~~

point source equation. (7) Since such formulas are for point sources,
large errors can result in calowlating ground level concentrations down-
wind from a milti-stack source. We proposed, Figure 8, treating ali of
the stacks as one large volume source.

Holand (8) has suggested that a volume source could be represented
by postulating a "virtual point source" just far enough upwind to produce
a gaussian distribution of material within the volume source. This
postulation's value is permitting point source calculations to predict
dispersion from a volume sources ,

The calewlation of the distance to this virtual point source my
be accomplished simply by taking advantage of a surprising observation:
The magnitude of the cross wind spread at short range from a point source
is independent of wind speed over a large range of wind speeds.
Experimental results'9) show that an average cross wind spread of 20
degrees is observed for wind speeds of 2-12 meters/sec for distances up
to one kilometer. This amazing fact can be batter understood by con.
sidering the en term in Sutton’s equation. At high turbulence the
concentration varies almost as the inverse square of the distance down
wind, at low turbulence at somewhat less than the inverse square. This
means that athigher wind speeds, when a narrower plume is expected,
higher turbulence tends to spread the plume. At longer distances the
turbulence factor is not as important and the angle of spread does vary
with wind speed. We found that 66 ueters represented the distance to our
virtual point source for most conditions.

Figure 9 shows why it's important to choose diffusion formlas
carefully. Curve A represents the conventional form of Sutton's equation



Final Technical Report

Before 1992, metallic materials (structural stee!, conduit, piping, ventilation, etc.) resulting
from the decommissioning and decommissioning support activities that did not meet the
criteria for release for unrestricted use were sent to Chem-Nuclear for burial. After 1992,
these materials were sent to Eavirocare for burial.

A. Site Characterization

Between 1986 until 1992, samples were obtained using hand and mechanized borings

(soil), wall scabbling (paint), floor scabbling (paint), core sampling (concrete), and

groundwater monitoring wells (groundwater). The samples were aualyzed for chemical

and radiological constituents. The results of this site characterization are described
low.

1. Site Description

The Apollo Site was separated into three areas for planning and controlling the site
characterization and subsequent decommissioning activities: the Apollo Facility, Parking
Lot, and Off-Site areas (Figure 1).

a. Apolio Facility

The Apollo Facility had one main bay, the East Bay, and three smaller attached bays
known as the West Bay, the Box Shop, and the Annex. These buildings were located on
B&W-owned property on the east side of the site, They were bordered on the north,
south, and west by a Metals Processing Facility owned by a Third Party located in the Off-
Site area. Manufacturing activities in the Apollo Facility included HEU conversion, HEU
Scrap recovery, LEU conversion, LEU scrap recovery, and other support activities

- (utilities, uranium storage, laboratories, offices, health physics, etc.).

b. Parking Lot

The Parking Lot was a 1.5 acre L-shaped area located on the south and east section of the
Apollo Site. One acre was leased to B&W and a half acre was used by a neighboring
industrial facility. The Parking Lot area was bounded by the Kiskiminetas River on the
west, Warren Avenue on the east, and the Off-Site area on the north. The Parking Lot
also contained the Laundry Building and the Smail Block Building. The Laundry Building
was used for washing protective clothing used at nuclear facilities and the Small Block
Building was used for storage of processing equipment.



RADIOACTIVITY SURVEY ~KISKIMINETAS RIVER
ALLEGHENY RIVER

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Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner:



Environmental Monitoring Near A Multi-Stack Uranium Plant

"Roger D, Caldwell and Ronald F. Crosby
Nuclear Materials and Equipwent Corporation
Apollo, Pennsylvania

introduction
Every nuclear plant must demonstrate permissible radioactivity

concentrations beyond its site boundaries. The nuclear industry almost
traditionally limits stack discharges below permissible concentrations. (1)
Because it 4s unequivocal, the Atomic Energy Commission encourages this

approach, If the stack concentration is permissible, then certainly the
concentration anywhere else will be less.

Evaluating off site concentrations at NUMEC's uranium piant
proved difficult, but also quite necessary, You can appreciate the
- _ problem by examining Figure 1 which shows the plant setting. The NUMEC

|
|

building, Jocated inside the town of Apollo, shares three common walls
with a steel truss fabricator. The whole complex of buildings was once
the old Apollo Steel Plant. Houses crowd in as close as 200 feet anti
several hundred people Jive within a thousand yard half circle of the |
plant. Since the Kiskiminetas River runs close by, the whole town sets
i . down in one of those typical, steep sided Appalachian river valleys.

We're located about 30 miles northeast of Pittsburgh.

Stack Samvling .
Figure 2 shows our stack sampling problem. There are 12h filtered

stacks on our plant roof. You can also see the housings for six large
unfiltered exhaust fans which provide comfort ventilation for the plant.
| About 10° GFM of filtered air is exhausted via the stacks and an equal

amount of unfiltered air by the roof fans.



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 28 of 42

Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House,
1991), 223.

2. Aronson, Slomo and Brosh, Oded, The Politics and Strategy of
Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, the Opacity Theory, and
Reality, 1960-1991-An Israeli Perspective (Albany, New York:
State University of New York Press, 1992), 20.

3. Karsh, Efraim, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli
Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 82.

4. Cohen, Avner, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998), 16.

5. Cordesman, Anthony, Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process
and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1996), 118.

6. Pry, Peter, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview, 1984), 5-6.

7. Quoted in Weissman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert. The Islamic
Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East. (New
York, New York: Times Books, 1981), 105.

8.. “Former Official Says France Helped Build Israel's Dimona
Complex.” Nucleonics Week October 16, 1986, 6.

9. Milhollin, Gary, “Heavy Water Cheaters.” Foreign Policy
(1987-88): 101-102.

10. Cordesman, 1991, 127.

11. Federation of American Scientists, “Israel's Nuclear Weapons
Program.” 10 December 1997, n.p. On-line. Internet, 27 October
1998, Available from

http://www. fas.org/nuke/hew/Israel/Isrhist.html.

12. Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear Weapons in Israel (New Delhi: S. B.
Nangia Books, 1996), 3.

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 10 of 42

above ground part of the buildings, not the many levels underground
and the visit frequency was never more than once a year. The above
ground areas had simulated control rooms, and access to the
underground areas was kept hidden while the inspectors were
present. Elevators leading to the secret underground plutonium

- reprocessing plant were actually bricked over.[23] Much of the
information on these inspections and the political maneuvering
around it has just been declassified.[24]

One interpretation of Ben-Gurion's “peaceful purposes” pledge given
to America is that he interpreted it to mean that nuclear weapon
development was not excluded if used strictly for defensive, and not
offensive purposes. Israel's security position in the late fifties and
early sixties was far more precarious than now. After three wars,
with a robust domestic arms industry and a reliable defense supply
line from the U.S., Israel felt much more secure. During the fifties
and early sixties a number of attempts by Israel to obtain security
guarantees from the U.S. to place Israel under the U.S. nuclear
umbrella like NATO or Japan, were unsuccessful. If the U.S. had
conducted a forward-looking policy to restrain Israel's proliferation,
along with a sure defense agreement, we could have prevented the
development of Israel's nuclear arsenal.

One common discussion in the literature concerns testing of Israeli

-- nuclear devices. In the early phases, the amount of collaboration
between the French and Israeli nuclear weapons design programs
made testing unnecessary. In addition, although their main efforts
were with plutonium, the Israelis may have amassed enough uranium
for gun-assembled type bombs which, like the Hiroshima bomb,
require no testing. One expert postulated, based on unnamed
sources, that the French nuclear test in 1960 made two nuclear
powers not one—such was the depth of collaboration.]25] There
were several Israeli observers at the French nuclear tests and the
Israelis had “unrestricted access to French nuclear test explosion
data.”[26] Israel also supplied essential technology and hardware.
[27] The French reportedly shipped reprocessed plutonium back to
Israel as part of their repayment for Israeli scientific help.

However, this constant, decade long, French cooperation and support

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 8 of 42

The French, embarrassed by their failure to support their ally in the
operation, found the Israelis deeply concerned about a Soviet threat.
In this meeting, they substantially modified the initial understanding
beyond a research reactor. Peres secured an agreement from France
to assist Israel in developing a nuclear deterrent. After further
months of negotiation, agreement was reached for an 18-megawatt
(thermal) research reactor of the EL-3 type, along with plutonium
separation technology. France and Israel signed the agreement in
October 1957.[15] Later the reactor was officially upgraded to 24
megawatts, but the actual specifications issued to engineers provided
for core cooling ducts sufficient for up to three times this power
level, along with a plutonium plant of similar capacity. Data from
insider reports revealed in 1986 would estimate the power level at
125-150 megawatts.[16] The reactor, not connected to turbines for
power production, needed this increase in size only to increase its
plutonium production. How this upgrade came about remains
unknown, but Bourges-Maunoury, replacing Mollet as French prime
minister, may have contributed to it.[17] Shimon Peres, the guiding
‘hand in the Israeli nuclear program, had a close relationship with

Bourges-Maunoury and probably helped him politically.[18]

Why was France so eager to help Israel? DeMollet and then de
Gaulle had a place for Israel within their strategic vision. A nuclear
Israel could be a counterforce against Egypt in France's fight in

- Algeria. Egypt was openly aiding the rebel forces there. France also
wanted to obtain the bomb itself. The United States had embargoed
certain nuclear enabling computer technology from France. Israel
could get the technology from America and pass it through to
France. The U.S. furnished Israel heavy water, under the Atoms for
Peace program, for the small research reactor at Soreg. France could
use this heavy water. Since France was some years away from
nuclear testing and success, Israeli science was an insurance policy
in case of technical problems in France's own program.[{19] The
Israeli intelligence community's knowledge of past French
(especially Vichy) anti-Semitic transgressions and the continued
presence of former Nazi collaborators in French intelligence
provided the Israelis with some blackmail opportunities.[20} The
cooperation was so close that Israel worked with France on the

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‘wactbinatenempan24 October, to airlift f Soviet airborne troops to 42
reinforce the Egyptians cut off on the eastern side of the Suez Canal Mok
and put seven Soviet airborne divisions on alert.[69] Recent
€ . ; BERIMAR AOS

alge aited States, evi Spbasonevaidessemphatinabtaiined

fealeis padeal PIRES: He siokers epupladavigh some
; tia aed songs ci ie nto enteatinwt
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he eda er tu iPéuadasthinandoniibr azeead to a
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date thaiigddimonalnspattiies £2) whithimg indbAbcimejhkawne,
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teapablatpudke anedethote[Saiclear option. The Egyptians planned to
capture an eastern strip next to the Suez Canal’and then oi The
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cote isaac G GORPRRIGH (RH POAaHADeEefise
tos. Musivarardor, teaser of Rafael, the Armament-Development

wwii and other unnamed sources, that Israel “cobbled together”
Awthddixkottledeviork [ffir War (a nation shaking exsrience)
srael waa her au sagan arsenal fully functional and tested by 4

sede : ste
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AS ea ve included successful Arab penetration of

SURIEEON areas, destruction of the Israeli Air Force, massive air

Biter oes ipakbidigetbal Beikts op iheBasitirenesiainab use

of nuclear weapons.[56]

Never Again!

In 1971, Israel began purchasing krytrons, ultra high-speed

electronic switching tubes that are “dual-use," having both industrial
hitp:/vand faucbakepapdins dp pledations as detonators. In the 1980s, the12/7/2005

United States charged an American, Richard Smith (or Smyth), with

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 18 of 42

- Reportedly welded on the
first Israeli nuclear bomb[77}

Shortly after the 1973 war, Israel allegedly fielded considerable
nuclear artillery consisting of American 175 mm and 203 mm self-
propelled artillery pieces, capable of firing nuclear shells. If true,
this shows that Dimona had rapidly solved the problems of designing
smaller weapons since the crude 1967 devices. If true, these low
yield, tactical nuclear artillery rounds could reach at least 25 miles.
The Israeli Defense Force did have three battalions of the 175mm
artillery (36 tubes), reportedly with 108 nuclear shells and more for
the 203mm tubes. Some sources describe a program to extend the
range to 45 miles. They may have offered the South Africans these
low yield, miniaturized, shells described as, “the best stuff we
got.”[78] By 1976, according to one unclassified source, the Central
Intelligence Agency believed that the Israelis were using plutonium
from Dimona and had 10 to 20 nuclear weapons available.[79]

In 1972, two Israeli scientists, Isaiah Nebenzahl and Menacehm
Levin, developed a cheaper, faster uranium enrichment process. It
used a laser beam for isotope separation. It could reportedly enrich
seven grams of Uranium 235 sixty percent in one day.[80] Sources
jater reported that Israel was using both centrifuges and lasers to
enrich uranium.[81]

Questions remained regarding full-scale nuclear weapons tests.
Primitive gun assembled type devices need no testing. Researchers
can test non-nuclear components of other types separately and use
extensive computer simulations. Israel received data from the 1960
French tests, and one source concludes that Israel accessed
information from U.S. tests conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s.
This may have included both boosted and thermonuclear weapons
data.[82] Underground testing in a hollowed out cavern is difficult
to detect. A West Germany Army Magazine, Wehrtechnik, in June
1976, claimed that Westem reports documented a 1963 underground
test in the Negev. Other reports show a test at Al-Naqab, Negev in
October 1966.[83]

A bright flash in the south Indian Ocean, observed by an American

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 6 of 42

division. Promising students went overseas to study nuclear
engineering and physics at Israeli government expense. Israel
secretly founded its own Atomic Energy Commission in 1952 and
placed it under the control of the Defense Ministry.[6] The
foundations of a nuclear program were beginning to develop.

