United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit 

 Chicago, Illinois 60604

December2,2010

Before

RICHARDA. POSNER,CircuitJudge

MICHAELS. KANNE,CircuitJudge

TERENCET. EVANS,CircuitJudge

No.10–2407

STEVENJ. THOROGOOD, individuallyand

onbehalfofallotherssimilarlysituated,

PlaintiffAppellee,

v.

SEARS, ROEBUCKANDCOMPANY,

DefendantAppellant.



AppealfromtheUnitedStates

DistrictCourtfortheNorthern

DistrictofIllinois,EasternDivision.

No.06C1999

HarryD.Leinenweber,Judge.



ORDER

Theplaintiffappelleefiledapetitionforpanelrehearing,andrehearingenbanc,on

November16,2010.Allthejudgesonthepanelhavevotedtodenythepetition,andnojudge

hasrequestedavoteonrehearingthecaseenbanc.Butinviewoftheaccusationsleveledinthe

petitionbytheplaintiff’slawyer,ClintonA.Krislov,againstthepanel’sdecision,wehave

decidedthatafurtherstatement,beyondmerelyreportingthedenialofthepetition,wouldbe

helpfultoreadersofthepanelopinion(2010WL4286367,Nov.2,2010;ourearlieropinionsin

thisprotractedlitigationarereportedat547F.3d742and595F.3d759),readersofthepetition

forrehearing—andperhapsevenMr.Krislov,whoseaccusationsareoverthetop,asweshall

nowexplain,andwhomaywishtomoderatehisfury.

Thepetitionexpressesintonesofoutrage(1)disagreementwiththemeritsofour

decision,includingthescopeoftheinjunctionthatweorderedthedistrictcourttoenter;and(2)

outrageatthepanel’scharacterizationofKrislov’sandBoling’slitigationtactics.MarkBolingis

Krislov’scocounselintheCaliforniacopycatclassactionsuitthatweorderedenjoinedonthe2

authorityoftheAllWritsAct.Krislovisthecolorfulattorney(andIllinoispolitician1)whoin

theoralargumentofthefirstappealinthislawsuitaboutallegedruststainsinclothesdryers

soldbySearsRoebuckaskedustoquizourwivesastowhethertheyworrythata“stainless

steel“clothesdryermightcauseruststainsontheclothesbeingdriedunlessthedryer’sdrum

wasmadeentirelyofstainlesssteel.Thewivesunanimouslyanswered“no.”GivenKrislov’s

challenge(askyourwives),thatshouldhaveendedthislitigation.(Andspeakingofgender,we

noteKrislov’sremarkattheoralargument:“Nottobesexist,yourhonor,butmaybeweshould

havethisenbancsosomeofthefemalejudgesonthiscourtcouldsitandmightweighin.”This

maybeanunacknowledgedgroundonwhichheisseekingnotonlypanelrehearingbut

rehearingenbanc.)

Thepetitionnotesatensionbetweenourinjunction(againsttheCaliforniaclassaction),

andoursimilarinjunctioninInreBridgestone/Firestone,Inc.TiresProductsLiabilityLitigation,333

F.3d763(7thCir.2003),ontheonehand,andtheSupremeCourt’sdecisionsinTaylorv.Sturgell,

553U.S.880(2008),andPhillipsPetroleumCo.v.Shutts,472U.S.797(1985),ontheotherhand.

ButitsfailuretoacknowledgethegrantofcertiorariinSmithv.Bayer,131S.Ct.61(2010)

(discussedinouropinion),istelling:theholdingsinthecasesthatKrislovcitesdonotriseto

thelevelofa“cleardirective”fromtheSupremeCourt.Insteadacircuitsplithasdeveloped

concerningwhetherandwhenclasscertificationorderscanserveasthebasisforcollateral

estoppelinotherforums.Ouropinionnotesthistensionandthepossibilitythatthemerits

decisioninSmithv.Bayer,whenitisissued,maywarrantmodificationoftheinjunctionthatwe

haveordered.

Thepetitionignorestheprincipalreasonsouropiniongaveforenjoiningthecopycatclass

action.ItsaysvirtuallynothingabouttheAllWritsAct,thoughthatwastheverygroundofour

decision,andmakesanumberofdisingenuousstatementssuchasthat“ratherthanseeking

interlocutoryreviewintheNinthCircuit,SearsfiledanAllWritsAct,28U.S.C.§1651(‘All

WritsAct’)petitionintheclosedThorogoodcaseintheNorthernDistrictofIllinoisseekingto

enjointhepreviousunnoticedclassmembersfrombringingclassclaimselsewhere.”Searscould

notappealtheCaliforniacourt’sorderbecauseitwasnotanappealableorder.

