Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1609-CR-2152 | August 10, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Lorie Bohannon

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lorie Bohannon,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 10, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1609-CR-2152

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable William J. Nelson

Trial Court Cause No.

49G18-1502-F6-4352

Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Lorie Bohannon appeals her conviction for theft, as a Level 6 felony, following 

a bench trial. Bohannon raises seven issues for our review, but we consider

only the following three issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it considered video 

evidence.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Bohannon’s conviction.

3. Whether Bohannon has demonstrated that she received 

ineffective assistance from her trial counsel.

[2] We affirm.1

Facts and Procedural History2

[3] On February 5, 2015, Bohannon went to the Beech Grove Walmart and 

proceeded with a number of items to the self-scan checkout station. There, 

Bohannon placed a stack of steaks, valued at $140, which she had placed inside 

one plastic bag, on the scanner such that only the bottom steak was scanned. 

Bohannon then placed the steaks back in her shopping cart and proceeded to 

 

1

 Bohannon also asserts that she was falsely imprisoned by a Walmart employee, but that argument was not 

developed below and has no relevance to this appeal from her conviction and sentence. Accordingly, we 

dismiss Bohannon’s apparent attempt to raise for the first time in this criminal appeal her putative civil claim.

2

 Bohannon’s appendix does not comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 50(B)(1), and the Statement of Facts 

in her appellate brief is not in accordance with our standard of review, which is contrary to Appellate Rule 

46(A)(6)(b).
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exit the building. At the exit, Kristopher Britton and another Walmart 

employee, who both had observed Bohannon’s actions, stopped her, and police, 

who had already arrived, arrested Bohannon.

[4] The State charged Bohannon with theft, as a Level 6 felony.3 At her ensuing 

bench trial, Britton testified as to his observations of Bohannon on February 5. 

During his testimony, the State had surveillance video, which consisted of three 

different angles showing Bohannon inside the Walmart, admitted into evidence. 

Bohannon’s counsel informed the court that he had “no objection” to the 

admission of the video. Tr. Vol. 2 at 9. However, Bohannon’s counsel stated 

that he was “concerned” and wanted “the entire video to be presented” rather 

than “portions of the video.” Id. at 11. The total video time was about ninety 

minutes. The trial court, however, noted that there was “a lot of silent time” 

with portions that were not “really relevant.” Id. at 13. Accordingly, the State 

asked “to play [the video] at a times 4 speed.” Id. at 16. The court responded: 

“let’s try it . . . and if you [Bohannon] object . . . or if I don’t understand what’s 

going on, then we’ll back it back down to normal speed.” Id. Bohannon did 

not object.

[5] Following Britton’s testimony and description of the video evidence, Bohannon 

testified in her own defense. She stated that, while it looked like she was 

attempting to leave the Walmart with unpaid goods, she was actually “waitin[g] 

 

3

 Bohannon’s theft offense was elevated to a Level 6 felony based on prior, unrelated convictions.
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on my brother to come so that I could pay” for those items. Id. at 62. 

Bohannon’s brother also testified and confirmed that Bohannon had texted him 

and mentioned the unpurchased meat.

[6] The court found Bohannon guilty as charged. According to the court:

[Bohannon] . . . clearly pushed the cart past the . . . EAS 

[security] towers into the area towards the exit . . . . [S]he clearly 

did not pay for the meat . . . [or] 15 [other] unpaid items . . . . 

[T]he behavior of Ms. Bohannon [in the video] was very strange, 

I mean, it really was. [B]ut on top of it all, her admission to her 

brother that hey, I didn’t pay for this meat, . . . and then[,] in the 

Court’s opinion, after th[at] evidence, [she] attempted to leave 

the store by passing all points of payment, which is the threshold 

that the Court can use in this case to determine whether or not 

she intended to deprive Walmart of the use of value of the items. 

And . . . I think it’s enough, so I’m finding her guilty of theft.

Id. at 85-86. The court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced 

Bohannon accordingly. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admission of Evidence

[7] We first consider Bohannon’s argument on appeal that the trial court erred 

when it “allow[ed] the video evidence to be admitted without being completely 

viewed, not being complete footage of the defendant in the store, and played at 

a faster[-]than[-]real[-]time speed . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 11. We generally 

review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

E.g., McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 264 (Ind. 2004). But Bohannon did not 
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object to the State’s request to admit the video evidence. Bohannon also did 

not object when the trial court proposed to watch the video at an accelerated 

speed. As such, Bohannon has not preserved this issue for appellate review, 

and we will not consider it.4 E.g., Lockhart v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 (Ind. 

1993).

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] We next consider Bohannon’s argument that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence to support her conviction.5 Our standard of review is clear: 

in reviewing such claims, we will consider only the evidence most favorable to 

the verdict and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Leonard v. 

State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 160 (Ind. 2017). We will affirm the conviction if there is 

probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We will neither reweigh the 

evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses. Id.

[9] To show that Bohannon committed theft, as a Level 6 felony, the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bohannon knowingly or 

intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the property of another person, 

 

4

 Relatedly, Bohannon argues that the trial court committed judicial misconduct in the manner in which it 

viewed the video and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in presenting the video at an accelerated 

rate. But Bohannon did not object to the alleged misconduct below and therefore has not preserved our 

review of those claims. In any event, her arguments on appeal are not supported by cogent reasoning. App.

R. 46(A)(8)(a). Further, Bohannon does not argue on appeal that any of her challenges to the video evidence 

demonstrates fundamental error. See id.

5

 We agree with the State that Bohannon’s apparent Issue 5 is superfluous to this issue.
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with the intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, and 

that she had a prior unrelated conviction for theft or criminal conversion. Ind. 

Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(C) (2014). On appeal, Bohannon asserts only that the 

State failed to prove that she intended to deprive Walmart of the value or use of 

the steaks.

[10] We cannot agree. The evidence shows that Bohannon passed a stack of steaks 

over a self-scan checkout such that only the bottom steak was scanned. 

Bohannon then placed all the steaks in her shopping cart and went past security 

checkmarks to the store’s exit. The trial court was free to conclude that that 

evidence demonstrated Bohannon’s intent to deprive Walmart of the value or 

use of the steaks. Bohannon’s argument to the contrary on appeal simply asks 

us to reweigh the evidence to give her self-serving testimony controlling weight, 

which we will not do. The State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Bohannon’s conviction.

Issue Three: Effective Assistance of Counsel

[11] Bohannon next asserts that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we 

apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Helton v. 

State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). To satisfy the first 

prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance: 

representation that fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant 

did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 

McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (citing 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052). To satisfy the 

second prong, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable 

probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052).

Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017).

[12] According to Bohannon, her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

because he did not present evidence to show that Bohannon was allergic to 

shellfish, which (according to Bohannon) would have made it unlikely that she 

would have stolen a bag of shrimp. Bohannon further asserts that her counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance because he did not introduce documents that 

would have shown that “all but 4 of the items alleged . . . were indeed paid for.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 10.

[13] Bohannon has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if we 

were to accept Bohannon’s argument on appeal, the fact remains that the State 

showed that Bohannon attempted to leave Walmart with numerous, unpaid-for 

steaks. That was enough to support Bohannon’s conviction, and her challenge 

to her counsel’s assistance does not affect that evidence. In other words, 

Bohannon has presented no cogent argument to show that any error in her 

counsel’s conduct resulted in prejudice to her. Thus, we reject Bohannon’s 

argument.
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Conclusion

[14] In sum, we affirm Bohannon’s conviction for theft, as a Level 6 felony.

[15] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.