Il. 1948-1962: With French Cooperation
It has always been our intention to develop a nuclear potential.
- Ephraim Katzir[7]

In 1949, Francis Perrin, a member of the French Atomic Energy
Commission, nuclear physicist, and friend of Dr. Bergmann visited
the Weizmann Institute. He invited Israeli scientists to the new
French nuclear research facility at Saclay. A joint research effort
was subsequently set up between the two nations. Perrin publicly
stated in 1986 that French scientists working in America on the
Manhattan Project and in Canada during World War I were told
they could use their knowledge in France provided they kept it a
secret.[8] Perrin reportedly provided nuclear data to Israel on the
same basis.[9] One Israeli scientist worked at the U.S. Los Alamos
National Laboratory and may have directly brought expertise home.
[10]

Te After the Second World War, Fratice's nuclear research capability
was quite limited. France had been a leading research center in
nuclear physics before World War Il, but had fallen far behind the
US., the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and even Canada. Israel
and France were at a similar level of expertise after the war, and
Israeli scientists could make significant contributions to the French
effort. Progress in nuclear science and technology in France and
Israel remained closely linked throughout the early fifties. Israeli
scientists probably helped construct the G-1 plutonium production
reactor and UP-1 reprocessing plant at Marcoule.[11] France
profited from two Israeli patents on heavy water production and low-
grade uranium enrichment.[12] In the 1950s and into the early
1960s, France and Israel had close relations in many areas. France
was Israel's principal arms supplier, and as instability spread through

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- we

10-140 ppm, Consequently, we also surveyed water from several mines.
The term, boney pile, refers to the overcover removed from coal.

We found striking increases in radioactivity from coal wane
drainage, The levels are appreciable, considering that the MPCy for
unidentified radionuclides is 10 pCi/1, We subjected several samples
to radiochemical analysis and found the activity predominantly from
7344238y; ess than 10% was from 26Ra, Thus the mines do exceed the
MPC,, but not so much that a truly dangerous circumstance exists.

Conclusion

We have denonstrated that the NUMEC uranium plant effluent
Produces permissible off-site radioactivity concentrations. Even with
adverse topography, cramped site boundaries, short stacks and unfavorable
winds, the lower atmosphere dilutes our stack concentrations by factors
of 100-1000, Restricting stack effluents to MPC, is unnecessary.

“We have also shown that nature's radioactivity can be appreciable.
Our natural radiation environment mist be understood if we are to have

reasonable and realistic regulation of. radicactive-waste discharge.



Final Technical Report

Gg to 4 pCiTc-99/g and 1 to 7 pCiEu-152/g), and transuranics (0.7 to 19 pCiTRU/g).
Uranium concentration in the riverbank adjacent to the site ranged from 5 to 57 pCiU/g.

Although the uranium concentration on selective wall areas reached 2,000 pCiU/e, the
majority of the Apollo Facility’s walls were below 30 pCiU/g. The Apollo Facility’s
concrete floors had levels that exceed 2,000 pCiU/g in some areas. The Apollo Facility’s
toof had uranium concentrations varying from 11 to 5,600 pCiU/g. The Apollo Facility’s
concrete sump contained 3 to 160 pCiTc-99%/g.

The groundwater beneath the Apollo Site was sampled and did not contain concentrations
greater than 30pCiU/1. In the last 13 years, the Kiskiminetas River has been sampled at
various areas along the Apollo Site. No sample exceeded 30 pCiU/.

3. Chemical Characterization

Characterization activities focused on site soils and groundwater. Soil samples were
analyzed for metals, reactive cyanide, reactive sulfide, and polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs). Also, the soil was tested for volatile organic analytes (VOAs), polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and pesticides.

Some soil with contamination greater than 30pCiU/ contained low concentrations of
heavy metals (chromium, cadmium, etc.) typical of levels found at western Pennsylvania
steel mill sites, The soils did not fail the EPA’s Toxic Characterization Leaching
Procedure (TCLP), and none of the soils were classified as mixed waste.

Comprehensive groundwater sampling and analysis was performed to determine if
chemicals were present in the groundwater, Compounds analyzed consisted of fluoride,
dissolved metals, and volatile organics. Trichloroethylene (TCE) was found at elevated
levels in two of the monitoring wells.

B. Building Demolition

Varions building structures were decontaminated and demolished using standard methods
before NRC approval of the Apollo Decommissioning Plan.

L. Apollo Facility

The HEU Processing Area located on the second floor of the East Bay underwent
remediation from 1978 until July 1991. Initially, the process equipment was dismantled
and sent to Chem-Nuclear. The second floor then was broken up and the rubble disposed
- of in a similar manner. Finally, all remaining equipment, ventilation systems, and other
installations, such as piping and power lines from the area were dismantled and disposed



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 27 of 42

1967: 13 bombs
2bombs TM

1969: 5-6 bombs of 19 kilotons yield each

1973; 13 bombs?
20 nuclear missiles and have developed a “suitcase bomb” 153

1974: 3 nuclear capable artillery battalions each with 12 175mm
tubes & atotal of 108 warheads
10 bombs *

1976: 10-20 nuclear weapons 156
1980: 200 bombs 4?

1984; 12-31 atomic bombs **
31 plutonium bombs and 10 uranium bombs *

1985; atleast 100 nuclear bombs?

1986: 100-200 fission bombs and a number of fusion bombs

1991: 50-60 to 200-300
1992: >200 bombs

1994: 64-112 bombs (@ 5 kefwarhead)
50 nuclear tipped Jericho missiles, 200 total 165

70-80 weapons
“A complete repertoire” (neutron bombs, nuclear mines,

suitcase bombs, submarine borne)

_ 1995: 66-116 bombs @ 5 ke/warhead) ies

1996: 60-80 Plutonium weapons, maybe >100 assemblies, ER variants,
variable yields 169
Possibly 200-300 7°
50-90 Plutonium weapons, could have well over 135. 50-100
Jericho I and 30-50 Jericho I missiles. ‘7

1997; >400 deliverable thermonuclear and nuclear weapons '”

\

Notes

1. Hersh, Seymour M., The Samson Option. Israel's Nuclear

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xposure Cohort Petition — Form B ~_ OMB Number: 020-0052 dix

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 30 of 42

25. Weissman and Krosney, op. cit.,114-117
26. Cohen, op. cit., Israel and the Bomb, 82-83.

27. Spector, Leonard S., The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishers, 1988), 387 (n.22).

28. Quoted in Stevens, Elizabeth. “Israel's Nuclear Weapons—A.
Case Study.” 14 pages. On line. Internet, 23 October 1998.
Available from

http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/najournal/israelinucs.htm).

29. Green, Taking Sides, 148-179 and Raviv, Dan and Melman,
Yossi, 1990, 197-198.

30. Weissman and Krosney, 119-124.

31. Black, Jan and Morris, Benny, Israel's Secret Wars. A history
of Israel's Intelligence Services (New York, New York: Grove
Weidenfeld, 1991), 418-419.

32. Hersh, 257.

33. Green, Stephen, Living by the Sword: America and Israel in the
Middle East, 1968-1987 (London: Faber, 1988), 63-80.

34. Cordesman, 1991, 120.

35, Weissman and Krosney, 124-128 and Raviv, Dan and Melman,
Yossi, 1990, 198-199.

36. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 395(a. 57).98-199
37. Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 58.
38. Milhollin, 100-119.

39. Stanghelle, Harold, “Israel to sell back 10.5 tons.”
Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, Norway, 28 June 1990 in: Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, “Nuclear Developments,” 28 June 1990,
34-35; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 29 of 42

13. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 48-49.

14. Bennett, Jeremy, The Suez Crisis. BBC Video. n.d.
Videocassette and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi. Every Spy a
Prince, The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community.
(oston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 63-69.

15. Weissman and Krosney, 112.

16. “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal” (London)
Sunday Times No. 8,461, 5 October 1986, 1, 4-5.

17, Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 57-59.

18. Peres, Shimon, Battling for Peace. A Memoir (New York,
New York: Random House, 1995), 122.

19. Pry, 10.

20. Loftus, John and Aarons, Mark, The Secret War Against the
Jews. How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People (New
York, New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1994), 287-303.

21. Green, Stephen, Taking Sides. America's Secret Relations with
a Militant Israel (New York: William Morrow and Company,
1984), 152.

22. Cohen, Avner, “Most Favored Nation.” The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists. 51, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 44-53.

23. Hersh, The Samson Option, 196.

24. See Cohen, Avner, “Israel's Nuclear History: The Untold
Kennedy-Eshkol Dimona Correspondence.” Journal of Israeli
History, 1995 16, no. 2, 159-194 and Cohen, Avner, Comp.
“Recently Declassified 1963 Correspondence between President
Kennedy and Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and Eshkol.” Journal of
Israeli History, 1995 16, no. 2, 195-207. Much of the
documentation has been posted to
http:\\www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/israel.

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 32 of 42
Sorenson, David S., “Middle East Regional Studies-AY99,” Air
War College: Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 542.
51. Hersh, op. cit., 126-128.
52. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 210-213.

53. Spector, Leonard S., “Foreign-Supplied Combat Aircraft: Will
They Drop the Third World Bomb?” Journal of International
Affairs 40, no. 1(1986): 145 (n. 5) and Green, Living by the Sword,
op. cit., 18-19.

54, Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 280.

55. Cohen, op. cit., Israel and the Bomb, 237.
56. Ibid., 273-274.

57. Milhollin, op. cit., 103-104.

58. Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, Friend in Deed: Inside the
U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York New York: Hyperion, 1994), 299.

59. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 464-465 and Raviv, Dan and
Melman, Yossi, op. cit., 1990, 304-305.

60. ‘Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 179.

61. Dowty, Alan. “Israel and Nuclear Weapons.” Midstream 22,
no. 7 (November 1976), 8-9.

62. Hersh, op. cit., 217, 222-226, and Weissman and Krosney, op.
cit., 107.

63. Green, op. cit., Living by the Sword, 90-99.
64. Loftus and Aarons, op. cit., 316-317.

65 Smith, Gerard C. and Cobban, Helena. “A Blind Eye To Nuclear
Proliferation.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 3(1989), 53-70.

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CONTINUOUS VOLUME SOURCE FORMULA FOR GROUND LEVEL
CONCENTRATION AT DISTANCE x FROM:A MULTI-STACK PLANT

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8.

for 2 12 meter stack. Be € are volune source curves where the height
of the virtual point sources, bh’, is 12 and 24 meters respectively. The
significant difference between point and volume sources is inmediately
apparent: Volume sources yield higher concentrations closer to the
point of discharge. The point source formila predicts undetectable
concentration 15 meters away. The fact is that concentrations measured
here were the greatest.

The measured data do not really follow the volume source formula
well. The different data points were gathered under widely separated
times. We were “lucky to get the data ta stay on the graph. The data
seems to follow an inverse power function rather than a product of
power and exponential functions. It's as if there was no effective stack
height at all, This is not surprising, considering the adverse topography
and short stacks. :

However, atmospheric dispersion is still effective. For a con-
servative wind speed of 1 meter/sec and a maximum discharge, Q, of 103
d/m/sec, the predicted averaged concentration will never exceed 1.6
d/m/WP; this is less than 0.2 MPC. ;

Surfac tion

Fallout collection is an elusive monitoring technique to interpret.
Simple correlations between concentrations measured above a surface and
the amount deposited per unit surface area with time do not exist.

Our Iuck was no better than.others at finding a simple factor by
which to miltiply surface collection to obtain air concentration. So we
chose to represent fallout collection separately. Figure 10 shows a
typical weekly fallout contour. The cotttours are miltiples of picocuries





-10-

gummed paper works as well as horizontal adhesive. Of course, the reason
stems from the small particle size and resultant low settling velocities.

‘

Kiskiminetas River Survey

An appreciation of the magnitude of natural radioactivity levels
ean be gained from a survey we made in Mey, 1966. For several years we
have sampled the Kiskiminetas River at three bridges, one above our *
Uranium plant, one below the uranium plant and above our plutonium plant
and another below the plutonium plant. The 1966 average is given in the
following table:

Table 1

Alpha Activity Levels
Kiskiminetas River ~ 1966

Averaged ,

Concentration Concentration

Jecation pei /iiter * 2, POUT
Apollo 13.4 «3 = 102.7
Vandergrift 13.36 245 = 101.0

Leechburg 10.27? «9 = 46.0

Since the average flow in the Kiski River is 3080 cubic feet per
second, the Apollo concentration represents about a curie per day. The
mystery of all this radioactivity upstream proved irresistable to us, so
an May, 1966, we took a two day survey by canoe of the Kiski watershed.
Figure 11 show the sample locations. The results are in Table 2.

The Kiski area contains a munber of coal mines, whose drainage
creates a high acid content (pH = 2-5) in the Kiskiminetas River. Several
geological publications(t1s12s13) nave deseribed the association of uraniun
and coal in Western Pennsylvania. Estimates of uranium in coal ranged from



GROUND LEVEL DOWNWIND DIFFUSION
MULTI-STACK URANIUM PLANT
10°2,--o-
A-POINT SOURCE ch
h=l2 METERS me
B- VOLUME SOURCE rt
h's 12 METERS [
C- VOLUME SOURCE |
B oO h's 24 METERS” ae
ae <9 cAb | -O-@ HOURTAIR SAMPLES [T0000 “1
1073 eS
2. Sch
ee ee Cc
BX
Q ‘ad
1o-4 Zz
EEL
J
I
f
19°5t ~
10 iCefe) 1000 10,000
DISTANCE, METERS



-5=

through 4 -inch Whatman 41 or glass fiber filters. .On the hand truck
you see the 8 x 10 inch sample head of a Gelman Hurricane sampler. We
carried several hundred feet of electrical cord to power our A/C
Samplers. The can-like object on the hand truck is an Anderson Cascade
impactor. It has its own 12 volt battery powered D/C pump. Our
assistant is changing one of the low wall pie pan fallout collectors.
If you look carefully, you can see, on the telephone pole behind the
car, one of our 4" x 8" vertical gummed paper dust collectors.

Local, Wind Conditions
The Kiski valley is narrow, steep sided and prone to frequent

inversions. At Apollo it runs north and south, across the prevailing -
westerlies. Since such valleys tend to distort wind flow(6), we felt
it was necessary to measure local. wind parameters. Consequently, we
purchased a Taylor Instrument Co. Windscope, a combination potentiometer
wind vane and generator anemometer. The windscope was mounted on the
plant roof at stack height, about 40 feet high, and the readout located
in the Plant Health and Safety Laboratory. -Readings of wind. speed and
direction are taken'every four hours, seven days @ week.

