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SEC Petition Evaluation Report 

Petition SEC-00139 

Report Rev #: 0 Report Submittal Date: December 11, 2009

Subject Expert(s): Robert Coblentz, Mike Domal

Site Expert(s): N/A

Petition Administrative Summary 

Petition Under Evaluation 

Petition # Petition 

Type 

Petition 

Receipt Date 

Qualification 

Date 

DOE/AWE Facility Name 

SEC-00139 83.13 February 27, 2009 September 8, 2009 Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB) 

Petitioner Class Definition 

All employees who worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base, from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 

1996. 

Class Evaluated by NIOSH 

All employees who worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), from March 1, 1989 through February 

29, 1996. 

NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC 

None 

Related Petition Summary Information 

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status 

None 

Related Evaluation Report Information 

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility 

Name 

None 

ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: Robert Coblentz ORAU Peer Review Completed By: Daniel Stempfley 

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on file] 12/13/2009 

Sam Glover Date 

SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By: [Signature on file] 12/18/2009

J. W. Neton Date 

SEC Evaluation Approved By: [Signature on file] 12/18/2009

Stuart Hinnefeld Date 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB

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Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00139, Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

This evaluation report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) addresses a class 

of employees proposed for addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) per the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7384 et seq. (EEOICPA) 

and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special Exposure 

Cohort under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000. 

Petitioner-Requested Class Definition

Petition SEC-00139 was received on February 27, 2009, and qualified on September 8, 2009. The petitioner 

requested that NIOSH consider the following class: All employees who worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air 

Force Base, from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. 

Class Evaluated by NIOSH

Based on its preliminary research, NIOSH accepted the petitioner-requested class for review. NIOSH 

evaluated the following class: All employees who worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base, from March 

1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. 

NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC

Based on its full research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH has obtained exposure monitoring data for the 

specified worker class. Based on its analysis of these available resources, NIOSH found no part of the class 

under evaluation for which it cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. 

Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), NIOSH has established that it has access to sufficient information 

to: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are 

reconstructed, that could have been incurred in plausible circumstances by any member of the class; or (2) 

estimate radiation doses of members of the class more precisely than an estimate of maximum dose. 

Information available from the site profile and additional resources is sufficient to document or estimate the 

maximum internal and external potential exposure to members of the evaluated class under plausible 

circumstances during the specified period. 

Health Endangerment Determination

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), a health endangerment determination is not required because 

NIOSH has determined that it has sufficient information to estimate dose for the members of the evaluated 

class. 
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Table of Contents 

1.0 Purpose and Scope.......................................................................................................................... 7

2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 7

3.0 SEC-00139, Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB Class Definitions............................................................ 8

3.1 Petitioner-Requested Class Definition and Basis.................................................................. 8

3.2 Class Evaluated by NIOSH ................................................................................................... 9

3.3 NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC .......................................................... 10

4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH to Evaluate the Class........................................................... 10

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs) ................................................................ 10

4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs) and Procedures ..................................... 11

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts .......................................................................................... 11

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions ........................................................................................... 12

4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database .......................................................................................... 13

4.6 Other Technical Sources...................................................................................................... 13

4.7 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners ................................................. 13

5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Class Evaluated by NIOSH ......................................... 14

5.1 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB Plant and Process Descriptions................................................ 14

5.2 Radiological Exposure Sources from Hangar 481 Operations............................................ 17

5.2.1 Internal Radiological Exposure Sources from Hangar 481 Operations .................. 17

5.2.2 External Radiological Exposure Sources from Hangar 481 Operations ................. 18

5.2.2.1 Photon....................................................................................................... 18

5.2.2.2 Beta........................................................................................................... 18

5.2.2.3 Neutron..................................................................................................... 19

5.2.3 Incidents .................................................................................................................. 19

6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Class Evaluated by NIOSH ............................. 19

6.1 Available Hangar 481 Internal Monitoring Data................................................................. 19

6.2 Available Hangar 481 External Monitoring Data ............................................................... 20

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Class Evaluated by NIOSH ...................................... 20

7.1 Pedigree of Hangar 481 Data .............................................................................................. 21

7.1.1 Internal Monitoring Data Pedigree Review............................................................. 21

7.1.2 External Monitoring Data Pedigree Review............................................................ 21

7.2 Evaluation of Bounding Internal Radiation Doses at Hangar 481 ...................................... 22

7.2.1 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Doses........................... 22

7.2.2 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion ............................................. 22

7.3 Evaluation of Bounding External Radiation Doses at Hangar 481 ..................................... 22

7.3.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related External Doses....................................... 22

7.3.1.1 Personnel Dosimetry Data........................................................................ 23

7.3.1.2 Area Monitoring Data............................................................................... 23
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7.3.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses.......................... 24

7.3.3 Hangar 481 Occupational X-Ray Examinations ..................................................... 24

7.3.4 Methods for Bounding External Dose at Hangar 481 ............................................. 24

7.3.4.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period External Dose....................... 25

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion............................................ 26

7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00139 ....................................................................... 27

7.4.1 Lost (or Otherwise Unavailable) Personnel Monitoring Data................................. 27

7.5 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00139.................................................. 28

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00139...................................................... 28

9.0 Class Conclusion for Petition SEC-00139 ................................................................................... 29

10.0 References .................................................................................................................................... 31

Attachment 1: Data Capture Synopsis................................................................................................... 35

Figures 

5-1: Diagram of Kirtland AFB Showing Hangar 481 ........................................................................... 15

5-2: Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base ............................................................................................ 16

Tables 

4-1: No. of Hangar 481 Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule ................................ 12

7-1: Annual Dose Summaries for Kirtland AFB, Hangar 481 .............................................................. 25

7-2: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00139.......................................................................... 28
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SEC Petition Evaluation Report for SEC-00139 

ATTRIBUTION AND ANNOTATION: This is a single-author document. All conclusions drawn from 

the data presented in this evaluation were made by the ORAU Team Lead Technical Evaluator: 

Robert Coblentz, Quantaflux, LLC. The rationales for all conclusions in this document are explained 

in the associated text.

1.0 Purpose and Scope 

This report evaluates the feasibility of reconstructing doses for all employees who worked at Hangar 

481, Kirtland Air Force Base, from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. It provides 

information and analyses germane to considering a petition for adding a class of employees to the 

congressionally-created SEC. 

This report does not make any determinations concerning the feasibility of dose reconstruction that 

necessarily apply to any individual energy employee who might require a dose reconstruction from 

NIOSH. This report also does not contain the final determination as to whether the proposed class 

will be added to the SEC (see Section 2.0). 

This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of EEOICPA, 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, 

and the guidance contained in the Office of Compensation Analysis and Support’s (OCAS) Internal 

Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, OCAS-PR-004. 

2.0 Introduction 

Both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 require NIOSH to evaluate qualified petitions requesting that the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) add a class of employees to the SEC. The 

evaluation is intended to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether it is feasible to 

estimate with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses of the class of employees through NIOSH dose 

reconstructions.1

 

42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1) states: Radiation doses can be estimated with sufficient accuracy if NIOSH 

has established that it has access to sufficient information to estimate the maximum radiation dose, 

for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred in 

plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or if NIOSH has established that it has access to 

sufficient information to estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely than an 

estimate of the maximum radiation dose.

 

 

1

 NIOSH dose reconstructions under EEOICPA are performed using the methods promulgated under 42 C.F.R. pt. 82 and 

the detailed implementation guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 
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Under 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), if it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses 

for members of the class, then NIOSH must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such 

radiation doses may have endangered the health of members of the class. The regulation requires 

NIOSH to assume that any duration of unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of 

members of a class when it has been established that the class may have been exposed to radiation 

during a discrete incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring 

during nuclear criticality incidents. If the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has 

not been established, then NIOSH is required to specify that health was endangered for those workers 

who were employed for at least 250 aggregated work days within the parameters established for the 

class or in combination with work days within the parameters established for other SEC classes 

(excluding aggregate work day requirements). 

