -- systemically why that 


they would need to do this. 


MS. OWENS: This is Kathleen from Senator 


Reid's office. Can I perhaps add something 


here? 


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


MS. OWENS: You're asking for reasons, you 


know, and I believe this is the only issue 


that's being looked at, but I have heard from 

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many workers who also didn't wear their badges 


for fear of damaging them in terms of, you 


know, trades workers. I'll give you one 


example, one of the petitioners, for example, 


he would get sparks on it and so, you know, 


they didn't want to damage the badges, 


supervisors looked down upon this in terms of 


having to do more paperwork. Has this been 


looked at, and I've heard this from many 


people, not just perhaps one person. 


 MR. CHEW: Billy, I mean you might 


(unintelligible) since you were part of the 


dosimetry on (unintelligible) maybe address 


that. 


MR. SMITH: Kathleen, I don't -- I'm not aware 


of people taking off their badges for any 


reason, and -- and I certainly hadn't heard of 


anybody taking off their badge for fear of 


damaging them. 


MS. OWENS: I -- I guess this is maybe more 


particular for the SEC, but I -- one of the 


affidavits in the SEC petition quite clearly 


states that. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, this is John. I -- I have to 


second that. The reason I am paying a lot of 

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attention to this particular issue, it is -- it 


certainly has applicability to the dose -- the 


site profile, but it is probably the most 


important problem or issue associated with the 


SEC. There are -- there are ten affidavits 


that were filed and the -- the affidavits are 


very compelling that there was in fact some 


widespread problems, and in fact the very 


reason that we just heard, beside approaching a 


max -- it sounds like even there was a -- more 


reason was that -- that the -- they get -- 


there's a problem in terms of the -- this -- 


the -- they get dirty and they left -- and 


there was a -- and it -- it sound like from 


looking at the affidavits, quite frankly just 


trying to look -- read the story told, and it 


sure sounds like there was a lot of that going 


on, leaving it behind. And if that one worker, 


and I have to go look again, and this may be 


another way to get a hook on this, claimed that 


he routinely left his badge behind, but he did 


wear a pocket ionization chamber, and in -- and 


he was -- and in fact he talked about a 


particular circumstance where his pocket 


ionization chamber read very high, I think it 

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was 5 rem, and -- but -- but he left his badge 


behind. So the -- this seems to be -- one of 


the things I would want to do of course is see, 


you know, if there's any way to track -- say 


okay, the -- here's -- here's a bunch of pocket 


ionization chamber readings that were -- that 


were read out -- I don't -- I don't know if 


these are in the records -- I mean this would 


be almost like the prima facie evidence of yes 


or no whether this was going on if -- if there 


is a record of the PIC readings and -- and if 


the same -- in that month let's say you find 


that yeah, this person has a record in the log 


somewhere that says the -- the -- the pocket 


ionization chamber read whatever numbers are in 


-- are in the record, we -- recognizing that 


pocket ionization chambers are not as -- 


anywhere near as reliable as a film badge, but 


then looking at the film badge records and if 


you see for that month it is reading of zero 


and -- and this is basically what's being 


claimed in some of these SEC affidavits, that 


would -- you know, for -- if that's -- if we 


see that -- I'm looking at a way -- you see, 


this is an indirect way, and I understand your 

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argument, the table 1 that we're looking at. 


But then I read that -- I have to say, after 


reading that petition I said hmm, oh, my 


goodness, I would sure like to find out whether 


or not for this particular person that ga-- 


gave this particular claim in his affidavit, 


whether or not his -- his actual dose in that 


month when -- you know, was re-- recorded as 


zero, but his PIC he claims has recor-- 


recorded at least, on one day, five -- five R, 


there may be -- that may be a direct way -- 


does anyone know on the phone whether or not 


pocket ionization handwritten logs are -- are 


maintained somewhere --


MR. SMITH: This is Billy, John. 

DR. MAURO: Yes? 

MR. SMITH: Yes. 

DR. MAURO: Yes. 

MR. SMITH: There were logs maintained of any 

PIC readings that people exiting an area -- 


they were recorded on logs and those records 


would be maintained at the records center. 


THE COURT REPORTER: Excuse me, was that Mr. 


Smith? 


MR. SMITH: Yes. 

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THE COURT REPORTER: Okay, I just wanted to 


make sure. Thank you. 


MR. SMITH: Who was that? 


THE COURT REPORTER: This is the court 


reporter. 


MR. SMITH: Oh, I'm sorry. 


DR. ROESSLER: Who was the person who talked 


before that? 


DR. MAURO: John Mauro. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay, but there was somebody 


else I think that --


 MR. ROLFES: Billy and Mel Chew. 


DR. ROESSLER: But it was probably Mel 


answering the PIC question. 


MR. SMITH: No, that was me, Billy. 


 MR. ROLFES: That was Billy Smith. 


DR. ROESSLER: Billy, okay, thanks. 


MR. SMITH: Okay. Yes, we did maintain logs of 


people exiting areas where they wore PICs, and 


those records are available. Haven't looked at 


them from the respect -- from the perspective 


that John just mentioned. That would be an 


interesting view. But one of the things that, 


you know, you need to recognize is that when 


these people worked in these radiological areas 

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where there was potential exposures and they 


had to wear PICs in -- associated with those 


dosimeters, that was one of the methods we used 


to determine whether or not they would need to 


get dosimeters changed, badges changed, on a 


more frequent basis than monthly. 


 MR. ROLFES: In addition -- yeah, the real time 


monitoring is documented by one of the health 


physicists that we spoke with. Real time 


monitoring was in fact done for individuals 


that were in a position to be exposed to high 


dose rates -- for example, on re-entries. So 


an individual working in a high dose rate area 


would have had radio communications with 


someone who was observing his recorded dose or 


his exposure on a real time basis. 


MR. SMITH: The other thing that took place is 


while these people were working in those areas 


WSI security had a very, very high presence in 


these areas and one of the reasons why it -- it 


-- it doesn't seem reasonable to me that people 


would be allowed to take off their badges is 


that because, you know, if they did, then it 


would have been a security violation and they 


would not have been able to work in them. 

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 MR. CHEW: Billy --


MR. SMITH: Yes. 


 MR. CHEW: -- let me -- I don't want to put 


words in your mouth, but maybe you can answer 


this question here. Let's focus in on the time 


frame, the '63 to '66 --


MR. SMITH: Okay, in the --


 MR. CHEW: -- 'cause I think '67 afterward -- 


MR. SMITH: The dosimeter and the security 


credentials were separate at that time. 


 MR. CHEW: At that time there was clearly some 


of the REECo rad safe staff present when -- you 


know, in high radiation areas and people 


potentially wearing pocket dosimeters 'cause 


that's who issued them. And so were the rad 


safe monitors, the RCTs, part of their 


responsibility to assure that they were also -- 


that people were wearing those -- 


MR. SMITH: Of course. 

 MR. CHEW: -- film badges in addition to the 

PICs, too? 

MR. SMITH: Yes. 

 MR. CHEW: Okay. I was hoping you would say 

that. 

DR. MAURO: Now I don't know --
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 MR. CLAWSON: Let me ask, John, I've got a 


question. You're telling me of course you've 


got a check-off list that you checked each one 


of those had a badge. Let me ask you this. 


Did you check to make sure they had any kind of 


crystals in them --


DR. MAURO: Oh, I didn't check --


 MR. CLAWSON: -- or anything else like that? 


DR. MAURO: Oh, I didn't go back to his -- no, 


this is basically a que-- see, I know -- there 


are these af-- ten affidavits. I didn't go 


back to their dose reconstructions or their 


records. We didn't do any of that. We -- we 


have not been authorized to do that. All we've 


been authorized to do is to review the 


affidavits and the information that's available 


to us as part of the SEC review. And when I 


see a person that claims that he left his badge 


in the locker room and went in because of the 


concerns that were mentioned earlier, getting 


it dirty, the -- the sparks, and also high 


exposures -- potential, but did report that he 


had this very high PIC reading on his pocket 


ionization chamber, one -- one thing I would do 


immediately but which I haven't done is simply 

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say okay, any way we can zero in on the date -- 


the date when that PIC was -- when he claims 


that he received that high exposure reading, 


and then go and look at his film badge reading 


for that month. And if he got -- if he saw 5 


rem or R on his pocket ionization chamber and 


there's a zero in his -- his data for his film 


badge reading for that month, something doesn't 


look right and maybe his claim is valid. Maybe 


his --


 MR. CHEW: And we have to be -- caution, too, 


John, as you well know, you know, pocket 


ionization chambers are susceptible to doses -- 


I mean to -- to discharges that potentially 


give false readings --


DR. MAURO: And I --


 MR. CHEW: -- (unintelligible) factor that in, 


too. 


