THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Melissa Dixon and Willard Dixon, Respondents, 

v. 

Lansing Pattee, Stephanie Pattee, Weekley Homes, L.P., 

d/b/a David Weekley Homes, John Doe, A2Z Advanced 

Home Inspections, LLC, Fidelity and Deposit Company 

of Maryland, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, and 

Gutter Pros, LLC, Defendants, 

And 

Lansing Pattee and Stephanie Pattee, Third-Party 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Gutter Pros, LLC, Third-Party Defendant, 

Of whom Weekley Homes, L.P., d/b/a David Weekley 

Homes is the Appellant, 

And 

Lansing Pattee and Stephanie Pattee are the Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2020-000384 

Appeal From Dorchester County 

Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 6040 

Heard June 5, 2023 – Filed December 20, 2023 
 

 

 

 

 

 

REVERSED 

Jennifer Sue Ivey and John Phillips Linton, Jr., both of 

Walker Gressette & Linton, LLC, of Charleston, for 

Appellant. 

Steven L. Smith and Zachary James Closser, both of 

Smith Closser, and William King Kalivas, all of 

Charleston, for Respondents Lansing Pattee and 

Stephanie Pattee. 

Gregory L. Hyland, of Walterboro, for Respondents 

Melissa Dixon and Willard Dixon. 

KONDUROS, J.: This case arises out of Melissa Dixon and Willard Dixon's (the 

Dixons') lawsuit alleging the home they purchased from Lansing Pattee and 

Stephanie Pattee (the Pattees) was defective. Weekley Homes, LLC, f/k/a 

Weekley Homes, L.P. d/b/a David Weekley Homes (Weekley) constructed the 

home. Weekley appeals the circuit court's denial of its motion to compel 

arbitration. It contends the Pattees' purchase agreement with it (the Agreement) 

involved interstate commerce, which the Agreement explicitly stated, and provided 

the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would apply. We reverse. 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Pattees entered into the Agreement with Weekley on August 18, 2008, to 

purchase the subject property in Summerville and the "residential improvements 

constructed, or to be constructed, thereon." Weekley built the home sometime in 

2007 and/or 2008, although the parties do not agree exactly when it was 

completed. Changes and customizations of the home were made pursuant to the 

Agreement. The sale closed on September 10, 2008. The Agreement specified 

that the closing was to be completed within five days of Weekley's completion of 

its "construction obligations." 

Regarding construction of the home, the Agreement provided: 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5[.] CONSTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS: 

Seller's construction obligations shall be deemed 

completed upon the earlier of: (a) when it has completed 

construction of the dwelling in substantial conformity 

with the Plan referred to herein; or (b) upon final 

approval by any applicable governmental authority; or (c) 

upon final inspection in accordance with the Home 

Warranty program offered by Seller. There is no 

guaranteed date of completion and Seller shall have 

no liability for failure to complete the dwelling by a 

certain date or within a reasonable period of time. 

Any statement of construction time is only an 

estimate. Construction of the improvements may be 

subject to changes in plans, specifications, materials, 

fixtures and methods; . . . By closing, Purchaser accepts 

the Residence as constructed, except for repairs required 

under the terms of the Home Warranty. 

The Agreement also provided: 

6[.] DECORATOR SELECTIONS, CUSTOM 

CHOICES, AND CHANGE REQUESTS: Seller may 

allow Purchaser to select some interior decorating 

items,[1

] such as floor coverings and color of appliances 

("Decorator Selections" and/or "Custom Choices"), or 

make other minimal modifications to the Interior of the 

Property ("Change Requests"), if selected and deposits 

paid within fourteen (14) days of the Write-Up Date of 

this Agreement. Any selections made after this deadline 

may be subject to a change order fee. Decorator 

Selections may be made only from Seller's designated 

catalogs or other approved selection lists or samples. 

Under the section entitled Notices and General Provisions, the Agreement states: 

1 A checklist accompanying the Agreement suggests the Pattees had been able to 

select between options for flooring, appliance color, bath hardware, countertops, 

plumbing fixtures, shower enclosures, interior and exterior hardware, lighting 

style, interior paint, and backsplash and wall tile. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12[.] ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: Sellers to 

continue hardwoods through Family Room (to door of 

Owners Retreat), Kitchen, and Breakfast Rooms. Sellers 

to replace laminate kitchen countertops, sink, and faucet 

with a first level Quartz countertop (customer's choice), 2 

Bowl undermount Stainless Sink and Stainless Faucet. 

Sellers to continue crown molding through Study and 

Family Room. 

Regarding arbitration of disputes, page 4 of the Agreement states: 

9[.] DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ANY CLAIM, 

DISPUTE OR CAUSE OF ACTION INVOLVING 

SELLER OR PURCHASER (INCLUDING ANY 

CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION BROUGHT BY 

EITHER PARTY AGAINST SUBCONTRACTORS, 

SUPPLIERS, MANUFACTURERS, AFFILIATED 

COMPANIES, THE DEVELOPER OF THE 

PROPERTY, OR ANY OTHER PROVIDER OF 

GOODS OR SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH 

THE PROPERTY OR THIS AGREEMENT), 

SHALL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING 

ARBITRATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 

FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (TITLE 9, U.S. 

