### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 22, 200 9 S es sio n

AR CKA ISER

WAT KINS , b y and th rough he r GU AR DIA N A D L ITEM, JOE DU NC AN v. M ETHOD IST HEA LTHC AR E SY STEM a/k/a METHO DIST GERMANTO WN, ET AL


### .
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-002983-05 Kar en R. Williams, Jud ge

No. W2008-01349-C OA-R3-C V - M ay 13, 2009

Pla int if f’ s atto rn e y

a pp e a ls the tr ia l cou

rt ’s or de r sum mari ly fi nd ing him in dir e c t conte mpt of c ourt

. We vacate the trial c ourt’s orde r, re mand, and o rder the matter tra

nsfer red to a nother judg e for further proce eding s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t V ac at e d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined.
Donald Cappa

rella, N ashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, R. Sadler Bailey.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r a nd Do ug la s Ea rl Di mon d, Se nio r C ou ns e l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

Th is a pp e a l ari se s f

ro m a jud g me nt o f t

he Cir c uit Co urt fo r S he lby County summa ri ly holdin g P laintiff’s attorne y , Appellant Sadler Ba iley (Mr. B ailey

), in direc t criminal contempt of

c o urtan d s e n t e n c i n g h i mt o a

f i n e i nth e am o un to f $ 5 0 an d t o t e nd ays i nj a i l
, s u s p e n d i n g n i n e d ays upon participation in the Te nnessee L awy ers Assistance Prog ram. The fac ts releva nt to our review of the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt o n a pp e a l are un dis pute d. In M a y 20 05 , Re g ina

Watkin s a

nd Do na ld Watkin s, ind ivi du a lly and a s pa re nts and ne xt f

ri e nd s of Ar c ka ise r Watkin s, a min or c hil d (“ Pla in ti ffs ” ), fi le d a

me dic a l ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n a g a ins t Me tho dis t H e a lth c are Sy ste m a /k/ a Methodist Germantown ( “Methodist”); Jay anta K. D irg hang i, M.D.; and Indurani Tejwani, M.D. In M ay 20 07 , th e tr ia l c ourt

a pp ointe d Joe M. Dunc an, Es q. , gua rd ian ad lit e m to se rv e in t he be st int e re sts of

the min or

c hil d, Ar c ka ise r Watki ns . A c c or din g to the c ourt do c ke t r e po rt c on ta ine d in the re cord, the trial court awa rded J ay anta K. Dirg hang i, M.D

. summary judgme nt in J anuar y 2007. In J une 2007, the tria l court ente red a n o rd er of voluntary

dismiss al without prejudice of InduraniO n N ov em ber 18
, 200 5, t he t r i al court ent er ed a c on s ent order s t ayi ng procee di ng s pend i ng t he T enness ee 1

Su p rem e C o u rt ’s res o l u t i o n of C al aw ay ex r el

. Ca l aw ay v. Schu ker
, 19 3 S. W

. 3d 509 ( T enn. 200 5). Th e s t ay w as l i ft ed on J une 2, 2006.

-2- Tejwa ni, M.D. After

intense, protra cted discove ry and the filing of near ly 750 pleading s in the trial court, the matter sty led Arc kaiser Watkins, by and throug h her Guardia

n Ad L item, J oe Dunc an v. 1 Me tho dis t H e a lth c are Sy ste m a /k/ a Me tho dis t Germ ant own came to b e he ard in t he tr ia l c ourt

in Marc h 2008.

