Page 1 of 22

DOE Review Release 11/16/2016

Evaluation of Health Physics Area and Health 

Physics Department Codes To Identify 

Neptunium Workers at the Savannah River 

Site

ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Rev. 00

Effective Date: 11/08/2016

Supersedes: None

Subject Expert(s): Billy P. Smith, Robert L. Morris

Document Owner 

Approval: Signature on File

James M. Mahathy, Document Owner

Approval Date: 11/03/2016

Concurrence: Signature on File

Daniel H. Stempfley, Objective 4 Representative

Concurrence Date: 11/04/2016

Concurrence: Vickie S. Short Signature on File for

Kate Kimpan, Project Director

Concurrence Date: 11/03//2016

Approval: Signature on File

James W. Neton, Associate Director for Science

Approval Date: 11/08/2016

FOR DOCUMENTS MARKED AS A TOTAL REWRITE, REVISION, OR PAGE CHANGE, REPLACE THE PRIOR 

REVISION AND DISCARD / DESTROY ALL COPIES OF THE PRIOR REVISION.

New Total Rewrite Revision Page Change
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 2 of 22

PUBLICATION RECORD

EFFECTIVE 

DATE

REVISION

NUMBER DESCRIPTION

11/08/2016 00 New report to evaluate the use of Health Physics Area codes and 

department codes to identify workers associated with the 237Np

processes in Building 235-F, the HB Line, and the M-Area at 

Savannah River Site from 1973 through 1982. Incorporates formal 

internal and NIOSH review comments. Training required: As 

determined by the Objective Manager. Initiated by James M. 

Mahathy and Billy P. Smith. 
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 3 of 22

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION TITLE PAGE

Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 4

1.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5

2.0 Health Physics Area Codes...................................................................................................... 5

3.0 Health Physics Department Codes........................................................................................... 6

4.0 Workers at Risk for Intakes ...................................................................................................... 8

5.0 Correlation of Health Physics Area and Health Physics Department Codes for Workers 

Monitored for Plutonium or Neptunium Intake ........................................................................ 11

5.1 Correlation with Health Physics Area Code ................................................................ 11

5.2 Correlation with Health Physics Department Code ..................................................... 11

5.3 Correlation with the Combinations of Health Physics Area and Health Physics 

Department Codes ..................................................................................................... 12

6.0 Monitored Workers in Health Physics Department 205 .......................................................... 14

7.0 Examination of Claims Cases and Radiological Events.......................................................... 15

7.1 Examination of Works Technical Department reports and Claims Cases.................... 15

7.2 Examination of Contamination Event Reports............................................................. 17

8.0 Summary ............................................................................................................................... 18

References ........................................................................................................................................ 19

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE TITLE PAGE

2-1 HPA codes and associated locations based on the reference in ORAUT (2014)...................... 5

3-1 HPD codes in 1977 ..................................................................................................................7

4-1 Number of 237Np bioassay sample results from Building 235-F and associated HPA 

codes .......................................................................................................................................9

4-2 Number of 237Np bioassay sample results from the HB Line and associated HPA codes ......... 9

4-3 Personal neptunium contamination events at SRS, 1973 to 1989 .......................................... 10

5-1 Combinations of HPA and HPD codes associated with intake monitoring for exposure to 

238Pu and 237Np, 1973 through 1989....................................................................................... 12

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE TITLE PAGE

5-1 Monitoring events sorted by HPA code .................................................................................. 12
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 4 of 22

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEC U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

AFR away from reactor

AOP advanced operation planning

cm centimeter

CS Central Shops

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

dpm disintegrations per minute

DWPF defense waste pilot facility

EAS engineering assistance section

E&I Electrical and Instrumentation

ft foot

hr hour

HP health physics

HPA Health Physics Area

HPD Health Physics Department

LOSD Laboratory Operations and Services Division

m meter

mR milliroentgen

nCi nanocurie

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NOCTS NIOSH-Division of Compensation Analysis and Support Claims Tracking System

ORAU Oak Ridge Associated Universities

P&A Performance and Accountability

PTL Pittsburgh Testing Lab

PuFF 238PuO2 Fuel Form Facility

RMT Reactor Materials Technology

SRDB Ref ID Site Research Database Reference Identification (number)

SRS Savannah River Site

WMO Waste Management Operations

μCi microcurie
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 5 of 22

 

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) Team for the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Dose Reconstruction Project evaluates the usefulness of 

Health Physics Area (HPA) and Health Physics Department (HPD) codes to identify workers 

associated with the 237Np processes at Savannah River Site (SRS) from 1973 through 1989.

Neptunium-237 processes included operations, construction, and maintenance work in Building 

235-F, the HB Line, and 321-M. Separations processes associated with 237Np are closely related to 

similar processes involving 238Pu; therefore, monitoring for exposure to 238Pu is assumed to be an 

indicator of a potential for 237Np intake.

This report also examines:

• The intake monitoring of workers in HP Department 205, which is the organization in the 

Separations Department responsible for work in Building 235-F,

• The NIOSH-Division of Compensation Analysis and Support Claims Tracking System 

(NOCTS) records of three workers who worked in Building 235-F during the period of interest, 

and

• The records on workers associated with radiological events involving 237Np.

