18-866-cv (L); 18-490-cv

Nnebe v. Daus; Stal l worth v. Joshi

UNITE D STATE S COURT OF APPE AL S F O R T H E S E C O N D C I R C U I T August Term, 2018 (Argued: January 14, 2019 Deci ded: Jul y 19, 2019) Docket Nos. 18-866-cv (L); 18-1254-cv (XAP); 18-490-cv J O N A T H A N N N E B E , K H A I R U L A M I N , E D U A R D O A V E N A U T , N E W Y O R K T A X I W O R K E R S A L L I A N C E , i ndi vi d ual l y and on behal f of al lothers si m i l arl y si tuated,

Plaintiffs - Appellants - Cross-Appellees , A L E X A N D E R KA R M A N S K Y, i ndi vi dual l y and on behal f of al lothers si mi l arl y si tuated, Plaintiff,

— v. — M A T T H E W D A U S , J O S E P H E C K S T E I N , E L I Z A B E T H B O N I N A , T H E N E W Y O R K C I T Y T A X I A N D L I M O U S I N E C O M M I S S I O N , T H E C I T Y O F N E W Y O R K, C H A R L E S F R A S E R,

Defendants - Appellees - C ross-Appellants ,

C H A R L E S F R A Z I E R, Defendant. *

*The C l erk of C ourt i s requested to amend the capti on to conform to the above.A N T H O N Y S T A L L W O R T H , P A R I C H A Y B A R M A N , N O O R T A N I, T H E N E W Y O R K T A X I

W O R K E R S A L L I A N C E , i ndi vi dual l yand on behal f of al lothers si mi l arl y si tuated, Plaintiffs - Appellants ,

v. M E E R A J O S H I, C H R I S W I L S O N , S T A S S K A R B O , T H E C I T Y O F N E W Y O R K,

Defendants - Appellees

. B e f o r e: KA T Z M A N N , Chief Judge, and H A L L and L Y N C H , Circuit Judges

. The Nnebepl ai nti ffs are taxi dri vers who i nsti tuted thi s acti on under 42 U.S.C . § 1983, compl ai ni ng that thei r consti tuti onalri ghts were vi ol ated when thei r l i censes were suspended fol l owi ng thei r arrests and they were not gi ven meani ngfulpost-suspensi on heari ngs to consi der whether thei r l i c enses shoul d be rei nstated. They appeal fol l owi ng a bench tri ali n the Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt for the Southern Di stri ct of New York (Ri chard J. Sul l i v an, Judge ), after whi ch the court hel d that the heari ngs provi ded by defendants were suffi ci ent. Because the dri v ers’ property i nterest i n thei r l i censes i s substanti al, the ri sk of erroneous depri vati on i s unacceptabl y hi gh, and defendants coul d i nsti tute a more meani ngful process at mi ni malfi nanci aland admi ni strati ve cost, we concl ude that the heari ngs di d not afford pl ai nti ffs adequate process. We therefore AFFIRM i n part and REVERSE i n part the judgment of the di stri ct court and REMAND for further proceedi ngs. The Stallworth pl ai nti ffs are al so taxidri vers who i nsti tuted a si mi l ar acti on chal l engi ng the same regul atory regi me. The di stri ct court di smi ssed thei r compl a i nt for fai l ure to state a cl ai m in rel i a nce on i ts Nneberul i ng. Because we fi nd that that rul ing was i ncorrect, we AFFIRM i n part and REVERSE i n part the judgment of the di stri c t court and REMAND for further proceedi ngs.

2D A N I E L L. A C K M A N , Law Offi ce of Dani elL. Ackman, New York, New York, D A V I D T. G O L D B E R G , Donahue & Gol dberg, LLP, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs - Appellants - CrossAppellees i n Nnebe, and Dani elL. Ackman, Law Offi ce Of Dani el L. Ackman, New York, New York for Plaintiffs - Appellants i n Stallworth

. C L A U D E S. P L A T T O N , Assi stant C orporati on C ounsel (Ri chard Deari ng, Susan Paul son, on the brief ), for Zachary W. C a rter, C orporati on C o unsel, New York, New York, for Defendants - Appellees - Cross-Appellants i n Nnebe, and Zachary W. C arter, C orporati on C o unsel, C l aude S. Patton, Susan Paul son, and Scott Shorr, New York, New York, for D efendants - Appellees i n Stallworth

. Runa Rajagopal, The Bronx Defenders, Bronx, New York, for amici curiaeThe Bronx Defenders, C o mmuni ty Servi c e Soci ety of New York, Legal Acti on C enter, Nei ghborhood Defender Servi ce of Harl em, Youth Represent, Urban Justi ce C enter MentalHeal th Project, Brookl yn Defender Servi ces, Legal Ai d Soci ety, and Lati noJusti c e PRLDEF.

G E R A R D E. L Y N C H , C ircuit Judge : The Taxi and Li mousi ne C ommi ssi on of New York C i ty (the “TLC ”) has the authori ty to i ssue, revoke, and suspend taxi dri vers’ l i censes. These tandem cases requi re us to exami ne the TLC ’s suspensi o n procedures under the Due Process C l ause to determi ne whether the TLC provi des meani ngful heari ngs to

3dri vers whose l i censes have been suspended pendi ng the outcome of cri minal

proceedi ngs. We concl ude that i t does not. We fi rst determi ne that evi dence of a dri ver’s ongoi ng danger to heal th and publ i c safety i s rel evant under the statutory and regul atory scheme. We then concl ude that, i n l i ght of the si gni fi cant pri v a te i nterest at stake, the unacceptabl y hi gh ri sk of erroneous depri v ati on, and the fact that addi ti o nalsafeguards can be provi ded wi th mini malburden on governmental resources, the TLC ’s refusal to consi der such evi d ence vi ol ates due process. Accordi ngl y, i n Nnebe we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE i n part the judgment of the di stri c t court, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE i n part the judgment in Stallworth, and we REMAND both cases to the di stri ct court for further proceedi ngs. BACKGROUND Thi s appeal concerns what happens when taxi dri vers are arrested on cri minalcharges and thei r l i c enses are summari l y suspended. Though arrested dri vers are enti tl ed under the rel evant regul ati on to a post-suspensi on heari ng, the pl ai nti ffs contend that the heari ngs the TLC provi des are meani ngl ess, and that no dri v er has ever had hi s or her l i cense rei nstated fol l owi ng such a heari ng.

4They bri ng cl ai ms that sound i n procedural due process, argui ng that the postsuspensi o n heari ngs are not the “meani ngful ” heari ngs that due process requi res. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (ci tati on omi tted). In the fi rst of the tandem cases, Nnebe v. Daus , pl ai nti ffs-appel l ants-crossappel l ees are dri vers whose l i c enses were suspended before 2007. They fi rst brought thi s acti on under 42 U.S.C . § 1983 i n 2006; i t has si nce wound i ts way through a compl ex procedural web whi ch cul m i nated i n a bench tri al, from the resul ts of whi ch pl ai nti ffs now appeal (No. 18-866-cv). The defendants i n that

case  ̄ the TLC , the C i ty of New York, and vari ous empl oyees of those enti ti es  ̄ cross-appeal the si ngl e i ssue on whi ch the di stri c t court found i n pl ai nti ffs’ favor: that the noti ce gi ven to suspended dri vers pri o r to December 2006 was consti tuti onal l y i nfi rm (No. 18-1254-cv). In the second case, Stallworth v. Joshi, the pl ai nti ffs-appel l ants are dri vers suspended i n 2017 after bei ng arrested for l eavi ng the scene of an acci dent. Defendants

 ̄

the C i ty of New York, and vari ous C i ty and TLC empl oyees  ̄ moved to di smi ss the case for fai l ure to state a cl ai mi n l i ght of the di stri ct court’s rul i ngs i n Nnebe

. The di stri ct court granted the moti o n; pl ai nti ffs appeal (No. 18- 490-cv).

5I. The TL C Regulatory Regime

The New York C i ty C harter grants broad authori ty to the TLC to promul gate and i mpl ement a regul atory program for the taxi i ndustry. See N.Y.C

. C harter § 2303(b)(5) (granti ng the TLC , inter alia , the power to i ssue, revoke, and suspend l i censes). New York C i ty Admini strati ve C ode § 19-512.1(a) (the “Ordi nance”) governs the revocati on of taxi cab l i censes and reads as fol l ows: “The commi ssi on . . . may, for good cause shown rel ati ng to a di rect and substanti althreat to the publ i c heal th or safety and pri or to gi vi ng noti ce and an opportuni ty for a heari ng, suspend a taxi cab . . . l i cense . . . .” The Ordi nance further requi res noti c e to be gi ven wi thi n fi ve cal endar days of any such suspensi o n, and “an opportuni ty to requ est a heari ng . . . wi thi n ten cal endar days” of such noti fi cati on. Id. In passi ng the Ordi nance, the C i ty C ounci l noted “the strong need for aggressi ve regul ati on of the taxi cab . . . i ndustry and those di rectl y responsibl e for the safety of the ri d i ng publ i c” but found that certai n TLC rul es modi fyi ng di sci pl i nary measures agai nst dri v ers were overl y “onerous.” Id. n.1. The C ounci ldetermi ned that the new ordi nance, wi th i ts requi rements of good cause rel ated to a di rect and substanti althreat to publ i csafety and of a prompt heari ng process, “establ i shes a superi or bal anci ng of the concern for safe

6and hi gh qual i ty servi ce wi th the need for fai r treatment of an i ndustry i mportant

to New York C i ty.” I

d. Under thi s authori ty, the TLC has promul gated a number of regul ati ons over the years deal i ng wi th arrest-rel ated l i cense suspensi ons and revocati ons. In 1999, the fi rst versi on of the Rul e, 35 R.C .N.Y. § 8-16(a) (1999), al l o wed the TLC C hai rperson to order a summary suspensi on of a l i cense, pendi ng revocati on proceedi ngs, i f he or she “fi nds that emergency acti on i s requi red to i nsure publ i c heal th, safety or wel f are.” The 1999 Rul e further requi red noti fi cati on of the summary suspensi on wi thi n fi ve days, and an opportuni ty to request a prompt post-depri vati on heari ng before an admi ni strati ve l aw judge (“ALJ”) “who shal l consi der rel evant evi dence and testi mony” under oath. Id. §8-16(c),(d). The ALJ was then requi red to i ssue a wri tten recommendati on to the TLC C hai r, who coul d “accept, reject or modi fy the recommendati on.” Id §8-16(e)

. In 2006, the Rul e was amended; notabl y, the amended Rul e speci fi ed that the TLC C hai r coul d summari l y suspend a l i cense “based upon an arrest on cri minalcharges that the C hai rperson determi nes i s rel evant to the l i censee’s qual i fi cati ons for conti nued l i c ensure.” R.C .N.Y. § 8-16 (c) (2006). It then l ai d out the i ssue to be determi ned at the heari ng: “whether the charges underl yi ng the

