White Paper:

Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification and/or 

Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations 

By

Mutty Sharfi

(Rev. 0, 06-10-13)

This is a technical assessment of the allegations made by a former Rocky Flats Plant worker in 

interviews conducted on October 24-25, 1989 by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

N.E.I.C. Office of Criminal Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These 

interviews resulted from a phone call by the interviewee to the FBI Rocky Flats Hotline on June 

16, 1989 alleging safety violations and manipulation of laboratory samples at RFP. ORAUT was 

provided a transcript of the interviews by the EPA Office of Criminal Investigations (SRDB 

122614).

In response to a NIOSH request, ORAUT reviewed the transcript of the EPA/FBI interviews to 

technically assess the allegations and their relevance to potential data falsification and/or data 

invalidation in Building 123 as it might affect the technical basis for dose reconstructions, and 

specifically, tritium dose reconstructions under EEOICPA. Building 123 was the Analytical 

Health Physics Laboratory, and as such, was the location where RFP health physicists generated 

the site-wide data used by ORAUT for its evaluations. After reviewing the transcript, ORAUT 

noted the following:

Interviewee’s RFP Job History

The interviewee worked several entry-level positions at RFP before accepting employment as a 

[[redacted for privacy]] in the Analytical Health Physics Laboratory in Building [redacted for 

privacy]. He began this assignment after entering and completing a [redacted for privacy]

Technician Program ([redacted for privacy]) sponsored by [redacted for privacy]. The program 

incorporated chemistry and physics classes and included on-the-job training and work in the 

laboratory. After [redacted for privacy] years serving in this position, he left his employment 

with [redacted for privacy] over concern for his own health and safety.

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.
White Paper: Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification

And/or Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.

Page 2 of 8

Interviewee Allegations Relevant to Data Falsification and/or Data Invalidation in Building 123

1. During the interviewee’s time as a [redacted for privacy] in Building [redacted for privacy], 

he indicates that the fume hoods were inadequate. He states that a piece of pH paper he 

taped outside the fume hood turned bright red immediately.

ORAUT Response: There could have been a chemical hazard issue; however, the amount of 

radioactive material involved in this work should be small and there is no indication that 

personal monitoring was not in place. [Note: The interviewee’s name and dates of 

employment are redacted in the FBI interview transcript.]

2. During the interviewee’s time as a [redacted for privacy] in Building [redacted for privacy], 

he states that environmental and bioassay samples were routinely left on the shelf too long 

and not refrigerated or preserved properly.

ORAUT Response: From a radiological perspective, there is no scientific basis for 

concluding that sample counting performed weeks after collection would compromise the 

results for the target radionuclides. The half-lives of these target radionuclides are too long 

for the intervening time period to impact the results. 

During an ORAUT interview with a former Mound [redacted for privacy] (SRDB 123763), 

the interviewee corroborated the view that concern about sample-counting delays are not 

specifically applicable to bioassay samples and that there should be no impact on the validity

of the radiological data as it applies to the EEOICPA dose reconstruction program. [See 

“Further Follow-up Efforts” later in this white paper.] 

3. During the interviewee’s time as a [redacted for privacy] in Building [redacted for privacy], 

he indicates that fecal coliform samples were diluted in order to get the count rate low 

enough to be counted. The sample was then recorded in the logbook as a count relative to 

the amount of dilution. He states that the amount of dilution was sheer guesswork. The 

samples could only be analyzed once based on the amount of sample collected. If an 

incorrect guess was made on the amount of dilution, and the sample was over-diluted, the 

count could or would be zero.
White Paper: Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification

And/or Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.

Page 3 of 8

ORAUT Response: Any issue with coliform dilution has no relevance to radio bioassay 

results.

4. During the interviewee’s time as a [redacted for privacy] in Building [redacted for privacy], 

he recollects that occasionally there would be a release of plutonium in a production 

building. When stack filters were analyzed, they were divided in half, and if the first half

was found “unacceptably high” then the second half was counted.

ORAUT Response: Stack sample results are not used to support reconstructing dose for RFP 

personnel because stack samples are considered a measure of environmental releases and not 

representative of workplace exposure conditions. Nevertheless, as discussed in ORAUT’s 

Item 2 response in regard to sample-counting delays, a vial sitting for weeks, if properly 

processed during analysis, should not compromise the radiological count results. It is 

common lab protocol to divide a sample into aliquots to preclude a sample being lost or 

compromised in process. The interviewee did not indicate that the analytical process for the 

other aliquots was different. 