B oth pa rt ie s c ha ra c te ri ze thi s a c tio n a s c on te nti ou s, c omb a tiv e and pr otr a c te d. Th e inc ide nts ultimately

g iving r ise to the trial cour t’s judgme nt holding Mr. B ailey in direct c ontempt occur

red

on Marc h 27, 20 08 , dur ing the jur y tr ia l of the matte r. Mr . Ba ile y a dv ise d the c ourt that whe n it di d

n o th av e t h e t i m e t o re adan d t h i n k ab o u t th e p art i es ’ ar gu m en t s , i t“a l m o s tal wa y s [ go t ] i twr o n g” and that the case was “on pace

. . . to se t a world rec ord for reve rsible er

ror[.]” After tellingthe cour t that he wa s “not worr ied about fifty dollars that [t he court] w ant[ed] to wave in f ront of [him] on a salmon-colore d car d ”; ca l ling opposingcounsel a liar and the court “ bizarre” ; and stating that the court did not ca

re whether

it was lied to and could not “g et i t rig ht,” M r. B ailey told the court that it “[had] never , at any

time, d emonstrated a

willingness to enf

orce [i ts] ruling s.” The tr ial court advised Mr. B ailey

to “put [hi s] case in front of the jury and let’s just g et m o v i n g, ” to which Mr. Ba iley replied, “ Oh, my

God.” The court then imm ediately announce d a re cess. F ollowing a brief

rec ess, the cour

t gr a nted Def endants’ e arlier

motion for a mistrial “base d on Mr. B ailey ’s contentious

c on du c t to wa

rd the Court .” Th e tr ia l c ourt dis mis se d th e jur

y and a djo ur ne d unti l 2: 00 PM.
At approximately

12:25 PM, Mr. Bailey

and De fenda

nts’ counsel L ee Cha se, I I I , telephoned the tr ia l jud g e to inf

or m he r that, in Mr

. B a ile y ’s wo rd s, the y we re “ re a l c los e to h avin g a se ttl e me nt” i nth e c a s e s h o u l d t h e y r e a c h“ t o t a l c l o s ur e o f e v e r y s i n g l e i s s u e

. ” A c c o r d i n g t o M r

. B a i l e y, “eve ry thing e lse [was] worked out,” and if all “unce rtainty ” could be resolved, the case would settle. Mr. Bai l ey

advised the c ourt that Methodist had “no de sire to pursue in a ny way any further sanctions or a

ny thing a g ainst” him, and that the parties wanted to “ drop it.” Mr. B ailey reque sted the court to “excuse” the parties from the 2:00 hearing , advising the cour t that if it would do so, “the

case would be done.” The trial c ourt indic ated that a settlement probably would be adva

ntag eous to all sides, but that the 2: 00 hear ing would be held as scheduled. Mr. Bailey advised the c ourt that continuing w ith the hear ing “ would mean [they] wouldn’t be able to settle bec ause the re w ould be thi s unc e rt a int

y ,” and the c ourt a dv ise d M r. B a ile y

that he wo uld

the re fo re have to w a it.

Whe n it re c onve ne d at 2: 00 , th e tr ia l c ou rt tol d Mr

. B a ile y , “ the Court fe e ls t hat you are in criminal conte mpt for y our re marks.” T he cour t ad v i s ed Mr. B ailey

that it had spoken with an attorney about ac ceptingthe role of specia l prosecutor , and that it believed it wa s appropriate for

ano the r j ud g e to h e ar t

he c on te mpt pr oc e e din g s. Th e c ourt fu rt he r t old Mr . B a ile y

that th e re wo uld be a c harg ing doc ument serve d on him informing him of the time and pla ce of the hea ring . The c ourt stated, “I think that the di g nity of t he court was challeng ed in such a way this morning that cannot be over looked.” The court a djourned at approxim ately 2:03 PM.-3-

On Marc h 31, 2008, the trial cour t entere d an order setti ng the contempt matter for a he aring on April 2, 2008. Mr. Bailey was re prese nted by

counsel at the April 2 hea ring , who aske d the cour

t to a llow him to a ddress a due proce ss conce rn that wa s “somewhat raised” in a motion to continue appar ently

filed the da

y befor e and de nied by

the trial cour

t at the hear ing. Counsel a lso advised the trial court that he had witnesses to pre sent and re quested the “ opp o rt unity to be hea rd.” The trial court d en i ed counsel’s reque sts and announce d that it had cited Mr. B ailey for dire ct cr iminal contempt of c ourt based on his languag e and conduct on Marc h 26 and 27, 2008. The trial court r ead its written findings of