NIOSH is required to document its evaluation in a report, and to do so, relies upon both its own dose 

reconstruction expertise as well as technical support from its contractor, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU). Once completed, NIOSH provides the report to both the petitioner(s) and to the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (Board). The Board will consider the NIOSH 

evaluation report, together with the petition, petitioner(s) comments, and other information the Board 

considers appropriate, in order to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on whether or not 

to add one or more classes of employees to the SEC. Once NIOSH has received and considered the 

advice of the Board, the Director of NIOSH will propose a decision on behalf of HHS. The Secretary 

of HHS will make the final decision, taking into account the NIOSH evaluation, the advice of the 

Board, and the proposed decision issued by NIOSH. As part of this decision process, petitioners may 

seek a review of certain types of final decisions issued by the Secretary of HHS.2

 

3.0 SEC-00139, Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB Class Definitions 

The following subsections address the evolution of the class definition for SEC-00139, Hangar 481, 

Kirtland Air Force Base. When a petition is submitted, the requested class definition is reviewed as 

submitted. Based on its review of the available site information and data, NIOSH will make a 

determination whether to qualify for full evaluation all, some, or no part of the petitioner-requested 

class. If some portion of the petitioner-requested class is qualified, NIOSH will specify that class 

along with a justification for any modification of petitioner’s class. After a full evaluation of the 

qualified class, NIOSH will determine whether to propose a class for addition to the SEC and will 

specify that proposed class definition. 

3.1 Petitioner-Requested Class Definition and Basis 

Petition SEC-00139 was submitted by the surviving spouse of a deceased former Ross Aviation 

employee at Hangar 481. The petition was received on February 27, 2009, and qualified on 

September 8, 2009. The petitioner requested that NIOSH consider the following class: All employees 

who worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base, from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 

1996. 

2

 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 for a full description of the procedures summarized here. Additional internal procedures are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 
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The petitioner provided information and affidavit statements in support of the petitioner’s belief that 

accurate dose reconstruction over time is impossible for the Hangar 481 workers in question. NIOSH 

deemed the following information and affidavit statements sufficient to qualify SEC-00139 for 

evaluation: 

The petition under evaluation was submitted on the basis that there is a lack of personnel 

monitoring for certain individuals who were employed at Hangar 481. The petitioner (also 

a former employee at Hangar 481) asserts that the deceased former Ross Aviation 

employee at Hangar 481 “did not wear dose monitoring badges,” and to the best of his 

knowledge, “there was no monitoring of any kind at Hangar 481 or adjacent there to

[sic].” The petitioner also states that “shipments of substances and items were delivered to 

the hangar in guarded shipments from Sandia National Labs and loaded into planes at 

Hangar 481 for further delivery by personnel wearing dose badges.” (Petition, 2009) 

The petitioner also submitted a statement from another former Hangar 481 employee, who 

stated by affidavit, “...I recall that pilots, flight engineers and flight mechanics who were 

present at the time of loading on the ramp would be wearing radiation dose badges. I was 

not required to wear radiation badges during times that I assisted in loading cargo into the 

planes, or while cleaning the planes.” He also stated that “[evaluated employee - name 

redacted] would have been working in the offices in the hanger [sic] building, and on 

occasions when the cargo would have been loaded into airplanes parked on the ramp that 

was located near to the Ross Aviation hanger [sic].” (Affidavit, 2009) 

Based on its Hangar 481 research and data capture efforts, NIOSH determined that it has access to 

summary reports containing personnel monitoring data for Hangar 481 workers during the time period 

under evaluation, as well as area monitoring data (radiological surveys) for radioactive material 

shipments transported by planes based at Hangar 481. However, NIOSH identified a lack of 

individual dosimetry results for the evaluated period. Based on this information, NIOSH found 

support for the petition basis regarding lost (or otherwise unavailable) personnel monitoring data. The 

information and statements provided by the petitioner qualified the petition for further consideration 

by NIOSH, the Board, and HHS. The details of the petition basis are addressed in Section 7.4. 

3.2 Class Evaluated by NIOSH 

Based on its preliminary research, NIOSH accepted the petitioner-requested class employee 

description. Therefore, NIOSH defined the following class for further evaluation: all employees who 

worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 

1996. 
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3.3 NIOSH-Proposed Class(es) to be Added to the SEC 

Based on its research, NIOSH has obtained Hangar 481 summary reports containing personnel 

monitoring data for the time period specified in the class under evaluation. NIOSH has also obtained 

documents pertaining to Ross Aviation radiation protection programs, radiological surveys, and 

radioactive material shipment records. Based on its analysis of these available resources, NIOSH 

found no part of the class under evaluation for which it cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient 

accuracy. 

4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH to Evaluate the Class 

As a standard practice, NIOSH completed an extensive database and Internet search for information 

regarding Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base. The database search included the DOE Legacy 

Management Considered Sites database, the DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information 

(OSTI) database, the Energy Citations database, the Atomic Energy Technical Report database, and 

the Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System. In addition to general Internet searches, the 

NIOSH Internet search included OSTI OpenNet Advanced searches, OSTI Information Bridge 

Fielded searches, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agency-wide Documents Access and 

Management (ADAMS) web searches, the DOE Office of Human Radiation Experiments website, and 

the DOE-National Nuclear Security Administration-Nevada Site Office-search. Attachment 1 

contains a summary of Hangar 481documents. The summary specifically identifies data capture 

details and general descriptions of the documents retrieved. 

In addition to the database and Internet searches listed above, NIOSH identified and reviewed 

numerous data sources to determine information relevant to determining the feasibility of dose 

reconstruction for the class of employees under evaluation. This included determining the availability 

of information on personal monitoring, area monitoring, industrial processes, and radiation source 

materials. The following subsections summarize the data sources identified and reviewed by NIOSH. 

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs) 

A Site Profile provides specific information concerning the documentation of historical practices at 

the specified site. Dose reconstructors can use the Site Profile to evaluate internal and external 

dosimetry data for monitored and unmonitored workers, and to supplement, or substitute for, 

individual monitoring data. A Site Profile consists of an Introduction and five Technical Basis 

Documents (TBDs) that provide process history information, information on personal and area 

monitoring, radiation source descriptions, and references to primary documents relevant to the 

radiological operations at the site. The Site Profile for a small site may consist of a single document. 
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As part of NIOSH’s evaluation detailed herein, it examined the following TBDs for insights into 

Hangar 481 operations or related topics/operations at other sites: 

 TBD: Nevada Test Site – Occupational External Dose; ORAUT-TKBS-0008-6, Revision 01 

PC-1; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; May 28, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 34013 

 TBD: Site Profile for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the 

Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; ORAUT-TKBS-0037, Revision 00; Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities; June 22, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32531 

4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs) and Procedures 

An ORAU Technical Information Bulletin (OTIB) is a general working document that provides 

guidance for preparing dose reconstructions at particular sites or categories of sites. An ORAU 

Procedure provides specific requirements and guidance regarding EEOICPA project-level activities, 

including preparation of dose reconstructions at particular sites or categories of sites. NIOSH 

reviewed the following OTIB as part of its evaluation: 

 OTIB: Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray Procedures; ORAUTOTIB-0006, Rev 3 PC-1; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; December 21, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 

20220

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts 

To obtain additional information, NIOSH conducted eight interviews with seven individuals that 

included: two individuals who are currently or formerly with the Department of Energy-Albuquerque; 

two individuals with the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Secure Transportation; 

and three former Ross Aviation-Hangar 481 employees: 

 Personal Communication, 2009a, Personal Communication with Employee at Sandia National 

Laboratory, DOE-Albuquerque; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; June 10, 2009; SRDB Ref 

ID: 69631

 Personal Communication, 2009b, Personal Communication with Employee at Sandia National 

Laboratory, DOE-Albuquerque; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; June 3, 2009; SRDB Ref 

ID: 69633

 Personal Communication, 2009c, Personal Communication with former Director of Safety and 

General Manager at Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; June 2, 

2009; SRDB Ref ID: 69638

 Personal Communication, 2009d, Personal Communication with the ES&H Division Director, and 

a Nuclear Engineer at the Office of Secure Transportation; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; 

June 17, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 70643
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 Personal Communication, 2009e, Personal Communication with former Director of Safety and 

Security at Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; August 25, 2009; 

SRDB Ref ID: 72792

 Personal Communication, 2009f, Personal Communication with Director of Safety and Security at 

Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; November 6, 2009; SRDB Ref 