5. During the interviewee’s time as a [redacted for privacy] in Building [redacted for privacy], 

he indicates that there was improper collection of environmental water samples.

ORAUT Response: Even if improper collection of environmental water samples occurred, it

has no relevance to the personal monitoring results used for dose reconstructions under 

EEOICPA.

Further Follow-up Efforts

Most of the information and incidents described by the FBI interviewee do not provide sufficient 

detail to support a follow-up investigation of the claims. Nevertheless, as part of its follow-up 

efforts, ORAUT located and interviewed three individuals who potentially had related 

knowledge or information that might corroborate or dispute the statements offered by the FBI 

interviewee. Two of the follow-up interviewees had relevant information to offer.
White Paper: Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification

And/or Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.

Page 4 of 8

 ORAUT interviewed a former Mound employee who started in [redacted for privacy] and 

worked over the next [redacted for privacy] years as a [redacted for privacy], [redacted for 

privacy], [redacted for privacy] (SRDB 123763). The interviewee read the FBI interview 

and made the following observations (summarized here).

- He was aware of the FBI raid at RFP and generally aware of what was going on at that 

time. He considers it a valid assumption that Mound procedures would be representative 

of other DOE sites within the DOE Complex. He further stated that he did not think there 

was a significant difference between the 1991 protocols and the 1989 protocols in place 

in the FBI investigation timeframe.

- At Mound, nothing was added to bioassay samples for bacterial concerns or preservation. 

He stated that urine is sterile. For tritium analysis, Mound used liquid scintillation vials 

that held 30 ml maximum, which were processed at room temperature. After counting, 

they were placed in a refrigerator in case a recount might be needed later. If no recount 

was needed, they were discarded. The sample was not in the container long enough for 

any plating to occur.

- In general, in his DOE experience, there may be instances where mistakes are made by 

individuals; however, that does not mean there was a programmatic lack of sample 

control.

- He stated there is no direct correlation between environmental samples and bioassay

based on his experiences. Bioassay samples are not treated the same way. 

Environmental samples would have to be treated and preserved first; no preservation 

techniques were employed for bioassay.

 ORAUT interviewed a former Rocky Flats [redacted for privacy] who worked from [redacted 

for privacy] managing both [redacted for privacy] (SRDB 123339). He returned as a Rocky 

Flats employee from 1994 [redacted for privacy] in [redacted for privacy]. In [redacted for 

privacy], he also worked with the [redacted for privacy] as manager of their [redacted for 

privacy] Program. As such, his RFP experience was related to the time period directly after 

the FBI raid (he had no information or experience relating to the time period prior to the 

raid). During his interview, he made the following observations (summarized below). These 
White Paper: Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification

And/or Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.

Page 5 of 8

observations have relevance if one assumes that the 1989 protocols in place in the FBI 

investigation timeframe were essentially the same as those in place when he began work in 

1990. 

- Environmental monitoring and personnel dosimetry were separate programs, although 

their respective samples were analyzed in the same low-level on-site lab. Around 1997-

1998, the on-site lab was shut down and everything was contracted out. Turnaround 

times on samples were sometime a problem, especially for Pu, but not so much for 

tritium. While he was there, there was no routine tritium monitoring program; just some 

pre and post-job tritium analyses. There were no significant tritium intakes during his 

RFP employment.

- Based on his RFP experience, there is no specific link between environmental and 

bioassay results; the same numbers might have a different significance in environmental 

versus bioassay.

- RFP had a state-of-the-art program for dealing with compromised PPE. They had CAM 

alarms, nasal swipes, and bioassay. Bioassay would be done immediately if there was a

suspected exposure (not necessarily at the end of the work shift). RFP also had a 

wound-counting program.

- In bioassay analysis, lab staff used hoods. There was a complete IH staff. He is sure the 

airflow was tested. He is not aware of any injuries or complaints regarding hoods. 

Strong acids were used in bioassay for fecal samples, but he recalls no incidents.

- After the FBI raid and shutdown, a lot of work was done to restart operations to get rid of 

the in-process material for D&D. Mountains of documents were being prepared for 

restart. Each successive site operator increased the emphasis on safety.

ORAUT also reviewed An Insider's View of Rocky Flats: Urban Myths Debunked by Farrel D. 

Hobbs (a former RFP worker) (SRDB Ref ID: 104858). The author implies (and most articles 

accessed via the Internet seem to agree) that the FBI raid on RFP found no issues with worker 

protection or the worker monitoring program. The only violation cited for RFP was an 

environmental release. This is not to imply that an environmental release is not an issue, but 
White Paper: Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification

And/or Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.

