COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bray and Bumgardner 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

DANIEL SCOTT PIELA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0550-99-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 APRIL 4, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 

William H. Shaw, III, Judge 

 Andrea K. Amy-Pressey for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Daniel Scott Piela (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial 

of obstructing justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A).1 

Appealing to this Court, he challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the conviction. Finding no error, we affirm 

the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1

 Although both the warrant and conviction order reference 

Code § 18.2-460 generally, the warrant alleges conduct 

proscribed by paragraph (A) of the statute and the briefs and 

oral argument addressed only that provision. 
I. 

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). 

The credibility of the witnesses, the weight accorded testimony, 

and the inferences drawn from the proven facts are matters to be 

determined by the fact finder. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. 

App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The judgment of the 

trial court will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or 

unsupported by the evidence. See Code § 8.01-680. 

 On November 21, 1998, Gloucester County Sheriff's Deputy 

Lawrence Stolk, a "watch commander" at the local jail, was on duty 

when a "small riot" erupted in the "dayroom" of the "maximum 

security cell block," then housing "10 to 12" inmates in four 

cells. Stolk immediately initiated a "lockdown," which required 

all inmates "to go back into their separate cells." After "[a] 

lot of noise, . . . complaining, . . . and cursing," jail staff 

"got them all back in," the cell doors were electronically closed 

and locked, and Stolk departed the area. 

 Within minutes, Stolk "got a call to come back." Returning, 

he observed defendant "standing in the doorway" of his cell, 

"holding the door open." As Stolk watched, defendant "took one of 

his plastic shoes and put it in the locking mechanism to stop the 

door from closing," resulting in a "grinding sound." Uncertain 

- 2 -
"what kind of damage had been done" to the door, Stolk decided to 

temporarily relocate defendant pending investigation. However, 

when Stolk approached defendant, then inside his cell, and 

requested him to "get . . . out of the bed," defendant "cursed"2

Stolk and repeatedly refused to cooperate. Finally, Stolk, aided 

by two deputies, "put [defendant] up against the wall," applied "a 

come-along hold," and removed him from the cell. Defendant 

physically "resisted" and "curse[d] all the time," reminding Stolk 

that "he wouldn't be in jail forever" and threatening to "take 

care of" him when "he had the chance." 

 Defendant argues on appeal that such "conduct did not oppose, 

impede or resist the officer's efforts to ensure a secure prison" 

but only offended and insulted Stolk. 

II. 

 Code § 18.2-460(A) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f 

any person without just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any law 

enforcement officer in the performance of his duties or refuses 

without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do 

so by such . . . law enforcement officer, he shall be guilty of a 

Class 2 misdemeanor." 

"'To constitute an obstruction of an officer 

in the performance of his duty, it is not 

necessary that there be an actual or 

technical assault upon the officer, but 

there must be acts clearly indicating an 

 2

 The record reflects that defendant "called [Stolk] a big 

ear son of a bitch." 

- 3 -
intention on the part of the accused to 

prevent the officer from performing his 

duty, as to obstruct ordinarily implies 

opposition or resistance by direct action. 

. . . It means to obstruct the officer 

himself not merely to oppose or impede . . . 

the officer . . . .'" 

Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 

(1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79, 126 

S.E. 74, 77 (1925) (citation omitted)). Thus, "fail[ing] to 

cooperate fully with an officer" or engaging in conduct which 

"merely renders the officer's task more difficult" is not 

proscribed by Code § 18.2-460(A). Id. 

 Here, defendant's conduct constituted direct action clearly 

calculated to resist, oppose, impede and prevent Stolk from the 

lawful discharge of his duties. After intentionally disabling the 

cell door, which prevented a proper lockdown, defendant refused to 

exit his cell on command, and physically resisted the efforts of 

Stolk and other law enforcement officers to remove him, while 

cursing and threatening Stolk. Such behavior did not simply 

burden the task of a law enforcement officer, but necessitated 

affirmative and violent intervention to allow the proper 

performance of his duties, circumstances clearly contemplated by 

Code § 18.2-460(A). 

 Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to prove the 

conviction and affirm the trial court. 

 Affirmed.

- 4 -