The annual windrose for 1966, Figure 6, clearly demonstrates the
valley's perturbation of the upper wind flow. Almost all wind flow in
the valley is north and south, while the general wind direction,

. recorded at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, is out of the west.

An inordinate proportion of wind speeds below 1 MPH worried us a
great deal. We thought perhaps that the anenoneter wasn't properly
calibrated, so we ran several smoke drift and velometer tests, all of
which confirmed the anemometer readings. A possible explanation is our



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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 31 of 42

http://cns.miis.edu.
40. Hersh, op. cit., 139.

41. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “Israeli Friends,” ISIS
Report, May 1994, 4; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available
from http://cns.miis.edu.

42. Abecasis, Rachel, “Uranium reportedly offered to China,
Israel.” Radio Renascenca, Lisbon, 9 December 1992 quoted in
Center for Nonproliferation, “Proliferation Issues,” 23 December,
1992, 25; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from
http://cns.miis.edu.

43. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 231-232 and 256-257.

44. Nordeen, Lon O., Nicolle, David, Phoenix over the Nile
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), 192-193.

45. O'Balance, Edgar, The Third Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber
and Faber, 1972), 54.

46. Brecher, Michael, Decision in Crisis. Israel, 1967 and 1973
(Berkley, California: University of California Press, 1980), 104, 230-
231.

‘47. Cohen, Avner. “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War.” —

Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 190-210.

48. Creveld, Martin van. The Sword and the Olive. A Critical
History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York, New York: Public
Affairs, 1998), 174.

49. Burrows, William E. and Windrem, Robert, Critical Mass. The
Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New
York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 282-283.

50. Aronson, Shlomo, Israel's Nuclear Options, ACIS Working
Paper No. 7. Los Angeles, California: University of California
Center for Arms Control and Intemational Security, 1977, 3, and

http://www. fas.org/nuke/guide/israe/nuke/farr. htm. 12/7/2005



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 16 of 42

open an aerial resupply pipeline to Israel, and Israeli aircraft began
picking up supplies that day. Although stockpile depletion remained
a concern, the military situation stabilized on October 8th and 9th as
Israeli reserves poured into the battle and averted disaster. Well
before significant American resupply had reached Israeli forces, the
Israelis counterattacked and turned the tide on both fronts.

On 11 October, a counterattack on the Golan broke the back of
Syria's offensive, and on 15 and 16 October, Israel launched a
surprise crossing of the Suez Canal into Africa. Soon the Israelis
encircled the Egyptian Third Army and it was faced with
annihilation on the east bank of the Suez Canal, with no protective
forces remaining between the Israeli Army and Cairo. The first U.S.
flights arrived on 14 October.[63] Israeli commandos flew to Fort
Benning, Georgia to train with the new American TOW anti-tank
missiles and return with a C-130 Hercules aircraft full of them in
time for the decisive Golan battle. American commanders in
Germany depleted their stocks of missiles, at that time only shared
with the British and West Germans, and sent them forward to Israel.
{64} ;

Thus started the subtle, opaque use of the Israeli bomb to ensure that
the United States kept its pledge to maintain Israel's conventional
weapons edge over its foes.[65] There is significant anecdotal
evidence. that Henry Kissinger told President of Egypt,.Anwar Sadat,
that the reason for the U.S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to
“going nuclear.”(66]

A similar Soviet pipeline to the Arabs, equally robust, may or may
not have included a ship with nuclear weapons on it, detected from
nuclear trace emissions and shadowed by the Americans from the
Dardanelles. The Israelis believe that the Soviets discovered Israeli
nuclear preparations from COSMOS satellite photographs and
decided to equalize the odds.[67] The Soviet ship arrived in
Alexandria on either 18 or 23 October (sources disagree), and
remained, without unloading, until November 1973. The ship may
have represented a Soviet guarantee to the Arab combatants to
neutralize the Israeli nuclear option.[68] While some others dismiss
the story completely, the best-written review article concludes that

http://www. fas.org/nuke/guide/israeV/nuke/farr. htm 12/7/2005


Roger D. Caldwell Archives , Page 3 of 6

and sticky paper on telephone poles can be
useful for finding unintended releases, but do
not correlate well with air samples.

e Caldwell RD, TE Potter, and E Schnell.
Bioassay Correlation with Breathing Zone
Sampling. UCRL-18140. 1967. Berkeley,
California, U.C. Berkeley. Proceedings of the
13th AEC Bioassay and Analytical Chemistry
Conference at U.C. Berkeley. This is Caldwell,
Potter, and Schnell's groundbreaking
examination of the correlation of bioassay with .
air sampling. Roger Caldwell introduces the
"Pig Pen Effect" wherein a worker creates the
aerosol, so that breathing zone air sampling
becomes critically important and general area
air samples are shown to be not representative.

e Brodsky A, J Schubert, SS Yaniv, K Lamson,
N Wald, R Wechsler, L Gumerman, and R

Caldwell. Deposition and Retention of 1925 j in
the Lung After an Inhalation Accident.
Abstract. Health Physics 13[6], 938. 1967.

Caldwell RD, Schnell E. Respirator... .

Effectiveness in an Enriched Uranium Plant. _
Presented at the 1968 American Industrial

Hygiene Conference, May 13-17, 1968, St.
Louis, Missouri.

« Potter TE, D Sgarlata, R Atkins, RD Caldwell,
H Glauberman, and E Katine. 1968. A
Technique for the Disposal of Highly
Contaminated Glove Boxes. Presented at
Health Physics Society 13th Annual Meeting,
Denver, Colorado, June 16-20, 1968, Nuclear
Materials and Equipment Corporation, Apollo,
Pennsylvania. The NUMEC plutonium-238

http://bidug.pnl.gov/rde.htm 12/7/2005



WIND ROSE - APOLLO, PENNSYLVANIA
HEIGHT OF MEASUREMENT-40 FEET YEAR-1966

% SCALE

FF



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 23 of 42

crowded Europe.[116]

However, Jane's Intelligence Review has recently reported an Israeli
review of nuclear strategy with a shift from tactical nuclear warheads
to long range missiles.[117] Israel always has favored the long
reach, whether to Argentina for Adolph Eichmann, to Iraq to strike a
reactor, Entebbe for hostages, Tunisia to hit the PLO, or by targeting
the Soviet Union's cities. An esteemed Israeli military author has
speculated that Israel is pursuing an R&D program to provide
MIRVs (multiple independent reentry vehicles) on their missiles.
[118]

The government of Israel recently ordered three German Dolphin
Class 800 submarine, to be delivered in late 1999. Israel will then
have a second strike capability with nuclear cruise missiles, and this
capability could well change the nuclear arms race in the Middle
East.{119] Israeli rhetoric on the new submarines labels them
“national deterrent” assets. Projected capabilities include a
submarine-launched nuclear missile with a 350-kilometer range.
[120] Israel has been working on sea launch capability for missiles
since the 1960s.[121] The first basing options for the new second-
strike force of nuclear missile capable submarines include Oman, an
Arab nation with unofficial Israeli relations, located strategically
near Iran.[122] A report indicates that the Israel Defense Ministry
ro has formally gone to the. government with a request to authorize.a
retaliatory nuclear strike if Israel was hit with first strike nuclear
weapons. This report comes in the wake of a recent Iran Shihab-3
missile test and indications to Israel that Iran is two to three years
from a nuclear warhead.[123] Israeli statements stress that Iran's
nuclear potential would be problem to all and would require
“American leadership, with serious participation of the G-7...
[124]

A recent study highlighted Israel's extreme vulnerability to a first
strike and an accompanying vulnerability even to a false alarm.[125]
Syria's entire defense against Israel seems to rest on chemical
weapons and warheads.[126] One scenario involves Syria making a
quick incursion into the Golan and then threatening chemical strikes,
perhaps with a new, more lethal (protective-mask-penetrable)

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 25 of 42

weapons? How susceptible are they to misuse or theft? With no
open, frank, public debate on nuclear issues, there has accordingly
been no debate or information on existing safeguards. This has led
to accusations of “monolithic views and sinister intentions.”[1360]
Would a right wing military government decide to employ nuclear
weapons recklessly? Ariel Sharon, an outspoken proponent of
“Greater Israel” was quoted as saying, “Arabs may have the oil, but
we have the matches.”[137] Could the Gush Emunim, a right wing
religious organization, or others, hijack a nuclear device to “liberate”
the Temple Mount for the building of the third temple? Chances are
small but could increase as radicals decry the peace process.[138] A
1997 article reviewing the Israeli Defense Force repeatedly stressed
the possibilities of, and the need to guard against, a religious, right
wing military coup, especially as the proportion of religious in the
military increases.[139 ]

Israel is a nation with a state religion, but its top leaders are not
religious Jews. The intricacies of Jewish religious politics and
rabbinical law do affect their politics and decision processes. In
Jewish law, there are two types of war, one obligatory and
mandatory (milkhemet mitzvah) and the one authorized but optional
(milkhemet reshut).[140] The labeling of Prime Minister Begin's
“Peace for Galilee” operation as a milchemet brera (“war of choice”)
was one of the factors causing it to lose support.[141] Interpretation
of Jewish law concerning-nuclear weapons does not permit their use.
for mutual assured destruction. However, it does allow possession
and threatening their use, even if actual use is not justifiable under
the law. Interpretations of the law allow tactical use on the
battlefield, but only after warning the enemy and attempting to make
peace. How much these intricacies affect Israeli nuclear strategy
decisions is unknown.[142]

The secret nature of the Israeli nuclear program has hidden the
increasing problems of the aging Dimona reactor and adverse worker
health effects. Information is only now public as former workers sue
the government. This issue is now linked to continued tritium
production for the boosted anti-tank and anti-missile nuclear
warheads that Israeli continues to need. Israel is attempting to obtain

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 26 of 42

a new, more efficient, tritium production technology developed in
India.[143]

One other purpose of Israeli nuclear weapons, not often stated, but
obvious, is their “use” on the United States. America does not want
Israel's nuclear profile raised.[144] They have been used in the past
to ensure America does not desert Israel under increased Arab, or oil
embargo, pressure and have forced the United States to support
Israeli diplomatically against the Soviet Union. Israel used their
existence to guarantee a continuing supply of American conventional
weapons, a policy likely to continue.[145]

Regardless of the true types and numbers (see Appendix A) of Israeli
nuclear weapons, they have developed a sophisticated system, by
myriad methods, and are a nuclear power to be reckoned with. Their
nuclear ambiguity has served their purposes well but Israel is
entering a different phase of visibility even as their nuclear
capability is entering a new phase. This new visibility may not be in
America's interest.[146] Many are predicting the Israeli nuclear
arsenal will become less useful “out of the basement” and possibly
spur a regional arms race. If so, Israel has a 5-10 year lead time at
present before mutual assured destruction, Middle East style, will set
in. Would regional mutual second strike capability, easier to acquire
than superpower mutual second strike capability, result in regional
stability? Some think so.{147] Current Israeli President Ezer
Weizman has stated “the nuclear issue is gaining momentum [and
the] next war will not be conventional.[148]

Appendix A

Estimates of the Israeli Nuclear Arsenal

http://www fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr htm 12/7/2005


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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 36 of 42

from the Second Gulf War (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 1-10.
99, Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 278.

100. Cohen, Avner and Miller, Marvin, Nuclear Shadows in the
Middle East: Prospects for Arms Control in the Wake of the Gulf
Crisis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1990), 10.

101. Aronson and Brosh, op. cit., 276.
102. Raviv and Melman, op. cit., 399.

103. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 297n and Creveld, 1998, op.
cit., 321-322. ;

104. Levran, op. cit., 8-10.

105. Ahmar, Moonis, “Pakistan and Israel: Distant Adversaries or
Neighbors?” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,
1996, 20, no.1, 43-44.

106. “Nuclear proliferation didn't start in 1998 . . and not in
Pakistan nor with Islam,” Middle East Realities, or on-line,
Internet, 21 September 1998, available from

- http:/Awww.middleeast.org/1998_06_28.htm.

107. Garrity, Patrick J. “The Next Nuclear Questions.”
Parameters, XXV, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), 92-111.

108. Cohen, Eliezer. Israel's best defense: the First Full Story of
the Israeli Air Force, (New York, New York: Random House,
1993), 495.

109. Cohen and Miller, op. cit., 18.

110. “Before Meeting with King, Peres Claims Israel's Nuclear
Arsenal was built for Peace,” Jordan Times, July 14, 1998. Quoted
in Sorenson, op. cit., 542.

111. Beres, Louis Rene, “Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A

http://www. fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm 12/7/2005



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~6— id

“observation of frequent nocturnal calms. A lid goes on the valley at
night and most of the low wind speeds are recorded then. Even at low’
wind speeds, the wind vane functioned, so we have aided the wind
direction during these calms to the windrose.

Because of the dramatic variation, we have plotted 2 Seasonal
Windrose, Figure 7. The relative turbulence in winter and fall is much
greater than during the spring and sumer seasons. Most valley

inversions occur in late spring, summer and early fall.

Dispersi: A Multi-Stack Source

Air sampling has demonstrated effective dispersion of the plant
effluent. When averaged over eight hours, we have never measured off-
site concentration above permissible limits. Ten minute grab sample§,
taken in the lee of the building, have occasionally given concentrations
up to 25 d/n/P. However, another 10 minute sample, taken a short tine
later, might give a result a 1000 times lower. Since preventing
accumlation of long term body burdens is the criterion for uranium
health, protection, averaging concentrations is completely. justified.

