THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 

convenes the 

WORKING GROUP MEETING 

ADVISORY BOARD ON 

RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 

DAY ONE 

The verbatim transcript of the Meeting of the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health held 

at the NIOSH, Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 31, 2005. 
 

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C O N T E N T S 

May 31, 2005 

TASK 4: DOSE RECONSTRUCTION CASE AUDITS 

REVIEW OF SECOND SET OF 18 CASE AUDITS 

ADVISORY BOARD WORKING GROUP 

STUART HINNEFELD, NIOSH

HANS & KATHY BEHLING, SC&A 
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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND 

The following transcript contains quoted material. 

Such material is reproduced as read or spoken. 

In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 

an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 

sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 

or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 

word(s) when reading written material. 

-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 

of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 

reported. 

-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 

the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 

available. 

-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 

"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 

-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 

without reference available. 

-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 

failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

In the following transcript (off microphone) 

refers to microphone malfunction or speaker's neglect 

to depress "on" button. 
 

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 P A R T I C I P A N T S 

ABRWH MEMBERS: 

GIBSON, Michael H.

President 

Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union

Local 5-4200 

Miamisburg, Ohio 

GRIFFON, Mark A.

President 

Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc.

Salem, New Hampshire 

ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D.

Professor Emeritus 

University of Florida

Elysian, Minnesota 

OTHER ATTENDEES: 

MR. DAVID ALLEN, NIOSH

DR. HANS BEHLING, SC&A

MS. KATHY BEHLING, SC&A

MR. STUART HINNEFELD, NIOSH

DR. ARJUN MAKHIJANI, SC&A

DR. JIM NETON, NIOSH 

STAFF/VENDORS 

STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter 
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 P R O C E E D I N G S

 (9:30 a.m.) 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Shall we get started, then we can 

be home -- get done before supper time. I think 

we all know each other. We won't do any more 

introductions. We're here to go through the 

second set of 18 dose reconstructions. We can --

there's some housekeeping things we probably 

ought to worry about at some point, like lunch. 

Do we want to try to go out for lunch? Do you 

want to bring lunch in? There -- we can order -- 

there's a pizza place, a Dewey's pizza place that 

probably delivers here. There's a Subway just 

down the street that we can pick something up 

from and bring it back if we want to work through 

lunch, or we could break for lunch. There's a 

restaurant probably close as well. I could 

escort a group to either the Tumbleweed or 

something. So, you know, we want to see how 

we're going --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- decide if we need to work 

through? 

 DR. BEHLING: I'm -- both Kathy and I usually 

skip lunch anyway, so we're out of the picture 
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for making a decision. 

 DR. ROESSLER: I say work through lunch and get 

done before midnight. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Well, I think we can do 

that anyway, but -- I think I'm -- maybe I'm more 

optimistic maybe than I should be. Okay. Well, 

we'll worry about the situation in a little while 

-- in a little bit, and if need be we can always 

-- like we can always call Subway and run down 

and pick up some sandwiches. 

 THE COURT REPORTER: Well, let me just put in my 

-- I've got to have something to eat. I've been 

up since 3:00 and haven't eaten a thing, so I'll 

need something, intravenous or whatever. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We gave you coffee. What more do 

you want? 

I also, Ray, will need to eat some lunch. I get 

-- if nothing else, I won't feel well for not 

doing lunch. So we'll have some lunch. 

 THE COURT REPORTER: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Well, let's just -- I 

would just propose we go through these in order. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes, that's what we're going to do. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And then you give whatever 

summary you have and we can talk about anything 
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that we have as well. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay, good. As we said, we're 

going to try to keep it brief, but I have the 

first one, which is tab 21, and this is a Rocky 

Flats case. And in this case, I'll give you just 

a brief overview to start with and then we'll go 

through the few findings in this case. The --

the employee was a master electrician. He worked 

from -- let's see here, from '69 through 1990 and 

he was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1997. 

NIOSH estimated a dose of about 57 rem to the 

bladder and he -- that resulted in a Department 

of Labor POC of 40.8 percent. Now, we'll just 

through the findings unless anyone else has any 

types of questions, but the very first finding 

that we had, which is on page 9 under the 

recorded photon dose -- we were not able -- based 

on the procedure that was used, we were not able 

to reproduce the photon dose. In fact, we -- in 

Section 2.1 -- were able to calculate -- we 

actually gave you the equation and showed exactly 

what the dose reconstructor did in calculating 

that dose. And in some cases, we were able to 

reproduce it. And there were actually eight 

entries in which -- in which we could not 
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reproduce the 30 to 250 keV photon dose, and 

eight entries which we couldn't reproduce the low 

energy photon dose. And it just so happened that 

the -- see, in each case, the 30 to 250 keV 

photon dose was an underestimate, and the less 

than 30 keV photon dose was an overestimate and I 

assume it was an arithmetic mistake, but we just 

could not reproduce those. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I -- I -- I think I know 

what the -- what the dose reconstructor did to 

get to the numbers he got, and I don't know if 

it's correct or not because I haven't had a 

chance to sort out exactly the Rocky Flats 

Technical Basis Document, the various reports. 

But I brought along a couple sheets of paper that 

are from this case. The two different ways of 

describing the exposure history is the first. 

This is the one that you provided. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And then these sheets also relate 

to the same person and they're also in -- in the 

DOE response for this case. And these are 

individual -- well, at some point they're annual 

summaries and then they break into badge readings 

that -- in some year. And this sheet -- and this 
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sheet with the handwritten numbers shows 

penetrating number and a skin number. The 

printout from the record shows deep dose 

equivalent/shallow dose equivalent, hyphen skin, 

and then has an additional neutron column on the 

right side. And what we noticed was whenever 

there was a neutron recorded on this sheet, it 

was added to the DDE penetrating on the -- or DDE 

on this same sheet to get 24, and you got the 

value on the handwritten sheet. So at some point 

they added the neutron deep and this DDE value 

together, or they broke the neutron out of the 

original number and -- and recorded it that way. 

So it was -- it was a difference in the two 

reporting, so what the dose reconstructor did was 

take the difference between this DDE and SDE skin 

to get the 30 keV and then do the arithmetic as 

described in your review. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Now, that's the difference. I 

don't know which one is the right -- the way it's 

supposed to be done. Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and for the record, some of 

these things will result in very trivial 

differences and I think we should have started 
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out by saying that our audit was first to see can 

we reproduce it based on the information 

provided, and we didn't really say whether or not 

that would result in any even significant dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: It's just whether or not we could, 

and understand the process. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and of course, you know, as 

you see in almost all the cases here, our 

findings result in impacts that are very low, 

meaning that it has a very modest effect on dose 

and certainly not on the POC. And I just want to 

be on record for saying that we're not saying 

these are monumental issues; it's just that our 

attempt to reproduce them, these numbers, based 

on information provided in the text, did not 

allow us to do that --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- regardless of whether or not 

there was a significant difference in our -- our 

dose assessment. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I would hope that before -- 

you know, before you leave Thursday or Friday 

I'll be able to sort out the various reporting -- 
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these two different reports from Rocky Flats and 

which is the appropriate way to -- which is the 

appropriate subtraction. Because it's not clear 

to me today which one is the appropriate way to 

do it. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Whether it's subtract these 

numbers or subtract those numbers. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and I think we will see that 

later on, too. The methodology for reporting 

doses changed over the years. You will see -- 

early on you see penetrating dose and nonpenetrating doses. And of course, the skin dose 

would be the summation of penetrating/nonpenetrating. And oftentimes later on you would 

throw in slow neutrons, fast neutrons, and even 

X-rays. And so the methodology for reporting 

doses changed over the years. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and sometimes when you look 

at the composite annual doses, you don't get a 

full understanding of what really went into those 

until you get to the actual cycle itself, 

individual reporting, that you get to understand 

how these numbers came to be. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and, you know, as I said, in 

most instances these are quite trivial. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And these are small differences. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: These particular differences are 

pretty small. Yeah. Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. The second finding -- and 

this is under missed dose on page 10 of tab 21. 

And this is one of these issues that we seem to 

encounter a lot of times when we're dealing with 

procedures such as the TIB-10 and TIB-8 

procedures. And in this particular case, we're 

really not sure. What -- what we feel the dose 

reconstructor should have done if they wanted to 

maximize the missed photon dose was to take the 

LOD value times N exchange periods and enter that 

into IREP as a constant with no uncertainty. 

However, what was entered was a -- what appears 

to be a geometric mean with a geometric standard 

deviation of 1.52. And this is something that we 

see on a routine basis on -- in this particular 

area, especially with missed photon dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: When they use the LOD value and -- 
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times the N, that is already your 95th percentile 

value and should be entered as a constant without 

the uncertainty. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and that's -- I guess my 

comment on this was that's -- you're correct, and 

that since this was an error in the high dose 

side on a non-compensable outcome, we wouldn't 

necessarily correct it. We might -- we would 

just send it on. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: On that -- on that -- along those 

lines of missed photon dose, it's not so much the 

uncertainty, but I had a question on this case of 

missed versus unmonitored. And in 1972, '78, 

'81, '82, '85 -- if my notes are right here -- 

there was no data. And I was -- I didn't have a 

chance, but either -- this is either SC&A or to 

NIOSH, did the dose reconstructor just assume it 

was a missed dose and a -- and assign the LOD 

over two, or whatever technique, or did they 

assume it was unmonitored and assign some other 

value like co-worker data or something like that? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: My -- my judgment on this is 

since this employee went from monitored to 

unmonitored and -- and then back to monitored on 
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a -- what seems to be a relatively consistent 

work assignment, that there were certain years 

when he would just not get assigned to places 

where he needed a badge. And in those cases, the 

-- the missed dose of a badged person we would 

consider an upper estimate or a bounding estimate 

on what the person's exposure might have been for 

those years, and so it would be an appropriate 

way to -- to do the unmonitored. Yeah, he was -- 

there were a handful of years where he does 

appear to be unmonitored, given this work 

situation and particularly given '81, '85, you 

know, that work era --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we would say that okay, well -

- if he -- since he was unmonitored, he would no 

more dose than someone who was monitored all the 

time and had zeros, you know -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- every cycle and all that. So 

it's an appropriate bounding dose for those 

years. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I guess what I -- what I was 

wondering is, was there any attempt to find out -

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alive, but was there any attempt to find out from 

the CATI interview whether he did go on and off 

badging like that or was there anything in his 

work history that would have dictated necessarily 

-- my -- my concern, again, is that if -- if 

there's data missing, how do we know it was 

simply that he got off the monitoring program and 

not that data is just simply missing and for 

whatever reason -- a lost badge, a whatever. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: There's really no way to verify 

that I guess, or --

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know of any way right 

now. We certainly read the CATI. I don't -- I 

haven't read it recently, but certainly the dose 

reconstructor would have read the CATI and our 

reviewer would have read the CATI and probably 

would have, and should have, commented and the 

dose reconstruction -- or the dose from the 

incidents would have reflected some sort of -- 

you know, something saying then that he was 

continuously monitored but -- but that it's 

missing for some years or -- it would seem like 

it would have been annotated in some fashion. 

don't recall sitting here today because I -- I 

I 
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don't know that I actually read it when I was 

preparing for this. Certainly the dose 

reconstructor would have done it and our reviewer 

would have read it. I just felt like with this 

person's assignment being an electrician, and 

presumably working all over -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- you know, he could be assigned 

to, you know, clean side maintenance. I mean 

there was a -- Fernald was a clean side 

maintenance and while Fernald and Tippy (sic) 

were badged for most of the history -- well, 

everybody was badged, but you just didn't go in 

the process area. They only worked maintenance 

on the clean side. So I would suspect it would 

be consistent with that kind of approach. 

 MR. GRIFFON: It could well be. I'm -- I'm just 

asking whether that was checked or not. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. I'd say -- I'd say, to 

answer your question, our approach would be -- in 

a situation like this, we would probably conclude 

that assigning a missed dose rather than a 

monitored dose for this kind of situation would 

be an appropriate bounding approach. 

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3, which is missed neutron dose section on page 

12. In this case, the dose reconstructor 

specified the formula that he was actually 

following for calculating missed photon dose, 

which was N for the badge exchanges times LOD 

over two times two times 1.91. And this 

methodology is not endorsed in either the 

implementation guide or the Technical Basis 

Document. And here again, he had two options. 

If he was going to maximize that missed dose, he 

would have followed the N times LOD formula and 

entered it into IREP as a constant. Or, if he 

wanted to use the best estimate approach, he 

would have used N times LOD over 2, entered that 

as geometric mean with standard -- geometric 

standard of deviation of 1.52. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Same comment as before, 

that since it's an error on the high dose side on 

a non-compensable case, we wouldn't necessarily 

correct it. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Finding 4 has to do with the 

occupational medical dose. And here there was 

what we felt an underestimation of the dose, 

because apparently the dose reconstructor only 

calculated one chest X-ray for 1969. And I -- if 
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I recall, I think the dose reconstruction 

indicated that he was going to assume an annual 

chest X-ray, which he did not do and that would 

have resulted in additional 7 or .700 millirem. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Now, in this case, they 

did use the -- the tables from the site profile 

on these dose numbers. But 33 millirem was 

assigned in 1970, right, the first year of 

employment? Isn't that where we are on this one? 

The table on the appendix would be -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- where it would be. In line 

212, line 212 of the dose reconstruction. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, I -- I didn't have that 

information on this one. I don't know why. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Line 212 of the dose 

reconstruction is the 33 millirem and then 

there's a whole series of zeroes -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- after that. On the Technical 

Basis Document for Rocky Flats -- this is the 

medical section -- there's the -- this is later 

years. Here's '70 to '85 and there's pre-'70 for 

a PA chest and --we're looking at bladder -- 

right? -- urinary bladder for the surrogate. 
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Isn't that what we're doing here? Urinary 

bladder? 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So pre-'70 we have a 25 millirem 

 DR. BEHLING: And you multiply it times -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Times 1.3, which gives us the 33 

for that entry. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. When you get to '70 -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Through '84? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- '70 to '85, urinary bladder 

goes to less than a millirem. So even with the 

1.3 multiplication, it will be -- it will be less 

than one, and IREP rounds to the nearest 

millirem, so it appears as a zero. Now on the -- 

appears as a zero on this printout. Now if you 

open the SL workbook that is actually the IREP 

input and you highlight that field, you'll see 

that it's not actually a zero. It's actually a 

calculated value based on some -- and just is 

less than one so it rounds down to zero in the 

IREP printout. So from -- for the years, except 

for the first year, the numbers for -- you know, 

the medical dose based on the TBD are less than 
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one, so you get all those zeros down there. 

Okay. And that also explains the arithmetic, why 

the dose reconstructionist assigned a total of 

like 38 millirem for this report -- medical 

exposure -- when in fact you only can see the 33 

on the -- on the spreadsheet. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: And (unintelligible). 

 MS. BEHLING: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Now -- and then there's 

another comment about the lumbar spine exam, 

which is way down at the end. It's line 234 of 

the dose reconstruction, his lumbar spine. The 

dose reconstructor appears to have shortcut it 

and on a -- on a high side, which would be 

assigned as a -- as the lumbar spine. The 

Technical Basis Document says they had a two-view 

lumbar spine, an AP and a lateral. And he gives 

a value for both the AP and the lateral on the 

lumbar spine in the -- in the years when they 

were given, '52 to '74, so you may want to give 

him higher if you want to give him anything. And 

the urinary bladder, as you can see, is -- you 

have an AP value and these are lung only, and 

then a lateral number. The dose reconstructor 
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just took two AP. 

 MS. BEHLING: Uh-huh. I see. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Two times the AP value and kept 

that GSD rather than, you know -- your other 

alternatives would be list them on separate lines 

or do a combination of these two means and then 

geometric -- you know, some sort of combination 

of the distribution. 

 MS. BEHLING: No. No, we didn't -- 

 DR. BEHLING: I -- I think I did make a comment 

later on about the lumbar spine as it's being 

calculated here versus for Iowa, which is like a 

factor of ten higher, and I couldn't figure out 

why one --

 MR. HINNEFELD: I'm not sure -- see, I can -- 

yeah, that was in the Iowa I think. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. Yeah, I think they go up to 

like 2.9 rem --

 MR. HINNEFELD: As I recall, it had to do with 

the number of views. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Certain places took like five 

views for the lumbar spine, and that I think is -

- explains the magnitude of the difference. And 

this was -- so in this case, the lumbar spine was 
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counted for as if it were two AP's as opposed to 

an AP and a lateral. I think the dose 

reconstruction incorrectly says they accounted 

for two lumbar spine exams. And they didn't have 

two lumbar spine exams, they did two views. 

 DR. BEHLING: Views. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So that's -- so that's part of 

the comment (unintelligible). 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

UNIDENTIFIED: This is yours, too. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, yeah. Sorry. I need just a 

few more things in front of me. 

 MS. BEHLING: All right. And finding number 5 is 

we could not reproduce -- based on the 

information that was provided in the dose 

reconstruction report, we could not reproduce the 

on-site ambient dose. I believe NIOSH calculated 

73 millirem, and based on using the Technical 

Basis Document, we calculated 202 millirem. No. 

No, I'm sorry. We did not. We calculated 60 

millirem. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, there's two. 

 MS. BEHLING: Sixty, yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 
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 MS. BEHLING: Trivial, however -- as Hans said -- 

one of the things we're trying to do is just 

reproduce all of the numbers. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. What I think they did was 

took the 1985 dose from their -- from the TBD 

table and they used the 1985 dose of -- is that 

the highest one? I may have these wrong -- 1989 

dose. 1989 dose had the highest mean value of 

167 and the recommended 1 sigma value is this 

value all the way over here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, 36 and 39. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So if you add those two, 167 and 

2 sigma 78, you get 245 for an 1860-hour year, 

and that's 73 millirem for the 26-hour -- 26-hour 

work period. So that seems to be how they did 

the arithmetic. Again, the number is trivial and 

it doesn't really matter. 

 MS. BEHLING: It is. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: But that seems to be how they did 

(unintelligible). 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Okay. And then the last 

finding is with regard to the internal dose. And 

in this particular case, and I know that dose 

reconstructors do this a lot when they're 

maximizing the hypothetical internal dose, they 
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use the TIB-2 when they select the 28 

radionuclides for the hypothetical internal. 

However, since Rocky Flats is a facility without 

a reactor, procedurally they should have selected 

the model with the 12 radionuclides, which would 

have obviously reduced the internal dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, you're right. 

 MS. BEHLING: I believe that's it for this one. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Can I -- yeah, just one more thing 

on this. Not to beat a dead horse, but I -- this 

is my horse to beat. I'm looking at the CATI 

interview with this guy, and -- and Stu, I mean 

he is an electrician, but there's also a 

statement in here that says he was -- he did odd 

jobs until he became a -- got his license -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. All right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- as a master's electrician -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: That's right. That's right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- and then he worked on -- did 

glove box work in 7/71. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Glove box maintenance, sure. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Now, did he -- was he assigned 

there permanent -- you know, I mean, is there -- 

is there a black line or is it -- did he go back 

and forth? I don't know. It seems like he's 
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saying I did odd jobs to a certain point, then I 

was a master's electrician, then I was assigned 

to glove box work. Maybe it's not that clean, 

but I -- I just wondered if -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe probably our 

interpretation was that he at times did 

maintenance on things in glove boxes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Electrician work on things in 

glove boxes --

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- as part of his master 

electrician assignment. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And so --

 MR. GRIFFON: But that doesn't necessarily mean -

-

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- our approach would be that 

that comment or that information would not 

necessarily cause us to change the judgment that 

I described early on. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I -- I was just -- you know, 

the other note that I have was I don't think 

there's any original records of -- of -- they're 

all annual summary records, right, for the -- 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: For the dose, you mean? 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- exposure data. Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There is actually the printed 

page from the person's record that actually 

includes -- after a particular year, and I forget 

what it is, '78 or '79. After that year it shows 

what appears to be monitoring cycle by monitoring 

cycle. So the printed -- you know, it looks like 

a printout from a computer database -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Uh-huh. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- does in fact show that. The 

early on is annual summary even on that report. 

The handwritten numbers are annual summaries. 

But that report does seem to show what appears to 

be monitoring cycle by monitoring cycle. It 

usually is like a quarter or every couple months 

or something like that, and it's got an unusual 

nomenclature becau-- or unusual designation 

because it has two dates, activity start and 

activity end, which you normally think would be 

start of the wear period and end of the wear 

period, but it's not. It's like the day before 

and the day after the -- the badge was collected. 

So -- and those things are only like a day apart, 

so it's a little bit -- kind of throws you off 
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describe that report in that fashion and it's -- 

so it's a little unclear what the start of each 

wear period was, but it's pretty clear what the 

end of each wear period was. 

 MR. GRIFFON: But again, this may not be that 

critical in this case, but in -- in general, I -- 

I guess one concern is if you have the -- if you 

have borderline -- if we run up against 

borderline cases, I think -- because we've heard 

so many stories about people being asked to put 

their badge down to do certain work or whatever. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: So it -- it would make sense in 

those situations to maybe go back and ask the 

person. Often they're not going to remember 

because --

 MR. HINNEFELD: And in fact, that person actually 

has a different problem than the one you're 

describing, because the one you're describing, 

he'll have exposure on it. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It will -- he won't look like an 

unmonitored person; he'll have an exposure 

record. And so it's another issue and we look 
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for that comment. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And we -- and we don't just 

ignore that comment when we see it. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Right, right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: In this particular case, if the 

person has no record for monitoring, we kind of 

go with the -- the site in general, how -- how 

they seem to, you know, badge people and not, the 

-- the era. You know, if you're well into the 

'80s, we have a little more confidence. So if a 

guy doesn't have an exposure record in the '80s, 

he probably wasn't monitored that year -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. The one that really caught 

my eye on this situation -- the one that caught 

my eye was the '72 because he had -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There was one in '72. Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: He had his higher exposure in '69, 

'70, then there was a -- like a blank and then it 

went one more high year, and then it kind of 

lowered, you know, tailed off. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: In the '80s like -- yeah, I agree. 

It wouldn't surprise me that much. But anyway, 

I'll leave it at that. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay, kind of move this through, 

we're on tab 22, the next case, which is case 

number 10610. This is an individual who worked 

at Y-12. And if I can just quickly go through it 

here, it's a female worker who worked there from 

1980 through 1998 for a period of about 19 years, 

and this person was diagnosed with breast cancer 

in the year 2000, shortly after she terminated 

employment. Her job at Y-12 was a machine 

cleaner, so she was in contact with materials 

that may have involved external as well as 

internal exposures. The total assigned dose to 

this individual was 31.85 rem. And for her 

breast cancer that translates to a POC value of 

32.13 percent. And just quickly going through 

Table 1 on page 5 of the report you'll obviously 

come to some conclusions just looking at the 

doses. She had very little measured doses. Most 

of the external dose was assigned to her from 

photon missed dose. So she had a total of only 

26 millirem of measured dose and a total of 6.84 

rem of photon missed dose. And she received 

quite a bit of exposure from electron missed 

dose, which was also calculated. And on top of 
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it, a very, very hefty dose from internal 

exposures that was based on a hypothetical model. 

So again, the -- the doses are -- in most 

instances here, the overwhelming majority of dose 

contributing to her 31.85 rem were -- were 

basically assigned doses for missed doses, as 

well as hypothetical internal. 

Let me just point out an -- an error. I don't 

know if Kathy had sent you an errata sheet, but 

in Table 2, our case review list, for -- for the 

category of C.2.2, missed dose. You should have 

had a no and a low instead of the yes, and that 

is exchanged with value C.3.2 where we had the -- 

the no and low, and you should have a checkmark 

on your yes. So it's a reversal of those two. 

 MS. BEHLING: Same number of findings. 

 DR. BEHLING: Same -- same findings. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, okay. I got it. 

 DR. BEHLING: Again, if you look at the bottom of 

that checklist, we find eight findings. The 

majority of them had low impact, but there were a 

couple of instances where we concluded that we 

can't really identify what the impact is. And so 

they were category 4 under review, and we'll 

briefly talk about that when we get there. Let 
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me just quickly focus on the findings. 

The first finding is identified on page 10, and 

it's misinterpretation of procedure resulting in 

improper assignment of uncertainty for missed 

dose. And again, this is one of those cases that 

I think we're going to be hearing again and 

again, and then Stu is going to say enough, I 

heard. This is the misinterpretation of TIB-8 

and 10 where people are looking at those tables 

and confusing what needs to be done in maximizing 

doses based on recorded dose versus missed dose. 

And here they -- again there's three things that 

they do. They multiply -- they used N times LOD, 

which should be enough if you're going to 

maximize missed dose, and -- and what they do is 

they multiply it by 2 and then they introduce 

implementation guide number 2, which divides by 

2. And then they obviously still have the 

uncertainty, so you have three errors. So you 

have the multiplier, a -- a correction -- 

standard correction factor which does not belong. 

They correct that by dividing by two, so error 

one -- number one is corrected by error two, and 

you're left with error number three, which is 

uncertainty which doesn't belong. And that is 
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the routine error that has been made. And, you 

know --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Which I -- I still think they 

made one error which -- 

 DR. BEHLING: They made one error. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- which was adding the -- which 

included the multiplier of 2 which didn't belong. 

You know, they -- and then -- and then the 

language that they chose to describe what they 

did kind of leads me to believe -- 

 MS. BEHLING: That's the other thing. The 

language sometimes --

 DR. BEHLING: You can either do it two way. You 

can say the multiplier 2 doesn't belong. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Doesn't belong. 

 DR. BEHLING: Or you can say the multiplier and 

the divider doesn't belong, which leaves it with 

LOD as a -- as a constant. So -- so you can do 

it in either direction, but -- and I -- I've gone 

on record in saying that when I read those two 

Technical Information Bulletins I, too, was 

confused until I realized that table needs to be 

segregated that says this is for recorded dose; 

this is for missed dose. 

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mean unless somebody around here can change my 

mind. But I at least agree with you on your 

reading of this document. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah. And this is a 

constant. It's one that we routinely -- so we 

want -- the next time, we'll just say this is, 

you know, something we've already discussed. 

The next finding, finding 22.2, C.2.2, that 

should also have inappropriate assumption used 

for calculating not recorded dose but missed 

photon dose. The word "recorded" should be 

replaced with "missed photon" dose. Again, here 

-- and I don't want to come across as not being, 

you know, claimant-favorable, but my assumption 

is always when you have the real data, use it. 

Don't necessary (sic) -- even if it's claimantfavorable, and in this case we -- we talk about 

12 cycles per year as the number of cycles for 

calculating missed dose. But if you look at the 

individual dosimetry records, the first number is 

monitored on a quarterly basis. So use the 

quarterly, and obviously it's going to reduce the 

dose and won't be as claimant-favorable, but -- 

but it's the real information and should be used. 

(Whereupon, Mr. Gibson enters the 
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proceedings.) 

 MR. GIBSON: Hello. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Hey, Mike. 

 MS. BEHLING: Hello. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. The next one is page 12, 

finding 22.3, D.1.1, incorrect procedure used to 

estimate electron dose. 

 MS. BEHLING: Can I stop you for just one second? 

Can I assume that on this -- on the finding 2, 

you're in agreement with the fact that we feel 

that that is an overestimate -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Oh, okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Just want to be sure. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: That's just, you know, as a -- as 

a matter of course, if we see an overestimate in 

a -- in a noncompensable case, even more so than 

needs to be there, we'll -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Just let it go. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- just let it go, sure. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. And we don't. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: The -- the -- as I said, the next 

finding is on page 12, and it's finding 22.3, 
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D.1.1, incorrect procedure used to estimate 

electron doses. The reference cited was ORAUOTIB-0008 for reconstruction of missed shallow 

dose. That procedure basically tells you you 

cannot use this for measuring a skin dose or 

shallow dose. It's one of the statements up 

front. In essence he should have used TIB-17 as 

-- as the correct one. 

 MS. BEHLING: For the breast. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, for the breast. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: Just a technical oversight. 

Finding 22.4, LOD value could not be verified. 

think the individual used 40 millirem. And of 

course if you use TIB-17, the LOD should have 

been 50. Again, it's a modest difference which 

would change the dose by about 200 millirem. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Let me stop at each one of these. 

Are -- are you in agreement or... 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I -- I believe that is one 

-- I believe that is right. I believe that... 

yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: There's two things that cancel each 

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other out, 40 versus 50, but then I also say it's 

quarterly instead of 12 cycles. So in essence 

you actually lose, again, dose. So we're 

actually talking about dose reduction here if you 

comply with my -- my statements. 

The next finding is on page 14. It's 22.5, 

incorrect selection of hypothetical. We just 

already talked about that in the previous one. 

Whenever you have a facility that is not a nonreactor, the correct choice based on TIB-2 is to 

use 12 radionuclides instead of 28. Again, this 

would reduce the dose. 

