139

production facility and also doing specific research at the request of other
contractors. Its purification program may have benefited from access to others’
files, but most of that was done on demand from another contractor with
whom conversation was allowed. The Manhattan District's strict zules and
regulations were more a nuisance than probably anything else,
Effect of Secusity on the Academic Laboratory, 1942-1945

Despite the requirements and regulations imposed by added secuniiy’
when the Manhattan District acquired the atomic bomb project, the Ames
Project remained an academically-managed unit. The security requirements
were added along side the academic structure, and even the military employed
academic management techniques when time and expediency required it. For
example, compartmentalization often broke down when a laboratory wanted
information to continue its project. Los Alamos was a perfect example when
Groves allowed the weekly seminars to continue. Groves never set foot on the
Towa State College campus during the war, and Spedding recounted several
instances when security was compromised fo accommodate other concerns.
For example, once a security officer asked that bars be placed on the windows in
the Chemistry Building to prohibit entry by some saboteur. There were no bars
placed on the windows because the design of the building requized that
ventilation go through those windows when experiments were in process.
Another time, a Manhattan District officer told Spedding to darken some
windows in the Chemistry Building. They were never darkened because

Spedding thought that would make the warking area for the scientists too
dark, Jt was also a well-known fact that the Manhattan Distaict officers were



160
the government-sponsored programs.316 Bush succeeded in convincing all
OSRD contractots fo move toward that goal.

It was agreed that no monetary consideration would be given by
the Government for the patent tights that already had been vested
in the contractors through operation of the original provision, but
instead that the necessary legal consideration would be supplied
by the signing of supplemental agreements to continue the work,
as each of the contracts involved required renewal.317

Bush wanted someone familiar with Aimy and Navy patent practices to
administer patents for OSRD, so the Navy assigned Captain Robert A.
Tavender (retired) the task of handling the patenting process for the OSRD 518
When the Manhattan District took over the project, it continued the practices
set up by the OSRD and even allowed Lavender to handle all patents for them
as well, since he was already familiar with the rules and regulations that
governed military and defense interests 19 Bush as director of the OSRD
continued to receive “on behalf of the Government, assignments of rights to
inventions made under the Manhattan District coniracts.”320 Bush, in turn,
assigned the patents to the public, thus keeping individuals after the war from.
profiting from research completed by the contractors during the war.

The practice of issuing patents followed very specific instructions, and
all projects upon termination had to clear up and file patents according to

316Stewart, 229-230, Bush, Pieces sof the Action, 83-84; MED History Book I General,
Volume 15 Patents, $2, 2.3-24 See also Office for Emergency Management of the Office of

Sclentific Research and Development, “Inventions and Discoveries,” Administrative Circular
10.06, MED History. Generel, Volume 13 Patents, Appendix A3,

317Stewart, 230.
318Stewart, 226; Bush, Pieces of the Action, 83.
319Stewart, 226-227; MED History, Book I General, Volume 73 Patents, 6:1.

320 Stewart. 231.



156

As seen in the appendix, the eatly contracts with the University of
Chicago and OSRD were quite flexible. When the Manhattan District took
charge, the production contract underwent several modifications. Because all
contracts were on a cost plus overhead basis, there could be no profit to an
educational institution like Iowa State. Particular problems arose when the
Manhattan Engineering District wanted to negotiate the contracts on a price-
per-pound delivery of uranium and also on certain purity and quantities
produced. However, there was no adequate way to predict the costs of these
requirements. Price per pound started at about $22 when the district took
control, but Spedding thought that he could make uranium for around $8.50
per pound. It was actually produced at a cost less than that, so with each
contract supplement, the price. was negotiated downward.as quantity and
purity sealed upward. Renegotiating supplements demanded by the no profit
clause created a constant problem, and during the war it was never solved
because Iowa State, an educational institution, was the only full-fledged

. industrial plant operating under.no-profit requirements. Eventually, the
Manhattan Project had to reimburse Jowa State for actual costs because the
Project could not get extra money from the College or anywhere else if the costs
of materials suddenly changed or delays were encountered in the processing.210

By December 31, 1946, the face value of the Ames contracts amounted to
approximately $7 million. However, the work, including research, production,
and service had been carried out for $4 million with the laboratory producing

5!0Frank H. Spedding, “Contracts,” Spedding Manuscript, 1-2; Manhattan Engineer
District, “Listing of Recent See the ape foe the histo 9 of costs reductions,



133

That was not the only trouble the project had with those whiskey
barrels. Wher the barrels arrived, a group of men who did the heavy lifting
around the project called the “Bull Gang,” were instructed to dig up the dump
material, Suddenly, Dr. Wilhelm had too many men volunteering for this
dirty and strenuous duty, He suspected something was amiss, and when he
went to the dump, he found that the men were propping the whiskey barrels
on the edge of a hill and draining about a cup of whiskey from each barrel
before filling them with the dump matetial. Despite the happy workers, the
slag was eventually crated and shipped to New Jersey as the instructions
provided. What New Jersey finally did with the fine Iowa black dirt and slag is
not mentioned in any records, and evidently no one fo this day knows.266

Oceasionally, more than plant security was threatened by secrecy.
Because the chemicals were volatile, frequent fires errupted. Since the Ames
fire department could not come into the buildings that housed the production
plant or the research activities because of sectecy requiremenis, the College
aliowed the firemen and equipment to come, but remain outside in the event
a fire went out of control. Luckily, the workman were always able to use the
lime and powdered graphite around the production building to squelch any
flames. Some days that was quite a chore; there were at least six explosions in
one day because some wet raw lime being mixed in the bomb retort coniainers
adversely affected the reduction experiment.267

266Prank H. Spedding, “Security Involving Scrap,” Spedding Manuscript, 1; Frank H.
Spedding “Interview with Dorothy Kellenbeck," faly 8, 1961, Transcript in Spedding Papers,
5-6; Tressel, 10-21; Daane, Spedding, Wilhelm interview, 1967, 13-14,

267 Kooser, 8; Prank H. . “Explosions.” Spedding Manuscript, 4-5; Daane,
Spedding, Wilhelm Interview, 1967, 25.



143

papers from the laboratories of that civilian body, the Atomic Energy
Commission, were still classified “Secret.” Also after the war, academic theses
on atomic energy remained classified uniil information could be later released,
and academic journals could publish nothing about atomic processes. It was
not until 1955 after the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy that many of the previously held secrets were released. This conference
was also coupled with a directive from President Eisenhower that all atomic
energy information be released so that industry could use the information to

build nuclear reactors.282

82Kevies, 378; Greenburg, 216. Also see Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan,
Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. I;
College Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969). At Iowa State theses also
remained classified. By 1951, Robert Orr, the Director of the Library, ried that at that
point a total of 26 theses were still classified and 5 were restricted. Of the 31 total, 17 were
from Piysical Chemistry (Robert Orr, “Record of Classified Theses Written at ISC,” Library
5),



161

those specifications. For example, research notebooks could be used as proof
and evidence for both assigning the patent to the government and crediting a
patent to the named contractor. This evidence was followed with statements
and certifications from the prime contractor head.32!_ As of December 31, 1946,
over 5,600 inventions had been docketed by the Patent Advisor Lavender’s
office from over 2,400 prime and subcontracts. 922

After the project was discontinued, this kind of paperwork created
additional headaches for men like Spedding who not only had to worry about
the disposal of property for the projects under them, but they also had to clarify
what was patentable and then go through the lengthy processes of determining
who should be credited for the inventions. Spedding, for example, spent
coundess hours and several letters clarifying the varying potential patentable
processes under his control at Chicago and Ames during the war.223

The Impact of the Contact on Research Management Styles

The contract encouraged universities to par ticipate in defense work
because of the benefits incurred doing government research without many of
the adminisirative problems that had previously plagued agency-supported

321 Amy Services Forces, Manhattan District, "District Circular Letter,” Legal 44-5,”
June 12, 1944, MED History Book I General, Volume 13 Patents, Appendix A10,

322MED History Book I General, Volume 13 Patents, 5.1.