fac t and conc lusion of law, and stated that it was imposing a f ine in the amount of $50 and se n t en ci n g M r. Bailey to ten day s in jail, suspending nine da y s upon voluntary participation in and satisfactory completio n o f p ro g rams off ere d by the Tenne ssee L awyers Assistance Prog ram. Counsel for Mr. B ailey

ag ain aske d for pe rmission to addr ess the court, a nd restate d his posi t i o n that Mr. B ailey was be ing de nied due pr ocess whe re the trial court ha d

announce d that the hea

ringwould be an indirect proc eedingbefor e a spe cial judg e and w ith a specia l pr os e c uto r. Th e tr ia l c ourt a sk e d th e She ri ff to take Mr . B a ile y int o c us tod

y , a nd c ouns e l mo ve d to

se t bo nd purs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d § 39 -1 7- 41 7. Th e c ourt re pli e d, “ [h]e ’s g oin g to be take n into custody

one wa y or anothe r.” After further discussion betwee n counsel and the trial

c ourt , th e c ourt

se t bo nd in t he amou nt o f $ 1, 500 cash and den ie d c ouns e l’ s o ff e r o f p ro of

wi th respe ct to the offe red w itnesses.

The trial c ourt enter ed its order holding Mr. B ailey

in direct c riminal contempt on April 2, 2008. In its order, the tria l court stated:

T h e [ c] o urt i n i t i al l y

i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s m at t er wo u l d b e d ea l twi thb y

ap p o i n t i n g a specia l prosecutor

and having

a spec ial judge assig ned to hear the ca se. Upon fur ther ref lection, the [c]ourt decide d that this was a direc t criminal contempt that should be dealt with summarily

but throug h a wr itten finding of fac ts and law.

The trial c ourt found that it ha d found Mr. Ba iley in c ontempt on the morning of Marc h 27, 2008, and re- set the matter for 2:00. The trial court further found that, on Marc h 27, 2008, Mr. B ailey “willfully misbehaved so as t o obstruct t he adminis tration of j ustice i n violation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated , Section 29-9-102( 1).” Mr . Bailey filed a timely notice of appea l to this Court.

Issues Presented
Mr. Bailey pre sents the following issues for our revie w:

1. Whethe r the c riminal contempt conviction should be re verse d b ecause the trial court wr ongfully serve d as prose cu t o r, judge and jury w here (1) the primary ba sis for the conte mpt was the allege d di s respect of the tria l court judge her self, and ( 2) there was no need to a ct summarily when the trial was over be fore the criminal contempt was eve n char ged?-4-

2. W he the r the tr ia l c ou rt faile d to pr ov ide e sse nti a l due pr oc e ss b y r e fu sin g to give Mr. Bai l ey an opportunity to defend himself, a nd proper notice of the

c ha rg e s a ga ins t hi m?

3. Whethe r the trial c ourt abused h er d i scre tion in finding t he ac tions of Mr. Ba ile y a mou nte d to c ri min a l c on te mpt wh e re (1 ) the a lle ge d mi sc on du c t di d not obstruct or dela y the administration of justice, and ( 2) occur red pur suant to a sin c e re e ff

ort in pu rs uit

of a dv oc a c y f

or his c lie nt?

4. Whethe r the trial c ourt judge abuse d her discr etion in finding Mr. Bailey guilty of criminal contempt for ma king an allege dly p ro fane statement --

- “Oh, my God.” ?

Stan dard of Revie w
Criminal contempt actions have long been use d to protect the dignity and authority o f the court. E.g., Black v . Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn. 1996) . Criminal contempt proce edings “in a very true sense r aise a n issue betwee n the public and the a ccuse d.” Id. (quoting Sta te e x re l. An de rso n v . D au gh e rty , 191 S.W . 9 74 (T e nn . 1 91 7) ); see also State v. Turner , 914 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . Criminal contempt sho uld be imposed in appropriate ca ses “whe n
nece ssary to pre vent ac tual, direc t obstruction of
, or interfe renc e with, the administration of justice.” Robinson v. Air Draulics Engineering Co. , 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. 1964) . Thus , sanctions imposed for criminal contempt gener ally are both punitive and unconditional. Black , 938 S.W.2d at 398.

