2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-5-2011

USA v. Daniel Siddons

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 10-1350

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 10-1350

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DANIEL R. SIDDONS,

 Appellant

_____________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Crim. No. 07-cr-00717-001)

District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond

____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 13, 2011

____________

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: October 5, 2011)

____________

Todd E. Henry, Esq.

22nd Floor

1500 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19102-0000

Counsel for Appellant
2

Mary A. Futcher, Esq. 

Ashley K. Lunkenheimer, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

BARRY, Circuit Judge

Daniel Siddons pled guilty to a 34-count indictment 

charging him with various types of fraud. Prior to sentencing, 

Siddons moved to withdraw his guilty plea, a motion the 

District Court denied. At sentencing, the Court imposed 

certain enhancements and varied upward from the 

recommended Sentencing Guidelines range. Siddons now 

appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 

as well as the imposition of the sentencing enhancements and 

the upward variance. We will affirm. 

I. Background

Siddons was a licensed financial adviser working at the 

investment arm of Mellon Bank (later Citizens Bank), and 

then at Wachovia Securities. His job involved advising 

clients about purchasing investment products, and many of his 

clients were elderly customers seeking to invest their 

retirement savings. On November 15, 2007, a grand jury 

indicted Siddons, charging him with nine counts of mail 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, five counts of wire 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of bank 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. A superseding 

indictment was later returned charging thirty-four counts of 
3

mail, wire, and bank fraud. The Government alleged that 

Siddons solicited his bank clients to invest in speculative real 

estate transactions that he controlled and that were unrelated 

to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry 

known as “selling away.” Some of his clients invested their 

modest life savings with Siddons, initially believing that they 

were investing in a bank-supported, conservative investment 

product. The Government accused Siddons of collecting 

$1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006. 

On February 3, 2009, while he was out on bail, 

Siddons requested that the District Court appoint him a new 

attorney; the Court denied his request. On March 3, 2009, 

one week prior to trial, the Court held a change of plea 

hearing after Siddons indicated that he wished to plead guilty. 

During the plea colloquy, Siddons stated that he was not 

satisfied with his attorney, and the Court called a halt to the 

plea proceedings. The Government’s motion to revoke bail

was then addressed, with the Court hearing sworn testimony 

from Siddons and remanding him after finding that he had 

contacted witnesses. Before the Court entered the remand 

order, Siddons stated that he wished to plead guilty to one 

count, and the Court recessed for Siddons to consult with his 

attorney. Following the recess, Siddons stated, upon repeated 

questioning by the Court, that he was “unequivocally” 

satisfied with his attorney, Supp. App. at 118, and he 

thereafter pled guilty to all counts of the indictment without a 

written plea agreement. 

On July 15, 2009, Siddons, represented by new 

counsel, filed a motion to withdraw the plea. The District 

Court held a hearing, and Siddons and his father, who had 

been present at the meeting during the recess on March 3, 

2009, testified that Siddons’ prior attorney was unprepared to 

go to trial and had browbeaten Siddons into pleading guilty. 

That attorney and his associate testified and challenged 

Siddons’ testimony. The Court stated that it did not believe 

Siddons, that the Government would be prejudiced by a 

withdrawal of the plea, and that Siddons had not adequately 

supported his claim of innocence. The motion was denied. 
4

Siddons’ Presentence Investigation Report listed a 

Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months. The range included a 

four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 

2B1.1(b)(16)(A) (2008) because the offense involved a 

violation of securities law and Siddons was a financial 

adviser. The District Court imposed a two-level enhancement 

for obstruction of justice because it found that Siddons 

provided materially false information to the Court during his 

testimony at the hearing on the motion for new counsel and at 

the hearing to withdraw his guilty plea. It also found that he 

obstructed justice by contacting witnesses. With the 

enhancements, the final Guidelines range was 135 to 168 

months. After reviewing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the 

Court varied upward and imposed a sentence of 180 months 

on each count, to be served concurrently, as well as $1.3 

million in restitution. 

Siddons appeals the District Court’s (1) denial of his 

motion to withdraw the guilty plea; (2) imposition of the fourlevel enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); (3) imposition of

the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement; and (4) 

upward variance to 180 months. 