DR. MAURO: And I agree with that. Now the 


things is -- now if there are -- let's say it 


turns out -- that's why I asked the opening 


question was if there's a record maintained of 


the pocket ionization chamber readings, and 


let's say we went in and randomly grabbed ten 


of them out of -- just randomly grabbed -- 

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don't even look at anything but just randomly 


grab some positive readings, and let's say just 


take ten of them, then go back and say okay, 


and let -- these are positive readings now so 


you're going to see some number above zero. 


Then go back -- just go grab these same 


people's month-- monthly film badge readout, 


and if in all cases they read zero and -- while 


the pocket ionization chambers that you picked 


for these people read something positive, I 


would -- I would -- then -- and then I would 


say you know something, these folks have a -- 


have a -- make an as-- sounds like there's a 


legitimate claim here. 


 MR. CHEW: Sure, it doesn't add up, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, it doesn't add up -- 


 MR. CHEW: (Unintelligible) I agree. 


DR. MAURO: -- and -- and then they say -- but 


if you look at ten and in all cases the film 


badge gave a positive reading -- may not be 


exactly the same as the pocket ionization 


chamber --


 MR. CHEW: Sure. 


DR. MAURO: -- reading is, you wouldn't expect 


it to be, but you would like -- you expect that 

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if you did get a positive on the pocket 


ionization chamber, you would get a positive on 


the -- on the film badge, and -- and if you see 


that and in all ten you do get a positive 


positive, I would say hmm, you know, maybe this 


wasn't a widespread practice if it existed. So 


to me, that goes -- the only reason I'm -- I'm 


bringing this up is that this is the essence of 


the SEC petition, and -- and this -- and right 


now the -- this type of analysis, though it 


goes towards that concern, I -- I would say if 


what I just described sounds reasonable to 


everybody on the phone, this is certainly 


something that might be a good thing to do. 


Not SC&A, for NIOSH to do, to put this problem 


and answer this question because the affidavits 


-- these folks that wrote those affidavits are 


very detailed and they're convinced that this 


was a widespread practice, so they're coming -- 


their position -- these workers are -- are -- 


definitely believe that there was this 


widespread practice. I remember [Name redacted 


was one time spoken to about this. 


Unfortunately he has passed on. He also said 


it was a widespread practice, and I think we -- 

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we have an obligation to let -- let's really 


put this one to bed. And if we can do that by 


looking at the PIC data and -- and almost like 


a blind test to see what the film badge 


compared to the PIC, that might be one way to 


get a real handle on this and put this issue to 


bed the right way. 


 MR. CHEW: John, I -- this is Mel. I like what 


you're saying. Let me propose this, that NIOSH 


and the ORAU team go back and come up with a 


spot so we can think this out and so we can 


really address this because you -- you clearly 


say that this is a very important issue here 


and so we'll come up with some method -- 


methodology to try to address this issue 


adequately, taking into consideration what you 


have suggested here. 


 MR. ROLFES: Before -- before we agree on 


anything -- this is Mark -- and I wanted to ask 


Billy a question. For an individual that would 


have damaged his dosimeter or his film badge 


associated with, you know, welding or getting 


sparks on the film badge, burning a hole in it, 


would something like that, if that occurred, 


would that be documented in the individual's 

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file? 


MR. SMITH: Yes. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. So if we had documentation 


then of an individual that had damaged his 


badge, if we had that indication and he was the 


same one that was making the statement that he 


was told -- or asked to remove his dosimeter, 


then that would certainly be a number one 


identifier that would, you know, attract our 


attention to such an issue. 


MR. SMITH: Yes, that would be --


 MR. ROLFES: And then -- and then in that case 


it would give us a path forward for assigning a 


dose to that individual. 


MR. SMITH: I have a comment to John relative 


to the petition that you were talking about, 


not the -- not the overall SEC petition but the 


claimant statement that he got 5 -- 


DR. MAURO: R. 


MR. SMITH: -- R on his badge and he was a 


welder. I mean as a health physicist, does 


that make sense that a guy would be welding in 


an area, creating vapors in a radiological area 


and that -- that there was not any other people 


around doing the proper air monitoring and 

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personnel monitoring? 


DR. MAURO: There -- there are a lot of reasons 


not to believe that statement, that he received 


5 R. In other words, I'm not disagreeing that 


there are reasons -- but then again, the 


statement is made in an affidavit and it's a 


re-- and it's a -- a recurring issue. I just 


used that as one example of one that -- there 


are nine others that have stories that are 


attested to, and then of course we have the 


statements made by Mr. Brady that this was a 


widespread practice, and I -- and I think that 


we have -- I think that if there's another way 


to come at this problem that might be a little 


bit more direct in order to really put this 


thing to bed, I think we should do it. I'm 


sorry to be so -- I mean I'm -- I -- I feel as 


if the data analysis that was just done goes 


toward that, but there are other things that 


could be done -- probably fairly expeditiously, 


unless I'm wrong -- that could really answer 


this question to the satisfaction of everyone, 


including the folks -- you know -- you know, 


who are con-- concerned this was a widespread 


issue. It may turn out that it's not -- was 

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not a widespread issue and such an analysis 


might actually show that. So I'm not -- I'm 


not saying that I necessarily believe the 


person actually experienced 5 R any -- in one ­

- in one day. I don't know if that's -- if 


that's real. But I think that -- that this -- 


this recurring theme needs to be more directly 


addressed and I -- I'm only saying this because 


I'm right -- involved up to my eyeballs in the 


NTS SEC petition review. 


 Along these same lines -- 


 MS. MUNN: Which -- which period? Which time 


period, John? 


DR. MAURO: Pardon me? Who --


 MS. MUNN: Which time period? 


DR. MAURO: Oh, this is -- this is post-'62. 


This is -- this is during -- this is -- now I 


don't know for this particular worker what year 


that was, but it -- this is all when the below-


ground testing was -- not during the above-


ground, so we're talking post-'62. That's --


and the reason that's the case is because 


that's the SEC petition, it's for post-1962 -- 


 MS. MUNN: Right, right. 


DR. MAURO: -- and so this worker and the other 

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nine affidavits all go toward that time period. 


Now what the particular year is when this 


occurred, whether it occurred during the '63 to 


'67 period or occurred a later period, I don't 


know. 


 MS. MUNN: But it was post the existing SEC, 


that -- that was the only question. 


DR. MAURO: Ye-- yes, it was -- the existing -- 


not the old -- not the one that's been awarded 


but this is the new one. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: Now there's one more thing that I 


think is important that I think is a source to 


get a handle on this, and bear with me. In the 


S-- in the SEC there is -- the evaluation 


report -- the evaluation report explicitly 


tries to address this issue. And what it does 


is it has a table in it, and it says okay, we 


looked at 1,200 CATIs for -- for -- taken -- 


you know, CATI reports taken from claims, and 


we also, independent of that -- this is NIOSH's 


report -- said that we interviewed I think it 


was 14 or 15 people. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, that's correct. 


DR. MAURO: Right. And the outcome of that -- 

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and this is really a question. The outcome of 


that was you fou-- you observed thir-- you got 


13 hits, namely -- and what I mean by hits is I 


think the number was 13 individuals said yes, 


we did leave our film badges behind at -- so -- 


and the argument was made that well, 13 out of 


on the order of 1,200 shows that, if it did 


occur, it was very rare. 


Now my -- so I think the idea that that was 


done, that phone calls were made -- other 


words, you looked at the CATIs and that you 


also did separate telephone calls to -- I 


believe it was 14 or 15 people specifically 


asking that question in the phone calls -- not 


in the CATI. Remember, the CATI does not ask 


that question. Certainly it might come out in 


-- during the CATI interview, but there's no 


question in the CATI that says did you, you 


know, leave your badge behind. But -- but so 


they actually -- NIOSH actually called up 15 


people or 14 people, and the outcome, though, 


was 13 hits. 


My question is that -- did those 13 hits occur 


in the -- did most of those hits occur in the 


results of looking at the CATI, or did a 

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significant number of those hits occur as a 


result of the 15 people that were called up. 


Right now I think that, you know, you read that 


and you say we got 13 hits, but if the 13 hits 


came from the 14 or 15 people that were called, 


that changes the complexion -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Sure --


DR. MAURO: -- of (unintelligible) 


considerably. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- sure, certainly, and I'd be 


happy to provide that information to you. And 


in order to answer that question, none of the 


15 individuals that interviewed -- that we 


interviewed said that they had defeated the 


badging or had directly seen anyone do this. 