ID: 76358

 Personal Communication, 2009g, Personal Communication with Director of Safety and Security at 

Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; December 7, 2009; SRDB Ref 

ID: Not yet in SRDB

 Personal Communication, 2009h, Personal Communication with former Ross Aviation General 

Manager and former Ross Aviation Personnel Director; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; 

December 7, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: Not yet in SRDB

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions 

NIOSH reviewed its NIOSH OCAS Claims Tracking System (NOCTS) to locate EEOICPA-related 

dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to the petition evaluation. Table 4-1 

summarizes the results of this review. (NOCTS data available as of October 22, 2009) 

Table 4-1: No. of Hangar 481 Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule 

Description Totals 

Total number of claims submitted for dose reconstruction 1 

Total number of claims submitted for energy employees who meet the definition criteria for the class 

under evaluation (March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996) 1 

Number of dose reconstructions completed for energy employees who meet the definition criteria for 

the class under evaluation (i.e., the number of such claims completed by NIOSH and submitted to the 

Department of Labor for final approval). 0 

Number of claims for which internal dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 0 

Number of claims for which external dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

evaluated class definition 0 

NIOSH reviewed the current Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB claim to determine whether internal and/or 

external personal monitoring records could be obtained for the employee. The claim is for the same 

employee represented in this SEC00139 Hangar 481 petition. 
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4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database 

NIOSH also examined its Site Research Database (SRDB) to locate documents supporting the 

assessment of the evaluated class. One hundred ninety four (194) documents in this database were 

identified as pertaining to Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base. These documents were evaluated for 

their relevance to this petition. The documents include historical background on contracts between 

the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and Ross Aviation, contracts between the DOE and Ross 

Aviation, DOE Occupational Radiation Exposure Reports, periodic regulatory site inspection reports, 

radiological surveys of facilities and aircraft, shipping records, and site drawings and photos. 

4.6 Other Technical Sources 

NIOSH found personnel radiation exposure summary data for Ross Aviation employees located in the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Radiation Exposure Information Recording System (REIRS) 

database (Ross, 2009), and the DOE Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for 1996 (DOE, 1996) 

that, together, cover the timeframe specified in the worker class description. 

NIOSH also reviewed the following DOE document, which provided the basis for exempting Ross 

Aviation from performing worker internal exposure monitoring for Hangar 481 activities: 

 Transportation Safeguards Division Technical Basis for Radioactive Material Intake Potential, 

Transportation Safeguards Division, Albuquerque Operations Office, U.S. Department of Energy;

August 7, 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 71009 

Although the date of the above report is subsequent to the timeframe specified in the class definition, 

the document describes reviews of data and information regarding historical Hangar 481 activities and 

is, therefore, considered relevant to this evaluation. 

4.7 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners 

In qualifying and evaluating the petition, NIOSH reviewed the following documents submitted by the 

petitioners: 

 Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B and supporting documents; received February 27, 

2009; OSA Ref ID: 108306

 Employment History Affidavit from Co-worker; received April 9, 2009; OSA Ref ID: 108623 
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5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Class Evaluated by 

NIOSH 

The following subsections summarize both radiological operations at the Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

from March 1, 1989 to February 29, 1996 and the information available to NIOSH to characterize 

particular processes and radioactive source materials. From available sources NIOSH has gathered 

process and source descriptions, information regarding the identity and quantities of each radionuclide 

of concern, and information describing processes through which radiation exposures may have 

occurred and the physical environment in which they may have occurred. The information included 

within this evaluation report is intended only to be a summary of the available information. 

5.1 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB Plant and Process Descriptions 

Hangar 481 is located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, as shown in Figures 

5-1 and 5-2. Ross Aviation, with operations based at Hangar 481, was under contractual agreement 

with the DOE to provide air transport of personnel and equipment associated with DOE operations at 

the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Ross Aviation maintained air transport 

services for government-owned aircraft at government-owned facilities, which included: Kirtland 

AFB; Las Vegas, Nevada; Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; Los Alamos, New Mexico; and Desert 

Rock, Nevada (Contract, 1989). The transported equipment included packages containing radioactive 

materials associated with atomic weapons programs. 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

HANGAR 481 

HOT PAD #2 

Figure 5-1: Diagram of Kirtland AFB Showing Hangar 481 

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SEC-00139 12-11-09 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB

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Figure 5-2: Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base 

According to the contract (Contract, 1989), the government-owned aircraft that were operated and 

maintained by Ross Aviation at Kirtland AFB consisted of the following: 

 Douglas DC-9-15F (3 total) 

 DeHavilland DHC-7 (3 total) 

 DeHavilland DHC-6 (2 total) 

 Beech BE 200 (2 total) 

Radioactive materials were transported in sealed containers in accordance with Department of 

Transportation (DOT) requirements (Contract, 1989). By former Ross employee accounts, radioactive 

shipment loading activities took place at specific loading areas, called “hot pads,” that were located at 

least 6,000 feet from the Hangar 481 building. Cleaning and servicing of unloaded aircraft took place 

at Hangar 481 (Personal Communication, 2009e; Personal Communication, 2009h). Based on Ross 

Aviation shipment records, radioactive material shipments predominantly consisted of tritium, 

depleted uranium, and mixed fission products (Checklist, 1988a; Checklist, 1988b; Shipping Record, 

1988; Shipping Record, 1989; Shipping Record, 1992). 

During the majority of the covered period at the site, aircraft non-destructive testing (NDT) was 

performed at Hangar 481 via X-ray analysis. This work was performed for short durations at night 

during off-shift hours (Personal Communication, 2009e). 

A December 2, 1992, Occupational Safety and Health Inspection report (Ross, 1992) regarding health 

physics practices at Ross Aviation states: 

Ross does not handle, store, or use radioactive materials in the Albuquerque facilities. There is an 

x-ray machine used in one building. Most people wear external dosimetry to support other Ross 

activities involving loading and unloading aircraft, as well as flight operations. 
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Ross uses a Baltograph IV X-ray unit and control console. This unit is operated for nondestructive 

testing and inspections, approximately ten minutes per month. There are only two qualified 

operators, who are the only current Radiological Workers at Ross. Inspection records, operator 

training records, and device records/interlocks were inspected, and no discrepancies noted. 

The Ross External Dosimetry Program is contracted through Eberline, Inc., and is DOE 

Laboratory Accreditation Program accredited. The highest recorded exposure for 1991 was 

approximately 45 millirem. No discrepancies were identified in the dosimetry records from 

Eberline to Ross. 

A Health Protection Division appraisal document dated April, 1994 states that the X-ray operations at 

Hangar 481 had been curtailed (HPD, 1994). Information gained through personal interviews with a 

former Ross Aviation Safety Director indicates that the X-ray testing was outsourced sometime 

around 1992 or early 1993, but the interviewee was unsure of the exact date. After that time, X-ray 

testing was no longer performed at Hangar 481; the planes were taken to a facility in Arizona for 

testing (Personal Communication, 2009g). Only the NDT operations performed at the covered facility 

evaluated in this report (Hangar 481) are addressed in this evaluation; the NDT operations and 

associated exposures associated with X-ray work at other contractor facilities outside of this covered 

facility location (after testing was outsourced), are not covered under this evaluation. 

5.2 Radiological Exposure Sources from Hangar 481 Operations 

The following subsections provide an overview of the internal and external exposure sources for the 

Hangar 481 class under evaluation. 

5.2.1 Internal Radiological Exposure Sources from Hangar 481 Operations 

On August 7, 1997, the Transportation Safety Division (TSD) of DOE’s Albuquerque Operations 

Office issued the Technical Basis for Radioactive Material Intake Potential regarding activities 

performed by Ross Aviation at Hangar 481 (TSD, 1997). The document stated: 

Based on: (1) the TSD Special Agents tasks (i.e., no contact with package contents); (2) TSD’s 

operational history with confirmatory surveys (i.e., no package breach or leakage); and (3) the 

use of DOT compliant shipping packages and programs, there is no credible path for an intake of 

radioactive materials during normal operations.

Based on the available information on the radiological program and potential for internal exposure 

sources, NIOSH concludes that internal radiological exposures to Ross Aviation employees resulting 

from services rendered for the DOE at Hangar 481 are unlikely to have occurred. Radioactive 

materials handled by workers at Hangar 481 were in sealed DOT-compliant containers and monitored 

in accordance with DOT regulations to verify radiation and contamination levels on package exteriors. 