The off site fixed station air samplers have consistently
averaged below 10% of the MPCg. The roof edge samplers, averaged over
the year, show permissible concentrations. We have found the roof .
samplers very useful in.detecting problem stacks. When we were sampling
stacks monthly it was: possible to have a leaky stack go undetected for
several weeks. The present arrangement allows us to find our problems
much faster. © ‘

We intended our separate air sampling surveys to confirm an
alternate diffusion model to common formulas such as Sutton's continuous



Roger D. Caldwell Archives a : Page 2 of 6

contributed by Thomas E. Potter, who co-
authored several of them. Tom has several fond
memories of working with Roger.
e Rager Caldwell died in 1974 at the agé of 39.
Please contact the webmaster if you have any
other Roger Caldwell papers to contribute to
this archive.

e Caldwell RD. The Detection of Insoluble Alpha
Emitters in the Lung. AEC Bioassay and
Analytical Chemistry Conference, CONF-
661018, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, October, 1966.

« Caldwell RD, Judd, WC. Alpha Spectrum
Degradation by PuO, Particles. Presented at

1966 Annual Meeting of Health Physics
Society, Houston, Texas. Abstract in Health
Physics 12:1193 (1966).

e Caldwell RD and WC Judd. 1966. Gamma

Spectrum Measurements and the Interpretation
of Absorbed Dose During Plutonium Fuel
Fabrication. Presented at the 1966 Meeting of

the Health Physics Society, Houston, Texas;
~ : . Nuclear-Materials and Equipment Corporation,
Apollo, Pennsylvania

e Caldwell RD and RF Crosby. 1967.
Environmenta] Monitoring Near a Multi-Stack
Uranium Plant. Unknown - date is estimated
based on complete 1966 wind rose, Nuclear
Materials and Equipment Corporation, Apollo,
Pennsylvania. A variety of innovative
approaches to air monitoring around a uranium
nuclear fuel fabrication facility. The stack
height for stacks with caps is very low.
Atmospheric dispersion models were tried
without a lot of success. Fallout collection trays

http://bidug.pnl. gov/rde.htm. 12/7/2005



ADDED TO sygessiond AT

’ =
Sundin, David S. APPLICAOT'S REQUEST
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From: NIOSH OCAS

Sent: Monday, December 12, 2005 7:34 AM

To: Sundin, David S.; Rutherford, LaVon B

Subject: FW: PittsburghLIVE.com - Agency faced conflicts in promoting and regulating nuclear energy

Please see the email below. it was received in the OCAS inbox. This individual would like
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Subject: PittsburghLIVE.com - Agency faced conflicts in promoting and regulating nuclear
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Comment from Here is the article if you can put it at the back of my
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AGENCY FACED CONFLICTS IN PROMOTING AND REGULATING NUCLEAR ENERGY You can't have the
inmates running the asylum. But that's just what watchdog groups and even some former
government officials say is the case when it comes to the nation's nuclear energy
programs.

To read the entire article, visit:

1. Click here: http: //www.pittsburghLive .com/x/tribune-
review/specialreports/buriedlegacy/s_87958 html

2. Or visit http://www.pittsburghlive.com and type in NewsCode: 87958

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 38 of 42

122. Shahak, Israel, Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign
Policies (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 72-73.

123. Davis, Douglas, “Defense Officials Said Urging Nuclear
Second-Strike Capability,” Jerusalem Post, 6 August 1998, 3; or on-
line, Internet, 22 November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu.

124. Inbar, Efraim, “Israel's security in a new international
environment,” in Karsh, Efraim, Editor, Between War and Peace:
Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996),
41.

125. Hough, Harold, “Could Israel's Nuclear Assets Survive a First
Strike?” Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1997, 407-410.

126. Terrill, W. Andrew, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the
Yemen War.” Comparative Strategy, 10 (1991), 109-119.

127. Boyne, Sean, “Across the Great Divide. Will Assad go for the
Golan?” Jane's Intelligence Review, 10, no. 4 (April 1998), 21-24
and Cordesman, 1996, op. cit., 254.

128. Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 243.

129, Harel, Amos and Barzilai, Amnon, “Mordechai says Arrow
_.... alone cannot protect.against missiles,” Ha’gretz, 13 January 1999, or

on-line, Internet, 13 January 1999, available from

http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/htmls/3_9.htm

130. Shahak, op. cit., 78-79.

131. Chubin, Shahram, “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?”
Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 91-93.

132. O'Sullivan, Arich, “New F-151 Warplanes Expand Israel's
Reach,” The Jerusalem Post, 19 January 1997, or on-line, Internet 22
November 1998, available from http://www. jpost.co.il.

133. Karsh, op. cit., 9.

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 41 of 42

162. Harkavy, Robert E. “After the Gulf War: The Future of the
Israeli Nuclear Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer
1991), 164.

163. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 308.

164. Albright, David, Berkhout, Frans and Walker, William,
Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. World Inventories,
Capabilities, and Policies (New York: Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute And Oxford University Press, 1997), 262-
263.

165. Hough, Harold, “Israel's Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane's
Intelligence Review 6, no. 11 (November 1994), 508.

166. Ibid., 262-263.

167. Spector, and McDonough, with Medeiros, op. cit., 135.
168. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 283-284.

169. Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 234.

170. Ibid., 234.

171. Ibid., 230, 243.

172. Brower, Kenneth S., “A Propensity for Conflict: Potential
Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle East,” Jane's
Intelligence Review, Special Report no. 14, (February 1997), 14-15.

173. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, op. cit., 262-263.
USAF Counterproliferation Center

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 to
provide education and research to the present and future leaders of
the USAF, and thereby help them better prepare to counter the threat
from weapons of mass destruction.

Barry R. Schneider, Director

http://www. fas.org/auke/guide/israe//nuke/farr-htm 12/7/2005



“12

Table 2
Kiskiminetas ‘River Ragsqnotivity Survey

May, 1

Conesntration

Sampling Point —Beifditer Remarks
Allegheny River

4

RE Swavaueunr
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p
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464 Downstream of principal mine drainage
co w ci " w
Bi) 821.8 . ” " . a

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rn tt

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163.6 Downstream of Boney Pile

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. o of © a

. : 17.3 Reservoir, some mine drainage
Hine #1 . 14 :

Mine #2 . ‘ 120.0

Boney Pile 180.0 Shale overcover of coal

2

VOSVRERGHMOMMOUOW
e
5
o



Special. Exposure Cohort Petition
under the Energy Employees Occupational
Iiness Compensation Act

Special Exposure Cohort Petition

Survivor Information — Complete Seciion B if you are a Survivor or representing a Survivor.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

OMB Number: 0920-0639

Centers for Disease Contro! and Prevention
National institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Expires: 05/31/2007
Page 2 of 7

B.1 Name of Survivor:
Mr/MrsJMs. First Name Middle inifial Last vane
B.2 Social Security Number of Survivor: S
B.3 Address of Survivor: o
Street Apt# P 0 Bs
—
City State Zip Code, on
B.4 Telephone Number of Survivor: i = ned
B.5 Email Address of Survivor:
B.6 _ Relationship to Employee: Q Spouse Q Son/Daughter Q Parent
Q Grandparent Q Grandchild

Employee Information — Complete Section C UNLESS you are a labor organization.
Name ~f Emniaves:

Canyivrs.ms. Pirst Name

Middle initial

LastName

C.2 Former Name of Employee (e.g., maiden name/legal name change/other):

Mc/Mrs/Ms. First Name Middle Initial Last Name
C.3. Social Security Number of Employee:
C4 Address of Empiovee (if livina):

ene P.O. Box

City State CALL Zip Goae
C.5 Telephone Number of Employee:
C.6 Email Address of Employee:
C.7 Employment information Related to Petition:
C.7a Employee Number (if known):
C.7b Dates of Employment Star 1962 End [464
C.7¢ Employer Name: (NUMEC JNUCLERR MATERIALS ¢ EQuiPmenT Conf
C.7d Work Site Location: _A\PoLtLo, PR

OFFICE AG CCOUNTING Dé!

C.7e Supervisor's Name:

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner:


Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 42 of 42

USAF Counterproliferation Center
325 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427k

(334) 953-7538 (DSN (493-7538)
Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell,af-mil

http:/Awww. fas.org/auke/ guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm 12/7/2005



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 2 of 42

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awe/awegate/awe-cps.htm

Contents:
Page

Disclaimer i
The Author ii
Acknowledgments iii
Abstract iv
I. Introduction 1
II. 1948-1962: With French Cooperation 3
Il. 1963-1973: Seeing the Project Through to Completion 9
IV. 1974-1999; Bringing the Bomb Up the Basement Stairs 15
Appendix: Estimates of the Israeli Nuclear Arsenal 23
Notes 25
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those solely of the author
and are not a statement of official policy or position of the U.S.
Government, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or the
USAF Counterproliferation Center.

The Author

Colonel Warner D. “Rocky” Farr, Medical Corps, Master Flight
Surgeon, U.S. Anny, graduated from the Air War College at
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama before becoming the Command
Surgeon, U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. He also serves as the Surgeon for the U.S. Army
Special Forces Command, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and

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Roger D. Caldwell Archives Page 5 of 6

surgery was not a success). Lessons learned are
detailed in the paper.

¢ Caldwell RD and TE Potter. 1968. The
Solubility of Inhaled Particles. Presented at the
14th AEC Bioassay and Analytical Chemistry
Conference, Oct. 7-8, 1968, Nuclear Materials
and Equipment Corporation, Apollo,
Pennsylvania.

e Caldwell RD, RF Crosby, and MP Lockard.
1968. Radioactivity in Coal Mine Drainage.
Presented at the 1968 Midyear Topical
Symposium of the Health Physics Society,
Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation,
Apollo, Pennsylvania. Extensive environmental
sampling (the authors describe canoe trips to
collect the samples) shows that alpha
radioactivity in the Kiskiminetas River near
Apollo, Vandergrift, and Leechburg,
Pennsylvania derives primarily from coal mine
drainage that contains uranium leeched from
the overburden of the coal seams. The
technique of comparing samples upstream and
downstream of coal mines is very cogent, The
casual tone of this work makes it particularly
delightful reading.

e Caldwell RD. Large-Scale Processing of
Plutonium: Radiation Protection Under
Commercial Conditions. "For Presentation
Only" Probably about 1970, based on statement
on page 2. Alas, the slides are not available at
this time.

e Caldwell RD. 1972. "Evaluation of Radiation
Exposure." in Health Physics Operational
Monitoring, Vol. 1, eds. CA Willis and JS
Handloser, pp. 563-612. Gordon and Breach,

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Roger D. Caldwell Archives Page 4 of 6

| facility contained 6 glove-boxes that had high

| levels of alpha contamination. Decontamination
was deemed impractical, so they were to be
disposed of. These glove boxes were
decommissioned by filling them with fire-
retardant polyurethane foam, and putting each
in a steel drainage culvert. The void space in
the culvert was then filled with foam. They
were shipped on 3 flat-bed trailer trucks to
Nuclear Fuel Service, West Valley, New York
with an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
escort. The trip was safely accomplished in 7
hours on snowy and icy roads.

Potter TE and RD Caldwell. 1968. Calibration

ofa 2105 0-Be Neutron Source. December 3,
1968, Nuclear Materials and Equipment
Corporation, Apollo, Pennsylvania.

e Caldwell RD, T Potter, and E Schnell. 1969.
Radiological Emergency Experience in an
Industrial Plutonium Plant. Date estimated
from latest reference. Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation, Apollo, Pennsylvania.

aa - - NUMEC had four serious incidents.at its-

plutonium plant near Leechburg, Pennsylvania.
These were 1) a dry box explosion on January

17, 1966 involving alpha contamination Cpu
and 241 amm);2) a peroxide glove box explosion

on November 30, 1966 involving 7°?Pu and

241 aim: 3) an 192), hot cell release on January

13, 1967; and 4) a hand amputation in a
plutonium glove box on December 14, 1967
(the paper describes decontamination so a
surgeon could re-attach the hand; alas, it has
been reported later that the reattachment

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 15 of 42

smuggling 810 krytrons to Israel.[57] He vanished before trial and
reportedly lives outside Tel Aviv. The Israelis apologized for the
action saying that the krytrons were for medical research.[58] Israel
returned 469 of the krytrons but the rest, they declared, had been
destroyed in testing conventional weapons. Some believe they went
to South Africa.[59] Smyth has also been reported to have been
involved in a 1972 smuggling operation to obtain solid rocket fuel
binder compounds for the Jericho II missile and guidance component
hardware.[60] Observers point to the Jericho missile itself as proof
of a nuclear capability as it is not suited to the delivery of
conventional munitions. [61]

On the afternoon of 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel
in a coordinated surprise attack, beginning the Yom Kippur War.
Caught with only regular forces on duty, augmented by reservists
with a low readiness level, Israeli front lines crumbled. By early
afternoon on 7 October, no effective forces were in the southern
Golan Heights and Syrian forces had reached the edge of the plateau,
overlooking the Jordan River. This crisis brought Israel to its second
nuclear alert.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, obviously not at his best at a press
briefing, was, according to Time magazine, rattled enough to later
tell the prime minister that “this is the end of the third temple,”
referring to an impending collapse of the state of Israel. “Temple”
was also the code word for nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Golda
Meir and her “kitchen cabinet” made the decision on the night of 8
October. The Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs.
The number and in fact the entire story was later leaked by the
Israelis as a great psychological warfare tool. Although most
probably plutonium devices, one source reports they were enriched
uranium bombs. The Jericho missiles at Hirbat Zachariah and the
nuclear strike F-4s at Tel Nof were armed and prepared for action
against Syrian and Egyptian targets. They also targeted Damascus
with nuclear capable long-range artillery although it is not certain
they had nuclear artillery shells.[62]

US. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was notified of the alert
several hours later on the morning of 9 October. The U.S. decided to

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Final Technical Report

materials.

The Small Block Building was a single-story, corrugated sheet metal and concrete block
structure located in the northeast portion of the Parking Lot. The Small Block Building
was demolished between Jannary and February of 1991. The debris, palletized concrete
block and drummed wall rubble, was covered and stored in the Parking Lot until the
Processing Plant was ready to accept materials. The sheet metal was radiologically
surveyed, determined to meet the NRC’s release for unrestricted use criteria, and disposed
of as scrap. The floor slab was covered for remediation during decommissioning.