DR. MAURO: 

--

Okay, that's important. We didn't 

 MR. ROLFES: 

DR. MAURO: 

They were --

-- I appreciate that information 

because that was our first concern. We'd like 


to know where -- where are they -- so the hits 


occurred -- something that emerged from the 


1,200 CATI interviews. 


 MR. ROLFES: There were two people that had 


reported that they had heard third-hand that 

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this was done on site, but none of the 15 had 


direct knowledge of this occurrence. So these 


are second- and third-hand reports of -- of 


this occurrence. 


DR. MAURO: Well, I mean just from a 


statistical point of view, I am encouraged that 


out of the 14 or 15 people that I assume you 


randomly called, you got zero hits. If there 


was a widespread practice, you know, one would 


expect more -- you know, at least one or two 


hits, but I'm glad you gave me that 


information. I didn't know that. See, that's 


the kind of information that I see that goes 


directly towards this issue as oppo-- you know, 


and is very, very helpful in helping to come to 


grips with this, not only for the site profile 


but also for the SEC. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, are there any more 


questions? 


 MS. MUNN: This is really a thorny issue, and ­

-


 MR. PRESLEY: This is -- this is something that 


is going to have to be -- as far as I'm 


concerned, going to have to be done on a -- 


almost on a case-by-case basis. 

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 MS. MUNN: Well, you know, it's the -- I -- by 


the time the 1960s rolled around, people who 


worked on these sites were not babes in the 


woods. No one that I knew during the 1960s was 


unaware of the potential involved in radiation 


exposure. It was a well known, well 


documented, quite reasonably understood 


phenomenon. And the reason for badging would 


have been obvious to anyone. Not only that, it 


was not a period of deprivation in the United 


States. It isn't as though anyone working on ­

- out in the middle of the Nevada desert in the 


extreme hot, extreme cold, terrible conditions 


couldn't have found a job somewhere else. It's 


-- in order for this kind of thing to have 


occurred systemically, it boggles the mind as 


to how many individuals would have had to be 


complicit in having it happen. You would have 


to have the worker. You would have to have the 


worker's supervisor. You would have to have 


the security and health physics people. And 


you would have to have all coworkers. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: This is Arjun. I'm back. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Arjun. 


 MS. MUNN: It just -- well, the suggestions 

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that have been made are good ones. I just 


could not keep making that observation. It 


seems very difficult, but certainly if we can 


track it to ground and it can be done with a 


relative short period of time, then certainly 


in the context of the SEC that needs to happen. 


But in the interim, thank you to those of you 


who have put together the information that we 


have. It's most informative. 


 MR. CLAWSON: And Wanda -- this is Brad -- and 


to your comments, you're talking back in these 


days -- and I can tell you today that we're 


still fighting with these issues. And as far 


as the security badges go and so forth like 


that, my TLD is different than my security 


badge. There's many, many different things 


that push people into this. And I can sit 


right now -- I have a new work force that is 


coming in that actually scoffs at me and laughs 


about some of our contamination issues and 


radiation issues because they -- they don't 


believe them. There's -- there's a lot of 


issues that play into this, so don't think that 


because of the issues that have arisen because 


of these petitions and everything else like 

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that that this problem has stopped, because it 


still happens now. 


 MS. MUNN: Hmm, I'm (unintelligible) -- 


MR. SMITH: This is Billy Smith. One -- one --


one fact that -- that stands out to me over the 


period of operation of the Nevada Test Site 


through the present, over a million individual 


dosimeters have been issued, and less than one 


percent of that number had any positive gamma 


dose on them at all. 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLFES: That's very helpful to know, 


Billy. That's --


 MR. PRESLEY: I appreciate that, Billy, very 

much. 

 MR. CLAWSON: You're -- you're telling me one 

million badges and you've only got one percent 


that got any kind of dose? 


MR. SMITH: Less than one perc-- less than one 


percent received any type of gam-- of -- of 


radiation exposure. 


 MR. ROLFES: That certainly does make sense 


based on the limited number of exposures that 


occurred at the Site. Once again, this is not 


a production facility where there's a 

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continuous exposure potential, but rather it's 


-- it's an acute exposure potential associated 


with and shortly following after a test. And 


once again, as we had mentioned before in the 


analysis that was completed, most of these 


exposures that we're seeing were received in, 


for example, an acute manner in one- or two-day 


time period. So that -- that really does make 


sense to me from -- you know, from a knowledge 


of the operations. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But by the same token then, 


Mark, you know, a global analysis -- a global 


analysis of badges in the way that you present 


it rather than -- I had thought that there was 


going to be an analysis of a particular group 


of workers in a particular -- in the -- in -- 


in -- in that period of time, which was the 


tunnel re-entry workers rather than all of 


them. I haven't had a chance to study what you 


sent, but I thought you -- you essentially put 


all the badges together, which -- which throws 


in the non-testing periods and the testing 


periods and the workers who were in the forward 


areas and those who were not in the forward 


areas. 

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 MR. ROLFES: No, we --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: That's what I understood Jim 


Neton to say in the last working group meeting 


is that you would look at the workers who were 


in the forward areas. 


 MR. ROLFES: What we have here was the time 


period of 1963 through 1966 -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- and it was 160 of the highest 


exposed claimants that we have from Nevada Test 


Site; 94 of those 160 were within the 1963 to 


1966 time period, so those are the individuals 


that we focused on. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, yeah, but that's 


different than what I'd thought Jim Neton was 


proposing is to look at -- because this thing 


has really mostly arisen, at least in terms of 


the testimony that has been given, apart from 


the atmospheric testing period which -- which 


to some extent is moot because of the SEC -- is 


-- is the tunnel re-entry workers. This is --


this has arisen both in the testimony that's 


been presented before the Board, some 


documentary evidence and so on in -- in that 


context. And if I remember what Jim Neton had 

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proposed is what you were going to do is to 


look at that group of workers to see if -- if 


there was an issue with -- with their records, 


their CATIs, their affidavits, their dosimetry, 


and I don't know exactly -- I don't know that a 


-- a -- a plan of research was set forth at the 


last working group meeting, but the group of 


workers had been defined. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, I feel that --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Not (unintelligible). 


 MR. ROLFES: I really can't think of any other 


exposure scenario other than -- you know, the ­

- the highest exposed individuals would have 


been captured in this -- in this study that we 


have done. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: You're -- you're talking about 


the highest recorded badges. We're not talking 


about the highest recorded badges, which is the 


data that you've presented. What -- what we 


were talking about is to look at what might be 


a pattern -- I mean a worker might leave their 


badge off entirely if they anticipate a high 


exposure 'cause they don't want to be sent 


back. I mean I -- I had -- at least this was 


my understanding and -- and -- that -- that 

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NIOSH was going to look at a group of workers, 


not at a group of high exposed claimants but at 


a group of tunnel workers and look at their 


records. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, once again, this highest 


exposed group is comprised of several people 


who were involved in tunnel re-entry. 


DR. MAURO: Arjun, I -- during the disc-- what 


-- during your absence -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I'm sorry that I -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, it's okay, but -- 


 MR. CLAWSON: This is -- this is Brad. I hate 


to -- I -- I've got some -- I've got a lot of 


people waiting on me to do a job. I didn't 


think that this was going to take this long. 


have got to -- I've got to step off right now. 


I've got some work that has to be done. I 


apologize, but I've got several people waiting 


on me, so Bob, I apologize but I've got to -- 


I've got to stop right now and go take care of 


some work right now. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

 MR. CLAWSON: I apologize. 

 MR. PRESLEY: I understand. 

 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: We've got about an hour before 


I've got to go. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, we'll see you later. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Now. 


 MR. ROLFES: John, I think Arjun came back in ­

-


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- after your discussion, if you 


want to --


DR. MAURO: I just wanted to bring -- this is 


something I want to put out for just 


consideration. It's an idea that I came up 


with. In reading the affidavits -- and Arjun, 


I just mentioned this -- this be-- before you 


came on -- that we have an individual who turns 


out wore a pocket ionization chamber, and I 


found out that -- that the -- this is -- a lot 


of folks wore pocket ionization chambers, and 


there are records of what their readings are 


from the pocket ionization chambers. And in 


theory you can go back and randomly sample all 


of the positive readings and maybe -- from -- 


that -- where there are pocket ionization 


chamber readings, and they're in the records, 


and then go back to that person's film badge 

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record history and see if that month he had a 


zero, the month where the pocket ionization 


chamber read something positive, and see if the 


-- that same very month he has a zero on his 


film badge reading. That would -- and if that 


happens, and it happens a lot, well, it sounds 


like there's something fishy going on. If it 


turns out that whenever you get a -- a positive 


pocket ionization chamber reading, you get -- 


you more or less -- or out of the let's say 


ten, 20, 30 samples, you also get a positive 


film badge reading, it's not going to be the 


same, it seems to me that kind of analysis -- 


unless I'm missing something -- would really 


put this issue to bed, one way or the other. 


