184
Health and Safety at Iowa State College

Because the Ames Project at first fell under the jurisdiction of the
Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, there was always a concern for the health of
fhe workers on the project, Ames worked with uranium in ton amounts and
most of the health considerations evolved from that work in the pilot plant
situation. As long as the chemists were involved in research with the various
elements, typical laboratory precautions were taken, Ventilating hoods to take
the dust away from workers were already being used before the war and
obviously continued throughout. Respirators were used on occasion, and
some scientists remembered that lead aprons were around when needed to
work with particularly hazardous chemical materials. Chemists were generally
careful people, trained in working with danger. So if explosians were a
problem, they built walls to hide behind when processes could be potentially
dangerous. Even when working with the unknown, they took precautions
based upon what was in the research literature about the chemicals with which
they were working, Uranium was thought to be toxic when ingested, so proper
methods of handling akeady discussed were implemented at Ames when
scientists were working with the materials. Rarely did any scientist receive

more than cuis or abrasions from the work they were doing. Spedding

indicated that when experiments were discussed in the Sunday seminars,
instructions were also included on safety precautions. It was most often when
someone was careless that problems occured, such as falling off a chair, or
doing something careless to get metal in the eyes Those were typical accidents



205

Engineer District was tranafezred io this civilian board, and later that year,
the Ames Laboratory appeared to administer atomic energy research at
Towa State College.

When the OSRD disappeared, weapona research was in limbo. The
inilitary picked up the slack by contracting directly with institutions. ‘The
Navy established its Office of Naval Research (ONR) and adopted the
research contract as its mechanism of administering research. Weaponry
though was not its only interest. As the military egencies came to realize,
the future of military reaearch was dependent upon advances in the
fundamental sciences. Boyd Keenan in Science and the University
examined the role of military research after the war and concinded that
“realizing that the future of naval weaponry depended on progress in the
entire range of sciences, ONR provided support and let contracts in fields

ranging all the way from biology to physical sciences, mathematics, nuclear
any of the

science, and engineering,"255 Military research fanders use any of
" structures that characterized war research and certainly exhibited the

attitude that research was related to national security. ,

Vannevar Bush had set the stage for the third path as early as 1944 in
his Science: Tha Endless Frontier when he stated, “it is my judgment that
the national interest in scientific research and scientific education can best
be promoted by the creation of a National Research Foundation.3% This
foundation should

68) epee R Keenan, Sciatte and the University (New York: Columbia University Press,
1966}, p. 47,
386Bush, 1945, 27.



201

think it would be mutually beneficial to both parties, It would
permit the institute to obtain men who would feel a greater
security in being members of a regular department, and it would
give us pleasant relationships with the other departments
involved. It would permit the department to have more exerts
on their t teaching 3, SO that a wider variety of courses could be
given!

Asking for an initial budget of $50,000, Spedding got his institute after
some negotiations with the University of lowe, which wanted to establish its
own nuclear institute”? After several meetings and discussions, both schools
were satisfied. On November 1, 1945, the Institute for Atomic Energy at Iowa
State College and the University of fowa’'s institute of Nuclear Research were
approved by the Board of Education. 38 In 1947, the Ames Laboratory was

S78spedding. “Letter to President Friley;" 6.

379These negotiations revolved around the role of fundamental research in chemistry
and physics at Iowa State College. President Virgil Hancher from the University of Iowa
precipitated the discussion when he wrote to President Friley after a Des Maines Register
ardcle implied that Iowa State was about to enter andamental physics research rather than
continue with the type of appiled research undertaken for the Manhattan District. He
questioned: why Iowe State should suddenly enter’a type of study that previonsly was Iowa's
responsiblity. In an eloquent reply to Hancher, riley axgued that Iowa State rust conduct
fundamental research in those areas of chemistry and physics that relate to its ing war
yesearch in atomic energy, “These two aspects of any research cannot be separated. Si
applied sclence always springs from pure science the two have to go together or the applied
science dries up and becomes sterile.” He went an to indicate that duplication was teally the
problem, and, of course, Iowa State would not duplicate those known strengths of the
University of lowa. {Virgil M, Hancher, “Letter ¢o Charles 5. Friley Refe: to Article in
Paper on Establishing an Atomic Institute,” Septembor 13, 1945, Papers from the Office of the
President, Charles E. Friley, located in the Robert Parks and Biten Sorge Library, lowa State
University, Ames, Iowa fter called the Friley Papers); Charles E, 7, “Letter to
Virgil M. Hancher Regarding Creation of an Atomic Institute," September 25, 1945, Ames
Labora! Papers, 2. See also R. M. Hixon, “Letter to Charles E. Feliey on Fundamental and
Applied ience Issues,” September 15, 1945, Ames Laboratory Papers; Harold Y. Gaskill,

ter to Charles Friley on ending the Institute,” October 12, 1945, The Ames

Laboratory Papers; G, W. Stewart, “Minutes of a Meeting of a Group from iowa State College
and the University of Jowa,” November 1, 1945, Friley Papers; Harold Y. Gaskill, “Letter to
Charles Friley on Establishing the Institute,” November 9, 1945, Friley Papers; R. 2.
Buchanan, “Letter to Dean HV, Gaskill Regarding the Role of the Graduate College in the
Institute,” November 13, 1945, Friley Papers.)

380 ysinates of the Stake Board of Education, Novernber 2-3, 1945, 317.



210

Interviews and Private Files

Edith Landin, Ames, IA

Manuscript History of the Ames Project, dictated by Frank Spedding to
Edith Landin, in approximately 50 shart chapters, pi mover
individually and others not af all

Miscellaneous Papers and Reports of Frank H, Spedding

‘Transcripts of Eight Interviews Conducted by Frank Spedding’s
Datighter, Elizabeth Calciano from 1979-1980

Carolyn Payne, Ames, IA

Interview with Wayne Calderwood, February 18, 1991
Interviews with Norman Carlson, July 2, 1990, April 1992
Interview with Adrian Daane (telephone), March 18, 1992
Interview with Bess Ferguson, April 1986,
Tnterview with Margaret Mae Gross, January 14, 1992
Interviews with David Peterson, July 10, 1990, April 1992
interviews with Harry Svec, February 18, 1991, April 1992
~ Interview with "AdolP" Voigt, July 2, 1990
Interview with Harley A. Wilhelm, August 17, 1990
Interview with Harley A. Wilhelm (telephone), July, 1989
Interview with Daniel Zaffarano, February 15, 1991

Other Interview Recordings and Ty anseripts in Author's Possession

Premo Chiotti Interview with Barton C. Hacker, October 20, 1980

Norman Hilberry Interview with George Tressel, 1967

David T. Peterson Interview with lacker, October 22, .1980_.

Frank H, Spedding iterview with Hacker, Ocfober 21, 1980

Frank H. Spedding Interview with Dorothy Kehlenbeck, July 5, 1961

Frank H. Spedding Interview with Harry Svec, September 1984

Frank H. Spedding Interview with George Tressel, fully 12, 1967

Frank H. Spedding Interview with Russ Van Dyke, December 1962 -

Frank Spedding, Harley A. Wilhelm, Adrian Daane Interview, May 1967

Adolph Voigt, Norman Carlson, and David Peterson Interview for “A
Common Ground,” a radio program, March 28, 1967

Harley A Wilhelm Interview with Jim Chimbidis, December 1991

Harley A. Withelm Interview with Laura Kline, 1987

Harley A. Wilhelm Interview with Laura Kline, November 14, 1988
(partial transcript only}

Recording of the 40th Reunion Dinner for Manhattan Project
Employees, fume 1985



178

Biological research section

Most of the biological research dealt with the maximum permissible
exposures to radiation. The roentgen had already been established as the unit
measure in monitoring radiation activity, but further studies were conducted
throughout the war on large exposure in chain reacting piles or other
conditions where large amounts of alphe and beta particles and gamma rays
might be present. Studies of the decay of various fission products like iodine,
strontium, barium, and yitrium were conducted in relation to the metabolism
of these elements by animals and humans, Ihe effects of plutonium on the
human body was also examined, and researchers found that it was indeed just
as dangerous as radium when deposited in the bone, Studies examined the
elimination of these elements from the body, while others examined

overexposure in animals and humans49

349Summartes of the research appear in Stone, “Health Protection Activities,” 16-19
and S. f. Cantril, “Biological Bases for ‘imum Permissible Exposures,” in Stone, Indusériat
Medicine, 36-74. For more details sce the individual reports that were also presented at a

osium at the 32nd annual meeting of the Radiological Society of North America,

cago, December 1-6, 1946, The reports were published in an issue of Radiology in 1947 and
include the following: Raymond Zirkle, “Components of the Acute Lethal Action of Slow
Neutrons,” Radiology 49 eptember 1947 271-273; Egon Lorenz et al,, *Biological Studies in
the Tolerance Range,” Radiology 49 (September 1947}: 274-285; Leon ©. Jacobson and E. K,
Marks, “The Hematological Effects of lonizing Radiation's in the Tolerance Range,” Radiology
49 September 1947): 286-298; C. Lacid Prosser et al., “The Clinical Sequence of Physiological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation in Animals,” Radiology 49 (September 1947): 299-313; John R.
Raper, “Effects of Tota? Surface Beta Irradiation,” Radiology 49 (September 1947}: 314-324;
Joseph G. Harailton, “The Metabolism of the Fission Products and the Heaviest Elements,”
Radiology 49 Geptember 1947: 325-343; William Bloom, “Histological Changes Following
Radiation Exposures,” Radiology 49 (September 1947): 344.34; P. 5. Henshaw, E. P. Riley, and
G. E, Stapleton, “The Biologic Effects of File Radiations,” Radiology 49 (September 1947}: 349-
360; and Hermann Lisco, Miriam P. Finkel, and Anstin M. Brues, “Carcinogenic Properties of
Radioactive Fission Products and Plutonium,” Radiology 49 September : 361-363,