2.0 HEALTH PHYSICS AREA CODES

The SRS radiological protection program established and used HPA codes to assist in dose tracking 

as a performance indicator (Boiter 1973), the collection of bioassay samples, and in the control, 

accountability, and periodic exchange of personnel dosimeters. During the period covered by this 

analysis, 1973 through 1989, personnel dosimeters were stored on “badge boards” at each HPA 

location while they were not being worn.

The HPA code was also an indicator of where workers were most likely to use their dosimeters. An 

HPA code was included on each worker’s personnel dose report.

Codes given in Table 2-1 reference codes in place at SRS during the time period covered by this 

report. Some, not all, codes were in service for the entire period. The systems of HPA codes used 

over the history of the plant are provided in (ORAUT 2014). Old codes were replaced with new codes 

over time. Table 2-1 contains the majority of codes, associated locations and trade labor designations 

that were in place by 1990. 

Table 2-1. HPA codes and associated locations based on the reference in ORAUT (2014). 

HPA Code Location Comment

1C 100-C MAIN GATE 1973 listing showed location as “100-C”

1K 100-K —

1P 100-P —

2F 200-F MAIN GATE 1973 listing showed location as “200-F”

2G 722-G —

2H 200-H MAIN GATE 1973 listing showed location as “200-H”

3A 703-A (B Wing) 1973 listing showed location as “703-A”

3M 300-M —

4D 400-D —

4H 234-H TRITIUM 1973 listing showed location as “232-234-H”

5A 773-A MAIN BUILDING 1973 listing showed location as “773-A”

5B 777-10A 1973 listing showed location as “777-M”
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 6 of 22

HPA Code Location Comment

5C TNX 1973 listing showed location as “CMX”

5D 735-A —

5F 235-F CONST. 1973 listing showed location as “235-F (Separations/Const.)”

5G 705-G T&T 1973 listing showed location as “705-G”

7A CS SOUTH GATE 1973 listing showed location as “Central Shops (CS)”

7B PTL (30) 1973 listing showed location as “Pittsburgh Testing Lab (PTL)”

7C CD-CAB 1973 listing showed location as “TC”

7D 709-A Fire House 1973 listing showed location as “709-A”

7E 713- Receive-Ship 1973 listing showed location as “713-A”

7F 716-A Auto Shop 1973 listing showed location as “716-A”

7G 717-A MAINT 1973 listing showed location as “717-A”

7H 719-A MEDICAL 1973 listing showed location as “719-A”

7I 720-A WSI 1973 listing showed location as “720-A”

7J IRON WORKER (12) Central Shops, HPD 040

7K 722-A E&I 1973 listing showed location as “722-A”

7L 723-A EED 1973 listing showed location as “723-A”

7M 724-A TRAINING 1973 listing showed location as “724-A”

7N 725-A MAINT 1973 listing showed location as “725-A”

7P 784-A POWER 1973 listing showed location as “784-A”

7Q 722-4A E&I —

7R CS NORTH GATE —

7S 722-5A CSWE 

(COMPUTER)

—

7T 707-A DIVERSCO —

7W WSI 703-B —

7Z UGA ECOLOGY LAB 1973 listing showed location as “735-A (University of Georgia)”

8A MACHINIST (24) Central Shops, HPD 040

8B BOILERMAKERS (30) Central Shops, HPD 040

8C CARPENTER (6) Central Shops, HPD 040

8F 235-F (Separations/

non-const.)

1973 listing shows location as “235-F (Separations/non-const.)”

8G 618-G Class. Yard 1982 listing showed location as “618-G”

8H HEAVY EQUIPMENT (14) Central Shops, HPD 040

8I INSULATOR (31) Central Shops, HPD 040

8K CONCRETE (8) Central Shops, HPD 040

8L LABORER (5) Central Shops, HPD 040

8M MILLWRIGHT (18) Central Shops, HPD 040

8P PAINTERS (17) Central Shops, HPD 040

8S SHEET METAL (21) Central Shops, HPD 040

8T TRANSPORTATION (10) Central Shops, HPD 040

8Z U. S. AEC Atlanta Code Designation in 1973

8Z SOU BELL (TRAILER) Code designation in 1990

a. HPA codes for general site workers from CS (HPD 040) were not included in the original 1973 code listing as shown 

above.

3.0 HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT CODES

HPD codes were used to define the functional organization or group to which a worker was assigned 

and for radiation protection tracking. A list of HPD codes for departments involved in separations and 

research dated 1977 is given in Table 3-1 (DuPont 1977a).

An HPD code was included for each monitored worker on external dose reports (DuPont 1977b).
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 7 of 22

Table 3-1. HPD codes in 1977 (DuPont 1977a).