 MR. PRESLEY: This is Bob Presley. We're going 


to beat this one to death. I'm going to ask 


Mark if he would go back -- Mark, how long is 


it going to take to do something like there to 


where that you can get your hands on those 


pocket dosimetry -- those things and then look 


and see what the -- if it corresponds in any 


way to the badge readings. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, we are trying to be -- you 


know, we are trying to work within a set amount 

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of time and trying to provide responses to 


claimants in a timely manner. This is 


something -- if we're referring to a million 


film badge results, I certainly expect there's 


at least that many pocket ioniza-- ionization 


chamber results. 


 MS. MUNN: I think what we're talking about is 


a random sample of pocket ionization results 


that can be correlated to the same individual's 


film badge for that period, and I heard the 


number suggested 20? 


DR. MAURO: And that -- this is a question I 


guess a statistician -- you know, what kind of 


sense of a power we're looking for, I don't 


know. I'm just saying that you only nee-- you 


don't need that many, and if you get -- you 


know, if you could randomly select ten, 20 or 


whatever number that is deemed appropriate of ­

- of the positive, you start with the -- you 


want to get positive readings of pocket 


ionization chambers, and these would just be 


for a given day, and then -- and you got a 


positive reading. Then you go back to the -- 


for that person, that -- the month in which 


that day got that reading and see if he got a 

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positive reading, or did he get a zero. 


 MR. CHEW: I agree with you, John, I think the 


first -- first order of business to see if we 


can retrieve the records of the pocket 


ionization chambers and look at the positive 


ones. I -- I think that's the right approach 


here, just talking about how we're going to go 


forth (unintelligible). 


 MR. PRESLEY: Would we want to look at them 


random, or would we want to pull say 20 high 


doses and look and see if -- if you know you've 


got a positive high, then there should be a -- 


at least something on that film badge. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Now if we do that and it's on 20 


of those film badges, then I'd say we don't 


have a problem. If you look at 20 and say 


okay, ten of these pocket ionization chambers 


have a high reading but their badges say no 


reading, then yeah, we've got a problem. 


 MR. ZLOTNICKI: This is Joe Zlotnicki with 


SC&A. I've got a question on this and that is 


is there any indication that the workers in 


general in these affidavits say they didn't 


wear their film badge; they say they did, 

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however, wear their PIC, or were they likely to 


leave both of them off? 


DR. MAURO: I -- I brought this up, Joe, 


because there was one affidavit where this was 


the claim made by the worker, that he had his 


PIC, he got a very high reading on his PIC, but 


he left his film badge behind. 


 MR. ZLOTNICKI: Yeah, I heard -- I heard you 


say that, but --


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay. 


 MR. ZLOTNICKI: -- I'm wondering in general -- 


DR. MAURO: Oh. 


 MR. ZLOTNICKI: -- in these other affidavits if 


people are claiming that they still wore their 


PIC and that that dose got recorded. It would 


seem if people were leaving their film badge 


off and wearing a PIC and getting a result, 


they were laying themselves open to be sort of 


discovered. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's exactly --


 MR. ZLOTNICKI: So I'm wondering if they would 


leave all dosimetry off if they're intending to 


leave any off deliberately. 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, this is Mark, and for this 


particular individual, what might be best 

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helpful for us in directly analyzing whether 


this situation occurred and if any significance 


-- any significant dose was received by the 


individual, maybe we could get -- you know, 


maybe we could speak with him and get 


authorization to retrieve his records and take 


a look at the specific, you know, time period 


that this occurred and also take a look at what 


kind of radiation exposure environment this 


individual was in. That might give us our most 


straightforward answer. 


DR. MAURO: I agree, we should start -- well, 


you folks should start with the affida-- the 


people who claim -- who made the affidavits and 


-- and it sort of -- you know, convince 


yourself that gee, this has really happened. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I've got no problems with that. 


This is Bob Presley. Wanda, what would you 


agree? 


 (No responses) 


Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: I think if the information is 


available, that's the very first place to 


start. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

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 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yeah, I -- I agree with that, 


too. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) a good idea, John. 


I hope it doesn't take us down an unproductive 


path. 


DR. MAURO: Well, you know what it is is -- in 


reality is this is more an SEC issue than it is 


-- I mean the -- the immediacy of this is 


apparent. It is the heart and soul of the 


issue. And the fact that we're engaging it 


here in the site profile I have to -- I -- I 


apologize for bringing it up, but it's so -- so 


fundamental that I -- I -- you know, I couldn't 


help myself. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Let me ask you something -- this 


is Bob Presley. Did we not talk about setting 


a working group up to look at this problem? 


don't think we ever did; I know we talked about 


it. But -- because this is such a widespread 


problem --


 MS. MUNN: Well, it recurs on every site. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- it recur-- recurs at every 


site. 


 MR. ROLFES: I know that it was evaluated in 


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detail for the Rocky Flats site as well, and I 


know that it's come up with Nevada Test Site 


and other sites as well, so -- 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, we never -- I've got to say 


that the only reason I -- the idea came about 


the PIC, I don't think we ever talked about the 


-- that the -- the pocket ionization chambers 


may be the ultimate solution. I'm not sure if 


it is. May turn out that it's not going to 


work. You know, they -- the rea-- you know, 


and -- but it seems to be at least an idea that 


might give us a handle on one of the most 


difficult problems we've been trying to deal 


with. 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Right, Nevada has things -- two 


things, one, the fact that they did actually 


record these PIC values, which is something 


that I -- I can say from personal experience 


they did not do in Los Alamos. Plus, the film 


badge and your badge were one and the same. 


They were --


MR. SMITH: Not during this particular time 


period. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Not during this particular time 

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period, okay. 


MR. SMITH: Right. 


 MR. ROLFES: During the '63 through '66 time 


period. However, following 1966 they were one 


and the same. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Oh, okay. 


MR. SMITH: Right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. Okay, let's leave this 


open, and Mark, the only thing that I know to 


do -- 'cause we can talk about this for the 


next week -- is if we decide that we've got to 


have our meeting on the night of the 7th, let 


Mark give us an update on what's happened on 


this. 


 MS. MUNN: That sure would be helpful to have. 


 MR. ROLFES: I guess -- I guess a little 


clarification now as well, you know. If we 


have indication that one individual did this 


and it occurred, it becomes a dose 


reconstruction specific to his claim. What 


we've done for the site profile review is 


evaluated, in our entire claimant population, 


whether this in fact occurred. And for the 


site profile issue we have a methodology to 


address this and assign a dose based on the 

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relevant facts of the case and documentation in 


our site profile, which we did agree within -- 


excuse me, that the Board did agree -- the 


Board did agree with, I believe. We 


incorporated -- remember we had discussed about 


assigning a potential unmonitored dose. For 


example, if an individual was working in a high 


radiation area for three quarters and then 


suddenly had a zero reported for the fourth 


quarter, we did propose using a methodology 


based on the individual's own dosimetry records 


to interpolate a potential radiation dose, or 


even assign the highest recorded dose from any 


quarter of that year to the quarter where the 


individual had a zero dose and indicated that 


he had removed his dosimeter or hid his 


dosimeter. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ROLFES: So there is a dose reconstruction 


methodology that exists, and that is the focus 


of the site profile review. 


This is also something that was considered for 


the SEC evaluation as well, which is a separate 


issue at this point, so... 


DR. ROESSLER: I think that's a separate issue, 

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but since we've spent a lot of time on it today 


and since we know that this is going to be an 


area that comes up and up again, I like Bob's 


idea of a workgroup on this particular issue, 


and I don't -- I hope we don't lose that 


thought. That should come up at the Board 


meeting, I think, in --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


DR. ROESSLER: -- Las Vegas. 


 MR. ROLFES: All right. All right. 


MR. SMITH: Mark, this is Billy. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, Billy. 