The next finding is finding 22.6, F.3, 

hypothetical dose value incorrectly derived. And 

again, when you look at the hypothetical dose 

model, it offers here I believe 13 organs that 

you can select from. And of course that does not 

allow for all organs that are defined in -- in 

DC-9 code, which means that when you have an 

organ that is not among the 13, you're supposed 

to use a surrogate organ. That is, a nonmetabolic organ that would serve as a maximizing 

dose. I guess the experience has shown that the 

colon is always the maximal organ for a 

surrogate, but in this case the person has breast 
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cancer and the breast tissue is among the 13 

tissues that can be used to identify the real 

dose. And so based on that, we calculate the -- 

the dose for the breast using the 28 

radionuclides would have been 8.75 rem which is 

considerably lower than the ones for the colon. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It was -- I think this is a 

holdover from the original -- original use of the 

TIB-2 --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- was use the highest nonmetabolic. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Or it's available for -- these 

non-metabolic organs, use the highest nonmetabolic dose, and that was the approach. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And this remains from that. In -

- in the interim, TIB-2 has evolved to provide -- 

and the tools now provide doses to a variety of 

organs --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: That's right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- specific organs, and this -- 

this probably is -- the dose reconstructor would 
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relate me on -- you know, going back to previous 

activities, I believe he's used the maximum nonmetabolic. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: And the only -- only issue here is 

that when people -- and we've seen those through 

the meetings that we've attended during the 

public speaking sessions, and you realize that 

oftentimes these people who are claimants 

congregate and -- and compare notes. And I guess 

it would be nice to know that when they do talk 

to each other and they have common cancers, that 

one doesn't say oh, they gave me this dose based 

on a colon, but the other one says no, they used 

a real -- and -- and it's just consistency and so 

forth. So basically what we found here is that 

almost -- most of the findings would reduce the 

person's exposure. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and we've made that 

statement before. We're not afraid to say when 

the doses are in excess of what they should be 

based on available information, we're going to 

cite that as a finding even though it may prove 

to be not claimant-favorable. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think there's something 

to be said for that, for saying that hey, look, 

if you've got a way -- if you have a way to do 

the dose to the breast, it's not -- and it's the 

same approach as the dose to the colon that they 

gave more worth --

 MS. BEHLING: Exactly. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- why bother to have these 

artificial (unintelligible) thrown in. And I 

think there's some -- that's certainly worth 

carrying into our conversation with ORAU is that 

they -- because of the consistency of the dose 

reconstruction --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- I think we'll get -- 

 DR. BEHLING: I -- I think for --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- (unintelligible) dose 

reconstruction, even if they're all 

(unintelligible), it doesn't help us out. 

 MS. BEHLING: And I -- I believe the other 

philosophy that we've taken is, as Hans was 

saying, we don't always go with the maximal dose, 

especially when it is a known. And that's also 

consistent with the regulations, and it keeps the 

dose reconstructions consistent among one another 
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if you follow that philosophy. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. The next -- I guess final 

two are on page 15. And the first one, 22.7-B.3, 

is unresolved discrepancies between CATI report 

and DOE records. The claimant indicated in the 

interview that she was subject to in vitro 

biological monitoring; that is, urinalysis. DOE 

records, however, did not identify any bioassay 

records. The claimant also stated that a medical 

X-ray was taken in all but the last year of 

employment. However, the DOE records provide no 

evidence of any chest X-rays. And the claimant 

stated that the worker had whole-body counts 

annually through 1992, and DOE records only 

provide in vivo data for four measurements. So 

whether or not she's correct, it's always 

difficult when you talk about a person's 

testimony over the -- over the phone during an 

interview. And at this point you're only left 

with a discrepancy that you can't really assess 

in terms of who's right or wrong. Are the 

records complete and is the person who has 

provided these statements during the interview 

suffering from a lapse of memory, or is it the 
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fact that these records are in fact incomplete 

and therefore are missing certain records is 

something we can't really discuss or make a 

judgment call other than to say it's a 

discrepancy that is unresolved and that's why we 

identify these deficiencies as having an 

uncertain impact because we really don't know. 

mean the -- the -- obviously, one could cap, for 

instance, a chest X-ray for breast cancer and say 

well, we could assume an annual one and take the 

dose to the breast as a function of time using 

obviously TIB-6. That's not a problem. We could 

account for that. But what is more difficult to 

account for, if there are urinalysis data that 

are simply not there, which the interviewee 

claims to have been there, because that is 

basically an open-ended question for which we 

have no way of providing an answer. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and I don't know right now 

what efforts, if any -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- were taken to try to resolve 

that. 

 DR. BEHLING: No, given the fact -- and I will 

again -- come full circle again, is that this 

I 
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person was given a very healthy hypothetical 

internal exposure. And based on that large dose, 

which is not only 12 but 28 radionuclides, one 

could reasonably conclude that it's likely a 

gross overestimate of whatever it is she might 

have missed, and therefore one could come again 

with the conclusion that the assigned dose is 

more than likely to have bounded any internal 

exposure. No question of that. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Well, certainly we would 

feel that way, but I don't know what was done to 

try to resolve any discrepancy. I will say that 

not every site gives us X-ray information. And 

so the fact that the DOE response didn't include 

any evidence of medical X-rays would not 

necessarily be surprising because a lot of sites 

don't send -- it all -- it just depends on how 

they keep -- do their record-keeping. So we 

would -- I would -- I would expect that medical 

X-ray was assigned for this person in the dose 

reconstruction for each year of her employment 

and so ... 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. And again, in conclusion, 

when you look at Table 1 and the report at 5 and 

you just scan through and you realize that 
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measured photon doses were 26 millirem and in the 

end she was assigned to internal/external dose of 

nearly 32, it clearly suggests that we bounded 

her exposure. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess the part where the CATI 

interview goes back to comments we made in first 

22, Stu, that -- you know, when you come out with 

a DR report, I think -- I mean one concern that 

we raised last time was this boilerplate type of 

language that says the CATI was considered. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: And -- and it doesn't really speak 

personally to that person, but you don't give the 

details. For instance, she said in one of her 

phone interviews that in '83/'84 I worked in some 

really bad stuff. And, you know, that -- that 

doesn't tell us much at all, but if you said 

that, you know, we looked at these records, we 

looked at these records and, you know, we 

couldn't find any incidents in that time period. 

However, we've assigned the 12 radionuclide, you 

know --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

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favorable measure, you know -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- that at least speaks to that 

you're -- you're at least listening to them when 

-- when they ask -- when you ask them what they 

worked in, you know. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. And of course all 60 

cases have been selected before any feedback from 

this review --

 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- has gotten back to our 

(unintelligible) --

 MR. GRIFFON: I understand. I understand. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and so we'll see the same 

kinds of things --

 MR. GRIFFON: That's what I'm saying. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- from the entire -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: It's the same comment. 

MR. ALLEN: I was just going to say this one was 

sent through December of '03. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

MR. ALLEN: So when this was sent to the 

claimant, so there is a lag time. 

DR. ROESSLER: Well, the book --

MR. ALLEN: I'm sorry. Go ahead, Gen. 
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DR. ROESSLER: It would be helpful on all of 

these, I think, to have the date that the dose 

reconstruction took place and then we could kind 

of track what's happening with time. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Well, we can provide that. 

I mean we've got -- we can get them. But --

DR. ROESSLER: Just in a general way, I think. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: There's a date on the dose 

reconstruction report, completion date, so we 

could incorporate that into our -- 

MR. ALLEN: Right. Well, we have -- 

 MS. BEHLING: -- report, also. 

DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, I think that would be 

helpful. 

MR. ALLEN: I don't know how much information 

we'll put in the report for Privacy Act... 

DR. ROESSLER: Well, I think maybe kind of a 

general -- like the year, even, would help so we 

could --

MR. ALLEN: The date it was -- the date the DR 

was approved is probably okay. I wouldn't think 

there'd be any particular -- 

DR. ROESSLER: Privacy. 

MR. ALLEN: -- privacy issue with that. What do 
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you think? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't think so. I just think 

if you keep --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- taking everything that's okay 

to put in --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- eventually you could supply 

more--

MR. ALLEN: The more information that's okay by 

itself --

 MR. GRIFFON: Certain sites, certain cancer 

approved --

MR. ALLEN: -- at some point --

DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, at some point it's not okay 

anymore. 

DR. ROESSLER: Protective. 

 DR. BEHLING: Just as a final statement for this 

case, on page 15 I make a statement here that 

says SC&A concludes that the technically 

inappropriate parameter selected for hypothetical 

internal dose, which included 28 instead of the 

12 radionuclides and the use of colon as a 

surrogate for the breast, may have been motivated 
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by the potential for missed internal dosimetry 

records. Meaning that maybe the guy said well, 

in the absence of -- of dosimetry records on all 

the internal --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- I will opt to go and aim high on 

two counts. One, the use of 28 radionuclides and 

the use of colon instead of the breast, both of 

which are obviously very claimant-favorable with 

-- with -- and provide a dose beyond what's -- 

the procedures would have dictated. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I guess we'll move on to tab 

23, which is case number 004747. And this 

employee worked at both the Y-12 plant and the 

Oak Ridge gaseous diffusion, the Y-25 plant. And 

he worked between 1954 and 1992 in three 

uninterrupted employment periods. In 1997 the 

worker was diagnosed with prostate cancer. And 

he was a machinist and worked at various 

buildings and plants throughout the facility. 

His -- NIOSH calculated a dose of 24.7 rem and 

that resulted in a POC of 24 percent. And as you 

can see from Table 1, the majority of the dose 

was the hypothetical internal dose that this 
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person was assigned. But starting with the first 

finding, 23.1-C.1.1 on page 9, in this particular 

case we found a discrepancy between the two 

different guidance documents -- and when we're 

talking an incorrect assignment or what we 

consider an incorrect assignment of a surrogate 

organ, this was a prostate cancer and the dose 

reconstructor selected the testes as the 

surrogate organ. If you look at TIB-0005, they 

recommend using the bladder as the surrogate 

organ for the prostate, and OCAS -- the 

implementation guide, OCAS-IG-001, actually 

recommends the testes. So I guess the dose 

reconstructor wasn't wrong in using the testes 

here because one guidance document does recommend 

that. But I think obviously there's -- has to be 

a correction to --

MR. ALLEN: Okay. At the time this was done, 

they both recommended that and it was changed in 

one and, you know, we hadn't got it changed in 

the other yet. 

 MS. BEHLING: They both recommended testes? Is 

that --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Early on -- early on the testes 

was --
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 DR. BEHLING: Clearly, the bladder is the more 

correct one. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. And you're right, the end 

value should be modified to reflect that. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. The second finding -- now 

this particular case, the dose reconstructor 

entered the recorded dose as a constant with no 

uncertainty. And this is another one of these 

procedural issues that Hans and I have been 

challenged by, and that's the implementation 

guide which recommends when you have a recorded 

dose, you enter it as a normal distribution with 

a -- you have a numerical standard deviation and 

the guidance provided in that implementation 

guide is -- is very, very complex and difficult. 

And we have never seen -- at least in these 38 

cases we haven't seen one dose reconstructor even 

attempt it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. That's where he used an 

uncertainty area reading -- right? Isn't that 

what it describes to do and -- and -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- propagate the uncertainty for 

everyone... 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 
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MR. ALLEN: And for TLD to contact your local DOE 

 MR. HINNEFELD: (Unintelligible) 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) 

 DR. BEHLING: And I look at that and say, come on 

now. Let's use something more realistic. Use a 

30 percent --

 MR. HINNEFELD: We were a lot more naive in those 

days, and I think that was probably written 

before Dave -- even Dave maybe wasn't on the 

program yet when that was done. I certainly 

wasn't. Yeah, the point being though, you'd have 

a == you know, there is the issue that still -- 

it's still kind of outstanding; they haven't 

resolved it yet from the first set of 20 -- about 

in the situation where you have a measured dose 

and -- which is supposed to be normally 

distributed. And we have some sort of guidance 

usually that in a particular Technical Basis 

Document what's a good standard deviation to 

choose as a shortcut, and I think it's 30 percent 

for most years. 

 MS. BEHLING: That makes sense. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And maybe 50 percent on very 

early years or something. 
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MR. ALLEN: Yeah, I think it's in one of these 

cases. I don't remember the number. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean the medical usually uses 30 

percent --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. There is some standard -- 

 DR. BEHLING: -- as a default value. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We do have to have some standard 

guidance out there on how to use it, and then the 

dose reconstruction technique we're talking about 

is that the don't use the uncertainty. They 

enter the measured value as a constant and then 

they don't apply the dose conversation factor -- 

the organ-specific dose conversion factor, but 

they'll apply a 1, a 1 as a conversion factor, 

which is higher than the entire range -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Offsets. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- of dose conversion factors by 

organ saying that this is an overestimating 

approach and so we're going to leave it as a 

constant, and is that in fact the right thing to 

do. Is that in fact -- (unintelligible) we 

haven't resolved it. I don't know of any way to 

do it other than to do a whole bunch of Monte 

Carlo combinations and just see, you know, case 
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by case for all these -- for all these organ DCFs 

that wouldn't be utilized in this fashion where 

the range is below 1 or below .8 or something 

like that -- is that does it in fact work out 

that way, and we haven't finished that yet. And 

it's still kind of the same hanging-over issue 

from the first 20. So that issue -- you're right 

on that. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean it should be --

 MR. HINNEFELD: We're not arguing with that. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- deleted because it's too 

complex. It's too time-consuming -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: All that -- all that discussion, 

yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- and it doesn't -- certainly it 

doesn't warrant that kind of investment of time 

for developing a sigma value. I think it's 

reasonable to conclude that a surrogate approach 

is too high at 30 percent sigma value and say 

that's it, that's good enough. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: It's claimant-favorable. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, but it has to be -- I mean 

you said delete it. It has to be replaced -- 
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 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- with something. Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. This is where I think we can 

hopefully give you some guidance as to the 

procedures that are giving the -- the dose 

reconstructors the most problem, because we -- 

after going through these first 38 cases, we can 

certainly list for you these are the procedures 

that the dose reconstructors seem to -- to be 

most difficult for them is just that the guidance 

isn't clear and that they do it wrong. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Yeah, okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Now if we move on to the 

neutron dose, in this particular case, the -- 

there was no neutron dose calculated. However, 

when we looked at the DOE records, it -- it 

showed zeroes for neutron readings or -- or -- 

yeah, it was 52 zero neutron readings and this -- 

these occurred between 1961 and 1974. And based 

on the fact that this person was a machinist and 

worked in various areas of the plant, we thought 

that there was some potential for neutron 

exposure. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and I guess you can clarify 
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this issue, because obviously post-'70, the HMPD 

dosimeter was used that was capable of measuring 

obviously shallow dose, deep dose, photon dose, 

as well as neutron dose. And it may very well 

have been a badge that was assigned to people 

with or without any potential for neutrons, 

meaning that it was processed regardless, and the 

zero dose didn't mean he was exposed to neutrons 

except that that was a dosimeter that was 

assigned to everyone independent of whether or 

not there was a potential. And so we have to 

know what the difference is. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, that certainly happened a 

lot of places, where they'd hang a badge on 

someone regardless of their -- and then the badge 

could measure neutrons regardless of the person's 

potentials 'cause everybody wore that badge. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Now I -- I'll have to do some 

more research this week to sort this particular 

case out on why the dose -- in the dose 

reconstructor's judgment he decided that this 

person wasn't reasonably exposed to neutrons so 

we don't have to do the neutron missed dose. 

There's also another limiting -- you know, could 
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be another limiting factor rather than doing just 

your -- your -- if neutrons are assigned, one 

approach would be to use the neutron -- the 

standard missed dose calculation for neutrons, 

and the other would be -- that may be too high 

based on his external photon exposure and the 

neutron to photon ratios. So there may be 

another bounding step that would be done in 

assigning it because the neutron to photon ratio 

would indicate that the -- the -- if he doesn't 

have any measured photon dose, his neutron dose 

can't be as high as the standard missed dose 

calculation would tell you. So there might be 

another bounding step in there, but I'll just 

have to go look at the case and see what the 

judgment was for determining that this person was 

really not exposed to neutrons and therefore it's 

okay to (unintelligible). 

 DR. BEHLING: And it can be quite substantial if 

a person --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, yeah. It's going to be big. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- worked in the area and he was 

monitored 12 cycles a year, missed neutron dose 

can be very substantial, which if he wasn't 

exposed, shouldn't be there. But if he was, it 
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should be there. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: In fact I think we calculated about 

7 to 8 rem in this particular case. And I guess 

another question that comes up, and I may have 

misstated this, because in the records it's 

sometimes confusing, and this is something that 

we talked about, when there's a blank as opposed 

to a zero --

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- and how do we treat that. And I 

guess it's probably site-specific -- 

MR. ALLEN: And error. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- and error-specific. 

MR. ALLEN: Error specific. 

 MS. BEHLING: Error specific, yes. 

MR. ALLEN: It varies with time from each site 

and --

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Especially for -- for Savannah 

River between '70 and 1988, there was that blank 

spot that involved the recording of doses, that 

if they were below a certain value they didn't 

even bother reporting them. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, so --
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 MR. GRIFFON: I know this one jumped out at me 

because I -- I thought I remembered hearing some 

issues with this at Y-12 specifically, so -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: You've gone through Y-12, or... 

 MR. GRIFFON: Not necessarily on neutrons, just 

the -- the practice of whether they were entering 

blanks as opposed to zero values or -- or -- 

 MS. BEHLING: For the dosimeter records. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, trying to -- I think it was 

for deep -- you know, photon dose. But I don't -

- I don't recall, you know. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: But they were recording zeroes 

when the reading didn't really indicate a zero? 

Is that what you're saying? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, whether they were recording 

blanks --

 MS. BEHLING: Blanks. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- when they were measuring less 

than detectable. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, so it looks like there was no 

read --

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- but in fact it was a zero 

read. 

 MR. GRIFFON: When it was -- yeah, when it was 
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less --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Or a less than detectable 

reading. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- than detectable, right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, okay. 

MR. ALLEN: Well, the Y-12 report that I'm 

thinking of only sees -- there's always a zero 

there, the ones I'm thinking of. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: The ones I'm thinking of too, but 

I can't really -- I've seen too many sites, too 

many (unintelligible). 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah, that's my problem too. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. The finding 4 on page 12, 

again, this is what we discussed before. The Y12 and K-25 plant do not have a reactor, 

therefore we felt they should have selected the 

hypothetical dose model with the 12 radionuclides 

as opposed to the 28. I think we've come to 

agreement on that. In this -- well, when we go 

on to now the CATI report and to our finding 

number 5. In -- in this particular case, we did 

identify the fact that there -- there was -- 

there was an inconsistency between at least what 

the employee indicated in the CATI regarding two 

incidents that he was involved in. One he 
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describes as a critical spill of mop water, and 

also a fire, a uranium fire. And it just 

stresses that in some of these cases we don't 

always see a lot of follow-up with information 

that's provided in the CATI report. And it just 

-- when there's situations like this, we just 

think it would be best if they did go back and -- 

and try to contact DOE and see if there's, you 

know, more extensive records than -- than what 

you received the first time. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. We -- we think we have a 

pretty complete record of the Y -- if we're 

talking about the 1958 Y-12 criticality, which 

was -- there was a criticality at Y-12. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. Oh, yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And we think we have pretty 

complete records of the involved person on that. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: It's pretty well-described, et 

cetera. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And so that turned out it's the 

only criticality for Y-12. So he may have worked 

-- I mean he may have been at Y-12 learning that, 

but we think we know pretty much who was, you 
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know, affected by or in that building. So --

 DR. BEHLING: In and around. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, in and around that 

building. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So I would think that the 

criticality of -- of -- what did you say, mop 

water or something, was actually -- they were in 

fact -- I think it's the cleaning. 

MR. ALLEN: Critical spill of --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Critical spill of mop water. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: They were in fact I think doing 

some cleaning of tanks. 

 MS. BEHLING: I understand. And we also 

recognize that you did assign the hypothetical 

internal dose and used 28 radionuclides and it's 

a very conservative assumption. I guess, as we 

had mentioned earlier, when you come to these 

meetings and, you know, you -- you hear the 

claimants speak, it's just it would sometimes I 

think help them if they were convinced that we 

really did --

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 MS. BEHLING: -- look through these records. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- the claimant -- I didn't read 

that one, but was he claiming some sort of 

criticality of --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think he claimed he was 

exposed a couple times early on -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- through a couple of events. 

He -- you said he mentioned a uranium fire? 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. He mentions that's where the 

uranium fire (unintelligible), so... 

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 

MR. ALLEN: And that mop water, I think it was 

pretty much the description right there, wasn't 

it? A critical spill of mop water -- 

 MS. BEHLING: It is. 

MR. ALLEN: -- involved with this. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

MR. ALLEN: It was -- I don't even think he said 

1958, but it was in that era. Or he might have 

said --

 MR. HINNEFELD: He worked there during that 

period. I don't think he -- I don't know if he 

ever gave a date for that. 

 MS. BEHLING: I believe he said 1958. 
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MR. ALLEN: Definitely need to look at that and 

the documentation in the dose reconstruction as 

far as what they looked at is lacking. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, well, we'll look at it. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. Okay. 

 MR. MAKHIJANI: Could I ask a question? How did 

you -- how did you handle the fire, the uranium 

fire? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: The uranium fire? Well, I mean 

the uranium fire would probably -- he said 

multiple uranium fires. 

 MR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Which is probably, you know, 

burning chips or --

 MR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, the chips. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- (unintelligible) and things 

like that. The dose reconstruction included the 

hypothetical maximizing intent, which we believe 

would bound exposure from that situation. And I 

don't know if -- do we have any internal 

monitoring information on this guy? I don't 

remember if we have an internal monitoring record 

or not. 

 MS. BEHLING: I don't know. 

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had any. I mean our view would be, you know, in 

a situation like that, that 12 -- that 

hypothetical intake -- intake bounds the kind of 

intakes you would see at -- even at a relatively 

chronic episodic set of events like that. 

 MR. MAKHIJANI: Can I ask if --

MR. ALLEN: He did have -- he did have urinalysis 

and the hypothetical intake is higher. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's higher? 

MR. ALLEN: It's higher. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Then okay, that is your number. 

Okay? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Can I ask a silly question, maybe a 

silly question? In the -- in your report, SC&A's 

report, it says that claimant received radiation 

exposure during employment as a machinist, as a 

machinist that came to perform work at the K-25 

plant in Buildings Alpha 1-5; Beta 2-4, and 9212, 

9215, and he also worked as a machinist at Y-12. 

Is that from the DR report? Because if that's 

from the DR report, you're going to lose 

credibility right away because those are -- those 

buildings are all Y-12 buildings that you 

mentioned under K-25. The claimant's going to 

say, they don't even know where I work, you know. 
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 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Now, it might -- it might be that -

- I don't know. I haven't got it wrong here, I 

just want to --

 DR. BEHLING: I have to look to see if that comes 

out of the CATI report. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I didn't see it on the -- I don't 

have the DR report on mine. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I've got it right here. 

 MR. GRIFFON: It's just worth double-checking. 

If you mentioned the wrong buildings, I think you 

lose credibility with these people. 

 MS. BEHLING: Up front. 

DR. ROESSLER: So all those buildings -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: All those -- that list of buildings 

are all Y-12. 

DR. ROESSLER: -- all in Y-12? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Except I don't know about H-2. 

never heard of that one. 

DR. ROESSLER: That might have been just a 

shorthand way of writing that. 

MR. ALLEN: Says he worked as a machinist before, 

Building 1401 at K-25. And all the others say Y12. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Y-12, okay. 

I 
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MR. ALLEN: In the DR report. 

 MR. GRIFFON: All right. So you just got a 

little --

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- or -- or --

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. We're going to make that 

change. 

 MR. GRIFFON: As long as it's correct on the DR 

report. I just wanted to double-check. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, uh-huh. Okay. I think we're 

done with -- unless there's other questions on 

tab 23. Okay. We'll move on into tab 24, and in 

this particular case, this is case number 012943. 

And this individual worked at the Y-12, K-25 and 

the X-10 sites at Oak Ridge. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Can --

 MS. BEHLING: I'm sorry. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm sorry. I'm just a little 

behind, a little slow this morning, tired. Was 

4747, the last case we did, the person worked 

there from '54 on; is that correct? From '54 to 

whatever? I have a note on my -- my handscratched notes here about -- 
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 MS. BEHLING: '54 to --

MR. ALLEN: '90. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. The unmonitored dose prior 

to 1961, you might have already -- I think you 

passed by it, Kathy. I'm sorry. 

 MS. BEHLING: That's all right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: But my question is, is that 

something -- I mean I know there's -- there's 

Technical Information Bulletins that have come 

out on Y-12 and how to handle that. It was and -

- it wasn't available at the time -- 

 DR. BEHLING: At the time of this 

(unintelligible)? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, there was no -- no procedure, 

and he did something that I considered reasonable 

and claimant-favorable by taking the maximum year 

in 1962 and multiplying that yet by 2 -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- and assigning it to all years 

prior to '61. And based on the more current 

guidance, he got a much larger dose than he would 

have gotten under the current guidance. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. Well, I guess my -- 

my question here is just -- just how to -- how to 
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handle this finding more -- more than -- because 

I don't necessarily -- I mean Hans, you explained 

this to me on our conference call that -- and I 

don't necessarily disagree with you, that he had 

-- sorry. I'm covering up the mike. You know, 

he had the -- a similar job all throughout that 

period and -- and they doubled his highest -- his 

highest annual dose I guess and applied it to the 

time periods. However, now there's a -- a new 

Technical Information Bulletin coming out on how 

to deal with that. I wonder if -- if resolution 

on -- on that kind of finding shouldn't be 

reserved for the Y-12 site profile review, as 

we've done in the past, because I wonder if it's 

a broader description of how -- how should that 

be handled. Is it appropriate just to assign, 

you know, a factor -- just multiply it by 2 and -

- and assign a dose for those earlier periods? 

Maybe in this particular instance where he's got 

the same job and the same, you know, situation, 

it might be appropriate. But I just think 

there's a broader discussion there that -- that 

back extrapolation from time periods when you had 

data to time periods where you didn't have any -- 

any monitoring records. There's a broader 
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discussion. I'm not disagreeing with what Hans 

said about this case, but -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think certainly the -- that 

discussion certainly should be I think a 

Technical Basis Document type of discussion 

because it will -- it will certainly happen at Y12. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know of a similar type of 

period at Savannah River, but -- so it wouldn't 

necessarily come up there, but that kind of -- 

the discussion of what's appropriate in those 

situations will certainly come out during the Y12 TBD review, so maybe we can defer it to that. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I just wonder if for this 

particular situation, you know, if -- if -- I'm 

not sure what the activities were that were going 

on prior to '61, but I imagine they were pretty 

similar if not less than what he was doing in 

'61. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I -- I would -- I would think -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: In the same job, I think 

multiplying by 2 is probably pretty darn 

conservative, like you said. But it also -- to 

some people, I think they could say well, that's 
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-- boy, they had no data and they just threw in a 

factor of two swag and -- and assigned this. 

What's your basis, you know. 

 DR. BEHLING: Well, I think the assumption -- 

again, if I look at the new procedure, it says 

the procedure is only applicable under conditions 

where the individual didn't switch job and he has 

at least five cycles post-'62 on which you -- you 

extrapolate the data. And so it doesn't answer 

all the questions, but for instance let's assume 

a person worked between '54 and stopped in '61. 

Well, you have no data now. You're not going 

beyond the '61 time frame where you can say well, 

you know -- and he -- assuming he didn't switch 

jobs, then extrapolating backwards using the 

protocol, that -- that's not available to you, 

and I don't know how you will deal with Y-12. 

The only issue is that apparently the assignment 

of badges was based on certain potential for 

exposures, meaning that if you were not badged 

prior to '61, you were considered a low-exposure 

worker as opposed to those who were badged who 

had -- and I don't remember what the criteria was 

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 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Y-12 did in fact, before '61, 

badge the people they felt had the highest -- 

 DR. BEHLING: High potential. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So there -- I mean there will be 

-- there may be a variety of approaches that, 

when they come up, can deal with those kinds of 

periods, those data gap kinds of periods. But 

again, I think that the discussion of what are 

appropriate approaches for those kinds of things 

is maybe a TBD type of discussion -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- or topic, more so than 

individual case kind of topic. Certainly it will 

influence -- you know, it would influence a good 

deal of the work that we will do and, to a 

certain extent, what we have done. It all comes 

up on those same -- so -- or whatever -- whatever 

the whole determination of it. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess my feeling on 

this is -- is, you know, my -- my gut tells me 

this -- this method that they used, that they 

applied, was probably claimant favorable, but 

what is the basis for it? You know, it seems 
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like it was kind of pulled out of the -- you 

know. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I guess there is a sort of -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Throw in a factor of 2 --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- kind of a judgment of --

 MR. GRIFFON: Or individual judgment, yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- if he's exposed to these 

levels from here on, he probably wasn't exposed 

to more than double that -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- each year back farther, so I 

mean it's probably just a -- 

MR. ALLEN: As far as I know --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- considered equal judgment. 

MR. ALLEN: As far as I know that technique was 

always used -- only used case by case. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

MR. ALLEN: I mean that particular one, it wasn't 

used that much. Like in this particular case, 

they looked at it and said, you know, does this 

kind of technique work for this individual, and 

then used it. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I think it might have even been -- 

you know, that's what I'm saying is that it may 

necessarily not -- doesn't likely affect this 
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individual case, but I think there is a broader 

discussion that has to take place, and I don't 

want to lose that as an item. I think we're 

covering Y-12 site profile anyway -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I think there are 

interviews going on down there this week. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. So... 

 MR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I agree with Mark in the 

sense that, you know, I -- I haven't looked as 

many records as Mark, but one of the difficulties 

in extrapolating -- say you start in '62 and your 

records for five years beyond that point back is 

in a lot of places the conditions in the '50s 

were worse than in the '60s. Because I mean from 

the '50s, '60s, and '70s, overall there seemed to 

be an improvement. So -- and I think how much of 

an improvement is probably site-specific and 

work-specific. So I think this factor of two in 

fact may be claimant-favorable in some 

circumstances and may not be -- and so I would 

wonder whether something like area monitoring 

information --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, at Y-12 and K-- 

 MR. MAKHIJANI: -- area badges and things like 

that might not be a suitable base to establish 
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this factor rather than a factor of two. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the basis for the 

extrapolation of Y-12, which is -- was not 

available at the time this dose reconstruction 

was done but which is available now -- is the 

work -- workers who were monitored from the early 

'50s on through into the -- well into the '60s 

had -- the monitored cohort, in other words. And 

what happened to their doses as you go earlier 

from '61 out of what -- at what rate do those 

doses go higher. And so that back extrapolation 

was based on the monitored cohort and then that -

- people who joined the monitored cohort in '61 

and had a consistent job back earlier, that their 

-- you know, there's this analog of theirs would 

extrapolate backwards at approximately the same 

rate as the monitored population that was 

monitored for the entire period. So that's the 

basis for (unintelligible) -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: So you have some priors. You have 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There was a -- there was a set of 

monitored -- there was a monitored cohort 
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identified, 100 and some-odd people who were 

monitored early -- from early in the '50s in -- 

well into the '60s and so they spanned that '61 

date. And that -- the -- their -- the behavior 

of their dose, as it declined over time, was the 

basis for the back extrapolation of the people 

who started monitoring in '61. 