323For just a sampling of the various cases that required Spedding’s attention, see the

following letters all in the Ames Laboratory Papers: Frank H, Spedding, “Letter to Coi, H. E.
Metcalf Regarding Case $-520, Patent for a exttum Hydride Method Under Newton and

Johnson,” February 27, 1945; Frank H. Spedding, “Letter to Col. H. E. Metcalf Regarding Case
$524, Reduction of Uranium Tetratluoride with Magnesium,” May 4, 1945, Frank EH. Spedding,
“Letter to Col, H. 5. Metcalf Regarding Cases $-4035 and $-4036, Purifying Uranium
Materials,” May #1, 1945,



124

No mention was made that this extensive remodeling included erecting
barricades across the halls of the building, A more direct reference to secret
sesearch was made in January 1943 when a report appeared about the building
of a gas main for the new research laboratory east of the Daity Industry
Building. “What the gas will be used for was not revealed since the activities
within the laboratory are defense secrets;”24 This article was the last to appear
and only a small letter to the editor in 1943 complaining about the lack of fire
exits in the Chemistry Building followed. In that Jeter, a reference was made
by the student to new construction that “ closed off the hallway."250 The
voluntary censorship pian must have worked because no more mention was
made of the project at all. This search of the papers probably proved that
Groves’ method to allow casual references in every day matters did wotk at
least at Iowa State College. ‘The secret was never that there was secret work
going on; it was just that the details of the involyement with atomic research
and any mention of the Manhatian Project was prohibited,25!

269-New Research Laboratory Connected to Ges Main,” the lewa State Daily Student, 7.

250Lonise Jaggars, “Believes Chemistry Building Need Mote Fire Exits,” The lowa State
Daily Student, March 30, 1943, 3,

251 There is some evidence that even town's people knew that scerot work was on
catnpus. For example, Margaret Mae Gross, a young secretary in the library at the time
remembered taking her father’s farm milk to the Dairy Industries Building for testing and
knowing that secret work was going on next door (Gross, interview with author, January 1992).
Also Bess Ferguson, a longtime Ames resident remembered walking by on the cinder path that
ran near the present day Physical Plant and knowing that secret work was progressing in
what later became known as Little Ankeny (Mrs. Fred Forguson, “Interview with author,”
April 21, 1986, Ames, IA, 10}. The attitude in both cases seemed to be that even if you knew,

you just did not talk about it; after all a war was in progress,



154

the wartime research, but it also continued as government relations with
universities continued to grow after the war, It is still a cammon characteristic
of academic research administration.303

This type of research organization succeeded then, partly because of the
novel form ef the contract, and partly because scientists were more than
willing to support the defense efforts. By 1942, work on between 400 and 500
contracts with abont seventy-five educational institutions had commenced.24

The Manhattan District followed the policies of OSRD and NDRC in the
contracting area, It used the cost plus overhead basis for all its academic
research program contracts. Payment for work completed continued by a
reimbursement system just as it had under OSRD However, the Manhattan
Engineer District required each contractor to submit a voucher to its assigned
area office first where a preliminary audit would be conducted before the
request for reimbursement would be forwarded to the District headquarters.

Contracting at Iowa State College

The University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory negotiated the first
contract with Fowa State College. actually a subcontract from its own OSRD
Contract No, OXMsr-410 in February 1942 for $30.000, to last until july 1942 to
conduct experimental studies on the chemical and metallurgical aspecis of

303Milton Lomask, A Minar Miracle: An Informal History of the National Science
Foundation (Washington, D. C.: National Science Foundation, 1975), 39-39,

504Kari Compton, “Scientists Face the World of 1942," in Scientists Face the World of
1942: Essays by Karl T. Compton, Robert W. Trullinger, and Vanneoay Bush (New Branswick, N-
J+ Rutgers University Press, 1942), 20-21.

505ED History, Book IV Pile Project, Volume 2 Research, Part t Metallungical
Laboratory, Appendix D-1,



140

required to go through channels, but if a research director had an urgent
problem, he could even directly approach Groves if he wished 276

Security did prevent publication of the results of research, and on the
surface that was a military victory. But that requirement was imposed long
before the military took over, and the scientists found a substitute for
publication that served the project just as well in secreey—the report. In the
beginning of the project, weekly 2epozts were required, then bi-weekly, and _
eventually monthly reports of progress in each laboratory, Each project leader
was responsible for his own group's report and those were summarized by
Spedding and submitted to the Metallurgical Laboratory.2”? An elaborate
process of coding, numbering, and distributing these reports was instituted,
and the only way added security from the military affected this system was fo
require that only laboratory or project directors request reports from another
facility. Written agreements had to be formulated with each facility as to what
it could provide to others. But by the time this took effect in 1943 and 1944,
most scientists alzeady lnew,.in.a general way, who-was working-on the project
and what each laboratory might discover. It was a matter of getting around the
paperwork to obtain information,

276gpedding, interview with Hacker, 1980, 25-26.

277Numerous memos and letters abound in the files relating io the receipt of reparts,
weekly, bi-monthly, and then monthly. For a sampling, see A. H. Compton, “Letter to S. K.
Allison, Encouraging Widespread Use of the Reports for Dissemination of Information,” June 5,
1942; J. A. Wheeler, “Memo to Research Associates on the Change in Plans for Weekly
Reports to a Monthly System,” August 13, 1942; Warren C. Jones, “Memo to i, Burton.
Coryell, Seaborg, Spedding, Eastman, and Latimer Discussing the Receipt of ts to
Provide Summaries for Dr. Campton,” August 4, 1943; "Request for Assistance in Indexing Your
Reports,” n.d; A, H, Compton, “Letter to F. H. Spedding Requesting a Report for the Transfer
of OSRD Contracts to Manhattan District” April 19, 1943; and Cantield Hadlock, “Letter to
F, H. Spedding on the Consolidation af Monthly Reparts and Letters into Semi-monthly
Reports,” September 6, 1943, alt located in the Ames Laboratory Papers.



146

probably made the difference in the relationship between government and
sclence—they needed each other to win a war which was to be fought with
advancing technology as weil as human resources.*86 The split between
academic scientists, if indeed there was an actual split, and the government
establishment dissolved when scientists and federal money were both needed
to win the war against Germany.

Cemeating the Relationship~Bush'’s NDRC and OSRD

When the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) and the Office of
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) were established, they did not
create thei own laboratories to support scientific afforts, but they decided to
support research through existing laboratories, mostly in educational
institutions. The idea was certainly novel, since during the last war scientists
had most often worked in uniform at makeshift labotatoties away from their
home institutions, This new approach though necessitated some way to
register the government/academic relationship, thus the NDRC looked_at the _
contract as a device to cement that relationship with academic laboratories.

Interpreted in its broadest sense as an agreement between two or more
parties to conduct work for the benefit af those involved, the contract had long
existed as a device fo contro! relations between the government and others.
For example, the government had been known to contract for surveys of
coastal or geographic areas of importance, to fund expeditions across the

286armold Frutkin, Esternational Cooperation in Space (New York: Prentice Hall, 1965),
10-17, argues that scientists in war time have genevaliy roacted to the national needs of the
country.



142

structure In most cases when security was lifted. what was left was an
academically-styled unit or laboratory.

However, there was one area in which security continued to exert a
detrimentel influence and that was in the declassifying process of documents
used in ihe creation of the atomic bomb and the many processes developed for
atomic energy applications. As early as 1944, there was a movement under way
to discuss ways to notify the public about atomic energy, Henry Smyth was
hired to begin the history of the project and release certain kinds of
information at the end of the war. The process of declassification of
information though became ensnared in procedure after procedure, Ihe
Tolman Committee (Spedding served on the committee) was commissioned
in early 1946 to implement a declassification scheme, designating which
information could be released to the public and when it could be released.
Information to be released immediately included that of “a broad scientific or
general technical nature.”289 Information to be held secret included the
“design. and availability of atomic weapons. On these we believe that release of
information must be made a matter of generat policy to be determined by the
Congress and the President. "281

Tre major complication after World War I was the developing Cold
War, with the Soviet Union as the target of continued secrecy. The Tolman
Committee recommendations were not implemented quickly by the new
civilian agency overseeing atomic research. By 1948, three of four research

280«Statement of Recommendations on Release of Atom Bomb Project Information,”
Spedding Papers, 2,
281-Statement of Recommendations on Release of Atom Bomb Project,” 3.