MR. SMITH: You may want to inform the Board of 


the problems that I encountered relative to 


trying to retrieve some of the -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. SMITH: -- (unintelligible) data. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


MR. SMITH: I don't know how that's going to be 


resolved between now and the January meeting, 


so --


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah, very true, Billy. NIOSH 


isn't the only one with funding problems, and 


DOE is also, you know, under a tight budget 


constraint right now as well. To access 

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individuals' records it can get into quite a 


large amount of time and money and man hours 


that go into these studies. These -- these are 


not simple record retrievals. These take lots 


of time. And if we're talking about going 


through a lot of data, it -- it's not something 


that's going to be addressed in a very -- I 


don't foresee it being, you know, done in a 


very timely manner. We'd certainly make any 


arrangements we could to try to -- you know, to 


try to do it in a timely manner, but I -- I did 


want to make the Advisory Board aware of that, 


or the working group aware of that, so... 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm very much --


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm very much aware of that. 


 MS. MUNN: We certainly do hope we're not 


talking about a significant sorting of data. 


If it's not -- if it's available, that's one 


thing. If it's -- if it's not available, then 


that's an entirely different issue. 


MR. SMITH: Wanda, this is Billy. The data is 


available. One of the main storage systems 


that they use for these records -- well, Nevada 


brought all of the records back from the 

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federal archives and put them in a repository 


here --


 MS. MUNN: Right, right, thank goodness. 


MR. SMITH: -- and most of them are stored on ­

- on microfilm, and you can go in by some 


microfilm index number and -- and -- and find 


most of the things that you are looking for. 


Then the staff over there -- DOE staff over 


there have to go over and sort through these 


things and sort out the Privacy Act stuff 


that's associated with it so when they present 


it to us it doesn't have all the stuff other 


then what we --


 MS. MUNN: All the other identifiers, yeah. 


MR. SMITH: Yes. So -- and their staff has 


recently been reduced -- I -- I was trying to 


get some information from Martha DeMarre within 


the last few weeks and she just couldn't 


support me because of their -- 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) 


MR. SMITH: -- ongoing mission and -- and she 


does not have the resources, and I'm not 


allowed to go into their particular database 


because I don't have the permissions to get -- 


to use their databases. 

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 MS. MUNN: Right. 


DR. ROESSLER: I think that because this is 


really a bigger issue and there's -- there are 


a lot of problems like time and budget, it 


needs to be done on a very systematic way, not 


just somebody has an idea, we follow through on 


it and then maybe that's not considered the 


very best way to have approached it. Again, I 


just want to support the idea of a working 


group on this particular issue. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Let me ask something. Can we go 


ahead and for this site profile go ahead and 


say that we support, as a working group, the 


means of doing this on this site profile, but 


we recommend that the Board ask that a working 


group be put together to study this as a 


complex-wide problem? 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: Bob, I'll back that. I'll 


second that. 


 MS. MUNN: Sounds reasonable to me. 


 MR. CHEW: Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MR. CHEW: This is Mel. I think that -- I 


think maybe it's best for us to -- the ORAU 


team and you and NIOSH, to -- let's get 

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together and think about this and how to 


approach -- to answer this particular one for 


the site profile here before we make any 


commitment you said (unintelligible) with an 


approach that we can try to address this thing 


in a timely manner. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Can -- can we talk about this 


then on September (sic) the 7th and come up 


with -- if we can -- if we can close this issue 


out for this SEC, I'm sorry, for this site 


profile, and then make the recommendation that 


the Board study this for a -- have a study 


group look at this for a -- as a -- not a site 


DR. ROESSLER: Global. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- global problem, 'cause that's 


what we talked about before. I remember --


hey, Lew, you still on there? Lew may still 


have the list of what we talked about but I'm 


pretty sure this was one of the problem-- one 


of the things that we -- we looked into and -- 


and we decided we didn't have the money to do 


at the time, but I think it's going to have to 


be done or else we're going to have this 


problem on every site. 

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DR. ROESSLER: Bob, I think maybe you meant, 


when you mentioned a date, in January 7th for 


our --


 MR. PRESLEY: January 7th, yeah. 


DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, just for the record. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, January 7th. Can we -- can 


we do that? Mark, can you just come back and ­

- and y'all talk about it? SC&A, what do you 


think about that, John? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, the way I'm looking at this 


is that this is an idea to come at a very 


important problem, its feasibility, its 


plausibility, how you would actually do it, 


whether it'll work and -- is still uncertain. 


And I think the first step is just -- you know, 


I -- I guess it was Mel that mentioned this -- 


I believe it was Mel -- you know, we've got to 


first look at whether -- you know, whether it's 


plausible to do this in this particular 


instance, on this site, and maybe this could 


almost be a pilot investigation. That is, you 


know, for this site, since we do know -- sounds 


like that we do -- do know that there is -- 


that these data do exist, the -- I mean the 


pocket ionization chamber exist, but the 

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plausibility of retrieving it, the cost, what 


it's really going to tell us, there may be some 


fundamental flaws with the idea, we don't know. 


But I think that -- so the first step should be 


taken by -- by which -- just to look into the 


plausibility of this line of investigation to 


give us fruitful results in this particular 


instance. And if we could hear back about the 


plausibility of it on the 7th, that would be 


very helpful. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well -- well, I think Mr. 


Presley is -- is -- is also right in the sense 


that we -- we are looking at it in -- in this 


context, but -- but as has been mentioned, it 


comes up at many different sites and -- and -- 


and -- well, in a way it's not for us, but it ­

- it -- this is, to some extent, a generic 


issue. I mean there's a particularity with NTS 


because there's more documentation here, but -- 


but there is -- there is a more general 


question and maybe a more general method is 


called for or a general investigation is called 


for. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Let's let -- let NIOSH look at 


this and come back to us with a recommendation 

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on the 7th. Mark, do you agree? 


 MR. ROLFES: All right. Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Hey, Larry? Is he there? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm here. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Is that workable for you? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'm sorry, I was distracted in 


another conversation and so I wasn't paying 


attention. Can you fill me in? 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right. We're going to -- we 


are asking you all to come back with a 


recommendation on the 7th, that night in our 


meeting, on whether it would be plausible to 


look into this issue of checking badges with -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: PICs. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- yeah, PICs and -- and things 


like that. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Given our -- given DOL's 


constraints included, I understand. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. Right. Okay? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: We'll certainly be prepared to 


give you a status report. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I think that's -- I think that's 


only fair. Okay? Working group, are y'all 


satisfied with that? 


 MS. MUNN: Surely. 

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 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes. 


DR. ROESSLER: Yes. 

 MR. PRESLEY: All righty, let's go on to 21. 

 MR. CLAWSON: Hey, Bob, this is Brad. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 

 MR. CLAWSON: I'm going to be back with you for 

about 20 minutes. They'll come and get me when 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. CLAWSON: -- exactly I've got to run, so I 


-– 


COMMENT TWENTY-ONE: EXTREMITY DOSIMETRY


 MR. PRESLEY: All righty. The TBD does not 


contain information about extremity dosimetry. 


Mark, do you want to go over that? This is 


another --


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, sure. We do have extremity 


dosimetry within individuals' DOE reported dose 


files, and those are used in dose 


reconstructions when necessary. For example, 


if the individual has a skin cancer of an 


extremity for which we need to calculate a dose 


to that extremity. Let's see, I believe that 


we have provided an update in the NTS Chapter 


6, Revision 1, and let's see, that is Section 

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6.3.5.3.1 -- let me check on the status. That 


is currently -- that should be in the 


currently-approved documentation, so it is 


currently available. And I believe that -- 


let's see, our response also addresses the 


expanded review that was conducted by SC&A as 


well. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. Okay. Arjun or John, do 


y'all have a problem with this? As I see it, 


this is a closed issue. We -- we solved this 


problem in Cincinnati on the 25th. 


 MS. MUNN: I think we did. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, from -- from a TBD point 


of view. That might have to come up in -- in 


the SEC, but from a -- if -- if -- if -- yeah, 


our -- our comment had been -- in -- in our 


review that there were only rare instances of 


monitoring, as NIOSH said, prior to '67. After 


'67 it doesn't seem to be an issue. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But I guess if the position is 


we don't need to reconstruct doses prior to '67 


at the present time, I guess -- you know, that 


-- that's -- then it's not a TBD issue but it 


might be an SEC issue. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, agreed. 


 MS. MUNN: Good. 


COMMENT TWENTY-TWO: NEUTRON DOSES


 MR. PRESLEY: Let's go on to 22. There are no 


neutron doses -- neutron dose data until 1966 


and partial data until 1979. Mark, do you want 


to -- we talked about this also. You want to 


say what our finding was on this? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, let's see, we've got a 


proposed methodology based on the Pantex site 


profile, and these are based on recorded 


dosimeter results for individuals that were 


working in a production-related environment. 