188

and since much of the wark took place in hot months without the luxury of air
conditioning, respirators and masks, though required for particularly dusty
work, were sometimes discarded for worker comfort. Rules and regulations
were clearly spelled out by project leaders, but it was up to the individual work
chiefs to enforce them while also completing the production work on time.382
David Peterson, one of the foremen on the project, remembered:

There was a higher level of concern, probably at the higher levels
of management, and we were given some instructions on what to
do. I was acting as either assistant foreman or foreman for a crew
of from six to fifteen or sixteen people. We had the direct
responsibility for seeing that things were done as they should
have been done. In a situation of that type it often falls on the
immediate supervisor to make some decisions with his own
judgment. I would say that we were perhaps occasionally guilty of
erring on the side of, “Weil, let’s get the job done and not worry
foo much about this or that safety, rule.” ... There were other
factors at that time which were probably weighed in. This was a
period of wartime. There were other hazards besides radioactivity
to be concerned with. There was a great deal of emphasis and
interest in trying to push things along quickly, ane reason being
that at that ame it "as not atall known for certain that the
Germans weren't working along parailel line 36

Dust was a particular industrial problem on the Ames Project, as it wes
evidently throughout the District, probably even mote of a problem than
radiation exposure itself. Uranium salts had to be ground, which produced
dust; boosters and other materials placed in reaction with uranium had to be
ground from salt or compound chunks; cleaning uranium caused dust; and

362spedding, Wilhelm, Daane interview 1967, 19-20; Chiotti, interview with Hacker
198, 19-20; faterview with Hacker, 7-8, 10, 15-15, For the example of obtaining fans
for metal work in the chemistry building see W. F. Coover, “Letter to F. H. Spsiing
Regarding Order of Fans and Rating Problems Slowing Deliveries,” July 31, 1942, Ames
Laboratory Papers.

%63Peterson, interview with Hacker, 4-5.



206

develop and promote a national policy for scientific research and
scientific education, should support basic research in nonprofig
arganizations, should develop scientific talent in American youth
by means of scholarships and fellowships, and should by contract
and otherwise support long-range research on military affaire.587

Bush thought that his foundation would ineorporate medical research,
natural science research, and military research, That did not happen, but
eventually the National Science Foundation, created in 1950, contained many
of Bush’s ideas about research that he had developed in his capacities as
head of several warselated organizations. Interestingly though, it did not
allow support of secret research. After much debate in Congress, the
“representatives decided that fimdamental, scientific research was of such
great national importance as to warrant the expenditure of Federat funds in
its support,88 Again, the inference to national security determined the
direction and structure of thie new organization. It bad embodied many of
the principles of war-related research, including its primary administrative
structures—the flexible contract, no geographic requirements for the
research work, the cost, plus nio-profit principles, and institutional rather
than individual contracting responsibilities.

Tn conetusion, in the post-war period, science again became linked
with national security, which was by law a federal responsibility. Research
funding also came under junisdiction of the federal government because
there the most monay could be expended to secure America’s future in a real
war or in a cold war. This attitude was an important carry-over from war

387Bnsh. 1945. 27.
88. Annual Report of the National Science Foundation, 1 (1950-51; vii.



169

these false cures, research began to be published on just how much radioactive
material a person could safely ingest 52 :

This idea of tolerance was debated widely throughout the late twenties
and thirties.2# Developing out of the debate came the fitst quantified measure
of exposure tolerance, the roe#igen. Adopted at the 1928 International Congress
of Radiology. it was based upon the ionization per unit volume of air by the
radioactive rays in question.331 By 1934, the agreed upon exposute for a ,
human being was no more than .1 roentgen (r)/day for most of the body and
perhaps 5 r/day for the fingers. This tolerance standard remained in force
throughout the next decade and became the starting point for the Manhattan
Engineer District to use for its atornic bomb project. #2 By 1941, the National
Bureau of Standards had also published the first handbook detailing safe
standards of handling radioactive substances. Fortunately, this handbook
proved to be just in time for the war projects; subsequent health and safety
protections substantially built upon these published standards.533

‘The Health Division at the Metallurgical Project _

When the Chicago Metallurgical Project was created in 1942, health
issues began to be discussed in earnest. The materials to be used in the project

823 packer, Dragon's Tail, 23-24: Lang, “A Most Valuable Accident: 49, Si.

220For a discussion of tolerance and a general history of radiation standards see
Lauriston S. Taylor, Radiation Protection Standards (Cleveland: CRC Press, 1971}, 13-21.

*81Glasser et al, 228-230.
382 Taylor, Radiation Protection Standards, 18-19.
S33 packer. Dragon's Tail, 25.



199

CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF THE AMES PROJECT UPON
IOWA STATE COLLEGE

From 1942-1945, Iowa State College, like many ather colleges and
universities conducted classified, war-related research. At the beginning of
World War 1, no administrative structures existed for academic institutions to
conduct classified research. By the'end of the wat, however, three unifs—the
NDRC, OSRD, and the Manhattan Engineer District—had coordinated and
funded warrelated research. Each of these units contributed to winning the
war, but each was a temporary agency. It was apparent at the end of this war
that scientists wanted to continue the research started and sustained by these
agencies, For one thing, the agencies had allowed xesearch to be conducted on
campuses across the nation, not at some remote military site. Structures to
handle the administration of research had been developed at institutions, and
they-did not want to see the benefits disappear: after the war. There was talk of
converting the war-time weapon to peacetime uses under civilian control,
and alveady there were pockets of research around the country that could
continue the efforts if an infusion of funds flowed from the federal
government. Even lowa State, a small college by many national standards, had
been greatly affected by the war-time research efforts.

In many ways, lowa State could not return to the normalcy of the pre-
war years. The College, like others in the nation, saw its enrollment
burgeoning after the war years in both undergraduate and graduate areas.
Spedding understood the future possibilities and immediately after the war



185

recorded by the scientists throughout the war period. This same attitude
continued under the Manhattan Engineer District.357

Radiation was never a large problem at Ames, but unfamiliar elements,
like beryilium, probably caused the greatest risks at Iowa State. Little was
known about dangerous levels of exposure fo this chemical, but it was a
concern because Iowa State experimented with this element in quantity,
particularly in crucible making. Beryllium was an insidious killer in many
installations, but Jowa State scientists had a pasticular built in safety feature all
around them—latge amounts of calcium. Unknown at the time, beryllium
was a bone seeker, but if the body could get enough calcium, it would reject
beryllium. Fortunately, there were great quantities of calcium around the
Arnes laboratory.388

There were a few instances at Iowa State of overexposure fo beryllium by
the scientists, and nationally there were over fifty known deaths from
handling of this material. Norman Carlson, for example, one of the
researchers, received too much beryllium and was put into the university
hospital with a high fever for a short time. He did recover though and had no
further exposure problems.95? Premo Chiotti, another scientist on the project,
zemembered that he ico visited Dz. Grant at the hospital for an overexposure
problem. Ironically, his developed not from the reduction experiment that

$8?gpedding, interview with Barton Hacker, 1980, 14, 24, 29,38-29; Prema Chioiti,
interview with Barton Hacker, 1980 in Ames Laboratory Papers, 3, 11-15; David Peterson,

interview with Barton Hacker, 1980 in Ames Laboratory Papers, 4, 9, 12, 15; Spedding,
Wilhelm, Daane interview 1967, 23-24; Frank Spedding, interview with George Tressel 1967,

16.

58Spedding, interview with Hacker, 1980, 18.
59Carlson, interview with the author. 1990, 7.



191-

in uranium: samples at the rate of 1-2 parts-per-million, enough to
contaminate the runs. After a thorough investigation, the culprit was found to
be the shower, After the men showered, they used a preparation to teat
athlete's foot that contained boron. They tracked the boron info the plant from
the shower, thus contaminating the uranium runs. A sign finally had to be
placed in the shower area warning against certain powder preparations.367

Occasionally, there were people on the Ames Project who did not follow
safety rules. The most noforious person at Ames was a man known locally as
the “Green Hornet” because he did not properly shower or clean up after
working on the shift. According to the prevailing stories, he did not wear a
respirator and refused to take other precautions in his dusty work. Since
uranium fetrafluoride was a green salt, the dust stuck to his clothes, giving
him his nickname. Unfortunately though, no one knows exactly what
happened to this man as a result of his dangerous overexposure to dust,
Spedding told the story in his manuscript history that this man was chosen as
one of the most likely subjects to be tested for heavy exposure to uranium. He ,
was approached by one of the medical researchers asking for a sample of bone
fissue from his sternum. Apparently, he agreed but when time came for the
test, he yanished, from the room, and from the project, The Ames Project
owed him several days of pay, but he never came back to claim it. No one
evidently ever heard from him again.368

387Frank H. Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 5-6

368 Frank Spedding, “The Green Hornet," Spedding Manuscript, 3-4. The story was also
repeated in vai detail in the following sources: Adolf Voigt. interview with the author
1990, 6; Spedding, im, Daane interview 1967, 15-16.



