SEC Petition Evaluation Report

Petition SEC-00178

Report Rev #: 0 Report Submittal Date: February 6, 2012

Subject Expert(s): Jason Davis

Site Expert(s): N/A

Petition Administrative Summary

Petition Under Evaluation

Petition # Petition 

Type

Petition

Receipt Date

Qualification 

Date

DOE/AWE Facility Name

SEC-00178 83.13 July 28, 2010 October 20, 2010 Clinton Engineer Works

Petitioner-Requested Class Definition 

All guards and service workers who worked in any area at Clinton Engineering Works from January 1, 1943 

through May 18, 1947.

Class Evaluated by NIOSH

All guards and service workers who worked in or around the warehouses at the Elza Gate area of Clinton 

Engineering Works from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949.

NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC

All employees of the Tennessee Eastman Corporation (1943-1947) and the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals 

Corporation (1947-1949) who were employed at the Clinton Engineer Works in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, from 

January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949 for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, 

occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the parameters 

established for one or more classes of employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort.

Related Petition Summary Information 

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status

N/A N/A N/A N/A

Related Evaluation Report Information 

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility 

Name

N/A N/A

ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: Jason Davis ORAU Peer Review Completed By: Daniel Stempfley

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on File] 2/8/2012

Lara Hughes Date

[Signature on File] 2/8/2012 SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By:

J. W. Neton Date

[Signature on File] 2/8/2012 SEC Evaluation Approved By:

Stuart L. Hinnefeld Date
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Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00178, Clinton Engineer Works

This evaluation report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

addresses a class of employees proposed for addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) per the

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7384 et seq. (EEOICPA) and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as 

Members of the Special Exposure Cohort under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 

Compensation Program Act of 2000.

Petitioner-Requested Class Definition

Petition SEC-00178 was received on July 28, 2010, and qualified on October 20, 2010. The petitioner 

requested that NIOSH consider the following class: All guards and service workers who worked in 

any area at Clinton Engineering Works from January 1, 1943 through May 18, 1947.

Class Evaluated by NIOSH

Based on its preliminary research, NIOSH modified the petitioner-requested location description and 

extended the requested class period to the end of the EEOICPA-covered period for the site. NIOSH 

evaluated the following class: All guards and service workers who worked in or around the 

warehouses at the Elza Gate area of Clinton Engineering Works from January 1, 1943 through 

December 31, 1949. The petitioner-requested class location was modified (see Section 3.0). The 

evaluated worker definition was restricted to the Elza Gate area because the warehouses located there 

were the ones identified as storage locations for radioactive materials for the site. The petitionerrequested class time period was extended through 1949 because that is the end of the EEOICPAcovered period for the site.

NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC

Based on its full research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH has defined a single class of 

employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. The NIOSHproposed class includes all employees of the Tennessee Eastman Corporation (1943-1947) and the

Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation (1947-1949) who were employed at the Clinton Engineer 

Works in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949 for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more classes of employees 

included in the Special Exposure Cohort. The class under evaluation was modified (see Section 3.0). 

The proposed class definition was expanded to include all employees of the contractors listed above 

who carried out operations at the Clinton Engineer Works in the warehouse area near the Elza Gate. 

The Elza Gate warehouse area is the only area of CEW that has known operations involving 

radioactive materials and research by NIOSH has determined that the contractor that was operating the 

Y-12 plant also provided the workforce for the Elza Gate warehouse area at CEW. NIOSH found that 

it was infeasible to completely reconstruct internal and external doses for the class under evaluation 

due to insufficient monitoring data. The class period extends through 1949 because there was 

insufficient information and data to bound dose to the end of the EEOICPA-covered period for the 

site. 
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Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), NIOSH has established that it does not have access to 

sufficient information to: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer for which 

radiation doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred in plausible circumstances by any 

member of the class; or (2) estimate radiation doses of members of the class more precisely than an 

estimate of maximum dose. Information available from related site profiles and additional resources

is not sufficient to document or estimate the maximum internal and external potential exposure to 

members of the evaluated class under plausible circumstances during the specified period.

The NIOSH dose reconstruction feasibility findings are based on the following:

• NIOSH finds that it is likely feasible to reconstruct occupational medical dose for workers at the 

Clinton Engineer Works Elza Gate warehouse area with sufficient accuracy.

• Principal sources of internal radiation for members of the proposed class included exposures to 

uranium residues as well as African and domestic uranium ores through inhalation and ingestion 

of airborne uranium dust, and exposure from thorium, radium, radon and radon progeny. 

• Based on the lack of thorium, radium, radon and uranium monitoring data for Clinton Engineer 

Works Elza Gate warehouse workers during the storage and/or repackaging operations conducted 

during the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, internal dose reconstruction 

from all potential sources of exposure is not feasible.

• Principal sources of external radiation for members of the proposed class included exposures to 

uranium ore, UO2 residues, uranium tailings, uranium slag, and uranium decay products that were 

stored at the Clinton Engineer Works Elza Gate warehouse site. 

• NIOSH has not identified sufficient documentation to define and quantify the total external source 

term for the Clinton Engineer Works Elza Gate warehouse area during the period January 1, 1943 

through December 31, 1949. Without additional documentation, NIOSH cannot make 

assumptions about the relative amounts of materials that would have been encountered at the site 

during this period. 

• Limited external dosimetry data were found for 1945-1946. Without additional source term 

information, NIOSH is unable to determine whether the exposures monitored are representative of 

the maximally-exposed individual during the period under evaluation. 

• NIOSH concludes that there is insufficient source term information and external monitoring data 

available to bound external exposures for the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 

1949.

• Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), NIOSH determined that there is insufficient information to 

either: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer for which radiation 

doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred under plausible circumstances by any 

member of the class; or (2) estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely 

than a maximum dose estimate.
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• Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal and external monitoring data that may become 

available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals employed 

at Clinton Engineer Works in the area around the Elza Gate warehouses during the period from 

January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, but who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may 

be performed using these data as appropriate.

Health Endangerment Determination

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), a health endangerment determination is required because 

NIOSH has determined that it does not have sufficient information to estimate dose for the members 

of the evaluated class.

NIOSH did not identify any evidence supplied by the petitioners or from other resources that would 

establish that the proposed class was exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved exceptionally high-level exposures. However, evidence indicates that some workers in the 

proposed class may have accumulated substantial chronic exposures through episodic intakes of 

radionuclides, combined with external exposures to gamma and beta radiation. Consequently, NIOSH 

has determined that health was endangered for those workers covered by this evaluation who were 

employed for at least 250 work days either solely under this employment or in combination with work 

days within the parameters established for one or more SEC classes (excluding aggregate work day 

requirements).
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Table of Contents

1.0 Purpose and Scope.......................................................................................................................... 9

2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 9

3.0 SEC-00178 Clinton Engineer Works Class Definitions............................................................... 10

3.1 Petitioner-Requested Class Definition and Basis................................................................ 10

3.2 Class Evaluated by NIOSH ................................................................................................. 11

3.3 NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC.......................................................... 11

4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH to Evaluate the Class........................................................... 12

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs)................................................................ 12

4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs)............................................................... 13

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts.......................................................................................... 13

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions........................................................................................... 14

4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database .......................................................................................... 14

4.6 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners ................................................. 15

5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Class Evaluated by NIOSH......................................... 16

5.1 Clinton Engineer Works Plant and Storage Descriptions.................................................... 16

5.1.1 Elza Gate Warehouses............................................................................................. 18

5.1.2 Stored Materials....................................................................................................... 19

5.2 Radiological Exposure Sources from Clinton Engineer Works Operations ....................... 23

5.2.1 Internal Radiological Exposure Sources from CEW Operations............................ 23

5.2.1.1 Uranium.................................................................................................... 23

5.2.1.2 Thorium..................................................................................................... 23

5.2.1.3 Radium ..................................................................................................... 23

5.2.1.4 Radon........................................................................................................ 23

5.2.2 External Radiological Exposure Sources from CEW Operations........................... 24

5.2.2.1 Photon....................................................................................................... 24

5.2.2.2 Beta........................................................................................................... 25

5.2.2.3 Neutron ..................................................................................................... 25

5.2.3 Incidents .................................................................................................................. 26

6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Class Evaluated by NIOSH ............................. 27

6.1 Available Clinton Engineer Works Internal Monitoring Data ............................................ 27

6.2 Available Clinton Engineer Works External Monitoring Data ........................................... 27

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Class Evaluated by NIOSH...................................... 28

7.1 Pedigree of Clinton Engineer Works Data .......................................................................... 29

7.1.1 Internal Monitoring Data Pedigree Review............................................................. 29

7.1.2 External Monitoring Data Pedigree Review............................................................ 29

7.2 Evaluation of Bounding Internal Radiation Doses at CEW................................................ 30

7.2.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related Internal Doses........................................ 30

7.2.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Doses........................... 31

7.2.3 Methods for Bounding Internal Dose at Clinton Engineer Works.......................... 33

7.2.3.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period Internal Dose........................ 33

7.2.3.2 Methods for Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Dose ............... 33

7.2.4 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion ............................................. 35

7.3 Evaluation of Bounding External Radiation Doses at CEW............................................... 35
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7.3.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses.......................... 36

7.3.3 Clinton Engineer Works Occupational X-Ray Examinations................................. 38

7.3.4 Methods for Bounding External Dose at Clinton Engineer Works......................... 38

7.3.4.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period External Dose....................... 38

7.3.4.2 Methods for Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses............. 39

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion............................................ 40

7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00178....................................................................... 41

7.4.1 Lack of Monitoring Data ......................................................................................... 41

7.5 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00178.................................................. 41

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00178...................................................... 43

9.0 Class Conclusion for Petition SEC-00178 ................................................................................... 43

10.0 References .................................................................................................................................... 45

Attachment One: Data Capture Synopsis.............................................................................................. 51

Tables

4-1: No. of Clinton Engineer Works Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule............ 14

5-1: Gamma Emissions of Primary Interest .......................................................................................... 24

5-2: Beta Emissions of Primary Interest................................................................................................ 25

7-1: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00178.......................................................................... 41

Figures

5-1: Map of Clinton Engineer Works (1943-1945)............................................................................... 17

5-2: Elza Gate Site at CEW................................................................................................................... 19
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SEC Petition Evaluation Report for SEC-00178

ATTRIBUTION AND ANNOTATION: This is a single-author document. All conclusions drawn from 

the data presented in this evaluation were made by the ORAU Team Lead Technical Evaluator: Jason 

Davis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities. The rationales for all conclusions in this document are 

explained in the associated text.

1.0 Purpose and Scope

This report evaluates the feasibility of reconstructing doses for all guards and service workers who 

worked in or around the warehouses at the Elza Gate area of Clinton Engineering Works from January 

1, 1943 through December 31, 1949. It provides information and analyses germane to considering a

petition for adding a class of employees to the congressionally-created SEC.

This report does not make any determinations concerning the feasibility of dose reconstruction that 

necessarily apply to any individual energy employee who might require a dose reconstruction from 

NIOSH. This report also does not contain the final determination as to whether the proposed class 

will be added to the SEC (see Section 2.0).

This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of EEOICPA, 42 C.F.R. pt. 83,

and the guidance contained in the Division of Compensation Analysis and Support’s (DCAS) Internal 

Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, OCAS-PR-004.1

2.0 Introduction

Both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 require NIOSH to evaluate qualified petitions requesting that the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) add a class of employees to the SEC. The 

evaluation is intended to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether it is feasible to 

estimate with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses of the class of employees through NIOSH dose 

reconstructions.

2

 

42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1) states: Radiation doses can be estimated with sufficient accuracy if NIOSH 

has established that it has access to sufficient information to estimate the maximum radiation dose, 

for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred in 

plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or if NIOSH has established that it has access to 

sufficient information to estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely than an 

estimate of the maximum radiation dose.

Under 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), if it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses 

for members of the class, then NIOSH must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such 

radiation doses may have endangered the health of members of the class The regulation requires 

 1 DCAS was formerly known as the Office of Compensation Analysis and Support (OCAS). 2 NIOSH dose reconstructions under EEOICPA are performed using the methods promulgated under 42 C.F.R. pt. 82 and 

the detailed implementation guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas.
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NIOSH to assume that any duration of unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of 

members of a class when it has been established that the class may have been exposed to radiation 

during a discrete incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring 

during nuclear criticality incidents. If the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has 

not been established, then NIOSH is required to specify that health was endangered for those workers 

who were employed for at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more SEC classes 

(excluding aggregate work day requirements).

NIOSH is required to document its evaluation in a report, and to do so, relies upon both its own dose 

reconstruction expertise as well as technical support from its contractor, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU). Once completed, NIOSH provides the report to both the petitioner(s) and to the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (Board). The Board will consider the NIOSH 

evaluation report, together with the petition, petitioner(s) comments, and other information the Board 

considers appropriate, in order to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on whether or not 

to add one or more classes of employees to the SEC. Once NIOSH has received and considered the 

advice of the Board, the Director of NIOSH will propose a decision on behalf of HHS. The Secretary 

of HHS will make the final decision, taking into account the NIOSH evaluation, the advice of the 

Board, and the proposed decision issued by NIOSH. As part of this decision process, petitioners may 

seek a review of certain types of final decisions issued by the Secretary of HHS.

3

3.0 SEC-00178 Clinton Engineer Works Class Definitions

The following subsections address the evolution of the class definition for SEC-00178, Clinton 

Engineer Works. When a petition is submitted, the requested class definition is reviewed as 

submitted. Based on its review of the available site information and data, NIOSH will make a

determination whether to qualify for full evaluation all, some, or no part of the petitioner-requested

class. If some portion of the petitioner-requested class is qualified, NIOSH will specify that class 

along with a justification for any modification of petitioner’s class. After a full evaluation of the 

qualified class, NIOSH will determine whether to propose a class for addition to the SEC and will 

specify that proposed class definition.

3.1 Petitioner-Requested Class Definition and Basis

Petition SEC-00178 was received on July 28, 2010, and qualified on October 20, 2010. The petitioner 

requested that NIOSH consider the following class: All guards and service workers who worked in 

any area at Clinton Engineering Works from January 1, 1943 through May 18, 1947.