Department or group HPD code

Reactor 100

Separations: F Canyons 200

Separations: F B-Line 201

Separations: F Outside 202

Separations: H Canyons 203

Separations: H Outside 204

235-F: 238PuO2 Fuel Form Facility (PuFF) 205

Separations: 232-H 206

Separations: 234-H 207

244-H 208

H B-Line 209

F Waste Management 210

H Waste Management Technology 211

F Waste Management Operations (WMO) 212

H WMO 214

Defense Waste Pilot Facility (DWPF) 215

Raw Materials-M 300

GS Process Area 400

Accountability 405

Works Technical: HP 500

Works Technical Laboratories 501

Works Technical: Technical Procedures Office 502

Works Technical: Reactor Materials Technology (RMT) 503

Works Technical: Separations Technology 504

Works Technical: Engineering Assistance Section (EAS) 505

Works Technical: Integrated Safety Program (Quality Assurance) 

Away from reactor (AFR) 506

Works Engineering: Electrical & Instrumentation (E&I) 601

Works Engineering: Maintenance 602

Works Engineering: Power 603

Works Engineering: Project 604

Works Engineering: RMT 605

Service: Traffic and Transportation 703

Technical: Miscellaneous 906

Technical: Experimental Physics 907

Technical: Reactor Engineering 908

Technical: Nuclear Materials 909

Technical: Source Technology 910

Technical: Separations Chemistry 911

Technical: Analytical Chemistry 912

Technical: Separations Engineering 913

Technical: Radiological Science 914

Technical: Radiation Control (Radiation Safety Department) 915

Technical: Building Operations [LOSD)] 916

Technical: Engineering Services (LOSD) 917

Technical: Mechanical Services (LOSD) 918

Technical: High-Level Caves 919

Construction 040
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 8 of 22

 

4.0 WORKERS AT RISK FOR INTAKES

Four groups of workers with 237Np intake potential have been identified:

• Workers assigned to HPD code 205,

• Workers who are named in the bioassay logbooks as having a 238Pu or 237Np bioassay,

• Claimants listed in NOCTS with 238Pu or 237Np bioassay results, and

• Workers involved in 237Np contamination events.

Workers assigned to HPD code 205, which is a functional group within the Separations Department, 

were likely to work routinely in Building 235-F where 238Pu and 237Np operations were conducted. All 

of these workers are assumed to have exposure potential based on the mission of that group. A total 

of 196 different employees worked in HPD code 205 during the period of interest and were identified 

in bioassay logbooks, DOE records in NOCTS, and the SRS intake database (ORAUT 2004). Each 

of these workers’ last names, initials, employee numbers, areas worked, and bioassay sample data 

are included in the logbooks (DuPont 1969–1973, 1969–1982, 1970–1973, 1973–1978, 1973–1979, 

1978–1983, 1979–1980, 1980–1981a, 1980–1981b, 1981–1986, 1986–1989). The bioassay logbook 

data, combined with various external dosimetry quarterly reports (DuPont 1980a is an example), 

provide the HPA and HPD codes that identify worker exposure locations. If a worker submitted a 

bioassay sample that was analyzed for 238Pu or 237Np, that person was probably exposed. The data 

from the source documents, including sample date, employee number, HPA code, and HPD code, 

were transcribed and analyzed. A total of 188 individuals who are not members of HPD 205 were 

identified as part of this group. Claimants whose case information includes 238Pu or 237Np bioassay 

data or some other indication of intake potential are also included in the evaluations described above.

Monitoring for potential intakes of radionuclides at SRS was controlled by DPSOL 193-302 (DuPont 

1971b) from 1971 through 1988 and by DPSOL 193-211 beginning in 1989 (DuPont 1989). The 

ORAU Team has obtained data to demonstrate that neptunium workers were monitored for internal 

intakes of 237Np since 1961 (DuPont 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969–1982, 1970, 

1971a, 1974, 1975, 1980b, 1980c, 1980d, 1980e, 1984a, 1984b, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1985d; Reinig 

1984). The Team obtained information on the number of neptunium analyses associated with 

Building 235-F, as reported in the Works Technical Department reports from 1972 through 1989 (as 

listed in the References list). These data are listed in Table 4-1. The number of 237Np bioassay 

samples from the HB Line from 1973 to 1989 is provided in Table 4-2. This data is useful in 

evaluating the use of HPA and HPD codes to identity neptunium workers. A former worker was 

interviewed by the ORAU Team on August 26, 2013. That interview provided insight on the 

movement of workers between Building 235-F and the HB Line. Movements and access between 

these areas was strictly controlled and monitored (ORAUT 2013b).

Table 4-3 identifies some of the incident descriptions of radiological events in the operations at SRS

involving work with 237Np/238Pu from 1972 through 1989 by area, department, and HPA code. There 

were other events that could have resulted in the intakes documented in Attachment A, Health 

Physics Monitoring of Specific Events, contained in ORAUT-RPRT-0065, An Evaluation of Neptunium 

Operations at Savannah River Site, for the period from 1973 to 1989 (ORAUT 2016). The correlation 

of the area, HPD codes, and HPA codes indicates that the work in the 235-F and the HB Line was 

responsible for the incidents.
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 9 of 22

Table 4-1. Number of 237Np bioassay sample results from Building 235-F and associated 

HPA codes (ORAUT 2016).

Year Building 235-F HPA code(s) Location-area

1973 16 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1974 17 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1975 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1976 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1977 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1978 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1979 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1980 36 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1981 3 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1982 36 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1983 12 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1984 23 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1985 7 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1986 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1987 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1988 5 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

1989 3 2F, 5F, 8F 200-F, 235-F Construction,

235-F Nonconstruction

Total 158 Not applicable Not applicable

Table 4-2. Number of 237Np bioassay sample results from the HB Line and associated 

HPA codes (ORAUT 2016).