7l i censee’s arrest, i f true, demonstrate that the l i c ensee’s conti nued l i censure

duri ng the pendency of the cri minalcharges woul d pose a threat to the heal th or safety of the publ i c.” Id. The TLC C hai r retai ned the authori ty to accept, reject, or modi f y the fi ndi ng of the ALJ. Id. §8-16(f). The most recent versi on of the Rul e, as amended i n 2014, provi des as fol l ows: “The C hai rperson can summari l y suspend a Li cense based upon an arrest or ci tati on i f the C hai rperson bel i eves that the charges, i f true, woul d demonstrate that conti nued l i censure woul d consti tute a di rect and substanti al threat to publ i c heal th or safety.” R.C .N.Y. § 68-15(d)(1). The Rul e then proceeds to state that al lfel oni es and certai n enumerated mi sdemeanors wi l l t ri g ger a summary suspensi on. Id. Thi s l atest versi on of the Rul e provi des for a heari ng at whi ch the i ssue to be determi ned i s “whether the charges underl y i ng the Li censee’s arrest, i f true, demonstrate that the conti nuati on of the Li c ense whi l e awai ting a deci si on on the cri minalcharges woul d pose a di rect and substanti al threat to publ i c heal th or safety.” Id. § 68-15(d)(3). 1

1 The Rul e was al so modestl y amended i n 2008 and 2011. 8II. Summary Suspension Process 2

Whi l e the text of the Rul e has gone through several i terati o ns, i n practi ce the summary suspensi on process has been essenti al l y the same si nce i ts adopti on. As the di stri ct court poi nted out, “[e]ven the most si gni fi c ant change to the Rul e

 ̄the addi ti on of the substanti ve standard i n 2006

 ̄merel y refl ected and restated pre-exi sti ng practi c e.” J. App’x 65. 3 A. The Initial Suspension Process When a l i censed taxi dri ver i s arrested, the New York Di vi si o n of C ri minal Justi ce Servi c es (“DC JS”) sends the TLC an arrest noti fi c a ti on. A TLC empl oyee then confi rms that the arrested person i s i n fact a l i censed TLC dri ver and checks the charged offense agai nst a l i st of offenses that the TLC consi ders suffi ci entl y

2The facts set forth i n thi s Secti on are taken from the fi ndings of fact made by the di stri ct court after tri al, none of whi ch are chal l enged on appeal

. 3“J. App’x” refers to the NnebeJoi nt Appendi x. 9seri ous to warrant suspensi on. 4The l i sted offenses i ncl ude al lfel o ni es, and

mi sdemeanors i nvol vi ng vi ol ence, dri vi ng, or sexual mi sconduct. 5 The TLC then noti fi es the dri v er i n a l etter that i t has l earned of hi s or her arrest, that the dri ver’s l i cense has been suspended, and that the dri v er can schedul e a heari ng to contest the suspensi on. The dri ver i s not informed of any standard that wi l lbe appl i ed at the heari ng, but the l etter does di rect the dri ver to the versi on of the Rul e i n force at ti me of the l etter’s i ssuance. The l etter al so makes cl ear that the TLC may l i ft the suspensi on i f the charges are resol ved i n the dri ver’s favor, and that the dri ver shoul d i nform the TLC of any devel opments i n the cri minalcase. Approxi matel y ni ne out of ten suspended dri vers i ni ti al l yrequest a heari ng. Seventy-fi v e percent of suspended dri v ers eventual l y have thei r suspensi o ns l i fted by vi rtue of a favorabl e di sposi ti on of thei r cases  ̄such as the

4Thi s l i st of offenses was not made publ i c unti lthe 2014 amendment, whi ch enumerated the offenses for whi ch an i ni ti al summary suspensi on was automati c.

5On a few i sol ated occasi o ns, the TLC has summari l y suspended a dri ver for a mi sdemeanor that, whi l e not l i sted, was deemed suffi ci entl yseri o us to warrant suspensi o n. See TLC v. Nahamov, OATH Index No. 1796/ 12 (June 4, 2012) (revi ewing a suspensi on for promoti ng prosti tuti on i n the fourth degree). 10charges agai nst them bei ng di smi ssed, reduced to an offense that i s not on the

l i st, or otherwi se resol ved i n thei r favor. A dri v er can noti fy the TLC of a change i n the status of hi s or her cri minalcase at any ti me, i ncl udi ng after the heari ng and revi ew process has taken pl ace. If the cri minalcase i s resol ved wi thout a convi cti on, the TLC does not i nqui re i nto the reasons for the favorabl e di sposi ti on, but automati c al l yl i fts the suspensi on. B. The Summary Suspension Review Process After a dri ver requests a heari ng, the TLC noti fi es the dri ver by l etter of the ti m e, date, and l ocati on of the heari ng, and i nforms the dri v er that he or she can present evi dence and cal lwi tnesses. The l etter i nforms the dri ver that “the purpose of th[e] heari ng wi l lbe to determi ne whether your TLC l i cense shoul d remai n suspended pendi ng the fi naldi sposi ti on of your cri minalcase.” J. App’x 67. The revi ew process i tsel f consi sts of two parts: the fi rst i s a heari ng before an ALJ at whi ch the dri ver and a TLC attorney appear and present evi dence; the second i s a revi ew of the ALJ’s recommendati on by the TLC C hai r. Two di fferent admini strati v e bodi es have presi ded over the summary suspensi on heari ngs. Whi l e there were some di fferences i n procedure, under nei ther regi me has the

11TLC C hai r ever recommended rei nstati ng a dri ver’s l i c ense. We consi der each i n

turn. 1. Hearings before TLC ALJs Pri or to November 2007, the ALJs presi di ng at summary suspensi on heari ngs were TLC empl o yees. The TLC ALJs were i nstructed not to consi der any speci fi c facts and ci rcumstances about ei ther the dri vers or the i ndi vi dualcri mes wi th whi ch they were charged. Rather, they were di rected to address onl y three i ssues: (1) whether the suspended dri ver had i n fact been charged wi th a cri me; (2) whether the charge was sti l lpendi ng; and (3) whether the cri me wi th whi ch the dri ver was charged had a “nexus” to publ i c heal th or safety. J. App’x 67. The fi rst two were factualquesti o ns, 6but the nexus questi on “was a ‘phi l osophi cal ’ questi on and was deci ded based on argument, not facts.” Id. However, the ALJs di d not di rect dri vers to the “phi l osophi cal ” nexus standard, and “most, i f not al l, suspended dri vers di d not understand what the standard was.” J. App’x 68. Instead, the ALJs “encouraged dri vers to argue anythi ng they wanted

 ̄

6The TLC most often met i t s burden on the fi rst two i ssues by provi di ng a DC JS arrest noti fi cati on, a pri ntout from the TLC database showi ng that the suspended dri ver was the same person i denti fi ed i n the arrest noti fi cati on, and a copy of the penal statute defi ning the charged cri me. Occasi onal l y, i tprovi ded a copy of the cri minalcompl ai nt. 12i ncl udi ng that they were not a threat to heal th or publ i c safety or that they were

i nnocent

 ̄so that those arguments coul d be i ncl uded i n the record.” Id. Al though the dri vers were al l owed to present evi d ence and cal lwi tnesses on these subjects, the TLC ALJs di d not consi der dri v ers’ parti c ul ari zed arguments that thei r l i censure di d not pose a threat to the publ i c safety. The heari ngs under the TLC ALJs “resul ted i n a nearl y unbroken record of recommendati ons that the suspensi o n be conti nued.” J. App’x 68. In onl y three cases out of hundreds of heari ngs was a contrary recommendati on made. A si ngl e ALJ, Eri cGottl i eb, was responsi bl e for al lthree. He was promptl y repri manded by hi s supervi sor, and subsequentl y took care not to make another such recommendati on for fear that he woul d be transferred to a l ess desi rabl e work l ocati on. See Nnebe v. Daus , 644 F.3d 147, 152

S53 (2d C i r. 2011) (“ Nnebe II” ). Gottl i eb testi fi ed that, after bei ng admoni shed, he recommended conti nued suspensi o n i n al lcases. As Gottl i eb stated, “[s]o l o ng as the person before me was, i n fact, arrested, he woul d remai n on suspensi on, absol utel y.” J. App’x 306.

2. Hearings before OATH ALJs Starti ng i n November 2007, the heari ngs were presi ded over by ALJs empl oyed by the C i ty’s Offi ce of Admi ni strati ve Tri al s and Heari ngs (“OATH”).

13The process under the OATH ALJs was l argel y the same as before the TLC ALJs,

but the standard appl i ed was di fferent. At an OATH heari ng, the ALJs were di rected to consi der “whether the particularsuspended dri v er i s, in fact, a di rect and substanti althreat to publ i c heal th or safety.” J. App’x 68 (emphases added). Under thi s regi me, an ALJ was more l i kel yto recommend l i fti ng a dri ver’s suspensi o n, though the absol ute number of such recommendati ons was sti l ll ow. 7

3. TLC Chairperson Review Under both regi m es, the TLC C hai rperson makes the ul ti mate deci si on about whether to l i ft a summary suspensi on. After the heari ng, the TLC sends a copy of the ALJ’s recommendati on to the dri ver, and noti fi es the dri ver that he or she may submi t a wri tten response to the recommendati on. The wri tten response, however, may not i ncorporate any evi dence outsi de of the heari ng record, and the noti ce does not i nform the dri ver of the standard the C hai r wi l lappl y.

7As the di stri ct court found, “[t]here have been si x recommendati o ns to l i ft suspensi o ns ... out of [a] few dozen heari ngs.” J. App’x 69. Thi s i s i n contrast to the hundreds of heari ngs hel d by the TLC ALJs, a drop due pri mari l y to the presence of “pre-heari ng conferences” at whi ch an OATH ALJ meets wi th the dri ver and a l awyer for the TLC . At these conferences, the OATH ALJ typi cal l y di scourages the dri ver from proceedi ng to the heari ng, advi si ng hi m or her “that there i s ‘l i ttl e or no chance’ that the dri ver wi l lul ti matel yprevai l .” J. App’x 69. Fol l owi ng the conference, most dri vers deci de to wai ve or postpone thei r heari ngs. 14Throughout the peri od at i ssue, regardl ess of the affi l i ati on of the ALJ, the

C hai r, l i ke the TLC ALJs, consi dered onl y : (1) whether a suspended dri ver has i n fact been charged wi th a cri me; (2) whether that charge i s sti l lpendi ng; and (3) whether there i s a nexus between the charged cri me, consi dered i n the abstract, and publ i c heal th and safety. The C hai r can consi der evi dence rel ati ng to the fi rst two i nqui ri es, i ncl udi ng the cri minalcompl ai nt or other chargi ng documents, but the C hai r’s determi nati on as to whether there i s a “nexus” i s a “‘common sense’ determi nati on ‘based on the nature of the pendi ng charges.’” J. App’x 70 (ci tati on omi tted). The C hai r does not consi der the speci fi c factualal l egati ons i n the compl a i nt, nor does he or she consi der any evi dence that the dri ver i s not gui l ty of the charges, or any other evi dence that a parti cul ar dri ver does not pose a di rect and substanti al threat to publ i c safety based on hi s or her i ndi vi dual characteri sti cs or hi story. 8Under nei ther heari ng regi me has the TLC C hai r ever l i fted a suspensi on.