CODE) OR THE APPLICABLE STATE 

ARBITRATION STATUTE, IF THE FEDERAL 

ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT APPLY. 

a[.] Scope of Arbitration. The Arbitration provisions 

of this Agreement apply to all claims brought by 

through or under Purchaser, their dependents or 

other occupants of the Property, whether sounding in 

contract, tort, or otherwise, including claims for 

emergency or interim relief. The claims, disputes or 

causes of action within the scope of arbitration 

include, but are not limited to, those arising in 

connection with: (i) this Agreement, including the 

negotiation, formation, subject matter, breach, 

cancellation or termination hereof; (ii) the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

development, design, construction, preparation, 

maintenance or repair, of improvements to the 

Property; (iii) marketing or sale of the Property; (iv) 

any representations or warranties, express or implied, 

relating to the Agreement or the Property; (v) any 

transaction, event or relationship between Purchaser 

and Seller, including any subsequent agreement or 

alleged agreement between Purchaser and Seller; (vi) 

any violations of any statute including, but not limited 

to, consumer protection, disclosure, or similar statutes 

or regulations (vii) any personal injury or property 

damage claim; and/or (viii) any other agreement, 

transaction, occurrence or event giving rise to a 

dispute over breach of legal duties, rights or 

obligations which involve Purchaser and Seller ("the 

Dispute"). This arbitration provision shall survive 

closing, breach or termination of this Agreement and 

shall not be superseded by the doctrines of merger or 

waiver. 

. . . . 

c[.] Administration of Mediation and Arbitration. If 

the Dispute arises in connection with an alleged 

construction defect the arbitration may be initiated 

and administered in accordance with the provisions of 

the Home Warranty instead of this Agreement. 

. . . . 

f[.] Limitations. ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE OR 

CAUSE OF ACTION BETWEEN PURCHASER 

AND SELLER MUST BE BROUGHT BY 

PURCHASER NO LATER THAN TWO (2) YEARS 

AFTER THE DATE THE CAUSE OF ACTION 

ACCRUES, unless applicable law requires 

application of a different period of limitations (i.e., 

prevents a contractual two-year limitations period). 

Unless proven otherwise, it shall be presumed that 

any such cause of action accrued on the Closing Date; 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

or, if no closing occurs, on the Acceptance Date. Any 

longer periods of limitations are hereby expressly 

WAIVED by the parties. An unsuccessful motion or 

action to stay an arbitration proceeding based on the 

position that It has been commenced after expiration 

of limitations shall not waive any party's right to have 

the underlying dispute resolved by arbitration. 

Each page of the Agreement contains the purchasers' signed initials. 

Additionally, the Pattees signed a Homeowner Portfolio Receipt, which states, they 

received a sample of the Home Warranty ("Warranty") administered by 

Professional Warranty Service Corporation (PWC).

2 At the bottom of the front 

page of the Warranty it states, "THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS A BINDING 

ARBITRATION PROVISION, WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY EITHER 

PARTY." On the second page it states: 

THIS LIMITED WARRANTY PROVIDES: THAT 

ANY AND ALL CLAIMS AND DISPUTES 

BETWEEN YOU AND US WHICH YOU AND WE 

ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE BY MUTUAL 

AGREEMENT, SHALL BE RESOLVED SOLELY 

AND EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH FINAL AND 

BINDING ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 

THE TERMS AND PROCESS DESCRIBED WITHIN 

THIS DOCUMENT. BY THIS AGREEMENT, BOTH 

YOU AND WE ARE WAIVING THE RIGHT TO 

LITIGATE DISPUTES IN COURT. 

The Warranty disclaimed any express or implied warranties to the extent permitted 

by law and excluded from recovery consequential or incidental damages resulting 

from construction defect. Consequential and incidental damages were defined as 

injury other than, the cost to correct a construction defect, repair or replace 

personal property damaged by the construction defect, and the cost for reasonable 

alternative housing necessitated by any construction defect or its repair. 

The Warranty further stated: 

2 The Warranty included in the record on appeal is an unsigned "Sample 

Warranty." 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This arbitration agreement is made pursuant to a 

transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall be 

governed by and interpreted under the Federal 

Arbitration Act now in effect and as it may be hereafter 

amended (the "FAA") to the exclusion of any 

inconsistent state law, regulation or judicial decision. 

The award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding and 

may be entered as a judgment in any court of competent 

jurisdiction. 

The Warranty also indicated it was "separate and independent" of the Agreement 

and any unenforceable provision on the Warranty were severable from the rest of 

the provisions therein. It also contained a provision regarding subsequent 

homeowners. 

B. Transfer to Subsequent HOMEOWNERS 

This LIMITED WARRANTY, subject to all of its terms 

and conditions, including but not limited to, its 

mandatory binding arbitration provision, will transfer to 

new owners of the HOME for the remainder of the 

WARRANTY PERIOD. YOU agree to provide this 

LIMITED WARRANTY to any subsequent purchaser 

of the HOME as a part of the contract of sale of the 

HOME. Please see the form "SUBSEQUENT HOME 

BUYER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND 

TRANSFER"[3

] contained at the end of this document. 

The Pattees sold the residence to the Dixons on February 28, 2017. On August 30, 

2017, the Dixons filed a complaint against the Pattees, alleging the Pattees sold 

them a home with certain defects, including moisture intrusion issues, and the 

Pattees knew of the issues but did not reveal the defects to the Dixons prior to the 

conveyance. The Dixons alleged causes of action against the Pattees for breach of 

3 This provided transfer form includes the statement: "I/we acknowledge and 

agree to the Binding Arbitration Procedure contained in the HOME 

BUILDER'S LIMITED WARRANTY." The form has instructions for mailing it 

in to PWC. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

contract, fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and violation 

of the South Carolina Residential Property Conditions Disclosure Act. 

On July 18, 2018, the Dixons filed an amended complaint, maintaining their claims 

against the Pattees, but also adding claims against Weekley; A2Z Advanced Home 

Inspections, LLC (A2Z); and John Doe, as unknown construction agents. The 

Dixons asserted that during 2007 and 2008 Weekley obtained the necessary 

permits to construct a home, built the home, and subsequently sold the home to the 

Pattees. They asserted the home was constructed in a defective condition. The 

amended complaint asserted three causes of action against Weekley: (1) negligence 

and gross negligence; (2) breach of express and implied warranties; and (3) 

violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practice Act (SCUTPA). As to the 

cause of action for breach of warranties, the Dixons stated: 

These Defendants impliedly and/or expressly warranted 

that the design, building, construction, and materials 

would be performed using the utmost skill and attention 

and would be of good and workmanlike quality. Further, 

these Defendants impliedly and/or expressly warranted 

that the design, building, construction, and materials 

would be such that the Subject Property would be 

habitable and fit for its intended use as a single family 

residence. 