C, Removal of Offsite Soil and High Activity Under-Building Soil

Selective soil remediation was performed using standard excavating equipment before the
NRC approval of the Apollo Decommissioning Plan.

1. Alcove

The Alcove was a small strip of ground north of the Apollo Site, owned by the
neighboring industrial facility. Between March, 1988 and May, 1989, soil was excavated,
transported to the B&W property, covered, and stored in the Parking Lot for
dispositioning during decommissioning. Soil excavation ceased at the point that sampling
confirmed uranium concentrations at all locations were below the NRC’s criteria for
release for unrestricted use of 30 pCiU/g. The results of the B&W radiological survey of
the alcove were confirmed by the NRC and the area was backfilled with clean fill.

2. South Bay Area

Fhe South Bay Area was located on the southern end of the Metals Processing Facility’s
property. Soil was removed from the south bay area until the remaining activity was
below 30 pCiU/g. The soil also was stored and covered in the Parking Lot for disposition
during decommissioning. The results of the final survey of the area were verified by the
NRC and the South Bay Area was backfilled with clean fill.

| 3. Apollo Facility Area

Between 1991 and 1992, interior portions of the Apollo Facility’s concrete floor slab and
{ underlying soil containing activity greater than 2,000 pCiU/g were removed, packaged in
metal boxes, and shipped to Chem-Nuclear.

B&W NESI 4130/97
| Page 13 of 30



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 39 of 42

134. Shahak, op. cit., 4-5.
135. Garrity, op. cit., 92-111.
136. Dowty, op. cit., 8.

137. Gaffney, op. cit. 165.

138. Ibid., 37-38 and Friedman, Robert I. Zealots for Zion: Inside
Israel's West Bank Settlement Movement (New York, New York:
Random House, 1992), 132-52.

139. Blanche, Ed, “Is the Myth Fading for the Israeli Army? — Part
1.” Jane's Intelligence Review, 8, no. 12 (December 1996), 547-550
and Blanche, Ed. “Is the myth fading for the Israeli Army? — Part
2,” Jane's Intelligence Review 9, no. 1 (January 1997), 25-28.

140. Cohen, Stuart A., The Scroll or the Sword? Dilemmas of
Religion and Military Service in Israel (Amsterdam, Netherlands:
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 11-24.

141. Creveld, op. cit., 1998, 298.

142, Broyde, Michael J., “Fighting the War and the Peace:
Battlefield Ethics, Peace Talks, Treaties, and Pacifism in the J ewish
Tradition,” or on-line, Internet, 20 November 1998, available from

http://www. jlaw.com/Articles/war3.html,

143. Hough, Harold, op. cit., 1998, 11-12 and Berger, Julian,
“Court Fury At Israeli Reactor.” Guardian, 13 October 1997, in
Center for Nonproliferation, “Nuclear Abstracts,” 13 October 1997,
or on-line, Internet, 22 November 1998, available from
http://cns.miis.edu.

144. Creveld, op. cit., 1998, 252.

145. Valry, Nicholas, “Israel's Silent Gamble with the Bomb,” New
Scientist (12 December 1974), 807-09.

146. Harden, Major James D., Israeli Nuclear Weapons and War in

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SEASONAL WIND ROSE - APOLLO, PENNSYLVANIA 1
HEIGHT OF MEASUREMENT « 40 FEET YEAR-1966 '

SCALE = MILES PER HOUR x FREQUENCY

———m 1
1,25 MILES PER READING

SPRING SUMMER ‘ i

WINTER FALL



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 3 of 42

Psychological Operations Command, and the U.S. Army John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. With thirty-three
years of military service, he holds an Associate of Arts from the
State University of New York, Bachelor of Science from Northeast
Louisiana University, Doctor of Medicine from the Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences, Masters of Public Health
from the University of Texas, and has completed medical residencies
in aerospace medicine, and anatomic and clinical pathology. He is
the only army officer to be board certified in these three specialties.
Solo qualified in the TH-55A Army helicopter, he received flight
training in the T-37 and T-38 aircraft as part of his USAF School of
Aerospace Medicine residency.

Colonel Farr was a Master Sergeant Special Forces medic prior to
receiving a direct commission to second lieutenant. He is now the
senior Special Forces medical officer in the U.S. Army with prior
assignments in the Sth, 7th, and 10th Special Forces Groups
(Airborme), Ist Special Forces, in Vietnam, the United States, and
Germany. He has advised the 12th and 20th Special Forces Groups
(Airborne) in the reserves and national guard, served as Division
Surgeon, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), and as the Deputy
Commander of the U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, Fort Rucker,
Alabama.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the assistance, guidance and
encouragement from my Air War College (AWC) faculty research
advisor, Dr. Andrew Terrill, instructor of the Air War College Arab-
Israeli Wars course. Thanks are also due to the great aid of the Air
University librarians. The author is also indebted to Captain J. R.
Saunders, USN and Colonel Robert Sutton, USAF. Who also offered
helpful suggestions.

Abstract

This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn
from a review of unclassified sources. Israel began its search for
nuclear weapons at the inception of the state in 1948. As payment

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 22 of 42

Arab state.”[108]

As the Israeli bomb comes out of the basement, open discussion,
even in Israel, is occurring on why the Israelis feel they need an
arsenal not used in at least two if not three wars. Avner Cohen
states: “It [Israel] must be in a position to threaten another Hiroshima
to prevent another holocaust.”[109] In July 1998 Shimon Peres was
quoted in the Jordan Times as saying, “We have built a nuclear
option, not in order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an Oslo,”{110]
referring to the peace process.

One list of current reasons for an Israeli nuclear capability is:

e To deter a large conventional attack,

e To deter all levels of unconventional (chemical, biological,
nuclear) attacks,

¢ To preempt enemy nuclear attacks,

To support conventional preemption against enemy nuclear
assets,

To support conventional preemption against enemy non-nuclear
(conventional, chemical, biological) assets,

e For nuclear warfighting,

¢ The “Samson Option” (last resort destruction).[111]

The most alarming of these is the nuclear warfighting. The Israelis
have developed, by several accounts, low yield neutron bombs able
to destroy troops with minimal damage to property.[112] In 1990,
during the Second Gulf War, an Israeli reserve major general
recommended to America that it “use non-contaminating tactical
nuclear weapons” against Iraq.[113] Some have speculated that the
Israelis will update their nuclear arsenal to “micronukes” and
“tinynukes” which would be very useful to attack point targets and.
other tactical or barrier (mining) uses.[114] These would be very
useful for hardened deeply buried command and control facilities
and for airfield destruction without exposing Israeli pilots to combat.
[115] Authors have made the point that Israeli professional military
schools do not teach nuclear tactics and would not use them in the
close quarters of Israel. Many Israeli officers have attended
American military schools where they learned tactical use in

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Roger D. Caldwell Archives Page 1 of 6

Roger D. Caldwell
Archives

a

e Roger Dale Caldwell, Ph.D., was a pioneering
health physicist who worked at Brookhaven
National Laboratory, in the Health and Safety
Group at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment
Corporation (NUMEC) in Apollo,
Pennsylvania, during the 1960s and into the
1970s. Roger struggled with the challenges of
protecting workers from intakes of uranium and
plutonium and measuring how well protection
had succeeded using bioassay, air samples, and
workplace indicators. He showed that
traditional indicators were not adequate, and
developed new means to monitor workers that
were adequate.

He received the Health Physics Society's Elda
E, Anderson Award in 1973. Dade W.
Moeller's Citation for Roger Dale Caldwell
appeared in Health Physics 25(3): 216-218, and
it contains biographical detail about Roger.

Roger Caldwell left NUMEC in the early 1970s
and joined the faculty of the Department of
Radiation Health at the University of Pittsburgh
Graduate School of Public Health. Some of the
papers linked below were salvaged from the
trash at Pitt in the early 1990s when the
department began relocating off-campus.
Others listed can be found in publications. The
unpublished papers are reproduced here out of
respect for the legacy of this forward-thinking
individual. Most of the papers below were

http://bidug.pnl.gov/rde.htm 12/7/2005



per square foot per week, The contours account for 25% of the released
activity; the rest is dispersed at a distance. There are several
interesting features of the fallout contour. Fallout generally follows
the wind pattern, the direction and extent being dependent on the
direction and speed of the wind. The fallout collectors are useful for
detecting otherwise unknown releases. For instance, the local contours
around NDC resulted one week from unwittingly burning contaminated scrap
clothing. No excessive levels resulted, but the fallout network enabled
us to warn NDC and the error was corrected before it got out of hand.

We experimented considerably with gummed paper. Cylindrical
collectors‘10) were recomended to us, but we found the directionality
benéfit was lost. Apparently due to small particle size (AMAD*0.3-3
microns), the collection on the back of the cylinder was as great as in
front. This led us however to use vertical collectors. It is very simple
to staple gummed paper to a telephone pole.

One of the surprising things to us was the prevailing presence of
alpha activity in the environment. Fallout collectors, located many miles
away, often showed activity levels as high a 20 pci/ft2/week. Thiis the
effect of uranium plant fallout is lost within a few hundred yards of the
plant.

Another interesting feature of the remote fallout collectors
illustrated something about the mechanism of fallout collection. Collectors
located near well-traveled roads always give higher results than those away
from roads. We think this happens because radioactive dust doesn't settle
outs it impacts onto surfaces. The more turbulence in an area the higher
the collection rate of the available ratioactivity. This is why vertical



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 40 of 42
the Middle East, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, December 1997.
147. Dowdy, op. cit., 20.

148. Aronson, Geoffrey, “Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and
the Nuclear Question,” Middle East Journal, 46, no. 4 (Autumn
1992), 619-630.

149. Data from Time, 12 April 1976, quoted in Weissman and
Krosney, op. cit., 107.

150. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 280 and Cohen, Israel and the
Bomb, op. cit., 273-274.

151. Tahtinen, Dale R., The Arab-Israel Military Balance Today
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1973), 34.

152. “How Israel Got the Bomb.” Time, 12 April 1976, 39.
153. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 302.

154, Kaku, op. cit., 66 and Hersh, op. cit., 216.

155. Valéry, op. cit., 807-09.

156. Data from CIA, quoted in Weissman and Krosney, op. cit.,
109.

157. Ottenberg, Michael, “Estimating Israel's Nuclear Capabilities,”
Command, 30 (October 1994), 6-8.

158. Pry, op. cit., 75.
159. Ibid., 111.

160, Data from NBC Nightly News, quoted in Milhollin, op. cit.,
104 and Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 308.

161. Data from Vanunu quoted in Milhollin, op. cit., 104.

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 13 of 42

Author Seymour Hersh, writing in the Samson Option says Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol delayed starting weapons production even after
Dimona was finished.[40] The reactor operated and the plutonium
collected, but remained unseparated. The first extraction of
plutonium probably occurred in late 1965. By 1966, enough
plutonium was on hand to develop a weapon in time for the Six-Day
War in 1967. Some type of non-nuclear test, perhaps a zero yield or
implosion test, occurred on November 2, 1966. After this time,
considerable collaboration between Israel and South Africa
developed and continued through the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa
became Israel's primary supplier of uranium for Dimona. A Center
for Nonproliferation Studies report lists four separate Israel-South
Africa. “clandestine nuclear deals.” Three concerned yellowcake and
one was tritium.[41] Other sources of yellowcake may have
included Portugal.[42]

Egypt attempted unsuccessfully to obtain nuclear weapons from the
Soviet Union both before and after the Six-Day War. President
Nasser received from the Soviet Union a questionable nuclear
guarantee instead and declared that Egypt would develop its own
nuclear program.[43 | His rhetoric of 1965 and 1966 about
preventive war and Israeli nuclear weapons coupled with overflights
of the Dimona rector contributed to the tensions that led to war. The
Egyptian Air Force claims to have first overflown Dimona and
recognized the existence of a nuclear reactor in 1965.[44 ] Of the 50 -
American HAWK antiaircraft missiles in Israeli hands, half ringed
Dimona by 1965.[45] Israel considered the Egyptian overflights of
May 16, 1967 as possible pre-strike reconnaissance. One source lists
such Egyptian overflights, along with United Nations peacekeeper
withdrawal and Egyptian troop movements into the Sinai, as one of
the three “tripwires” which would drive Israel to war.[46] There was
an Egyptian military plan to attack Dimona at the start of any war
but Nasser vetoed it.[47] He believed Israel would have the bomb in
1968.[48] Israel assembled two nuclear bombs and ten days later
went to war.[49] Nasser's plan, if he had one, may have been to gain
and consolidate territorial gains before Israel had a nuclear option.
[50] He was two weeks too late.

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 37 of 42

revisiting of ‘Deliberate Ambiguity' vs. ‘Disclosure’, Between War
and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security, edited by Efraim Harsh
(London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 113-133.

112. Hersh, op. cit., 319.

113. Amos, Deborah, Lines in the Sand: Desert Storm and the
Remaking of the Arab World (New York, New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1992), 105.

114. Dowler, Thomas W. and Howard II, Joseph H., “Countering
the threat of the well-armed tyrant: A modest proposal for small
nuclear weapons,” Strategic Review, XIX, no. 4 (Fall 1991), 34-40.

115. Beres, Louis Rene, “Israel's bomb in the basement: A
revisiting of ‘Deliberate Ambiguity’ vs. ‘Disclosure.'” In Karsh,
Efraim, op. cit., Editor, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of
Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 116.

116. Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 265.

117. Hough, Harold, “Israel reviews its nuclear deterrent,” Jane's
Intelligence Review 10, no.11 (November 1998), 11-13.

118. Creveld, op. cit., 1993, 105.

119. Burrows, and Windrem, op. cit., 311-312 and “Israel begins
test of nuclear missile submarines,” The Irish Times, July 2, 1998,
or on-line, Internet, 24 December 1998, available from
http://www. irish-times.com/irish-
times/paper/1998/0702/wor13.html.

120. Melman, Yossi, “Swimming with the Dolphins,” Ha'aretz,

Tuesday, June 9, 1998, and “Report: Israel to get Subs with Nuclear

Strike Capability,” Jerusalem Post, 1 July 3, 1998, 3 and Sorenson,
_ op. cit., 543.

121. Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, op. cit., 1990, 344-345, 422-
423.

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—

[Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
under the Energy eyes Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Preveritian
Wines Compensation Act National Institute for Occupational Sefety and Hdalin

OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007 |
Special Exposure Cohort Patition — Form B Page 6 of7

F.3 Q I/Wé have attached a report from a health physicist or other individual with expertise In
tadibtion dose reconstruction documenting the limitations of existing DOE or AWE records on
radition exposures at the facility, as relevant to the patition. The report specifies the basis for
beliéving these documented limitations might prevent the completion of dose reconstructions for
members of the class under 42 CFR Part 82 and related NIOSH technical implementation
guidelines.

(Attach report to the back of the petition form.)

F.4 Qf WWé have attached a scientific or technical report, issued by a government agency of the
Executive Branch of Government or the General Accounting Office, the Nuclaar Regulatory
Conjmission, or the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, or published In a paer-reviewed
journal, that identifies dosimetry and related information that are unavaitable (due to elther a lack
of monitoring or the destruction or loss of records) for estimating the radiation doses of
employees covered by the petition.

{Attach report to the back of the petition form.)

G
All Petitioners khould sian and date tho petition. A mavimum of three pérsons may sign the patition.

—— 1% 0G- 2905

Date
Signature Date
Signature Date
Notice: Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, misrepresentation, concediment of

fact or any other act of fraud to obtain compensation as provided under EEOICPA or who
knowingly accepts compensation to which that person Is not entitled ls subject to civil or
administrative remedies as well as felony criminal prosecution and may, under appropriate
¢fiminal provisions, be punished by a fine or imprisonment or both. | affirm that the information
Provided on this form is accurate and true.

Send this form to: SEC Petition

: Office of Compensation Analysis and Support
NIOSH
4676 Columbia Perkway, MS-C-47
Cincinnati, OH 45226

Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: , —



Tsrael's Nuclear Weapons Page 20 of 42

the rubble. This was the world's first attack on a nuclear reactor.[91]

Since 19 September 1988, Israe! has worked on its own satellite
recon- naissance system to decrease reliance on U.S. sources. On
that day, they launched the Offeq-1 satellite on the Shavit booster, a
system closely related to the Jericho-II missile. They launched the
satellite to the west away from the Arabs and against the earth's
rotation, requiring even more thrust. The Jericho-II missile is
capable of sending a one ton nuclear payload 5,000 kilometers.
Offeq-2 went up on 3 April 1990. The launch of the Offeq-3 failed
on its first attempt on 15 September 1994, but was successful 5 April
1995.[92]

Mordechai Vanunu provided the best look at the Israeli nuclear
arsenal in 1985 complete with photographs.(93] A technician from
Dimona who lost his job, Vanunu secretly took photographs,
immigrated to Australia and published some of his material in the
London Sunday Times. He was subsequently kidnapped by Israeli
agents, tried and imprisoned. His data shows a sophisticated nuclear
program, over 200 bombs, with boosted devices, neutron bombs, F-
16 deliverable warheads, and Jericho warheads.[94] The boosted
weapons shown in the Vanunu photographs show a sophistication
that inferred the requirement for testing.[95] He revealed for the
first time the underground plutonium separation facility where Israel
was producing 40 kilograms annually, several times more than .
previous estimates. Photographs showed sophisticated designs
which scientific experts say enabled the Israelis to build bombs with
as little as 4 kilograms of plutonium. These facts have increased the
estimates of total Israeli nuclear stockpiles (see Appendix A).[96] In
the words of one American, “[the Israelis} can do anything we or the
Soviets can do.”[97] Vanunu not only made the technical details of
the Israeli program and stockpile public but in his wake, Israeli
began veiled official acknowledgement of the potent Israeli nuclear
deterrent. They began bringing the bomb up the basement stairs if
not out of the basement.

Israel went on full-scale nuclear alert again on the first day of Desert
Storm, 18 January 1991. Seven SCUD missiles were fired against
the cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa by Iraq (only two actually hit Tel

http://www fas.org/nuke/guide/israe/nuke/farr.htm 12/7/2005


Special Expopure Cohort Petition
under the EnergyiEmployees Occupational
Niness Compensation Act

Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B

Continuation Page — Photocopy and complete as necessary.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Centers for Disease Contro| and Prevention
Nationa! institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OMB Number; 0920-0838 Expires: osi31/2007
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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 33 of 42

66. Hersh, op. cit., 230-231.

67. O'Balance, Edgar, No Victor, No Vanquished. The Yom Kippur
War (San Rafael, California: Presido Press, 1978), 175.

68. Ibid., 234-235 and Aronson, S, op. cit., 15-18.

69. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 396 (n. 62); Garthoff,
Raymond L., Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institute, 1994), 426, n76 and Bandmann, Yona and Cordova,
Yishai. “The Soviet Nuclear Threat Towards the Close of the Yom
Kippur War.” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1980 5,
no. 1, 107-9.

70. Cherkashin, Nikolai, “On Moscow's Orders.” Russian Life, 39,
no. 10 (October 1996), 13-15.

71. Brownlow, Cecil. “Soviets poise three-front global drive.
Nuclear weapons in Egypt, artillery buildup at Guantanamo,
Communist concentrations in Vietnam aimed at political gains.”
Aviation Week and Space Technology 99, no. 19 (5 November
1973), 12-14; Holt, Robert. “Soviet Power Play.” Aviation Week
and Space Technology 99, no. 19 (5 November 1973), 7 and Gut-
Arieh, Danny, “A non-Conventional Look at Israel During '73 War.”
IsraelWire Tuesday, October 6,'1998 17; 23; on-line, Internet 20-
November 1998, available from

http://www. israelwire.com/new/98 1006/98 10068 html.

72. Hersh, op. cit., 321-235.
73. Creveld, 1998, op. cit., 220-221.

74, Evron, Yair, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell Publishing, 1994), 62-74.

75. Cohen, Avner, “Peres: Peacemaker, Nuclear Pioneer.” The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 52, no. 3 (May/June 1996), 16-17
and Aronson, S, op. cit., 11-12.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israeV/nuke/farr-htm 12/7/2005



DoE /E W/'400)7--Th

Final Technical Report

Apollo Decommissioning Project
Apollo Pennsylvania

(DOE Assistance Instrument Number DE-FG01-91EW40017)

MASTER

OISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT is ununat,

Rev0 4730/97 Prepared by B&W NESI



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 9 of 42

preproduction design of early Mirage jet aircraft, designed to be
capable of delivering nuclear bombs.[21]

French experts secretly built the Israeli reactor underground at
Dimona, in the Negev desert of southern Israel near Beersheba.
Hundreds of French engineers and technicians filled Beersheba, the
biggest town in the Negev. Many of the same contractors who built
Marcoule were involved. SON (a French firm) built the plutonium
separation plants in both France and Israel. The ground was broken
for the EL-102 reactor (as it was known to France) in early 1958.

Israel used many subterfuges to conceal activity at Dimona. It called
the plant a manganese plant, and rarely, a textile plant. The United
States by the end of 1958 had taken pictures of the project from U-2
spy planes, and identified the site as a probable reactor complex.

The concentration of Frenchmen was also impossible to hide from
ground observers. In 1960, before the reactor was operating, France,
now under the leadership of de Gaulle, reconsidered and decided to
suspend the project. After several months of negotiation, they
reached an agreement in November that allowed the reactor to
proceed if Israel promised not to make nuclear weapons and to
announce the project to the world. Work on the plutonium
reprocessing plant halted. On 2 December 1960, before Israel could
make announcements, the U.S. State Department issued a statement
that Israel had a secret nuclear installation.. By 16 December, this
became public knowledge with its appearance in the New York
Times. On 21 December, Ben-Gurion announced that Israel was
building a 24-megawatt reactor “for peaceful purposes.”[22]

Over the next year, relations between the U.S. and Israel became
strained over the Dimona reactor. The U.S. accepted Israel's
assertions at face value publicly, but exerted pressure privately.
Although Israel allowed a cursory inspection by well known
American physicists Eugene Wigner and I. 1. Rabi, Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion consistently refused to allow regular international
inspections. The final resolution between the U.S. and Israel was a
commitment from Israel to use the facility for peaceful purposes, and
to admit an U.S. inspection team twice a year. These inspections
began in 1962 and continued until 1969. Inspectors saw only the

http:/Awww.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm 12/7/2005




Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 12 of 42

one of their own Mirage fighters during the Six-Day War. The
Israelis also shot down a Libyan airliner with 104 passengers, in
1973, which had strayed over the Sinai.[33] There is little doubt that
some time in the late sixties Israel became the sixth nation to
manufacture nuclear weapons. Other things they needed were extra
uranium and extra heavy water to run the reactor at a higher rate.
Norway, France, and the United States provided the heavy water
and “Operation Plumbat” provided the uranium.

After the 1967 war, France stopped supplies of uranium to Israel.
These supplies were from former French colonies of Gabon, Niger,
and the Central Africa Republic.[34] Israel had small amounts of
uranium from Negev phosphate mines and had bought some from
Argentina and South Africa, but not in the large quantities supplied
by the French. Through a complicated undercover operation, the
Israelis obtained uranium oxide, known as yellow cake, held in a
stockpile in Antwerp. Using a West German front company and a
high seas transfer from one ship to another in the Mediterranean,
they obtained 200 tons of yellow cake. The smugglers labeled the
560 sealed oil drums “Plumbat,” which means lead, hence
“Operation Plumbat.”[35] The West German government may have
been involved directly but remained undercover to avoid
antagonizing the Soviets or Arabs.(36] Israeli intelligence
information on the Nazi past of some West German officials may
have provided the motivation.[37] ;

Norway sold 20 tons of heavy water to Israel in 1959 for use in an
experimental power reactor. Norway insisted on the right to inspect
the heavy water for 32 years, but did so only once, in April 1961,
while it was still in storage barrels at Dimona. Israel simply
promised that the heavy water was for peaceful purposes. In
addition, quantities much more than what would be required for the
peaceful purpose reactors were imported. Norway either colluded or
at the least was very slow to ask to inspect as the International
-Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rules required.[38] Norway and
Israel concluded an agreement in 1990 for Israel to sell back 10.5
tons of the heavy water to Norway. Recent calculations reveal that
Israel has used two tons and will retain eight tons more.[39]

http://www fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.btm 12/7/2005



Israel's Nuclear Weapons , Page 21 of 42

Aviv and one hit Haifa). This alert lasted for the duration of the war,
43 days. Over the course of the war, Iraq launched around 40
missiles in 17 separate attacks at Israel. There was little loss of life:
two killed directly, 11 indirectly, with many structures damaged and
life disrupted.[98] Several supposedly landed near Dimona, one of
them a close miss.[99] Threats of retaliation by the Shamir
government if the Iraqis used chemical warheads were interpreted to
mean that Israel intended to launch a nuclear strike if gas attacks
occurred. One Israeli commentator recommended that Israel should
signal Iraq that “any Iraqi action against Israeli civilian populations,
with or without gas, may leave Iraq without Baghdad.”[100] Shortly
before the end of the war the Israelis tested a “nuclear capable”
missile which prompted the United States into intensifying its SCUD
hunting in western Iraq to prevent any Israeli response.[101] The
Israeli Air Force set up dummy SCUD sites in the Negev for pilots to
practice on—they found it no easy task.[102] American government
concessions to Israel for not attacking (in addition to Israeli Patriot
missile batteries) were:

« Allowing Israel to designate 100 targets inside Iraq for the
coalition to destroy,

e Satellite downlink to increase warning time on the SCUD
attacks (present and future),

e “Technical parity with Saudi jet fighters in perpetuity.”[103]

All of this validated the nuclear arsenal in the minds of the Israelis.
In particular the confirmed capability of Arab states without a
border with Israel, the so-called “second tier” states, to reach out and
touch Israel with ballistic missiles confirmed Israel's need for a
robust first strike capability.][104] Current military contacts
between Israel and India, another nuclear power, bring up questions
of nuclear cooperation.[105] Pakistani sources have already voiced
concerns over a possible joint Israeli-Indian attack on Pakistan's
nuclear facilities.[106] A recent Parameters article speculated on
Israel's willingness to furnish nuclear capabilities or assistance to
certain states, such as Turkey.[107] A retired Israeli Defense Force
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Amnon Shahak, has declared, “all
methods are acceptable in withholding nuclear capabilities from an

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Asrael's Nuclear Weapons Page 1 of 42

&] Index

THE THIRD TEMPLE'S HOLY OF HOLIES:
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army

The Counterproliferation Papers ~S
Future Warfare Series No. 2 . we
USAF Counterproliferation Center re) Qe
Air War College
Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
September 1999

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF
Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to
U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF officers to assist.
‘them in countering the threat posed by adversaries equipped with
weapons of mass destruction. Copies of papers in this series are
available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325
Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number
is (334) 953-7538; phone (334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 2
USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air War College

Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://www. fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm 12/7/2005



Final Technical Report

particles. The air was exhausted through a HEPA filter to minimize any airborne
emissions. Building rubble was sent to the Processing Plant where it was reduced in size,
sampled, analyzed, and either released for unrestricted use as backfill on the site or sent to
Envirocare. By the end of 1992, the demolition of the East Bay shell was complete.

b. Apollo Office Building

‘The Apollo Office Building was located directly across Warren Avemue, east of the Apollo
Facility, It was used as an administrative, engineering, and support office for management
and professional staff. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, it contained an analytical
laboratory that was used to analyze radioactive and non-radioactive products. A small
portion of the building basement also housed operations which manufactured instruments
used in the production of nuclear fuels. Although the Apollo Office Building was not an
original part of the Apollo Decommissioning Project, it was included as part of the Project
in the Spring of 1993 after it was determined that some floor boards and some drain lines
contained uranium levels that exceeded 30 pCiU/g. The affected drain lines and floor
boards were removed and sent to Envirocare and the building was demolished under
controlled conditions, Following B&W’s survey of the property and the NRC’s
confirmatory survey, the area was backfilled, graded and revegetated. The property
subsequently was sold to an adjacent business in July of 1996.

c. Metals Processing Facility

The Metals Processing Facility (never owned or operated by NUMEC or B&W) located
in the Off-Site area per Figure 1 was not included in the Apollo Decommissioning Project,
but significant activities occurred there during the 1992-1995 period. The owner of the
facility demolished the 23 production buildings and the one office building. This
demolition allowed. greater access to the sewers located in the Off-Site area that required
radiological remediation. .