Results of available radiological surveys performed on the packages and in the transport aircraft 

support this premise. 
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Since Kirtland AFB and Hangar 481 are directly adjacent to the Sandia National LaboratoryAlbuquerque (SNL-A), it is conceivable that internal dose to individuals working at Hangar 481 could 

have occurred from ambient environmental sources at SNL-A moving across the site boundary. 

5.2.2 External Radiological Exposure Sources from Hangar 481 Operations 

External radiological exposures to employees at Hangar 481 occurred as a result of handling packages 

containing radioactive materials. Those radioactive materials emit photon and particle radiation (i.e., 

gamma and beta). However, since the materials were in sealed packages, photon radiation was the 

dominant external exposure source for Hangar 481 personnel. 

Non-destructive testing was performed at Hangar 481 via X-ray analysis. This work was performed at 

night (Personal Communication, 2009e) for approximately ten minutes per month by trained 

Radiological Workers (Ross, 1992). In a personal interview, a former Ross Aviation Safety Director 

stated the names of two individuals involved in X-ray activities at Hangar 481. The names provided 

are listed in the personnel monitoring summary data available to NIOSH. Therefore, NIOSH 

concludes that the personnel dose from these operations would be accounted for in the personnel 

exposure summary data available to NIOSH. 

5.2.2.1 Photon

According to available radioactive material shipping documents associated with Hangar 481, the 

principal photon-emitting radioactive materials were predominantly depleted uranium and mixed 

fission products (Checklist, 1988a; Checklist, 1988b; Shipping Record, 1988; Shipping Record, 1989; 

Shipping Record, 1992). 

Photon exposures from depleted uranium are primarily from the Th-234 daughter of U-238 

(Radiological Health, 1970). 

Photon exposures were also possible from radioactive material shipments containing mixed fission 

products; shipping documents indicated that such shipments consisted of samples taken from 

weapons-test tunnels. 

As stated in Section 5.1, non-destructive X-ray testing was performed at Hangar 481 and served as a 

potential external photon (X-ray) exposure source for those personnel involved in the NDT activities. 

This work was performed on the evening/night shift for about 10 minutes per month by trained 

Radiological Workers. 

Bremstrahlung effects (excluding that from tritium beta emissions) could also be considered as a 

photon source, but are accounted for in the exposure summary data. 

5.2.2.2 Beta

Due to the fact that the radioactive materials were transported in sealed DOT-compliant containers 

(TSD, 1997), beta exposure was not likely. However, as recorded in the personnel dosimetry data, 

some shallow exposure to either beta or non-penetrating photon radiation did occur. 
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5.2.2.3 Neutron

Neutron generators were frequently transported by aircraft at Hangar 481. These devices emit neutron 

radiation only when powered and energized (Procedure, 1990). Since these devices were only being 

transported, neutron exposure was infeasible. This statement is backed up by neutron monitoring data 

which indicated that no positive neutron doses were ever recorded for any individual at Hangar 481. 

Based on this information, neutron exposure is not considered a factor for this site and the topic will 

not be discussed further in this report. 

5.2.3 Incidents 

The petitioner did not file a claim on the basis of exposure incidents and did not indicate knowledge 

of any having occurred at Hangar 481. The former Director of Safety and Security at Ross Aviation, 

Hangar 481, stated there were no incidents involving radioactive material shipments at Ross that he 

was aware of (Personal Communication, 2009e). A NIOSH review of all Ross Aviation/Hangar 481 

documents contained in the Site Research Database (SRDB) has found no information regarding any 

radiological incidents occurring at Hangar 481. Therefore, incidents are not considered a factor for 

this site and the topic will not be discussed further in this report. 

6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Class Evaluated 

by NIOSH 

The following subsections provide an overview of the state of the available internal and external 

monitoring data for the Hangar 481 class under evaluation. 

6.1 Available Hangar 481 Internal Monitoring Data 

For the reasons stated in Section 5.2.1, internal monitoring was not needed or performed at Hangar 

481 (TSD, 1997); therefore, there are no internal monitoring data associated with the operations for 

this site. 

However, since it is conceivable that internal dose to individuals working at Hangar 481 could have 

occurred from ambient environmental sources at SNL-A moving across the site boundary, NIOSH 

intends to use the method defined in the SNL-A ambient environmental methods defined in the 

SNL-A Site Profile document to assess and bound any internal dose for the Hangar 481 class under 

evaluation (ORAUT-TKBS-0037). 
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6.2 Available Hangar 481 External Monitoring Data 

Summary external personnel monitoring data (TLD data) are available for Hangar 481 personnel 

during the covered period at the site, with the exception of 1996. For 1996, external personnel 

monitoring was not performed because operations requiring external monitoring and reporting had 

ceased (DOE/EH-0575). NIOSH is working with Landauer (which has the Eberline data for this time 

period) to obtain the raw data represented in the summary reports. However, as of the date of this 

evaluation report, NIOSH has not been able to coordinate (via Landauer) the review and release of the 

applicable Eberline dosimetry data. It should be noted that the 1996 portion of the covered period 

consists of two months, January and February. 

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Class Evaluated by 

NIOSH 

The feasibility determination for the class of employees under evaluation in this report is governed by 

both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1). Under that Act and rule, NIOSH must establish whether 

or not it has access to sufficient information either to estimate the maximum radiation dose for every 

type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed that could have been incurred under 

plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or to estimate the radiation doses to members of 

the class more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. If NIOSH has access to sufficient 

information for either case, NIOSH would then determine that it would be feasible to conduct dose 

reconstructions. 

In determining feasibility, NIOSH begins by evaluating whether current or completed NIOSH dose 

reconstructions demonstrate the feasibility of estimating with sufficient accuracy the potential 

radiation exposures of the class. If the conclusion is one of infeasibility, NIOSH systematically 

evaluates the sufficiency of different types of monitoring data, process and source or source term data, 

which together or individually might assure that NIOSH can estimate either the maximum doses that 

members of the class might have incurred, or more precise quantities that reflect the variability of 

exposures experienced by groups or individual members of the class as summarized in Section 7.5. 

This approach is discussed in OCAS’s SEC Petition Evaluation Internal Procedures which are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. The next four major subsections of this Evaluation 

Report examine: 

 The sufficiency and reliability of the available data. (Section 7.1) 

 The feasibility of reconstructing internal radiation doses. (Section 7.2) 

 The feasibility of reconstructing external radiation doses. (Section 7.3) 

 The bases for petition SEC-00139 as submitted by the petitioner. (Section 7.4) 
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7.1 Pedigree of Hangar 481 Data 

This subsection answers questions that need to be asked before performing a feasibility evaluation. 

Data Pedigree addresses the background, history, and origin of the data. It requires looking at site 

methodologies that may have changed over time; primary versus secondary data sources and whether 

they match; and whether data are internally consistent. All these issues form the bedrock of the 

researcher’s confidence and later conclusions about the data’s quality, credibility, reliability, 

representativeness, and sufficiency for determining the feasibility of dose reconstruction. The 

feasibility evaluation presupposes that data pedigree issues have been settled. 

7.1.1 Internal Monitoring Data Pedigree Review 

As stated in section 5.2.1, internal monitoring was not needed or performed (TSD, 1997); therefore, 

there are no internal monitoring data associated with site operations available for, or requiring, a 

pedigree review. Available radiological monitoring data, from surveys performed on shipment 

packages and the transport aircraft, agree with and support the position stated in the Technical Basis 

for Radioactive Material Intake Potential issued by the Transportation Safety Division (TSD) of 

DOE’s Albuquerque Operations Office (TSD, 1997). 