187

genetally knew to handle certain substance carefully. When Iowa State
instituted a pilot plant, a razity for an educational institution, two problems
arose: scientists were unfamiliar with some industial safety practices in some
cases, and workers, often from the community, had to be hired who were often
unfamiliar with even routine industrial practices. They rarely had enough
security clearance to know the dangers of the materials with which they were
working. Most of the foremen though. who wete in charge of shifts and the
Production areas, were, in most cases, at least undergraduates in chemfatry, so
they did know about chemical reactions. but most had little training in
industrial practices. At first these foremen, with the help of other scientific
leaders, instituted safety and health procedures much like any college research
laboratory. Ventilation and hoods were provided, but it soon became apparent
that stricter adherence to safety would be needed. There was also a basic
conflict trying to balance safety with accomplishing the work in time to win the
war. Iowa State's production facility was set up in a small house-like building
that had to be equipped with even the basics in safety features. Due to the
emergency, much of the early work was not done under the best of conditions,
and there was certainly a make-do attitude combined with great difficulty in
obtaining safety equipment, or any equipment for that matter, For example,
most of the tools that had been obtained from Bill Maitland’s shop garden in
downtown Ames were hand-driven, so power appatatus had to adapted and
added to them. Also many of the grinders, cutting mills, and machining tools
were originally manufactured for other industrial purposes and nahurally did
not have all the necessary safety features for working with uranium. It took
months to obtain fans that were needed for proper ventilation in the building.



200

started pushing for the creation of an atomic institute at Iowa State to
incorporate the physical chemistry and physics research into a permanent
laboratory at lowa State College. Spedding formalized his plans in a letter to
President Charles Friley in September 1945, calling for a state-funded institute
to cut across several disciplines, continuing the work started during the war:

I believe that a permanent institute should be set up, similar fo
the Agricultural Experiment Station ... which would cut across
all divisions and departments, and that this institute should have
its own state budget independent of any federal money which
might and almost certainly would be forthcoming. In this way we
could build a sound research organization which would have
security over a long range, and which would not be subject to the
whims of federal patronage... Further, ... we should be in a
much better position to maintain our freedom of thought, action
and research when accepting any federal aid 377

However, Spedding saw more than just an independent research
laboratory providing services to the government in return for federal funding.
He wanted the institute to be fully incorporated into the academic structure of
the institution. Perhaps because of the concern left from his own lean years of
searching for an academic appointment, he insisfed that the institute be fully
functioning within the academic structure:

I feel that the institute should be closely integrated with the
Science departments on the campus, since the everyday contacts
of scientists with their exchange and clashes of ideas are very
fruitful in producing new discoveries. I believe this close
relationship could be maintained by having the permanent
members of the institute working 2 definite part-time for the
institute and a definite part-time for the departments in their
major fields. This arrangement would of course have to be
voluntary with the heads of the departments concerned, but I

97?Frank Spedding, “Letter to President Charles E, Friley Regarding Creation of the
Institute for Atomic Research“ September 6, 1945, Ames Laboratory Papers, 3.



192
hygiene group. The program also had a large field effort that encouraged
doctors to conduct research studies on special industrial activities and hazards
through the District, They also drafted minimum procedures and standards
that were sent to the various facilities detailing approved methods of working
with materials like fluorine, uranium hexafluorine, or plutonium, including

the proper first aid measures in working with those hazardous materials.
Inspections were also under the control of this group and those were carried
out according to the type of contract involved. Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract sites
and others where the government had financial responsibility for the costs
were likely to receive very close scrutiny; where a company had primary
Hability for costs were inspected less often and less rigorously.254

The clinical services branch provided the isolated installations of
Clinton, Hanford, and Los Alamos with on-site medical facilities. These
facilities operated primarily without supervision or interference from the
Manhattan Engineer District, Facilities at Oak Ridge in Clinton induded a
fifty-bed hospital,-an animal hospital; a psychiattic and social wélfare
consultation service as well as the full range of medical services for its
community. The Hanford clinical medicine program, primarily civilian in
nature since it was under the control DuPont, provided regular medical
services as well as emergency dental! care and public health services. Los
Alamos residents also received full medical care, an important program for

jones, 416-418; MED History Bac Book General. Volume 7 Medical Program, 3.1-3-6;
Warren, “The Role of Radiology,” 858.



V4

The health-physics section

‘The health-physies section provided physical methods to provide health
protection from hazards, but its goal was more than just designing instruments
or measurement development. Its ultimate goal was to test and monitor these
methods and instruments and to provide whatever protection personnel
needed from any dangers that the new and unknown materials might deliver.
Its first task was to determine the amount of shielding needed when piles
became commonplace. All of the early protection schemes imitiated from the
principle of placing enough material (gas or solid shielding} between the
source of radiation and the person nearby in order to reduce the radiation to
less than the maximum dose (or the tolerance level as discussed above).23

Piles presented a particular problem because concrete alone was not
always adequate shielding. For example, holes had to be placed in the walls for
unloading and loading the uranium into the pile. Since shielding alone could
not provide adequate protection, monitoring systems were developed to keep
tract of dangerous exposures, Photographic film had long been. used to. detect
xadiation levels but had been problematic in detecting the says of different
energies to which the workers would now be exposed. New badges were
developed with a thin shield of metal to cover all but a small area, so that these
xays of varying intensities could be detected, 44

Public safety was also under the domain of the health-physics section.
Every attempt at safety by the health-physics section involved prevention,

343}, J, Nickson, “Protective Measures for Personnel,” in Stone, industrial Medicine, 75.
544Stone, “Health Protection Activities,” 14-15,



197

contracts, The Manhattan District did send security personnel as well as
financial and safety advisors to Ames where the Jowa Area of the Manhattan
District was located, but these personnel were essentially placed there to see
that work was completed on time. They did conduct safety and secuxity
inspections and reported those back to District headquarters, but they must
have had little effect on the day-io-day operation because the research scientists
barely knew these men and women were around, No reports remain of their
activities in the files at Ames and most of the scientists were never sure what
they were there fo do.376

Contracting certainly influenced the direction of research in the Ames
Project. However, it was not the Manhattan District that placed the basic
tenants of contracting-—flexibility, institutional responsibility and control, fiscal
accountability, no cost/no profit terms~-in place. Those characteristics were
developed from the OSRD and NDRC, both civilian, academic-type
organizations. The Manhattan District continued contracting under much the

" same system, although it often added more requirements or sizicter controls.

3?6None of the scientists that I or others interviewed spoke of the group of Manhattan
Project personnel who were in Ames, Scientists nade passing references to them, bitt few
names were remembered except when humerous stories about their inefficie or insufficient
taining were noted. Spedding’s manuscript refers to them in passing and is the only locat
account of their existence. However, the miscellaneous records from Oak Ridge show
correspondence from several majors in charge of the area, pius at least a couple of minor
officers who often signed correspondence for the area engineer. ‘There was also a Project
manager, a financial officer who checked vouchers and reported discrepancies to the
Madison Square Area Office and brought the same concerns to Spedding’s attention. The best
estimate on the number of these miliary staff members located at Ames must have been under
ten. There were certainly not enough of them to create much of a sensation on the campus,

{See bills of lading and miscellaneous correspondence between Oak Ridge and these officers in
the Oak Ridge Papers). The property manager or fiscal officer was located in the Collegiate
Press Building ¢ of Account,” attached to 1946 Audit, {1}, Whether other personnel
were there or not is. wn, but it was a logical place for offices since the building was
across the street from Little Ankeny. (lt is also somewhat ironic that such a secret group of

Personnel were located in 2 press building}



14

nuclear plants after the war, Workers at Ames were carefully monitored by
research feams. Certain men and women were also studied after they left the
Project to determine long-term effects of the work they were doing, Probably
because of this system, very few workers and almost no scientists appeated to
die due to some problem that arose in the Ames Project. It was incredible that
the major problems on the Ames Project were those that any industrial
laboratory o factory might contend with—accidents, carelessness in handling
heavy materials, and typical first aid cuts and abrasions.373

575fo7 research studies, for example, sea Samuel Schwartz, “Letter to Dr. Grant on
Repott af Studies of Personnel at Ames, Iowa,” June 4, 1944, in Ames Laboratory Papers, t-2 fo
blood, urine, kidney, and liver studies ona group of 19 compl 8 with heavy, moderate and
relatively stight exposure to uranium activities. The re fs indicated “less abnormality than
I would have expected from the amount of exposure these men are ting” (2). Other
research studies were reported in S, T. Cantril, “Letter to F. H, Spedding on Testing of Two
Men for a Sensitive Urine Test Developed by the Metallurgical Laboratory,” January 29,
1948; Samuel Schwartz, “Letter to J. G. Grant for Results of Kidney Studies on @ Select Group
of Workers,” June 7, 1944; Samuel Schwartz, “Letter to J. G. Grant an Tests for Certain Nemed
Employees for Urine Samples,” June 14, 1945; in the Ames Laboratory Papers. For the kind of
folewTMup 3 Studies that were conducted, see numerous Jetters in the files to those who were
leaving the project requesting that submit to tests after ing. For example, see Elaine
Katz, “Letter to Mr. Elmer J. Ban Weekly Urine Tests for One Month,” Jannary 19, 1945
in the Ames Laboratory Papers. Also see Appendix F for a sample letter of this type.



it

entize field of radiation protection.“ Three plans of action were developed
early in the Metallurgical Project by these divisions: the development of
sensitive instrumentation and clinical tests to detect radiation and other
harmful exposures; research on the effects of radiation exposure on people,
animals, and instruments; and the incorporation of ehields and safety
measures into actual plant design and construction. These Metallurgical
Project sections soon set the standard for health and medical care for entire
Manhattan Project, serving as the mode! for providing information on and
protection from radiological exposures.37

The medical section
The medical section at Chicago performed the normal functions related

to personnel on the project: conducting pre-employment health examinations,
taking routine tests of blood and urine, and conducting x-rays of the chest, But
the section was also charged with developing clinical tests to detect exposure as

338Hacker, Dragon's Tail, 29-30. Stone, Industriat Medicine, 3; Robert S. Stone, “Health
Protection Activities of the Plutonium Project,” A paper read at the Symposium on Atomic
Energy and its Implications, Joint Meeting of the American Philosophical Society and the
National Academy of Sciences, November 16-17, 1945, Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society 90 (1946): 13. Also see S. T. Cantril, “Letter to all Group Leaders Detailing the
Dangers of Radiation Exposure and Eliciting the Support of Group Leaders to Educate Workers
to the Dangers,“ September 15, 1942, the Ames Laboraiory Papers.

