Calendar No. 410

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1453

A BILL

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a

comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.

NOVEMBER 8, 1999

Reported with an amendment
II

Calendar No. 410

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1453

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war

in Sudan.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 28, 1999

Mr. FRIST (for himself, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr.

CLELAND, Mr. BUNNING, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. FEINGOLD,

Mr. BROWNBACK, and Mr. LIEBERMAN) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

NOVEMBER 8, 1999

Reported by Mr. HELMS, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive

solution to the war in Sudan.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

6 Congress makes the following findings:
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1 (1) With clear indications that the Government

2 of Sudan intends to intensify its prosecution of the

3 war against areas outside of its control, which has

4 already cost nearly 2,000,000 lives and has displaced

5 more than 4,000,000, a sustained and coordinated

6 international effort to pressure combatants to end

7 hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict of8 fers the best opportunity for a comprehensive solu9 tion to the continuing war in Sudan.

10 (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally

11 sponsored peace process, protected from manipula12 tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso13 lution of the war, protection of human rights, and

14 a self-sustaining Sudan.

15 (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian

16 relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in

17 the effort to bring an end to the war.

18 (4) Continued leadership by the United States

19 is critical.

20 (5) Regardless of the future political status of

21 the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov22 ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au23 thority and institutions is a major impediment to

24 achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
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1 and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace

2 process.

3 (6) Through manipulation of traditional rival4 ries among peoples in areas outside their full con5 trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used

6 divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their

7 population, and Congress finds that internationally

8 sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical

9 role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human

10 suffering.

11 (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly

12 utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense

13 Forces, and other irregular troops for raiding and

14 slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the

15 Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt

16 the ability of those populations to sustain them17 selves. The tactic is designed to replace the overt use

18 of bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting

19 the war through selective starvation and to minimize

20 the Government of Sudan’s accountability inter21 nationally.

22 (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly

23 stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds

24 from future oil sales to increase the tempo and
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1 lethality of the war against the areas outside its con2 trol.

3 (9) Through its power to veto plans for air

4 transport flights under the United Nations relief op5 eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov6 ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the

7 receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the

8 United States and other donor countries as a dev9 astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the

10 Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out11 side of the Government’s control.

12 (10) The United States and other donors’ ef13 forts in delivering relief and assistance through

14 means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad15 dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov16 ernment of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations

17 to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

18 (11) While the immediate needs of selected

19 areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad20 dressed in the near term, the population in areas of

21 Sudan outside of the control of the Government of

22 Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of

23 their ability to sustain themselves.

24 (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in

25 Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and southern Blue Nile
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1 regions have been excluded completely from relief

2 distribution by OLS, consequently placing their pop3 ulations at increased risk of famine.

4 (13) At a cost of more than $1,000,000 per

5 day, and with a primary focus on providing only for

6 the immediate food needs of the recipients, the cur7 rent international relief operations are neither sus8 tainable nor desirable in the long term.

9 (14) The ability of populations to defend them10 selves against attack in areas outside the Govern11 ment of Sudan’s control has been severely com12 promised by the disengagement of the front-line

13 sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of

14 the Government of Sudan that success on the battle15 field will be achieved.

16 (15) The United States should use all means of

17 pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu18 tion to the war, including—

19 (A) the maintenance or strengthening of

20 sanctions against the Government of Sudan;

21 (B) the support or creation of viable demo22 cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of

23 Sudan outside government control;
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1 (C) continued active support of people-to2 people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in

3 areas outside of government control;

4 (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms

5 to provide relief to those areas;

6 (E) cooperation among the trading part7 ners of the United States and within multilat8 eral institutions toward those ends; and

9 (F) the use of any and all possible unilat10 eral and multilateral economic and diplomatic

11 means to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end

12 their hostilities and again assume a constructive

13 stance toward facilitating a comprehensive solu14 tion to the ongoing war in Sudan.