7.1.2 External Monitoring Data Pedigree Review 

External monitoring data from thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) results are available for 

individuals who were monitored at Kirtland AFB, Hangar 481. The data are annual summaries for 

each individual who was monitored for all years of the evaluation period except for 1996. Eberline 

was the TLD processor throughout the covered period except for 1996. Those monitored included 

mechanics, pilots, and personnel involved with handling or securing packages (Personal 

Communication, 2009b; Personal Communication, 2009e). These individuals were expected to have 

received the highest exposures because their work activities frequently put them in close proximity to 

the source (radioactive packages). Monitored individuals were issued TLDs that were changed out on 

a quarterly basis. This level of personnel monitoring was robust given the low levels of exposure at 

the site (no individual received over 200 mrem annual exposure from 1989 through 1995). The data 

appear to be complete and accurate. In 1996, no external monitoring results were recorded because 

operations requiring external monitoring and reporting had ceased (DOE/EH-0575). 

NIOSH is working with Landauer to obtain (from Eberline) the raw data represented in the summary 

reports to permit data validation for the pedigree review in this report. However, as of the date of this 

evaluation, NIOSH has not been able to coordinate (via Landauer) the review and release of 

applicable Eberline dosimetry data to support the validation review. 
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7.2 Evaluation of Bounding Internal Radiation Doses at Hangar 481 

As stated in Section 5.2.1, internal monitoring was not needed or performed. Therefore, an evaluation 

of the ability to bound operationally-related internal doses at Hangar 481 for the evaluated worker 

class is not required in this report. 

7.2.1 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental Internal Doses 

As discussed in the Sections 5 and 6 of this report, the primary radiological hazard at Hangar 481 was 

external exposure from radioactive packages; therefore, internal monitoring to assess potential internal 

exposures from Hangar 481 operations was not needed or performed (TSD, 1997). However, 

low-level ambient environmental internal exposures were conceivable from sources on the boundary 

of Kirtland AFB and Hangar 481. Because Kirtland AFB is located immediately adjacent to Sandia 

National Laboratory-Albuquerque (SNL-A), it might have been possible for individuals at Kirtland, 

and therefore Hangar 481, to receive low-level ambient environmental internal exposure from SNL’s 

radioactive effluent releases. Ambient environmental doses for individuals who worked at SNL-A 

have been researched and assessed (ORAUT-TKBS-0037). Considering the effect that the additional 

distance beyond the SNL-A boundary would have had on the dispersion of airborne radiological 

contaminants, the ambient environmental exposures assessed for workers in the SNL-A Site Profile 

document would have been considerably higher than those for individuals working at an off-site 

location. Therefore, the ambient environmental internal exposure assessment method defined for 

SNL-A workers in the environmental section of the SNL-A Site Profile will serve to bound any 

ambient internal doses for individuals at Kirtland AFB and Hangar 481. 

7.2.2 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion 

Based on NIOSH’s evaluation, there is no potential for internal exposures (or the need to assess dose) 

associated with Hangar 481 operations. However, NIOSH has identified a potential source of ambient 

environmental exposures from a source external to the Hangar 481 site/location, which can be 

assessed using the boundary site’s ambient environmental monitoring data and dose assessment 

approach (ORAUT-TKBS-0037). Considering this information, and the methods to assign ambient 

environmental dose defined in the environmental section of the SNL-A Site Profile, NIOSH concludes 

that it can bound any potential internal dose for the Hangar 481 class under evaluation. 

7.3 Evaluation of Bounding External Radiation Doses at Hangar 481 

The principal sources of external radiation doses for members of the evaluated class were the 

packages containing radioactive materials. The following subsections address the ability to bound 

external doses, methods for bounding doses, and the feasibility of external dose reconstruction. 

7.3.1 Evaluation of Bounding Process-Related External Doses 

The following subsections summarize the extent and limitations of information available for 

reconstructing the process-related external doses of members of the class under evaluation. 
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7.3.1.1 Personnel Dosimetry Data

As stated in Section 7.1, many employees at Kirtland AFB, Hangar 481, were monitored for external 

radiation exposure by TLDs. The available dosimetry data are annual summaries for each individual 

who was monitored for all years of the evaluation period except for 1996. Those monitored included 

mechanics, pilots, and personnel involved with handling or securing packages (Personal 

Communication, 2009b; Personal Communication, 2009e). These individuals were expected to have 

received the highest exposures because their work activities frequently put them in close proximity to 

the source (radioactive packages). Monitored individuals were issued TLDs that were changed out on 

a quarterly basis. The data appear to be complete and accurate. In 1996, no external monitoring 

results were recorded because operations requiring external monitoring and reporting had ceased 

(DOE/EH-0575). 

The annual dose summaries list the total number of individuals monitored, the site collective dose, and 

the maximum individual dose. The maximum individual doses can be used to bound all other doses 

since they included data from the maximally-exposed individuals. 

Photon

Personnel most likely to receive external dose at Kirtland AFB were pilots and mechanics. The 

mechanics were involved in handling the packages. The pilots likely had the opportunity to come in 

close proximity to the packages depending on the package locations in the aircraft. 

Non-destructive X-ray testing also took place at Hangar 481, providing an additional photon source. 

These activities took place on night shift with minimal personnel on site (Ross, 1992). TLDs would 

have provided adequate personnel monitoring data for these photon sources. 

Beta

Beta radiation emanating from shipped radioactive materials is not likely to have penetrated the 

packaging containers. Therefore, it is not considered to be a likely source of external exposures to 

workers. However, TLD data indicate personnel shallow dose, which is most likely caused by 

non-penetrating photon radiation. In either case, the TLD data are adequate to assess personnel 

shallow/beta dose. 

7.3.1.2 Area Monitoring Data

No records of perimeter or fixed area monitors were found. Given that the primary radiological 

hazard was transporting packages with limited exposure fields, fixed area or perimeter monitoring 

likely would not have provided much usable data 
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Area monitoring focused on surveys for contamination in areas where it was possible for 

contamination to spread from damaged or improper packaging. Records found included shipping 

records and surveys of empty aircraft, Hangar 481, and other areas. Source term data could be 

obtained by reviewing radioactive shipping records and receipt surveys. Shipping surveys were 

reviewed and were found to contain isotope data as well as surface and one-meter dose rates (SRDB 

70776). External dose rates from the packages and time estimates could be used to estimate 

maximum doses for those who handled radioactive packages. However, based on the hierarchy 

established in OCAS guidance documents, personal dosimetry information is the preferred data source 

over area monitoring results for use in dose reconstruction. 

The available area monitoring data support that there was no spread of contamination. These data also 

provide information about the program and plane conditions. However, the data do not provide a 

reasonable means for bounding external doses and are, thus, not supportive of external dose 

reconstruction. Bounding of external doses will rely on the available TLD data. 

7.3.2 Evaluation of Bounding Ambient Environmental External Doses 

Ambient environmental doses are accounted for in the personnel monitoring data. Therefore, further 

assessment of ambient environmental external doses is not required in this evaluation report. 

7.3.3 Hangar 481 Occupational Examinations 

Interviews with former Hangar 481 workers indicate that annual occupational X-ray examinations 

were not performed at Hangar 481. Sufficient data and references are available regarding annual 

X-ray exams at DOE facilities to bound occupational X-ray doses during the covered years (ORAUTOTIB -0006). 

7.3.4 Methods for Bounding External Dose at Hangar 481 

There is an established protocol for assessing external exposure when performing dose reconstructions 

(these protocol steps are discussed in the following subsections): 

 Photon Dose 

 Beta Dose 

 Medical X-ray Dose 
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7.3.4.1 Methods for Bounding Operational Period External Dose

Photon Dose

Given the availability of TLD data for the period under evaluation, external photon doses for Kirtland 

AFB, Hangar 481, can be bounded. 

From the years 1989 through 1995, individual annual doses are available and summarized in Table 

7-1. Site collective dose and individual maximum doses are also available for those years. An 

average of 76 Hangar 481 employees was monitored each year from 1989 through 1995. The 

maximum number of personnel monitored was 98 in 1989 and the minimum was 56 in 1995. The 

maximum annual individual dose recorded during this timeframe was 172 mrem in 1994, which was 

about two times higher than any other year. Those who were monitored included the mechanics and 

pilots. These individuals were believed to have been the most likely to have received external photon 

exposure due to the nature of their jobs and the likelihood of being in close proximity to radioactive 

packages. The TLD data available from 1989 through 1995 is believed to accurately assess exposures 

at Hangar 481 for that time period and is acceptable for bounding external exposures. 