 MR. GRIFFON: In the same area? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I mean I don't know where these 

people (unintelligible). 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: In Y-12. I know they're Y-12. 

 DR. BEHLING: I don't think they segregate on the 

basis of job description. There was 50 monitored 

workers, which assumably involved the most 

exposed population of workers. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Like I said, that seems to be the 

case that Y-12 attempted in the '50s to monitor 

the people that they thought would be more highly 

-- that seems to be what they were doing. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I just -- I think we'll leave 

it at that. I think it needs the discussion in 

the TBD. This likely would not affect this case, 

I tend to agree. But further the discussion in 

the TBD -- I mean the other thing to remember at 
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Y-12 was that all these people were at X-10 

hanging out and there was about one to cover the 

whole Y-12 facility for most of those early 

years. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's just a uranium plant. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know, I know. They had a 

plant with the californium and einsteinium at X10 there --

 MR. HINNEFELD: All the fun stuff at X-10. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's right. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Can we move on now since 

(unintelligible)? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I'll go back to tab 24. As 

I said, that's case number 012943. The 

individual worked in Y-12, K-25 and the X-10 

facility for a 21-year period and was diagnosed 

with prostate cancer in 2000. The dose 

calculated by NIOSH was 41.6 rem and the POC was 

31.45 percent. This -- we only have two findings 

on this particular case, and the first one I 

believe we've covered on previous cases, 

reoccurring problem with -- for the photon, you 

know, misinterpretation of the -- of the TIB-8 

and TIB-10 procedures and the improper assignment 
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of the uncertainty, so (unintelligible). And the 

second finding in this -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, you know, this uncertainty in 

this one -- I think you said the POC was 41 

percent (unintelligible) -- 41 percent, and you 

add in uncertainty on 8 rem or whatever you've 

got here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay, 31 percent is the POC on this 

one. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, 31 percent? Okay, so it still 

may not... 

 DR. BEHLING: And the -- actually, the 

uncertainty that was added to it shouldn't have 

been added. Therefore, the POC will come down. 

 MS. BEHLING: Come down. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: And the second and last finding in 

this case, here again it -- this speaks to using 

his professional judgment in the dose 

reconstruction reports. And something came to 

mind when we were talking about Mark's issue with 

the Y-12, it seems to me that when the dose 

reconstructor does use professional judgment to 

make certain assumptions or decisions, it would 

be nice if -- I assume he has to have some basis 
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for making that professional judgment. Once 

again, the dose reconstruction report would 

benefit from a little bit more explanation, as 

we've belabored on the first Y-12 case. In this 

particular case, the -- the dose reconstructor 

assigned an on-site ambient dose of 1 rem per 

year. And we went into each of the three 

Technical Basis Documents for the Y-12, K-25 and 

X-10 facilities. And for example, at the Y-12 

facility we calculated a median and a 95th 

percentile value for an annual dose of 55 

millirem with a 95th percentile of 335 millirem 

at that particular facility. So it just seems a 

bit excessive and inordinately conservative to 

use the 1 rem per year and it was -- I just could 

not understand what his basis was or -- or -- I 

think he stated in their professional judgment. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah, I think that's, again, early on 

when you -- all you had was a cursory review of 

data and you bound it based on the cursory 

review, and you wouldn't bound it very high. 

That's essentially all that (unintelligible). 

DR. ROESSLER: On this one you just got done -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: In the table there, there's a bold 
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under the occupational medical dose. In Table 1, 

is that -- is there any significance to that, on 

page 4? It doesn't appear to be as you read 

back. 

UNIDENTIFIED: What's the number? 

DR. ROESSLER: The number? Seven millirem, 

probably just a --

 MS. BEHLING: No significance other than -- to be 

pointed out? 

DR. ROESSLER: Okay. I was looking for something 

and didn't find it yet. 

 DR. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) --

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- on the issue of... Sometimes we 

deal with trivia and I noticed that in the TIB-6 

that involves the generic occupational medical 

exposures, we have certain (unintelligible) that 

are outside the primary field, especially in 

latter years when there was collimation and then 

everything else. We have doses that -- for 

certain tissues, each of them minus six or even 

seven rem --

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- and you get to the point of 

saying why are you saying that (unintelligible) 
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millirem because -- and my criticism is in -- in 

so many instances we try to impart a feeling we 

have, this level of precision that doesn't exist. 

And as I said, it's like saying well, your 

exposure was approximately (unintelligible) whole 

body, but you're -- based on the 

(unintelligible), we have to divide it by three 

and then you end up dividing about 10 by three 

and come up with 3.3333 to ad infinitum and you 

realize that -- that doesn't make it. The -- the 

limiting factor is the about 10 rem so if you 

divide by three, don't go beyond the first 

decimal point because it's a (unintelligible) 

precision that has no meaning. 

DR. ROESSLER: So if anything, this number should 

have been (unintelligible). 

 MS. BEHLING: I think what maybe we're talking 

about is that this issue of balancing precision 

against (unintelligible) as stated in the 

regulations. I'm surprised we get carried away 

here trying to calculate seven millirem. 

UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 

DR. ROESSLER: I'm going to have to leave for a 

few minutes. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I believe that's it for this 
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case unless there's any other questions. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We'll take a break. 

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 

 DR. BEHLING: We're at tab 25, which is the claim 

number 4567. The individual worked at Oak Ridge 

K-25 site and if we could go over with the 

background of this individual, this guy worked 

from October 22nd, 1953 to January 4th, 1954 and 

that represents a total of 11 weeks of -- of 

employment. The individual was diagnosed in the 

year 2001, which is now really about 47 years 

later, with a skin cancer. In behalf of this 

individual, a skin dose of 28.78 rem was 

calculated, which results in a POC value of about 

13 and a half percent. And if you look at Table 

1 on page 5, you look -- you see what the 

assigned dose is for. He was -- for external 

exposure he was given 3.3 rem for photons and 

another 3.3 rem for electrons, and also an 

occupational medical exposure of 10.5 rem, and 

also internal hypothetical exposures which also 

give him another 11.65. So we've got a total of 

28 -- really 29 rem of assigned dose to the skin 

for this individual. And let's just briefly go 

over. 
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As you can clearly see in context with 11 weeks, 

an assigned dose of almost 29 rem is obviously a 

very, very high dose. And in Table 2 we have the 

checklist where we identify what we considered 

were potential issues that we wanted to discuss, 

and there were a total of five of them. And so 

let's quickly go over them. This individual was 

not monitored. So again, this was 1954, very 

early on and he worked -- I assume he was a 

chemist working with uranium and he was not 

monitored, so now the question is what could have 

been his exposure. And for claimant 

favorability, the individual elected to assign 

what at that time was a regulatory limit. And he 

assigned it not just once, but twice. He 

assigned 300 millirem from external photon per 

week, plus an additional 300 millirem external to 

electron, meaning that he was given a total of 

600 millirem every week for the 11 weeks for 

which he was -- during which he was employed. 

And I looked at that and I sort of said the 

procedures allow you to do that. It is a default 

approach that is considered very claimantfavorable and, as stated here on page 9, the dose 

reconstruction based on administrative or 
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radiological monitoring (unintelligible) result 

in a gross overestimation of the claimant's dose. 

And I wasn't really sure to what extent we were 

basically excessively so, because one could 

conclude that a deep dose and a skin dose may 

very well represent two different types of 

radiation that could in essence be effective to a 

part. But then I also looked at the NBS guidance 

document, which was appropriate at the time, and 

they give you essentially a 300 millirem skin 

dose which in essence should have been a bind -- 

a bounding value. And so instead of giving the 

guy a total of 600 millirem, I think it would 

have been more than claimant-favorable by giving 

him only 300 because at the time it was in fact 

an NBS dose limit. And so again, we're being 

excessive here in giving him a -- an exposure 

dose limit, regulatory limit on two counts as 

opposed to one. 

The next one is the issue of assessing on-site 

ambient dose. No on-site ambient dose was 

estimated. Again, this is an area that could 

have been because on-site ambient dose is 

intended for those instances when a person is not 

monitored, which he clearly wasn't. So in spite 
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of this overwhelming claimant-favorable approach 

to assigning external exposure based on 

regulatory limits twice, which I consider is 

perhaps excessive, there was a deficiency when 

the person maybe should have been given a 

assigned ambient dose which is appropriate for a 

person who was not monitored. Those were the two 

issues on -- on -- under 2.2.1. 

The next one was occupational medical exposure, 

and that was clearly an issue here because this 

person was there for 11 weeks which bridged two 

years, 1953 and also 1954. And you could 

reasonably -- as an outside limit -- say well, he 

was given a chest x-ray on the day he took 

employment and maybe after the first of the year 

in 1954 where he only was there for four more 

days, he was yet given another medical 

occupational exposure of the chest x-ray. But 

nowhere can you come up with a dose of 5.265 rem 

for a chest X-ray. And so my concern here is 

that this dose of a total of 10.5 rem for medical 

occupational exposure is clearly a -- an error 

here that cannot be supported by any procedure or 

any documentation. And I guess my concern is 

that this should have been caught as part of an 
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in-house audit before this -- this document was 

released. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Did -- did they use the 

photofluoro or something? I can't imagine that 

dose unless there's a photofluoro. 

MR. ALLEN: It has to be to get that high. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean I cannot imagine where this 

dose comes from. 

MR. ALLEN: It says flat out what table it came 

from and I have to check that. I don't know the 

numbers off the top of my head, but I can go 

(unintelligible). 

 DR. BEHLING: He -- he lists the TIB-6 obviously 

as his reference, and clearly nowhere in TIB-6 do 

you come up with this kind of a dose. In fact, 

if you look at the actual skin cancer -- which 

turns out to be on the face -- which is on the 

anterior side and you realize, you know, two 

chest x-rays is possibly not even in the primary 

beam and is on the exit side of the body. 

Clearly, even if he had elected to use the skin 

dose, which would have been on the posterior or 

entrance side, that in itself would have been 

excessive but certainly claimant-favorable -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Yeah, for a cancer high up 
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on the face. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- and how you come up with 5.6 

some rem for each of the two exposures is 

something that, you know, is a glaring error here 

that should have really been caught by somebody 

since you don't get that kind of a dose from two 

X-rays. But anyway, so that was my concern here 

is that somebody didn't catch this one as part of 

the sign-off sheet. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's got to be a photofluoro 

assumption, but even then it's got to be right in 

the beam, too. 

 DR. BEHLING: I'll take a look at the DR report 

and see what he states, whether it's not a chest 

x-ray that he's making reference to. I don't 

know if I quote him. I think he -- he makes 

mention of a chest X-ray in the dose 

reconstruction report, so... 

 MS. BEHLING: I guess the other question that I 

have, the initial findings that Hans discussed, 

are you in agreement with our conclusions or -- 

you know, because in this particular case there's 

some -- this administrative -- this again opens 

up some question to me as to when should they use 

this administrative (unintelligible) -- 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the implementation guide 

says that you really should probably only use 

that for a period up to a year or less when you 

apply the control limit. And so with 11 months, 

that --

 DR. BEHLING: Actually it's 11 weeks is -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Eleven weeks. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So 11 weeks there, they would 

conform to the implementation guide -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- instruction on that. 

 DR. BEHLING: 300 millirem is --

 MR. HINNEFELD: It would be 300. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It wouldn't have been 600. 

 DR. BEHLING: 600 I'm sure is... 

 MS. BEHLING: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So I -- I think that's probably 

correct. I think that's -- that's -- you're 

right. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: But the approach for a short 

period of time like that, for a few weeks, 

applying the -- the radiation protection standard 

that was in effect at the time is -- is a method 
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that's described in the implementation guide. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean they were clearly claimantfavorable on every turn. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: The assigned dose, the -- the -- 

obviously I can't account for 10.5 rem for 

medical occupational. And then you've got 20 

radionuclides internal for a facility that 

doesn't have a reactor. So all in all, I mean 

this is --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- unbelievably excessive dose 

assigned to someone who may not have received 

much of any kind of dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Just a question on the 

implementation guide, though. Does -- would that 

apply to individuals -- say you had individuals -

- not this individual, but you had a case where 

you had missing weeks or months in those early 

years. Would you apply the administrative limit 

that would be --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it would -- it would be an 

option. 

 MR. GRIFFON: It would be an option. 
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 DR. BEHLING: Co-worker data would be another 

option. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There may be other options -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Or other options. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- depending upon that particular 

person. 

 DR. BEHLING: Maximum exposure for on-site for 

anybody -- you know, these are all options. 

Clearly this is the most extreme approach for 

filling in gaps using regulatory limits. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, for this case I would -- I 

would tend to agree with you. I'm not sure that 

that's always the case. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That's why -- that's why I raised 

that point. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. It -- it -- like I said 

there, it will either depend on, you know, the 

case and what else do you know about the person. 

And if it's a person who has some monitoring and 

then gaps in their monitoring record, it -- that 

-- it may be less likely to be used in that -- in 

that context than in the context like this where 
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the person just worked for a few weeks. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. The next one is the one that 

Mark had already raised the issue. It's the Iowa 

claim and you may want to go on records to 

stating we're not even going to discuss it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. I think that, based on the 

Secretary's recent recommendation or finding of 

Congress, that we won't be going through any Iowa 

dose reconstruction approaches. 

 DR. BEHLING: We're now on tab 26, which is case 

number 2668. And this involves a claim by a 

person who was employed at the Savannah River 

Site. And this person was there from early on in 

1953 through the end of 1986. This person was an 

operator/foreman/supervisor, so he held a number 

of different jobs over that period of time. He 

was diagnosed with colon cancer in 2001 which was 

obviously there for about 15 years after he 

terminated his employment. He worked in the 400-

D Area, as well as in 420-D facility. The dose 

reconstruction -- and I always look at this. 

Oftentimes they state up front whether or not 

they're going to maximize the dose based on 

obviously the type of cancer and potential 

exposures in order for making the process more 
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efficient. They will tell you up front that 

exposures were maximized as opposed to best 

estimate where obviously the potential exists 

that this person's exposure may bring him close 

to the 50 percentile probability value, in which 

case they tend to focus more on a best estimate 

as opposed to a maximized estimate. And so on 

the basis of that approach, they came up with a 

dose of about 23.6 rem to the colon, and that 

generated a POC value of 43.21 percent. 

When you look at table number 1 on page 5 of the 

review, you can kind of scan over the elements 

that gave rise to his exposure. He was -- he had 

a photon recorded dose and missed dose -- and 

we're going to discuss that briefly -- so it's 

both recorded and missed dose of about 7.3 rem. 

He also had an environmental dose, external 

photon, of about 1.3 and he was given a 

hypothetical internal exposure which, when you 

add the tritium and the alpha electron doses, you 

end up with another 14.3. So it's really -- I 

wouldn't say it's necessary (sic) a best 

estimate. Anytime I see hypothetical, I tend to 

say that this was also a combination of best 

estimate and perhaps for external, but not 
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necessary for internal whenever I see 

hypothetical, which is usually done for 

expediency and is oftentimes an overestimate of 

potential real exposure. 

But anyway, if you go to Table 2, which is our 

case review checklist, you'll see quite a few 

checkmarks on the first page. And some of these 

checkmarks have an asterisk on it, which on the 

bottom explains that NIOSH employed workbooks in 

lieu of procedures. And this perhaps is one of 

the principal reasons for these numerous 

checkmarks which you -- when you total them up, 

they were a total of 13. Was it really 13? One, 

two, three, four... Yeah, 13. And at this point 

I guess we'll go through them with the 

expectation that over the next few days we're 

going to have a look at the workbooks and perhaps 

resolve many of these checks. We only checked 

them because at the time when we did the audit we 

were not aware of the existence of workbooks -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- what they represented, to what 

extent they paralleled the intent of the 

procedures that they tend to replace and -- and 

so forth. So we may come back to this one and 
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resolve many of these concerns based on what 

we'll be hearing in the next few days regarding 

the use of workbooks and to what extent they 

follow and -- and make use of parameter values as 

defined in written procedures. So treat these 

checkmarks with a certain amount of -- of caution 

because they may very well change as a result of 

what we find out over the next few days. 

MR. ALLEN: And do you have access to the -- I'm 

not sure what files we've given you. Did we give 

you everything we've got? Or --

 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe they have -- yeah, 

everything in the analysis records, so I'm not 

sure -- on the disk we sent you. 

 MS. BEHLING: Well, in this particular case, what 

happened with this Savannah River Site case is, 

as Hans said, we sat down and we tried to 

reproduce all of the numbers. And we took the 

procedures and the TBD and we tried reproduce 

these numbers, tried to do the uncertainty, and 

we just couldn't get there. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: And we came to the conclusion that 

there must be some computer-generated -- and then 

I requested the workbooks and I was sent a CD -- 
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I'm trying to remember the date on that CD, I 

don't know -- of the DR tools that were being 

used for the cases that we were reviewing. 

 Now since then, in preparation for coming to this 

meeting and asking for a list of which workbooks 

we wanted training on, when I sent in that list I 

don't -- I think it was Dick Toohey may have sent 

back that not all of these -- not all of these 

workbooks are currently being used. And I guess 

that's going to be another question that we're 

going to be asking during this training session, 

which ones are in use; how do we know which ones 

are in use; how do we know which ones have been 

retired and no longer -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, that would be -- that would 

certainly be questions to ask over there. I 

think Dave's question though, was in -- on the 

administrative record there's a DR development 

folder. Have you ever looked -- in the DR 

development folder there's a work-- a 

spreadsheet. Is that where you're going on this? 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. I'm not sure what they're 

getting. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know whether you get that 

or not. 
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 MS. BEHLING: In -- yeah, we do get -- in some 

cases we get that. We do get that. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: To me, that --

MR. ALLEN: Should be a monster spreadsheet. 

 MS. BEHLING: It is a monster spreadsheet, super 

max. 

MR. ALLEN: That's the tool. 

 MS. BEHLING: Super max. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: My view of that, though, is just 

 MS. BEHLING: That's what it's called. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- seeing that spreadsheet 

doesn't -- is not very informative about what was 

done. 

 MS. BEHLING: Exactly. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: You know, you can see the 

spreadsheet. It doesn't really explain to you 

how those numbers came out, though. They may be 

on the spreadsheet someplace, but there's a lot 

of numbers on that spreadsheet that weren't -- 

MR. ALLEN: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- used in this dose 

reconstruction. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

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of that worksheet is very explanatory. 

MR. ALLEN: No, I just wanted to know if they had 

it and --

 MS. BEHLING: We do get them. 

MR. ALLEN: -- with some familiarization -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think with the training -- with 

the training in the next few days, you know, of 

the tools and how they go about that and what's 

being done by these workbooks, I think with that 

and the -- and checking DR development in these 

folders to make sure, you know, if there should 

be a worksheet in there. I think the combination 

of the two would -- would be explanatory for a 

lot of these. 

 MS. BEHLING: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: Normally as part of our audit I 

essentially check every single entry, which in 

this case would have amounted to 268 dose entries 

in the IREP. Given the fact, however, that I 

realized -- and that -- that clue came right away 

when I looked at the IREP input and I said for 

the column that's supposed to be recorded photon 

dose and missed dose, you see a myriad of entries 

that says okay, in one case it's normal, in other 
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ones --

 MS. BEHLING: It's lognormal. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- the lognormal. In some cases, 

it's a sigma value and other ones it's a 

geometric standard deviation. And I said this is 

a computer-driven code because no one could do 

this. And whenever you did have a GSD instead of 

the standard 1.52 value, it oscillated a little 

bit above, a little bit below, and you realized 

somebody obviously had the benefit of a computer 

program to generate that data that I couldn't 

reproduce. But nevertheless, I said well, are we 

in the ballpark. So in one instance I did -- I 

made a few spot checks rather than verify each 

one. And as you see on page 9, I looked at the 

assigned values, parameter values, that were 

selected. That is 50 percent at different 

energies -- 30 to 250 -- 50 percent greater than 

250. I used the colon DCF for each of the 

appropriate energies and -- and so forth, and I 

came up with values that you see on this page. 

And they turn out to be very, very close to the 

assigned value but not obviously on the money. 

The -- the problem here was also one of merging 

recorded dose with missed dose, which obviously 
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then left me in no-man's land to try and figure 

out how to do this. But as I said, my values 

based on spot checks clearly showed that we were 

in the ballpark and that the spreadsheet must be 

linked to the generic procedures that I would 

have used in the absence of spreadsheets. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Now, do -- I'm trying to follow 

the report. I'm going through it quickly. It 

looks like findings 1 through 5 at least, maybe 1 

through 8 --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- all relate to this -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, all relate because -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- particular topic, is that 

right? 

 DR. BEHLING: -- as you see in most -- it's, you 

know, I'm stating basically unclear if -- and 

this basically just leaves me in the situation 

where I can't reproduce (unintelligible) 

spreadsheet. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: It's too complex for me to 

reproduce on a manual level. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And so as I said, most of these 
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issues will probably fall by the wayside when we 

look at those. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: And so to say is this -- is this a 

-- a -- an appropriate facsimile of the generic 

procedures that one might use as a surrogate for 

the spreadsheet or workbooks. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Do you plan to like take 

this case later in the week? Could I suggest 

that maybe as you take it to the training -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- with -- with ORAU --

 MS. BEHLING: That's very good. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and then say okay, let's -- 

whatever tools were used on this case -- 

 MS. BEHLING: That's very good, and then -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- help us understand how this 

works. 

 MS. BEHLING: And then if --

 DR. BEHLING: As I said, if we end up with the 

same numbers they came up, well, then this gets 

all changed. All the checkmarks come off the 

table. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 
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MR. ALLEN: But you've evaluated and got roughly 

the same numbers that -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: So therefore if we couldn't -- if 

we couldn't account for the dose and we said it 

was unclear whether we could account for 

uncertainty in organ dose. That's why you see a 

series of three --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- in a row for the photon, the 

missed photon in vitro and so on. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: That's right. Yeah. I think --

I think it would be best if they -- if they were 

set up to go through like this exact case, and 

say -- maybe I'll call over there and see -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- if they are ready to do that. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. The summary of my findings 

are on page 12. If you look at Table 3, this is 

where I essentially compared SC&A manual values 

to NIOSH computer-generated values and you see -- 

for instance, I segregated my dose on the basis 

of recorded dose between 30 and 250 and missed 

dose between 30 and 250 and -- and so forth. And 
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you, on the other side, see NIOSH computer values 

which obviously are a combination, and you 

realize that they are very, very similar. Very, 

very similar. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

 DR. BEHLING: In other words, for instance, I -- 

you look at 0.204 rem versus 0.191 rem. Now if 

we're talking about less than -- well, we're 

talking 13 millirem difference. And so I know 

that I'm close. I just, you know -- and of 

course that may be due to the uncertainty that 

was assigned and so forth. So in doing this 

manually, which took me quite a long time to do, 

I was able to at least say we're in the ballpark. 

The workbooks obviously must be very close to 

what the generic procedures would dictate you do, 

and therefore I can walk away from a few spot 

checks and say the numbers are correct. But 

again, we only wanted to point out that the 

workbooks are something that we need to have 

access to so when we encounter this we can go and 

punch in the same numbers that these guys do and 

say okay, rather than spend two days trying to 

reproduce numbers here manually, we can -- we 

can sign off on this. 
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Okay. Yeah. Well, there's -- there's -- the 

next one is on-site ambient. And here's where I 

guess I made a few comments about the various 

options for on-site ambient doses. There are so 

many options and again, I'm looking back on Task 

3 that says okay, what are the procedures. Are 

they functional? Are they user-friendly? Are 

they consistent? Are they -- are they in a 

position where you can say we balanced precision 

against efficiency, meaning that let's not spend 

an inordinate amount of time for things that 

really don't matter significantly. And I sort of 

looked at the TBD in that light and looked at the 

options that are described in the TBD. And in 

the case of on-site ambient -- again, if you look 

at Table 4, you see the various ORAU-TBD-3 

procedures that allow you to calculate the onsite ambient dose as under option 1, and then 

under option 2, 3, and 4. And based on these 

different options and you compare that to the 

very bottom, it has NIOSH dose reconstruction 

report maximized where you see a parameter one 

input of 39 millirem as opposed to 58, 52, and 

65. And -- and again, I was not in a position to 

-- to reproduce these numbers. Again, the 
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question is, is it really worth all these efforts 

to come up with a dose that varies between 39 and 

52 or 58, especially when you realize the effort 

you have to go through in coming up with these 

values and the various tables you have to consult 

and so forth. The truth is, perhaps there should 

be -- like they have done in so many instances 

for others, like Hanford where you say where's 

the maximum annual dose for on-site ambient and 

we'll just generously put the guy always there 

every year regardless of where he may have 

worked. And the truth is, in most instances it's 

your real dose that doesn't require or -- or that 

shouldn't require a large investment of time. 

And that was my point here is that we have all 

these different options, and 50th percentile and 

95th percentile and GSD values. And for a guy 

who worked there for 15, 20 years in different 

locations, you can spend a lot of time chasing 

these numbers down and trying to enter them into 

IREP. And I question again, based on this 

regulatory requirement to balance precision 

against efficiency, is this efficiency? Or is 

this an awful lot of time spent in trying to 

calculate a dose that in the end contributes only 
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marginal. And I say this in context with the 

fact that when you get to the point where you 

give a hypothetical internal for 20 years, all of 

a sudden you're dealing with this huge dose that 

we know for a fact is not a real dose. And in 

one instance you're trying to be definitively 

accurate and chasing this guy from one location 

to the other and giving values of geometric 

standard deviations, and then in the next 

instance say, oh, what the hell, give him 28 

radionuclides for hypothetical and -- and -- and 

realize that that level of accuracy has just been 

tossed to -- to the winds. And that was the 

point here in going through that exercise. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: One of the other issues that I 

might raise here is it appears, once we found out 

about the workbooks and the spreadsheets, that 

they are starting to develop a lot of the 

spreadsheets I believe or workbooks for the onsite ambient environmental doses for sitespecific cases. So possibly this type of thing, 

after we get some training here, helps to 

eliminate all of these options that these -- that 

these people, the dose reconstructors, have at 
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this point in time. I don't know if that was 

their thinking in developing these workbooks. 

MR. ALLEN: The tools you're going to see -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: -- it includes ambient; it includes 

X-ray. And they have an option to basically 

maximize things or to go hardcore. Monte Carlo, 

if they hit that then it takes a little while to 

-- to grind through it all and it spits out an 

answer for them --

 MS. BEHLING: I see. 

MR. ALLEN: -- based on the tables in the TBD. 

It's going through all the methodology and that 

external implementation guide. And you're right, 

it's -- it's very tedious if you had to calculate 

it by hand, but that's why they've put in their -

-

 MS. BEHLING: They're starting --

MR. ALLEN: -- tool, to be able to do that. And 

like I said, you'll be seeing those tomorrow. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

MR. ALLEN: Tomorrow --

 MS. BEHLING: Tomorrow --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Starts tomorrow afternoon. 

 MS. BEHLING: Tomorrow afternoon. Yeah. Because 
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-- and not to trivialize the on-site ambient dose 

either, because I know in one of the Fernald 

cases that I did, Fernald in the early years, 

they've developed a spreadsheet that I, you know, 

picked up and could easily determine what they 

were doing. And I calculated for that particular 

case 9 rem of on-site ambient dose. So like I 

said, I think they are developing these workbooks 

and spreadsheets in order to -- to help the dose 

reconstructors. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. And -- and -- and I don't 

want to minimize on-site ambient. You look at 

Hanford site in the late '40s. They released, in 

some instances for early years, something in the 

order of one million curies of iodine-131, 

meaning that you would get both a whopping 

immersion dose external, and certainly a whopping 

thyroid dose from those. So I don't want to 

minimize the impact of on-site ambient. But in 

those instances where you fully understand that -

- you know, John Till's word that the exposures 

were very, very low, perhaps a time-saving thing 

would be to develop -- as they have in other 

facilities, saying where's the maximum dose for 

the 2000 hours or the 2600 hours a year and put 
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the guy there, which will be claimant-favorable 

and it usually doesn't amount that much to a 

dose. But it's claimant-favorable and certainly 

saves an awful lot of time. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: Occupational medical exposures, 

again, I looked at that. And I looked at the TBD 

for numbers, and I came up with values that are 

somewhat different. Again, extremely trivial in 

differences, but nevertheless they -- they differ 

to some extent. We're talking, you know, 

millirem quantities here. But again, it's just 

simply a number that I couldn't reproduce. 

MR. ALLEN: Some of these minor differences 

you're saying might be just the timing on when 

the --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: -- dose reconstruction was done and 

the revisions of the TBD? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. I mean the -- the 

occupational medical, you're talking very 

trivial, talking a few millirem. 

(Whereupon, Dr. Roessler returns to the 

discussion.) 

 MS. BEHLING: Although I will tell you, we do 
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look at when -- we try to look at when that dose 

reconstruction was done, and go back into the 

archives to get the right Rev. of the TBD -- if I 

could only do that. 

 DR. BEHLING: I'll tell you what, in some cases 

the dose reconstructor doesn't make the proper 

reference. He will, for instance, use a -- a 

reference -- for instance, what is it, the ORAUPROC triple --

 MS. BEHLING: No, it's -- it's either PROC 6 or 

it's --

 DR. BEHLING: -- 6, and they have attachments and 

the attachments came out subsequently. And he 

will give you the original issue date, and yet he 

will reference Attachment E. 