8At tri al, two wi tnesses testi fi ed that the C hai r engaged i n a more hol i sti c i nqui ry i nto the i ndi vi dualci rcumstances underl yi ng a dri ver’s arrest. The di stri ct court, however, credi ted nei ther wi tness’s testi mony, fi ndi ng that one wi tness had “l i ttl e memory of hi s actualexperi ence revi ewi ng summary suspensi on heari ngs, and what memory he di d have was contradi cted by the documentary record,” J. App’x 71, and that the testi mony of the other wi tness, a former TLC C hai r’s desi gnee, “fl atl y contradi c t[ed]” the offi ci aldeci si ons that she hersel f had wri tten, J. App’x 72. 15III. Procedural History

A. Nnebe The Nnebepl ai nti ffs

 ̄ Jonathan Nnebe, Eduardo Avenaut, and Khai rul Amin, and the New York Taxi Workers Al l i ance 9

 ̄fi l ed sui tagai nst offi ci al s of the TLC and empl oyees of the C i ty of New York i n June 2006, chal l engi ng the TLC ’s summary suspensi on procedures under the Due Process C l ause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought certi fi cati o n of a cl ass acti on, decl aratory and i njuncti v e rel i ef, compensatory and puni ti ve damages, and attorney’s fees. Each of the named pl ai nti ffs was a dri ver whose l i cense had been suspended after an arrest for assaul t i n the thi rd degree and was restored several months l ater after the charges agai nst hi m were ei ther di smi ssed or adjourned i n contempl ati on of di smi ssal

. 10

9An addi ti onalpl ai nti ff, Al exander Karmansky, was l i sted i n the ori gi nal compl a i nt. He di ed i n 2014 and i s not a party to thi s appeal

. 10 Accordi ng to the compl ai nt, Nnebe was arrested on May 29, 2006, gi ven a Desk Appearance Ti cket (“DAT”), and rel eased. He requested a heari ng, whi ch was hel d before a TLC ALJ on June 8, 2006; the ALJ recommended conti nued suspensi on. On Jul y 3, 2006, the C hai r accepted the ALJ’s recommendati on. Nnebe’s l i c ense conti nued suspended for at l east four months, at whi ch poi nt the cri minalcharges were di smi ssed for fai l ure to prosecute. Avenaut was arrested on Jul y 17, 2006, for an al l eged domesti c di spute wi th hi s gi rl fri end, who subsequentl y recanted her accusati on. Hi s l i cense was suspended on Jul y 20, 2006, and rei nstated on October 24, 2006, when hi s case was di smi ssed 161. Summary Judgment Motion

In 2009, the di stri ct court granted summary judgment to the defendants . Nnebe v. Daus , 665 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“ Nnebe I”) . The di stri ct court consi dered both the l ack of a pre-depri vati o n heari ng and the meani ngfulness of the post-depri vati on heari ng under the fami l i ar M athews framework, fi rst fi ndi ng no consti tuti onaldepri vati o n i n the l ack of a pre-depri vati on heari ng despi te the “undoubtedl y si gni fi cant” pri v ate i nterest at stake, noti ng that “the depri vati on of a protected i nterest i s mi ti g ated by the avai l abi l i ty of prompt post-depri vati o n revi ew.” Nnebe I

, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 324. The court al so found that the post-depri vati o n heari ngs di d not depri ve the pl ai nti ffs of procedural due process, basi ng i ts concl usi on pri mari l yon i ts concern that a “ful l adversari alheari ng” as to pl ai nti ffs’ gui l t or i nnocence “woul d be unworkabl e,” and “woul d present the si gni fi cant possibi l i ty of i nterference wi th the cri minali nvesti gati o n and proceedi ngs.” Id. at 328. The

for fai l ure to prosecute. Ami n was arrested on June 11, 2005, and hi s l i cense was suspended on June 14, 2005. At hi s heari ng the ALJ recommended conti nued suspensi o n and the TLC C hai r so rul ed. Hi s cri minal case was adjourned i n contempl ati on of di smi ssal on August 24, 2005, and the charges were formal l y di smi ssed on February 23, 2006. Hi s l i cense was suspended for ten weeks. 17court al so concl uded that “addi ti onalsafeguards . . . woul d present a si gni fi cant

fi nanci a land admi ni strati ve burden on the TLC .” Id. The court then hel d that the pl ai nti ffs’ substanti ve due process cl ai ms l acked meri t

, concl udi ng “that [d]efendants’ acti ons were not so outrageousl y arbi t rary as to ri se to the l evel of a substanti ve due process vi ol a ti on.” 11 Id. at 331 (i nternalquotati on marks omi t ted). Fi nal l y, the court hel d that there was no meri t to pl a i nti ffs’ cl ai ms that the summary suspensi o ns were “unconsti tuti onal because dri vers l ack noti ce that they wi l l be suspended after they are arrested for speci fi ed cri mes.” 12 Id. at 332.

2. 2011 Appeal The Nnebepl ai nti ffs appeal ed to thi s court. We affi rmed i n part, agreei ng that procedural due process di d not requi re a pre-depri vati on heari ng, and vacated and remanded i n part, hol di ng that we coul d not “determi ne whether the post-depri vati on heari ng affords due process because we fi nd that the record on summary judgment does not support the di stri ct court’s fi ndi ng (and the

11 Pl a i nti ffs then contended, and conti nue to contend, that they di d not i ntend to rai se any substanti ve due process cl ai ms. See Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 153

S54 n.2.

12 The court’s summary judgment opini on al so addressed several other i ssues not rel evant to thi s appeal

. 18C i ty’s cl ai m) that the heari ng enabl es a dri ver to make a showi ng that ‘the

charges, even i f true, do not demonstrate that the l i censee’s conti nued l i censure woul d pose a threat to publ i c heal th or safety.’” Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 150 (quoti ng Nnebe I , 665 F. Supp. 2d at 318) (i nternal quotati o n marks omi tted). At oralargument, the C i ty took the posi ti on that arrest for one of the enumerated offenses was not per seconcl usi ve that “the l i censee’s conti nued l i censure woul d pose a threat to publ i c heal th or safety,” but rather that dri vers were gi ven a “real opportuni ty to show that they do not pose a ri sk to publ i c safety, arrests notwi thstandi ng,” by presenti ng evi dence rel evant to that determi nati on. Nnebe II , 664 F.3d at 161. We were troubl ed, however, by the record’s fai l ure to cl ari fy “what i t i s a dri ver may i n fact attempt to show” to prove that “the regul atory standard was not met

 ̄ [ that] the charges, even i f true, di d not demonstrate that conti nued l i censure woul d pose a threat to publ i c safety.” Id. at 160. Whi l e we noted that the regul atory standard that the C i ty purported to appl y mi ght fal l“wi thi n the range of adequate due process protecti ons,” we were neverthel ess concerned that the asserted standard was “an oft-quoted nul l i ty that in no way resembl es a part of the standard ALJs must appl y” as there was “l i ttl e evi dence that an ALJ i s al l owed actual l y to appl y thi s

19standard, . . . [but] consi derabl e evi dence supporti ng the appel l ants’ vi ew that

they may not.” Id. a t 160

S 61. Furthermore, we noted that the di stri c t court had “assumed that the onl y al ternati ve to a heari ng on i denti ty and charge woul d be a heari ng at whi ch the TLC woul d be requi red to prove that each dri ver engaged i n the charged conduct.” Id. at 163. Whi l e we agreed wi th the di stri ct court that a host of probl ems coul d ensue i f the C i ty hel d “a heari ng that functi ons as a previ ew of the cri minalcase” and thus that such a heari ng was not requi red by due process, id. at 160, we noted that there mi ght be other i nqui ri es that coul d be l ess burdensome to the C i ty and that mi ght be requi red, gi ven the si gni fi cant i nterests of the pl a i nti ffs, id. at 162

S 63. We posi ted, for exampl e, that “even a heari ng at whi ch the ALJ i s permi t ted to exami ne the factual allegations underl yi ng the arrest, wi thout making a determi nati on of l i kel y gui l t or i nnocence, woul d provi de to dri vers consi derabl y more opportuni ty to be heard than the current system, as the ALJ mi ght i n some cases determi ne that the al l egati ons, al though arguabl yi nconsi stent wi th the cri minalstatute, do not provi de any basi s for fi nding the dri ver to be a threat to publ i c safety.” Id. at 163.

20We thus remanded to the di stri ct court “to conduct addi ti onal fact-fi ndi ng,

i n the manner i t deems appropri ate, to determi ne whether the post-suspensi on heari ng the C i ty affords does i ndeed provi de an opportuni ty for a taxidri ver to assert that, even i f the cri minalcharges are true, conti nued l i censure does not pose any safety concerns,” and then to determi ne, i n l i ght of that fact-findi ng, “whether the heari ng the C i ty actual l y provi des . . . comports wi th due process.” Id. We di d “not di scuss the di stri ct court’s substanti ve due process anal ysi s” as pl ai nti ffs had “expressl y di savow[ed] [any substanti ve due process cl ai ms] on appeal .” Id. at 153

S54 n.2.

3. On Remand On remand, the parti es cross-moved for summary judgment. The di stri ct court deni ed the moti ons, fi ndi ng that i t was “genui nel y i n di spute” whether “the C i ty meaningfullyconsi ders evi dence other than the fact of arrest.” J. App’x 260. The court schedul ed a tri a lto resol ve the narrow i ssue of “whether the postsuspensi o n heari ng the C i ty affords does i ndeed provi de an opportuni ty [both de jure and de facto ] for a taxi dri ver to assert that, even i f the cri minalcharges are true, conti nued l i censure does not pose any safety concerns.” J. App’x 36 (al terati on i n ori gi nal ) (ci tati o n omi tted).

21Shortl y before the schedul ed jury tri al, defendants rai sed an objecti on to

the proposed Jury Verdi ct form whi ch woul d have i ncl uded several i nterrogatori es concerni ng whether “the TLC pol i c yal l owed meani ngful consi derati on of,” inter alia , whether the dri ver had previ ous cri minalconvi cti ons or arrests, the facts and ci rcumstances that l ed to the arrest, whether the dri ver was gi ven a DAT or arrai gned, whether the dri ver was rel eased wi thout bai l, whether the charged conduct was commi tted on- or off-duty, and the dri ver’s maturi ty, fami l y background, and communi ty ti es. J. App’x 388

S 8 9. Defendants suggested a si ngl e questi o n for the jury i nstead: di d the TLC pol i cy al l ow “meani ngfulconsi derati on of whether even i f the pendi ng cri m i nalcharges are true, the dri ver’s conti nued l i censure woul d not pose a threat to the heal th or safety of the publ i c.” J. App’x 423. The di stri ct court noted that the objecti ons presented a “quandary” as “[i ]n order for there to be a real , de facto opportuni ty ‘to assert that, even i f the cri minalcharges are true, conti nued l i censure does not pose any safety concerns,’ the ALJs and the TLC C hai r must be abl e to consi der somethingother than the fact of a mere cri minalcharge. But i f none of the factors l i sted i n the verdi ct form may be consi dered, then the C ourt i s frankl yat a l oss for what that somethi ng mi ght be.” J. App’x 425

S26. The di stri ct court i nstructed

22defendants to suggest factors that the TLC mi ght consi der, but warned that “i f

they cannot even suggest any factors that an ALJ or the TLC C hai r can consi der beyond the fact of arrest, then a di rected verdi ct i n thi s tri alwoul d appear i nevi tabl e.” J. App’x 426

S27. In response, the TLC General C ounsel stated that the TLC ’s posi ti o n remai ned that i t was open to consi deri ng other rel evant factors and that evi dence supporti ng that posi ti on woul d be presented at tri a l

. J. App’x 273. Shortl y thereafter, the parti es agreed to a bench tri a l, rather than a jury tri al, renderi ng the verdi ct form moot. J. App’x 282. The tri alcommenced on January 13, 2014, and concl uded on January 21, 2014. Thi rteen wi tnesses testi fi ed.