Page 6 of 8

such a release does not indicate an issue with the monitoring program or the resulting data that 

ORAUT relies on to perform dose reconstruction under EEOICPA.

An audit was performed by a DOE Special Assessment Team that focused on environmental 

issues, finding 95 deficiencies of varying types. The following two deficiencies mentioned the 

Building 123 laboratory:

 Under Radiation: Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) practices for 

radiochemistry analyses in the Building 123 HS&E Laboratory do not conform to generally

accepted practices.

 Under Quality Assurance: QA/QC practices at Building 123 HS&E laboratory for 

environmental analyses are not adequate to document validity of data.

Although these two deficiencies mention Building 123, they are in the context of an 

environmental release investigation and all other 93 deficiencies are related to environmental 

issues. Environmental monitoring deficiencies do not translate into deficiencies in the worker 

monitoring program, and no such formal allegations were made. Personal monitoring, not 

environmental monitoring, is the focus of dose reconstruction under EEOICPA.

Current Availability and Accessibility of Relevant Documents

It appears that many of the documents potentially relevant to the FBI’s RFP raid are sealed in 

files associated with the litigation. ORAUT has obtained a limited number of documents related 

to the FBI raid and litigation. These include:

 A report from a DOE Environmental Special Assessment Team (one of four assessment 

teams that also included Management and Operations, Safety, and Legal Matters) (SRDB 

21359). These teams were mobilized by the Secretary of Energy to perform a separate 

evaluation in parallel with the FBI investigation in order to provide the Department with an 

independent assessment of Rocky Flats at the time of the raid.
White Paper: Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification

And/or Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.

Page 7 of 8

 A 1995 symposium presentation titled, Are You Prepared To Survive an FBI Raid At Your 

Facility?, that specifically discusses aspects of the 1989 FBI raid as well as the legal charges 

resulting from the raid (SRDB 122696).

 A detailed published response from a manager in the Environmental Department who was 

apparently an individual of investigative interest during the FBI raid (An Insider's View of 

Rocky Flats: Urban Myths Debunked) (SRDB 104858).

 A petitioner representative provided the DOE’s Initial Agency Decision for Case No. 

VWA-0031 dated August 6, 1999 (SRDB 125051). This case involves a complaint from a 

former RFP worker alleging management reprisals following disclosures of possible health 

and safety violations and site mismanagement. The scope of the allegations is outside the 

time frame and location under evaluation in this paper and do not impact NIOSH dose

reconstructions for RFP.

Although it does have access to the above documents, ORAUT has not been able to obtain any 

other site documents that provide a response to the FBI allegations resulting in the raid. 

General Observations and Conclusions

Based on its review of the limited number of documents that are available, ORAUT has arrived 

at the following general observations and conclusions:

1. While the information from the DOE’s Environmental Report discusses data QA and 

validation issues with the Building 881 and Building 123 analytical laboratories, there were 

no identified situations where falsification of data was identified (as was the case with CEP 

data) (SRDB 21359, Sections 7 and 8).

2. As stated by the U.S. Attorney in the RFP sentencing memorandum, there were no identified 

situations that posed an imminent threat to RFP workers, the public, or the surrounding 

environment (SRDB 122696, pdf p. 13).
White Paper: Evaluation of Petitioner Concerns About Data Falsification

And/or Data Invalidation in RFP Building 123 Based on Worker Allegations

This is a working document prepared by NIOSH or its contractor for use in discussions with the ABRWH or its 

Working Groups or Subcommittees. Draft, preliminary, interim, and White Paper documents are not final NIOSH or 

ABRWH (or their technical support and review contractors) positions unless specifically marked as such. This 

document represents preliminary positions taken on technical issues prepared by NIOSH or its contractor.

Page 8 of 8

3. Although the FBI investigation that led to the raid identified potential issues at RFP, the 

actual situations/issues were different from what seemed apparent based on the allegations 

and investigative characterizations that led to the raid (SRDB: 104858).

4. While Rockwell did plead guilty as a company to fine, five felony charges, and five

misdemeanor charges, it appears that the decision to settle was based on the company’s 

desire to close the long, drawn-out litigation. The end result was a settlement that included 

an agreement between parties eliminating further pursuit of individual indictments (SRDB 

122696, pdf pp. 12-14).

5. The charges against Rockwell at RFP were specific to environmental RCRA and Clean 

Water Act laws and the impact to the environment and did not specifically call out a data 

falsification, data validity issues, or data quality violation (SRDB 122696, pdf p. 13-14).