 MS. BEHLING: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And you realize you can't even go 

by that because Attachment E didn't exist back in 

the early version of the TBD. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: We talked about that during -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Or -- or the procedure, so again, 

you know, when you -- when you see all -- this is 

in compliance with Attachment E and you look at 

the reference and the issue date, and you use the 
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wrong date so --

 MS. BEHLING: And we talked about that for the 

first 20 cases, and it had to do with, as you 

say, and I think that Attachment E and F of the 

ORAU-PROC procedure that was Hanford-specific 

guidance --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- and they gave the wrong 

reference. But quite honestly, we now -- because 

-- as we've also belabored on the first set of 

20, because the dose reconstruction reports are 

not always very clear and they're not thorough 

enough, I do look at that initial date and don't 

always just base it on what the reference might 

be so that we're sure that we're using the 

documentation that he -- that he or she was 

using. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. It's -- it's clear obviously 

when you see a date completed, that if it predates the -- an amendment, that he couldn't have 

used it. So I will go back and actually use the 

ones that he would have had access to, because 

I'm not -- I'm not going to hold somebody 

accountable for a procedure that changed 

subsequently, you know -- 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- that's -- I just think it would 

not be fair to the dose reconstructor. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And I think we've changed the 

referencing practices since those first 20. Now 

they won't probably be reflected in any of the 

dose reconstructions that have been selected for 

review, but I think we have told -- you know, 

pointed out to them that when you're referencing 

something that has page changes, you've got to -- 

you've got to indicate that you're referencing 

the one with the page changes by date or by PC 

number or something. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and as --

 MR. HINNEFELD: We've told them that. 

 DR. BEHLING: As it indicates in our 

recommendation, sometimes the dose reconstructor 

will say "and in accordance with TBD" and they 

list the whole TBD and, you know, I mean this is 

like 200-some odd pages. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Two hundred pages, right. 

 DR. BEHLING: Wouldn't it be nice to tell me 

which -- which table you used? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Zero in a little bit? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Could be a tactic. 
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 DR. BEHLING: Especially for the neutron dose 

reconstruction at the Savannah River Site. It 

would be nice to tell me which table came -- you 

used for this thing. But, you know, they make 

you work for your living. 

Anyway, the last -- the next one's on page 16, 

but these are again issues that we've talked 

about before and now were brought up by Joyce 

Lipsztein when she first identified the issue of 

the organic tritium exposures, which we know is 

not likely to be significant based on the 

likelihood that at best a small portion of 

tritium exposures. And again, these are 

hypothetical on top of it. We're talking about 

tritium exposures that were not recorded based on 

5 microcuries per liter. But we deferred to -- 

to the review of the Savannah River TBD on this 

one, the issue involving the -- the potential 

exposures for organified tritium, which would 

give a -- perhaps up to a 2.3-fold higher dose 

based on a longer residence time in the body, et 

cetera and --

 MR. GRIFFON: Can I --

 DR. BEHLING: -- and the other issue -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- ask for clarification on that? 
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That's not listed in the matrix. 

 DR. BEHLING: No. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Those ones? And why is that? 

 MS. BEHLING: I should have done that. I'm 

sorry. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I know we've covered it in the 

past. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes, we have. 

 MR. GRIFFON: But it's still kind of an 

outstanding --

 MS. BEHLING: Yes, we have. 

 DR. BEHLING: It's an outstanding issue of the 

TBD. 

 MS. BEHLING: I'm sorry. Yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean if -- if we can all concur 

that organified tritium is such an insignificant 

fraction of total tritium, then that issue should 

be something that we can ignore. And the other 

issue was the ICRP 30 versus 68 issue. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, those two -- 

 DR. BEHLING: And, you know, in extreme 

conditions, as Joyce pointed out, that those can 

be higher. But in many other instances it's 

actually more favorable to apply the ICRP 30 
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data. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And so again, this is an issue that 

needs to be hacked out and resolved at a level 

that involves Task 3 as opposed to Task 4. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: But they should be included in the 

matrix. I apologize. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Can I -- for case 27 I have one 

other thing. I was going to raise those two but 

you covered them. Going back to the same theme 

here but with the Savannah River, I'm looking at 

this individual -- and it applies to the next 

case, too. They -- the monitoring for this 

person is very sporadic and I guess the 

assumption is that if they were monitored, they 

should have been monitored. If there was no 

data, they worked in an area where they weren't 

required to be monitored or -- am I to conclude 

that all these blanks are -- are they -- they 

didn't require monitoring? I mean I see cycle 

and then a -- cycle 7, sometimes cycle 2, 6, and 

9. I'm assuming that -- 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there's a time period at 

Savannah River when --

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm trying to understand what these 

records mean. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't remember the timing off 

the top of my head, or what years it was, but 

there was a period of time when this record 

didn't reflect zeroes, so those could be -- those 

could be like 00 readings. Like in this case, 

you know, you've got a 30 shallow so there -- 

it'll show a zero but -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- you won't see any 00 readings 

in these. There was a period of time when that's 

not evidence of not monitoring. That would -- 

that would be evidence actually of either not 

monitored or a 00 reading on that. And I don't 

remember the year --

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the exact year that Savannah 

River went (unintelligible). But it wouldn't be 

uncommon in this case to consider them as 00's 

for the dose reconstruction. 

MR. ALLEN: Right, and that's what they did in 

this particular guy. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and they used missed, right? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, they would have used a 

missed. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

MR. ALLEN: They assigned a zero every month 

except for June for 1981. 

MR. 

GRIFFON: June of 1981 -- 6/1981 would have been a 

10. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. For the deep. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Yeah, for the deep. 

MR. ALLEN: So they assigned him 11 zeroes and 

one 10 -- I think, yeah -- for recorded dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: So -- so it could have been a case 

where that he was wearing a badge all the time, 

but how do you know the difference, I guess is 

what I'm trying to get at, when you're -- when 

you're reviewing an individual case? How do you 

know? 

 DR. BEHLING: That's a good point. That's a 

problem. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I don't know that you know 

positively for sure --

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the difference. I don't know 

that you know positively for sure on this record. 

 MR. GRIFFON: For instance, whether a person -- 

MR. ALLEN: That's part of digging into sites and 

the site records and what they mean in different 

years and different records, and I think this one 

for Savannah River changed from one period to the 

next. At one point they recorded -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. There -- there is another 

-- certain periods of time when you look at this 

record, that are 00's in this record. I forget 

what the timing is. 

 DR. BEHLING: It's 1970 through '88 I believe. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: '70 through '88 is when they 

don't list the 00's. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So --

 MR. GRIFFON: Later, I think you're right. I 

think it was 00's. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think we would probably -- our 

approach on these would probably be that he was -

- he had a 00 reading on his badge. And if he 

didn't, if he was unmonitored during that period, 

given the Savannah River badging practices, we 

figure he was probably less exposed than somebody 
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who was monitored and had a zero. And so we'd be 

bounding his -- his exposure by figuring he was 

monitored and had zero. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. But that -- that presumes 

that the program is working a hundred percent 

accurately. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It presumes it works, yeah. 

Well, yeah. There's a certain presumption that 

they badged the people that needed to be badged 

at a particular time and in a particular 

population, 'cause for a construction worker, we 

wouldn't necessarily make that -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- draw that conclusion. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I understand it better. I -- I 

still -- I guess -- I know it's site-specific and 

I -- is it to some extent covered in the site 

profile document? Some of them seem to have -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Some of them -- I won't say they 

will all do a great job. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Some of them do and some of them 

don't. 

 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause it can be confus-- the 

reason I raised it is it can be confusing. And 
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also, you know, if -- if an individu-- you know, 

if an individual says that they -- especially if 

in the CATI interview they raise questions on, 

you know, concerns about their badges being 

accurate. I think then, you know, it raises that 

to a higher level where you owe it to them to 

investigate it further maybe, or something like 

that. 

 MS. BEHLING: I think in this particular issue, 

because of using these workbooks, it was 

difficult for us to pull out missed from 

recorded. 

 DR. BEHLING: Because they mixed them. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, they mixed them. 

MR. ALLEN: The final answer is all mixed 

together. 

 MS. BEHLING: Exactly, and so we couldn't 

determine --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I can -- I can look at, for 

instance, the -- the input to the IREP, you know, 

in Appendix A and the assigned recorded/missed 

doses start with entry number 201 and go all the 

way to 268. And you can look at these and 

realize obviously a computer program was used 

because you see a -- alternation between 
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lognormal, normal, lognormal distribution, and 

then you look at the -- the geometric standard 

deviation which oscillates about 1.52 and you 

realize that we're talking mostly missed dose 

here in most of these cases here and -- and this 

is how they arrived at their numbers. But it was 

very difficult for me to follow because of the 

fact that they blended these two. And you have 

to go through there and sort of say okay, what 

were the change-out cycles for that period of 

time and, on the assumption that it was purely 

missed dose, what should have been the value, et 

cetera, et cetera. And I did as much as I could 

without the benefit of the spreadsheet or 

workbook to -- to track this, and they looked 

okay. And I looked at the dosimetry record. 

 MR. GRIFFON: And I know what -- I know what 

you're saying too, that you're looking for things 

that don't look normal for certain time periods 

for certain sites, and yeah, if you've got some 

protocols in mind when you're going through 

these. I guess it would help us to see those in 

the site profile to some extent. I don't --

 DR. BEHLING: Well, there are a whole host of 

Savannah River Site procedures which are outside 
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of the site profile --

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- that are among the procedures we 

reviewed that -- strictly dedicated to Savannah 

River, including this period of time that I guess 

spans from around 1970 to 1988 where doses were 

not recorded because zeroes were not simply 

recorded, or -- or modest doses. Whatever they 

did, they did not record those dose values -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- that period of time. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. There's got to be some set 

of records at the site that show those zeroes 

somewhere, though. Right? I mean... 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know what to tell you 

about Savannah River. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess part of what I'm 

looking at is the validation, and it probably 

doesn't have to be done on each case, but if you 

had data that you can -- that says -- that says 

to the public that this final database from 

Savannah River is accurate; We checked it, we did 

some -- we did some --

MR. ALLEN: Validation of data --

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm not -- I'm not talk -- I know 
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Jim Neton --

MR. ALLEN: I really don't know. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- sometimes accuses me of -- 

MR. ALLEN: I understand what you're saying. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm not talking a hundred percent. 

I'm saying do some random sampling and take a 

case back and say okay, for this individual it 

says cycle 12, 15 millirem, but actually we -- we 

went back and found (unintelligible) -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Try to look at all those other 

cycles. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- records, and he had zeroes for 

all the other cycles. 

MR. ALLEN: (Unintelligible) the records are in 

there. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Well, I don't -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: I think those are. I don't know. 

I didn't -- this is the first I'm scanning this 

case so, you know, but... 

MR. ALLEN: I can't recall every site because 

they're all so different but -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I know. 

MR. ALLEN: That looks like a summary for that 

guy he's underlined there. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Yeah. 
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MR. ALLEN: I think that's -- Okay. That's for 

the year, nothing for the quarter there. Yeah, 

so that might be --

 MR. GRIFFON: That sort of does show the zero 

there. You're right. Yeah. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There's some things that -- I 

don't know what every site retained in terms of 

individual dosimeter results. It could be that -

-

MR. ALLEN: Some are obviously better than 

others. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: They accumulated them in the 

quarterly reports and may not -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess something -- something to 

say, you know, this was the protocol for certain 

time periods at Savannah River and we validated 

that was in fact practiced -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: By looking at original record -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Exactly. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- like film badge -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: A sampling. A sampling of original 

records, you know. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't -- I don't know. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't -- I don't know that 

every site would have a -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: No, I know. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- a record --

 MR. GRIFFON: You're not going to always be able 

to do it. Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- you can go back to the 

original record and do that. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm saying to the extent possible, 

I think that -- you know, again, that charge of -

- or the concern of the public of well, you're 

just using DOE's records again. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, and they were lying through 

their teeth the whole time. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, they're all DOE's records, 

but if we can go back beyond the database, maybe 

that -- that gives a -- you know, you -- you made 

attempts to validate. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, I --

 MR. GRIFFON: That's --

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know what's -- I guess 

I'm not -- I don't know what's been done or -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And the only other comment -
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- this is a general comment again, not 

necessarily in this particular case because I 

think the POC was pretty -- pretty low. But the 

-- the question of whether you cross-walked -- 

sort of cross-walked the work history with those 

records to say okay, he, you know, he -- he was 

taken on and off of monitoring. I mean here they 

could have been zeroes, but say a person was 

taken on and off of monitoring -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- does it make sense, given his 

work history --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, that -- that -- actually at 

Savannah River there is an opportunity to do some 

of that --

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- because if they've got a 

bioassay record, you've got an indication of 

where they were when they left the bioassay 

sample on the bioassay card. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And there are certain level 

locations, like in the heavy water facility which 

is in the 400 area --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: -- at Savannah River, they didn't 

require monitoring --

 MR. GRIFFON: And it was --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- for the longest time. 

 MR. GRIFFON: So then you could say, you know, we 

assigned missed dose. Even though there was no 

record, we assigned missed dose and this seems 

consistent with the person's work history, that 

they probably weren't in those areas requiring 

monitoring --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- or something to that --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: The next one is tab 28. It's claim 

number 6257 for the Savannah River Site. And 

this individual worked at the Savannah River Site 

from August '78 to October 1995. The individual 

was diagnosed with skin cancers, basal cell 

carcinomas, on four separate occasions in -- 

basically in sets of two. The first two skin 

cancers were found on the right side of the neck, 

and they were diagnosed in '95. And the second 

skin cancer in the upper right back was diagnosed 

a few days later on March 17th, '95. So you have 
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two sets of skin cancers, in essence a few days 

apart. And then two additional cancers were 

identified in June of 2001 on the middle of the 

back and the final, fourth skin cancer is on the 

left side of the neck. So you had a total of 

four cancers. The first two coincided in time 

and the second two coincided in time, so you can 

basically view them as two -- two types of 

cancers. 

He worked as a pipe fitter, and again NIOSH 

states that this dose reconstruction was 

performed using best estimates. For skin dose 

exposures NIOSH divides it again for the first 

two and the second two. So what you have -- 

well, I'll get to that in a second. But for the 

assigned dose of -- what do we have here, about 

11 -- between 11.6 and 11.9 rem to the skin, a 

POC value of 43.87 percent. So we're -- we're at 

the threshold of compensation, at least according 

to the POC. 

If you look at the Table 1 on page 5 of the 

report you see that appendix --you have two 

appendices, Appendix A-1, and Appendix A-2, and 

they each correspond to the first two sets of 

skin cancer and the second two skin cancers as 
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appendix A-2. So you have two different sets. 

Now, obviously the two will share the kind of 

exposure up until the time of the first 

diagnosis, and of course, the second two skin 

cancer will have additional exposure beyond the 

diagnosis of the first two, and that's why 

they're different. And you can look down the 

list here and see where did the doses come from. 

Obviously there was a -- again, a combination of 

photon dose for photon energies, 30-250, greater 

than 250 plus electron dose and missed dose, and 

they were all thrown into a single bucket. And 

so again it made the audit of this whole dose 

reconstruction quite complicated. But you see 

that for photon/electron recorded and missed 

dose, you have about a total of 6 rem assigned. 

And then you have some additional occupational 

medical and some environmental dose, and you have 

internal assigned doses from tritium and other 

radionuclides that collectively contribute to the 

dose of about 11 to 12 rem for -- for different 

cancers. 

When you go to Table 2 on page 7, again you see 

what we already discussed in a previous case, a 

lot of checkmarks with an asterisk that 
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identifies the issue of the workbooks which we 

already said may resolve itself in the next day 

or so. Again, based on our inability to really 

follow each of the numbers based on the fact that 

we had a very complex dose reconstruction 

procedure that was broken up by photon energies 

plus electrons and recorded dose with missed 

dose, we had a very difficult time in really 

understanding how each of the various numbers 

came to be. Nevertheless, we -- we had some 

comments. 

As you can see, on page 9 where we describe the 

recorded photon/electron doses, how it was 

defined in the DR. They segregated it on the 

basis of 30 to 250 keV photons and greater than 

250, plus the greater than (unintelligible) keV 

electrons. And I guess one of the things that -- 

I hoped to touch on this earlier with Dr. 

Roessler on the issue of is it really that 

critical to segregate for IREP these different 

energies. Does it really have a purpose. Can --

can this even be justified based on relative 

effectiveness factor that is defined by different 

photon energies versus electron. I don't really 

have the answer. I know that David Coker had 
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presented something to the Board some time ago 

where he obviously showed some scientific basis 

for making that, but I haven't seen it so I've 

have to say this really complicates dose 

reconstruction when you have to go through each 

of these segregations, especially for skin 

cancers where you have to deal with a low energy 

photon and electron dose, et cetera, et cetera. 

And if you track a guy like this over a period of 

years for our facility, you can get yourself 

bogged down very quickly into a complex dose 

reconstruction protocol, to say the least. 

And of course, then comes the issue of the 

anterior, the DR further reports -- I'm reading 

on page 9 -- the DR report further states that 

for external exposure 100 percent anteriorposterior. And again, I'm looking at that and 

saying well, if you have a skin cancer on the 

back -- side and back of your neck, is it really 

even reasonable to assume an electron dose can be 

half of an anterior-posterior geometry? Now I 

know it's claimant-favorable because the DCF 

tells you it's claimant-favorable, but it sure 

doesn't make much sense from a scientific point 

of view to talk about an electron dose when the 
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exposure geometries assume anterior-posterior. 

And we're talking about a skin cancer on a guy's 

back, and -- and simple first principles tell you 

that photon energies less than 30 keV invaders 

will never get there. 

So anyway, I make a couple comments here that, 

you know, it's just me talking as a scientist as 

opposed to saying what is more claimant-favorable 

in our assumptions. But really, you know, there 

are some issues here that I just discussed here 

that may or may not be resolved based on the fact 

of claimant-favorability and simplicity we'll say 

you have to make a decision about exposure 

geometry. In this case AP geometry was selected. 

But I do also want to make a comment about that 

because the appendix B is wrong in some of the 

DCF values because, especially for skin, they 

will give you skin values that assume that the 

dosimeter was not on the -- on the chest. I mean 

ultimately we always have to convert, especially 

for recorded dose, what the dosimeter recorded. 

And when it's worn on the chest you can make an 

assumption about the DCF, make an assumption that 

the dosimeter was in fact on the back side, which 

is frequently the case for -- and I made that 
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comment in my Task 3 report. The DCF values for 

PA geometry exposures are wrong, and so are those 

for -- for rotational isotropy because they're 

based on assumptions that do not hold. 

Operational health physics tells you when you 

hand a guy a TLD, he wears it right here and -- 

and therefore the DCFs, as they are defined in 

appendix B as well as in -- in procedure number 

6, are wrong. 

Again, I -- I made some attempts to calculate it, 

and on page 12 and 13 I -- I talk about what I 

would have calculated. And again, my 

calculations suggest that I would have arrived at 

a dose of 4.045 rem and the dose that were 

recorded here were 3.583, and in the paragraph 

that follows, about 3.5, 3.6 rem versus 4, we're 

talking about 500 millirem as a difference. 

Again, it's something that the workbooks probably 

would account for, but I couldn't when I did it 

manually on a spot check basis. I guess the -- 

the findings on page 13 are obviously issues that 

I already touched upon, the assumption of a skin 

dose and AP geometry that simply doesn't make 

much sense when you talk about the different 

locations for the four skin cancers. You could 
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spend a good number of hours on this one. 

MR. ALLEN: It looks that way. 

 MS. BEHLING: Is the issue of why --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. On -- on page 14 I found an 

inconsistency here that -- under statement two 

for external doses that include recorded missed 

dose, I take it that right there for the cancer 

that was diagnosed in 1995, this included an 

external photon dose of 3.231 rem and external 

electron dose of 4 -- and so for -- and then I 

compare that to the year 2001 and you realize 

that's impossible where you can have a larger 

dose of let's say the 4.285 versus the 4.262 for 

the year 2000, realizing there were an additional 

six years of exposure from internal that would 

have obviously had more dose. So it's a 

theoretical impossibility. I don't know how that 

came to be. 

MR. ALLEN: I don't think those doses you're 

quoting include the internal, do they? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think they do. Yeah, yeah. 

Yeah, the internal dose here is 4. -- in fact, 

those two numbers are highlighted, the 4.285 and 

-- and the 4.091, so forth -- and I -- yeah, the 

doses -- it's -- you know, again, it's trivial 
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when you talk about a few millirems, but it's 

just something that doesn't seem to make 

scientific sense where you have a higher dose for 

a shorter exposure period for the first two as 

opposed to the second two with the identical 

assumptions. 

 MS. BEHLING: Again, I think that's computergenerated --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it's probably --

 MS. BEHLING: -- numbers that --

 DR. BEHLING: This may be a statistical error 

when you cycle through the -- the Monte Carlo, 

that may be, you know, the reason. I don't know. 

But it's quite trivial. 

MR. ALLEN: I haven't had a chance to dig into 

deep yet, but there -- it could be a random 

number. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. It could be a random number 

since we were doing, you know, you're doing a 

Monte Carlo. 

MR. ALLEN: It could also be an entry error. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. One of the things that I've 

always felt when we have -- when you use the -- 

the -- I'm on page 15. I'm talking about the -- 

the ORAU-PROC 6 as well as the appendix B in the 
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implementation guide. When you have a DCF for 

skin, they give it to you for an HP-10 dose and 

your kerma dose or air exposure dose and so 

forth, but when you have an HP-10 dose, you 

should really not have to deal with a skin dose 

because invariably you also have a shallow dose, 

and shouldn't that be your -- your dose and 

ignore the whole concept of a DCF. I -- I can't 

-- I can't really grasp the concept of an HP-10 

dose with a DCF to give you a skin dose when in 

fact you should have really a 7 millirem dose 

that defines the dose to the skin. 

MR. ALLEN: I'm trying to think of a situation. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Certainly at the time when the 

site was recording HP-10 they were also recording 

HP-07. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So at that point you wouldn't 

need them to have a DCF on an HP-10 number. 

There are cases when we've made adjustments in 

the recorded values at a site to say that if you 

make this adjustment, you can treat the doses as 

HP-10. That's about 1.19 at Savannah River and 

these are other periods that -- at Hanford when 

we made that kind of an adjustment on the 
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recorded dose and (unintelligible) recorded dose 

as HP-10, the deep dose as HP-10, when they may 

not have been recording an HP-07, they may have 

recorded in some other fashion. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So it's -- it's really -- 

 DR. BEHLING: I don't have the (unintelligible) 

facts of it --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Because of the weight factor, I 

didn't bring mine. But if you have the appendix 

B on the skin, I don't know if the DCF for -- 

let's say greater than 250 or 30 to 250, what the 

DCF values are for skin for HP-10. Is it greater 

than -- is it 1? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's usually less than 1. 

 MS. BEHLING: It's less than 1. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. And this is what -- what 

conflicts here. Obviously there's no theoretical 

way that a deep dose at a -- at a 10 millimeter 

depth should be anything less than -- than would 

-- that the skin dose should be less than what it 

is at 10 millimeters. So I'm -- I'm sort of 

looking at these numbers, whether it's the AP or 

PA geometry and I'm looking at a organ -- a skin 
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dose, HP-10, for -- for 30 to 250 keV of 0.677 

for the AP geometry and 0.674 for the PA geometry 

and so forth -- and to me it doesn't make any 

sense. I mean you have as a minimum, depending -

- I mean not depending. Obviously you will have 

some attenuation in your first centimeter of 

tissue that records this as a dose. Wouldn't you 

expect by a default a -- a 7 millirem dose would 

be greater and therefore the DCF should be at 

least 1 or possibly slightly greater than 1. I 

can't think of why a DCF that is recorded on my 

badge, and let's say my badge records exactly and 

I'm at the AP geometry, I'm facing the source, 

and it records 1 rem, HP-10. What should be my 

skin dose? My skin dose should be greater than -

- than 1 rem. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: The basis would be that if the 

attenuation from the skin to 1 centimeter is 

small, is very small, that it would be the energy 

deposition rate from -- from -- as you go from 

the air into the skin, and you have to build up 

in the energy deposition as you go into the skin. 

So --

 DR. BEHLING: I would say --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- that would be the basis. 
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 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. What we're talking about 

here is -- is electron equilibrium. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Electron equilibrium, and 

it's -- rapidly rises and it's based on the mean 

free path of an electron that you generate. And 

for 30 to 250 keV, you're talking about an 

electron mean free path length that is microns. 

It's very short. And so you would have a rapid 

build-up, which at the point of 7 millirem 

probably has reached electron equilibrium. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: If that's the case, then there is 

none. I think this came out of the standard 

reference --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and I have to go find -- 

 DR. BEHLING: I suspect all these DCFs are in 

error. For one, you know, I have a difficult in 

understanding why AP and PA are identical. In 

fact, you can see the same thing happened -- if 

you look at an eye dose -- one could certainly 

argue the point in saying well, maybe these take 

an average value since obviously skin is on the 

anterior side and the posterior side and 

everywhere in between. On the other hand, if you 
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look at for instance the eye dose or thyroid dose 

and -- and you look at the DCF value depending on 

AP and PA geometry, you know, realizing that the 

eyes are the exit side for photons that are 

coming from the posterior and the same thing with 

the thyroid, and so you have to look at those 

numbers and say these things don't make sense. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and for some reason or 

another ICRP must have assumed that you're 

wearing dosimeters front and back. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Let -- let -- we'll have 

to look into the whole appendix B -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- thing then. I mean that's 

kind of a procedure of your task, sort of -- 

finding. I mean rather than being specific to 

this dose reconstruction, it would be kind of 

part of your task -- which task is that? 

 MS. BEHLING: Three. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Three. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I mean I can clearly look at 

the less than 30 keV and say the DCF -- it 

doesn't matter whether it's AP or PA -- is 1.8 

versus -- you know, they're essentially the same. 
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And there has to be something wrong here with -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. That has to presume that 

the dosimeter is facing the beams. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. I think they make some 

generic assumptions in ICRP that invalidates the 

fact that people monitored always wore their TLD 

up front. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. And that is the dose of 

record, and you're trying to convert that HP-10 

dose into a deep dose. And so for instance, I 

would say this. How could you have anything less 

than unity if for instance you're measuring let's 

say a dose to the lung and it's a PA geometry. 

What you're measuring is an exit dose. This TLD 

-- this is my TLD and the source is behind me. 

You're measuring an exit dose which means that 

the tissue that precedes this, my lungs or 

anything else, is getting more than what the exit 

dose is that my TLD is receiving. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: So by -- by simple first 

principles, you can conclude that these DCFs are 

wrong. They should always be higher than unity, 

especially for PA geometry. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: For PA geometry. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. And -- and don't forget, 

these TLDs and films, they actually even had not 

-- it's not even an exit dose. They had 1000 

millirem filter on the back side. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, back side too. Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: So -- so you can look at these and 

conclude that the DCFs are based on something 

that is -- doesn't apply to the world of 

individual personal monitoring and what the dose 

of record really would suggest. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Well, certainly something 

we need to carry into our -- 

 DR. BEHLING: And I pointed that out under Task 

3. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's in Task 3, yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: I've looked at the DCFs and said 

there's something wrong here with the 

assumptions. The DCFs do not -- do not comply 

with what you understand based on -- on the 

dosimeter position and the monitoring practices. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: All right. Well, let's break 

real quick since lunch is here. 

DR. ROESSLER: Can I ask a question on this case 

before we -- two questions actually, and they're 
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kind of general, not so much specific to the 

conversation today. But Hans and Kathy, on this 

particular case -- it seems like one of the more 

complicated ones. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: And I'm wondering what input you 

got when you did the conference call. You had 

Henry Anderson and Bob Presley involved. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: Now Henry, being a physician, I 

would think would have maybe some input on the 

basal cell cancer situation. Did you get much 

feedback --

 DR. BEHLING: No. 

DR. ROESSLER: -- from them? 

 DR. BEHLING: No, not really. And I fully 

understand he's a physician but this is really a 

dosimetry issue. 

DR. ROESSLER: What you're bringing up is 

dosimetry. What I want to bring up is more of a 

clinical thing, and this I'll mention to Stu. 

Every time I look at one of these basal cell 

cancers, I keep thinking of suntanning, fishing 

and stuff. When -- and in the lung cancers, 

there's a provision for taking into consideration 
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smoking. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

DR. ROESSLER: That's not true, I would say, on 

the basal cell cancers. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

DR. ROESSLER: There's nothing. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There is no other lifestyle -- 

DR. ROESSLER: You just assume --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- adjustment made in IREP. 

 DR. BEHLING: And clearly, I mean I come from --

our current location is North Carolina and we 

have farmers. And whenever I go to my barber 

shop I deal with the locals sitting in the barber 

shop and listening to conversations. I'm 

awaiting my -- my hair -- my turn for a haircut, 

and the subject invariably turns to old people 

and their health problems. And I can't tell you 

how many people complain about oh, he was 

diagnosed with melanoma. He died from melanoma. 

And these farmers, they all get cancer because 

they spend their whole lifetime outside in -- in 

the environment. 

DR. ROESSLER: Or people who fish a lot. 

 DR. BEHLING: And of course, you know, the POC 

has to obviously be driven by baseline cancers as 
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a competing variable. In other words what is it. 

Is it more likely to be radiation as opposed to 

all other factors, including sunlight. And so --

DR. ROESSLER: Uh-huh, but that's not taken into 

consideration. 

 DR. BEHLING: And so it's not likely to be taken 

into consideration. 

DR. ROESSLER: Okay. Those are my questions. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean skin cancers are so 

prevalent in the South. 

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:35 

p.m. to 1:15 p.m.) 

 (Whereupon, Dr. Makhijani was unavailable for the 

remainder of the day.) 