33%Smyth, 123. In addition to the medical, health, and health physics sections, there
was also a military section established in the beginning. It was short lived because it was
soon taken over by the Army since it was concerned with German atomic weeponry design and
Ere se of German weapons in the fd and what effeet they ml i
area. At this time, it was thought that Germans were developing an atomic in.

Additionally, there was some deliberation on using a pile to produce radioactive materials
other than plutonium as offensive weapons against the Germans. That idea was quickly
dropped, and the defense against German weapons was completely taken from the
Metallurgical Laboratory and placed under the Army's control. Stone, Industrial Medicine, 4.



170

obviously posed considerable dangers Interestingly, the half-life of
uranium238, the most common isotope and the one that was to be used in ton
quantities on the project, was measured in billions of years and uranium?235 in
hundred of millions, numbers not presenting significant radiological
hazards.3%4 Plutonium though was another matter. So much was unknown,
but it was certain that the separation processes would involve far more
radioactive materials than those produced in the radium industry to date.
Even the effects of plutonium on the body were virtually unknown.335

As a result of the known and unknown health concerns, the
Metallurgical Project established the Chicago Health Division under Robert
Stone, originally from the University of California, to protect all the scientists
and workers under the jurisdiction of the Metallurgical Laboratory. The unit
was formed August 6, 1942, with divisions in medicine, health, and a new
division called health physics to cover radiation protection or the special hazard
as it became commonly known, Health physics was an unusual name for the
new division. Perhaps-“radiation protection” was not secure enough; but that
new division gave the name to a profession that later came to denote the

334Hacker, Dragon’s Tail, 21, 35; Smyth, 90. For one of earliest letters detailing the
potential problems with uranium toxicity sce C, R. Wallace, “Letter to Lyman Briggs on the
‘Toxic Properties of Uranium Metal, Uranium Oxide and Uranium Hexafluoride,” July 24, 1941,
the Ames Laboratory Papers, Wallace reports that though litte is in the literature about
uranium salts, it is a toxin exhibiting itself through symptoms of high sugar levels in the
urine of the exposed. He also reviews the general symptoms of uranium poisoning, ing
that though it is not a grave danger, great care should be given to prevent its ingestion since
that is where its potential danger lies {1-2}.

325Robart Spencer Stone, Industrial Medicine on the Plutowtem Project: Survey and
Coffected Papers, National Nuclear Bnergy Series, Manhatten Project Tec! Section
Division IV [Flatonium Project], vol. 20 (Elmsford, NY: Microforms International, 1977,
microfitm), 2, hereafter called Stone, Industrial Medicine,



183

such a remote site. In 1944, Warren even sent a psychiatiist to help with the
tensions in this strain-producing plant.355

The safety program
The start of the large-scale building activities under the Manhattan

District required the impiementation of safety standards in the planis for the
workers. In June 1943, James R. Maddy was hired to assume command of the
safety program and immediately began the accident prevention program for
the District. By the end of 1943, Maddy had reorganized his program into two
units: an occupational safety section that operated as any large industrial staft
requiring contractors to provide workers with safe drinking water, goggles,
hard hats, safety shoes and other items that would prevent accidents, and a
public safety section that worked with the community in Hanford and Oak
Ridge to implement programs in traffic control and other areas of community
safety, Ihe District employed a district safety engineer and several resident
safety engineers to-serve-as consultants to the various area engineers.996

The Manhattan Engineer District, just like the earlier agencies,
acknowledged the importance of health and safety issues in its operations. It
took the policies that had been developed in laboratories like the Metallurgical
Laboratory and applied themt to the entire district. In short, what had been
started under individual laboratories was continued and coordinated by the
Manhattan Engineer District.

385 jones, 422-426; MED History Book I General, Volume 7 Medical Frogram, 4.14.40;
Warren, “The Kole of Radiology,” 872-875,

586jones, 426-427; MED History Book I General, Volume 2 Safety Progtam, 1.1-1.6, 2.1-
2.12, 3,1-3.8, and 6.1-6.4.



173

existed in micrograms so there was little danger of exposure, but after 1943,
cyclotron.production raised that amount te gram quantities and subsequent
research proved that piutonium was just as dangerous as taditun. Since it had
no gaseous daughters like radium with its radon, the problem was controlling
the dust and vapors of the element. Because it was excreted in a petson’s
wine, laboratory procedures were developed to detect it in very minute
quantities 340

Research in the medical section ded very closely to clinical services. All
research with human beings was placed under the jurisdiction of the medical
section, and many of the early tests studied blood cells for evidence of minimal
radiation damage. Urine was also examined and studied for any radiological
damage to kidneys, Because it was well known that the liver was the
detoxifying center of the body, studies were undertaken on the liver, but
changes found here were so small that they could not detinitely be linked to
overexposure.441 A summary of the contributions of the section up until 1945
included: the rapid and simple method of detecting uranium in the urine,
sensitive to one-hundred-billionth of a gram; urine uranium studies of Ames
personnel showing good correlation with their history of uranium exposure;
and significant correlation of personnel exposure to uranium, beryllium, and
other metals to their urinary excretion of certain products.342

340Stone, “Health Protection Activities.” 13; Wirth, “Medical Services,” 38.
34iStone, Industrial Medicine, 3; Stone, “Health Protection Activities,” 12.
242Stone, Industrial Medicine, 14,



189

finally uranium machining operations also caused dust build-up. Uranium in
dust form could be more easily ingested, so there were several research studies
conducted by the medical research section at Chicago and at other installations
in the Manhattan Engineer District on uranium ingestion in this form. In fact,
it was one of the early experiments with mice and urantum dust that proved
work with uranium was not as dangerous as first thought36¢
Probably the second most difficult problem in Ames was controlling the
hazardous chemicals to prevent explosions. Impure materials caused
explosions as well #8 wet materials. Improper handling or lack of attention to
properly ning the bomb retorts could cause blowout problems when the
uanium reaction came into contact with the steel or iron in the bomb
"containers. Magnesium was a particularly volatile material, and protection
from explosions on many occasions became making sure that at every step of
the process workers had a wall between the bomb vessel and themselves. As
noted earlier, in one day alone there were six ‘explosions. Once an | explosions
blew out the south wall of Little Ankeny i in the early hours of the: morning; by
then explosions were so commonplace that the workmen went outside and
pushed the wall back in as far as they could. Fires were also a danger at several
steps in the process, Magnesium could shoot a flame several feet in length
sometimes setting anything in its path on fire. Until the proper insulation
techniques were learned, uranium cutting or machining caused fires when the
cutting blade struck such a hard metal, Controlling these special chemical fires

Sé4Peterson, interview with Hacker, 18; Jones, 419; Warren, “Role of Radiology,” 853.



165

the project turned to production, engineering, and construction, different
considerations were brought into play. For example, scientists were not
usually placed in the role of industrial production workers nor were they
typically supervisors of industrial personnel, so common industrial safety
procedures were often unfamiliar, Additionally, nonscientific personnel were
brought into the project, people who were not trained in taking proper safety
precautions in dealing with potentially volatile materials.

Early protection measures to protect the health of scientists, were
suggested as a part of OSRD contracts, but the implementation generally fell to
the individual laboratories to develop procedtes for’ their own unique
situations. When the Manhattan Engineer District took over the bomb
production processes though, it established and maintained two
administrative units, one to protect the health of workers from potentially
hazardous materials and another to protect the workers’ occupational safety in

a production, construction type environment.
Early Health Protection Under OSRD Jusisdiction

The early wartime knowledge of health issues concerning bomb
building centered primarily around laboratory procedures for proper handling
of the radioactive materials that might be produced in chemical and physical
reactions. Radioactivity protection actually began shortly after the scientific
discovery of zadioactivity and the elements that produced it. In 1895, Wilhelm
Conrad Roentgen, a professor of physics at the University of Wtizburg,
published his famous paper on the discovery of x-rays. In 1896, inspired by
Roentgen’s work, Henri Beoquerel discovered that uranium emitted rays.



212

Anders, Roger M. “The President and the Atomic Bomb: Who Approved the
Trinity Nuclear Test?” Prologue (Winter 1988): 268-282.

Annual Report of the National Sclence Foundation. 1(1950-51).

Arming, Michael, The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb.
New York: G. P, Putnam, 1959,

Aviel, Simon D, “Congressional Attitudes to Nuclear Energy in the Wake of
the Three-Mile Island Accident.” Ph D. diss., Golden State University,

1980,

Babbidge, Homer D., and Robert M Rosenzweig. The Federal Interest int Higher
ducation. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

Badash, Lawrence. Radioactivity in America: Growth and Decay of a Science,
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

Bainbridge, Kenneth I. “Prelude to Trinity.” Bulletin of he Atomtic Scientists
(April 1975): 42-46,

—— ,*A Foul and Awesome Display.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May
1975): 40-46,

Bartter, Martha A. The Way to Ground Zero: The Atomic Bomb in American
Science Fiction. Contributions to the Study of Science Fiction and
Fantasy, no. 33. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988,

Baxter, James Phinney, Til. Scientists Against Time. Cambridge, MA: M.L I.
“Press; 1946, °°
Beasley, Kenneth, Michael R Dingerson, Oliver D. Hensley, Larry G. Hess, and
Nein A. Rodman. The Administration of Sponsored Programs. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1982.