Thepetitionignoresourpointthatclasscertificationisimpropergiventhenatureofthe

ruststainsclaim,whichdoesnotpresent“commonissuesoflaworfact”thatcansupporta

classaction.ItignoresourpointthatMurray’ssuitisindeedacopycat.Itignoresourcriticisms

ofthetwodistrictcourtopinions.Itsaysthat“thePanel...orderedthedistrictjudgetoenjoin

classmembersfrompursuingcausesasaclassactionagainstSears,anywhere,”yetignoresthat

theopinionisexplicitthatindividualclaimsarenottobeenjoined.Evenclassactions“against

Sears,anywhere”arepermitted,providedtheyarenotbasedontheoriesrejectedinour

 

1 As he explains in the petition, ““Whileitmaybethatsomenumberofattorneyswhobringclassactionsseekmerelyto

fattentheirpocketsattheexpenseoftheirclients,counselhereincannotbecountedamongthem.Since1983—over

thecourseofalmostfortyyears[actuallyjust27years]—Plaintiff’scounselhastakenontoughbattlesagainstdifficult

defendantsondifficultissuesinclass,derivative,andpublicinterestcases....Moreover,Ihaverunforpublicoffice,

always,onplatformsthatchallengedthestatusquoinourstate,andwhenIhavesucceededfinancially,Ihaveused

thatforthepublicgoodaswell....In2009,IfoundedandfundedtheCenterforOpenGovernmentlawclinicatIIT

ChicagoKentCollegeofLaw,whichuniquelyassistsindividualsingainingaccesstotheirgovernment,generally

undertheFreedomofInformationandOpenMeetingsActs,wherecurrentlysixcasesareproceeding”(emphasisin

original).
3

decision.AnditignoresthatthepressuresonSearstosettleinthefaceofKrislov’sonslaughtof

litigationamountstoirreparableharm;weexplainedthat“thereisnowayinwhichSearscan

recouptheexpenseofrespondingtoMurray’sextravagantdiscoveryrequestsandoffiling

preclusiondefensesagainstduplicativeclassactionsinotherstates.Theharmitfacesfromthe

denialoftheinjunctionisirreparableanditsremedyatlawagainstsettlementextortion

nonexistent.”

Thepetitionstates,withoutsubstantiation,that“thiscasewasbroughtbyahighly

educatedmetallurgicengineer,StevenThorogood(‘Thorogood’),whocarefullyevaluatedhis

claimsagainstSearsbeforetakingaction.”Evenifthisistrue,thereisnosuggestionthat

Murray,thenamedplaintiffinthecopycataction,hasanyrelevantbackgroundthatmighthave

helpedhimto“carefullyevaluatehisclaimsagainstSearsbeforetakingaction.”

ThefocusofKrislov’sconcernislanguageinouropinionthatheregardsasadhominem.

Heinsiststhat“thetoneandrampantmischaracterizationsoftheopinionmustbemodified

eveniftheconclusionremains,becausetheopinionunjustifiablyportraysthecaseasmeritless,

lawyerdrivenlitigation,anaccusationthoroughlybeliedbytherecordandthedistinguished

careersofthelawyersinvolved....[T]hemeritsoftheclaims,thesuitabilityofcertifyingthecase

asaclassactionandtherefusaltoenjoinplaintiff’sCaliforniaonlystateclassactionhavebeen

legitimizedbytwoindependentfederaldistrictcourts.Thus,todisparagethemeritsor

professionalmotivationsofthepartiesortheircounsel[i.e.,KrislovandBoling]isunjustified

andmustbecorrectedbecauseitrunsafouloftheCodeofConductforUnitedStatesJudges.”

Hisspecificconcerniswiththephrases“settlementextortion,”“nearfrivolous,”“pugnacious,”

“pertinacioustoafault,”and“anuisance”thatappearintheopinion.Heignorestheevidence

andanalysisthatsupportsthesecharacterizations,andsimilarcharacterizationsbyother

judges,andcommentators,concernedwithclassactionsthatarebelievedtobeabusive.He

ignorestherightandindeedthedutyofjudgestocriticizelawyerswhotrythepatienceofother

membersofthebar,andthecourts.