The petitioner provided information and affidavit statements in support of the petitioner’s belief that 

accurate dose reconstruction over time is impossible for the Clinton Engineer Works workers in 

question. NIOSH deemed the following information and affidavit statements sufficient to qualify 

SEC-00178 for evaluation:

 3 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 for a full description of the procedures summarized here. Additional internal procedures are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas.
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“I have enclosed a document with information obtain [sic] from DOE that indicates that 

dad was not monitored for radiation exposure during his employment.”

Based on its Clinton Engineer Works research and data capture efforts, NIOSH determined that it has 

access to a set of external dosimetry records and area monitoring surveys for some Clinton Engineer 

Works workers during the time period under evaluation. However, NIOSH also determined that 

internal and external dosimetry records are not complete for all time periods or for all radionuclides. 

NIOSH concluded that there is sufficient documentation to support, for at least part of the requested

time period, the petition basis that internal and external radiation exposures and radiation doses were 

not adequately monitored at Clinton Engineer Works, either through personal monitoring or area 

monitoring. The information and statements provided by the petitioner qualified the petition for 

further consideration by NIOSH, the Board, and HHS. The details of the petition basis are addressed 

in Section 7.4.

3.2 Class Evaluated by NIOSH

Based on its preliminary research, NIOSH modified and extended the petitioner-requested class. The

location description was modified because there is no indication that radiological work was performed 

at Clinton Engineer Works outside the Elza Gate warehouses or outside the X-10, Y-12, K-25, and 

S-50 plants, or outside Oak Ridge Hospital and the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education 

(ORISE) which are considered separate sites under this program. The petitioner-requested class 

period was extended to through 1949 because that is the end of the EEOICPA-covered period for the 

site. Therefore, NIOSH defined the following class for further evaluation: all guards and service 

workers who worked in or around the warehouses at the Elza Gate area of Clinton Engineering Works 

from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949.

3.3 NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC

Based on its research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH has defined a single class of employees for 

which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. The NIOSH-proposed class 

to be added to the SEC includes all employees of the Tennessee Eastman Corporation (1943-1947)

and the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation (1947-1949) who were employed at the Clinton 

Engineer Works in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949 for a 

number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this 

employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more 

classes of employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort.

Based on its research, NIOSH modified the class under evaluation. The evaluated class definition was 

expanded to include all employees because warehouse operations data did not specify the job titles of 

all individuals who worked in the area. Based on research done during the evaluation, NIOSH 

determined that the same contracting company that operated the Y-12 plant also appeared to supply 

the workforce at the Elza Gate warehouse area. Therefore, the recommended class was defined using 

the operating contractor. NIOSH found that it was infeasible to completely reconstruct internal and 

external doses for the class under evaluation due to insufficient monitoring data. The class period 

extends through 1949 because there was insufficient information and data to bound dose to the end of 

the EEOICPA-covered period for the site. 
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4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH to Evaluate the Class

As a standard practice, NIOSH completed an extensive database and Internet search for information 

regarding Clinton Engineer Works. The database search included the DOE Legacy Management 

Considered Sites database, the DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) database, 

the Energy Citations database, the Atomic Energy Technical Report database, and the Hanford 

Declassified Document Retrieval System. In addition to general Internet searches, the NIOSH 

Internet search included OSTI OpenNet Advanced searches, OSTI Information Bridge Fielded 

searches, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agency-wide Documents Access and Management 

(ADAMS) web searches, the DOE Office of Human Radiation Experiments website, and the DOENational Nuclear Security Administration-Nevada Site Office-search. Attachment One contains a 

summary of Clinton Engineer Works documents. The summary specifically identifies data capture 

details and general descriptions of the documents retrieved.

In addition to the database and Internet searches listed above, NIOSH identified and reviewed 

numerous data sources to determine information relevant to determining the feasibility of dose 

reconstruction for the class of employees under evaluation. This included determining the availability 

of information on personal monitoring, area monitoring, industrial processes, and radiation source

materials. The following subsections summarize the data sources identified and reviewed by NIOSH.

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs)

A Site Profile provides specific information concerning the documentation of historical practices at 

the specified site. Dose reconstructors can use the Site Profile to evaluate internal and external 

dosimetry data for monitored and unmonitored workers, and to supplement, or substitute for, 

individual monitoring data. As part of NIOSH’s evaluation detailed herein, it examined the following 

related TBDs for insights into Clinton Engineer Works operations or related topics/operations at other 

sites:

• Site Profiles for Atomic Weapons Employers that Worked Uranium and Thorium, Battelle-TBD6000: PSWS-3738; Rev. F0; December 13, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 30671

• K-25 Site - Occupational Environmental Dose, ORAUT-TKBS-0009-4, Rev. 01, Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities; June 22, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32526

• Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Occupational Medical Dose, ORAUT-TKBS-0012-3, Rev. 02, 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities; October 1, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 35194

• Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Occupational Environmental Dose, ORAUT-TKBS-0012-4, 

Rev. 00, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; May 7, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 20136

• Y-12 National Security Complex – Occupational Medical Dose, ORAUT-TKBS-0014-3, Rev. 01, 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities; June 18, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 32461

• Y-12 National Security Complex – Occupational Environmental Dose, ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4, 

Rev. 01, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; July 20, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 30042
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4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs)

An ORAU Technical Information Bulletin (OTIB) is a general working document that provides 

guidance for preparing dose reconstructions at particular sites or categories of sites. NIOSH reviewed 

the following OTIBs as part of its evaluation:

• OTIB: Estimating the Maximum Plausible Dose to Workers at Atomic Weapons Employer 

Facilities, ORAUT-OTIB-0004, Rev. 03 PC-2; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; December 6, 

2006; SRDB Ref ID: 36191

• OTIB: Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray Procedures, ORAUTOTIB-0006; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; December 21, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 20220

• OTIB: Estimation of Neutron Dose Rates from Alpha-Neutron Reactions in Uranium and Thorium 

Compounds, ORAUT-OTIB-0024, Rev. 00; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; April 7, 2005; 

SRDB Ref ID: 19445

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts

To obtain additional information, NIOSH attempted to locate and interview former Clinton Engineer 

Works employees who worked in or around the warehouses at the Elza Gate area. No living 

employees meeting this criterion could be located. However, a Manufacturing Engineer who worked

at DOE’s Y-12 site and also served as a member of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker 

Health was contacted for historical knowledge. In addition, NIOSH interviewed two historians with 

expert knowledge of the Oak Ridge area.

Personal Communication, 2010, Personal Communication with Current Manufacturing Engineer 

at Y-12; Informal phone conversation with NIOSH staff member; November 29, 2010; SRDB Ref 

ID: 93103

Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication with two Oak Ridge Historians, 

December 12, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 105919
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4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions

NIOSH reviewed its NIOSH DCAS Claims Tracking System (referred to as NOCTS) to locate

EEOICPA-related dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to the petition 

evaluation. Table 4-1 summarizes the results of this review. (NOCTS data available as of January 25, 

2012)

Table 4-1: No. of Clinton Engineer Works Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule

Description Totals

Total number of claims submitted for dose reconstruction 38

Total number of claims submitted for energy employees who worked during the period under 

evaluation January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949. 34

Number of dose reconstructions completed for energy employees who worked during the period

under evaluation (i.e., the number of such claims completed by NIOSH and submitted to the 

Department of Labor for final approval). 27

Number of claims for which internal dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 0

Number of claims for which external dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 0

NIOSH reviewed each claim to determine whether internal and/or external personal monitoring 

records could be obtained for the employee. Based on its review of the dose reconstructions 

completed for CEW employees and the available site documentation, NIOSH has identified a limited 

amount of personnel and area monitoring data for the CEW site. NIOSH’s detailed review and 

assessment of the available records is provided in Sections 6.0 and 7.0 of this report.

4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database

NIOSH also examined its Site Research Database (SRDB) to locate documents supporting the 

assessment of the evaluated class. Four hundred twenty nine documents in this database were 

identified as pertaining to Clinton Engineer Works. These documents were evaluated for their 

relevance to this petition. The documents include historical background on the Clinton Engineer 

Works site, external monitoring data, limited air monitoring data, and radioactive material inventory 

for the Elza Gate warehouses. 
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4.6 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners

In qualifying and evaluating the petition, NIOSH reviewed the following documents submitted by the 

petitioners:

• Clinton Engineer Works Special Exposure Cohort Application: January 1, 1943 through May 18, 

1947, SEC Petition; received July 28, 2010; OSA Ref ID: 112238

• Excerpts from Covered Energy Employee’s Personal Dose Reconstruction, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health, Division of Compensation Analysis and Support; March 10, 

2005; OSA Ref ID: 112238

• Excerpts from SC&A Task Group Evaluation of ORAUT-TKBS-0012, “Technical Basis Document 

for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,” SCA-TR-TASK1-0013, Sanford Cohen and Associates; 

September 29, 2006; OSA Ref ID: 112238 and 112615

• Internet Printouts from the EEOICP Facilities List: Clinton Engineer Works and Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory, United States Department of Energy, Office of Health, Safety and Security, 

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, URL: 

http://www.hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/fswp/advocacy/faclist/showfacility.cfm; accessed March 

23, 2010; OSA Ref ID: 112238

• Prostate Cancer and Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, Citation of epidemiological studies that 

include data from workers employed at ORNL and Y-12, Center for Environmental Health 

Studies; July 23, 2010; OSA Ref ID: 112238

• NIOSH Energy-Related Health Research Program: Previous DOE Studies, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health; unknown date; OSA Ref ID: 112238

• Parameter Estimates for the Main Effects Model for Mortality from Selected Cancer Causes of 

Death Among White Males (N=67,197) Who Worked in Oak Ridge Between 1943 and 1984, 

single-page table, unknown source; unknown date; OSA Ref ID: 112238

• Single-page Executive Summary Presenting the Results and Analysis of a One-year Needs 

Assessment Study Evaluating Whether a Medical Monitoring and Risk Communication Program is 

Justified for Former and Current Workers at the Y-12 Plant and ORNL, unknown source; 

unknown date ; OSA Ref ID: 112238

• Energy Citations Database listing for: Advances in Dose Reconstruction at Oak Ridge, F.O. 

Hoffman, and T. E. Widner; Health Physics, Volume 70, Issue S6; June 1996; OSA Ref ID: 

112238

• Definition of a “Cancer Effect Level”, unknown source; unknown date; OSA Ref ID: 112238
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• The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb. Part IV: The Manhattan Engineer District in 

Operation, single-page printout from The Atomic Archive internet site, URL: 

http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/mp/p4s22.shtml; accessed May 18, 2010; OSA Ref ID: 

112615

• External Coworker Dosimetry Data for the X-10 Site, single-page excerpt from ORAUT-OTIB0021, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; November 7, 2006; OSA Ref ID: 112615

• Table AIV: Summary Results for White Males Ever Employed at X-10 or Y-12 by Dose Group 

Using Ten Year Lag, single-page table, unknown source; unknown date; OSA Ref ID: 112615

5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Class Evaluated by 

NIOSH

The following subsections summarize both radiological operations at the Clinton Engineer Works

from January 1943 through December 1949 and the information available to NIOSH to characterize 

particular processes and radioactive source materials. From available sources NIOSH has gathered 

process and source descriptions, information regarding the identity of each radionuclide of concern, 

and information describing processes through which radiation exposures may have occurred and the 

physical environment in which they may have occurred. The information included within this 

evaluation report is intended only to be a summary of the available information. 

5.1 Clinton Engineer Works Plant and Storage Descriptions

Clinton Engineer Works was located in both Roane and Anderson Counties, Tennessee. The facility 

was a 59,000-acre federal government area which hosted three main operating units concerned with 

atomic energy work (two U-235 production plants and a nuclear research center) as well as the 

community of Oak Ridge (see Figure 5-1). The population of CEW, concentrated chiefly in Oak 

Ridge, reached a peak of about 75,000 in the summer of' 1945. The employment peak of 82,000 was 

reached in May 1945. Thereafter, population and employment declined steadily; at the end of 1946,

population was 42,465 and employment was 28,737. The primary contractor (Roane-Anderson 

Company) had a peak employment of nearly 10,000 in September 1945, declining to about 2,400 by 

September 1947 (Manhattan, 1947a, pdf p. 20).

The operating units within Clinton Engineer Works were the gaseous diffusion plant for the 

production of U-235 (K-25), operated for the Atomic Energy Commission by the Carbide & Carbon 

Chemicals Corporation; the electromagnetic plant for the production of U-235 (Y-12), operated from 

1943-1947 by the Tennessee Eastman Corporation and after 1947 by the Carbide & Carbon 

Chemicals Corporation (also known as the Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation); and the Clinton 

Laboratories, now a nuclear research center (X-10), which served during the war as a pilot plant for 

the construction of the huge plutonium process buildings at Hanford Engineer Works in the State of 

Washington. Near the gaseous diffusion plant, there was also a high-temperature, high-pressure, 

variable-frequency steam power plant, which has generating equipment with a capacity of 238,000 

kilowatts (equal to the capacity of Norris Dam of the TVA). Each of these facilities was fenced 
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separately from the fence that surrounded the larger body of the Clinton Engineer Works (Bowman, 

1949). 

(Source: CEW Map, 1985)

Figure 5-1: Map of Clinton Engineer Works (1943-1945)

The site for Clinton Engineer Works was selected on Sept. 19, 1942, by representatives of the 

Manhattan Engineer District (MED) (established August 13, 1942) and the Stone & Webster 

Engineering Corporation of' Boston, which later had the contract for the construction of' the town of 

Oak Ridge and the electromagnetic plant (Manhattan, 1947a, pdf p. 28). The site was selected for 

these reasons: (1) it had to be isolated from large centers of population; (2) it had to be large enough to 

accommodate several huge plants to be built in flat building areas separated by natural barriers; (3) it 

had to have dependable electrical power in large quantities; (4) it had to be near a large body of' water; 

and (5) it had to be accessible to rail and motor transport.
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The Clinton Engineer Works footprint was about 17 miles long at its greatest length, and about nine 

miles wide at its greatest width. The area is approximately eight miles from the town of Clinton, the 

town for which CEW was originally named, about 18 miles from the city of Knoxville, and about 20 

miles from Norris Dam. The area runs generally in the northeast and southwest direction and is 

bounded on the east, southeast, and southwest by the Clinch River which provides a meandering

35-mile boundary.

