IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-0291

Filed May 2, 2018

SHAWN P. SHELTON,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lucas County, Gary G. Kimes, 

Judge.

Shawn Shelton appeals the district court’s dismissal of his contempt action 

and his underlying motion for injunctive relief. AFFIRMED.

Shawn P. Shelton, Ft. Madison, self-represented litigant, appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
2

DOYLE, Presiding Judge

Shawn Shelton appeals the district court’s dismissal of his contempt action 

and his underlying motion for injunctive relief. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1991, Shawn Shelton was convicted of first-degree murder and 

attempted murder.1 See Shelton v. State, No. 08-1962, 2011 WL 441932, at *2 

(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). His subsequent postconviction-relief action was 

denied and dismissed after a trial, and this court affirmed the dismissal in 2011.2 

See id. at *2-3. Further review was denied by the Iowa Supreme Court. See 

Shelton v. Mapes, 821 F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2016).

Thereafter, Shelton filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing 

“he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel or that the state 

appellate court decision was unreasonable.” Id. The federal district court denied 

his petition, but granted a certificate of appealability on issues raised by Shelton. 

See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (requiring issuance of “a certificate of 

appealability” to appeal to the federal court of appeals). Shelton appealed, and 

the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. See Mapes, 821 F.3d at 951. 

Shelton sought review by the Supreme Court, but his petition for writ of certiorari 

was denied. See Shelton v. Mapes, 137 S. Ct. 196 (Oct. 2016).

On June 9, 2015, prior to the Eighth Circuit’s ruling, Shelton received a 

notice from the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) concerning property he 

had stored in remote legal storage. The notice explained that on May 1, 2015, an 

 

1 The criminal case number was FECR001872.

2 The postconviction case number is PCCV022133.
3

earlier notice was posted informing inmates that “IDOC Policy was revised to 

exclude the provision for remote legal storage.” The May notice had stated 

inmates had sixty days from the date of the memo “to send your excess legal 

material out at your expense, give it to an authorized visitor, or have it destroyed.” 

The May notice went on to say:

Each offender identified with legal materials in storage will be 

allowed to review what is in storage. You will be given an opportunity 

to identify which items you would like destroyed, given to an 

authorized visitor, sent out, and what you will like to have in your 

legal property within your cell. Reminder, policy dictates that each 

offender is allowed 3 boxes of personal property, and legal work is 

counted in that limit.

The June notice advised Shelton he had yet to comply with the IDOC directive to 

deal with his property, and it gave Shelton until July 7, 2015, “to come into 

compliance with the directive” or his property would be destroyed.3

 

3 Materials designated by Shelton and included in the appendix prepared by Shelton show 

that on May 22, 2015, he petitioned the IDOC for a waiver or variance from the new rule 

“because [he] was actively involved in litigation and have been wrongfully convicted.” On 

June 22, general counsel for the IDOC informed Shelton his petition did not comply with 

applicable regulations and therefore his waiver/variance request was denied. Shelton 

then filed a grievance with the IDOC on July 15, 2015. On August 13, the IDOC provided 

Shelton with a grievance response. Shelton’s grievance was sustained. He was informed:

I [a representative of the Anamosa State Penitentiary] have been 

informed that the DOC is reviewing their earlier directive to discontinue 

remote legal storage areas.

Based upon information you have provided as well as information 

contained above, your grievance complaint is sustained. Until a final 

decision is made by the DOC, you will be allowed to keep your excess legal

material in remote legal storage.

In a Warden Appeal Response dated September 10, the deputy warden of the penitentiary 

responded, “I fail to see what you are appealing as your remedy is already in place; your 

legal material is currently stored, just as it was previously.” Inexplicably, these documents 

were never furnished to the district court during the course of this litigation. The materials 

are not a part of the record on appeal, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.801, and we therefore do not 

consider them in deciding this appeal. Rasmussen v. Yentes, 522 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1994).
4

On July 9, 2015, Shelton filed a “Motion to Preserve Criminal Court 

Records,” dated June 25, 2015, in state district court concerning the IDOC’s 

revised policy. Shelton’s motion caption cited his criminal case number, 

FECR001872, as well as his original postconviction-relief case number 

PCCV022133.4 Shelton asserted he had “attempted to resolve this problem 

administratively,” but the IDOC had “declined to accommodate [his] procedural, 

statutory and constitutional rights to access the court and to have criminal 

records. . . .” Shelton noted his appeal to the Eighth Circuit was still pending at 

that time, and he asserted it was “more likely than not” that “a minimum limited 

remand will be ordered back to the Federal District Court due to the State of Iowa’s 

misconduct.” Shelton requested an order be entered to protect the record for 

present and future court proceedings. Shelton filed his own memorandum to 

support his motion for the protection of his property, and later, a supplement to the 

motion.