155
uranium and related materials.0 Most early contracts were actually Jetters-of-
intent with specific details to be worked out later in a formal written
document. In the summer of 1942, the OSRD negotiated directly a separate
contract (No. OEMs1~433) with Iowa State College for experimental studies of
tube alloy and for experimental chemical and metallurgical studies in building
a power plant.207 (For examples of versions of these two contracts, see
Appendix E) In late November 1942, the Manhattan Engineer District took
over OEMst-410, changing its status to a production or supply contract and
continuing it as Contract No. W-7405-eng-7 uni termination on December 31,
1945508 OEMsr-433 transferred to the Manhattan District as Contract No. W-
7405-eng-82 on May 1, 1943, when most other OSRD contzacts were Placed
under district control. That contract with some modifications is the present
contract with which the Ames Laboratory continues its work through the U. S.
Department of Energy#% (See Appendix E for extracts of those under the
Manhattan District, and the full contract with the U). $. Atomic Energy
Commission is included for 1948) oe

SO6MED History, Book IV Pile Project, Volume 2 Research, Part 1 Motalinrplat
Laboratory, 2.1, E. I. Fulmer, “History of the Ames Project under the Manhattan District to
December 31, 1946, 7 also published as MED History, Book I General, Chapter £1 Ames Project
{lowa State College). :

307Vennevar Bush, “Letter to F. H. Spedding Appointing Him as Official Investigator
for Contract CEMsr-433,” July 20, 1942. ‘Contract OEMsr-433, Supplement No, 2,” December 26,
1942, 1, both located in Anes Laboratory Papers, Parks Library.

908Mankattan Engineer District, “History of Account.” attached to an Audit by E. J.
Stimpson, May 6, 1947, in Manhattan Engineer District Files, Record Group No. 77, National
Archives, Washington, DC. Also see MED History, Book IV Pile Project, Volume 2 Research,
Part 1 Metallurgical Laboratory, 2.9

509Manhattan Engineer District, “Listing of Accounts,” attached to an Audit by E. J.
Stimpson, May 6, 1947, in Manhattan Engineer District Files, Record Group No. 77, Nationa!
Archives, Washington, DC.



197

case of holding a colloquium af Los Alamos, for example, created such a stir
within the project that the Military Policy Committee sent Bush to Roosevelt
for a letter that could be sent to Oppenheimer and project directors
emphasizing the need for strict compartmentalization. Finally, a compromise
was reached with Los Alamos where they were allowed t continue weekly
colloquiums for exchange of information; these meetings were testsicted as to
who was given access, a concession to Groves’ extreme interpretation of

compar tmentalization.273

Compartmentalization at Iowa State College

There was some compartmentalization at Iowa State, especially after the
Manhattan District took over. Only the top research directors had access to
what transpired at other sites and travel between sites became more restrictive.
But the seminars started under Spedding in 1942 continued chroughout the
war. The Manhattan District seemed to be much more interested in the
products that: came out of the Antes Project itself, and since production was not
interrupted, the Manhattan District did little to interfere with the internal
workings of the scientific side of the laboratory.

Just like at other institutions, the Manhattan District did provide its own
separate staff to lowa State College An area manager, security agents, safety
engineers, and auditors were placed on campus to run the project
administratively. These agents could not interfere with the scientific progress,

273Franklin Roosevelt, “Letter to Lestie R, Groves, on Security in Manhattan Froject,”
June 29, 1943 in MED History, Book 1 General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, Appendix
4-1; Hewlett and Anderson. 238-239; Wyden, 99-100.



129

Good and Fair ratings respectively, and it was up to the area engineers to bring
them into compliance.25?

Protection against sabotage was another concern of plants, so erecting
banriers like fences and screens as well as locking entrances and providing
guard details was common practice. Usually workers wore an identification
badge to gain entrance to restricted areas that were normally set aside or
protected in same way. The Manhattan District also instituted a rigorous
program of visitor access in order to protect the plant from the unwanted, the
undesirable, or the curious. For a visitor to gain access, written permission had
io be obtained from the District Engineer Office. Since most visits were
personnel employed elsewhere on the project, background checks had already
been completed. Those completely outside the jurisdiction of the Manhattan
Project facilities at first had to undergo a background check before gaining
admittance to a site facility. Later, the Area Engineer’s Office initiated a
standard pass and completed checks, which speeded up the process of visitor
access, When visits were considered urgent by the contractor, as was quite
often the case later in She war, teletype and telephone clearances substituted for

written requests.260

29MED History, Book | General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, $4-5,, 41-49,

20MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 4.94.11. See
also The War Department, “Plant Protection for Manufacturers,” Pamphlet No. 32-1, May 1,
1943, revised from the February 1942 pamphlet of the same name for more information on
every aspect of plant security fom sabotage to fire protection.



152

necessary for the expenditure of public funds."2? Upon first hearing of this
new way of mobilizing science, James Conant, Bush's colleague, remembered:

I recall saying something to the effect that, of couse, we would
have to build laboratories and staff them with government
employees. “Not at all,” Bush replied. “We will write contracts
with universities, research institutes and industriaf laboratories.”
He pointed out that such a procedure had already been used by the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics of which he was
then chairman. ... Scientists were to be mobilized for the defense
effort in their own laboratories, A man who we of the committee
thought could do a job was going to be asked to be the chief
investigator; he would assemble a staff in his own laboratory if

ler he would make progress reports to our committee

jirou a small organization of part-time advisors and full-time
trough ‘gan pa

The actual contract form adopted on August 29, 1940, contained two
characteristics: work at the home laboratory and complete flexibility in the
research plan of attack. The performance clause, the key to the new contract,
was an exercise in simplicity: the contractor would conduct studies on a given
topic and make a final report on a specified date; no details were provided as to
how the work must be performed.299 oe oo.

Another departure from past contracting procedures required contract
negotiation with the investigator's institution, not the individual. This legal
precedent freed the researcher to do the work but did not leave the institution
holding the bag if additional costs were incurred. Io provide further
safeguards, the contract was written on 2 no-cost basis to the institution, plus
an overhead recovery, oz administrative charge, of fifty percent of the wages

BW Etewart, 191,
278Conant, My Several Lines, 236.

Stewart, 191.



is
and its subsequent legislation affecting agricultural research, certainly set the
stage for certain notions of contract research to be implemented later in the
twentieth century.

The National Advisory Committee fot Aeronautics

However, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (VACA)
came closest to the actual model for contzact research as interpreted and put
into place by Bush. NACA employed a contract type arrangement to fund
research in both its own laboratory and in those instances it went outside to the
university. Created in 1915, NACA consisted of a committee of twelve unpaid
people, including two from the War Department, two from the Navy
Department, one each from the Smithsonian, the Weather Bureau, the Bureau
of Standards, and five more atlarge members commissioned to solve
problems in the aeronautics field.2 After splitting into thisty-two
subcommittees during World War I, the Committee reorganized after the war

Experiment Stations, 1870-1890 {Ames. 1A: towa State University Press, 1985) for an
examination of the complicated relationships between the various peoples and associations
involved in establishing and maintaining the experiment stations in the late nineteenth
century, Robert 8, Friedman and Renee C, Friedman, The Role 4 Lngoersiy 5 Organized Research
Units in Academic Science, National Science Foundation Report, TB

(Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1982), 35-36 point to thase agricultural units
being separate from academic departments and foreshadowing a trend for research institutes
in the twentieth centuries as separate, sponsored-driven and funded, task-oriented, and
problem-focused entities. Agricultural research received the Hon’s share of federal funding
from the federal government up until World War I. For example, from the time of the
enactment of the Act through 1933-34, experiment stations had recived almost $74
million. (Malcolm M, Willey, Depression, Recovery ang Higher Education: A by
Committee Y of the American Association of University Professors (New Yorks McGraw-Hill.
1937), 360.