II. Discussion1

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986). We review a 

district court’s factual findings regarding adjustments to the 

Guidelines range for clear error, and we review the court’s 

“legal interpretation and application of the sentencing 

guidelines under a plenary standard.” United States v. Powell, 

113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 1997). Finally, we review the 

reasonableness of the ultimate sentence for abuse of 

discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). 

 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 

U.S.C. § 3742. 
5

A. Withdrawal of the Guilty Plea

A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea bears a 

substantial burden of “showing a ‘fair and just reason’ for the 

withdrawal of his plea.” United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 

139 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)). 

Accordingly, “[a] shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or 

the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to impose on 

the government the expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a 

defendant who has already acknowledged his guilt by leading 

guilty.” United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 

2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When 

determining whether a defendant has shown a “fair and just 

reason” for withdrawing a plea, a district court must consider 

whether: “(1) the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the 

defendant proffered strong reasons justifying the withdrawal; 

and (3) the government would be prejudiced by the 

withdrawal.” King, 604 F.3d at 139 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by 

facts in the record that support a claimed defense.” United 

States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). Further, a defendant must also 

“give sufficient reasons to explain why contradictory 

positions were taken before the district court.” Jones, 336 

F.3d at 253 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Siddons argues that his “fair and just reason” for 

seeking to withdraw his guilty plea was that at the time of his 

plea, his attorney was unprepared to go to trial and pressured 

him into pleading. Siddons’ appeal on this issue fails for at 

least three reasons. First, while he states that he is innocent, 

he does not, as required, cite to any record evidence that 

would support his claim of innocence or sufficiently explain 

the contradictory position he took during the plea colloquy. 

Second, the District Court correctly found that the 

Government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the 

plea. Many of the Government witnesses were elderly, and 

there was a real risk that key witnesses would pass away or 

memories would fail prior to trial; indeed, at least four victims 

had died between the time of the defendant’s fraud and the 

time of his motion to withdraw the plea. Reopening the case 
6

would delay the trial and increase the likelihood that other

witnesses would be unable to testify on behalf of the 

Government. Finally, as the Court found after the hearing on 

the motion to withdraw the plea, Siddons’ attorney was 

prepared to try the case had Siddons not pled guilty on March 

3, 2009. Accordingly, there was no “fair and just reason” 

justifying the withdrawal of the plea. 

B. The Four-Level Investment Adviser 

Enhancement

A defendant’s Guidelines range is to be increased by 

four levels if the offense involved

a violation of securities law and, at the time of 

the offense, the defendant was (i) an officer or a 

director of a publicly traded company; (ii) a 

registered broker or dealer, or a person 

associated with a broker or dealer; or (iii) an 

investment adviser, or a person associated with 

an investment adviser.

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) (2008).2

The District Court applied this provision. Siddons 

argues, however, that (1) he was not technically an investment 

adviser

 

3

 2 The current Guidelines Manual recodifies this provision at § 

2B1.1(b)(17)(A).

in March 2003, the time that the indictment sets as 

the earliest offense date for the wire fraud counts; and (2) the 

§ 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) enhancement did not exist at the time that 

3 The Guidelines use the definition of “investment adviser” 

listed at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11), which states, in relevant 

part, that investment adviser “means any person who, for

compensation, engages in the business of advising others, 

either directly or through publications or writings, as to the 

value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 

purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation 

and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates 

analyses or reports concerning securities.” 
7

he was an investment adviser, so it is an ex post facto

violation to apply it to him. 

With reference to his first argument, Siddons began 

“selling away” in 2002, while employed as a financial adviser 

at Wachovia Securities. When Wachovia found out, Siddons 

resigned under threat of termination on January 23, 2003. 

The pertinent indictment against Siddons alleges that he 

committed instances of wire fraud, at the earliest, on March 3, 

2003, after his resignation from Wachovia. The enhancement 

under § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) still applies, however, because, as 

the Government states, “[t]he determination of loss and other 

factors pertinent to a fraudulent scheme is never confined to 

the date of the charged mailing or wiring, but always 

encompasses all relevant conduct that was ‘part of the same 

course of conduct or common scheme or plan.’” Appellee’s 

Br. at 78 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)); see also United 

States v. Stephens, 198 F.3d 389, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(permitting consideration of uncharged conduct beyond 

statute of limitations for purposes of Guidelines determination 

in fraud case). Accordingly, because Siddons was an 

“investment adviser” when he began fraudulently obtaining 

the victims’ money, the enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) 

applies. 