. . . These Defendants have breached said warranties by 

designing, developing, manufacturing, constructing, 

distributing, selling and/or repairing Subject Property 

and/or the manufactured components installed into and/or 

onto said residence in such manner as to be in violation 

of applicable building codes, standard building practices, 

relevant product specifications, accepted building 

component manufacturing standards and accepted 

construction industry standards and practices. 

On August 16, 2018, the Pattees answered the Dixons' amended complaint, 

denying the allegations, raising multiple defenses, and cross-claiming against 

Weekley seeking equitable indemnification. Weekley answered the Dixons' 

amended complaint on August 24, 2018, raising numerous defenses and asserting 

that the Dixons' claims should be resolved by arbitration. On September 11, 2018, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Weekley also filed an answer to the crossclaims for equitable indemnification 

asserted by the Pattees. 

On November 21, 2018, Weekley filed a motion to compel arbitration for all 

claims asserted against it, stating, "The factual allegations offered in support of 

each of the causes of action further demonstrate that the claims arise out of or 

relate to the home, the warranty, and/or the contract. Consequently, all claims in 

this case are within the scope of the arbitration provision." Weekley filed an 

affidavit from John Burchfield, General Counsel for Weekley, in support, stating 

that "[b]ecause [the Agreement] included the construction of the home and allowed 

the Pattees to make certain decisions customizing that construction, the contract 

implicates interstate commerce." He further provided, "The contract includes a 

mandatory binding arbitration provision providing for the arbitration of all disputes 

including but not limited to disputes arising out of the contract; the development, 

design or construction of the property; the marketing or sale of the property; any 

warranties, express or implied, relating to the property." The records submitted by 

Burchfield as exhibits to his affidavit show that the Pattees made $15,275 worth of 

customizations. 

On January 1, 2019, the Dixons amended their complaint again. The Dixons' 

second amended complaint added allegations against two surety companies that 

allegedly issued license bonds to Weekley and a negligence cause of action against 

Gutter Pros, LLC. The second amended complaint asserted two causes of action 

against Weekley: (l) breach of express and implied warranties and (2) an unfair 

trade practices cause of action. This complaint did not assert negligence and gross 

negligence claims against Weekley, unlike the first amended complaint, although it 

did raise negligence claims against other parties. 

On January 16, 2019, Weekley answered the Dixons' second amended complaint 

asserting arbitration as a defense and incorporating its pending motion to compel 

arbitration. On January 21, 2019, the Pattees answered the Dixons' second 

amended complaint and asserted the same equitable indemnification cross-claims 

against Weekley as they had in a prior responsive pleading. On February 1, 2019, 

Weekley filed an answer in response to the Pattees' crossclaims. 

On February 11, 2019, Weekley filed a memorandum of law in support of its 

motion to compel arbitration. It maintained the Dixons' two claims against them, 

breach of warranty and violation of the SCUTPA, fell within the arbitration 

provisions of the Agreement and, "[t]o the extent the [Dixons] argue the arbitration 

provision cannot be enforced against them because they are non-signatories to the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

agreement to arbitrate, that argument fails" because they "have sued Weekley for 

breach of the express warranty issued to the Pattees, which included the provision 

for mandatory arbitration." It also argued the Pattees' cross-claim against it for 

equitable indemnification fell within the broad mandatory arbitration provisions 

because the Dixons' claims against the Pattees arise from the construction of the 

home. 

On February 12, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on several matters including 

the motion to compel arbitration. At the hearing, the Dixons and Pattees argued 

the Burchfield affidavit was insufficient to demonstrate the transaction involved 

interstate commerce as he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction. The 

Dixons also argued they had not alleged a breach of contract claim against 

Weekley, instead they alleged "negligence, gross negligence, breach of the implied 

and/or expressed warranties, [and] merchantability, you know, workmanlike 

manner" and also an Unfair Trade Practices Act claim." As relates to the actual 

construction of the home, the Dixons asserted although the Agreement was signed 

on August 18, 2008, "permits were pulled for this property in 2007" and "only last 

up to one year unless renewed." They closed on their property September 10th of 

2008, "approximately 20 days later, which certainly did not leave room to build a 

home . . . ." The Dixons argued "we're dealing with a contract for the sale of real 

estate, not for construction, not for custom elements." They argued Bradley v. 

Brentwood Homes4 stated a purchase sale agreement was an intrastate transaction, 

not an interstate transaction, therefore did not involve federal preemption by the 

FAA. The Dixons contended that because the FAA did not apply, the agreement 

should be examined under the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (SCUAA) 

and the agreement here did not meet the requirements of it. 

The Dixons also argued they "were not signatories to this purported agreement." 

They asserted the separate document warranty, "which it's been represented as 

accepted by the Pattees, is a sample document that has not been signed by anyone." 

They stated they "don't base any claim on warranty because, chances are, based on 

a—common knowledge and experience, that an expressed warranty concerning the 

issues that we're dealing with in this case would [have] expired anyway if we even 

had that as, as of the—any sort of basis for asserting a claim."5 

4 Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 398 S.C. 447, 730 S.E.2d 312 (2012). 5 The Dixons also argued the agreement was barred from being enforced by the 

Statute of Frauds. However, they did not plead the statute of frauds. See Shirey v. 