Table 7-1: Annual Dose Summaries for Kirtland AFB, Hangar 481 

Year Total 

Monitored 

Maximum Individual 

Shallow Dose (mrem) 

Maximum Individual Deep 

Dose (mrem) 

Total Person-mrem 

1989 95 77 58 246 

1990 89 89 89 201 

1991 87 61 44 207 

1992 70 51 48 203 

1993 67 47 37 163 

1994 66 83 172 1501 

1995 56 77 54 445 

In 1996, no external monitoring results were recorded because operations requiring external 

monitoring and reporting had ceased (DOE/EH-0575). Although it is likely that no occupational dose 

was received during the covered period in 1996, it is possible to use the data from the previous years 

to support bounding any potential dose at the facility for 1996. Any possible external photon dose 

from operations or ambient environmental sources can be bounded by using the highest recorded 

individual external dose for any of the previous covered years, which is 172 mrem in 1994. 
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Beta Dose

Given the availability of TLD data for the period under evaluation, external beta doses for Kirtland 

AFB, Hangar 481, can be bounded. 

From the years 1989 through 1995, individual annual shallow dose equivalent (SDE) and deep dose 

equivalent (DDE) doses are available. These data can be used to determine the contribution to SDE 

from beta radiation. Those who were monitored included the mechanics and pilots. These individuals 

were believed to have been the most likely to have received external beta exposure due to the nature 

of their jobs and the likelihood of being in close proximity to radioactive packages. The TLD data 

available from 1989 through 1995 are believed to accurately assess exposures at Hangar 481 for that 

time period and are acceptable for bounding external beta/shallow exposures. 

In 1996, no external monitoring results were recorded because operations requiring external 

monitoring and reporting had ceased (DOE/EH-0575). Any possible external beta/shallow exposures 

for 1996 can be bounded by using the highest recorded individual external beta dose for any of the 

previous covered years. This approach is also bounding because the evaluated period in 1996 consists 

of two months, and any assessed exposure will assume exposure for the entire year. 

Medical X-ray Dose

Interviews with former Hangar 481 workers indicate that annual occupational X-ray examinations 

were not performed at Hangar 481. Based on this information, the bounding approach for assessing 

medical X-ray doses for the class under evaluation is to assume annual X-ray examinations. 

Sufficient data and references are available regarding annual X-ray exams at DOE facilities to bound 

occupational X-ray doses during the covered years (ORAUT-OTIB -0006). 

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion 

Given the availability of TLD data for the covered years of employment, it is feasible to bound the 

evaluated worker class external dose (reconstruct external doses with sufficient accuracy). The 

primary radiological hazard was external photon dose from radioactive packages. A shallow dose 

component was also present, but to a much lesser extent. From 1989 through 1995, individual annual 

TLD data was available for all monitored individuals. Those that were monitored included 

individuals such as mechanics and pilots. These individuals were believed to have been the most 

likely to have received external exposures due to the nature of the jobs. The TLD data from 1989 

through 1995 is believed to adequately assess the radiological exposures at Kirtland AFB Hangar 481 

during this timeframe and is therefore adequate for performing dose reconstructions. Dose from 1996 

can be over-estimated for dose reconstructions by using the highest individual dosimetry data for all 

previous covered years (1989 through 1995). 
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7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00139 

The following subsections evaluate the assertions made on behalf of petition SEC-00139 for Hangar 

481, Kirtland AFB. 

7.4.1 Lost (or Otherwise Unavailable) Personnel Monitoring Data 

SEC-00139: The petition under evaluation was submitted on the basis of a lack of personnel 

monitoring for certain individuals employed at Hangar 481. The petitioner (also a former employee at 

Hangar 481) asserts that the deceased former Ross Aviation employee at Hangar 481 “did not wear 

dose monitoring badges,” and to the best of his knowledge, “there was no monitoring of any kind at 

Hangar 481 or adjacent there to [sic]”. He also stated that “shipments of substances and items were 

delivered to the hangar in guarded shipments from Sandia National Labs and loaded into planes at 

Hangar 481 for further delivery by personnel wearing dose badges.” (Petition, 2009)

The petitioner also submitted a statement from another former Hangar 481 employee, who 

stated by affidavit, “...I recall that pilots, flight engineers and flight mechanics who were 

present at the time of loading on the ramp would be wearing radiation dose badges. I was not 

required to wear radiation badges during times that I assisted in loading cargo into the planes, 

or while cleaning the planes.” He also stated that “[evaluated employee - name redacted] 

would have been working in the offices in the hanger [sic] building, and on occasions when the 

cargo would have been loaded into airplanes parked on the ramp that was located near to the 

Ross Aviation hanger [sic].” (Affidavit, 2009) 

Not all employees who worked at Hangar 481 were monitored for radiation exposure. 

However, not all Hangar 481 employees worked near radioactive materials, and as such, were 

not required to having monitoring. Ross Aviation was required to monitor personnel who were 

directly involved in radioactive material shipments, and NIOSH has located personnel 

exposure data for the applicable Ross Aviation employees for the time class period under 

evaluation. 

While it may not be feasible to determine which individuals were directly involved in 

radioactive material shipments and those who were not, the available data are adequate for 

determining upper bound dose estimates for all members of the class under evaluation. 

The bounding scenario for this evaluation is based on the Hangar 481 worker who handled packages 

containing radioactive materials. Because NIOSH has the monitoring data for that exposure 

scenario/worker group, NIOSH concludes that it can bound the dose for the worker class under 

evaluation in this report.
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7.5 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00139 

This report evaluates the feasibility for completing dose reconstructions for employees at the Hangar 

481, Kirtland AFB from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. NIOSH found that the available 

monitoring records, process descriptions and source term data available are sufficient to complete 

dose reconstructions for the evaluated class of employees. 

Table 7-2 summarizes the results of the feasibility findings at Hangar 481 for each exposure source 

during the time period March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. 

Table 7-2: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00139 

March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996 

Source of Exposure Reconstruction Feasible Reconstruction Not Feasible 

Internal X 

External X 

 - Gamma X 

 - Beta X 

 - Neutron N/A N/A 

 - Occupational Medical X-ray X 

As of October 22, 2009, a total of one claim has been submitted to NIOSH for an individual who 

worked at Hangar 481 and is covered by the class definition evaluated in this report. This individual 

claim is currently with NIOSH for dose reconstruction. 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00139 

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3). Under these requirements, if it is not 

feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, NIOSH must 

also determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered the 

health of members of the class. Section 83.13 requires NIOSH to assume that any duration of 

unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of members of a class when it has been 

established that the class may have been exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If 

the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then NIOSH is 

required to specify that health was endangered for those workers who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 
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NIOSH evaluated Petition SEC-00139 on the basis of lost (or otherwise unavailable) personnel 

monitoring data. Through research and data capture activities, NIOSH has located radiation exposure 

summary data for Hangar 481 workers for the time period under evaluation. NIOSH’s evaluation 

determined that it is feasible to estimate radiation dose for members of the NIOSH-evaluated class 

with sufficient accuracy based on the sum of information available from available resources. 

Modification of the class definition regarding health endangerment and minimum required 

employment periods, therefore, is not required. 

9.0 Class Conclusion for Petition SEC-00139 

Based on its full research of the class under evaluation, NIOSH found no part of said class for which it 

cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. This class includes all employees who 

worked at Hangar 481, Kirtland Air Force Base, from March 1, 1989 through February 29, 1996. 

NIOSH has carefully reviewed all material sent in by the petitioner, including the specific assertions 

stated in the petition, and has responded herein (see Section 7.4). NIOSH has also reviewed available 

technical resources and many other references, including the Site Research Database (SRDB), for 

information relevant to SEC-00139. In addition, NIOSH reviewed its NOCTS dose reconstruction 

database to identify EEOICPA-related dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to 

the petition evaluation. 

These actions are based on existing, approved NIOSH processes used in dose reconstruction for 

claims under EEOICPA. NIOSH’s guiding principle in conducting these dose reconstructions is to 

ensure that the assumptions used are fair, consistent, and well-grounded in the best available science. 