A determination of contempt is within the sound discretion of the trial c ourt, subject to the provisions of the law. Robinson, 377 S.W.2d at 912. Genera lly, the t rial court’s decision wil l not be disturbed a

bsent an a

buse of discr etion. Id. One char ged with c riminal cont em p t i s p re sumed innocent until found guilty beyond a re asonable do ubt. Id. On appe al following a finding of contempt, howeve r, the de fendant must overcome the pr esumption of guilt b y d em o n strating that the evidenc e pre ponderates aga inst the trial court’s fi n d i n g s. Id. With respe ct to the trial court’s de te rm inatio ns on qu e sti on s o f l a w, ho we ve r, ou r r e vie w i s de novo with no presumption of

corr ectne ss. Bo wde n v . W ar d , 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Anal y sis

The c ourts’ inhere nt power to punish ac t s o f contempt historically has be en re garde d as essential to protec t the authority and int egrity of the c ourts. Black v . Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1996) . Although at commo n l aw t h e court’s pow er to punish contempt wa s “vast and

u n d ef i n ed [, ]” the court’s c ontempt authority now is governe d by statute in this S tate. Id

. ; T enn.S ec t i o n 2 9 -9 -1 0 2 p ro v i d es: 2

T h e p o w e r o f th e se v e ra l c o u rts t o issu e a ttac h m e n ts, an d in flic t p u n ish m e n ts fo r c o n te m p ts o f c o u rt, sh all n o t b e c o n st ru ed t o ex t en d t o an y ex ce p t t h e fo l l o w i n g ca ses: ( 1) Th e w i l l ful m i s behav i or of any p er s on i n t he pres ence of t he court
, or s o near t here t o as t o ob s t r uct t he adm i ni s t r at i on of j ust i ce;

(2 ) T h e w i l l fu l m i sb eh av i o r o f a n y o f th e o fficers o f su ch c o u rts , i n th eir o ffici al t ran sac t i o n s; (3) T h e w i l l ful d i sob ed i en ce o r r esi st an ce o f any o ff ic e r o f t h e such co u rt s, pa rt y , j u ror,

w i t nes s , or any o t h er per s on , t o any l aw ful w r i t , proces s , order
, r ul e, decr ee, or com m and o f s uch

co u rts ; (4 ) A b u se o f, o r u n la w fu l i n te rf e re n c e w ith , t h e p ro c e ss o r p ro c e e d in g s o f th e c o u rt;

( 5) W i l l ful l y con vers i ng w i t h j uror s i n re l at i on t o t he m er i t s of t he caus e i n t he t r i al o f w hi ch
t hey ar e enga ged, or ot her w i s e t am per i ng w i t h t hem ; or

( 6 ) An y o t h e r a c t o r o mi s s i o n d e c l a r e d a c o n t e mp t b y l a w.

T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 2 9 -9-1 0 2 (20 0 0 ).

-5- Code Ann. § 29-9- 102 (2000). Contempt may be either c ivil or criminal in nature, a n d may be 2 either dire ct or indirec t. Black , 938 S.W.2d at 398. While c ivil contempt i s remedia l and coe rcive

a ndde sig ne d to c omp e l c omp lia nc e wi th the c ou rt ’s or de r, the pu rp os e of c ri min a l c on te mpt

is t o safe guard the authority of the c ourt. It is theref ore punitive in nature