Bishop, 431 S.C. 412, 424, 848 S.E.2d 325, 331 (Ct. App. 2020) ("[T]he party 

seeking the protection of the statute of frauds must plead it." (emphasis added by 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Pattees argued the Agreement which contained the arbitration provision did 

not involve construction of the home. In further attacking Burchfield's affidavit, 

the Pattees asserted the affidavit did not "go through the choices they actually 

[made] and say where those materials came from." The Pattees additionally argued 

that the Agreement was an adhesion contract and the arbitration provision was 

unconscionable towards them. They asserted D.R. Horton6 was on point with 

respect to the arbitration provision. 

Weekley argued the Dixons' assertion that this was a complaint for negligence 

against Weekley was untrue because the complaint stated which party each cause 

of action was against and the only two causes of action in the second amended 

complaint against Weekley were breach of warranty and unfair trade practices. It 

argued the Dixons' contention that they were not trying to sue under the Agreement 

or Warranty was belied by the language in their complaint which alleged "Weekley 

impliedly and/or expressly warranted" to do certain things. Weekley argued that 

this was a "[Bradley v. ]Brentwood Homes issue": "Is it just the simple sale of a 

piece of property . . . or does this contract include elements of construction." It 

contended Burchfield's affidavit provided that because the contract involved the 

customization of the house, it was more than a purchase agreement. It argued the 

contract itself also supported that contention; Paragraph 5 entitled "construction 

obligations" was about half a page and provided "construction of the improvements 

may be subject to changes in plans, specifications, materials, fixtures, methods." It 

stated "the next paragraph include[d] custom choices and change order requests." 

It asserted "this contract is more than just the sale of a piece of property because, 

by its very terms, it includes things other than that. "It also pointed to footnote 8 of 

Brentwood Homes in which the court provided that if the contract had involved the 

construction of a house, the court would have compelled arbitration under the FAA 

because construction contracts implicate interstate commerce. The circuit court 

stated it would take the matter under consideration. 

Following the hearing, Weekley filed an affidavit of Tim Dupree in further support 

of its motion to compel arbitration. Dupree attested that the following specific 

materials were purchased for the Pattees' home from manufacturers or suppliers 

outside of South Carolina: appliances: Kentucky; roofing shingles: Minnesota; 

hardwood flooring: North Carolina; countertops: Minnesota; sinks purchased: 

court) (quoting Am. Wholesale Corp. v. Mauldin, 128 S.C. 241, 243, 122 S.E. 576, 

576 (1924))). 

6 Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. 42, 790 S.E.2d 1 (2016). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

California; faucets: North Carolina; and crown molding: Georgia. Dupree further 

attested that those materials were transported from outside of South Carolina to the 

property. 

On October 9, 2019, the circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration in a 

Form 4 order with no findings, along with other matters, stating: "After careful 

consideration, the Court respectfully denies the motion to compel arbitration, the 

motion to dismiss, and the motion for summary judgment. The court finds that 

there is sufficient evidence based upon the pleadings, discovery, motions, to 

withstand the motion for summary judgment and continue with the case." 

On October 14, 2019, Weekley filed a motion to reconsider, alter, or amend the 

order. On February 10, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on Weekley's motion. 

At the outset of the hearing, the court stated "what I normally do is . . . I decide 

whether or not I'm going to hear it again. Okay? And I did not decide to hear it 

again. Okay?" No actual arguments on the motion were made at the hearing and 

the circuit court issued an order stating "I have reviewed and considered the 

Motion to Reconsider and all supporting documents, affidavits and memoranda on 

file and, after due consideration find and conclude that the Court's previous ruling 

should stand undisturbed." This appeal followed.7 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Unless the parties otherwise provide, the question of the arbitrability of a claim is 

an issue for judicial determination. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 

596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001). Determinations of arbitrability are subject to de 

novo review, but if any evidence reasonably supports the circuit court's factual 

7 The Dixons and the Pattees are all Respondents. However, only the Dixons filed 

a Respondent's brief. Rule 208(a)(4), SCACR, provides in part: "Upon the failure 

of respondent to timely file a brief, the appellate court may take such action as it 

deems proper." Such action may include reversal. See Turner v. Santee Cement 

Carriers, Inc., 277 S .C. 91, 96, 282 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1981) (noting the 

respondent's failure to file a brief alone would justify reversal); Robinson v. 

Hassiotis, 364 S.C. 92, 93 n.2, 610 S.E.2d 858, 859 n.2 (Ct. App. 2005); see also 

Wierszewski v. Tokarick, 308 S.C. 441, 444 n.2, 418 S.E.2d 557, 559 n.2 (Ct. App. 

1992) (stating that when the respondent failed to file a brief, "it [was] proper to 

reverse on the points presented rather than to search the record for reasons to 

affirm"). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

findings, this court will not overrule those findings. Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 

351 S.C. 606, 609-10, 571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

I. Application of the FAA – Interstate Commerce 

Weekley argues the circuit court erred in denying its motion to compel arbitration 

when an enforceable arbitration agreement covered the scope of the claims asserted 

in this dispute and the agreement explicitly provided that the transaction involved 

interstate commerce and that the FAA would apply to the resolution of any claim, 

dispute or cause of action involving the Agreement. We agree.8 

"'[T]he basic purpose of the [FAA] is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce 

agreements to arbitrate,' and 'ensure that arbitration will proceed in the event a state 

law would have a preclusive effect on an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.'" 

Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371, 379, 759 S.E.2d 

727, 731 (2014) (alteration by court) (first quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 

Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995), then quoting Bradley, 398 S.C. at 453, 730 

S.E.2d at 315). Accordingly, "unless the parties specifically contracted otherwise, 

the FAA . . . appl[ies] whenever an arbitration agreement involves interstate 

commerce." Id. "[T]he reach of interstate commerce—and thus the FAA—was 

coextensive with the broad reach of the Commerce Clause." Id. "Thus, in practice, 

arbitration agreements enjoy a strong presumption of validity in federal and state 

courts." Id. at 380, 759 S.E.2d at 731-32. 

