1 Filed 4/8/15 In re J.H. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re J. H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. D. B., Defendant and Appellant. A142593
(San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. JD14-3184)

D. B. (Mother) appeals jurisdictiona l and dispositional orders finding her daughter, J. H. (Minor) a dependent child and removing her from Mother’s care. She
contends the evidence is in sufficient to support either the jurisdictional or the dispositional findings. We shall affirm the orders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Detention and Jurisdiction Minor was detained in May 2014, shortly after she was born. According to a detention report prepared by the San Fran cisco Human Services Agency, Family and Children’s Services Division (t he Agency), Mother’s mother (Grandmother) had filed a missing person’s report for Mother about tw o weeks before Minor was born. After Mother was located, she was placed on a psychiatric hold pursuant to Welfare and2 Institutions Code 1 section 5150 (5150 hol d) and labeled “Gravely Disabled” because of
her hallucinations and delusions. She declin ed psychiatric treatmen t. The officer who found Mother reported that Mo ther appeared agitated and unfocused. She had been contacting the FBI to make complaints about a child pornography ring with which her brother-in-law, a police officer in another state, was allegedly involved. Although Mother denied having had any pr evious mental health holds, a social worker said she had been put on a 5150 hold in 2010 , and had received no follow- up mental health treatment or psychotropic medication. Minor’s father, L.H. (Father), 2 had a history of domestic violence, drug use, and assault, and was a registered sex offender. He had been convicted of rape in 1992, annoying or molesting children in 1994, failing to register as a sex offender in 2000, and sexual battery in 2004. Minor was born at full term with no complications, was of normal weight, and tested negative for drugs. Mother behaved appr opriately during her visits to the nursery. A social worker spoke with Mother after Minor was born. Mother appeared calm.
She told the social worker the mental health hold was the result of a mistaken
identification. She said she had several la wsuits pending against defendants ranging from the medical clinic where she received her pren atal care to a university that had failed to grant her a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, a nd that she had pending restraining orders against her biological family because of an “a trocity” that had occurred in her family in the past. She asked to have Minor’s last name changed in order to protect her from people wishing to harm her. Mother was not aware Father was required to register as a sex offender and she said she had no concerns regarding him. Sh e denied having received any current or past psychiatric care and said her mental health was not an issue.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Father is not a party to this appeal.3 The Agency filed a petition pursuant to section 300 alleging there was a
substantial risk Minor would su ffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of (1) the parents’ inability to protect her and (2) Mothe r’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse (§ 300, su bd. (b)), and that there was a substantial risk Minor would be sexually abused by Father due to hi s criminal history (§ 300, subd. (d)). B. Disposition Report In a July 2014 disposition report, the Ag ency said it had been unable to obtain
documentation about Mother’s mental health because she had refused to sign releases. She said she had no mental health proble ms, had never been hospitalized, and had not been diagnosed with any mental illness. There was evidence, however, that she had been placed on a 5150 hold in 2010. Mother said she had completed all the coursework to obtain a doctorate in psycholo gy, but that the university wo uld not issue her degree; she
said this was due to her fa mily making false statements about her mental health. Mother’s family had been concerned about her mental status for several years,
since her mental health deteriorated toward the end of her graduate work. Grandmother had been actively seeking help for Mother for years, including trying to keep in touch
with Adult Protective Services and Child Pr otective Services, and felt she had lost her daughter to mental illness. Mother had refused to be assessed by an Adult Mobile Crisis psychiatrist, and had
refused services when offered them by Adult Protective Servi ces. An FBI ag ent told the Agency that Mother had sought to file a re port on May 1, 2014, shortly before Minor was born, and that she had been to the FBI office multiple times. After receiving her reports, the FBI determined they di d not have merit and “were more indicative perhaps of someone with psychological issues.” The report noted that Mo ther’s mental health had been a concern to most professionals with whom she ca me into contact. It appeared that she might be suffering ongoing delusions, and that she might have schizoaffective diso rder or paranoid schizophrenia. She had refuse d to release her psychiatric records to the Agency, but it4 appeared she had declined any psychiatric services after being released from the recent
5150 hold.