Nevada Test Site, once again, was limited to a 


very defined number of tests involving a 


defined exposure potential to neutrons. The 


comments that we recently received also on -- 


these were public comments that had been sent 


out to the Advisory Board. This concern was 


raised by an individual member of the public as 


well, and this was in regards to Operation BREN 


and HENRE. We do have data indicating that 


neutron doses were in fact monitored associated 


with those projects, the bare reactor 

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experiment Nevada and the high energy reactions 


experiment, which were conducted on-site at 


Nevada Test Site. So I believe that we do have 


information that would allow us to do a 


claimant-favorable dose reconstruction. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's al-- go ahead, I'm sorry. 


 MR. ROLFES: Oh, no. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's also been reported out in 


the NTS Revision 1. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. And that's -- that's the 


portion -- the Page Change 1 portion I believe 


is still in -- let's see, that's still 


internal, I believe. Let me verify that --


yes, it's still internal, in review at this 


time, so... 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Anybody have anything on 


that? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, we -- we've reviewed 


this, Mr. Presley, in -- in our October review 


that we submitted to the working group -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Uh-huh. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- and had commented then that 


the use of these NP ratios from Pantex was not 


well justified and -- and -- in one case 2.5 


and in the other case five, and in general have 

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some discomfort with -- with NP ratios from 


other sites being transferred to -- you know, 


intersite use of NP ratios seems -- seems to 


pose some difficulties in terms of 


(unintelligible). 


DR. MAURO: I'd like to add, though, that the 


first part of your response dealing with the 


tests and the contribution of neutron exposure 


as a function of distance, I'm familiar with 


that and that's certainly true. That is -- so 


the -- the problem has to do -- I mean if there 


is an issue here, it has to do with the 


neutron-to-photon ratio that's being adopted 


for people who were exposed I guess in the 


reactor tests. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, on the methodology in 


regard to the tests, we -- we -- we didn't 


reproduce the calculations, but saw no 


problems. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, we -- yeah, that the -- yeah, 


we agreed that the -- the neutron doses at -- 


at a distance are not going to be a problem. 


But right now -- I think that was one of our 


findings in the -- in the Pantex, even though ­

- I know that's right now being held up for 

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various reasons, but that wa-- that was one of 


our concerns, and not only the Pantex ratio but 


also, as Arjun pointed out, the -- the use of 


other site data in this context, and we're 


actually working on -- with -- with the working 


group whe-- on the -- under what conditions can 


you use other site data. This is certainly an 


area that has been actively investigated by 


other working groups. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. One of the important things 


to mention I guess, also the Operation BREN, 


the Bare Reactor Experiment Nevada, one of the 


primary concerns was potential neutron 


exposures associated with an atmospheric test, 


and we do have quite a number of civil effects 


experiment documents that were conducted by -- 


this was under the civil effects test 


operations, CETO, I believe, that was quite an 


elaborate study and quite a bit of detail 


associated with this test in order to determine 


neutron doses and gamma doses at various 


distances and reactor heights or source heights 


on the BREN tower. The individuals that had a 


potential for neutron exposure in these 


scenarios were in fact monitored, and I think 

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that's the important point. 


In relation to the device assembly individuals 


-- so the bottom line is that atmospheric 


testing, the people that were in a potential to 


be -- well, there really was no potential 


during the atmospheric testing time period for 


the great majority of individuals. The one 


exception we've mentioned is potentially a 


flight crew from the military that could have 


been in the air during a test. 


The individuals at NRDS and those associated 


with Operations BREN and HENRE were also 


monitored. Furthermore, we do have 


documentation at the NRDS of the gamma and 


neutron dose rates surrounding the reactor at 


various distances. Those could simply be used 


to apply a neutron-to-photon ratio because it 


is documented the highest recorded exposures 


received on these reactor tests for each 


reactor test. So there -- there are a number 


of pieces of information that we could use to 


assign neutron doses from various operations 


and --


DR. MAURO: Mark, I'd be interested in how tho­

- those ratios stack up against the -- the 1.7 

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(unintelligible) value that you were thinking 


about using originally. Other words, have you 


sort of confirmed that the 1.7 was a good 


number or does it show that the actual data you 


have -- maybe the 1.7 was not very claimant 


favorable? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, let me -- let me pull up a ­

-


DR. MAURO: Because this goes a little bit 


toward this question of other site data, it's ­

- it's almost like a test case. 


 MR. ROLFES: Let me see if I can find this 


reference here. 


MR. SMITH: Mark, while you're looking -- this 


is Billy. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, Billy. 


MR. SMITH: I actually worked on Project HENRE 


at NRDS. That was a linear accelerator so 


there was no gamma associated with that 


particular operation. Only when the BREN tower 


was in Area 4 -- it was a bare reactor, it was 


a research reactor that -- that's now back at 


Oak Ridge at DOSAR -- would there have been 


some gamma associated with neutrons. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. I do have, for example -- 

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this is from the Los Alamos Scientific 


Laboratory, environmental effects of the QETNT* 


effluent, a review and evaluation report. I am 


looking through this document and there is a 


table at various distances from the reactor 


that have integral gamma and neutron data at 


100 and 200 feet. At the closest measurement, 


which was 100 feet from the reactor, the gamma 


dose rate was -- let's see -- about three -- 


let's see, let me make sure I've got this right 


-- this was an integral dose, so it was a total 


of 3,640 rad for gamma exposures. The neutron 


exposure was 65 rad, so --


DR. MAURO: Okay, so it was (unintelligible). 


 MR. ROLFES: -- we're talking about -- yeah, 


we're talking about a couple of orders of 


magnitude difference, so an individual that was 


associated with the project that received gamma 


dose likely would not have received a 


significant neutron dose without receiving a 


very large gamma dose, is -- is the bottom 


line. 


DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. That -- that sort of 


validates that the 1.7 if you were to -- if we 


did use that, at least in -- from the 

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comparison you made, it would be very claimant 


favorable. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, very. 


DR. MAURO: In fact to the point where -- yeah, 


okay. All right, that's helpful. 


 MR. PRESLEY: All right, we're going to mark 


this one closed. 


COMMENT TWENTY-FOUR: HIGH-FIRED OXIDES
 

Okay, let's go on to 24, presence of high-fired 


oxides resulting from atmospheric weapons 


testing and reactor testing needs to be 


investigated. Mark, y'all did a tremendous 


amount of work on that. 


 MR. ROLFES: All right. Yes, I did just 


receive notification of a revision to TIB-49 


which addresses plutonium strongly retained in 


the lung, and that basically gives us 


adjustment factors to -- based on the data that 


we have for a particular claim, on how to 


assign a claimant-favorable dose estimate for 


high-fired oxides or very insoluble plutonium. 


 MS. MUNN: This has been well covered by many 


workgroups and I think -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah, and also --


 MS. MUNN: -- most of them agree it's done. 

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 MR. ROLFES: I apologize, I talked over you a 


little bit, Wanda. And also obviously from the 


atmospheric weapons testing period there is an 


SEC that has been designated for the '51 


through '62 time period, so... 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes, I'm going to mark that one 


complete. 


COMMENT TWENTY-FIVE: SITE EXPERT INTERVIEWS
 

All righty, 25, NIOSH documentation of site 


expert interviews is inadequate. Mark, you all 


have gotten with SEC and -- or SC&A and done a 


tremendous amount of work I know back on that. 


Do you want to discuss your all's findings with 


that? 


 MR. ROLFES: Well, in addition to those listed 


in this document, there are additional 


interviews once again that have been conducted 


following the Special Exposure Cohort 


submission that we received, so as far as for 


the -- and those -- the summarization of those 


interviews has been presented in -- in what 


I've related to you today as well, so I don't 


foresee us needing to do anything else with 


this. 


 MR. PRESLEY: No. Arjun? 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, Mr. Presley, I agree with 


that. Just as a kind of FYI, the -- the 


broader interview procedure -- now NIOSH has a 


very formal procedure for documenting 


interviews now and -- and we've reviewed that 


separately as part of our Task III work, and 


Ms. Munn, you have that report. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: We haven't discussed, I don't 


think, at any of our meetings, but -- but you 


have that report. 


 MS. MUNN: Right, I do. 


DR. MAURO: I think that's OTIB-97 -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, so --


DR. MAURO: -- or Proc. (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- so Mr. Presley, I -- I agree 


with Mark, it's --


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- closed. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, we had a -- y'all sent me 


an e-mail message on that. 