"To ascertain whether an arbitration agreement implicates interstate commerce and 

the FAA, 'the court must examine the agreement, the complaint, and the 

surrounding facts,' focusing particularly on 'what the terms of the contract 

specifically require for performance.'" Id. at 380, 759 S.E.2d at 732 (quoting 

8 Our supreme court recently determined the inclusion of a provision stating the 

FAA applies to any disputes arising under a contract would not, in and of itself, be 

controlling. See Hicks Unlimited, Inc., v. Unifirst Corp., 439 S.C. 623, 630, 889 

S.E.2d 564, 567 (2023) (finding parties may not "agree—preemptively—that a 

court may apply the FAA's federal preemption power to their contract without first 

peeking behind the curtain to ensure interstate commerce is involved"). 

Nevertheless, in this case, because we conclude the Agreement involved interstate 

commerce, as discussed infra, the FAA is controlling. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bradley, 398 S.C. at 455, 730 S.E.2d at 316). "This is generally a very factspecific inquiry." Id. 

"[I]n determining whether the FAA applies to a particular arbitration agreement, a 

court considers whether the contract concerns a transaction involving interstate 

commerce." Cape Romain Contractors, Inc. v. Wando E., LLC, 405 S.C. 115, 122, 

747 S.E.2d 461, 464 (2013). "Under the reach of the Commerce Clause, 'Congress 

has authority to regulate (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce," (2) 

"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 

commerce . . ." and (3) "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 

commerce."'" Id. (quoting United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir. 

2009)). "Channels of commerce are 'the interstate transportation routes through 

which persons and goods move.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 

1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 

n.5 (2000) (noting channels of interstate commerce include highways, railroads, 

navigable waterways, airspace, telecommunications networks and even national 

securities markets))). "Instrumentalities of interstate commerce, by contrast, are 

the people and things themselves moving in commerce . . . ." Id. (quoting 

Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1226 (identifying automobiles, airplanes, boats, shipments 

of goods, pagers, telephones and mobile phones as instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce)). 

The Dixons argued the Agreement was for the sale of real estate, not for the 

construction of a home or for custom elements contained therein. They argued 

Bradley v. Brentwood Homes stated a purchase sale agreement was an intrastate 

transaction, not an interstate transaction, therefore did not involve federal 

preemption by the FAA. 

In Bradley, the court explained the contract was not for the construction of a home, 

but an already complete home, noting "the Home Purchase Agreement specifically 

provides that Bradley agreed to purchase a completed dwelling rather than contract 

for the construction of a dwelling. Notably, the provisions of the Agreement 

providing for 'New Construction,' 'House Plan,' 'Options,' and 'Color Selection,' are 

eliminated as 'N/A' and were not signed by Bradley." 398 S.C. at 458, 730 S.E.2d 

at 318. The court found the affidavit of Brentwood Homes' representative was 

"inapposite as his attestation that out-of-state materials, suppliers, and 

subcontractors were used for the construction of the residence has no bearing on 

the purchase of the completed dwelling." Id. The court determined that "[b]ecause 

the essential character of the Agreement was strictly for the purchase of a 

completed residential dwelling and not the construction, . . . the FAA does not 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

apply as these types of transactions have historically been deemed to involve 

intrastate commerce." Id. at 459, 730 S.E.2d at 318. However, the court clarified 

"had the Agreement actually encompassed the construction of the residence, it 

would have been subject to the FAA as our appellate courts have consistently 

recognized that contracts for construction are governed by the FAA." Id. at 458 

n.8, 730 S.E.2d at 318 n.8 

In Damico, the homeowners argued the contracts did not involve interstate 

commerce and therefore, the builder could not compel the homeowner to arbitrate 

under federal law (the FAA). Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC, 437 S.C. 596, 

608, 879 S.E.2d 746, 753 (2022). The supreme court disagreed, finding, "[t]he 

transactions here manifestly involve interstate commerce, as they involved the 

construction of new homes built to Petitioners' specifications rather than the 

purchase of pre-existing homes." Id. (citing Bradley, 398 S.C. at 458 n.8, 730 

S.E.2d at 318 n.8 ("[O]ur appellate courts have consistently recognized that 

contracts for construction are governed by the FAA."); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. 

Fed. Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 631, 640, 239 S.E.2d 647, 652 (1977) (explaining that 

contracts requiring the construction of a new building implicate interstate 

commerce because it would be "virtually impossible" to construct the building 

"with materials, equipment[,] and supplies all produced and manufactured solely 

within the State of South Carolina"). 

In this case, contrary to the Dixons' position, the language of the Agreement and 

the record demonstrates the Agreement was not for the purchase of a completed 

home but involved at a minimum the completion of custom elements in the home 

which fall within the parameters of construction. A checklist accompanying the 

Agreement suggests the Pattees had been able to select options for flooring, 

appliance color, bath hardware, countertops, plumbing fixtures, shower enclosures, 

interior and exterior hardware, lighting style, interior paint, and backsplash and 

wall tile. Provision 12 of the Agreement, titled ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS, 

designates specific directions for the additional laying of hardwood floor, the 

extension of crown molding, the replacement of laminate countertops with quartz, 

and the installation of specified sinks and faucets. The records submitted by 

Burchfield as exhibits to his affidavit show that the Pattees made $15,275 worth of 

customizations, and Dupree's affidavit attested to shingles, appliances, hardwood 

flooring, countertops, sinks, faucets and crown molding being purchased outside of 

South Carolina. 

Neither the Dixons nor the Pattees have provided any evidence to support their 

contention that the contract between the Pattees and Weekley was to purchase a 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

fully-constructed home. They did not provide any affidavits or records in support; 

merely, their attorneys' arguments that based on when the permits were issued, the 

home had to have already had been completed.9 Weekley provided evidence in the 

form of affidavits and the Agreement itself that the transaction here did not involve 

the sale of a completed home and did involve interstate commerce. Consequently, 

we conclude the FAA did apply. 