Siddons’ ex post facto claim requires somewhat deeper 

analysis. 4

 4 In brief, “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution 

prohibits application of a law enacted after the date of the 

offense that inflicts a greater punishment[] than the law 

annexed to the crime when committed.” United States v. 

Pennavaria, 445 F.3d 720, 723 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The principles of the 

clause relate to the “core due process concepts of notice, 

foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as 

those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching 

criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent 

conduct.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The 

ex post facto inquiry has two prongs: (1) whether there was a 

change in the law or policy which has been given 

 In most situations, “a court must use only one 
8

version of the Guidelines under the ‘one book rule,’ and must 

apply that version in its entirety.” United States v. Mills, 613 

F.3d 1070, 1072 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing U.S.S.G. § 

1B1.11(b)(2)). The Guidelines state that “[t]he court shall use 

the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant 

is sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a). However, if the court 

determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the 

sentencing date would violate the ex post facto clause, “the 

court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date 

that the offense of conviction was committed.” Id. § 

1B1.11(b)(1); see also United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 

193 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Importantly, however, the Guidelines also instruct that 

“[i]f the defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first 

committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of 

the Guidelines Manual became effective, the revised edition 

of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses.” 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3). Siddons argues that because the 

enhancement contained in § 2B1.1(B)(16)(A) did not exist 

until November 1, 2003, after he was no longer an investment 

adviser, it was a violation of the ex post facto clause when the 

District Court applied the enhancement from the 2008 

Manual, rather than using the 2002 Manual without the 

enhancement. The Government contends that there was no ex 

post facto violation because the Sentencing Guidelines’ 

“grouping” provision for continuing crimes (U.S.S.G. § 

3D1.2(d)), combined with the one-book rule and § 

1B1.11(b)(3), put Siddons on notice that he would be 

sentenced for fraud under the later-enacted Guidelines 

Manual. 

We have held that courts may use the later-enacted 

Guidelines Manual for sentencing “straddle” crimes—

continuing offenses that started before an intervening change 

in the Guidelines but that ended afterward. See United States 

 

retrospective effect, and (2) whether the offender was 

disadvantaged by the change.” Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 

775, 784 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). The only issue in this appeal is the first prong.
9

v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 198 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A]pplication 

of the November 2000 Sentencing Guidelines would still not 

violate the ex post facto clause if the fraud continued after the 

effective date of the amendment.”); United States v. Moscony, 

927 F.2d 742, 754 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Rosa, 891 

F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1989). The crime here, wire 

fraud, is not technically a straddle crime because mail and

wire fraud are not continuing offenses but, rather, are crimes 

that are complete upon the execution of each mailing or 

wiring. See United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1425 

(3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute for other reasons as 

stated in United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 

1995). 

The Government argues, however, that in cases of a 

continuing course of wire fraud, “the guideline calculation for 

a fraud offense is based on the entirety of the conduct during 

the scheme,” and thus “it is appropriate to apply the guideline 

manual in effect at the time the fraud ended, on the theory that 

the defendant was fully on notice as he continued his conduct 

of the enhanced penalty.” Appellee’s Br. at 82. The 

Government relies on the “grouping” provision of U.S.S.G. § 

3D1.2, which states that “[w]hen the offense level is 

determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or 

loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other 

measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is 

ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is 

written to cover such behavior,” then “[a]ll counts involving 

substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a 

single Group.” U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2(d), 3D1.2. Because, the 

argument goes, the District Court correctly relied on § 

3D1.2(d) to group the thirty-four related counts of conviction 

for purposes of determining the offense level, see PSR ¶ 86, 

the Court appropriately applied “the final applicable manual 

to the entire sum of the wrongdoing.” Appellee’s Br. at 85. 