Ben-David, Joseph, American Higher Education: Directions Old and New. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1972,

Bilstein, Roger B. Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-
1990. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 1989.

Blatz, Hanson. “Transportation of Large Quantities of Radioactive Materials.”
A. IM. A, Archives of Industrial Health 14 Guly 1956); 1-91.



1%

beta, and gamma particles and rays on the hands were established at Chicago
and other sites. Additionally, special clothing was worn to protect other parts
of the body and laundry facilities were employed to decontaminate these
working clothes. Instruments were developed to monitor the particles from
the clothing before and after laundering. Personnel were also required to
shower before leaving the sites to prevent taking contamination outside to the
home. Any skin wound was a patticular hazard since radioactivity could enter
an open wound and react with the body just as if the material had been
injected. Any wound, occupational or not, had to be reported; no one was
permitted to work with radioactive materials until a cut healed.24

S. T. Cantzil, reporting his observations about the working conditions of
the chain reaction experiment in late 1942, suggested several measures fo
Protect workers at the Stagg Field, controls that were later put into force
throughout the project. He detailed items like the importance of cleanliness of
workers through showering He recommended adding several showers as well
as always providing the proper kind of soap. He suggested paper.cups.and.....
sodium-bicarbonate for brushing teeth after working in the affected areas.
Protective clothing like gloves and overalls as well as masks in the dusty areas
were recommended. He also suggested altering ventilation systems in the pile
area, the materials storage room, and other preparation centers to better protect
workers. He finally recommended the hiring of a full-time janitor to collect
clothing and masks and supply clean clothing at the beginning of the day as

46Nickson, “Protection Measures for Personnel.” 87-92; Stone. “Health Protection
Activities” 15-16.



175

particularly prevention from harmful substances entering the body. Ais
control devices such as hoods, respirators, face masks, and even oxygen supply
units weze made available to protect the workers against radioactive
substances. Dust-laden air was also taken away from workers by the use of
ventilated hoods that filtered air out through ducts. This principle of air flow
away from the body had been used for years because scientists often worked
with noxious fumes. This principle worked equally well for radioactive
materials. There were some problems introduced because of the necessity to
completely change the air every four minutes, particularly in work with
plutonium. Fans capable of handling over 50,000 cubic feet of air per minute
were purchased for the job, but then heating the buildings became a problem.
Accurate measuring devices to monitor contamination had to be developed
since there was not often enough time to design completely effective hoods 345
Prevention of ingesting hazardous materials through the mouth or skin
was another matter of concern to the health physicisis. Eating food with
contaminated hands, smoking and ‘inhaling hazardous materials along with
the smake, ot using contaminated eating vessels were all ways to ingest
dangerous materials, Smoking was prohibited in places where toxic materials
were handled, and at Chicago it was prohibited in all areas and offices of the
plutonium laboratory. Rubber gloves were encouraged when working with
any radioactive material to partially prevent contact with the skin by
radioactive materials, but also to prevent transfer of the materials to the
mouth through the hands. Geiger counter systems of monitoring the alpha,

345Nickson, “Protection Measures for Personnel,” 81-86.



208

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Souxces

Archival Materigts
Ames Laboratory, Iowa State University, Ames, IA

Frank HL. Spedding Box of Miscellaneous Papers and Reports
Harley A. Wires Papers
National Archives and Record Service, Washington, DC

Record Group 77: The Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers
Miscellaneous Manhattan District Records

Record Group 227: The Records of the Office of Scientific Research and

Development
Miscellaneous Financial Records, 1942-1946

National Archives—Great Lakes Region, Chicago, IL

Argonne National Laboratory Files, 1942-1946
Miscellaneous Metallurgy Project Files, 1943-1946
Meiallurgy Program: Files, 1943-1946 °

Robert W. and Ellen Sorge Parks Library, Iowa State University of Science and
Technology, Ames, 1A

Annual Reports to the Graduate Faculty, Iowa State College 1923-1947, by
Robert E. Buchanan

Financial Report of Iowa State College, Report Year Ending June 30, 1942-1946
Jowa State Board of Education Minutes, 1942-1946
Jowa State College Administrative Board Minutes, 1942-1946

town State College Bulletin, 1942-1946

Towa State College of Agricultire and Mechanic Arts Official Publications:
General Calg 10. 19ee Off
Graduate Catalog. 1916-1946



196

Security did affect the academic management style to an extent though.
The Ames Project remained isolated from the other installations, and this
isolation probably meant that, to an extent, no one knew when duplication was
going on between this laboratory and others. Personnel were also not as free to
travel to other installations, so later in the war, the group at Ames knew less of
what was tfranspiring at Los Alamos or Hanford than at Chicago. Early in the
project, there was a great deal of interaction between the laboratory and other
facilities, pattly because Spedding was more involved at a central facility early
in the war. He became somewhat isolated from Chicago when Ames
demanded his full atiention. By that time, Groves moved the bulk of the
activity to the secret, well-guarded sites at Los Alamos, Hanford, and Clinton.
Even Chicago was out of the loop for what was going on at the saxret facilities,
That decision had been a military victory of sorts because those new facilities
were under much stricter secrecy requirements.975

The sirict requirements for secrecy though did not really affect the style
of management at Ames because. the laboratory's organizational structure had
been established long before the Manhatian Engineer District took over the

375There were several other reasons for the mova to three sccret facilities than just
isolation. Compton had been in trouble for disclosing secret information to some imeleared
workers in eatly 1942, Bush had intercoded on his behalf, but when it came to building the
bomb, the site was moved from Chicago partly because of this security problem at the
Metatusgical Laboratory. (For a more complete discussion, see Montgomery Cunninghem
Moigs, 69-70.) Groves also had particular problems with other scientists at Chicago, such as
Szilard and other immigrant scientists, when he had to inform them about DuPont taking over
the Oak Ridge project instead of them. The resulting isolation of the Metallurgical
‘Laboratory probably extended in some ways to lowa State since Ames was a contracting agency
under Groves never visited Iowa State, for crample, and though it was ased as art
industrial plant to ‘uranium and other metals, after December 1942, Ames was not a

part of any policy making group. It served as a supplier to other facilities like Oak Ridge,
|, and Los Alamos, laboratories that were making decisions. (For these various

concerns see Groves, 1962, 42-46.)



213

Brown, Anthony C., and Charles 8. MacDonald, eds. The Secret History of the
Atomic Bomb. New York: Dial Press. 1977.

Burnham, John C,, ed. Science in America: Historical Selections. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Bush, Vannevar. Science the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President.
Washington: The Government Printing Office, 1945,

» Modern Arms ond Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving
Detrocracy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949.

—— Science is Not Enough. New York: William Morrow, 1967.
, Pieces of the Action. New York: William Morrow, 1970.
Castle, William B., Katherine R. Drinker, and Cecil K. Drinker. “Necrosis of
the Jaw in Workers Employed in Applying 2 Luminous Paint
Containing Radium.” journal of Industrial Hygiene 7 (1925): 371-382.

Clark, Burton R. The Higher Education 8 : Academic Organization in Cross-
National Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

Cloutier, Roger J. “Florence Kelley and the Radium Dial Painters.” Health
Physics 39 (1980): 712-716.

Coleman, Earle B, “The ‘Smyth Report: A Descriptive Checklist.” The
Princeton University Library Chronicle 37, no. 3 (Spring 1973); 204-218.

Compton, Arthur Holly. Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1956.

» The Cosmas af Arthur Holly Compton. Bdited b Johnston, jorie. New
York: Ained A Knopf, toby. m if May

Conant, James B. Modern Science and Modern Man. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1952.

. My Several Lives. New Yorle Harper and Row, 1970.

Day, H. Summerfield. The lows State Untversity Campus and Its Buildings 1859-
1979. Ames, IA: lowa State University, 1980.

de Hoffmann, Frederic. “Pure Science in the Service of Wartime Technology.”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Qanuary 1975): 41-44,



195

SUMMARY; THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY MANAGEMENT STYLE
UPON THE ACADEMIC MANAGEMENT STYLE, 1942-1945
The Manhattan Engineer District represented the typical military
management style, controlling three areas of administration during World -
War Ti: security, contracting, and health However, as seen in the preceding
chapters, each of the areas had already been addressed before the Manhattan
District took control of the project, and, in most cases, the organization and
administration of these areas remained essentially academic in management
style. The Ames laboratory, even under the Manhattan District, ran by
committee, as exhibited by group leaders’ meetings every Saturday to both
discuss results and plan for the next week’s activity, These sessions employed
an academic style where everyone participated and added ideas to the group.
Often the plan of research changed or modified itself based upon suggestions at
these meetings 374 Even that these seminars continued was a victory for the
academic management style, because Groves had tried at one point to

discontinue these at Los Alamos, without success.

574For the organiza tion and topics of these meetings, see "Meeting of Metallurgica
Group October 15, 1943," “Meeting ‘Saterday 2:30 pan., Chemical Group,” “Mee ing October 24,
1943, 12:30 pm," “Chemical Meeting October 30, 7:30 p.m.” and “Metallurgical

October 30, 1943, 2 p.m.” berry, somewhat in jest, indicated that at Chicage there
was not always consensus in these typically academic meetings: “There was never consensus.
Fach one consensed with himself and went out and did—go thou and do as thou pleaseth. The
teal consensus was Ehat this. # mechanism for two or three different brilliant people to
disagree effectively because the instant they made up their minds that the path that they
were on was wrong, that was the Jast you ever heard of it.... It was an extremely effective
pana igement it system and a complete anarchy in a sense” Gilberry, interview wifit Tressel,

?, Reel 2, 19}.