II. The Pattees' Claims against Weekley 

Weekley contends the circuit court erred in denying a motion to compel arbitration 

with respect to the Pattees' claim against Weekley, because the Pattees' claim falls 

within the scope of the arbitration provisions, and it is undisputed that the 

agreement is enforceable. We agree. 

A claim for equitable indemnity may arise when "a first party is liable to pay a 

second party for a loss or damage the second party incurs to a third party." Rock 

Hill Tel. Co. v. Globe Commc'ns, Inc., 363 S.C. 385, 389, 611 S.E.2d 235, 237 

(2005) (quoting First Gen. Servs. of Charleston, Inc. v. Miller, 314 S.C. 439, 442, 

445 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1994)). "The right to indemnity arises by operation of law 'in 

cases of imputed fault or where some special relationship exists between the first 

and second parties.'" Id. (quoting First Gen. Servs. of Charleston, Inc., 314 at 442, 

445 S.E.2d at 449). A claim for indemnification "exists whenever the relation 

between the parties is such that either in law or in equity there is an obligation on 

one party to indemnify the other, as where one person is exposed to liability by the 

wrongful act of another in which he does not join." Id. (quoting Stuck v. Pioneer 

Logging Mach., Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 24, 301 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1983)). 

In the instant case, the Pattees allege any damages they suffer as a result of the 

Dixons' claims against them should be paid by Weekley because Weekley 

defectively constructed the home. 

The Pattees initialed every page of the Agreement, including those containing the 

arbitration provisions, fully executed the signature page of the Agreement and 

acknowledged receipt of a sample of the Home Warranty which contained the 

relevant Warranty arbitration provisions. The Pattees have not asserted any basis 

for avoiding the arbitration agreements contained in the Agreement and Warranty, 

9 No permits are included in the Record. In its answer to the Dixon's complaint, 

Weekley admitted "it obtained a permit during 2007 [and] denie[d] a permit was 

obtained in 2008" 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

other than their assertion the FAA does not apply, which we have resolved against 

them. Furthermore, the Pattees have not disputed that their claim against Weekley 

for equitable indemnification is within the scope of the arbitration agreements 

contained in the Agreement and Warranty. Even if there were some doubt as to the 

scope or applicability of the relevant arbitration agreements, such doubts are 

resolved in favor of arbitration given the FAA's liberal federal policy favoring 

arbitration agreements. See Landers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 402 S.C. 100, 109, 

739 S.E.2d 209, 213 (2013) ("A clause which provides for arbitration of all 

disputes 'arising out of or relating to' the contract is construed broadly."). In this 

case, the claim for equitable indemnification arises from the construction of the 

home and the Pattees relied on the Agreement to assert a special relationship 

between themselves and Weekley as purchaser and seller. For all the foregoing 

reasons, we conclude the Pattees' claims are subject to arbitration pursuant to the 

FAA. 

III. The Dixons' Claims 

Weekley contends the circuit court erred in denying its motion to compel 

arbitration with respect to the Dixons' claims because their causes of action are 

dependent upon the agreements that require arbitration and are within the scope of 

the arbitration agreements. We agree. 

"Generally, arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to 

submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Pearson 

v. Hilton Head Hosp., 400 S.C. 281, 288, 733 S.E.2d 597, 600 (Ct. App. 2012) 

(quoting Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 

411, 416 (4th Cir. 2000)). "[T]he presumption in favor of arbitration applies to the 

scope of an arbitration agreement; it does not apply to the existence of such an 

agreement or to the identity of the parties who may be bound to such an 

agreement." Wilson v. Willis, 426 S.C. 326, 337, 827 S.E.2d 167, 173 (2019) 

(quoting Carr v. Main Carr Dev., LLC, 337 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Tex. App. 2011) 

(emphasis added)). "Even the exceptionally strong policy favoring arbitration 

cannot justify requiring litigants to forego a judicial remedy when they have not 

agreed to do so." Id. (quoting Carr, 337 S.W.3d at 496). "Moreover, because 

arbitration, while favored, exists solely by agreement of the parties, a presumption 

against arbitration arises where the party resisting arbitration is a nonsignatory to 

the written agreement to arbitrate." Id. at 337-38, 827 S.E.2d at 173. "Whether an 

arbitration agreement may be enforced against nonsignatories, and under what 

circumstances, is an issue controlled by state law." Id. at 338, 827 S.E.2d at 173-

74. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"Well-established common law principles dictate that in an appropriate case a 

nonsignatory can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision within a 

contract executed by other parties." Pearson, 400 S.C. at 288, 733 S.E.2d at 600 

(quoting Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 416-17). "South Carolina has recognized 

several theories that could bind nonsignatories to arbitration agreements under 

general principles of contract and agency law, including (1) incorporation by 

reference, (2) assumption, (3) agency, (4) veil piercing/alter ego, and (5) estoppel." 

Wilson, 426 S.C. at 338, 827 S.E.2d at 174. 

"[A] party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a 

written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when he 

has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be 

enforced to benefit him." Id. (quoting Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 418) (emphasis 

added by court). "To allow [a plaintiff] to claim the benefit of the contract and 

simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity and contravene the 

purposes underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act." Pearson, 400 S.C. at 290, 

733 S.E.2d at 601 (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 

418). When "plaintiffs sue and seek relief based on contracts containing arbitration 

clauses, courts have applied equitable estoppel." Wilson, 426 S.C. at 344, 827 

S.E.2d at 177 (citing Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 417-18 (applying equitable 

estoppel and holding the nonsignatory plaintiff could not bring claims to enforce 

the guarantees and warranties issued by the defendant in a contract with another 

party without complying with an arbitration provision contained in that contract)). 