232Roger Bilstein, Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990
(Washington, D.C: National Acronautics and Space Administration, 1989}, 4,



126

cartied in the old suitcase some students had earlier given him.2¢ Frank
Spedding continued that tradition for a short while when he transported metal
on his weekly tnips into Chicago. Soon the quantity and weight of shipments
grew too great to hand carry, so the project began to use railway express and
then freight. Shortly before moving to the Physical Chemistry Annex, the
small 4" x 4" x 8° boxes would be trucked down to the depot to catch a Railway
Express car, but when the production plant was set up at the Annex, a train box
car would be called to come to the railroad sidetrack that ran by the power plant
close to the Annex. Men from the plant would load the train, lock it, and give
instructions for shipping the materials. On the other end, quite often Chicago,
someone from the laboratory would meet the train and unload it. ‘The railroad
personnel had no reason to suspect what was in the little wooden boxes. The
trains appeared to come into Ames empty and Jeave empty because usually
one layer of 4” by 4” boxes was all that was necessary to come close fo exceeding
the weight limits, Most freight cars at that time held approximately 40,000
pounds, so quite aften less than 409 boxes would meet the weight limits. Most
tains left Ames with what looked like a higher floor, but if anyone had
examined the train closely, they would have seen axles straining or even
bending under the extreme weight.255

Early under the jurisdiction of the Manhattan District, there were no
Special guard details. After the Manhattan District required shipments of this
type fo carry guards from the Chicago pool, two men in civilian clothes,

2S4withelm. interview with author, 11-12.
25Peterson, interview with author, 7,



125
Matezials Shipping Security Regulations
Federal rules and regulations for shipping matcriais
The OSRD and NDRC developed no specific requirements for shipping
hazardous materials, so the general regulations of the War Department
regarding all military information served ‘as the guide.2 However, by the
time the Manhattan District took over, shipments were becoming more
numerous, so the District instituted a survey in November 1943, followed by
specific regulations on handling shipments. Guard pools were created at
specified sites around the country, including over twenty guards who were
stationed at Chicago to guard rail and trtick shipments of critical materials fo
Hanford from sites in the East and shipments of recovery materials from
Hanford to sites in the Midwest and East (including Iowa State College). The
courier system was also enlarged with pools established at various sites,
including Chicago, especially after the institution of the Top Secret
classification scheme, to catty smail items, often radioactive. in personal
luggage from site to site, Pinally, a scheme of eight forms of transportation
methods ranging from Raitway Express to Courier in descending order was
standardized io prescribe shipment of the critical materials by the most

appropriate and secure means.253

Materials shipping security at Iowa State College
Harley A Wilhelm received the honor of taking the first “shipment” of
uranium to Chicago when he made the historic trip with an 11-pound ingot

S2MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 5.1.
255MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 3.1-5.9.



138

but they reported production progress, checked security measures, and audited
travel and other expense accounts, Spedding reveaied in his mamuscript
history that these people were rarely scientists, or were they even security
agents by taining. They were often businessmen or lawyers, so they had little
experience with either how science worked or how to make a plant secure,
They used compartmentalization techniques that were handed down from
headquarters, but often they did not understand what they were
implementing” So often this level of organization seemed to the scientists
more of a nuisance than actually facilitating the project's goals.

The District Area Manager’ himself was Spedding’s counterpart on the
Amy side. Usually, he was a major in training for a higher management
position in the Army and because Ames was such a small installation, the area
managers changed as often as every six months. It became almost a joke that
Ames was breaking in so many new managets constantly. Spedding said the
Army told him (in jest he assumed) that they would send someone to Ames,
and, if he could get along with Spedding, he was xeady for a larger assignment,
such as a project that employed 5,000-30,000.275

Compartmentalization affected many sites much more than Iowa State,
Because lowa State, by the time the Manhattan District antved, had already
completed much of its original research under freer conditions, it was not as
hampered. From 1943 onward. lowa State was primarily serving as a

frank H. Spedding, “Security of Scientific Information, 1941-1954." Spedding
Manuscript, 3.

2SFrank H. Spedding. “My Personal Contacts with General Groves;* Spedding
Mannscript, 2-3.



18

them. All of that activity was left to individual contractors. There were
twenty-five plants, however, planis that were contributing a major portion of
research expertise, whose operations were checked for any violations of
government security measwes. The violations though were reported only to
OSRD and it was left to the committee to bring about compliance with the
recommendations. The national headquarters adopted minimal security
Measures; staff wore photographic badges like those used by the Army and
Navy, the Federal Works Agency provided guards for duty around the
building, and OSRD installed electrical burglar alarms in sensitive areas to be
turned on after the offices closed.258

‘The Manhattan District instituted a much more thorough program of
plant security when it launched its Plant Protection Progtam in August 1943,
The program required a survey of all installations engaged in important work
to discover if conditions existed to delay and hamper production or to violate
security, particulatly checking fo see if a loss or comprise of sensitive
information occurred...Reports and recommendations. were forwarded. to the
Area Engineer or an officer assigned to that facility as security officer. The
District compiled a list of important facilities and revised it bi-monthly starting
in June 1944. Bach facility was rated A (where interruptions would seriously
delay the project work). B (infractions would cause minor delay), and C (where
violations would cause no delay). Each report contained a composite rating of
Excellent, Good. Fair, ot Poor. All A and B facilities had to maintain at least

28Stewart, 253-254.



144

CONTRACTING—FINANCIAL CONIROL OF THE AMES PROJECT

introduction

Just as security challenged the administration of research, financial
control also became an important issue in research administration, Financial
controls were placed on the Ames Project by the NDRC, the OSRD, and the
Manhattan Engineer District. Each of those wartime national organizations
adopted a financial management device known as a contract, a mechanism that
essentially redefined the relationship between government and the academic
world, Unlike security, which was by and large a temporary measure that
affected primarily the administration of a wartime laboratory, contract
administration actually changed the nature of research administration forever.

Early University/Governmental Research Relationships

Contractual atrangements actually developed out of a long-time and
somewhat ambivalent relationship between scientists and the federal
government,” The academic scientist, particularly in the non-agriculiual
disciplines, generally taught courses while completing research and

283Por detailed reports on carly governmantal and academic relationships, see A.
Hunter Dupree, Science i the Federal Goverament, who traces what he calls a split between

the government that values primarily applied research and the universities that conduct
what he calls basic research, Though this argument doesa’t take into consideration all of the
complexities governing the developing relations, it does portray the fact that the two entities
dig in many ways feel suspicious of each other, Also see Daniel S. Greenburg, The Politics of
Pure Science (New York: New American Library, 1967}, 51-67 for a discussion of pre-World
War attitudes in academia and government towards scientific research.



120

for use on the telephone. Spedding recalled several farm terms developed by
the Ames group. “Eggs” were 2” diameters of uranium and often the caller
would indicate “2-dozen eggs shipped.” Later, when Clinton wanted a1” x 4"
dength of uranium shipped, these were called frankfurters or hot dogs; billets
4" in diameter and 2-3-feet long weighing 250 pounds were called “cheeses.”
Towa State shipped uranium scrap turnings as “hay.” Boron, a dangerous
poison and contaminant, was called Vitamin B, Reports referring to a percent
of Vitamin B content contained in the metal or tube alloy meant that the
uranium contained a certain percent of boron 241

Code names were also used for the heads of laboratories and other
prominent scientists. Dr, Enrico Fermi, for example, was called Mr. Farmer,
Dr. Bugene Wigner was known as Mr. Warner, and Dr, Arthur Compton
answered to Mr. Comas.242 Sometimes, though the code name system
backfired. In his manuscript history, Spedding explained well what could
happen to even a Manhattan Distict person who made a mistake in realizing
the importance of security as far as codes were.concerned...As noted. earlier,
documents of specified classifications were delivered in cettain ways. By 1943
and 1944, secret documents were usually sent by registered mail, and top secret

241R. S, Apple, “Letter to C. M, Cooper on Froposed Codes at the Metallurgical
Laboratory,” October 30, 1942 Speddtin; Paperg; Spedding, interview 5 with Caleiano, 10-13;
Frank H. Spedding, “A Security Scare—Boy Saying Uranium,” 1-2. Humorous names also
appeared. At some point later in the project, when lowa State began shipping thorium
billets, some people in the Chi Metalureteal Jab called thorinm “mi y” after the

actress, Mj . (Spedding, “A Security Scare,” 2) See also Frank H. Speddin;
Mintervion’ with Coome ‘Tressel for filen on anniversary of CP-1," July 22, 1967, Trakeatpt in

Ames Laboratory Papers, 10-11.
ues tm H. Spedding, “Top Secret Incident,” Spedding Manuscript, 1; Compton, Atomti¢
jest, TAL



131

situation at Ames, especially the hiring and maintaining of guards. Moore
conducted the personnel checks for many of the Ames workers hired on the
project, He was also responsible for hiring guards. These men, usually local
residents, were equipped with revolvers and controlled passage in and out of
buildings. Moore went on to explain the tight security:

A system of pass identification (if you didn’t have one, you didn’t

get in period, and if you had left it home you went home after it

period) was worked out for employees. The guards were tough,
too, On one occasion, even Moore was refused admittance

because he had left his pass at home. although he remedied that
situation by writing one out 26

Several scientists found out that the guards were just as strict about notebooks
or research materials left about. If someone left a notebook unlocked, he or she
was telephoned at home and told to come back immediately to put it in the
safe. Needless to say, coming back late at night to put away secret materials
soon cured the forgetful sctentists about carelessness.263 ;

Few documents remain recording the results of plant inspections,264 but
in one recorded instance, the security inspection team proposed some untisual
measures to correct a perceived security problem. Yowa State disposed of the
slag material from the reduction experiments at the College dump. The
material included calcium fluoride, lime, and probably a itle vranium that
aight be left in the slag. The calcium chloride, according to Spedding, served

262Bemie Kooser, “Intricate System of Passes for Bomb Project at College.” Ames Daily
Tribune, Angust 10, 1945, 8,

268Peterson. interview with author. 2

2645e0, for example, John Z.. Ferry, "Letter to F. H. Spadding about Visit to Project to
take Radivactivity Tests,” August 18, 194, he Pej

Ames Laboratory Papers.