Simultaneously, uncertainties in the science and data must be handled to the advantage, rather than to 

the detriment, of the petitioners. When adequate personal dose monitoring information is not 

available, or is very limited, NIOSH may use the highest reasonably possible radiation dose, based on 

reliable science, documented experience, and relevant data to determine the feasibility of 

reconstructing the dose of an SEC petition class. NIOSH contends that it has complied with these 

standards of performance in determining the feasibility or infeasibility of reconstructing dose for the 

class under evaluation. 
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10.0 References 

42 C.F.R. pt. 81, Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule, Federal 

Register/Vol. 67, No. 85/Thursday, p 22,296; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 19391 

42 C.F.R. pt. 82, Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 

19392 

42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special 

Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000; Final Rule; May 28, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 22001 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385 [EEOICPA], Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program Act of 2000, as amended 

Affidavit, 2009, Employment History Affidavit from Co-worker; received April 9, 2009; OSA Ref ID: 

108623 

Checklist, 1988a, Incoming Radioactive Material Checklist, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co, 

Inc.; air freight survey for Ross Aviation; July 5, 1988; SRDB Ref ID: 70726 

Checklist, 1988b, Incoming Radioactive Material Checklist, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co, 

Inc.; air freight survey for Ross Aviation; October 25, 1988; SRDB Ref ID: 70717 

Contract, 1989, Contract DE-AC04-89AL52318 Between Ross Aviation, Inc., and DOE, March 1, 

1989; SRDB Ref ID: 64990

DOE, 1996, DOE Occupational Radiation Exposure 1996 Report, U.S. Department of Energy; 1996; 

SRDB Ref ID: 9020 

DOE/EH-0575, DOE Occupational Radiation Exposure, 1997 Report; Appendix A, Exhibit A-2, 

Organizations Reporting to DOE REMS, 1993-1997; U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Public 

Health and Safety; SRDB Ref ID: 64900, pdf pp. 61 and 64 

HPD, 1994, Health Protection Division Appraisal at Ross Aviation, U.S. Department of Energy 

Health Protection Division; April 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 71001 

OCAS-PR-004, Internal Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, Rev. 0, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); Cincinnati, Ohio; September 23, 

2004; SRDB Ref ID: 32022 

ORAUT-OTIB-0006, Dose Reconstruction from Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-Ray 

Procedures, Rev 3 PC-1; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; December 21, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 

20220 
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ORAUT-TKBS-0008-6, Nevada Test Site – Occupational External Dose, Rev 01 PC-1, Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities; May 28, 2008; SRDB Ref ID: 34013 

ORAUT-TKBS-0037, Site Profile for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

and the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada;, Rev 00; Oak Ridge Associated Universities; June 22, 2007; 

SRDB Ref ID: 32531 

Personal Communication, 2009a, Personal Communication with Employee at Sandia National 

Laboratory, DOE-Albuquerque; Telephone interview by ORAU Team; June 10, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 

69631

Personal Communication, 2009b, Personal Communication with Employee at Sandia National 

Laboratory, DOE-Albuquerque; Telephone interview by ORAU Team; June 3, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 

69633

Personal Communication, 2009c, Personal Communication with former Director of Safety and 

General Manager at Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone interview by ORAU Team; June 2, 2009; 

SRDB Ref ID: 69638

Personal Communication, 2009d, Personal Communication with the ES&H Division Director, and a 

Nuclear Engineer at the Office of Secure Transportation; Telephone interview by ORAU Team; June 

17, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 70643

Personal Communication, 2009e, Personal Communication with former Director of Safety and 

Security at Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; August 25, 2009; 

SRDB Ref ID: 72792 

Personal Communication, 2009f, Personal Communication with Director of Safety and Security at 

Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; November 6, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 

76358 

Personal Communication, 2009g, Personal Communication with Director of Safety and Security at 

Ross Aviation, Hangar 481; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; December 7, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 

Not yet in SRDB 

Personal Communication, 2009h, Personal Communication with former Ross Aviation General 

Manager and former Ross Aviation Personnel Director; Telephone Interview by ORAU Team; 

December 7, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: Not yet in SRDB

Petition, 2009, Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B and supporting documents; received 

February 27, 2009; OSA Ref ID: 108306

Procedure, 1990, Safe Operating Procedure for the Use of Neutron Generators (1990); Sandia 

National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, 1990; SRDB Ref ID: 23742 

Radiological Health, 1970; Radiological Health Handbook, Revised Edition; Public Health Service, 

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; January 1970; publicly available 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB

33 of 51 

Ross, 1992, Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Inspection, Ross Aviation, Inc., U.S. Department 

of Energy, December 2, 1992; SRDB Ref ID: 71004 

Ross, 2009, Ross Aviation External Dosimetry Data and Results (Access Database name: Ross 

Aviation 09-29-2009); Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Radiation Exposure Recording System 

(REIRS) database; September 29, 2009; SRDB Ref ID: 73850 

Shipping Record, 1988, Radioactive Material Shipping Record, U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Test Site; air freight survey for Ross Aviation; July 12, 1988; SRDB Ref ID: 70754 

Shipping Record, 1989, Radioactive Material Shipping Record, U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Test Site; air freight survey for Ross Aviation; May 17, 1989; SRDB Ref ID: 70804 

Shipping Record, 1992, Radioactive Material Shipping Record, U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Test Site; air freight survey for Ross Aviation; July 12, 1988; SRDB Ref ID: 70846 

TSD, 1997, Transportation Safeguards Division Technical Basis for Radioactive Material Intake 

Potential, Transportation Safeguards Division, Albuquerque Operations Office, U.S. Department of 

Energy; August 7, 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 71009 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB

34 of 51 

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SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Attachment 1: Data Capture Synopsis 

Page 35 of 51 

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured D

Primary Site/Company Name: Hangar 481 

March 1, 1989 - February 29, 1996; DOE Other Site Names: 

Ross Aviation, Inc. Pierce Air Pierce Enterprises, Inc. 

On 06/03/2009 the ORAU Team confirmed with a former Ross Aviation Director of Safety and General Manager that dosimetry records are in the possession of the DOE. Radiological surveys were performed by Sandia National Lab. On 08/25/2009 the ORAU Team confirmed with a former Ross Aviation Director of Safety and Security that Ross Aviation went out of business in 2008. 

08

State Contacted: John Parker, Chief, New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau 505-827-2855 

No relevant data identified. The New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau does not hold records for Hangar 481 or Ross Aviation. 

10

DOE Albuquerque Office (DOE AL) Contract documents from Ross Aviation contracts with the AEC and 

DOE. 

04

DOE Office of Secure Transportation (OST) The Transportation Safeguards Division technical basis for eliminating 

intakes as a credible source of exposure. 

07

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 1988 DOELAP application and 1988 and 1993 DOELAP 

accreditations. 

06

Internet - DOE Comprehensive Epidemiologic Data Resource (CEDR) 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - DOE Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System (DDRS) 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - DOE OpenNet No relevant data identified. 10Internet - DOE OSTI Energy Citations No relevant data identified. 10Internet - DOE OSTI Information Bridge No relevant data identified. 10Internet - Google Occupational radiation exposure reports, an audit of aircraft activities, 

fire protection review, and brief mentions of Ross Aviation as a transporter of weapons components. 

10

Internet - National Academies Press (NAP) No relevant data identified. 10Internet - National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - Nevada Site Office 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - NRC Agencywide Document Access and Management (ADAMS) 

No relevant data identified. 10

Internet - Washington State University (U.S. Transuranium and Uranium Registries) 

No relevant data identified. 10

NARA Atlanta Results of the DOE Indoor Radon Study. Hangar 481 was included in 

the study. 

08
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-1: Data Capture Synopsis for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Data Capture Information General Description of Documents Captured D

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - Service Center 

1997 Ross Aviation Safety Manual. 08

Nevada Test Site Records Center Radioactive material shipping records, checklists, and documentation. 07ORAU Team The seventh through eleventh annual reports of contractor radiation 

exposures, process knowledge interviews with former Ross Aviation, DOE AL, NNSA, and OST personnel. 

09

ORISE Ross Aviation external dosimetry data from the REM/REIRS Database. 09SAIC Radiation exposure summaries from 1970 and 1972. 09Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) Contamination surveys of aircraft and associated equipment, a 

computed exposure report, documents regarding annual environmental reports, statement of work for providing external dosimetry services and 

the associated NEPA determination, DOE appraisals, occupational 

radiation exposure reports, drawings and photos of Hangar 481, drawings of pads 2 and 5, Ross Aviation organizational chart, and requirements for TLD storage and use. 

07

Unknown DOE Occupational Exposure Report 1992-1994. N/TOTAL 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

DOE CEDR http://cedr.lbl.gov/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" in Title "Pierce Air" in Title "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

DOE Hanford DDRS http://www2.hanford.gov/declass/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" in any field (simple search mode) "Pierce Air" in any field (simple search mode) "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

36 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

DOE OpenNet http://www.osti.gov/opennet/advancedsearch.jsp COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" in any field "Pierce Air" in any field "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

DOE OSTI Energy Citations http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" in any field "Pierce Air" in any field "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

DOE OSTI Information Bridge http://www.osti.gov/bridge/advancedsearch.jsp COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" in any field "Pierce Air" in any field "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

Google http://www.google.com COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" "Ross Aviation" americium OR Am241 OR Am-241 OR Am 241 OR 241Am OR 241-Am OR 241 Am "Ross Aviation" ionium OR Th230 OR Th-230 OR Th 230 OR 230Th OR 230-Th OR 230 Th "Ross Aviation" neptunium OR Np237 OR Np-237 OR Np 237 OR 237Np OR 237-Np OR 237 Np OR palm OR palmolive "Ross Aviation" polonium OR Po210 OR Po-210 OR Po 210 OR 210Po OR 210-Po OR 210 Po "Ross Aviation" thorium OR thoria OR Th232 OR Th-232 OR Th 232 OR 232Th OR 232-Th OR 232 Th OR Z metal OR Z-metal OR myrnalloy OR chemical 10-66 OR chemical 1066 OR chemical 10 66 

OR chemical 18-12 OR chemical 1812 OR chemical 18 12 OR chemical 10-12 OR chemical 1012 OR chemical 10 12 OR UX1 OR UX2 OR Th-234 OR Th234 OR Th 234 OR 234-Th OR 234Th OR 234 Th "Ross Aviation" tritium OR H3 OR H-3 OR mint OR HTO 

37 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

"Ross Aviation" uranium OR U233 OR U-233 OR U 233 OR 233U OR 233-U OR 233 U OR U234 OR U 234 OR U-234 OR 234U OR 234-U OR 234 U OR U235 OR U 235 OR U-235 OR 235-U OR 235U OR 235 U OR U238 OR U 238 OR U-238 OR 238-U OR 238U OR 238 U OR U308 OR U 308 OR U-308 OR 308-U OR 308U OR 308 U OR black oxide OR brown oxide OR green salt OR orange oxide OR yellow cake OR UO2 OR UO3 OR UF4 OR UF6 OR C-216 OR C-616 OR C-65 OR C-211 OR U3O8 (uranium extraction OR uranium dioxide OR uranium hexafluoride OR uranium tetrafluoride OR uranium trioxide) "Ross Aviation" plutonium OR Pu-238 OR Pu238 OR Pu 238 OR 238Pu OR 238-Pu OR 238 Pu OR Pu-239 OR Pu239 OR Pu 239 OR 239Pu OR 239-Pu OR 239 Pu OR Pu-240 OR Pu240 OR Pu 240 OR 240Pu OR 240-Pu OR 240 Pu OR Pu-241 OR Pu241 OR Pu 241 OR 241Pu OR 241-Pu OR 241 Pu "Ross Aviation" radium OR Ra-226 OR Ra226 OR Ra 226 OR 226-Ra OR 226Ra OR 226 Ra OR Ra-228 OR Ra228 OR Ra 228 OR 228Ra OR 228-Ra OR 228 Ra "Ross Aviation" radon OR Rn-222 OR Rn222 OR Rn 222 OR 222Rn OR 222-Rn OR 222 Rn "Ross Aviation" thoron OR Rn-220 OR Rn220 OR Rn 220 OR 220Rn OR 220-Rn OR 220 Rn Ross Aviation" protactinium OR Pa-234m OR Pa234m OR Pa 234m OR 234mPa OR 234m-Pa OR 234m Pa “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” oralloy "Ross Aviation" strontium OR Sr-90 OR Sr90 OR Sr 90 OR 90-Sr OR 90Sr OR 90 Sr 

38 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” postum “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” tuballoy “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "uranyl nitrate hexahydrate" OR UNH “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "K-65" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "Accident" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "Sump Cake" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "air count" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "air dust" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "air filter" 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "airborne test" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” alpha 

39 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "belgian congo ore" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” beta “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” bioassay OR bio-assay “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” breath OR "breathing zone" OR BZ “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "body burden" 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” calibration 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "chest count" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” columnation “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” contamination 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” curie “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” denitration OR "denitration pot" 

40 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” derby OR regulus “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "derived air 

concentration" OR DAC “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” dose “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” dosimeter 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” dosimetric “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” dosimetry “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” electron “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” environment “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "Ether-Water 

Project" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” exposure OR "exposure investigation" OR "radiation exposure" 

41 of 51 
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Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” external “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "F machine" 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” fecal “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "feed material" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” femptocurie 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” film “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” fission “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” fluoroscopy “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program" OR FUSRAP “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "gamma-ray" OR "gamma ray" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "gas proportional" 

42 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "gaseous diffusion" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” health OR "health instrument" OR "health physics" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "highly enriched uranium" OR HEU “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” hydrofluorination “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "in vitro" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” in vivo “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” incident “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” ingestion “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” inhalation “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” internal 

43 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” investigation 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” isotope “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” isotopic “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "isotopic 

enrichment" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "JS Project" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” Landauer “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "liquid scintillation" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” log OR "log sheet" OR "log book" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "low enriched uranium" OR LEU “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "lung count" 

44 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "maximum permissible concentration" OR MPC “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” metallurgy “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” microcurie “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” millicurie “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "mixed fission 

product" OR MFP “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” monitor OR "air monitoring" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” nanocurie 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "nasal wipe" 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” neutron “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "nose wipe" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” nuclear OR 

"Chicago-Nuclear" OR "nuclear fuels" 

45 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "nuclear track emulsion type A" OR NTA “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "occupational radiation exposure" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” occurrence “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "ore concentrate" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "PC Project" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” permit OR "radiation work permit" OR "safe work permit" OR "special work permit" OR RWP OR SWP “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "phosphate research" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” photon “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” picocurie “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” pitchblende 

46 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "pocket ion chamber" OR PIC “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” problem “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” procedure “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” radeco “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” radiation “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” radioactive “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” radioactivity 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” radiograph 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” radiological 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "Radiological Survey Data Sheet" OR RSDS “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” radionuclide 

47 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” raffinate “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” reactor “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” respiratory “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "retention schedules" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” roentgen “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” sample OR "air sample" OR "dust sample" OR "general area air sample" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” sampling OR "air sampling" OR "dust sampling" OR "general area air sampling" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "solvent extraction" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” source OR "sealed source" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” spectra 

48 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” spectrograph “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” spectroscopy “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” spectrum “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "standard operating" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” survey OR "building survey" OR routine OR special “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "technical basis" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "thermal diffusion" “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "thermoluminescent dosimeter" OR TLD “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "Tiger Team" 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "tolerance 

dose" 

49 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

“Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” urinalysis “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” urine “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” "whole body count" OR WBC “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” working level OR WL “Ross Aviation” OR “Ross Aviation, Inc” OR “Ross Aviation Angel Fire” OR “Pierce Air, Inc” OR “Pierce Enterprises, Inc” X-ray OR X ray OR Xray "Ross Aviation" "Hangar 481" "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

National Academies Press http://www.nap.edu/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" "Pierce Air" "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

NNSA - Nevada Site Office www.nv.doe.gov/main/search.htm COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" "Pierce Air" "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

NRC ADAMS Reading Room http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" in any field "Pierce Air" in any field "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

50 of 51 
SEC-00139 12-11-09 

51 of 51 

Table A1-2: Database Searches for Hangar 481, Kirtland AFB 

Database/Source Keywords / Phrases 

U.S. Transuranium & Uranium Registries http://www.ustur.wsu.edu/ COMPLETED 10/23/2009 

"Ross Aviation" "Pierce Air" "Hangar 481" "Hanger 481" 

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