Mother had no known histor y of substance abuse. Fa ther said he occasionally smoked marijuana and drank alcohol. He denied having used harder drugs, but he had at least one conviction for narcotics possession. He said several of his criminal convictions
had occurred when he was under the influenc e and behaved inappropriately by “rubbing up against people, etc.” He had not comple ted substance abuse treatment and did not think he needed it. A drug test had been positive for THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. The disposition report provided a more detailed summary of Father’s criminal history: he was a registered sex offender and had suffered convictions for misdemeanor sexual battery in 1991, three counts of misd emeanor annoying or molesting children in 1991, misdemeanor obstructing or resisting a po lice officer in 1991, fe lony rape in 1992, felony annoying or molesting ch ildren in 1994, felony burglar y in 1999, felo ny failure to register as a sex offender in 2000, fel ony narcotics possession a nd felony marijuana possession in 2003, misdemeanor sexual batte ry in 2004, and felony possession of
concentrated cannabis in 2009. Mother had no cr iminal record.
Mother and Father lived to gether in the home of a re lative of Father’s. Both parents denied that there was domestic violence in their relationship. Mother appeared to have obtained regular prenat al care during her pregnancy, although she had not signed
releases to allow the social worker to see the documentation. Both Mother and Father handled Minor gently and with affection and were attentiv e to her needs at visits. Minor had been placed in the home of a paternal grea t-aunt at the request of both parents. However, the great-a unt had recently reported that Mother’s contact with her and other paternal relatives had “suddenly taken a very ne gative tone, somewhat bizarre
tone.” Grandmother had asked to have Mi nor placed with her, but Mother became so agitated at a discussion of her family that the Agency was con cerned placement with
Grandmother would interfere w ith the reunification process.5 The Agency recomme nded that Minor remain in out-of-home placement and that
both Mother and Father be offered reunifica tion services, with a requirement that she undergo psychological assess ment and adhere to any clinical recommendations for treatment. The disposition report noted that Mother was very bright and high functioning in many areas, but that she appeared to be suffering from delusions, paranoia, and an
“inflated sense of self.” She would make stat ements apparently mean t to arouse interest or alarm, but then maintain an air of my stery about those statements. The Agency expressed concern as to whet her Mother could care for Mino r safely, since she appeared to be “actively psychotic and experiencing delusions,” and psychosis “involves a degree of unpredictability that must be addressed when discussing the safe parenting of young children.” Mother denied having mental issu es, however, and was reluctant to participate in treatment. She had a history of feeling wr onged by family members or care providers, and the Agency expressed concer n that she would not be able to maintain relationships with Minor’s service providers. The Agency also recommende d that Father undergo a psychological assessment, and expressed concern that Father was not mo re aware of or alarmed by Mother’s mental
state. He had attended several visits with Minor and behaved approp riately, but Mother
had done much of the feedi ng and changing, and Father ha d left for periods of time during the visits. C. Addendum Report In an addendum report filed on July 15, 2014, the Agency noted that its concerns
about Mother’s mental state had deepened since the original dispositional report was submitted. The visitation superv isor had reported that Moth er appeared to be actively suffering from paranoia and psychosis. Mother had reportedl y been contacting authorities to report both a vis itation center staff member, L ily McGowan, and the social
worker. In Mother’s email communications w ith the center, she referred to herself as “Dr. [Mother’s name]/Agent Status,” declared herself to be a “doctor and legal law enforcer,” stated that McGowan, the visita tion coordinator, was “in no way shape or form to be involved as Lily McGo wan is misrepresenting Lily McGowan self,” and made6 statements such as “committing crimes against any person assi gned to visitations is never
allowed or tolerated.” According to the addendum report, pr oblems had arisen during visits between
Mother and Minor. At a visit in late June , Mother was told Minor’s pediatrician had recommended that Minor receive only a certain type of formula. Mother insisted on feeding Minor the formula she had brought hers elf, despite being told that it seemed to upset Minor’s stomach. At a visit the next da y, when the visit mon itor entered the room with Minor in her car seat, Mother aggressive ly snatched the car se at away and said she did not want the monitor taking Minor out of it. The monito r explained she was trying to soothe the baby, and Mother became upset and told her to be quiet. Minor’s caregiver had not provided a bottle for th e visit, because Mother had insisted on providing her own
formula at other visits. When it became clear that Minor was hungry, the monitor suggested Mother buy formul a from the store next door. Mother said it “wasn’t her problem,” and let Minor cry for 25 minutes before she called Father, who arranged for the caregiver to drop off a bottle. The addendum report noted that Father remained “highly protective” of Mother
and did not view her mental state as a primary concern. D. Contested Hearing and Juvenile Court’s Orders A contested jurisdictional an d dispositional hearing took place on July 18, 2014. Social worker Jennifer Malcolm, who had prep ared the detention report, testified as an expert in child welfare. According to Malc olm, when Mother was in the hospital after Minor’s birth, she was calm and her behavior was appropriate. Mother had been placed on the 5150 hold two days before giving birth, and was released from the hold a day after