3. Soil and Building Concrete

‘The site characterization results defined the depth and extent of radiological constituents
in the soil and building concrete that exceeded the NRC’s release for unrestricted use
criteria, Eight major areas were designated for soil remediation (Figure 2). Concrete
stored in the Parking Lot and concrete from the foundations of the Apollo Facility and
Small Block Building were also designated for remediation. Excavated soil and building
concrete was sent through the Processing Plant and either released for unrestricted use or
loaded into rail cars and shipped to Envirocare (Any soil or concrete rubble exceeding
2,000 pCiU/g was disposed of at Chem-Nuclear during decommissioning support
activities).

B&W NESI 4/30/97
Page 16 0f30



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 24 of 42

Russian nerve gas if Israel resists.[127] Their use would drive Israel
to nuclear use. Israeli development of an anti- missile defense, the
Atrow, a fully fielded (30-50[128}) Jericho II ballistic missile, and
the soon-to-arrive strategic submarine force, seems to have produced
a coming change in defense force structure. The Israeli newspaper
Ha'aretz, quotes the Israeli Chief of Staff discussing the
establishment of a “strategic command to . . . prepare an adequate
response to the long term threats. . . ”[129]

The 1994 accord with Jordan, allowing limited Israeli military
presence in Jordanian skies, could make the flying distance to
several potential adversaries considerably shorter.[130] Israel is
concerned about Iran's desire to obtain nuclear weapons and become
aregional leader, coupled with large numbers of Shiite Moslems in
southern Lebanon. The Israeli Air Force commanding general
issued a statement saying Israel would “consider an attack” if any
country gets “close to achieving a nuclear capability.”[131] The
Israelis are obviously considering actions capable of stopping such
programs and are buying aircraft such as the F-15I with sufficient
operational range. At the first delivery of these 4,000 kilometer
range fighters, the Israeli comment was, “the aircraft would help
counter a growing nuclear threat.”[132] They consider such regional
nation nuclear programs to be a sufficient cause for war. Their
record of accomplishment is clear: having hit the early Iraqi nuclear

- . _-effort, they feel vindicated by Desert-Storm. They also feel that. only
the American and Israeli nuclear weapons kept Iraq's Saddam
Hussein from using chemical or biological weapons against Israel.
[133]

Israel, like Iran, has desires of regional power. The 1956 alliance
with France and Britain might have been a first attempt at regional
hegemony. Current debate in the Israeli press considers offering
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and perhaps Syria (after a peace agreement)
an Israeli nuclear umbrella of protection.[134] A nuclear Iran or Iraq
might use its nuclear weapons to protect some states in the region,
threaten others, and attempt to control oil prices.[135]

Another speculative area concerns Israeli nuclear security and
possible misuse. What is the chain of decision and control of Israel's

http://www. fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/auke/farr.htm 12/7/2005



~2-

It is obviously impractical to monitor all stacks continuously.

We have been sampling each stack four hours once & month. Even this
minimal sampling keeps one full time technician busy. :

Our stack sampling technique is standard: We insert an isokinetic
probe into the center line of the stack and draw air at 40 1/min throvgh
an inline Whatman a filter paper. Recently we have successfully used
Gelman Type E glass fiber filters. Where the stack diseharge is corrosive
or has high water vapor content, we bubble the sample through cascaded
impingers. Several models of Gelman and Gast pumps have given us good
service. - .

This intermittent stack sampling has not given us assurance that
off site concentrations are acceptable. In the first Place, the measured
stack concentration frequently exceeds permissible levels. (23g is the
major isotope; its MPCa = 4 x 10-12 pos /ml, or 8.8 6/m/i? az .08 pgn/), (2)
Occasionally this is caused by a deficiency in air cleaning such as a poor
filter seal. But more often the leakage is through the filter itself. So
called "absolute" filters are merely highly efficient, allowing a small
(< .034) (3y put measurable quantity of aerosol to penetrate through the
filter, Adding a second stage of absolute filtration would solve the
problem, but is too costly.

Secondly, only 8 of the stacks are sampled on a given day. It is
not reasonable to’ guess what the other 116 are discharging on that day.

Bven total continuous sampling of all stacks would not guarantee
Permissible off site concentrations. For example, the off site concen-
tration might exceed MPCa because of the summed contributions from several

stacks, each of which was discharging concentrations below MPCa.



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 11 of 42

was soon to end and Israel would have to go it alone.
II. 1963-1973: Seeing the Project to Completion

To act in such a way that the Jews who died in the gas chambers
would be the last Jews to die without defending themselves.

- Golda Meir[28 ]

Israel would soon need its own, independent, capabilities to
complete its nuclear program. Only five countries had facilities for
uranium enrichment: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, France, and China. The Nuclear Materials and Equipment
Corporation, or NUMEC, in Apollo, Pennsylvania was a small fuel
rod fabrication plant. In 1965, the U.S. government accused Dr.
Zalman Shapiro, the corporation president, of “losing” 200 pounds
of highly enriched uranium. Although investigated by the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and other government agencies and
inquiring reporters, no answers were available in what was termed
the Apollo Affair.[29] Many remain convinced that the Israelis
received 200 pounds of enriched uranium sometime before 1965.[30]

One source links Rafi Eitan, an Israeli Mossad agent and later the
handler of spy Jonathan Pollard, with NUMEC.[31] In the 1990s
when the NUMEC plant was disassembled, the Nuclear Regulatory
“Commission found over 100 kilograms of plutonium in the structural
components of the contaminated plant, casting doubt on 200 pounds
going to Israel.[32]

The joint venture with France gave Israel several ingredients for
nuclear weapons construction: a production reactor, a factory to
extract plutonium from the spent fuel, and the design. In 1962, the
Dimona reactor went critical; the French resumed work on the
underground plutonium reprocessing plant, and completed it in 1964
or 1965. The acquisition of this reactor and related technologies was
clearly intended for military purposes from the outset (not “dual-
use”), as the reactor has no other function. The security at Dimona
(officially the Negev Nuclear Research Center) was particularly
stringent. For straying into Dimona's airspace, the Israelis shot down

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm 12/7/2005



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 17 of 42

the answer is “obscure.” Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev saoat



ae

us to extrapolate reasonably between air sampling ‘locations.

Figure 4 shows our continuous environmental sampling network.
There are seven fixed station air samplers, four of which are at
“stack height on the plant roof. The three off site continuous air
samplers were placed north, east and south of the plant. Our
industrial neighbors, Raychord and Nuclear Decontamination Corporation,
kindly permitted us to locate samplers at their sites. Filters are
changed daily and counted for alpha radioactivity.

We distributed 26 fallout collectors around the plant. After
some study we séttled on two types of dust fall collectors: Vertical
gumed paper and 9 inch aluminun low wall pans (pie pans). The fadlout
collectors are assayed weekly for alpha radioactivity in an Eberline
Pc.4 large area proportional counter. Counts are scaled on an NCA RC~3
scaler-~ratemeter.

To understand the plant effluent dispersion better, we air
sampled at points between and beyond the fixed stations. We took two
approaches to this supplenentary sampling, First, many individual
short period samples were grabbed whenever the wind behaved in an
unusual way. One example is during downwash in the lee of a high wind.
Second, we carried out sampling campaigns under typical wind conditions.
After determining wind speed and direction, we set out high volume air
samplers downwind at different distances from the plant. At the
furtherest distance we also set out samplers crosswind, Most of these
sampling studies were run for four hours.

Figure 5 depicts sone of our equipment. One of us is cranking
up a gasoline powered Richmond Sampler. It draws about 2.5 CFM



Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Centers

under the Energy Employees. Occupational . . for Disease Control and Preverition,
lliness Compensation Act "National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health |
OMB Number: 0820-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007

Special Exposure Cohort Patition — Form B
Continuation Page — Photocopy and complete as necessary.

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‘px che NUMEC ene (Lites.

Appendix — Continustion Page

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ConTAMINATED TIME CARDS

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under the Energy Empioyees Occupational Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

. fliness Compensation Act National! Institute for Occupational Safely and Health

. : OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007

Special Expogure Cohort Petition — Form B . _ Page Sof 7
F Basis for Proposing that Records and Information are Inadequate for Individual Dose

F1 Qa

F2 0

Name or Social Security Number af First Petitioner:

Special Exposure Cohort Petition . U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Complete Section F.

Complete at tea f A
the required information related to the selection. You are not required to complete more than one eniry.

st one of the following entries in this section by chacking the appropriate box arid providing’ |

We have attached elther documents or statements provided by affidavit that indicate that
tadlation exposures and radiation doses potentially incurred by members of the proposed class,
that relate to this petition, were not monitored, either through personal monitoring or through area .
monitoring. :

(Attach documents and/ar affidavits to the back of the petition form.)

Describe as completely as possible, to the extent it might be unclear, how the attached
documentation and/of affidavit(s) indicate that potential radiation exposures were nat monitored.

NDMEC office WORKERS DD NOT WEAR Dose

Bances ju TRE oF Fice GuiLowWs. TF RAVE No
DasimerRy REPORTS in MN EEo\CPA CLAW, FILA,

’ Li

\/ We have attached either documents or statements provided by affidavit that indicate that
radiation monitoring records for mambers of the.proposed class have been lost, falsified, or
destyoyed; or that thers is no information regarding monitoring, source, source term, or process
frony the site where the employees worked.

(Attach documents and/or affidavits to the back of the patition form.)

Destribe as completely as possible, to the extent it might be unclear, how the attached
docymentation and/or affidavit(s) indicate that radiation monitoring records for members of the
proposed class have been lost, altered illegally, or destroyed.



Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 34 of 42

76. Karsh, op. cit., 86.
77. Quoted in Hersh, op. cit., 180 and Stevens, op. cit., 1-14.

78. Hersh, op. cit., 216, 276 and Kaku, Michio. “Contingency
Plans: Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War.” In Altered States: A
Reader in the New World Order, Bennis, Phyllis and Moushabeck,
Michel, Eds. (New York, New York: 1993), 66.

79. Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 109.

80. Gillette, Robert, “Uranium Enrichment: Rumors of Israeli
Progress with Lasers.” Science 183, no. 4130 (22 March 1974),
1172-1174.

81. Barnaby, Frank, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in
the Middle East (London: 1. B. Tauris, 1988), 25.

82. “Israel: The Covert Connection.” Frontline, PBS Network, May
16, 1989, quoted in Spector, Leonard S., and McDonough, Mark G.,
with Medeiros, Evan S., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. A Guide
in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1995).

83. Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East:
. Dimensions and Responsibilities (Princeton, New Jersey: Kingston
Press, 1984), 22-23.

84. Hersh, op. cit., 216.

85. Barnaby, Frank, “Capping Israel's Nuclear Volcano,” Between
War and Peace. Dilemmas of Israeli Security, edited by Efraim
Karsh (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 98.

86. Hersh, op. cit., 271-275.
87. Nashif, op. cit., 32.

88. Gaffney, Mark, Dimona: The Third T ‘emple? The Story Behind
the Vanunu Revelation (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1989),

http:/Avww_fas.org/auke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm 12/7/2005


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References

A. 3. Breslin, Toward More Realistic Systems for the Discharge of
Radioactive Airborne Wastes, Health Physics, Vol. 12, No. 10, pp»
{1896)~(1501), October 1966. .

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 20, Appendix B.

W. J. Smith, N. F. Surprenant, Properties of Various Filtering
Media, Third AEC Air Cleaning Conference, LASL (1953).

Meteorology and Atomic Energy, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. (July 1955).

Industrial Ventilation, A Manual of Recommend Practice, Amarican
wegen of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Ninth Edition,
1966.

Air Pollution Control Manual, Part 1 - Evaluation, 1960, American
Industrial Hygiene Association.

M. Eisenbud, Environnental Radioactivity, p. 76, McGraw-Hill, 1963.
J. 2 Holland, AEC Report ORO-99, 1955~

-F. Pasquill, Atmospheric Diffusion, p. 134, Van Nostrand, 1962.

W. L. Pritchard, C. E. Schumann and C. W. Gruber, The Role of
Surface Geometry in Particle Collection Upon Adhesive Materials,
Presented at the 1966 American Industrial Hygiene Conference,
Pittsburgh, Pa., May 1966.

d, Pe MeCauley; Uranium in Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Geological
Survey, Bulletin 143, 1961,

J. C. Fern, Radioactivity of Coals and Associated Rocks in Beavers
Clearfield and Jefferson Counties, Pennsylvania, U.S. Geological
Survey, TEI-468, January 1955. :

ED Patterson, Radioactivity of Part of the Bitwninous Coal
Region of Pennsylvania, U. S. Geological Survey, TEI-49,
Novenber, 1954.