4. Findings of Fact The di stri ct court i ssued i ts fi ndi ngs of fact on August 7, 2014. They are detai l ed i n Secti o n II, above, but Judge Sul l i van concl uded by frami ng the questi on upon remand as “whether the post-suspensi o n heari ng the C i ty affords does i ndeed provi de an opportuni ty for a taxidri ver to assert that, even i f the cri minalcharges are true, conti nued l i censure does not pose any safety concerns” (quoting Nnebe II

, 644 F.3d at 163), and answeri ng i t as fol l ows:

23[D]ri vers do have such an opportuni ty: a dri v er who has been arrested may argue that conti nued l i censure does not pose any safety concerns because the charged cri me, based on i ts statutory el ements, does not have a nexus to publ i c heal th or safety. The argument may rarel y succeed

 ̄so far, i t never has

 ̄but the evi dence i n the record shows that dri vers may make such arguments, the C hai rperson may consi der such arguments, and the C hai rperson may l i ft a suspensi on i f the argument i s persuasi ve. That argument, however, i s the onl y argument an arrested dri ver can make. A dri ver cannot argue, based ei ther on any facts parti cul ar to the dri ver or on the factual al l egati ons i n the cri m inalcompl ai nt, that he or she woul d not pose any safety concerns. Put si mpl y, once the C hai rperson has determi ned that (1) the dri ver was charged wi th a cri me, (2) the cri m e i s sti l l pendi ng, and (3) the charged cri m e has a nexus to publ i c heal th or safety, the i nqui ry i s over and any other facts or arguments are i rrel evant. J. App’x 72. The di stri ct court then ordered addi ti o nalbri efi ng, speci fi cal l y i nstructi ng the parti es to “focus onl y on procedural due process, as Pl ai nti ffs have expl i ci tl y wai ved any substanti ve due process cl ai ms.” Id.

5. Conclusions of Law The parti es submi tted addi ti onal bri efi ng in the Fal l of 2014, and hel d oral argument on the i ssue on December 5, 2014. On Apri l 28, 2016, the di stri ct court i ssued i ts concl usi ons of l aw. The court i denti fi ed onl y one consti tuti onal

24vi ol a ti on: “that the noti ce provi ded by the TLC wi th respect to summary postsuspensi o n heari ngs hel d pri or to December 2006 vi ol ated the procedural component of the Due Process C l ause of the Uni ted States C onsti tuti on.” J. App’x 75. It further found that “[i ]n al lother respects . . . Pl ai nti ffs have fai l ed to prove thei r consti tuti onalcl ai ms.” I d. As to pl ai nti ffs’ procedural due process cl ai ms that were not noti ce-rel ated, the di stri ct court i denti fi ed the Mathews test as the rel evant i nqui ry but went on to emphasi ze that “procedural due process does not req ui re a government agency to provi d e a party wi th an i ndi vi dual i zed heari ng where the purpose of such a heari ng woul d be to address a fact not rel evant to the appl i cabl e substanti ve i nqui ry.” J. App’x 83. The di stri ct court compared the i nstant case to cases i n whi ch convi c ted sex-offender pl ai nti ffs unsuccessful l ysought heari ngs on thei r i ndi vi d ualdangerousness (or l ack thereof) before bei ng pl aced on sexoffender regi stri es, and concl uded that “due process onl y requi res that the i ndi vi dualbe granted an opportuni ty to prove or di sprove facts relevant to the substantive standard sel ected by the l egi sl ature.” J. App’x 84 (emphasi s added). More speci fi cal l y, i thel d that the TLC regul atory scheme rested “on whether the charges refl ect a threat to publ i cheal th or safety, noton whether an i ndi vi dual

25dri ver i n fact poses a ri sk to publ i c heal th or safety.” J. App’x 85. As a resul t, the

di stri ct court concl uded that “the dri ver’s i ndi vi dualcharacteri sti cs and evi denti ary arguments rel ati ng to the strength of the cri m i nalcase agai nst hi m are si mpl y not rel evant to the regul atory framework, whi ch rests on a l i mi ted i nqu i ry i nto the fact and nature of the charges . Thus, an addi ti onal heari ng on an i rrel evant i ssue woul d have no beari ng on or otherwi se prevent an erroneous l i cense depri vati on.” Id. (i nternal quotati on marks omi tted). The court, concl udi ng that “Pl ai nti ffs real l y seem to be asserti ng a substanti ve due process chal l enge to the TLC ’s arrest-pl us-nexus standard,” then devoted a l arge porti on of i ts opi ni on to a substanti ve due process anal ysi s, fi nding that any such cl ai m s woul d fai ldue to the “rati onalrel a ti onshi p” between the Rul e and a l egi ti mate l egi sl ati ve purpose  ̄“protecti ng the publ i c from dangerous taxi dri vers.” J. App’x 87, 91-92. Fi nal l y, the court turned to the i ssue of whether the noti ce to the dri vers was consti tuti onal l yadequate, bi furcati ng the answer based on whether the noti c e was gi ven before December 2006 (when the Rul e was amended) and duri ng and after December 2006. As to the second peri od, the court found no vi ol a ti on, as the noti ce at that ti me ci ted the rel evant rul e, whi ch cl earl y stated the

26rel evant i ssues for purposes of the heari ng  ̄the fact of the charges, the

pendency of those charges, and the nexus between those charges and publ i c heal th or safety. As to the fi rst peri od, however, duri ng whi ch the rel evant Rul e di d not i ncl ude thi s standard, but merel y i ndi cated that a summary suspensi on coul d be ordered i f the C hai r “fi nds that emergency acti on i s requi red to i nsure publ i c heal th, safety, or wel fare,” and di d not i ncl u d e anythi ng about the i ssues to be settl ed at the post-suspensi on heari ng, the di stri ct court found that due process had been vi ol ated. 35 R.C .N.Y. § 8-16 (1999). Speci fi cal l y, i t noted that a dri ver i n that peri od (duri ng whi ch al lthree named pl ai nti ffs recei ved thei r l etters) “woul d have had no way of knowi ng” what the cri ti cali ssues were, and thus that the noti ce was consti tuti onal l y i nadequate. J. App’x 93. Because there were state-l aw cl ai ms that were sti l lpendi ng, pl ai nti ffs were unabl e to appeal to thi s court; onl y when they wi thdrew those cl ai ms and the di stri ct court i ssued i ts fi naljudgment, on March 27, 2018, were they abl e to do so. They fi l ed thi s ti mel y appeal thereafter. The defendants then cross-appeal ed the di stri ct court’s fi nding of a pre-2006 noti ce vi ol ati o n.

27B. Stal l worth

On September 19, 2017, after the di stri ct court i ssued i ts opi ni on i n Nnebe, but before entry of fi nal judgment, the Stallworth pl ai nti ffs (Anthony Stal l worth, Pari chay Barman, Noor Tani, and the New York Taxi Workers Al l i ance) brought thei r acti on. The case was assi gned to Judge Sul l i van as “rel ated” to the Nnebe sui t . The Stallworth pl ai nti ffs are al ldri vers whose l i censes were suspended after each was arrested for l eavi ng the scene of an acci dent. 13Al lthree were i ssued DATs and subsequentl y requ ested heari ngs. At thei r heari ngs, each i ntroduced evi dence that he was not a danger to the publ i cheal th or safety, by, for exampl e, cal l i ng character wi tnesses, and i ntroduci ng hi s dri vi ng records as wel las evi dence that he had no previ o us cri minalconvi cti ons. Al lwere unsuccessful ; thei r l i censes were suspended for between 81 and 160 days 14before bei ng rei nstated after they pl ed gui l ty to reduced charges. 15

13 These facts are drawn from the Stallworth compl a i nt; for purposes of thi s appeal, we accept the al l egati ons as true and draw al lreasonabl e i nferences i n pl ai nti ffs’ favor. Doe v. Columbia Univ. , 831 F.3d 46, 48 (2d C i r. 2016).

14 At the ti me of the compl ai nt, Stal l worth’s l i c ense had been suspended for approxi m atel y45 days and had not yet been rei nstated.

15 At thei r post-suspensi on heari ngs, the argument centered i n part over whether a fi nding of i ndi vi dual i zed dangerousness was rel evant i n l i ght of Nnebe I and Nnebe II

. 28Pl ai nti ffs ori gi nal l y sought a temporary i njuncti on, but the di stri c t court

deni ed i t on November 22, 2017, on the basi s of i t s opi ni on i n Nnebe . Defendants moved to di smi ss; the moti on was granted after the pl a i nti ffs wi thdrew thei r opposi ti on. The Stallworth pl ai nti ffs then appeal ed. 16 DISCUSSION The Nnebe pl ai nti ffs ask us to concl ude that the heari ngs the TLC offers are not meani ngful and that they thus vi ol ate due process. They al so argue that the TLC pol i cy unconsti tuti o nal l y assumes the gui l t of the dri vers. The Stallworth pl ai nti ffs appeal pri nci pal l y on the same i ssues, and add that the dri vers are deni ed fai r warni ng of the l aw. Defendants cross-appeal the di stri ct court’s rul i ng i n Nnebe that the pre-December 2006 noti ces are consti tuti onal l yi nfi rm.

16 The Stallworth acti on was thus fi l ed at a ti me when the Nnebeacti on was stal l ed due to the pendency of state-l aw cl ai ms, i n an apparent effort to reach a q ui ck fi naljudgment that woul d permi tan appel l ate chal l enge to the di stri ct court’s Nnebedeci si on. The effort succeeded, i n that the Stallworth appeal was fi l ed before proceedi ngs i n Nnebereached fi naljudgment. When the Nnebe pl ai nti ffs then di smi ssed thei r state-court cl ai ms, however, and a fi naljudgment in that case was entered, an appeal was fi l ed i n that case as wel l

. The two cases, whi ch rai se substanti al l y i denti cali ssues, were then pl aced on a si mi l ar schedul e and were heard i n tandem. 29I. Standard of Review

For the Nnebeappeal, we revi ew the “di stri c tcourt’s fi ndi ngs of fact for cl ear error, and i t s concl usi ons of l aw de novo.” CARCO GROUP, Inc. v. Maconachy, 718 F.3d 72, 79 (2d C i r. 2013). For the Stallworth appeal, “[w]e revi ew the grant of a moti o n to di smi ss de

novo , accepti ng as true al lfactualcl ai ms i n the compl ai nt and drawi ng al l reasonabl e i nferences i n the pl ai nti ff[s’] favor.” Singh v. Cigna Corp. , 918 F.3d 57, 62 (2d C i r. 2019). II. Procedural Due Process The Fourteenth Amendment provi des that “[n]o state shal l. . . depri ve any person of . . . property, wi thout due process of l aw.” In a § 1983 sui t brought to enforce procedural due process ri ghts, a court must fi rst determi ne whether a property i nterest i s i mpl i cated, and then, i f i t i s, determi ne what process i s due before the pl ai nti ff may be depri ved of that i nterest. Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 158. Here, there i s no di spute as to the fi rst part of the i nqui ry: “a taxi dri v er has a protected property i nterest i n hi s l i cense.” Id. (quoting Nnebe I , 665 F. Supp. 2d at 323). Thus, we need deci de onl y what process i s due.