Krislovcriticizeswhathecalls“thePanel’schoicetopersonallyattackPlaintiff’scounsel

[himself],inlieuofrecognizingthesounddiscretionoftwofederaldistrictcourts”(emphasisin

original).TheopinionexplainsthatthedistrictjudgeinIllinois,whosedecisionwewere

reviewing,appearedtohaveoverlookingseveralrelevantconsiderations:“Heseemstohave

believedthatpleadingresjudicataorcollateralestoppelalwaysprovidesadequatereliefagainst

vexatiouslitigation.Thiscaseshowsthatitdoesnot,asdothesimilarcaseswecitedearlierand

thecasesthatsaythatenjoiningvexatiouslitigationispreferabletotheharassmentofan

expensive,timeconsumingproceduretoprove[adefendant’s]resjudicataorestoppelclaimsin

anothercourt.”AndthedistrictjudgeinCalifornia—whoseruling,torepeat,cannotbe

appealed,eventhough,ifitstands,itforcesSearstoengageincostlydiscovery,asemphasized

byBolinginurgingasettlementfavorabletotheclass—wasconfusedabouttherecord,asour

opinionexplains.

Krislovsaysthat“Sears’resorttothisCircuitforthepreclusiveshotistransparentforum

shopping,lookingforthisCourt’sderisoryviewoftheclaimtoinfluenceitintobindingallclass

membersnationwide,becausetheNinthCircuit’sstandardsaredecidedlymorefavorableto

plaintiffs’claims.”Thisiswhatisknownaschutzpah,sinceKrislovbroughthiscopycatsuitin

Californiabecause,ashesaysunguardedly,“theNinthCircuit’sstandardsaredecidedlymore4

favorabletoplaintiffsclaims.”Searswasnotengagedinforumshopping.Onlyoneforum

offeredthepossibilityofrelief.Becauseitcouldnotappealtheinterlocutoryorderofthe

Californiajudge,theonlyplacetogotoseekreliefagainstbeingsuedalloverthecountryon

frivolousgroundsaimedatsecuringasettlementwasthedistrictcourtinIllinois.

Krislovsays:“IfthelogicofRhonePoulenc[InreRhonePoulencRorer,Inc.,51F.3d1293(7th

Cir.1995)]remainsaccurate,thenSearshadanadequateremedytoseekmandamusinthe

NinthCircuit,overtheNorthernDistrictofCalifornia’sdenialofDefendants’MotiontoStrike.”

Thismissesthepoint:theAllWritsActpermitscourtstoissueinjunctiverelieftoprotectand

effectuatetheirownjudgments,sothatwinningpartieswillnotbeforcedtolitigateadefenseof

collateralestoppel(orseekmandamusorders)ineverysubsequentforuminwhichtheyare

harassedwiththesamelegalclaimuntiltheycry“Uncle!”

Hesays:“Justasthecourtisentitledtobetreatedwiththerespect[sic]bylitigantsand

theircounsel,litigantsandtheircounselareentitledtobetreatedwithrespectbythecourt.”

Well,hedoesn’ttreatuswithmuchrespect,statinginthepetitionforrehearingenbancthathe

filedafterourfirstopinion:“thePanel’sopinionreadsmorelikeapostinginitsauthor’swell

knownblog(www.beckerposnerblog.com),declaringitsviewofclassactions,

mischaracterizingclasscounselasbeinginherentlycorruptedbytheinducementtoselloutits

clients’smallclaimsforitsownfeesobtainedthroughacollusivesettlement....[T]hepanel

opinionblatantlyignoredtherecordevidenceandsubstitutedtheauthoringjudge’spersonal

economictheoriesandbaselessfactualdeclarationsforthedevelopedrecord.”Andinhis

currentpetitionhesaysthat“theCourt’sclearlyprejudicedopinionpresentsanunsupported,

opedstyleportrayalofclassactionattorneysthatpaintswithabrushsobroadthatit

demonizesallclassactionattorneysasinherentlymotivatedtosellouttheirclientsforsmall

recoveries,toobtainlargefees,andgoeswelloverthetopinitscharacterizationofundersigned

counsel’sactionsandmotivation.Moreover,itappearstorunafoulofCanon3oftheCodeof

ConductforUnitedStatesJudges....Indeed,thePanel’sroleastheselfassuredSimonCowell

oftheCircuitsdemeansnotjustus,buttheCourtaswell”(emphasisinoriginal).