15 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

16 In this Act:

17 (1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov18 ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic

19 Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

20 (2) IGAD.—The term ‘‘IGAD’’ means the

21 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

22 (3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United

23 Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF and

24 the World Food Program known as ‘‘Operation Life25 line Sudan’’.
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1 SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN

2 RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW TACTICS BY THE

3 GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

4 Congress hereby—

5 (1) condemns—

6 (A) violations of human rights on all sides

7 of the conflict in Sudan;

8 (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall

9 human rights record, with regard to both the

10 prosecution of the war and the denial of basic

11 human and political rights to all Sudanese;

12 (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and

13 the role of the Government of Sudan in abet14 ting and tolerating the practice; and

15 (D) the Government of Sudan’s increasing

16 use and organization of ‘‘murahalliin’’, Popular

17 Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese

18 Army units into organized and coordinated

19 raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal,

20 the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and southern

21 Blue Nile regions; and

22 (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on

23 air transport relief flights by the Government of

24 Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties has

25 largely replaced total bans on such flights as the pri26 mary tool for creating food shortages and is used as
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1 a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture,

2 and economies of the Dinka and Nuba peoples in a

3 policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

4 SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby—

6 (1) declares its support for the efforts by execu7 tive branch officials of the United States to lead in

8 a reinvigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace proc9 ess;

10 (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European

11 Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt,

12 and other key states to support the peace process;

13 and

14 (3) urges Kenya’s leadership in the implementa15 tion of the process.

16 (b) RELATION TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY.—It

17 is the sense of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts

18 toward resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made

19 through IGAD and that the President must not create any

20 process or diplomatic facility or office which could be

21 viewed as a parallel or competing diplomatic track.

22 (c) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The

23 Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel

24 of the Department of State for the support of—

25 (1) the secretariat of IGAD;
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1 (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov2 ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;

3 (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried

4 out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD

5 Partners’ Forum (IPF); and

6 (4) other United States diplomatic efforts with

7 respect to Sudan.

8 SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

9 It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting

10 through the United States Permanent Representative to

11 the United Nations, should—

12 (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations

13 Security Council to investigate the practice of slav14 ery in Sudan and provide recommendations on meas15 ures for its eventual elimination;

16 (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human

17 rights practices of the Government of Sudan at the

18 United Nations conference on human rights in Gene19 va in 2000;

20 (3) press for implementation of the rec21 ommendations of the United Nations Special

22 Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to human rights

23 monitors of the United Nations High Commission

24 for Refugees in areas of conflict in Sudan; and
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1 (4) press for UNICEF, International Com2 mittee of the Red Cross, or the International Fed3 eration of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or

4 other appropriate international organizations or

5 agencies to maintain a registry of those individuals

6 who have been abducted or are otherwise held in

7 bondage or servitude in Sudan.

8 SEC. 7. SUPPORTING SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN.

9 (a) Until the President determines, and so certifies

10 to Congress, that the Government of Sudan has—

11 (1) fully committed to and has made verifiable

12 progress toward a comprehensive, peaceful solution

13 to the war within the IGAD-sponsored peace process

14 or has otherwise committed to and made verifiable

15 progress in a good faith effort with both northern

16 and southern opposition toward a comprehensive so17 lution to the conflict based on the Declaration of

18 Principles reached in Nairobi Kenya, on July 20,

19 1994,

20 (2) made substantial and verifiable progress in

21 controlling the raiding and slaving activities of all

22 regular and irregular forces, including Popular De23 fense Forces and other militias and murahalliin,
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1 (3) instituted credible reforms with regard to

2 providing basic human and civil rights to all Suda3 nese, and

4 (4) ceased aerial bombardment of civilian tar5 gets,

6 the following are prohibited, except to the extent provided

7 in section 203(b) of the International Emergency Eco8 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations,

9 orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant

10 to this section:

11 (A) The importation into the United States

12 of any goods or services of Sudanese origin,

13 other than information or informational mate14 rials.

15 (B) The exportation or reexportation, di16 rectly or indirectly, to Sudan of any goods,

17 technology (including technical data, software,

18 or other information), or services from the

19 United States or by a United States person,

20 wherever located, or requiring the issuance of a

21 license by a Federal agency, except for dona22 tions of articles intended to relieve human suf23 fering, such as food, clothing, and medicine.

24 (C) The facilitation by a United States

25 person, including but not limited to brokering
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1 activities of the exportation or reexportation of

2 goods, technology, or services from Sudan to

3 any destination, or to Sudan from any location.