 DR. BEHLING: We're back to the -- with tab 28, 

and I'm just briefly going over it. As I said, 

there's so -- this is so complex and we can't 

really deal with all of the issues. But with 

regard to missed external electron and photon 

doses, I just did a couple calculations, and they 

are on page 19 where you see, for instance, my 

estimates there. And I calculated the doses for 

two years, for 1979 and for 1990, and I came up 

with for -- for 1979, a dose of 90 millirem and 

for 1990, 30 millirem. And when you compare that 
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to those in the table below, you realize I'm 

considerably lower than what the assigned dose 

is. So again, the errors here, if there are any 

-- and I'm not saying there are because of the 

workbooks -- they would probably, at least based 

on my preliminary investigation, be on -- on the 

side of the claimant, being higher than I would 

have calculated them manually. 

And as I said, I think what we can do is, if you 

show us a workbook maybe we'll run one of these 

two cases just to see what we come up. And if in 

the process we realize what he did is in 

compliance with the workbook and the workbooks 

are compliant, then these -- these two cases in 

particular, the Savannah River cases, will all be 

modified to reflect our new understanding of what 

the workbooks really have you do and how these 

doses are calculated. 

I think with regard to on-site ambient dose, 

which starts on page 20, again, we end up with a 

similar situation that we talked about in the 

previous case where there are so many options for 

you to choose from and -- and TBD 3, which is the 

Savannah River TBD, I have option 1, 2, 3, and 4, 

and I followed their procedure and then compared 
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it with NIOSH dose reconstruction. Again, that's 

on -- in Table 3 on page 22. And you see they're 

all very close, depending on which option. I 

have 65 millirem, 52, another one is 52, and 45 

and so forth. And of course, the NIOSH report 

was 43. But none of them match exactly, but 

they're all obviously very close and I still 

question whether or not all these different 

options that are available are really worth the 

time to pursue based on these trivial 

differences. 

Going on to occupational medical exposure, 

nothing on this exactly match those numbers. On 

page 23 we talk about audit of internal doses, 

and again we talk about here the two issues that 

are really task 1 issues, and that's the issue of 

organified tritium versus ICRP 30 and 68. And 

we've already discussed those issues and stated 

that they -- they really belong under task 1. 

So there were quite a few things that -- that we 

could have spent probably hours on discussing 

that I would just as soon defer to looking at a 

workbook and -- and maybe we can clear these two 

-- two dose reconstructions up once 

(unintelligible) --
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 MR. HINNEFELD: We could conceivably get an 

opportunity on Friday after you've gone -- you 

know, to chat one last time and see how we feel 

like we're standing on these, or we could do it 

on the phone after this week, as well, so... 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. As I said, most of the 

things -- as you see, they're not just one 

finding, two findings. There are a whole bunch 

and it's all because they're locked into each 

other. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And once we solve one, this domino 

effect falls by the wayside. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: But just as a -- as a technical and 

as a side issue, I think the way we're going to 

handle the reports from here on in -- and Mark, 

you can correct me if I'm wrong -- but when we do 

have a finding, because this is now going to be a 

trackable issue and something that we're going to 

-- we're tracking through our checklist and 

tracking through the matrix, when we go back to 

revise the -- our write-up, we'll put there in an 

issue, this was resolved. It won't -- it's not 

like the finding will go away. It will just be -
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-

 MR. GRIFFON: Don't just delete it. Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- a resolved issue. Exactly. So 

we can follow the -- the sequence of events. 

 MR. GRIFFON: We worked with NIOSH on workbook 

analysis and --

 MS. BEHLING: Exactly. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- this issue is resolved. 

 MS. BEHLING: Exactly. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. The next case is case 10,732 

which is also a Savannah River Site case. For 

quick review, this individual worked from 

September 1984 to May of '93, so a period of 

about ten years. But it was not continuous 

employment; in fact right below on page 4, you 

see the periods of employment. So there were a 

total of six discrete employment periods over 

that ten-year time frame. In fact when you add 

those time frames up, instead of ten years they 

only correspond to about 21 months in total of 

employment. 

This individual was an iron worker and he died of 

lung cancer in -- no, he was diagnosed with lung 

cancer in 2002. I'm not sure if he's a survivor. 

I should look at the CATI report to see if he was 
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the one giving the interview. This person was 

monitored on a monthly basis for external 

exposure. There were in his file a number of 

bioassays, in vitro bioassays, urinalysis for 

tritium, strontium, fission products, plutonium, 

as well as he had some whole-body counts. Based 

on the assigned dose of 16 rem, this individual 

was given a POC of just under 19 percent for his 

lung cancer. 

Page 5 of the report is Table 1, which gives you 

a quick summary. Again, recorded photon dose was 

very nominal. He had around -- a recorded dose 

of 282 millirem as a recorded photon dose. He 

had occupational medical exposure that was very 

comparable, 279 millirem, and assignment of 

external environmental dose of 545. But the 

single largest exposure to the 16 rem whole-body 

dose -- or organ dose assigned to him comes from 

hypothetical exposures from tritium, alpha, and 

electron, as you see in the bottom. So if you 

add those up, it's about 14.7 rem for -- for 

assigned internal dose, which is the overwhelming 

component of the total assigned dose of 16. So 

he had very little external, and most of his 

assigned dose was really internal. 
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Table 2 on page 7 has some of the things that we 

identified as findings. In total there were five 

findings. Again, they're all very low impact and 

affect the doses only in a very marginal sense. 

And let me just briefly go over those. 

The first finding is on page 9, which is finding 

number 29.1-C.4.1, failed to include recorded 

photon dose uncertainty. We've already discussed 

that this morning, and again, it's a decision on 

the part of the dose reconstructor saying I don't 

know how to this probably, or it's not worth the 

time. And again, like I said, it would have 

probably been a very trivial amount given the 

fact that the recorded photon dose was less than 

300 millirem. So any uncertainty associated with 

that, would have been trivial. And again, in 

context of the overall assigned dose of 16, which 

would have probably contributed very little to 

that since most of that 16 rem dose was due to 

hypothetical internalized exposures assigned to 

them. 

The next finding is on page 10. It's finding 

29.2-C.2.3, incorrect occupational medical dose. 

Again, the doses here are very marginal. I was 

not able to produce the assigned medical dose, 
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but these values are just slightly different from 

the ones that were assigned. In other words, 

this -- this time around we would have added 157 

millirem to his dose had he assigned the doses 

that I think he should have, based on the lung 

dose and values identified in TIB-6. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Were there other numbers in the 

Savannah River Technical Basis Document, 

different numbers? Or did you -- do you recall -

-

 DR. BEHLING: I -- I -- he references TIB-6. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: TIB-6. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and so I used that. I can't 

tell you, Stu, whether or not if the, you know, 

the section on the TBD for Savannah River would 

have given -- I'm not sure whether they used 

group 1, 2, 3 categories in the -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Savannah, I think they have the 

option to do that. I'm not sure. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I -- I can't tell you, but 

if I recall the dose reconstruction -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: But he referenced TIB-6. 

 DR. BEHLING: Referenced TIB-6. So, you know, 

they always reference Table 4.0-1 and then you 

have the option of tracking the time periods in 
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question and you take the organ dose. Based on 

that, I would have assigned 157 millirem in 

addition to the ones he did assign. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: Oh, I -- I believe -- yeah, he used 

a gender factor, as I did in the next one, error 

in converting occupational medical dose to organ 

dose. It appears that the error involves the use 

of a lung dose for a specific gender when in fact 

the claimant is of the opposite gender. I try 

not to use -- unless of course it's prostate 

cancer, I try not to identify the person's 

gender. But, you know, when you have breast 

cancer or prostate cancer you usually have to 

obviously acknowledge the fact that we know what 

the gender is (unintelligible) -- 

DR. ROESSLER: I have a comment on that one. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: And without specifying the gender, 

it seems like this particular -- this is an 

example that fits in that same case of when you 

use the efficiency process and trying to be 

claimant-friendly that there's some things that 

you should really use the realistic situation, 

like the 12 radionuclides instead of 28 is one. 
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Here's another one. If the gender is a certain 

gender, and you use the opposite gender because 

it's more claimant-friendly, that doesn't make 

sense. This is kind of a trivial one but I think 

it fits in that same category of -- of, you know, 

in the future it should be claimant-friendly but 

not beyond the bounds of being ridiculous. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

DR. ROESSLER: And this -- this is one -- one 

case of it I think. 

 MS. BEHLING: Good scientific -- yeah, 

scientifically sound. 

DR. ROESSLER: Use the reality --

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: -- when it -- when it's there. 

 DR. BEHLING: There were a number of findings 

involving environmental external dose. Again, if 

you look at the actual tables that are defined in 

the TBD for the H-Area, that's Table C-13, they 

end up with a number that I couldn't match. 

Yeah, in this case they failed to include the onsite ambient dose uncertainty which is contained 

in that table -- and the issue of argon 41 as a 

potential contributor. But like I said, these 

are likely to have added very few -- few amounts 
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of additional exposure, either the uncertainty or 

the inclusion of argon 41. And again, based on 

the fact that the internal exposures were fairly 

high and probably well in excess of what he -- 

what the individual really experienced, in -- all 

in all it would not have made a significant 

difference to dose to have included uncertainty 

and the contribution of argon 41 as part of onsite ambient. 

 Again, very trivial issues here, the missed dose 

from tritium here for entry number 40. I have to 

tell you, I have to re-read some of it myself 

because I can't commit everything to memory. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I don't see anything about missed 

dose from tritium in your -- 

DR. ROESSLER: Page 14. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- matrix, on your matrix. I'm 

looking on the matrix. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. I'm looking at that myself. 

MR. 

GRIFFON: I'm trying to make -- oh, no. This --

this -- I don't know if you have this, Gen. 

DR. ROESSLER: Oh, no. I don't have that. I 

have just this one. 

 MS. BEHLING: I e-mailed it. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, it's -- you got it on e-mail, 

but you don't -- yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: We're talking here 3 millirem. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah, that missed dose anyway was -- 

the assumption in this one was 71 -- 92, probably 

7 millirem per year. That's right about the 

cutoff point. It was either 71 or -- 

 DR. BEHLING: It's five -- five -- yeah, may have 

been. 

MR. ALLEN: Basically the assumption of missed 

dose ends up giving you a higher -- I believe a 

higher urinalysis than what this guy had, so it's 

why it was ignored. 

 MS. BEHLING: And I guess the reason I didn't 

include it in the matrix is because we made a 

statement here that this dose is trivial and can 

be ignored and so I didn't make a finding out of 

it. 

 MR. GRIFFON: So it's more of an observation. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I just make a statement. We 

state here, however, this dose is trivial and may 

be ignored. I mean I don't think I would trip 

over 3 millirem if someone chose to ignore it. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. I was trying to say instead of 
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being missed, it was just overestimated. 

 DR. BEHLING: And I think both the -- yeah. 

There were no findings for issues involving the 

CATI; radiological incidents, none. Okay. So I 

-- as I said on page 6, most of the findings had 

very little impact on dose and I would say, given 

some of the differences being either in favor -- 

more in favor than not, there was no significant 

impact on -- on changing dose or probability of 

causation. 

 MS. BEHLING: One more here, Hanford. 

 DR. BEHLING: One more here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Take them through. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. The next one is tab 30, and 

this involves a claim from Hanford. The number -

- claim number is 1157. And this individual 

worked at the Hanford facility from 1967 to the 

present. The cancer was embryonal carcinoma of 

the right testis diagnosed in 1977, so obviously 

this individual was a male. He was employed at 

three different periods of time, and he -- his 

dose reconstruction was fragmented through three 

different areas. He was a chemical technologist 

for most of that time frame, engineer/chemical 

technologist. He stated that he was involved in 
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a number of radiological incidents that involved 

spills and other things. Individual was 

monitored monthly and -- for a period of time, 

but in portions of his employment he was 

monitored quarterly. So again, he has a fairly 

complex dose reconstruction based on the 

different jobs, locations, and monitoring 

periods. 

If you look at Table 1 on page 5, again you get 

an overview of what his exposures were based on 

the type of exposure. He had about 8.8 rem of 

photon dosimeter dose. He also had nearly 1.4 

rem of neutron dose and he again was given the 

largest contribution of dose from an internal 

dose based on hypothetical radionuclide intake. 

So in total his exposure was 35.46 rem to the 

testes. 

Table 2, which is our case review checklist 

identifies a total of 11 findings which we'll try 

to briefly go through. 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I'm trying to remember 

exactly what -- what he had done here. He -- he 

fractionated the photon exposures by 25 percent 

being less than 30 keV, 75 percent between 30 and 
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250, and then we had to go through an awful lot 

to find out what -- those conversion factors were 

also energy dependent, as you see in Table 3 on 

page 9. And they varied. As I said, the 

fractions varied over time period. So you see in 

the first period, '67 through '71, in 1975 he 

used zero per fraction for 30, 50 percent, 30 to 

250, and 50 percent greater than 250. And for 

subsequent time periods, that changed from -- to 

-- to some contribution from lower energy photons 

between '72 and '74, and so forth. So it was one 

of those things where you had to really look hard 

to figure out which years and which energies and 

which DCFs were being used. 

 MS. BEHLING: That all came from the Technical 

Basis Document --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- from the Hanford Technical Basis 

Document. But in any case he didn't use them 

appropriately. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I'm trying to remember what 

he -- yeah, I couldn't figure out on what the -- 

the -- what was the basis for selecting these 

photon energy distributions, the 25 and 50 and 75 

(unintelligible). I did not verify the -- the 
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basis for it, at least according to the Hanford 

Technical Basis Document. I could not verify 

where those fractions came from, and I explain 

that on page 10. 

 MS. BEHLING: We were able to reproduce what he 

did, but it does not match what the TBD 

recommends you -- that he does for those 

fractions, energy distributions. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, and again I don't -- I'm not 

convinced that all of the effort is really 

something that complies with efficiency, 

balancing efficiency with precision. Seems like 

we're splitting hair here in some of these 

instances and we do often question whether or not 

the assigned fractions are even representative of 

the facility to begin with. But it seems like we 

spend an awful lot of time here going through 

these various time-consuming and laborious 

approaches for assigning IREP. And as I said, I 

would like still to determine whether or not 

IREP's assessment of relative effectiveness 

factors that are driven by these different photon 

energies are in fact something that has any level 

of credibility that would warrant this level of 

effort. After all, a dose is a dose until you 
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know that a dose is not a dose based on a 

relative effectiveness factor. And I realized in 

looking at some of these, they spend an awful lot 

of time going through these (unintelligible) 

because then it not only applies to recorded 

photon dose, but it also applies to missed photon 

dose. And you go through all these different 

iterations just to accommodate IREP. 

 MS. BEHLING: Well, the other thing -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, when it's in a workbook, it's 

a little faster. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, if it's in a workbook -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Although in this particular case, 

he did not use a workbook and this, I believe, he 

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, he didn't? 

 MS. BEHLING: No, he is a best estimate because 

he was at a little over 40 percent POC with this 

dose reconstruction. So the reconstructor spent, 

you know, a fair amount of time -- we always say 

sharpening his pencil -- on this one, because it 

was -- the POC was over 40 percent. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, it wasn't a best estimate 

though, was it? Because the internal dose is 

still a hypothetical. 
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 DR. BEHLING: Yes. Well, now this is what I 

said. Sometimes they go through all these very 

definitive things for -- for making precise 

estimates of recorded or even missed, and then 

they just say well, we'll give you 20 

radionuclides on the first day and all of that 

attempt to be precise is lost and somewhat 

inconsistent. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, probably what happens is 

the dose reconstructor tries it as an 

overestimating approach because it's testicular 

cancer. It's not particularly radiogenic. And 

so he does several overestimating steps and he 

came out over 45 percent or around 50 percent or 

something and says, okay, well, I can't turn in 

an overestimate in this range. So now, what can 

I do to fine tune this. 

 MS. BEHLING: Exactly. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's easier to fine tune the 

external stuff than for -- for -- depending on 

who the dose reconstructor is, it's easier to 

fine tune the external stuff than it is to fit an 

IMBA curve to bioassay data. And so they start -

- you know, they start doing more and more 

definitive things on the external and then leave 
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the internal at the overestimating. I suspect 

that's how it got to be where we were. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, as I said I think --

MR. ALLEN: I think (unintelligible) did use a 

workbook on this one. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: They do have a workbook. They 

just did it under Monte Carlo where it goes back 

and forth between normal and lognormal, or what? 

MR. ALLEN: I think they -- they probably used a 

workbook and clicked off a couple of maximizing 

and then tweaked on that. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I saw the workbook in the files. 

 MS. BEHLING: Oh, is that right? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: So they did work use a workbook on 

this? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I don't know if they Monte 

Carlo'd it but --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Not Monte Carlo --

 MR. GRIFFON: They used the workbook, right. 

DR. ROESSLER: Is that really Table -- in the 

middle of that first paragraph, it says Table 6E 

-2. That's a very strange table number. This is 

on page --

 MR. GRIFFON: 6E-2. 
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 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, it's --

 DR. BEHLING: It's part of the attachment E. 

DR. ROESSLER: It is? It sounds like a number 

with a superscript or something. That is a real 

number? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: You've got to get a microscope 

out to read it though. That one's really hard to 

read. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Table 20 is --

 DR. BEHLING: No, it's in reference to Attachment 

E. 

 MS. BEHLING: That's right. They force you to 

read lots and lots of pages in that site profile 

and then at the attachment at the end they give 

you all --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Here's what you do --

DR. ROESSLER: I tried looking at one of these 

backup disks that they send you, the Privacy Act 

stuff -- which you can't let anybody else see and 

all that -- before our teleconference call. And 

then looking at the case and looking at the disk, 

I said thank God we have a contractor because 

those of us who are on the Board have jobs. 

There's no way that we could put in the detailed 

time that these people are doing. I mean this is 
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an absolute necessity. Not only the time, but 

the knowledge, too. 

 DR. BEHLING: As I said, I couldn't convince 

myself that what was done was really claimantfavorable/unclaimant-favorable but, you know, and 

-- and I state there on page 10 where I talk 

about what they did. And in the end I sort of 

conclude that, given the varying locations and 

energy distribution, it may have been more 

efficient to assume a hundred percent of 30 to 

250 keV and a dose conversion factor of 1.011 for 

all recorded -- I mean to me, I would have like 

to have actually had the time to run all the 

variables. And so I say what is the final 

difference. Are we talking about a few millirem 

here? All that effort with all the energies and 

fractions and so forth, again, I don't want to 

beat a dead horse, but efficiency has to be 

viewed as part of the equation for saying is this 

really worth our time, especially when we then 

turn around and assign the biggest dose to a 

hypothetical situation that we can't verify one 

way or the other in terms of its authenticity or 

how accurate. It really doesn't represent the 

true internal dose. And so it's just, you know, 
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my feeling that perhaps for -- for efficiency's 

sake, let's default to a value that is -- is easy 

to deal with, understandable to the claimant who 

may have to review his report, and in the end 

take some of the hours of work out of the 

equation. 

 The next issue is the missed photon dose, and I 

guess what I state here is that we -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Uncertainty. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, we again missed the 

uncertainty here. He -- he talks in one place -- 

and maybe this is something that -- Kathy has 

made mention of this before. I think the report 

oftentimes reflects a boilerplate wording that is 

taken out and it does not represent ultimately 

what the actual IREP input statement would have 

you believe. For instance, on page 10 I state 

that for missed photon dose, the DR report 

identified total 15 missed dosimeter readings 

using LOD values cited in Table 6E-6, and then 

states the following: A maximum potential missed 

dose of 0.463 rem from photons was used as the 

95th percentile of a lognormal distribution for 

the purpose of calculating probability of 

causation. Well, if you look at the actual 
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values, they use not the LOD but they use LOD 

over 2 and a geometric standard deviation. So 

what you have -- and then that's okay, too, but 

you shouldn't state one thing in the text of the 

report and then do something totally different in 

the IREP input. And it appears that boilerplate 

wording is taken out -- and again, I understand 

why you want to standardize the format of the 

report, make it as -- as simple as possible, but 

as a minimum he could have done either LOD or LOD 

over 2, but they should be consistent. You 

shouldn't state that you're going to say -- you 

give them the 95th percentile value, but then 

actually when you look at the IREP input values 

that they are in fact LOD over 2 with a geometric 

standard deviation. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it was the -- I mean the 

463 is the 95th percentile of that -- of that 

lognormal distribution that's used in the IREP. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It used 230 and a GSD of 1.52, 

that means 463 is the 95th percentile. So the 

explanation -- the dose reconstruction 

explanation is not intuitively obvious, or it's 

not obvious --
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 MS. BEHLING: That's right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- to the reader why that says 

463 and the IREP line says 230. That's true. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Have you gone past the missed dose 

yet, Hans? 

 DR. BEHLING: Pardon? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Missed photon dose, are you done 

with that one? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, missed photon dose. Those 

are multiple findings here. Failed to account 

for all missed photon doses -- (unintelligible) -

- yeah, in some instances zero doses are not the 

only time when you should use missed dose, 

because obviously if you're going to maximize a -

- an exposure, then it is LOD. Any value 

recorded dose that's less than LOD should be 

considered as a surrogate for a missed dose 

because obviously -- let's assume the LOD value 

for a dosimeter is 40 millirem and the recorded 

dose is 25. You would -- if you want to maximum 

his missed dose, you would assign 40 millirem as 

opposed to -- to the 25 that is really the 

recorded dose. So missed dose has to be viewed, 

not just for zero recorded doses, but any value 

that's either LOD, if you're maximizing, or LOD 
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over 2. And I think that everyone understands 

that equation. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, yeah. I was just going to 

say, certainly if you have a recorded value 

that's less than LOD over 2 -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we would say that should be a 

zero. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: That would be treated as a zero. 

 DR. BEHLING: And I think in the last 20 cases I 

identified cases where the recorded dose was 1 or 

2 millirem. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And -- and of course the guy would 

have been better off if we would have had zero 

because he would have -- as a minimum have gotten 

LOD over 2 as opposed to one or two recorded 

doses. So that's that issue. 

 MS. BEHLING: And I believe during the previous 

cases we addressed this, and this was something 

that you were going to be making changes to. Is 

that correct? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. We've already -- we've 

told the contractor that if they have a recorded 
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dose that's less than LOD over 2, then that's 

treated as a zero. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. I think, as I state here, 

count 16 zero readings along with 12 positive 

readings below LOD. And so again, if -- if you 

want to be claimant-favorable you would assign a 

missed dose even though there was a positive but 

it was below LOD. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I guess LOD -- or LOD 

depends on how the LOD is valid. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: How do you know -- what do you 

know because LOD -- if it's a Currie MDA, meaning 

that you're confident you're going to see that 

value -- and the halfway too, that would be what 

Currie calls the critical line, and then we would 

use the critical (unintelligible) LOD because 

that's really where you say you can't tell if 

you're different from zero is LOD over 2. So if 

you can't tell that you're different than zero, 

recorded count is a zero, including the missed 

dose calculation. That's -- that's our approach. 

 DR. BEHLING: The next one, recorded neutron 

doses, and there were a couple findings here that 

I identified on page 12. He -- he said he gave 
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neutron doses on the basis of energy between 100 

keV and 2 MeV and between 2 and 20 MeV, and what 

it turns out, that he did not -- he states that 

these were the fractions, but when you -- when 

you actually calculate it, it appears that what 

he's done is to use 100 percent for each. The 

doses for the 100 keV to 2 MeV would have been 10 

percent too high based on the 90 percent and 10 

percent, and of course the 2 to 20 MeV would have 

been ten times too high because they should have 

only been 10 percent fraction. So in essence he 

overestimated by -- he -- by stating in the text 

that he was going to do it but then failing to 

apply those fractions in this calculation. 

 Missed neutron doses. Okay. I identified 

several deficiencies -- three deficiencies for 

missed photon doses. Let's see here. The first 

one is failure to properly account for missed 

neutron dose. SC&A was not able to duplicate the 

42 zero readings reported by NIOSH but did count 

90 zeroes neutron dosimeter readings and 21 

neutron readings below LOD over a 10-year period. 

 MS. BEHLING: In going into the records, we -- we 

found almost double of the -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. He --
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 MS. BEHLING: -- of the zero --

 DR. BEHLING: -- understated the number of missed 

neutron doses. Incorrect energy percentages -- 

yeah, again, the same mistake here. He said he 

would give it a 10 percent and 90 percent 

fraction for the two ranges, but he ended up 

doing the same mistake as he did for actual 

recorded neutron doses. 

 MS. BEHLING: Excuse me one second. Can this be 

an item? This is an item that NIOSH can look 

into, the dose --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I certainly want -- I want 

to certainly look into the number of missed doses 

and the number of zeroes, the number of zeroes in 

the missed dose calculation. This table that he 

-- that's here in section 2.3 on page 12, is this 

out of the dose reconstruction report? 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. Yes, it is. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Hasn't he combined the 90 percent 

and 10 percent with the ICRP 60 factor in that 

table? Is that how he got these numbers? 

Because the number I'm familiar with, I mean .1 

to 2 -- the ICRP conversion is 1.91, right? 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Isn't that the energy range you 

use --

 DR. BEHLING: You may be correct --

 MR. HINNEFELD: If you take 90 percent of that -- 

 DR. BEHLING: ICRP 60 may have taken that into 

consideration. 

 MS. BEHLING: Maybe that's what they did then. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think they took the 90 percent 

and the 10 percent in those ICRP factors, because 

an ICRP factor of .13 just looks too low to me on 

2 to 20. And so I think that must incorporate 

that 10 percent fraction that goes in that energy 

range. I think those factors that they call ICRP 

factor are actually a combination of the 

apportioning --

 DR. BEHLING: I have to look at that, but 10 

percent wouldn't give you .13. It would give you 

.19. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: But those -- but the ICRP factor 

is different on different energy ranges. You see 

1.91 most often because .1 to 2 is used most 

often because of the REF and it's most favorable. 

So you see 1.91 most often, but the different 

energy bands for neutrons have different ICRP 

factors. 
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 DR. BEHLING: I'd have to look at that. 

 MS. BEHLING: Let's all look at that. 

 DR. BEHLING: You may be right. 

 MS. BEHLING: Because I thought we assumed that's 

what he did, also. I don't know. 

 DR. BEHLING: I have to look at that to see if 

that -- if that actually addresses that as 

(unintelligible). 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think that's what's going on in 

that table. 

 MS. BEHLING: Possibly. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And I really hated that table 

when I saw it in the dose reconstruction -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, if you have --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and I told them for -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, let's -- let's make an issue 

of that. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- explain to me what you're 

doing here, you know -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- instead of mixing stuff up 

like that. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Table 6E-3 is the table that we 

need to look at. 
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 MS. BEHLING: We'll look at that again, but I can 

assure you when -- when we can't reproduce 

something, before we will say we can't do that, 

we go through hoops --

 MR. HINNEFELD: A lot of different tries -- 

 MS. BEHLING: So we tried --

 MR. HINNEFELD: You have convinced me of that. 

Trust me, you have convinced me of that. 

 MS. BEHLING: Because we don't want to 

erroneously, you know, keep it. But -- but you 

may be right on this one. I'll look. But with 

regard to the missed neutron dose -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And the number of zeroes, that's 

important. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- and the number of zeroes, I 

think that -- that's --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, that's the note I made. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- I think a more significant 

issue. 

 DR. BEHLING: Who's got a calculator? Does 

anybody have a calculator where they can -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I've got an Excel spreadsheet. 

 DR. BEHLING: Multiply 1.91 times .9. What does 

that tell you? 

 MS. BEHLING: 1.719. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: 1.72, yeah. 1.719. 

 DR. BEHLING: Well, that would appear, because 

that's what's in that table. So it may very well 

end up being that he accounted for that 10 

percent and 90 percent fraction by using the ICRP 

60 factor as --

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think that's what he's done 

just based on seeing that -- that value. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. In that case we will -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think that might be what he 

did. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. We will look --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Like I said, I hated that table. 

I saw a number of dose reconstructions that had 

tables like that where they combined two factors 

without really explaining -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Without really putting how they did 

it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- that they had combined two 

factors and it'd drive you nuts when you haven't 

seen one like that, trying to figure out what in 

heck they're doing. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 
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 DR. BEHLING: Okay. So we'll -- we'll take a 

look at those. Let me just make a note here. 

Okay. Then the same thing then applies for the 

missed --

 MR. HINNEFELD: The missed. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's the same table on this. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah, looks like they've got it broke 

down by area there. That's the two factors for 

these areas. 

 MR. GRIFFON: The 25 and 75 and 50/50, yeah, it's 

broken down by work areas. Right? 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

MR. ALLEN: Can't tell the basis for it on this 

spreadsheet here, but it looks like that's what 

it is. Some areas it's 1.91 all for the one 

range --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, 1.91 in one range and zero 

in the other, and some ranges it's -- yeah. 

MR. ALLEN: It's split up differently in other 

areas. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Shallow -- recorded shallow 
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electron dose. I think in this case the 

individual may have double-dipped and actually 

overstated. Shallow dose he assigned to -- you 

have an option of assigning shallow dose to less 

than 30 keV photon energy or to -- to electrons. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

 DR. BEHLING: And I think he did both. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Is that this one? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: Because it was also the Hanford 

case where the recorded -- the dosimetry data 

initially appeared as if there was a shallow -- 

no. How did that work? That there was a shallow 

dose -- maybe it's under the missed shallow dose. 

We're going to get to that. 

 DR. BEHLING: In -- in this case they assigned a 

shallow dose to both 30 keV -- less than 30 keV 

photons and to betas. And in essence that's 

doubling the -- the shallow dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: You should either use one or the 

other, but not both. Let's see. What do we have 

here. Missed shallow doses. For shallow dose, 

obviously the PROC -- procedure 6, addendum to 
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external dose reconstructor provides some means 

of calculating shallow dose for complex-wide 

situations, and that's formerly a number of zero 

dosimeter readings LOD, and then you multiply it 

by 2 and that's -- that multiplier is not really 

one for maximizing, but it accounts for the 

deficiency of the dosimeter. And so when you 

divide that by 2, you're not doing what some of 

the other people have done wrong in the past, but 

that's a correction factor for the deficiency in 

-- in monitoring shallow dose. And so when you 

divide by 2, you're still then subject to a -- an 

uncertainty. And the LOD for that was 15 

millirem, and let me see here. I think he used a 

professional judgment case here of 200 millirem 

as a profession judgment. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, he did. He used an LOD of 

200. 