172

well as conducting research on the many medical aspects of potential health
hazards.38¢
Blood and urine tests were both used to detect exposure in personnel.
At the beginning of the project, blood counts were considered an accurate
measure of abnormalities. but the medical section research revealed that
normal changes in blood count varied so much that a small amount of
exposure to radiation or hazardous products could never be determined with a
"great deal of accuracy. Since no better tests were developed during the period
to detect low level exposure, these blood tests continued to be used to monitor
personnel once a month for potentially high levels of exposure 329
Utine tests were successfully instituted to detect small amounts of

uranium and plutonium. Since uranium would be handled in ton quantities,
and it was already published in research literature that uranium was a highly
toxic substance once inside the body, there was concern for providing adequate
protection to these workers, Conversely to the scientific literature though,
personnel from the Port Hope factory in Canada had been extracting radium
from tons of uranium for years with no adverse effects, Also some early
research with mice exposed to thick levels of uranium oxide dust showed no
ill effecis on the animals. After several toxicology studies, the Metallurgical
Project proved that while uranium was toxic once in the blood, its various
compounds were difficult to get through the lungs or intestines to the blood.
However, plutonium was another matter. In the beginning. plutonium only

538stone, “Health Protection Activities,” 12; Stone, Indusirial Medicine, 2-3; J. B.
Wirth, Medical Services of the Plutonium Project," in Stone, Industrial Medicine, 22-31,

$89Stone, “Health Protection Activities,” 12.



186

used open pots fo reduce beryllium fluoride with magnesium but from
making his work area clean. A gummy sort of fluffy dust collected on the side
of the pots and Chiotti decided that he would clean them out one Saturday
moming He gota pail of water and sponge, rolled up his sleeves, and washed
the areas thoroughly. By Sunday morning, he had chills and by Monday a rash
on his arms. It was subsequently cured. and he also never had a recurrence,
but it pointed to the dangers of handling a material that evidently affected
people differently.360

Beryllosis was the most dangerous reaction to beryllium When
beryllium traveled to the lungs, it acted much like the flu initially, but then it
migrated to the bones and behaved like radium, displacing calcium. Some of it
would also travel back to the lungs, giving the symptomis of tuberculosis,
inevitably causing death. Wayne Jones, a nonscientist glassblower on the
project, did die of beryHosis later in his life, and though he was never in the
main area where beryllium was handled, he may have ingested it from the

_$lass he was blowing or from even the beryllium in fluorescent lighting in his

glassblowing area. Twenty years after the project he died, and the Atomic
Energy Commission settled the case out of court with his family.%62

There were few examples of safety breaches or carelessness by the
scientists at the Ames Project. The production area though presented quite a
different problem. Scientists generally had security clearance, so they knew
with what they were working. Because of their past training. they also

S60Chiotti, interview with Hacker, 5-6,

561Prank Spedding, “Spedding ‘s Role as Guinea Pig." Spedding Manuscript, 2-3;
Spedding, inerionr with ache 7980, ‘18-29. 5 "s P



203

shortly after the war. Their theses were classified; however, by 1955, all of these
plus others had been released, and the men and women could finally publish
their classified results.

War research work certainly added new men and women to the
scientific xanks of colleges and universities across the nation. Iowa State
benefited greatly from the infusion of these scientists who were already willing
fo form partnerships with the federal government. They had worked under
strict conditions duing the war. gaining expertise. if not in publishing research
results, cettainly in reporting research. It was only a small matter for them to
become active in publishing their research results in the national journals of
the day.

However, the Ames Project and its successors served as more than
educational laboratories for the increasing numbers of graduate students
making their way through Iowa State College. This laboratory and its successor
served as models for developing research relationships with the federal
government after the war. As noted above, the OSRD, the NDRC, and the
Manhattan District were merely temporary structures in the federal
bureaucracy, Shortly after the war though, the type of research and contracting
agreement with universities remained while the civilian versus military
status cotdd be debated in Congress. The relationships forged during this
interim helped Iowa State set up its administrative apparatus to handle
research funding that would come as a result of the federal government's role
in agencies like the National Institutes of Health and in the establishment of
new agencies like the National Science Foundation in 1950. The Manhattan
Dishict continued its contracting with the Ames Project under much the same



204

circumstances as during the war. When the civilian Atamic Energy
Commission took over from the Manhattan District in 1946, it too continued
to use the contracting principles established during the war.

This was also a time when Iowa State and other institutions solved
many of the overhead problems created by the war. Iowa Sttte finally
instituted and clatified its regulations and in 1950 with Board of Education
approval published both a policy for conducting research and a policy for
accepting and maintaining an overhead fund. Those two policies were
developed out of the experiences of the Ames Project contracts just in time for
the creation of the National Sctence Foundation in the same year 583

After the war, a familiar theme about research funding recurred, one
prevalent during World War [—that research was somahow connected to
national security and thus a federal xesponsibility—-developed partly because
of the new conditions of Cold War confronting the nation. When the federal
agencies like the Manhattan District, OSRD, and NDRC dismantled,
research funding distributed itself in three different directiong, all borrowing
from the administrative structures of the war organizations. When the
atomic bomb exploded in Japan, the Manhattan Engineer District as a unit
no longer had a mission. It disappeared only after numerous hearings in
the Congress discnased its future, but finally a civilian board took over the
jurisdiction of atomic energy on January 1, 1947, keeping many of the same
administrative structures.54 Iowa State’s contract under the Manhattan

SBSviiautes of the Board of Education. March 16, 1950, 269-272. See the two policies in
Appendix G.
S#4Hewlett and Anderson, 654-655.



192

On several occasions, the tight security of the Manhattan Engineer
District also interfered with health and safety standards. One security expert
from the District tried, for example, to get Spedding to put bars on windows in
the long narrow zooms of the Chemistry Building, but since that could have
prevented escape in the event of an emergency, Spedding had that plan
overruled. Another time a security officer insisted upon painting the windows
black in the same building to prevent sabotage. That would have led to a very
dark room in which to do the dangerous chemical work; again he was
overrnled.56 At yet another time, Elroy Gladrow, one of the scientists on three
separate comparimentalized projects, gave three different blood samples each
week from his eat lobes. Once, after appearing before Spedding with swollen
ear lobes and asking why he needed three separate samples, Spedding
convinced the officials to take only one sample and divide it into three parts
for the health reports.970 :

A thorough satety and health-program was instituted at Ames over a
period of time. The program at.the pilot plant was aimed.at eliminating the
typical kinds of accidents common in any industrial situation. In August 1943,
a survey conducted at the pilot plant concluded that since August 16, 1942 there
were 16.2 injuries per million men hours, somewhat high for a chemical plant,
but probably low considering the plant was experimenting with new,
herefofore untested processes, The production plant was also run by scientists

26°Frank Spedding, “Frustration of the Manhattan District Safety Officials,”
Spedding Maruscript.

3frank Spedding, “Gladrow’s Ears.” Spedding Manuscrj 3 Spedding, interview with
Hacker, 1989, 303. Spedding et



168

tipping had been instituted in the company, but many of the women who did
not die in the twenties died later of cancer or other debilitating diseases.

‘Throughout the period, the company refused to acknowledge that
xadium was the culprit, although they did finally settle several out-of-court
suiis with individuals, In 1933, Robley D. Evans published a report that
concluded that as litde as two micrograms fixed in the bones of a human could
cause death, but only two percent of the total amount of radium ingested
probably remained for any time in a person’s body. No one knew how much
tadium the bodies of these particular employees retained, but even
conservative estimates placed the amount at far more than two micrograms.228
Although tragic, the cases actually added much to the medical knowledge
about radioactive elements. Ihe literature was replete with reports that.could
be used as a base for the treatment of radioactively exposed patients in World
Wat Il. These cases also helped set the stage for the later radioactivity tolerance
standards.

. Scientists and personnel working with ores.and compounds of. the
radioactive elements were also victims during this period. Often the problems
resulted from poor ventilation or careless chemical techniques that allowed
these people to ingest chemicals into the mouth. Many of the careless practices
were discontinued in the 1930s after public outery and treats of legal action.
Medical patients injected with radium were also victims of ovetexposure, and
often many of them were unsuspecting recipients of radium in popular over-
the-counter medicines. After the death of several famous people who took

S28 vans, “Radium Poisoning,’ 1019.



211

Newspapers

Ames Daily Tribune
August 6, 1945; August 7, 1945; August 8, 1945; August 10, 1945;
September 29, 1945; October 10, 1945; October 12, 1945; December 4, 1948;
December 1. 1962; September 5, 1964, Centennial Edition; August 12, 1968

Des Moines Register
August 8, 1945; August 9, 1945; October 9, 1945; May 16. 1949

Des Moines Tribune
July 6, 1942; August 6, 1945

Towa State Daily Student
May 22, 1942; July 7, 1942; September 19, 1942; September 23, 1942; March
3, 1943; July , 1945; August 8, 1945; August 10, 1945; August 15, 1945;
heat 22, 1945; October 9, 1945; October 12, 1945; October 13, 1945; April

mat

Towa Stater
June 1979

New York Times
August 7, 1945
Secondary Sources

“adele Voigt Looks Back.” Ames Laboratory Changing Scene (December 1981): 5-

Allardice, Corbin, and Edward R. Isapnell, The First Pile, Reprint of AEC
Report TID-292. Washington, DC: U.S, Atomic Energy Commission,
1955,

Alexander, Peter P, “Ihe Hydride Process—IV.” A Reprint from Metals and
Alloys (October 1938) [1]-D1.