COMMENT ELEVEN: ENVIRONMENTAL DOSE
 

Now we're through the 25, except we need to go 


back to 11. Arjun had to leave. Arjun, what 


we said we were going to do is wait till you 

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got back and then go back and discuss 11, so if 


everybody (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, (unintelligible). 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- everybody would, go back to 


11, which has to do with correction factors for 


extreme environmental doses and -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Where am I? I've lost my --


number 11, okay. Yeah, before I -- I'm very 


sorry, again, I had to leave like that, but I ­

- we -- we did -- we had overlooked number 11 


because it was about environmental dose, but it 


actually had been a revision in -- in Chapter 6 


and I had overlooked it, thinking that we were 


not to review environmental doses. Since our 


last working group I had asked our team to 


prepare responses to this. Unfortunately, 


we've got two different pieces of paper. They 


aren't consolidated or internally reviewed. 


I'm sorry they aren't ready yet, but I will -- 


I will send you this piece of paper immediately 


after the first of the year, so about a week 


before the Board meeting. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, 'cause I -- you know, we're 


going to have to have that meeting on the 7th. 


I'd like --

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- to be able to discuss this -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- as one of the action items and 


saw that off at that time. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, you -- you will have this 


several days before -- before the meeting on 


the 7th. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: I've got just a quick question on 


the response that's provided by Mark. I notice 


that you did an analysis of angular or 


directional dependence. 


 MR. ROLFES: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAURO: And based on your analysis, you 


felt that there was -- there is -- the 


adjustment factor is one. That is, there 


really --


 MR. ROLFES: Exactly. 


DR. MAURO: -- is no effect. Did you -- did 


you do that based on -- you ran some models and 


-- and how the -- did -- the flux would hit -- 


hit the -- other words, what am I -- am I to 


understand what you're saying is a person was 


standing in a contaminated area, let's say it 

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was a -- the ground was contaminated. You're 


saying that the -- the angular direction 


doesn't really change the -- the response of 


the film badge? 


 MR. ROLFES: It does not change it where it 


would exceed our claimant-favorable dose 


conversion factors. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, I see. 


 MR. ROLFES: And certainly in light of our -- 


our assumptions that we make when we complete a 


dose reconstruction, we are already 


incorporating various correction factors for 


energy spectra and -- let's see, radiation 


energies -- let's see, I'm trying to recall off 


the top of my head other -- but the bottom line 


of the study was that we did take a look at 


whether separate external dose correction 


factors from environmental contamination would 


result in a -- in a higher dose to the 


individual than what the badge would have 


reported, and we did not find that to be the 


case. 


DR. MAURO: Did you -- did you do this by a -- 


like an MCMP type calculation? 


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clarification. I know that this was done quite 


a while ago and -- let's see, I believe we had 


addressed this -- let's see, that was in Rev. 1 


of the NTS external dosimetry TBD. Let's see ­

- and -- do we have Gene on the line? I'd like 


to see if he could explain a little bit more 


detail. I believe it was Richard that had 


conducted this analysis. 


 MR. ROLLINS: Yes, I'm -- I'm here, Mark. 


 MR. ROLFES: It's been a while and I'm trying 


to recall exactly what was done. I know we did 


document it and it has been -- 


 MR. ROLLINS: Well, we -- we worked up the 


geometry factors and -- if I'm remembering 


correctly 'cause it was done some time ago -- 


it turned out that the -- they were less than 


one. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


 MR. ROLLINS: And so we decided just to leave 


them as one, to be claimant favorable. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. 


DR. MAURO: And this would be the fa-- let me 


just see if I have it right. So you get a 


reading on your dosimeter -- let's say a film 


badge -- that reads 100 MR was -- the -- was 

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darkening on your -- your film badge, but 


you're saying that -- that would -- but that's 


of course determined under a certain set of 


calibration conditions if the -- you're saying 


the way in which you convert the -- the -- the 


optical density reading on the film badge to an 


organ dose, the way it's done now, is more than 


adequate to account for the fact that the -- 


the film badge may not respond -- under-respond 


if the angle of incidence is -- let's say not 


perpendicular but say a much more severe angle, 


you're saying that -- that the -- 'cause I know 


when we did some calculations we found that the 


angle of incidence did have a -- and the energy 


of the photon did have a very significant 


effect on how the film badge would respond and 


-- but you're saying that you -- taking that -- 


even taking that into consideration, your -- 


your adjustment factors are more than 


sufficient to account for that? 


 MR. ROLLINS: That's correct. Badges would not 


have under-responded. 


DR. MAURO: Did we -- do we have -- did we see 


that? Did we -- has that report been -- is 


that contained in any of your documents that we 

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have available to us? 


 MR. ROLFES: Did we document that in the site 


profile, Gene? I --


 MR. ROLLINS: The actual -- the actual 


calculational package? No. 


 MR. ROLFES: No, okay. 


DR. MAURO: I -- the -- I only bring it up 


because I recall in another -- for some other 


purposes, we did -- we did some analysis like 


this and we did see a substantial, you know, 


under-response on the ang-- when the energy is 


low and the angle of incidence is -- is off -- 


is not perpendicular, you could really -- and I 


was just surprised that, you know, you're okay. 


 MR. ROLLINS: We could -- we could -- I guess ­

- I'm going to leave that up to Mark, but I 


presume we could make that package available. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah, that's -- I'm trying to 


recall, I -- I wanted to look back and see if I 


could find -- I don't have those -- I thought 


we had closed this issue at the last -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, we had. 


 MR. ROLFES: -- working group meeting. 


DR. MAURO: We did? Please, I apologize. If 


this has been closed, I -- 

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 MR. PRESLEY: We closed this. 


DR. MAURO: I don't want to open it up again, I 


just wasn't --


 MR. PRESLEY: You all -- you all met with this 


-- with NIOSH and closed this thing about the ­

- about the interviews. That's what I've got ­

-


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, yeah, we -- we -- the 


documentation of the interviews? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, John -- John, we did. 


DR. MAURO: No, I'm talking about this angle of 


incidence response --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, the angle of incidence 


thing? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, I mean the -- I -- I -- we're 


on number 11. Right? I assume we're on number 


11. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, I'm sorry. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, number 11. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Number 11 is not -- Mr. 


Presley, number 11 is not -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right, right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- closed 'cause we haven't 


given you our response to it. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, that's right. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: But we will do that before -- 


before... 


DR. MAURO: And the reas-- that -- that was -- 


for the question was do we have the analysis 


that was done. Sounds like that there wasn't 


qui-- there was an analysis done by NIOSH that 


was a while back, and my question was did we 


have an opportunity to look at it. And the 


only reason I brought it up was I was surprised 


to see, given a -- you know, a low energy 


photon coming in at a high angle of incidence, 


our -- my expectation is that you could really 


underestimate a dose if you don't take that 


into consideration. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, well, we're -- we're 


going to file -- we're going to file our 


response and -- and -- and you -- yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Okay, but they have a report 


apparently that -- that we haven't seen. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, we have. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, you -- we do have it. Okay, 


that was my question. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: This was -- yeah, this was -- 


this was a problem that -- it was a omission on 

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our part, John, which I just said is -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: It was there and -- and we 


didn't -- we overlooked it and so in -- in our 


general review of external dose issues and 


that's why we had to go back and do this 


separate piece of work. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay. So we still owe them a ­

- a -- our responses. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: Arjun, as a small heads-up, are you 


seeing major problems here with the report that 


you're putting out? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I don't know actually, Ms. 


Munn. I -- I -- I farmed this out -- 


 MS. MUNN: Or it's too early to ask. Okay. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- I farmed this out and I 


haven't -- I haven't had a chance to go through 


it carefully. 


 MS. MUNN: Oh, fine, fine. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I wish I could brief you. 


 MS. MUNN: It was just -- my only thought was 


time constraints with the meeting we're going 


to have (unintelligible) before -- 

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 DR. MAKHIJANI: I will try to send it to you as 


soon as possible. 


 MS. MUNN: No problem. Thank you. 


 MR. ROLFES: And also keep in mind that if you 


are an individual that is working in a 


contaminated environment, and if it's an 


environmental area where there's a low dose 


rate based on background contamination, it's 


very unlikely that an individual's dosimeter 


would even register a positive dose given the 


low dose rate associated with an environmental 


contamination scenario. I don't see 


significant environmental doses being 


accumulated by an individual at the Nevada Test 


Site. 


DR. MAURO: The only -- the only comment I have 


is that it sound like, notwithstanding whether 


there is one or not -- a detectable dose -- the 


-- the argument is being made here that -- that 


the angular -- direction really does not need 


to be taken into account because built into the 


calculational method and converting from a film 


badge reading to an organ dose that you have 


sufficient conservatism built into that 


adjustment factor to account for any angular 

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dependency. 