30To make that determi nati on, we bal ance the factors l ai d out by the

Supreme C ourt i n Mathews v. Eldridge : (1) “the pri vate i nterest that wi l lbe affected by the offi ci a lacti on;” (2) “the ri sk of an erroneous depri v ati on of such i nterest through the procedures used, and the probabl e val ue, i f any, of addi ti onal or substi tute safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s i nterest, i ncl udi ng the ... fi scaland admi ni strati ve burdens that the addi ti onalor substi tute procedural requi rement[s] woul d entai l .” 424 U.S. at 335. In Nnebe I

, the di stri ct court hel d that the Mathews factors favored the Government, pri mari l y because of what i t assumed woul d be a “si gni fi cant fi nanci a land admi ni strati ve burden on the TLC ,” an assumpti on i n part based on the premi se that onl y a process that i ncl uded an adjudi cati o n as to the gui l t or i nnocence of an arrested dri ver woul d sati sfy pl ai nti ffs. Nnebe I , 665 F. Supp. 2d at 328. On appeal, we questi oned that premi se, suggesti ng that i t was “enti rel y possibl e that a meaningfulheari ng can be devi sed at mi ni mal cost to the C i ty that does not consti tute a mini -tri alon the cri minalcharges.” Nnebe II , 644 F. 3d at 163. On remand, i n i ts concl usi ons of l aw, the di stri c t court di d not bal ance the Mathews factors

 ̄i nstead i t bri efl y noted the pri vate i nterest at stake, “di rect[i ng] i ts focus to what mini malprocess a taxi dri ver i s due before he may

31be depri ved of hi s property i nterest i n hi s l i cense, and whether the process

afforded dri vers i s suffi c i ent for such purposes.” J. App’x 84. It then concl uded, rel yi ng on Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) and Doe v. Cuomo , 755 F.3d 105 (2d C i r. 2014) , that the facts that the dri vers asked for an opportuni ty to prove

 ̄namel y, that thei r parti cul a r l i censure di d not pose a ri sk to the publ i c heal th or safety

 ̄were not rel evant to the substanti ve standard sel ected by the TLC

. In Connecticut Department of Public Safety, the Supreme C ourt determi ned that si nce the C onnecti cut l egi sl ature requi red convi cted sex offenders to regi ster wi th the C onnecti cut Department of Safety, but based such a req ui rement not on current dangerousness, but on the mere fact of convi cti on, due process di d not requi re an opportuni ty to prove a fact that was not materi alto C onnecti cut’s statutory scheme

 ̄namel y, that a regi strant di d not pose a danger to hi s or her communi ty. 538 U.S. at 4. We reached a si mi l ar concl usi on as to the New York state regi stry i n Cuomo , hol di ng that “the New York State Legi sl ature deci ded that a convi cti o n for a rel evant offense was proof enough of dangerousness,” and that therefore there was no procedural due process vi o l ati on. 755 F.3d at 113.

32The di stri ct court anal ogi zed those cases to the i nstant one, determi ni ng

that i ndi vi dualdangerousness was not materi aland thus that a meani ngful heari ng on dangerousness was not req ui red. The court based thi s determi nati on on a narrow readi ng of the regul atory standard, rel yi ng heavi l y on the word “charges.” Accordi ng to the di stri ct court, si nce the Rul e states that the i ssue to be determi ned i s “whether the charges underl yi ng the Li censee’s arrest, if true, demonstrate that the conti nuati on of the Li cense whi l e awai ti ng a deci si on on the cri minalcharges woul d pose a threat to publ i c heal th or safety, . . . the enti re regul a tory scheme turns on whether the charges refl ect a threat to publ i c heal th or safety, noton whether an i ndi vi dualdri ver i n fact poses a ri sk to publ i c heal th or safety.” 17 J. App’x 85. We di sagree wi th thi s readi ng of the Rul e and thus fi nd the sex offender cases i napposi te. Furthermore, we fi nd the di stri c t court’s readi ng i n tensi on wi th the purpose of the Rul e.

17 The di stri ct court di d not di sti ngui sh the pre-2006 versi on of the Rul e, whi ch, i n i ts wri tten form, al l owed the TLC to suspend a l i cense summari l yi f the C hai r found that “emergency acti on i s requi red to i nsure publ i c heal th, safety or wel fare,” perhaps because al lparti es agreed that the 2006 Rul e si mpl y codi fi ed the exi sti ng standard, rather than changi ng i t. 33A. The TLC Rule

A cl o se readi ng of the Rul e, i n accordance wi th New York state rul es of i nterpretati on, reveal s that i ndi vi dualdangerousness i s, i n fact, rel evant under the regul atory scheme. 18“[B]ecause the cl earest i ndi cator of l egi sl ati ve i ntent i s the statutory text, the starti ng poi nt i n any case of i nterpretati on must al ways be the l anguage i tsel f, gi vi ng effect to the pl ai n meani ng thereof.” Town of Aurora v. Vill. of E. Aurora , 32 N.Y.3d 366, 372 (2018) (ci tati on and i nternal qu otati on marks omi tted). The current TLC rul e al l ows a l i cense to be summari l y suspended “based upon an arrest or ci t ati on i f the C hai rperson bel i eves that the charges, i f true, woul d demonstrate that conti nued l i censure woul d consti tute a di rect and substanti althreat to publ i c heal th or safety.” 35 R.C .N.Y. § 68-15(d)(1). The current Rul e further provi des a l i st of charges that meet the pre-suspensi on standard. Id. At the post-depri vati on heari ng, however, the rel evant i nqui ry i s “whether the charges underl yi ng the Li censee’s arrest, i f true, demonstrate that

18 In i ts anal ysi s of the Rul e, the di stri ct court focused sol el yupon the 2014 i terati on of the Rul e. We do the same here, acknowl edgi ng that there were sl i ght vari a ti ons throughout the years but that throughout the i terati ons the underl yi ng concerns remai n the same. Because we fi nd that indi vi dualdangerousness i s rel evant even to the most recent Rul e, we need not di scuss i n detai lthe previ ous i terati ons, for whi ch we fi nd the same to be true. 34the conti nuati on of the Li cense whi l e awai ti ng a deci si on on the cri minalcharges

woul d pose a di rect and substanti althreat to publ i c heal th or safety.” I d. § 68- 15(d)(3). The di stri ct court emphasi zed the words “the charges . . . i f true,” whi ch appear i n both the pre- and post- suspensi o n standards. Whi l e i t i s certai nl y correct that those words cut agai nst an i nterpretati on that woul d authori ze an i nqu i ry i nto whether the dri ver i s i n fact gui l ty of the charged offense, a focus on these words al one gi v es short shri ft to the rest of the regul atory text. See Town of Aurora , 32 N.Y.3d at 372 (stati ng that a l aw “must be construed as a whol e” (ci tati o n omi tted)). Read i n context, the regul ati on i s focused not on the threat posed by the charges , but rather on the threat posed to the publ i c by the driver’s licensure . The TLC must show that the charges, i f assumed to be true, “demonstrate” that “the continuation of the Li c ense . . . woul d pose a di rect and substanti althreat.” § 68-15(d)(3) (emphasi s added). It i s possibl e for a dri ver to be charged wi th an act that i tsel f endangered publ i cheal th or safety, but that i s i nsuffi ci ent to demonstrate that the dri v er woul d c ontinueto pose a threat i f al l owed to retai n hi s or her l i cense. The cri me may have been unrel ated to hi s or her duti es, for i nstance, or a sol e i nfracti on i n an otherwi se spotl ess record. The

35underl y i ng conduct, whi l e perhaps sati sfyi ng the el ements of a cri m e on the

TLC ’s l i st, may al so be such as to persuade an ALJ and the TLC C hai r that the offense was techni calor mi ti gated, such that conti nuati on of the dri v er’s l i cense di d not pose the ki nd of threat conjured by the general nature of the cri me charged. The Rul e permi ts the TLC to put forward a charge as a proxyfor dangerousness, but i ts l a nguage does not forecl ose arguments that the charge alonefai l s to demonstrate that conti nued l i c ensure woul d pose a threat. Addi ti onal l y, regul ati ons are “to be read, i f possibl e, i n a manner consi stent wi th, rather than i n opposi ti on to, the governi ng statute.” People ex. rel. Knowles v. Smith , 54 N.Y.2d 259, 267 (1981). As di scussed above, the Ordi nance governi ng revocati on of for-hi re vehi cl e l i censes al l ows the TLC to suspend a l i cense “for good cause shown rel a ti ng to a di rect and substanti althreat to the publ i c heal th or safety,” and al l ows further suspensi on or revocati on “after noti ce and an opportuni ty for a heari ng.” N.Y.C . C o de § 19-512.1(a). The Ordi nance thus does not authori ze suspensi on of a l i cense upon arrest, but rather for “good cause” that “ relat[es]to a di rect and substanti althreat to the publ i c heal th and safety.” Id. (emphasi s added). The good cause requi rement, as wel las the general l anguage of the Ordi nance, shi nes the spotl i ght on whether the TLC has

36demonstrated that keepi ng a dri ver on the road poses a threat to heal th or safety.

Whi l e the TLC may deci de to treat an arrest for certai n cri mes as “good cause” for i mmedi ate suspensi on pendi ng further i nqui ry, under the statutory scheme i t remai ns rel evant whether the arrest i n fact “rel at[es]” to a heal th or safety threat to the publ i c from conti nued l i censure of the dri ver. And because that threat must be both “di rect” and “substanti al,” i t i s rel evant whether the conduct underl y i ng the arrest and the overal l record and character of the dri ver confi rms or di sproves the arrest’s rel ati on to publ i c heal th or safety. Thus, for exampl e, i n the majori ty of cases, the further removed the cri me i s from the dri ver’s job, the l ess “di rect” the threat may be i f he or she remai ns l i censed. Dependi ng on the surroundi ng ci rcumstances and the dri ver’s hi story, the threat may al so be more or l ess “substanti al .” Moreover, i t i s useful to put the post-suspensi on heari ng i ssue back i nto i ts proper due process context. Suspensi on of a dri ver’s l i cense i s automati c upon arrest for any fel ony or l i sted mi sdemeanor. The Nnebepl ai nti ffs ori gi nal l y argued that due process req u i res a heari ng beforethe suspensi on takes effect. In Nnebe II , we agreed wi th the C i ty and the di stri ct court that a pre-suspensi on heari ng was not requi red, because the fact of an arrest provi d ed suffi ci ent i ndi ci a

37of a threat to publ i c heal th and safety to permi t an i mmedi ate suspensi on at a

poi nt at whi ch l i ttl e was known about the dri ver and the charged cri me, provi ded that the dri ver woul d be gi ven a post-depri vati on heari ng. Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 158