 DR. BEHLING: And then again --

 MS. BEHLING: But again, it does say professional 

judgment. 

 DR. BEHLING: I have no idea where that number 

comes from. 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, one of the things -- yeah, 
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the statements made on page 15, reviewer's 

comment, improperly estimated shallow doses, and 

I have an exhibit here on page 16. I fully 

understand why some of these errors are made, but 

for instance, on page 16 you have the exposures 

for this individual for the year 1974 and if you 

look at Code 59, Code 59 is an external dosimeter 

for the whole body. And what you see on the far 

right-hand side -- not far right-hand, there's -- 

but the second to last and the one before that, 

you have NP, which stands for non-penetrating 

radiation, and then you have penetrating 

radiation. And you'll see for instance, the 

first entry -- which corresponds to month of 

January, there are 12 entries which has a Code 59 

-- and then you see obviously the five elements 

for the TLD and -- and I guess the algorithm then 

spits out that for -- for the first month, in 

January, the non-penetrating dose is recorded 

zero and the penetrating dose is recorded as 40. 

And one would conclude that the dose really then 

to the skin is zero, when in fact it's 40. Just 

turns out to be that the penetrating/nonpenetrating dose were the same. And so when you 

record it as non-penetrating, you subtract 
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penetrating from it and end up with a zero dose 

which is in essence an artifact. There -- this 

is not a missed -- this is not a missed dose 

then, and therefore -- you tend to overestimate 

the missed dose when your penetrating dose is 

equal to the non-penetrating, and when you 

subtract it you end up with a zero dose. The 

truth is there was no non-penetrating -- there 

wasn't a penetrating. It's not a missed dose, 

it's just that --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Penetrating dose to the skin as 

well. 

 DR. BEHLING: And as I mentioned to you, from my 

experience in the utilities, if you have high 

energy photons as the ambient dose, your 7 

millirem, your 300 millirem, your 1000 millirem 

dose will always be the same, generally speaking. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: And so when you subtract one from 

the other to -- to determine what is your nonpenetrating, you end up with a zero dose when in 

fact that's an artifact. The skin dose really is 

40 in this case. And so I just wanted to point 

that out. Again, it's claimant-favorable in this 

case when you assume a zero dose and assign a 
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missed dose, when in fact it just turns out there 

was no -- a dose that should have been assigned 

as a missed dose --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- in this case. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, right. You're right. 

 MS. BEHLING: And again, it reflects on the 

facility reporting requirements and the reporting 

-- the way they report their (unintelligible due 

to electrical interference in microphones). 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Going back to this question of the 

algorithm now and -- I mean I noted in 1968 -- I 

think it's -- and I didn't bring that file, but 

on page -- I think it's on page 41 in the DOE 

data for this person -- they -- I mean they have 

an annual penetrating dose of 1910 for that year. 

And I -- I would -- I'd love it if somebody could 

describe to me how they came up with that number. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: You're in 1968? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, 1968. There's -- there's -- 

in this case I think they -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, you've got the -- oh, we 

don't have the -- we don't have those here. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, you don't have that. 
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MR. ALLEN: I could go grab it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We can go look them up. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, it -- it just -- it was 

confusing to me to walk through that one. There 

were a bunch of negative values in that column, 

and I think they can be explained by the 

algorithm that was used, but it wasn't clear how. 

And I can see when I add all the -- I can make 

the numbers work and come up with 1910, but I'm 

not sure why a certain value is -- are in that 

column. So I guess just to crosswalk, that was 

difficult for me. And maybe it makes sense for 

someone who is more --

 MR. HINNEFELD: We'll look that up. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- understands this data more. 

Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We'll look that up when we get 

done with our discussion and we'll have something 

for this week. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That's fine. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: If we can figure anything out. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm sure -- I'm sure you'll be able 

to. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, for that particular exhibit 

here, if you look at it, I think the -- the 
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penetrating dose for that year, for the 12 

cycles, was 590. I think if you actually look at 

the numbers and the annual doses where they 

collate them, they correctly identify the skin 

dose at 680 or something like -- 670. I explain 

that on page 15. If you look at the actual 

annual doses which collates the shallow dose as 

penetrating and non-penetrating, you realize that 

you don't really have a zero dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: So again, you have to be familiar. 

If you -- if you only look at this, you may not 

come to that conclusion, but in this case, again, 

it benefits the claimant in the sense where you 

assign a missed dose when in fact these are 

really artifacts here. They're not zero doses at 

all. And then --

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess my only question on that, 

Hans -- I don't disagree with you on this -- this 

example for this year, but I think it varies from 

year to year on how --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes, that's what I --
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 DR. BEHLING: And that's one of the statements I 

made is that, you know, when you look at the 

instructions, you realize -- and -- do I have it 

here? In one of them I included tables that they 

give you and saying okay, for this year skin dose 

is shallow dose -- is penetrating plus nonpenetrating, but it varies over time and you have 

to be really careful. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MS. BEHLING: Like Hanford. 

 DR. BEHLING: And at what point does a shallow 

dose equal a skin dose, et cetera. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That's why I wanted just to clarify 

for my own sake. 

MR. ALLEN: Didn't we have one earlier where we 

added the neutron in on one year's sheet -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: -- and not the other? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: And it gets very, very complex. 

MR. ALLEN: Somebody had already added the 

tritium dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: For a while. 
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MR. ALLEN: Yes, for a while. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: For some years, the tritium dose 

is included. It's listed there and it's also 

added over here. And other years it's listed 

here and it's not added in. 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) 

 MR. GRIFFON: Real archaeological dig 

(unintelligible). 

 MR. HINNEFELD: (Unintelligible) thought this was 

a good idea. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Can I -- can I touch on a couple 

things? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. 

 MR. GRIFFON: The -- the missed photon dose on -- 

in this instance, again going back to my topic, 

my main topic I've hit on today, missed versus 

unmonitored. I guess I look at the summary and 

you see 231 millirem assigned for I think what 

they're saying are 15 missing dose periods. I 

think I came up with 17, but again, I'll agree 

with it for the sake of argument. If I look at 

this individual's photon dosimeter dose, he's got 

about 8 1/2 rem, close to 9 rem, recorded for 

photon dosimeter dose. That gives like an 
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average of 65 millirem per month. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: If you're -- is it claimantfavorable to assign that LOD over 2 in this 

instance for those missing periods? They all 

seem to fall within -- unless you have good -- a 

good basis for saying that he was out of a -- out 

of a work area, but they all seem to me to fall 

within the '68 to '72 time period when he was 

doing -- when he was getting most of his higher 

external doses. And, you know, I guess the 

question is, you've got a few gaps in his data, 

you're assigning LOD over 2 and saying it's 

claimant-favorable. I'm saying on average for 

those years, he was getting about 65 millirem a 

month. Why not -- I -- I'm -- I guess I'm 

questioning, is that the most claimant-favorable 

approach, or -- or a best estimate? I think in 

this case you were trying to maybe hone in on it 

a little closer. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, they tried to -- they tried 

to narrow in on this one, at least on the 

external side. Let me think a minute. 

 MR. GRIFFON: It seems to me -- it didn't seem 

logical to me, unless you have work history 
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justification, to say that he was jumping in and 

out of hot areas. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Does the record indicate -- I 

mean is the record void for those years? Or does 

it look like he had a zero reading? Or can we 

tell for those months? 

 MR. GRIFFON: That's -- that's a good question. 

I mean your report says 15. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Zero readings, or 15 periods when 

he wasn't -- 15 cycles when he wasn't monitored? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Fifteen where you assigned -- where 

you assigned missed doses, missed photon doses. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. But I mean before that, 

before we assigned 15 missed doses -- or were 

they zero readings --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- 15 badge zero readings, or 

were they --

 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know. I don't have --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- were they 15 --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- the record here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Unmonitored. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- months when we don't have a 

result because --

 MR. GRIFFON: I know. I know what you're saying. 
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Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. That would -- that would 

certainly influence how we would approach the 

problem. 

 MR. GRIFFON: See, I have in my notes here -- and 

again, don't take these for granted, but I had -- 

I had like 17. I -- I'm using the word fields 

were blank, which for me would say not zeroes, 

but blank, no entries. Now, I don't know 

Hanford's practices with this regard, you know -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- were they -- were they zeroes 

that they just noted as blanks in the record. I 

don't know. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Let us do some checking on that 

because I don't know sitting here. 

MR. ALLEN: I'm just digging through the 

spreadsheet. It's looking like a lot of zeroes 

are pretty sporadic like a hundred -- you know, 

low dose -- in one month it's a zero and then a 

low dose the next month. I'm thinking it's just 

less than sensitivity. 

 MR. GRIFFON: It could be. 

MR. ALLEN: But I don't have the dose record in 

front of me. I just have what they recorded 
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here. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Do you have zeroes in there, or 

blanks? I don't --

MR. ALLEN: This is just the spreadsheet. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's not the record. It's what 

they do for --

 MR. GRIFFON: I thought there were blanks in the 

actual data. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I guess from -- you know, an 

average of 65 millirem a month to me looks like 

it probably varies quite a bit on either side of 

that and you'll have some months quite a bit more 

and some considerably less. If you go to half 

that, or slightly less than half that, you're 

below the LOD and it would look like a zero on 

the badge. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So what you've described so far 

doesn't give me a lot of concern that this was a 

situation where this guy should have had a result 

there and didn't. Sounds like he probably had a 

zero result there based on that kind of, you 

know, monthly exposure experience. If he were 

getting 500 a month and then there were months 
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missing or something like that, that would 

probably cause me to worry more than 65 millirem 

a month because it's just not that far from the 

threshold of badge. You know, the average is not 

that far from the threshold for the badge and I 

expect to have quite a bit of variation around 

the average, and I expect sometimes -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- vary below the threshold of 

the badge. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I think 60 -- well, I don't know. 

I -- I think it -- I mean in this case I think 

you're honing in on that a little more, and I 

think it probably -- this is my back of the 

envelope here, almost literally. But that 65 per 

month is also average from 1967 through '75, so -

-

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, I see what you're saying. So 

it wasn't just in an early period -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- and the blanks were in '68 

through '72 when he got more of -- it looked like 

he got more of --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 MR. GRIFFON: You know, so -- these aren't 

whopping exposures, but you are honing in on -- 
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on something that's closer to your 50 percent 

cutoff, too. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Let's see if we can draw 

any conclusions from it later on this week. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I wish I had the hard -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's available to us. I just --

we just didn't bring it down here. I mean we 

couldn't bring them all, so -- I guess we could 

have, but we didn't. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

MR. ALLEN: I could stick it on a stake real 

quick, but... 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, let's -- let's try to get 

through them. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, let's get through them. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Mark's going to be here all week. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's fine. No, I'm not 

going to be, but that's fine. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Let's go ahead and get 

through this report and then we'll -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: We can hold that. It's fine. 

 DR. BEHLING: Last finding is on page 19. It 

involves the internal dose assigned for a 

hypothetical exposure. As we always do, we try 

to run the Excel workbook in identifying what the 
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exposures were for photons, electrons, alpha 

particles, and for some reason or another we were 

able verify everything, but we were unable to 

reproduce the dose assigned to the alpha reading 

radiation. And we can't figure that one out 

since obviously this is a computer-generated set 

of data. 

 MS. BEHLING: And I was -- excuse me, Hans. 

 DR. BEHLING: Go ahead. 

 MS. BEHLING: I -- I was going to say, I believe 

on this one I used version 3.03 and I went back 

to an old -- the only older version that I have, 

which was 3.02.12, and tried to see if maybe they 

used an older version, and I -- I still was not 

able to reproduce that alpha dose. 

MR. ALLEN: I think the difference is, but I've 

got to check this out for us. I think the 

difference was that they actually used testes on 

this one but they didn't use high uranium. High 

uraniums were basically a year-end process at 

Fernald or something. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

MR. ALLEN: So they used a lower uranium value 

for a reactor facility, and they used testes. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. That may be it. 
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MR. ALLEN: Basically, they did this one right. 

That -- that threw you. But he said he was able 

to reproduce the numbers. I never verified it 

myself. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I'm going to check that. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. So it would it be non-U -- 

non-U and then reactor? 

 MS. BEHLING: That's right. 

MR. ALLEN: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Non-U, reactor, and then testes 

and see what you get. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: See if that matches. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Okay. Is that it for that 

one? I have --

 DR. BEHLING: Let me just be sure. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I've got a couple --

 DR. BEHLING: Let's see here, CATI reports -- 

yeah, obviously this guy had a series of events 

here involving everything from contamination of 

his hand when he borrowed a pen from a coworker. 

And of course the action cited was that they 

surveyed it, they decon'd the skin. They did a 

nasal smear which turned out negative and did -- 

did a whole-body count. Everything turned out 
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negative, et cetera. And then also that same 

year, 1970, he had a glove contamination event. 

Again they used a survey to assess the 

contamination, nasal smear, and it sounds like 

they -- they did everything that they probably 

should have done in assessing any potential 

contamination that involved these events from the 

pen to the cutting his finger, as he did on -- in 

April of 1971 here. 

I guess in summary perhaps what they could have 

done is to perhaps follow up with some urinalysis 

that may have potentially found some internal 

exposure. But given the high dose assigned to 

him from the hypothetical, it's -- it's just my 

intuition that more than likely any doses he 

would have received and was not necessarily 

monitored by whatever method they took would have 

been captured by the assigned dose. So I didn't 

make any issue or make any finding on this case. 

Yeah, I think that's it. Do I get a break from 

talking for a while? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Can I just ask two -- two things on 

this. One, I think the uncertainty on the 

recorded photon dose, you guys -- you raised this 

as a finding. Right? 
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 DR. BEHLING: Uh-huh. 

 MR. GRIFFON: But I think in this kind of case 

it -- it could play a pretty critical -- I mean I 

think what would happen actually is that if you 

added in uncertainty on that 8.78 rem recorded -- 

obviously annually, but if you added that in, 

even if the numbers got closer I think what would 

end up happening is you'd have to go back and 

tweak the internal dose a little -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Could be. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- more realistically. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Could be. 

 MR. GRIFFON: You know, so it may not make a -- a 

difference in the outcome, but some of these 

things could push it over, the way it stands 

right now. You know what I'm saying? 

 DR. BEHLING: If everything (unintelligible) -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Given the hypothetical internal 

rate. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- dose. 

 MR. GRIFFON: So I think -- I think that's 

something that, you know -- you know, is a pretty 

important thing to resolve, and procedurally or 

whatever, they're not using what's on the 

procedures now and they're just assigning a 
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constant. I think that should be resolved, 

especially when you get to closer cases. It's 

going to -- could play a role I suppose. 

 MS. BEHLING: I think the implementation guide -- 

implementation guide, one, and using the normal 

distribution. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Yeah, it was a -- this is 

a testicular? What was the cancer in this one? 

I'm getting them confused now. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, this one was a testicular 

cancer. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I'll have to find out about that, 

because that is an awfully high DCF. 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) 

 DR. BEHLING: Let me ask Dave on -- on the issue 

-- do you have -- let's just hypothetically go 

through a mental exercise that you can visualize. 

Let's assume you have a recorded dose for an 

individual of 10 rem and you assign that as a 

constant with no uncertainty. And then you say 

well, you know, there is an uncertainty, a sigma 

value that we should assign to that dose, and 

let's just for -- for simplicity assume that it's 

30 percent. 

(Whereupon, Dr. Neton enters the 
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proceedings.) 

 DR. BEHLING: So you could, in essence, have a 10 

rem plus a sigma value of 3 rem assigned to that 

individual. Now you subject that to a Monte 

Carlo analysis that incorporates all the other 

variables and then you essentially select a 99th 

percentile value of that Monte Carlo analysis. 

What would that dose that is now defined of -- as 

10 rem as a constant versus 10 rem with a sigma 

value of 3 result in an effective dose? If you 

were to say the same -- you -- you -- for the 

first case, you develop a POC and let's assume 

for the 10 rem constant with no uncertainty you 

get a POC of let's say 25 percent. And then you 

run the same calculation but you say 10 rem plus 

a sigma value of 3 rem, and you get a new POC. 

What I would like to know is what would be the 

single dose, a deterministic dose that would give 

you the same value with everything else being 

constant? What would you have to put in as a 

dose instead of 10 rem plus 3 rem sigma as a 

single dose in order to get the same POC 

calculation? Do you know what that -- just a 

ballpark estimate? 

DR. NETON: Its varies depending on the cancer 
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and --

 MR. GRIFFON: Cancer model. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Cancer model. That should in the 

cancer model. 

DR. NETON: There are some where -- 

 DR. BEHLING: But let's assume you keep 

everything a constant -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Hans, it's going to vary 

depending on the number of years, and you name 

it. 

DR. NETON: I could tell you, Hans, you get the 

same number oftentimes if you put 10 as a 

constant or for a distribution value, it makes no 

difference because the uncertainty of the dose 

model -- the dosimetry calculation is extremely 

small compared to the overall uncertainty and all 

the other hundreds of -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Use the risk model that IREP 

applies to get the -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I'm trying to gauge the 

significance --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- overwhelms the rest of the --

if they got 30 there, that overwhelms the 

uncertainty of the dose. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. Well, when you even ask for 
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your (unintelligible) -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: It does depend on the cancer model. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- in so many cases the sigma value 

has been deleted because we know it's a very 

complex thing to calculate and people have simply 

ignored it. And I guess Mark is raising the 

question, what would happen if -- you know, what 

-- how does that sigma value really impact the 

POC. 

DR. NETON: The sigma value, if it'd been deleted 

or not put in there, it's my understanding the 

way you do this is that that value -- the 

constant should be an upper limit of the dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: That's what it -- that's what 

it's supposed to be. That means that the number 

is supposed to have (unintelligible) because of -

- because of one of a number of things. One 

would be if there's a DCF for this organ that's -

- the entire range would be kept at less than 1. 

So -- but rather than use that DCF, we're going 

to use a DCF of 1. So we apply that one rather 

than this lower DCF --

 MR. GRIFFON: So that's your maximizing 

assumption. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- we actually are -- we're 
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actually maximizing the actual dose number rather 

than applying the uncertainty amount. That's 

even --

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, that --

 MR. HINNEFELD: You know, that's one application. 

That's one position that's been made that we have 

yet to validate. That's from the first 20. We 

have yet to validate that that's the fact, but 

that's kind of what we -- what the position was. 

Other -- I've seen it stated, I don't know that 

this was everything (unintelligible) abide by, 

but if we maximize things like geometry and -- 

and maximize the effectiveness of the energy band 

-- like we know the photons are spread over 

several -- over a couple energy bands, but we're 

going to put them all in the most energy 

effective range, the 30 to 250 -- then that's 

overestimating. And so rather than -- so we're 

not really recording the true dose. We're 

recording the overestimate of the dose, so we're 

not going to -- we're going to treat that as a 

constant because it's a high estimate. 

 MR. GRIFFON: See, here you didn't do that, 

though. This case you didn't do it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I have to check out why it would 
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be okay on this one. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I would have to check why it 

would be okay on this one not to include the 

uncertainty on the measured dose because I -- 

just sitting here today, I can't figure it out. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That's what I -- I was asking 

specifically for this case. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

DR. NETON: But that is something we 

(unintelligible) -- I do remember from the first 

20 that they had taken some liberties and put 

them in as constants and saying that it was 

claimant-favorable because you didn't include any 

other correction factors would tend to lower the 

dose. But I think we agreed that we need to 

demonstrate that that was the case. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, yes. 

DR. NETON: It's -- it's a real -- it's all over 

the map as to how much that uncertainty really -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, just curious. 

DR. NETON: I tell you, if it's plus or minus 30 

percent, my prediction is it will make almost 

zero difference in POC value. A 30 percent swing 

on a dose input value with models that span a 
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large, you know, range, I mean even -- and if 

you have alpha dose on top of it because the 

alpha (unintelligible) effectiveness factors goes 

anywhere from like 5 to 100 times that dose. So 

there's all kinds of other parameters in there 

that drive those uncertainties hugely. But we 

haven't -- we haven't done a detailed analysis 

of... 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I'm just -- I'm pointing out 

when you get to these cases that sort of start to 

approach your 45 percentile, I think we need to 

at least --

DR. NETON: Yeah, I agree. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible). 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We've got several things to check 

on this one I think. 

 MR. GRIFFON: The last --

DR. NETON: If it's in the 45 percentile, I 

suspect there's a lot more going on that's 

claimant-favorable for a (unintelligible). 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There are. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, the internal is very 

claimant-favorable. Right, right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Now, Mark wanted to talk a little 

bit about the plan for tomorrow and -- 
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DR. NETON: Yeah, my copy indicated you wanted to 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- so we may want to just chat 

about that for a minute. If anybody who's not 

going to be involved in that conversation wants 

to take a break, I guess they can do that right 

now. We can sort out what's going to happen 

then. 

DR. NETON: Well, I guess the first question is 

how many people here are going to attend and 

participate? The problem is -- is -- I don't 

know how you're running. Are you going to meet 

tomorrow morning to finish up these 18? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't think so. 

 MR. GRIFFON: No, we're going to get through. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't think we're going to need 

it. 

DR. ROESSLER: No, we'll get through. 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) zip right along. 

DR. NETON: I've been trying to get -- see, 

tomorrow morning the idea was that it would sort 

of be -- we have no court recorder scheduled for 

tomorrow because there was -- you know, there was 

a possibility that you guys were -- tomorrow 

morning. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: So Ray was scheduled to -- we 

have had actually this room scheduled for this 

conversation tomorrow morning. 

DR. NETON: Right. And I was going to meet 

upstairs in 124. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right, uh-huh. 

DR. NETON: And that's why I came down here. 

was going to get set up and try to get some juryrigged NOCTS access, which turns out is not as 

easy as I thought. If we can convene here 

tomorrow morning with no court recorder required 

and that on the agenda is going over case files. 

I think (unintelligible) is just heading out from 

what I saw at --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, he wanted to get on NOCTS, 

so... 

DR. NETON: I mean so he may get bored, but I was 

going to go through -- I selected the 66 -- I 

have a listing of 66 cases we've done so far for 

Mallinckrodt that are compensable, the 6 that 

aren't. And I was going to go over some examples 

and pick whatever anybody else wants and go 

through as to what approaches were used. And 

then I have three new cases that I just received 

from ORAU that are done sort of proof of 

I 
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principle using the profile, although, you know, 

you can't get all possibly flavors, but just to 

get an idea of how those will done against the 

profile. That was going to be sort of show and 

tell and no substantive discussion of issues 

because we can't get into that if the court 

recorder is not available. Now, if Ray is 

available and we go quickly through the demo 

files, then maybe we could get into some 

discussions. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, and -- and then the plan 

generally was in the afternoon we were going to 

get into the SC&A question resolution? 

DR. NETON: Yes. Well, discuss the questions and 

stuff. That was the plan in the afternoon, talk 

about -- there's some internal dosimetry 

questions, external, and some combined questions. 

Cindy Bloom is coming in today. She'll be here 

for tomorrow all day and Thursday. She is more 

knowledgeable about the specifics of Mallinckrodt 

than I am. And Janet Westbrook is going to be 

available by telephone for any real nuts and 

bolts issues that go to data. So that's the 

plan. I'm encouraged to hear we can meet here 

tomorrow. It sounds like you guys are going to -
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-

 MR. HINNEFELD: We'll just make a point of 

staying till we're done. 

DR. NETON: Well, I don't want to, you know, tax 

anybody. 

 MS. BEHLING: No, we'll get there. 

DR. NETON: If you can do that, then great. Then 

tomorrow morning we'll meet here, say 8:30-ish. 

Is that when you started today or -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's when we tried to start 

today. 

 MS. BEHLING: Depends on when our cab gets here. 

 DR. BEHLING: Taxi cab drivers --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Depends on how good of directions 

we give them. 

DR. NETON: Well, we have two full days for 

Mallinckrodt, so I feel we've got plenty of time. 

I mean if we want to start at 9:00 to make sure 

people can get here and get some coffee, that's 

fine by me. I'll make sure I'm ready to set up 

with the projector and everything. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, I was hoping to head out 

tomorrow night, so --

DR. NETON: Okay, 8:30 then. We'll start at 8:30 

tomorrow. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: I mean I can --

DR. NETON: Yeah, we'll go through the questions, 

and Thursday was really sort of an open agenda 

item. It had just general more discussion, and I 

don't know if we're going to solve all of the 

Mallinckrodt issues tomorrow. This is a little 

ahead of where I -- it needs a little further 

advance than I may want to hold it, but it's 

fine. I mean if we can get these issues on the 

table. I will -- I need to talk to Leroy, 

though, because he was not planning on having the 

NOCTS available here until tomorrow afternoon. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

DR. NETON: So I'll make -- I'll try to see if I 

can get that hooked up. There may have to be 

some people mucking around in here while you're 

deliberating. Okay. So how many people are 

planning on attending then tomorrow? Gen's going 

to be here. Okay. So pretty much Hans and Kathy 

-- this will be right up your alley, and then 

we're going to be going over some case files, 

which is, you know, how we've approached the 

Mallinckrodt cases thus far and how we intend to 

do the remaining. Turns out there's really only 

90 -- 127 cases of Mallinckrodt that are not in 
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the SEC, people who started work after 1948 and 

worked at the Destrehan Street facility. So of 

those 127, you know, we're going to -- I'm going 

to try to -- I'm going to show you three that 

have been done according to profile. And turns 

out we probably have done about 30 of them 

already using the -- some similar techniques to 

what you've seen already, the 20 radionuclides 

mix and that kind of stuff. 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) we don't have more 

board members here. 

DR. NETON: I will leave this stuff here. 

DR. ROESSLER: You're going to be here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Can we take a break? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, we can take a break for a 

couple minutes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: There's one more point on this last 

case. It doesn't make sense to -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, go ahead. 

 MR. GRIFFON: The question I had was, the Hanford 

worker, was he doing any glovebox work? I think 

we talked about this sometime. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean he tore -- he tore -- 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Question I had. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- one of the gloves and, you know, 

so --

 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know the extent of his 

glovebox work over time, but I guess the question 

I had was -- especially -- I saw that recent TIB 

released on the applicability of -- or 

corrections to be used for certain organ doses, 

and this is a testicular cancer. You got I 

imagine lapel monitoring. Was that taken into 

account, the glovebox -- potential glovebox 

exposures? I mean there was a lot of corrections 

given to -- to the various, you know, doses here 

for energy levels for other -- you know, did 

anyone take into account the glovebox question? 

DR. NETON: Up until now the glovebox corrections 

that we've been using were only for cases that 

were either clearly non -- or probably clearly 

non-compensable. We didn't have a refinement. 

We knew it couldn't be higher than, like I said, 

a factor of 10. So we just, you know, jack it up 

by a factor of 10 and say that we will -- we're 

in the processing of refining that TIB right now. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I'm not saying it wasn't 

even in -- it clearly wasn't available at the 
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time this --

DR. NETON: Right. That's what I'm wondering -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

DR. NETON: It might have not. 

 DR. BEHLING: From the description, I'm not sure 

he was a -- a typical glovebox worker. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. I'm not clear on that, 

either. Appears, I should say. 

 DR. BEHLING: He worked as an engineer, generally 

in the B Plant as a chemical technologist in the 

PUREX lab --

 MR. GRIFFON: So it might have involved very 

minimal --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Here's kind of a description, 

some of the CATI quotation, and -- let's see. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Chemical technologist. 

 MS. BEHLING: (Unintelligible) 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Receiving process samples, 

breaking samples down, radiochemical analysis, 

decontamination activities, lab hoods, and 

spills. Sounds like he worked in the laboratory 

more than a glovebox --

 MR. GRIFFON: Rather than a glovebox setting, 

yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I don't think this is a 
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typical glovebox worker. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Okay, I wasn't clear on that. I 

know I saw that one incident with a glove -- 

related to a glovebox and I didn't know if he was 

-- did that for a period of time or whatever. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That was it. Okay. Take a break. 

 MS. BEHLING: Can we go --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Break for a few minutes. 

Ten minutes? 

 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:35 

p.m. to 2:55 p.m.) 

 (Whereupon, Dr. Neton was unavailable for the 

remainder of the day.) 

 MS. BEHLING: All right. I guess I'm going to 

start now with tab 31, and the rest of these 

really will go quite quickly, I -- I believe, 

just because when I scanned through these I 

didn't see any new issues that we really haven't 

discussed before. But we'll still go through 

each of the tabs, and if anybody has any 

questions, you know, just stop -- stop us along 

the way. Again, tab 34 (sic), and this is case 

number 010556 and this was our second Hanford 

case of these 18. This case, the employee had 
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several jobs, job titles -- pipefitter, 

maintenance engineer, operations specialist. He 

was employed from September of 1980 I guess up 

until present and was diagnosed with prostate 

cancer in July of 2002. 

 The dose reconstructor indicated that this was -- 

they -- they proceeded with this dose -- 

reconstructing this dose in an overestimation 

using overestimating techniques for calculating 

the dose, and their dose was 27.7 rem and that 

resulted in a probability of causation of 16.6 

percent. 

And if you look down Table 1, as you can see, the 

-- the biggest contributor of the dose was the 

missed neutron dose, which was over 10 rem. And 

I believe in this case there were two findings, 

and I do have to make two corrections here. We 

sort of went back into these cases after we were 

done and Mark and I had been working on the 

matrix and the checklist, and some cases I didn't 

identify all the findings appropriately in the 

text. And in this particular case, in Table 2, I 

MR. ALLEN: What page? 