. Id. Indirec t contempt arises from ac ts committ ed out of the pre sence of the c ourt, and c annot be punished unle ss the acc used has been give n the due pr ocess pr otections of notice an d an o pportunity to be hear d. Id. Ac ts constituting di rec t contempt, on the other hand, are acts commit ted i n the pre sence of the c ourt. Id. Dir e c t c o n te mp t may b e p u n is h e d s u mm ar il y if th e ju d g e c e rti f ie s th a t h e o r s h e s a w or he ard the conduct c onstitut ing contempt. Turner , 914 S.W.2d at 956; Tenn. R. Crim. P

. 42(a) . When the

c ha rg e d a c ts o f c on te mpt

inv olv e dis re sp e c t to the tr ia l cou rt or c ri tic ism of the jud ge , tha t judg e is disqualified from pr esiding over the c ontemp t h earing unless the defe ndant conse nts. Black , 938 S.W.2d at 398. Recusa l is prefe rre d ex ce pt where it would cause pr ejudicial or injurious delay. State v. Turner , 914 S.W.2d 951, 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.

Inhis brie f t o th is C ou rt , M r. Ba ile y ass e rt s the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d insu mma

ri ly h old ing him in c on te mpt

wh e re the un de rl yin g lit igatio n ha d se ttl e d, wh e re the tr ia l c ou rt sc he du le d a

he ari ng to be held six days a fter the char ged ac ts of contempt occ urre d, and whe re the trial court ha d advised Mr. Bailey that a specia l pr osecutor and specia l judge would be appointed. H e submits that the trial court de nied his due proce ss rights by unnece ssarily and inappropriately holding him i n contempt without an opportunity to be hear d wher e the summary pr ocedur e was not nece ssary to prevent an obstruction in the administration of justice. He further asserts that the trial c ourt’s orde r re flec ts bias

a ga ins t hi m w he re it r e fe re nc e s b e ha vio r s pa nnin g the c ou rs e of the lit igatio n. Mr . Baile y a sse rt s that the trial court held no hearing on April 2, but merely re ad aloud pr e-w ritten findings of fa ct and conclusions of law . He a dditionally asserts that, under Turne r , d u e proc ess prohibits the use of

su mma ry c on te mpt

e xc e pt i n e xtr e me c a se s, pa rt ic ula rl y whe re the a lle ge d co nte mpt ari se s f ro m a c ts of dis re sp e c t a ga ins t th e tr ia l judg e

. Mr . Baile y s ub mit s th a t in su c h c a se s, a sp e c ia l ju dg e sh ou ld be appointed to pr event bias or the appe arance of

bias. Finally, Mr. Bailey asserts that the evidenc e in the rec ord does not support a f inding of willful disobedience or obstruction of the a dminist ration of j ustice. He asserts that, under State v. Gre en , 783 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. 1990) , his actions are-6-

corr ectly per ceive d as ze alous advoca cy of this client, and not obstruction of the administration of jus tic e or dis re sp e c t of

the c ou rt

.
The State, on the other hand, asserts the trial court prope rly invoked its summary contempt authori ty under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 29-9-102 a nd Rule 42 of the Te nnessee Rules of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re . T he Sta te qu ote s Harris v. United States
, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965), f or the proposition that disrespectful outbursts and disruptive be havior in the courtroom are acts for which a trial judge may exe rc i s e s ummary conte mpt authority to “protect the judicia l insti tution it self.” The State submits that, under Turner , a judge who ma kes a summary contempt find i n g i s not require d to impose a sentenc e im mediately, but may dec ide upon an a ppropriate sentenc e af

ter ref lection and de liberation. It as s er t s t h at this is exactly what the tria l court did in this case. The State argue s that if the contemptuous acts occur in the prese nce of the trial court, then the contempt is direct and, unde r the Code a nd the Rules of Criminal Procedur e, may be punished summarily.
The issues pre sented by this appea l, as we perc eive them a re thre efold: first, whe ther the tria l court e rre d by imposing a summary contempt judgment at the April 2 hea ring; second, whe ther the trial judge wa s disqualified o r should have r ecuse d herse lf from the c ontempt proce edings; third, whether a finding of c ontempt is supported by the rec ord. We addre ss these issues in turn.

