Jane MLO, INC. ° Page 14

April 18, 1985
: PLUTONIUM CONTENT OF NLO FEED MATERIALS
@ SUMMARY OF RECYCLE FEEDS OF MATERIALS RECEIVED ABOVE THREE ppb PLUTONIUM
Total - Total Total
Matertal Uranium Plutonium Plutoniun
Year Type —*2__ grams ppb
1966 _ UNE 103,469 0.698, 6.746
1967 03 263,545 1.044 3.961
UHH 130,823 0.880 6.727
1968 UHH 147,210 0.992 6.739
1969 UHH 119,148 0.804 2 66748
1970 U03 1,249,642 "4,953 3.964
UHH 52,354 0.352 6.723
1971 . UHH 66,399 0.448 6.747
1972 UHH 1,000 0.006 "6.000
e 1974 UNH 14,965 0.100 . 6.682
1975 UNH 12,290 0.082 : 6.672
1975-76 _ Pad. Serap 290,742 2.610 ” 8,977
1976 UNH 6,935. 0.046 6.633"
1978 . UNH 12,279 0.082 6.678
1979 03 395,482 2.160 5.462
1980 UNH 29,751 0.200 6.722
ASH 22,529 "25.290 122.553 _
1981 U03 399, 301 2.180 5.460
1982 . v03 622,746 3.619 > $811
1983 u03 420,660 2.166 5.149


NS

@ nesntonance Personnel:

x
xf
i7is

“n°
2 10/T
ae 10/u4

1/28

BAT /
/'

8/28

ve

93 .

Te

Qver .2

Ves

10/1

1/28
8/25

8/17
8/23

210/19
9/24

CRIGINAL 3.CRES bY
R.C. HEATHERTON

R. C. Heatherton


2132052

- February 2,. 1954
Dust Exposures at Packaging Station
A. Stewart, Plent &

“R. GC. Heatherton

The following is a tabulstion of air dust samples taken at the
Paokaging Station on three different dates. :

Adjusting weight from green salt in

six-galion can. Funnel hood installed :
about January 14 in us@.cccccsscrccecereses 5h00 4/n/¥>

Same operation as above, No hodd used. -

Operator extremely Careful...ceceseseseese* 1600 ¢/a/w3

Same operation as above. No hood used.

Operator Using NOTMAL CATC..seeseeeceseeess 21000 a/n/¥
@ Prom the above data it was apparent that the use of the funnel=

shaped canopy hoodhas resulted in some improvement in the normal

operation. However, the average ‘aoneentration in using the hood
is still about 70 times the MAC. Still greater improvement wes
realized without using the hood but with using some care.

On the basis of the above results it 18 seen that the funnel
type hood is unsatisfactory for the @esirable control. The
tuateliavion-of this.heodcould satually result in higher
concentration if the operators are led to iieve that it is
satisfactory and do not use necessary care. It is our recom-
mendation that this problem be subuitted to Engineering for
design of suitable dust control at this station. It is our
belief that suitable control will be maintained only by con-
pletely enclosing the entire operation.

It has also been noted that personnel are entering the Packaging
Station enciesure for the purpose of cleaning up green salt spil

without the use of respiratory protection. The use of respiratc
is recommended for this work.
Yours truly,
ORIGINAL
R.C. HEAT

R. C. Heatherton



~-2e
does not indicate the degree of the risk. We sould introduce such
terma as severe harard or negligible hazerd or slight hazard or
moderate harard to denote the degree of the hazerd.

The smoking « cigarettes involves some risk to the human lungs.
Smoking then can be thought of as a hazard.

A housewife working with a frayed heater cord on her electric
iron could be killed by the electricity in the cord. A heater cord
then too can be thought of as a hazard,

A husband building s cabinet can be killed by a shorted wire
on an electric hand drill which has no ground wire. An slectric
hand drill can also be a hazerd.

A bald headed tire can cause a skid on @ wet highway. The skid
could wreck an attomobile and kill its occupents. A tire can be &
“nezerd.

The one who seid, “The hazards of life are many", was right.
There are hazards everywhere we look.

These hazards, however, can be reduced to such a point thet

although the risk is still there, it may be so minute as to be

statistically udemonstrabdle.

3290297


SS eee
:
3
SEC00046 <
FMPC PETITION
Addendum

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Page 2 .
fhe following conclusions can be draw from the above data:

1. It will be necessary to provide local exhaust venti-
Jation in order to control the air contamination at
the straighteners and saws. This should include venti-
lation for the run-on and run-off tables for the Medarts.

2. In addition to planned ventilation for the saws, it
will be necessary to ventilate the filing operation
if this is to be continued as an operating procedure.
It is our understanding that with the changes an the
Acme-Gridley, the Piling operation will no longer be required

3. While the air contamination level in the vioinity of
the shears and the mill area is above MAC, it will
not be necessary to ventilate the shears for these
reasonst

a. A large part of the contamination in this area
originates at the Medart. Controlling the
contamination at the Medart will result in a
reduction of the air contamination in the rest
of the mill area.

b. Personnel in the mill area are not required to
spend a large portion of their time in the
immediate vicinity of the shears, where the
concentrations will be higher than that measured
in the general air.

‘
We feel that adequate ventilation provided for at the straighteners
and saws, and by following good operating practices, personnel
exposures can be limited to less than the maximum allowable
exposure and that it wili not be necessary to provide venti-
lation for any of the other equipment in this area under the
present system of operation. There is one operation in the
area -~ that of stamping the rods -- where 4t is still
questionable whether local exhaust ventilation should be
provided: However, we do not feel: that such a: system .shovuld
be incorporated with that of the Medarts and saws. We feel’
that if any ventilation at ali is required at this point, that
4t ean be very simply provided for on & job order, for a
system of its own.

R, C. Heatherton

RCH smk -

: ec: J. Aw Quigley, M. D.

Cc. Bussert
A. Yoceco

M. S. Nelson
Cc. Konkie

045860


~8-

5 years. The Health & Safety Division bas refused to adapt this

recommendation.
Radiation Protection at Pemald:
I. External Radiation.

One of the funotions of the Health & Safety Division is to
protect the employees of the National Lead Company of Ohio from the
haraful effects of radiation.

Wherever there is « rediation hazard - i.6. any possible condition
that might result in the exposure of persons to radiation in excess
of the maximm permiasible dose ~ the Industrisl Hygiene & Radiation
Department takes. steps to prevent the overexposure of personnel. This
department's protective ateps consist of: 1) shielding the rediation
so that the amount of radiation escaping into the enviroment is
reduced to a permissible or below permissible level, 2) dy iimiting
the time a person spends in the high radiation area, 3) by moving
the source of radiation away from the employee. These three steps
are fundamental in radiation protection.

It may be worthwhile to see how these three steps are actually

utilized at Fernald.

= ; 3290302


* mast be worn while performing these operations, This is very

and immediate equipment repair will improve the operations. Further im

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANNUAL I.H, & R. SURVEY - PLANT 8 Page 2
C. Re Chapman
March 1, 1960

one area per line supervisor. ‘The area supervisor will inspect and grade
each area weekly as a means of developing 2 more competitive housekeeping
spirit. The 1959 I.He & R. survey indicated that signs have been install~
ed on most canning and dumping stations stating that respiratory protection
good, however, __
more signs are needed. (A job order was. issued 2/10/60 to install 48 addi~
tional signs}. ‘The anmal I.H. & Re survey also stated that signs are worth-
Jess without enforcement. ‘Therefore, at the forthcoming foreman's meeting
3/4/60 all line supervisors will be instructed to issue reprimands to any
individuals who fail to heed to the warning signs. .

Ansther reason for the high dust levels in Plant 6 is that almost every ty
square inch of horizontal surface of high elevation or remote areas is 4 :
source of airborne dust. Since most of these areas, rafters, ledges, etc
are covered with a layer of combaminated dust it is undoubtedly one of the
principle sources for the high general air dust levels. This high level
contamination is due to equipment leaks. Mr. Martin indicated at our
meeting last week that this is primarily a maintenance problem, There-
fore, Messrs. Martin, Yieminen and I will get together this week 3/1/60
to resolve these problems, Numerous job orders of this nature have been
issued as far back as October and still are pending. AS soon as all jobs
pertaining to improvements in dust problems are completed a high level
cleaning and painting program will be inaugurated, .

The final dust problem is related to the condition of the drums used at - a

the Plant 8 packaging stations. A prototype packaging station was in-

sballed.at the rotex station in Plant &.. Initial. survey of this unit .

indicated an exposure level of 1,03 MAC. ‘his survey was conducted uo-

der ideal ‘conditions using-new drums, However, in the last six (6)

months we have nob seen any new or good drums. Consequently, the 1959

survey indicated an exposure level of 89.10 MAC for the rotexing opera~ -

tion. This operation is, therefore, the Teason for the general air —

level of 1.93 MAC in the dry area of the Recovery Plant. Arrangements

were, therefore, made with the Transportation Department on 2/29/60 to

supply us with good drums and lids. S12 product will be packeged in

good drums so that the exposure level at the rotex station should be down

to the desired level, Since good drums are a prerequisite for this opera~ 3
¢

tion the drumming facilities for Plant 1 are 2 must and a drum re-roller
should be considered a crash item, I think the drumming facilities for
Plant 1 have been on the agenda for about one year. The idea-letter was
approved by the £8 on 9/10/5)=and the Engineering Division is still - a
studying design criteria for this iten. .

Thus more rigid adherence to the SOP's, high level cleaning and painting

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

nannnen


OFFICAL USE GNLY al
@

Gctobes 5, 1960
SUBJECO «AIR DUST EVALUATION GF REXOVING MOSTAR ANG BRICKS FROM RIELT FURNSCS COIL,

PLANT 9
TO &. 8. Koss

FROM R, N. Heicomb -

Gz Eziday, September 23, 1960, an air dust eveluntion ef the operatiza of

xemoving torrer and tricks from a remelt furnace coil was conducted. Tae

- Operation wer perforred on the east pad, south of the maintenance sisp. .
The coil vas attechec to the furnace bottom. The stone arson removed the

mortar amc: bricks with 2 hammer and chisel, All droppings were shoveled

out ef the tettom of the tenk by s leborer. Yeavy concentrations of cust

were visible at eli times during the, operation.

Listec below ere the results of the aiz dust sanples coliested:

Concentration-a_d/a/M3
Type Sanvle Nescrintion High Low Avesaze MACY

*. B2 Breaking brick and mortar vith 59,549 8,510 24,932 356 .
e bamer and chisel, ani picking .
loote brick fron inside coli

and tessing into dsum. Res-

paxetor worn.

BZ Laberer shoveling brick and 90,842 50,601 67,039 (=)

nortar residue from botton

of tank. Visible U0. Res-
pistter werd: ~

PMAC (Manimun Alloweble Concestration) ~ 70 a d/n/H3-

a As indicates by the shove results, a ventilated enclosure shonid be assed
for this type of operation in the future. It is umerstocd that this work
: dis done appremimetely twice each wek, DPinnt 9 supexvision sheulc expiore
. the possitilities of procuring @a eaclesure for this opsrntion siniiar to
a the one iccsted in the “BY Aree of Plant $. 4n air line respiretor should
be used in the interim pesiod tetween now end such time cs 2 ventileted -
enclosure is avaiiable end an air dust se-eveluation shaws dust icveis te .
be less than the MAC, Also, the operation shonid be isolated as nuc2z as
possible from other jobs end persomel.

ue

yp) nels

aw, Beteonb

RNHsdg

; 4)

RECT ANDV AVIAN ARIE

rd

wade uoe on NLY



i] y RIUM EXP% cont inued)

a larger fraction of plutoniue that is absorbed into
the bloodstream deposits in bone and liver for much
Tonger periods (biological half lives of 50 and 20
years, respectively). Therefore inhaling a given
activity of plutonium will result in a significantly
higher radiation exposure than will inhalation of the
Same activity of uranium.

effective dose equivalent." Effective dose equivalent
determinations take into account the organs that receive
radiation exposure as a result of an intake of radioactive
material, the quantity of radiation exposure received by
each organ, the risk of health effects associated with
radiation exposure of those organs to arrive at a Single
value have units of “rem", the unit of measurement for
radiation exposure. A given quantity of effective dose
equivalent carries the same ultimate risk of health
effects as the same quantity of external gamma radiation
exposures,

After an intake of radtoactive. Raterial, -an- individual
cont fives ‘te receive radiation exposure as Tong as a
significant quantity of the material remains in his body.
Tor materials that leave the body within a short period of

those Few yerks. For materials sock 25 plutonium that
remain in body for many years, involved .
co ve effective dose

ive
equivalent for man; rs. Recognizing this, ICRP
developed the “comattted effective dose equivalent"
quantity, which is simply the total effective dose
Soutvatent that ts received in the fifty years following
an intake.

expressed in units of rem, represents the total lifetime
risk associated with an intake of radioactive materials.

The current ICRP estimate of cancer risk resulting
from radiation exposure is 10-' per rem. In ether
words, if 10,000 people were exposed to 1 res of

effective dose equivalent, there would be one fatal
cancer in that group due to the radiation exposure.


COPY

t ) NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIC
HEALTH & SAFETY DIVISION ROUTE TO

INCIDENT OBSERVATION REPORT i

To Z. dD, isininger . :
From ie Te Lawrence é :

Leconen__Plant 8 i

Subject. Gh3-27 Dust Collector Dore ___ 219, OF

BE amount of dust ¢: GZ out the stace oF 33-27 dust collector. The

stack Silter was ioaded with material.

I immediately informed 41 xreusmenn of this condition, anc he shut
the collector down. ‘“e found two bags with holes in them richt away.

but it was harcé to teil how many more holes there were because the da:-

house was so Sull of meteriel. The material loss must be very large.
When the collector was a s. rae if

+ MLGaMaS-267%, (27267627



ag 2

RADIATION HAZARDS AT FERNALD

INTRODUCTION

In any Giscussion it is advisable to define the terms that will
be used in the discussion so that all parties will understand one
another. In discussing hazards it is therefore necessary to define
the word "hezard".

According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, the noun
"hazard" is defined as: °

1. An old dice game of which craps is a simplified torn. .

2. Chancé, a chance.

ay .. -

BoA risks danger; peril; also, a source of risk. b Shakes-
pertaa: Anything risked; a stake.

4. Court tennis. One of the winning openings in a court.

5. English billiards. A stroke which pookets an object ball,
oaiied winning hazerd, or # cue bell after sontect, called
lesing hazard.

&. Golf. Any obstruction in playing a stroke, including bunkers,
traps, ponds, roedways, stc.

The third definition is the one we gre concerned with ~ partico-

larly the lest phrase, "also, # sonrce of risk". But, this definition

2681469 3290296


ye

om be ise
NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY ; .
on one 37o"%
- 2:0. DOX 198. MY. HEALTHY STATION
CINCINNATI 81. 0K10  etober 22, 1953

Dumping of G-11 Into The Temporary Hopper
J. J. Costa
3. V. Barry

2124456

Air dust samples taken during the dumping of Q-11 into the
temporary hopper indicate the following dust concentrations
in the breathing zones of the operating personnel.

1396 « d/m/n3 4150 a d/m/n3

ea ad, 1125 a a/a/as

2573 « aft 373 a d/a/

Average ~- 1703 a d/a/a3
The average dust concentration is 24 times greater than the
meximum concentration.

The original design proposed an 8 inch ventilation duct at
the rear of the hopper. The size in actually 5 inches.

if the hopper is to again be put into operation we recommend
the following changes.

1. an 8 inch diameter ventilation duct. .