S59. The post-depri vati on heari ng thus provi des the necessary i nqui ry i nto the propri ety of the suspensi on i n l i ght of the ful l er record that can be compi l ed i n the aftermath of the arrest, whi ch mi ght confi rm or di spel the i ni ti al i mpressi on that the dri ver’s conti nued l i censure woul d pose a threat to the safety of the publ i c. Thus, by readi ng the Rul e as a whol e and consi stentl y wi th the Ordi nance under whose authori ty i t was promul g a ted, we concl ude that the i ndi vi dual ci rcumstances underl yi ng a taxidri ver’s suspensi on are rel evant to the statutory scheme and to the rol e that a due process heari ng i s desi gned to pl ay when a person i s threatened wi th the l oss of a val uabl e property i nterest. Fi nal l y, “[w]hi l e exami ni ng the speci fi c l a nguage of statutory provi si ons i s part of our i nqui ry, we must al so l ook to the underl yi ng purpose and the statute’s hi story. . . . The l egi sl ati ve i ntent i s the great and control l i ng pri nci pl e.” Meegan v. Brown , 16 N.Y.3d 395, 403 (2011) (i nternalquotati on marks omi tted); s ee also G oodwin v. Perales , 88 N.Y.2d 383, 395 (1996) (noti ng that regul ati ons may go

38beyond the text of a statute onl y “as l ong as they are i n harmony wi th the

statute’s over-al lpurpose”). As noted above, the Ordi nance bespeaks a cl ear i ntent to l eaven the C ommi ssi on’s eagerness to di sci pl i ne dri vers wi th greater concern for dri vers’ ri ghts. Indeed, the C i ty C ounci lembedded i t s concern i nto the text of the Ordi nance i n the form of a l egi sl ati ve “fi nd[i ng] that certai n of the rul es promul gated wi thi n the past several months by the [TLC ], such as those that modi fy the di sci pl i nary measures that may be i mposed agai nst taxi cab and for-hi re vehi cl e dri vers, taxi c ab and for-hi re vehi cl e owners and taxi cab medal l i on owners are onerous.” N.Y.C

. C ode § 19-512.1, n.1 (1999). 19Suspensi ons conti nued due to arrests al o ne, wi th no meani ngfulabi l i ty to contest the TLC ’s determi nati on that the l i censee poses a threat, woul d appear to be just the ki nd of “onerous” di sci pl inary measure that the C i ty C ounci lpassed § 19-512.1 to el i m i nate. Thus, the text of both the Rul e and the Ordi nance, as wel l as the l egi sl ati ve purpose underl yi ng the Ordi nance, al li ndi cate that the threat from a gi ven

19 Thi s l anguage apparentl y referenced a recentl y -establ i shed Persi stent Vi ol ator program, whi ch “created a poi nt system for l i cense revocati on” that the i ndustry compl a i ned “i m pose[d] penal ti es . . . for conduct . . . unrel ated to passenger safety.” Arif v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n , 2002 WL 1559732, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. C t. Jul y 10, 2002) (al terati on omi tted), rev’d on other grounds , 3 A.D.3d 345 (N.Y. App. Di v. 2004). 39dri ver’s conti nued l i censure i s the l odestar of the statutory and regul atory

i nqu i ry, and that the heari ng i s i ntended to provi de a meani ngfulprocess for dri vers. We thus di sagree that the onl y consi derati on rel evant to the i nqu i ry i s the statutory charge ; a meani ngfulheari ng, for purposes of the Rul e, must gi ve the dri ver an opportuni ty to show that hi s or her parti c ul ar l i censure does not cause a threat to publ i c safety. Wi th that understandi ng, we turn to the Mathews factors. B. M athews Factors 1. Private Interest The fi rst factor to be consi dered i n the M athews i nqui ry i s “the pri vate i nterest that wi l lbe affected by the offi c i a l a cti on.” Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335. As we have al ready stated i n thi s case, “the pri vate i nterest at stake . . . i s enormous

 ̄most taxidri vers rel y on the job as thei r pri mary source of i ncome and often earn the sol e i ncome for l arge fami l i es i n a ci ty where the cost of l i vi ng si gni fi c antl y exceeds the nati onalaverage.” Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 159 (i nternal quotati o n marks omi tted). Indeed, we have previ ousl y hel d that thi s factor favors more extensi ve process where the i nterest at stake i s “operati ng a busi ness and . . . pursui ng a parti cul a r l i vel i hood.” Spinelli v. City of New York , 579 F.3d

40160, 171 (2d C i r. 2009) (i nternal quotati on marks omi t ted). Moreover, “[t]he

Supreme C ourt has ‘repeatedl y recogni zed the severi ty of depri vi ng someone of hi s or her l i vel i hood.’” Id. (quoting FDIC v. Mallen , 486 U.S. 230, 2 43 (1988)); see also B rock v. Roadway Exp., Inc. , 481 U.S. 252, 263 (1987); C leveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). In the past, we have regi stered parti cul ar concern about the i nabi l i ty to remedy thi s type of depri v a ti on, noti ng that “a l i censee erroneousl y depri ved of a l i cense cannot be made whol e si mpl y by rei nstati ng the l i cense,” and that “the i nteri m peri od between erroneous depri vati on and rei nstatement can be fi nanci a l l y devastati ng to the l i censee.” Spinelli, 579 F.3d at 171 (ci tati ons and i nternal quotati on marks omi tted). We thus have l i ttl e di ffi cul ty i n concl udi ng  ̄parti cul arl yupon a record demonstrati ng that pl a i nti ffs were depri ved of thei r l i censes for several months at a ti m e  ̄that the pri v ate i nterest here i s extremel y strong. The fi rst Mathews factor favors the pl ai nti ffs.

2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Next, we consi der “the ri sk of an erroneous depri vati o n” under the procedures used by the TLC , al ong wi th “the probabl e val u e, i f any, of addi ti onal

41or substi tute procedural safeguards.” Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335. We note at the

outset that in New York state, “[u]nl i ke a fel o ny charge, for whi ch a ‘prompt’ probabl e cause heari ng must be hel d or evi d ence of probabl e cause must be presented to a grand jury, a mi sdemeanor charge . . . req ui res no post-arrest determi nati on.” Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 44 (2d C i r. 2002); see also People v. Green , 96 N.Y.2d 195, 199

S200 (2001). Compare N.Y. C ri m. Proc. § 170.10 (mi sdemeanors) with N.Y. C ri m. Proc. § 180.10 (fel oni es)

. What thi s means i n practi ce i s that a dri ver can be arrested for a mi sdemeanor based on an on-thescene determi nati on of reasonabl e cause made by the arresti ng offi cer, 2 0and then have hi s l i cense suspended for the several m onths that fol l ow, wi thout any meani ngfulopportuni ty to chal l enge the arrest. In thi s case, the ri sk of erroneous depri vati on can be assessed by l o oki ng to the stati sti c s regardi ng the outcome of the cases i n whi ch dri vers’ taxi l i censes were suspended. The TLC hi nges the ul ti mate deci si on as to whether to conti nue the suspensi on of a l i cense on the outcome of the cri m i nalcase. In other words, the TLC di sconti nues the suspensi on of an arrested dri ver onl y i f the charges are

20 New York C ri minalProcedure Law § 140.10(1) al l ows a pol i ce offi cer to arrest a suspect wi thout a warrant for “reasonabl e cause” that the arrestee has commi tted a cri me “whether i n hi s or her presence or otherwi se.” 42di smi ssed, reduced to an offense that does not warrant a suspensi on, or resol ved

favorabl y. Upon the occurrence of any of these three di sposi ti ons, the dri v er i s rei nstated wi thout further i nqui ry i nto hi s conduct. As the di stri ct court found, the charges agai nst at l east 75% of arrested dri vers are resol ved favorabl y to the dri ver, and the dri v ers’ l i censes are accordi ngl y rei nstated. 21 J. App’x 66. In fact, there was evi dence presented at tri a li ndi cati ng that, putting asi de arrests for dri vi ng under the i nfl uence, the percentage of dri vers whose l i c enses are rei nstated coul d be as hi gh as 90%. 22J. App’x 61, 383. In an anal ogous case, Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 995 (2d C i r. 1994), the pl ai nti ff brought a § 1983 cl ai mchal l engi ng her i ncl u si on on a regi stry of chi l d abusers, where a person coul d be pl aced on the regi stry based on a “some credibl e evi dence” standard. C onsi deri ng both the pri vate i nterest (the pl ai nti ff’s ri ght to secure empl oyment i n the chi l d care fi el d) and the Government i nterest (i t s parens patriae obl i gati on to protect chi l dren from abuse and mal treatment) to be extremel y strong, we concl uded that “the deci di ng factor” was an

21 Defendants do not chal l enge thi s fi ndi ng. 22 The cal cul a ti on excl u di ng charges of dri vi ng under the i nfl uence of i ntoxi cants i s rel evant because such convi cti ons may wel lbe more l i kel y to l ead to a hi gh percentage of conti nued suspensi ons even where a meani ngfulheari ng i s provi ded. 43unacceptabl y hi gh ri sk of error, as evi denced by the fact that “nearl y 75% of those

who seek expungement of thei r names from the l i st are ul ti matel y successful .” Id. at 1003. We hel d that “[t]he fact that onl y 25% of those on the l i st remai n after al l admini strati v e proceedi ngs have been concl uded i ndi cates that the [procedures used were] at best i mperfect.” Id. at 1004. Here, as many as 75% of taxi dri vers wi l lhave thei r l i censes rei nstated wi th no further i nqui ry i nto the danger posed by any i ndi v i dualdri ver to the taxi

- ri di ng publ i c. Thus, the vast majori ty of the suspensi ons wi l lturn out to have been, by the standard appl i ed by the TLC i t sel f , erroneous. 2 3Nor can thi s depri v ati on “be recompensed by the cl ai mant’s prevai l i ng in l ater proceedi ngs,” Krimstock

, 306 F.3d at 63, as there i s no way to make up for the i ncome l ost duri ng

23 We are cogni zant that some number of the 75% of dri vers whose l i censes were not revoked were vi ndi cated based on thei r i nnocence of the charged offense, a factor that woul d not i n any event be canvassed i n a proper heari ng. J. App’x 66; see also Nnebe II

, 644 F.3d at 160. That does not depri ve the stati sti c of si gni fi cance, however. It i s the best avai l abl e evi dence of the percentage of dri vers charged wi th cri mes and summari l y suspended under the regul ati on who are ul ti matel y deemed unfi t to retai n thei r l i censes. Suspensi on pendi ng resol uti on of charges may be enti rel y appropri a te i n some number of cases that do not ul ti matel y resul t i n convi cti on and revocati on of l i censes. But when such a preponderant percentage of summary suspensi ons are not ul ti m atel yvi ndi cated by a fi ndi ng of unfi tness, that fact surel y wei ghs heavi l y agai nst the defendants’ argument that essenti al l y automati c suspensi ons, for a peri od of many months, are requi red to ensure publ i c safety, and that no further revi ew of i ndi vi dualcases i s requi red by the consti tuti onalguarantee of procedural fai rness. 44the peri od i n whi ch the dri ver’s l i cense i s suspended. We fi nd thi s to be an

unacceptabl y hi gh ri sk of error, and thus fi nd that the second factor, l i ke the fi rst, favors pl ai nti ffs.