Minor was born. Malcolm’s decision to de tain Minor was based on the 5150 hold, Mother’s refusal to obtain services, and a police report indicating she was in a paranoid
and delusional state. Briana Lewis, the social worker who pr epared the disposition report and detention report, also testified as an e xpert in child welfare. Acco rding to Lewis, the visitation supervisor had contacted her to express concern about Mother’s mental heath and7 stability. The staff at the visitation center believed Mother was showing paranoia and delusions, and said Mother’s statements we re “rambling and not quite making sense to them.” These facts had strengthened Lewis’ s recommendation that Minor remain in an out-of-home placement while Mother and Fath er received reunification services. Lewis acknowledged that Mother had no cr iminal history, that she had received prenatal care and attended a prenatal class, that she had housing, and that Father was employed. However, Mother had not signed re leases to allow the Ag ency to review her medical records, so Lewis did not know specifically what pren atal care she had received. Mother possessed basic parenting skills and ha d an understanding of child development topics. Lewis also acknowledg ed that because Mother and Father had never had custody of Minor, it was “challenging” to assess Minor’s safety in their care. However, she was concerned that Mother’s statements suggest ed she was sometimes out of touch with reality. She also believed that Mother’s pa ranoia and hostility to service providers could jeopardize her ability to provi de consistent care to Minor. Minor’s hospital records indicated Mother might have a diagnosis of either paranoid schizophrenia or
schizoaffective disorder. According to Lewis, Father had been a rrested for domestic violence in 2011.
Father told her he had taken domestic violence classes. He had not been arrested since then, and Lewis did not believe Minor was at risk due to violence between Mother and
Father. Father had been testi ng randomly for drugs; the firs t test came back positive for marijuana, and all subsequent tests had been clean. Lewis believed Father’s history of sexual offenses created a risk to Minor, both because it raised concerns about his judgment and because it showed a pattern of inappropriate re lationships with vulnerable people. Father’s last conviction for a sexual offense took place 11 years previously, and he had told Lewis his youngest victim was 16 years old. Although Minor’s current car egiver had been selected at Mother and Father’s request, the caregiver had said she was not su re she was willing to continue to care for Minor in the long term because of Mo ther’s increasingly hostile behavior.8 An FBI agent testified that Mother went to the FBI o ffice on May 1, 2014. His investigation showed she was the subject of a missing person re port, and he called Mother’s grandmother (Great-g randmother), who was listed as the contact on the missing person report. Mother had emailed the FBI on a number of occasions, and had come into the San Francisco office at least once previous ly. The story on the intake form Mother filled out was difficult to follow, and it app eared that the writer was disconnected from reality. According to the ag ent, Mother was “complaining about a conspiracy by local
law enforcement entities to br eak into her car as retalia tion for her reporting to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departme nt of Justice about a child pornography ring.” The agent spoke with Mother and told her he had spoken with her Grandmother and Great-grandmother. Mother told him she had obtained restraining orders against mother from the CIA and the Department of Ju stice. She indicated she had relationships with the United States Department of Justic e and she named a contact within the CIA. The agent’s investigation show ed that she had no relationship with the Department of Justice, and that her CIA contact was a public relations official. When the agent spoke with Grandmother, she expressed concern about Mother’s mental state. The agent called the San Franci sco Mental Health Crisis Hotline. He had seen that Mother was about eight months pr egnant and thought a trained person should
evaluate her. A few hours after Mother left th e office, she called and asked to speak with the agent’s supervisor. When he told her she could not do so, she said he would be hearing from her attorney.
Father testified that before Minor’s birt h, he and Mother ha d obtained clothing and other supplies for her. His last arrest was in 2010, for domestic viol ence. He had taken a
52-week domestic violence class as a conditio n of his probation. There had been no
instances of sex crimes since his la st conviction 11 years previously.
Father testified he was willi ng to engage in parenting cl asses. When asked if he would engage in therapy, he first replied, “It depends on what ty pe of therapy you are talking about,” and later said he would have therapy. He was not willing to have a9 psychological evaluation because he did not see the purpose of it. He had visited Minor
and wanted her home. The juvenile court found true allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b),
that Mother was unable to care for Minor in that she had recen tly been put on a 5150 hold and labeled “gravely disabled” due to halluci nations and delusions a nd that she had been previously put on a 5150 hold but had refused treatment. The court amended the allegation to add the statement, “The moth er currently suffers from a mental health disorder which prevents her from providing adeq uate care for the baby and the baby is at risk.” The court also found true the allegati ons pursuant to secti on 300, subdivisions (b) and (d), that Father was a registered sex o ffender. The court found Minor’s physical or emotional health required removal from the parents’ physic al custody, approved placement with relatives, and ordered reunifi cation services for Mother and Father.
II. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdictional Findings Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provi des that a juvenile court may take jurisdiction of a child where “[t] he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illne ss, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardia n to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmenta l disability, or substance abuse.” Mother contends the evidence does not support a conc lusion that her mental illness placed Minor
at substantial risk of future harm.
Our standard of review is well settled. “We review the r ecord to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, cont radicted or not, which supports the court’s
conclusions. ‘All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the ve rdict, if possible.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1649.) It has long been recognized that harm to a child cannot be presumed from the mere fact that a parent is mentally ill. ( In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 540.) “The10 proper basis for a ruling is expert testimony giving specific examples of the manner in
which the mother’s behavior has and will adversely affect the child or jeopardize the child’s safety.” ( Ibid .) Thus, in In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136–137, the appellate court reversed a jurisdictiona l order where the mother had a history of mental instability and suicide attempts, but had never abused or neglected her children,
there was no evidence her use of alcohol rendered her incapabl e of providing regular care for the children, the children’s father was able to protect a nd supervise the children, the children were at school or day care while the father was at work, and the parents had the support of extended family members.
In re Kristin H. is instructive. The appellate court there upheld jurisdictional findings against a contention that they were unsupported by the evidence. ( In re
Kristin H ., supra , 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649.) The juve nile court found true an allegation that the mother had a long history of ment al illness, with diag noses of borderline personality, post-traumatic stress disorder, and major depression, and the Court of Appeal concluded the evidence supported this finding. ( Id . at pp. 1651–1652.) The court also
concluded the evidence was suffi cient to support an allegation that there was a substantial risk the child would suffer serious physical harm: “[I]llustrations of the effect of the mother’s mental health problems on Kristin’s safety and well-being were provided here by . . . allegations in the petition and evidence in the record, such as the numerous reports from the visitation supervisors. In one such instan ce staff was obliged to call the police
when the mother refused to physically release her daughter. Moreover, both of the mother’s treating doctors stat ed shortly after the petition wa s filed that the mother’s
condition was such that Kris tin should not be in her care at that time.” ( Id . at p. 1652.) The problems at visitation had included th e mother engaging in angry outbursts and threatening to sue the staff at the visitation center. ( Id . at pp. 1644, 1 646.) The mother also argued that there was no evidence her re fusal to take her psychotropic medications had harmed Kristin or posed a substa ntial risk of physical harm. ( Id . at p. 1652.) The appellate court rejected this contention, notin g that there was evidence the mother could not provide consistent pare nting without medication, and her refusal to take her11 medications could lead to further neglect “and in a larger sense illustrated the mother’s unwillingness to accept and ackn owledge how her mental pr oblems contributed to her situation.” ( Id . at p. 1653.) Here, multiple professionals had concerns about Mother’s behavior. The social workers who testified as experts, the FBI ag ent, and staff who observed Mother at the
visitation center all indicated that she suffe red from a mental illness that could endanger her or Minor. Additionally, there is evidence that Mother has a history of concocting conspiracy theories, that Moth er believes herself to be a doctor and “legal law enforcer,”
and that Mother had contacted authorities to report that the visitation center worker was “misrepresenting” herself. There is evidence that, despite having been placed on two 5150 holds, she has denied having mental hea lth problems and has refused to be assessed for her mental illness. Moreover, there is ev idence that Mother’s irrationality affects her ability to care for Minor’s most ba sic needs: at one visit, sh e insisted on giving Minor the formula she had brought, against the doctor’s recommendation, and at the next visit, she allowed Minor to cry with hunger for nearly half an hour because she did not believe it was her job to provide formula for her baby daughter. Based on this record, the juvenile court could reasonably find Mother’s mental illness placed Minor, a newborn infant, at substantial risk of physical harm. Accordingly, we reject Mother’s challe nge to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding based on her mental illness. Because we uphold jurisdiction on this ground, we
need not consider her further contenti on that the evidence did not support the jurisdictional finding based on Fathe r’s history as a sex offender. ( In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [“[A]n appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findi ngs once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence.”].)