"A nonsignatory is estopped from refusing to comply with an arbitration clause 

when it receives a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause." 

Pearson, 400 S.C. at 290, 733 S.E.2d at 601 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting 

Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 418). "[A] nonsignatory cannot be bound without 

receiving a direct benefit from or pursuing a claim . . . integrally related to the 

contract containing the arbitration clause." Id. at 291, 733 S.E.2d at 602 (internal 

quotation omitted) (quoting Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 418 n.6). In International 

Paper, the Fourth Circuit found International Paper, the purchaser of a saw 

manufactured by Schwabedissen and distributed by Wood Systems, sought a direct 

benefit from the agreement between the manufacturer and distributor and made a 

claim integrally related to that agreement when it sued Schwabedissen for breach 

of the terms and warranties contained therein. 206 F.2d at 414-18. Consequently, 

International Paper was estopped from contesting the arbitration agreement in the 

contract. Id. at 418. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"[A] party may not rely on the contract when it works to its advantage, and 

repudiate it when it works to its disadvantage." Pearson, 400 S.C. at 295, 733 

S.E.2d at 604 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Iris.com, 524 F. 

Supp. 2d 742, 749). "When 'a signatory seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement 

against a non-signatory, the doctrine estops the non-signatory from claiming that 

he is not bound to the arbitration agreement when he receives a "direct benefit" 

from a contract containing an arbitration clause.'" Id. (quoting at Jackson, 524 F. 

Supp. 2d at 749-50). 

When a claim depends on the contract's existence and 

cannot stand independently—that is, the alleged liability 

"arises solely from the contract or must be determined by 

reference to it"—equity prevents a person from avoiding 

the arbitration clause that was part of that agreement. 

But "when the substance of the claim arises from general 

obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts 

and other common law duties, or federal law," directbenefits estoppel is not implicated even if the claim refers 

to or relates to the contract or would not have arisen "but 

for" the contract's existence. 

Wilson, 426 S.C. at 343, 827 S.E.2d at 176 (emphasis added by court) (quoting 

Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 637 (Tex. 2018). 

The arbitration provisions contained in the Agreement and Warranty are 

enforceable against the Dixons because, while they are not parties or signatories to 

the relevant agreements, the Dixons expressly rely on the Agreement and Warranty 

in alleging their breach of warranty claim against Weekley. The second amended 

complaint states "Weekley impliedly and/or expressly warranted that the design, 

building, construction, and materials would be performed using the utmost skill 

and attention and would be of good and workmanlike quality. Further, Weekley 

impliedly and/or expressly warranted that the design, building, construction, and 

materials would be such that the Subject Residence would be habitable and fit for 

its intended use as a single-family residence." (emphasis added). They cannot 

therefore repudiate the arbitration provisions contained therein on the basis of 

being nonsignatories. 

With regard to the SCUTPA claim, the Dixons' reliance on the Agreement or 

Warranty is not as clear. However, they fail to address in their respondents' brief 

Weekley's argument that the claim is subject to arbitration. See First Union Nat'l 
 

 

 

 

Bank v. FCVS Communications, 321 S.C. 496, 502, 469 S.E.2d 613, 617 (Ct. App. 

1996) (noting if respondent fails to answer to an issue in his brief, the appellate 

court may treat the failure to respond as a confession that the appellant's position is 

correct). Consequently, we conclude the Dixons' claims are subject to arbitration. 

IV. The Dixons' Additional Arguments (Additional Sustaining Grounds)10 

The Dixons raise two additional sustaining grounds on appeal— 

violation of the SCUAA and unconscionability. 

[A] respondent . . . may raise on appeal any additional 

reasons the appellate court should affirm the lower 

court's ruling, regardless of whether those reasons have 

been presented to or ruled on by the lower court. It 

would be inefficient and pointless to require a respondent 

to return to the judge and ask for a ruling on other 

arguments to preserve them for appellate review. It also 

could violate the principle that a court usually should 

refrain from deciding unnecessary questions. 

I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 419, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 

(2000). However, "an appellate court is less likely to rely on such a ground when 

10 Because the circuit court issued a Form 4 order with no findings and did not 

make any indication of findings at the hearing, we do not know on what ground the 

circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. This court has recently 

reiterated that a circuit court is allowed to issue a Form 4 order when ruling on a 

motion to dismiss. See Santos v. Harris Inv. Holdings, LLC, 439 S.C. 214, 219, 

886 S.E.2d 483, 485 (Ct. App. 2023) (citing to the language of Rule 52(a), SCRCP 

which provides "[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on 

decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided 

in Rule 41(b)" and concluding the circuit court properly acted within its discretion 

when granting a motion to dismiss via Form 4 order); see also Borg Warner 

Acceptance Corp. v. Darby, 296 S.C. 275, 279, 372 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (Ct. App. 

1988) (holding Rule 52(a)'s requirement that a court in an action tried without a 

jury "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon" 

was "merely directory and provide[d] no basis for invalidating a judgment"). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the respondent has failed to present it to the lower court." Id. at 421, 526 S.E.2d at 

724. "An appellate court may not rely on Rule 220(c), SCACR, . . . when the 

court believes it would be unwise or unjust to do so in a particular case. It is 

within the appellate court's discretion whether to address any additional sustaining 

grounds." Id. at 420, 526 S.E.2d at 723. 

"While a respondent may raise on appeal any additional sustaining grounds 

appearing in the record, even where those reasons have not been ruled on by the 

lower court, we are reticent to invoke an alternative sustaining ground where the 

ground is not raised in the appellate brief." Alexander v. Houston, 403 S.C. 615, 

620 n.4, 744 S.E.2d 517, 520 n.4 (2013). "Invoking an additional sustaining 

ground under such circumstances would generally be unfair to an unaware 

appellant." Id. 