 MS. BEHLING: -- on page 7, I erroneously marked 
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that we had a finding at C.2.1 and actually the 

finding should be the missed photon dose, which 

is C.2.2. It's the same number of findings, but 

I just checkmarked the wrong box there. The 

second issue I see that I didn't do here is on 

page 9 under the photon recorded dose, under our 

reviewer's comments, that's where I should have 

inserted finding 31.1-C.4.1. And the issue here 

was failed to account for photon dose 

uncertainty, and this is the same issue where the 

dose reconstructor had a recorded dose. He 

entered it as a constant with no uncertainty, 

which is not what is recommended by OCAS-IG001, 

and I believe we've touched on that many times 

now. 

The second issue, again Hans got the brunt of -- 

of all of the findings and he discussed this in 

his Hanford case, and this is an issue where when 

we -- we did -- it was an inappropriately 

accounted for maximum potential missed dose. And 

when you go into the IREP code, the actual dose 

is correct. They entered a median dose with 

geometric standard deviation of 1.52, and we 

could reproduce that dose. However, it's the 

wording that appears in the dose reconstruction 
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report that we're questioning because, again, the 

dose reconstructor indicated that the maximum 

potential missed dose of 4.56 rem from photons -- 

that was the value that was calculated and that 

this was entered as a 95th percentile of the 

lognormal distribution. And it's just confusing 

when you actually go into IREP and you tally up 

the total number that are the maximum dose. You 

won't come up with this 4.56; you come up with 

one-half that value, but that is correct as far 

as the dose that's been entered into IREP. It 

was a correct dose entered into IREP along with 

the standard -- the standard deviation of 1.52. 

However, it's -- we're just questioning the 

wording that's put into this boilerplate dose 

reconstruction report. 

MR. ALLEN: We struggled with that ourselves 

so... 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. That's -- those are the only 

two findings in this particular case. The only 

thing I will point out, because it's something 

that we did talk about earlier and I just marked 

this more as an observation. As I mentioned, a 

lot of times when we do the -- when we're going 
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through the dose reconstruction reports, when we 

go through our reference list, we will find 

references that aren't necessarily appropriate. 

In this case, this is the ORAU-PROC 6 reference 

that should have been -- and they're referencing 

that -- that Attachment E, but they're using an 

older version and they did not use the PC-1 

version which was dated November 7th, 2003. So 

to be technical, they -- they -- technically they 

used the wrong -- the wrong reference in that 

dose reconstruction report. I -- I just marked 

that as an observation. 

DR. ROESSLER: I have a question on this case, 

and it probably elapsed this morning. I think we 

talked about it. This is dose to the prostate 

using the bladder as the surrogate organ and in 

case 23 the testes was used. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: What was the difference on that, 

Kathy? 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Initially, the -- the 

implementation guide states that you should use 

the testes as the surrogate organ for the 

prostate. However, TIB -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: 5. 
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 MS. BEHLING: -- 5. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: OTIB-5. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- OTIB-5 states that you should 

use the bladder as the surrogate organ for the 

prostate. 

 DR. BEHLING: For external. 

 MS. BEHLING: For external dose. And so there's 

an inconsistency in the procedures and I believe 

Dave said that possibly back when they did this 

dose reconstruction -- or did that dose 

reconstruction, both the TIB and the 

implementation guide specified the testes. Is 

that correct? 

MR. ALLEN: Everything originally specified 

testes, and that was a question we raised 

ourselves and decided bladder was a much better 

surrogate and changed OTIB-5 several months ago, 

but this is past tense here. 

DR. ROESSLER: So you're saying scientifically, 

the bladder is the more appropriate surrogate, 

and which would be more claimant-friendly? 

MR. ALLEN: Testes. 

 DR. BEHLING: Testes. Yeah, especially if it's 

an AP geometry exposure. 

DR. ROESSLER: I'm trying to think of the anatomy 
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 DR. BEHLING: Well, the prostate sits right at 

the neck of the bladder and so it would be more 

subject to -- to photon attenuation as would be 

the testes. So testes would clearly be more 

claimant-favorable for AP geometry using external 

exposure -- for -- for (unintelligible) exposure, 

there's no question. 

DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. So those are the only two 

issues with tab 31, with the Hanford. 

Okay. We'll go on to tab 32, and this is Nevada 

Test Site, and it's case number 006704 and -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Just for the record, I'll have to 

recuse myself from this Nevada Test Site case. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: In this particular case, it was a 

female employee who was diagnosed with breast 

cancer in 2001 and actually worked for only a 

several -- a few months in 1970 and then again in 

1979. NIOSH derived a dose of 17.3 rem which 

resulted in a probability of causation of 28 

percent. Here again the majority of the dose was 
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associated with the internal dose by using the 

hypothetical internal dose model. Let me see 

here -- again, the first issue -- the first 

finding we have on page 9 is finding 32.1-4 -- C4-2 -- .2, I'm sorry, inappropriate missed photon 

dose uncertainty. And here again it is what we 

have seen throughout. If you're going to 

maximize the dose, you use LOD times 10, enter 

that as a constant into IREP with no uncertainty, 

or you can use a best estimate where you take LOD 

divided by 2 times N and enter that as a 

geometric mean with a standard -- geometric 

standard deviation of 1.52. And in this case 

they inappropriately entered it as a median value 

of a lognormal distribution when they should have 

actually entered it as a constant. And that's, 

again, associated with that ORAU-TIB-10. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: TIB-10. 

 MS. BEHLING: TIB-10. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

DR. ROESSLER: Are there any claimants ever male 

with breast cancer? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Beg your pardon? 

DR. ROESSLER: Are there -- have you ever had any 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. Male claimants with -- 

yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 

MR. ALLEN: We have some now. I don't know if 

we've completed them or not, but we've had -- I 

know there's some in there. 

 MS. BEHLING: I -- I know. I thought about that 

when I said about the breast cancer. Yeah, you 

can certainly have --

 DR. BEHLING: Well, we also have records of -- of 

the actual dosimetry, and in this case we were -- 

based on the name -- aware of the fact that this 

was a female. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, but -- but the gender of 

the claimant is part of the claimant -- claim. 

DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, part of the record. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Part of the record. 

DR. ROESSLER: So you don't have to go by name. 

That could be dangerous, too. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: No. 

MR. ALLEN: No. No, we don't. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: There's a gender-specific -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the IREP model. 
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DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, I remember looking one of 

these up on that. I think it might -- might have 

been this one. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. And then we can skip to page 

12 under the audit of the internal doses and here 

again, I -- I identified two findings and they 

both have to do with the hypothetical internal 

dose model, the fact that this was obviously a 

breast cancer and they used the colon as the -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Surrogate. 

 MS. BEHLING: -- the surrogate organ, where they 

could have used the breast itself because that's 

the organ of interest or tissue of interest in 

this particular case, which obviously results in 

an overestimating or conservative dose, internal 

dose. And also in this particular case, I 

believe --

 DR. BEHLING: 28. 

 MS. BEHLING: Let's see. Is this a 28 also? No, 

I didn't identify this one as a -- as -- they did 

use the 28 radionuclides and I should have 

actually incorporated that also into our findings 

for consistency, which I didn't in this 

particular case. But with this being Nevada Test 

Site, they should have actually also used the 12 
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radionuclide model for this, for the internal 

dose calculation. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think we make allowance for 

Nevada Test Site --

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- for using the 28 radionuclide. 

I think that -- I have to figure out where we 

wrote that because of -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- Because of fission products. 

 DR. BEHLING: Fission products, right. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: Right. I mean that's the whole -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: That's why. 

 DR. BEHLING: Fission products is what drives the 

28 versus 12, the reactor being a source term for 

fission products. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: So that's probably something we 

don't want to --

 MR. HINNEFELD: The 28 is probably okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I didn't cite it in this 

one. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's not written here. 

 MS. BEHLING: The reason I have two findings is 
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because I indicated there you selected the wrong 

model and also obviously then you didn't account 

-- or you improperly accounted for the 

hypothetical internal dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, the dose is different 

because of the model selection. 

 MS. BEHLING: So it's just dose. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And I looked at -- this is one of 

the cases that I -- I was -- that I looked at 

getting ready for the meeting and we kind of 

(unintelligible) --

 MS. BEHLING: Sure. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And the work -- the spreadsheet 

that has the dose to the breast is right there in 

DR development --

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- so -- but they didn't use it, 

they used colon, which is the highest nonmetabolic or the routine choice, which was the 

original approach of TIB-2 was highest nonmetabolic. 

 MS. BEHLING: So there was -- there was a reason 

why we didn't cite the 12 and 28 radionuclides in 
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this particular case. 

 DR. BEHLING: I'm not even sure -- I won't give 

myself credit for saying the fission products 

would have been there that would warrant the 28, 

but maybe it was just a gratuitous oversight on 

our part that we did. 

 MS. BEHLING: No, come on. Okay. Unless there's 

any other questions on this particular case, 

we'll move on to tab 33. And tab 33 is case 

number 5206, which is a Fernald case. And again, 

there is very few findings in this particular 

case but I'll give you an overview. 

 This employee worked from 1955 until July of 

1994. He worked as a laborer and was diagnosed 

with four basal cell skin carcinomas in 1993 and 

1998. Two of the skin cancers were on the eyelid 

and two were in -- on the back, in the back -- on 

the back region. And actually when NIOSH 

calculated the dose in this particular case, the 

dose actually -- entering that dose into IREP 

actually exceeded the 50 percent POC value, and 

so this case was compensated. The only reason 

that I identified, let's see, some findings in 

this particular case was something that Hans 

discussed in detail earlier, and that was the 
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fact that SC&A is questioning the DCF values for 

the skin in the implementation guide, the 

external implementation guide. And he went into 

great detail about our issues and concerns about 

these DCF values, and so that was one of the 

findings in this particular case. 

Let's see what the second one is. 

 DR. BEHLING: The second one is (unintelligible). 

 MS. BEHLING: Oh, yes. Yeah, in this particular 

case it just so happened -- the assumptions that 

were used by NIOSH in calculating the dose -- one 

of the assumptions was to use a dose reduction 

factor of .6, which was applied to -- because of 

attenuation from clothing. And when we actually 

went into the Technical Basis Document they also 

give a more modest dose reduction factor of .8. 

And one of the other issues was that the dose 

reconstructor -- he -- he used The Health Physics 

Manual of Good Practices for Uranium Facilities 

as his basis for the dose reduction factor of .6, 

and I don't believe he actually referenced that 

in his records, unless he may have made mention 

of it in the dose reconstruction report. But the 

other issue is, he -- he could have, more 

appropriately in our minds, used the Technical 
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Basis Document for Fernald to come up with a dose 

reduction factor of .8. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean he was overly 

underestimating the dose -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- which is something that is 

commonly used when you -- really trying to push 

this to the test and saying will we have to 

compensate, by either doing a partial or using 

parameters that are not necessarily claimantfavorable or claimant deliberately unfavorable. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: But, you know, the -- the reduction 

factor of .8 versus .6, the TBD offers that as -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- one option and I said well, why 

did he have to go to another (unintelligible) to 

come up with this value when the TBD has a value 

here that he could have referenced that would 

have been more appropriate. But, you know, it's 

a nitpicking issue. 

DR. ROESSLER: So what you're saying is instead 

of using .8, he used .6 --

 DR. BEHLING: .6. 

DR. ROESSLER: -- and still came up over -- 
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 DR. BEHLING: Yes, uh-huh. 

DR. ROESSLER: So -- I got it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: And all these -- and really only 

considered two of the four cancers. 

DR. ROESSLER: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: He had four basal cells -- 

DR. ROESSLER: That's right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- but only two of them were 

considered in the dose reconstruction. 

DR. ROESSLER: In the other basal cell cancer, 

did they use this dose -- 

 DR. BEHLING: No, no. It's only for clothing. 

The eyelids are --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Eyelids wouldn't --

DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, I don't mean this -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Unless the guy wore glasses or 

something --

DR. ROESSLER: A different case, there was a guy 

with a back cancer, an earlier one. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. There wasn't any -- I 

don't think there was any beta dose on that. 

Wasn't it all photon dose on that? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think so. 

DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I believe that's it for this 
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case. I got the easy ones. 

DR. ROESSLER: Maybe you're just more efficient. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: The meeting goes much quicker 

when you run things, Kathy. 

DR. ROESSLER: Kathy, there's only two. There's 

two of our gender here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. We're going to go on to tab 

34, but this I must have been doing late at 

night. I made -- I got a little overzealous on 

the checkmarks that I put in my checklist. I 

think I -- in the version that you got that was 

originally sent out I think I have eight findings 

and there's actually only six. And I don't think 

they're the same findings as what I ultimately 

came to when I changed some wording. So here's 

five pages of an errata sheet that I sent to some 

people. I actually sent to -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Me and Dr. Ziemer. 

DR. ROESSLER: I think -- yes, I've got copies of 

that. 

 MS. BEHLING: I may have sent this out before the 

meeting also, but I do apologize. 

MR. ALLEN: I got it. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. It makes it a little bit 

easier when we go through this case if you have 
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those. Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Maybe I'll just mention that I'll 

insert these errata sheets in the hard copy that 

I'm going to provide to Ray so that Ray's version 

will have the corrected sheets. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. And after this meeting and we 

come to some resolution on these issues, and 

we'll be submitting a revised version. And in 

fact, there was several typographical errors that 

we found throughout. But this particular case, 

it makes it so much more difficult to go over 

this case if you don't have these errata sheets 

in your hand here. 

Okay. As I said, this is tab 34. It's case 

number 014898, and it is again a Fernald site. 

The individual worked at Fernald from 1954, early 

time frame, until 1968 and was diagnosed with 

prostate cancer in 1990. Again, this was 

considered an overestimation of the dose by 

NIOSH, and they derived a 35.6 rem dose to 

prostate, which resulted in a probability of 

causation of 37.95 percent. The largest 

contribution of dose was the calculation or the 
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estimate of missed photon dose, which was over 16 

rem, and then there was also a hypothetical 

internal dose calculated. 

Okay. As I said, there were actually six 

findings as opposed to the eight original 

findings, and let's see here. Okay. We -- we 

discussed this several times before, again, and 

that's the issue of using either the testes or 

the bladder as the surrogate for the prostate, 

and I make mention of that on page 9. I don't 

know that I actually identified that as a 

finding, but I did make mention that there's an 

inconsistency between the two guidance documents. 

So the first finding, 34.1-C.2.2 on page 10 of 

the errata sheet -- let's see here, inappropriate 

assignment of missed photon dose. Okay. In this 

particular case this individual, as I recall, had 

records, and -- yes, older records seem to be 

available. And I just felt as I went through 

this, again, it's this issue of if you have an 

unknown, then be maximally claimant-favorable and 

you can overestimate the dose. However, in this 

particular case the records did exist and I was 

able to go into those records and actually 

calculate the number of missed dose cycles which, 
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rather than NIOSH's number of 328 missed 

dosimetry cycles, I calculated or counted 197. 

And the difference in missed dose then from the 

16.3 rem that was calculated by NIOSH would have 

been 9.8 using the same -- using the same LOD and 

DCF values as NIOSH used -- for the 197 dosimetry 

exchange cycles. And again, it's just an issue 

of -- as the regulations state, when you -- when 

you know the information, there is no reason to 

be overly claimant-favorable in this case. 

 DR. BEHLING: And let me just interject, 

sometimes -- we probably would not have even made 

that an issue if the dose reconstruction -- right 

now, I'm making an assumption here that he did 

not, but sometimes they will say a missed dose 

was assigned for all years during which the 

person was monitored based on the exchange 

frequency, independent of whether or not a person 

had a recorded dose. And so they tell you that, 

for instance, if six cycles out of this year, a 

person had a recorded dose, they would still give 

you 12. And if they state that, then you know up 

front that that is an intended overestimation of 

missed dose because they state so. And I'm not 

sure in this case whether that was done or not. 
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But 320 versus 197, sort of -- I don't know where 

they came up with that number. 

 MR. GIBSON: (Unintelligible) 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, okay, we discussed this 

already. Thanks. 

(Whereupon, Mr. Gibson excused himself from 

the meeting.) 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Yeah, and I'm not sure -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Again, it's claimant-favorable. 

 MS. BEHLING: It's claimant-favorable, but -- 

 DR. BEHLING: The question is, is this an issue 

that you want to necessarily deal with by 

correcting something. For efficiency purposes, 

it's sometimes easier -- rather than to go 

through each of the data sheets of dosimetry and 

saying oh, for this year there were -- there was 

three recorded doses that were positive, 

therefore missed dose is only 9. And perhaps for 

efficiency one could argue let's just assume all 

years and all cycles were basically missed and 

therefore -- knowing very well that you're going 

to overestimate and in the process save yourself 

an hour or two worth of going through the 

individual records, I can understand the 

efficiency factor here. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: That's probably what was done in 

this case. 

 MS. BEHLING: The second finding has to do with 

the use of the limit of detection for -- in this 

particular case, the dose reconstructor used 

ORAU-TIB-10, which is a complex-wide procedure 

and assumed a 40 millirem per cycle limit of 

detection where they -- they should have gone to 

the site-specific procedure or Technical Basis 

Document, the Fernald Technical Basis Document, 

which actually identifies 30 millirem as your -- 

to be used for your LOD for your missed dosimetry 

cycles. So again, this was an overestimation of 

the dose, but we just felt it was more 

technically correct to use the information from 

the Technical Basis Document. 

 And then finding three, which is finding 34.3-

C.4.2, again goes back to this reoccurring issue 

that we obviously have seen in almost every case, 

and that's inappropriately assigning uncertainty 

for the missed photon dose. 

 DR. BEHLING: When LOD is used. 

 MS. BEHLING: Right, when LOD is used. Exactly. 

I think we've gone through that enough times now. 

Okay. And here again, the -- we're going to move 
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on to the on-site ambient dose, and I identify 

two findings on page 12, that the dose 

reconstructor failed to account for on-site 

ambient dose and that they didn't use appropriate 

procedure for considering the use of on-site 

ambient dose. Again, I just feel -- looking at 

the regulations and looking at what's most 

defensible, the dose reconstructor in this case 

actually made the statement in the dose 

reconstruction report that because they used 

claimant-favorable correction factors for 

measured and missed photon dose, they decided not 

to use -- not to calculate an assigned dose -- an 

on-site ambient dose. And I feel that it would 

be -- it would have been better -- in fact I 

cited up-front findings that it --the dose 

reconstructor could have almost -- just as easily 

looked at the records, they were clear to me how 

many missed doses there were, and actually count 

the correct number of missed doses and then gone 

into the Fernald -- Fernald does have -- it's one 

of those facilities that in the early years -- 

since this dose reconstructor (sic) started his 

employment in 1954, Fernald has a workbook or a 

spreadsheet I believe that you can go in and very 
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easily put in the years of employment and 

calculate the on-site ambient dose, which in this 

particular case I did and it came up to 9.17 rem. 

And so I just felt it's more defensible and 

scientifically sound to actually calculate the 

doses that apply to this particular dose 

reconstruction in the most appropriate manner. 

And like I said, although in early cases I said 

it was a lot of overestimation of dose, in this 

particular case I feel they should have 

calculated this on-site ambient dose. 

Okay. The last --

 MR. GRIFFON: To me, that 9.17 rem -- or 9.71, I 

forget what you said. Is that for the entire -- 

how long was that individual there? 

 MS. BEHLING: '54 through '68, I believe. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Is that for that 14-year period? 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: Was it based on a maximum 

(unintelligible) -- you're placing the person 

always at the highest location? 

 MS. BEHLING: I don't know yet, because we didn't 

get training. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Workbook training. That's pretty 

high. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: That's out of the workbook? Yeah, 

that's 600 --

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- millirem a year. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: That's 600 or 700 millirem a 

year. That's pretty high for a uranium plant. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That seems surprising to me to have 

that high of an ambient dose. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: So are you saying they really 

underestimated in this case, that we should add 9 

to --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes. Yeah, that's the 

deficiency. 

DR. ROESSLER: -- and with a POC of 38, that -- 

 MS. BEHLING: However --

 MR. HINNEFELD: It was already about 8 that she 

took out. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. What I was going to say is, 

if you go back to Table 1, the majority of the 

dose in Table 1 is identified under photon missed 

dose, which was 16 rem. And I'm suggesting that 

-- the dose reconstructor really overestimated 

that dose because --

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DR. ROESSLER: Oh -- oh, yeah. I see it here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. It should have been around -- 

I think I calculated -- what did I say, 9. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I think you said --

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, about 9 rem. 

DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: So in one case, I'm -- I'm saying 

add -- you know, add the 9 rem for the on-site 

ambient, but to me it's just still something 

that's more defensible -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess my question was -- 

 MS. BEHLING: -- in both cases. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- is that ambient worksheet -- I 

mean that seems high to me. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. I wondered where that is, 

too. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. In fact --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Maybe I'll go over that one when 

I'm over there. 

 MS. BEHLING: In fact, I found it interesting 

also, because initially I -- I wasn't going to 

delve this far into that on-site ambient, but 

when I started to look at those worksheets and 

the site-specific Fernald, there is a Word 

version write-up up front that talks about how 
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significant the Fernald dose was in the early 

years. So that's what made me look a little bit 

deeper and actually calculate what that dose was. 

Yeah. But it's something hopefully we'll discuss 

over the next few days of the training. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: K65. It had to be close to K65 

to get anything --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- anywhere close to that, and 

then it would be --

 MR. GRIFFON: Maybe they assume --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- badge storage and subsequent 

subtraction of that, you know, from control. I 

don't know. I don't know what they did in the 

'50s. In the early '80s the control badges were 

kept in the lab. So I don't know what they did 

in the '50s. There was two in 1954. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. And if we move on to the 

internal dose, here again, in this particular 

case they used the hypothetical internal dose. 

They did assume 12 radionuclides. They used the 

colon, even though I guess you can now use -- I 

think you can use prostate now in -- in the 

model. But what I wasn't able to do was to 

reproduce the electron dose with, again, energies 
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less than 15 keV based on the assumptions that 

were provided in the dose reconstruction report. 

And again, I used the workbook version 3.03, and 

I believe I may have gone back to an older 

version of the workbook that I had, which didn't 

change anything. 

MR. ALLEN: Oh, I recognize the number. There 

was an error in an earlier workbook. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

MR. ALLEN: The electron greater than 15 keV, you 

said? 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's got a (unintelligible) 

greater than 15. 

MR. ALLEN: There -- there was an error on that 

12 isotope that added one of those isotopes into 

the 12, exactly 13 isotopes, one of which did not 

belong there. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

MR. ALLEN: That's why you can't reproduce it. 

It was corrected later. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. In fact, that makes sense 

because -- well -- yeah, that does make sense 

because initially the difference between my 

calculation and their calculation for the 
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electron dose energies greater than 15, NIOSH 

derived 1.265 rem and my -- my dose came up to 

.886 rem. 

MR. ALLEN: Sounds about right. 

 MS. BEHLING: So that's -- I think that probably 

accounts for it. So I was using a version where 

this was corrected. 

MR. ALLEN: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. That explains it. Okay. 

Let me just mark this. 

 Okay, and I believe that's all the findings for 

this case unless anyone has some questions. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I just have a question but it's 

more of on the Fernald site -- I mean the 

monitoring practices. I'm looking at this 

person's record, and from '58 to '59 it seems 

like he went from having like all zeroes in his 

deep dose to having measurable quantities. Was 

there --

 MR. HINNEFELD: What was his job? 

 MS. BEHLING: I was just going to say --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I wondered if it was a matter 

of the work or a matter of the monitoring 

changing from '58 to '59. 
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MR. ALLEN: It's probably the monitoring change. 

I think it went from like weekly to bi-weekly, or 

bi-weekly to monthly --

 MR. GRIFFON: So they'd have more --

MR. ALLEN: -- in that time frame 'cause I think 

you're right. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- detectable sensor -- 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. Yes. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you. 'Cause it's 12 periods, 

yeah. Yeah, you're right. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. We'll move on to tab 35, 

which is the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory site, and it's case number 014627. In 

this case the energy employee worked from 1975 

through 2001 and was diagnosed with breast cancer 

in 2001. She was a member of the administrative 

staff and NIOSH calculated the dose to the breast 

of 48.140 rem, and that resulted in a probability 

of causation of 42 percent. 

 And here again, if you look at Table 1, the 

biggest contribution of dose came from the 

estimation of missed photon dose and they also 

calculated missed electron dose and also there 

was a hypothetical internal dose calculated. 

Okay. We identified three findings. The first 
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finding is on page 10, and once again it's that 

reoccurring theme of an inappropriate method used 

for estimating missed photon dose where they used 

that standard correction factor of 2 and then 

they correct that error by dividing by 2, and 

then they enter the dose as a lognormal -- or as 

a median with a lognormal distribution of 1.52. 

So it's the same -- as you can see, those 

procedures are troublesome to the dose 

reconstructors. 

Okay. Where's finding two here. Okay. We've 

covered two findings there. 

The third finding -- again, something we've 

already talked about -- the hypothetical internal 

-- the hypothetical intake model. They used the 

colon to maximize the dose where they could have 

used the breast as the tissue of interest, which 

would have reduced the internal dose. And also 

in this case they selected the 28 radionuclides 

as opposed to the 12 radionuclides, which I 

thought would have been more appropriate for the 

Lawrence Livermore site. And that also would 

have reduced the dose to, I think -- let's see, 

it would reduce the dose down to 7.2 rem and -- 

as opposed to 13.7 rem as calculated by NIOSH. 
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Let's see. And I believe that's it for tab 37 -- 

35. 

 MR. GRIFFON: You're getting ahead of it. 

 MS. BEHLING: Wishful thinking. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, wishful thinking. 

 MS. BEHLING: That's my next -- Hans's turn. 

 DR. BEHLING: Okay. Here comes slowpoke again. 

DR. ROESSLER: Don't get defensive. 

 DR. BEHLING: Well, I've been insulted 

(unintelligible) --

DR. ROESSLER: I can see I'm not riding back with 

him. 

 DR. BEHLING: All right. Next case, tab 36 is 

case number -- claim number 10920. The 

individual worked at Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory, and the person was there between 

January of 1977 through February of the year 

2000. So he was there for 23 years or 

thereabouts. The Energy employee was an engineer 

type and he was a senior designer. He was 

diagnosed with melanoma skin cancer on the right 

cheek on October 17, 2001 shortly after he 

terminated his employment. There was an assigned 

skin dose of 33.5 rem to the -- to the -- cancer, 

skin cancer, and the POC for that assigned dose 
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was 35.1 percent. 

Table 1 identifies the general distribution of 

assigned doses. For photon recorded dose, he 

only had 100 millirem. The largest dose assigned 

to him was from missed photon dose, less than 30 

keV, with 15 rem and also an assigned missed 

photon dose of an additional 2.6 rem for photon 

doses in the energy range of 30 to 250 keV. He 

was given a fairly significant high occupational 

medical dose, as well as an on-site ambient dose, 

and also a total hypothetical internal dose of -- 

if you add alpha, photon, electron -- 13.5. So 

you see that most of the doses assigned to this 

individual are from the calculated doses that are 

far in excess of the potential real doses based 

upon missed dose as well as internal hypothetical 

dose. 

For this audit we identified a bunch of noes in 

our audit response, that if you look at Table 2, 

there was -- right up front under review of data 

collection as well as issues involving the CATI 

report there were a bunch of noes and also cited 

as potential significant for under review, and 

we'll explain why that turned out to be the case. 

In addition to those, there were several other 
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deficiencies which we identified for -- for 

recorded model photon doses, and those involved 

electron doses. In total we had nine 

deficiencies or issues that we wanted to bring 

up. 

One of the things that we -- I wanted to just 

briefly point out -- and again, it's relatively 

minor -- and that was the issue of how shallow 

doses are -- are identified. And on page 9 I go 

through the actual document itself. In the 

middle of the page we have dose data reported by 

the DOE, and -- for all the years he worked there 

was only -- there were only two years in which he 

received a recorded dose. All others were either 

zero or non-recorded doses. And so for 1980 you 

see two values, a shallow dose and a deep dose. 

And for 1981, again, a -- and for the first year 

was 30 and 30. For 1981 it's 40 and 10. And I 

looked at those and then I tried to identify how 

the entries in the IREP input code for entries 

one through three were derived, and I had a tough 

time really understanding it, so I looked towards 

the bottom. You see at the bottom of page 9 I 

stated -- based on this explanation NIOSH 

assigned the following skin doses which are 
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defined in the entries as one, two, and three, 

and they were also defined as constants. And so 

you see doses defined in behalf of 30 to 250 keV 

and less than 30 keV, and these are the reflected 

doses assigned in the IREP input for the two 

years, '80 and '81. And I cannot really come up 

with how these numbers were derived. And again, 

I sort of go to the Table 3, which I identify on 

page 11 as the instructions that were offered, 

historical Hanford recorded dose practices. And 

-- and you look at those and you sort of say how 

did they come up with the numbers that they 

assigned based on the definition for nonpenetrating and penetrating doses. And as I 

said, they're trivial differences, but I really 

can't quite understand how these numbers that you 

identify in the IREP code were -- were derived 

from these values. 

Also I might want to add that when you look at 

the Table 3 values and then also go to the -- on 

page 25 there is a table which came -- which is 

taken directly out of the DOE assigned doses as 

an instruction -- you find that they're not -- 

not -- they don't coincide in time when you look 

at the Table 2 on page 25 and compare that to 
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Table 3 on page 11. They do not match each other 

in terms of how these dosimeters are to be 

interpreted with regard to -- to skin dose as 

opposed to whole body dose over function of time. 

And then I think sometimes you run into these -- 

these problems where you sort of say well, which 

procedure should I -- which instruction should I 

follow. And as you can see, the time frames 

don't match necessarily. And as I said 

beforehand, the actual doses are trivial, but 

it's just a matter of trying to get an 

understanding of how these doses were actually 

derived. 