“Ames Laboratory: How it Began.” Ames Laboratory Bulletin Series, no. 1
(May 1982): 1-2.

Ames Laboratory: How it Started. Ames, IA: “Ames Laboratory Office of
Information, n.d.

Anderson, Herbert L. “The Legacy of Fermi and Szilard.” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (September 1974): 56-62.



209

Report of the lowa State Board of Education, Biennial Period Ending June 30,
1942-1946 .

Record Group 17/1; Ames Laboratory Papers, 1942-1946
Miscellaneous correspondence of Spedding and other principals on
Project
Metallurgical Laboratory and Ames Project scientific and technical
reports
Regeareh notebooks (Microfilm and Bound Copies)

Record Group 6/3/11: Robert B Buchanan Papers
Miscellaneous Reports and Corresponderice from the Graduate

School
Record | Group 2/9: Charles E. Friley Papers in the Office of the President
cords

Folder on the Institute of Atomic Research

Record Group 13/1/17: Harald I. Gaskill Papers
Folder on the Atomic Energy Commission

Record Group 25/1/1: Library Dean's Office Subject File
Charles H. Brown's Miscellaneous Correspondence

Record Group 25/1/20: Library Dean's Office Subject File
Robert Ort’s Miscellaneous Correspondence Files
Robert Orr's Incomplete Manuscript History of the Library
Robert Orr's Thesis Folder *

‘Record Group 17/1/11" Pratik Howard Spedding Papers
Boxes D, P, 8, CC, GG, HH: Correspondence
Boxes C, Z, DD: Miscellaneous, including Speeches, Booklets,
Articles and Other Historical Material of the Project
Box N: Speeches and Publications

US, Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Oak Ridge IN (Records
Located at Peden omen East Point. GA) a

Box 18, Miscellaneous Correspondence with the Manhattan Engineer
District and Its Employees at Iowa State; Vouchers and Other

Financial Forms
Box 28, Bilis of Lading for Various Shipments from Iowa State



179

Summary
The Metallurgical Laboratory established the first and probably most

comprehensive medical and health protection unit during the war period. In
1942, there was a limited body of knowledge upon which to build, but by 1945,
Stone could list several division accomplishments: ;

We calculated the anticipated hazards from known facts and
extrapolated to the probable permissible levels of exposure. IL was
agreed at the time that we would be given the opportunity to
check our calculations by experiments and so establish the
tolerable limits of exposure on solid ground, Our program to date
has been based on accomplishing these aims for uranium, fission
products, plutonium, neutrons, beta rays, pile gamma rays, and
other chemically toxic and radioactive substances that might come
into the processes on the Metallurgical Project. In addition we
have attempted to understand the mechanism by which these
agents acted 80-26 to be able to treat anyone who might be
overexposed fo any of them.... The resulis which we have
obtained and will obtain are of value not alone fo the
Metallurgical Project, but also to any Project making use of the
materials developed with the Manhatian District.

The. Development of Health and Safety Measures
under the Manhattan Engineer District
The Manhattan Engineer District developed essentially two areas of
expertise under its jurisdiction: the health or medical program and the safety
program. Each of these programs built upon previous OSRD installations like
the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory, :

350Stone, industrial Medicine, 9-10,



182

treat those who might be overexposed to these same materials. The
Metallurgical Laboratory conducted much of the eatly research on toxic
materials and continued that research when the Manhattan District took
supervision of its contracts in 1943 Other laboratories involved in this
research included the University of Rochester, initially under Warren, which
investigated the exposure of animals to high-level x-rays in its radiology group,
the radioactivity of certain toxic chemical substances in its pharmacology unit.
and the design of monitoring devices that were to be tested in Clinton,
Hanford, and elsewhere in its instrumentation group. Columbia University
also tested instruments as well as Hanford. which had its own instrument
testing group. The University of California canied out medical research in the
area of fission products at its Crocker Radiation Laboratory. The Clinton
Laboratories had a complementary research program directly under 9. T.
Cantzil who originally worked with Stone at Chicago.%3 ,

‘The industrial medicine program tried to control the particular
industrial hazards associated with the atomic bomb production processes.
Captain John L, Ferry, the head of this branch, established groups to monitor
industrial hygiene activities at the University of Rochester, to oversee hazards
in materials procurement at the Madison Square Area Engineers Office, and to
serve as consultants in first aid or whatever needed throughout the Distsict.
The industrial medicine program did not oversee Clinton, which was under
the University of Chicago, or Los Alamos, which had its own industrial

3Sjones, £14416; Warren, “The Role of Radiology,” 880-853; MED History Book 1
General, Volume 7 Medical Program, 515-23,



167

Workers in 2 factory belonging to the United States Radium Company
in Orange, New Jersey, were the most affected by these famous radium
poisoning episodes. Fluorescent items were in vogue in the twenties, but none
more coveted than the luminous radium dials on watches, Since radium was
extremely expensive, the company found that substituting cheaper, but
unknown to them, more rapidly decaying radium isotopes and substituting
water-based paints for oil paints, they could fill the mass market demand for
luminous watches, however at a deadly health cost. Oil paints had been
applied with rods, but water paints required a very fine brush that workers
invariably pointed by wetting with thelr lips. This process called Hpping caused
the workers to ingest the paint, which contained the radium isotope, into their
mouths and finally into their bodies. Only about 7.5 micrograms per week of
radium would be taken in the body, so no one thought that those small
amounts could endanger anyone. By the end of 1924 though, nine women had
died of the radium jaw syndrome, Ihere were probably more cases that ‘went
unreported, ‘or other deaths attributed to anemia, rheumatism or other ,
misdiagnosed diseases that were actually caused by radium poisoning. By 1925,
partly due to publicity by health advocates and others, some controls against

“Radium Necrosis,” Journal of the American Medical Association 85 (1925): 961-965; Daniel
Lang, “A Most Valuable Accident,’ New Yorker {May 2, 1959); 49-94; Harrison 5, Martland,
“Occupational Poisoning in Mamufacture of Luminous Watch Diais; General Review of Hazard
Caused by Ingestion of Luminous Paint, with ial Reference to the New Jersey Cases,”
Journal of the American Medical Association 92 ruary 9, 1929): 446-473; A short summary
also appears in Hacker, The Dragon's Tail, 20-23, For summaries of the radium dial painters
as well as other instances of pula stories about the effects of radimme in the twenties and

thirties, see Spencer R. Weart, “Radium: Elixir or Polson?” in Nuclear Fear A History of
Images (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 36-54.



202

established by the Atomic Energy Commission to be administeted by the state
established Institute for Atomic Research.381 Spedding’s plan had worked; he
had created both a state-operated and federally-funded facility on the Iowa State
campus linked academically to the institution. Spedding hired departmental
faculty members part-time at the Group and Section Leader levels for the new
laboratory. There were some members of the Ames Laboratory hired without
faculty rank. but not that many until much later when the Department of
Energy neaded very specialized scientists who were not represented by a
departmental area of expertise. He also managed to get some of the men on
the project who already had Ph.D.s to stay in his employ and receive academic
appointments in departments part-time and continue their research work at
the laboratory.

Several other men remained behind after the war to complete studies or
finish up advanced degrees. Many of the men working on the project had the
equivalent of a Ph.D. but had not finished their theses. In the next few years,
several of these men finished. degrees, including: -Donald-Ahman who
finished a Ph.D in 1949; John Ayers, Ph.D. 1946; Norman Baenziger; Ph.D,
1948; Charles Banks, Ph.D. 1946; Adtian Daane, Ph.D. 4950; Eiroy Gladrow,
Ph.D. 1946; Harry Svec, Ph.D. 1950, and James Warf, Ph.D, 1946. Dave Peterson,
a foteman at the pilot plant even finished his bachelor's degree in 1947, his
PhD. in 1950.92 There was one problem with these men getting degrees

381 tment Newsletter, January 1, 1947, 3; Frank Spedding, “The

Operation and Scope of the Ames Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission,” nd, The
Ames Laboratory Papers, 1-2.

S82Robert On, “Thesis Card Files” the Library Papers.



190

with lime or graphite became a common practice that every worker had to
learn.36

‘There were several industrial safety measures employed in the
production facility at Ames, When grinders or cutting mills were used,
workers had to wear respirators; that requirement was apparently rigorous
enforced. Every man and woman was given time aff to shower and change
clothes at the end of the shift in order to prevent taking uranium and thorium
particles home or outside the work area. Special work uniforms were issued to
every worker and required to remain on the premises af the end of a shift.
Washing thoroughly before eating was also rigorously enforced. To prevent
ingesting radioactive dust in the process of smoking, no one was allowed to
smoke in work areas; smoking was allowed in.the locker rooms, however.
Sometimes, a fire would occur at the bottom of 2 bomb, and molten uranium
would pour out on the floor. The building personnel would immediately
evacuate and wait until the fumes died down before cleaning up the accident.
Ventilation was at least adequate in the.cld house,.due. partly.to the fact-that-it--
was a drafty old building. After fans were installed, the air was changed and
filtered enough to prevent the kind of dusty haze often encountered in the
average foundry operation. :

Sometimes, these extreme safety precautions caused trouble with the
uranium production purity standards. One summer, boron began to show up

S65 Frank interview with Hacker 1980, 18-19; Prank Spedding, *The the
Wall Blew out of Ue Ae Spedding Manuscript: Frank Spedding, sSeplosions,”
Spedding Manuscript.

56€Peterson, interview with Hacker, 6-11.