Special Exposure Cohort Petition U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

under the Energy Employees Occupational Centers for Disease Controf and Prevention
Uness Compensation Act National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
ae . OMB Number: 0920-0639 Expires: 05/31/2007
ial Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B Page 4 of 7

Proposed Definition of Employee Class Covered by Petition — complete Section E.
£.1 Name of DOE or AWE Facility:( NUM
E.2 ions at relev: his petition:

ra & VILDIAG

NUMEG  BPoLLo PLANT
Numec  PaegKg  Ercpesty

E.3 List job titles and/or job duties of employees included in the class. In addition, you can fist by
name any individuals other than petitioners identified on this form who you believe should be

ded in this cl
udgd in s clans: to rN ANE \CAL.
RL NuMe Aport.o PLAST _CMPLoYeSS
ALL Numec FARKS FAciLITY EuMProyees
E.4 Employment Dates relevant to this petition: Contaminated URANIUM
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tc INST End A ws foaug 1 pony’
Start AAS 1 End = loo%iRoS
t OX / 14 11903 End ORO FIRE INcIDEAT
E.5 __ Is the petition based on one or more jinmonitored, unrecorded, or inadequately monitored or
recorded exposure incidents?: x Yes Q No

if yes, provide the date(s) of the incident(s) and a complete description (attach additional pages

as necessary):

ONE ANCIDENT KAPPENED 08 orhs i143. THIS WAS & WORKMY
FoR ME Avy Twas INAPD out OF THE OFFICE + PLANT Ww
APOLLO, An) UconTRolLABLe URANIUM FIRE ERuPTeD INSIDE

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p DECLASSIFIED News K, # ;
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6 ERNET on WEB Site “Fi LIVE. Com”
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Name or Social Security Number of First Petitioner: _


Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 4 of 42

for Israeli participation in the Suez Crisis of 1956, France provided
nuclear expertise and constructed a reactor complex for Israel at
Dimona capable of large-scale plutonium production and
reprocessing. The United States discovered the facility by 1958 and
it was a subject of continual discussions between American
presidents and Israeli prime ministers. Israel used delay and
deception to at first keep the United States at bay, and later used the
nuclear option as a bargaining chip for a consistent American
conventional arms supply. After French disengagement in the early
1960s, Israel progressed on its own, including through several covert
operations, to project completion. Before the 1967 Six-Day War,
they felt their nuclear facility threatened and reportedly assembled
several nuclear devices. By the 1973 Yom Kippur War Israel had a
number of sophisticated nuclear bombs, deployed them, and
considered using them. The Arabs may have limited their war aims
because of their knowledge of the Israeli nuclear weapons. Israel
has most probably conducted several nuclear bomb tests. They have
continued to modernize and vertically proliferate and are now one of
the world's larger nuclear powers. Using “bomb in the basement”
nuclear opacity, Israel has been able to use its arsenal as a deterrent
to the Arab world while not technically violating American
nonproliferation requirements.

The Third Temple's Holy of Holies:
Israel's Nuclear Weapons

Warner D. Farr
1 Introduction

This is the end of the Third Temple.
- Attributed to Moshe Dayan

during the Yom Kippur War{1]

As Zionists in Palestine watched World War II from their distant
sideshow, what lessons were learned? The soldiers of the Empire of

http://www .fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr._htm 12/7/2005



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Final Technical Report

of at Envirocare.

The LEU Processing Area located in the East Bay was remediated between 1983 and
1984. During this period, the LEU processing equipment was removed, volume-reduced
and disposed of as LLRW. By October 1984, all of the equipment had been removed and
sent to Chem-Nuclear.

The Box Shop was a two-story, corrugated sheet metal building with concrete block walls
and a concrete floor. It was adjacent to the south wall of the East Bay. In 1976, all the
Box Shop processing equipment was removed. Starting in September, 1990, the Box
Shop was demolished. The masonry portion of the Box Shop was broken up, palletized,
covered with shrink-wrapped polyethylene, and temporarily stored in the Parking Lot until
the Processing Plant was ready to accept materials, The floor slab was remediated during

decommissioning.

The Annex was a corrugated sheet metal and concrete block building attached to the west
wall of the East Bay. From July, 1990 until October, 1990, the Annex was demolished in
the same manner as the Box Shop.

In early to mid 1992, the East Bay’s architectural features (1.e., offices, laboratories,
elevated mezzanines, etc.) were demolished. Also during this period, the West Bay and
two smait attached buildings (the Central Alarm Station/Visitor Area and the compressor
building) were demolished. Concrete rubble was temporarily stored onsite in the Parking
Lot for eventual crushing by the Processing Plant. The crushed concrete rubble exceeding
the release criteria was sent to an appropriate LLRW disposal facility.

At the initiation of the Apollo Decommissioning Project in June, 1992, the East Bay shell,
consisting of four walls, a roof, and a concrete floor slab, and the floor slabs. of the Annex
and the Box Shop remained to be remediated.

2. Parking Lot Buildings

The Laundry Building located in the southwest corer of the Parking Lot was a single
story, corrugated sheet metal and steel structure with an adjoining concrete block wing. It
was remediated between 1984 and 1991. In 1984, processing equipment, nonessential
utilities, and miscellaneous sapport systems were volume reduced, packaged and sent to
Chem-Nuclear. The Laundry Building’s concrete trench that served as a sump drain for
washing machine waste water was removed in April 1989. The corrugated sheet metal,
roofing, and structural steel was dismantled and radiologically surveyed. The steel was
determined to meet the NRC’s release for unrestricted use criteria and was disposed of as
scrap. The concrete block walls were demolished in August 1991, covered, and
temporarily stored in the Parking Lot until the Processing Plant was ready to accept





Roger D. Caldwell Archives Page 6 of 6

New York. This paper is a classic!

» Caldwell RD. Working Paper. Fecal Sampling
for Uranium Exposure. Date unknown; 1972 or
later judging by references.

afacific Northwest Return to: BIDUG Home Page
OmusdbyBatstetete’ Contact: Dan Strom
US. Depatmertofineny Read about: Security & Privacy
Revised: 28 December 2004

http://bidug.pnl.gov/rde.htm 12/7/2005



Israel's Nuclear Weapons . Page 19 of 42

satellite on 22 September 1979, is widely believed to be a South
Africa-Israel joint nuclear test. It was, according to some, the third
test of a neutron bomb. The first two were hidden in clouds to fool
the satellite and the third was an accident—the weather cleared.[84}
Experts differ on these possible tests. Several writers report that the
scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory believed it to have
been a nuclear explosion while a presidential panel decided
otherwise.[85] President Carter was just entering the Iran hostage
nightmare and may have easily decided not to alter 30 years of
looking the other way.[86] The explosion was almost certainly an
Israeli bomb, tested at the invitation of the South Africans. It was
more advanced than the “gun type” bombs developed by the South

' Africans.[87] One report claims it was a test of a nuclear artillery

: shell.[88] A 1997 Israeli newspaper quoted South African deputy
foreign minister, Aziz Pahad, as confirming it was an Israeli test with
South African logistical support.[89]

Controversy over possible nuclear testing continues to this day. In
June 1998, a Member of the Knesset accused the government of an
underground test near Eilat on May 28, 1998. Egyptian “nuclear
experts” had made similar charges. The Israeli government hotly
denied the claims.[90}

Not only were the Israelis interested in American nuclear weapons
development data, they. were interested in targeting data from US.
intelligence. Israel discovered that they were on the Soviet target
list. American-born Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard obtained satellite-
imaging data of the Soviet Union, allowing Israel to target accurately
Soviet cities. This showed Israel's intention to use its nuclear arsenal
as a deterrent political lever, or retaliatory capability against the
Soviet Union itself. Israel also used American satellite imagery to
plan the 7 June 1981 attack on the Tammuz-1 reactor at Osiraq, Iraq.
This daring attack, carried out by eight F-16s accompanied by six F-
15s punched a hole in the concrete reactor dome before the reactor
began operation (and just days before an Israeli election). It
delivered 15 delay-fused 2000 pound bombs deep into the reactor .
structure (the 16th bomb hit a nearby hall). The blasts shredded the
reactor and blew out the dome foundations, causing it to collapse on

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 35 of 42

100-101.

89. Pedatzur, Re'uven, “South African Statement On Nuclear Test
Said to Serve Israel,” Ha’aretz, 29 July 1997. On line: Internet, 22
November 1998 and Kelley, Robert. “The Iraqi and South African
Nuclear W”’6Nuclear Abstracts," 1 March 1996, or on-line, Internet,
22 November 1998, both available from http://cns.miis.edu.

90. “Was there a Nuclear Test near Eilat?” IsraelWire, 16 June
1998, or on line Internet, 22 November, 1998, available from
http://www. israelwire.com and “Deputy Defense Minister Denies
Israeli Nuclear Testing.” Israeli Wire, June 18, 1998, or on-line.
Internet, 13 October 1998, available from

http://www. israelwire.com/New/980618/9806184 html.

91. McKinnon, Dan. Bullseye One Reactor. The Story of Israel's
Bold Surprise Air Attack That Destroyed Iraqi's Nuclear Bomb
Facility (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1987).

92. “Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Report on the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Moscow, 1993.”

Journal of Palestine Studies XXI, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 135-140;
Creveld, Martin van, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future Of
Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 105; and Clark, Philip.
“6Third successful Israeli satellite launch.” Jane's Intelligence
“Review 7, no. 6 (June 1995), 25-26. ;

93. Sunday Times, London, op. cit., 1,4-5.

94. Toscano, Louis, qi viple Cross: Israel, the Atomic Bomb and the
Man Who Spilled the Secrets (New York: Carol Publishing Group,
1990).

95. Green, Living by the Sword, op. cit., 134.
96. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 165-166.
97. Hersh, op. cit., 291.

98. Levran, Aharon, Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm: Lessons

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 5 of 42

Japan vowed on their emperor's sacred throne to fight to the death
and not face the inevitability of an American victory. Many Jews
wondered if the Arabs would try to push them into the
Mediterranean Sea. After the devastating American nuclear attack
on Japan, the soldier leaders of the empire reevaluated their fight to
the death position. Did the bomb give the Japanese permission to
surrender and live? It obviously played a military role, a political
role, and a peacemaking role. How close was the mindset of the
Samurai culture to the Islamic culture? Did David Ben-Gurion take
note and wonder if the same would work for Israel?[2] Could Israel
find the ultimate deterrent that would convince her opponents that
they could never, ever succeed? Was Israel's ability to cause a
modern holocaust the best way to guarantee never having another
one?

The use of unconventional weapons in the Middle East is not new.
The British had used chemical artillery shells against the Turks at
the second battle of Gaza in 1917. They continued chemical shelling
against the Shiites in Iraq in 1920 and used aerial chemicals in the

- 1920s and 1930s in Iraq.[3}

Israel's involvement with nuclear technology starts at the founding of
the state in 1948. Many talented Jewish scientists immigrated to
Palestine during the thirties and forties, in particular, Ernst David

_ Bergmann. He would become the director of the Israeli Atomic -
Energy Commission and the founder of Israel's efforts to develop
nuclear weapons. Bergmann, a close friend and advisor of Israel's
first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, counseled that nuclear
energy could compensate for Israel's poor natural resources and
small pool of military manpower. He pointed out that there was just
one nuclear energy, not two, suggesting nuclear weapons were part
of the plan.[4] As early as 1948, Israeli scientists actively explored
the Negev Desert for uranium deposits on orders from the Israeli
Ministry of Defense. By 1950, they found low-grade deposits near .
Beersheba and Sidon and worked on a low power method of heavy
water production.[5]

The newly created Weizmann Institute of Science actively supported
nuclear research by 1949, with Dr. Bergmann heading the chemistry

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons Page 7 of 42

French colonies in North Africa, Israel provided valuable
intelligence obtained from contacts with sephardic Jews in those
countries.

The two nations collaborated, with the United Kingdom, in planning
and staging the Suez Canal-Sinai operation against Egypt in October
1956. The Suez Crisis became the real genesis of Israel's nuclear
weapons production program. With the Czech-Egyptian arms
agreement in 1955, Israel became worried. When absorbed, the
Soviet-bloc equipment would triple Egyptian military strength.
After Egypt's President Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran in 1953,
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion ordered the development of
chemical munitions and other unconventional munitions, including
nuclear.[13] Six weeks before the Suez Canal operation, Israel felt
the time was right to approach France for assistance in building a
nuclear reactor. Canada had set a precedent a year earlier when it
had agreed to build a 40-megawatt CIRUS reactor in India. Shimon
Peres, the Director-General of the Defense Ministry and aide to
Prime Minister (and Defense Minister) David Ben-Gurion, and
Bergmann met with members of the CEA (France's Atomic Energy
Commission). During September 1956, they reached an initial
understanding to provide a research reactor. The two countries
concluded final agreements at a secret meeting outside Paris where
they also finalized details of the Suez Canal operation.[14]

For the United Kingdom and France, the Suez operation, launched
on October 29, 1956, was a total disaster. Israel's part was a military
success, allowing it to occupy the entire Sinai Peninsula by 4
November, but the French and British canal invasion on 6 November
was a political failure. Their attempt to advance south along the
Suez Canal stopped due to a cease-fire under fierce Soviet and U.S.
pressure. Both nations pulled out, leaving Israel to face the pressure
from the two superpowers alone. Soviet Premier Bulganin and
President Khrushchev issued an implicit threat of nuclear attack if
Israel did not withdraw from the Sinai.

On 7 November 1956, a secret meeting was held between Israeli
foreign minister Golda Meir, Shimon Peres, and French foreign and
defense ministers Christian Pineau and Maurice Bourges-Manoury.

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3

We could not apply the commonly used stack gas dispersion
formias(4), because our local topography is grossly unfavorable.
The steel plant hext door is twice as high as our plant. Rain hats
cover many stacks. Figure 3 pictures graphically what rain hats do
to exhaust plumes. The effective stack height of the capped stacks
4g easily half that of the uncapped stacks Most. of our stacks do
not reach above the peak of our roof; all are well below the
recommensed(5) 2-1/2 times the building height. A better set-up for
downwash cannot be imagined.

Off Site Sanvling Methods
Our stack sampling experience forced us to begin monitoring

the neighborhood for radioactivity. When we started, we were afraid
we might find excessive levels. But, as we will show later, we had
underestimated the dispersion capability of the atmosphere.

Since exposure of people was our controlling concern, ‘we chose
airy sampling as the best monitoring technique. If our building had
been surrounded with farn land, perhaps deposition on crops would be"
more important.

Continvous air sampling in the neighborhood posed several.
practical problems. Battery powered high volume air samplers are not
commercially available. Even where there were electrical outlets, air
sampling equipment could not be left unattended very long. Children
cannot leave gadgets alone, Finally cost dictated 2 limit on the
number of continuous samplers.

We decided to supplement whatever air samplers we could manage

with fallout collectors. We thought that they would at least enable