The city of Oak Ridge was constructed by the U.S. Government to provide living accommodations for 

CEW personnel. In general, the city is laid out on the long sloping side of a ridge that extends slightly 

to the northeast and southwest. The city occupied approximate1y eight square miles in the northeast 

corner of the CEW site. The city site is a hilly, wooded section 1.25 mi1es wide and 6.75 miles long 

bounded on the north by the ridge and on the south by the Oak Ridge Turnpike, the main artery 

through CEW. The turnpike was part of U.S. Highway 61 before the CEW project started (CEW 

Facts, 1947, pdf p. 18).

CEW reservation security was initially provided by forces from Stone and Webster. On October 11, 

1943, responsibility for Y-12 plant security as well as the reservation guard houses, was transferred to 

Tennessee Eastman Corporation (Covington, 1943).

The Atomic Energy Commission took over jurisdiction of the Clinton Engineer Works from the 

Manhattan Engineer District on Jan. 1, 1947. The Manhattan Engineer District was abolished by the 

Corps of Engineers of the War Department on Aug. 15, 1947.

5.1.1 Elza Gate Warehouses

In the early 1940s, five warehouses were built in the northeastern portion of CEW for the storage of 

process-related materials. The 20-acre Elza Gate site is bounded by the L&N railroad tracks, Melton 

Lake Drive to the east, and the Clinch River (Melton Hill Reservoir) to the south and west (see Figure 

5-2) (Elza Gate Survey, 1992). This site was variously known as “The Elza Gate Site,” “The Elza 

Gate Warehouses,” “Area 10,” “Parcel 228,” “Tennessee Storage,” “Tennessee Scrap Storage,” and 

“Area 0101” (Radon Results, 1944; Assessment, 1992; Sapirie, 1972; Monthly Reports, 1943-1945). 

Three of these warehouses (Warehouses #1, #2, and #3) were the only buildings within CEW 

boundaries, but outside the separately-fenced plant properties, where radioactive materials are known 

to have been stored or handled during the CEW covered period. Limited information is available on 

the affiliation of the workforce in the Elza Gate warehouses, such as a history report of the Tennessee 

Eastman Company from 1944 which indicated that by 1944 the warehouses at the Elza Gate area were 

operated by the company (History Report, 1944). In addition, five of the worker names available on 

the warehouse film badge result sheets were matched with employment rosters of the Tennessee 

Eastman Corporation available in the Oak Ridge Operations Records Holdings Area. This information 

was backed up by one of the Oak Ridge Historians interviewed. In his opinion, it was most likely 

TEC who would employ workers who would handle radioactive materials, and that the general CEW 

contractor (Roane Anderson Company) would be less likely to be involved in radioactive material 

operations (Personal Communication, 2011). It is assumed that the warehouse operations were 

continued in 1947 by the next contractor for the Y-12 plant, the Union Carbide and Carbon 

Corporation.
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(Source: Elza Gate Survey, 1992)

Figure 5-2: Elza Gate Site at CEW

5.1.2 Stored Materials

NIOSH has found no documentation indicating that radiological materials were stored in Elza Gate 

Warehouses #4 and #5. Early documentary evidence indicates that Warehouse #1 was used for the 

storage of slag for recovery (Inspection, 1944). It was noted that some of the storage barrels were 

broken and leaking and would need repackaging. This same document states that high-grade ore, 

processing residues, and process tailings were stored in Warehouse #2. Low-grade ore was stored in 

Warehouse #3, with some of the ore in paper bags and some in burlap bags awaiting transfer to paper 

bags. NIOSH has discovered documents from other time periods that describe materials stored at the 

Elza Gate warehouses. The available documentation does not specify which materials were housed in 
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which of the warehouses. The materials known to have been stored at the Elza Gate site during the 

period under evaluation are listed below. All listed materials are radiological except as noted.

• A was the storage code designation given to all uranium metal ores stored in Area 0101 at Clinton 

Engineer Works (Davies, 1944). 

• B-1 was the waste designation for tuballoy (uranium) extraction tailings from the Point Hope and 

Vitro facilities. This material contained approximately 100 mg of radium per ton of tailings and 

varied from a semi-liquid to a consistency similar to damp sand. B-1 was stored in wooden 

whiskey barrels because it was caustic enough to corrode standard steel 55-gallon drums. These 

materials were received and unloaded from August 3, 1944 through February 24, 1945 (B1 

Material, 1945). 

• B-2/B-3 were code designations for non-radiological sludges. B-2 referred to sludges that 

contained other valuable materials; B-3 designated sludges of little value (Davies, 1944). 

• C-1, C-2, and C-3 were various grades of scrap material and slag with uranium concentrations 

generally less than 20% (Davies, 1944).

• C-6 was a waste metal recovery designation given to sodium diuranate salts (Na2U2O7·6H2O) that 

precipitated following the addition of sodium hydroxide to pitchblende solutions as part of the 

waste and neutralization cycle (Hanford Glossary, 1961).

• C-616 Residue was a code designation for uranium hexafluoride. This designation was used by 

both the Army Corps of Engineers and the K-25 plant operators (Codes, 1979).

• C-716 was used to describe two different non-radiological solvents. The Army Corps of 

Engineers used this code to describe hexadeca fluoroheptane (C7F16); K-25 operations used the 

code when discussing perfluoroheptane (C7H2F14) (Codes, 1979). 

• Chemical 42-17 was a designation used to describe a variety of uranium compounds, with the

specific compound being indicated by a letter grade following the chemical number. Grade A was 

uranyl nitrate (UO2(NO3)2·6H2O), grades B and C described uranyl oxide (UO3), grades D and E 

indicated pitchblende (U3O8), and grades F and G indicated uranium dioxide (UO2) (Hadlock, 

1943). Of these, the only material known to be stored at the Elza Gate warehouses was the uranyl 

nitrate (Chemical 42-17, 1943).

• Chemical 264 is the code used to describe uranium trioxide (UO3), also known as orange oxide. 

The orange oxide was generally stored in 2-1⁄2 gallon fiber drums that weighed seventy-five 

pounds when full (Shipment, 1945, pdf p. 3). Thirty-nine thousand pounds of this material was 

sent to Clinton Engineer Works between November 16, 1944 and December 19, 1944. Beginning 

on December 15, 1944, fifteen thousand pounds were shipped to CEW on a weekly basis

(Shipment, 1945, pdf p. 7).
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• Chemical 723 was a code designation for uranium trioxide (UO3) prepared from uranium peroxide 

(UO4·2H2O) and carried the alternate shipping designation of “PC-A” (Y-12 Glossary, 1946; 

Winters, 1945).

• Chemical 727 and Iron designated ammonium diuranate ((NH4)2U2O7) and iron residues 

precipitated by the addition of ferric aluminum oxalate ((NH4)3Fe(C2O4)3·3H2O) to alpha “gunk” 

solutions, where alpha refers to the alpha calutron processes at Y-12 (Y-12 Glossary, 1946). 

• Domestic Ore was alternatively termed “low-grade ore.” Domestic sources of natural uranium 

were in the Colorado Plateau region of Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico. The uranium in this 

region occurred in carnotite ores, which would have been pre-processed in order to extract the 

vanadium present in the ore (Manhattan, 1985). Although the original carnotite ore had uranium 

concentrations of less than 1%, the tailings were shipped as a 20% sludge concentrate (Eisenbud, 

undated).

• E (B-1) Residue, also known as E-carbon, was a condensate from the first evaporation of solutions 

containing residues from the receiver end of the calutron (Y-12 Glossary, 1946). As one report 

notes, these residues may have contained large quantities of uranium because only 10-20% of the 

starting material was collected in the product pockets, while 80-90% of the charge was volatilized 

onto the liner and source and receiver parts, and had to be recycled to be reused as charge material 

(Banic, 1973). 

• “E” End Ash Material was material remaining following the combustion of scrapings from the 

graphite liner and receiver on the receiver end of the calutron (Y-12 Glossary, 1946). This 

material was alternatively designated PC-2 (Winters, 1945). As with the E residues, the 

inefficiency of the pocket collection process likely resulted in this material containing significant 

quantities of uranium (Banic, 1973). Memos indicate that this material was essentially U3O8

(Morse, 1945).

• G-1 (non-radiological) was magnesium with natural impurities (Davies, 1944).

• G-2 was magnesium that had been contaminated with foreign matter. There is no documentation 

indicating whether these impurities may have been radiological (Davies, 1944).

• High-Grade Ore was pitchblende ore from the Belgian Congo (the so-called “Congo ore” or 

“African ore”), supplied by the Belgium-based African Metals Company. It had average 

concentrations of 25% (Eisenbud, undated) or 30% (Mason, 1977) uranium by weight, up to a 

maximum of 65-70% (Linking Legacies, 1997; Dupree-Ellis, 2000). Ores from the Belgian 

Congo had average concentrations of up to 100 mg of Ra-226 per ton of ore (Dupree-Ellis, 2000; 

Eisenbud, undated), possibly up to 135 mg per ton (Health Hazards, 1949). Thus, there could be a 

significant dose rate from the ore when it was in drums or when it was being loaded into other 

containers and hoppers.

• Iron Residues were precipitated by the addition of ferric aluminum oxalate 

((NH4)3Fe(C2O4)3·3H2O) to alpha “gunk” solutions, where alpha refers to the alpha calutron 

processes at Y-12 (Y-12 Glossary, 1946).
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• Iron and Ammonium Precipitate is an alternative designation for ammonium diuranate 

((NH4)2U2O7) and iron residues precipitated by the addition of ferric aluminum oxalate 

((NH4)3Fe(C2O4)3·3H2O) to alpha “gunk” solutions, where alpha refers to the alpha calutron 

processes at Y-12 (Y-12 Glossary, 1946).

• L.P. Solid Residues are residues from the liquid phase reaction used to convert UO3 to volatile 

UCl4 and UCl5 using liquid CCl4. These residues were known to contain phosgene (COCl2);

elemental chlorine (Cl2); carbon tetrachloride (CCl4) in vapor, liquid, and dry forms; nitrogen;

uranyl oxide (UO3); and uranium tetrachloride (UCl4) (Y-12 Glossary, 1946).

• “M” End Ash Material is material remaining following the combustion of scrapings from the 

graphite liner of the source unit end of the calutron (Y-12 Glossary, 1946). This material was 

alternatively designated as PC-1 (Winters, 1945). As with the other ash and residue materials, 

this material likely contained significant quantities of uranium (Banic, 1973).

• Product-80, as manufactured by Harshaw Chemical Company, was a nickel-chromia catalyst with 

traces of iron, copper, sodium, sulfate, chlorine, calcium, and magnesium. In addition, this 

material may have contained trace amounts of cobalt, lead, manganese, and zinc. No information 

has been found to indicate that this material contained any radiological materials (deBethune, 

1943).

• Q Material was a code for more than one material and was commonly used as a generic 

designation for tuballoy (uranium, and specifically, U-238). However, because this material is 

listed as having come from Y-12, it is likely that the appropriate definition of this code is residual 

material from the Q pocket of the receiving end of a calutron (Y-12 Glossary, 1946). 

• Scrap Metal: NIOSH has not located any specific information describing what these materials are, 

but assumes that the materials were radiological in nature. This assumption is based on the 

materials’ inclusion on an inventory of “special material” (Inventory, 1945). In general, uranium 

metal scraps during the MED era were collected at the machining sites in 30- or 55-gallon drums. 

The pieces would have been kept immersed in either water or oil to resist oxidation (BattelleTBD-6000).

• Solid Gunk is a solidified form of the recovery solutions from the washing of calutron units using 

4M nitric acid following the removal of the source, liner, and receiver assemblies. This material 

was filtered, dried, and finally run through an ion exchange resin in an attempt to extract useable 

heavy metals (Banic, 1973).

• Waffle Ash Material was the material remaining following the combustion of scrapings from the 

graphite liner and receiver of the receiver end of the calutron (Y-12 Glossary, 1946). This 

material was alternatively designated as “PC-2,” “Q-face carbons,” and “E face carbons” (Winters, 

1945).
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5.2 Radiological Exposure Sources from Clinton Engineer Works Operations

The following subsections provide an overview of the internal and external exposure sources for the 

Clinton Engineer Works class under evaluation.

5.2.1 Internal Radiological Exposure Sources from CEW Operations

Based on extensive data capture efforts and review of available information, NIOSH has concluded 

that the Clinton Engineer Works workers in and around the Elza Gate warehouses had the potential for 

internal radiation exposures from uranium residues as well as from African and domestic ores through 

inhalation and ingestion of airborne uranium dust, and exposure from radon and radon progeny while 

working at the site. The distinction between the two types of ore is important. The primary 

radiological hazards from an ore that contained only uranium and its short-lived progeny would be 

due to alpha and beta emissions. In contrast, radium and other progeny in the African ores would 

produce, in addition to the alpha and beta emissions, significant gamma emissions and elevated levels 

of radon.

5.2.1.1 Uranium

The radiological hazard presented by uranium metal or compounds results primarily from alpha 

particles emitted by U-238 (4.15 MeV and 4.20 MeV) and its isotopes U-235 (4.37 MeV, 4.40 MeV, 

and 4.58 MeV) and U-234 (4.27 MeV and 4.77 MeV). Naturally-occurring uranium is 0.71% (w/w) 

U-235 and 0.0055 (w/w) U-234. On an activity basis (i.e., dpm/gram), the U-235 will be present in 

negligible amounts at these enrichment levels, but the U-234 activity will be at a level that is 

essentially equal to U-238 due to its much shorter half-life (2.46 x 105 years for U-234, and 4.47 x 109

years for U-238). However, because many of the products stored at the Elza Gate warehouses were 

by-products from an enrichment process, NIOSH cannot assume that the uranium stored at this site 

was of natural enrichment. 

5.2.1.2 Thorium

The uranium ores were reported to contain average concentrattions between 100 - 135 mg of Ra-226 

per tom of ore. Since the progeny were likely in secular equilibrium with the parent nuclide, a 

significant amount of Th-230 could have also been present in the ores and residues. The main 

radiological hazard from Th-230 results from alpha particles, which are emitted at 4.68 MeV.

5.2.1.3 Radium

Ores from the Belgian Congo had average concentrations of up to 100 mg of Ra-226 per ton of ore 

(Dupree-Ellis, 2000; Eisenbud, undated), possibly up to 135 mg per ton (Health Hazards, 1949) and it 

is possible that workers could have been exposed to radium containing dusts while handling and rebagging the ore materials. The internal radiological hazard from radium in the residues comes from 

alpha emissions at 4.78 MeV and 4.61 MeV.