(Who,youask,isSimonCowell?Hewasthecantankerousjudgeon“AmericanIdol.”See

www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3cTEQFP3VQ(visitedDec.1,2010).)

AttorneyKrislovsaysthatthepanel’s“exceedinglyfacileapproachdisregardsthe

highlydesirableroleofpersuasiveauthorityanditsunderlyingreasoningintheAmericanlegal

system....Intherealworld,whicheverwaythefirstdecisiongoesstandsassomepersuasive

authorityforsubsequentones.Cumulatively,thedecisionaltideofopinionswouldtrend

towardonecompetingtheoryuntiloneortheotherwasultimatelyacceptedaseither

consensus,orsimplycorrect,orcorrectinthatjurisdiction.”Translated,thismeansthat

Krislov’sstrategyistobringidenticalorsimilarsuitsindifferentjurisdictionsuntilhewinsone,

thenusethejudgmentinthatsuitasresjudicataorcollateralestoppelinthenextsuit,andthe

next,andthenext,untilSearsgivesup.Aswenotedinouropinion,Krislovwantedajudgment

(ratherthandismissalongroundsofmootness,Searshavingofferedanuisancesettlementwell

inexcessofthemaximumamountofmoneythatThorogood’sindividualclaimwasworth)so

thathecoulduseittoblockSearsfromdefendingthenextsuit,whichturnedouttobethe

Californiasuit.5

“Zestingtosmeartheplaintiff’scounsel,”saysKrislov,”thePanel’scharacterizationofthe

letter[thereferenceistococounselBoling’slettertoSears,whichwereprintedasanappendix

toouropinion]as‘settlementextortion’lackssupportintherecord,sameasthePanelauthor’s

declarationthatMr.Boling’s‘olivebranch’lettersoughttosellouttheclass....Thelettersimply

detailsthatthecaseisgoingforward,discoverywilllikelyproducemoredamagingevidence,

whichcouldgenerategreaterdamages,andplaintiffsareofferingan‘olivebranch,’exploring

defendants’appetitefornegotiatinganagreedresolution.Thereisnothingimplyingasellout.

Instead,theletterproposesdiscussingasolutionthatwouldbeinthebestinterestofboth

sides—preciselywhatcounselareoftendirectedtodobycourtsalloverthecountry.”Thisisa

joke.Bothpartiesknowtheletterisademandforfavorablesettlementterms.Theletteritself

contradictsKrislov’sclaim.Itdeclaresthat“discoverywilllikelyproducemoredamaging

evidence,whichcouldgenerategreaterdamages....[I]fplaintiffissuccessfulonamotionfor

classcertification,thecourtasthegatekeeperwilldemandamoresignificantrecoveryfor

resolution.”

Krislovisconcernedwithharshlanguageinouropinion,butoverstatesthecasewhenhe

decries“characterizationofplaintiffclassactionlawyersasinherentlycorruptandmotivated

primarilytosellouttheclassinordertogainlargefees.”Whatwesaidwasthatthestructureof

classactionsunderRule23ofthefederalrulesgivesclassactionlawyersanincentiveto

negotiatesettlementsthatenrichthemselvesbutgivescantrewardtoclassmembers,whileat

thesametimetheburdenofrespondingtoclassplaintiffs’discoverydemandsgivesdefendants

anincentivetoagreetoearlysettlementthatmaytreattheclassactionlawyersbetterthanthe

class.Classactionattorneyshavean“inherentmotivation”toenrichthemselvesattheexpense

oftheclass(andwiththeconnivanceofdefendants),butmotivationisnotasynonymfor

action;anyactualcorruptionorsellingoutisgaugedcasebycase.TheBolingletterissome

indicationthatthepresentcaseissuchacase.

Thecriticismsinouropinionofthetacticsemployedbysomeclassactionlawyersarenot

criticismsmadebyjudgesalone,letalonebyjudgesoftheSeventhCircuitaloneormembersof

thispanelalone.Ouropiniongavesomeexamples:“Thedefendantwantstominimizeoutflow

ofexpendituresandtheclasscounselwantstoincreaseinflowofattorneys’fees.Bothcan

achievetheirgoalsiftheycolludetosacrificetheinterestsoftheclass.”ChristopherR.Leslie,

“TheSignificanceofSilence:CollectiveActionProblemsandClassActionSettlements,”59Fla.