4 (D) The performance by any United States

5 person of any contract, including a financing

6 contract, or use of any other financial instru7 ment, in support of an industrial, commercial,

8 public utility, or governmental project in Sudan.

9 (E) The grant or extension of credits or

10 loans by any United States person to the Gov11 ernment of Sudan.

12 (F) Any transaction by a United States

13 person relating to transportation of cargo to or

14 from Sudan; the provision of transportation of

15 cargo to or from the United States by any Su16 danese person or any vessel or aircraft of Suda17 nese registration; or the sale in the United

18 States by any person holding authority under

19 subtitle 7 of title 49, United States Code, of

20 any transportation of cargo by air that includes

21 any stop in Sudan.

22 (G) Any transaction by any United States

23 person or within the United States that evades

24 or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or
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1 avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the pro2 hibitions set forth in this section.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that the sanctions in subsection (a), and in the

5 President’s Executive Order of November 4, 1997, should

6 be applied to include the sale of stocks in the United

7 States or to any United States person, wherever located,

8 or any other form of financial instruments or derivatives,

9 in support of a commercial, industrial, public utility, or

10 government project or transaction in or with Sudan.

11 (c) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President

12 may waive the application of any of the sanctions de13 scribed in subsection (a) if he determines and certifies to

14 Congress that it is important to the national security of

15 the United States to do so.

16 (d) REPORT.—Beginning 3 months after the date of

17 enactment of this Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the

18 President shall submit a report to Congress on—

19 (1) the specific sources and current status of

20 Sudan’s financing and construction of oil exploi21 tation infrastructure and pipelines;

22 (2) the extent to which that financing was se23 cured in the United States or with involvement of

24 United States citizens;
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1 (3) such financing’s relation to the sanctions

2 described in subsection (a) and the Executive Order

3 of November 4, 1997;

4 (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the

5 Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its con6 trol, including targets, frequency, and best estimates

7 of damage;

8 (5) the number, duration, and locations of air

9 strips or other humanitarian relief facilities to which

10 access is denied by any party to the conflict; and

11 (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace

12 process, including the specific and verifiable steps

13 taken by parties to the conflict, the members of the

14 IGAD Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD

15 toward a comprehensive solution to the war.

16 (e) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this

17 section shall prohibit—

18 (1) transactions for the conduct of the official

19 business of the Federal Government or the United

20 Nations by employees thereof;

21 (2) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activ22 ity by persons regularly employed in such capacity

23 by a news-gathering organization; or

24 (3) legitimate humanitarian operations.

25 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—
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1 (1) the term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership, as2 sociation, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other

3 organization;

4 (2) the term ‘‘Government of Sudan’’ includes

5 the Government of Sudan, its agencies, instrumen6 talities and controlled entities, and the Central Bank

7 of Sudan;

8 (3) the term ‘‘person’’ means an individual or

9 entity; and

10 (4) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means any

11 United States citizen, permanent resident alien, enti12 ty organized under the laws of the United States

13 (including foreign branches), or any person in the

14 United States.

15 SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

16 It is the sense of Congress that the President should

17 organize and maintain a formal consultative process with

18 the European Union, its member states, the members of

19 the United Nations Security Council, and other relevant

20 parties on coordinating an effort within the United Na21 tions to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power

22 of the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for

23 air transport relief flights.
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1 SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR

2 RELIEF EFFORTS.

3 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the progress

4 made by officials of the executive branch of Government

5 toward greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more

6 effective distribution of United States relief contributions.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that the President should continue to increase the

9 use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup10 plies in southern Sudan.

11 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date

12 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de13 tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to14 ward carrying out subsection (b).

15 SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS16 PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

17 (a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a detailed

18 and implementable contingency plan to provide, outside

19 United Nations auspices, the greatest possible amount of

20 United States Government and privately donated relief to

21 all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Moun22 tains, Upper Nile, and southern Blue Nile, in the event

23 the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or in24 cremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.

25 (b) ELEMENT OF PLAN.—The plan developed under

26 subsection (a) shall include coordination of other donors
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1 in addition to the United States Government and private

2 institutions.

3 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 2 months after the date

4 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a clas5 sified report to Congress on the costs and startup time

6 such a plan would require in the event of a total ban on

7 air transport relief flights or in the event of a partial or

8 incremental ban on such flights if the President has made

9 the determination required by subsection (a)(2).

10 (d) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—Notwith11 standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the

12 plan developed under subsection (a), the President may

13 reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for

14 support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for

15 the purposes of the plan.

16 SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID’S SUDAN TRANSITION

17 ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION (STAR)

18 PROGRAM.

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby ex20 presses its support for the President’s ongoing efforts to

21 diversify and increase effectiveness of United States as22 sistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of the

23 control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long24 term focus shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for

25 Rehabilitation (STAR) program with its emphasis on pro-
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1 moting future democratic governance, rule of law, building

2 indigenous institutional capacity, promoting and enhanc3 ing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people

4 reconciliation efforts.

5 (b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts made

6 available to carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign

7 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating

8 to development assistance) for the period beginning on Oc9 tober 1, 1999, and ending on September 30, 2002,

10 $16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable

11 civil authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in

12 Sudan, including the provision of technical assistance, and

13 for people-to-people reconciliation efforts.

14 SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUN15 TAINS AND OTHER AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS

16 ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

17 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that civilians in

18 the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and southern Blue

19 Nile regions of Sudan are not receiving assistance through

20 OLS due to restrictions by the Government of Sudan.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that the President should—

23 (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the

24 humanitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red

25 Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan;
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1 (2) respond appropriately to those needs based

2 on such assessment; and

3 (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on

4 efforts made under paragraph (2).

5 SEC. 13. PROTECTING HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, SEPA6 RATING CIVILIANS FROM COMBATANTS, AND

7 REDUCING FOOD DIVERSION.

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

9 (1) diversion of food assistance from civilians to

10 combatants is a hindrance to an effective and com11 prehensive relief effort;

12 (2) the proximity of combatants to humani13 tarian operations for noncombatants poses a security

14 risk for both humanitarian relief personnel and for

15 those they serve;

16 (3) the lack of a reliable and adequate means

17 of securing food is a major factor in the ability of

18 populations in areas outside of the control of the

19 Government of Sudan to defend themselves from ag20 gression by Government of Sudan forces and related

21 militias or paramilitary groups, thus resulting in di22 versions of food; and

23 (4) options to address the situation are very

24 limited.
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1 (b) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE DIRECT FOOD ASSIST2 ANCE.—

3 (1) AUTHORITY.—For the purpose of mini4 mizing diversions of food assistance and to insulate

5 noncombatants and the relief operations which serve

6 them from combatants in areas outside the control

7 of the Government of Sudan, the President, acting

8 through appropriate Federal agencies, is authorized

9 to provide food assistance directly to the National

10 Democratic Alliance participants or other groups en11 gaged in the protection of civilian populations from

12 attacks from regular government forces, associated

13 militias, or other paramilitary groups supported by

14 the Government of Sudan.

15 (2) SUPERSEDES EXISTING LAW.—The author16 ity of paragraph (1) supersedes any other provision

17 of law.

18 (c) LIMITATION.—The assistance described in sub19 section (b) may only be provided in such a way that—

20 (1) does not endanger, compromise, or other21 wise reduce the United States’ support for existing

22 unilateral, multilateral, or private humanitarian op23 erations or the beneficiaries of those operations; or

24 (2) compromise any ongoing or future people25 to-people reconciliation efforts in Sudan.
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1 (d) RELATION TO CURRENT OR FUTURE HUMANI2 TARIAN OPERATIONS.—The assistance described in sub3 section (b) shall be implemented separate from and not

4 in proximity to current humanitarian efforts, both within

5 Operation Lifeline Sudan or outside of Operation Lifeline

6 Sudan, or any other current or future humanitarian oper7 ations which serve noncombatants.

8 (e) DETERMINATIONS OF ELIGIBILITY.—In deter9 mining the eligibility of potential recipients described in

10 subsection (b), the President shall take into account the

11 groups’ respect for human rights, civil authority, civil in12 stitutions, and the integrity of ongoing humanitarian oper13 ations.

14 (f) REPORT.—The President shall submit a report to

15 Congress, in classified form if necessary—

16 (1) describing the effectiveness in preventing di17 versions of such food assistance;

18 (2) whether or not the provision of such food

19 assistance has resulted in or has the potential to in20 advertently allow for the enrichment of any indi21 vidual or organization by the resale or other transfer

22 of the assistance for other purposes, either to the in23 tended recipients or other parties;
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1 (3) whether such operations have affected ongo2 ing humanitarian operations described in subsections

3 (c) or operations described in subsection (d); and

4 (4) the extent to which the provision of assist5 ance in subsection (b) has impacted respect for

6 human rights and rule of law.

7 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

8 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.

9 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

10 Congress makes the following findings:

11 (1) With clear indications that the Government

12 of Sudan intends to intensify its prosecution of the

13 war against areas outside of its control, which has al14 ready cost nearly 2,000,000 lives and has displaced

15 more than 4,000,000, a sustained and coordinated

16 international effort to pressure combatants to end hos17 tilities and to address the roots of the conflict offers

18 the best opportunity for a comprehensive solution to

19 the continuing war in Sudan.

20 (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally

21 sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation,

22 presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of

23 the war, protection of human rights, and a self-sus24 taining Sudan.
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1 (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian re2 lief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the

3 effort to bring an end to the war.

4 (4) Continued leadership by the United States is

5 critical.

6 (5) Regardless of the future political status of the

7 areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Govern8 ment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority

9 and institutions is a major impediment to achieving

10 self-sustenance by the Sudanese people and to mean11 ingful progress toward a viable peace process.

12 (6) Through manipulation of traditional rival13 ries among peoples in areas outside their full control,

14 the Government of Sudan has effectively used divide

15 and conquer techniques to subjugate their population,

16 and Congress finds that internationally sponsored

17 reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in re18 ducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human suffering.

19 (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly

20 utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense

21 Forces, and other irregular troops for raiding and

22 slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the

23 Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt

24 the ability of those populations to sustain themselves.

25 The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans on
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1 air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war

2 through selective starvation and to minimize the Gov3 ernment of Sudan’s accountability internationally.

4 (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly

5 stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds

6 from future oil sales to increase the tempo and

7 lethality of the war against the areas outside its con8 trol.

9 (9) Through its power to veto plans for air

10 transport flights under the United Nations relief oper11 ation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Govern12 ment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the re13 ceipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the

14 United States and other donor countries as a dev15 astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the

16 Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out17 side of the Government’s control.

18 (10) The efforts of the United States and other

19 donors in delivering relief and assistance through

20 means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad21 dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov22 ernment of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations

23 to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

24 (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas

25 in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in
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1 the near term, the population in areas of Sudan out2 side of the control of the Government of Sudan are

3 still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability

4 to sustain themselves.

5 (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in

6 Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions

7 have been excluded completely from relief distribution

8 by OLS, consequently placing their populations at in9 creased risk of famine.

10 (13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per

11 day, and with a primary focus on providing only for

12 the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current

13 international relief operations are neither sustainable

14 nor desirable in the long term.

15 (14) The ability of populations to defend them16 selves against attack in areas outside the Government

17 of Sudan’s control has been severely compromised by

18 the disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fos19 tering the belief within officials of the Government of

20 Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.

21 (15) The United States should use all means of

22 pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu23 tion to the war, including—

24 (A) the maintenance and

25 multilateralization of sanctions against the Gov-
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1 ernment of Sudan with explicit linkage of those

2 sanctions to peace;

3 (B) the support or creation of viable demo4 cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of

5 Sudan outside government control;

6 (C) continued active support of people-to7 people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in

8 areas outside of government control;

9 (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to

10 provide humanitarian relief to those areas;

11 (E) cooperation among the trading partners

12 of the United States and within multilateral in13 stitutions toward those ends; and

14 (F) the use of any and all possible unilat15 eral and multilateral economic and diplomatic

16 tools to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end

17 their hostilities and again assume a constructive

18 stance toward facilitating a comprehensive solu19 tion to the ongoing war in Sudan.

20 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

21 In this Act:

22 (1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov23 ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic Front

24 government in Khartoum, Sudan.
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1 (2) IGAD.—The term ‘‘IGAD’’ means the Inter2 Governmental Authority on Development.

3 (3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United

4 Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the

5 World Food Program, and participating relief orga6 nizations known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.

7 SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN

8 RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW TACTICS BY THE

9 GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

10 Congress hereby—

11 (1) condemns—

12 (A) violations of human rights on all sides

13 of the conflict in Sudan;

14 (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall

15 human rights record, with regard to both the

16 prosecution of the war and the denial of basic

17 human and political rights to all Sudanese;

18 (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and

19 the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting

20 and tolerating the practice; and

21 (D) the Government of Sudan’s increasing

22 use and organization of ‘‘murahalliin’’ or

23 ‘‘mujahadeen’’, Popular Defense Forces (PDF),

24 and regular Sudanese Army units into organized

25 and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in
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1 Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper

2 Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and

3 (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on

4 air transport relief flights by the Government of

5 Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a

6 tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys7 tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and

8 economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in

9 a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

10 SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby—

12 (1) declares its support for the efforts by execu13 tive branch officials of the United States and the

14 President’s Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a re15 invigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace process;

16 (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European

17 Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt,

18 and other key states to support the peace process; and

19 (3) urges Kenya’s leadership in the implementa20 tion of the process.

21 (b) RELATION TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY.—It is

22 the sense of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts to23 ward resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made

24 through a peace process based on the Declaration of Prin25 ciples reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and
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1 that the President should not create any process or diplo2 matic facility or office which could be viewed as a parallel

3 or competing diplomatic track.

4 (c) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The Sec5 retary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the

6 Department of State for the support of—

7 (1) the secretariat of IGAD;

8 (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Govern9 ment of Sudan and opposition forces;

10 (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried

11 out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD

12 Partners’ Forum (IPF); and

13 (4) other United States diplomatic efforts sup14 porting a peace process in Sudan.

15 SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

16 It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting

17 through the United States Permanent Representative to the

18 United Nations, should—

19 (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations

20 Security Council to investigate the practice of slavery

21 in Sudan and provide recommendations on measures

22 for its eventual elimination;

23 (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights

24 practices of the Government of Sudan at the United
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1 Nations conference on human rights in Geneva in

2 2000;

3 (3) press for implementation of the recommenda4 tions of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for

5 Sudan with respect to human rights monitors in

6 areas of conflict in Sudan;

7 (4) press for UNICEF, International Committee

8 of the Red Cross, or the International Federation of

9 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or other appro10 priate international organizations or agencies to

11 maintain a registry of those individuals who have

12 been abducted or are otherwise held in bondage or ser13 vitude in Sudan;

14 (5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of

15 Sudan each time it subjects civilian populations to

16 aerial bombardment; and

17 (6) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations

18 General Assembly condemning the human rights prac19 tices of the Government of Sudan.

20 SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

21 Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this

22 Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the President shall sub23 mit a report to Congress on—
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1 (1) the specific sources and current status of Su2 dan’s financing and construction of oil exploitation

3 infrastructure and pipelines;

4 (2) the extent to which that financing was se5 cured in the United States or with involvement of

6 United States citizens;

7 (3) such financing’s relation to the sanctions de8 scribed in subsection (a) and the Executive Order of

9 November 3, 1997;

10 (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Gov11 ernment of Sudan forces in areas outside its control,

12 including targets, frequency, and best estimates of

13 damage;

14 (5) the number, duration, and locations of air

15 strips or other humanitarian relief facilities to which

16 access is denied by any party to the conflict; and

17 (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace proc18 ess and any other ongoing effort to end the conflict,

19 including the specific and verifiable steps taken by

20 parties to the conflict, the members of the IGAD Part21 ners Forum, and the members of IGAD toward a

22 comprehensive solution to the war.

23 SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

24 It is the sense of Congress that the President should

25 organize and maintain a formal consultative process with
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1 the European Union, its member states, the members of the

2 United Nations Security Council, and other relevant par3 ties on coordinating an effort within the United Nations

4 to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the Gov5 ernment of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport

6 relief flights.

7 SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR

8 RELIEF EFFORTS.

9 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the progress made

10 by officials of the executive branch of Government toward

11 greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more effective

12 distribution of United States relief contributions.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress

14 that the President should continue to increase the use of

15 non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in

16 southern Sudan.

17 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date

18 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de19 tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to20 ward carrying out subsection (b).