2. The duct as it enters the hopper sRould be
coned so as to streamline the air flow. :

3. The duct be relocated from the midpoint of the

back Tuco ‘tO @ distance about’ 3/8 down tiie
back face.

The above recommendations will, in our estimation, improve
the dust situation. Ye do not, however, guarantee it.

BYB:bg
ce: R. C. deatherton .

Fswanns7e7


SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendum

PE174b
PE186a
PEI87b
PE196b
PE300b
PE306c
PESI7d
PE32id

Beryllium Dust-Uranium Alloy Program-Plant 5
Wrist Badge Exposure

Chip Fires, Plant 5 East Ingot Saw

Letter

Justification of Basic Need for Ventilation

Re-Evaluation of Scrap Melting Operation. [Perchlorethylene exposure].
Airborne Contamination Plant 8

Hand i

3362751 Unaccourited for Low Enriched Uranium Plant 8. [1964]
Revisions to UAP Furnace

Incident Observation Report

Incident Observation Report

Job Order

Memo

High Air Dust Exposure Operations

PE323
PE325b
PE325¢
PE3S9
PE360
PE37itb



beopren eye Gan!

ede wae eat

- pagent 8, 2900
TEER FIRRS AMD ASHOCIESED ATR OOKT RAWLS « MANE 5

Jo A, Cuigtoy, HD.

R. He Starkey

sepies
GA Rackgrom - vest side 5 , a ee od P=
of dervy Cn
i ?

: A see emer @,000 4,237 32,063 458.0

some © *

t

A seca sen, cent (8) 1,00 mB FM IO
tw dartdes om fire.
(a/aho>

‘ A seem atow, emet 845,00 O17, BO
anid of cesize on °

Gh Suse an shove, exit «= 3 «SK,000 4,900, 90,080 -429.0.

'
3
B
#

Bd

USE ONLY

BEST. COPY AVAILABLE .
: 2637851 3110955


.

Excerpt from H&S Monthly Report for March. 1963 - TH&R Dept.

Air Hygiene Studies

Dumping Station - 619 Level - Plant 4:

An air dust evaluation of the UO; and UF 4 dumping station on the 619 level of
Piant 4 showed breathing zone air dust levels as high as 200 MAC. The chief
causes for this level were improper handling of the drums while dumping and

the ventilation to the drumming station had been deliberately cut off and a Hoffman
Hi-Vac line used instead. This has been discussed with Plant 4 supervision.

An airline respirator outlet has been installed, and it has been agreed that this
station will be operated properly in the future.

Noyes sent this to Chapman with a note "Please explain this action."

on 5/3, following all the explanations, Mr. Noyes wrote: "For me to understand,
without any other explanation, is very difficult. This meant (past tense} complete
and utter disregard of the dust problem.

PEIolA
zescass ' - 3383862


NATIONAL LEAD COMPAN ¢
OF OHIO

: ep
P.O. BOX 158 7 - _ . Se
MT. HEALTHY STATION y ver. .
CINCINNATI 31, CHIC .
March 17, i
suesect + 1953
jo Ventilation of Spectroscopic Sources in Laboratory
. 2257534

From S. L. Cox

rerereace F. Blase

On March 11, five air dust process samples were taken at the
spectroscopic sources in the Laboratory Building to determine
the amount of contamination being made airborne at these -

locations.

Results of the samples varied from 25029 afafpe to 71370 afar
and averaged 51068 or 729 times the maximum allowable ,
soneentration.

It 1s our understanding that a request to engineer the appropriate
ventilation has been made to your department by George Stucken-
brocher and we would appreciate your expediting this job for
health reasons.

EFBtbg
co: R, C. Heatherton -“| -

rw)
rd
wo
wh
t

wn



-7T-

injury manifestadle during the lifetime of the exposed individual or
8 in subsequent generations. However, the probability of the occurrence

of such injuries must be so low that the risk would be readily

eccoptable to the average individual. Permissible dose may then

pe defined as the dose of ionizing rediation that, in the light of

present knowledges, is not expected to cause appreciable bodily injury

to @ person st any time during his lifetime. As used here "appreciable

bodily injury" means any bodily injury or effect thet the average

person would regard as being objectionable and/or competent medical

suthorities would regard as being deleterious to the health and well
t being of the infividual. "Dose" is used here in its radiological

sense and partioulariy as tissue dose in the irradiated tissue, organ,

or region of interest. What constitutes the region of interest depends

count in

on the condttices “of exposure ane imust be taken into
assigning numerics] values to the permissible dose or doses applicable
to a given set of conditions.”

The Health & Safety Division hes always sdepted the recommende-
tions of the National Bureau of Standards except in « few speciel
eases. Handbook 59 recommends for people over 5 yeara « sazimun

weekly permissible dose figure which is twice that for peopie uder

3290302


SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendam

Thus far ORAU has used uranium urinalysis for internal dose reconstruction
contrary to Fernald documents PE901 and PE760. They performed a data reconstruction
documents declared to be inaccurate by a Fernald record keeper (3455935-3455940).

Some thorium products were improperly coded and drums exploded. (Oct.61)
(PES47b).

A single BZ sample of 126,200 resulted in an x-NCG of 1260 for one worker in
the Pilot Plant in Nov.1970. Other samples were 180, 293, 140, 157, 159 x-NCG during
the same operation

PES41 reveals there were 711.3 metric tons of thorium on site in Aug.1978.

PES33 reveals the general air samples for Plant 6 thorium emissions were 2-3
MAC, while air dust leveis ranged from 10-1300 MAC. Fire and safety hazards also
existed. The roof over the thorium furnace in the plant was not fire-proof. (April 1963).
[These conditions are not part of the information included in what ORAU considers the
“best information available’).

PE544a Plant 6 sludge furnace underwent alteration for the oxidation of
Pytophoric thorium residues to eliminate the constant danger from these materials, which
bad been responsible for 30 known fires in 4 years. One fire bumed through a concrete
slab on which drums were being stored.

PES44j in Dec.1962, the BZ sample for one Plant 6 thorium operation was
1260xMAC. . -

Protection.” The committee in 1959 gave a provisional vale of bee tro tanes the
MAC, but urged that the exposure of personne! to natural thorium be kept as low as
operationally possible.

PE745ww In March 1963, the Plant 6 thorium furnace BZ air dust levels ranged
from 10 to 1,770 MAC.

NOTE: If Fernald’s MAC is 20 times the national recommendation and samples of
1260xMAC have been taken, that puts exposure level potential at 25,200 times higher
than recommended and 35,400 times higher for 1,770xMAC. In addition they had been
urged to keep it as low as possible.


OFFICIAL USE ONLY pee”
! cs

=
KNB, ig CE "24
a4

Septexber, . Three of the thirteen wera subject to cali back proce-
dares. ‘A review of work records indicate that two operat te.
as ‘tdon. ‘These operations are: (1) dumping of

tes
that all operators are using the required protection during the dumping
operation. However, wo also find that at least one operator (Sutton)
acknouledges that he wears co reepirstor when handling and loading empty

becn
order to reduce delay between exposure and cur follow up, Ms
has agreed to call to us, immediately, any urine results above s'
his will permit us to more accurately determine the cause for exposure
and to move the exposed operator to soother operation.

foo

i

ce: S. F. sudia (1x)

SFFICIAL USE ONLY

27221445


ear. OMS TIT OTF
. SePrieimn Vek Ue

aM

hoppers. In
the i% ims not been
{ Zz standing on juice 19
a : hopper and *rodding out"
hopper. ‘ Respirater worn,
E47 Sane a8 shove 1
: BZ. Sam as shove 57
: SHAG. (Nexium AUenmbie
. Type Senglee ito renthice tone
3.
. : . . ORGINAL SIGNED BY _
7 A.D, Wortun °
. Adie
i
® 3 ied
BEST COPY AVAILABLE PE

2637774 : 3110820


we ee ee eee

ATIONAL LEAD COMPANY B7S
OF OHIG

P.0. 80K 158 : 2124904
MT. HEALTHY STATION
- GINCIRNATE 31. OMI

“4.3
4) Evesking salt at eutside mill, BZ 2,498

2.8

Bust-Fee respirators were worn by tie epersting peteemmel curing these
operations, a





SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendum

CONCLUSION:
After reviewing the FMPC site profile and Fernald documents, I believe the
following to be true.

FMPC management permitted emissions, releases and leaks of uranium, thorium,
plutonium and other radioactive/hazardous materials to occur on site. They failed to
determine where and how many of them were occurring. They accepted consistently high
MAC levels of potential exposure, with no attempt to lower them. They failed to
premises. They failed to warn workers of contamination and health dangers. They failed
to provide a safe work environment. They failed to inform workers of potential radiation
hazards and what to do to protect themselves in the event of release conditions. They
failed to responsibly monitor, inform, diagnose and treat workers who were exposed to
tadioactive/hazardous materials. The failed to abide by ALAP and ALARA
recommendations to limit exposure. They felt production concems justified ignoring
government regulations, and established that attitude in the very beginning of operations.

They even limited record keeping and monitoring based on the time required that diverted
their attention from more important concerns.

FMPC management grossly failed in their responsibility to their workers,

Some data was unavailable.

Some data was limited.

Some data was incomplete,

Some data was unreliable.

Some data could not-be interpreted.
Some data was improperly interpreted.

Some processes were not fully understood allowing potential exposures to go
unrecognized by the dose reconstructors.

The jobs performed may not be the jobs dose reconstructed, due to errors in
FMPC records. Many jobs were evaluated in their simplest form, allowing many aspects
of the jobs to be overlooked and the exposures associated with them.

ORAU dose reconstructors assumed that FMPC operated within the guidelines
established by them and for them by government agencies.

ORAU made estimates based on that assumption.



Cleaning Under Burnout Oxide Conveyors - Plant 5
R. H. Starkey .

December 7, 1960

Breathing sone sample results were:

a- 4 :
Operator cleaning under
burnout conveyor. 3,1005088 500,000 1500, 000

Up to about one year ago, the operator had to position

Te ope tnenection piste to remove it for accesa under the

Page 2

oxide conveyor. This caused much of the ozide to come. down

him. Brea

found to be:

At the present time the inspection plates are heid

metal poles p:

PIE:mJs
BEST COPY AVAILABLE

‘thing zone sample restlts of this operation were .

me
9,3007000 4,6007000 6-800-000

X MAC .
37,000

s

in place vy

ropped up against them before removing the bolts.
A rope is then tied to the poles holding up the inspection
plates, The operator can then pull the rope which allows the
inspection plates and oxide fail without anyone below. This
way the operators.are out of the area where contamination is-

after the dust has subsided behind the canvas
cleaning under the burnout conveyor begins. _

Poesede) [ela

F. J. Klein

oa



4 2132117
:

CENTRAL FES cr

4 November 25, 1952

Transfer of K-65 from Deteriorated to Solid Drums

W. Strattman -— - -~-- nt
R, 0. Heatherton

On Tuesday, November 25, I made an inspection of the subject
operation on the Storage Pad, There were indications that

people working on this operation are subject to very

fadiation exposure and in-all probability, exposure to radlo-
active dust in excess of the waximum allowable concentration.

At the time of my inspection there were a total of six (6)
operativs. .

a) Two {3} were handling drums with fork lifts.
pb) two {2} were removing lever locks and covers from
oid drums and placing the collar and new drum in

a position.
© c) Two (2) were removing the old drums and placing
covers and lever locks on new drums.

None of these operators were working behind shields, although
shields were provided for Operators B, above.

Radiation exposures as measured with a pocket dosimeter on
eee Monday indicate that the fork litt operators were receiving
appro: tely 20 me/hr. Other operators were peceiving about
10 mr/hr when working behind shields. However, it is expected
that their exposure is at least doubled when they are working
as they were today, At this time we have no dosimeter deta to
confirm this, although we are accumulating more information.

Previously wé-have permitted exposures equal to or in excess of
the maximum permissible dose in case of emergencies/ However,

the practice of conside: each job as an emergency and permitting
exposures at Ser ead not be continued. “fhe maximum
permissible exposure of 300 mr/wk is just what the term implies,
the maximum permissible exposure. It is not an exposure which we
would recommend be permitted on a continuous basis. It will be
the policy in this plant to limit radiation exposure to a minimum.
Where emergency requires that a person receive a certain amount

of exposure the total during the emergency should be limited to no
more than 150 mr if possible. This is on the assumption that a
person may normally receive 150 mr in his other duties.

e 090927-



document itself admits that "the losses may be every bit as high as we calculate them to be
and maybe even higher.©

We shoald note that more than 280 sources of unmeasured losses are still not incinded
in our estimates, making it probable that our estimates for unmeasured losses will be on
the low side. One important piece of evidence for this bypothesis, is that Plant 2/3
unmeasured losses were not a part of the estimate, yet a recent official estimate has put
_ unmeasured losses from this source at 38.6 metric tons.

public sorutiny, and when much of the then-existing equipment was in poor condition,

“The official estimate for releases from unmessured process emissions is 319 kilograms
over 37 years. However, we have documentary evidence, cited above that the unmeasured
losses from $0 sources primarily related to plant process was about 440 kilograms in ons
month.

BE ee to ‘Levy, “Information Pertaining to Uranium Losses’, July

1 Addendum to History; p.6.



- 9 -

In three of our Plante there is a large amount or radiation
shielding tn the form of concrete barriers in the form of walls
and gunniteéd tanks. In one of the other plants shielding takes
the form of aluminum caxe type covers. Incidentally, the cost
of radiation protection requirements at Fernald increased the cost
of this project by one-fourth.

Tne radiation time limit has also been used whenever personel
mast go into high rediation areas for one reason or another. This
recomended time limit specifies the time a man can spend in the
area without exceeding 1/2 the maximum weekly permissible dose,

Sometime ago the Industrial Hygiene & Radiation Department
had in use a Radiation Work Permit which has been replaced vy an
Industrial Hygiene Work Permit. The reason for the change is that
many of the jobs inspected indicated possible exposure to industrial
hazarde other than radiation, In the prescribing, for example, of
Aix Line respirators for tank work (even though the tank has been
flashed with water) the Industriel Hygiene & Radiation Department
believes that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

In several cases rotetion of personnel ban been used to linit

the exposure of a man to radiation.

= 3290304


‘SUBJECT

ORRSB4

RENTRAL FILES NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY vt

v4
ce .
PO, BOX 168, MT. HEALTHY STATION =F
CINCINNATI 31. OHIO:
July 21, 1953

Chip Furnace
The Files 2124465
R. C. Heatherton .

Attached is a summary of results of all dust samples
collected during the opsration of the Chip Furnace
during the period from 3/7/53 to 5/7/53.

Contamination surveys made in the area during this
period showed alpha radiation measurements in the
Vicinity of the furnace and the collector between
3000 and 20,000 d/m/l00cm2. Contamination readings
ae the Thorium Building around the Hoffman
vacuum cleaner measured 000 to 15,000 d/ni/l00cm2.

RCE/pip



2129310

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY
OF OHIO
PO BOX 158, MT. HEALTHY STATION

CINCINNATE 31, OHIO.
October 2, 1958

SUBJECT  RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED INDUSTRIAL VEHICLES gk /

To R. H, Starkey ox) A Ou-le
FAT LES

FROM W. A. Smith CERTRAL fi

REFERENCE

gel

Reference is made to your letter of September 25, 1958,
addressed to G. J. Nowlin, subject as above. Motor vehicles
- including tow trucks, passenger cars and trucks, trailers,
industrial trucks, cranes and miscellaneous other material
handling equipment have been moved about the site without
regard for process areas since the beginning of this plant.
In this instance it seems inappropriate for you to remark
that this has just come to your attention.