5.2.1.4 Radon
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Radon levels could exist where residues containing uranium daughter products were stored. It is 

likely that workers may have been exposed to short, high-level exposures when opening drums of 

stored uranium residues, opening rail cars used to ship drums to the site, or opening enclosed storage 

rooms containing residues. Radon levels were likely to have varied between warehouses based on 

different materials stored at Elza Gate Warehouses #1, #2, and #3. The major internal exposure hazard 

from radon and its short lived decay products stems from alpha emissions as listed below:

• Rn-222: 5.59 MeV

• Po-218: 6.12 MeV

• Po-214: 7.88 MeV

5.2.2 External Radiological Exposure Sources from CEW Operations

Based on the information and documentation available to NIOSH, the potential for external radiation 

doses from uranium ore, UO2 residues, uranium tailings, uranium slag, and uranium decay products 

existed at the Clinton Engineer Works Elza Gate warehouses site. The following subsections provide 

an overview of the external exposure sources. 

5.2.2.1 Photon

Uranium ore, residues, tailings, and slag were handled by CEW employees. External exposures to 

photon radiation would have resulted from the immediate daughter radionuclides in the uranium decay 

chain. The uranium progeny that result in the most significant photon exposures include Th-234 and 

Pa-234m (Rad Handbook, 1970). Note that these isotopes have relatively short half-lives and can be 

assumed to be in equilibrium with the parent U-238. Because of their short half-lives, the exposure 

potential from these isotopes would travel with the parent and will not be considered separately. The 

radium-226 and short lived decay products of radon-222 are also significant gamma emitters which 

are also part of the uranium chain.

Table 5-1 provides the gamma emission energies of the primary isotopes of concern at the Clinton 

Engineer Works. 

Table 5-1: Gamma Emissions of Primary Interest

Radionuclide Gamma Energy 

(MeV)

Gamma Yield Per Nuclide 

Disintegration (%)

Uranium-238 None N/A

Thorium-234 0.063 3.5

0.093 4

Protactinium-234m 0.766 0.2

1.00 0.6

Uranium-235

0.144 11

0.163 5

0.186 54

0.205 5

Thorium-231 0.026 15

0.084 6.5
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Table 5-1: Gamma Emissions of Primary Interest

Radionuclide Gamma Energy 

(MeV)

Gamma Yield Per Nuclide 

Disintegration (%)

Uranium-234 0.053 0.1

Radium-226 0.186 3.5

Lead-214

0.352

0.295

0.242

37.6

19.3

7.4

Bismuth-214

0.609

1.764

1.120

1.238

2.204

46.1

15.4

15.1

5.8

5.1

Source: Radiological Health Handbook, 1998. A more complete list for 

uranium progeny can be found in this document (Rad Handbook, 1998).

5.2.2.2 Beta

Exposure to beta sources for CEW employees would have resulted principally from uranium/radon

decay products. In the uranium-series decay scheme, beginning with U-238, the short-lived isotope 

Pa-234m emits the most energetic beta particle (2.28 MeV). It is this beta particle that accounts for 

the shallow-dose hazard associated with handling uranium. Table 5-2 provides the beta emission 

energies of the primary isotopes of concern at the Clinton Engineer Works Elza Gate warehouses. 

Table 5-2: Beta Emissions of Primary Interest

Radionuclide Beta Energy 

(MeV, max.)

Beta Yield Per Nuclide 

Disintegration (%)

Uranium-238 None N/A

Thorium-234 0.10 19

0.193 79

Protactinium-234m 2.28 99

Uranium-235 None N/A

Thorium-231

0.205 15

0.287 49

0.304 35

Uranium-234 None N/A

Source: Radiological Health Handbook, 1998. A more complete list for 

uranium progeny can be found in this document (Rad Handbook, 1998).

5.2.2.3 Neutron

Due to the low concentration of uranium in the stored materials, there is no credible source of neutron 

radiation exposure for CEW employees. However, neutrons could be emitted as a result of the α-n 

reaction with light elements, interactions of emitted alpha particles with the oxides, and through 

spontaneous fission. According to Battelle-TBD-6000, uranium oxides would be the most common 
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generators of (α,n) reactions. Spontaneous fission yields and (α,n) yields in oxides are provided in 

Table 3.5 of Battelle-TBD-6000. Based on its analysis, NIOSH concludes that none of these sources 

would be sufficient to result in a significant neutron exposure.

5.2.3 Incidents

NIOSH did not identify any documented accidents at Clinton Engineer Works that resulted in 

exceptionally high personnel exposure levels (such as a criticality event). Therefore, further 

discussion or assessment of potential personnel exposures associated with incidents at Clinton 

Engineer Works is not included in this report. 
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6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Class Evaluated 

by NIOSH

Although NIOSH has been unable to locate any information on the work practices employed by CEW 

workers when loading and unloading materials at the Elza Gate warehouses, some documentation is 

available describing exposure conditions associated with these operations. The documentation 

available to NIOSH does not describe the work processes or exposure conditions associated with the 

Clinton Engineer Works repackaging of the AEC shipments involving uranium and uranium residues

(B1 Material, 1945).

The following subsections provide an overview of the state of the available internal and external 

monitoring data for the Clinton Engineer Works class under evaluation.

6.1 Available Clinton Engineer Works Internal Monitoring Data

NIOSH has access to nineteen radon air samples collected in 1944. Seven of these air samples were 

taken on March 2, 1944 and the remaining twelve were taken on May 23. Of the twelve samples 

taken on May 23, 1944, three were taken in Warehouse #2 before the installation of new ventilation 

fans, and three were taken after the installation. Similarly, three samples were taken both before and 

after installation of fans in Warehouse #3 (Radon Results, 1944).

NIOSH also has records for sixteen radon air samples collected in 1945. On March 9, 1945, five 

samples were collected in Warehouse #2, four samples were collected in Warehouse #3, one sample 

was taken outside the warehouses, and one sample was taken at the nearby Elza Gate guard shack. On 

March 20, 1945, three samples were collected from Warehouse #2 and three were collected from 

Warehouse #3 (B1 Material, 1945).

Although weekly blood counts were recommended for workers at the Elza Gate warehouses as early 

as March 1945 (B1 Material, 1945), NIOSH has been unable to find any documentation indicating 

that CEW conducted a routine bioassay sampling program for its employees. NIOSH does not believe 

that uranium scrap presented an internal hazard at the Clinton Engineer Works Elza Gate warehouses 

because the scrap did not undergo further processing or machining at the site. Battelle-TBD-6000 

indicates that the greatest potential for internal exposures from scrap material occurs during the 

processing of scraps into briquettes, releasing dust and fumes. NOISH has found no indication that 

such processing occurred at the Elza Gate warehouse site. However, uranium ores and residues did

present a potential internal hazard, particularly when such materials were stored in leaky containers or 

when ore was transferred from burlap bags to paper bags (Inspection, 1944; Ferry, 1944). NIOSH has 

insufficient information to support evaluating the dose from those residues. Further information is 

discussed in Section 7.2.

6.2 Available Clinton Engineer Works External Monitoring Data

NIOSH has access to monthly summary exposure records for 20 men covering the time period from 

August 1944 through March 1945. NIOSH has also discovered 347 individual film badge records 

covering the time periods from March 12 through September 1, 1945 (B1 Material, 1945) and January 

29 through March 31, 1946 (Film Badge Results, 1946). These badges are associated with a total of 
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182 control badges, some of which were stored in the guard shack at Elza Gate. Task-specific badges 

were issued to six men on October 29, 1945, six men on July 28, 1945, and nine men on July 31, 

1945. These task-specific records contain descriptions of the types of work each individual was

performing as well as how long each badge was worn (B1 Material, 1945).

NIOSH also has access to two sets of area gamma surveys. The first set was taken in August 1944 

and contains four readings from Warehouse #2 and three readings from Warehouse #3 (Inspection, 

1944, pdf p. 11). The second set of measurements was taken in March 1945 and is comprised of three 

measurements in Warehouse #2 and six measurements in Warehouse #3 (B1 Material, 1945, pdf p. 8). 

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Class Evaluated by 

NIOSH

The feasibility determination for the class of employees under evaluation in this report is governed by 

both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1). Under that Act and rule, NIOSH must establish whether 

or not it has access to sufficient information either to estimate the maximum radiation dose for every 

type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed that could have been incurred under 

plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or to estimate the radiation doses to members of 

the class more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. If NIOSH has access to sufficient 

information for either case, NIOSH would then determine that it would be feasible to conduct dose 

reconstructions.

In determining feasibility, NIOSH begins by evaluating whether current or completed NIOSH dose 

reconstructions demonstrate the feasibility of estimating with sufficient accuracy the potential 

radiation exposures of the class. If the conclusion is one of infeasibility, NIOSH systematically 

evaluates the sufficiency of different types of monitoring data, process and source or source term data, 

which together or individually might ensure that NIOSH can estimate either the maximum doses that 

members of the class might have incurred, or more precise quantities that reflect the variability of 

exposures experienced by groups or individual members of the class as summarized in Section 7.5. 

This approach is discussed in DCAS’s SEC Petition Evaluation Internal Procedures which are

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. The next four major subsections of this Evaluation 

Report examine:

• The sufficiency and reliability of the available data. (Section 7.1)

• The feasibility of reconstructing internal radiation doses. (Section 7.2)

• The feasibility of reconstructing external radiation doses. (Section 7.3)

• The bases for petition SEC-00178 as submitted by the petitioner. (Section 7.4)
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7.1 Pedigree of Clinton Engineer Works Data

This subsection answers questions that need to be asked before performing a feasibility evaluation. 

Data Pedigree addresses the background, history, and origin of the data. It requires looking at site 

methodologies that may have changed over time; primary versus secondary data sources and whether 

they match; and whether data are internally consistent. All these issues form the bedrock of the 

researcher’s confidence and later conclusions about the data’s quality, credibility, reliability, 

representativeness, and sufficiency for determining the feasibility of dose reconstruction. The 

feasibility evaluation presupposes that data pedigree issues have been settled.

7.1.1 Internal Monitoring Data Pedigree Review

As discussed in Section 6.1, NIOSH has not located any documentation indicating that routine air 

sampling or internal monitoring programs for uranium or radon were conducted during CEW 

operations. Therefore, an internal monitoring data sufficiency and pedigree evaluation is not possible 

for this internal monitoring data type.

Radon air sample results from MED surveys conducted in March and May 1944 and March 1945 are 

presented in report form and are recorded both in units of microcuries of radon per liter of air and in 

multiples of the tolerance limit (B1 Material, 1945; Radon Results, 1944). However, due to a lack of 

detailed inventory data spanning the entire period under evaluation, NIOSH could not draw a 

conclusion about the representativeness of the samples for the purpose of estimating personnel 

intakes.

7.1.2 External Monitoring Data Pedigree Review

NIOSH has access to monthly summary exposure records for 20 men covering the time period from 

August 1944 through March 1945. These reports list each individual’s gamma and beta exposures 

and are in the form of original reports. NIOSH also has discovered 347 individual film badge records 

covering the time periods from March 12 through September 1, 1945 (B1 Material, 1945) and January 

29 through March 31, 1946 (Film Badge Results, 1946). These badges are associated with a total of 

182 control badges, some of which were stored in the guard shack at Elza Gate. Task-specific badges 

were issued to six men on October 29, 1945, six men on July 28, 1945, and nine men on July 31, 

1945. These task-specific records contain descriptions of the types of work each individual was 

performing, as well as how long each badge was worn (B1 Material, 1945). Each of these records is 

in the form of original typewritten reports. Based on the format and context provided with the 

available film badge reports, it was possible to conclude that the University of Rochester provided the 

film badge service for the workers at the warehouses. Due to a lack of detailed inventory data 

spanning the entire period under evaluation, NIOSH could not draw a conclusion about the 

representativeness of the dosimetry results for the purpose of estimating personnel exposures.

NIOSH also has access to two sets of area gamma surveys. The first set was taken in August 1944 

and contains four readings from Warehouse #2 and three readings from Warehouse #3 (Inspection, 

1944, pdf p. 11). The second set was taken in March 1945 and is comprised of six measurements 

taken in Warehouse #3 and three measurements taken in Warehouse #2 (B1 Material, 1945, pdf p. 8). 

Both sets of results are in original typewritten reports. Due to a lack of detailed inventory data 
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spanning the entire period under evaluation, NIOSH could not draw a conclusion about the 

representativeness of these samples for the purpose of estimating personnel exposures.

7.2 Evaluation of Bounding Internal Radiation Doses at CEW

The principal sources of internal radiation doses for members of the class under evaluation were 

uranium ore dust during the repackaging of materials shipped and initially stored in burlap bags and

uranium residues that may have spilled from leaky drums (Inspection, 1944). The following 

subsections address the ability to bound internal doses, methods for bounding doses, and the 

feasibility of internal dose reconstruction.

7.2.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related Internal Doses

Workers at the Elza Gate warehouse site were potentially exposed to uranium residues, uranium ore 

dust, and radon. NIOSH has found no indications that bioassay measurements were collected for the 

period under evaluation. NIOSH has also been unable to locate any records indicating that breathing 

zone or area air sampling was conducted during repackaging of uranium ore shipped and initially 

stored in burlap bags or during the clean-up of materials that may have spilled from leaking drums. 

While NIOSH has obtained a limited number of radon air sampling results from 1944 and 1945, those 

results were found to be inadequate to bound internal intakes from radon during the period under 

evaluation (B1 Material, 1945; Radon Results, 1944). Radon air samples were taken on four 

occasions during these two years. On the first occasion, no information is provided on the precise 

location of the sampling. On the subsequent three occasions, each sample is listed along with 

information on the area being sampled. Due to the lack of detailed inventory records, NIOSH cannot 

determine the quantity of material present when the sampling was performed; therefore, the relevance 

or representativeness of those samples for the evaluated class cannot be established.

NIOSH has not identified sufficient documentation to define and quantify the total internal source 

term for the Elza Gate warehouse area during the period under evaluation. Without additional 

documentation, NIOSH cannot make assumptions about the relative amounts of materials that would 

have been encountered on site during this period. Thus, NIOSH finds that it is infeasible to 

completely reconstruct internal doses for the class under evaluation due to insufficient monitoring data 

as well as the inability to define who would have had occasion to work in and around the Elza Gate 

warehouses. Therefore, there is insufficient information available to NIOSH to bound internal 

exposures for the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949 (the end of the EEOICPAcovered period for the site).
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7.2.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Doses

Ambient environmental internal exposures were possible from atmospheric releases of radionuclides 

from the large scale operations of the four plants located within CEW boundaries, as discussed below.