130

Plant security at Iowa State College

At the start of the project, Iowa State developed its own security system.
After clearances were received, all employees were informed that the Ames
Project's purpose was to obtain pure materials used in the construction of an
atomic bomb and that the work was highly classified, No one was to discuss
the work with another person except others an the project. Papers and
notebooks were always to be locked up and no non-project person who was in
the area at the time should see handwriting on paper or on the blackboard By
summer, the Chemistry Building had two wooden partitions or barricades
erected, one at each end of the area in which the project people were working,
and a guard was posted at each barricade at all times to check identification
badges of workers and passes from visitors, That guard kept a log of visitors
with names, time of arrival, and time of depaxture. There were no special
barriers erected at the production plant, but it was guarded at all times and
spotlights were placed outside and fluorescent lighting inside for extra
protection. Since three shifis ran 24-hours per day, it was probably thought that
guards and the spotlights were sufficient, Ihe Manhattan District added some
guards to the local force and also required extensive logs to be kept. Work was
compartmentalized and only the top men in each project were briefed on work
elsewhere.261

Jokn W. Moore, personnel director of the Ames Project, in an interview
with a local Ames paper in 1945, explained a bit more about the local personnel

26lFyank H. S} blems Encountered with Setting and Maintaining a Security
System,” Spedding Frank HL iding, “Security,” Spedding Manuscript, 1-2;
“Building and Grounds se 1 Busy,” 6; ““Litlle Ankeny’ Plog Part in Victory," Jorea State

Student, August 15, 1945, 6,



163

remained the primary way of doing business with the government until the
National Science Foundation was created in 1950. At that Hime, the non-
military agencies like the National Science Foundation began fo develop what
they called a new mechanism to control scientific research. However, if one
looks closely at the grant, it was first and foremost a flexible contract. It had all
the characteristics of Bush's eatlier device: non-limiting in its geographical
applications, supporting project research with no prescribed formula except the
demand of a report at project's end, the award of the funds to the institution
rather than the individual, and fiscal as well as research zesponsibility
demanded from the institution. The contract then—first a wartime fiscal
device—grew to be the controlling device for most research administration
after the war. It was the foundation upon which the academic world and the
government built a long-term relationship, a relationship that appeared to

mutually benefit both parties.



ii

research work. By 1939, NACA had contracts for twelve investigations at ten
universities.25 This flexible contract style of research management attracted
Vannevar Bush when he became the committee's chairman in 1938.

The Contract As Developed By NDRC and OSRD

When Bush looked around for a structure to administer NDRC
research, contzacts were fairly cotmmon. However, those developed outside
the USDA and NACA were most often military procurement devices so
fraught with requiremenis and speciat safeguards that they would not work
with universities thai already suspected government contol. When Bush
originally developed the plan for the NDRC organizational structure, he made
a decision to split the actual research areas from the business side of the agency
under the assumption that ance work started, the scientist need not worry
about financial regulations with the Bureau of the Budget or the Patent Office
or the other bureaucratic agencies that-were concerned with the administration
of research. He chose Irvin Stewart, a lawyer who had been a member of the
Federal Communications Commission, to oversee the business side, or the
administration of contracts.2°6 ,

In Stewart's mind as well as Bush’s, the development of a special
contract with universities must “combine a maximum of freedom for the
exercise of scientific imagination on NDRC problems with those safeguards

25Dupree, 366,
Stewart, 194; Bush, Pieces of the Action, 37-98. Conant, My Several Lives, 241.



150

into six technical committees and a research director who handled most
administrative matters.

By the late 1920s, the committee was enlarged to fifteen members with
its own national laboratory conducting most of the research work. ‘The
committee received suggestions for research from three sources: the
government (most often the military), the NACA staff, and outside sources
like aircraft manufacturers, The projects from outside sources were assigned to
a subcommittee in the area for evaluation on technical merit and then sent to
the executive committee for final approval. The suggestions from the military
services and other government bureaus were sent directly to the executive
comunittee and approved unless they duplicated work already in process. Once
a project was approved, it generally ended up at the Langley Laboratory where a
research authorization was written with a scientist who was allowed great
latitude in the conduct of the research Review of the research was guaranteed
at the beginning of the project and at intervals along the way, but researchers
were essentially left to conduct the research by their own devices. Prior to.
building the laboratory at Langley, NACA had also contracted research on
aeronautics to individuals within universities. The earliest contracts were for
studies on propeilers with William F. Durand at Stanford, who coincidentally
was a member of the main committee. Even ajter establishing the
laboratory, NACA continued to contract with universities for scientific

293Alex, Roland, Model Resaarch: The National Advisory Conumtiter ‘for Aeronautics,
1915-1958 (Washington, D. C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1985): 103-
106.

24Roland, 33.



127

usually overalls and sweaters, came and left with the shipments. Spedding
recalled that people in town soon Spread stories that empty train cazs were
coming into the College with two hobos in the car and were leaving empty
with those same two hobos aboard, [hose who saw the trains probably
thought that the scientists or the College had so much power that they could
order and send out empty trains when farmers throughout the state could not
get a train to ship out their corn.256 But security remained intact and no one
reported in the newspapers the incidents of the empty trains.257

Plant Seewity

Govermmental plant security regulations

In the case of academic institutions, the NDRC and OSRD required no
special integrity checks oz loyalty signatures for the institution as it did for
individuals within the organization. Unlike the educational institutions,
companies and other private contractors were checked for violations of laws,
fraud, and. any poor-performance with government contracts, -OSRD and
NDRC made no physical inspections of the majority of plant operations, since
it did not have a separate staff from the committee or organization to perform

Bégpadding, interview 5 with Calciano, 10; Peterson, interview with anthor, 1990, 6-
7; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 16-27; Spedding, Withelm, Daane, Interview, 1967.
12; Frank H. Spedding, “Freight Car Boondoggle.” Spedding Manuscript, 1.

*57There was only one small breach, or what was initially believed to be a breach, In
security during the shipping days. A young boy of about twelve, watching some of the men
loading the Rallway Express car, noticed that they were having trouble lifting the boxes. He
shouted, “What are you loading there, uranium? When military security got wind of the
incident, they were sure a breach of security had occurred. Upon investigation though, it
seemed that the boy had been sedying chemistry and the elements on the periodic table. He
had made the assumption that the highest numbered element (aranittm) was also the

heaviest, He just used that as a reference to the heaviness of the boxes, No one from the
Project had talked. (Frank H. Spedding, “A Security Scare—-Boy Saying Uranium,” Spedding
Manuscript, 1-2,



41
Visits to other facilities were siill allowed under the Manhattan

Engineer District though more paperwork accompanied each visit. There is
some discrepancy in how much time the military security requirements
actually delayed the project. In a Senate Hearing after the war, Leo Szilard
complained that he thought compartmentalization delayed the atomic bomb
deployment by up to eighteen months.278 When one considers that in the
National Academy Report in 1941, Compton predicted a device by January
1945, compartmentalization and other security measures delayed the
achievement of the final goal only until August. Other problems were just as
important in the delay as the nuisance of security measures: innovative
procedures had io be developed; shortage of raw materials delayed the
development of processes; and the expetimeniation and calculation and
recalculation in a new field certainly caused as much delay as security. Groves
even hinted in his book that perhaps the Manhattan Project speeded up the
process because scientists were not allowed to discuss every alternative and

, spend a great amount of detait in the discussion process. When a method
worked, it was immediately used and usually became the preferred method;
action on all others was stopped.29 Perhaps, in some strange way, that was the
case. The military did not change the existing academic structure set in place by
Bush; it merely added procedures and requirements along side the other

27$*Vearings Before the Senate Committee on Atomic Ecc, USS, Senate Resolution
179; A Resolution Seating a Special Committee to investigate Problems Relating to the

Development, Use, and Coniral of Atomic Energy,” November 27, 1945-February % 1946, 294.