The Summa ry Pr

oc e e din g
Although, as Mr. Bailey asserts, the trial court ref ere nced acts over the course of seve ral days and his conduc t over the course of the litigation of this matter in its order on contempt, it is clear that at least some of

the ac ts giving rise t o t h e court’s finding of conte mpt occurr ed in the pre sence of the tr ia l c ou rt . Fu rthe r, the c ou rt ma de a sin gle fi nd ing of

c on te mpt . T hu s, we a gr e e wi th the State that the ac ts cited, assuming they consti tute contempt, consti tute direc t contempt under Rule 42( a) of the Rul es of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re . H ow e ve r, a s th e Sta te a sse rt s, Rul e 42 (a ) i s p e rm iss ive in

natur e . I t pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art :
A judge may summarily punish a pe rson who co m m i t s crimi nal contempt in the judge’s pre sence if the judge c ertifies that he or she sa w or he ard the conduct constituting t he conte mpt.
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2008)

. Clearly, a trial judge has the authority to punish direc t c ontempt summarily when nec essary to protect the authority and integrity of the c ourt and to pr event obstruction of the a dminist ration of justice. State v. Turner , 91 4 S.W.3d 951, 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The c ourt’s summary contempt power

“may be invoked when the re is a ne ed to ‘act swiftly and firmly to preve nt contumacious c onduct from disrupting the orde rly progre ss of a . . . trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Uni ted S t a t es v. Wi lson
, 4 2 1 U

. S. 3 0 9
, 3 1 9 ( 1 9 7 5 ) )

. H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e th e imp o s it io n o f s u mm ary punishment of

ten dramatically departs from traditional conc epts of due pr ocess, it should be used sparingly and r eserved for circ umstances whe re it is essential. Id. at 957 (c itations omi tted).-7-

The de termination of whe ther such ex ce p tional circumstanc es exist is gener ally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. (citations om itted). In exercising i ts discretion, the tria l court must consider the nature of the acc used’s c onduct; the effec t of the conduc t on the administration of jus tic e ; and the ov e rall pur po se of Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 42 (a ), in a dd iti on to i ts fac ial re q u irements. Id. a t 95 8. Ac ts j us tif yin g a su mma ry c on te mpt

jud gme nt i nc lud e “ a c ts threatening the judge or disrupting a he aring or obstruc tion of co urt proce edings.” Id. at 957 (quoting Harris v. United States , 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965). The y also include “ unusual situations . . . wher e instant ac tion is necessary to protect the judicia l insti tution it self.” Id. (quoting Ha rri s , 382 U.S. at 164). Tenne ssee courts have held that direc t acts of contempt i nclude a cts committed in the prese nce of the court that are disrespec tful, unrea sonable, or contemptuous; use of violent or loud la nguage or noises; or “turbulent” conduct that disrupts the proc eedings. Id. at 958 (c itations omitted). Thus, the court’s discretion mus t be balanced against the pre fer ence for pr ocee dings that inc lud e no tic e a nd a he ari ng , an d inso me c a se s, pa rt ic ula rl y w he re the a c ts o f the a c c us e d c on sis t of acts direc ted against the trial judge, a diff ere nt judge. Id. at 959. When the trial judge def ers the i m p o s ition of punishment unti l the trial has conc luded, the nee d for summary pr ocee dings diminis hes and the pref

ere nce f or a he aring incr ease s. Id. n.11.
Although Mr. Bailey asserts the underlying litigation had settled when he appea red be fore the c ou rt on the a ft e rn oo n o f M arc h 2 7 a ndon Ap ri l 2, 20 08 , w e mus t di sa gr e e wi th h is char acte riza t i o n of the status of the litigation. The re cord r efle cts that the trial court declar ed a mistrial based upon Mr. Bailey’s behavior on Marc h 27, and that Mr. Bailey and opposing counsel telephoned the trial court to advise the court that the matter could settle if a ll issues, including any potential action against Mr. B ailey, were concluded. We must expre ss our amazeme nt that, afte r two year s of combative if