It_seems only reasonable that vehicles in question become
mildly contaminated and there have been instances where
contaminated material has been spread about the site; a

recent case being the spreading of contamination between

Plant 8 and the K-65 area. If your memory serves you, the
Transportation Department called this situation to your
attention and, in fact, was responsible for first, discontinuing
the operation; secondly, cleaning up the resultant contamination
and thirdly, instituting corrective measures which markedly
- neduced-the-spread~of- contaminattor: °~-~ ~ a oe _

In another instance, e@gain in the Plant 8 area, we sent two
fork trucks to the decontamination area to be thoroughly
steam cleaned.

The Transportation Department is as mindful as you are regarding-

the general desire not to contaminate the outside areas or otherwise
spread contamination and, I believe, takes reasonable precaution
against this, We contemplate no other action than to continue

this program. .

082529

]


‘3. A, Quigley, M.D.

@ Industrial Hygiene Evaluation of ITO Job Assiguments Page 2
April Ll, 19 -

Exposures to airborne material from fires can be quite satisfactorily ~
controlled by the use of dust respirators which are equipped with

ultra-fllters.
Original Si.-~3 3,
R. H. STARKEY
R. H. Starkey
RHS:irr
Attachment

cos J. A. Quigley, M.D. (3)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE anz7770


Radioactively Contaminated Industrial Vehicles Page 2
R. H. Starkey

October 2, 1958

“If the movement of industrial vehicles which are important to
this site does in fact Spread contamination, then it seems to -
me that you could much better devote your time in the industrial
areas where the contamination exists since I believe it is common
practice not to allow contaminants to xehain_on_the-working—

————Surfaces-of the various plants.

Generalizations such as are contained in your letter of September 25
are inappropriate. If you have specific examples or situations
to_veport, I will be more than happy and keenly interested in
helping you resolve our problems. Supervision in the Procurement
Division does not need nor deserve the type of criticism which

is contained in your letter and you will be well advised to
discontinue writing the sort of tripe therein contained.

JAF.

W. A. Smith

WAS/re a
ee: J, A. Quigiey
G. J. Nowlin
Central Files

982536


F2
Thorium data was lost, and a large number of records and files were destroyed in
the early 1970s during declassification efforts (Dolan and Hill 1988).

Documents included identify areas of thorium processing previously unknown and
not included in the data reconstruction. These areas therefore, were omitted from the
characterization of the internal and external exposure environments at FMPC. Radiation
sources, work processes and practices are also described in varying detail.

Documents are also included that describes how air samples were manipulated to
gain desired readings, to give the appearance that radiation exposure levels were much
ower than actually existed. Workers were in situations involving exposure to a mixture
of radionuclides of uncertain identity and quantity. Radioactive materials were often
mis-identified. Workers were subjected to exceptionally high levels of radiation exposure
for long durations of time. [42 U.S.C. 7384 Findings of Congress (6) states that 98% of
radiation induced cancer within the nuclear weapons complex have occurred at dose
levels below existing maximum safe thresholds.] The documents show FMPC
consistently operated far above those thresholds. Management hid facts from government
authorities by falsifying data. This was confirmed in United States District Court.

I would like to clarify a statement that was reported in the qualification phone call
letter. I don’t recall stating that the TBD was based incorrectly on the assumption that
procedures were appropriately followed. The statement as it was read during the
interview is in the addendum, which is only now being submitted, it states: ORAU dose
reconstructors assumed that FMPC operated within the guidelines established by them
and for them by government agencies. I believe dose reconstructors operated in good
faith and believed the information provided to the government by FMPC management
‘was accurate and reliable for the purpose of dose reconstruction. If FMPC had followed
the guidelines established by the government regulatory agencies, and limited radiation
exposure as they. had been requested to do, we wouldn’t be going through this process.
The documents show that FMPC seldomly followed the rules, and often ignored the
warnings to do so; which eventually led to the government breaking it’s contract with
NLO, the contractor operating FMPC.

The justification for data reconstruction for thorium processes is based on the
information that data prior to 1970 had been destroyed. The fact that no default exposure
allowance was attributed to Plant 6 from January 1960 to July 1963 indicates that it was
not considered or included in the internal and external thorium exposure environment.
This is confirmed by the TBD. Fernald documents indicated the exposures were
significantly high and continued throughout the operation until it was finally shut down.
Documentation also confirms that Fernald’s maximum allowable levels of exposure to
thorium exceeded government recommendations by 20 times.



LE.E.R. QUALIFICATIONS

BERND FRANKE, M.A. BIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF
HEIDELBERG

ARJUN MAKHLJANI, Ph.D., ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA

KEVIN GURNEY, B.A, ENVIRONMENTAL PHYSICS,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKLEY; MA.,
ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE, MIT

MICHAEL THORNE, Ph.D., PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY OF
SHEFFIELD, GREAT BRITAIN



NLC BLOTE

SUSJECT
To
FROM

REFERENCE

2. Mote

NATIONAL, LEAD COMPANY

“OF OHIO 3
P.O, BOX 138 ‘og
MT. HEALTHY: STATION f° OSy
CINCINNATI St, OHIO Res
May 22, 1953”
Air Dust Results: - Rooms 130 and 131, Laboratory Bldg, 2257537

R. C. Heatherton
B. F. Blase

On May 1, 1953 and May 4, 1953, a number of air dust samples
were collected in Rooms 130 and 131 of the Laboratory

- Building. In these rooms samples of metal are palished

@

34

ty grinding and buffing for use of the Metallurgical Depart-
ment.

A summary of results is as below:

No. of a/ae
Room Description Samples High Low Avg. X MAC
130 BZ #2 7 polish 2 La
samples paper
130 BZ #2 wheel polish 6 187
paper
130 BZ #1 wheel #190 paper 2 12
130 BZ #1 wheel guze paper 2 38
130 BE #1 wheel #400 paper 3 oak 3h
B2‘Burring’ “°° y 1 “2220 ©

130 BZ Cut-off wheel 4 226. 363
130 Ga Walle grinding i To mf
130 Burring, cut-o z : aah

opera’ : .:
131 «BZ U 2 26 26
132 «GA U. a Polisher * & 33 3 21
An average \ 30) specimens per day are polished in
these two ay, (30) ee normally used are. Mos..24, 36,

60, 120, 180, 240, 400, and 600, the coarser grades having the
: papers
produce the greater contamination. It was also noted that a

fresh piece of paper produced greater contamination than one
that was used.

The Stig weighted average for a tochnioal wan going this job
48 3.3 . fob Exposure Evaluation Sheet #1.

The surface contamination found in these rooms after polishing
Faas elo.
5.

g

rire



ee

ue

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

pice:

re rien FREE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Jexmuary 19, 1958
SDOLTICHAL SUSTIFICATION FOR UP-58~€5

>. a, DeFasie

S. R, Chapean

L Latter, C, L. Karl ta 3. H. Heyes, oudject, "OP-S8-€5 ~ sdditionsl
Yent{iation end Dust for Packaging Stations - Pisnt 4",

duted Savuary T, 1989,(5 )-{-

Cpa a pry din tram arin:
wo Mrhome Radtouctive Dust = 1968", dated April 18, 1968. f 1"

3. Letter, P, G DeFssio to C. R. Chapman, wubject, “additional Justice
fication for GPH58-65, dated Jamury 9, 1959.

At present, meterial collected in Dust Collecters Gio? und Gi-12 is
collected sud packaged together and treusferred to Plant 8 for reesvery

‘2 & 5, end the orange salt to green salt sonversics ix Plant 4. -
The estinated savings that woeld have been realised in the sixsanth :
peried July through December, 2968 is $5700, :

2637703 PEIST4 3110676


WHA! NALIONAL LEAD KNEW ABOUT
. RADIATION IN THE 1950’S -
eo .

1. Pharmacology and Toxicology Textbook - 1949.
2. Humans to avoid breathing and swallowing of Uranium, Radium and Thorium.

3. Dr. Quigley, Director of Health and Safety (1951-1973), NLO, said in 1958:

A. Radiation Produces Genetic Change.

. B. "... Radiation can produce .. .
ss + a, Skin Burns
r b. Neoplasms [cancer]
c. Cataracts

d. Leukemia [cancer of the blood] and other blood dyscrasias {abnormal
Production of blood cells] . . ."

C. “(Radioactive Materials] continue to exert an influence on the tissues
surrounding them as long as they remain in the body." (for life)

D. | believe that it is not a question of “can an industry afford proper protec-
tion?, but rather it is a fact that no industry can afford to be without it*.



R, H. Starkey

~T. how oav

ip

As Pesvcer ef THis

Have Re-Iepigued
April 11, 1969 Bec
Surere wire Rae srevercor

INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE EVALUATION OP INDUSTRIAL TRUCK
OPERATOR JOB ASSIGNMENTS

J. A. Quigley, M.D. iy
,
f

On weary re

only.

— z~

Per 23-8

c hy
2 PAY

As you requested, I have evaluated all areas in which industrial
truck operators are assigned.
stated that the individual “should not work in areas where the
airborne dust or fume levels are excessive,” I.feel.that the fol-

lowing areas are safe for an individual to work.

Based on the restriction which

Where accidental

releases of Fadioective dust and/or acid gases are possible, these

are also listed.
Plant 1 - all
. Plant
oo Plant 5 - all
Plant - all

Plent 9 - all
Pilot Plant -

- all

own

A complete list of

areas. Occasional NOz exposures possible from
Refinery.
areas. Occasional BP leak possible.

areds.

areas. Occasional uraniuag fires and NO.

releasoa.

areas. Potential acid gas reloases trea Zirnlo Area.
Potential acid gas releases. HF, .

all aroas.

HMOs, Hz.

ITO job assignments furnished by J. H. Harrison
be

. are inoluded in the attachmen

The only areas that I feel that a person with such a restriction
should not be assigned are Plants 2, 3 and 8. The Project Labo:
Pool also, occasionally, becomes involved in some rather dusty

short-term operations; therefore, I'd also recommend against this

assignment.

If there is some concern with en individual's working in sreas
whero an occasbnal fire and/or gas release may ococur, then Ifd

sugges that he be supplied with adequate respiratory protection
while

working in these areas.

be instructed to immediately leave an affected erea when 2 relcuso

Also, for gas releases, he could

occurs. Fires in thease areas might cause a more complicated
problem, however, as it is quite common that an industrial
truck operatorts aasistance is required for extinguishing a fire.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

oa

PRPTSRS

an777Ra


OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4 AO

@ ° april 2h, 196i

PROJECT LABOR POOL OPERATIONS
3. a. whighey, Kem.
a. i. Starkey

teticvitiee are routinely observed and when « specific
operatic: looks to be unsatisfactory, air cust samples are
taken. For examples, we don't sample operations such as sorting
lids and rings or blending organics. The duplicate copy of
tne work records thas 7 Focaive deity have belpes cones ae
am our follow-up on the a0! os, + complete sumaary
the afr dust sample results ars included tn appendix I.

8B you recall, the operation ef sersening and
io FLEUT Us ciptecben cur 2fia/ee mecting at waden tine wt
anc as we surmised, they are extremely high (up to 1100 NG).

There is no question that this operation ve:

performed until] suitable facilities are provided. As you recall,
considerable discussion concerning clean-up, and lack of
facilities for deing so, took plase at our 2/13/6l, meeting.

This time, a portable vacuue was avallable in Plant 7 but not
usec. Air dust levels of 3CG resulted from the “sweeping
Cleaner. Respirators were worn during these operations; however,
tnere was never & dust respirater built efficient enough to
auequately protect workers in sueb atmospheres.

Tnc cement mixer loceted in Plant 3 is now being operated on ©
twoeshift basis. Air dust levels of SCG were measured while
RgPo was being dumped on the tray for tuto tha mixer.
<i] general air levels taken throughout the Denitration ares
while the mixer is operating are above NCG, The mixer is located
juat inside the east door and the wind blows the contamination
througnout the entire ares. 4 Peport was written to J. Carvitti
on March 31, 1964 outlining suggested revisions to the operating
ocuipmant and procedures “bieh would result in lower air dust
levels. Jee contacted me end told me that it wouldn't be possibic
to reviee the operating procedure and be didn't feel he would be
able to get money for other equipment for ths operation. fo

OFFIC!*!. USE ONLY -

BEST COPY AVAILABLE 2697952 3391519
PE 3IYb


— Air Dust Exposure Operations Continued Page 3
@ Pane .

OPERATION

Medart straightener
operation

Shoving rods down rollers
to scales

.  ) Leading reds inte tote pans

> Stamping rods

lprumming crop ends
warm crucibles

EGeating
- “Conder Selt Melting Bldg.)
fron

Dumping can of
: : fioser table into drum

‘Under Salt Melting Bldg.)
Breaking out "pigotTM onto
grated teble (Under Sait
Melting Building) :
Stirring molten metal with
graphite stick (Under Salt
Nelting Building)

Putting salt into furnace.
(Under Salt Helting BLég.}

dant 8
Removing and lidding drut
tex

_ Brom Ro’
box furnace

Removing and lidding dram

from wuffle furnace

i
‘Removing and lidaing drum
from WAP fornace
Drumming VAP cake

”

pt Me

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

:

|

ok

13.0

4.3
3.2

608.0
3.2

5.5
16.0

BD
wo

STATUS .
Revision of hooding on the
8 peraitting it to be

will ist.

Yew spray quenching tests conducted
by the Technical Division Snd@icated
that an appreofabie reduction of
air dust levels wiil result if
approval to water quench the rods
is received from the reactor sites.
Nothing in‘ progress to improve.

Hothing in progress to improve.

" Wothing in progress to dmprove.-

Nothing in progress to aiuprove.

Nothing in progress to improve.
Nothing in progress to improve.

New or reconditioned drums would

reduce still further. _
Dropped from 68 x MAC largely by

more operator care. =! .

phouid Smprove still more.

propped fron 88 x MAC as 2 result
of installation of new

station. Will be Gropped from list.
Dropped fros 43 x MAC sargely by
tor care. Engineering

more
Project 8-78 (AP Furnace Off-Gas
Revision

PE 37le 3110760


EXPOSURE STUDY OF FLANT 8 PERSONREL TO ATRBORME RADKOACTIVE DUST Page 2
S. F. Audia
October 5; 1967

The Reference Report defines the problems as:
(2) Poor operator's material handling procedures
(2) Leaks in equipment
(3) Poor housekeeping
(4) Inadequate ventilation

(1) We do nor find fault with any of these coments. Most of the
handling problems are manual rether than automatic and it is
very difficult to maintain constant feed rates by this technique.
For instance. We have established schedules at a1 our charging
stations in drums per shift or drums per hour. This should be
satisfactory but it is obvious that the incremental rates per x,
%, and/or 1 hours are not maintained. This is part of the
problem and the main reason why we are planning to feed the
mew UAP furnace via a Moyno pump.

(2) Equipment is leaking and is with yellow tapé due to
shortage of sheetnetal — —————

(3) Housekeeping standards are improving.

(4) Ventilation is inadequate in some areas and Engineering Requests
have been issued to improve ventilation at the Box Furnace, and
Rotex unit (new dust collector).

Comments of Recommendations are as follows:

(1) Expedite Revisions to UAP furnace. According to the Engineering
Division this project should be completed some time during
February 1968.

(2) Job Order Requests on duct work are and bave been issued but
shortage of craftsmen doesn't accomplish the job.

(3) An Engineering Request will be issued today for e complete
ventilation survey of all Plant 8 equipment.