3. Government Interest The Supreme C ourt has recogni z ed the “si gni fi cant i nterest” that the government has “i n i mmedi atel y suspendi ng, when fel ony charges are fi l ed agai nst them, empl oyees who occupy posi ti ons of great publ i c trust and hi gh publ i c vi sibi l i ty, such as pol i ce offi cers.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997). And we have noted, when thi s case was l ast before us, that “[a]mong the most cri ti c alfuncti ons performed by the TLC are ensuri ng the safety of the taxi -ri di ng publ i c and mai ntai ni ng the publ i c’s trust i n the safety of taxi s,” and thus that “an arrest for a fel ony or seri ous mi sdemeanor creates a strong government i nterest i n ensuri ng that the publ i c i s protected i n the short term, pri or to any heari ng.” Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 159 (al terati on i n ori gi nal ) (i nternal ci tati ons and quotati on marks omi tted). For that reason, we affi rmed the deci si on bel ow that there was no consti tuti onalvi ol ati o n i n fai l i ng to offer dri vers a pre-suspension heari ng, si nce “i n the i mmedi ate aftermath of an arrest, when the TLC has mi ni mal i nformati on at i ts di sposal and the very fact of an arrest i s cause for concern, the

45government’s i nterest i n protecti ng the publ i c i s greater than the dri ver’s i nterest

i n an i mmedi ate heari ng.” Id. However, i n the post-deprivation context, “the exi stence of ‘exi g ent ci rcumstances’ warranti ng a depri vati on before hol di ng a heari ng i s i rrel evant. The rel evant i nqui ry i s whether the C i ty had a l egi ti m ate i nterest i n not provi di ng [dri vers] wi th meani ngfulpost-depri vati o n due process.” Spinelli, 579 F.3d at 174. The di stri ct court found, i n Nnebe I , that addi ti onaladmini strati ve procedures

 ̄speci fi cal l y, a heari ng that attempted to adjudi cate the gui l t or i nnocence of an i ndi vi dual dri ver  ̄woul d “unacceptabl y i nterfere wi th the paral l elcri minalproceedi ng” and “present a si gni fi cant fi nanci aland admini strati v e burden on the TLC .” 665 F. Supp. 2d at 328. “We agree[d] wi th the di stri ct court that the C i ty cannot be requi red to hol d a heari ng that functi ons as a previ ew of the cri minalcase.” Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 160. But we consi dered the possibi l i ty that “a meaningful heari ng can be devi sed at mi ni malcost to the C i ty that does not consti tute a mini -tri alon the cri minalcharges.” Id. at 163. Defendants di d not respond to our supposi ti on by attempti ng to show, on remand, that a heari ng that al l owed, for exampl e, an i nqu i ry i nto the facts underl y i ng a cri minalcompl ai nt, the dri vi ng record of the arrested dri ver, or

46whether the charged conduct occurred on- or off-duty, woul d fi nanci a l l yor

admini strati v el y burden the TLC . Indeed, the TLC al ready al l ows such testi mony to be heard and such evi dence to be presented. They thus do not, and perhaps coul d not, credibl y contend that al l owi ng the ALJ or TLC C hai r to considerthe evi dence alreadypresented at the post-suspensi on heari ngs woul d present an onerous admi ni strati ve task. Thus, whi l e we take seri ousl y the Government i nterest i mpl i cated, we hol d that, gi v en the potenti alof conducti ng far more meani ngfulheari ngs at l i ttl e or no addi ti onalfi nanci alor admi ni strati ve cost to the TLC , that i nterest i s outwei ghed by the pri vate i nterest at stake and the unacceptabl y hi gh ri sk of erroneous depri vati on. In Nnebe II

, we reserved the q uesti on of “whether a heari ng that does nothi ng more than confi rm the dri ver’s i d enti ty and the exi stence of a pendi ng cri minalproceedi ng agai nst hi m woul d i n fact be adequate process to al l ow the C i ty to suspend a dri ver’s taxi l i cense unti lthe cri minalcharges are resol v ed.” Id. at 161. W e now deci de that, under the ci rcumstances presented here, gi v en the hi gh ri sk of erroneous depri v ati on of the dri ver’s l i v el i hood for a peri od of months, and under thi s parti cul ar statutory regi me that emphasi zes the danger of

47l i censure to the publ i c heal th and safety, a heari ng that in effect concl usi vel y

presumes that suspensi o n i s appropri ate based sol el y on the abstract rel ati onshi p of the el ements of a charged offense to safe dri vi ng provi d es i nadequate process. 24 That concl usi on i s bol stered by our hol di ng i n Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40. In Krimstock

, we hel d that dri vers whose cars were sei zed for forfei ture after an arrest for certai n cri mes for whi ch the car coul d be consi dered an i nstrumental i ty were enti tl ed to a prompt heari ng to contest the l egi ti macy of the sei zure. Id. at 43

S4 4. Noti ng that “[a] car or truck i s often central to a person’s l i vel i hood or dai l y acti vi ti es,” we concl uded that “[a]n i ndi vi dual must be permi tted to chal l enge the C i ty’s conti nued possessi on of hi s or her vehi cl e duri ng the pendency of l egalproceedi ngs where such possessi on may ul ti matel y prove i m proper and where l ess drasti c measures than depri v ati onpendente lite are avai l abl e and appropri ate.” Id. at 44. We were parti cul arl y concerned wi th

24 We further agree wi th the Nnebe II court that the out-of-C i rcui t cases ci ted i n Nnebe I

 ̄

Brown v. DOJ

, 715 F.2d 662 (D.C . C i r. 1983) and Cooke v. Social Security Admin. , 125 F. App’x 274 (Fed. C i r. 2004)

 ̄are di sti ngui shabl e by vi rtue of the facts that: (1) taxidri v ers, unl i ke the pl ai nti ffs i n those cases, are not C i ty empl oyees; (2) the mi sconduct here, unl i ke that i n Brown and Cooke, need not be work-rel a ted; and (3) summary suspensi on can be tri ggered by a warrantl ess arrest, whereas i n both B rown and Cookethere had been an i ndependent probabl e cause determi nati on. See Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 162. 48“the temporal gap that typi cal l y exi sts between sei zure of the vehi cl e and the

forfei tu re proceedi ng.” 25 Id. at 53. We concl uded that “the Due Process C l a use requi res that cl ai mants be gi ven an earl y opportuni ty to test the probabl e val i di ty of further depri vati on, i ncl udi ng probabl e cause for the i ni ti alsei zure, and to ask whether other measures, short of conti nued i mpoundment, woul d sati sfy the l egi ti mate interests of the C i ty i n protecti ng the vehi cl es from sal e or destructi o n pendente lite .” Id. a t 68. We note that i n Krimstock, there was no prompt post-depri vati o n heari ng hel d at al land that our opi ni o n focused heavi l yon that defect. But there are al so some cl ear si mi l ari ti es between the i nstant case and Krimstock . Here, a l i cense to dri ve a taxi cab i s not si mpl y “often” central to the dri ver’s l i vel ihood; i t i s a prerequi si te to pl y i ng hi s or her trade. And whi l e the TLC does provi de a postdepri v ati on heari ng, pl ai nti ffs successful l y argue that the heari ng i s effecti vel y meani ngl ess. Moreover, the Krimstock C ourt di d not remand the case wi th i nstructi ons to hol d a heari ng merel y on the fact of the arrest of a gi ven cl ai mant

 ̄i nstead, i t requi red the heari ng to al l ow for a testi ng of the “probabl e cause for the i ni ti alwarrantl ess sei zure.” Id. at 70. As i n thi s case, we emphasi zed that we

25 The forfei ture proceedi ng often took pl ace “months or even years after the sei zure.” Krimstock

, 306 F.3d at 45. 49di d “not envi si on the retenti on heari ng as a forum for exhausti ve evi denti ary

battl es that mi ght threaten to dupl i cate the eventual forfei ture heari ng,” but neverthel ess concl uded that a heari ng that was l ess i ntrusi ve i nto the anti ci pated l aw-enforcement proceedi ng was both possibl e and requi red to provi de due process. I

d. at 69

S 70. The concerns wi th whi ch we grappl ed i n Krimstock appl y wi th equalforce here. As i n Krimstock

, a taxi -dri ver’s l i cense can be suspended wi thout any i ndependent determi nati on of probabl e cause, and the depri vati on coul d l ast weeks or months. And whi l e the TLC Rul e does provi de a prompt postdepri v ati on heari ng, as di scussed above, that heari ng i s meani ngl ess. Here, as i n Krimstock

, a l engthy depri vati on of property, based on an arrest wi thout a judi ci al determi nati on of probabl e cause and wi thout a deeper i nqui ry i nto whether the depri v ati on i s appropri ate, vi ol ates the C onsti tuti on’s guarantee of procedural due process. We therefore fi nd a procedural due process vi ol ati on, and remand to the di stri ct court to fashi o n a consti tuti onal l y adequate process, after heari ng from the parti es. We emphasi ze that we do not requi re an i nqui ry i nto factualgui l t or i nnocence to sati sfy the due process i nqui ry; rather, a heari ng that encompasses

50some l evel of conduct-speci fi c fi ndi ngs based upon the facts underl yi ng the

compl a i nt and the dri ver’s hi story and characteri sti cs, for exampl e, woul d be suffi ci ent. Addi ti onal l y, the di stri ct court shoul d consi der on remand the pl ai nti ffs’ Rul e 23 moti on for cl ass certi fi cati on, and determi ne what, i f any, damages pl ai nti ffs are due. 26 II. Notice The di stri ct court hel d that the noti ce provi ded to dri vers before December 2006 deni ed due process, but that the noti c e gi ven si nce that poi nt has been suffi ci ent. The parti es cross-appeal that concl usi o n. “Parti es whose ri ghts are to be affected are enti tl ed to be heard; and i n order that they may enjoy that ri ght they must fi rst be noti fi ed.” Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1983) (i nternalquotati on marks omi tted). “[I]n the absence of effecti ve noti ce, the other due process ri ghts . . . such as the ri ght to a ti mel y heari ng . . . are rendered fundamental l y hol l ow.” K apps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 124

26 Whi l e we express no vi ew on the cl ass certi fi cati on and damages i ssues, we note that the depri v ati o n of a heari ng al one does not necessari l y proxi matel y cause a l oss of i ncome, si nce a heari ng i n a parti cul ar case may wel lhave l ed to a conti nued suspensi on i n any event. See Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125, 143 (2d C i r. 2016) (noti ng that “[i ]n the procedural due-process context, actual damages are based on the compensati on that resul ted from the pl ai nti ff’s recei pt of defi ci ent process,” whi ch i nvol v es a determi nati on of “whether a di fferent outcome woul d have been obtai ned had adequate procedural protecti ons been gi ven”). 51(2d C i r. 2005). For noti ce to be effecti ve, i t must inform the affected party of what