Additional ambient environmental internal exposures were possible from radon released through the 

ventilation systems of the Elza Gate warehouses, although these exposures were likely small 

compared to environmental exposures from the four plants operating within the CEW boundaries. 

K-25 Environmental Releases

Internal exposures to CEW employees were possible due to releases from K-25 stacks, individual 

building releases, and from the purge cascade and other operations at the Oak Ridge Gaseous 

Diffusion Plant. Releases of these radionuclides were studied from 1994 through 1999 as part of the 

Oak Ridge Dose Reconstruction, resulting in the development of a source term for airborne 

radionuclides (Dose Reconstruction, 1999; Shonka, 1997a; Shonka, 1997b; Shonka, 1997c). These

source term data were combined with documented environmental monitoring data to estimate 

radionuclide specific airborne concentrations for U-234, U-235, and U-238. These values are 

tabulated in Tables A-1 through A-3 of the Occupational Environmental TBD of the K-25 Site Profile 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0009-4). These values may be used to bound ambient environmental internal 

exposures for CEW employees. 

X-10 Environmental Releases

Releases from several processes at X-10 had the potential to contribute to ambient environmental 

exposures to CEW employees. The X-10 Graphite Reactor operated from November 1943 until 

November 1963. It was an air-cooled graphite pile; the cooling air exhaust was ventilated unfiltered 

via the 105 stack. The exhaust air system did not provide any hold-up or delay, so the effluent stream 

included short-lived fission gases, their particulate decay products, and air activation products, most 

notably Ar-41. In addition, particulate mixed fission product activity would be released following 

incidents of ruptured fuel slugs. The estimated Ar-41 emission rate from the 105 stack when the 

reactor was at its initial power level in 1944 was approximately 200 curies/day (Parker, 1944). The 

emission rate increased to approximately 500 curies/day in 1945 following an increase in the reactor’s 

operating power level (Cheka, 1945).

Low volumes of high-activity offgases were produced from process vessels such as dissolvers, in 

which the initial chemical separations steps involving irradiated source materials were carried out. 

Examples of such operations include plutonium separations processes such as bismuth phosphate or 

PUREX and its variants, alternative fuel cycle processes such as Thorex, and production of 

radioisotopes such as I-131 or Ba-140/La-140 (i.e., the RaLa process). These high-activity offgas 

streams were ventilated via the 205 stack prior to completion of the ORNL central offgas-handling 

system about 1950 (Cheka, 1948).

High volumes of low-activity waste gases were produced by ORNL’s numerous hot cells and fume 

hoods. Most of these sources were ventilated locally prior to completion of the central offgashandling system about 1950. Other sources of airborne radioactive material in this era were hot 

chemistry work conducted in hoods in Building 706-A. These materials were exhausted via roof 
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vents. In addition, the tank farm was considered a source of airborne material from spills that 

subsequently dried and became airborne (Cheka, 1948). 

Initial air monitoring at X-10 focused on measurement of outdoor exposure rates from the radioiodine 

and noble gas emissions from stacks 105 and 205 via particulate air filters. It was noted that the 

principal effluents from stack 105 was Ar-41 and the principal effluents from stack 205 were xenon 

and iodine. Because the sampling methods at that time did not employ charcoal cartridges for 

sampling radioiodines, the results from the on-site air monitoring network may be considered reliable 

for mixed fission products but may not be accurate for I-131 concentrations. 

Bounding values of dispersion coefficients coupled with release estimates and source term 

information derived from the Oak Ridge Dose Reconstruction project (Dose Reconstruction, 1999) 

have been used to calculate annual average airborne concentration data for I-131 and particulate 

mixed fission products for X-10. These values are tabulated in Attachment 4-B of the Occupational 

Environmental TBD of the X-10 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0012-4) and may be used to bound 

ambient environmental internal exposures for CEW employees. 

Y-12 Environmental Releases

Releases from the electromagnetic separation and uranium salvage processes at Y-12 had the potential 

to contribute to ambient environmental exposures for CEW employees. The Y-12 calutron began 

operation in the fall of 1943 and ran until December 1946, when the gaseous diffusion process was 

selected as a less-costly alternative for uranium enrichment. After this time, electromagnetic 

operations continued for the purpose of researching new radionuclides for medical and industrial uses. 

In addition, the Y-12 plant was involved in the conversion of large quantities of UO2, UO3, and U3O8

for use in the calutrons (Dose Reconstruction, 1999). 

An elaborate system of mechanical and chemical processes was used to recover and reclaim residual 

uranium feed and product material found on equipment and scrap material associated with the calutron 

operations as well as material shipped from the AEC’s Weldon Spring (Missouri) Plant that had 

recoverable U-235. These operations included mechanical scraping and brushing, nitric-acid washing, 

and distillation and reclamation of solid uranium compounds adhering to surfaces. Uraniumcontaminated materials included condensates, scrubber solutions, raffinates, destructive distillates, 

oils, and miscellaneous residues. These facilities handled mostly natural uranium (NU) and depleted 

uranium (DU).

Salvage operations involved EU recovery from all non-product components or by-products of 

operations. Uranium was reclaimed from materials not considered to be production equipment, such 

as liquid and solid waste materials from maintenance and clean-up activities (e.g., mop water, laundry 

washes, and floor drain residues). Other salvage operations included mechanical scraping and 

brushing, nitric-acid washing, and distillations and reclamation of solid uranium compounds (Dose 

Reconstruction, 1999). Combustible materials such as wood, rags, sponges, filter paper, and carbon 

solids were burned in muffle furnaces and incinerators to recover the uranium.

Release estimates for all buildings at Y-12 were previously estimated as part of the Oak Ridge Dose 

Reconstruction Project (Dose Reconstruction, 1999). These independent estimates were based on a 

reconstruction of releases from stack monitoring data. Estimates of uranium releases were 

reconstructed for individual exhaust stacks and vents and were based on available information on
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individual buildings and uranium processes and from indoor air monitoring data. A compilation of 

these release estimates is presented in Table 4.2.4-1 of the Occupational Environmental Dose TBD of 

the Y-12 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4). These values may be used to bound ambient 

environmental internal exposures for CEW workers. 

S-50 Environmental Releases

Construction of the Liquid Thermal Diffusion Plant (S-50) began on July 9, 1944. Uranium 

enrichment began on September 16, 1944 (before construction was complete) and concluded on 

September 9, 1945 (S-50 Compilation, 2005). UF6 losses were common during S-50 operations, with 

UF6 often escaping into the air or cooling water (Manhattan, 1947b); such releases could have 

contributed to the ambient environmental exposures of CEW employees. From March through July 

1945, monthly UF6 losses ranged from 247 to 1,826 lbs (S-50 Compilation, 2005). This released UF6

would rapidly oxidize and form uranyl fluoride (UO2F2), which could then exhaust through the 

building roof (S-50 Compilation, 2005). Accountability records showing losses for other months of 

operation are unavailable. 

NIOSH has been unable to find any environmental monitoring data from S-50 operations. NIOSH 

determined in the SEC Evaluation Report for S-50 that there are insufficient personnel monitoring, air 

monitoring, or source term data to adequately reconstruct any internal or external occupational 

exposures at the plant (NIOSH, 2006). Consequently, NIOSH finds that it is not feasible to estimate 

with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses from internal or external ambient exposures at the S-50 

plant for this current evaluation.

7.2.3 Methods for Bounding Internal Dose at Clinton Engineer Works

7.2.3.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period Internal Dose

NIOSH has determined that the available bioassay, workplace monitoring, and source term data are 

inadequate to bound worker exposures to radon and uranium dust during the storage, transport, and/or

repackaging of uranium ore and residue materials performed during the operational period at the Elza 

Gate warehouse site. Therefore, NIOSH has not identified a method for bounding internal doses at the 

Clinton Engineer Works Elza Gate warehouse site for the period from January 1, 1943 through 

December 31, 1949 (the end of the EEOICPA-covered period for the site). 

7.2.3.2 Methods for Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Dose

Although ambient environmental internal exposures were possible from radon released through the

Elza Gate warehouses’ ventilation systems, these exposures would be small compared to the 

environmental exposure resulting from operations of each of the four plants within the CEW boundary 

The environmental exposures resulting from the operations of the four plants located within the CEW 

boundary are considered bounding for any internal environmental exposure that may have been 

received by a worker at the Elza Gate Warehouse area. 

Although NIOSH does not have Elza Warehouse area-specific internal monitoring data for the period 

from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, NIOSH intends to use the information provided for 

each of the four plants within the CEW boundary, as well as any internal monitoring data that may 
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become available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH dose 

reconstruction processes or procedures). Dose reconstructions for individuals employed at CEW 

during the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, but who do not qualify for 

inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate.

K-25 Environmental Releases

Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at K-25 have been researched and assessed 

in the Occupational Environmental TBD of the K-25 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0009-4). 

Considering the effect that the additional distance between the K-25 plant and the other work 

locations within the CEW boundaries would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the K-25 Site Profile 

would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at off-site (i.e., beyond K-25) 

locations. Therefore, the ambient environmental internal exposure assessment method defined in the 

K-25 Site Profile will serve to bound any ambient internal doses for individuals working within the 

CEW boundaries, but outside the fenced boundaries of the K-25 plant. 

X-10 Environmental Releases

Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at X-10 have been researched and assessed 

in the Occupational Environmental TBD of the X-10 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0012-4). 

Considering the effect that the additional distance between the X-10 plant and the other work 

locations within the CEW boundaries would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the X-10 Site Profile 

would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at off-site (i.e., beyond X-10) 

locations. Therefore, the ambient environmental internal exposure assessment method defined for 

X-10 workers in the X-10 Site Profile will serve to bound any ambient internal doses for individuals 

working within the CEW boundaries, but outside the fenced boundaries of the X-10 plant. 

Y-12 Environmental Releases

Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at Y-12 have been researched and assessed 

in the Occupational Environmental TBD of the Y-12 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4). 

Considering the effect that the additional distance between the Y-12 plant and the other work 

locations within CEW boundaries would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the Y-12 Site Profile 

would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at off-site (i.e., beyond Y-12) 

locations. Therefore, the ambient environmental internal exposure assessment method defined for 

Y-12 workers in the Y-12 Site Profile will serve to bound any ambient internal doses for individuals 

working within the CEW boundaries, but outside the fenced boundaries of the Y-12 plant. 

S-50 Environmental Releases

NIOSH has been unable to find any environmental monitoring data from S-50 operations. NIOSH 

determined in the SEC Evaluation Report for S-50 (NIOSH, 2006) that there are insufficient personnel 

monitoring, air monitoring, and source term data to adequately reconstruct any internal or external 

occupational exposures at the S-50 plant. Consequently, NIOSH finds that it is infeasible to estimate 
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with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses from internal or external ambient exposures at the S-50 

plant. 

7.2.4 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion

NIOSH finds there are insufficient data, including bioassay results, air concentrations, or process 

information to estimate with sufficient accuracy internal exposures to radionuclides in the Elza Gate 

warehouse area of Clinton Engineer Works. Therefore, NIOSH finds that it is infeasible to 

completely reconstruct internal doses from the start of the class under evaluation (January 1, 1943) 

through the end of the EEOICPA-covered period (December 31, 1949) due to insufficient monitoring 

data.

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct internal radiation doses for the 

period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, NIOSH intends to use any internal 

monitoring data, including the ambient environmental monitoring data for the plants within the 

Clinton Engineering Works area, that may become available for an individual claim (and that can be 

interpreted using existing NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or procedures). Dose reconstructions 

for individuals employed at Clinton Engineer Works during the period from January 1, 1943 through 

December 31, 1949, but who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these 

data as appropriate.

7.3 Evaluation of Bounding External Radiation Doses at CEW

The principal sources of external radiation doses for members of the evaluated class were uranium and 

uranium daughters found in the uranium materials and wastes located on the property. Domestic ores, 

African pitchblende, recoverable scrap materials, and various residues were stored on site. Radium 

and its progeny would produce gamma radiation. The following subsections address the ability to 

bound external doses, methods for bounding doses, and the feasibility of external dose reconstruction.

While the supporting documentation available to NIOSH states that some external monitoring was 

performed during the CEW operational period, NIOSH has been unable to locate a complete 

individual external monitoring data set for the class evaluated in this report. NIOSH has individual 

gamma and beta monitoring records spanning the time periods from August 1944 through September 

1945 and January through March 1946 for employees who directly handled the radiological material 

at the warehouses; however, a lack of detailed inventory information precludes NIOSH from

determining whether these data sets are representative of the exposures potentially received during the 

entire period under evaluation.

Although NIOSH has obtained a limited number of area gamma survey results from 1944 and 1945, 

these results were found to be inadequate to bound external exposures during the period under 

evaluation (B1 Material, 1945, pdf p. 8; Inspection, 1944, pdf p. 11). Each of the sample results 

includes information on the approximate sampling location. However, due to lack of detailed 

inventory records, NIOSH cannot determine the quantity of material present when sampling was 

performed; and therefore, cannot establish the relevance or representativeness of those samples to the 

class under evaluation.
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NIOSH has not identified sufficient documentation to define and quantify the total external source 

term for Clinton Engineer Works during the period under evaluation. Without additional 

documentation, NIOSH cannot make reasonable assumptions about the relative amounts of materials 

that would have been encountered at the site during the specified period. Thus, NIOSH finds that it is 

infeasible to completely reconstruct external doses for the class under evaluation due to insufficient 

monitoring data. Therefore, there is insufficient information available to NIOSH to bound external 

exposures for the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949 (the end of the EEOICPAcovered period for the site).

7.3.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses

Area surveys performed in 1988 and 1989 (ORNL Survey, 1988; ORNL Survey, 1989) indicate that 

the concrete pads on which the warehouses once stood, as well as the soils surrounding the pads, 

contained radiological contaminants, suggesting a possible exposure pathway for ambient 

environmental external doses. NIOSH has not discovered any documentation describing when the 

structures were removed, thus exposing the concrete pads to the elements. Because the CEW area 

experiences an average annual precipitation of 140 cm (Assessment, 1992), it is infeasible to use the 

available data to estimate a soil or concrete pad contamination level for the time period under 

evaluation. However, any ambient environmental external exposures will be bounded by the

atmospheric releases of radionuclides from the four plants located within CEW boundaries. 