Year HB Line HPA code(s) Location-area/buildings

1973 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1974 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1975 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1976 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1977 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1978 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1979 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1980 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1981 2 2H 200-H

1982 32 6H 200-H North Gate (Construction)

1983 4 6H 200-H North Gate (Construction)

1984 5 6H 200-H North Gate (Construction)

1985 2 6H 200-H North Gate (Construction)

1986 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1987 No results found No code designated Not applicable

1988 5 6H 200-H North Gate (Construction)

1989 No results found No code designated Not applicable

Total 50 Not applicable Not applicable
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 10 of 22

Table 4-3. Personal neptunium contamination events at SRS, 1973 to 1989. 

Date

Type of 

contamination Area

HPA 

code

HPD 

code Job title Comments Source

12/1972 Wound 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Np-237 ORAUT 2004, NOCTS

07/1973 Inhalation 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 DuPont 1973, NOCTS

07/1973 Inhalation HB Line 2H 500 HP Inspector Exposed to Pu-238 ORAUT 2004, NOCTS

09/1973 Airborne HB Line 2H 209 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

10/1973 Contamination HB Line 2H 209 Operator Exposed to Np-237 NOCTS

10/1974 Inhalation 235-F 2F 200 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 DuPont 1974

10/1974 Inhalation HB Line 2H 202 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

11/1974 Inhalation 235-F 2F 602 Maintenance Mechanic Exposed to Pu-238/Np-237 NOCTS

01/1975 Airborne HB Line 2F 500 HP Inspector Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

02/1975 Inhalation HB Line 2H 201 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

10/1975 Airborne HB Line 2H 500 HP Inspector Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

07/1976 Wound 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238/Np-237 NOCTS

11/1976 Inhalation HB Line 2H 209 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

01/1978 Airborne 235-F 2F 505 Engineering Assistant Exposed to Pu-238/Np-237 NOCTS

08/1978 Inhalation 235-F 2F 603 Maintenance Mechanic Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

09/1978 Airborne 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238/Np-237 NOCTS

11/1978 Airborne 235-F 2F 205 HP Inspector Exposed to Pu-238/Np-237 NOCTS

01/1979 Inhalation HB Line 2H 209 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 ORAUT 2004, NOCTS

09/1979 Inhalation 235-F 2H 209 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

03/1980 Inhalation 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238/Np-237 ORAUT 2004, NOCTS

04/1980 Airborne HB Line 2H 500 HP Inspector Exposed to Pu-238 ORAUT 2004, NOCTS

01/1981 Skin HB Line 2H 500 Operator Exposed to Pu-238/Np-237 NOCTS

03/1981 Inhalation 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

07/1981 Airborne 772-F (lab for 235-F) 2F 501 Laboratory Technician Exposed to Pu-238/Pu-239 NOCTS

08/1981 Skin 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

03/1982 Skin 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

03/1983 Airborne 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

09/1983 Inhalation HB Line 2H 209 No Information Exposed to Pu-238 ORAUT 2004

11/1983 Airborne 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

12/1983 Skin 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

04/1984 Airborne 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

06/1985 Airborne HB Line 2H 209 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

02/1988 Inhalation 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

09/1988 Inhalation 235-F 2F 205 Operator Exposed to Pu-238 NOCTS

11/1988 Wound CS 8B 40 Boilermaker Exposed to Pu-238 ORAUT 2004

04/1989 Inhalation CS, Old HB Line 8C, 2F 40, 205 Carpenter Exposed to Pu-238 ORAUT 2004, NOCTS
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 11 of 22

5.0 CORRELATION OF HEALTH PHYSICS AREA AND HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT 

CODES FOR WORKERS MONITORED FOR PLUTONIUM OR NEPTUNIUM INTAKE 

It is known that some neptunium workers retrieved their dosimeters from locations not directly 

adjacent to the immediate neptunium process work locations. Access to areas where neptunium work 

was conducted was controlled and required approval before entry. The HP organization developed 

and used departmental locations and HPA codes to track and maintain accountability where external 

dosimeters were issued. The analysis in this report shows that HPA and HPD codes for operations 

and maintenance workers have a correlation in terms of the neptunium facilities.

HPA and HPD codes were instrumental as administrative tools for management and radiological 

safety organizations for tracking workers who performed neptunium operation, construction, and 

maintenance work in Building 235-F, the HB Line, and Building 321-M. The departments associated 

with neptunium workers are categorized as being from Separations (Departments 200 to 201), Works 

Technical (Departments 500 to 505), or Works Engineering (Departments 600 to 604). The following 

HPA codes are associated with the area/building shown in parenthesis following the codes: 2F 

(Area/235-F), 5F (Area/235-F), 8F (Area/235-F), 2H (H-Area/HB Line), 6H (H-Area/HB Line), 3M 

(300-M), 1A (Technical Works Facilities), 3A (300-M), and 5A (773-A). HPA codes 8A, 8B, and 8C 

did not appear in the 1973 HPA code listing; they represented craftsmen associated with the CS and 

were added to the list of codes in the 1980s.

5.1 CORRELATION WITH HEALTH PHYSICS AREA CODE 

Data from logbooks and personnel dosimetry reports was sorted to produce Figure 5-1, which shows 

the number of monitoring events (generally, these are bioassays) sorted by HPA code. A large 

majority (92%) of the monitoring events were associated with five HPA codes (all other HPA codes 

were associated with 1.2% or less of the monitoring events):

• HPA 2F = 62%,

• HPA 2H = 12%,

• HPA 3M = 9.2%,

• HPA 5A = 8.1%, and

• HPA 4H1 = 1.9%.