7Sroves, 140; Hewlett and Anderson, 23%, See also Richard G. Hewlett, “Beginnings
of Development in Nuclear Technology.” Technology and Culture 17, no. 3 Guly 1976}: 469.



158

funds were spent essentially at the discretion of the President, and it was not
until 1956 that a policy was created to handle this administrative money
differently (see Appendix F), That policy again established the two ter system:
both a science officer and a business officer for the College needed to negotiate
contracts The policy for handling administrative costs was also established:
that all overhead funds should go into the General Fund instead of the
President's Office to compensate the College for the costs of doing research 314
Shorily after the war's end, Spedding approached the state of Iowa to
take some of the overhead money and invest in the initiation of an Institute
for Atomic Research at Iowa Siate College to rum atomic research projects of
interest to the state. The Ames Laboratory was also established in 1947 funded
from the federal government, and continued under the newly formed U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission the same research and development contract held
by the old Manhattan Engineer District. The contract declared that Iowa State
as a national laboratory should continue atomic research, particularly
specializing in materials preparation research. The newly-formed Institute for

Agencies for War Research, and te accept grants for such research programs, subject to the
approval of the Building and Business Committec” (Minutes of the Board of Education,
February 8, 1944, 273). A separate account was created to receive the funds from the
governtnent for war research, but Friley reported each of the payments to the Board af
Education during the war. (See Minutes of tie Board of Education, June 22, 1943, 181 for a report
of the receipt of $300,000; Miuuies of the Board of Education, March 28, 1944, 298 for a report of
a $500,000 amount on a research supplement as well as the report of the inspection of am
addition to the Physical Chemistry Rinex on February 14 paid for by government funding;

Minutes of the Board of Education, September 19, 1944 for receipt of $1,324,000 for continued
research, Subsequent reports follow in June 1945.}

3i4fowa State Board of Education, “Statement of Principles Relating to the
Negotiation and Acceptance of Research Contracts,” Minutes of fhe Iowa State Bourd of
Education, 1949/50, March 15-16, 1950, 269-272.



159
Atomic Research would contractually administer the federal laboratory for the

College 315

Patents and the Contracting Process

The use of the contracting mechanism by universities had one
requirement that greatly affected research administration during the war as
well as set a precedent after the war: afl patents belonged to the United States
government when research work was completed on federal contracts. This
policy developed out of lengthy discussions during the time both NDRC and
OSRD controlled atomic research As can be seen in the Standard Contract 1001
there are two forms for patents. The first patent arrangements, worked out
with companies, essentially stated that the government received a royalty-free
Hcense from any invention developed from war research. This policy helped
break the bottleneck that developed when companies refused to sign contracts
that did not give them title to patents. However, all atomic research
eventually came under jurisdiction of the short form which stated that the
government had the sole zight to determine who had title to the patents, In
the beginning, the long form patent policy was used, but as the project grew, in
the summer of 1942, President Roosevelt instructed Bush ta make sure that the
government obtain assignment of the patent titles for all research done under

315Note the similarities between this unit and the agricultural research units
described above. Spedding went to the state legislature also hoping to receive state finding
for his research unit, much like an experiment station. It was separately administered by a
research institute outside any one department; it was focused upon research in both chemistry
and physics as they related to atomic reseatch; and it was sponsored by the federal

government through 2 contract-like appropriation,



147

country, or to support some project of national importance throughout its
history, but these were not by and large scientific ventures.287 By the early
twentieth century, the primary support for science funding was still located
within the university structure. Government support of scientific research
efforts in World War I became temporarily necessary for national defense.
Scientists were recruited into the military forces and given problems, especially
those of a chemical nature, to solve. The National Research Council was set
up as an agency to oversee this cooperative research, but after the war when
the emergency was lifted, most scientists returned to their individual

institutional efforts 288

The agricultural research movement

That is not to say there were no cooperative ventures between the
government and the academics, Federal money provided through semi-
indépendent research institutes called experiment stations had supported
agricultural research at land grant colleges since the passage of the Hatch Act in
1887. The Adams Act in 1906, the Purnell Act of 1925, and the Bankhead-Jones
Act in 1935 further codified and structured the rules for agricultural research.
‘The experiment station was organized as essentially a separate, but cooperating
organized research unit (ORU) or research institute, or center within a

287For the most definitive work on government and science relations see Dupree, Science

in the Federal Government. See also books like Alice M. Rivlin, The Role of the Federal
Government in Financing Higher Education (Washingion, DC: Brookings Institution, 1961),
Chapters 2 and 3; and er D. Babbidge and Rot tM. Rosenzweig, The Federal Interest in
Higher Education (ew York: McGraw 1962), Chapter 1 for general Historical surveys on
governmental and academic relations.

2B8jonn C. Bumham, od., Science in America: Historieal Selections (New York: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 257,



123

newspaper, censorship rules were first referred fo even before the Manhattan
Project took over. In an editorial on May 22, 1942, the newspaper editor hinted
that tough measures would come to those who were caught either
intentionally or unintentionally revealing secret information.245

Direct references to the project during the time period totaled four
articles and one editorial, A blaze that damaged the chemistry roof was
reported in July 1942, The Ames Fire Department was called, but about thirty
members of the chemistry staff had almost extinguished the fire before the Gre
trucks arrived. The explanation for the fire. given by W #. Coover, was: “an
experiment using highly inflammable materials and a continuously running
motor was being conducted for defense work."246 This article was the only
time the project, even in an indirect way, made the front page of a paper before
the official announcement in August 1945 about the role of the College in war
work. Later that year, Coover reported in the paper that “26 members of the
Chemistry Department are engaged in vital war projects of a confidential
nature, “24” ‘His referenoe was never explained in any follow-up atticle, Barller
that same month, B, H. Platt, the head of the building and grounds department
at the College, indicated “considerable remodeling on the inside of the
{Chemistry Building} where storerooms and classrooms were rearranged.""248

243Lyle Abbott, “Be Patriotically Quiet,” The lowa State Daily Student. May 22, 1942.
3.

pe. 246"Chemistry Roof Blaze Brings Out Firemen,” The lowe State Daily Student. july 7.
2.6 247"Chemista Needed for War Work," The lows State Daily Student, September 23,
UB>Byiding and Grounds Men Kept Busy," The lowa State Daily Student. 6,



164

WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY
Intzoduction

Mr. Premo Chiotti was working with Dr. Wilhelm and me on the
reduction of thorium fluoride to thorium metal. Mr. Chiotti was
adding a booster to the reaction in a room a few doors down the

from my office. Suddenly there was a terrific explosion
which blew out several of the windows in the front of the
chemistry building. When I came out of my office to see what
had happened, the corridor was filed with dust about six feet
above the floor to the ceiling. § was relieved to see that Mr.
Chiotti had not been injured, but he loaked very dazed and was
pacing up and down the cortidor, As I passed him, I heard kim
multering, “I must have misplaced that decimal point, I must
have misplaced that decimal point”52¢

The story above was probably embellished in the retelling, because
health and safety of warkers were serious matters on the Ames Project. As
long as the atomic bomb project remained a research project, worker health
protection schemes concentrated on protecting scientists, who by training were
careful ‘experimenting with potentially hazardous materials, from the dangers .
of known radioactive and toxic materials that would be used in the wartime
laboratories. Little was known though about the risks with new materials like
plutonium, thorium, and other potentially harmful daughter products created
as a result of splitting uranium, Since the scientific literature contained
information about the harmful effects of radioactivity, it was natural to start a
protection program upon that established knowledge base. However, when

824Frank Spedding, “Humorous Story Conceming Explosions and Education,” Spedding
Manuscript, 2