(4) Job Order Request issued today to repair drum dumpers 80
all doors can be completely closed.

(5) I thick we do inspect cux equipment routinely and we do issue
JOR's but manpower is 2 problem. We seem to have more jobs
then craftsmen.



%

_NLO, Ine.

A suBSIpIARY OF M1, INDUSTRES, mec,

P. O. BOX 39158 eS CINCINNATI, OHIO 45239

PHONE: AREA CODE: 513-738-6209 Wo :
MAY 2 1995 Plutanw
ae Account|

:

Mr, J. A. Reafsnyder

Site Manager

U. S. Department of Energy

P. 0. Box 39158

Cincinnati, Ohio 45239

Dear Mr. Reafsnyder:

. \
. ; 8 A i
“MOINT TASK FORCE ON RECYCLE MATERIAL PROCESSING i sa |

REFERENCE: 1) J. A. Reafsnyder to R. ML Spencetey, Same Subject, dated
April 18, 1985.
2) B. Gessiness to W. J. Adams, “Plutonium Content of NLO Feed
Materials (Revision 1)", dated April 10, 1985.

Several divisions of NLO, Inc. have reviewed the questions raised in Refer-
ence Letter 1, It should be stated from the outset that NLO, Inc. has not
attempted over thé years to maintain pluton alyses for

rs ain plutonium scrourtabiiity. an; y to
prutonium were made only on s casion when specific receipts o €
materval warranted such aialyses for transuranic elencnts- ring the past

A anatys Fo! ae nr CS
few weekS” we Rave initiated plutonium analysés on a routine basis in our
laboratories in order to characterize our present inventories and to check
incoming offsite receipts of questionable materials.

Reference Letter 2 was prepared several weeks ago to answer specific questions
which you raised at that time in behalf of Senator Glenn's Office. Much of
that information is included in the current report.

Our answers to your specific questions are provided in the attachments.

Sincere? Yours,
si :

LS ms
R. M. Spenceley
Manager
BG:kmb
Attachments

cc: R. H. Cross, ORO
R. C. Kispert - B. Gessiness (2X)
E. MJ Nutter - D. C. Bonfer
R. 8. Weidner ~ S. L. Hinnefeld

Central Files oo _

vet - - -- ~".FRPOO04547


01-24-9$P92:09 RC
SEC 00046 2:09 REVD

Office of Compensation Analysis and Support
NIOSH MS-C-47
4676 Columbia Parkway
Cincinnati, OH 45226
. January 24, 2006

Attached: FOR CLARIFICATION PURPOSES

Ammended Submission for Qualification of FMPC SEC 00046 Petition.

Respectfully,



ALRDUST SS SRORTN REVERTEN = PLEANE' BT Page’e “or
R. H. Starkey,
February 28, 1966

e end replaced as necessary. If a good vacuum is main-
tained in this system, these leaks will be internal
and cause no industrial hygiene problems.

3. The drums of fhF;, must be placed inside the dumping
station before they are delidded. They should not be
removed from this station until they are relidded and

cleaned. The same procedure applies to the drumming
station. All ThO. including residue from the cyclone
a in drums that can be dumped in the
dumping station. ‘This will make it umnecessary to
hand scoop any material.

lh. The entire reverter ares should be cleened at least
once/day. All spills should be vacuumed immediately.

5. Changing drums from the cyclone drumirg station
requires an sir supplied respirator on the operator.
Dust in this operation is quite visible.

Te ventilation for the entire process is supplied by one

quick draft eductor through one scrubber. As the scrubber
pecomes plugged blest gates on ventilation lines ere gradu-
ally closed to ntein static pressure on the process off-

w- e gas line. This deprives the dumping station of its needed

ventilation. The exhaust line from the drumming station is
too long to provide sufficient ventilation, with the door
open, at any time.

Leaks from the dumping station to the floor continue to
puild up piles of materiel on the floor end sides of the
_ dumping system. Leeks in the seals of the screw feeders
and in the sédis of the reverter -perew. are often. visit
when the scrubber is plugged, reducing the stetic pre
on the off-gas line. ° .

Drums are delidded and relidded outside the dumping station.
Recycle Th0s is scooped from @ drum outside the ventilated
enclosure end eunped into the drumming station. The filled
drums of ThOp are not cleaned or lidded before they are re-
moved from the drumning Station. Th02 deposits are visible
on all these levels in the reverter area. :

These deposits are not cleened up on a routine basis and
ere rarely cleaned up except at the specific request of the
IRER Department. Allowing dusty material to accumulate on
floors and other surfaces is @ lerge source of eirdust.

eS ORIGINAL SIGNED 8Y
K. NH. Ross
si

Ranme

22176


plant-by-plant data from the recently releases Addendum to the official History
of Radionnclide Discharges. ‘We then applied this average loss per unit of production to
the plant-by-plant production data for the period 1970 to 1982 (inclusive) to obtain release
estimates for the period. This estimation procedure may miss accidents and sudden, large
releases. It is also likely to yield underestimates of the true releases for all the same
reasons that the official releases estimates are likely to be serious underestimates for the
period 1957-1969.

‘The purpose of this re-estimation for the 1970-1982 period is enable better year-by-year
dara than the offical release estimates to enable a beter estimation of the doses, within
the acknowledged imitations af the dust collector data generally.

‘There are some peculiar limitations of the procedure we have adopted as it relates t0
production; the March 1989 addeicinm contains data for several years which shows that
losses were being reported when there was no production in that plant. ‘

‘Thus, we have the peculiar simation that zero loss were reported when there was
considerable production. For example, in Plant 8 during 1978 and 1979, and losses were
being reported when there was no production. ‘This was also the case with the Pilot Plant

It is possible that some explanation exists for non-zero losses for years when production
partiolar dustcollecsor during a period when 2 plant was not in production, However, it is
__ also possible shat the production data are faulty. This isa matter witich needs considerable
farther investigation. Until such investigation resolves the issue, this will remain an
uncertainty with the method we use of estimating the ammual losses for the 1970 to 1982
period.

|A further limitation is that it is generally acknowledged that during the 1970s much or
most of the plent and equipment at FMPC was deteriorating because of a lack of funds.
‘Thus, it possible and eves likely thst in many operation, the efficiency of dust collection
mary have markedly gone down during this period compared to the 1957-1969 period when
some fonds were available for improvements. ‘This farther biases our estimates in the
direction of underestimation of the true releases.

nor?
Ww
or



Page 2
Sc
36.t
secont level
wed
canes

Speers
3,599
on the
howis

ef
on the
soutes.

Lod
and

4,200 3,700
geplers

Sise 12.

fe

were
Those seuplers
rixet hour the
tasen after
wanlers we
oe ample
the reaikts
Curing the tint
and weat sides
the breskoct
ae
- Consttions Seeing samplings § —Leves Senpies
py teisth ont

ROSY PIazs A, Ab ACER AB TOKE BHUDS © A 5

BEST. COPY AVAILABLE

3110956


FOR CLARIFICATION PURPOSES: SEC00046

T request the following change to Form B, Part F.

Fal
which monitoring was not available to Fernald workers:

*No monitoring for internal exposure for Ru contaminants. *No smears or air sampling
filters were analyzed specifically for: Plutonium, Neptunium or Thorium isotopes, before
Feb. 1989. _*No RU contaminants were reported in analysis before 1989. *In Vivo
counts were not performed frequently enough to be of significant value in TRU dose
reconstruction. “Internal dosimetry was not introduced until 1986. *Before DOE
Order 5480.11 (89) bioassay data was not routinely used to estimate intake and internal
organ dose. *No routine air monitoring was used to establish internal intake or
exposure estimates. _ *In Vitro bioassays for thorium were not performed. *No
records were found of any bioassay results for Radium or daughter products during this
time. *No non-uranium urinalysis was conducted. *No fecal sampling has ever been
apart of the routine bioassay program. *No monitoring for non-uranium
radionuclides. _*No monitoring to detect TRU contaminants with the MIVRML. *No
neutron dosimetry.

This lack of monitoring is confirmed in the NIOSH site profile.

In addition to the above I would like to add, the uranium urinalysis that was
performed was based on chemical toxicity and not radiological toxicity. So therefore,
*no radiological uranium urininalysis monitoring was performed. (In a Fernald
document entitled ‘Radiation Hazards at Fernald’ the writer says “Before discussing the
steps taken to protect personnel against the inhalation of radioactive dust, the writer
would like to indicate that the present maximum allowable concentration for uranium
dust is based on the chemical toxicity of uranium rather than the radiological toxicity.
his can be verified by reading the footnote for the uranium concentration inthe National

footnote: SEL ined ba cot umd ia eat catraabetes) This will be
confirmed with additional documentation.



SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendom

PE107c Seventeen men in the Pilot Plant were exposed to uranium hexafluoride.
100% showed urinary damage.

PE114d UF4 containing up to 3% U-235, operations were performed without
respirators.(March 1961). In the absence of specific enrichment information, dose
econstructors assumed only natural uranium was used prior to 1964.

PE 142 Plant 2 dumping station cleanout operations were 1800 times the MAC.
The respiratory protection was not satisfactory.

PE300a Plant 6 machining area fires (April 1954), only 5 of the 26 machine
operators involved were sampled. [ Examination of worker records would not show
exposnre for that incident for 21 workers involved.] Remember, Fernald didn’t see the
value in keeping records and testing was performed only to evaluate air quality and
monitor for possible uranium toxicity.

PEl61a Ventilation was deliberately cut off. (April 1963). The areas effected
‘were not identified.

Subcontractors often worked in their street clothes. Some were also told that they
‘were not contaminated, They unknowingly were permitted to carried contaminants home
to their families.

NA85_ States that Fernald has not attempted over the years to maintain plutonium
accountability. Analyses for plutonium were made only on special occasions until 1985.

PESSIs(WEST) Out of specification material due to plutonium and neptunium in
scrap at a ratio of 200 times higher than was typical.

ADDITIONAL disturbing information is high-lighted throughout the evidence submitted
with the submission of the SEC petition for FMPC workers.



MLO25.L0TE

SUBSECT
TO
FROM

REFERENCE

he

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY
OF OHIO

P.O, BOX 158
MT. HEALTHY STATION
CINCINNATE 31, OHIO f

2257542

Resvits of air dust semples collected on June 19 in the
" area are as follows.

Three (3) breathing zone samples of the graphite crusher

operator feeding graphite to the crusher through.a port
on the ground floor 2 428 to 1112 The
average value of 817 « are about 12 times the present

maximum allowable concentration. Three (3} breathing zone
samples of a helper babe ieces of ite to the
Platform range from 8856 peas . ‘The average
value was about 3100 or ak?

These are typical of the results that can be ob:
when operations are perforsed in a manner ot!
standard procedure where ventilation has bi
We understand that the crusher which was not rating has
now been placed in operation. We therefore can
that in the future the operation
to the standard procedure, If 1:
from this we would like to be notifN

precautions are deing tak, =
personnel,

R. C. Heatherton

RCHsbs
ces J. A. Quigley, M.D. a“

nN
o



SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendum

It’s one thing to attempt to reasonably ascertain what a given workers exposure
dose potential was, but it’s another thing to do it with reasonable accuracy. It’s like
putting a puzzle together when there aren’t enough pieces to even give a glimpse of the
scene being depicted.

The pieces of the Femald puzzle which are included as evidence with this petition
reveal some of the follow :

A worker whose nostrils are caked with black oxide, yet medical examination
revealed no unusual findings.

Workers working in areas different than as noted in the records.

Respirators with the potential of creating health problems because they were filthy
and failed to provide the protection intended due to improper fit, lack of use or even
unavailability. Some workers were required to provide their own respiratory protection.

Management perceived record keeping as tedious work. “We have records which
tell us to which plant a person is assigned and in which job classification he worked
however, these records do not tell us the specific job operation he performed.”(PE901)

Workers were rotated as a means of limiting exposure. Some records reveal air
dust sampling for specific jobs by plant, but the person performing the job can’t be
determined based on the record keeping practices Fernald documents describe.

Exposure potential varied for a specific job based on the worker performing the
task, the condition of the equipment, the ventilation, whether a respirator was used, and
the type and quantity of material being processed. Unknown factors also apply making it
impossible to estimate exposure based on limited data. Several documents indicate the
extreme levels of exposure that existed from one survey to another. Levels changed by
hundreds of MAC based on process changes or even by how, when or where an air
sample was taken. These factors all contributed to gross errors in estimates.

PES515c states that data is useful in assessing tisks to worker’s health only to the
extent the data are accurate, comprehensive, accessible and comparable. ORAU has
already stated in the site profile that Fernald data is very limited and portions of it can’t
be interpreted, Testimony presented through affidavit PE747, admitted as court evidence,
makes the accuracy of some air sampling data ‘suspect’. The National Research Council
. concluded that data collected in the past (prior to 1994) are inadequate because of both
the kinds of data collected and the manner in which they are stored.



' —

’

AIRBORNE RELEASES FROM FMPC SCRUBBERS

BPRICIBNCY

THS BFFECT OF SCRUBBER

ACTUAL

SES”

INNO"
od -

420

ISG SE
HZ

iW WOO
1G

EXSSQ

288 — SS

S3IUN Gaeta: ‘ojUtETISe ossetoy

Bt] a.
Sorubber efficiency %

FIGURE 1



eee

pri

S. L. Hinnefeld {wico:0sH(00T} :68-359

September 19, 1988
POOS HISTORY AND RISK ASSESSMENT

H. D. Christiansen W. A. Wefnreich
a. A. Grumski

The recent round of publicity concerni potential exposure to plutonium
at the FMPC has caused considerable employee reaction and there appears
to be a genera} lack of information about this issue. Consequently, I
have prepared the attached summary to provide some insight into the
background and significance of the current situation. Nease feel free
to disseminate this summary as you see fit.

x

th Hinnefetd, r
OS&H Dosimetry & Instrumentation
Attachment
SLH/bIr/daj
c: R. W. Keys (w/ attachment)

Central Files (w/ attachment)


July 31, 1981
HEALTH & SAFETY DIVISION MONTHLY REPORT - JULY 1981

R. M. Spenceley
R. C. Heatherton

2) Considerable work was done in thsepast month preparing drafts
of procedures for the Medical Deperrment Manual. Most of the
procedures have been reviewed in draft form and corrections
have been wade, Formal typing of the procedures is to follow.
Preparation of the manual is on schedule for the targeted date
of August 15 for draft completion and September 15 for final
issue.

2) Bealth & Safety's Quality Assurance Manual was issved in July.

3) The Health & Safety Division Safety Meeting was held on July 16.
The primary topic was the employee's rights and responsibilities
under the Occupational Safety and Health Program. The meet-
ing was attended by most of the Health & Safety Division
employees and some of the Production employees in the Health
and Safety Building.

4) There have been several meatings with two millwrights for the
purpose of providing thes with better understanding and
acceptance of procedures for radiation control. Originally
four meetings were planned for about ane hour each, but each of
the three meetings which kas been held lasted for about tvo
in providing better understanding and acceptance. The union
Safety Representative has also been included in the last two
meetings. The fourth and final meeting has been scheduled
for early in August whan the file bedge procedures vill be
discussed in considerable detail.

5) Severdd persons have been included in « specisl urine
sampling program during the veek of July 27. This progran
was initiated because of work Yoing on in Plant 4 with the .
subcontractor Master Painting prepsring to paint. The airborne

Gast levels beve been relatively high during the cleening process. mm
SFP STE LES, eres bey and ai BLO

chemical operateta from Plant 4 submitted urine samples prior

to leaving the plant. Bight of the Mester Painting eaployees

and six HLO enployees returned on the start of the workday on
sample.