21 SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS22 PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

23 (a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a detailed and

24 implementable contingency plan to provide, outside United

25 Nations auspices, the greatest possible amount of United
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1 States Government and privately donated relief to all af2 fected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains,

3 Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government

4 of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on

5 OLS air transport relief flights.

6 (b) ELEMENT OF PLAN.—The plan developed under

7 subsection (a) shall include coordination of other donors in

8 addition to the United States Government and private in9 stitutions.

10 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 2 months after the date

11 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a classi12 fied report to Congress on the costs and startup time such

13 a plan would require in the event of a total ban on air

14 transport relief flights or in the event of a partial or incre15 mental ban on such flights if the President has made the

16 determination required by subsection (a)(2).

17 (d) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding

18 any other provision of law, in carrying out the plan devel19 oped under subsection (a), the President may reprogram up

20 to 100 percent of the funds available for support of OLS

21 operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of the

22 plan.
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1 SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID’S SUDAN TRANSITION

2 ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION (STAR)

3 PROGRAM.

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby expresses

5 its support for the President’s ongoing efforts to diversify

6 and increase effectiveness of United States assistance to

7 populations in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the

8 Government of Sudan, especially the long-term focus shown

9 in the Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation

10 (STAR) program with its emphasis on promoting future

11 democratic governance, rule of law, building indigenous in12 stitutional capacity, promoting and enhancing self-reliance,

13 and actively supporting people-to-people reconciliation ef14 forts.

15 (b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts made

16 available to carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign

17 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating to

18 development assistance) for the period beginning on October

19 1, 2000, and ending on September 30, 2003, $16,000,000

20 shall be available for development of a viable civil author21 ity, and civil and commercial institutions, in Sudan, in22 cluding the provision of technical assistance, and for people23 to-people reconciliation efforts.

24 (c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.—Notwithstanding any

25 other provision of law, the President is granted authority

26 to undertake any appropriate programs using Federal
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1 agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct support of in2 digenous groups, agencies, or organizations in areas outside

3 of control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to pro4 vide emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency,

5 build civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law

6 and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, sup7 port people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implementa8 tion of any programs in support of any viable peace agree9 ment at the local, regional, or national level.

10 (d) IMPLEMENTATION.—It is the sense of Congress that

11 the President should immediately and to the fullest extent

12 possible utilize the Office of Transition Initiatives at the

13 Agency for International Development in an effort to pur14 sue the type of programs described in subsection (c).

15 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress

16 that enhancing and supporting education and the develop17 ment of rule of law are critical elements in the long-term

18 success of United States efforts to promote a viable eco19 nomic, political, social, and legal basis for development in

20 Sudan. Congress recognizes that the gap of 13–16 years

21 without secondary educational opportunities in southern

22 Sudan is an especially important problem to address with

23 respect to rebuilding and sustaining leaders and educators

24 for the next generation of Sudanese. Congress recognizes the

25 unusually important role the secondary school in Rumbek
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1 has played in producing the current generation of leaders

2 in southern Sudan, and that priority should be given in

3 current and future development or transition programs un4 dertaken by the United States Government to rebuilding

5 and supporting the Rumbek Secondary School.

6 (f) PROGRAMS IN AREAS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CON7 TROL.—Congress also intends that such programs include

8 cooperation and work with indigenous groups in areas out9 side of government control in all of Sudan, to include north10 ern, southern, and eastern regions of Sudan.

11 SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUN12 TAINS AND OTHER AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS

13 ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

14 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that civilians in

15 the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions

16 of Sudan are not receiving assistance through OLS due to

17 restrictions by the Government of Sudan.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress

19 that the President should—

20 (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the hu21 manitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea

22 Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan;

23 (2) respond appropriately to those needs based

24 on such assessment; and
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1 (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on ef2 forts made under paragraph (2).

3 SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE

4 FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PAR5 TICIPANTS.

6 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date

7 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the

8 appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified

9 form if necessary, detailing possible options or plans of the

10 United States Government for the provision of nonlethal as11 sistance to participants of the National Democratic Alli12 ance.

13 (b) CONSULTATIONS.—Not later than 30 days after

14 submission of the report required by subsection (a), the

15 President should begin formal consultations with the appro16 priate congressional committees regarding the findings of

17 the report.

18 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘appro19 priate congressional committees’’ means the Committee on

20 Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of

21 the Senate and the Committee on International Relations

22 and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep23 resentatives.