B. Dispositional Order Mother also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order removing Minor from the home. She argues th at the order was based on speculation that
she would not be able to care for Minor properly, and contends that the record12 “primarily” shows that she did a good job wh en she was allowed to care for Minor during visitation. Moreover, she points out, the reco rd shows she and Father had housing, Father was employed and seeking additional employment , she had applied for public assistance, and she had acquired necessary supplies, such as a car seat, before Minor’s birth. “At a dispositional hearing, the court’s findings must be made on clear and convincing evidence. Th e court must find that the welfare of the child requires that she be removed from parental cust ody because of a substantial da nger, or risk of danger, to her physical health if she is returned ho me and that there are no reasonable means to protect her without removing her. [Citations .] On review, we employ the substantial evidence test, however bearing in mind the heightened burden of proof. [Citation.]” ( In re Kristin H. , supra , 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1 654; see § 361, subd. (c)(1).) As explained in In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.Ap p.4th 900, 917, “T he parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child . [Citations.]” (Italics added; see also In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 [“ ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdicti on and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ”].) Based on this record, the juvenile c ourt could reasonably find Minor’s welfare required her removal from the ho me. As we have explaine d, Mother’s behavior and paranoia raised concern in both her family and in multiple professionals who came into contact with her. Despite two section 5150 hol ds, she refused to have a mental health assessment and it appears she ha s not engaged in mental hea lth services. Her behavior
affected Minor on at least two occasions—on one visit, she insisted on feeding Minor formula she had brought, despite being told it upset Minor’s stomach. The following day, she aggressively grabbed the car seat —with Minor in it—from the visit monitor to keep her from removing Minor from the seat, and then refu sed to obtain formula for
Minor as the infant cried with hunger for almost half an ho ur. Moreover, Father did not appear to view Mother’s mental status as a concern. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that in the present circumstances , with Mother unwilli ng to acknowledge or13 treat her mental problems, Minor would not be safe in her parents’ care. (See In re Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1657–1658 [a ffirming removal where mother refused to cooperate with professionals in addressing substanc e abuse and mental problems]; compare In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 288–289 [reversing removal order where both parents had forswo rn corporal punishment of teenagers, expressed remorse for having used it, a ttended parenting classes, and undergone therapy].) The cases upon which Mother relies do no t persuade us otherwise. The minor
In re James T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 58, 61, was 16 years old. Be cause of conflicts in his relationship with his mother and the fami ly’s economic instabilit y, he lived briefly with family friends; when that living situ ation ceased, a dependenc y petition was filed. ( Id . at p. 62.) The juvenile court found th ere was substantial danger to the minor’s
emotional health if he were returned to hi s mother. ( Id . at p. 63.) The appellate court reversed the dispositional orde r, concluding the facts were insufficient to sever, even temporarily, the parent-child relationship, a nd that the circumstances were “far from urgent and no attempts ha d been made to assist family unification.” ( Id . at p. 65.) In
contrast to the minor in James T ., a resourceful and intelligent teenager ( id . at pp. 61–62), Minor here is entirely helpless, and Mother ha s refused the Agency’s attempts to help her address the mental health problems th at gave rise to the dependency.
Nor does In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10 assi st Mother. Th e child there, an infant, was removed from his mother’s custody after his fa ther killed the child’s halfbrother. ( Id . at pp. 12–14.) The children’s mother testified that she did not intend to resume a relationship with the fa ther and that she hoped he w ould stay in prison. She had assisted in the prosecution, had begun counseling, and was self-supporting. ( Id . at pp. 15, 22.) The appellate court reversed the di spositional order removing Steve from his mother’s custody, concluding it was based on “little more than speculation” that she
would enter into another relationship with an abus ive type of person. ( Id . at p. 22.) Here, on the other hand, from the outset Mother has been unable or unw illing to acknowledge her mental problems or to obtain treatment.14 In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996 is no more helpful to Mo ther. The child there was a well-loved four-year-old who lived in a messy home. ( Id . at p. 999.) After the court established dependen cy jurisdiction and the parent s were given a service plan, the parents made improvements in their liv ing conditions; however, social workers still found unsanitary and potentially hazardous conditions in the home. When the parents failed to remedy those conditions, the child was placed in a foster home. ( Id . at pp. 999– 1000.) The Court of Appeal reversed the or der, reasoning that the mother was devoted to her son and willing to follow him around all day to keep him from hurting himself, that the child had not suffered any ill effects, and that chronic messiness, without resulting illness or accident, was not clear and convincing evidence of a substantial risk of harm. ( Id . at p. 1005 & fn. 8.) Here, as we have ex plained, there was ampl e evidence to support a conclusion that Mother’s mental illness pr esented a substantial risk to Minor’s wellbeing and that she was unwilling or unab le to recognize and treat her illness.
III. DISPOSITION The orders appealed from are affirmed.15 _ ____________ ____________ Rivera, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Reardon, Acting P.J.

_____________ ____________ Streeter, J.