The majority of Courts of Appeals that have decided

the issue have held that use of the later-enacted Guidelines 

Manual in such circumstances is not an ex post facto violation 

because § 3D1.2, in combination with the one-book rule, 

gives notice to the defendant that his or her offenses may be 
10

grouped for sentencing purposes and that the later-enacted 

Manual will apply. In United States v. Vivit, 214 F.3d 908 

(7th Cir. 2000), for instance, the defendant was convicted of 

numerous counts of mail fraud involving false claims to 

insurance companies. Certain mailings involved minors, but 

those mailings occurred prior to the enactment of a two-point 

enhancement for use of a minor. Id. at 916-17. Other 

mailings that led to counts of conviction occurred after the 

enactment of the enhancement, but the district court applied 

the enhancement after grouping the convictions pursuant to § 

3D1.2(d). The Seventh Circuit stated 

that the relevant inquiry becomes whether the 

grouping rules give the defendant fair notice at 

the time a crime is consummated that the 

commission of further crimes subject to 

grouping would subject the defendant to 

sentencing under revised Guidelines. The 

grouping rules, enacted in 1987, provide 

warning to criminals that completing another 

criminal offense similar to one committed 

previously places them in peril of sentencing 

under a revised version of the Guidelines. The 

introductory commentary to the grouping rules 

explains that because the offense guideline for 

fraud, § 2F1.1, “deal[s] with repetitive or 

ongoing behavior,” multiple fraud convictions 

are appropriately grouped when the convictions 

involve substantially the same harm. See 

U.S.S.G. § 3D introductory commentary. We 

believe that this conclusion reflects the intent of 

the Sentencing Commission to provide notice to 

criminals that engaging in ongoing fraudulent 

behavior involving the same type of harm risks 

grouping of convictions, which because of the 

one-book rule, will all be sentenced according 

to the Guidelines in effect when the latest 

conduct occurred.

Id. at 919 (emphasis added). 
11

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that there was no 

ex post facto violation by virtue of the district court’s decision 

to apply the “use of minors” enhancement to all of the 

grouped offenses. Similar reasoning has prevailed in the 

majority of Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue. 

See United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 626-28 (2d Cir. 

2010); United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 

2008); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 

(10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-

95 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 

1404-07 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 

1248, 1250-53 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094 

(1995), reinstated, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir. 1995) (per 

curiam);5 but see United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 546-

47 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding an ex post facto violation and 

requiring the district court to sentence the defendant under 

different Guidelines Manuals depending upon the date of the 

completion of the charged conduct in a multiple-count 

indictment). 

Similarly, our decision in United States v. Bertoli, 40 

F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994), does not mandate a finding of an ex 

post facto violation. There, we held that where the district 

court grouped discrete acts of obstruction of justice for 

sentencing purposes, it was error to use a Guidelines Manual 

containing an enhancement enacted after the completion of 

some of the relevant conduct. Id. at 1401-04; id. at 1404 

(“The fact that various counts of an indictment are grouped 

cannot override ex post facto concerns.”). In Bertoli, 

however, we did not address the grouping provision at issue 

here, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), the provision we discussed above. 

Indeed, in Bertoli, there was no indication as to why the 

district court grouped the disparate conduct, but it could not 

 5

At least one circuit has found no ex post facto violation in 

similar circumstances based only on the fact that § 

1B1.11(b)(3) gave fair warning to the defendant that the laterenacted Guidelines Manual would be used; the court did not 

address grouping, even though the crimes involved repeated 

commission of the same offenses. See United States v. Lewis, 

235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2000). 
12

have been for the reasons stated in § 3D1.2(d) because the 

government itself acknowledged that grouping was improper. 

See id. at 1403 n.16 (“On appeal, the government does not 

endorse the district court’s decision to combine Counts Three 

and Six for the purpose of determining which Manual applies. 