On July 13, 2015, the district court construed Shelton’s filings in the district 

court as “seeking an order restraining the [IDOC] from destroying records in his 

possession in prison.” The court noted it could not “tell whether or not the State 

ha[d] been given notice of [Shelton’s] request,” so the court granted Shelton’s 

motion “temporarily,” enjoining the IDOC “from destroying [Shelton’s] records 

wherever situated, pending hearing.” On August 24, 2015, the court entered an 

order finding Shelton had not exhausted his administrative remedies but the 

 

4

Iowa Courts Online shows that when Shelton filed this motion, he had two other 

postconviction-relief actions pending in Jones county, one filed in 2013, see Iowa Courts 

Online, Shelton v. State, No. 06531 PCCV005602, and one filed in 2014, see Iowa Courts 

Online, Shelton v. State, No. 06531 PCCV005843.
5

temporary order “shall remain in full force and effect,” pending hearing, to “be 

scheduled upon request of either party after administrative proceedings are

completed.”

A few months later, Shelton filed an application for an order to show cause

why the IDOC should not be held in contempt. Shelton stated he had received a 

CD from the Clerk of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals containing an audio 

recording of the oral arguments heard in his appeal. Shelton asserted the IDOC 

was ordering that he “send out or destroy” the recording, in violation of the IDOC’s 

policy classifying the CD as “legal materials” and in violation of the temporary 

injunction. Shelton insisted he would “suffer irrefutable harm if an order [was] not 

issued immediately.” The matter was set for hearing. 

On January 21, 2016, the district court entered an order denying Shelton’s 

contempt action. The court stated:

The first consideration is that the litigation underlying the 

present case has been completed and is now closed. The action 

was dismissed in 2009 and the appeal from that action was 

eventually dismissed by Shelton. For reasons unknown, Shelton has 

attempted to revive the present action in 2015 “in an attempt to 

preserve the records in another ongoing case before the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals.” There is no jurisdictional basis to revive 

this action and no reason why this action should be used to enforce 

issues related to another pending action. Therefore, on this basis 

alone, the action is denied.

As well, the claim that Shelton is attempting to argue that he 

wants to preserve the audio file of the oral arguments, Shelton v. 

Mapes, 8th Cir. No. 15-1015, is still pending. Shelton has counsel in 

that appeal and any question with regard to the events that transpired 

in the proceeding should be discussed with counsel. If Shelton has 

a claim with regard to access to the courts in that case, that is a claim 

which should be bought by his counsel.

Finally, the ultimate test is whether Shelton has access to the 

courts. See Walters v. Kautzky, 680 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2004). In this 

action [there] is no indication that Shelton has been denied counsel 
6

or that his ability to litigate claims has been impeded. Therefore, any 

request for contempt or otherwise is denied.

The contempt action is denied and this action is closed.

Thereafter, Shelton filed a plethora of motions, including for a new trial and 

for sanctions. The district court subsequently denied Shelton’s motions. Shelton 

now appeals.

II. Discussion.

On appeal, Shelton asserts two claims. First, he argues, “The district court 

had jurisdiction to treat a motion to preserve criminal court records as a petition for 

injunctive relief prior to the filing of a civil complaint,” citing Iowa Code chapter 664 

(2015) and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1501. Second, Shelton asserts, “The 

district court violated principles of equity when it dismissed a consent decree i.e. 

temporary injunction, for lack of jurisdiction.”