1

HPA 4H is generally associated with tritium facilities workers, but replacement workers were

rotated to 235-F from the tritium area when external exposures of neptunium workers

approached the administrative limit. . This type of rotation is confirmed via documentation in a

worker’s interview (ORAUT 2013).

5.2 CORRELATION WITH HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT CODE

A large majority (71%) of the monitoring events were associated with seven HPD codes (all other 

HPD codes were associated with 2% or less of the monitoring events): HPD 205 (Separations: 235-F 

PuFF) = 50%,

• HPD 500 (Works Technical: HP) = 5.4%,

• HPD 503 (Works Technical: Reactor Technology) = 4.6%,

• HPD 505 (Separations: 235-F PuFF) = 50%

• HPD 209 (Separations: H B-Line) = 4.0%,

• HPD 300 (Raw Materials) = 2.4%,

• HPD 601 (Works Engineering: E&I) = 2.4%, and

• HPD 602 (Works Engineering: Maintenance) = 2.2%.
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 12 of 22

 

Figure 5-1. Monitoring events sorted by HPA code. 

5.3 CORRELATION WITH THE COMBINATIONS OF HEALTH PHYSICS AREA AND HEALTH 

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT CODES

The data in Table 5-1 shows that most (66%) of the monitoring is associated with seven combinations 

of HPA codes and HPD codes:

• HPA 2F and HPD 205 (235-F PuFF) = 43%,

• HPA 2H and HPD 205 (235-F PuFF) = 5.6%,

• HPA 3M and HPD 503 (Works Technical: Reactor Technology) = 4.3%,

• HPA 2F and HPD 500 (Works Technical: HP) = 4.0%,

• HPA 2H and HPD 209 (Separations: HB Line) = 3.8%,

• HPA 2F and HPD 601 (Works Engineering: E&I) = 2.4%, and

• HPA 3M and HPD 300 (Raw Materials) = 2.4%.

Table 5-1. Combinations of HPA and HPD codes associated with intake monitoring for exposure 

to 238Pu and 237Np, 1973 through 1989. A description of the HPD code is provided in parentheses 

where available.

HP Area and HPD Code combination

Number of 

occurrences

Percentage of total 

occurrences

2F and 205 (235-F PuFF) 160 43

2H and 205 (235-F PuFF) 21 5.6

3M and 503 (Works Technical: Reactor Technology & RMT) 16 4.3

2F and 500 (Works Technical: HP) 15 4.0

2H and 209 (H B-Line) 14 3.8

2F and 601 (Works Engineering: E&I) 9 2.4

3M and 300 (Raw Materials-M) 9 2.4

2F and 602 (Works Engineering: Maintenance) 7 1.9

2F and 261 6 1.6

2F and 272 6 1.6

2F and 201 (Separations: F B-Line) 5 1.3

3M and 205 (235-F PuFF) 5 1.3

5A and 955 5 1.3

4H and 420 4 1.1

5A and 963 4 1.1
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 13 of 22

HP Area and HPD Code combination

Number of 

occurrences

Percentage of total 

occurrences

2F and 262 3 0.8

2H and 500 (Works Technical: HP) 3 0.8

3F and 40 (Construction) 3 0.8

5A and 909 (Technical: Nuclear Materials) 3 0.8

5A and 912 (Technical: Analytical. Chemistry) 3 0.8

5A and 957 3 0.8

5A and 969 3 0.8

5A and 972 3 0.8

#N/A 3 0.8

2F and 200 (Separations: F Canyons) 2 0.5

2F and 212 2 0.5

2F and 520 2 0.5

2F and 524 2 0.5

2F and 703 (Service: Traffic and Transportation) 2 0.5

3H and 214 2 0.5

3M and 362 2 0.5

5G and 703 (Service: Traffic and Transportation) 2 0.5

1A and 200 (Separations: F Canyons) 1 0.3

1A and 504 (Works Technical: Separations Technology) 1 0.3

1C and 40 (Construction) 1 0.3

1C and 100 (Reactor) 1 0.3

1C and 500 (Works Technical: HP) 1 0.3

1C and 503 (Works Technical: Reactor Technology & RMT) 1 0.3

2F and 204 (Separations: H Outside) 1 0.3

2F and 207 (Separations: 234-H) 1 0.3

2F and 209 (HB-Line) 1 0.3

2F and 220 1 0.3

2F and 266 1 0.3

2F and 501 (Works Technical Laboratories) 1 0.3

2F and 523 1 0.3

2F and 700 (Service: Clerical) 1 0.3

2F and 921 1 0.3

2H and 203 (Separations: H Canyons) 1 0.3

2H and 261 1 0.3

2H and 262 1 0.3

2H and 272 1 0.3

2H and 603 (Works Engineering: Power) 1 0.3

2M and 602 (Works Engineering: Maintenance) 1 0.3

3A and 200 (Separations: F Canyons) 1 0.3

3A and 505 (Works Technical: Engineering Assistance & EAS) 1 0.3

3A and 515 1 0.3

3A and 921 1 0.3

3M and 304 1 0.3

3M and 315 1 0.3

4H and 207 (Separations: 234-H) 1 0.3

4H and 500 (Works Technical: HP) 1 0.3

4H and 520 1 0.3

5A and 40 (Construction) 1 0.3

5A and 583 1 0.3

5A and 906 (Technical: Miscellaneous) 1 0.3

5A and 919 (Technical: High-Level Caves) 1 0.3

5A and 961 1 0.3

5A and 970 1 0.3

5D and 955 1 0.3
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 14 of 22

 