166

Within two years, Marie and Pierre Curie had added thorium, polonium, and
radium to the Hist of elements that emitted rays; the Curies even called the
process radioactivity.225 In 1903, Exnest Rutherford and his colleague Frederick
Soddy examined and broke the rays into three kinds—alpha, gamm, and beta.
Rutherford and Soddy also discovered that radioactive elements decayed, or
passed through stages where they emitted rays or particles until reaching the
last stage, lead.925 By the end of the nineteenth century, of these new
elements, radium had become the most useful, but like x-rays, it was also the
most dangerous, Only a few radium burns were reported publicly before the
1920s, but during that decade a more insidious discovery was made—radium
poisoning, In 2924, Theodore Blum, 2 dentist, reated a woman whose jaw
failed to heal after dental surgery. Blum labeled the syndrome radium: jaw and
attributed the problem to her occupation, painting luminous dials on clock

faces,527

325Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safty it the Manhattan Project, 1942-
1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 19. This book published under the aegis
of the Dey ent of Energy's Nevada Operations Office was the first complete examination
of the US. record in radiation safety practices, Based on both oral interviews and dassified
docurnents, it is the first volume of a seminal work on radiological safety in nuclear weapons
testing. This volume covers the war years and stops with the end of the management of the
atomic bomb project by the Manhattan Engineer dct in 1946, Also see Alfred Romer, The
Restless Atom {New York: Doubleday, 1960) and Lawrence Badash, Radioactivity ix Auericat
Growth and Decay of a Science Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979) for detailed
discussions of the history of radioactivity. See Otto Glasser et al., Physical Foundations of
Radiology 34 ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) for @ more technical dismussion of
radiology in its historical setting,

326Glasser et al., 318.

27 The story of the radium dial painters has been told in several sonrces, $0 see Teports
in the following sources for the full story: Wiliam B. Castle, et al., “Necrosis of the Jaw in
Workers Employed in Applying A Luminous Paint Containing Radium,” Journal of Industrial
Hygiene 7 (1925): 371-382; Roger J. Cloutier, “Florence Kelley and the Radium Dial Painters,
Health Physics 39 (1980): 711-716; Robley D. Evans, “Radium Poisoning: A Review of Present
Knowlodge;” Amarican Journal of Public Health 23 (1933): 2017-1018; Frederick L. Hoffman,



214

Dietz, David. Atomic Science, Bontb and Power. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.,
1954

Disque, Ned “The Atom at Ames." The lowad 4, no. 6 (August-September
1956): 11-13, 50-52,

“Dr. Spedding Recalls First Controlled Chain Reaction.” Ames Laboratory News
4, no, TI (November 30, 1962): 1, 3.

DuPont De Nemours and Company. DuPont's Part in the National Security
Program. Wilmington, DE: DuPont, 1946.

Dupree, A. Hunter. Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and
Activities to 1940, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University

Press, 1957.

England, J. Merton, A Patvon for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation’s
Formative Yeers, 1945-57. Washington, DC: National Science
Foundation, 1982.

Ermene, Joseph J., ed. Atomic Bomb Scientists: Memoirs, 1939-1945. Westport,
CT: Meckler, 1989,

Evans, Robley D. “Radium Poisoning: A Review of Present Knowledge.”
American Journal of Public Health 23, no. 10 (October 1953): 1017-1023.

Fermi, Laura, Atoms in the Family: My Life with Enrico Fermi. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954,

“First Metals Development Bullditig.” Ames Laboratory News 2. no, 8 (October
13, 1960): 7-8.

Fitch, Val L. “The View from the Bottom.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(February 1975): 43-46,

“40-Year Veterans Look Back.” Ames Laboratory Changing Scene (july 1984): 1-4,
“40 Years.” Ames Laboratory Changing Scene (May 1987): 2-8.
“Frank Harold Spedding Turns 80.” Ames Laboratory Changing Scene (October

s 1-2,

Friedman, Robert S,, and Renee C, Friedman. The Role of University Organized
Research Units in Academie Science. College Park, PA: Center for the
Study of Higher Education, Pennsylvania State University, 1982.



198
Patent administration was not controlled by the District either; those policies
were already set in place by OSRD. in fact, the Manhattan District chose to use
the existing OSRD structure to manage the patent process for its facilities tao.

Health was certainly a concern of the atomic bomb project, but it was not
the Manhattan District that initiated most of the health and safety
organizations. Those carried over from the individual laboratories like the
Metallurgical Laboratory. In fact, the Manhattan Engineer District used the
Metallurgical Laboratory for its model to establish an organization to
coordinate all the facilities under its jurisdiction. The District continued to
supply many of the same services as those created originally by the
Metallurgical Laboratory.

It is hue that these areas of administration—security, contracting, and
health and safety—changed research administration during and after the war.
However, those changes did not originate out of military style management
techniques employed by the Manhatian District, It might be said that the
Manhattan District, while employing some military management techniques,
such as hierarchical control and strict adherence to command structure, for
example, was also controlled from the top by an academic management
structure, a committee. The Military Policy Committee actually made final
decisions on every activity that the District undertook. So, in a sense, the
academic management style won the last victory, finally determining and
controlling the policies for the Manhattan District operations.



207

research support days, Also, administrative and financial structures had
been ereated. in both the federal government and universities and colleges to
regulate research funding. Although classified research requized special
considerations and tha Ames Project encompassed these stringent 1ules and
regulations, many of the administrative structures survived ox evolved into
the post-war period to affect a new generation of research organizations, but

ones with similar attitudes to thosa developed during the war.



198

who were not familiar with all industrial practices, and many of the employees
were local men and women who had little experience with labor practices 371
Tn June 1943, Eltoy Gladrow took over the health and safety program, working
dosely with group leaders in the scientific project and initially with Mr. Rafdel,
one of the guards, on the production pilot plant project.372

Finally though it was radiation, the “special hazard,” that received the
most attention at every installation. Research studies monitored and kept a
record of the dangers of the levels of exposutes of employees. Clinical testing
was also employed at Ames as well as other installations, Blood tests were
administered routinely, though most employees do not zemember what was
done with them. Urinalysis tests administered at least once a month
evidently, were turned in to higher authorities at the Metallurgical Laboratory
and the Manhattan District. No medical doctor was on staff for the Ames
Project though Dz. John G, Grant of the University Hospital was called upon to
provide some support in ireatment and research. Thelma Bruce, a nurse
evidently at the hospital, was the other medical technician who administered
routine blood and urine tests throughout the war. On occasion, certain staff of
the Ames Laboratory participated in research studies to determine the
effectiveness of clinical tests or to serve as subjects for medical research carried
on by the district. Those research studies were particularly important because
they became the foundation upon which standard exposure levels were tested.
These studies also became the building blocks for protection of workers in the

371 "Safety Report for Perlod Ending 8/1/43," the Ames Laboratory Papers, 2,

272 frank S “Letter to Group Leaders,” June 16, 1943, Ames Laboratory Papers;
“Health and Salo Rene for the Week Ending Jane 28, 1943,” ‘Ames Laboratory pa



77

well as routinely clean shelves, floors and benches to kept the affected areas as
free of dust as possible”

Waste disposal was also under the jurisdiction of the health physicists.
All sites had to develop burial grounds for radioactive waste materials.
However, the problem with most of the burial sites was that long-lived
materials like plutonium were buried along with those of short-lived status.
This problem continued long after the war when containers broke o seals
came undone contaminating ground water and soils around particularly
hazardous sites. No final solution to this problem was devised during the war,
but suggestions for disposal ranged from burying the more contaminated
materials at sea in concrete to firing rockets of contaminated material out of
the earth's atmosphere into deep space.34 :

It fell to the health-physics section not only to build instruments that
monitored hazardous materials, but it also became their charge to keap
meticulous records of the levels of the exposure to personnel and also those
levels of radiation found in plants, soils, water, and other living things for
information to future generations, These personnel became especially
valuable to the project duxing the war, and those trained in this area during
the war found that their tasks continued well after the war years.

3476, T. Cantril, "Memo to R. L, Doan Regarding Safety Precautions for the Experiment
at the West Stands, Stagg Field,” August 31, 1942, Ames Laboratory Papers, 1-3. pm

*48nickson, “Protection Measures for Personnel,” 87-92; Stone, “Health Protection
Activities.” 15-16,



180
The medical program ,

‘The medical program developed slowly at first since the District was
involved with just engineering and construction in the early days, After the
OSRD projects became a part of the District in 1943, it was apparent that some
coordination of the diverse medical operations needed attention. At first,
Groves considered pulling Stone from the Metallurgical Laboratory to oversee
the entire operation, but as he visited with installations one name continued
to surface as the best choice for coordination of the entire program: Stafford L.
Warren, professor of radiology at the University of Rochester. Warren was
brought into the project, initially in June 1943, as chief of a provisional medical
section at the District headquarters. The need to procure and retain medical
men and women necessitated militarizing the medical operation, so
negotiations soon began with the Office of the Surgeon General. After
negotiations concluded successfully for the Manhattan District, Warren moved
to Clinton where he was commissioned as a colonel on November 2, 1943 351

Warren quickly set about reorganizing.the Medical Section’s three- -
branches: medical research, industrial medicine, and clinical medicina3&2 The
basic objective af the medical research branch was to collect data on toxic
material to protect workers who were being hired for the plant projects and to

1gtatford L. Warren, “The Role of Radiology in the Development of the Atomic
Bomb," in Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the 1, Radiology in World War II
(Washington, DC: U.S, Superintendent of Documents, 1966), 841-942, hereafter known as
Warren, “The Role of Radiology." Also sea K. D. Nichols, “Letter to Stafford L. Warren on
the Responsibilities of the Medical Section,” MED History Book I General Volume 7 Medical
Program, Appendix Al for a detailed elaboration of the responsibilitics of the Madicat

S2}ones, 410-413; MED History Book I General, Volume 7 Medical Program, 61-63,