A. Jurisdiction.

Though Shelton’s June 2015 “Motion to Preserve Criminal Court Records” 

was captioned with the original criminal and postconviction-relief case numbers, 

the substance of the motion challenged the constitutionality of the IDOC policy—

destruction of his stored legal materials if he did not move them to another 

permitted location. Shelton mentioned the postconviction-relief chapter of the Iowa 

Code—chapter 822—a few times in his motion and in his memorandum in support 

thereof, but he did not cite section 822.2, which sets out who can seek 

postconviction relief under that chapter and claims upon which relief may be 

granted. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a)-(g); see also Belk v. State, 905 N.W.2d 

185, 188 (Iowa 2017) (discussing section 822.2(1)). As relief, Shelton prayed in 

his memorandum that the court “preserve his criminal case records by granting the 
7

motion to preserve his various other criminal case documents in the interest of 

justice . . . [until] such time that [his] court avenues and legal remedies [were] 

exhausted or until such time” as the IDOC provided him a “meaningful opportunity 

and reasonable time to convert his physical . . . records into electronic [files] . . . .” 

The court clearly took this to mean Shelton sought a temporary injunction while he 

was exhausting his administrative remedies—not a request for postconviction 

relief. Our rules generally require that we look at a motion’s substance to 

determine its nature, not its label. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Lagle, 430 

N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1988). 

“A temporary injunction is a preventive remedy to maintain the status quo 

of the parties prior to final judgment and to protect the subject of the litigation.” 

State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Iowa 2011) (emphasis added); see also 

Iowa R Civ. P. 1.1501-.1502. “One requirement for the issuance of a temporary 

injunction is a showing of the likelihood or probability of success on the merits of 

the underlying claim.” Lewis Invs., Inc. v. City of Iowa City, 703 N.W.2d 180, 184 

(Iowa 2005). Where the litigant’s underlying claim is an equitable action seeking 

permanent injunctive relief, the district court must “assess the likelihood that the 

[party] would be successful in showing entitlement to a permanent injunction” in 

determining whether a request for a temporary injunction should be granted. Id. 

Pursuant to rule 1.1506(1), a “temporary injunction may be granted by . . . [a] judge 

of the district in which the action is or will be pending.” Because the question of 

whether a temporary injunction should be issued or rejected depends upon the 

unique facts of each case and “rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial 
8

court,” our review is for an abuse of discretion. Id. However, to the extent Shelton 

claims a violation of his constitutional rights, our review is de novo. See id.

Here, the district court initially granted Shelton a temporary injunction so 

that matters could be sorted out before any action was taken by the IDOC. Then, 

the court extended the temporary injunction so that Shelton had the opportunity to 

pursue and exhaust his administrative remedies concerning the IDOC’s policy. 

The court was empowered to grant Shelton injunctive relief. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 

1.1501-.1502; see also Schrier v. State, 573 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Iowa 1997) (noting 

Iowa district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, “empowered by the Iowa 

Constitution to hear all cases in law, equity, or special proceedings”). The 

injunction was only temporary; its issuance was essentially conditioned upon 

Shelton seeking administrative review of the policy. When Shelton requested the 

State be held in contempt for violating the temporary injunction, there was no 

evidence in the record before the district court that Shelton had exhausted or even 

had begun pursuing his administrative remedies. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 201-

50.21 (2018) (discussing prisoner’s discipline and grievance procedures); IDOC 

Policy No. IO-OR-06 (2018) (setting forth offender grievance procedures) available 

at https://doc.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/io-or-06_offender_grievances_procedures.pdf

(last visited April 15, 2018). Thus, there was no likelihood or probability of success 

on the merits of his underlying claim—the constitutionality of the IDOC’s policy.

In denying Shelton’s motion, the district court stated:

The first consideration is that the litigation underlying the 

present case has been completed and is now closed. The action 

was dismissed in 2009 and the appeal from that action was 

eventually dismissed by Shelton. For reasons unknown, Shelton has 

attempted to revive the present action in 2015 in an attempt to 
9

preserve the records in another ongoing case before the Eighth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. There is no jurisdictional basis to revive 

this action and no reason why this action should be used to enforce 

issues related to another pending action. Therefore, on this basis

alone, the action is denied.

Given that Shelton’s original motion was not brought pursuant to section 822.2(1), 

we agree the postconviction-relief statutes offered him no relief. See Fassett v. 

State, No. 15-0816, 2016 WL 3554954, at *4-7 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2016) 

(discussing district court’s jurisdiction versus its authority over certain matters and 

finding district court correctly concluded the inmate “could not proceed under 

chapter 822 and should instead seek relief under chapter 17A,” which provides for 

pursing administrative remedies); see also Belk, 905 N.W.2d at 193 (Waterman, 

J., dissenting) (discussing Fassett and inmates’ challenges to IDOC policies). 

Moreover, there is no evidence in this case that Shelton exhausted his 

administrative remedies concerning the IDOC policy, and we have no 

administrative process to review. See id. Ultimately, while the district court had 

the power to enter a temporary or permanent injunction, its decision not to continue 

the temporary injunction was not an abuse of discretion under the facts of the case.

B. Equity.

Shelton next contends, “The district court violated principles of equity when 

it dismissed a consent decree i.e. temporary injunction, for lack of jurisdiction.” His 

argument is essentially the same as above—the court had jurisdiction to enter an 

injunction; therefore, its dismissal of the injunction was inequitable. Shelton claims 

“the parties agreed a temporary injunction should issue as an independent remedy 

prior to the filing of a civil complaint.” Upon our review of the record, we disagree.
10

To be sure, inmates are not stripped of all constitutional rights by 

imprisonment, including the right to have meaningful access to the courts. See 

Risdal v. State, 573 N.W.2d 261, 263 (Iowa 1998); Mark v. State, 556 N.W.2d 152, 

154 (Iowa 1996); see also Walters, 680 N.W.2d at 5. But there is no denial of 

access to the courts where there is no actual injury to the offender. See Walters, 

680 N.W.2d at 5. Here, there is no evidence Shelton suffered any injury. See

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (noting the necessity of exhausting 

administrative remedies before claiming a denial of access to the courts); see also 

Risdal, 573 N.W.2d at 263 (noting offender exhausted his administrative remedies 

before filing an application for postconviction relief); In re City of Ames, 219 

N.W.2d 718, 719 (Iowa 1974) (“The rule requires that, prior to calling upon the 

courts to act, a party must exhaust any remedy available before an administrative 

agency.”). Shelton had a means to challenge the constitutionality of the IDOC’s 

policy, and the court even entered a temporary injunction to allow Shelton time to 

do so. Equity does not require reversal under the facts of this case.

III. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion by the district 

court in dismissing Shelton’s contempt action and the underlying motion for 

injunctive relief. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s dismissal of Shelton’s motions.

AFFIRMED.

Tabor, J., concurs; McDonald, J., concurs specially.
11

MCDONALD, Judge (concurring specially).

I would dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. Final judgment in this 

postconviction-relief action was entered in December 2008. See Shelton v. State, 

No. 08-1962, 2011 WL 441932, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). The motion 

and contempt application at issue in this appeal were wholly unrelated to the 

underlying case and filed in 2015. The district court lacked jurisdiction over the 

motion and subsequent contempt application. See State v. Olsen, 794 N.W.2d 

285, 289 (Iowa 2011) (“Although Olsen filed a post-judgment motion, the motion 

was untimely and therefore did not resurrect the district court's jurisdiction in the 

matter. Thus, the district court had no jurisdiction to enter its . . . ruling.”); State v. 

Braun, 460 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Iowa 1990) (explaining the district court was without 

jurisdiction over application filed in a closed criminal case and stating “[a] 

defendant cannot jump-start an expired case by simply filing an application for 

collateral relief”). We thus lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Shelton’s filing of a 

motion wholly unrelated to the underlying case seven years after final judgment 

was entered does not revive the case, create jurisdiction in the district court, revive 

the time to appeal from the final judgment, or create appellate jurisdiction where it 

does not exist. See Olsen, 794 N.W.2d at 289 (“A timely appeal is jurisdictional, 

and the time limit for appeal cannot be extended by filing an improper posttrial 

motion. An untimely posttrial motion is defective and does not toll the running of 

the thirty-day period within which an appeal must be taken.”); State v. Fidler, No. 

15-1648, 2016 WL 2747825, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) (dismissing appeal 

where motion at issue was filed ten years after entry of final judgment).