With regard to unconscionability, the Pattees mentioned the issue at the circuit 

court hearing in reference to the D.R. Horton case, but the Dixons did not argue 

unconscionability in front of the circuit court. However, because this case involves 

the possibility of enforcing an unconscionable arbitration agreement, we will 

consider it as an additional sustaining ground. 

A. SCUAA 

The Dixons argue the arbitration provision is unenforceable under the SCUAA.11 

They contend the notice contained in the Agreement does not comply with section 

15-48-10(a) because (1) it is neither typewritten nor stamped; (2) it is not 

underlined; (3) and it is not displayed on the first page of the document. They 

maintain these technical failures—both individually and collectively—preclude 

enforcement of arbitration under South Carolina law. We decline to address this 

additional sustaining ground because even if the Agreement violates the SCUAA 

requirements, our decision that the FAA is controlling is dispositive. See Zabinski, 

346 S.C. at 592, 553 S.E.2d at 116. ("While the parties may agree to enforce 

arbitration agreements under state rules rather than FAA rules, the FAA will 

preempt any state law that completely invalidates the parties' agreement to 

arbitrate."); Bradley, 398 S.C. at 453, 730 S.E.2d at 315 (finding the builder's 

concession the contract violated the SCUAA was not dispositive because even 

though "an application of the South Carolina law would have rendered the parties' 

arbitration agreement completely unenforceable, consideration of the applicability 

of the FAA is required" and "[t]he FAA is intended to ensure that arbitration will 

11 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-48-10 to -240. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

proceed in the event a state law would have preclusive effect on an otherwise valid 

arbitration agreement"). 

B. Unconscionability 

The Dixons also assert the arbitration provision is unconscionable. They contend 

the Agreement is an adhesion contract, and the Pattees, and by extension the 

Dixons, had little-to-no bargaining power. We conclude this issue is abandoned on 

appeal. 12 

The Dixons correctly point out that the beginning point of an unconscionability 

analysis is whether the complaining party had a meaningful choice in consenting to 

the terms of the agreement or whether it was a contract of adhesion. "The 

touchstone of the [unconscionability] analysis begins with the presence or absence 

of meaningful choice." Damico at 612, 879 S.E.2d at 755. "[A] party seeking to 

prove an arbitration agreement is unconscionable must allege he lacked a 

meaningful choice as to the arbitration clause specifically, not merely that he 

lacked a meaningful choice as to the contract as a whole." Id. at 613, 879 S.E.2d at 

755. "Whether one party lacks a meaningful choice . . . typically speaks to the 

fundamental fairness of the bargaining process." Id. (quoting D.R. Horton, 417 

S.C. at 49, 790 S.E.2d at 4. "[I]n determining whether an absence of meaningful 

choice taints a contract term, . . . courts must consider, among all facts and 

circumstances, the relative disparity in the parties' bargaining power, the parties' 

relative sophistication, and whether the plaintiffs are a substantial business concern 

of the defendant." Id. 

"Parties frequently claim they lack a meaningful choice when a contract of 

adhesion is involved." Id. at 613, 879 S.E.2d at 756. "[A]dhesion contracts are 

'standard form contracts offered on a take-it or leave-it basis with terms that are not 

negotiable.'" Id. (quoting D.R. Horton, 417 S.C. at 49, 790 S.E.2d at 4). "Because 

contracts of adhesion are non-negotiable, '[a]n offeree faced with such a contract 

has two choices: complete adherence or outright rejection.'" Id. (quoting Lackey v. 

Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 394, 498 S.E.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1998) 

12 The Agreement also contains a severability provision. However, because we do 

not find the arbitration provisions unconscionable, we need not address that issue. 

See Whiteside v. Cherokee County School Dist. No. One, 311 S.C. 335, 340, 428 

S.E.2d 886, 889 (1993) (appellate court need not address remaining issues when 

disposition of prior issue is dispositive). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(citation omitted). Although "[a]dhesion contracts are not per se unconscionable," 

courts view them with "considerable skepticism," as it is doubtful the parties had a 

true agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, due to one party having virtually 

no input in the terms and language. Id. 

"[A]dhesive contracts are not unconscionable in and of themselves so long as the 

terms are even-handed." Id. at 614, 879 S.E.2d at 756 (emphasis omitted). 

"[U]nconscionability requires a finding of a lack of meaningful choice coupled 

with unreasonably oppressive terms. Thus, an adhesion contract with fair terms is 

certainly not unconscionable, and the mere fact a contract is one of adhesion does 

not doom the contract-drafter's case." Id. The supreme court has "taken judicial 

cognizance of the fact that a modern buyer of new residential housing is normally 

in an unequal bargaining position as against the seller." D.R. Horton, Inc., 417 

S.C. at 50, 790 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147-48, 

687 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (stating that South Carolina's "courts have shifted from 

following the doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') to the doctrine of 

caveat venditor ('let the seller beware')")). 

As noted in the caselaw above, the second part of the unconscionability analysis 

involves determining whether the terms of the agreement are so one-sided and 

oppressive that no reasonable person would accept them. The Dixons' argument 

focuses solely on the Agreement as being a contract of adhesion. They cite to no 

authority or specific provisions in the Agreement or Warranty that are oppressive 

or one-sided. As a result, we find their unconscionability argument is not 

preserved for our consideration as a critical portion of the analysis is only referred 

in a conclusory fashion and is unsupported by authority. See Equivest Fin., LLC v. 

Ravenel, 422 S.C. 499, 506, 812 S.E.2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2018) ("When a party 

provides no legal authority regarding a particular argument, the argument is 

abandoned and the court will not address the merits of the issue."); Glasscock, Inc. 

v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) 

("[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed 

abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review."). 

CONCLUSION 

Based on all of the foregoing, the decision of the circuit court denying Weekley's 

motion to compel arbitration is 

REVERSED. 
VINSON, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.