HP Area and HPD Code combination

Number of 

occurrences

Percentage of total 

occurrences

5E and 205 (235-F PuFF) 1 0.3

5E and 971 1 0.3

6F and 40 (Construction) 1 0.3

7A and 40 (Construction) 1 0.3

7L and 974 1 0.3

9A and 604 (Works Engineering: Project) 1 0.3

The other 68 combinations represented 34% of the monitoring. None of these combinations 

individually represented more than 2% of the total monitoring effort. Monitoring was not performed in 

hundreds of other potential code combinations of location and functional department, indicating that 

little or no intake potential was recognized in them. This shows that the combination of HPA and HPD 

codes is a powerful predictor of the recognized need for intake monitoring of work involving 237Np.

6.0 MONITORED WORKERS IN HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT 205

The HPD 205 worker entries identified from the source documents described in Section 4.0 were 

examined and analyzed, which resulted in a list of 196 unique employee numbers. These workers 

had been assigned to seven different HPA codes, but only two HPA codes accounted for 98% of the 

assignments:

• 168 individuals (86%) were assigned to HPA 2F,

• 24 individuals (12%) were assigned to HPA 2H,

• 1 individual (0.5%) was assigned to HPA 3A,

• 1 individual (0.5%) was assigned to HPA 3M,

• 1 individual (0.5%) was assigned to HPA 4H, and

• 1 individual (0.5%) was assigned to HPA 5E.

The data analysis used data tables with information from the source documents, including a field 

identifying the source of the data. This field has one of three values: “NOCTS,” “logbook,” or blank 

(no entry). All individual claimants listed in NOCTS have bioassay or in vivo counting data during the 

period of interest. All workers listed in the bioassay logbooks had bioassay monitoring. If the field 

was blank, the analysis assumed no intake monitoring data was collected. This might not be a correct 

assumption, but it does result in an accurate estimate, or an underestimate, of the monitoring rate that 

in either case bounds the estimate. If a worker was monitored for “Pu” or “Np” intake in any year 

during the period of interest, that person was counted as being monitored. Based on these criteria, 

75 workers (38%) were monitored and 121 workers (62%) were not monitored.

In addition, Quarterly Exposure Summaries for February 1, 1979, and February 6, 1979 (DuPont 

1979a, 1979b) were reviewed. The names and employee numbers of all of the workers identified in 

Department 205 were examined. The first document listed 16 workers, and the second listed 23. 

Combined, 27 unique workers were listed in the two documents. The worker identifications were used 

to search the bioassay logbooks and intake database (ORAUT 2004) to determine if any of the 

workers had ever been bioassay sampled. The Quarterly Exposure Summaries show that all the 

workers were externally monitored for radiation exposure. Of the 27 unique workers, 13 workers had 

bioassay records in NOCTS, the intake database, or the logbooks. Six had bioassay data in the 

logbooks, three had bioassay data in the intake database, and seven were in NOCTS with both in 

vitro and in vivo records. The three workers from the intake database who had bioassay data are part 

of the seven workers that are in NOCTS. It should be noted that data for these workers who were 

monitored by whole-body counts or chest counts is only available in NOCTS; the results do not 

appear in the logbooks or intake database. Therefore, the only way to confirm if workers from 

Department 205 were in vivo counted would be to retrieve their complete hard-copy individual 
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 15 of 22

 

personnel dosimetry records, because there is no evidence that an in vivo database for SRS workers 

exists. 

7.0 EXAMINATION OF CLAIMS CASES AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENTS

7.1 EXAMINATION OF WORKS TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT REPORTS AND CLAIMS CASES

A review of Works Technical Department reports and NOCTS intake monitoring records was 

performed for a small sample of claims and a small sample of radiological events associated 

with 237Np. Three of the cases reviewed below are in incident reports, as shown in Table 4-3. The 

contamination events table is from ORAUT-RPRT-0065 (ORAUT 2016).

• SEPARATION INCIDENT, SI-76-93: CONTAMINATED PUNCTURE WOUND, 

BUILDING 235-F, June 30, 1976, (DuPont 1974‒1979).

A Separations operator was packaging waste for removal from the neptunium billet glove box 

line. A sharp projection from the scrap penetrated the operator’s glove and he sustained a 

contaminated puncture wound to his right thumb. The waste included pre-filters which are 

made of fiberglass with a metallic reinforcement on each side. The sharp edges of the metallic 

reinforcement are covered by a frame, but when the filter was rolled out of shape for 

packaging, the frame provided no protection from the sharp edges. The “wound monitor” in 

772-F indicated contamination in the wound at 200 counts/minute. The operator was taken to 

719-A Medical for treatment. No other contamination released occurred except to the glove 

that was punctured. There was no airborne contamination detected. The same type of cf prefilter is used in the 238Pu Fuel Form (PuFF) Facility. Maintenance and handling of the pre-filter 

with gloves will be required. Contamination for similar incidents would be much more severe 

in the PuFF facility due to the significantly higher activity of 238Pu. 