134

Incidentally, that was the day that several secretaries threatened to resign
and one Army officer received a rather suspicious wound. Secretaries, who
were at an office attached to the production plant, had to pass through the
firing pit area in order to get outside the building. After that series of
explosions, they were wary of staying any longer in a potentially dangerous
work environment, Spedding, however, convinced all but two of them to stay
after he promised to strengthen the wail between the office and the operations
area and to cut a door to the outside directly from their office. That same day
Major H, A. Savigny, an Army officer who also happened to be the Area
Engineer, came fo investigate the problem after the third explosion. While he
was there, another explosion occurred, and, of course, he immediately ran for
the door. As he was talking to someone a few moments later, he suddenly
grabbed his leg, and a small piece of metal fell from a burned hole in the seat of
his pants. Since he sustained a minor burn, he was kidded that he was
probably entitled to a purple heart that could be used as a patch to cover that
hole in his pants.. Others, however, thought it might be somewhat hard-to -
justify his “bravery” since it was apparent what he was doing when he was
injured.268

When there were breaches of plant security, Spedding could often
depend upon his own personnel to let him know about potential problems.
Only one letter existed in the documentary files about a potential lack of
security, and that was from a night shift manager at the Physical Chemisty

268Frank H. Sj losions; Spedding Manuscript, 5-6; Daane, Spedding

“EXph
Wilhelm Interview, eet 11-22, 25-26.



136

The guiding principle for the Manhattan Engineer District was also
compartmentalization, interpreted in the most stringent of terms. Groves took
his 1ules from an intelligence bulletin that stated:

‘Two cardinal rules govern the tight to possess classified
information:

(1) The person nwust be authorized to have the information
(ie., known, to require the information in connection with

official duties and in performance of his work.)

(2) If the person is authorized to have the information, then
he is entitled to only so much as is necessary for him te
execute his function.271

Groves applied this policy much mote literally than the guidelines used
under the NDRC or OSRD. For example, blueprints for plant construction
project had to be broken into parts to conceal total project designs; orders for
raw materials were supposed to come from a number of suppliers because a
large quantity coming fram one supplier could betray the project’s purpose;
and functions like assembly of certain equipment and its manufacture were fo
take place in separate locations. The Army took a much stricter view of
information and personnel exchange between laboratories and even within
each laboratory. As a result, written agreements such as one developed
between Los Alamos and Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory were spelled out in
such minute detail that the only practical channel open for exchange of
information was for Oppenheimer or his representative from Los Alamos to
visit the Chicago laboratory in person when information was needed.””2 The

ZA\MED History. “Safeguarding Military Information,” 4.
Z2YED History, Book | General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 63-64; Jones,
268-270; Hewlett and Anderson, 238-239,



122

Chemistry Building. According to one scientist on the project, since Spedding
had been given almost carte blanche from President Friley to obtain whatever
he needed, when several scientists needed access to books on tadio-chemistry,
the library was instructed to let him have any books he wished on indefinite
Joan. To explain the loan to the Ames Project, the entry in the check-out
records in the library told users the books were at the bindery. Scientists thus
had their own private Hbrary behind the wall of secrecy, probably a great
convenience as well as a security measure to let no one know what was being
used, but any student who wanted information on 2 field of atomic energy
found books that had once appeared in the library suddenly and inexplicably
missing.24
Evidently, newspapers in Ames and the surrounding towns obeyed the

censorship orders prohibiting any news about the secret project. From January
1942 until August 5, 1945, there were only passing references fo the project in
the Iowa State Daily Student, the College newspaper. It was not because the

_ Project was so secret that no one knew aboutit.. In fact, there was no. attempk to.
hide the fact that war research was being canducted on campus; no one though
questioned just what kind of research was undertaken In the student

2445 vee, interview with author, 1991, 3. See also Dane, telephone interview with
the author. The books were still behind the barricade in 1946, when an ateditor from the
Project noted that: “Library books are numbered with yellow paint and charged out by 2
librarian on a loan basis,” (2, Stimpson, Auditor's Report, November 12, 1946, OSRD Files,
Finance, National Archives, Washington, DC). These same books after the war became the
nucleus of the Physical Sciences Reading Room which Spedding had built from funds left from
overhead recovery. (Margaret Mae Gross, “Interview with the Author,” January, 1992, Ames,
Jowa; Charles H. Brown to Charles Friley, “Memorandum on the Future Organization of the

College Library,” November 10, 1944, Library Dean's Office Subject File, Record Group 25/1/12,
William Robert Parks and Elien Sarge Parks Library, lowa State University, Ames Iowa, 1-2
thereafter cailed Library Papers);
2, no. 3 (November 19, 1947): 33.

sical Sciences Reading Room,” The Library at Jowa State



157 - -
over two million tons of uranium billets with smaller amounts of thorium
and other rare earths. Uranium production costs fell from around $22 per
pound to $2 per pound before the end of the war, in most part, because of the
Ames process of uranium production. All in all, the government received
quite a bargain working on a no profit basis with the College.
The issue of overhead cost recovery was a particular thomy issue for

. Towa State because of the difference in the face value of the contracts and the
actual costs inured. After the wat, that charge was negotiated and
renegotiated until Iowa State finally received approximately $1.2 million in
administrative charges for research and development work for the war
work,3!2 Some of the federal overhead money paid for a new building that
linked the chemistry and physics departments physically as well as
symbolically, President Friley, as controller of the overhead money, spent
$10,000 for journals and books to start a Physical Sciences Reading Room on
the second floor of the new administration building; some of the finds even
went to assist the new commercial television station on the campus.318 These

312FnImer, 7.

$12jowa State Board of Education, Minules of the Jowe State Board of Eslucation,
December 9, 1947, 97, To understand the enormous value of that figure one needs only note
that the entire operating budget of the College for 1944-45 was $4.5 million (Biennial Report of
the State Board oF Education Ending June 30, 1946, 476). The total value of business transacted
by towa State during the 194443 fiscal year was $8 million, a 50 percent increase over the
last peace time year 1241-42, Most of that increase was due to increased activity in military
training and war-related research (Biennial Report of the State Board of Education Ending June
50, 1946, 394},

513Frenk H. Spedding, “1946-55," Spedding Manuscript, 3; Spedding, Wilhelm, Daane
Interview, 1967, 35-36. Actuafly Gaskill and Friley could sign for Jowa State according to a
resolution adopted at the February 8, 1944 Board of Education meeting: “WHEREAS,
President Friley has reported the negotiation of contracts with governmental agencies for war
research, BE iT THEREFORE RESOLVED that the President of Iowa State College, the
Business Manager of Iowa State College, and Harold V. Gaskill, Dean of the Division of
Science be authorized to sign, cither separately or jointly, contracts with U.S. Governmental



145

scholarship at his/her own expense as a patt of the teaching appointment.
Little governmental support of academic science developed before World War
I, except some attempts at supporting application-oriented research that would
have short-term benefits to a particular segment of society (Le, that provided
by agricultural support or public health research). A report commissioned by
Franklin Roosevelt in 1938, for example, reported that universities spent $50
million on research in 1935-36; of that $6 million came from the federal
government, mostly supporting agricultural research 284

By the 1930s. some of the barriers to government funding changed by a
complicated set of circumstances. The financial situation, caused in large part
by the Depression, eroded many university endowments as well as those of
private foundations that had supported scientific research through the 1926s.
By the beginning of World War IE, coupled with the advent of more
sophisticated and expensive research equipment. the transition to large group
research, and the need for large infusions of money to make new scientific
discoveries in fields like nuclear physics, scientists had begun to make
overtures to interest the government in funding scientific research.285

However, the eroding world situation was probably as much a
contributor to the changing attitude as anything. Most documentary sources
do not give enough credit to this dangerous condition, but physicists and other
scientists were most often, as the majority of professionals and non-
professionals alike, patriotic people. This situation more than anything else

284Research—A National Resource: I, Relation of the Federal Government to Research,
National Resources Committee, December 1938, 189.