K-25 Environmental Releases

External exposures to CEW employees were possible due to releases from K-25 stacks, individual 

building releases, and from the purge cascade and other operations at the Oak Ridge Gaseous 

Diffusion Plant. Releases of these radionuclides were studied from 1994 through 1999 as part of the 

Oak Ridge Dose Reconstruction, resulting in the development of a source term for airborne 

radionuclides (Dose Reconstruction, 1999; Shonka, 1997a; Shonka, 1997b; Shonka, 1997c). This 

source term was combined with documented environmental monitoring data to estimate radionuclide 

specific airborne concentrations for U-234, U-235, and U-238. These values are tabulated in Tables 

A-1 through A-3 of the Occupational Environmental TBD of the K-25 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS0009-4) and may be used to bound ambient environmental external exposures assuming a plume 

submersion scenario for CEW employees. In addition, ORAUT-TKBS-0009-4, Attachment A, lists 

average occupational environmental doses derived from gamma radiation levels measured at two 

perimeter monitoring stations. 

X-10 Environmental Releases

As described in Section 7.2.2, releases from several processes at X-10 had the potential to contribute 

to ambient environmental exposures to CEW employees. By the late 1940s, ORNL had an established 

program of routine measurements to monitor the ambient “background” at the Laboratory. 

Measurements were made at approximately 50 specific locations in the Laboratory area using a 

portable GM counter and scaler. The measurements, referred to as “background checks,” were 

performed approximately monthly and were originally quantified in terms of count rate. Starting in 

February 1949, a radium source was used to determine a calibration factor in cpm per mR/hr for the 

detector used, and results from then on were reported in mR/hr. However, data for 1947 and 1948 

have been found in which the results have been converted from cpm to mR/hr (Morgan, 1959).
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Annual average site-wide exposure rate data are not available for 1944 through 1946. The annual 

site-wide average determined for 1947 was therefore assigned for 1944 to 1946 in the Site Profile 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0012-4). The largest contributor to elevated local exposure rates during that time 

was the RaLa process, both from exposure rates around the process building itself while runs were in 

progress, and from high-level liquid wastes eventually discharged to the settling basin. Data from the 

X-22 chambers from 1944 and 1945 show noble gas emissions to be only a minor contributor to 

on-site exposure rates. The number of short-decayed fuel slugs from the Graphite Reactor used in the 

RaLa program in 1944 and 1945 was much less than that for 1946, and the amount of material 

processed in 1946 was comparable to that processed in 1947 (Dose Reconstruction, 1999). Thus, 

applying the 1947 exposure rate for the prior years is a plausible upper bound.

Annual average exposure rate data for the X-10 site are summarized in ORAUT-TKBS-0012-4, 

Attachment 4C, for 1944 through 2003. The site-wide averages include measurement locations where 

exposure rates were chronically much higher than for other measurement locations and thus served to 

drive the average higher. These high-reading locations include the vicinity of the 706-D fan house

(which operated until about 1950) and the vicinity of the settling basin. Other locations would raise 

the site-wide average depending on what activities were taking place, such as locations in the vicinity 

of Buildings 706-A or 706-C in the mid-to-late 1940s. The fact that these instances are included in 

the average exposure rate data means the site-wide averages should be sufficiently bounding for a 

CEW worker. 

Y-12 Environmental Releases

As described in Section 7.2.2, releases from the electromagnetic separation and uranium salvage 

processes at Y-12 had the potential to contribute to ambient environmental exposures for CEW

employees. ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4 uses the results of the 1987 outdoor scoping survey (Y-12 

Survey, 1990a; Y-12 Survey, 1990b) for estimating external exposures for all years from 1948 to 

2002. The scoping survey is a comprehensive assessment of radiation exposures and encompasses all 

areas of the site. There are 1787 grids; the resolution of the grids (100 feet x 100 feet to 200 feet x 

200 feet) ensures that all localized hot-spots are included. The purpose of the scoping survey was to 

locate and prioritize areas of concern from both a worker health and safety standpoint and from an 

environmental assessment standpoint; therefore, this survey is very relevant to assessing worker 

exposure. 

The Occupational Environmental Dose TBD for Y-12 workers (ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4) employs the 

highest direct exposure value from either the scans or the direct readings to ensure that exposures 

attributable to shine or localized hot-spots are taken into account. Data derived from these 

measurements are presented in Table 4.4.4-1 and converted to dose equivalent rates in Table D-7 of 

ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4. These values may be used to bound ambient environmental internal 

exposures for CEW employees. 

S-50 Environmental Releases

Construction of the Liquid Thermal Diffusion Plant (S-50) began on July 9, 1944. Uranium 

enrichment began on September 16, 1944 (before construction was complete) and concluded on 

September 9, 1945 (S-50 Compilation, 2005). UF6 losses were common during S-50 operations, with 
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UF6 often escaping into the air or cooling water (Manhattan, 1947b); such releases could have 

contributed to the ambient environmental exposures of CEW employees. From March through July 

1945, monthly UF6 losses ranged from 247 to 1,826 lbs. (S-50 Compilation, 2005). This released UF6

would rapidly oxidize and form uranyl fluoride (UO2F2), which could then exhaust through the 

building roof (S-50 Compilation, 2005). Accountability records showing losses for other months of 

operation are unavailable. 

NIOSH has been unable to find any environmental monitoring data from S-50 operations. NIOSH 

determined in the SEC Evaluation Report for S-50 that there are insufficient personnel monitoring, air 

monitoring, or source term data to adequately reconstruct any internal or external occupational 

exposures at the plant (NIOSH, 2006). Consequently, NIOSH finds that it is not feasible to estimate 

with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses from internal or external ambient exposures at the S-50 

plant for this current evaluation.

7.3.3 Clinton Engineer Works Occupational X-Ray Examinations

During the earliest construction periods of Clinton Engineer Works, individual construction 

companies operated their own field first-aid facilities and medical care programs (Radiology, 1966). 

A formal medical program for the CEW was developed under the guidance of the MED in April 1943. 

Under this program, all employees received a full physical examination, including a

photofluorographic chest X-ray, before starting work (Radiology, 1966). In November 1943, Oak 

Ridge Hospital opened in Oak Ridge complete with emergency rooms, an outpatient facility, 

pathology laboratory, and diagnostic X-ray equipment (Hospital, 1951). An investigation of medical 

X-ray films contained in the ORNL Medical Records Vault indicates that the screening X-ray 

examinations for all of the CEW facilities were performed at Oak Ridge Hospital until the individual 

plants developed their own occupational medicine departments and began performing their own X-ray 

examinations (ORAUT-TKBS-0012-3; ORAUT-TKBS-0014-3).

No specific information regarding occupational medical dose has been identified for individual 

Clinton Engineer Works employees; however, the dose associated with on-site medical X-ray exams, 

required as a condition of employment, can be bounded by using the assumptions in the complex-wide 

TBD, Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray Procedures (ORAUTOTIB-0006). Therefore, NIOSH concludes that it is likely feasible to reconstruct occupational 

medical dose for Clinton Engineer Works workers with sufficient accuracy.

7.3.4 Methods for Bounding External Dose at Clinton Engineer Works

There is an established protocol for assessing external exposure when performing dose reconstructions

(these sources of exposure are discussed in the following subsections):

• Photon Dose

• Beta Dose

• Neutron Dose

• Medical X-ray Dose

7.3.4.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period External Dose
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Due to the low concentration of uranium in the stored materials, there is no credible source of neutron 

radiation exposure for CEW employees. NIOSH has determined that it lacks sufficient personnel 

monitoring data, area monitoring data, or source term data needed to bound external photon or beta 

doses that CEW workers potentially received from natural uranium, uranium residues, and uranium 

progeny. Therefore, NIOSH has not identified a method for bounding external doses at Clinton 

Engineer Works for the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949 (the end of the 

EEOICPA-covered period for the site).

Medical X-ray Dose

Although no specific information regarding occupational medical dose has been identified for 

individual Clinton Engineer Works employees, the dose associated with medical X-ray exams, if 

required as a condition of employment and administered onsite, can be bounded by using the 

assumptions in the complex-wide TBD, Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic 

X-Ray Procedures (ORAUT-OTIB-0006). NIOSH believes this methodology supports its ability to 

bound the occupational medical X-ray doses for the Clinton Engineer Works class under evaluation

7.3.4.2 Methods for Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses

Although ambient environmental external exposures were possible from ground contamination around 

the Elza Gate warehouses, any exposures would be small compared to the environmental exposure 

resulting from operations of each of the four plants within the CEW boundary The environmental 

exposures resulting from the operations of the four plants located within the CEW boundary are 

considered bounding for any environmental exposure that may have been received by a worker at the 

Elza Gate Warehouse area.

Although NIOSH does not have Elza Gate Warehouse area-specific external-monitoring data for the 

period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, NIOSH intends to use the information 

provided for each of the four plants within the CEW boundary, as well as any external monitoring data 

that may become available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH 

dose reconstruction processes or procedures). Dose reconstructions for individuals employed at CEW 

during the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, but who do not qualify for 

inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate.

K-25 Environmental Releases

Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at K-25 have been researched and assessed 

in the Occupational Environmental TBD of the K-25 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0009-4). 

Considering the effect that the additional distance between the K-25 plant and the other work 

locations within the CEW boundaries would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the K-25 Site Profile 

would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at off-site (beyond K-25) 

locations. Therefore, the ambient environmental external exposure assessment method defined for K25 workers in the K-25 Site Profile will serve to bound any ambient external exposures for individuals 

working within the CEW boundaries, but outside the fenced boundaries of the K-25 plant. 

X-10 Environmental Releases
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Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at X-10 have been researched and assessed 

in the Occupational Environmental TBD of the X-10 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0012-4). 

Considering the effect that the additional distance between the X-10 plant and the other work 

locations within the CEW boundaries would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the X-10 Site Profile 

would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at off-site (beyond X-10) 

locations. Therefore, the ambient environmental external exposure assessment method defined for 

X-10 workers in the X-10 Site Profile will serve to bound any ambient external doses for individuals 

working within the CEW boundaries, but outside the fenced boundaries of the X-10 plant. 

Y-12 Environmental Releases

Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at Y-12 have been researched and assessed 

in the Occupational Environmental TBD of the Y-12 Site Profile (ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4). 

Considering the effect that the additional distance between the Y-12 plant and the other work 

locations within the CEW boundaries would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the Y-12 Site Profile 

would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at off-site (beyond Y-12) 

locations. Therefore, the ambient environmental external exposure assessment method defined for 

Y-12 workers in the Y-12 Site Profile will serve to bound any ambient external doses for individuals 

working within the CEW boundaries, but outside the fenced boundaries of the Y-12 plant. 

S-50 Environmental Releases

NIOSH has been unable to find any environmental monitoring data from S-50 operations. NIOSH 

determined in the SEC Evaluation Report for S-50 (NIOSH, 2006) that there are insufficient personnel 

monitoring, air monitoring, and source term data to adequately reconstruct any internal or external 

occupational exposures at the S-50 plant. Consequently, NIOSH finds that it is infeasible to estimate 

with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses from internal or external ambient exposures at the S-50 

plant. 

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion

NIOSH finds there are insufficient data, including film badge results, area surveys, or process 

information, to estimate with sufficient accuracy external exposures to radiological materials in the 

Elza Gate warehouse area of Clinton Engineer Works. Therefore, NIOSH finds that it is infeasible to 

completely reconstruct external doses from the start of the class under evaluation (January 1, 1943) 

through the end of the EEOICPA-covered period (December 31, 1949) due to insufficient monitoring 

data. 

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct external radiation doses for 

the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949, NIOSH intends to use any external 

monitoring data, including the ambient environmental monitoring data for the plants within the 

Clinton Engineering Works area, that may become available for an individual claim (and that can be 

interpreted using existing NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or procedures). Dose reconstructions 

for individuals employed at Clinton Engineer Works during the period from January 1, 1943 through 
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December 31, 1949, but who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these 

data as appropriate.

7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00178

The following subsection evaluates an assertion made on behalf of petition SEC-00178 for the Clinton 

Engineer Works. 

7.4.1 Lack of Monitoring Data

SEC-00178: I have enclosed a document with information obtain [sic] from DOE that indicates that 

dad was not monitored for radiation exposure during his employment.

Personal internal, external monitoring, and/or area monitoring data are not always required to develop 

an exposure model for a given facility. However, if these monitoring data are not available, NIOSH 

must have access to source term information and detailed process information in order to develop a 

sufficiently accurate exposure model. To date, NIOSH does not have access to Clinton Engineer 

Works personnel or area monitoring documentation that describes the extent of the storage and/or 

shipping activities that may have been performed with the uranium scrap, uranium ore, and uranium 

residues.

Due to the unknown radiological makeup of the uranium residues, NIOSH determined that intakes 

from potential uranium residue exposure cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. NIOSH

also determined that it does not have adequate internal monitoring data for members of the class under 

evaluation, nor does it have enough source term or process information to develop a sufficiently 

accurate model for dose reconstruction for these exposures during the relevant timeframe.

7.5 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00178

This report evaluates the feasibility for completing dose reconstructions for employees at the Clinton 

Engineer Works from January 1943 through December 1949. NIOSH found that the available 

monitoring records, process descriptions and source term data available are not sufficient to complete 

dose reconstructions from January 1, 1943 through the end of the EEOICPA-covered period 

(December 31, 1949).

Table 7-1 summarizes the results of the feasibility findings at Clinton Engineer Works for each 

exposure source during the time period January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949.

Table 7-1: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00178

January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949

Source of Exposure Reconstruction Feasible Reconstruction Not Feasible

Internal1 X

 - U X

 - Rn X
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Table 7-1: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00178

January 1, 1943 through December 31, 1949

Source of Exposure Reconstruction Feasible Reconstruction Not Feasible

- Ra X

 - Th X

External X

 - Gamma X

 - Beta X

 - Neutron N/A N/A

 - Occupational Medical X-ray X

1 Internal includes an evaluation of airborne dust data.

As of January 25, 2012, a total of 38 claims have been submitted to NIOSH for individuals who 

worked at Clinton Engineer Works during the period under evaluation in this report. Dose 

reconstructions have been completed for 27 individuals (71%).

Although NIOSH found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation doses for the 

proposed class, NIOSH intends to use available ambient environmental monitoring data from the 

plants within the Clinton Engineer Works area as well as any internal and external monitoring data 

that may become available for an individual claim (and that can be interpreted using existing NIOSH 

dose reconstruction processes or procedures). Therefore, dose reconstructions for individuals 

employed at Clinton Engineer Works during the period from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 

1949, but who do not qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as 

appropriate.
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8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00178

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3). Under these requirements, if it is not 

feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, NIOSH must 

also determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered the 

health of members of the class. Section 83.13 requires NIOSH to assume that any duration of 

unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of members of a class when it has been 

established that the class may have been exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If 

the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then NIOSH is 

required to specify that health was endangered for those workers who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 

NIOSH has knowledge that radiological material were stored and repackaged in the area of the Elza 

Gate Warehouses of Clinton Engineer Works. NIOSH has limited survey and monitoring data, 

including limited information on total inventories of radiological materials in this location. NIOSH’s 

evaluation determined that it is not feasible to estimate radiation dose for members of the NIOSHevaluated class with sufficient accuracy based on the sum of information available from available 

resources. Therefore, the resulting NIOSH-proposed SEC class must include a minimum required 

employment period as a basis for specifying that health was endangered.

9.0 Class Conclusion for Petition SEC-00178

Based on its full research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH has defined a single class of 

employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. The NIOSHproposed class to be added to the SEC includes all employees of the Tennessee Eastman Corporation 

(1943-1949) and the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corporation (1947-1949) who were employed at

the Clinton Engineer Works in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, from January 1, 1943 through December 31, 

1949, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this 

employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more 

other classes of employees in the Special Exposure Cohort.

NIOSH has carefully reviewed all material sent in by the petitioner, including the specific assertions 

stated in the petition, and has responded herein (see Section 7.4). NIOSH has also reviewed available 

technical resources and many other references, including the Site Research Database (SRDB), for 

information relevant to SEC-00178. In addition, NIOSH reviewed its NOCTS dose reconstruction 

database to identify EEOICPA-related dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to 

the petition evaluation.

These actions are based on existing, approved NIOSH processes used in dose reconstruction for 

claims under EEOICPA. NIOSH’s guiding principle in conducting these dose reconstructions is to 

ensure that the assumptions used are fair, consistent, and well-grounded in the best available science. 
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Simultaneously, uncertainties in the science and data must be handled to the advantage, rather than to 

the detriment, of the petitioners. When adequate personal dose monitoring information is not 

available, or is very limited, NIOSH may use the highest reasonably possible radiation dose, based on 

reliable science, documented experience, and relevant data to determine the feasibility of 

reconstructing the dose of an SEC petition class. NIOSH contends that it has complied with these 

standards of performance in determining the feasibility or infeasibility of reconstructing dose for the 

class under evaluation.
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10.0 References

42 C.F.R. pt. 81, Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule, Federal 

Register/Vol. 67, No. 85/Thursday, p 22,296; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 19391

42 C.F.R. pt. 82, Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 

19392

42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special 

Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000; Final Rule; May 28, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 22001

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385 [EEOICPA], Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program Act of 2000, as amended

Assessment, 1992, Postremediation Dose Assessment for the Elza Gate Site, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 

M. Nimmagadda, C. Yu; Argonne National Laboratory for U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge 

Operations; October 1992; SRDB Ref ID: 78398

B1 Material, 1945, Storage of B1 Material in 0101 Area, Memorandum to the Files from J. L. Ferry 

(Medical Corps), U.S. Engineer Office, Manhattan District; April 16, 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 5920

Banic, 1973, Radiation Safety and Control for the Electromagnetic Isotope Separation of the Heavy 

Elements in Building 9204-3, Y-12 Plant, Including Operational Procedures and Facility Layouts, G. 

M. Banic, et al; prepared by the Isotopes Development Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, for 

the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; March 1973; SRDB Ref ID: 42112

Battelle-TBD-6000, Site Profiles for Atomic Weapons Employers that Worked Uranium and Thorium, 

PSWS-3738; Rev. F0; Battelle; December 13, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 30671

Bowman, 1949, Report on Oak Ridge Operation, from H. L. Bowman (consultant) to S. Warren 

(Director, Division of Biology and Medicine); August 26, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 8285

CEW Facts, 1947, Basic Facts on Clinton Engineer Works, Its Operating and Research Units, and the 

Community of Oak Ridge, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; undated, but from content, likely 1947; 

SRDB Ref ID: 90645

CEW Map, 1985, Clinton Engineer Works, reprinted from V. C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the 

Atomic Bomb; U.S. Government Printing Office; 1985; www.atomicarchive.com/Maps/Images/ 

oak_ridge_large.gif; SRDB Ref ID: 89564

Cheka, 1945, Air Monitoring at Site “X,” J. S. Cheka; Health Division, Health-Physics Section, Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory; June 31, 1945; SRDN Ref ID: 13254
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Cheka, 1948, Progress Report on the Particle Problem, J. S. Cheka, H. J. McAlduff; Health Physics 

Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; September 10, 1948; SRDN Ref ID: 5499

Chemical 42-17, 1943, Transfer of Chemical 42-17, Grade A, transfer request from G. W. Russell 

(Corp of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District) to the District Engineer, Clinton Engineer Works; 

September 8, 1943; SRDB Ref ID: 90788

Codes, 1979, Visit from Mont Mason, 21-24 August 1979: Codes Used for Material at MCW, 

Chemical and radionuclide codes used at Mallinckrodt Chemical Works; August 21-24, 1979; SRDB 

Ref ID: 13864

Covington, 1943, Transfer of Responsibility for Guarding the Y-12 Area, letter from P. T. Covington 

(Clinton Engineer Works, Tennessee Eastman Corporation) to W. E. Kelley (The Area Engineer 

office, Clinton Engineer Works); September 27, 1943; SRDB Ref ID: 90946

Davies, 1944, Materials in 0101 Area, C. E. W., memorandum from J. L. Davies (Corps of Engineers, 

Madison Square Area) to B. W. Menke; July 18, 1944; SRDB Ref ID: 91992

deBethune, 1943, Gas Velocity Relationships, Product 80 Reduction, A. J. deBethune; Columbia 

University, Division of War Research; May 17, 1943; SRDB Ref ID: 31036

Dose Reconstruction, 1999, Uranium Releases from the Oak Ridge reservation – a Review of the 

Quality of Historical Effluent Monitoring Data and a Screening Evaluation of Potential Off-Site 

Exposures, J. E. Buddenbaum, et al; Reports of the Oak Ridge Dose Reconstruction, Vol. 5; The 

Report of Project Task 6; July 1999; Submitted to the Tennessee Department of Health by ChemRisk; 

SRDB Ref ID: 12715

Dupree-Ellis, 2000, External Radiation Exposure and Mortality in a Cohort of Uranium Processing 

Workers, E. Dupree-Ellis, et al; American Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 152, No. 1, 2000; SRDB Ref 

ID: 9486

Eisenbud, undated, Early Occupational Exposure Experience with Uranium Processing, M. Eisenbud; 

New York University Medical Center; undated; from content, not earlier than 1970; SRDB Ref ID: 

10629

Elza Gate Survey, 1992, Verification Survey of the Elza Gate Site, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, T. J. Vitkus, 

T. L. Bright; Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education; ORISE 92/L-30; December 4, 1992; 

SRDB Ref ID: 40358

Ferry, 1944, Inspection of Warehouses at Oak Ridge, memo from J. L Ferry (U.S. Engineer Office, 

Manhattan District) to P. Merritt (The Area Engineer office, Madison Square Area, New York); 

August 12, 1944; SRDB Ref ID: 78413

Film Badge Results, 1946, Results of Film Density Measurements in Area 0101, J. R. Hayes; Clinton 

Engineer Works; various dates in January-March, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 5495
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Hadlock, 1943, Letter to Columbia University Specifying Code Symbols for Compounds, from C. 

Hadlock (Corps of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District) to Dr. J. R. Dunning (Columbia 

University); September 29, 1943; SRDB Ref ID: 31030

Hanford Glossary, 1961, Glossary of Hanford Terminology, B. B. Lane; General Electric, Hanford 

Atomic Products Operation; February 1, 1961; SRDB Ref ID: 43651

Health Hazards, 1949, Health Hazards in NYOO Facilities Producing and Processing Uranium (A 

Status Report – April 1, 1949), NYOO Medical Division, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, New 

York Operations Office; April 18, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 3931

History Report, 1944, History Report, Clinton Engineer Works Tennessee Eastman Corporation, 

October, 1944; SRDB Ref ID: TBD

Hospital, 1951, Second Annual Report, Oak Ridge Hospital, Incorporated, Oak Ridge, Tennessee for 

the Year Ended June 30, 1951, Oak Ridge Hospital; 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 64546

Inspection, 1944, Inspection of Warehouses at Oak Ridge, inspection report from J. L. Ferry (for the 

District Engineers) to the Area Engineer, Madison Square Area, Manhattan Engineer District; August 

12, 1944; SRDB Ref ID: 8328

Inventory, 1945, Inventory of Special Materials, 0101 Area, Clinton Engineer Works, March 1, 1945; 

SRDB Ref ID: 46027

Linking Legacies, 1997, Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production 

Processes to Their Environmental Consequences, Office of Environmental Management, U.S. 

Department of Energy; January 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 11930

Manhattan, 1947a, Manhattan District History, Book I – General, Volume 12 – Clinton Engineer 

Works, Central Facilities, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission; March 26, 1947; SRDB Ref ID: 44037

Manhattan, 1947b, Manhattan District History, Book VI Liquid Thermal Diffusion (S-50) Projects, U. 

S. Atomic Energy Commission; May 21, 1947; SRDB Ref ID: Export Controlled Information. A 

controlled copy can be obtained by contacting the COC Librarian.

Manhattan, 1985, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, V. C. Jones; Center of Military 

History, U. S. Army; Chapter XIV: The Feed Materials Program; 1985; SRDB Ref ID: 6603, pdf p. 

195

Mason, 1977, History & Background Relative to the Radiological Re-monitoring of Mallinckrodt by 

the Energy Research and Development Administration, prepared for Mallinckrodt, Inc, by M. G. 

Mason; August 19, 1977; SRDB Ref ID: 15283

Monthly Reports, 1943-1945, Monthly Accountability Reports for Various Sites (including Oak Ridge) 

for 1943-1945, Memoranda to the Files, Corps of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District; various 

authors and dates in 1943-1945; SRDB Ref ID: 30859
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Morgan, 1959, Waste Management Program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, K. Z. Morgan; 

Congressional Wastes Disposal Hearings, Washington, D.C.; January 28 – February 4, 1959; SRDB 

13258

Morse, 1945, Scrap Materials, memo from R. D. Morse (Corps of Engineers) to L. R. Zumwalt 

(District Engineer Office, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, Tennessee); January 3, 1945; SRDB Ref 

ID: 46642

NIOSH, 2006, SEC Petition Evaluation Report for Petition SEC-00060, S-50 Oak Ridge Thermal 

Diffusion Plant; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); August 4, 2006; 

SRDB Ref ID: 33588

OCAS-PR-004, Internal Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, Rev. 0, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); Cincinnati, Ohio; September 23, 

2004; SRDB Ref ID: 32022

ORAUT-OTIB-0004, Estimating the Maximum Plausible Dose to Workers at Atomic Weapons 

Employer Facilities, Rev. 03 PC-2; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; December 6, 2006; SRDB 

Ref ID: 36191

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray 

Procedures, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; December 21, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 20220

ORAUT-OTIB-0024, Estimation of Neutron Dose Rates from Alpha-Neutron Reactions in Uranium 

and Thorium Compounds, Rev. 00; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; April 7, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 

19445

ORAUT-TKBS-0009-4, K-25 Site - Occupational Environmental Dose, Rev. 01, Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities; June 22, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32526

ORAUT-TKBS-0012-3, Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Occupational Medical Dose, Rev. 02, Oak 

Ridge Associated Universities; October 1, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 35194

ORAUT-TKBS-0012-4, Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Occupational Environmental Dose, Rev. 

00, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; May 7, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 20136

ORAUT-TKBS-0014-3, Y-12 National Security Complex – Occupational Medical Dose, Rev. 01, Oak 

Ridge Associated Universities; June 18, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 32461

ORAUT-TKBS-0014-4, Y-12 National Security Complex – Occupational Environmental Dose, Rev. 

01, Oak Ridge Associated Universities; July 20, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 30042

ORNL Survey, 1988, Summary of October/November ORNL Survey, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; 

November 1988; SRDB Ref ID: 78416

ORNL Survey, 1989, Preliminary Site Survey report for the Former Elza Gate Warehouse Area, Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; September 1989; SRDB Ref ID: 40359
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Parker, 1944, Review of Air Monitoring Procedures at Clinton Laboratories, H. M. Parker, possibly 

Argonne National Laboratory; September 1944; SRDB Ref ID: 13256

Personal Communication, 2010, Personal Communication with Current Manufacturing Engineer at 

Y-12; Telephone interview by NIOSH; November 29, 2010; SRDB Ref ID: 93103

Personal Communication, 2011, Personal Communication with two Oak Ridge Historians, Interview, 

December 12, 2011; SRDB Ref ID: 105919

Rad Handbook, 1970, Radiological Health Handbook, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 

Welfare, Public Health Service; PHS-PUBL-2016; January 1970; SRDB Ref ID: 75017

Rad Handbook, 1998, Handbook of Health Physics and Radiological Health, 3rd Edition, B. Shleien, 

L. A. Slaback, Jr., B. K. Birky, editors; 1998; SRDB Ref ID: 22737 (commonly available from public 

resources)

Radiology, 1966, Radiology in World War II, Medical Department, U.S. Army; 1966; SRDB Ref ID: 

10603

Radon Results, 1944, Mz Concentrations in Warehouses at Oak Ridge, memorandum from J. L. Ferry

(Medical Corps) to S. L. Warren (U.S. Engineer Office, Knoxville, Tennessee); March 2, 1944; SRDB 

Ref ID: 5930

S-50 Compilation, 2005, Compilation of Historical Document Reference Sources for Project S-50, 

Liquid Thermal Diffusion Plant, R. P. Prince; Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC for the U.S. Department 

of Energy; ETTP-736; May 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 17169

Sapirie, 1972, Disposal of Excess Real Property – Parcel 228, approval letter from S. R. Sapirie 

(Manager, Oak Ridge Operations) to J. L. Smith (Director, Division of Contracts, HQS); February 3, 

1972; SRDB Ref ID: 78415

Shipment, 1945, Shipment Security Survey at Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Memorandum to the 

Officer in Charge from F. W. Simons, Intelligence and Security Division, Manhattan Engineer 

District; February 15, 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 9161

Shonka, 1997a, The Atmospheric Master Release List and Atmospheric Source Term for K-25, R. E. 