Rather, the government’s sole argument is that the 1989 

Manual is not more favorable to Bertoli than the 1993 

Manual.”).” Unlike Siddons’ actions, which involved 

ongoing, connected fraudulent conduct occurring both before 

and after the enactment of the sentencing enhancement, the 

defendant’s actions in Bertoli involved discrete, unconnected 

acts. We agree with those Courts of Appeals that have found 

no ex post facto violation when a court groups continuing, 

related conduct and applies the Guidelines Manual in effect 

during the latest-concluded conduct. This is so because the 

grouping provisions, combined with the one-book rule, place 

a defendant on notice that a court will sentence him or her 

under the Guidelines Manual in effect during the commission 

of his or her last offense in a series of continuous, related

offenses. 

Applying this analysis to Siddons, the District Court 

did not err in using the 2008 Guidelines Manual with the fourlevel enhancement at § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A). Siddons was an 

investment adviser when he initiated the fraud that led to his 

convictions. Even though he was no longer an investment 

adviser as of the date of the first offense or at the time of the 

enactment of the enhancement, a court considers his “relevant 

conduct” as an investment adviser in determining his 

Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). Due to the 

grouping rules at § 3D1.2(d) and the one-book rule at § 

1B1.11, Siddons was on constructive notice that the 

November 1, 2003 enhancement could apply to his entire 

scheme, should he continue the conduct after the date of 

enactment. As the Eighth Circuit aptly stated, “it was not the 

amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that disadvantaged 

[Siddons], it was his election to continue his criminal activity

[after the effective date of the enhancements].” Cooper, 35 

F.3d at 1250. There was no ex post facto violation here. 
13

C. The Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

The District Court imposed a two-level enhancement 

based on § 3C1.1, which states

[i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or 

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the

administration of justice with respect to the 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 

instant offense of conviction, and (B) the 

obstructive conduct related to (i) the 

defendant’s offense of conviction and any 

relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related 

offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

The District Court found that Siddons had (1) lied 

about his reasons for wanting to change counsel and the 

nature of his dispute with his original counsel; (2) lied under 

oath when he attempted to withdraw his plea and explain his 

reasons for pleading guilty; and (3) attempted to unlawfully 

influence the testimony of witnesses and then lied about the 

reasons behind his behavior. The application notes to the

Guidelines support all of the Court’s reasons for imposing the 

enhancement. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(a) (attempting 

to unlawfully influence a witness), cmt. n.4(f) (providing 

materially false information to a judge). 

Siddons challenges the District Court’s credibility 

determination, arguing that the Court misinterpreted his

testimony on all fronts, and that he did not believe that he was 

violating the terms of his bail when he contacted witnesses. 

We will not disturb a sentencing court’s factual findings 

unless, on review of the entire evidence, we are “left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Having 

reviewed the transcripts of the various hearings, we cannot 

say that the Court committed error, much less that we have a 

definite and firm conviction there was error. 
14

D. The Reasonableness of the Sentence

Finally, Siddons argues that the District Court 

unreasonably applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that 

his 180-month sentence was unduly punitive and greater than 

necessary. He contends that the only reason that he received 

such a high, above-Guidelines sentence was because he aired 

his grievances about his attorney with the Court, and the 

Court held the failure of that relationship against him at 

sentencing. 

The record does not support Siddons’ arguments. The 

District Court stated that it was imposing an above-Guidelines 

sentence because of the nature of Siddons’ crimes against 

elderly investors and the “abhorrent nature” of the crimes, 

Supp. App. at 514; because of his abuse of his position as a 

financial adviser; and because the Court found that he

“appears to have absolutely [no] compunction about lying, 

lying under oath. He appears to have no conscience.” Id. at 

510. The Court concluded, with reference to the “no 

conscience” component, that “the public does, indeed, need 

protection from the defendant” as “he would be likely to 

repeat his crimes if he were at liberty or to commit criminal 

acts if he were at liberty.” Id. The Court acted well within its 

discretion when it varied upward in sentencing Siddons. The 

reasons it gave are persuasive and fully supported by the 

record. 

Siddons does not argue that the District Court 

committed any procedural error. Under our “highly 

deferential” standard of review of a sentencing court’s 

decisions, we are to affirm a court’s procedurally sound 

sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 

imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 

the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. 

Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Given the record before us, we 

simply cannot find that no reasonable court would have 

imposed a sentence one year longer than the highest 

Guidelines range. 
15

III. Conclusion

We will affirm the judgment of sentence.