J-S82037-17

2018 PA Super 65

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

DANIEL JACOB PIER,

 Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 988 WDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 12, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001536-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STEVENS, P.J.E.,* and STRASSBURGER, J.**

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2018

Daniel Jacob Pier (Appellant) appeals from the June 12, 2017 order that 

denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with aggravated assault and 

endangering the welfare of a child, claiming that he caused multiple injuries, 

including fractures of the arms and legs, to his less-than-two-month-old child, 

and failed to seek medical attention. N.T., 1/6/2016, at 7-8. Appellant pled 

no contest to the charges.1 On March 8, 2016, Appellant was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of 23 to 46 months of incarceration. Appellant’s post-

 

1 The Commonwealth thereafter dismissed other charges not discussed herein. 
J-S82037-17

- 2 -

sentence motion to modify sentence nunc pro tunc was denied on March 28, 

2016, and he filed no direct appeal. 

Appellant timely filed a PCRA petition on August 24, 2016. Counsel was 

appointed, and, after transcripts were produced, a supplemental petition was 

filed on March 13, 2017. On May 10, 2017, the PCRA court issued notice of 

its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not respond, and the PCRA court dismissed 

the petition by order of June 12, 2017. Appellant timely filed a notice of 

appeal, and both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2 

“Our standard of review of a [PCRA] court order granting or denying 

relief under the PCRA calls upon us to determine ‘whether the determination 

of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal 

error.’” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011)). 

On appeal, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in denying his 

PCRA petition because his plea was unknowing and involuntary. Specifically, 

Appellant claims that his plea was invalid because (1) plea counsel “failed to 

advise [Appellant] of his right to withdraw his no contest pleas and of the 

distinct legal standards relating to withdrawal of a plea prior to sentencing and 

 

2 The PCRA court did so by directing our attention to its Rule 907 notice for 

the reasons for its decision. 
J-S82037-17

- 3 -

post-sentencing;” and (2) the “pleas were a product of a false and coerced 

confession made to the police investigators[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

To the extent that Appellant is challenging the effectiveness of his plea 

counsel, we bear in mind that counsel is presumed to be effective. 

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 112 A.3d 1194, 1197 (Pa. 2015). To prevail 

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must prove 

each of the following: “(1) the underlying legal claim was of arguable merit; 

(2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and 

(3) the petitioner was prejudiced—that is, but for counsel’s deficient 

stewardship, there is a reasonable likelihood the outcome of the proceedings 

would have been different.” Id. 

Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea[3] will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or 

unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the 

advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on 

whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “Thus, to establish prejudice, the 

 

3 Appellant pled no contest rather than not guilty. However, “[i]t is well 

established that a plea of nolo contendere is treated as a guilty plea in terms 

of its effect upon a given case.” Commonwealth v. V.G., 9 A.3d 222, 226 

(Pa. Super. 2010). The standards for voluntariness and withdrawal of the

plea are the same in both instances. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(A)(3) (discussing 

understanding and voluntary requirement of guilty or nolo contendere plea); 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 591 (providing one set of standards for withdrawal of plea of 

guilty or nolo contendere). 
J-S82037-17

- 4 -

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Barndt, 74 A.3d at 192 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

To the extent that Appellant contends that his plea was involuntary 

because of his allegedly-coerced confession, Appellant must establish that his 

confession was constitutionally infirm, that the circumstances surrounding the 

plea make it likely that the confession caused him to enter the plea, and that 

counsel incompetently advised Appellant to enter the plea. Commonwealth

v. Nelson, 574 A.2d 1107, 1110-11 (Pa. Super. 1990). 

Appellant does not discuss his two challenges separately. Rather, the 

entirety of his argument is as follows.

[Appellant] has alleged that counsel was ineffective in failing 

to advise him of his right to withdraw his no contest pleas and 

most importantly the distinct legal standards for said withdrawal 

based upon pre-sentencing and post-sentencing withdrawal.

[Appellant] asserts that his no contest pleas were the 

product of his preceding confession to the police interrogators, 

which confession was false and the product of coercion by those 

police agents who promised that he would be permitted to leave 

[] the police station after he falsely admitted to the charges 

involving the assault and mistreatment of the infant, M.P. The 

recitation of the impact the false confession had on the election 

thereafter to enter the no contest pleas would have afforded 

[Appellant] with a fair and just reason to seek to withdraw the no 

contest pleas, if he had been apprised of his right to exercise that 

option. [Appellant] has provided further proof that his confession 

was in fact false and the product of police coercion in the form of

statement from his parents, James Pier and Leann Pier, which 

statements were appended to the supplemental PCRA before the 

[PCRA c]ourt. His pa[r]ents recite that Kristen Farley, (mother of 
J-S82037-17

- 5 -

M.P.), admitted to both of them on September 23, 2014 that she 

knew that [Appellant] lied about his confession because she was 

fully aware that he had never hurt her or the baby, which was the 

predicate for the criminal charges to which he confessed and 

ultimately pled no contest to in regard to the injuries to M.P. and 

the failure to seek prompt and necessary medical care for the 

infant. This admission by Kristen Farley corroborates and 

supports [Appellant’s] instant challenges to the legal efficacy of 

the no contest pleas.

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5. 

We are unpersuaded that the PCRA court erred or abused its discretion 

in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant cites no authority to 

support his claim that effective assistance of plea counsel requires a discussion 

of the nuances of the standards for pre- and post-sentence withdrawal of the 

plea. On the other hand, the PCRA court, citing the requisites of a plea 

colloquy, notes that confirmation that a defendant is making a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary plea does not require that the defendant have any 

understanding of the legal standards for withdrawal of the plea. Notice of 

Intent to Dismiss, 5/10/2017, at 5 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 and Comment 

thereto). 

Another defect in Appellant’s argument noted by the PCRA court is that

it is contrary to “[t]he longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law ... that a 

defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while 

under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies.” Commonwealth 

v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 881 (Pa. Super. 2007). Notice of Intent to 

Dismiss, 5/10/2017, at 4-5.
J-S82037-17

- 6 -

The record reveals that, after discussing Appellant’s rights, the factual 

basis for the plea, and the penalties he faced, and after Appellant indicated 

his desire to plead no contest, the trial court colloquied Appellant as follows.

THE COURT: Do you understand everything so far?

[Appellant]: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand the rights that you 

waive or give up when you enter a plea?

[Appellant]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand these two offenses 

that you’re entering a plea to?

[Appellant]: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that even though 

you’re pleading no contest, you will stand convicted of these 

charges? Do you understand that?

[Appellant]: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you had enough time to think about 

what to do in your case?

***

[Appellant]: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the legal 

representation you’ve received?

[Appellant]: Yes. 

THE COURT: Do you feel pressured or forced or has 

anyone promised you anything to enter this plea?

[Appellant]: No.

* * *
J-S82037-17

- 7 -

THE COURT: Has anyone promised you any type of 

sentence in your case?

[Appellant]: No.

THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any 

substance that would [a]ffect your ability to know what you’re 

doing?

[Appellant]: No.

THE COURT: Is your plea here knowing and voluntary, 

meaning you know what you’re doing and you’re voluntarily 

entering your plea?

[Appellant]: Yes. 

N.T., 1/6/2016, at 8-10.

“A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he 

makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea 

colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 

2003). Hence, even if we saw any logic behind Appellant’s claim that he would 

not have lied at the plea colloquy had he known that it would have been harder 

to withdraw his plea after sentencing than it would have been before 

sentencing, we would agree with the PCRA court that Appellant cannot obtain 

relief now based upon the claim that he lied under oath then. 

Order affirmed.
J-S82037-17

- 8 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2018