Approximate amount of time operetor in location No. i ~ 210 minutes
Apbroxinate amount of time operator in location Now 2 - 20 minutes
Approximate amount of time operstor in location Noe é - Oo minuses
Approximate amount of time operatcar in location No. - 5 minutes

ns ~ _95 minutes

Approximate amount of time operator in other locatio.
Total Tine h20 minutes

Assuming cafeteria and change time as zero (0) the following is e weishted
aversze exposure of #2 AG operator on }-12-5h (based on 510 min. shift).

ho afa/sd

Conditions noted in the Acme-Gridley Area:

1. Push brooms are being used to clean floors around machines and besket
loading area.

2. Slide doors, particularly on the north side of the machines, are not
kept entirely closed. fhe door on the operator's side is usually
kept closed but still leaves an opening of approximately 3-1/2 sq- ft.

9 3. Turnings are allowed to puild up quite high before being raked down.

Turnings seem to pile up much faster on the side opposite the operator
which forces the operator to walk around the machine to rake them down.

ke Coolant supply and angle of quenching 4s not sufficient to eliminate
sparking and burning.

5.--Small tires. in mechines receive very little attention. Most times are
allowed to burn themselves out. Te mene nee ee . tee

$. Smoke and coolant mist is often visible above machines; an indication
of inadequate ventilation.

7. Ventilation efficiency is very low. 7" ducts into machines are”
evacuating 203 CFM. Main exhaust duct through roof (9%) shows
1115 CFM.

8. Floor around A-G is littered with turnings and coolant.

9. Cperstors frequently stick their head inside machine before smoke and
mist has settled. -

10. Set-up operators work with heed 4nside machine.

arerann



Meeting to Discuss Pit Area ius. Contre} Page Zz
k. C Heatherton
January 28, 1980

a
uw

VazlLous.uses of water for dust suppression were con~
sidered. Empty dumpsters would have to be dried
betore reuse because of the hard cake- formed when
MEP becomes wet.

Drawings of the Middlesex dumping enciosure were
reviewed at the meeting. This device is intended
to help control losses vnen contaminated soil is
dumped from a front-end louder into a truck bed.
Various modifications were discussed but no
Satisfactory alterations were suggested.

wy

(7) Pine materials, excluding uranium metal. are now
being duaped Into pit 6. Coarse wateriaiz will ve
adced when a suitable protective layer is formed
Over the pit rubber liner.

'@) Urentum metal and materials which could camage the
pit v liner continue to be dumped into pit 4.

#, R. Diehi agreed to identify drums now at Plant 1,
awaiting disposal approval, in which liners were used.
C. E. Slock will schedule the dumping and notify the

@ Meeting attendees. The dumping. will pe observed to

determine if the use of liners provides adequate dust
control when the drums cre emptied.

E. A. Huey noted there was an active engineering project
for pit area dust contrel. The job originated nit:

&. &. Block's request for engineering servines.

2. Skintik vow has been assigne’ thet prefect

Dt this
‘of

ere made for anothe> forma. t
Peport will be made of the vest Jamp
rial from arums.

No paans +

erizht

BEST COPY AVAILABLE ; 3103093


Mr. C. Le Hari. Pace 2

suen 3 transfer of xLOcoperated vehicles te a central ccverjoe::
pool would sear that esen venicle would require wonitorics {a-d
very likely deco:tamination to varying degrees) each day pricr
to each vehicle being Freturred to tre pool. we feel that sucn
a proposal is not practical from a nealth end safety viewpoint.

Siseerely yours,
[+ Ce Chaprnn—

cd. Ke. Noyes
Pia.t Mecager

vantral vile

030544


SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendum

SUMMARY: 01-24-06P01:48 RCVD

Exposure problems occurred consistently during Femald’s operation due to design
handling unidentified materials, just to mention a few. The extent of difficulty in
attempting to maintain a safe exposure levels from such varied reasons as equipment
malfunction, lack of maintenance, inadequate monitoring and material reactions on
equipment and storage containers, is overwhelming.

Production demands outweighed safety concems and exposure limits. They
deemed it necessary to continue using defective equipment in spite of the dangerous
levels of radiation exposure this practice was creating for the workers. They permitted
these levels to persist for not just days, but for years.

. Many exposure problems were in place long before they were discovered through
uranium urinalysis. Even witnessed incidents often were undetectable by this method of
monitoring. When monitoring did reveal an exposure problem, the source often could not
be determined. The monitoring for uranium exposure only offered a 3 day window of
opportunity for discovery as demonstrated by one of the case studies. This infrequency
would allow innumerable exposures to occur within the frame of lyear or longer between
the routine monitoring.

Failure to understand specific material processing procedures by the dose
reconstructors, also attributed to oversights in exposure potential. Wrong assumptions
were made concerning the exposure potential to particular worker groups. For example,
engineers were assumed to have limited exposure because their job, in concept, involved
drawing plans and working in a protected office environment. The nature of the-
workplace and its functional difficulties, required them to be in the most contaminated
areas throughout the facility trying to discover the reason for potentially high exposure
levels for the workers. Furnace blowouts, ventilation failures, and leaking materials were
Just a few of the conditions evaluated to determine whether design changes were needed
to correct the problems, The theories behind the assignment of exposure potential to
specific groups of workers is not always based on reality.

Incomplete records and the practice of rotating workers to limit exposure also
contribute to the inability to adequately assess exposure potential. Without a thorough
monitoring program, complete accurate records, and knowledge of all incidents of
accidental exposure, it is impossible to estimate exposures responsibly. Fernaldrecords
teveal that workers often didn’t know what constituted an incident, while other didn’t _
recognize the sources or locations for potential exposures.



e
e
e

/

ns

FTEVUVAY AdOd 1$34

OOGOTTE

>

West Behind #28

‘Tine Separation §=—Reaelt
Started Booth prea Furnace.
(30 da,
Senples)
003s | (369 9000
0708 64 332
0733 26 330
0803 as 2

Conteninated convas tarps hing
fxom 6625 AWM, wtll 7133 AH,

Operations
‘Bearted
83s az 92
p03 335 665
099s = 440202 690000
0950 3463 246000
1007 390 2000
A037 a3 43000
Rrosk for Lunch
aang 20° 1249
1249 1 0
1309 359 3068
1349 1876 20000
2419 09 B00,
Total — 150962 708374
Average a d/e/¥? par 5 Hr.
Period (Ducing actuat
Cleanout operations)
13729 64215
Wwe 197 947

Avoxage HAG for entixe aren #259 HAC

tn Pront of Fi
#25 Rene

32
4386

859
810

230

492
1347

16

Pusp D
#23 Renal
ce

4120
2647

5946
1726

19571
280

Pinp B
tal Rei
Furnace,

Pusp B
ALT Re

1462
1363

eneit

Furnace

Blac. Switch
Area for Hest

Renedts

1549
2386

100

36470
S24,

West Breakout
Canning -
a

5312
6

2916
Als

AB

213

149300
47700
43000

8800,

an
174

2130
603,
Wt
126



NLO, INC.
HEALTH & SAFETY DIVISION

@ MESSAGE FORM

Suovee: looming Sbewitiact Kacsndley Frac BOUTE To POATE |
“8 ath ZA Bobo one, zie
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pore U22f 2 f

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RLO-MLS- B79 (REV, 1/26/87

BEST GOPY AVAILABLE



July 7, 1967

ATRDUST EVALUATION OF PULLING A PLANT REACTOR SCREW
K. NH. Ross
D. @. Jones and R. E. Kein

When reactor screws break they must be repleced. Bince the
reactor is full of uranium exide or UF, in a powdered form,
this is an unusually dusty operation.

This particular evaluetion is ef pulling the Cocoa main screw
ef the Bumber 3 reactor. Since this screw was broken into
several pieces in operation, the ursniu exide in the reactor
could not be run out to the next reactor. This is one of the
Yeasons that this evaluation must be considered as a “mexinum
eir dust level” evaluation. If the screw had net been so badly
broken, it could probably heve been pulled in less tine and with
somewhat less dusting.

It was also necessary in this particular operation to remove
doth the front and rear reactor cover plates to remove pisces
ef the screw from both ends. Air dust levels were higher while
working at the rear of the reactor screw possibly because of the
gmall emount of working area and drafts from nearby windows
blowing the dust about.

fhe following tables show sir dust levels during various phases
of the operation. —_ : .

Wo. of 3
Bamples Typo Description _ High sseor xco*
2 GA Removing rear motor 900 4go 70
drive unit
2 GA Vecuuming open end of 5690 1720 37-0
talcum reactor :
4 GA Shoveling oxide into damm 25600 890 96.0
2 GA fall zoctions of screv THO 500 6.2
peing removed
7 BZ ° Raking loose oxide into 172,770 10390 454.0

eatch pen, vacuuming talc,
& shoveling oxide inte drums

2 Bz Pulling parts of screw 23330 17800 206.0
from the reactor

2608928 wa2187t



~6e4

Recently the National Bureau of Standards published Handbook 59
ealled Permissible Dose From External Sources of Ionizing Radiation.

It may be well to read what this Hatiomal Committee of Radiation
Protection has to sey about setting of radiation limits. Their words
are:

ome concept of a tolerance dose involves the assumption that af
the dose is lower then a certain walue - the threshold value ~ no .
injury results. Since it seems well established thet enere 4s no
threshold dese:for the production of gene mutations by radiation, it
follows that strictly speaking there is no such thing as a tolerance
Gose when ali possible effects of radiation on the individual sn
future generations ere included. In connection with the protection
problem the expression has been used in @ more liberal sense, namely,
to represent @ dose that may be expected to produce only “tolerable”
deleterious effects » if any are produced at all. Since at as desirable
to avoid this ambiguity the expression “permissible dose" is mech to
be preferred.

It is now necessary to give this expression a more precise
meaning. In the first place it is well to state explicitly that

the concept of a permissible dose envisages the possibility of radiation

- 3290301


February 28, 1966

ATRDUST SVALUAPION OF. THORIUM REVERTER - PLANT 8
R, H. Starkey
K. KR. Ross

Airdust samples taken in the Plant 8 Thorium Reverter -
Ares and shown in the following table indicete the con~

centration of Thorium is too high in all areas. The
causes of these high airdust levels are, 1) ineffective

ventilation on both the drumming and dumping stations,
2) leaks in dumping system and in the reverter, 3) poor
procedure in handling the feed end the product, and )}
leck of general cleanliness in the area.

Th : Th

33 3
ad/m/i? \ nate X_NCG
BZ Dumping ThF), into reverter 3 +] BL
dumping station

BZ Scooping recycle TnOp into 3387 2037 113
reverter dumping stetion

BZ Changing. drums et reverter Wyo . 450 25
drumming station — - -

G&A Th Reverter Grum dumping 188 46 2.5
station ares

GA Th Reverter drumming station 135 119 6.6
area .

GA Thorium reverter level 12h. 39 2.2

NCG = 18 ug Th/s?

To improve these sirdust levels it is recommended:

1. The face velocity of the reverter dumping station be
kept at at least 200 ft./min. Equipment for measuring
this is available end is being used.

2. The leaks in the dumping station and reverter feeding
system must be ceaulked and sealed. The inspection
doors to this system shoul¢ be gesketed and kept closed.
fhe reverter screw seals should be inspected frequentiy

2eaRBS1 30217


-~he

The adoption of the recommendations and the advice of the many
safety groups in this country has been instrumental in the reduction
of the severity of the hazards.

Radiation Rezards:

A short time after the discovery of z-raya, man became acquainted
with the barmful effects of ionizing radiation. Between 1896 and 1922,
the control of the bazards of radiation were virtually non-existent
in this country. In 1922, the American Roentgen Ray Seetety published
its first radiation protection measures. The arrival of the atomic
age at the University of Chicago on December 2, 1942, brought with
it many unanswered problems concerning radiation. Prior to that
time the world had produced only two pounds of radium. Whet would be
the consequences if man were permitted to work with the equivalent
of thousants of tons of rediumt

Portunately the persons responsible for this development were
wise and far-sighted and from the beginning took adequate measures
to prevent any radiation damage. In fact a new science called "health
physics" had its origin at the University of Chicago in the sumer of

1942. ‘Thies new science was dedicated to the prevention of radiation

Gamage to man, and it is formate thet health physics wes able to

= 3290296


B33

-3-  POOS HISTORY AND RISK ASSESSMENT

The ¢: to process the Poos to UF, ran for
rise fore a spill of material from a

hopper shut down operations. Subsequent OOS
operattons have involved running out the POOS material
that remained in the reactor banks at the time the
operation was shut down, and recovering material from
various pieces of process equipment.

One aspect ‘of the procedure for running POOS satertals was
the.collection of urine Samples to be analyzed at an
outside laboratory for plutoniue. A "POOS urine sample"
was to be collected before an employee started working

with POOS materials, at six-month intervals during POOSs
operations, and at completion of POOS operations. In the
April 1988 time frame samples were collected from
individuals who had worked in POOS areas since duly of =~
1987. In one batch of 11 samples that were sent in a
Single shipment to an outside pnalytical laboratory, 8
Samples were reported to contain Plutonium. These results
were received at FMPC in early August, the involved
eaployees were informed of the results, and additional
bioassay samples were collected.

SIGHLEICANCE OF PLUTONTUM ExPosuRE

The risk associated with exposure to plutonium stems from
the resulting radiation exposure. The most coamon
plutontum fsotope, Pu-239, ts a alpha enttter. It
Goes not emit gamsa rays, and unlike uranium, it does not
have short half-lived decay products that eait beta
particles. Consequently, it poses no external radiation
sirgat., posure to plutonioe is significant only if it

The impact of inhaling a radioactive material depends on
1) {ts physica? halfolifes 2) the type and qrergy of the
Yadiation it emits; and 3) where it resides in body;
and 4) how tong it resides in the body.

The uranium and plutonium isotopes of interest al] have
sical half-lives that are much longer than a person’s
Ifespan, and al] emit alpha Particles having energies
within about 30% of each other. The reason that plutoniue
is considered more azardous than uranium, then, is that
the behavior of these two elements inside the body is
Fadically different. Whereas a fraction of the uraniue
that is absorbed into the bloodstreas its relatively
briefly in bone and kidneys {biological half-lives of a
few days for the vast majority of the deposited material};


2131708 : CENTRAL FILES a
pee

. August 12, 1958
DUST LEVELS ENCOUNTMEED AT SLUDGE REACTOR, HAST PAD ~ PLANT 6

siz dust survey peciod of June and July, 1988, it was
found that the radiocsctive airborne dust levels encountered during
the sludge reseter operation have incressed from .44 WAC in 1957
to 18.94 aC in 1958, When collecting the samples of this operation,
it was noted that stean was tising into the ares of the operator's
face, ‘The top of the tank is open, thereby making this condition

It has been learned that the new slndge furnace is expected to be in
operation scactine in the near future. If #0, it ds understood thet
this will eliminate the use of the siudge reector.

Unti2 the sludge furnace is in routine operation, the possibilities
of installing s ventilated cover over the opening of the reactor
should be investigated, It is believed thst this cover will tend
to reduce these dust levels.