 MR. ROLFES: Exactly. 


DR. MAURO: And -- and -- yeah, and I believe 


that's true, but we haven't reviewed that. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, so --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Why don't we just revisit that 


(unintelligible). 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay, so as you are aware, if we 


have a non-positive dose from an individual 


working in an environmentally contaminated 


area, we would assign a missed dose to that 


non-positive dosimetry cycle, so -- 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


WRAP-UP AND FUTURE PLANS


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. Now, we're through our 25 


items. We have the comments that Mark has 


added from the external dose section of the NTS 


technical database. Mark, to my knowledge, all 


of these have been closed. 


 MR. ROLFES: All right. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Now, you know, we've got to go 


back and look at that thing, and I was 


wondering, has anybody -- has everybody had 


time to look at this or has anybody got any 


comments on these responses? 

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 MS. MUNN: I don't have any grief with them 


myself. I was wondering what -- what else do 


we need to look at? Do we have any -- any 


issue from SC&A on these? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) didn't go over 


these (unintelligible). 


 MS. MUNN: I -- I thought we were finished with 


them. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, I did, too. 


 MS. MUNN: (Unintelligible) comments on the 


external dose section. So we -- we've worked 


the external dose thing pretty well and I 


thought we'd come to closure with... 


DR. MAURO: It looks like we've talked about -- 


I mean beta dose, there is this list of 


radionuclides that -- aren't these similar to 


the ones we just discussed -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: They are a -- they're -- every 


one of them are out of the same thing we just 


discussed. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, that's what I -- that's what 


I -- I'm looking at them and that's what 


appears to be the case. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, these were --


DR. MAURO: Are there any here that we -- that 

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are new? When I say new, I -- are not already 


covered by the above 25? 


 MS. MUNN: I don't think so. The comments are 


all -- you know, responses that were made to 


the -- to the first revision. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Hey, Bob --

 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 

 MR. CLAWSON: -- this is Brad. I'm going to --

they've come to get me now so -- are we -- one 


question I wanted to find out before we left, 


are we going to need to meet the 7th? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, so --


DR. ROESSLER: Do you have a time? 


 MR. PRESLEY: 7:00 o'clock. 


DR. ROESSLER: Oh, good, okay. 


 MR. SCHOFIELD: What time? 


 DR. BRANCHE: All right, Bob -- Bob, this is 


Christine. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yes. 


 DR. BRANCHE: So you're going to definitely do 


that? You're definitely going to see the need 


for the meeting at 7:00 p.m. on that -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, we're going to -- 


 DR. BRANCHE: -- Monday the 7th? 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, we're going to have to to 


go -- 'cause we've got some stuff to go over so 


that hopefully we can make a recommendation to 


the Board. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Okay, I just -- I want to make 


sure 'cause I got to make arrangements for 


Zaida to have the room arranged. We -- we sent 


it up as tentative. Now I can confirm it with 


her. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Okay. 


DR. ROESSLER: But that's in the hotel, our 


meeting hotel. 


 DR. BRANCHE: It will be in the hotel, yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: And --


 DR. BRANCHE: And we'll get details to you, 


Bob, and the -- and the rest of the committee. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, sounds good. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I just want to make sure I'll get 


my schedule figured out for that. I know that 


that was tentatively -- we went from there, so 


we'll see you on the 7th then. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, thank you, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay, thank you. 'Bye. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 

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 MS. MUNN: We should be able to use the same 


room as procedures. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Right, that's exactly right. 
I 


don't see a problem. Y'all get through, we'll 


go in. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


 MR. PRESLEY: In fact, two of us will already 


be in there. 


 MS. MUNN: Yep, true. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Anybody got anything else on 


these comments? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes, is there anything that we 


need to do with the public comments that we 


received? We did put together a matrix from 


the approximately 40 pages of information that 


were received and we prepared a response and 


how we've documented our public comments and 


what we propose to do with the information 


we've received. If there are any issues there, 


I'd be happy to discuss those as well, so -- 


 MS. MUNN: That was a staggering amount of 


information and, as I said, I didn't do my 


homework. I (unintelligible) not -- 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MS. MUNN: I didn't download that because it 

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wasn't from Mark and so I didn't -- I didn't 


think that it was going to be (unintelligible). 


 MR. PRESLEY: Well, I'll tell you what I've 


done. I've -- for two nights I've read over 


those things, spent about four hours a night. 


Some of them I've gone over more than once. 


don't see -- I'm going to be honest with you. 


I don't see a whole lot of the comments that I 


think we need to do a whole lot with. There's 


some of the comments that -- that are going to 


be incorporated in the site profile, but 


there's a lot of those things that it would 


take years and years and years and years and 


years to go back and check on. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. I believe that we've done a 


pretty good job at incorporating the issues 


that would affect the outcome of a dose 


reconstruction, so --


 MR. PRESLEY: I think you have, too. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I don't see a problem. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: What I'm saying. Anybody else 


got anything? 


 MS. MUNN: Can we hopefully make a short item 


I 
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of that on our meeting on Jan-- in January? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I don't see why we can't. Mark, 


do we need to --


 MS. MUNN: I really would like to at least read 


it over. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, yeah, I tell you what let's 


do. Everybody go back, look at those things. 


If you have an issue with anything, bring it to 


the Board on the 7th and we'll discuss it. 


 MS. MUNN: Very good. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Mr. Presley, is that for the 


working group or for -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's for --


 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- (unintelligible)? 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's for the working group -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- and we'll -- we'll go at it 


from there, not SC&A. I'm not asking y'all -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: -- to do anything extra right 


now. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay, right. Just clarifying. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, thank you, Bob. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay? 

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 MS. MUNN: I feel badly about that. Sorry. 


 MR. PRESLEY: No problem. No problem. It took 


-- I didn't start reading them until, like I 


said, night before last. 


 MS. MUNN: I just didn't realize what they 


were. 


 MR. PRESLEY: And --


 MS. MUNN: My bad. 


 MR. PRESLEY: So I appreciate everybody's time 


and concern and -- has anybody got anything for 


the good of the working group or anything like 


that? If not, I'd like to wish everybody a 


Merry Christmas. 


MR. SMITH: Bob, this is Billy Smith. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


MR. SMITH: I sent Mark Rolfes a comment just a 


minute ago, e-mail, I don't know whether or not 


he saw it, but it has to do with a comment on 


item 24. I think NRDL needs to be changed to 


NRDS (unintelligible). 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 MR. ROLFES: Thank you, Billy, I did see that 


and -- let's see, let me get back -- I didn't 


look in the matrix to see where -- where we had 


put that. 

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MR. SMITH: Down at the bottom of number 24. 


The fact that we were talking about the NRDL 


document might be confusing if we leave it 


uncorrected. 


 MR. ROLFES: Okay. Oh, okay, I see it here, 


any new guidance would apply to the NRDL -- is 


what it says -- activities. It should be NRDS. 


MR. SMITH: Yes. 


 MR. ROLFES: My apologies. Thank you, Billy. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you, glad you caught it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, has anybody else got 


anything? 


 MS. MUNN: No, Merry Christmas to everyone. 


 MR. ROLFES: Yeah, Merry Christmas, Happy 


Holidays. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Christine, do you have anything? 


 DR. BRANCHE: No, I just -- I just know that 


we're going to be making plans for -- making 


arrangements for the location on the 7th at 


7:00 p.m. Is that right? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, and like --

 DR. BRANCHE: Okay. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Like Wanda and I said, we can use 

the same room. When she finishes up, then I'll 


go -- come in. 

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 DR. BRANCHE: Well, let's just make sure that 


that's going to be okay with the hotel, so -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay. 


 DR. BRANCHE: -- (unintelligible) just wait for 


notification from Zaida, I'd appreciate it. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, we can do that. 

 DR. BRANCHE: Okay. Merry Christmas to all of 

you. 

 MR. PRESLEY: Merry Christmas to everybody. 

 MR. SCHOFIELD: Merry Christmas. 


 MR. PRESLEY: And I'd like to thank Mark Ross 


(sic) for all his help. 


 MR. ROLFES: Thank you, Bob. Thank you, 


everyone. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Merry Christmas. 


 MR. ROLFES: Happy New Year's and Happy 


Holidays. 


 DR. BRANCHE: Merry Christmas, Ray Green. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, Ray. 


THE COURT REPORTER: Thank you all. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 4:12 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

276 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of December 19, 


2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


25th day of January, 2008. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR, CVR-CM 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102