85 Creenburg, 65-66; Dupree, 367,



121

ones were sent to Ames by a courier. For delivery of top secret documents,
usually the courier was a lieutenant who would come to Ames by Hain or
plane. He would contact the director, Spedding, personally and get his
signature on the document before he left. To protect the identity of the
directors, each courier used code names to hide theiz true identity One time, a
man carrying a British top secret document on turning rhodium into platinum
arrived in Ames looking for Spedding. Spedding related the rest of the tale in
his history:

[He] went to the telephone booth at the Sheldon Munn Hotel and
got out his litle black book whick informed what my true name
‘was instead of my code name, and what my telephone number
was. He called me and I made arrangements to meet him at my
office. When he arrived, he suddenly became very concerned,
because ke had left his Hetle black book with the code names for
ail prominent scientists in the phone booth, We immediately
sent him down with a car, but the little black book was gone, He
was a very concerned young lieutenant, with some justification,
because he had to report the loss! I never saw the young
Heutenant again, but I did hear from Washington gossip that he
had been transferred to a company which was stationed on the
outermost Aleutian. Islands? were .

Whether or not all of the story is true is probably not so important, but it does
point to the fact that the Manhattan Engineer District considered adherence to
its security policies a serious matter indeed

Sometimes secrecy and protection of documents led to unusual
applications. At Iowa State, all books on afomic energy and related topics were
removed from the College library and placed in a room behind a barricade that
‘was built across the east and north halls of the first and ground floozs in the

Stank H. Spedding. “Top Secret Incident; Spedding Manuscript 2.



183
and salaries to cover the institution’s cost in providing research facilities.209 As

Bush later reported:
We proposed to contract with the university itself, thus placing
on it the responsibility for all such matters, and also giving it the

authority necessary for performance. in return we
proposed to pay its overhead costs, the portion of its general
expenses properly attributable to the added operation.°0!

OSRD also adopted the contract device as developed by NDRC, and by
January 1943, it created what became known as Standard Form 1001 to use for
all contracts (See Appendix E for 2 copy of this form). When procurement
became a necessary part of the project as it scaled into its engineering stage,
another contract form, the Standard Form 1002, was created allowing for work
on a fixed price, plus a xeasonable profit for the contractor. Educational
institutions, however, never benefited from this form since by charter they
could not make a profit 302

Establishing research administration at the institutional level also
involved splitting the functions of business.and. research... NDRC and-then
OSRD assigned each institution recetving a contract both a research officer and
a business or contracting officer. Likewise, the institution receiving a contract
was expected to assign someone to handle business aifairs for the institution,
in addition to the principal investigator already chosen by OSRD to handle
research. This important division into two fumctions became a characteristic of

S00Stewart, 191; Irvin Stewart, “Memo on Explanation of Overhead and Survey Report
on Possible Changes,” August 5, 1942, in OSRD Papers, Record Group No 227, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.

30tBush, Pieces of the Action, 38.
302stewart, 19192-2938,



162

research. At first, the contract was Aexible, open-ended, and did not presctibe
the work needed. Those principles laid down by NDRC and OSRD were in line
with basic goals and principles of academic management techniques. The
contract also allowed administration of research to be split from the actual
work of research and that appeased the scientists involved. It satisfied the
educational institutions because they were to be reimbursed at cost, plus an
administrative fee for providing facilities and other necessities to enable the
scientists to undertake the necessary work without jeopardizing the financial
situation of the institution. The patent clause became an additional control
device over the project because no one person could benefit financially from
the work undertaken though due credit for effort and innovation was
promised The Manhattan District did not do away with the contract or patent
principles laid down by OSRD, even though it made the contract somewhat
more prescriptive, particularly under those regulations that controlled
preduction.

__ But the contract did moze than enhance the academic style of
management; it allowed the relations between government and universities to
continue in much the same fashion after the war was over. Unlike World
War I, the scientists did not retreat from seeking research funding from the
government, because Bush had brought that research support along with its
administration to the researcher in his own laboratory, and in order to
continue work with necessary support, the scientist had a stake in seeing that

the relationship with government continue to grow after the waz. The
contract helped cement that relationship between the academic world and
government in ways that heretofore had been unknown. The contract



48

university or college. The Hatch Act was not explicit about the particular

structure to be employed in the organization of experiment stations, except that

the stations act somewhat like departments in colleges or universities:
in order to aid in acquiring and diffusing among the people of the
United States useful and practical information on subjects
connected with agriculture, and to promote scientific
investigation and experiment respecting the principles and
applications of agricultural science, there shall be established,
under direction of the college or colleges or agricultural
departments of colleges in each State or Tertitory .. . a department
to be known & and designated as an “agricultural experiment
station” ..

Since the research crossed several departments, for all practical purposes,
most stations were separately administered by their own staff, quite often tun
by governing boards from various disciplines in universities or colleges Early
on, some university presidents even served as station directors, but by 1905
only four states remained in this situation. A more common practice saw the
dean of agriculture serving as the station director. This administrative
structure, akin fo a quasi-departmental structure, surfaced again in the
twentieth century as a standard model for interdisciplinary research in physics
and chemistry during and after World War 0°! The passage of the Hatch Act

289Act of 1887 Establishing Agricultural Experiment Stations,” in H. C. Knoblauch et
al., State Agricultural Experiment Stations: A History of Research Policy and Procedure, U.5,
Departenent of Agriculinre Miscellaneous Publication No, 904 (Washington, D.C: U.S,
Government Printing Office, 1962), 219.

2DAltred Charles True, A History of Agricultural Expertmentation and Research in the
United States 1607-1925, U.S. Department of Agriculture Miscellaneous Publication, No. 251
(Washington, DC: U.S, Government Printing Office, 1937), 134-136

23Several works have been written detailing the passage and effects of the Hatch
Act and subsequent legistation. See H. C. Knoblauch et al, 1962 for a summary discussion of
the Hatch Act and its subsequent implementation; Alfred Charles Trac, 1937 for one of the
first surveys of agricultural research and its relationship with the goverment; and Alan I
Marcus, Agricultieral Science aud the Quest for Legitimacy: Farmers, Agricultural Colleges, and



132
as a good rat poison, but the security officials for the Manhattan District were
concerned about the uranium pieces as a security risk, The project employees
were instructed fo dig up material that had been deposited in the dump and
ship it to New Jersey for storage as well as any future waste. Security inspectors
also noticed that small amounts of the uranium tetrafluoride were sometimes
deposited in the soil at the Chemistry Annex building. The Ames Project
personnel dug up six inches of soil in a strip twenty inches wide all around the
Annex to ship to New Jersey also. Filters wete installed on the exhaust fans to
eliminate the deposition of uranium outside the annex.

The project administration searched in vain for containers to ship this
material in until Wayne Keller suggested that in his Kentucky hometown,
whiskey barrels were quite often left over from the distillation process and
could make suitable containers. Spedding approved the suggestion and asked
him to order 1,000 whiskey barrels. By mistake, Keller’s secretary typed on the
purchase order, “one thousand barrels Hiram Walker Whiskey.” The
purchasing agent of the college, Mr. Potts, had been told early in the project
that for security reasons he was to approve anything Dr. Spedding ordered, and
the government would pay for it, Despite the security requirements, Potts
called Spedding at 6 o'clock one moming and questioned why he was ordering
whiskey through the College in fowa, a dry state. Needless to say, Spedding
straightened out the agent and assured him that it was just a typographical
error; he only needed the barrels.265

26SSpedding, interview with Hacker, 37-38; Frank H. Spedding, “Security Involving
Scrap,” Spedding Manuscript, 3-3. This story also appeared in varying forms in several
publications incinding many Ames Laboratory publications after the war.



- 135
Annex 1 During a blackout one night that foreman, testing the project
security, found that he could move freely around the building without being
challenged since only one roving guard was posted. He noticed that there was
no guard in the back room where locked files were located, so he suggested that
guards be pasted in each room. The three regular guards then could be placed
at the front doar, the back door, and roving.26?

Comparimentalization of Information

Federal rules for coutpartmentalization

Compartmentalization of information as conceptualized by the NDRC
and OSRD meant that no person contracting a project from the government
needed mose information than what-was necessary to complete a contract. As
a result, no one except the members of the committee or some central staff
members knew the entire operation of NDRC or OSRD. The purpose of this
restrictive policy was to minimize fhe amount of damage if any individual,
either intentionally: or inadvertently, divulged secrets:2/0 The policy -was-
highly criticized by the scientists throughout the war as a detriment to
efficiency. The principle, as it operated under NDRC and OSRD, was probably
as much a concession to the armed forces to allow them to entrust the agency

with classified information as it was to protect indiscretion since there were no

known cases of the latter.

26fack Boyt, “Letter to Frank H. Spedding, on Security,” July 30, 1943, Spedding
Paper.
Stewart, 28-29.