“cri ti cali ssue” wi l lbe determi ned at the heari ng. See Turner v. Rogers , 564 U.S. 431, 447 (2011). In addi ti on, “[p]art of the functi on of noti ce i s to gi ve the charged party a chance to marshal the facts i n hi s defense.” Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974). Adequate noti ce must “reasonabl y. . . convey the requ i red i nformati on that woul d permi t [a dri ver] to present [hi s or her] objecti o ns” to the conti nuati o n of a suspensi on. S pinelli, 579 F.3d at 172 (ci tati o n and i nternal quotati o n marks omi tted). C i ti ng to the versi on of the Rul e then i n effect, the di stri ct court found that the pre-December 2006 noti ce di d not i ndi cate what standard woul d appl y at the post-suspensi on heari ng, as nei ther the Rul e nor the noti ce i nformed the dri ver as to the cri ti cali ssue to be determi ned at the heari ng. Defendants appeal , argui ng that “any reasonabl e dri ver woul d know that they coul d chal l enge thei r suspensi o n by asserti ng that they had not been charged wi th a cri m e and by chal l engi ng the assumpti on of dangerousness.” Appel l ees’ Br. 57

S58. They maintai n that the i nformati on contai ned i n the noti ce  ̄that the dri v er’s l i cense was bei ng suspended based on an arrest for the charge i denti fi ed i n the l etter

52wi th a ci tati on to the rel evant Rul e  ̄was adequate to al l ow the taxi dri ver to

marshalevi dence and prepare a defense. Whi l e we do not i mpl ythat adequate noti c e must incl ude a roadmap to a successful defense, the noti ce here fal l s consi derabl y on the other si de of that l i ne. The text of the Rul e pre-2006, as wel l as the encouragement gi ven to dri vers by the TLC ALJs, gave the dri ver no i ndi c ati on that the onl yi ssue that mattered was the questi on of a “phi l osophi calnexus” between the abstract el ements of a charged offense and publ i c safety, for whi ch he or she woul d need to marshal a dramati cal l y di fferent case

 ̄case l aw and l egalargument

 ̄than he or she woul d to show evi dence of hi s or her own l ack of dangerousness. Indeed, the mi sl eadi ng qual i ty of the noti ce was confi rmed by the fact that dri vers di d present, and ALJs were i nstructed to admi t, evi dence regardi ng thei r i ndi vi dual records and the speci fi c facts charged by the arresti ng offi cer — evi d ence that the ALJs were then pri vatel y di rected not to consi der. We thus affi rm the l ower court on the i nadequ acy of the pre-2006 noti ce. As the di stri ct court i nterpreted the Rul e, the suffi ci ency of the postDecember 2006 noti ce presented a cl oser questi on, si nce the noti ce then ci ted a versi on of the Rul e that the di stri ct court bel i eved embodi ed the “arrest-pl us53nexus” standard. Moreover, the drop-off i n heari ng requests after November

2007 suggests that dri v ers and thei r uni on representati v es were bei ng made aware i n some manner of the standard bei ng appl i ed to facts by the ALJs and the TLC C hai r that rendered the heari ngs futi l e. As we have hel d above, however, that standard was not what the Rul e actual l y requi red. We therefore di sagree wi th the l o wer court’s deci si on that the noti c e became adequate when the l anguage of the Rul e changed. For the very same reasons the di stri ct court found that dri vers woul d be i l l -prepared for the heari ng the TLC provi d ed before 2006, they woul d remai n i l l -prepared and poorl y -i nformed as to what evi dence woul d be rel evant to thei r heari ngs thereafter. We thus fi nd that the noti ce gi ven, both before and after December 2006, was consti tuti onal l yi nfi rm. Thi s concl usi on i s l argel yacademi c, i n l i ght of the more fundamentalprobl em that the heari ng i n questi on was consti tuti onal l y i nsuffi ci ent, regardl ess of the content of the noti c e.

54III. Additional Issues

A. Substantive Due Process Despi t e the pl ai nti ffs’ protestati ons that they di d not bri ng cl ai ms based i n substanti ve due process, the di stri ct court proceeded to assess a potenti al substanti ve due process cl ai m, findi ng no such cl ai m was vi abl e. Because the pl ai nti ffs do not press, and i ndeed have affi rmati vel ydi savowed, any such cl ai m, we have no reason to di scuss the i ssue. B. Unconstitutional Presumption of Guilt Pl ai nti ffs addi ti onal l yargue that what they characteri z e as a presumpti on that the taxidri v ers are gui l ty of the charges, for purposes of the heari ngs, i s unconsti tuti onali n l i ght of Nelson v. Colorado , 137 S. C t. 1249 (2017). In Nelson , the C ourt determi ned that i twas unconsti tuti onalto conti nue to depri ve defendants whose convi cti ons had been vacated or reversed of property that had been retai ned upon thei r convi c ti on. Id. at 1252. The C ourt, noti ng that “the presumpti on of i nnocence l i es at the foundati o n of our cri minall aw,” hel d that defendants i n that posture shoul d have to meet no burden to recover thei r property, as they were once agai n presumed i nnocent i n the eyes of the l aw. Id. at 1256 (ci tati on and i nternalquotati on marks omi tted).

55Pl ai nti ffs’ anal ogy to Nelson i s i napt. Nelson struck down a l aw that

permi tted the State to retai n costs, fees and resti tuti on charged to cri minal defendants, even after a cri minalprosecuti on had resul ted i n the i nval i dati on of thei r convi cti ons, unl ess the defendant proved hi s or her factual i nnocence by cl ear and convi ncing evi dence. Id. at 1255. Here, by contrast, the dri vers’ charges remai n pendi ng. Rather than rel yi ng on an assumpti o n of gui l t, the TLC Rul e says, i n effect, that i f a charge i s seri ous enough to warrant revocati on of a l i cense upon convi cti on, then i ti s seri o us enough to warrant suspensi on upon arrest. It i s true that the TLC Rul e al l ows i ni ti aland conti nued suspensi ons based on arrests for at l east ei ghteen mi sdemeanors, whi ch i n New York may occur wi thout a warrant. N.Y. C ri m. Proc. § 140.10(1); s ee Nnebe II , 644 F.3d at 162. It i s al so true that pol i ce offi cers who arrest someone for a mi sdemeanor wi thout a warrant may i ssue the accused a Desk Appearance Ti cket (“DAT”), NY. C ri m. Proc. § 150.20(1)

S (2), and that unti lthe accused appears on the date set by the DAT no neutral factfi nder wi l l have determi ned that the arrest was based on probabl e cause. However, any concern about the l ack of probabl e cause i n a parti cul ar case i s mi ti gated, for purposes of the l i cense suspensi o n process, by our hol di ng that the TLC must al l ow dri vers to argue that the ci rcumstances surroundi ng thei r

56arrest show that there i s no reason to deem them a danger. Vi ewi ng the Mathews

factors i n l i ght of the procedural changes our rul i ng today wi l lrequi re, and for the reasons set forth i n Nnebe II , we see no consti tuti onal i nfi rmi ty i n a process that al l ows for context-speci fi c fi ndi ngs but does not open the questi on of a dri ver’s factual gui l t of the cri m i nal charges. We l eave that to be resol ved i n the cri minalcourts, wi th the burden on the prosecuti on to prove gui l t beyond a reasonabl e doubt. C. Fair Warning Fi nal l y, the Stallworth pl ai nti ffs argue that defendants have deni ed them fai r warni ng of the l a w. C i ti ng FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. , 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) for the proposi ti on that “l aws whi ch regul ate persons or enti ti es must gi ve fai r noti c e of conduct that i s forbi dden or requi red,” and that a regul ati on wi l lbe unconsti tuti onal l yvague i f “i t i s uncl ear as to what fact must be proved,” pl ai nti ffs argue that the Rul e does not sati sfy these consti tuti onalrequi rements. Stallworth Appel l ants’ Br. 57. That argument i s merel y another versi on, and a l ess convi ncing one, of pl ai nti ffs’ noti ce argument. The cases on whi ch pl ai nti ffs rel y are i napposi te. Both cases address the harm that occurs where prohi bi ted conduct i s not cl earl y

57defi ned or when an agency exceeds i t authori ty i n enforci ng the l aw. 27 Here, pl ai nti ffs concede that prohi bi ted conduct i s cl earl y defi ned by the Rul e, and do not argue that the TLC exceeds i ts authori ty by conti nuing thei r suspensi o ns. Pl ai nti ffs note that the Fai r Warni ng Doctri ne appl i es not onl y to proscribed conduct but al so to col l ateral consequences of that conduct, ci ti ng Johnson v. United States , 135 S. C t. 2551 (2015) , and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. C t. 1204 (2018). But those cases were concerned wi th the vagueness of the resi dual cl a uses of, respecti vel y, the Armed C areer C ri m i nalAct and the federal cri minal code’s defi ni ti on of “cri me of vi ol ence,” as i ncorporated i nto the Immi grati on and Nati onal i ty Act, and the parti cul ar probl ems that arose from the i nteracti ons between the state cri minalcodes and federal l a w; the C ourt concl uded i n both cases that there was i ndeed uncertai nty as to whi ch cri mes woul d be consi dered suffi ci entl y vi ol ent to tri gger parti cul ar federal consequences.

27 In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. , 567 U.S. 239 (2012), the C ourt found the l aw i n questi on unconsti tuti onal l y vague because i tdi d not gi ve noti ce to tel evi si o n broadcasters that fl eeti ng expl eti ves or momentary nudi ty coul d be found acti o nabl yi ndecent when previ ous FC C deci si ons had found that such ci rcumstances woul d not be consi dered acti onabl y i ndecent; i n SEC v. Sloan , 436 U.S. 103 (1978), the C ourt hel d that the SEC exceeded i ts authori ty when i t i mposed an i ndefi ni te tradi ng suspensi on under a statute that expl i ci t l y stated that the SEC coul d suspend tradi ng for no more than ten days. 58In contrast, the Stallworth pl ai nti ffs were al l suspended under a versi on of

the Rul e that speci fi cal l y enumerates the offenses that wi l ltri gger a summary suspensi o n. There i s l i ttl e doubt that certai n mi sdemeanors and al lfel oni es wi l l always l ead to a summary suspensi on and that a heari ng wi l lfol l ow. The i ssue i s not that the warni ng i s not fai r; i ti s, as di scussed above, that the heari ngs that fol l ow fai lto provi de any real opportuni ty for a dri ver to contest that suspensi o n. 28Accordi ngl y, pl ai nti ffs’ fai r warni ng argument fai l s. CONCL USION For the foregoi ng reasons, we AFFIRM i n part and REVERSE i n part the judgments of the di stri ct court and REMAND for further proceedi ngs. The Nnebe judgment i s affi rmed i nsofar as i t found a noti ce vi ol a ti on, and reversed i nsofar as i t found no vi ol ati on of procedural due process. The Stallworth judgment, whi ch rel i ed upon the Nnebe judgment, i s affi rmed as to the assumpti o n of gui l t and fai r warni ng cl ai ms but i s otherwi se reversed. On remand, the di stri ct court i s di rected to address the proper remedi es for the consti tuti onalvi o l ati ons

28 To the extent pl ai nti ffs cl a i m they were deni ed fai r warni ng because the wri tten Rul e, whi ch makes facts other than the fact of arrest rel evant to the suspensi on deci si on, fai l ed to warn them that the TLC ’ s de facto standard i gnored such evi dence, that argument i s dupl i cati ve of pl ai nti ffs’ fai r noti ce cl ai m. 59establ i shed by the pl a i nti ffs as wel las the moti on for cl a ss certi fi cati on and the

damages, i f any, to whi ch pl ai nti ffs are enti tl ed.

60