L.Rev.71,79–81(2007)(footnoteomitted);seealsoJohnC.Coffee,Jr.,“LitigationGovernance:

TakingAccountabilitySeriously,”110Colum.L.Rev.288,326–27(2010).Twooftheexamples

wereopinionsbyJudgeHenryFriendly,theveryrespectedSecondCircuitjudge:Saylorv.

Lindsley,456F.2d896,900–01(2dCir.1972);AlleghanyCorp.v.Kirby,333F.2d327,347(2dCir.

1964)(dissentingopinion).Wegaveadditionalexamplesinourfirstopinionintheclothesdryer

litigation:Parkerv.TimeWarnerEntertainmentCo.,L.P.,331F.3d13,22(2dCir.2003);Newtonv.Merrill

Lynch,Pierce,Fenner&Smith,Inc.,259F.3d154,165–68(3dCir.2001);JeffreyW.Stempel,

“ClassActionsandLimitedVision,”83Wash.U.L.Q.1127,1213–14(2005);BruceL.Hay&

DavidRosenberg,“’Sweetheart’and‘Blackmail’SettlementsinClassActions,”75NotreDameL.

Rev.1377,1389–92(2000);BruceL.Hay,“AsymmetricRewards:WhyClassActions(May)Settle

forTooLittle,”48HastingsL.J.479,485–89(1997);SusanP.Koniak&GeorgeM.Cohen,“Under

CloakofSettlement,”82Va.L.Rev.1051,1053–57(1996)(describingtheclassactionas“lawyer6

selfdealingonagrandscale,”id.at1053);JonathanR.Macey&GeoffreyP.Miller,“The

Plaintiff’sAttorney’sRoleinClassActionandDerivativeLitigation,”58U.Chi.L.Rev.1,22–

26(1991).Andthecriticismscanbefoundinotheropinionsofthiscourt.See,e.g.,Szabov.

BridgeportMachines,Inc.,249F.3d672(7thCir.2001);Blairv.EquifaxCheckServices,Inc.,

181F.3d832,834(7thCir.1999);Vollmerv.Selden,350F.3d656,660(7thCir.2003);Inre

RhonePoulencRorer,Inc.,supra,51F.3dat1298–99.

Wantmore?Thereisplentymore,includingreferencesinSupremeCourtaswellascourt

ofappealsopinionstothedangerofcollusionbetweenclassactionlawyersanddefendants’

lawyers.StoneridgeInvestmentPartners,LLCv.ScientificAtlanta,552U.S.148,163–64(2008);Ortiz

v.FibreboardCorp.,527U.S.815,852–53(1999);AmChemProducts,Inc.v.Windsor,521U.S.591,

621–22(1997);BlueChipStampsv.ManorDrugStores,421U.S.723,740–41(1975);Sullivanv.DB

Investments,Inc.,613F.3d134,149–50(3dCir.2010);InreGeneralMotorsCorp.PickUpTruckFuel

TankProductsLiabilityLitigation,55F.3d768,802(3dCir.1995);Weinbergerv.GreatNorthern

NekoosaCorp.,925F.2d518,524(1stCir.1991);InreAgentOrangeProductLiabilityLitigation,818

F.2d216,223–25(2dCir.1987);Piambinov.Bailey,757F.2d1112,1139andn.68(11thCir.1985);

Sheltonv.Pargo,Inc.,582F.2d1298,1306–07(4thCir.1978);Pettwayv.AmericanCastIronPipe

Co.,576F.2d1157,1169(5thCir.1978).Therearealsoreferencestosettlementextortion:Jones

MotorCo.v.Holtkamp,Liese,Beckemeier&Childress,P.C.,197F.3d1190,1193(7thCir.1999);Byrne

v.Nezhat,261F.3d1075,1129–31(11thCir.2001);Duhaimev.JohnHancockMutualLifeIns.Co.,

183F.3d1,6–7(1stCir.1999).

Neitherthejudgesonthispanelnorotherfederaljudgessofarasweareawarehave

deniedthattheclassactionisaworthwhiledevice,andindeedisindispensableforthelitigation

ofmanymeritoriousclaims.Butlikemanyothergoodthingsitissubjecttoabuse.Ithasbeen

abusedinthestainlesssteelclothesdryerlitigation.

Thepetitionforrehearingis denied.Nojudgeofthiscourtinregularactiveservicehaving

requestedavoteonthepetitionforrehearingenbanc,rehearingenbancisalsodenied.