• SEPARATIONS INCIDENT, SI-78-10-107: GLOVE FAILURE, BUILDING 235-F NEPTUNIUM 

TARGET FABRICATION FACILITY, September 25, 1978, (DuPont 1978b)

Category Code 4, Degradation of a barrier designed to contain radioactive materials. 

Contamination was discovered on a cabinet glove (#16, about 2,000 d/m). No nasal 

contamination was detected and no contamination was found either on the cabinet or floor. 

The glove has been in service since 1978. While loading and pressing a compact a 

Separations operator detected contamination on his surgeon’s glove. The operator, along with 

all others in the room, evacuated per procedure. All persons in the room received nasal 

smears which showed less than minimum detectable contamination. During the change-out 

the glove lip was found to have 5 × 104 d/m alpha. Air activity during the change-out was 

7.7 × 10-12 μCi/cc air.

• SEPARATIONS INCIDENT, SI-80-8-109: PREMATURE PENETRATION BORING 

CONCRETE FLOOR, August 19, 1980, (DuPont 1980h)

Category 9, Threat to safe operations from natural events or man-made activities.

Two concrete finishers form Construction were cutting holes in the concrete floor of second 

level for ducts to be installed under Project S-2191, Improved Ventilation. Rectangular holes 

are cut by boring overlapping round holes along the edges of the rectangular hole, using a 

water cooled boring machine. Operators in the Neptunium Compact Line heard water dripping 

and traced the source to leakage through the second level slab to the floor of the regulated 

Compact Line Maintenance Room 107D, 13 feet below. They promptly notified the supervisor 

who had the work stopped.

Roll 4 construction workers had been told that the floor thickness was 8 inches and instructed 

to set the boring machine to stop 2 inches before full penetration. Actual thickness of the floor 

slab in this area is only 6 inches; other areas are thicker. The area in the Compact Line 
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 16 of 22

 

Maintenance Room under the penetration was not roped off because full penetration and 

removal of the block was not scheduled until later. A wooden catch box had been made to 

catch the 22” × 26” block of concrete to be removed, but the box was not at the job site when 

work began. The boring plug was retained in the boring machine and did not fall to the first 

floor 13 feet below. There was no personal injury, equipment damage, or contamination 

spread. This incident had potential for serious consequences.

The NOCTS records of three workers who were involved in incidents from Table 4-3 were reviewed. 

The incidents occurred in November 1974, March 1981, and December 1983.

• An employee worked as a maintenance mechanic at SRS from July 1953 to October 1993. 

He worked from the mid-1960s into the 1990s in F-Area. During this time his HPD was 602 

and his HPA was 2F. Over his career he was routinely sampled for urine bioassay, wholebody counted, and monitored for external exposures via personnel dosimetry. The worker was 

involved in a radiological contamination incident in November 1974 when a cabinet glove 

being used by another worker failed. An air concentration of ~0.00000000001 μCi/cm3 Pu was 

measured. Nose swabs were taken and he was bioassay sampled for plutonium, both urine 

and fecal, over several days after the incident. A special whole-body count was performed on 

the worker on December 3, 1974, with negative results. All of the incident documentation 

(initial incident reports, air monitoring data, bioassay cards with results and sample weights, 

and whole-body count spectra and results) were in the NOCTS records.

• A second employee worked as an operator in the H- and F-Areas at SRS from 1954 to 1986. 

He began to work in F-Area in 1963 and worked there until end of his career. His HPD code 

was 205 and HPA was 2F for the latter part of his career. This incident was a radiological 

inhalation due to his exposure to high plutonium airborne contamination from bags containing 

plutonium pellets. All documentation of this incident was available in the NOCTS file 

describing the event, the samples taken, and monitoring requirements with their results. The 

chest count provided for this incident indicated a lung burden of <21 nCi 238Pu. This employee 

had been involved in other radiological incidents during his employment, and that information 

was also in his records. The worker was routinely monitored with personnel dosimetry and 

was internally monitored through urine and fecal sampling and whole-body and chest body 

counts on the normal schedule established by the HP Department during his entire career.

• A third employee worked as a laboratory technician from 1971 to 1989 and as an operator 

from 1989 to 2002. Early in his career, about 1973, he transferred from P Reactor to F-Area. 

His assigned HPD and HPA codes for his duties in F-Area were 205 and 2F, respectively. He 

was routinely monitored with the standard radiological area requirement. This incident 

occurred when, without any protective clothing, he entered a laboratory where the floor was 

highly contaminated to 10,000 dpm of alpha contamination. The alpha contamination was 

suspected to be 239

Pu because the analyst was working with the material. As a result his left 

little finger became contaminated to 2,000 dpm and his clothing to 8,000 dpm. He was 

decontaminated to below the minimum detectable activity and required to provide a special 

urine bioassay sample for plutonium. Results were less than the minimum detectable activity. 

Sampling and personnel dosimetry result histories were in the records. He worked the rest of 

his career in the F-Area.

The results of this review indicates that adequate radiological worker records were developed, 

collected, and evaluated during a worker’s employment and were archived after leaving employment.
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 17 of 22

 

7.2 EXAMINATION OF CONTAMINATION EVENT REPORTS

Examinations of event and incident reports were undertaken to specifically determine if any HPA and 

HPD codes were used to identify the administrative work assignment locations or functional work 

areas in the incident descriptions.

The routinely published Works Technical Reports captured significant events that occurred in the work 

areas. The reports along with the initial incident reports were used as management tools and 

information and to develop a tracking and monitoring corrective action system. The following 

information on incident reports was selected and extracted from ORAUT-RPRT-0065 (ORAUT 2016) 

because their occurrence was within the timeframe addressed by this report. Because HP monitoring 

of specific radiological events occurred when necessary, some incidents involving work with 

radioactive materials were categorized for official review and tracked in the Special Hazard 

Investigations reports available through 1989 (DuPont 1954–1989), and they are sequentially 

numbered. Each of the four volumes in the previously sited reference contain descriptions of about 

100 incidents per volume that occurred at SRS from 1954 to 1989. Reports of these incidents are

retained in SRS Dosimetry Special Hazards Investigations files.

Several examples of these incidents that occurred throughout the time of this report are shown below. 

They indicate various work locations at the plant where neptunium or plutonium was processed. The 

workers came from various HPDs and worked in different HPAs. Their personnel dosimetry records 

contain this location information.

• January 1972, HB Line. One construction worker continued installation of Pu-Np partitioning 

equipment in the JT·3 process cabinet in Room 311. Transferable contamination was 

measured up to 108 dpm/ft2 and gamma radiation exposure rates to 100 mR/hr were 

measured in the cabinet. Plastic suits were worn for personnel protection, and containment 

huts were used for contamination control. Even with these precautions, as one employee 

undressed after work, he contaminated his hair to 80,000 dpm and his right cheek to 

30,000 dpm. A second employee contaminated his coveralls to 40,000 dpm when a seam in 

his plastic suit failed. Plutonium bioassay analyses indicated that neither employee 

assimilated radioactive materials (DuPont 1971–1973).

• November 1974, 235-F. While working in the Neptunium Compact Operating Room, two 

Roll 2 construction trade workers and an operator received nasal contamination to 420 dpm, 

25 dpm, and 30 dpm, respectively, due to a process cabinet glove failure. The maintenance 

mechanic with the highest nasal contamination also had contamination to 10,000 dpm on his 

wrist. There were five other workers in the room at the time and their nasal smears were 

negative. Health Physics personnel collected bioassay samples from the three workers with 

positive nasal smears. A survey of the room revealed one failed glove and 14 contaminated 

gloves. The failed glove was contaminated to 8 × 106 dpm alpha with levels to 100,000 dpm 

on the other 14 gloves. The floor was contaminated up to 105 dpm/ft2 (DuPont 1974).

• October 1978, 235-F. An operator working in the neptunium line incurred nasal contamination 

of 190 dpm when a cabinet glove failed. The glove was contaminated to 1 × 104 dpm and the 

floor to 2 × 103 dpm/0.1 m2

. Room airborne activity remained less than the radioactivity 

concentration guide during the incident. Nasal irrigation promptly removed the contamination. 

A follow-up chest count of the operator indicated less than the minimum detectable amount 

and urine sample results were negative (DuPont 1978a).

• June 1980, 772-F. Contamination to 2.5 × 105 dpm/100 cm2 was detected after clean-up on 

the floor of a laboratory bench where neptunium samples were processed. Contamination 

ranging from 4,000 to 20,000 dpm/100 cm2 was spread to the utility corridor and three other 
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 18 of 22

 

laboratory modules. Shoe covers of several lab workers were contaminated to 20,000 dpm. 

No airborne activity was detected and nasal smears from personnel were negative. Bioassay 

samples were collected from five workers (DuPont 1980g). 

Although the original event descriptions were documented on forms designed for that purpose, and 

they include general location information, they neither make further use of that information, nor do 

they capture some of administrative information that would have been depicted by the use of HPA or 

HPD codes.

8.0 SUMMARY

All workers associated with HPD 205 are assumed to have had a significant exposure potential due to 

the mission of the group and the location of the work.

• 92% of the intake monitoring was associated with only five HPA codes: 2F, 2H, 3M, 5A, and 

4H.

• 71% of the intake monitoring was associated with only seven HPD codes: 205, 500, 503, 209, 

300, 601, and 300

Most (66%) of the intake monitoring for 238Pu and 237Np is associated with seven combinations of HPA 

and HPD codes:

• HPA 2F and HPD 205 (235-F PuFF) = 43%,

• HPA 2H and HPD 205 (235-F PuFF) = 5.6%,

• HPA 3M and HPD 503 (Works Technical: Reactor Technology) = 4.3%,

• HPA 2F and HPD 500 (Works Technical: HP) = 4.0%,

• HPA 2H and HPD 209 (Separations: HB Line) = 3.8%,

• HPA 2F and HPD 601 (Works Engineering: E&I) = 2.4%, and

• HPA 3M and HPD 300 (Raw Materials) = 2.4%.

This indicates that there was little or no known intake potential in other combinations of location and 

functional department. It suggests that the combination of HPA and HPD code is a powerful predictor 

of the recognized need for intake monitoring for 238Pu and 237Np. Personnel dosimetry exposure 

records contain these HPD and HPA codes for the workers. Works Technical Reports and site 

Special Hazard Investigations reports contain documentation of radiological worker incidents and 

events that occurred in the various work areas. When necessary, these documents can be 

references to determine HPD and HPA codes for workers.
Document No. ORAUT-RPRT-0077 Revision No. 00 Effective Date: 11/08/2016 Page 19 of 22

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