In addition, we talk about a skin DCF, and I have 

to say, when -- in this case it didn't matter 

because they used a dose conversation factor of 

1, but the fact is when you add penetrating and 

non-penetrating as defined in those two tables, 

either Table 3 on page 11 or the other table on 

page 25, the skin dose is defined as open window 

plus shielded, let's say, for '44 through '47, do 

you really need a DCF value? In this case, as I 

said, it didn't matter because they used -- 

elected to use a DCF of 1. But the truth is, a 

skin dose is a skin dose, and the concept of a 
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DCF falls by the wayside. The fact that, again, 

these values were entered as constants as opposed 

to a -- an arithmetic mean with an uncertainty, 

again was an issue we've raised in a number of 

previous cases and, again, these doses were 

modest so that any uncertainty assigned dose 

wouldn't have really significantly made any 

difference. But again, it's just a technical 

error. I'm on page 12 and these are the 

findings, 36.3 and 36.4. 

Under other observations I do point out the issue 

of something that we've already discussed, and 

that is what I find is -- is -- are DCF values 

that I can't reconcile based on the actual 

numbers. And we won't go into it but, you know, 

I don't -- I can't understand how the HP-10 dose 

that's given and the DCF values for AP versus PA 

are essentially identical. That cannot be, so 

something is wrong about this whole table in 

which DCFs were derived based on ICRP data. 

One of the things that we could not really do for 

this particular case, and that was explained by 

DOE, that because of the low doses that he 

received they only provided an annual summary 

table, not -- rather than individual monitoring. 
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So it's -- it was essentially impossible for me 

to determine what the frequency of the monitoring 

period was, whether it was monthly, quarterly, or 

whatever. But NIOSH assumed 300 zero dosimeter 

readings on the assumption that they were -- this 

individual was monitored on a monthly basis for 

the full 25 years in question. And then they 

divided by two photon energies, 30 to 250 and 

less than 30 keV. Given that, I will give the 

benefit by saying that okay, in the absence of 

data, 12 cycles per year does appear to be 

claimant-favorable and -- and so it certainly 

would tend to overestimate, if anything else. 

But I didn't make that as a finding, it's just 

that the -- the dosimetry DOE data did not allow 

me to verify whether or not the individual was 

monitored monthly because they stated in the 

dosimetry records that for very low doses they 

simply do not give cycle by cycle readouts. So I 

can only conclude that this must be a claimantfavorable assumption of 300 cycles of monitoring. 

 On-site ambient, again, I think this is something 

that we've talked about. It's likely to be 

trivial, but on-site ambient doses are usually 

defined by a deep dose, which is very appropriate 
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then when you assign an on-site ambient dose for 

a person who has a solid cancer. Or you take the 

HP-10 if you want to do -- take the HP-10 at face 

value, or you take a DCF value in using maybe 

perhaps an isotropic geometry. In this case, the 

cancer in question is skin dose, and therefore 

the ambient doses, as we see them or as they are 

recorded, might just underestimate the actual 

dose to the skin because the on-site ambient 

doses are deep doses. I assume they're always 

recorded as deep doses, which means that a skin 

dose or a skin cancer may be underestimated in 

circumstances where on-site ambient dose is also 

in addition to photon exposures includes the beta 

component or very low energy photon component 

that wouldn't be captured in the environmental 

dosimeter that is recorded only by -- by the deep 

dose. It's not like it's going to be a 

significant change but, you know, it's just 

something that I've raised in other instances 

involving skin cancers since ambient doses are 

never defined for a -- a 7 millirem dose. 

MR. ALLEN: Shouldn't be a lot of low energy 

ambient dose --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 
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MR. ALLEN: I mean if you're close enough to get 

that kind of dose, then it's not ambient anymore. 

 DR. BEHLING: Well, if it's a plume emersion and 

it involves certain noble gases that might 

contain, you know, a beta component, the HP-10 

dose that is normally recorded as a deep dose for 

-- for environmental purposes is -- is something 

that would modestly underestimate the real dose. 

Audit of internal doses on page 15, let's see 

here. He assigned internal dose of 13.4 and it 

corresponds to the colon, which was used as the 

surrogate for non-metabolic tissue. When we did 

the calculation for skin, the dose in question 

turned out to be 8.46 rem, so again the skin is 

one of those tissues that can be calculated 

directly without having to rely on a surrogate 

tissue. Again, the dose is lower, so the 

assigned dose is clearly claimant-favorable and 

was also assigned for 28 radionuclides. Let me 

see here. Does PNNL have reactors that would 

justify the 28 radionuclides? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We would assume a PNNL person 

maybe (unintelligible) around reactor -- 

MR. ALLEN: Pretty intermingled, so -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 
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 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I didn't make an issue out of 

it but I was just asking for -- for own -- my own 

clarification. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We kind of -- it's a little tough 

to separate PNNL --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- from Hanford sometimes, so... 

 DR. BEHLING: As I said, I wasn't sure and so I 

didn't make that as a -- an issue at all. But 

here we have a -- we're on page 16 and the CATI 

report and radiological incidents. Now here's 

the situation -- and I think we can talk about 

this -- where the person in this report claimed 

that he was injured at one point in time in the 

middle '90s while he was working on a pipe that 

ruptured and sprayed him. And apparently he 

claimed he was -- the injury required first aid 

treatment, and there is no record of any 

radiological incidents reported among the DOE 

records that were filed. And one would normally 

dismiss it, but according to the claimant it is 

the exact location where he was subsequently 

diagnosed with a melanoma. Now on that level of 

coincidence, one would certainly want to look at 

this and sort of say was this a radiological 
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incidence that should have been looked at? If it 

was not a radiological incident, could we at 

least dismiss it on the basis of information that 

should have been filed for on-the-job injuries 

which are well-documented even when they're not 

radiological in nature. The question is, given 

the coincidence of an injury that the claimant 

claims to have sustained and that also being the 

exact location of a skin cancer warrants somewhat 

of a closer look that says there is every reason 

to believe that this happened because of first 

aid. Perhaps some documentation in the first aid 

facility where he was apparently treated or, as a 

minimum, collaborate with -- with coworkers who 

may have seen this or been witness to this or 

something. So in essence what I wanted to do 

here is to say can we in some form or fashion 

eliminate the likelihood that that melanoma that 

he had was potentially linked to an injury that 

happened or didn't happen. Right now I don't see 

any documentation that would allow you to say 

categorically one way or the other. 

DR. ROESSLER: What's the latent period for 

melanoma? 

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one, it would have to get up there pretty high to 

make a huge difference. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. There was a relatively few 

years in between the diagnosis and the -- 

DR. ROESSLER: Just six years, and I'm wondering 

if that's a -- I don't know what it is. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know. I was thinking 

melanoma acts a lot like a solid tumor, doesn't 

it? 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. 

DR. ROESSLER: Be more like 10 to 20 years then? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the -- the risk factor, you 

know, doesn't just start in all these things. It 

kind of creeps up. 

DR. ROESSLER: Yeah, yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: So it wouldn't necessarily be 

zero at six years --

MR. ALLEN: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- but it would be far below 

where it would eventually be. 

DR. ROESSLER: Is that entered into the POC? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's part of IREP, yeah. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. Yeah, it's in IREP. Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: And I assume that the shortened 

latency period --
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DR. ROESSLER: This wasn't in there. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- is considered in IREP in terms 

of POC. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. Yes, it'd be independent of 

any dosing we do --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

DR. ROESSLER: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- because that gets sorted out 

in the IREP application. 

MR. ALLEN: So we could go through a lot of 

trouble determining a dose that's been multiplied 

by zero. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Or close to zero. 

DR. ROESSLER: Very close to zero. 

 DR. BEHLING: I mean I would just like to see 

something that says we either confirm or we 

discredit this claim. You know, I mean I don't 

want to call anyone a liar, but, you know, after 

the Wendy's incidence and chili and the finger, 

you sort of say is this something that you 

necessarily want to at least look at? You don't 

want to -- you don't want to call anybody a liar, 

but if -- if the claim is there, certainly an 

employee injured on the job is usually welldocumented. 
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 MR. HINNEFELD: You have -- if you got first aid, 

a lot of places will have it. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: I mean you get their medical 

record --

 DR. BEHLING: Oh, yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it has every visit -- 

 DR. BEHLING: And this was '95. This did not 

happen, you know, in the '60s when here's a band 

aid, son, get out of here. This clearly would 

have been documented and -- and I think we 

should, as a minimum, look at injury reports and 

-- and if nothing else, if that doesn't exist, 

say who were the coworkers that supposedly were 

with you and potentially will have to go on 

record as saying yes, I concur with -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: The outcome of this might be that 

regardless of what the scrape did to his cheek -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the latency period is such 

that it's just not credible to have an impact. 

You know, he -- he -- absolutely factual in 

telling us what happened -- 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 

DR. ROESSLER: Uh-huh. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and it just doesn't matter -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- because not enough time 

passed. I mean that could be (unintelligible) -- 

 DR. BEHLING: But, you know, one would still -- 

the probability which -- I mean the short latency 

period doesn't exclude it. It's just I think 

with the exceptions of -- I think IREP considers 

almost every latency period as something 

contributed to the cancer. I don't know where it 

stops. Clearly obviously, leukemia have a known 

short latency period. I don't know about skin 

cancer, but one could say with horrendous 

exposures if it was an alpha emitter and locally 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Sure. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- and, you know, I wouldn't say 

no. But I would like to at least say we've gone 

the distance. We've identified, you know, or we 

contacted the first aid people. Are there any -- 

any injury reports, are there any people that you 

recall that supposedly worked with you who will 

at least stand by your side and say that yes, 
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they remember him being injured and -- and even 

perhaps identify a location and perhaps a 

potential source term in terms of the 

radionuclides. I would just like to see some 

resolution. Anyway, having -- having that claim 

made by the claimant, we elected to cite a number 

of things that ultimately resulted in an 

uncertainty because we don't know what those 

could have been possibly without necessarily 

jumping to conclusions at this point. 

 MS. BEHLING: So we marked it as under review. 

 DR. BEHLING: Under review. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I know what the -- well, 

the dose -- I know what the dose reconstructor's 

view was that, you know, we gave him this huge 

intake --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- and so on and so forth, and 

the issue here that is sort of dramatic is the 

location of the scrape and the location of the 

melanoma, and so -- yeah. I guess I'd hate to 

speak for OCAS in terms of will we go do this, 

but it seems like that might be something we 

might want to look into. 

MR. ALLEN: As a manner of --
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 MR. HINNEFELD: At the very least --

MR. ALLEN: -- follow-up telephone calls. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- PNNL can obtain medical 

records from '95, which many sites can. I would 

suspect Battelle can. While they may not 

normally routinely provide them -- each site 

provides different stuff in response to our 

routine requests, based upon how they keep it. 

 MR. GRIFFON: But as a special request -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: As a special request, they might 

be able to pull it out and send it to us. 

 DR. BEHLING: And it was so recent. I know that 

most employers today would keep very good records 

on injuries, and they don't have to be serious 

injuries, but if it required first aid treatment 

on location it's likely that they do have records 

that would say no, there is nothing here on our 

file. Which would certainly, again, put some 

distance between the claimant's statement and the 

DR. ROESSLER: I'd like to see what the 

multiplier is six years after. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Where can I find that, Dave? Do 

you know? 

MR. ALLEN: Without asking Russ, we can -- 
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 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, Russ. 

MR. ALLEN: -- input --

 MR. HINNEFELD: We could stick it in IREP and 

just see what kind of POC you get for rem. 

DR. ROESSLER: Yeah. 

MR. ALLEN: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: Vary the time frame, you know, do 

it at 10-year, 15-year, 6-year -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Give him a rem or a rem a year. 

 DR. BEHLING: Let's see what it was, the POC was 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Three years before or six years 

before. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- to see how rapidly it falls off. 

MR. ALLEN: We know '94 is --

 DR. BEHLING: '94, '95 time frame. 

MR. ALLEN: 2001 we've got cancer, so -- we can 

get his age and stick it all in IREP and see what 

kind of a dose --

DR. ROESSLER: They'd have to -- have to bring it 

up there. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We could do something like that. 

 DR. BEHLING: And if it shows that you 

essentially go -- let's say you put in 20 rads to 

the skin, 15 years or 20 years ahead and then at 
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6 years it drops off to nothing, then it's an 

academic question --

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Doesn't matter. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- to even follow through. 

MR. ALLEN: And this guy is not even sure what 

the exact location was. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

MR. ALLEN: He doesn't even know if it was even a 

contaminated area. 

 DR. BEHLING: You know, there are many unanswered 

questions. Did the injury even occur? If it did 

occur, was it an injury that was -- that involved 

a radiological issue? You know, we don't know 

any of the answers here, but just the coincidence 

of the cheek and the -- and the injury sort of 

raises questions that be resolved. 

 MS. BEHLING: Is that it? 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I think that's it for this 

case. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. I'm going to take the last 

one, and -- and this is the last one, tab 37, 

because there were no findings on tab 38. That 

was a Bethlehem Steel case, and it was a 

compensable case and so there were no findings 

there. 
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 DR. BEHLING: For Bethlehem Steel. 

 MS. BEHLING: For Bethlehem Steel on case 38. So 

we're going to -- tab 37 is the last one. And 

that's Paducah, and it's case number 010753. And 

in this particular case the employee worked from 

1951 through 1953 and was diagnosed with prostate 

cancer in 1968. He was an instrument specialist 

and the dose -- NIOSH derived a dose of 18.8 rem, 

and it resulted in a probability of causation of 

17 percent. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Can you tell me -- as you give the 

background for this, can you tell me when they 

started processing in Paducah? I thought it was 

mid-'53, which would mean he was there prior to 

any rad contamination. 

 MS. BEHLING: It was, because in fact when we -- 

Okay. When we go on to my first line, then we'll 

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm sorry. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, that's okay. We'll discuss 

it because this particular case -- this is 

interesting because on page 9 they calculated an 

unmonitored dose for the years '52 and '53, and I 

put a note in here that no dose was assigned for 

1951 because Paducah was not yet operational. 
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Okay. But they did calculate for '52 and '53. 

And the process that they went about -- and this 

was something we were talking about earlier, how 

do we go about calculating these unmonitored 

doses for the various facilities. And in this 

case, again, they went into the Paducah Technical 

Basis Document and there was data showing that 

there were 223 workers monitored with an average 

exposure of 140 rem associated with those 

workers, and a maximum exposure -- 

 DR. BEHLING: 140 millirem. 

 MS. BEHLING: I'm sorry, 140 millirem. I'm 

sorry. 

 DR. BEHLING: I smell (unintelligible) here. 

 MS. BEHLING: Getting tired, huh? -- with a 

maximum exposure of 820 millirem. What NIOSH did 

to assess this or to calculate this unmonitored 

dose for these two years was to use that maximum 

exposure of 820 millilrem, and then they used 

maximizing parameters as specified in TIB-10. 

And those maximizing parameters were they 

multiplied that dose by a factor of 2, they 

assumed that the photon energy was 100 percent 30 

to 250 keV, that it was an acute exposure, and 

they used an organ dose -- a DCF factor of 1.244 
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which corresponds to the bladder as a surrogate 

organ for the prostate. 

 DR. BEHLING: And that's for the ranking to -- to 

organ dose conversion. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. The -- the only issue that we 

wanted to point out here is the fact that they 

did use maximizing parameters associated with 

TIB-10. And I know this sounds like it's 

nitpicking, but it's a technical issue that TIB10 is for --

 DR. BEHLING: Post --

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, it's post-1970 data. TIB-10 

is written for the late film badge era of 1970 

and after. And we're just recommending that this 

-- this -- this is more of a technical flaw that 

maybe NIOSH can either delete this restriction or 

provide separate guidance for pre-1970 film badge 

data. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, if -- if you look at the 

procedures as use this only for late era film 

badge dosimetry --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- and -- and this, of course, 

occurred in the '50s and so -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Of course it --
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 DR. BEHLING: It's not a --

 MS. BEHLING: It's not unreasonable -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It's also for application to a 

measured dose and this guy didn't have any 

measured doses. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MS. BEHLING: Exactly. And it's not that they're 

unreasonable assumptions, it's -- 

 DR. BEHLING: No, they're not. It's just that, 

again, it's a technical limitation that the 

procedure specifies and says don't use this 

unless it's for post-'70 dosimetry data involving 

film. And of course, this is obviously well 

before 1970, so it's just a technical issue. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. The second finding is on 

page 10 and this finding is associated with the 

occupational medical dose. And this -- this was 

just an interpretation by us. The finding is 

inappropriate assignment of occupational medical 

dose uncertainty, and the reason we felt that way 

is because when you go into the Technical Basis 

Document for Paducah they talk about the organ 

dose equivalents for the lumbar spine examination 

that are described as, quote, rough first 

approximations for lumbar spine dose 
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reconstruction in the absence of other 

information. So we assumed that, based on that 

information, the values that were provided should 

be used as a best estimate as opposed to an upper 

bound estimate and that they should have been 

entered -- they should have been entered -- 

 DR. BEHLING: With the 30 percent. 

 MS. BEHLING: Right, as a -- as a -- with an 

uncertainty. 

 DR. BEHLING: And standard is the 30 percent. 

 MS. BEHLING: Thirty percent uncertainty, which 

they weren't in this particular case, no. Right. 

Yeah, entry number 60 of Appendix A shows a 

lumbar spine dose of 2.9 rem, and it should have 

been entered with an estimate of uncertainty. 

 DR. BEHLING: Again, when you look at that and 

compare it to the other lumbar spine, which was 

somewhere around 270 millirem or thereabouts, you 

realize this is a factor of 10 higher. So this 

is a very high dose. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yes. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. I don't know where this 

2.9 came from. I think it has to do with the 

number of years. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. And you may be touching on 
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the next issue, which is finding three. It just 

so happens that we were looking at both the Iowa 

Technical Basis Document and this Paducah 

Technical Basis Document. And when you look at 

the issue of the doses assigned for the lumbar 

spine based on the guidance provided in those two 

Technical Basis Documents, the doses are very 

different. The Technical Basis Document for Iowa 

recommends a dose of 330 millirem for the lumbar 

spine associated with colon -- the colon/rectum 

and it -- for the Paducah, obviously it was -- it 

was the 2.9 rem and we couldn't -- couldn't -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Couldn't reconcile. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah, reconcile why there was such 

a difference. 

DR. ROESSLER: Does it have anything to do with 

the date when they would have given it, the 

technology that's involved? 

 DR. BEHLING: No, they were about the same time 

frame. 

DR. ROESSLER: About the same time. 

MR. ALLEN: Which would have been probably in the 

'50s, as well, I think. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Our reviewer says there was a 

difference in the number of years. Iowa's 
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(unintelligible) --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes. I think one was two and the 

other one was five. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- Paducah's five, that doesn't 

account for the total difference, so -- unless 

you -- I don't know. I'll have to do some more 

research on, you know, where these things come 

from. But 2.19 seems pretty high for -- 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah, it does. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- a lumbar spine exam, colon 

dose for the lumbar spine. Even -- even with 

five years that sounds kind of high. 

DR. ROESSLER: This says the blood changes at 

that -- I'm just kidding. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. And then the final finding 

on this case is on page 11 and it has to do, 

again, with the internal dose. And once again, 

the -- NIOSH selected the colon as -- in 

calculating their hypothetical internal dose, 

which resulted in 11.6 rem where -- whereas they 

could have used the prostate as the organ of 

interest for calculating the hypothetical 

internal, which would have reduced that dose to I 

believe about 10 rem. And again, the issue of 

they selected the 28 radionuclides for Paducah, 
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which I thought the 12 radionuclides would have 

been more appropriate because this facility does 

not have a reactor. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, the 12 certainly should 

have been used. What's the -- what worksheet -- 

what's the worksheet use as the target when it 

comes out for prostate? 

MR. ALLEN: Highest non-metabolic, a lot of times 

it's --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Heart wall or something? 

MR. ALLEN: Heart wall would be typical. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Because with colon, you get some 

GI tract contribution. Is that why colon is 

usually higher? If you're really talking nonmetabolic and from the circulating bloods-- you 

wouldn't use colon because colon is going to 

overestimate the dose just circulating in the 

bloodstream. 

MR. ALLEN: And in reality, heart wall is not the 

greatest because it's a hollow organ. It's got 

the blood going through it, but it's -- it's only 

slightly higher than the rest. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Than the rest. Okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: I believe that's it. 

DR. ROESSLER: I have a question about the 
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medical X-rays, and I probably just haven't been 

listening. But the -- when -- when someone has a 

chest X-ray, then the -- there is a dose assumed 

to the prostate and the bladder and the knees or 

whatever. I mean it's a pretty -- does that 

change over time as the --

 DR. BEHLING: Yes, yes. Collimation and the -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Technology. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- filtration, and other factors. 

DR. ROESSLER: Everything, yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: What starts out as a very small 

dose, ends up as an insignificant dose as a 

function of time. 

DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 

 DR. BEHLING: So for certain cancers such as 

colon and rectal and prostate and testicular, 

because they're basically out of the field and 

with proper collimation and filtration -- 

DR. ROESSLER: At about what year does that -- or 

is it a kind of a gradual? 

 DR. BEHLING: Over in --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Different sites have different 

times. There was a significant change at Rocky 

Flats in 1970. I happen to know that because 

that was one of the cases I looked at, that it -- 
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and for -- this is probably a bladder. It kind 

of disappears after 1970. It was like 25 

millirem in 1970 and then like 1 after that. So 

any kind of change -- different sites did change 

at different times, apparently. I've got those 

tables from the Rocky Flats TBD here I can show 

you what happened there -- over time there. 

 MS. BEHLING: Okay. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Is that it? 

 MS. BEHLING: That's it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Eighteen in one day. We're 

getting better at this. 

 MS. BEHLING: We are. Seventeen. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, I'm sorry. Seventeen. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess I have one follow-up 

question going back to --

 DR. BEHLING: Sixteen. 

 MS. BEHLING: Sixteen. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: We're still getting better. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- that Hanford case 1157, case 

number 30. 

DR. ROESSLER: We don't know for sure yet, 

because Mark speaks. 

 MR. GRIFFON: No, this is the last little point. 

I just wanted to see if -- since we said we'd 
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look at some of these issues on this case, 

anyway. I had a note on this -- on the dosimetry 

records, too, of -- like in 1972, Hans mentioned 

these codes, code 58 or 59 I think he said was 

whole-body. In 1972, as an example, I saw that 

they noted that code 59, not defined for this 

year. And it says it in the -- on the sheet 

itself, not defined for this year. But there --

it shows 11 times in that year and they -- and 

they sum up those doses for that year. So I was 

unclear if the code is not defined for that year, 

but then they're going ahead and summing up the 

doses, what -- what does that tell me. 

 MS. BEHLING: What are they assigning that dose 

to. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. So -- and '72 as an example 

I have, I saw that in some of the records, 

though, where they -- it said code -- it would 

say code so-and-so, and then the next column over 

would be a comment saying this code is not 

defined for this year. 

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. They change codes though, 

every year. 

 MR. GRIFFON: And then they went ahead -- it 

looked like to me they went ahead and used it. 
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Now I -- you know, it is a -- I'm looking at some 

of the other calculations over time change for 

the dosimetry, so I'm not that familiar with it, 

but I'm just laying it out there as a question. 

If these codes weren't defined -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: This is case --

 MR. GRIFFON: -- wouldn't that have -- wouldn't 

that have flagged it when you were going through 

this data. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Case 1157, is that the case? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, 1157. Number 30. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: And that's something we --

MR. ALLEN: I've got the 1972 here. I can tell 

you what doses they used. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Do you see the column I'm 

talking about? Oh, you've got the -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: He's got the -- he's got the 

worksheet. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Spreadsheet, yeah. 

 DR. BEHLING: You know, they --

 MR. GRIFFON: I'm talking about the DOE record, 

maybe we can all get -- take a look at that 

tonight if you have a chance. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, I can pull it out. 
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MR. ALLEN: Let me go grab that. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah, why don't you go grab it. 

Print -- print a bunch of them, 1157. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I don't know if he wants to print a 

bunch of them. The DOE records themselves -- 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, he can print the page. 

Yeah, sometimes we get hundreds of pages of 

responses. 

 MR. GRIFFON: That was it. I just -- that's it. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: It strikes me that there was a -- 

ORAU team has provided some training to various 

people, dose reconstructors, on the records from 

certain sites. And I think they probably 

provided something on Hanford where they -- you 

know, they have gone back to say these are -- 

this is what the records looked like from 

Hanford, and they change over time. And they -- 

and these are the columns, and these are what the 

various codes mean and things like that. Now to 

the extent that, you know, some of the site 

profiles might explain those things relatively 

well and some might not, so there seems to be 

knowledge available that's not necessarily 

captured in the site profile about what -- how to 

interpret those records. So I don't know exactly 
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where those training materials are or things like 

that. 

 MS. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess, what, you know, 

what I keep falling back to is, you know, it's 

pretty easy to follow what -- what you do with 

the data, albeit we haven't walked through the 

worksheets that well. I've tried on my own 

sometimes and I've stumbled a -- you know, 

there's some -- there's a learning curve there, 

but it's pretty easy to follow those 

categorizations. But -- but one thing I think we 

have to reflect back on constantly is we're 

starting with a -- we're starting with the 

assumption that all these numbers are correct. 

And based on -- I mean -- and I think from my 

standpoint I just want to know how they arrived 

at some of these numbers in these nicely-formed 

columns of years of deep dose exposures. I mean 

if -- if -- I think -- and I'm sure someone on 

your team has gone through all this, but I think 

we need to be able to look at that and make sure 

we -- and Hans probably knows better than I. But 

I'm just trying to get a level of -- level of 

comfort with that. 
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 DR. BEHLING: For instance --

 MR. GRIFFON: Did they handle these and, you 

know, --

 DR. BEHLING: Well, once you started with the 

five element multi-purpose dosimeters and they 

developed an algorithm -- now, an algorithm is 

really site-specific or the -- the radiologic 

condition-specific because what applies to one 

location in terms of an algorithm will not apply 

to another. I mean that is very, very, very 

specific to a condition. And I mentioned to you 

I believe when we were at Three Mile Island we 

had different algorithms defined for defining the 

radiation doses for Unit -- the damaged Unit 2 

reactor versus 1. And because of the high beta 

component that was there due to contamination and 

-- and external contamination that was not 

confined to tanks and pipes and so forth. So an 

algorithm is not a single algorithm, but one that 

you've got to define for a radiological 

environment. And of course when you go from one 

site to -- or a DOE site where in one location 

you may have a photon dose that is dominated by a 

very low energy photon like americium 241, you 

can't use that algorithm and compare that to a 
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production reactor, you know, that's clear. So -

-

 MR. GRIFFON: Well, that's what I'm saying. We 

spend a lot of time assessing what went on with a 

number after --

 DR. BEHLING: Yeah. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- it was taken as --

 DR. BEHLING: Is the number correct though? 

 MR. GRIFFON: What were the dose conversion 

factors, or were they, you know, organ dose 

conversions. But all that, what went into making 

that number is what I want to look at or closer 

understand that. I'm sure you guys have done 

that, but --

 DR. BEHLING: I mean it was simple during the 

times when you had a film dosimeter, you had an 

open window and you had a shielded, and you 

realized that a -- a film only responds to low 

energy based on the high z material of silver 

halide, silver bromide. But when you get to the 

multi-element TLDs in later years, those 

algorithms had to be defined for a radiation 

field to know --

MR. ALLEN: I grabbed the whole dose record here. 

 DR. BEHLING: -- what it is, and it is not the 
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same for a very wide range of photon fields. 

 MR. GRIFFON: You got the whole DR record. I 

forgot to bring that case 'cause I had reviewed 

that one. That's the one I've got on a disk at 

home. 

MR. ALLEN: The -- I've got all the DOE records 

that we had. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's the file I want. 

MR. ALLEN: I printed off some of the summary 

stuff. Is this --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Does the sheet you're looking at 

look like any of these? 

 MR. GRIFFON: No, no. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. I guess --

 MR. GRIFFON: The page is --

 DR. BEHLING: Those are the summary sheets for 

(unintelligible). 

 MS. BEHLING: I believe he's looking for these, 

okay? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, okay. 

 MS. BEHLING: Mark? 

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. Yes. 

 DR. BEHLING: Because here they give you -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: For different years they look a 

little different. 
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 DR. BEHLING: This is obviously is 1974 when the 

multi-purpose dosimeter was used and you have 

your five elements and then you have your -- 

 MS. BEHLING: What year? 

 MR. GRIFFON: I know page 41 in that document, if 

you're -- has this 1968 issue that I was talking 

about, and then not too far after that is 1972 

stuff, so --

 DR. BEHLING: Page 41. 

 MR. GRIFFON: -- 41 should start it. 

MR. ALLEN: That's 1968. Looks like those go in 

a different file, probably. 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Go -- maybe go down like on 

the next page -- yeah, here. That's it. That's 

it. Those are some of the ones I was wondering 

about when you had -- you have negative values. 

When you add up every -- they cancel each other 

out, so I know there's something going on. 

MR. ALLEN: Well, we had a hard code of 3, I 

suspect that's -- it looks like they're -- it's 

the same date for four readings in a row. 

 DR. BEHLING: Well, some will be finger rings. 

MR. ALLEN: This guy did have extremity -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

MR. ALLEN: Let's see, 1968. 
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 MR. GRIFFON: I don't -- I don't know that we 

even need this transcribed if you want to close 

out and we can look at this. I mean I --

 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Then we'll wrap up the -- 

 MR. GRIFFON: Do we need it, Jim? I don't think. 

Yeah, we're just --

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- the transcribed portion of the 

meeting then, and then we'll go ahead and have an 

off-line discussion on --

 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, that's fine. 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- this record's interpretation 

thing, if that's okay with you guys. 

(Whereupon, the recorded portion of the discussion concluded a 
_____________________ 

278 

C E R T I F I C A T E OF COURT REPORTER 

STATE OF GEORGIA 

COUNTY OF FULTON 

 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 

Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 

above and foregoing on the day of May 31, 2005; 

and it is a true and accurate transcript of the 

testimony captioned herein. 

 I further certify that I am neither kin 

nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 

have any interest in the cause named herein. 

 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 

20th day of July, 2005. 

STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 

CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 

CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102