not hostile litigation i ncluding nearly 750 pleadings and seve ral motions for sanctions, this matter re ache d a nea r settlement less t h an one hour afte r the trial c ourt dec lare d a mistrial. We must expre ss further amaz ement that the pr oposed settl ement hinged, at l east on Mr. Ba ile y’ s p art , o n th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionof iss ue s a ff

e c tin g M r. Ba ile y a ndno t th e pa rt ie s. Despite Mr. Bailey’ s assertion, howe ver, the matter ha d not settled by April 2, 2008. The unde rlying litigation was concluded on A pril 28, 2008, when an other trial judge, sitting by intercha nge, approve d a propose d settlement as in the best intere sts of the minor child.

W e m u s t a l s o d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t f o u n d Mr . Ba ile y in

c on te mpt wh e n it de c lare d a

mis tr ia l onMa

rc h 2 7, 20 08 , a ndme re ly w a ite d to impo se a n a pp ro pria te punishment after

further consideration and ref

lection. Although the trial court’s April 2, 2008, order on contempt states that the court “cited Mr. Bailey for direc t c riminal contempt of c ourt” on Mar ch 27, the re cord doe s not support this findi ng. As noted above, when it rec onvened on the afte rnoon of Mar ch 27, the court stated, “the Court fee ls that you are in criminal contempt for your re marks.” The c ourt then advised Mr . Bailey that it had spoken with an attorney about a cce pting the role of specia l prosecutor . The court additionally stated t hat i t believed it was a ppropriate for a nother judge to hear the contempt proc eedings. The court a d v i s ed M r. B ailey that ther e would be a char ging document ser ved on him informing him of the time and plac e of the h ea ri n g . Despite that trial

c ou rt ’s c omm e nt that it

“ [tho ug ht] that th e dig nit y of the c ou rt wa s c ha lle ng e d insu c h a way [ that] morning that cannot be overlooke d[,]” the cou rt did not summ arily hold Mr. Bailey in contempt.-8-

A punishment imposed summarily is one imposed “wi t h o ut cer emony or de lay.” Blac k’s La w D ic tio na

ry 14 35 (6 e d. 19 90 ). A sum mary pr oc e e din g is a “ [s ]h ort, co nc ise , a ndimm e diate

th proce eding” a nd a sum mary process is “[s] uch as is immediate or instantaneous, in distinction from the ordinary course , by emanating and taking eff ect without intermediate applications or delays.” Id . The trial c ourt did not hold Mr. Bailey in contempt on March 27. Rather, it schedule d a contempt hea

ring for April 2 and then sought to exer cise it s summary authority over acts of dir ect

c on te mpt

.
W ith ou t op ini ng on the me ri ts o f M r. Ba ile y’ s a sse rt ion that his a c ts did no t c on sti tut e a c ts of c on te mpt , w e mus t a gr e e that th e imp os iti on of su mma ry c on te mpt

wa s n ot ap pr op ri a te in this

case wher e a he aring wa s scheduled and held some six days af ter the a lleged ac ts of contempt

occur red. The t rial court did not exer cise it s permissive, di scre tionary authority on Marc h 27. The Ap ri l 2 hear ing a t w hic h th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d M r. Ba ile y to be in c on te mpt simply wa s n ot a

summa ry p ro ce eding as anticipated by the statutes or Rule 42( a). The need f or the imposition of summary punishment had greatly diminis hed by April 2, and a hea ring as originally anticipated by the trial court, including an opportunity to be hear d, was a ppropriate at t h i s j u n cture. We

a c c or din gly va c a te the tr ia l c ou rt ’s or de r o n c on te mpt a ndre ma ndfo r f

urthe r p ro c e e din gs

. Disquali fication or Recusal of th e Trial Judge

As our courts have noted, “ the risk that the judge will bec ome embroiled in pe rsonal antagonisms” with a pa