Burmeister; Shonka Research Associates, Inc.; Calc No. SRA-96-012, Rev. 1; February 11, 1997; 

SRDB Ref ID: 14012

Shonka, 1997b, 237Np and 99Tc Released to Air and Water from Historic Operations at the ORGDP 

and Y-12 Sites, R. E. Burmeister; Shonka Research Associates, Inc.; Calc No. SRA-97-003, Rev. 0; 

May 14, 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 14013

Shonka, 1997c, Per Annum Atmospheric Releases of Uranium from the K-25 Site from 1944 to 1995, 

R. E. Burns, Jr.; Shonka Research Associates, Inc.; Calc No. SRA-97-011, Rev. 0; December 3, 1997; 

SRDB Ref ID: 14014
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Winters, 1945, Memo Identifying Shipped Materials, from C. E. Winters (CEW Engineer) to K. T. 

McBee (Purdue University); April 11, 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 30742, pdf p. 9

Y-12 Glossary, 1946, Glossary of Y-12 Coded Terminology and Nomenclature, Part II: Chemical 

Terms, R. Beldock; Clinton Engineer Works – Tennessee Eastman Corporation; October 18, 1946; 

SRDB Ref ID: 8384

Y-12 Survey, 1990a, The Outdoor Radiological and Chemical Surface Scoping Survey of the Y-12 

Plant Site: Part 2 – The 1985-1987 Data Base, R. D. Foley, R. F. Carrier; Y-12 Plant Remedial 

Action Program Environmental Management Department; Y/TS-600 PART 2; March 1990; SRDB 

Ref ID: 12531

Y-12 Survey, 1990b, The Outdoor Radiological and Chemical Surface Scoping Survey of the Y-12 

Plant Site: Part 3 – Recommendations, R. D. Foley, R. F. Carrier; Y-12 Plant Remedial Action 

Program Environmental Management Department; Y/TS-600 PART 3; May 1990; SRDB Ref ID: 

12526
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Attachment One: Data Capture Synopsis

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Clinton Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded to 

SRDB

Primary Site/Company Name Clinton Engineer Works

DOE 1943-1949

Physical size of the site (acres, sq miles, sq feet, # blocks, 

etc. and/or size of specific buildings if relevant)

The Clinton Engineer Works site includes all of the Oak 

Ridge Area, however SEC0178 pertains to guards and 

service workers who worked in or around the warehouse at 

the Elza Gate area. The combined area of concrete pads 

used for 5 warehouses (3 known to have housed radioactive 

materials) was approximately 84,000 square feet, however 

uranium soil contamination has been found throughout the 

20-acre tract of land.

Size of the workforce during the SEC related periods

The class includes “all guards and service workers.” No 

records indicating specific work locations have been 

located. The peak employment number is 82,000 in May 

1945, which includes the entire Oak Ridge complex i.e., 

Clinton Laboratory, Y-12, K-25, etc. Employment declined 

steadily after May 1945 to 28,737 at the end of 1946. If our 

focus becomes limited to the primary contractor (RoaneAnderson Company), then the peak employment figure is 

about 10,000 in September 1945 and declined to about 

2,400 by September 1947. 

Other Site Names: 

Oak Ridge Area 

Oak Ridge Reservation 

Note: This material located in the ORO Vault, was identified using 

DOE/OR's Records Holding Task Group (RHTG) database and was 

subsequently reviewed for classification.

African Metals assays, purchase orders and invoices; security aspects of 

removal of the town of Oak Ridge from the controlled area; badge 

records; Y-12 plant progress report; Clinton Engineer Works 

employment records; film badge measurements; invoices for several 

agent for radioactive materials; machining of uranium; materials in 

0101 area; production of 1% enriched uranium rods for Brookhaven 

National Laboratory; personal and portable radiation meters; removal of 

town of Oak Ridge from controlled area; medical and industrial hygiene 

problems; storage of U-235 from Los Alamos

01/25/2012 41

State Contacted: Radiological Health Director, 

[Name/phone number redacted] and [Name/phone number 

redacted] 

No relevant data identified. 11/30/2010 0

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health Handwritten notes of Advisory Board Member [redacted] 11/30/2010 1
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Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Clinton Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded to 

SRDB

Atlanta NARA Account of T- metal at Aluminum Company Of America, construction 

of new warehouses, film badge results, monthly accountability reports, 

monthly progress reports, plans for handling African ore, radon air 

sample results, Roane-Anderson company insurance information, and 

special shipments of X-containing materials; warehouses, storage, blood 

changes, transportation and medical considerations 1943-1945, CEW 

and contractor employee information, CEW contract information.

12/09/2011 32

College Park NARA Production of fissionable materials, thorium fabrication, and a 

production report of the industrial hygiene section.

08/18/2010 7

Curtiss Wright Methods of separating U233 from thorium. 06/18/2008 1

Department of Labor/Paragon Uranium Ore Waste Residue Storage at LOOW. 12/30/2008 1

DOE Ames Laboratory Industrial Medicine on the Plutonium Project. 07/25/2006 1

DOE Argonne National Laboratory - East Organization of national nucleonics program, high temperature oxide 

pile, and an interim report on some manifold details for a P-9 pile.

04/02/2008 4

DOE Brookhaven National Laboratory BNL personnel who have worked on other AEC projects. 10/21/2008 1

DOE Germantown Safety program for Clinton Engineering Works, elimination report, 

monthly accountability, thorium information, site summary and history, 

Manhattan District history book, and a trip report to Mallinckrodt, St. 

Louis, Missouri.

05/09/2009 13

DOE Hanford Note: Request based on results of data search has been submitted. OPEN 0

DOE Legacy Management - Grand Junction Office Atomic power in war and peace, grinding of thorium rods, U-235 and 

plutonium at various laboratories, fact sheet on Elza Gate, inspection of 

warehouses, radioactivity surveys, Manhattan District history book, 

activity of slugs from Clinton, accountability report of X metal, 

inventory of five types of material at C101 warehouse, shipment of 

tuballoy, type-II metal extrusion billets containing fission elements 

shipped to Revere, and uranium cleanup guidelines for the Elza Gate 

site.

11/22/2010 40

DOE Legacy Management - MoundView (Fernald 

Holdings, includes Fernald Legal Database)

Metallurgical Laboratory report, progress report, and epidemiology 

project summaries.

02/07/2007 5

DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory Manhattan Project: Official History and Documents. 07/17/2007 1

DOE Oak Ridge National Laboratory Machining of Uranium for Brookhaven Reactor. 04/12/2007 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information 

(OSTI)

Closed-cycle beta process, alpha II calutron development, and operation 

of receivers with enriched feed.

09/05/2008 4
SEC-00178 02-02-12 Clinton Engineer Works

53 of 56

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Clinton Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded to 

SRDB

Dr. Denise Degarmo Biological research program at Clinton National laboratories, 

organization chart, purchase of workmen's insurance, and disposal of 

radioactive wastes in the Metropolitan St. Louis area.

11/24/2009 12

Hagley Museum Clinton Engineer Works and Hanford history. 09/29/2010 17

Interlibrary Loan The Dragon's Tail - Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project. 04/01/2008 2

Internet - DOE Comprehensive Epidemiologic Data 

Resource (CEDR)

No relevant data identified. 10/27/2010 0

Internet - DOE Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval 

System (DDRS)

Effect of counting rate on operation of poor GM counter, effective area 

of a thin wall glass GM tube when used to count beta particles, H.I. 

section report, Hanford monthly report, and a report of visits to the 

radiation laboratories. Note: 13 documents added by site association.

11/08/2010 13

Internet - DOE Legacy Management Considered Sites Survey of the Elza Gate site and special materials in 0101 area. Note: 

Three documents added by site association. 

11/08/2010 3

Internet - DOE OpenNet Manhattan District History Book I and Linking Legacies Appendix B. 

Note: Two documents removed by site association.

11/08/2010 4

Internet - DOE OSTI Energy Citations Account of Oak Ridge National Laboratory's thirteen nuclear reactors 

and the modeling of Elza Gate contaminated material. Note: One 

document added by site association.

11/08/2010 4

Internet - DOE OSTI Information Bridge Environmental baseline survey report, conversion of yellow cake to 

uranium hexafluoride, engineering evaluation/cost analysis for the 

proposed removal of contaminated materials from pad 1 at the Elza 

Gate site, environmental report, radioactivity and health information, 

and a radiological risk assessment. Note: Ten documents added by site 

association.

11/08/2010 19

Internet - Google Remedial action at the Melton Lake Industrial Park (former Elza Gate 

area warehouse), cleanout of waste storage tanks at Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory, Clinton Engineer Works photo, designation investigations 

for warehouses, environmental monitoring report, first report of the 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Operation Trinity and the Manhattan 

Project history, radionuclide releases, report of visit to Metallurgical 

Laboratories and Clinton Laboratories, reports on FUSRAP sites, Site X 

map, and surplus u-233 now "treasure" for new isotope technologies. 

Note: 49 documents were duplicates and/or removed by site association.

11/08/2010 85

Internet - HP Journal No relevant data identified. 10/27/2010 0

Internet - Journal of Occupational and Environmental 

Health 

No relevant data identified. 12/29/2010 0
SEC-00178 02-02-12 Clinton Engineer Works

54 of 56

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Clinton Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded to 

SRDB

Internet - National Academies Press (NAP) No relevant data identified. 11/08/2010 0

Internet - National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) - Nevada Site Office

No relevant data identified. 11/08/2010 0

Internet - NRC Agencywide Document Access and 

Management (ADAMS)

Supplemental Responses to Petition Under 10 CFR 2.206 Snake River 

Alliance/Envirocare of Utah, Inc.

11/08/2010 1

Internet - US Army Corps of Engineers No relevant data identified. 11/08/2010 0

Internet - Washington State University (U.S. Transuranium 

and Uranium Registries)

No relevant data identified. 11/08/2010 0

Kansas City NARA The Federal Connection: History of the U.S. Military Involvement in 

the Toxic Contamination of Love Canal and the Niagara Frontier 

Region Volume I.

08/14/2008 1

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH)

ORNL Review, A History of the Laboratory's First 25 Years. 10/30/2009 1

New York State Department of Health Semi-monthly report. 02/25/2008 1

Oak Ridge Public Library Alpha I-5 operating procedures, facts on Clinton Engineer Works 

operating and research units, and photographs of Oak Ridge production 

areas.

11/26/2010 10

ORAU Team Documented communication. 03/02/2011 2

San Bruno Federal Records Center Employee general information cards, beta run reports, and personnel 

assignment logs.

11/10/2010 6

Sanford Cohen & Associates (SC&A) Documents Issued to SC&A by BWXT Y-12 in Concert with the 

Federal Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health at the Y-12 

National Security Complex, Volume 2 of 4 (November 2005).

11/22/2005 1

Southern Illinois University The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in the Metropolitan St. Louis Area: 

The Environmental and Health Legacy of the Mallinckrodt Chemical 

Works

10/08/2008 1

University of Rochester Radiotoxicity of Inhaled or Ingested Radioactive Products. 09/10/2008 1

University of Tennessee Urinalysis results, instrument calibration, radiological incidents, history 

of Clinton Engineer Works and the Manhattan Project, radiological 

survey information, personnel exposure information, personnel 

monitoring at Clinton Laboratories, radiation protection practices, 

protective clothing sub-committee report, and monthly reports.

11/18/2010 41
SEC-00178 02-02-12 Clinton Engineer Works

55 of 56

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Clinton Engineer Works

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured Date 

Completed

Uploaded to 

SRDB

Unknown Atomic Energy Division records for Dupont, Hanford, and Clinton 

Engineer Works, Chemical Division operating manual, comparison of 

badge film readings, Manhattan District history, dust hazards, monthly 

status and progress reports, trip reports, and suggested tolerance for 

polonium.

10/08/2004 18

Viacom Records Facility and process descriptions. 12/06/2004 1

TOTAL 391

Table A1-2: Databases Searched for Clinton Engineer Works

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases Hits Uploaded to 

SRDB

NOTE: Database search terms employed for each of the databases listed below are available

in the Excel file called “Clinton Engineers Works Rev 01 (83.13) 03-03-11”

DOE CEDR

http://cedr.lbl.gov/

COMPLETED 10/27/2010

See Note above 0 0

DOE Hanford DDRS

http://www2.hanford.gov/declass/

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 0 0

DOE Legacy Management Considered Sites

http://csd.lm.doe.gov/

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 0 0

DOE OpenNet

http://www.osti.gov/opennet/advancedsearch.jsp

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 112 6

DOE OSTI Energy Citations

http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 666 3

DOE OSTI Information Bridge

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/advancedsearch.jsp

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 634 13

Google

http://www.google.com

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 135,058 134
SEC-00178 02-02-12 Clinton Engineer Works

56 of 56

Table A1-2: Databases Searched for Clinton Engineer Works

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases Hits Uploaded to 

SRDB

HP Journal

http://journals.lww.com/health-physics/pages/default.aspx

COMPLETED 10/27/2010

See Note above 0 0

Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 

http://www.ijoeh.com/index.php/ijoeh

COMPLETED 12/29/2010

See Note above 0 0

National Academies Press

http://www.nap.edu/

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 5,432 0

NNSA - Nevada Site Office

www.nv.doe.gov/main/search.htm

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 0 0

NRC ADAMS Reading Room

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 240 1

USACE/FUSRAP

http://www.lrb.usace.army.mil/fusrap/

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 0 0

U.S. Transuranium & Uranium Registries 

http://www.ustur.wsu.edu/

COMPLETED 11/08/2010

See Note above 0 0

Table A1-3: OSTI Documents Requested for Clinton Engineer Works

Document Number Document Title Requested

Date

Received

Date

No documents requested.