Original Signed By
4, F. Wing

. J. F. Wing
BNE sbg
ce: BR. H. Starkey

Central Fite —~

030294



\

Qevwves wove peReREe AR

‘s

Week of
Cleanout pat 3-7 to 3-14
Dump dust collector to 2-20 to 2-27
furnace
Béating bags 2-1 to 2-7
Repairing inside furnace pers te ae
" . ® 5-1 to 5-7
Repairing inside TH. 3 te ity
B F a 77 to ae
" " " 4-14 to 4-22
While repairing inside fur4-1 to 4-7
4-23 to 4-30
. " * S 5-1 to 5-7
. . " "5-20 ert
Rabble shaft opening 2-7 to 2-
g , ° 2-18 to 2-25
” ” * 4-14 to 4-20
Qver front of furnace 2- 4 te27.
O
" " se inte po 4-18
" " 7 # 4-23 to 4-30
" " oon 5-1 to 5-7
® " a on

5-13 to 5-20

Empty sludge to fur.tray 5-6 to 5-13
" ” noo 4-22 to 4-28

Feeding turnings 2-21 to 2-28
ad " 3-6 to 3-12
‘ : 3-13 to 3-19
3-20 to 3-26
3-26- to: 3-31
4-1 to 4-7
4.8 to 4-14
B14 to 4-20
4-20 to 4~27
4-28 to 4-30
5-1 to 5-7
5-8 to 5-14
5-14 to 5-21
sludge -23 to iE?
* a to 4-14
: 4-21 to 4-27

FIRRR Base

4-27 to 4-30
5-1 to 5-7

065965

No. of @ 6/a/13

Samples High Low Avg.
8 75589 9100. 26815
5 4339 420187 8120
5 6000 8 1582
21 81470 2 7922
5 1804 57 504
7 55083 15 8250
iL 167 17 «2578
28 126 ©2839
12 7876 120 1620
3 120787 268 7020
i} otek 78. tbs
2 B41 ole 528
a 12655 3 52
6 u 313 B35
5 28 15
5 S187 27a agers
3 a 658
8 i990 22 61
3 1 17220
3 286 §1 134
5 508 66 316
1 544 1
18 5527 6 503
10 605 L 11
& 348 3. 2117
5 WU6F. 3 - 308
10 ge 2 142
20 82 3 113
19 761 B3 150
1 1195 1
2 1287 12 252
48 2716 9° 1
12 2172 18 281
20 409 8 105
3 “1057 2 682
2 ee
13 eae 6 Bho
14 5276 re) ah

eee oe ee

*
uw

366
9.3
9.5
0.9
3.0
1.9
ee)
1.4
TL
iy
44
2
1.6
2.1
2.5
3-5
2.1
4
a
9

rere)
owor
NEYO

.


e

HEALTH & SAFETY DIVISION MONTHLY REPORT - SULY 1981
RM,
July 31, 198

Six of the Mester Painting employees and three NLO employees shoved urinary ~
vadistion concentrations above cur checkpoint of ‘ter on the
Four of the Master Painting employees aad two HLO employees were still
excreting urihe above the. .060 mg/liter level on July 29.
were asked to report again on July 31 at the start of the workday.

|

Tepresentati:
sampling and the reason for requesting additional samples. It is expected
that all employees will be down below the .040 mg/liter Level with the
samples submitted on July 31.

Highlight items for the month of July for H&S Departmente are given in
the attached reports. Accomplishments are included in these reports.

Original Signed by
R. C, HEATHERTON
Dir, of Health & Safety;

R. C. Heatherton

REH/J je
Ataachments


PZ

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OFFICIAL U

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Qetobder 90, 2962
AIR DUST SURVEY - WOSR SALT WELTINO BUILDING

aq. A. Quigley, B.D,
R, R. Starkey

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‘TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION. page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

A. INTRODUCTION

B. ADDITIONAL GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE OFFICIAL 5
C. UNMEASURED LOSSES un
D. WORKING CONDITIONS AND RELEASE ESTIMATES evesemeero——nomnnmeee 5
E. SCRUBBER LOSSES 17
F, PLANT 2/3 GULPING LOSSES. 23
G. DUST COLLECTOR LOSSES.. - 2s
HL RELBASE ESTIMATES AND AIR MONITORING DATA seeeneneeoem—oee 75
L

“



neeetnee

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY
OF OHIO C \

P.O. BOX 188 a
MT. HEALTHY STATION f - 212447)
CINCINNATI 31. OHIO

: July 6, 1953

SUBJECT
Air Dust Concentrations - Sample Preparation Room

J. Redinson
FROM

. we
ecrerence R. C. Heatherton CENT aL FILES yy ~

On July 1, 1953, E. Blase collected a total of thirty (30)
air dust samples in the sample preparation roca. These
consisted of general air and breathing zone samples while
screening the bomb liner and emptying the ball mill as well
&8 process samples of three possible sources of dust. The
resulta of all thirty samples were above the maximum
allowable concentration of 70 d/a/¥3 for airborne alpha
emitters. 4 rough approximatation of the exposure to
people in the room is 20 tines the maximm allowable concen-
tration while performivig’B0reening or ball mill operetions.
In addition it has definitely been determined that the use
. of & vacuum cleaner exhausting into the room, the operation
-@ of the grinding. machine aiid removing ore from the grinder are
all definite sources of air contamination rebly
above the maximm allowable concentration.

We understand that Mr. Cox has already begun
for the ventilation in the room.
as adequate ventilation is ins

To

following, . an

1. The area rules wi’ t to rin of pro-

tective clothing room to be followed at
times. oO protective clothing,

dust-proof gloves must worn for handling radio- -
contamination is possibéh.

2. Ext: care mast be used in handling in order to
redude air tamination and to keep contamination
of 7 tops, ete. to a minimum.

BS
3. Wherever possible wet cleaning should de used to
remove contamination from surfaces rather than the
vacuum cleaner which exhausts into the room, It is
suggested, for example, that the floors be
and that the bench tops be cleaned with a wet sponge. .

065376



SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendum

ORAU ititerpreted data based on that assumption. They assumed ‘0’ meant no
dose emitted. When in fact ‘0’ meant dose undetermined, dose not recorded, or dose
information is unavailable. This fact can be seen in Table 5-13 and Table 5-15 of the
TBD for years 1960-1963. In addendum document PE950d, Michael W. Boback, (bead
of industrial Hygiene and Radiation , 1969-72) admits to the use of zeroes, in lieu of
actual measurements,

ORAU interviews of workers failed to provide important information because:
The questions asked didn’t prompt the answers needed.
‘The information was ignored because it couldn’t be confirmed.

T believe the information provided is sufficient for NIOSH to determine that there
is insufficient ‘accurate data’ available to do dose reconstructions for FMPC workers, and
that all workers at FMPC have been subjected to levels of radiation exposure which far
exceed the limits established for their safety and protection by various United States
governmental agencies; and that exposure continued beyond production.

The FMPC documents, never show a concern for the doses of insoluble uranium
particles that were accumulating in the bodies of workers. Management was concerned
with discovering the effects of the radiation on workers through autopsy, and stated that
the use of’ the respirator protection complicated the exposure-intake ratio.(PE793)
[NOTE: Data obtained without the use of respirators was useful in the study of intake
and retention. Notations about respirator use would identify useful data, and the failure to
enforce respirator use would guarantee a sufficient quantity of data available for study.]

It appears there should have been more interest in safety at FMPC.

FINAL STATEMENT:

T believe Fernald Management operated under the false premise that they could
predict all potential exposure situations, and therefore could eliminate monitoring
expenses from their budget. Unfortunately it cost the workers their health and their lives.



iH.

_ UL

-2-  POOS HISTORY AND RISK ASSESSMENT

DESCRIPTION OF PO0S HISTORY (continued)

Essentially all recycle uranium is enriched in the U-235
isotope, and it is economically advantageous to reprocess
reaction byproducts (often called “residues” in order to
recover the enriched uranium. Consequently byproducts
Containing relatively high TRU to U Vatios were sometimes
returned to product streams. in 1980, 89,000 Ibs of
material identified as “Feed Plant Ash and Other Paducah
Scrap® was shipped from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion

Plant to the FHPC. This material Contained 22.5 metric
tons of uraniua, and the TRU to U ration was about 200
tines higher than what was typical for recycle uranium.

The plutonium and neptunium in this shipment is the cause]
of the out-of-specification matertals at the FHPC today. _|

A second finding of the Task Force on Recycle Urantum was
that most DOE facilities did not have specifications for
acceptable levels of TRU and fission product fapurittes in
recycle uranium. Consequently, affected facilities were
directed to develop such a Specification. The
Specification adopted by the FMPC was that the total alpha
activity from TRU elements in recycle uranium shal? not
exceed 0.1% of the alpha activity from the uraniua. This
equates roughly to 10 parts of plutonium per billion parts
Of uranium on a mass basis, if plutonium fs the only TRU
element present. This ification was adopted in late
1985, and was based on facts that 1) the 10 ppb value
had been used in the past by some DOE facilities for
Certain products; and 2) at that Tevel, the potential
health risk associated with exposure to the elements

When the specification for acceptable levels of TRU
elements was adopted in late 1985, {t was recognized that
Certain materials already at the FMPC did not meet the
Specification. In 1986 special procedures were. developed
for processing these materials, which were subsequently
dubbed "POOS", for plutoniua-out-of-specification. The
most significant POOS material was mately 160
metric tons of uranium as 03. The Tevel fn this
waterial was approximately four tines the specification.
The plans for processing this material called for it te be
blended with Methin specification -U03 while bei:
Converted to UF, in Plant 4. The goal was to dilute the
TRU content so it the product UF, would meet the TRU
specification.


SEC00046-FMPC PETITION: Addendum

INDEX Section 3. IEER and Other Scientific Data

PE950j TEER Qualifications

PE950d Addendum to the report “Release Estimates of Radioactive and
Non-Radioactive Materials to the Environment by the Feed Materials
Production Center 1951-85”. [Zeroes entered without measurement.]

PES54b National Bureau of Standards Handbook 52.[excerpt]

INDEX Section 4. Attitudes and Practices of FMPC

PE397e Health Protection Review at NLO [May 1964].

PE397g Health Protection Review at NLO [April 1965].

PE397i + NLO response to April 1965 Review.

PE397r Health Protection Review at NLO [Sept. 1968]. (Reviewers question the
validity of the job weighted air dust sampling approach long used by NLO.)

PE397t Health Protection Review at NLO [Sept 1970].

PE718a Urinary Uranium Investigations

PE723 _ Reporting Requirements for Internal exposures. [Urine assay of no value].

PE765 —_ Internal Radiation Exposure Evaluation. [Uranium urinalysis not used to
evaluate internal radiation.]

3417097 Occupational Safety & Health Standard (Ionizing Radiation).

3119382 Production Division Safety Meeting Minutes

11-25-81 Letter

INDEX Section 5. Thoriam Processes
PES525b Health Hazards Involved in Processing Thorium Material
PES28 Thorium Femald [April 1956].

8-22-58 Disposal of Femald Thorium Production Residues,
MPC-t-65 MPC Values for Thorium

INDEX Section 7. Plant Operations and Exposures

PE141 Contamination of Plant 3 Heater Tubes

PE149b Incident involving Uranyl Nitrate Burns

PE15@e Refinery Uranium Exposures

PE15Sb Letter Plant 4

PE164 Hydrogen Fluoride In Plant 4

PE17ib Comments on the Attitudes of FMPC PlantS Personnel...



SUBJECT
To

FROM
REFERENCE

—_ OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY
OF OHIO
PQ BOX [88, MT. HEALTHY STATION
CINCINNATE 31, OHIO.

Harsh 1, 1960
ANNUAL I.H. & R. SURVEY ~ PLAT &
C. BR. Charman
H. K. Beers .

The 1959 Industrial Hygiene and Radiation survey states that the air dust
problem in Plant & is worse than it ever has been. 89.5%/of the personnel
employed in Plant & are currently exceeding the desired exposure limits (MAS).

In reviewing the statistics of this renort it is obvious that the reasons
for these high exposure ievels fall into four categories.

1. Insufficient ventilation facilities

2. Poor housekeeping standards .
3. Insufficient high level cleaning and equipment maintenance

4, Fanity drums

During the past year it was obvious that the ventilation facilities were

dinadequate, Since 1955 the recovery rate of uranium has increased 297%.

Except for minor alterations the ventilation facilities have remained

status quo. Consequently, numerous engineering projects are currently on
agenda.

PROJECT NO. CoP. NO. PROJECT TITLE

8-78 . UAP. furnace off-gas revision .

8-69 Rotary kiln off-gas revision

8-86. CP-59=57 Additional dust collector capacity

8-73 CPH59~87 Improvement of drumming stations

8-56 CPH59~12 Primary caleiner off-gas revisions 1:
These five items will definitely improve the dust problems since they are :
directly related-to the higher exposure levels as indicated in the 1959 i
survey, > H

H
UAP Furnace ~ 13.99 MAC . . . a
Formace Roan ~-10.92 - }

Rotary Kiln - 6.01
Oxidation Furnace - 5.66 -

These additional facilities will, however, only be as effective as our

housekeeping standards. Consequently, in order to immediately improve
our housekeening standards we have divided the nlant into eight areas,

OFFICIAL USE ONLY



ATR HYGIENE AT WEST BREAKOUT STATION, PLANT $ Page 2
J. W. Mahaffey
November 20, 1956

Concentration-a d/a/N3

Operation or Location High Low Average X MAC
GA (1) By recording desk about ~ ~ 183 2.6
8* west of breakout
enclosure.
GA (2) Main floor area during 646 225 435 6.2

‘breakout operations.

NOTE: 0, Boehler, "A" Area shift foreman, was present during all of the
above sampling periods and certified that Operations were being per-
formed according to S.0.?.

The sources of visible dusting during this survey pexiod were: 1) break-
ing top liners of unlidded furnace pots, 2) leakage of material from
edges of crusher plate, 3) leakage of material from floor of. breakout
around the jolter downcomer, 4) dusting from furnace pots as they are
inverted on turnover mit and lowered to main floor, and.5) escape of
dust through reamer armports. The dusting through the reamer armports
was only occasional, .

Downdraft ventilation on the cleaning grates appeared good, However,
very Little air was moved through the reamers, probably. due to the

frequent plugging of the screen in the vent duct that is tied into the
xeamer discharge tube. This screen had to be cleaned twice during the

A survey of the east’ breakout is now underway, Results of that survey
will be forwarded in the very near future.

atsthe
AJSsbg

ces S, FB, Audia
R. C, Heatherton

Central File

9321355


SUBJECT:

FROM:

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OKIG
Cincinnati, Ohio 45239

January 28, 1980

MEETING TO DISCUSS PIT AREA DUST CONTROL
R. C. Heatherton
M. W. Boback

On January 17, 1980, a meeting was held in the Health &
Safety Conference Room for the purpose of discussing
Means tc control dust from residue dumping in the pit

area. Present were E. M. Nutter, A. R. Diehl, E. A. Huey,

E. Skintik,-C. E. Block, and M. W. Boback.

Present dumping methods frequently cause dust to drift
across ani beyond the pit disposal area. Even when the

wind 1s caln, a significant amount of dust usually occurs

when dry powders are emptied from drums or Quapsters «
Drums may contain depleted uranium (UF » » UL0, er a mix-
ture of residues) and the dumpsters cohtata Ragnesiun
fluoride. At pit 4, material is dumped at the concrete
pad and bulldozed into the pit. At pit 6, some direct
dumping into the cavity may be possible.

No single method of dumping that was discussed would
Solve the dust problem. Following are-several major
points brought out in the discussions:

(1) Plastic bag drum liners are being used in the drum
- wing of some materials in Planre 5 and 6. She
liners aré closed with tape. ‘fo date. no Linea
drums have teen dumped.

(2) Liners are not teing used for net material or
residues which contain sharp fragments.

(3) An average of three cumpsters of Magnesium rluoridze
from Building 55 are dumped each week. Each dumpster

contains 7500 los. of RSF:

(4) Using a bag liner insios the dumpsters iz not

feasibie. Positionin
be difficult. Dumping without tearing ths liner
may be impossitl:.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

2634969

che bag befcre filling woulc

3103092


@

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY
OF OHIO
>. ©. BOX 188. MY, HEALTHY STATION

CINCINNATI 31. OHIO

AIR HYGIENE AT WEST BREAKOUT STATION, PLANT S
J. W, Mahaffey

A. J. Stefanec

Fo asfelnd
CENTRAL FILES

November 20, 1956

2236 sig

Shown in the following table are the results of air dust samples
collected at the west derby breakout on 11/14/56 and 11/16/56, day

shift only.

These results indicate only radioactive dust concen-

tzations since fluoride analyses of these samples are not yet
complete,

Qperation or Location

Be (D

BZ (3)

Bz (3)

BZ (2)

Bz (3)

BZ (a)

GA CD

Breakout helper breaking
top liners of a row of
furnace pots with a pick
hammer,

Breakout operator jolting
ont derby and reaming
empty furnace pot om side
reamer only,

Removing furnace pot from
breakout and lowering to
main floor on turnover
unit.

Breakout operator.
(This is a combination
of the above two opera-
tions.)

Derby cleaning helper
rough cleaning derby with
an air hammer,

Derby cleaning helper
moving derby to circular
grate and finish clean-
ing with a chirping
hammer,

North side of treakout.

By weigh scale on west -
Side of breakout.

937135%

Concentration-c_¢/m/M3

High “Low Average
- - 1563
776 208 466
663 17 340
360 252 306
412 126 243
126 29 78
_ _ 264
_ _ 342

X Mac
22.3

6.7

4.9

4.4

3.5

1.2

3.8

4.3



2132049

@ NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY [2
OF CNIS .

P: 0, BOX 158. MT, HEALTHY STATION eee Ty
CINCINNATI 31. OHIO 7
February 5, 1954

SUBJECT Summary of Air Dust Samples taken of Rough Grinder Operator

me R. C, Heatherton
FROM A. J. Stefanec
REFERENCE
No. of .
Machine ¢ Date Sampies High Low Ave. Remarks
i 1/3/52 4 3039 «1285. 1861 E-Metal
L 1/2/53 4 14053 1978 6471
1 1/23/53 3 39° —-27 34 .
4 3/11/53 4 65 2h 48
12 3/12/53 4 4e 22 30
t qe 3/25/53 3 720 «672 698 Baffle on
12 3/27/53 5 92 45 68 Baffle Removed =
. determine efrec.
12 3/27/53 1 116 Baffle Replaced
only one sample
sy BL 4722/53" 2 295 47
iz 3/27/53 3 363 46 153 Lard oil veins
tried as coolant
iL 2/4/54 5 22143 211066 17814 Taken to determ.
high urine resu
ef Younz and
Heindreion
Yours truly.
A. J. Stefanec
AIS/mb

080760



Approximate emount of time #5 operator at position No. 2 - 300 minutes

Approximate amount of time #3 operator at other locations 120 minutes
(Other locations meaning storage & general lathe area)

Approximate amount of time #7 operator at position No. 3 ~- 310 minutes

Approximate amount of time #7 operator at other locations - 110 minutes

Assuming cafeteria and change period exposures as zero (0) the following are
weighted average exposures of #3 and #7 lathe operators {based on §10 min.
shift).

#3 operator - 113 a/m/x3

#7 operator - 57 d/and

Conditions noted in the Turret Lathe Area:

1. Turnings are allowed to build up unnecessarily.

2. Small fires (turnings) are constantly occurring.
: @ 3. Visible smoke from burning turnings flomts over machines,
4.

Coolant supply and angle of quenching is not sufficient to keep turnings
from burning.

5. Floor covered with coolant.
a 6. Operator gets head close to turnings quite often. . —
7. Push brooms are deing used to clean floors around ‘machines.

os59sl


ye CENTRAL FILES

ro"
e Mareh 15, 1955

AIR CONTAMINATION, MILL AREA, PLANT 6

q
’

55
G. Harr 21196

R, C, Heatherton

fhe following is a tabulation of sir dust samples collected
in the period from 2-18-55 to 2-28-55.

Concentration
Cperation or Location Type of Sample Range Average
Medart #0 Operator Breathing Zone 2.1-4.5 3 x MAC
Medart .#2 Operator Breathing Zone 12-59 34 MAC
Rod Kick-off Operator Breathing Zone 10-30 20 MAC
Medart Runout Breathing Zone 10-30 20 MAC
Medart Area General air 2.5-13 8.8 MAC
@ . Saw Operator, Filing
ends of rods Breathing Zone 5-20 16 MAC
Saw Operator, Sawing
rods only Breathing Zone 5-6.5 6 mac
- Saw Area, . General Air 1.5-7.5 4 MAC
Gag Shear Operator Breathing zone -8-1.5 1 MAC
Crop Shear Area General Air o7-2.5 1.7 MAC

Note: Present acceptable level, 70 alpha disintegrations
per minute.

Following is a tebulation of urinary samples collected in
the period from 3-1-55 to 3-9-55.

Location No. of Samples Range No, offer MAC
Saw Operators 21 032-2139 7
Medart Operators 3 08-078 2

r ) Stampers 2 -065-.079 2

Note: ‘The present acceptable urinary maximum allowable
0045859 concentration is .050 milligrams/liter.

PEROla


Airdust evaluation of Pulling a Plant k Reactor Screw
K. MW. Ross

July 7, 1967 Page 2
Type . . Average
Sample Tecation or Operation High Low ROG
GA 12! H.W. of reactor. No work 4? 41 O.k
being dons.
GA 12! N.W. of reactor. Casket 620 310 5.0
being attached. Millwright
standing in half-filled pan.
GA 12! N.wW, of reactor. Screw 105 ay 0.6
being winched out of reactor.
GA 12* from reactor. Cocoa being STO 26 2.2

raked from reactor into pan
then shoveled into 55-gal drums.

BZ Millwright attaching steel cable 22600 8230 154.0
to end of screw and bolting
casket up to reactor, standing
in pan of material.

BZ Chemical operator raking Cocoa 1180 20 7.0
from reactor into pan on
platform.

BZ Millwright prying at screw with 2550 2520 25.0

crowbar working through inspection
port of casket.

BZ Chemical operator raking Cocoa 1030 850 9.90
. into alent hoppers. . :

BZ Raking Cocoa into pan. 2700 1900 23.0
Ba Shoveling Cocoa from pan into 4oo 230 3.0
drums on floor.
GA - General Area
BZ - Breathing Zone

*NCG - National Lead Company of Ohio Concentration Guide -
100 alpha disintegrations per minute per cubic meter of sir.

seetsTe


-3-
The smoker can switch to a filter type cigarette or stop smoking
entirely. ‘The housewife can replace the electric heater cord as
goon as it starts to fray. The husband can buy a drill with e ground
wire. The tire can be replaced before it becomes bald headed. The
application of good commen horse sense can reduse the degree of the
hezerd to such @ point that the hazard is no longer real.

Industrial Rerarde:

The coming of the industrial revolution brought with it hazeris
which heve resulted in the death or disability of many industriel
employees.

Today, however, the severity of a large majority of these hazards
has been reduced to a very low level. This has reanited from: 1) the
understanding of the hazards, and 2) the control of the hazards.

Electricians are protected fron the hazards of electricity
through lockout procedures. Boiler plant operators are protected from
boiler explosions by the safety vaives on the boilers. Guards, rupture
disks, safety harnesses, safety goggies, heard hate, face shields,

and respirators are s few of the many safety devices used by industry

to protect the employee.

3230238


en

e~

@

October 26, 1954
PLANT 7 URINE SAMPLING PROGRAM.

J. A. Quigley, M. D.
R, C, Heatherton

In line with our discussion on Friday, I am briefly summarizing
the information which we have obtained from the sampling program
in Plant 7. For your information we have been obtaining weekly

urine samples from all personnel in Plant 7. Amyone showing over __
a 050 mg/l in a sample is required to return to Medical for eddi-

tional sampling on a daily basis until the excretion level is

“pelow .050 mg/l. In addition, a request is made to remove the

man from exposure to soluble uranium, until the level is down.

fhe above program was initiated in June. From that time to the
present just about everyone who has been employed in Plant 7
for any length of time has exceeded the MAC on one or more
occasions. There have been several individvals who have gone
from 2 to 4 times the MAC. ‘The following have/been selected
as possibly most significant,

- This man has shown the highest level of a

person on a single sample. on 8/7 the concentration was .621 __

mg/l, On two other ococasions in August he exceeded ..050.- ..

" - This man has been over .050 on 13 occasions.
On one occasion, 8/25, he was over .1 mg/l.

_. = Over .050 mg/l 11 times. On 8/25 and 10/7 he
was over .2 mg/l. © * 25 v7

: _— -* Over .050 & times. He was over .1 on 9/23
and over .2 on 8/36 and 8/22, * on 9/1

. -- -,° This man has been over .050 on 12 occasions.
On 8/6 and 9/2 he was over .1 mg/l. on 7/24 his concentration
was .364 « On 9/29 he was over .2 mg/l. This man was
. Removed from : . Sampies t: since that time
fluctuate below and above .050. He is presently employed as
@ maintenance man in Plant 5.

In addition to the above, the following people have shown
high urinary uraniine excretion as indicated:

CENTRAL FILES 2131988

1M ede qp ean peo yf

en

’

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i] AM HMNONNMH 1 no wm

9.06
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3110957


EE LER PE LN TENET ORE TE EEO TE EPO E GCE EEN AE I Eg
- . a)

a

2
NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY .
OF OHIC .
2 P.O. 80x TSE, MT. HEALTHY STATION
{ } - CINCINNATI 31, OHIO Aprdt 9, 1957
SUBJECT FUMES AT DIURANATE FURNACE, PLANT &
To A. J. Stefanec
From Re L, Ruhe
REFERENCE
oa Saturday, April 6, at approximately 2530 p.n., the nurse on duty
received @ call from one of the Plant 3 operators. He stated that
‘the funse at the new diurenate furnace were 20 heavy that he had
trouble tresthing. Phosphate cake was being roasted at the tine the
_ cell was received.
2 meaitored the air on the second floor, top level for sirborne
uranium contexination and obtained the following resulta?
No.of Concentesticn-< d/aAt3
Semples High low Average © MAC
$s 47,326 29,412 36,121 mw
2 was called tack about one and one-half hough Inter by C. Pursifi .
ghift foreman, who said thet the scrublet syytes hed now been
unplugged and wanted the arce resonitesed. ‘This tine the results
r were: 4
No.of Concentygticn-< ¢/n/its
Semple High ‘Sow Agerere |= - RMAC
Bea ph

RIRSbE

00267

NUO-CEN-S9R-2 £12. 14.85)


»®@

Our principal conclusions are es follows:

© plant records are too poor to arrive at accurate releases estimates of uraninm;

© official estimates are far too low and based on poor and partly deceptive methods of
calculation ~ they should be discarded;

° until such time as better estimates are calculated, a range of 270 to 1,400 metric tons
(600,000 to 3.1 million pounds) shouid be used for public health purposes.

© considerable further work needs to be dane to refine the estimates presented here.

Our estimate of 1,400 tons is obtained from a computer analysis of measurements of
‘uranium in soil samples around the plant. The preliminary results from this approach do
not corroborate the official estimates at all, dnd indicate that the releases may have been.
an order of magnitude higher. ‘We find it surprising the in all the years over which official
extmaies bere been made of urankun releases, there is 20 published anatyeis of any relense
estimate obtained from soil sample date.



ae.

brrciaL use omy BB
+

"

@ , NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY
: OF CHTO

_ December 7, 1960
SUBJECT: CLEANING UNDEA BURNOUT OXIDE CONVEYORS - PLANT 5
TO: R. H. Starkey
FROM: PF. de Elein

An atv dust evaluation was made on 10/29/60 of the dropping
- of inspection plates under the west burnout conveyor and the
' cleaning out of the wraninm oxide accumulation underneath
: the conveyor in Plant 5.

Pau

Five air sampling pumps were set up in the generdl area behind
bottom remeit furnaces where the operations took place, one
at the west separation booth area, one in front of #25 remelt
furnace and one at the west brealrout canning station. The
_ Pumps ran for approximately 7 hours which included the major
part of the cleaning operation. .

Z fhe air sampling results and description are as follows:

I. Samples taken while canvas tarpaulins were being hung to
. sett help confine the dust prior to dropping the inspection
@ . plates. This was done fron. 06:26 A.M. to 07335 A.M.

\ _ oe - The eir sample results averaged 2025 a or KE MAC
for the whole area during this hour, The canvas
contaminated with uranium oxide as it is used regularly
for this monthiy job.

2. Samples taken after canvas tarpaulins were hung and no

further operations from 07:35 A.M. to 08:35 A.M. (shift
change du this period and new shift crew grag. 8

Mae

organized). The air sample results averaged 69 a
or 1X Mac for the whole area during this hour.

3. The actual clean-out operation started between 08:35 A.M.
and 09:05 A.M, It was nearly completed at 3:00 P.M. and
.e Ly so air sampling was discontinued. The remainder of the work
. - consisted. of taking dow the canvas tarpaulin, routine
.--. ...., Vaeuum cleaning end water flushing the bottom remelt area.
“—— ” Daring the 5 hours of actual clean-out the entire west
stom remelt area averaged 359 X MAC. .

4 The individual air dust sample results and their respective
air semple pump locations are on the attached table.

sence Wel

a

ere)

od

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

vw

BEST COPY AVAILABLE =

2637818





- 5 -

Gevelop on s firm foundation of knowledge and experience asquired
and set forth by such men as R. S. Stone, E. 0. Wollan, R. D. Evans,
S. T. Cantril, H. MN. Parker, and G. Failis, to mention a few.

However, it spite of every conceivable precaution to prevent
radiation damage, health physics workers were not quite certain at
that time what ultimete success could reasonably be expected, since
the extrapolation from the 2-lb-radium age to the thousand-ton-radiun-
equivalent age was so great. As @ consequence, during ‘tes early days
of the development of atomic energy, a number of outstanding radiol-
ogists associated themselves Girectiy with the project. As time went
on, however, their success in avoiding radiation damage was much
greater than bad been snticipated, and one by one the radiologists
left the project, because there were no cases of radiation damage
and: they aid not have the opportunity te apply their skilis in this
new atomic energy field. A great deal of the credit for this successful
Program should be given te the hundreds of health physicists associated
with the various projects, who through the years have devoted their
every effort to making « study of the behavicr of radiation and to the

development of methods, procedares, and instruments to minimize

radiation damage.

3290300


gat we

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY F efi l

OF. OMS

P.O, BOX 158. MT. HEALTHY STATION

CINCINNATI St. ORI

A. J. Stefanec

c. =. Schumann

site

4

wih 9 :
L 2D yore
et
Yao During the week of april 12, 195k, an

April 15, 195k

AIR DUST SURVEY - PLANT 6 MACHINING AREA

2124423

effort was made to

determine the levels of airborne radioactive dust over &
continuous eight-hour period of machining operations. air

dust sampling was started at 8:15 a.m

. in each of the three

machining areas (Acme-Gridleys, Turret Lathes and Centerless
Grinders) and continued until b:15 pem. Each of the opere~

tions was sampled on different days.

Concurrent with the air dust sampling,

» operating conditions

and other incidents were also observed. An attempt is now
made to correlate these observations with the air dust
the-eause—

results sn@ to firther-deternine—

of. excessive,

dust exposures in these areas as indicated, by current urine

enalyses.

Weather conditions on each of these three days were similar.

All outside doors were open with roof
tion running continuously. Normal pri
in all areas.

Submitted herewith sre the results of

fans and other ventila-
eduction was maintained

this survey along with

comments and recommendations, Figures shown @re alpha A/a hd.

CES/m>

Attachments

nagRreg

c. E. Schumann



GiNiRAL FILES
a — -. =? ferirs
November 11, 1953

Occupational Histories Relating to Urinary Excretion Levels
J. W. Durkin, M.D. :
R. ¢. Heatherton

Your letter of November 5

213207¢

In addition to the work history of
the following are the work histories of the three men .
employed in Plant 6 mentioned in the letter. . -

; ’ Approx, :
Name No. Starting Date Job Description
Machine Tool Operator -
Centerless Grinders

Machine Tool Operator -
Acme-Gridleys

Machine Tool Operator -

Turret Lathes, Centerless

Grinders, Acme-Gridleys
Air surveys made in the machining section of Plant 6 in - “a
December 1952 and March 1953, showed the following average
‘concentrations for breathing ‘zone: ‘samptes~ for ~the ‘opérations
in question.

December 1952 March 1953

MAC : MAC
Acme-Gridley Opr. 153 Acme-Gridley Opr. 39
Contour Grinder Opr 213 Contour Grinder Opr.g1
Rough Grinder Opr. 646! Rough Grinder Opr. 154
Lathe Operator 336 Lathe Operator 79

We have no reason to expect that there will be any change in

the concentration since the March survey. We are not schedzed

to do any further checking at this time in the machining section cow:
unless 1t ig believed absolutely necessary. ~

. Yours truly,

RCH sbg R. C. Heatherton

ce: J. A. Quigley

NAS3


2131839

SEP 25 396%

Re. C, Le Kapil, Aves Mensger
U. 3. Atomio Zrergy Comission
P.O. Box 1°8

Cineinrati 39, Chico

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF VEHICLE COMPAMINATION SURVEY RESULTS
Dear mx. Karls

In complisnee with 2 verbal request from Mr. E. L.
your office to review the results of venisle cor-tsm
surveys with respeet ta tre vehicles poasivly tein; releused
$0 3 Goverraent poel the foliowir:~ is offared:

A review of tne results of past surveys for venicle co:tan: #ti>
indteate that, without decontamirstion, 6®E of the venicies extee:
the lists specified in ABC Manuel Chapter 5170-140, alt.ou.:
this pertains to "Uttldsstion acd Disposal of Feeess a:¢ Surviin
Property” the principle iryolved ia the ssav, vis., the relesss

‘~OF-Pactozetive: nated-venitcies for -pubdlts {or semiepoolic)
une.

In ad@ition, 100% of the venicsles «ould, as Lorwally escou ‘tered,
exceed the alpne radiation eortamivation limits of 560 cisinte- reels
per uinute per 106 equere cectivueters as specified {:. ceorse's
ICO Tariir vo. 13, #73.395. Approximately 48% of the venicles
wouls exceed the beta~-ganme init of 10 millirve:tgess per 24 :
This section alse indicates txat eso: vehisie “shall be trorou,: :t
Gleaned in suet a wenner that a resurvey of the isterior surface
shows the contazisation to be belcy these levels.” SHO sh oe
percentage values are subjuet to cnasge from day-to-day, trey io
indicate the secerel vehtele contamiration picture. The phrase
‘28 covaslly encoustered” was used to imply that is tne rectine
daily use of these venieles it ts quite likely tnat tney will
becoce contaminated. This ig cot surprising since, as you know,
shey are used daily througnowt tre Production area, i; many cesoe
be ppacepert urenicm feed usterials a:d/or redisactive serap

.

090543



é
*~

‘There were 430 sources of airborne emissions at FMPC. Of these 109 were point
sources and other were non-point sources, Of the point sources, about 70 to 75 stacks and
5 scrubbers were monitored or sampled. Thus, about 350 emission sources, incinding about
30 point sources and about 320 non-point sources were not monitored. Of these sources,
about 14 were denitration pots for conversion of uranyl nitrate to uranium trioxide, in
Planr2/3.5 Losses from the guiping of uranium trioxide have been estimated by
‘Westinghouse, as noted above, and are discussed in Section F below. In this section, we
deai with the remaining sources of unmeasured losses in this section, which number over
330.

‘There is one document dating ffom July 1964 which made an attempt to estimate the
_Josses from sources where there was no monitoring of emissions. The document is attached
to this paper. This is the only case in which we know that sach an attempt was made at all.
It ineinded $6 sources of unmeasured losses from all plants, except Plant 2/3.

RUHL Starkey, the author of the document estimated that unmeasured losses from about
56 sources amounted to 1,700 pounds per month. This estimate was based on 2

combination of spot sampling (29 sources) and “educated guesses” without any
measurements (37 out of 56 estimates).

Of these. 1700 pounds, 700 pounds are listed 2s unmeasured lostes tram four plant 8

* gerobbers, Since we are estimating these separately (see below) we omit these from our

estimation in this section of "unmessured losses’. Another 20 pounds per month are listed
as losses from the trash incinerator and oil bumer. These two sources have been
considered in the official History. We deal in this section with the remaining 980 pounds
per month from 50 unmeasured sources listed in the document 2s unmeasured losses. .

‘We have taken the unmeasured losses as reported in this document, and estimated the
losses for other years and plant by pro-rating them according to the plant-by-plant
production data in the addendum ‘to the official History of Radionuctide Losses. For
convenience, we have attached the data on production 2s part of the documents’ appendix

_ to this report.

Naturally, we expect that the variability in these estimates would be. very high
Moreover, it is probable that these estimates would understate the losses, because “guesses”
based on visual inspection wouid miss entirely emissions of fine particles. Indeed, the

3 EMPC Ar Exission Data Sheet, Plant 2/3"; July 19, 1085.



SUBJECT
TO

FROM
REFERENCE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY rm

rele

hyve

NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY OF OHIO

CINCINNATI, OHIO 45239

. oe
October 5, 1967 Hy’

EXPOSURE STUDY OF PLANT 8 PERSONNEL TO AIRBORWE RADIOACTIVE DUST
S. F. audia
RLM. Beers

Report issued by I H'& R, dated July 1967, Same Subject

The Reference Report reflects an increase in (OWE) from 0,9 NCG in

+1965 to 2.2 NCC in 1966. This report also indicates that 64% of

the personnel exceeded the NCG in 1966 as compared to 21% tn 1965.
Thus in either comparison approximately a three fold increase.

Reviewing the specific assignments and/or specific operations the
veport indicates the major problems are related to only a few items.

1. ASSIGNMENTS
_ es ses
1.1. Rotary Kiln and NPR Operator 0.9 7.1
1.2. Rowing Operators 0.9 43
2. OPERATIONS .
2.1. Chargiag Leach Tank 7.4 24.0
2.2. Changing drums at the Rotex
oversize station 1.4 76.0
2.3. Changing drums at the Rotex
packaging station 5.3 29.0
° 2.6, Charging Box Furnace 3.5 10.0
2.5. Changing drums at Rotary Kiln
packaging station 6.1 9.2
2.6. Charging Rotary Kiln feed tray 16 41.0

A PRIME CONTRACTOR FOR THE U.S. ATOMIC EXERGY COMMISSION


ACME-SFIDLEYS
3)
On Sheffield

(1) {2}
Where #2 In Aisle
AG Oper. 3+ EB. of Gauge, We
‘Stands #2 AG Oper. End of #2 aG Bebind 4
8:15 am to 9:15 am 95 50 63 25

. #5 started 8:32 am - #3 started 2:35 am - #2 a&:S er
Suall 1 min. fire in #2 ~ 3 min. fire in a at S598 ex
O0°am - #1 started at 9 ae

Another fire in #h at 9:
5 119 16
+25 am - out in 14 min. - all ee
smoke constantly
pair of ven Tilatio:

Fire in #2 at 9
9:15 em =
down at 10:00 am for re

9:15 am to 10:15 am
operating b
#5 ©
bh 5 15
- small 30 —
#3 stAil sui

10:15 am to 11:25 am 6
#3 & #h down 121 10:h5 em
#2 ~ fire in # at 10:47 am -
with ventilation on.
9... am to 12:15 pm 22 Bae 12 17
Zunch period ~ no operations
12:15 pm to 1:15 om 79 53 9 8h
ad : ALL.6. machines operating - smoke still arigtiagtivon
= small fire in #2, quickly extinguished. .
1:15 om to 2:15 pm 65 23 72 ; 3
#3 not ruming - glowing turnings slid down siIug
slide and burned out on floor by openstore
2225 pm to 5:15 pm 53 27 WS 69
: Pire in #2 turnings tray, extinguished in 1 min. -
small fire in #4.
2h BL

26 pas
#2 running only 10 min. 360 machines operating

20 min. - small fire in 76.

-arane


i.

BOOS History and Risk Assescuent

INTRODUCTION

Recently, bioassay: ‘les. from several FHPC employees
were reported by an ide laboratory to contain smal]

amounts of ‘plutonium.

significant reaction among empl:
be’s general lack of information about Pletonium. The

Purpose of this- doc

These results have caused

loyees, and there appears to

ument is to briefly describe how

plutonium became an issue at FMPC; discuss the current.
Situation; and assess the signi
bioassay results.

DESCRIPTION OF Poos HISTORY

In 1985 a DOE Task Force evaluated the processing of

"recycle uraniga”

uranium was defined as uranium
from irradiated production reactor fuel. It was known to
contain traces of transuranic (
TRU ities were usually limited to

impurities.
Neptuniun-23:

uranius.

One of the finding:
Uranium was that many

7 and Plutontum-238 and
radioactivity of the TRU
that 0.1% of the

processes performed at DOE faci

Ficance of the positive

at several OOE facilities. Recycle

that had been recovered
TRU) and fission product
+239, and the

iapurities was generally less
total radioactivity of the recycle

S Of from the Task Force on Recycle
of the chemical and physical

lities tend to

Separate impurities from the uraniun product. The
wechanism for this is iTlustrated by the following

generalized

reaction:

Uranium feed + Reagent-- Uranium product + Byproduct

The uranium feed would contain the trace of TRU impurity
that was typical of recycle uranium. A portion of the Tru
inpurities wold end up in the orantus product end ®
portion in products. vast majority o!

to the uranius product, but a small amount

uranium goes
does end up in the byproduct.
Tatio of to U is slightly 7

The end result is that the
lower in the product than it

was in the feed, but that ratio is such higher in the

byproduct th:

jan it was in the feed.

Pazt RAR


Airdust Evaluation of Pulling a Plant 4 Reactor Screw
K. N. Ross
July 7, 1967 Pege 3

4s can be seen from the above date, air dust levels are well
above the HOG, Respiratory protection is neteasary when
Performing this operation. On the basia of the air dust levels,
air-supplied respiratory protection would be required if it
Would not create a safety hazard from the trailing hoses.

It ia also recommended that reactor screws be removed and
tepaired before they become as badly broken up as this one was.
This should heip to lower the air dust exposure by lowering
doth the concentration of dust and the amount of time necessary
to change the screw.

ORIGINAL SIGNED 8%
D. G Jones

ORIGINAL SIGNED 8Y
R. 3. Keim
jiw

3021873


>

B. ADDITIONAL GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE OFFICIAL ESTIMATES

In the July 1988 report we discussed a great many problems with existing dat on
radionnclide emission to the atmosphere, generally tending in the direction of
underestimates of emissions, Some additional general problems have come to light since
that time.

In particular, Michael W. et i
1968-1972, sated a = deposition thar nals of « eat many stack fers were made
igfrequentiy. In the inmerim zeroes were entered into the stack loss data sheets wit aut [TOES

For example, sero losses were recorded fox Paat § during the,
entire from 1970 to 1978 and from 1977 to 1981, even 1 1 there was
Secacins Pan Girone wees of thase year ~

In the July 1988 repor, we noted the fact that stack monitocing probes were somerimes

and that vacuum lines to. the stack monitors were.sometimes disconnected. As

inte a8 1985, the Oak Ridge Associated Universities inspection team found that ail four of

the probes it inspected were partly pingged. ‘We further reported thete that inspection of
baghouses were sometimes vory infrequent, in violation of FMPC procedures.

‘Thus, it is impossible to tell at present whether actual observation of no material
collected in a filter would really: correspond to low losses or whether substential losses
might have gons undetected, :

Boback also stated that be did not look st information from various baghouses to see
which ones -were-opesating.when he and his colleagues compiled the officiat History of

Rasionnclide Discharges.

Given these facts and admissions, the official date for the extire 1969 to 1982 period for
monitored dust collectors-nmst be deemed to be at best seriously suspect and at worst
scientifically worthiess. “We have therefore decided to discard the official data from: this
period for the dust collectors and to'substimte estimares based an average losses per unit of
penton daring the Sek. I957 1969 Pind wes (ho recrd indus et mals?
data was probably not the practice at FMPC,

‘To make alternative eximate, we Set calculated foe Plant 2/3, Plants 4 trough 9204
the Pilot Plant the dust loses per unit of production for the 1957-1969 period. We obtained

* Depeation of Michael [MEGA W. Babac. ken bythe plaints athe office of Wate, Schneider

‘April 18, 1

entereef



- “auTHOR A, J. STERPEC BL. PRIVATE OFFICIAL USE OR

DSCEHBER. 1955
COMPARASES WEIGHTED EXPOSURE OF PLANT.9 PERSONNEL

TABLE I _
Daily Weighted
Exposures
Multiples of MAC
Job ‘tion . No of May 17 to Nov. 4 to
T . Employees Oct. 31 Nov. 23
Wet Area Operator - up 3 34.8 6.5e
Wet Area Operator - down 3 215.1 2.78
Wet Area helpers 2 46.9 6.22
Sump operators and helpers 7.3 3.34
REDUCTION AREA .
Reduction charging operato> 3 kL 2.67
Reduction charging helpers -3 233-72 3.49
Jolter operators 3 210 3-30
Reduction furnace helper 3 4.32 2.67
Breakout operato> 3 14.9 12.20
Derby cleaning operator. 2 6.21 5-42
Dezincing operator and helpers — 20.60 0.67

ARC FURNACE -

Primary welder 6 25.06 89.4
Secondary welders 3 5.8: 27.8
Secondary welder helpers 3 685. 122.
Primary arc furnace operators r- 4873.03 23.
and helpers :
Secondary are furnace operators 6 1.71 43.78
and helpers
MACHINING
Deroy saw operator ° 12.87 4.93
Ingot saw operator: 2 17.67- 5.63
Engine lathe operator 20.60 10.
Centeriess grinder >, & helper6 10.46 Operations
furret lathe operator 71 3 6.22 not performec
Turret lathe operator #2 3 25.41 during this
period,
MISCELLANEOUS .
Residue operator 3 2-66 5-23
Chip processing operator 3 39 _
Slug stamper 3 4.23 Operations
Quality Control operator 3 4.91 not performec
Final Inspection i 4,91 during this
- period.
Fork Lift Operator 4 aaike 3-31
Shift Foreman 3 4D 8.33
Area Foreman i gzan 5.17
Clerks 4 1.36 2-1
Superintendent z 21.59 1.
Bon es
316345:


FA

. : Sepnenber 27, 1908
AM DOM KVINTEA OF MELARD LAKE = SEVIER SUCK SCP

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

a. % Rates

Ke H Ress
Re My Hine

read

mest
GL

wa

1 TIae

Ai vw