rty ac cused of

direc t contempt is a conc ern in a ny summary direc t contempt proc eeding. State v. Turner , 914 S.W.2d 951, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing see Offutt v. United States , 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954)). This risk is of pa rticular c oncern when the conduct involves a

persona l attack or

conduct that is insulting to t he trial judge. Id. Further,

even c onduct fa lling short of a persona l attack may be so provocative as to “so embr oil [the judge] in controve rsy that [the judge ] cannot ‘hold the balanc e nice , clea r, and true betwee n the state and the acc used . . . ’” Id. at 958-959 (quoting Taylor v. Haye s , 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974)). Acc ordingly, due proc ess demands pa rticular c aution against summary c ontempt proce dures “aimed at vindicating conduct dire cted towa rd the judge.” Id. at 959. Further, our Courts have held that ca se law and the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure ma ndate that a nother judge be appointed to pre side at a he aring involving a cha rge of contempt involving a persona l attack on a tr ia l ju dg e or

in o the r c ir c ums ta nc e s w he re it w ou ld b e dif fi c ult fo r the tr ia l ju dg e “ to m a int a in the ca lm detachment ne cessa ry for fair a djudication.” Id. at 960. The inquiry is not only one of actua l bias on the part of

the trial judge, but also on the likelihood or a ppear ance of bias. Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 401 (Tenn. 1996)

. Although the trial court c ited sever al ac ts of contempt on the par t of Mr. Bailey, the inc ide nts oc c ur

ri ng on Ma

rc h 2 7 w hic h c a us e d th e tr ia l c ou rt to d e c lare a

mis tr ia l in c lud e d a c ts of allege d disrespec t of the trial judge. Mr. Ba iley’s re marks on Mar ch 27 we re the prover bial “straw that broke the came l’s back.” Although a trial judge in not disqualified fr om summary proce edings under Rule 42( a) involving ac ts of direc t contempt, see Id. n.13, rec usal at a later hearing is prefe rable unless it would cause “ prejudicia l or injurious delay.” Id. at 961. Whe re the a c ts c ha

rg e d in c lud e a c ts o f p e rs on a l a tta c k o r d isr e sp e c t of the tr ia l ju dg e , d isq ua lif

ic a tio n is mandatory in proc eedings unde r Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 42( b). Id. at 959.-9-

Al tho ug h w e ha ve va c a te d th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud gme nt h old ing Mr . Baile y inc on te mpt , wh e the r the tr ia l ju dg e sh ou ld b e dis qu a lif ie d o r r e c us e he rs e lf

is a thr e sh oldma tte r w hic h mu st be re solved in this case in light of our re mand of the matter to the trial court. See B lack v

. Blount , 938 S.W.2d 394, 401 (Tenn. 1996) . In addition to the nature of Mr. Bailey’ s acts, we note that the trial judge in this case has alre ady imposed a se ntence of conte mpt on Mr. Bailey. Although we do not believe the trial court’s conduct of the proc eedings in the unde rlying lit igatio n c on ve ys or

imp lie s a ny pe rs on a l bi a s, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s prior jud gme nt s umm ari ly imposing puni shment for dire ct contempt, combined w ith her statement that Mr. Ba iley was “going to be take n into custody one way or another ” during discussion with Mr. Bailey’s lega l counsel re garding the se tting of bond at the April 2 hea ring, would raise an appe arance of bias should the trial judge pre side over any further proce eding on this matter. We acc ordingly order this matter transfe rre d to another judge for f urther pr ocee dings upon remand.

Hol din g

Inlig ht o f the fo re go ing , th e jud gme nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt su mma ri ly h old ing Mr . Baile y in direc t criminal contempt is vacated. This matter is re manded f or further proc eedings. Upon

rema nd, this matter is to be transfe rre d to another tria l judge. In light of this holdi ng, we de cline to addre ss Mr. Bailey’s asse rtion that his acts did not constitute willful acts of contempt as not ripe for revie w. Costs of this appeal ar e taxe d to the State of Tenne ssee.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE