ORAU Lead Technical Evaluator: Albert W. Wolff ORAU Review Completed By: Michael Kubiak 

SEC Petition Evaluation Report 

Petition SEC-00057-2 

Report Rev #:_1_ Report Submittal Date: March 26, 2008 

Subject Expert(s): James Berger, Tim Adler 

Site Expert(s): Edward Scalsky 

Petition Administrative Summary 

Petition Under Evaluation 

Petition # Petition 

Type 

Petition B 

Qualification Date 

DOE/AWE Facility Name 

SEC-00057-2 83.13 November 21, 2006 Hanford 

Petitioner Class Definition 

All employees in all facilities and areas of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation from January 1, 1942 through December 31, 

1990. 

Proposed Class Definition 

All employees of the Department of Energy (DOE), its predecessor agencies, and DOE contractors or subcontractors, 

who worked from: 

1. September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1961 in the 300 Area; or 

2. January 1, 1949 through December 31, 1968 in the 200 Area; 

at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely 

under this employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes 

of employees in the SEC. 

Related Petition Summary Information 

SEC Petition Tracking #(s) Petition Type DOE/AWE Facility Name Petition Status 

SEC-00078 83.13 Hanford Merged with SEC-00057 

Related Evaluation Report Information 

Report Title DOE/AWE Facility Name 

SEC-00057-1, 1st Part of this Evaluation Report Hanford 

Peer Review Completed By: [Signature on file] 

Sam Glover 

03/27/2008 

Date 

SEC Petition Evaluation Reviewed By: [Signature on file] 

J. W. Neton 

03/28/2008 

Date 

SEC Evaluation Approved By: [Signature on file] 

Larry Elliott 

03/31/2008 

Date 
SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

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SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00057-2, Hanford 

This evaluation report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

addresses a class of employees proposed for addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) per the 

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7384 et seq. (EEOICPA) and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as 

Members of the Special Exposure Cohort under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 

Compensation Program Act of 2000. 

Petitioner-Requested Class Definition 

This evaluation reviews the requested classes as follows: 

•	 Petition SEC-00057, qualified on November 21, 2006, requested that NIOSH consider the 

following class: All employees in all facilities and areas of the Hanford Reservation from January 

1, 1942 through December 31, 1990. 

•	 Petition SEC-00078, qualified on February 8, 2007, requested that NIOSH consider the following 

class: All roving maintenance carpenters and apprentice carpenters that worked in the 100, 200, 

300, and 400 Areas of Hanford from April 25, 1967 through February 1, 1971. 

NIOSH-Proposed Class Definition 

NIOSH merged the two petitions because the class requested in SEC-00078 is encompassed by the 

class requested in SEC-00057. For evaluation purposes, due to the complexity of Hanford operations 

over almost fifty years, the SEC-00057 class and associated evaluation report were divided into two 

separate time periods. 

A previous evaluation report, SEC-00057-1, evaluated the SEC-00057 petitioner-requested years 

during which the Hanford site was being constructed and initially operated by the DuPont Company 

(October 1, 1943 through August 31, 1946). 

This report, SEC-00057-2, evaluates Hanford site operations from September 1, 1946 through 

December 31, 1990, and defines a single class of employees for which NIOSH has determined it 

cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy as follows: 

All employees of the Department of Energy (DOE), its predecessor agencies, and DOE contractors or 

subcontractors, who worked from: 

1.	 September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1961 in the 300 Area; or 

2. January 1, 1949 through December 31, 1968 in the 200 Area; 

at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, 

occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 

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Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction 

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), NIOSH has established that it does not have access to 

sufficient information to: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer for which 

radiation doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred in plausible circumstances by any 

member of the class; or (2) estimate radiation doses more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. 

Information available is not sufficient to document or estimate the maximum internal and external 

potential exposure to members of the proposed class under plausible circumstances during the 

specified period. 

Health Endangerment Determination 

Per EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), a health endangerment determination is required because 

NIOSH has determined that it does not have sufficient information to estimate dose for the members 

of the proposed class. 

NIOSH did not identify any evidence supplied by the petitioners or from other resources that would 

establish that the proposed class was exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved exceptionally high-level exposures. However, evidence indicates that some workers in the 

proposed class may have accumulated substantial chronic exposures through episodic intakes of 

radionuclides, combined with external exposures to gamma, beta, and neutron radiation. 

Consequently, NIOSH has determined that health was endangered for those workers covered by this 

evaluation who were employed for at least 250 aggregated work days either solely under their 

employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for other SEC 

classes (excluding aggregate work day requirements). 

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Table of Contents 

Evaluation Report Summary: SEC-00057-2, Hanford ............................................................................ 3 

1.0 Purpose and Scope.......................................................................................................................... 9 

2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 9 

3.0 Petitioner-Requested Class/Basis & NIOSH-Proposed Class/Basis ............................................ 10 

4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH.............................................................................................. 12 

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs) ................................................................ 12 

4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs) and Procedures ..................................... 13 

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts .......................................................................................... 13 

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions ........................................................................................... 14 

4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database .......................................................................................... 15 

4.6 Other Technical Sources...................................................................................................... 15 

4.7 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners ................................................. 15 

5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class ............................................................ 17 

5.1 Hanford Plant and Process Descriptions ............................................................................. 17 

5.2 Hanford Functional Areas ................................................................................................... 20 

5.2.1 Fuel Fabrication ....................................................................................................... 20
 

5.2.2 Reactor Operations .................................................................................................. 22 

5.2.3 Chemical Separations .............................................................................................. 23 

5.2.4 Plutonium Finishing ................................................................................................ 25 

5.2.5 Research and Development ..................................................................................... 26 

5.2.6 Tank Farms and Waste Management ...................................................................... 26 

5.2.7 Summary of Key Hanford Facilities........................................................................ 29 

5.3 Radiological Exposure Sources from Hanford Operations ................................................. 31 

5.3.1 Alpha Particle Emissions......................................................................................... 31 

5.3.2 Beta Radiation Fields .............................................................................................. 31 

5.3.3 Neutron Exposures .................................................................................................. 32 

5.3.4 Photon Exposures .................................................................................................... 33 

5.3.5 Incidents and Fires................................................................................................... 33 

6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class ................................................. 35 

6.1 Hanford Internal Monitoring Data....................................................................................... 35 

6.1.1 In Vitro Data Availability........................................................................................ 36 

6.1.1.1 Plutonium ................................................................................................. 36 

6.1.1.2 Americium ................................................................................................ 37 

6.1.1.3 Curium...................................................................................................... 37 

6.1.1.4 Tritium...................................................................................................... 38 

6.1.1.5 Uranium.................................................................................................... 39 

6.1.1.6 Fission Product Analysis .......................................................................... 39 

6.1.1.7 Strontium .................................................................................................. 40 

6.1.1.8 Promethium .............................................................................................. 40 

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6.1.1.9 Polonium................................................................................................... 41 

6.1.1.10 Neptunium ................................................................................................ 41 

6.1.1.11 Other Limited-Exposure Radionuclides ................................................... 42 

6.1.2 In Vivo Data Availability......................................................................................... 42 

6.1.2.1 Whole Body Counters .............................................................................. 43 

6.1.2.2 Chest Counters.......................................................................................... 44 

6.1.2.3 Thyroid Counters ...................................................................................... 45 

6.1.2.4 Thorium Exposure Monitoring ................................................................. 46 

6.1.2.5 Head Counters and Other Counts ............................................................. 46 

6.2 Hanford External Monitoring Data ..................................................................................... 46 

6.3 Hanford Air Sampling Data................................................................................................. 51 

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class ......................................................... 51 

7.1 Pedigree of Hanford Data.................................................................................................... 52 

7.1.1 Internal Data Review............................................................................................... 53 

7.1.2 External Data Review.............................................................................................. 53 

7.2 Internal Radiation Doses at Hanford ................................................................................... 54 

7.2.1 Process-Related Internal Doses at Hanford ............................................................. 54 

7.2.1.1 Plutonium ................................................................................................. 54 

7.2.1.2 Americium ................................................................................................ 55 

7.2.1.3 Uranium.................................................................................................... 57 

7.2.1.4 Thorium .................................................................................................... 58 

7.2.1.5 Tritium...................................................................................................... 59 

7.2.1.6 Fission Products........................................................................................ 60 

7.2.1.7 Iodine........................................................................................................ 61 

7.2.1.8 Polonium................................................................................................... 62 

7.2.1.9 Uranium-233............................................................................................. 63 

7.2.2 Ambient Environmental Internal Radiation Doses at Hanford ............................... 63 

7.2.3.1 Estimating Intakes from Airborne Radionuclides .................................... 64 

7.2.3 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion ............................................. 65 

7.3 External Radiation Doses at Hanford .................................................................................. 65 

7.3.1 Process-Related External Radiation Doses at Hanford ........................................... 66 

7.3.1.1 Radiation Exposure Environment............................................................. 66 

7.3.1.2 History of Whole Body External Monitoring........................................... 68 

7.3.1.3 History of Extremity Monitoring.............................................................. 69 

7.3.1.4 History of Neutron Monitoring ................................................................ 69 

7.3.1.5 Dosimetry Records ................................................................................... 71 

7.3.1.6 Application of Co-Worker Data for External Dose Reconstruction ........ 71 

7.3.2 Ambient Environmental External Radiation Doses at Hanford .............................. 71 

7.3.2.1 Ambient Radiation.................................................................................... 72 

7.3.2.2 Skin Deposition of Airborne Particulate Emissions ................................. 72 

7.3.2.3 Release of Noble Gases ............................................................................ 72 

7.3.3 Hanford Occupational X-Ray Examinations ........................................................... 72 

7.3.4 External Dose Reconstruction ................................................................................. 73 

7.3.4.1 Photon and Electron Dose ........................................................................ 73 

7.3.4.2 Neutron Dose ............................................................................................ 74 

7.3.4.3 Unmonitored Individuals Working in Production Areas.......................... 80 

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7.3.4.4 Medical X-ray........................................................................................... 80 

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion ............................................ 81 

7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00057-2.................................................................... 81 

7.4.1 Evaluation of Major Topics Detailed in Petition SEC-00057 and SEC-00078....... 81 

7.4.1.1 Hanford Workers were Inadequately or Inconsistently Monitored .......... 81 

7.4.1.2 Hanford Construction Workers Were Not Monitored for Internal Doses 82 

7.4.1.3 Under-recording of Neutron Dose ............................................................ 82 

7.5 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00057-2 .............................................. 83 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00057-2 .................................................. 83 

9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00057-2 ...................................................................... 84 

10.0 References .................................................................................................................................... 85 

Attachment One—Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992.............................. 97 

Tables 

4-1: No. of Hanford Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule .................................... 14 

5-1: Hanford Site Development Chronology ........................................................................................ 19 

5-2: Key Hanford Site Facilities and Operations (September 1946 through December 1990) ............. 29 

5-3: Hanford Site Alpha-Emitting Radionuclides ................................................................................. 31 

5-4: Hanford Site Beta-Emitting Radionuclides................................................................................... 32 

6-1: Summary of Available External Monitoring Data for Hanford Workers (1942-1992) ................. 47 

7-1: Buildings with Thorium Processing............................................................................................... 58 

7-2: Count of Polonium Bioassay Results (as obtained from REX) ..................................................... 62 

7-3: Maximum Intakes by Radionuclide ............................................................................................... 65 

7-4: Default Beta and Photon Energies/Percentages for Hanford DuPont Operations ......................... 66 

7-5: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00057-2 ...................................................................... 83 

Figures 

5-1: Hanford Site Major Operational Areas .......................................................................................... 18 

6-1: No. of Monitored Hanford Workers and Collective Dose, 1944 – 1989 ....................................... 50 

6-2: Monitored Hanford Workers with Photon >0 and Neutron Dose >0, 1944 – 1989....................... 50 

7-1: Example of Isodose Curves Found in Hanford Monthly Reports.................................................. 78 

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SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

SEC Petition Evaluation Report for SEC-00057-2
 

ATTRIBUTION AND ANNOTATION: This is a single-author document. All conclusions drawn from 

the data presented in this evaluation were made by the ORAU Team Lead Technical Evaluator: Albert 

W. Wolff, Oak Ridge Associated Universities. These conclusions were peer-reviewed by the 

individuals listed on the cover page. The rationales for all conclusions in this document are explained 

in the associated text. 

1.0 Purpose and Scope 

This report evaluates the feasibility of reconstructing doses for external or internal radiation exposures 

while working at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation from September 1, 1946 through December 31, 

1990. 

It provides information and analyses germane to considering a petition for adding a class of 

employees to the congressionally-created SEC. 

This report does not make any determinations concerning the feasibility of dose reconstruction that 

necessarily apply to any individual energy employee who might require a dose reconstruction from 

NIOSH. This report also does not contain the final determination as to whether the proposed class 

will be added to the SEC (see Section 2.0). 

This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of EEOICPA, 42 C.F.R. pt. 83, 

and the guidance contained in the Office of Compensation Analysis and Support’s (OCAS) Internal 

Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, OCAS-PR-004. 

2.0 Introduction 

Both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 require NIOSH to evaluate qualified petitions requesting that the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) add a class of employees to the SEC. The 

evaluation is intended to provide a fair, science-based determination of whether it is feasible to 

estimate with sufficient accuracy the radiation doses of the class of employees through NIOSH dose 

reconstructions.1 

42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1) states: Radiation doses can be estimated with sufficient accuracy if NIOSH 

has established that it has access to sufficient information to estimate the maximum radiation dose, 

for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred in 

plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or if NIOSH has established that it has access to 

sufficient information to estimate the radiation doses of members of the class more precisely than an 

estimate of the maximum radiation dose. 

1

 NIOSH dose reconstructions under EEOICPA are performed using the methods promulgated under 42 C.F.R. pt. 82 and 

the detailed implementation guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 

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Under 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3), if it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses 

for members of the class, then NIOSH must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such 

radiation doses may have endangered the health of members of the class. The regulation requires 

NIOSH to assume that any duration of unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of 

members of a class when it has been established that the class may have been exposed to radiation 

during a discrete incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring 

during nuclear criticality incidents. If the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has 

not been established, then NIOSH is required to specify that health was endangered for those workers 

who were employed for at least 250 aggregated work days within the parameters established for the 

class or in combination with work days within the parameters established for other SEC classes 

(excluding aggregate work day requirements). 

NIOSH is required to document its evaluation in a report, and to do so, relies upon both its own dose 

reconstruction expertise as well as technical support from its contractor, Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU). Once completed, NIOSH provides the report to both the petitioner(s) and to the 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (Board). The Board will consider the NIOSH 

evaluation report, together with the petition, petitioner(s) comments, and other information the Board 

considers appropriate, in order to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on whether or not 

to add one or more classes of employees to the SEC. Once NIOSH has received and considered the 

advice of the Board, the Director of NIOSH will propose a decision on behalf of HHS. The Secretary 

of HHS will make the final decision, taking into account the NIOSH evaluation, the advice of the 

Board, and the proposed decision issued by NIOSH. As part of this decision process, petitioners may 

seek a review of certain types of final decisions issued by the Secretary of HHS.2 

3.0 Petitioner-Requested Class/Basis & NIOSH-Proposed Class/Basis 

This petition reviews the requested classes as follows: 

•	 Petition SEC-00057, qualified on November 21, 2006, requested that NIOSH consider the 

following class: All employees in all facilities and areas of the Hanford Reservation from January 

1, 1942 to December 31, 1990. 

•	 Petition SEC-00078, qualified on February 8, 2007, requested that NIOSH consider the following 

class: All roving maintenance carpenters and apprentice carpenters that worked in the 100, 200, 

300, and 400 Areas of Hanford from April 25, 1967 through February 1, 1971. 

The petitioners provided information and affidavit statements in support of the petitioners’ belief that 

accurate dose reconstruction over time is impossible for the Hanford workers in question. NIOSH 

deemed the following information and affidavit statements sufficient to qualify SEC-00057 and SEC00078 for evaluation: 

The SEC-00057 petitioner claimed that personal monitoring data gaps existed for several of 

the individual workers listed in the petition. NIOSH found that the monitoring gap 

2 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 83 for a full description of the procedures summarized here. Additional internal procedures are 

available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. 

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information provided by the petitioner did not support the submission basis for qualifying 

the petition. However, during the qualifying process, NIOSH identified some early (prior 

to 1949) operational periods for which no internal exposure monitoring was performed or 

was reliable. NIOSH qualified SEC-00057 on this basis. 

The SEC-00078 petitioner provided several examples of work performed by construction 

trades workers that took place in contaminated areas or with contaminated equipment that 

sometimes required respiratory protection devices. The petitioner asserted that no bioassay 

monitoring or in vivo measurements were extended to the roving carpenter working class 

and no internal monitoring results could be found in their exposure records. The petitioner 

also provided the abstract of a peer-reviewed journal article claiming that of the 33,459 

workers who were employed for at least 180 days and that had at least one annual external 

dosimetry report, annual external dosimetry records were missing for 8% of the years of 

employment, which corresponds to 32,323 missing annual external dosimetry records 

(Richardson, 1999). 

The information and statements provided by the petitioners qualified the petition for further 

consideration by NIOSH, the Board, and HHS. The details of the petition basis are addressed in 

Section 7.4. 

NIOSH merged the two petitions because the class requested in SEC-00078 is encompassed by the 

class requested in SEC-00057. For evaluation purposes, due to the complexity of Hanford operations 

over almost fifty years, the SEC-00057 class and associated evaluation report were divided into two 

separate time periods. 

In this report, NIOSH evaluates the years of Hanford site operations from September 1, 1946 through 

December 31, 1990. The start date for Evaluation Report SEC-00057-2 follows directly after the 

dates covered in the SEC-00057-1 Evaluation Report. Based on its research, NIOSH identified and 

defined a single class of employees for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient 

accuracy. The class for this report, for which NIOSH cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient 

accuracy, is defined as: 

All employees of the Department of Energy (DOE), its predecessor agencies, and DOE contractors or 

subcontractors, who worked from: 

1. September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1961 in the 300 Area; or 

2. January 1, 1949 through December 31, 1968 in the 200 Area; 

at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, 

occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 

A previous evaluation report, SEC-00057-1, evaluated the petitioner-requested years during which the 

Hanford site was being constructed and initially operated by the DuPont Company (October 1, 1943 

through August 31, 1946). The start date for this evaluation report, SEC-00057-2, follows directly 

after the dates covered by that evaluation. 

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4.0 Data Sources Reviewed by NIOSH 

NIOSH identified and reviewed numerous data sources to locate information relevant to determining 

the feasibility of dose reconstruction for the class of employees proposed for this petition. This 

included determining the availability of information on personal monitoring, area monitoring, 

industrial processes, and radiation source materials. The following subsections summarize the data 

sources identified and reviewed by NIOSH. 

4.1 Site Profile Technical Basis Documents (TBDs) 

A Site Profile provides specific information concerning the documentation of historical practices at 

the specified site. Dose reconstructors can use the Site Profile to evaluate internal and external 

dosimetry data for monitored and unmonitored workers, and to supplement, or substitute for, 

individual monitoring data. A Site Profile consists of an Introduction and five Technical Basis 

Documents (TBDs) that provide process history information, information on personal and area 

monitoring, radiation source descriptions, and references to primary documents relevant to the 

radiological operations at the site. The Site Profile for a small site may consist of a single document. 

As part of NIOSH’s evaluation detailed herein, it examined the following TBDs for insights into 

Hanford operations or related topics/operations at other sites: 

•	 Technical Basis Document for the Hanford Site – Introduction, ORAUT-TKBS-0006-1; Rev. 03; 

May 23, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 31874 

•	 Technical Basis Document for the Hanford Site – Site Description, ORAUT-TKBS-0006-2; Rev. 

01; May 17, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 31859 

•	 Technical Basis Document for the Hanford Site – Occupational Medical Dose, ORAUT-TKBS0006-3; Rev. 01; April 11, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 19491 

•	 Technical Basis Document for the Hanford Site – Occupational Environmental Dose, ORAUTTKBS-0006-4; Rev. 02; June 5, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32073 

•	 Technical Basis Document for the Hanford Site – Occupational Internal Dose, ORAUT-TKBS0006-5; Rev. 02; June 22, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32522 

•	 Technical Basis Document for the Hanford Site – Occupational External Dose, ORAUT-TKBS0006-6; Rev. 03; June 5, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32074 

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4.2 ORAU Technical Information Bulletins (OTIBs) and Procedures 

An ORAU Technical Information Bulletin (OTIB) is a general working document that provides 

guidance for preparing dose reconstructions at particular sites or categories of sites. An ORAU 

Procedure provides specific requirements and guidance regarding EEOICPA project-level activities, 

including preparation of dose reconstructions at particular sites or categories of sites. NIOSH 

reviewed the following OTIBs and procedures as part of its evaluation: 

•	 OTIB: Estimating the Maximum Plausible Dose to Workers at Atomic Weapons Employer 

Facilities, ORAUT-OTIB-0004; Rev. 03, PC-2; December 6, 2006; SRDB Ref ID:29949 

•	 OTIB: External Coworker Dosimetry Data for the Hanford Site, ORAUT-OTIB-0030; Rev. 00 

PC-1; November 7, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 29961 

•	 OTIB: Internal Coworker Dosimetry Data for the Hanford Site, ORAUT-OTIB-0039; Rev. 00 

PC-2; January 31, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 29969 

•	 OTIB: Parameters to Consider When Processing Claims for Construction Trade Workers, 

ORAUT-OTIB-0052; Rev. 00, PC-1; January 16, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 29978 

•	 OTIB: Fission and Activation Product Assignment for Internal Dose-Related Gross Beta and 

Gross Gamma Analyses, ORAUT-OTIB-0054; Rev. 00; May 11, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 31780 

•	 PROC: Occupational Onsite Ambient Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites, ORAUT-PROC-0060, 

Rev. 01; June 28, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 29986 

•	 PROC: Occupational X-Ray Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites, ORAUT-PROC-0061, Rev. 01; 

July 21, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 29987 

4.3 Facility Employees and Experts 

NIOSH conducted interviews with former Hanford employees to obtain input regarding health physics 

practices, internal and external dosimetry programs, dose recording practices, and radiological 

incidents. In-person interviews were conducted both individually and in group settings. 

The personal interviews generally focused on the employees’ area of expertise while at Hanford, and 

general health physics monitoring practices. Most of these interviews were conducted with 

individuals that were expected to have first-hand knowledge regarding external monitoring decisions 

and methods, the response of external monitoring devices, and areas where significant neutron 

exposures were expected. With the exception of one interview in March 2007, all of the interviews 

were conducted June through August of 2007. All interviewees indicated that employees who entered 

radiologically controlled areas wore external dose monitoring devices. In general, those interviewed 

thought that photon monitoring during this period was reasonably accurate, but that the neutron 

monitoring capabilities were poor. 

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There were two group interviews that included individuals from a variety of disciplines. They were 

conducted on June 18 and June 19, 2007. Approximately 40 employees attended each group 

interview. They provided input regarding external monitoring practices, various radiological 

incidents, and recordkeeping. External monitoring, in general, was thought to be consistently applied. 

However, there was concern that specific incidents resulted in missed dose for certain individuals. 

Some of the incidents described could affect individual dose reconstructions; however, the incidents 

could not be reasonably applied to a specific class of workers. Several employees offered input 

regarding logbooks or similar reporting tools that could be useful for providing details regarding work 

practices and incidents. 

In general, information obtained through the interviews with former employees and facility experts 

was consistent with that found in NIOSH documents regarding the Hanford facility. 

4.4 Previous Dose Reconstructions 

NIOSH reviewed its NIOSH OCAS Claims Tracking System (NOCTS) to locate EEOICPA-related 

dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to the petition evaluation. Table 4-1 

summarizes the results of this review for the period of September 1, 1946 through December 31, 

1990. (NOCTS data available as of August 9, 2007) 

Table 4-1: No. of Hanford Claims Submitted Under the Dose Reconstruction Rule 

(September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1990) 

Description Totals 

Total number of claims submitted for dose reconstruction 2,564 

Number of dose reconstructions completed 1,827 

Number of claims for which internal dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

proposed class definition 1,919 

Number of claims for which external dosimetry records were obtained for the identified years in the 

proposed class definition 2,370 

NIOSH reviewed each claim to determine whether internal and/or external personal monitoring 

records could be obtained for the employee. The Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) 

provided some information that is useful for dose reconstruction, including work locations, hours 

worked, incidents (such as fires, radioactive releases, and spills), and hazards encountered. Of the 

2,564 claims submitted, 75% have internal monitoring data available and 92% have external 

monitoring data available. As of August 9, 2007, 50 recent claims had not yet received a response 

from DOE for exposure records. 

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4.5 NIOSH Site Research Database 

NIOSH also examined its Site Research Database to locate documents supporting the evaluation of 

the proposed class. One thousand thirty-two documents (as of August 16, 2007) in this database were 

identified as pertaining to Hanford. These documents were evaluated for their relevance to this 

petition. The documents include historical background on process descriptions, the radiological 

controls program, site history, monthly reports, incident documentation, and epidemiological studies. 

4.6 Other Technical Sources 

•	 Radiation Protection Criteria and Standards: Their Basis and Use; H. M. Parker; SRDB Ref ID: 

27678 

•	 Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System (DDRS); A DOE project that provides access to 

declassified information including that declassified in response to Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) requests; Available at http://www2.hanford.gov/declass/ 

•	 U. S. Department of Energy OpenNet System; OpenNet provides access to recently declassified 

documents, including information declassified in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

requests; Available at https://www.osti.gov/opennet/ 

•	 Comprehensive Epidemiologic Data Resource (CEDR) Database 

•	 Hanford Radiological Exposure (REX) Database 

4.7 Documentation and/or Affidavits Provided by Petitioners 

In qualifying and evaluating the petition, NIOSH reviewed the following documents submitted by the 

petitioners: 

Petition SEC-00057: 

•	 Potential Unrecorded Neutron Dose, Letter to distribution; Jack J. Fix; August 27, 1997; OSA Ref 

ID: 100318, page 23-25 

•	 Review of NIOSH Site Profile for the Hanford Site, SCA-TR-TASK1-0004; Richland, 

Washington, Contract No. 200-2004-03805, Task Order No. 1; June 10, 2005, OSA Ref ID: 

100304, page 38-43 

•	 Vern Haugen’s Handwritten Diary; June 2006; OSA Ref ID: 100318, page 62-77 

•	 Twelve affidavits submitted by the SEC-00057 petitioner regarding missing dosimetry records, 

location of records, medical conditions of individual workers, incidents, and overexposures; OSA 

Ref ID: 100318 

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Petition SEC-00078: 

•	 The Release of Radioactive Materials from Hanford: 1944 through 1972, Washington State Dept. 

of Health: Hanford Health Info Network; OSA Ref ID: 100102 

•	 Ionizing Radiation and Mortality Among Hanford Workers: Completed NIOSH Initiated Research, 

Summary (unknown source) of NIOSH-initiated research (no date); OSA Ref ID: 102415 

•	 Hanford Site: A Guide to Record Series Supporting Epidemiologic Studies Conducted for the 

Department of Energy; U.S. Department of Energy; OSA Ref ID: 100101, pages 3-22 

•	 Review of NIOSH Site Profile for the Hanford Site, SCA-TR-TASK1-0004; S. Cohen & 

Associates; June 10, 2005, OSA Ref ID: 100101, pages 23-244 

•	 Draft Issue Resolution Matrix, Based on the SC&A Review of the NIOSH Site Profile for the 

Hanford Site; OSA Ref ID: 100105, pages 71-72 

•	 NIOSH Health Hazard Evaluation Report, HETA 2004-0145-2941; CH2M Hill Hanford Group, 

Inc. and U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection Richland, Washington; July 2004; 

OSA Ref ID: 100105, pages 73-100 

•	 US Admits Radiation Exposure Killed Nuclear Weapons Workers; Kate Randall, World Socialist 

Web Site; February 2, 2000; OSA Ref ID: 102414, pages 4-5 

•	 Missing Annual External Radiation Dosimetry Data Among Hanford Workers; D. Richardson, S. 

Wing, J. Watson, and S. Wolf; Journal of Exposure Analysis and Environmental Epidemiology, 

9:575-585; 1999; [Journal name recently changed to “Journal of Exposure Science and 

Environmental Epidemiology”]; OSA Ref ID: 102416, page 2 

•	 NIOSH Assessment of Information Needed for the Evaluation of the Health Effects Due to 

Occupational Exposures for DOE Site Remediation Workers; National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH); January 2001; OSA Ref ID: 102417, pages 4-5 

•	 Affidavit from Petitioner of the Hanford Carpenters/Carpenter Apprentices Part B SEC Petition; 

an affidavit from the petitioner describing seven incidents occurring at Hanford to the proposed 

class, and two accidents occurring to the petitioner; OSA Ref ID: 102410 

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5.0 Radiological Operations Relevant to the Proposed Class 

Unless otherwise indicated, information for Section 5.0 is from three sources: History of the 

Plutonium Production Facilities at the Hanford Site Historic District, 1943-1990 (DOE, 2002); A 

History of Major Hanford Facilities and Processes Involving Radioactive Material (Ballinger, 1991); 

and Manhattan Project Buildings and Facilities at the Hanford Site: A Construction History (Gerber, 

1993). 

The following subsections summarize both radiological operations at Hanford from September 1, 

1946 through December 31, 1990 and the information available to NIOSH to characterize particular 

processes and radioactive source materials. From available sources NIOSH has gathered process and 

source descriptions, information regarding the identity and quantities of each radionuclide of concern, 

and information describing both processes through which radiation exposures may have occurred and 

the physical environment in which they may have occurred. The information included within this 

evaluation report is intended only to be a summary of the available information. Radiological 

operations are discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. 

5.1 Hanford Plant and Process Descriptions 

In 1943, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers selected an area of approximately 600 square miles in 

southeastern Washington State for the production of plutonium and other nuclear materials to support 

weapons production for World War II. This area, now known as the Hanford site, was divided into 

three major operational areas, each located and designed specifically for its role in plutonium 

production. The 100 Areas handled production reactor operations; the 200 Areas handled fuel 

reprocessing, plutonium recovery, and waste management; and the 300 Area handled fuel fabrication 

and general research and development activities. In the early 1970s, operations began in another 

area—the 400 Area, about 6 miles northwest of the 300 Area. The facility at this location was an 

experimental sodium-cooled breeder reactor known as the Fast Flux Test Facility. There were other 

Hanford Areas, but they had little, if any, involvement with radioactive materials operations. The 600 

Area was the general category assigned to facilities that supported multiple operations but were not 

within the security boundaries of other major areas. The 600 Area included road systems, fire 

stations, environmental and weather monitoring stations, and Nike missile sites. Some 300 Area 

waste disposal sites and Buildings 213-J and 213-K (plutonium nitrate paste and contaminated sodium 

storage) were also included in the 600 Area. The 700 Area was located inside the community of 

Richland, Washington, and consisted of administration, central supply, laundry, and 

repair/maintenance services. Richland Village was designated as the 1100 Area and the Richland 

Construction Camp was the 3000 Area. Figure 5-1 shows the locations of the major Hanford 

operational areas. 

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Figure 5-1: Hanford Site Major Operational Areas 

To ensure continuing plutonium production capacity in case of maintenance downtime, emergencies, 

and/or sabotage, many major Hanford plutonium production operations were duplicated. In addition, 

Hanford plutonium production operations were also essentially self-sufficient, containing all 

necessary support services and facilities. However, both initially and with changing missions, some 

operations utilized facilities and services located in other Areas. For example, after 1973 most of the 

radioactive liquid waste from all Hanford operations was transferred to the 200 Areas for processing 

and storage. 

Construction of facilities for plutonium production began almost immediately in 1943 and production 

operations were underway by the end of 1944. In 1944 and 1945, additional facilities were 

constructed to increase production and research and development (R&D). During the late 1940s and 

the 1950s, additional production capacity and R&D facilities were added. Plutonium production at 

the Hanford site peaked from 1956 through 1965. During the late 1960s, plutonium needs decreased 

and many production facilities were shut down. Initial decommissioning of many production-related 

facilities began in the late 1960s and continued through 1990. In 1988, the final Separations Plant 

(PUREX) and the Plutonium Finishing Plant were shut down. As production operations decreased, 

the era of diversification began; Hanford site activities related to peaceful applications of nuclear 

energy replaced those related to weapons. The N Reactor was converted into a commercial power 

generator in 1963 and operated until 1987. 

Table 5-1 summarizes Hanford site development. 

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Table 5-1: Hanford Site Development Chronology 

Table 5-1 spans two pages 

Dates Areas Activities 

Pre-September 1946 All 

Fuel manufacturing (313 and 314), reactors (100-B, 100-D, and 

100-F), and separation/finishing (221/224-T, 221/224-B, 

221/224-U, and 231-Z) facilities completed and operating; 

ongoing R&D activities related to reactors, radiation effects, and 

radiochemistry 

August 1, 1946 All Atomic Energy Act passed 

September 1, 1946 All General Electric Company assumes prime site contractor 

responsibility from E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company 

January 1, 1947 All Manhattan Engineer Project replaced by Atomic Energy 

Commission 

1947 All Cold War Era begins 

1947 - 1949 200 Installation of 42 single-shell waste tanks 

1949 200 Startup of REDOX separations (C-Plant) and Rubber Glove (RG) 

Line in 231-Z Plutonium Finishing Plant 

1949 100 Startup of H Reactor 

1950 - 1952 200 Installation of 18 single-shell waste tanks 

1950 100 Startup of DR Reactor 

1951 200 Startup of 242-T and 242-B evaporators 

1952 300 Startup of Physical Constants Test Reactor 

1952 200 Startup of REDOX (S-Plant), U-Plant uranium recovery 

operations, and Remote A Line 

1952 100 Startup of C Reactor, Experimental Animal Farm, and Aquatic 

Biology Laboratory 

1953 - 1955 200 Installation of 21 single-shell waste tanks 

1954 300 Startup of Thermal Test Reactor 

1954 100 Startup of KW Reactor 

1955 100 Startup of KE Reactor 

1956 200 Shutdown of B-Plant and T-Plant; Startup of Uranium Trioxide 

Plant and PUREX (A-Plant) 

1958 200 Shutdown of U-Plant 

1960 300 Startup of Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 

1963 - 1964 200 Installation of 4 single-shell waste tanks 

1964 100 Startup of N-Reactor power generating plant; Shutdown of DR 

Reactor 

1964 200 Startup of Plutonium Reclamation Facility 

January 4, 1965 All Battelle Memorial Institute assumes responsibility for 

management of Hanford Site laboratories 

November 1, 1965 100/300 Douglas-United Nuclear Inc. assumes responsibility for fuels and 

reactors 

1965 100 Shutdown of H and F Reactors 

January 1, 1966 200 ISOCHEM assumes responsibility for chemical processing and 

plutonium finishing 

September 1, 1967 200 Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company assumes responsibility for 

chemical processing 

1967 100 Shutdown of D Reactor 

1967 300 Construction completed on High Temperature Lattice Test 

Reactor 

1967 200 Shutdown of S-Plant (REDOX) 

1968 - 1988 200 Installation of 28 double-shell waste tanks 

1968 100 Shutdown of B Reactor 

1969 100 Shutdown of C Reactor 

1970 100 Shutdown of KW Reactor 

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Table 5-1: Hanford Site Development Chronology 

Table 5-1 spans two pages 

Dates Areas Activities 

1971 100 Shutdown of KE Reactor 

1972 200 Shutdown of Uranium Trioxide Plant 

1973 - 1976 200 Startup of evaporator plants 242-S and 242-A 

January 19, 1975 All Energy Research and Development Administration replaces 

Atomic Energy Commission 

July 1, 1977 200 Rockwell Hanford Operations assumes responsibility for 

reprocessing 

October 1, 1977 All Department of Energy replaces Energy Research and 

Development Administration 

1980 400 Startup of Fast Flux Test Facility 

1983 200 Restart of Uranium Trioxide Plant 

June 29, 1987 All 

Westinghouse Hanford Company assumes responsibility for fuel 

manufacturing, reactor operations, chemical engineering, and 

waste management 

1987 100 Shutdown of N Reactor 

1988 200 Shutdown of A-Plant (PUREX) 

1989 200 Shutdown of Plutonium Finishing Plant 

1989 All Cold War Era ends 

5.2 Hanford Functional Areas 

Hanford operations during the period of September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1990 included the 

following major functional areas: 

• Fuel Fabrication 

• Reactor Operations 

• Chemical Separations 

• Plutonium Finishing 

• Research and Development 

• Tank Farms and Waste Management 

The primary mission of early Hanford operations was production of plutonium and other nuclear 

materials to support weapons production. Operations developed, changed, and expanded to satisfy 

changing U.S. defense needs and developing nuclear knowledge and technology. 

5.2.1 Fuel Fabrication 

Plutonium was produced by irradiating uranium metal fuel in the Hanford Site reactors. The fuel for 

these reactors was fabricated in the 300 Area. Billets of natural uranium metal were received from 

offsite and stored in the 303 Buildings, where they were inventoried and inspected. The billets were 

then transferred to the Metal Extrusion Building (314), where they were preheated in a furnace and 

then passed through an extrusion press to extrude the uranium into rods. After the uranium was in rod 

form, the rods were heated in an argon atmosphere to drive off occluded gases. Rods were then 

straightened, if necessary. Extrusion operations ceased in 1948 and rolled rods were obtained for 

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fabrication process feed from other sites until 1950, at which time Hanford began making its own 

rolled rod feed stock. 

Uranium rods were transferred to the 313 Building, where they were cut to the desired length by turret 

lathe and machine-finished into slugs. Slugs were inspected and degreased in a nitric acid solution. 

They were then heated by immersion in molten baths and inserted into thin aluminum cans. The 

initial heating process was known as the triple-dip process and was employed until 1959, at which 

time it was replaced by the lead-dip process. After the uranium slug was inserted into the aluminum 

can, an aluminum cap was welded in place. Bonds and welds were inspected and tested. The finished 

fuel elements, measuring 1.5 inches in diameter and 8 inches in length, were inspected and tested in 

the 305 Building. The fuel elements were then transferred and stored in the 100 Areas, awaiting 

irradiation in reactors. Fabrication of aluminum-clad fuel elements was performed at Hanford from 

1944 through 1971, using this process. 

Aluminum-clad natural uranium fuel was used for the eight, single-pass reactors. The N reactor used 

a tube-in-tube design fuel element containing slightly enriched (0.95 to 1.25%) uranium with 

zirconium (zircoloy-2) cladding. Fabrication of these elements was performed in the 333 Building 

between 1961 and 1988. The major difference in the fabrication process from that of the aluminumclad elements was that uranium billets and zircoloy cladding were assembled and covered with a 

protective copper silicon shell. The entire assembly was then heated in an electric furnace and 

extruded into tubes. Extruded fuel tubes were cut to length and the ends were machine-finished. The 

protective copper silicon jacket was then removed by dissolving it in hot nitric acid. Zircoloy-2 end 

caps were then attached; elements were inspected, tested, transferred, and stored at the 100 N Area, 

awaiting irradiation in the N reactor. 

During the mid- to late-1960s, pellets of lithium aluminate were prepared in the 3722 Building. These 

pellets were clad in zircoloy-2 tubes and inserted into N reactor fuel elements for production of 

tritium. 

In addition to the above fuel fabrication operations, the Fuel Element Pilot Plant (306 Building) was 

completed in 1956 and expanded in 1960 to assist in 313 Building operations and for development of 

manufacturing processes for single-pass fuel. The 306 Building housed a complete fuel element 

manufacturing line, with the exception of autoclaving inspections. 

Chips, turnings, and other solid scrap uranium pieces were salvaged and pressed into briquettes. 

Liquids were settled and filtered to collect fines. Dusts and fines were oxidized in gas furnaces. 

These reclaimed uranium wastes were shipped offsite for recycling. 

NIOSH-reviewed documents contained sparse mention of fires occurring during the fuel fabrication 

operations. However, based on the history of other fuel fabrication operations, which entailed 

extrusion and machining of uranium metal, it is likely that such fires were not uncommon 

occurrences. 

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5.2.2 Reactor Operations 

As of September 1, 1946, the comparatively small 305-B reactor use to test graphite, slugs, and rods 

used in the production reactors and the three production reactors (B, D, and F) were operating to 

produce plutonium-239 by neutron irradiation of uranium-238 fuel elements. The design of these 

production reactors was a water-cooled, graphite moderated pile with boron control rods. A typical 

production reactor consisted of a large graphite block, approximately 36 feet x 36 feet x 28 feet, 

containing 2,004 horizontal tubes for aluminum-clad natural uranium fuel elements. The block was 

surrounded by 8 – 10 inches of iron and 40 – 80 inches of reinforced concrete shielding. The 

assembly contained multiple lines for cooling water and gas systems. Three additional production 

reactors (H, DR, and C) of like design began operating in October 1949, October 1950, and November 

1952, respectively. Two slightly larger reactors (KE and KW), each with 3,220 fuel tubes, became 

operational in 1955. 

The N Reactor was a dual-purpose facility. In addition to producing plutonium, the heat from the 

cooling water was used to produce electricity for commercial purposes. N Reactor included a closedloop primary cooling system, heat exchangers for steam production, and a confinement system to limit 

the spread of radioactivity in the event of an accident. The N reactor had 1,003 fuel tubes and used 

slightly enriched uranium in zircoloy-2-clad fuel elements. N Reactor went critical in 1964 and began 

producing electricity in 1966. The Federal government operated the reactor, while a consortium of 

public and private utilities operated the electric-generating portions of the plant. 

Production reactors were located in the 100 Areas along the Columbia River, which provided access 

to large volumes of cooling water and achieved maximum distance from populated areas. Each 

reactor was located in its own complex, occupied approximately 1 square mile, and was separated 

from other reactors by a relative distance of 1 to 3 miles to reduce the impact of possible malfunctions 

and sabotage. Reactors were located in Buildings 105, each of which measured approximately 250 

feet x 230 feet x 95 feet high. Each 105 building included a control room, spent fuel discharge area, 

fuel storage, and associated handling equipment. With the exception of the N reactor, each reactor 

complex included approximately 30 support buildings and facilities and essentially operated 

independent of the others. 

With a reactor in the shutdown state, fresh fuel elements were loaded (“charged”) into fuel tubes at the 

face of the graphite block. As new elements were introduced, irradiated elements were pushed out of 

the back of the block and fell into a pool of water. (About 25% of the fuel tubes were typically 

replaced at the same time.) Irradiated fuel elements were allowed to cool in the pool to reduce 

radiation levels; using remote handling tools, the irradiated fuel elements were then loaded, while 

under 20 feet of water, into large buckets (approximately 1000 pounds of fuel elements per bucket). 

After a further cooling period of 30 days, the buckets of spent fuel elements were transferred to the 

cooling basin, awaiting placement into shield casks and shipment to the 200 Areas for separation. 

Each reactor complex included facilities for managing its own waste. Single-pass cooling water and 

bleed-off from the N reactor recirculating primary coolant water were pumped to retention basins. 

From those retention basins, the liquids were released into the River or into soil columns. There were 

designated sites for burial of solid radioactive waste. 

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Reactors had associated high levels of direct gamma and neutron radiation during operation and high 

gamma levels during shutdown conditions and spent fuel handling. There was the potential for 

worker exposures to surface contamination and airborne contamination, in particular from fuel 

element failures. According to site health physics documentation, reactor work areas were 

categorized into danger zones (i.e., red, yellow and blue), which were subject to worker access 

limitations. For example, Special Work Permits were required for worker entry into red category 

zones. Direct radiation monitoring was performed using fixed and portable systems and workers wore 

personal monitoring devices. In potentially-contaminated areas, personnel protective clothing was 

worn, air monitoring was performed, and contamination monitors were provided. In addition, there 

were restrictions on eating and smoking in radiologically-contaminated areas. 

5.2.3 Chemical Separations 

Irradiated fuel elements were transported in shielded casks by rail from the 100 (reactor) Areas to the 

Chemical Separation Plants in the 200 Areas. Before 1950, irradiated fuel elements were transported 

approximately halfway to the Separations Facilities, where they were stored for up to 40 days in 

cooling basins in lag (irradiated fuel slag) storage buildings (212-N, 212-P, and 212-R Buildings) to 

allow for decay of short-lived radionuclides. After cooling, the fuel elements were reloaded into the 

casks for the remainder of the journey. After 1950, use of the interim storage was discontinued and 

irradiated elements were transported directly from the reactors to the Separation Plants. 

Two Separations Plants, called the T Plant and the B Plant were operational as of September 1946. 

Each Plant included a separations building (221 Building) and a reduction building (224 Building). 

These plants were large, rectangular reinforced concrete structures that consisted of a gallery area, 

containing piping, electrical, and operational facilities, and a process canyon, below which was 

located equipment for conducting the chemical separations. Plant dimensions were approximately 

810 feet x 85 feet x 102 ft high (approximately 20 feet of the height was below grade); T Plant had an 

extra section, about 65 feet in length. As with other major production facilities at Hanford, each 

Chemical Separations Plant included all buildings and support services so as to function as a selfsufficient operation. 

The plutonium chemical separations process used in the T and B Plants was known as the bismuth 

phosphate batch process. Three buckets of irradiated fuel elements were emptied into the dissolver 

tank in the 221 Building canyon, then the dissolver cell lid was replaced. A caustic solution was 

introduced into the tank and the aluminum cladding was dissolved from the fuel elements. After the 

decladded elements were rinsed, the fuel elements were dissolved in nitric acid. Bismuth phosphate 

was then added to precipitate plutonium as plutonium nitrate. Repeated steps of precipitation and 

centrifugation were performed to thoroughly separate the plutonium nitrate from uranium, fission 

products, and impurities. At this stage, the plutonium nitrate was in a batch of approximately 330 

gallons. Next, this batch was transferred to Building 224 (Bulk Reduction), where the 330 gallons 

were concentrated to approximately 8 gallons of plutonium nitrate paste and further precipitations 

with hydrogen fluoride and lanthanum salts were performed to remove additional impurities. Finally, 

the plutonium nitrate paste was then transferred to the 221 Z Building for “finishing.” 

Both the T and B Plants ended plutonium chemical separations in 1956. The T Plant went on to be 

used as a decontamination facility from 1958 into the 1990s. From 1968 through February of 1985, 

the B Plant was modified to remove strontium-90 and cesium-137 from liquid waste generated by 

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separation processes. The wastes were centrifuged to remove semi-solids containing primarily 

strontium-90. Phosphotungstic acid was added to the supernate, precipitating cesium-137, which was 

then separated by centrifuge. Strontium-90 was purified by solvent extraction, stripped into an 

aqueous stream, and isolated. Cesium-137 was purified by ion exchange. Both the purified 

strontium-90 and cesium-137 were transferred to the 225-B Building Waste Encapsulation Storage 

Facility, where they were converted to solids and encapsulated. 

The U Plant, of the same general design as the T and B Plants, was also constructed prior to 

September 1946. Initially, the U Plant was used for training, decontamination, and repair of 

equipment from the T and B Plants, rather than for separation operations. In 1952, the 221-U 

Building was modified to recover uranium from the wastes from plutonium separations. Uraniumcontaining slurries, stored in 12, 75-foot diameter underground tanks were centrifuged. Then, solvent 

extraction was used to extract the uranium from the slurry using tri-butyl phosphate. Residual 

plutonium and fission products were scrubbed from the organic uranium with nitric acid. The 224-U 

Building was also modified in 1956 to convert recovered uranium to a solid state. The uranium 

arrived at the facility in the form of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate; boiling concentrated the liquid. 

Heating to 800o

 F then oxidized the material into uranium trioxide. 

Two additional Separations Plants were constructed later. The S Plant, or REDOX (reductionoxidation) Plant, began operation in 1952. This plant was approximately 468 feet x 161 feet x 83 feet 

high and included a 132-foot-high silo. It also contained two parallel gallery areas with a central 

process canyon. The A Plant, or PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) Plant began operation in 

1956. The PUREX Plant was approximately 1005 feet x 104 feet x 62 feet high and contained one 

gallery area and one process canyon. REDOX ceased operation in 1967 and PUREX was shut down 

in 1988. 

The REDOX and PUREX continuous solvent extraction processes replaced the bismuth phosphate 

batch process in the 1950s. The REDOX process was more efficient than the bismuth phosphate 

batch process and produced uranium as a byproduct. The REDOX process was a gravity flow 

process. There were four main steps in the REDOX process: pre-cycle, partition, uranium cycle, and 

plutonium cycle. In pre-cycle, aluminum nitrate was added to the aqueous feed solution from the 

nitric acid dissolver, changing the valence of the uranium and plutonium. Hexone flowed through the 

aqueous stream and extracted the uranium and plutonium in an organic phase, leaving the fission 

products in the aqueous stream. The fission products were transferred to a waste tank and the 

plutonium and uranium were stripped back into the aqueous phase. Next, the partition phase was 

accomplished by placing the uranium and plutonium in the organic (hexone) phase and altering the 

plutonium’s valence by adding ferrous sulfamate. The uranium and plutonium were then extracted 

separately in aqueous phases. In the uranium cycle, uranium was converted to the aqueous phase, 

extracted in hexone, and stripped from the organic phase; it was then sent to the 224-U Building for 

concentrating. The plutonium cycle once again changed the valence, by addition of sodium 

dichromate and nitric acid, and extracted the plutonium in hexone from remaining fission products. 

The plutonium was stripped back into the aqueous phase and concentrated. The concentrated 

plutonium nitrate was transferred to the Plutonium Finishing Plant 221-Z Building. 

The PUREX process was similar to the REDOX process, except that it employed pulsed columns 

rather than gravity flow, and the organic solvent was tri-butyl phosphate instead of hexone. There 

were six main steps in the PUREX process: co-decontamination, partition, uranium cycle, plutonium 

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cycle, neptunium cycle, and N cell cycle. Fission products were removed in the co-decontamination 

step, leaving uranium, plutonium, and neptunium in the organic stream. In the partition step, 

plutonium was removed by stripping from the organic stream and then returned to the aqueous phase. 

The separated uranium and neptunium were also stripped from the organic to the aqueous stream in 

this step. Uranium was recovered in the uranium cycle, concentrated, and stored for processing at the 

Uranium-224 Uranium Trioxide Plant. There were two stages in the plutonium cycle step for 

separating and decontaminating the plutonium. Repeated extraction and stripping steps of the 

neptunium cycle separated and decontaminated the neptunium, which was then isolated by ion 

exchange. The N cell was the load-out area of the PUREX Plant (DOE, 2002). (Load-out refers to 

the transfer of the concentrated plutonium nitrate to the Plutonium Finishing Plant.) 

Chemical separations were operations that entailed potentially high radiation exposures. Of particular 

note was the sampling of process solutions on the canyon decks of the T and B Plants. Direct gamma 

radiation levels were high and respirators were required. This source of exposures was eliminated in 

the REDOX and PUREX Plant designs, which provided remote sampling stations in the gallery areas. 

However, because sampling entries to canyon decks were not required, the building design did not 

provide the same level of shielding for the canyons as was present in the T and B Plants. Another 

chemical separations operation that involved potentially high radiation exposures was service and 

maintenance of the cranes, located in the canyons. 

5.2.4 Plutonium Finishing 

Plutonium nitrate solution from the 200 Area Chemical Separations Facilities was transferred to the 

231-Z Plutonium Isolation building (also in the 200 Area). In this facility, the plutonium was 

separated from the nitrate solution by the addition of hydrogen peroxide. The plutonium was then 

dried and shipped to the Los Alamos site for conversion into metallic plutonium for weapons use. 

231-Z Building operations were performed in large protective boxes, equipped with rubber gloves 

(known as the Rubber Glove (RG) Line). In mid-1949, a new facility, the Plutonium Finishing Plant 

(234-5Z Building), began operation. This new facility was capable of converting the plutonium to the 

metallic form of “buttons” and performing casting and machining into components. The 231-Z 

Building continued to be used for preparation of plutonium oxalate until 1956. 

Initial production in the Plutonium Finishing Plant used a glove box line similar to that in the 

Plutonium Isolation Building. Continued requirements for increased plutonium production resulted in 

the installation of Remote Mechanical (RM) Lines, which incorporated automated equipment and 

significantly out-produced the RG Line. The RG Line provided limited scope operations until its 

shutdown in 1953. The Remote Mechanical A (RM A) Line began operation in 1952. It operated 

until 1984, and over its lifetime, it was continually upgraded and improved. During its later years, the 

RMA Line use was limited to producing oxides. The Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line started 

operation in 1960 to augment RMA line production and was permanently shut down in May of 1989. 

While its early work was for federal programs, in 1960 Hanford also began processing plutonium for 

the commercial nuclear fuel industry. Commercial production reached a maximum of about 30% of 

the total production in 1968, and ceased entirely in 1978. Total finishing production for all lines 

ranged from 250 kg in 1949 to over 4,500 kg in 1965. Hanford plutonium finishing operations ended 

in May 1989. 

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The 234-5Z and 231-Z Buildings housed metallurgical and analytical laboratories to support 

plutonium finishing and uranium trioxide operations. The 231-Z laboratory operated from 1943 until 

1953 and the 234-5Z laboratory operated from 1949 through 1990. 

Facilities were designed to recover and recycle plutonium from separations and finishing operations. 

The major recovery and recycle efforts were RECUPLEX, 232-Z Incinerator, 242-Z Waste Treatment 

Facility, and 236-Z Plutonium Reclamation Facility. RECUPLEX began processing solid and organic 

liquid wastes in 1953. The RECUPLEX operation experienced problems with accumulating materials 

in the system, resulting in elevated direct radiation levels. On April 7, 1962, a criticality accident 

occurred in the RECUPLEX Facility that resulted in the facility being shut down until 1964. When 

operations resumed from 1964 until 1976, an improved version of RECUPLEX operated; this 

improved version was known as the Plutonium Reclamation Facility. Combustible and acid-leached 

wastes were processed in the 232-Z Incinerator from 1962 until 1973. The Waste Treatment Facility 

recovered plutonium from aqueous liquid wastes from 1964 until 1973. 

Plutonium Finishing Facilities were plagued with recurring mechanical problems and process 

difficulties. Radiation-related concerns included direct neutron and gamma exposures, airborne 

activity, and surface contamination control. As a result of these problems, respirators and periodic 

operation shutdowns were necessary (DOE, 2002, Chapter 2, Section 5). 

5.2.5 Research and Development 

Early research and development (R&D) was connected directly or indirectly with plutonium 

production. Simultaneously, due to the lack of knowledge regarding nuclear material reactions and 

their effects on biological and ecological systems, R&D in a wide variety of other topical areas was 

also initiated. R&D topics included radiation detection, human radiation experiments, meteorology 

and atmospherics, applied fish studies, radioactive field and reactor effluent studies, environmental 

and biological monitoring, radiobiology, and inhalation studies. As the focus of R&D has changed 

over time, the Hanford Laboratories have shifted from specialized research in support of nuclear 

weapons production to generalized research related to numerous national missions. In response to 

increasing national awareness of environmental issues, reactor safety and potential radiation effects 

have been significant areas of R&D since the early 1970s. As radiological facilities are 

decommissioned, R&D has also shifted to development and evaluation of cleanup methods, including 

technologies for managing radioactive wastes. 

Initially, R&D was managed by the major site operating contractors E. I. DuPont de Nemours and 

Company and General Electric Company. However, since 1965, Battelle Memorial Institute has been 

responsible for Hanford R&D through its Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 

Although R&D involved all areas of the Hanford site, it was primarily associated with facilities in the 

300 Area. Numerous buildings and facilities were involved in R&D; some of the more prominent 

ones are described in Section 5.2.7. 

5.2.6 Tank Farms and Waste Management 

Early waste management was based on a limited technical understanding of nuclear physics and 

engineering; it was anticipated that problems in waste management would be addressed as technology 

developed. Many initial waste management practices were developed by trial and error; waste 

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management modifications were made as knowledge increased and undesirable and impractical 

practices were identified. The most hazardous and largest amounts of wastes were generated by the 

separations operations in the 200 Areas. The Hanford site generated 58% of the total national DOE 

weapons waste volume. The following categories of radioactive waste were generated by Hanford 

operations: 

•	 Low-level liquid wastes were generally discharged to ponds, trenches, cribs, and injection wells. 

There were numerous such facilities located throughout the Hanford site in which the liquids 

would percolate into the surrounding soil. 

•	 High-level liquid wastes were collected in large storage tanks, from 6-11 feet below ground. 

These storage tanks were all located in the 200 Areas. Tanks consisted of single-shell and doubleshell design. There were 149 single-shell tanks, ranging in capacity from 55,000 to 1,000,000 

gallons, and 28 double-shell tanks, with capacities ranging from 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 gallons. 

•	 Solid wastes were buried in facilities ranging from shallow pits to large lined excavations. Most 

burials were at least 18 feet deep. There were multiple solid waste burial sites in the 100, 200, and 

300/600 Areas. Burial distance above groundwater varied from approximately 5 feet in the 100, 

300, and 600 Areas to 55 feet in the 200 Areas. 

•	 Airborne effluents were discharged into the atmosphere through stacks. During initial production 

efforts, air discharges were not treated or filtered. Filtration and other air cleaning equipment 

were added as technology developed, production increased, and impacts on the environment 

became better understood. 

Each major functional area included its own waste management facilities and methods. Functional 

areas generated significantly different waste volumes and activities: 

•	 Fuel fabrication wastes included low-level liquids, solids, and air effluents. These wastes 

contained predominantly uranium. Radiation from uranium associated with fuel fabrication was 

considered relatively minor compared to other site radionuclides and activities. However, some 

wastes from the 300 Area R&D activities contained much higher levels of fission products such as 

cesium-137 and strontium-90, activated metal components, and transuranics. Liquid low-level 

wastes were collected in a process sewer which emptied into ponds located east of the 300 Area. 

Sludge from the ponds was periodically dredged to recover the uranium. In 1973, the Waste Acid 

Treatment System was placed into service to collect, neutralize, and store liquid wastes from fuel 

fabrication and other 300 Area operations (e.g., R&D). Operations in the 300 Area did not 

generate high-level liquid waste. Radioactive solid waste from fuel fabrication activities was 

disposed of in 28 burial grounds in the 300 Area and 600 Area. Solid wastes from R&D activities 

were also buried in these disposal sites; radiation levels as high as 5 Roentgens per hour (R/h) 

were associated with such wastes. After 1973, low-level radioactive solid waste from the 300 

Area was transported to 200 Area for disposal. There were no early efforts to confine particle and 

gas emissions; however, filters and other effluent cleaning devices were added later. 

•	 Reactor wastes contained fission and activation products, transuranics, and uranium. Cooling 

water from the single-pass systems was discharged into the Columbia River. Low-level liquid 

wastes, including liquids from the 100-F Animal Farm experiments, were placed into trenches or 

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cribs from which they entered soil columns. In 1960, a peak of approximately 2 million curies of 

activity was released in liquid wastes. Although the radionuclides primarily consisted of short 

half-lives, these wastes included some with longer half-lives, such as strontium-90, cesium-137, 

hydrogen-3, neptunium-237, plutonium-239, and uranium. There were no high-level liquid wastes 

from 100 Area operations. Solid wastes consisted primarily of protective clothing, reactor 

hardware and components, tools, and miscellaneous trash. 

•	 Separations and plutonium finishing wastes in the 200 Areas contained fission products (primarily 

cesium-137 and strontium-90) and uranium. Low-level liquids were released into the soil through 

ponds, trenches, French drains, cribs, and injection wells. High-level wastes were piped into 

underground storage tanks. Separations operations produced large quantities of liquid waste 

containing high levels of radioactive materials along with hazardous chemical constituents. In 

Evaporator buildings, water from underground tanks was boiled off, thus concentrating the 

radioactive content in slurry that was returned to the tanks. Solid wastes that were disposed of in 

200 Area burial grounds consisted primarily of process hardware, construction debris, protective 

clothing, and soil contaminated by spills from storage tanks. Since 1988, transuranic waste has 

been stored aboveground in the Central Waste Facility. Since the beginning of operations, 

airborne effluents were released through 200 foot-high stacks. During early production years, no 

treatment was provided to control airborne releases. The predominant radionuclide released in 

early operations was iodine-131; other contaminants included ruthenium-103, ruthenium-106, 

cerium-144, and strontium-90. After 1947, sand filters, fiberglass filters, and silver reactor filters 

were provided to reduce airborne emissions from the separations operations. 

There were no known radioactive waste disposals in the 400 Area. In addition to radioactive wastes 

resulting from on-site operations, the Hanford site also accepted low-level solid wastes from 58 other 

off-site generators. Included in this off-site waste were 50 Navy submarine reactor compartments, 

which were buried in the 200 East Area. 

Numerous problems associated with waste management operations (waste fires, ruptured containers, 

storage tank leaks, and crib overflows) resulted in the spread of contamination and elevated radiation 

levels. Exposure rates up to 200 R/h were encountered during routine handling of solid waste. Waste 

fires occurred in solid waste burial sites in all major areas. From one such fire in the 618-4 burial 

ground, particles were released that traveled as far as far 1,500 feet from the burial site with contact 

radiation levels of up to 4.5 R/h. Containers of waste were ruptured during transport due to the weight 

of backfill soil. One of these incidents in the 200 Area resulted in contamination of 4 square miles of 

surface soil. Similar releases occurred in the 300 Area. In 1957, a burial container containing 

REDOX hardware was dropped during transit to a 200 Area burial site, resulting in ground 

contamination of 2 R/h. There were frequent leaks in underground storage tanks and waste transport 

lines. Sixty-seven of the 149 single-shell tanks have experienced known or suspected leakage (no 

leakage from double-shell tanks has been reported). The estimated release from these leaks is 

approximately 1 million curies—mostly cesium-137. A transfer line from T Plant leaked in 1955, 

resulting in soil contamination levels of 100 rad/h; another T Plant leak in 1973 released 115,000 

gallons from a waste tank to surrounding soil. A 1953 chemical reaction in an underground vault at 

the U Tank Farm caused localized contamination. Many cribs overflowed or otherwise 

malfunctioned. Examples include the 216-U-1, -2, and -16 cribs, which released uranium-containing 

liquids to surrounding soil and groundwater. Crib overflows have also resulted in vegetation and 

wildlife contamination. In 1945, the dike of the 300 Area pond broke and released 14 million gallons 

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of low-level liquid waste into the Columbia River. Each of the eight reactor retention basins has 

leaked, allowing low-level liquid waste to enter underlying soil. Prior to installation of filters in 1947, 

flakes contaminated with iodine-131, ruthenium-103, ruthenium-106, cerium-141, strontium-90, and 

other radionuclides were occasionally discharged from the separations stack and contaminated the 

areas around the Separations Plants. Personnel in the vicinity of the plants were required to wear 

respiratory protection. An intentional release of over 8000 curies of iodine-131 from T Plant was 

performed in 1951. This experimental release, called the “Green Run,” was conducted to study the 

mechanisms of contamination spread. 

5.2.7 Summary of Key Hanford Facilities 

Table 5-2 summarizes the key Hanford site radiological facilities operations. 

Table 5-2: Key Hanford Site Facilities and Operations (September 1946 through December 1990) 

Table 5-2 and corresponding notes span three pages 

Areas Key Facilities Period of Operation Description 

100 B Reactor 1944 -1946; 1948-1968 Each production reactor complex included the 105 

Building, which contained the graphite core reactor 

for irradiation of uranium fuel elements to produce 

plutonium, storage pool, and handling facilities for 

irradiated fuel; the 103 Building for storage of 

unirradiated fuel elements; and the 107 retention 

basins for reactor cooling water 

D Reactor 1944 -1967 

F Reactor 1945 - 1965 

H Reactor 1949 - 1965 

DR Reactor 1950 - 1964 

C Reactor 1952 - 1969 

KW Reactor 1955 - 1970 

KE Reactor 1955 - 1971 

N Reactor 1963 - 1987 

Similar complex to production reactors, with the 

exception of the facility for utilizing heated water to 

operate power-producing turbines 

100-Animal Farm 1949 - Unknown Area for conducting research on effects of radiation 

and radioactive materials on animals and fish 

108-F 1949 - 1977 Biology Laboratory 

108-B 1949 - 1955 Tritium Extraction Facility 

200 T Plant 1944 - 1956; 1958 - 1990s T Plant was in 200 West; B Plant in 200 East; used 

tri-butyl phosphate batch process on irradiated fuel 

elements to separate plutonium from uranium and 

fission products; each plant included 221 Chemical 

separation buildings, 224 bulk reduction to further 

purify and concentrate plutonium, 222 sample 

preparation laboratories, 291 exhaust buildings, and 

242 evaporator; T and B Plants were modified to 

perform decontamination (T Plant) and Fission 

Product Recovery (B Plant) in the later time period 

B Plant 1945 - 1956; 1968 - 1985 

U Plant 1952 - 1958 

Design similar to T and B Plants but never used for 

separations; used instead for testing and 

maintenance of T and B components and processes 

C Plant 1952 – 1956; 1962 - 1967 Pilot Plant for REDOX and PUREX operations 

S Plant (REDOX) 1952 - 1967 Continuous flow solvent extraction process using 

hexone 

A Plant (PUREX) 1956 - 1972; 1983 - 1988 Continuous flow solvent extraction process using 

tri-butyl phosphate 

U Trioxide Plant 1956 - 1972 Conversion of separated uranium to UO3 

231-Z 1945 - 1956 Finishing building located in 200 West; converted 

material from Bulk Reduction Facilities to 

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Table 5-2: Key Hanford Site Facilities and Operations (September 1946 through December 1990) 

Table 5-2 and corresponding notes span three pages 

Areas Key Facilities Period of Operation Description 

plutonium nitrate paste 

234-Z5 1949 – 1976; 1978 Plutonium finishing 

242-Z 1965 - 1976 Americium recovery 

212-N, 212-P, and 

212-R 1944 - 1976 Lag storage buildings located in 200 North for storage of irradiated fuel awaiting dissolution 

213-J and 213-K 1944 - 1993 Magazine storage buildings located in 200 North for 

storage of plutonium nitrate paste from 231-Z 

241-B, 241-C, 241-T, and 

241-U 

Constructed from 1944 – 

1988 

Underground storage tanks for high-level liquid 

waste from separations operations; each group 

contained 16 tanks; B and C tank farms were in 200 

East; T and U farms in 200 West 

236-Z 1964 – 1979; 1984 – 1985 Reclamation of plutonium from waste 

232-Z 1961 - 1973 Incinerator and leach for plutonium recovery 

300 303-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, 

J, K, and M 

Built 1944 1988; still in 

use 

Used for storage of uranium metal to be fabricated 

into fuel elements 

305 1943 – 1977 Test reactor for development of fuel and reactor 

materials 

313 1944 – 1971 Metal Fabrication Building; uranium slugs were 

prepared and canned for irradiation 

314 1944 - 1971 

Press Building; extrusion and straightening of 

uranium rods in preparation for cutting into slug 

lengths and canning 

3706 1945 – (Used as office 

space into the 1990s) 

Radiochemistry Laboratory to support all Hanford 

Site operations 

321 1944 - 1988 

Separation Building, also known as cold semiworks; pilot studies to support development of 

separations processes 

326 1953 - Present Physics and Metallurgy Laboratory 

306 1957 - 1984 Fuel Element Pilot Plant 

333 1961 - 1988 Fuel Clad Building for N Reactor 

327 1953 - 1987 Post-Irradiation Test Facility 

325 1953 - Present Radiochemistry Laboratory/Cerium Recovery 

308 1960 - 1990 Plutonium Fuels Pilot Plant 

309 1960 - 1969 Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 

324 

1966 – Currently 

undergoing 

decommissioning 

Waste Technology Engineering Laboratory 

328 1953 - Present Mechanical Development 

329 1952 - Present Biophysics Laboratory 

320 1966 - Present Low-Level Radiochemistry Building 

318 1967 - 1971 High-Temperature Lattice Test Reactor 

335 1968 - 1984 Sodium Test Facilities 336 1969 - 1984 

337 1970 - 1984 Technical Management Facility; later housed the 

Biology Laboratory from 108-F 

400 Fast Flux Test Facility 

(FFTF) 1980 - 1994 Sodium-cooled reactor for testing of materials 

427 1983 - 1994 FFTF fuels and materials examination 

This table was created from information obtained from ORAUT-TKBS-0006-2, ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4, ORAUTTKBS-0006-5, and DOE, 2002. 

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5.3 Radiological Exposure Sources from Hanford Operations 

During the period of September 1946 through December 1990, there was a potential for radiation 

exposures from a variety of internal and external sources. The primary mission of the Hanford site 

was production of plutonium; consequently, there were potential exposures to that material. In 

addition, other operations necessarily related to plutonium production involved potential exposures. 

For example, fuel fabrication from natural uranium gave rise to potentially direct beta and photon 

exposures and to airborne exposure. Reactors used to irradiate fuel elements generated direct beta, 

photon, and neutron radiation fields, as well as the potential for surface and airborne contamination by 

uranium and a wide variety of fission and activation products. Separations processes, research and 

development activities, and the collection and disposal of radioactive wastes also resulted in potential 

direct exposures to direct alpha, beta, photon, and neutron radiation fields, as well as to surface and 

airborne contamination by uranium and a wide variety of fission and activation products. 

5.3.1 Alpha Particle Emissions 

Primary alpha particle-emitting radioactive materials at the Hanford Site include uranium, plutonium, 

and other transuranic materials produced by the irradiation of uranium fuel. Table 5-3 lists the 

alpha-emitting radionuclides and their primary alpha energies. 

Table 5-3: Hanford Site Alpha-Emitting Radionuclides 

Radionuclide Energy (MeV) 

Plutonium-238 5.46 (28%), 5.50 (72%) 

Plutonium-239 5.11 (11%), 5.16 (88%) 

Plutonium-240 5.12 (24%), 5.17 (76%) 

Americium-241 5.44 (13%), 5.49 (85%) 

Neptunium-237 4.78 (75%), 4.65 (12%) 

Uranium-234 4.72 (28%), 4.77 (72%) 

Uranium-235 4.37 (18%), 4.40 (57%), 4.58 (8%) 

Uranium-238 4.15 (25%), 4.20 (75%) 

5.3.2 Beta Radiation Fields 

The primary sources of beta exposure were fission and activation products from reactor operations. 

The greatest potential for exposure to beta radiation from these materials was during the separations 

process and subsequent waste handling after the material was separated from the solid fuel and placed 

in a dispersible form. Beta radiation was also emitted by unirradiated uranium fuel, but at 

significantly lower levels than encountered after the fuel was irradiated during reactor operations. 

Table 5-4 lists major beta-emitting radionuclides and the maximum beta energies and abundance of 

their primary beta energies. 

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Table 5-4: Hanford Site Beta-Emitting Radionuclides 

Radionuclide Energy (MeV) 

Strontium-90/Yttrium-90 0.546 (100%)/2.28 (100%) 

Cesium-137 0.512 (95%) 

Iodine-131 0.248 (2.1%), 0.334 (2.2%), 0.607 (90%) 

Cerium-144 0.318 (77%), 0.185 (20%) 

Ruthenium-106/Rhodium-106 3.54 (79%), 2.41 (10%), 3.03 (8%) 

Ruthenium-103/Rhodium-103 0.226 (91%) 

Protactinium-234m (uranium decay chain) 2.29 (98%) 

Thorium-234 (uranium decay chain) 0.103 (21%), 0.193 (79%) 

Plutonium-241 0.021 (100%) 

5.3.3 Neutron Exposures 

Areas at Hanford where there is a potential for neutron exposure include (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6): 

100 Area 

• 105-B, 105-C, 105-D, 105-DR, 105-F, 105-H, 105-KE, 105-KW, 105-N reactors 

200 Area 

• 221-U Facility cinder block building attachment (known as 271-U) 

• 224-T Facility to concentrate plutonium solutions and store sources 

• 231-Z Plutonium Isolation Facility 

• 232-Z Incinerator and Leach Facility 

• 234-5Z Primary Plutonium Handling Facility 

• 236-Z Recuplex/Plutonium Reclamation Facility 

• 242-Z Americium Recovery Facility 

• 2736-Z Plutonium vaults 

300 Area 

• 305-B Test Reactor 

• 308 Plutonium Fuels Pilot Plant (PFPP) 

• 309 Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) 

• 318 Radiological Calibrations Facility 

• 324 Chemical and Materials Engineering Laboratory 

• 3745A Calibrations Laboratory 

• 3745B Accelerator Facility 

400 Area 

• Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) 

The circumstances of neutron exposure at these facilities are different based on the primary method of 

neutron radiation generation. At the 200 and 300 Area Plutonium facilities, neutron radiation is 

generated from plutonium either by spontaneous fission or, importantly, by alpha particle interaction 

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with light elements such as oxygen, fluorine, and beryllium. These interactions are commonly 

referred to as alpha-n reactions. At the Hanford 100 and 400 Area Nuclear Reactor facilities, neutrons 

are generated by fission of uranium and plutonium in the reactor core. These two methods of neutron 

generation comprise the majority of Hanford worker neutron exposures. There is little potential for 

significant unrecorded neutron dose in the 300 Area Radiological Calibration (318, 3745B) and 

Accelerator (3745A) facilities because these are the facilities used to develop, test, and calibrate 

Hanford dosimetry and instrumentation systems (ORAUT-TKBS-00006-6). 

5.3.4 Photon Exposures 

Photons associated with plutonium are of low energy and would be shielded by construction materials 

in Processing and Handling Facilities. However, the fission process releases high levels of photon 

radiation, and many of the fission and activation products resulting from fuel irradiation in reactors 

decay by photon emission. Biological shields around reactor cores reduced the levels of fission 

photons and photons from irradiated fuel within the core. After their discharge from the reactor, 

irradiated fuel elements were stored underwater and handled with remote tools to limit exposures. 

Photons from irradiated fuel were a concern throughout the stages of the plutonium production 

process, including transportation, chemical separation, waste management, and equipment 

maintenance. Research and development activities used a wide variety of radionuclides with photon 

emissions similar to those generated in the fuel irradiation operations. ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6 

provides information regarding photon sources and energy spectra associated with various site 

operations. 

5.3.5 Incidents and Fires 

NIOSH reviewed documents that contain general and specific references to problems related to 

radiation exposure control, including many of the Radiation Protection Organization’s routine reports. 

There were numerous incidents related to the Hanford Waste Management Facilities and processes. 

Waste fires occurred at solid waste burial sites in all major areas. Containers of waste were ruptured 

as a result of both transport and the weight of backfill soil. There were frequent leaks in underground 

storage tanks and waste transport lines. Sixty-seven of the 149 single-shell tanks have experienced 

known or suspected leakage (no leakage from double-shell tanks has been reported). The estimated 

total release from these leaks is approximately 1 million curies—mostly cesium-137. Cribs 

overflowed or otherwise malfunctioned. Crib overflows have also contaminated vegetation and 

wildlife. Liquid waste retention basins/ponds have leaked. Some specific examples are as follows: 

•	 In 1948, the dike for the process liquid waste pond in the 300 Area broke, releasing the pond 

contents into the Columbia River. 

•	 A 1953 chemical reaction in an underground vault at the U Tank Farm caused localized 

contamination. 

•	 Fires occurred in the 618-2 and 618-4 waste burial grounds in 1954. Contamination from the 618­

4 fire was dispersed as far as 1500 feet from the burial site and radiation levels on contact with 

contaminated particles reached 4.5 R/h. 

•	 A transfer line from T Plant leaked in 1955, resulting in soil contamination levels of 100 rad/h. 

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•	 In 1957, a burial container containing REDOX hardware was dropped during transit to a 200 Area 

burial site, resulting in ground contamination to a level of 2 R/h. 

•	 Rupture of a waste container during burial in the 200 Area contaminated of 4 square miles of 

surface soil. 

•	 The 216-U-1, -2, and -16 cribs malfunctioned, releasing uranium-containing liquids into the 

surrounding soil and groundwater. Plutonium reached the water table in the 216-Z3 crib. 

•	 Plutonium accumulated in the soil at the 216-Z9 crib to the extent that remediation was necessary 

for criticality safety reasons. 

Several significant incidents within operations facilities were reported. Specific examples follow. 

•	 Throughout 1949, repeated high air concentrations occurred in the Building 234-5Z (Plutonium 

Finishing) process rooms and laboratories. Use of respiratory protection was required for workers 

in the affected facilities. 

•	 A fire involving plutonium turnings occurred in the RMA line of Building 234-5Z in 1954, 

contaminating the rear section of the line. 

•	 In 1962, there was a nuclear criticality involving plutonium solutions in the scrap recovery room 

of the RECUPLEX Facility. No significant worker exposures occurred, but the room was 

contaminated. 

•	 An explosion of an ion exchange column, containing approximately 100 grams of americium-241, 

occurred in a glove box in Building 242-Z in 1976. The operator was highly contaminated and 

experienced facial cuts, burns, eye injuries, and internal americium-241 deposition. 

NIOSH-reviewed documents contain sparse mention of fires occurring during the fuel fabrication 

operations. However, based on the history of other fuel fabrication operations, which entailed 

extrusion and machining of uranium metal, it is likely that such fires frequently occurred. Prior to 

installation of filters in 1947, flakes contaminated with iodine-131, ruthenium-103, ruthenium-106, 

cesium-141, strontium-90, and other radionuclides were occasionally discharged from the separations 

stacks and contaminated the areas around the Separations Plants. Personnel in the vicinity of the 

plants were required to wear respiratory protection. In 1954, ruthenium tetraoxide flakes were 

released from the stack of the REDOX Separations Facility, causing widespread land area 

contamination and requiring cleanup efforts. 

In 1951, over 8,000 curies of iodine-131 were intentionally released from T Plant. This experimental 

release, called the “Green Run,” was conducted to study the mechanisms of contamination spread. 

Additional iodine-131 releases occurred in 1951 as a result of failures of filtration systems in the B 

and T Plants during experiments in reducing cooling time for irradiated fuel. 

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6.0 Summary of Available Monitoring Data for the Proposed Class 

Radiation protection was a major concern at Hanford from the beginning of operations. Throughout 

most of Hanford’s history, considerable research was conducted to improve survey instruments, 

effluent clean-up mechanisms, monitoring instrumentation, workplace air-sampling practices, and 

understanding of the biokinetics of radionuclide intakes (ORAUT-OTIB-0002). The science and 

practice of monitoring for exposures from plutonium, uranium, and mixed fission and activation 

products were in their infancy in the 1940s. However, monitoring knowledge and assay skills were 

rapidly being developed and improved; thus, the scope of worker monitoring expanded over time. 

The primary sources of monitoring data for this evaluation include the NIOSH Site Research Database 

(SRDB), the NIOSH OCAS Claims Tracking System (NOCTS), the Comprehensive Epidemiologic 

Data Resource (CEDR) Database, the DOE Hanford Radiological Exposure (REX) System Database, 

and the DOE Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System. In addition to the REX database 

(maintained by the Hanford Site) and the CEDR database, NIOSH investigated various Hanford 

declassified databases (with DOE Hanford assistance) for available internal and external monitoring 

data. Furthermore, the NOCTS database was reviewed for claimant exposure data. Copies of many 

of the Hanford records are contained in the SRDB. NIOSH reviewed these sources and identified 

personal monitoring data (e.g., film badge exposure results, thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) 

monitoring results, and bioassay results) and area monitoring data. 

6.1 Hanford Internal Monitoring Data 

Summaries of the available in vitro and in vivo data, as well as overviews of sampling and analytical 

protocols, are provided in the following subsections. Additional details, including analytical methods, 

detectable activities, and reporting protocols can be found in Hanford Site—Occupational Internal 

Dose (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

The major sources of intakes during the 1946 through 1990 timeframe have been plutonium, 

americium-241 (either as an ingrown contaminant in the plutonium or as a separated waste product), 

uranium, fission products, activation products, and tritium (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 11). One of 

the priority tasks for a special studies group formed in 1944 was to determine a way to measure 

plutonium in the body. Limits on the amount of plutonium in the body were set as early as 1944; after 

experimentation with various methods, routine urine sampling and analysis for plutonium were 

initiated in 1946. Urinalysis for uranium appears also to have begun in 1946 and was well-established 

by 1948. Urinalysis for fission products began in this timeframe as well, although the Wilson 

document indicates that separation from potassium-40 was not always successful prior to 1949 

(Wilson, 1987). Since 1949, there has been monitoring for numerous radionuclides at Hanford 

because of the complex scope of work conducted over the succeeding years. This work included 

many research projects and special campaigns. Correspondingly, numerous monitoring and analytical 

techniques have been utilized and improved over time (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

Hanford records list a wide spectrum of radionuclides that were monitored, and an even longer list of 

codes used to identify the radionuclides, groups of radionuclides, specific measurement techniques, or 

combinations of radionuclides and techniques. Many of these radionuclides were of concern only to a 

small set of workers on a single research project, or to workers (for instance, radiation monitoring 

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technicians) whose tasks potentially exposed them to many different sources of radionuclides 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 11). 

6.1.1 In Vitro Data Availability 

The practice of having workers collect bioassay samples while at home began very early in the 

Hanford program (1946) and has continued throughout the history of Hanford (Wilson, 1987). Home 

sampling was used to prevent contamination of samples in the workplace. The sampling protocol 

used most frequently was a simulated 24-hour sample obtained by sampling from evening through 

morning on two consecutive nights (or the temporal equivalent for shift workers). Termination 

samples were often simulated 12-hour samples (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 14). 

In vitro analyses were performed in-house until 1965. At that time, the DOE Richland Office 

established a contract for in vitro analyses with the United States Testing Company (UST), which 

built a commercial low-level radiochemistry laboratory in north Richland and operated it until 1990 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 14). 

The REX system serves as the primary repository for Hanford in vitro data. A summary of the in 

vitro records stored in the REX database is presented in Attachment 1. It should be noted that the 

record totals presented in the table are based only on data that is currently in a format (electronic data 

tables) conducive to large scale data queries. Though much of the data collected prior to the routine 

use of computerized database storage systems (approximately 1958) has now been uploaded into REX 

database tables, some of this earlier data still remains stored predominantly in its original format such 

as individual paper copies and/or electronic images of those paper copies. As such, counts of 

analytical records presented in Attachment 1 in some cases do not represent all records that are 

available. An example of this discrepancy would be a lack of fission products results shown prior to 

1958 in the summary table, whereas various reports and individual monitoring history files contain 

fission product in vitro analytical results as early as 1948. 

6.1.1.1 Plutonium 

Plutonium represented a primary intake source at Hanford. With the exception of a few standards in 

radiochemistry laboratories, and a plutonium-238 purification experiment in the 325 Building C-cell 

around 1967, plutonium at Hanford was comprised of a mix of radionuclides, namely plutonium-238, 

plutonium-239, plutonium-240, and plutonium-241. The activity of plutonium-242 in plutonium 

mixtures at Hanford was too small to contribute significantly to dose (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 

17). Routine urinalyses for plutonium started in September 1946 (Wilson, 1987). The first plutonium 

bioassay analysis consisted of lanthanum fluoride precipitation and thenoyl trifluoroacetone extraction 

and gross alpha counting. Electrodeposition on a stainless-steel disk combined with nuclear track 

emulsion (autoradiography) started in December 1952 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 15). 

Prior to October 1983, the recorded value was the total alpha activity from plutonium, which would 

have included activity from plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and plutonium-240. The recorded results 

would not have accounted for any plutonium-241 or americium-241 present in the urine. The results 

might have been reported as either plutonium or plutonium-239; however, until October 1983, the 

result was really the total alpha activity from isotopes of plutonium. Results on plutonium urinalysis 

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sheets were recorded in units of dpm/sample, but the same results were recorded in units of 

μCi/sample in an electronic database (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 15). 

In October 1983, several changes were made. The lanthanum fluoride/ thenoyl trifluoracetone method 

was replaced by the use of anion exchange columns, alpha spectrometry analysis replaced 

autoradiography, and chemical yield was established for each sample separately by use of a 

plutonium-242 tracer. The results of plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 + plutonium-240 have been 

reported separately since then (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 16). 

Fecal sampling was normally done in response to suspected intakes; however, routine fecal sampling 

was used for some high-risk plutonium workers, mostly operators at PUREX and the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant, from 1986 through June 1989 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 17). Fecal samples 

were usually not analyzed in total (i.e., were aliquoted after muffling, dry ashing, and wet ashing); 

hence, more than one analysis result for a given sample was possible and will often be found in the 

REX database (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 16). 

6.1.1.2 Americium 

Americium was usually a trace contaminant in plutonium mixtures. However, americium was 

separated from plutonium at the Isolation Building (231-Z) in the early years of operation (Gerber, 

2005). There was also an americium recovery operation located in 242-Z of the Plutonium Finishing 

Plant that operated from 1965 until 1976 (Gerber, 2005). Therefore, waste tanks, transfer lines, and 

parts of the Plutonium Finishing Plant contained americium-241 that was chemically separate from 

plutonium (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

Based on a review of the historical documents and bioassay records prior to 1964, NIOSH has found 

no evidence of an Americium Bioassay program at Hanford. The first americium records in the REX 

database show 41 urinalyses for americium-241 in 1964, collected from 19 workers. There are no 

records of americium bioassay in 1965 or 1966; there are 168 results in 1967. The 1967 results are a 

combination of urine and fecal results. The 1967 results are all from special samples from six workers 

who were involved in the same potential intake accident on May 2, 1967. From 1968 on, there are 

americium bioassay results in the REX database (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

6.1.1.3 Curium 

The curium isotopes of concern were curium-242 and curium-244. Most sources of curium at 

Hanford were minor calibration sources or minor constituents in an actinide mixture. However, 

extraction of curium-244 from high-level waste occurred at the 325 Building sometime in the 1970s. 

Since the curium and americium procedures were the same, the results would have been reported as 

curium only if so requested through the bioassay request system (this was prior to the use of alpha 

spectrometry). After 1985, the chemistry is the same as americium, but americium-241, curium-242, 

and curium-244 were reported separately if requested (Battelle Northwest, 1985). 

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6.1.1.4 Tritium 

The earliest report found to date on tritium urinalysis at Hanford was written in 1949 by Jack Healy, a 

lead internal dosimetrist at Hanford for many years (Healy, 1949). Tritium urinalysis performed from 

March 1950 through March 1951 is also referenced in the April 4, 1951 meeting minutes of the P-10 

Hazards Control Committee (Kornberg, April 1951). 

The first urinalyses were performed by measuring the ionization current in acetylene (produced from 

water containing tritium) by using a vibrating reed electrometer. This procedure was thought 

adequate by Hanford, but apparently was too time-consuming to handle the increased sampling 

frequencies that started in 1951; daily sampling was implemented for those working in the P-10 hood 

rooms, and weekly sampling was implemented for others in the P-10 exclusion area (Healy, 1949; 

Kornberg, August 1951; Reed, 1952; Healy, 1950). A sensitivity for the acetylene tritium analysis is 

stated as 1.5 -2.0 μCi/L of the sample (Healy, 1950). An internal memo (Parker, 1950) that referred to 

the acetylene method for urinalysis also provides a sensitivity of approximately 1.2 x 10-3 μCi/cc (1.2 

μCi/L) in water (Parker, 1950). 

A program was started to develop new techniques for routine analysis. One such method placed the 

liquid sample in an aluminum carbide generator with the evolved methane being counted in a 

proportional counter. This procedure showed promise, but there were problems obtaining the reagents 

needed to perform the analysis, namely aluminum carbide. Healy, in describing the development of 

the new method states that “it was hoped this method would have a sensitivity slightly better than the 

acetylene method” (Healy, 1950). 

The next approach was using an internal Geiger-Mueller counter filled with hydrogen gas. This 

method was successful and was developed into the routine sampling analysis with a capacity of 6-8 

samples per hour per instrument. Details of this method were provided in a Healy letter that appears 

to indicate a process sensitivity of 20 counts per minute of tritium per microcurie of tritium per liter of 

urine (20 c/m/μCi/L) (Kornberg, August 1951; Healy, 1951). 

Liquid scintillation counting was implemented for tritium bioassay at the Savannah River Site in 1958 

and it is reasonable to assume that Hanford did so at about the same time (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, 

page 22-23). In an interview with Matt M. Lardy, Mr. Lardy stated that liquid scintillation counting 

of a 1-ml aliquot of raw urine has been used since UST was awarded the bioassay contract in 1965 

(Personal Communication, 2003). 

Tritium bioassay results were not recorded in the REX database until 1984. However, tritium doses 

were included in external dose reports from 1949 through 1987; thus, “monitored” workers would be 

determined by tritium dose listed in external dose records. A zero dose is indicative of a monitored 

worker; however, there are only two of these in the database. Having no value listed under “tritium” 

might indicate either an unmonitored worker or a monitored worker with less-than-recordable dose. 

No tritium doses are listed on external dose reports for the periods 1955 through 1960, 1970, 1971, 

and 1973 through 1984. This means that either there was no bioassay monitoring during these periods 

or the intakes were below some reporting criteria (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 52). 

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6.1.1.5 Uranium 

Uranium exposure at Hanford involved principally three physical forms: depleted, natural, and slightly 

enriched uranium. Uranium-233 was also isolated from irradiated thorium at PUREX from 1966 to 

approximately 1971. Small numbers of researchers may have experimented with more enriched 

uranium at different times (e.g., metallurgy on commercial-grade fuel), but such exposure would have 

been limited to small groups over short periods of time (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 24). 

Because chemical toxicity was the principal concern for uranium exposures at the UO3 Plant, one 

sampling method required obtaining both a Friday evening sample and Monday morning sample. The 

date this sampling method began is not known; however, it may have been in the 1970s or possibly 

earlier. This procedure was changed to Monday-morning-only sampling in the early 1980s (ORAUTTKBS-0006-5, page 26). 

According to Wilson (1987), the uranium urinalysis program prior to 1948 was not reliable. The 

fluorometric method, which fused uranium from raw urine with sodium fluoride and measured the 

fluorescence when the compound was exposed to ultraviolet light, was implemented sometime during 

the first half of 1948 (Wilson, 1987; Healy, 1948). This method was used for elemental uranium 

analyses, with refinements over the years including some upfront chemistry on the raw urine, until 

about 1991, when it was replaced by kinetic phosphorescence analysis (Personal Communication, 

2003). 

When alpha spectrometry was introduced in 1983, two uranium urinalyses procedures were offered: 

the elemental procedure and the alpha spectrometric procedure. The elemental procedure was 

typically used for workers exposed to natural or slightly enriched forms of uranium; the isotopic 

procedure (alpha spectrometric) was used for depleted or more-than-slightly enriched forms of 

uranium. In general, personnel working in the production facilities were monitored by the elemental 

analysis, whereas Pacific Northwest Laboratory workers, because of the wide scope of research 

projects that occurred over the years, were monitored by the isotopic analysis (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

5, page 27). The Hanford Bioassay database shows that a few urinalyses were obtained for uranium233, mostly in 1970. No information has been found regarding how the analyses were performed or 

the units of the recorded results. Copies of an earlier database show the units to be μg/L, consistent 

with the units for all uranium analyses at that time; however, the recorded values are much too small 

to realistically be in μg/L, with the exception of a single value in 1969. The recorded values appear to 

be similar to plutonium alpha measurements at that time; it is probable, but not verified that 

autoradiography was used for these bioassays because of the high specific activity of the uranium-233 

and the major contaminant uranium-232. Fecal samples were rarely obtained for potential uranium 

intakes (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 29). 

6.1.1.6 Fission Product Analysis 

Fission product urinalysis was the method used to monitor for intakes of fission products until the 

implementation of whole-body counting in 1960. Routine fission product urinalyses started in 

January 1947, but the results from the method used (ferrous hydroxide precipitation of the supernatant 

from the plutonium lanthanum fluoride procedure) were considered erratic until 1948. Therefore, data 

prior to 1948 should be considered unreliable and should be ignored. The procedure initiated in 1948 

was to add a strontium carrier to the aluminum oxide solution for the plutonium procedure, then 

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precipitate lanthanum hydroxide. This procedure was shown to extract the rare earths and strontium 

with yields ranging from 90% for cerium to 23% for strontium. The dried planchet was counted for 

beta activity with an approximate detection level of 30 dpm (Wilson, 1987; Healy, 1948). This same 

procedure was modified in 1954 with the addition of a cerium carrier. This procedure was also listed 

in the compilation of procedures referred to as the “Old Bioassay Bible,” but that same compilation 

had a separate procedure for detecting strontium-90 in urine. A memo in the Old Bioassay Bible 

discusses the initial use in November 1958 of a gas-flow, beta proportional counter, which resulted in 

increased counting efficiency. The new detection limit was stated as 1.4 × 10-5 μCi/sample, based on 

the counting efficiency of strontium-90. Gross fission products are also mentioned by Lardy in his 

1970 correspondence regarding detection limits for selected radionuclides. This correspondence 

includes a brief description that implies the same procedure was still available, although probably 

rarely used (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 29-30). 

6.1.1.7 Strontium 

The REX database records show the use of fission product urinalyses to obtain strontium-90 exposure 

data prior to 1965. Records of strontium-90 urinalyses, both routines and specials, begin to appear in 

the database in 1965. Beginning in 1982, actual analytical results were recorded in the database; that 

is, results were not truncated at a reporting level (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 30). 

6.1.1.8 Promethium 

Hanford manufactured promethium-147 heat sources. The high-activity work (kilocuries) took place 

in the 325 Building, but some exposure apparently occurred as early as 1962 or 1963 in the 222-S 

Chemistry Laboratory and the 325 Building, and occurred as late as 1971 in the 308 Fuels Laboratory 

(Glover, 1964; Howell, 1969). The REX database shows only seven promethium-147 urinalyses from 

1972 to 1975, but an increased number of analyses from 1976 to 1979; this suggests that the project 

may have experiences a brief hiatus around 1976 and continued for a few years thereafter. In 

addition, animal studies were conducted with promethium-147 as part of research to develop a human 

biokinetic model for the behavior of promethium in the body, so animal tenders might have been 

exposed to low levels of promethium-147. A small human volunteer study (14 volunteers) using 

promethium-143 was conducted in 1967 or 1968 (Palmer, 1970) (12 volunteers: injection of 0.1 μCi 

each; 2 volunteers: ingestion of 10 μCi each). 

In the late 1960s, fecal samples were analyzed for promethium-147 for some potential intake events. 

The minimum detectable activity, or at least the lowest reporting level, appears to be 1.67 × 10-5 

μCi/kg. A minimum detectable activity for fecal samples does not appear in laboratory statements of 

work during the 1970s, but reappears in the 1980s: 28–110 dpm/sample in 1982 depending on sample 

size (roughly 400 dpm/kg); 220 dpm/sample from 1983 to the 1990s (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 

32). 

Only one description of the procedure was found; the procedure itself appeared in documents dated 

1970, 1974 and 1977 (Lardy, 1970; UST, 1974). As described, promethium and rare earths were 

precipitated as the fluoride. Interferences such as zirconium, scandium, and IV actinides were 

removed by extraction by thenoyl trifluoracetone in xylene, first at a pH less than 1, then at a pH of 

about 4. The final sample was counted by liquid scintillation. Remaining rare earths were 

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distinguished from promethium-147 by proper setting of the counting window on the liquid 

scintillation spectrometer (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 32). 

6.1.1.9 Polonium 

From 1945 through the early 1950s, bismuth slugs were irradiated in Hanford reactors to produce 

polonium-210. The slugs containing the polonium were shipped offsite for processing at the 

Monsanto facility in Ohio (Tilley, 1945; DOE, 1997). Work with pure polonium-210 occurred in the 

308 Building in 1968 and again in 1975. NIOSH could not determine whether the work in the 308 

Building occurred continuously throughout that period or just during those two years (ORAUTTKBS-0006-5). 

A polonium urinalysis procedure, using deposition on silver foil from a hydrochloric acid solution of 

urine salts, was developed as early as 1948; this procedure was used in response to a contamination 

incident involving two workers with a polonium-beryllium neutron source. No polonium was found 

in the urine of the two workers (Thorburn, 1948), and these results were not found in the REX 

database. In the Hanford files, NIOSH discovered considerable activity, from about 1968 through the 

mid-1970s, toward initiating a bioassay procedure and establishing a biokinetic model for polonium210. UST was asked to develop a bioassay procedure in March 1968 and did so shortly thereafter; 

thus, concern for possible intakes apparently became important in early 1968 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

5, page 33). Polonium bioassay results appear in the REX database for the years 1968 through 1983. 

6.1.1.10 Neptunium 

At PUREX, from 1958 through 1972, and at REDOX from 1960 through 1967, neptunium-237 was 

removed from the dissolved fuel, purified, and packaged for shipment offsite (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

5, page 34; Pickard, 1968). 

The REX database contains only four bioassay samples for neptunium-237 in the 1970s, all baseline 

samples for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory workers. No routine samples or ending work 

samples were collected. All four samples had the same recorded value—1 × 10-7 with no units 

shown. The practice at the time was to record the activity of excreta samples in units of μCi, but it has 

not been determined to date if the units are μCi/sample or μCi/L. No information about the analysis 

method has been found (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 34). 

A few sample results appear in REX in the 1980s, mostly for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

employees. The units are in dpm/sample. The 1983 statement of work with UST shows a non-routine 

analysis for neptunium-237 with contractual detection levels of 0.02 dpm/sample for urine samples 

and 0.1 dpm/sample for fecal samples, which levels were consistent with alpha spectrometry for 

plutonium and americium at the time (Battelle Northwest, 1983). 

Although mostly neptunium-237 by mass, the small mass of plutonium-238 in the product produced 

most of the radioactivity. Plutonium bioassay was considered sufficient to monitor for neptunium 

intakes (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 34). 

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6.1.1.11 Other Limited-Exposure Radionuclides 

Hanford has always been a center for research, first as part of Hanford Works, and then as part of 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory from 1965 to present. As such, small-scale (in terms of either 

the number of persons or activity of the source) use of various radionuclides not addressed above has 

occurred throughout the history of the Hanford site. The following discussion, addressing carbon-14, 

thorium-232, radon, yittrium-90, thorium-227, actinium-227, sulfur-35 and phosporous-32, is not 

comprehensive (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 34). 

Carbon-14 exposure occurred at the 3731 Building in the mid-1950s when irradiated graphite samples 

were brought to the building from the operating reactors for destructive testing. No information has 

been uncovered about what bioassay, if any, was done. Carbon-14 was also used as a tracer in 

biological experiments (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 34). 

There are some thorium urinalysis samples that date back to 1979. These samples are identified as 

either thorium or thorium-232. The thorium urinalysis was a total thorium analysis by 

spectrophotometry with a detection level of 1 μg/L. The thorium-232 analysis was specific for 

thorium-232 using alpha spectrometry (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 34). 

There are some 1967 urinalysis results for sulfur-35. According to Lardy (1970), analysis was 

performed by ashing and then followed by liquid scintillation counting (Lardy, 1970). 

A radon generator was used for animal studies in the 108F Building; it was later moved to LSLII. 

Monitoring was probably via air sampling, but no information has been discovered yet (ORAUTTKBS-0006-5, page 35). 

Another project involved “milking” thorium-227 from actinium-227 on an ion exchange column. A 

bioassay procedure was developed specifically for this project under the assumption that the project 

was going to continue for several years; however, the project ended after only a few milkings. Only a 

couple of researchers were involved (Bihl, 1995). 

Phosphorous-32 was used for biological tracer studies; according to one retired researcher, “pipetting 

was done by mouth in the old days.” Such exposure would be limited to a few researchers and would 

have to be established through the claimant interview or by some indication of phosphorous-32 

bioassay samples in an individual worker’s record (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 35). 

6.1.2 In Vivo Data Availability 

In vivo counting equipment and techniques were developed in the late 1950s and have been in routine 

use for measuring X-ray and gamma-ray-emitting radionuclides since 1960 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, 

page 35). 

Sometimes radionuclides were listed without a value or detection limit. This probably means a 

“trace” was found. Additional information is sometimes available on the In Vivo Counter Results 

form if it is included in the worker’s personal radiation exposure history file (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, 

page 47). 

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The radionuclides routinely reported in a database changed over the years. From the beginning of site 

operations until 1983, sodium-24, potassium-40, cesium-137, and zinc-65 were the only routinely 

reported radionuclides. In 1983, only potassium-40 and cesium-137 results (or the minimum 

detectable activity) were routinely reported. In late 1987, cobalt-60 was added (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

5, page 48). As noted below, other less commonly measured radionuclide results are also recorded in 

the REX database. 

6.1.2.1 Whole Body Counters 

The first whole-body counter started counting workers in mid-1959 and became routinely used in 

1960. It consisted of a single NaI crystal (9.375-inch diameter and 4-inch thick) housed in a counting 

room (called the Iron Room) with 10-inch thick, pre-World War II steel plates on all six sides and 

graded shielding on the inner surfaces (lead, cadmium, copper) (Wilson, 1987; Roesch, 1960). The 

counting geometry was a chair configured to simulate a 1-m arc. The original count time was 20 

minutes, which was reduced to 10 minutes in October 1962 (Swanberg, 1962). A second, same-sized 

NaI detector was added in 1963 (Brady, 1964, page 8). 

Shortly after the chair counter in the Iron Room became operational, an entirely new design called the 

shadow shield counter was developed. The shadow shield consisted of a bed shielded on the bottom 

and on the sides by lead. The bed moved under a large NaI crystal (11.5-inch diameter by 4-inch 

thick) that was also shielded by lead, with the exception of the downward-looking face that looked 

directly onto the body as it passed under the crystal. The shadow shield detector was mounted in a 

mobile trailer so that it could be moved to areas closer to the Hanford worksites. The trailer also had a 

thyroid detector and a wound counter. The shadow shield detector became operational in 1963 

(Brady, 1964 page 9). The mobile trailer was described as having comparable sensitivity to the larger, 

conventional whole-body counters installed in massive iron rooms. However, there was some 

decreased sensitivity in the lower-energy region below about 300 keV, due to increased contribution 

to the background from scattered radiation (Swanberg, 1963). 

A report on the radionuclides detected in workers at the Whole-body Counting Facility in 1961 listed 

sodium-24, cobalt-60, zinc-65, zirconium-95, niobium-95, molybdenum-99 (presumably 

molybdenum- 99), technetium-99, ruthenium-103, ruthenium-106, iodine-131, cesium-137, and 

cesium-144 (Henle, 1962). A similar report summarizing 1961 through 1963 results added scandium46, chromium-51, and iron-59 to the list (Brady, 1964, page 20). 

A shadow shield whole-body detector was installed at the Whole-Body Counting Facility in 1977. 

This assembly had two 35% GeLi detectors and a 4-inch by 4-inch by 16-inch NaI detector. The 

shadow shield whole-body detector ended operation in 1987 when the two new counting rooms were 

added. Wilson (1987) provided a listing of minimum detectable activities that applied to 1980 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 37). 

By 1978, there were four shadow shield whole-body counters available for use. One was available at 

the Whole-Body Counting Facility, two in mobile trailers, and one at the Emergency Decontamination 

Facility; the latter was designated for large acute intakes with potentially high levels of external 

contamination (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 37). 

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A “standup” counter, which began operating in 1983, is still in operation today. It consists of five 

vertically stacked NaI crystals in a small lead-shielded area. The worker stands in front of the 

detectors with the detectors to his/her back; the detector array is raised or lowered to best fit the height 

of the worker. There are four 9.375-inch-diameter-by-4-inch-thick detectors and one 11-inchdiameter-by-4-inch-thick detector, the latter located behind the thoracic region. Count time is 200 

seconds (Palmer, no date). 

A coaxial HPGe scanning array developed in July 1989 is still in operation today (Lyon, 1990). For 

this system the person lies on a bed in a shielded room and the detector array moves under the bed. 

From 1960 to 1983, four radionuclides were reported routinely: sodium-24, potassium-40, zinc-65, 

and cesium-137. Potassium-40 is strictly a natural source. Sodium-24 and zinc-65 were detectable in 

many whole-body counts in the 1960s. Most of these intakes came from sanitary water drawn from 

the Columbia River (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 37). Cesium-137 detections are attributable to 

Hanford operations. 

6.1.2.2 Chest Counters 

In 1967, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory started using the original large NaI detector in the 

Iron Room for chest counting, with emphasis on uranium workers. The detector was placed directly 

over and nearly in contact with the chest region, with the worker in the supine position. Count time 

was 30 minutes. In the next year, a new counting room called the Lead Room was built specifically 

for chest counting. The Lead Room had four 5-inch-diameter by 0.375-inch-thick NaI detectors, two 

in front and two in back of the subject. Count time was 30 minutes (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 39; 

Wilson, 1987). 

A second chest counting system became operational in 1978 (Wilson, 1987). A phoswich detector 

became available and was used occasionally for special chest counts, but was never operated on a 

routine basis. A solid-state germanium counting system using three planar HPGe detectors (soon 

upgraded to six detectors) replaced the NaI detector in the Iron Room chair counter in 1983 (Palmer, 

1984). The HPGe detectors provide better spectral resolution than the NaI detector, thus resulting in 

lower backgrounds in the region of interest, better discrimination against radon decay products, and 

better detection of low-energy photon emitters in the presence of large activities of high-energy 

photon emitters (e.g., cesium-137 or cobalt-60) (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 40). 

Within less than a year, the three-detector system was upgraded to a six-detector array, allowing 

routine counting times to be reduced to 1,000 seconds with nearly the same reliable detector activities 

(RDAs) (Palmer, no date; Carbaugh, 1988). In July 1989, a second HPGe detector array became 

operational in a new shielded cell called the Stainless Steel Room (the inner (i.e., visible) lining of the 

graded shield was stainless steel). Although intended to be a six-detector array, this counter had only 

four detectors at first because of operational problems with the detectors. Counting times were 

increased to 2,000 seconds for the six-detector array and 3,000 seconds for the four-detector array 

(Lyon, 1990). 

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Ultrasonic measurements of chest wall thickness for workers who had activity in the lung began in 

about 1978 and continue today (Palmer, 1979, page 4). Decision levels for non-detected activities use 

a weight-to-height ratio to estimate chest wall thickness, whereas detected activity is corrected for 

chest wall thickness using ultrasound (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 42). 

For in vivo counting, the assumption was made that thorium-234 was in equilibrium with uranium238. This was a reasonable assumption at Hanford. Uranium recently separated from dissolved fuel 

was certainly not in equilibrium, and uranium being treated at the UO3 Plant might have been in 

equilibrium depending on how long it had taken the material to go through the separation process and 

be transported to the UO3 Plant. However, uranium in this part of the fuel cycle was very soluble and 

not important in relation to chest counting. Chest counts were used to monitor for intakes of insoluble 

forms of uranium, which were very old forms in terms of time elapsed since purification from decay 

progeny (e.g., machining on metal, uranium metallurgy studies) (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 42). 

6.1.2.3 Thyroid Counters 

While there is evidence of thyroid in vivo bioassay at Hanford as early as 1944 (Ikenberry, 1991), 

routine thyroid counting started on a limited basis for high-risk workers in 1956. Wilson (1960) 

states, thyroid counting started on a limited basis for high-risk workers at least as early as 1956. 

Wilson (1960) states, “At the present time routine thyroid monitoring is conducted on a limited basis 

in the REDOX and PUREX Facilities. Generally the pattern for coverage in the PUREX Facility 

includes about four to five employees weekly, picked from the sampling crews, crane operators, and a 

Radiation Monitor assigned to the stack area. At the REDOX Facility, routine monitoring is 

accomplished on a weekly basis for the shift crane operators” (Wilson, 1960). The letter continues to 

discuss counts and other data obtained in 1959; however, there is no indication if those results were 

placed in workers’ files. Radiation monitoring data sheets from 1956 show that results below 10 nCi 

for iodine-131 were recorded as “less than” (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 42). 

The first mobile whole-body counter had a thyroid counter consisting of a 3-inch by 3-inch NaI 

detector (assumed to mean 3-inch diameter by 3-inch thick) that was positioned next to the neck. That 

same detector was included in a description of in vivo counting capabilities at the Whole-Body 

Counting Facility (Andersen, 1971) and again in Palmer (1985). Minimum detectable activities were 

first listed with corresponding counts in 1986. Because the minimum detectable activity is different 

for each thyroid count, person-specific calculations were used (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 42). 

Starting at least as far back as 1967, a thin, 2-inch diameter NaI crystal with a beryllium window was 

used to count iodine-125 in the thyroid. By 1985, thyroid counting for iodine-125 was performed 

using two intrinsic germanium detectors, with a minimum detectable activity of 0.005 nCi for a 2,000­

sec count (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 43). 

Thyroid counting for either of the iodine isotopes has been rare since 1987 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, 

page 43). 

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6.1.2.4 Thorium Exposure Monitoring 

Experimental work with thorium began as early as 1946 at Hanford and continued until 1970. Except 

for small-scope, limited-time projects that may have occurred occasionally, exposure to thorium at 

Hanford stopped in 1970 (Gydesen, 1954; ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

Monitoring capable of detecting thorium intakes began with the start of the routine whole-body 

counting program in 1960. However, the first indication of thorium being reported as a detected 

analyte occurs in 1962. The REX database shows no thorium whole-body counting results until one 

count in 1962, two in 1963, and 48 in 1964; there were a total of 102 results from 1962 to 1970. 

Early thorium whole-body count monitoring was based on the detection of actinium-228. The two 

radionuclides, thorium and actinium, would not have been in equilibrium; both disequilibrium at 

intake and separate biological processes on the thorium-232 parent and the radium-228 progeny meant 

that the thorium-232 activity in the body would not have been the same as the measured actinium-228. 

Adjustment factors are provided in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 to account for this discrepancy (ORAUTTKBS-0006-5, page 44). 

Thorium urinalyses were used for special investigations (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 44). 

6.1.2.5 Head Counters and Other Counts 

Miscellaneous counts have been performed over the years at Hanford, including wound counts, head 

counts, liver counts, lymph node counts, and various longitudinal scans with collimated detectors to 

pinpoint the location of external or internal contamination. Results of these scans in the REX 

database are almost always listed as special counts associated with known intakes (ORAUT-TKBS0006-5, page 47). 

Since at least 1978, for intakes of plutonium or americium, head counts have been used to correct 

chest counts for activity in the bones of the chest region (Palmer, 1979). 

Routine head counting for strontium-90 or promethium-147 did occur for some period of time in the 

1970s. These counts were not very sensitive and there is the question about what a head count means 

in relation to the activity in the total skeleton. The same worker should have strontium-90 urinalysis 

results; the latter would be given preference for confirming or quantifying an intake (ORAUT-TKBS0006-5, page 47). 

6.2 Hanford External Monitoring Data 

The following discussion provides a summary of the Hanford site external dosimetry program, as well 

as the types, quantity, and quality of data that can be used for external dose reconstruction. Details 

regarding the various analyses used and the associated minimum detectable activities are presented in 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6. Additional information regarding the external dosimetry equipment, 

methodologies, and techniques in use during the time period of the proposed class is described in the 

Manual of Standard Procedures: Personnel Meters (Hart, 1946). Administrative practices are 

generally described in Historical Review of Personnel Dosimetry Development and its Use in 

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Radiation Protection Programs at Hanford, (Wilson, 1987). A description of the historical recorded 

dose values is provided in Historical Hanford Radiological Record Description (Fix, 2001). 

Records of radiation doses from personnel dosimeters worn by workers and co-workers are available 

for Hanford operations beginning in 1944 and reviews of the Hanford personnel dose data for 10- and 

15-year periods from the startup of Hanford are available in Parker (1954) and Keene (1960), 

respectively. Doses from these dosimeters were recorded at the time of measurement and were 

routinely reviewed by Hanford operations and radiation safety staff for compliance with radiation 

control limits. 

As is the case with Hanford’s internal monitoring data, external monitoring data are available via the 

CEDR database and the REX database. The NIOSH External Dosimetry Implementation Guide 

(OCAS-IG-001) has identified these records as representing the highest-quality records for 

retrospective dose assessments. 

Historically, Hanford had an extensive Radiation Safety Monitoring program that measured radiation 

exposure in the workplace by using portable radiation instruments (Howell, 1989), contamination 

surveys, zone controls, and personnel dosimeters (Parker 1954; Wilson, 1987). Monitoring was 

performed directly or under the guidance of a specially trained group of radiation monitors (i.e., 

radiation protection technologists). The results from the personnel dosimeters were used to measure 

and record dose from external radiation exposure to Hanford workers throughout the history of 

Hanford operations (Wilson, 1987). These dosimeters, as noted in the Health Instrument Division 

section of routine reports (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6), include one or more of the following: 

• Personnel whole-body beta/photon dosimeters 

• Pocket Ionization Chamber dosimeters 

• Personnel extremity dosimeters 

• Personnel whole-body neutron dosimeters 

Table 6-1 presents the number of annual dose records contained in the REX database for Hanford 

workers. 

Table 6-1: Summary of Available External Monitoring Data for Hanford Workers (1942-1992) 

Table 6-1 and corresponding table notes span two pages 

Total Number of Annual External Doses Recorded 

Year Total Record Number1 Shallow Dose Records2 Deep Dose Records2 Neutron Dose Records2 

1946 4,051 3,220 3,112 0 

1947 6,172 4,229 3,962 0 

1948 8,668 6,046 4,864 0 

1949 8,532 6,035 5,038 0 

1950 8,558 5,960 5,109 16 

1951 10,701 7,088 5,549 14 

1952 10,907 7,281 5,870 1 

1953 10,159 7,670 6,763 1 

1954 10,636 7,647 6,179 4 

1955 12,078 9,287 7,449 2 

1956 12,676 8,023 5,466 7 

1957 12,450 5,201 4,470 12 

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Table 6-1: Summary of Available External Monitoring Data for Hanford Workers (1942-1992) 

Table 6-1 and corresponding table notes span two pages 

Total Number of Annual External Doses Recorded 

Year Total Record Number1 Shallow Dose Records2 Deep Dose Records2 Neutron Dose Records2 

1958 10,813 5,419 4,973 307 

1959 10,191 4,683 4,192 181 

1960 11,015 5,516 5,242 421 

1961 11,011 8,101 7,991 455 

1962 11,149 9,619 9,582 587 

1963 12,219 9,771 9,813 336 

1964 12,001 9,905 10,064 918 

1965 11,989 9,554 9,654 605 

1966 10,848 9,072 9,010 536 

1967 11,008 8,450 8,412 395 

1968 10,739 8,917 8,630 359 

1969 10,311 7,969 6,818 302 

1970 11,108 5,509 4,956 206 

1971 13,518 6,607 6,217 242 

1972 13,404 9,580 9,552 655 

1973 13,242 7,650 7,627 548 

1974 19,060 9305 9,238 946 

1975 20,444 12,273 12,164 471 

1976 21,900 11,945 11,866 195 

1977 25,589 14,323 14,265 481 

1978 27,339 16,495 16,380 495 

1979 28,012 16,774 16,250 591 

1980 28,019 17,651 16,361 550 

1981 28,073 14,802 13,186 571 

1982 26,770 14,914 13,150 319 

1983 28,092 10,771 7,748 458 

1984 29,080 12,063 10,656 605 

1985 29,981 10,666 6,977 867 

1986 29,679 8,756 5,191 995 

1987 24,864 14,217 13,639 1,309 

1988 25,261 6,082 5,531 1,572 

1989 26,212 9,866 9,260 1,415 

1990 28,008 5,252 4,351 1,153 

1991 30,595 4,202 3,406 966 

1992 36,157 4,320 3,188 948 

Notes: 

1

 The REX database software does not allow for null entries and inserts a zero where they occur. Therefore, the
 

number of records noted in this column reflects the sum of the zero and non-zero records. Totals shown apply to
 

shallow, deep, and neutron record counts. 

2

 Totals shown are for non-zero records.
 

Hanford began operations in 1944 using in-house dosimeter processing and technical support. 

Hanford based its beta/photon film dosimetry methods on the dosimeter design developed at the 

Metallurgical Laboratory by Pardue, Goldstein, and Wollan (Pardue, 1944). This design was 

implemented at several of the Manhattan Engineer District sites. Beginning in 1944, Hanford 

implemented its individual worker neutron dosimetry methods, using pocket ionization chambers with 

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a boron-10 enriched lining. In 1950, the Nuclear Track Emulsion Type A dosimeter capability was 

implemented (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

Parameters concerning Hanford administrative practices significant to dose reconstruction include: 

•	 Policies to assign dosimeters to workers 

•	 Policies to exchange dosimeters 

•	 Policies to record the measured dose and not using a notional dose (i.e., some identified value for 

lower-dosed workers often based on a small fraction of the regulatory limit) 

•	 Policies to estimate dose for missing or damaged dosimeters 

•	 Policies to replace destroyed or missing records 

•	 Policies to evaluate and record dose for incidents 

•	 Policies to obtain and record occupational dose to workers for other employer exposure 

•	 Policies to evaluate and categorize workplace radiological hazards 

Hanford policies appear to have been in place for all of these parameters (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

Routine Hanford practices appear to have required assigning dosimeters to all workers who entered a 

controlled radiation area (Hart, 1967). Dosimeters were exchanged on a routine schedule. Dosimeters 

were processed and the measured results were recorded and used to estimate dose. There appears to 

be no use of recorded notional doses, although there are issues of “missed” recorded dose for lowdosed dosimeters, as well as recorded doses for individual dosimeters at levels less than the statistical 

minimum detection level (see ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6 for details). 

Early Hanford dosimetry procedures describe several aspects of the routine dosimetry program. 

Hanford workers entering operating areas were assigned dosimeters beginning in 1944 and throughout 

the proposed class timeframe. Trends in the number of monitored workers and the collective dose for 

these workers are shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2. These figures illustrate the number of workers with 

positive recorded dose from photon and neutron radiation, respectively, along with the number of 

monitored workers (Buschbom, 1993). 

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Figure 6-1: No. of Monitored Hanford Workers and Collective Dose, 1944 – 1989 

1.E+03 

1.E+04 

1.E+05 

1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 

Year 

No. of Monitored Workers 

Collective Dose (person-rem) f or All Workers 

Figure 6-2: Monitored Hanford Workers with Photon >0 and Neutron Dose >0, 1944 – 1989 

1.E+01 

1.E+02 

1.E+03 

1.E+04 

1.E+05 

1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 

Year 

No. of Monit ored Workers 

No . o f wo rk ers, Reco rded An nual Dose > 0 

No . o f wo rk ers, Reco rded Neut ron Dose > 0 

Administrative practices are generally described in Wilson, 1987. A description of the content of the 

historical recorded dose values for each year is provided in Fix, 2001. There does not appear to be 

any significant administrative practice that would jeopardize the integrity of the recorded dose of 

record. A study of detailed dosimetry records by E. S. Gilbert found agreement between the original 

paper records and computerized dose records (Gilbert, 1990). In addition, Hanford film dosimeter 

results were examined in the 1960s at the University of Pittsburgh as part of the AEC Health and 

Mortality Study of Hanford Workers (AEC, 1966). The University of Pittsburgh research results 

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regarding recorded dose data showed “good quality control was exercised over the film badge 

calibration and processing procedures at Hanford over the years (i.e., 1944 through 1961).” In 

addition, NIOSH has obtained and examined many of the routine weekly and monthly health physics 

organization reports; these reports illustrate ongoing knowledge of workplace hazards and operational 

controls. 

6.3 Hanford Air Sampling Data 

Air monitoring at Hanford was based on gross alpha and gross beta measurements corrected for radon 

progeny. Air monitoring was typically considered to be a facility-specific activity similar to radiation 

and contamination surveys and was used in day-to-day administration of workplace activities, such as 

in the preparation of the Special Work Permits. The raw data, if it still existent, were not collected in 

a central database, but maintained in facility-specific records. The amount of the raw data still in 

existence has not been determined. 

Limited air sampling results are available from the weekly and monthly reports of the Health 

Instrument Division of the Medical Department. These are brief summaries, mostly highlighting 

problems or indicating that air concentrations were below concern. Often no values were given and 

locations relative to the workers location are unknown. In addition, air sample data from the reactors 

were almost never listed in these reports. 

7.0 Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction for the Proposed Class 

The feasibility determination for the proposed class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1). Under that Act and rule, NIOSH must 

establish whether or not it has access to sufficient information either to estimate the maximum 

radiation dose for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed that could have 

been incurred under plausible circumstances by any member of the class, or to estimate the radiation 

doses to members of the class more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. If NIOSH has access to 

sufficient information for either case, NIOSH would then determine that it was feasible to conduct 

dose reconstructions. 

In determining feasibility, NIOSH begins by evaluating whether current or completed NIOSH dose 

reconstructions demonstrate the feasibility of estimating with sufficient accuracy the potential 

radiation exposures of the class (discussed in Section 9.0 of this report). If the conclusion is one of 

infeasibility, NIOSH systematically evaluates the sufficiency of different types of monitoring data, 

process and source or source term data, which together or individually might assure that NIOSH can 

estimate either the maximum doses that members of the class might have incurred, or more precise 

quantities that reflect the variability of exposures experienced by groups or individual members of the 

class as summarized in Section 7.6. This approach is discussed in OCAS’s SEC Petition Evaluation 

Internal Procedures, which are available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas. The next four major 

subsections of this Evaluation Report examine: 

• The sufficiency and reliability of the available data. (Section 7.1) 

• The feasibility of reconstructing internal radiation doses. (Section 7.2) 

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• The feasibility of reconstructing external radiation doses. (Section 7.3) 

• The bases for petition SEC-00057-2 as submitted by the petitioner. (Section 7.4) 

7.1 Pedigree of Hanford Data 

This subsection answers questions that need to be asked before performing a feasibility evaluation. 

Data Pedigree addresses the background, history, and origin of the data. It requires looking at site 

methodologies that may have changed over time; primary versus secondary data sources and whether 

they match; and whether data are internally consistent. All these issues form the bedrock of the 

researcher’s confidence and later conclusions about the data’s quality, credibility, reliability, 

representativeness, and sufficiency for determining the feasibility of dose reconstruction. The 

feasibility evaluation presupposes that data pedigree issues have been settled. 

A centralized radiological records program was established at Hanford at essentially the beginning of 

operations in 1943. Originally termed the Health Instrument Division, and in later years the Hanford 

Personnel Dosimetry Program (HPDP), this centralized group has maintained responsibility for 

Hanford workers’ radiological records, as well as for operating the internal and external dosimetry 

programs. There have been only two primary Hanford contractors and predecessor agencies 

responsible for the HPDP during the proposed class timeframe. Since 1965, the HPDP has been 

administered by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Prior to Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory, the General Electric Company was the administrator. DOE and its contractors have 

required radiological dose records to be administered and preserved by the HPDP for all Hanford 

workers and visitors, past and present, and have provided specified and requested reports using these 

records. The HPDP also maintains historical documentation of Hanford contractor radiation 

protection policies. However, facility radiological records, such as measured ambient exposure or 

contamination levels, are typically maintained according to the specific facility and are not included in 

the radiological record system for Hanford workers. 

Hanford record-handling capabilities have evolved over time with the availability of computerassisted retrieval and record imaging technology. Prior to 1958, HPDP staff used forms to manually 

record dosimeter processing and dose information. These forms were revised for each year of 

operation to show the scheduled dates of dosimeter exchange for each operating area. Designations 

on the form show each area that was operational during each year. Forms were revised to include 

designations for each new operating area as it became operational. 

Since 1958, the Hanford HPDP has migrated historical monitoring records into the newer systems 

while preserving existing original, manually-recorded records. Currently, a sophisticated database 

system is used to track and report dose for all current workers. The program also maintains a REX 

system that contains individual radiological exposure records for all Hanford DOE, contractor, and 

subcontractor employees, as well as for Hanford visitors. The REX database also contains annual 

summaries of each worker's external dose for each year of Hanford employment and summaries of 

internal dose for Hanford workers. 

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HPDP staff members maintain individual worker exposure records that are not reducible to database 

elements and also maintain backup documentation, known as the Hanford Radiation Protection 

Historical Files. To support this effort, the REX system incorporates exposure documentation on 

microfilm and compact disc that is indexed into computer-assisted retrieval systems. The computerassisted retrieval systems allow rapid retrieval of documents for any worker, using identifiers such as 

payroll number, social security number, names, and/or REX identifiers. REX identifiers are unique 

numbers generated for each worker to link all of his/her records. The staff scans, indexes, and 

retrieves hard-copy documents; prepares documents for long-term storage; and tracks and accounts for 

the documents through the imaging and indexing process. 

Current and past Hanford workers have access to their records at any time upon request. Records 

supplied to NIOSH by Hanford’s HPDP staff for EEOICPA purposes include computerized printouts 

of worker dose, in addition to copies of original, manually-entered dose records (when applicable). 

7.1.1 Internal Data Review 

NIOSH has found that Hanford policies for the collection and maintenance of employee monitoring 

data are sufficient for dose reconstruction in terms of the pedigree parameters described above. Upon 

request, the Hanford HPDP provides original hardcopy records in addition to database printouts (prior 

to 1958), which ensure the ability to confirm data. Per Dose Reconstruction Training ORAUTTRNG-0051, dated March 1, 2007, personnel performing dose reconstructions compare these data 

when performing dose reconstructions. Having the original records and this procedure in place 

negates a need for a separate internal consistency check of the manually entered data. 

7.1.2 External Data Review 

As noted for internal dosimetry records, Hanford policies also appear to have been in place for all 

significant external dosimetry record collection and maintenance activities, resulting in records of 

sufficient pedigree for external dose reconstruction use. In addition to NIOSH’s review, a 1990 

evaluation of the Hanford program identified no significant administrative practice that would 

jeopardize the integrity of the recorded external dose (Wilson, 1990). Two additional reviews of 

external dose records have been conducted. A study of detailed dosimetry records for a selected 

group of workers included in the Hanford Mortality study (Gilbert, 1990) found very good agreement 

between original paper records and Hanford’s REX database. A study by the University of Pittsburgh, 

Feasibility Study of the Correlation of Lifetime Health and Mortality Experience of AEC and AEC 

Contractor Employees with Occupational Radiation Exposure (AEC, 1966), concluded that good 

quality control was exercised over the film badge calibration and processing procedures at Hanford 

over the years covered by the proposed class. 

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7.2 Internal Radiation Doses at Hanford 

The principal sources of internal radiation doses to members of the proposed class would have been 

inhalation and ingestion of radiological contamination during the following operations: 

• Fabrication of uranium metal fuel elements 

• Irradiation of fuel elements in reactors to produce plutonium-239 

• Chemical separation of plutonium-239 from irradiated fuel elements 

• Plutonium concentration and finishing 

• Research and Development of production operations and biological and ecological systems 

• Waste management operations supporting all site radiological activities 

The potential internal sources would have been dependent on the operational area and activities. The 

major sources of intakes have been plutonium, americium-241 (either as an ingrown contaminant in 

the plutonium or as a separated product), uranium, fission and activation products, and tritium. 

However, the records list a wide spectrum of radionuclides that were monitored and an even longer 

list of codes used to identify the radionuclides, groups of radionuclides, specific measurement 

techniques, or combinations of radionuclides and techniques. Many of the radionuclides apply to a 

small set of workers on a research project or to workers (for instance, radiation monitoring 

technicians) whose tasks could have exposed them to many different sources (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

5). 

7.2.1 Process-Related Internal Doses at Hanford 

The following subsections summarize the extent and limitations of information available for 

reconstructing the process-related internal doses of members of the proposed class. More detailed 

information on the individual topics can be found in Section 6.1 of this report and in ORAUT-TKBS0006-5. 

7.2.1.1 Plutonium 

Plutonium production was the original mission of the Hanford Engineer Works; plutonium bioassay 

was recognized as a priority from the very beginning of operations. A special studies group was 

formed in 1944 to determine a way to measure plutonium in the body. Limits on the amount of 

plutonium in the body were set as early as 1944. After experimentation with various methods of 

plutonium bioassay analysis, routine urine sampling plutonium was initiated sometime prior to 

September 1946 (Wilson, 1987). 

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Based on information in ORAUT-TKBS-0006 and its associated references, the recorded plutonium 

internal dose to Hanford workers is reasonably accurate for all years and for all facilities. In addition, 

a guidance document written by J. W. Healy, dated March 1, 1946, shows that all Hanford workers 

entering plutonium areas were to have been placed in the plutonium urinalysis bioassay program. The 

guidelines to determine which workers were subject to plutonium urinalysis included (Healy, 1946): 

The workers of the Plant will be divided into three classes, depending on their relative exposure to 

Plutonium. The frequency of analysis for each class will be given as follows: 

•	 Class 1 – Continuously employed in product work area – every 2-3 months 

•	 Class 2 – Occasionally employed in product work area – every 4-6 months 

•	 Class 3 – All other employees (for control) – every 12 months 

The policy was modified in a 1948 document (Healy, 1948): 

•	 Group 1 consisted of personnel who spent 50% of their working time in product (plutonium) 

areas of the Isolation Building, Concentration Buildings, or the Control Laboratories; they 

were sampled every three months. 

•	 Group 2 consisted of personnel working in the 200 Areas who spent 50% of their working time 

in the Canyon Buildings and/or Metal Storage Basins and the technical personnel in the 300 

Area working with product on an intermittent basis; they were sampled every six months. 

•	 Group 3 consisted of personnel who had clearance to any zone of the operating areas but did 

not spend 50% of their time in a product zone; they were sampled once a year. 

•	 In addition, samples were taken from personnel involved in an accident involving possible 

plutonium contamination. 

Bioassay results are available from the start of routine sampling continuing throughout the time period 

of the class proposed for this evaluation. The quantity and quality of available plutonium urinalysis 

results in REX were sufficient for NIOSH to perform co-worker intake analyses presented in 

ORAUT-OTIB-0039. NIOSH has found no indication of the existence of any work groups that were 

at risk for plutonium intakes that are not represented in the co-worker data. NIOSH has not identified 

any additional data that would indicate that the co-worker data does not adequately represent the 

exposure potential of Hanford’s high risk plutonium workers. 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, the internal dose from plutonium for the class under 

evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.2.1.2 Americium 

Americium was usually a trace contaminant in plutonium mixtures; however, there were processes at 

Hanford that involved separating americium from plutonium. Experiments to separate americium-241 

from aged plutonium solutions were carried out as early as 1949 (Hanford Works, 1949). The 

separation by the peroxide precipitation method was accomplished in November 1950 in the Isolation 

Building (231-Z); the quantity of americium obtained far exceeded the amount anticipated. After the 

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americium was precipitated in the Isolation Building, it was then concentrated in a recovery unit of the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant (234-5Z) (Various Division Managers, 1950; Gerber, 2005). Hanford 

monthly reports from 1951 to 1953 show the quantities of americium-241 produced to be in the tens 

of milligrams to about 1 gram per month. For the years 1954 through 1963, NIOSH was unable to 

find information documenting an active americium recovery program or any associated production 

quantities. 

In 1964, a new americium recovery system was installed in a glovebox in the Waste Treatment 

Facility (242-Z), part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant complex. The 242-Z americium recovery 

system became operational in May 1965, producing americium nitrate. Production was increased 

from the early processes with the first batch on September 9, 1964 yielding 7.6 grams. In June 1965, 

8.6 grams were recovered, 15.2 grams in October 1965, and 8.3 grams in December 1965. From 1966 

through 1968, the rate of production averaged 7 to 8 grams a month. Production rates dropped in 

1969 due to a decrease in available plutonium feed (Gerber, 2005). 

 In 1969, the process in 242-Z was converted from a batch to a continuous process, which increased 

the purity and concentration of the americium product (DOE, 2002). On August 30, 1976 in the 242­

Z Facility, an explosion occurred in a column containing about 100 grams of americium-241. 

Although the column was located in a glovebox, the chemical operator standing in front of the column 

was contaminated and suffered facial cuts, burns, eye damage, and americium-241 deposition. 

Following the accident, the 242-Z facility was closed permanently (Gerber, 2005). 

NIOSH has found no indication of americium excreta analysis being performed at Hanford prior to 

1964. There is no mention of americium analysis either in Healy (1948); in a 1954 memo, “Bioassay 

Annual Report,” that lists numbers of urinalyses for plutonium, fission products, and uranium 

(Watters, 1954); or in a compilation of bioassay procedures, titled “Bioassay Procedures and Analysis 

(Old Bioassay Bible),” dated April 10, 1961 (Unknown author, 1961). 

The first americium bioassay records in the REX database show 41 urinalyses for americium-241 in 

1964, collected from 19 workers. The samples were collected over a short time period. The first 12 

samples were collected on August 25 or 26, 1964. The last sample was collected on October 29, 

1964. These samples appear to be baseline data for the new process starting up in 242-Z. Since no 

americium urinalyses were recorded in 1965 or 1966, it appears routine sampling for americium 

separation workers had not yet been started. An interviewee (the manager of the Radiobioassay 

laboratory at that time) stated that “From 1965 to 1983, americium and curium were obtained by 

DDTP extraction, collection on a planchet, and gross alpha counting” (Personal Communication, 

2003). The earliest located information on the minimum detectable activity on the analyses dates 

from 1967, as described below. 

For 1967, the REX records show 168 bioassay analyses; these were a combination of urine and fecal 

analyses for the same six workers who were involved in a potential intake accident occurring on May 

2, 1967 in Building 222-S. There are internal dosimetry evaluations in the workers’ files documenting 

the accident and bioassay results. Many of the urine sample results were listed as <5.41 × 10-7 μCi/L, 

so it is assumed that this was the minimum detectable activity for the analysis (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

5). 

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In a memorandum to file from a senior development engineer in the Personnel Dosimetry Services, 

the new detection limit for americium-241 is stated as 2.0 dpm/sample as of July 10, 1969 (Jech, 

1969). 

From 1968 through 1990, americium bioassay results are found in the REX database. In addition, 

routine in vivo chest counts for plutonium and americium deposited in the lung were initiated in early 

1968. The Chest Counting Room was constructed using lead with copper sheeting, and used four 

five-inch diameter sodium iodide (NaI) crystals coupled in five-inch phototubes. This analysis had a 

detectable amount of 0.15 to 1.60 nanocuries (Wilson, 1987). 

Based on the initiation of routine in vitro bioassay for americium in January 1968, and the routine 

operation of the chest counter for the detection of americium in early 1968, NIOSH finds that the 

internal americium-241 dose for the class under evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient 

accuracy beginning January 1, 1969. However, prior to January 1, 1969, based on the lack of 

available information showing that there was a routine americium bioassay program in place, or 

information detailing the type of analysis of levels of detection, NIOSH finds that the internal 

americium-241 dose cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy for the areas where americium 

activity cannot be associated with measured plutonium activity. NIOSH research to date indicates that 

americium isolation activities took place in: the Isolation Building (231-Z), the Waste Treatment 

Facility (242-Z), and the Plutonium Finishing Plant (234-5Z). NIOSH has insufficient information 

detailing worker movement between buildings of the 200 Area and is, therefore, unable to identify the 

potentially-exposed population using a building-specific class definition. NIOSH finds that the 

internal americium-241 dose cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy for the Hanford 200 

Area. 

7.2.1.3 Uranium 

Routine urinalysis for uranium began in 1947, but the results were considered unreliable until 1948 

when improvements in the procedure were made (Healy, 1948). The numbers of uranium urinalysis 

results in the REX database were found to be sufficient for performing co-worker intake analyses on a 

quarterly basis through 1969, and on an annual basis through the 1970s. The number of results per 

period ranged from a low of 65 in 1973 to a high of 1,197 in the second quarter of 1955. NIOSH has 

found no indication of the existence of any work groups that were at risk for uranium intakes that are 

not represented in the co-worker data, and NIOSH has not identified any additional data that would 

indicate that the co-worker data set does not adequately represent the exposure potential of Hanford’s 

highest risk uranium workers. A method to apply uranium co-worker data to unmonitored workers 

can be found in ORAUT-OTIB-0039, Section 6.2. 

NIOSH finds that uranium co-worker intake results cannot be extrapolated to cover exposures 

occurring prior to 1948, due to major process differences existing prior to the urinalysis monitoring 

program. Starting in January 1945, Hanford began extruding uranium billets in Building 314. The 

extrusion process entailed heating a uranium billet to about 1000 degrees C in a muffle type furnace to 

soften the metal, and then forcing the billet at high pressure through a die to form uranium rods 

approximately 1.45 inches in diameter (Lindlief, no date; Gerber, 1993; DOE, 1997). Hanford ended 

the extrusion process in 1948, at about the same time that uranium urinalysis began (DOE, 1997). 

Accordingly, there is not a predictable relationship between exposures prior to 1948 and exposures 

thereafter that were associated with entirely different processes. However, because of similarities 

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between the Hanford extrusion process and the processes at several AWE uranium metal handling 

facilities, NIOSH can adequately bound the doses from Hanford uranium metal operations using 

assumptions and methods such as those provided in ORAUT-OTIB-0004. 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, the internal dose from uranium for the class under 

evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.2.1.4 Thorium 

As early as October 1945, Hanford performed experimental work and testing with thorium (called 

“myrnalloy” at the time) (Gydesen, 1954; McMaster, 1951). In January 1946, Hanford received a 

shipment of 150 pounds of thorium, which consisted of crooked four- to five-foot long rods that 

required straightening prior to machining (Gydesen, 1954). To prevent the rods from being 

contaminated with uranium from the contaminated equipment in Building 314, these thorium rods 

were straightened manually in the 300 Area Maintenance Shop with a 75 ton press. This shop was 

possibly located in Building 3722 (known later as the “Area Shop”) or the Tool Room Shop inside 

Building 313. Following straightening, the rods were cut into 33 slugs with a power hack-saw, then 

machined on a small lathe in the 313 Tool Room (Kidder, 1946). The slugs were then canned, 

welded, and tested for integrity. Prior to charging them into a production reactor, some of these 33 

slugs were placed in the 305 Test Reactor to determine their effect on neutron flux distribution. On 

March 26, 1946, these thorium slugs were charged into the 105 D Reactor for testing. In April 1947, 

171.2 additional pounds of thorium rods were received at Hanford and were machined into 44 slugs 

(Gydesen, 1954). 

Large-scale thorium contamination was introduced into the 313 Building and surrounding fuel 

warehouses in the early 1950s. Thorium work in Building 313 continued until l970. 

Thorium work (See Table 7-1 below) was also conducted in Building 306 (alloy and fabrication test 

and development) from 1956 through 1970; Building 3706 (radiochemistry in support of fuel 

fabrication) from 1954 through 1963; Building 3732 (fabrication of thorium oxide fuel targets and a 

furnace for recycling depleted thorium) from 1965 through 1970; Building 3722 (possible machining 

of thorium rods in the early years, and later the fabrication of pelletized fuel targets) from 1946 

through 1970; and the 202 A PUREX Building (thorium recovery from irradiated fuel elements) with 

a process test in 1965 and two major thorium campaigns in 1966 and 1970. The PUREX thorium 

work recovered approximately 565 tons of thorium in the nitrate form from both campaigns (ORAUTTKBS-0006-5; Gerber, 1992; Walser, 1978). 

Table 7-1: Buildings with Thorium Processing 

Building, Area Date 

313, 300 1946–1970 

306, 300 1956–1970 

3706, 300 1954–1963 

3732, 300 1965–1970 

3722, 300 1968–1970 

202 A, PUREX, 200 East 1965–1970 

The sources for Table 7-1 include ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 and Gydesen 1954. 

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Routine monitoring for thorium intakes by whole-body counting was based on actinium-228. NIOSH 

has found that whole-body count records may report either thorium-232 results or actinium-228 

results, but in either case the measured activity was actinium-228. ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 presents 

methods and assumptions for assigning thorium intakes based on actinium in vivo bioassay results. 

Whole-body counting equipment and techniques were operational at Hanford in 1959 and have been 

in use for routine bioassay since 1960 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, page 35). 

Examination of Hanford in vivo and in vitro bioassay records indicate insufficient thorium bioassay 

prior to the start of thorium whole-body counting in 1962. Available thorium specific workplace and 

air monitoring data were also found to be inadequate to support sufficiently accurate dose 

reconstruction prior to 1962. 

Based on the inadequacies of thorium-specific monitoring, NIOSH finds that the internal dose from 

intakes of concentrated thorium activity cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy prior to 

January 1, 1962. NIOSH research to date indicates that insufficiently-monitored operations with 

isolated thorium took place in Buildings 313, 306, 3706, and the 3722 Shop. NIOSH has insufficient 

information detailing worker movement between buildings of the 300 Area and is, therefore, unable to 

identify the potentially-exposed population using a building-specific class definition. NIOSH finds 

that the internal thorium dose cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy for the Hanford 300 

Area prior to January 1, 1962. 

7.2.1.5 Tritium 

Bioassay monitoring for tritium began in 1949 at Hanford (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). As was the case 

at many facilities, tritium doses were included in the external dosimetry reports, through 1987. 

Tritium dose reconstruction is possible from 1949 to the present day based on individual worker 

monitoring and through the assignment of co-worker doses for unmonitored workers. ORAUTTKBS-0006-5 provides a method to assign tritium exposures to unmonitored workers based on a coworker analysis. NIOSH has found no indication of the existence of any work groups that were at risk 

for tritium intakes that are not represented in the co-worker data, and NIOSH has not identified any 

additional data that would indicate that the co-worker data do not adequately represent the Hanford 

workers with the highest tritium exposure potential. 

At the current time, little information on the use of tritium at the site prior to 1949 has been found. 

Facility 108-B started tritium extraction operations in 1949. An extensive search of site records 

yielded no documents mentioning tritium or its code name, P-10, dated earlier than 1948. This 

indicates that the tritium programs were likely to have begun in 1949. Prior to this, tritium may have 

been present at the 100 Area reactors, or at the 200 Area Plutonium Separations Facilities, but NIOSH 

has found no indication that tritium was isolated and separated, and thus would not be a significant 

dose contributor. ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 provides a method to assign tritium exposures to 

unmonitored workers prior to 1949 that results in a dose value larger than all but a few recorded doses 

from 1949 through the 1960s when tritium was isolated and separated. 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, NIOSH finds that it is feasible to estimate the internal 

dose from tritium with sufficient accuracy for the class under evaluation. 

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7.2.1.6 Fission Products 

Exposure to fission and activation products was monitored by combinations of workplace/personal 

surveys, air sampling, and/or bioassay. Fission product urinalysis began soon after the Hanford 

bioassay group was formed in 1946; however, the analytical method used was considered erratic and 

unreliable until January 1948. After 1948, the urinalysis procedure still did not account for all fission 

product nuclides, but only separated and counted radionuclides of alkaline earths and rare earths, such 

as strontium, yttrium, barium, lanthanum, cerium, europium, promethium, zirconium, and niobium. It 

did not account for radionuclides such as ruthenium, cesium, zinc, cobalt, or manganese. The records 

do not have sufficient information to link the results of the monitoring to specific radionuclides, since 

the analyses were usually gross beta or gross gamma counts and were recorded as “fission products” 

under a variety of names (ORAUT-OTIB-0054). Fission product urinalysis was used to monitor for 

intakes of fission products until the implementation of whole-body counting in 1960. 

To account for exposures from all plausible nuclides, ORAUT-OTIB-0054 provides a method for 

using intake mixture ratios, based on different types of work or facilities, to account for nuclides not 

specifically analyzed. For example, if an intake of strontium-90, cesium-137, or ruthenium-106 was 

being assigned to a worker, the other fission and activation products can be assigned by a ratio based 

on the type of work or facility. At Hanford, some fission products had greater prominence than 

indicated in ORAUT-OTIB-0054; these included zinc-65 for essentially all workers (because of its 

presence in the Richland drinking water through about 1972), sodium-24 for workers at the oncethrough-cooled production reactors through about 1971 (see Section 5.3.1), europium-154 for workers 

at N Reactor (because of the samarium-ball emergency shutdown system), and sodium-24 for 400 

Area workers (FFTF) for 1980 through 1994. From 1960 to present, these radionuclides have been 

measured by whole-body counts. If their activity is not included in the whole-body count record, the 

standard missed dose procedure for assigning these intakes with minimum detectable activities is 

used. 

Cesium-137 was recorded routinely with every whole-body count from 1960 through 1983. For 1984 

to 1988, with a few exceptions, cesium-137 was recorded only if it was detected above a reporting 

level. Because of its long half-life, and abundance in waste from the Separations Plants, cesium-137 

has long been considered one of the principal contaminants at Hanford and has often been used as an 

indicator of potential intakes. 

ORAUT-OTIB-0039 provides guidance to assign intakes prior to whole-body counting in 1960 and 

for unmonitored workers, based on co-worker data intake levels during the periods of the highest 

plutonium production years at Hanford from 1965 through 1967 (DOE, 1996). 

Bioassay results are available from the beginning of routine sampling continuing throughout the time 

period of the class proposed for this evaluation. The quantity and quality of available fission bioassay 

results in REX was sufficient for NIOSH to perform co-worker intake analyses, which are presented 

in ORAUT-OTIB-0039. ORAUT-OTIB-0054 can be used to account for nuclides which were not 

directly analyzed for in the gross alpha and beta analyses. NIOSH has found no indication of the 

existence of any work groups that were at risk for fission product intakes that are not represented in 

the co-worker data. NIOSH has not identified any additional data that would indicate that the coworker data do not adequately represent the exposure potential of the Hanford workers with the 

highest risk for exposure to fission products. 

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Based on the information available to NIOSH, NIOSH finds the internal dose from fission products 

for the class under evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.2.1.7 Iodine 

Considerable numbers (hundreds per month) of thyroid scans for iodine-131 were performed on 

workers in the fuel dissolution (canyon) buildings during 1945 through at least 1946. In addition, 

Wilson (1960) states, “At the present time routine thyroid monitoring is conducted on a limited basis 

in the REDOX and PUREX Facilities.” The letter continues to discuss counts and other data obtained 

in 1959; however, there is no indication if those results were placed in workers’ files. Radiation 

monitoring data sheets from 1956 show that results below 10 nCi for iodine-131 were recorded as 

“less than.” The presence of iodine-131 would have been detected in a whole-body count, but the 

recorded quantity would have been based on a whole-body calibration, not a thyroid calibration 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

A review of the thyroid monitoring program was conducted for the Hanford Environmental Dose 

Reconstruction Project (Ikenberry, 1991). The Ikenberry document, which discusses the review of the 

thyroid monitoring program, reviewed over 7,900 thyroid checks from October 1944 through August 

1946. The tolerance level for iodine-131 in air had been established in October 1945 as 1 × 10-13 

Ci/cm3 (Cantril, 1945) based on a permissible equilibrium amount in the thyroid of 2 μCi. The routine 

scanning program began in late May or early June 1945. The decision level for the measurement was 

estimated to correspond to a thyroid burden of about 27 nCi, and 93% of the measurements were 

below this activity. The highest measurement considered to be reasonably due to a thyroid burden (as 

opposed to external contamination) was 131 nCi (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). In these data, there are 

preponderances of low net count-rate results. Over 36% of the results were 0 cpm and nearly 80% 

were less than 5 net cpm. Since the normal background count rate was reported as being about 20 

cpm, more than 98% of all results are within a factor of two of normal background (20 net cpm). 

Ninety-three percent of all measurement results were at or below the decision limit of 10 net cpm 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

Since the beginning of routine whole-body counting, detections of iodine-131 have been a rare 

occurrence. For instance, from 1962 through 1969 (the peak production years), only about 130 

workers (out of about 14,500 whole body and thyroid counts) had detectable iodine-131; results 

ranged from 0.001 to 560 nCi, the highest measurement being a same-day measurement after an 

accidental exposure in the T Plant canyon. Ninety percent of the detected results were less than 15 

nCi. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, Section 5.6, provides guidance for assigning iodine-131 intakes. For workers 

prior to routine whole-body counting, a claimant-favorable assumption is made in which all at-risk 

workers are assumed to have thyroid burdens of 30 nCi (a daily intake of 20,000 pCi). NIOSH has 

found no indication of the existence of any work groups that were at a higher risk for iodine exposures 

than those workers that were included in the whole-body counting program from 1960 to 1987. From 

1960 to 1987, NIOSH assumes that workers who were not covered by whole-body counting did not 

incur intakes greater than the thousands of workers given whole-body counts, which showed no 

detection. Using a nominal detection limit for whole-body counts (as opposed to more sensitive 

thyroid counts) of 5 nCi, unmonitored workers associated with reactors or Fuel Dissolution Plants 

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would be assigned iodine-131 intakes of 3400 pCi/d. Because there was no significant source term 

after 1987 (the reactors were shut down by that time), no intakes of iodine-131 would be assigned 

after 1987 unless the worker’s personal information indicates the potential for an exposure, such as 

might be associated with a research project (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, the internal dose from iodine for the class under 

evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.2.1.8 Polonium 

Starting in 1945 and continuing into the early 1950s, bismuth slugs were irradiated in Hanford 

reactors to produce polonium-210; however, it appears that the slugs were promptly shipped offsite 

(Tilley, 1945; DOE, 1997) for processing at the Monsanto facility in Ohio. No evidence has been 

found that routine extraction or handling of concentrated polonium-210 occurred at Hanford during 

these early years. 

There are indications that work with pure polonium-210 occurred in the 308 Building in 1968 and 

again in 1975 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). Whether the work in the 308 Building was continuous 

throughout that period or occurred just in those two years is not known, but bioassay data from the 

REX database (see Table 7.2) span several years surrounding those two years, indicating that the work 

took place over several years. These results include both urine and fecal samples. It appears that 

polonium work was initiated sometime prior to 1968, based on a handwritten note documenting a 

telephone conversation in November 1967, during which it was stated that the polonium-210 starts in 

the process as the soluble form, but is converted to the insoluble form (Henle, no date). 

Table 7-2: Count of Polonium Bioassay Results (as 

obtained from REX) 

Year Number of Polonium Results 

1968 220 

1969 91 

1970 0 

1971 1 

1972 20 

1973 0 

1974 3 

1975 4 

1976 18 

1977 23 

1978 26 

1979 22 

1980 1 

1981 1 

1982 0 

1983 12 

Due to the limited scope and localized nature of the polonium isolation work, it is considered unlikely 

that a group of workers exists that would have had a higher exposure potential than the workers 

included in the polonium monitoring program. Polonium doses to unmonitored workers in the 308 

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Building can be bounded by applying claimant favorable assumptions and methods such as those 

provided in the NIOSH guidance document, Analysis of Coworker Bioassay Data for Internal Dose 

Assignment (ORAUT-OTIB-0019). Based on the information available to NIOSH, the internal dose 

from polonium for the class under evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.2.1.9 Uranium-233 

Results of analyses performed specifically for assessing uranium-233 exposures are very limited. 

However, NIOSH finds that doses resulting from uranium-233 exposure can be estimated with 

sufficient accuracy using methods detailed in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 and ORAUT-OTIB-0039. A 

brief summary of the Hanford activities involving uranium-233, the monitoring and analyses 

performed, and the dose reconstruction process available are presented below. Complete details are 

provided in the aforementioned documents. 

Uranium-233 was isolated from irradiated thorium at PUREX from 1966 to approximately 1971. 

Separation of uranium-233 from thorium occurred in three distinct campaigns: a small process test in 

1965, production runs in 1966, and production runs in 1970. A total of 820 kg of uranium-233 was 

produced (Walser, 1978; Isochem Inc., 1967). See Section 5.3.4 of ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 for a 

discussion of the program to create uranium-233 by irradiation of thorium. Operators, radiation 

monitors, and equipment maintenance workers at PUREX involved in the campaigns might have had 

the potential for intakes without monitoring that was specific for uranium-233. 

The REX database shows that a few urinalyses were obtained specifically for uranium-233, mostly in 

1970. No information has been located regarding how the analyses were performed or the units of the 

recorded results (see Subsection 6.1.1.5). 

For the purposes of reconstructing doses associated with uranium-233 exposure, ORAUT-TKBS 

0006-5 uses the highest uranium-233 urinalysis result available to NIOSH to estimate potential 

chronic intakes for the period 1965 through 1970. Because the material was absorption type F, 

urinary excretion equilibrates quickly; thus, the same daily intake can be applied for 1 to 5 years 

chronic exposure. The daily intake derived from the highest urinalysis result available is shown to be 

16 pCi per day (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5). To ensure claimant favorability this conservative daily 

intake rate can then be assumed for the entire period of potential uranium-233 exposure. Section 5.2.5 

of ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5 lists the contaminants that need to be added to this intake. 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, the internal dose from uranium-233 for the class under 

evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.2.2 Ambient Environmental Internal Radiation Doses at Hanford 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4 and ORAUT-PROC-0060 provide the rationale, historical background, and 

data for reconstructing occupational environmental doses for unmonitored personnel at the Hanford 

site. Internal dose from the inhalation of radioactive materials may be determined from radionuclide 

air concentrations. ORAUT-TBKS-0006-4 describes the main potential sources of dose that could be 

received by an individual while outside Hanford operational facilities. 

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7.2.3.1 Estimating Intakes from Airborne Radionuclides 

NIOSH uses the RATCHET computer program to calculate intakes from airborne radionuclides. The 

source terms were provided by the RAC report (2002), which describes methods for calculating 

“worst case” radiation doses from short-lived gaseous radionuclides and radioactive particles that 

were released to the atmosphere during Hanford operations from 1944 through 1961. The RAC 

(2002) source terms were based on the extensive research performed by Heeb (1994) as part of the 

Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project (HEDR), a 1990s study estimating the radiation 

dose that individuals could have received as a result of radionuclide emissions from 1944 to 1992 at 

the Hanford site. 

RAC (2002) provides monthly release estimates for the period from Hanford startup in 1944 through 

1961. These files were extended to Hanford facility shutdown dates using the data from Heeb (1994) 

and augmented with the revisions to the iodine-131 releases by Napier (2002). Minor releases in the 

1980s were added as reported in the Hanford annual reports for those years. The argon-41 source 

terms for the reactors, taken from RAC (2002), were respectively extended through the date when 

each reactor was shut down using the approach in that report. The plutonium-239 releases from the Z 

Plant were also extended using the 2-month lag-time approximation of RAC (2002). Details 

regarding inputs into the RATCHET program (uncertainties, dispersion factors, receptor locations, 

etc.) can be found in Section 4.2 of ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4. 

The following radionuclides were evaluated: 

•	 Argon-41 

•	 Cerium-144, Promethium-144 

•	 Cesium-137, Barium-137 

•	 Hydrogen-3 

•	 Iodine-131, Xenon-131m 

•	 Plutonium-239 

•	 Ruthenium-103, Rhodium-103m 

•	 Ruthenium-106, Rhodium-106 

•	 Strontium-90, Yttrium-90 

•	 Zirconium-95, Niobium-95 

Annual emissions were evaluated for the following sources: 

•	 T Plant particles, B Plant particles, Z Plant particles, REDOX Plant particles, PUREX Plant 

particles 

•	 T Plant iodine, B Plant iodine, REDOX Plant iodine, PUREX Plant iodine 

•	 B & C Reactor noble gas, KE & KW Reactors noble gas, N Reactor noble gas, D & DR Reactors 

noble gas, H Reactor noble gas, F Reactor noble gas 

•	 108-B elemental tritium 

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The annual air concentrations computed by RATCHET are multiplied by 2,400 m3

/year, which is the 

recommended breathing rate by reference man doing light work of 1.2 m3

/hour times a use factor of 

2,000 hour/year (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4). A standard deviation of 0.4 m3/hour was assigned to this 

breathing rate. The final intake results provide the annual intakes in becquerels per year for the 

maximum median receptor location by year and by radionuclide. Table 7-3 lists the maximum intake 

values by radionuclide given in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4, Table A-12. 

Table 7-3: Maximum Intakes by Radionuclide 

Radionuclide Maximum intake (Bq) 

Cerium-144 6.64E+01 

Cesium-137 2.35E+00 

Hydrogen-3 1.15E+05 

Iodine-131 1.04E+05 

Plutonium-239 1.47E-02 

Ruthenium-103 5.84E+02 

Ruthenium-106 1.93E+02 

Strontium-90 2.67E+00 

Zirconium-95 7.92E+01 

Using this method, NIOSH finds that the internal dose from environmental sources for the class under 

evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.2.3 Internal Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion 

NIOSH has established that it has access to sufficient information to either estimate the maximum 

internal radiation dose for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed that could 

have been incurred under plausible circumstances by any member of the class; or estimate the internal 

radiation doses to members of the class more precisely than a maximum dose estimate, with the 

exceptions of : the americium-241 internal dose from January 1, 1949 to December 31, 1968 for the 

Hanford 200 Area; and the thorium-232 internal dose from September 1, 1946 to December 31, 1961 

for the Hanford 300 Area. 

7.3 External Radiation Doses at Hanford 

The principal sources of external radiation doses for members of the proposed class are those 

associated with nuclear reactor fuel fabrication, nuclear reactor operations, the radiochemical 

separation/refinement/finishing/storage of plutonium, and the handling of radioactive waste. Other 

processes such as research, development, and testing, or processes limited to a specific radionuclide 

product, also contributed to worker exposures (although to a lesser degree). The processes that 

generated the principal sources of external radiation dose are described both in Section 5.0 of this 

document and in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-2. 

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7.3.1 Process-Related External Radiation Doses at Hanford 

The following subsections summarize the extent and limitations of information available for 

reconstructing the process-related external doses of members of the proposed class. 

7.3.1.1 Radiation Exposure Environment 

The external dose received by workers at Hanford was a function of the physical location of the 

workers on the site, the processes taking place, the types and quantities of material present, and the 

time spent in each location. The radiation contributing to external dose was primarily beta and photon 

(including X-rays) and neutron. 

Beta/Photon Characterization 

Beta and photon radiations are well-characterized in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6. Beta radiations were 

measured along with photon radiation by the Hanford personnel dosimetry and portable instruments. 

Potential exposure to workers, particularly in reference to skin or extremity dose, was routinely 

considered. Dose reconstruction for beta radiation, which is typically accompanied by photon 

radiation in Hanford work areas, is characterized in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6. The values in Table 7-4 

are intended to provide a claimant-favorable estimate of parameters that will be used to calculate the 

organ dose for long-term Hanford workers. 

Table 7-4: Default Beta and Photon Energies/Percentages for Hanford DuPont Operations 

Table 7-4 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Area 

Operations 

Starting DateOperations 

Ending Date 

Radiation 

Type 

Energy Percentages 

<30 keV 30-250 keV >250 keV 

Fuel Fabrication Facilities 

(300 Area, Buildings 313, 

306, 333) 

1945 -1972 Photon1

 0% 100% 0% 

Reactors 

(100 Area, 105-B, D, F, 

H, DR, C, KW, KE, and 

N Reactors, 400 Area 

FFTF, and 300 Area Test 

Reactors) 

1944 - 1987 Photon1 

0% 25% 75% 

Processing Plants and 

Radiochemical operations 

(T, B, S-REDOX, C, A ­

PUREX, U Plant, UO3 

Plant) 

1944 - 1988 Photon1 

0% 25% 75% 

Plutonium Production 

(including PFP, Z-Plant, 

234-5Z, 231-Z, Pu 

Laboratories 308/309, 

324 Plant) 

1945 - 2003 Photon 25% 75% 0% 

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Table 7-4: Default Beta and Photon Energies/Percentages for Hanford DuPont Operations 

Table 7-4 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Area 

Operations 

Starting DateOperations 

Ending Date 

Radiation 

Type 

Energy Percentages 

<30 keV 30-250 keV >250 keV 

Calibrations 1945 - 2003 Photon1 

0% 25% 75% 

Waste Handling 1945 - 2003 Photon1 

0% 50% 50% 

Notes: 

The source of this table is ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6, Appendix A, Table A.2, page 93. 

1

Beta energies in these areas are 100% > 15 keV 

Neutron Field Characterization 

Hanford workers had the potential to be exposed to neutron radiation during operation of the reactors 

in the 100, 300, and 400 Areas and during plutonium concentration and finishing work in the 200 and 

300 Area Plutonium Facilities. 

At the 100 Area nuclear reactor facilities, the 300 Area test reactors, and the 400 Area Fast Flux Test 

Facility, neutrons were generated by fission of uranium and plutonium in the reactor core. Neutron 

exposures for workers in the reactors were accompanied by photon radiation that was readily 

measured with Hanford portable instrumentation and/or dosimetry capabilities. These facilities 

generally had extensive shielding to reduce worker neutron and photon radiation exposure in most 

work areas. Neutron radiation was typically significant only while a reactor was in operation and only 

in those areas of a reactor that were typically restricted to general worker access. Reactor areas were 

categorized according to hazard potential because there were known areas of potential worker 

exposure to significant neutron (and photon) beams of radiation, such as those associated with 

instrument and test penetrations of the single-pass reactors (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

At the 200 Area Plutonium Facilities and the 300 Area plutonium laboratories, neutron radiation was 

generated from plutonium by either spontaneous fission, or importantly, by alpha-particle interaction 

with light elements such as oxygen, fluorine, and beryllium. These interactions are commonly 

referred to as alpha-n reactions. The most significant source, historically, of neutron exposure in the 

Hanford 200 Area Plutonium Facilities was the Plutonium Fluorination process (PuF4) (ORAUTTKBS-0006-6). 

Significant mapping of the dose rates, and evaluations of thermal and fast neutron fluxes are available 

for workplaces in the single pass reactors from 1944 through 1971. Neutron energy spectra 

measurements performed in the 1970s have been located in areas such as the Fast Flux Test Facility 

and the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Results of these studies can be found in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6. 

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7.3.1.2 History of Whole Body External Monitoring 

Historically, using portable radiation instruments, zone controls, and personnel dosimeters, Hanford 

had an extensive radiation safety monitoring program. Results from the personnel dosimeters were 

used to measure and record dose from external radiation exposure to Hanford workers throughout the 

history of Hanford operations. 

Routine Hanford practices appear to have required assigning dosimeters to all workers who entered a 

controlled radiation area. A 1948 document by Herbert M. Parker, which reviews the film badge 

program at the time, states that the incorporation of the film badge into the security badge has proved 

effective and that all persons entering restricted Plant areas are required to wear the badge at all times 

(Parker, 1948). This review also states that all construction workers within the boundaries of the 100, 

200, and 300 Areas shall wear the film badge at all times (Parker, February 1948). 

The trends in the number of workers who were monitored, the number of monitored workers with 

positive dose, and the collective dose from photon radiation, do not show any abrupt changes that 

would be indicative of significant changes in photon dosimetry capabilities or assignment of 

dosimeters (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

The two-element film dosimeter was used from October 1944 to March 1957. This design was also 

used at the Clinton laboratory (now ORNL) and later by other MED/AEC/DOE laboratories, and was 

based on the dosimeter design developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, Illinois, by 

Pardue, Goldstein, and Wollan. The minimum detectable dose based on laboratory irradiations was 

0.3 mSv (30 millirem), and the routine dosimeter exchange period was weekly. From 1944 to 1957, 

Hanford assigned skin dose based on the dosimeter open-window reading plus the silver-filtered 

dosimeter reading (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

From April 1957 to December 31, 1971, Hanford used multi-element film dosimeters to measure beta, 

X-ray, and gamma radiation dose components in one of two designs during the periods of 1958 to 

1961 and 1962 to 1971, respectively. These “beta/photon” film dosimeters consisted of four shielded 

areas and provided a substantially improved capability to measure both deep and shallow dose. 

Processing results (i.e., optical density) were recorded for the film response behind each filter and an 

algorithm was used to calculate the respective dose components. Beginning in 1958, the dosimeters 

were calibrated with a plutonium tetrafluoride source in order to better duplicate the neutron energies 

in Hanford’s plutonium facilities. The skin dose of record was calculated as the sum of the wholebody and non-penetrating doses (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

Beginning January 1, 1972, Hanford used thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) in various 

configurations. A “Basic” TLD, a one-chip design with limited capability for beta and photon (X- and 

gamma ray) radiation, was used from January 1, 1971 through about 1988, and was assigned to 

personnel considered to have little or no potential to receive dose. The Hanford Multipurpose TLD 

was used from January 1, 1972 to December 1994 to measure beta, photon, and neutron radiation. 

These dosimeters were assigned to personnel likely to work in radiation fields. Hanford Multipurpose 

TLDs originally had a five-chip design, which was changed to a four-chip design in July 1977 to 

enable the use of a commercial reader system; then, in January 1983, the Hanford Multipurpose TLDs 

returned to a five-chip design until the system was replaced on January 1, 1995 with a commercial 

system. The same filtration was used in Hanford Multipurpose TLDs during all years of use. The 

Hanford Multipurpose TLD was first accredited for performance testing in 1989 by the DOE 

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Laboratory Accreditation Program in beta, photon, and neutron radiation categories (ORAUT-TKBS0006-6). 

7.3.1.3 History of Extremity Monitoring 

Indications of an extremity dosimetry program exist as early as 1944 and 1945, with finger-ring 

dosimeters being referred to in weekly Health Instrument Section reports (Parker, 1945). Parker 

mentions the use of film and micro-ionization chambers for extremity monitoring in a 1948 paper 

(Parker, 1960). Early extremity dosimeter rings consisted of an aluminum ring holding a disc of film 

which responded to beta and photon radiation without any capability to distinguish between the two 

components. A silver disc shield was later added to allow a limited capability for distinguishing the 

gamma component. Finger-ring dosimeters could be bulky and sometimes could not be used in tight 

areas. In such cases, a pliable film packet was used (Parker, no date). 

Starting in mid-1967, a flexible rubber finger ring, which utilized a wafer of 7

LiF-impregnated Teflon, 

was available for routine hand dosimetry. This dosimeter had a wide range of response that provided 

more than adequate coverage for all work situations, as well a minimal energy dependence allowing 

its use for essentially any photon energy from plutonium to cobalt-60 photons (Wilson, 1987). 

In 1974, a plastic ring, designed by the U.S. Testing Company, containing a single TLD-700 chip, was 

used for hand monitoring (Fix, 1981). 

A wrist dosimeter, similar to a wristwatch, has also been used extensively in locations where exposure 

to the hands and forearms may be the limiting factor. In addition, flexible dosimeters with appropriate 

shielding materials were used extensively by underwater divers when repairing storage basins. These 

dosimeters could be affixed to almost any part of the body to determine the limiting exposure location 

where the source material could not be shielded or known with any certainty in remote locations of the 

basin. These dosimeters have also been used in work locations where the head and/or eyes may be the 

limiting exposure organ of the body (Wilson, 1990). 

Records indicate that between the years of 1946 and 1989, an average of 530 workers each year had 

extremity dosimetry results (with a high in 1963 of 1596 workers and a low in 1948 of 263 workers) 

(Buschbom, 1993). The dose records received by NIOSH from DOE for Energy Employee claimants 

include provisions for extremity dose results, which for some employees, contain extensive data. 

7.3.1.4 History of Neutron Monitoring 

With possibly one exception described below, the historical record shows that Hanford assigned 

neutron dosimeters to employees with any significant potential for exposure to neutron radiation. 

Hanford has used three general types of neutron dosimeters, which differ substantially in their 

responses to neutron radiation. 

Hanford implemented neutron dosimetry in 1944 by using enriched boron-lined pocket ionization 

chambers. The boron liners were sensitive only to thermal neutron exposure (Wilson, 1987; Fix, 

February, 1997). Some attempts were made during this time to measure fast neutrons using a finegrain film to record tracks from recoil protons, but these attempts were unsuccessful (Wilson, 1990). 

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Starting on January 1, 1950, the Eastman-Kodak Nuclear Track Emulsion Type A (NTA) film 

dosimeter was implemented. Indications are that the weekly-exchanged Hanford NTA film was 

generally processed independently from the bi-weekly exchanged beta/photon dosimeter. Prior to 

1957, NTA film was housed in the two-element beta/photon dosimeter holder along with the 

beta/photon film. Beginning in 1958, the NTA film was housed in a Hanford Neutron Dosimeter 

along with a beta/photon film. There was space available in the yearly forms (manually prepared 

before 1957) to record the neutron dose. The Hanford policy to process NTA film varied historically, 

but generally involved the practice of reading all NTA film for the 200 Area West Plutonium 

Facilities and, for other Hanford facilities, processing the NTA only if the photon dose was at least 

100 mrem. This policy was based on the observation that neutron dose was always accompanied by 

photon dose (Watson, 1959). For the other facilities, potential neutron dose was considered to be 

relatively small compared to photon dose. A neutron dose is recorded for all Hanford workers 

assigned an NTA film. If it was not processed, a zero neutron dose was recorded. The earliest 

recorded neutron dose for Hanford workers dates from 1950 (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

Starting January 1, 1972 through present day, TLDs have been used to measure neutron doses. As 

outlined in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6, several configurations were used: 

•	 Five-Chip Hanford Multipurpose TLD (January 1972 to June 1977): The five-chip Hanford 

Multipurpose TLD incorporated a neutron dose capability that involved three of the five chips 

(i.e., 3, 4, and 5). The combination of these chips allowed estimation of thermal (i.e., slow) and 

fast neutron components with the capability (chip 5) for an accurate beta/photon response 

correction (i.e., neutron-sensitive chips also respond to photon and high-energy beta radiation). 

Effective July 1, 1977, the dose algorithm was changed to use data for only four of the chips (i.e., 

omitting chip 5) to utilize the four-chip cards that were being implemented (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

6, page 18-19). 

•	 Four-Chip Hanford Multipurpose TLD (July 1977 to December 1983): The Hanford Multipurpose 

TLD dosimeter was modified to a four-chip design to accommodate introduction of a commercial 

reader system in the later 1970s that required the dosimeter cards to pivot around the center where 

chip 5 was located. Tens of thousands of Hanford Multipurpose TLD cards were fabricated with 

chip 5 removed. These modified cards were used in the original five-chip holders (ORAUTTKBS-0006-6, page 19). 

•	 Five-Chip Hanford Multipurpose TLD (January 1984 to December 1994): Routine dose evaluation 

using the five-chip Hanford Multipurpose TLD began again on January 1, 1984. Several 

refinements were made to this system (Wilson, 1990) to prepare for DOE Laboratory 

Accreditation Program performance testing. The Hanford Multipurpose TLD was first accredited 

by the DOE Laboratory Accreditation Program for performance testing in neutron categories in 

1989, and reaccredited every subsequent (typically 2-year) accreditation cycle thereafter 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6, page 19). 

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7.3.1.5 Dosimetry Records 

From essentially the beginning of operations, a centralized radiological records program was 

established at Hanford. Records of radiation doses to individual workers from personnel dosimeters 

worn by workers are available for Hanford operations beginning in 1944 (Buschbom, 1993). External 

dosimetry data and related records are readily available for the Hanford operational period from 

September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1990. The current radiation exposure database is REX, 

maintained by the Hanford Radiation Records Program. Other repositories of Hanford dosimetry 

records include the SRDB, NOCTS, and CEDR. 

7.3.1.6 Application of Co-Worker Data for External Dose Reconstruction 

For unmonitored workers, co-worker doses from monitored workers are presented in External 

Coworker Dosimetry Data for the Hanford Site, ORAUT-OTIB-0030 for photon radiation. Coworker doses for non-penetrating radiation doses could readily be prepared if needed. Co-worker data 

may be used for cases not having complete monitoring data and may fall into one of several categories 

including: 

•	 The worker was unmonitored and, even by today’s standards, did not need to be monitored (e.g., a 

non-radiological worker) 

•	 The worker was unmonitored, but by today’s standards would have been monitored 

•	 The worker may have been monitored, but the data are not available to the dose reconstructor 

•	 The worker has partial information, but it is insufficient to complete the dose reconstruction 

The Hanford Co-worker study was developed using dosimetry data for monitored Hanford workers 

from the CEDR database maintained by DOE. The CEDR data represent calculated annual 

penetrating dosimetry data provided by the Hanford site, which correspond to the shielded dosimetry 

readings and exclude neutron doses (ORAUT-OTIB-0030). 

7.3.2 Ambient Environmental External Radiation Doses at Hanford 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4 and ORAUT-PROC-0060 provide the rationale, historical background, and 

data for the reconstruction of occupational environmental doses for unmonitored personnel at the 

Hanford site. The occupational environmental dose is the dose received by individuals while outside 

operational facilities such as process buildings, Chemical Separations Plants, reactors, or other 

structures. External dose from radioactive materials outside the body may be determined from 

immersion in a cloud of inert gases; deposition of particles on the skin; or adjacent operational 

facilities. 

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7.3.2.1 Ambient Radiation 

Table 4.8 of ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4 lists the external gamma measurements at Hanford from 1944 

through 2001, including fallout and background. The values are given in averages in millirem per 

year for exposures of 2,000 hours/year, and can be used to reconstruct dose from environmental 

radiation sources. 

7.3.2.2 Skin Deposition of Airborne Particulate Emissions 

Starting in 1947, surveys of the T and B Plant area grounds revealed contamination in the form of 

discrete particles. The most likely source of these particles was iron-oxide particulates coated with 

radioactive material from corroding ductwork in the T and B Plant ventilation systems. Analysis of 

the particles indicated that the radionuclides were deposited on the blowers and other iron surfaces 

and were released into the ventilation air stream as the iron parts corroded. Although the particles 

were not discovered until 1947, these releases could have been ongoing from the start of operations. 

These particles were emitted through April 1948, when sand filters were installed to stop the releases. 

The greatest activity measured on a T or B Plant particle was 3.2 μCi, with the average being 1.1 μCi. 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4, Section 4.3.3, provides a method to estimate dose based on a conservative 

particle activity, the probability that a particle could land on a worker’s skin, mean residence times, 

and dose coefficients for different radionuclides on the particles (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4). 

7.3.2.3 Release of Noble Gases 

Xenon-133 was released from the production reactors and its dose contribution can be estimated by 

comparing it with the iodine-131 release rate and dose conversion factors. At its peak in 1945, when 

Hanford used shorter fuel-element cooling times, the xenon-133 release rate was 42,000 Ci/mo. The 

iodine-131 release during the peak time was 89,000 Ci/mo. When comparing the dose conversion 

factors and release rates of iodine-131 and xenon-133, the iodine contribution to the dose was more 

than 10,000 times larger than that of xenon. Therefore, iodine is listed as a major contributor and 

xenon-133 is not (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4). 

Argon-41 was released from the Hanford reactors as a neutron activation product of stable argon in 

air, but not from the Chemical Separations Facilities. Effluent concentrations were measured 

sporadically for only brief periods, and the reactors did not operate continuously. Table 4A-11 in 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4 provides submersion gamma dose and skin dose values that can be used to 

reconstruct dose. 

7.3.3 Hanford Occupational X-Ray Examinations 

Pre-employment, termination, and periodic medical examinations were given to Hanford workers 

from the very beginning of site operations. Cantril gives a count of 15 exams being given in 

December 1943, and states that the periodic exam program began in January 1944 (Cantril, 1946). 

These examinations were performed for the purpose of evaluating biological indicators of radiation 

exposure (i.e. blood cell counts) and included a chest X-ray. 

In the site’s early years, periodic X-ray examinations were relatively frequent. Groups of workers 

identified as being at-risk received medical exams, including X-rays, at more frequent intervals than 

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other workers. For work with radiation hazards, interval exams in January 1944 were as close to 

every four weeks as possible. By July 1945, the exam intervals were lengthened from every four to 

every seven or eight weeks. Other employees not working with radiation or other special hazards 

were examined every three to six months. As experience was gained with the outcome of these 

examinations, the frequency of medical radiographs was reduced to an annual occurrence until 1959, 

and thereafter, on a schedule dependent on age, but no more frequent than annually (ORAUT-TKBS0006-3). 

A review of the available documentation of the Occupational Medical program at Hanford from 1943 

to the present revealed that only three medical radiographic procedures were administered in 

connection with pre-employment or regular post-employment medical examinations, these included 

(1) a posterior-anterior 14”×17” chest film, (2) a lateral 14”x17” chest film, and (3) a 

photofluorographic 4”×5” chest film. 

The 14”×17” posterior-anterior chest radiography was the most widely-used procedure for screening 

for disease. In some cases, stereo views were taken; these required two 14”x17” films. 

Beginning in March 1945, photofluorographic chest films were taken. This method resulted in much 

greater worker doses than a standard radiographic procedure. Photofluorography used a smaller film 

(typically 4”×5”), a smaller source-to-skin distance, and typically resulted in a several-fold greater 

radiation exposure. Exposure was regulated by photometers, which used exposure to the film to 

determine the time of exposure (Cantril, 1946; ORAUT-TKBS-0006-3). 

7.3.4 External Dose Reconstruction 

Through August 9, 2007, 2,564 EEOICPA claims from the Hanford workers had been submitted to 

NIOSH. Of those 2,564 claims, which cover the entire range of operation at the Hanford site, 2.370 

claims had external monitoring data provided by DOE. 

There is an established protocol for assessing external exposure when performing dose reconstructions 

(these protocol steps are discussed in the following subsections): 

• Photon and Electron Dose 

• Neutron Dose 

• Unmonitored Individuals Working in Production Areas 

• Medical X-ray 

7.3.4.1 Photon and Electron Dose 

External dose has been measured and recorded for Hanford personnel since the beginning of site 

operations. Based on information in the Hanford Site Profile and associated references, the recorded 

photon penetrating dose to Hanford workers is reasonably accurate for all years and for all facilities. 

The Hanford dosimetry systems have been extensively evaluated. Importantly, all Hanford workers 

entering radiological areas were required to wear dosimeters. Additionally, Special Work Permits 

were used for higher-dosed activities and generally involved workers using two-pocket ionization 

chambers. 

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As previously shown in Table 4-1, the majority of completed dose reconstructions have included 

external dose records provided by DOE. Hanford worker-recorded dose measurements are considered 

reasonably accurate from 1944 through the present with one exception, that being a potential underresponse of the early (pre-1958) two-element dosimeter penetrating dose to low-energy X-rays, such 

as at the Plutonium Facilities. However, the non-penetrating dose component can be used to 

compensate, thus allowing a reasonable estimate of the penetrating photon dose. The stated historical 

Hanford practice (for Plutonium Facilities only) was to add to the penetrating dose, 20% of the 

measured non-penetrating dose. However, NIOSH has not been able to confirm that this was done for 

all years. Therefore, if the early photon dose is significant to the dose reconstruction, ORAUTTKBS-0006-6 recommends that the penetrating dose be adjusted by using 20% of the non-penetrating 

or shallow recorded dose to ensure a claimant-favorable assigned photon dose (ORAUT-TKBS-0006­

6, page 17). 

Missed dose, which may occur when the dose of record is zero because the dosimeter response was 

less than the minimum detection level or there is no dose of record for an assigned badge for a 

monitoring period, is accounted for by assigning a missed photon dose based on the minimum 

detection level divided by 2 (MDL/2) and then multiplied by the number of dosimeter exchange 

periods for the dosimetry system (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6, pages 50-51). 

Hanford began using extremity dosimetry as early as 1945. A standard monitoring practice in 

Operational Health Physics is to establish a factor between whole-body and extremity exposure 

radiation safety limits for the purpose of determining when extremity dosimeters should be assigned. 

Conservatively, it would not be necessary to monitor the extremity dose unless it was greater than 

three times the whole-body dose. To assign extremity dose for workers who have extremity cancer 

but no extremity dose data, the measured whole-body dose should be increased by a factor of three as 

a claimant-favorable assumption (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

An adjustment for glovebox workers is used to adjust the measured photon dose for Hanford workers 

in Plutonium Facilities, based on the guidance in Best Estimate External Dose Reconstruction for 

Glovebox Workers (OCAS-OTIB-0010). 

To account for the uncertainty in routine beta/photon dosimeter measurements, a standard error of 

+30% is recommended for use in reconstructing the annual dose. This is based on the estimated 

standard uncertainty of ±30% in individual recorded film badge doses from photons of any energy 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, the external photon and electron dose for the class 

under evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.3.4.2 Neutron Dose 

As stated before, there are no recorded neutron doses at Hanford prior to 1950 when the Pocket 

Ionization Chamber (PIC) was the sole neutron-monitoring dosimeter. Relatively little neutron dose, 

compared to the recorded whole-body dose from photon radiation, was recorded prior to 1957. 

Subsequently, much greater neutron dose was recorded from 1957 to 1972 when the Hanford 

Multi-element beta/gamma and neutron film dosimeter systems were used. Then, with 

implementation of the Hanford Multipurpose Dosimeter on January 1, 1972, the entire energy 

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spectrum was measured; thus, the doses measured are considered reasonably accurate. In contrast, 

significant whole-body dose from photon radiation is recorded throughout the history of Hanford 

operations (Buschbom, 1993; Fix, February 1997). 

Nuclear Track Emulsion Type A (NTA) Film 

Beginning in 1950 and continuing through 1971, NTA film was used to monitor neutron exposure at 

Hanford. NTA film was the industry standard for personnel neutron dosimetry during the 1950s and 

1960s. 

As noted earlier, a two-element neutron dosimeter was used from 1950 to 1958. This two-element 

dosimeter used a silver filter to absorb low-energy photons which, if not absorbed, would darken the 

film and inhibit identification of proton-recoil tracks. The major problem with this dosimeter was that 

it effectively responded only to neutrons with energies greater than 0.450 MeV. This dosimeter was 

calibrated using a PoBe source with an average energy of 4 MeV. Thus, for exposure to plutonium 

metal, fission spectra neutrons, and PuF4, this calibration and the subsequent evaluation of dosimeters 

resulted in an underestimate of the actual dose. 

Starting in 1958, a multi-element NTA dosimeter was used that included a tin filter and a cadmium 

filter. Due to the relatively large cross section of the cadmium for thermal neutrons, and the 

subsequent n,γ reaction, the difference in the optical density between the tin filter and cadmium filter 

was due to thermal neutrons (Wilson, 1990). Thus, the new multi-element design effectively extended 

the energy response of the neutron dosimeter over the two-element design because it effectively 

responded to neutrons greater than 0.450 MeV (3 grain track) and less than 5e-7 MeV (epithermal to 

thermal energies). The intermediate energy range (5e-7 MeV to 0.450 MeV) was the only gap in 

response, and this was effectively accounted for through the calibration methodology. Also starting in 

1958, PuF4 was used for the calibration of the multi-element neutron dosimeter. The PuF4 neutron 

energy spectrum extends from a maximum of around 3 MeV down through the intermediate, 

epithermal and thermal energies with an average of around 1.3 to 1.4 MeV (Lehman, 1968; Wilson, 

1990; and Brackenbush, 1991). Thus, by calibrating to the primary source of neutron exposure in the 

200 Area, the lack of response in a particular region is effectively corrected for during the calibration. 

It is also important to note that the actual number of grains used to identify a track becomes less 

important in that if a 5-grain track was the minimum for track identification, proportionally there 

would be less 5-grain tracks identified during the calibration for the same dose compared to 3-grain 

tracks. Thus, while the neutron energy response and subsequent calibration factor could vary 

depending on whether a 3-, 5-, or 7-grain track were used, the relative measured dose did not, because 

the calibration factor would also change. 

The average neutron energy of PuF4 is lower than the average fission neutron energy of approximately 

2.0 MeV. Due to this energy difference, exposure to plutonium metal while using a PuF4 calibration 

source would result in a slightly claimant-favorable overestimate of the dose. Thus, for the remainder 

of the 200 Area facilities, the use of the PuF4 calibration source and the multi-element neutron 

dosimeter results in a reasonably accurate dose assessment that tends to be claimant favorable due to 

the slightly harder neutron energy spectrum of plutonium metal compared to PuF4. 

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The response of the multi-element NTA dosimeter to a moderated fission spectrum around the 

graphite reactors was also evaluated. NIOSH has obtained survey reports of thermal, fast, and gamma 

flux measurements at many graphite reactor locations which provide sufficient evidence for the 

evaluation of neutron dose at these facilities. 

Several factors make reading the individual tracks for lower energies more difficult: (1) the shorter 

proton tracks caused by the lower energy neutrons; (2) photon fogging of the film; (3) fading of the 

film, which occurred during the elapsed time between exposure and processing; and (4) technician 

fatigue (counting the films day after day, particularly with little or no distinguishable neutron-induced 

tracks). 

However, Hanford did have several processes in place to help mitigate these errors. By using a 

standard track length for both the calibration and for track identification, the issue of shorter tracks 

was minimized. The fading of the films was minimized by using a two-week exchange cycle and by 

aging the calibration films for two weeks to simulate the period of wear by site personnel (Wilson, 

1987). To mitigate technician fatigue, Hanford had an extensive technician training program, the 

individual NTA films were read by multiple technicians (providing duplication), the time an 

individual technician could spend reading films was limited to four hours, and control and exposed 

films were included as blind audits to check the accuracy of the technicians reading the films. 

Hanford Multipurpose TLD 

Hanford improved neutron measurement capabilities by implementing the use of the Hanford 

Multipurpose TLD on January 1, 1972. Since 1972, dose measurements are considered reasonably 

accurate, with the exception of a period from 1978 through 1983 when a 4-chip Hanford TLD was 

used. The recorded neutron dose during this period was too low. A study conducted at that time 

showed an average under-recorded neutron dose of about 35% (Fix, February 1997). Thus, ORAUTTKBS-0006-6 recommends that a factor of 1.35 times the recorded neutron dose be used when 

performing dose reconstructions to ensure a claimant-favorable assigned neutron dose. 

To account for the uncertainty in the neutron Hanford Multipurpose TLD dosimeter measurements, 

starting in 1972 a standard error of +50%, based on actual DOE Laboratory Accreditation Program 

performance testing, is recommended by ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6 for use in reconstructing annual 

dose. 

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Use of Neutron-Photon Ratios to Reconstruct Neutron Dose 

As stated above, neutron doses determined prior to 1958 with the two-element NTA film dosimeter 

and the PIC are likely too low due to the dosimeter design and the calibration methodology. Since it 

is unlikely that a significant neutron dose would not be accompanied by a gamma dose, a claimantfavorable neutron-to-photon ratio distribution can be used to estimate an upper bound to the worker 

neutron dose during the time prior to the use of the Hanford multi-element neutron dosimeter in 1958. 

For the single-pass reactor area dose reconstruction, the measured photon radiation dose for Hanford 

workers is reasonably accurate for all years of single-pass reactor operation. Hanford employees 

entering a radiological controlled area were required to wear a personnel film dosimeter, and typically, 

a pair of pocket ionization chambers (PICs). Significant differences in measured dose between the 

film dosimeter and the PIC would have been a topic of investigation (Smith, 1947), as is noted in the 

dosimeter monitoring procedures and in routine monthly reports. Hanford had established protocols 

for classifying reactor workplaces according to potential danger and Special Work Permits were 

required for workers to access these areas (HAPO, 1949-1950; HAPO 1947-1950). Documents by 

Wilson (1987), Wilson (1990), and Fix (February 1997) describe the potential level of neutron dose 

received from Hanford single-pass reactors as being less than 5%, approximately, of the photon dose. 

NIOSH has recently obtained and examined Hanford Engineer Works Monthly Reports beginning in 

1944 that document shielded and unshielded gamma and neutron dose rate and flux surveys performed 

in various reactor areas. Survey locations included the reactor faces, experimental test penetrations, 

and operations and maintenance work locations. The surveys were performed under various singlepass reactor operating conditions and configurations. 

For example, a 1945 report provides the combined (photon, beta, slow neutrons, and fast neutrons) 

dose rate on the face of the three reactors in operation at that time (HW-2177, 1945). Figure 7-1 

depicts isodose curves for the B, D, F reactors in July 1945. While these data provide details which 

may warrant revision of the existing neutron-to-photon dose ratios currently used in the Hanford TBD, 

it is also important to note that the maximum combined radiation dose rate measured in this survey of 

the face of the B reactor was 7 mrem/hr. Assuming continuous exposure, 2000 hours per year on the 

platform at that location at that rate would result in a combined (photon, slow neutron, and fast 

neutron) upper bound dose of 14 rem. 

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Figure 7-1: Example of Isodose Curves Found in Hanford Monthly Reports 

An excerpt from a June 1945 report indicates that for the top of the reactor, the dose rates were 

considerably higher at 45 mrem/hr, and that the gamma, fast and thermal neutrons were fairly equally 

divided at approximately 15 mrem/hr each (HW-7-1981-Del). 

The available data are sufficient to validate or revise the neutron-to-photon ratios currently used for 

dose reconstruction. The ratios are applied in the determination of missed neutron dose (i.e., 

multiplying the potential missed photon dose by a neutron-to-photon dose ratio) and in assigning a 

neutron dose based on the measured photon dose. 

For neutron exposures to workers at the N Reactor, which operated from 1963 through 1987 in the 

Hanford 100 N Area, the Hanford Multipurpose TLD paired neutron and photon data are available 

from 1972 through 1987. As such, the neutron-to-photon ratio measured with the Hanford 

Multipurpose TLD for the period of 1972 through 1987 is likely to closely resemble the ratio from 

1963 through 1971, unless a major facility design change occurred. During interviews with former 

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health physicists with a history of working at the N-Reactor throughout all the years of its operation, it 

was stated that there was no reason for the ratio to significantly change (Personal Communication, 

2007). 

For dose reconstruction workers in the Plutonium Facility, the measured photon radiation dose is 

reasonably accurate for all years of operation using a combination of non-penetrating and penetrating 

dose components from the Hanford film dosimeter results, as described in Parker ( February 1948), 

Wilson (1987), and in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6. ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6 recommends using a 

distribution of neutron to photon dose ratios to assign neutron dose to Hanford plutonium workers. 

The distribution is based on paired photon and neutron dose measurements with the Hanford 

Multipurpose TLD. These distribution parameters are consistent with the AEC 1972 Investigation of 

Hanford worker neutron doses, which used maximum neutron to photon dose ratios (Wilson, 1972) to 

retrospectively evaluate the Hanford career whole-body dose for selected workers (Biles, 1972). The 

neutron to photon dose ratio is applied in the determination of missed neutron dose (i.e., multiplying 

the potential missed photon dose by a neutron to photon dose ratio) and in assigning a neutron dose 

based on the measured photon dose. Field measurements, including extremity, neutron, and photon 

dose components have often been performed at the Hanford plutonium facilities (Roesch, August 

1951; Roesch, July 1954; Roesch, July 1957; Reddie, 1949; Glasgow, 1951; Brown, October 1958; 

Brown, November 1958; Helgeson, November 1956; Helgeson, November 3, 1955; Helgeson, 

December 15, 1955; Helgeson, February 20, 1956; Helgeson, May 23, 1956; Helgeson, September 8, 

1956; Helgeson, August 9, 1956; Helgeson, August 31, 1956; Helgeson, October 2, 1956; Helgeson, 

October 12, 1956; Helgeson, October 15, 1956; Helgeson, October 31, 1956; Helgeson, November 1, 

1956; Helgeson, November 5, 1956; Helgeson, November 9, 1956; Helgeson, November 12, 1956; 

Helgeson, November 20, 1956; Helgeson, November 27, 1956; Moulthrop, September 21, 1949; 

Moulthrop, October 9, 1957; Moulthrop, March 20, 1958; Moulthrop, March 27, 1958; Moulthrop, 

May 21, 1958; Moulthrop, September 5, 1958; Moulthrop, October 22, 1959—Part 1; Moulthrop, 

October 22, 1959—Part 2; FEFPTP, 1960). 

For other areas where there is significant potential for neutron dose, such as the 300 Area Test reactors 

and Laboratory facilities, guidance is given to dose reconstructors to evaluate the area according to the 

two methods of neutron exposure (i.e., reactor or plutonium) that most closely fit the exposure pattern 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6). 

Other methods to validate the neutron to photon dose ratios described in the Hanford technical basis 

documents are being developed and evaluated by NIOSH. For example, NIOSH is modeling the 

neutron and gamma ray fluxes from selected gloveboxes in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (the 

Plutonium Fluorination gloveboxes) using the ATILLA radiation transport code. The ATILLA code 

was developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory as a tool to predict how neutron radiation 

travels through space and materials, using a deterministic approach. NIOSH also has the 1950 

through 1961 Hanford NTA processing data, which provides another option to validate the claimant 

favorability of the neutron dose calculated using the neutron-photon ratio and the measured photon 

dose. The 1950 through 1961 NTA data include pre- and post-NTA calibration with the plutonium 

tetrafluoride source (~1958) that likely has a neutron energy spectrum most similar to the neutron 

energy spectrum in Hanford plutonium facilities, particularly the comparatively high neutron exposure 

for the fluorination step. In addition, the earlier doses determined with NTA film, once corrected for 

energy response limitations (i.e., the fraction of the neutron energy spectrum that was not measured by 

the NTA), can be used as another method of validation. 

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Missed Neutron Dose 

There is a potential for missed neutron dose for Hanford workers. Missed neutron dose for Hanford 

workers would occur where there is no recorded dose (even though a dosimeter is assigned) or where 

a zero dose is recorded for any response less than the site dose recording threshold. Estimates of 

missed neutron dose are determined for the period prior to 1972 by using a neutron to photon dose 

ratio times the estimated missed photon dose; starting in 1972, estimates of the missed neutron dose 

for the Hanford Multipurpose TLD dosimeter are based on the respective dosimeter exchange periods 

multiplied by the MDL/2 (minimum detection level divided by two). This process equates to an 

annual neutron missed dose of 1,300 millirem for the early boron-lined PIC, 2,100 mrem for the 

weekly exchanged NTA film, and 300 millirem (assuming a monthly exchange frequency and a 

minimum detection level of 50 millirem) with the Hanford Multipurpose TLD (ORAUT-TKBS0006-6). 

Neutron Dose Feasibility Conclusion 

For neutron exposures after implementation of the Hanford Multipurpose TLD on January 1, 1972, 

recorded external dosimetry data are extensive and sufficient for external dose reconstruction. For 

neutron exposures prior to January 1, 1972, but after 1958, the recorded doses using the Hanford 

multi-element NTA dosimeter can be adjusted in a claimant-favorable manner to correct for the 

potential under-response around the reactor facilities. Prior to 1958, a claimant-favorable assignment 

of neutron dose based on the application of a neutron-to-photon dose ratio distribution can be used for 

external neutron dose reconstruction. These ratios can also be applied to workers who were not 

monitored but who potentially should have been monitored. 

7.3.4.3 Unmonitored Individuals Working in Production Areas 

Although all significantly-exposed Hanford workers should have been monitored with a recorded 

dose, unmonitored Hanford workers can be assigned unmeasured photon dose by using the Hanford 

co-worker doses presented in ORAUT-OTIB-0030. 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, the dose to unmonitored workers in the class under 

evaluation can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.3.4.4 Medical X-ray 

Medical X-rays were performed on Hanford workers from the very beginning as part of their preemployment, termination, and periodic medical examinations. Records of X-rays performed on a 

worker are typically included in the dose records provided by DOE. When records are not available, 

Table 3-3 of ORAUT-TKBS-0006-3 provides guidelines that are used to determine the number of Xrays. For example, Table 3-3 indicates that for dates prior to July 1, 1945, all employees are assumed 

to have had an entrance, exit, and every 3-6 months a 14”x17” posterior-anterior chest X-ray. 

Radiation or special hazard workers are assumed to have had a chest X-ray every 4 weeks. After July 

1, 1945, the radiation and special hazard workers’ periodic interval was increased to 4-8 weeks 

(ORAUT-TKBS-0006-3, page 12). Organ doses are provided in ORAUT-TKBS-0006-3, Table 3-5, 

and are based on 1940 X-ray practices and dose factors provided in ICRP 34 (ICRP 34; ORAUTTKBS-0006-3; ORAUT-PROC-0061). 

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Beginning in March 1945, photofluorographic chest X-rays were taken at the site. These exams 

typically have a higher exposure than the 14”x17” posterior-anterior radiographic chest X-rays. If 

uncertain as to the type of X-ray a worker received, the higher exposures due to photofluorography 

can be assumed for dose reconstruction (ORAUT-TKBS-0006-3, page 19-20). 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-3 provides a combined statistical uncertainty factor of +30% that can be 

assumed based on uncertainties such as measurement error, time of exposure, distance, and variations 

of tube current. 

Based on the information available to NIOSH, the medical X-ray dose for the class under evaluation 

can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. 

7.3.5 External Dose Reconstruction Feasibility Conclusion 

NIOSH has established that it has access to sufficient information to either: (1) estimate the maximum 

external radiation dose for every type of cancer for which radiation doses are reconstructed that could 

have been incurred under plausible circumstances by any member of the class; or (2) estimate the 

external radiation doses to members of the class more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. 

7.4 Evaluation of Petition Basis for SEC-00057-2 

The following subsections evaluate the assertions made on behalf of petition SEC-00057-2 for 

Hanford. 

7.4.1 Evaluation of Major Topics Detailed in Petition SEC-00057 and SEC-00078 

The following major topics were detailed in petition SEC-00057 and SEC-00078. Italicized 

statements are from the petition; the comments that follow are from NIOSH. To avoid unnecessary 

repetition, issues covering similar topics and eliciting similar NIOSH responses have been grouped 

together. 

7.4.1.1 Hanford Workers were Inadequately or Inconsistently Monitored 

Similar issues from SEC-00057 and SEC-00078 (OSA Ref ID: 100318, 100105, 100104): Radiation 

overexposures and radiation doses potentially incurred by members of all classes at the Hanford 

Nuclear Reservation were not monitored or consistently monitored through individual monitoring or 

area monitoring. 

It is evident from available personnel records and monitoring data that not all Hanford employees 

were monitored at all times. Some workers, who appear to have held jobs that were administrative or 

managerial in nature and unlikely to result in contact with radiation or radioactive material, may have 

not been monitored at all. Other workers were clearly monitored on an as-needed basis as determined 

by the Hanford Personnel Dosimetry Program; still, other workers were monitored constantly if their 

jobs involved consistent exposure potential. Because a large amount of monitoring data exist for 

Hanford employees, particularly for those employees working in jobs with highest exposure 

potentials, gaps in monitoring records for specific employees can be filled by conservatively utilizing 

available co-worker data. The data and appropriate claimant-favorable techniques for its use in dose 

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reconstruction are primarily contained in Internal Dosimetry Coworker Data for the Hanford Site 

(ORAUT-OTIB-0039) and External Dosimetry Coworker Data for the Hanford Site (ORAUT-OTIB0030). 

7.4.1.2 Hanford Construction Workers Were Not Monitored for Internal Doses 

Similar issues from SEC-0057 and SEC-0078 (OSA Ref ID: 100105, 100104, 100108): Petitioners 

noted a lack of internal monitoring for construction trade workers between 1967 and 1971; 

construction workers exposed to outside air releases without respiratory protection; and construction 

workers working in the Tank Farm area with limited access to properly functioning respirators. 

As mentioned in 7.4.1.1 above, a review of available personnel records and monitoring data indicates 

that not all Hanford employees were monitored at all times. Review of several individual dose 

reconstructions associated with construction trade workers employed from 1967 through 1971 further 

indicated a lack of monitoring data for some workers. Internal monitoring data gaps can be covered 

through the use of conservative assumptions and co-worker data as outlined in ORAUT-OTIB-0039. 

The proper application of ORAUT-OTIB-0039, specific for performing dose reconstruction for 

unmonitored construction trade workers, has been further assessed and is detailed in Parameters to 

Consider When Processing Claims for Construction Trade Workers (ORAUT-OTIB-0052). 

Additionally, guidance contained within Fission and Activation Product Assignment for Internal 

Dose-Related Gross Beta and Gross Gamma Analyses (ORAUT-OTIB-0054) is available. This 

guidance can be applied to situations when radionuclide-specific information is lacking, to intakes of 

fission and activation products associated with most reactor operations, to destructive fuel 

examination, fuel dissolution, and to high-level waste management operations such as the Tank 

Farms. Regarding to respirator protection, NIOSH does not take protection factors into account when 

assessing personnel dose under this radiological dose reconstruction program. That is, assumptions 

applied in performing EEOICPA dose reconstruction do not include any adjustment or correction to 

personnel exposures or dose to account for any personal protective equipment that may have been 

worn (including respirators). This eliminates the need to consider or account for the subsequent 

performance, or failure, of personal protective equipment for EEOICPA dose reconstructions. 

7.4.1.3 Under-recording of Neutron Dose 

SEC-00057 (OSA Ref ID: 100318): Neutron dose was under-recorded for plutonium workers during 

the period of 1950 through 1971 when the Hanford Nuclear Track Emulsion, Type A, (NTA) film was 

used. 

As discussed previously in Section 7.4.3.2, the neutron dosimetry systems prior to the implementation 

of the Hanford Multipurpose Dosimeter (January 1, 1972) had technological inadequacies in 

accurately measuring neutron dose in the thermal and intermediate energy spectra. This technical 

inadequacy is well-documented. For neutron exposures prior to January 1, 1972, NIOSH finds that a 

claimant-favorable assignment of neutron dose based on the application of a neutron-to-photon dose 

ratio distribution, supported by Hanford field measurements, can be used for external neutron dose 

reconstruction. 

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7.5 Summary of Feasibility Findings for Petition SEC-00057-2 

This report evaluates the feasibility for completing dose reconstructions for employees at Hanford 

from September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1990. NIOSH found that the available monitoring 

records, process descriptions and source term data available are not sufficient to complete dose 

reconstructions for the proposed class of employees. 

Table 7-5 summarizes the results of the feasibility findings at Hanford for each exposure source 

during the time period September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1990. 

Table 7-5: Summary of Feasibility Findings for SEC-00057-2 

September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1990 

Source of Exposure Reconstruction Feasible Reconstruction Not Feasible 

Internal1

 - Uranium X 

 - Plutonium X 

 - Fission Products X 

 - Thorium X (beginning January 1, 1962) X (before 1962)

 - Tritium X 

 - Polonium X 

 - Americium X (beginning January 1, 1969) X (before 1969)

 - Iodine X 

 - Ambient Environmental X 

External 

 - Gamma X 

 - Beta X 

 - Neutron X 

 - Occupational Medical X-ray X 

 - Ambient Environmental X 

1

Includes an evaluation of urinalysis (in vitro), airborne dust, and lung (in vivo) data 

As of August 9, 2007, a total of 2,564 claims have been submitted to NIOSH for individuals who 

worked at Hanford between September 1, 1946 and December 31, 1990. Dose reconstructions have 

been completed for 1,827 individuals (~71%). 

8.0 Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00057-2 

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees covered by this evaluation report is 

governed by both EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3). Under these requirements, if it is not 

feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, NIOSH must 

also determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered the 

health of members of the class. Section 83.13 requires NIOSH to assume that any duration of 

unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of members of a class when it has been 

established that the class may have been exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have 

involved levels of exposure similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If 

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the occurrence of such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then NIOSH is 

required to specify that health was endangered for those workers who were employed for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for the class or in 

combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of 

employees in the SEC. 

For internal thorium and americium exposures, due to a lack of information regarding internal 

radiation monitoring, prior to 1960 for thorium, and prior to 1968 for americium, NIOSH’s evaluation 

determined that it is not feasible to estimate radiation dose for members of the proposed class with 

sufficient accuracy based on the sum of information available from available resources. 

9.0 NIOSH-Proposed Class for Petition SEC-00057-2 

Based on its research, NIOSH has defined a single class of employees for which NIOSH cannot 

estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy. The NIOSH-proposed class for which NIOSH 

cannot estimate radiation doses with sufficient accuracy includes: 

All employees of the Department of Energy (DOE), its predecessor agencies, and DOE contractors or 

subcontractors, who worked from: 

1. September 1, 1946 through December 31, 1961 in the 300 Area; or 

2. January 1, 1949 through December 31, 1968 in the 200 Area; 

at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, 

occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 

NIOSH has carefully reviewed all material sent in by the petitioner, including the specific assertions 

stated in the petition, and has responded herein (see Section 7.4). NIOSH has also reviewed available 

technical resources and other references, including the Site Research Database (SRDB), for 

information relevant to SEC-00057-2. In addition, NIOSH reviewed its NOCTS dose reconstruction 

database to identify EEOICPA-related dose reconstructions that might provide information relevant to 

the petition evaluation. 

These actions are based on existing, approved NIOSH processes used in dose reconstruction for 

claims under EEOICPA. NIOSH’s guiding principle in conducting these dose reconstructions is to 

ensure that the assumptions used are fair, consistent, and well-grounded in the best available science. 

Simultaneously, uncertainties in the science and data must be handled to the advantage, rather than to 

the detriment, of the petitioners. When adequate personal dose monitoring information is not 

available, or is very limited, NIOSH may use the highest reasonably possible radiation dose, based on 

reliable science, documented experience, and relevant data to determine the feasibility of 

reconstructing the dose of an SEC petition class. NIOSH contends that it has complied with these 

standards of performance in determining that it would not be feasible to reconstruct the dose for the 

class proposed in this petition. 

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10.0 References 

42 C.F.R. pt. 81, Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule, Federal 

Register/Vol. 67, No. 85/Thursday, p 22,296; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 19391 

42 C.F.R. pt. 82, Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees 

Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; Final Rule; May 2, 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 

42 C.F.R. pt. 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special 

Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000; Final Rule; May 28, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 22001 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385 [EEOICPA], Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 

Program Act of 2000, as amended 

OCAS-IG-001, External Dose Reconstruction Implementation Guideline, Rev. 02; August 25, 2006; 

SRDB Ref ID: 29929 

OCAS-OTIB-0010, Best Estimate External Dose Reconstruction for Glovebox Workers, Rev. 02; 

December 30, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 22410 

OCAS-PR-004, Internal Procedures for the Evaluation of Special Exposure Cohort Petitions, Rev. 0; 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); Cincinnati, Ohio; September 23, 

2004; SRDB Ref ID: 32022 

HW-7-1981-Del, 1945, Hanford Engineer Works Monthly Report, June 1945, Hanford Engineer 

Works; July 14, 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 5060, pdf p. 91 

HW-2177, 1945, Hanford Engineer Works Monthly Report, July 1945, Hanford Engineer Works; 

August 13, 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 5072, pdf p. 97 

ORAUT-OTIB-0002, Maximum Internal Dose Estimates for Certain DOE Complex Claims, Rev. 02; 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); February 7, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 29947 

ORAUT-OTIB-0004, Estimating the Maximum Plausible Dose to Workers at Atomic Weapons 

Employer Facilities, Rev. 03, PC-2; Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); December 6, 2006; 

SRDB Ref ID: 29949 

ORAUT-OTIB-0019, Analysis of Coworker Bioassay Data for Internal Dose Assignment, Rev. 00; 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); December 29, 2004; SRDB Ref ID: 19439 

ORAUT-OTIB-0030, External Coworker Dosimetry Data for the Hanford Site; Rev. 00 PC-1; Oak 

Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); November 7, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 29961 

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SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

ORAUT-OTIB-0039, Internal Coworker Dosimetry Data for the Hanford Site; Rev. 00 PC-2; Oak 

Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); January 31, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 29969 

ORAUT-OTIB-0052, Parameters to Consider When Processing Claims for Construction Trade 

Workers, Rev. 00, PC-1; Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); January 16, 2007; SRDB Ref 

ID: 29978 

ORAUT-OTIB-0054, Fission and Activation Product Assignment for Internal Dose-Related Gross 

Beta and Gross Gamma Analyses, Rev. 00; Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); May 11, 

2007; SRDB Ref ID: 31780 

ORAUT-PROC-0060, Occupational Onsite Ambient Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites, Rev. 01; 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU); June 28, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 29986 

ORAUT-PROC-0061, Occupational X-Ray Dose Reconstruction for DOE Sites, Rev. 01; Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities (ORAU); July 21, 2006; SRDB Ref ID: 29987 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-1, Hanford Site—Introduction, Rev. 03; Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

(ORAU); May 23, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 31874 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-2, Hanford Site—Site Description, Rev. 01; Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

(ORAU); May 17, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 31859 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-3, Hanford Site—Occupational Medical Dose, Rev. 01; Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU); April 11, 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 19491 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-4, Hanford Site—Occupational Environmental Dose, Rev. 02; Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities (ORAU); June 5, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32073 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-5, Hanford Site—Occupational Internal Dose, Rev. 02; Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU); June 22, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32522 

ORAUT-TKBS-0006-6, Hanford Site—Occupational External Dose, Rev. 03; Oak Ridge Associated 

Universities (ORAU); June 5, 2007; SRDB Ref ID: 32074 

AEC, 1966, Feasibility Study of the Correlation of Lifetime Health and Mortality Experience of AEC 

and AEC Contractor Employees with Occupational Radiation Exposure, Progress Report, AEC 

Contract No. AT(30-1)-3394; Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); University of Pittsburgh; no date; 

SRDB Ref ID: 25758 

Affidavit, 2007, Affidavit from Petitioner of the Hanford Carpenters/Carpenter Apprentices Part B 

SEC Petition; an affidavit from the petitioner describing seven incidents occurring at Hanford to the 

proposed class, and two accidents occurring to the petitioner; January 3, 2007; OSA Ref ID: 102410 

Andersen, 1971, Battelle Northwest In-Vivo Measurements; B. V. Andersen; November 1, 1971; 

SRDB Ref ID: 17511 

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Ballinger, 1991, A History of Major Hanford Facilities and Processes Involving Radioactive 

Material; M. Y. Ballinger and R. B. Hall; Pacific Northwest Laboratory; March 1991; SRDB Ref ID: 

Battelle Northwest, 1983, Analytical and Personnel Dosimetry Support Services, statement of work; 

Battelle Northwest; October 28, 1983; SRDB Ref ID: 7794 

Battelle Northwest, 1985, Appendix A Statement of Work for Third Operational Year of Subcontract 

B-B-2472-A-I; September 1985; SRDB Ref ID: 7796 

Bihl, 1995, Intake Monitoring for the Actinium-227 Project, correspondence from D. E. Bihl to J. R. 

Hensley; D. E. Bihl; August 7, 1995; SRDB Ref ID: 31684 

Biles, 1972, AD HOC Technical Committee Findings, letter to T. A. Nemzek from Martin Biles; 

Martin B. Biles; November 28, 1972; SRDB Ref ID: 4754 

Brackenbush, 1991, Response of TLD-Albedo and Nuclear Track Dosimeters Exposed to Plutonium 

Sources, PNL-7881; L. W. Brackenbush, W. V. Baumgartner, and J. J. Fix; Pacific Northwest 

Laboratory; Richland, Washington; December 1991; SRDB: 13703 

Brady, 1964, Hanford Whole Body Counter Activities for 1961-1963; D. N. Brady, editor; May 1964; 

SRDB Ref ID: 7771, page 5 

Brown, October 1958, Shielding Basis for the High Exposure Plutonium Button Line, Part I, Gamma 

Shielding for the Feed Tanks, SN Tanks, and PR Can, HW-57716; C. L. Brown; October 20, 1958; 

SRDB Ref ID: 33188 

Brown, November 1958, Shielding Basis for the High Exposure Plutonium Button Line, Part II, 

Neutron Shielding for the Feed and Filtrate Facility and the PR Can, HW-58093; C. L. Brown; 

November 10, 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 32560 

Buschbom, 1993, Summary of Recorded External Radiation Doses for Hanford Workers 1944-1989; 

PNL-8909; R. L. Buschbom and E. S. Gilbert; Pacific Northwest Laboratory; October 1993; SRDB 

Ref ID: 299 

Cantril, 1945, Tolerance Limits for Prolonged Exposures, letter to file; S. T. Cantril; October 18, 

1945; SRDB Ref ID: 13428 

Cantril, 1946, Industrial Medical Programs: Hanford Engineer Works; Simeon T. Cantril; November 

15, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 26814 

Carbaugh, 1988, The Impact of Upgraded In Vivo Lung Measurement Capability on an Internal 

Dosimetry Program; E. H. Carbaugh, M. J. Sula, T. L. Aldridge, and H. B. Spitz, “Ann. Occup. 

Hyg.,” Vol. 32, Supplement 1, 1988, pp. 885-892; SRDB Ref ID: 7774 

Cohen & Associates, 2005, Review of NIOSH Site Profile for the Hanford Site, SCA-TR-TASK1­

0004; S. Cohen & Associates; June 10, 2005, OSA Ref ID: 100101, pages 23-244 

87 of 110 
SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

DOE, no date, Hanford Site: A Guide to Record Series Supporting Epidemiologic Studies Conducted 

for the Department of Energy; U.S. Department of Energy; no date; OSA Ref ID: 100101, page 3-22 

DOE, 1996, Plutonium: The First 50 Years, United States plutonium production, acquisition, and 

utilization from 1944 through 1994, DOE/DP-0137; U. S Department of Energy (DOE); February 

1996; SRDB Ref ID: 12292 

DOE, 1997, Linking Legacies, Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to 

their Environmental Consequences; U. S. Department of Energy (DOE); January 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 

11930 

DOE, 2002, History of the Plutonium Production Facilities at the Hanford Site Historic District, 

1943-1990; DOE/RL/-97-1047; Department of Energy (DOE); June 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 27666 

FEFPTP, 1960, Predicted Z Plant Radiation Exposure Levels vs Plutonium Isotopic Concentration of 

Products, HW-66675; Facilities Engineering and Finished Products Technology Personnel (FEFPTP); 

August 19, 1960; SRDB Ref ID: 3848 

Fix, 1981, Hanford Personnel Dosimeter Supporting Studies FY-1980; J. J. Fix, G. W. R. Endres, F. 

M. Cummings, J. M. Aldrich, M. R. Thorson, R. L. Kathren, and M. R. Thorson; February 1981; 

SRDB Ref ID: 15355 

Fix, 1997, Potential Unrecorded Neutron Dose, Letter to distribution; Jack J. Fix; August 27, 1997; 

OSA Ref ID: 100318, pages 23-25 

Fix, February 1997, Retrospective Assessment of Personnel Neutron Dosimetry for Workers at the 

Hanford Site; J. J. Fix, R. H. Wilson, and W. V. Baumgartner; February 1997; SRDB Ref ID: 5275 

Fix, 2001, Historical Hanford Radiological Record Description; J. J. Fix; E. H. Carbaugh; and J. A. 

MacLellan; Pacific Northwest Laboratory; July, 2001; SRDB Ref ID: 15354 

GE, 1954, Radiation Protection Standards: Basic Policy on Permissible Exposure; General Electric 

(GE); December 15, 1954; SRDB Ref ID: 27679 

Gerber, 1992, Past Practices Technical Characterization Study—300 Area—Hanford Site, WHC-MR0388; M. S. Gerber; December 1992; SRDB Ref ID: 13724 

Gerber, 1993, Manhattan Project Buildings and Facilities at the Hanford Site: A Construction 

History; M. S. Gerber; Westinghouse Hanford Company; September 1993; SRDB Ref ID: 11572 

Gerber, 2005, History and Stabilization of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex, Hanford 

Site, HNF-24400, Rev. 0; M. S. Gerber; March 2005; SRDB Ref ID: 34060 

Gilbert, 1990, A Study of Detailed Dosimetry Records for a Selected Group of Workers Included in 

the Hanford Mortality Study, E. S. Gilbert; Pacific Northwest Laboratory; September 1990; SRDB 

Ref ID: 285 

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Glasgow, 1951, Radiation Studies 234-5 Building (IV) Moderated BF3 Calibration, HW-22021; D. 

W. Glasgow and Wm. C. Roesch; August 23, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 32557 

Glover, 1964, Bioassay Sampling and Analysis for Personnel Working with Promethium-147, 

correspondence from J. C. Glover to H. V. Larson; J. C. Glover; November 18, 1964; SRDB Ref ID: 

Gydesen, 1954, Hanford Experience with Thorium, HW-31222; S. P. Gydesen; March 26, 1954; 

SRDB Ref ID: 34206 

Handwritten Diary, 2006, [Name Redacted] Handwritten Diary; June 2006; OSA Ref ID: 100318, 

page 62-77 

Hanford Works, 1949, Monthly Report for July 1949, HW-14043; Hanford Works; July 1949; SRDB 

Ref ID: 34763 

HAPO, 1947-1950, Special Hazards Meetings and Bulletins for 1947-1950, documents for each 

month; Hanford Atomic Products Operation (HAPO); 1947-1950; SRDB Ref ID: 31584 

HAPO, 1949-1950, Special Hazards Bulletins for 1947-1950; Hanford Atomic Products Operation 

(HAPO); 1949-1950; SRDB Ref ID: 31589 

Hart, 1946, Medical Department Health Instrument Section: Manual of Standard ProceduresPersonnel Meters; J. C. Hart; May 1, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 15199 

Hart, 1967, Derivation of Dose Data from Hanford-Dupont Personnel Meter Exposure Records 

Applicable to the Mancuso Study; J. C. Hart; Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL); April 1967; 

SRDB Ref ID: 15442 

Healy, 1946, Status of Urine Analysis for Plutonium at Hanford Engineer Works, correspondence to 

H. M. Parker from J. W. Healy; J. W. Healy; March 1, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 7787, pages 3-7 

Healy, 1948, Bioassay at Hanford; J. W. Healy; July 20, 1948; SRDB Ref ID: 4909 

Healy, 1949, Urine Analysis for Tritium Oxide; J. W. Healy; July 27, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 13422 

Healy, 1950, P-10 Oxide Analysis, Letter to Doctor Forrest Western, HW-18038; H. W. Healy; June 

9, 1950; SRDB Ref. ID: 34809 

Healy, 1951, Hydrogen Counter; HW-20811; H. W Healy; April 12, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 34768 

Heeb, 1994, Radionuclide Releases to the Atmosphere from Hanford Operations, 1944-1972, PNWD2222 HEDR UC-000; C. M. Heeb; May 1994; SRDB Ref ID: 463 

Helgeson, November 3, 1955, Dosimetry of 234-5 Manufacturing Processes – A Summary of Current 

Problems, HW-40448; G. L. Helgeson; November 3, 1955; SRDB Ref ID: 34825 

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Helgeson, December 15, 1955, Preliminary Notes on Dosimetry Problems, Room 242, 234-5 

Building, HW-40468; G. L. Helgeson; December 15, 1955; SRDB Ref ID: 34826 

Helgeson, February 20, 1956, Further Notes on the Surface Dosage Rate of Plutonium Metal, HW41369; G. L. Helgeson; February 20, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34828 

Helgeson, May 23, 1956, Exposures in Room 242, 234-5 Building, HW-43345; G. L. Helgeson; May 

23, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34831 

Helgeson, August 9, 1956, Exposures in Task V, Hoods 200 A & B, 234-5 Building, HW-44836; G. L. 

Helgeson; August 9, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34833 

Helgeson, August 31, 1956, Exposures in Task IV 234-5 Building, Part I, HW-45142; G. L. Helgeson; 

August 31, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34788 

Helgeson, September 8, 1956, Surface Dosimetry and Effective Energy Calculations, HW-41439; G. 

L. Helgeson; September 8, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34830 

Helgeson, October 2, 1956, Dosimetry of Plutonium Fabrication – Interim Report, HW-45600 G. L. 

Helgeson; October 2, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34789 

Helgeson, October 12, 1956, Exposures in Task VII, 234-5 Building, HW-46023; G. L. Helgeson; 

October 12, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34790 

Helgeson, October 15, 1956, Exposures in Task V, Part III-190, HW-46068; G. L. Helgeson; October 

15, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34791 

Helgeson, October 31, 1956, Exposures in Task III, Part I, HW-46383; G. L. Helgeson; October 31, 

1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34792 

Helgeson, November 1, 1956, Surface Dosage Rate Problems From Task III and Task IV Wastes, 

HW-46401; G. L. Helgeson; November 1, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34793 

Helgeson, November 5, 1956, Exposure Studies, 234-5 Building, Book II, HW-46449; G. L. Helgeson; 

November 5, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34794 

Helgeson, November 9, 1956, Exposure in Task II, HW-46507; G. L. Helgeson; November 9, 1956; 

SRDB Ref ID: 34795 

Helgeson, November 12, 1956, Exposures in Task III, Part II, Exposures in Task IV, Part II, Waste 

Material, HW-46508; G. L. Helgeson; November 12, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34796 

Helgeson, November 1956, Exposures in Task III, Part III, HW-46774; G. L. Helgeson; November 

20, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34797 

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Helgeson, November 20, 1956, Summary for HW-48000, Dosimetry of Plutonium Fabrication, HW46776; G. L. Helgeson; November 20, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34798 

Helgeson, November 27, 1956, The Dosimetry of Plutonium Fabrication – Terminal Report, HW48000; G. L. Helgeson; November 27, 1956; SRDB Ref ID: 34799 

Henle, no date, Hanford Internal Dosimetry File Note, typed version of a handwritten note assumed to 

have been written by J. C. Henle; J. C. Henle; no date; SRDB Ref ID: 19314 

Henle, 1962, 1961 Whole Body Counter Results, correspondence from R. C. Henle to F. Swanberg, 

Jr.; January 9, 1962; SRDB Ref ID: 7771, page 3 

Howell, 1969, Bioassay Sampling-147 Pm Workers, correspondence from W. P. Howell to J. J. Jech 

regarding letter of September 2; W. P. Howell; October 6, 1969; SRDB Ref ID: 30241 

Howell, 1989, A Historical Review of Portable Health Physics Instruments and Their Use in 

Radiation Protection Programs at Hanford, 1944 Through 1988; W. P. Howell, J. L. Kenoyer, M. L. 

Kress, K. L. Swinth, C. E. Corbit, L. V. Zuerner, D. M. Fleming, and H. W. Dehaven; Pacific 

Northwest Laboratory; September 1989; SRDB Ref ID: 27670 

ICRP 34, Protection of the Patient in Diagnostic Radiology; ICRP Publication 34: Annals of the 

ICRP, Vol. 9/2; Elsevier Publishing; January, 1983; http://www.elsevier.com 

Ikenberry, 1991, Evaluation of Thyroid Radioactivity Measurement Data from Hanford Workers, 

1944-1946; T. A. Ikenberry; May 1991; SRDB Ref ID: 14997 

Isochem Inc., 1967, Purex Plant Thorium Process Operation Report; Isochem Inc.; December 1967; 

SRDB Ref ID: 31708 

Jech, 1969, New Am-241 Detection Level, letter to file; J. J. Jech; September 12, 1969; SRDB Ref ID: 

17509 

Keene, 1960, Analysis of the Distribution of Externally Received Radiation at Hanford, 1944-1959, to 

be presented at the Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, June 29-July 1, 1960 at Boston, 

Massachusetts; A. R. Keene; July 1, 1960; SRDB Ref ID: 24381 

Kidder, 1946, 300 Area (Weekly Report), January 22 through January 28, HW-7-3368; C. P. Kidder; 

February 1, 1946; SRDB Ref ID: 34579 

Kornberg, April 1951, Minutes of the P-10 Hazards Control Committee Meeting, Seventeenth Meeting 

– April 4, 1951, HW-20883; H. A. Kornberg; April 12, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 34807 

Kornberg, August 1951, Terminal Report – P-10 Hazards Control Committee, HW-21231; H. A. 

Kornberg; August 17, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 34810 

Lardy, 1970, Correspondence Regarding Detection Limits for Selected Radionuclides, letter from M. 

M. Lardy to J. P. Corley; M. M. Lardy; April 23, 1970; SRDB Ref ID: 13399 

91 of 110 
SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Lindlief, no date, Casting Uranium Bars as a Substitute for the Extrusion Process; W. Earl Lindlief; 

no date; SRDB Ref ID: 28011 

Lyon, 1990, Hanford Radiological Protection Support Services Annual Report for 1989; M. Lyon, D. 

E. Bihl, J. J. Fix, J. L. Kenoyer, J. A. Leonowich, and H. E. Palmer; July 1990; SRDB Ref ID: 13423 

McMaster, 1951, Pertinent Facts about Thorium, HW-21061; J. V. McMaster; May 9, 1951; SRDB 

Ref ID: 34197 

Moulthrop, September 21, 1949, A Screening Review and Classification of Modifications needed on 

the RM Line, HW-14579; H. A. Moulthrop; September 21, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 34824 

Moulthrop, October 9, 1957; An Efficient Method for Radiation and Ventilation Control of 

contamination Enclosures Process Technology Information Report, HW-53004; H. A. Moulthrop; 

October 9, 1957; SRDB Ref ID: 34800 

Moulthrop, March 20, 1958, Z-Plant Radiation Study Interim Report on Special Process Sampling 

Program, HW-55384; H. A. Moulthrop; March 20, 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 34801 

Moulthrop, March 27, 1958, Z-Plant Radiation Study Special Sampling Program Interim Report #2, 

HW-55463; H. A. Moulthrop; March 27, 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 34802 

Moulthrop, May 21, 1958, Z-Plant Radiation Study Special Sampling Program Interim Report #3, 

HW-56102; H. A. Moulthrop and C. L. Brown; May 21, 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 34803 

Moulthrop, September 5, 1958, Z-Plant Radiation Study Special Sampling Program Interim Report 

#4, HW-57358; H. A. Moulthrop; September 5, 1958; SRDB Ref ID: 34805 

Moulthrop, October 22, 1959—Part 1, Z-Plant Radiation Study Interim Report #5 – Part I 

Possibilities for Reducing NPR Gamma Dose Rate, HW-61755, Pt 1; H. A. Moulthrop; October 22, 

1959; SRDB Ref ID: 34845 

Moulthrop, October 22, 1959—Part 2, Z-Plant Radiation Study Interim Report #5 – Part II, Data on 

Gamma Shielding of Special Plutonium Samples, HW-61755, Pt 2; H. A. Moulthrop; October 22, 

1959; SRDB Ref ID: 34846 

Napier, 2002, A Re-evaluation of the Iodine-131 Atmospheric Releases from the Hanford Site; B. A. 

Napier, Health Physics Vol. 83, pp. 204-226; 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 4743 

NIOSH, 2001, NIOSH Assessment of Information Needed for the Evaluation of the Health Effects Due 

to Occupational Exposures for DOE Site Remediation Workers; National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH); January 2001; OSA Ref ID: 102417, page 4-5 

NIOSH, 2004, NIOSH Health Hazard Evaluation Report, HETA 2004-0145-2941; CH2M Hill 

Hanford Group, Inc. and U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection Richland, 

Washington; July 2004; OSA Ref ID: 100105, page 73-100 

92 of 110 
SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Palmer, no date, Hanford Whole Body Counter 1983 Activities; H. E. Palmer, G. A. Rieksts, and H. B. 

Spitz; no date; SRDB Ref ID: 17502 

Palmer, 1970, The Uptake, Distribution and Excretion of Promethium in Humans and the Effect of 

DTPA on these Parameters; H. E. Palmer, I. C. Nelson, and G. H. Crook; “Health Physic” Pergamon 

Press 1970, Vol. 18, pp. 53-61; SRDB Ref ID: 13431 

Palmer, 1979, Hanford Whole Body Counter 1978 Activities; H. E. Palmer and G. A Rieksts; March 

1979; SRDB Ref ID: 31693 

Palmer, 1984, The Use of Planar High-Purity Ge Detectors for In Vivo Measurement of Low-Energy 

Photon Emitters; H. E. Palmer and Gunars Rieksts; “Health Physic,” Vol. 47, No. 4 (October), pp. 

569-578; SRDB Ref ID: 13359 

Palmer, 1985, Measurement Sensitivities for Radionuclides in the Body, memo from H. E. Palmer to 

Monte Sula; H. E. Palmer; April 1, 1985; SRDB Ref ID: 17512 

Pardue, 1944, Photographic Film as a Pocket Radiation Dosimeter; L. A. Pardue, N. Goldstein, and 

E. O. Wollan; April 8, 1944; SRDB Ref ID: 8599 

Parker, no date, Review of Personnel Monitoring at Hanford Engineer Works; H. M. Parker; no date; 

SRDB Ref ID: 5225 

Parker, 1945, Weekly Health Instrument Section Reports on the 100 Areas and the 300 Area, May 5, 

1945 through December 31, 1945; H. M. Parker; 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 31345 

Parker, 1948, Health Instrument Division Report for Month of June 1948; H. M. Parker; June 30, 

1948; SRDB Ref ID: 348 

Parker, February 1948, Proposed Revisions of H.I. Procedures, HW-8973; H. M. Parker; February 15, 

1948; SRDB Ref ID: 34747 

Parker, 1950, P-10 Hazards, communication from H. M. Parker to A. B. Greninger; H. M. Parker; 

January 10, 1950; SRDB Ref ID: 13420 

Parker, 1954, Radiation Protection in the Atomic Energy Industry – A Ten-Year Review; H. M. Parker; 

November 26, 1954; SRDB Ref ID: 13352 

Parker, 1960, Radiation Protection Criteria and Standards: Their Basis and Use; H. M. Parker; May 

1960; SRDB Ref ID: 27678 

Personal Communication, 2003, Interview with Former Hanford Employee; July 31, 2003; SRDB Ref 

ID: 606 

Personal Communication, 2007, Interview with retired Hanford employee; June 18, 2007; SRDB Ref 

ID: 33350 

93 of 110 
SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Pickard, 1968, Historical Data, CPD Cost, Production and Unit Cost Data, ARH-747; G. C. Pickard; 

August 9, 1968; SRDB Ref ID: 34298 

RAC, 2002, Methods for Estimating Radiation Doses from Short-Lived Gaseous Radionuclides and 

Radioactive Particles Released to the Atmosphere During Early Hanford Operations, Final Report; 

Risk Assessment Corporation (RAC); November 2002; SRDB Ref ID: 457 

Randall, 2000, US Admits Radiation Exposure Killed Nuclear Weapons Workers; Kate Randall, 

World Socialist Web Site; February 2, 2000; OSA Ref ID: 102414, page 4-5 

Reddie, 1949, Fast Neutron Measurements-234-5 Building, HW-14440; J. S. Reddie and G. H. 

Whipple; September 15, 1949; SRDB Ref ID: 355 

Reed, 1952, History of the P-10 Project as of February 1, 1951, HW-23151-DEL; George G. Reed Jr.; 

January 4, 1952; SRDB Ref ID: 34765 

Richardson, 1999, Missing Annual External Radiation Dosimetry Data Among Hanford Workers; D. 

Richardson, S. Wing, J. Watson, and S. Wolf; Journal of Exposure Analysis and Environmental 

Epidemiology, 9:575-585; 1999; [Journal name recently changed to “Journal of Exposure Science and 

Environmental Epidemiology”]; OSA Ref ID: 102416, page 2 

Roesch, August 1951, Radiation Studies 234-5 Building (III) Nuclear Track Film, HW-22020; W. C. 

Roesch; August 21, 1951; SRDB Ref ID: 26043 

Roesch, July 1954, Neutron Measurements (I), HW-32476; W. C. Roesch; July 26, 1954; SRDB Ref 

ID: 26045 

Roesch, July 1957, Surface Dose from Plutonium, HW-51317, W. C. Roesch; July 10, 1957; SRDB 

Ref ID: 26046 

Roesch, 1960, Hanford Whole Body Counter 1959 Activities; W. C. Roesch, R. C. McCall, and H. E. 

Palmer; December 1960; SRDB Ref ID: 13426 

SC&A, 2005, Review of NIOSH Site Profile for the Hanford Site, SCA-TR-TASK1-0004; Richland, 

Washington, Contract No. 200-2004-03805, Task Order No. 1; June 10, 2005; OSA Ref ID: 100304, 

pages 38-43 

Smith, 1947, Informal Investigation of High Personnel-Meter Readings, the form is to J. P. Lee from 

J. M. Smith; J. M. Smith; May 8, 1947; SRDB Ref ID: 31587 

Swanberg, 1962, Whole Body Counter Examination Time, memo to Internal Dosimetry Operations 

staff; F. Swanberg, Jr.; October 23, 1962; SRDB Ref ID: 7771, page 4 

Swanberg, 1963, Hanford Mobile Whole Body Counter; F. Swanberg, Jr.; December 31, 1963; SRDB 

Ref ID: 7771, page 23 

94 of 110 
SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Thorburn, 1948, Investigation of Polonium in Urine; HW-12217; R. C. Thorburn; November 17, 

1948; SRDB Ref ID: 34806 

Tilley, 1945, Production of Polonium, letter to W. O. Simon from J. W. Tilley; J. W. Tilley; February 

9, 1945; SRDB Ref ID: 22757 

Unknown author, no date, Ionizing Radiation and Mortality Among Hanford Workers: Completed 

NIOSH Initiated Research, Summary (unknown source) of NIOSH-initiated research (no date); OSA 

Ref ID: 102415 

Unknown author, 1961, Bioassay Procedures and Analysis (Old Bioassay Bible); No author cited; 

April 10, 1961; SRDB Ref ID: 4947 

Unknown author, 2006, Draft Issue Resolution Matrix, based on the SC&A Review of the NIOSH 

Site Profile for the Hanford Site; Unknown author; January 16, 2006; OSA Ref ID: 100105, page 71­

72 

UST, 1974, Promethium-147, internal procedure; United States Testing Company (UST); 1974; 

SRDB Ref ID: 7787, page 187 

Various Affidavits, Twelve affidavits submitted by the SEC-00057 petitioner regarding missing 

dosimetry records, location of records, medical conditions of individual workers, incidents, and 

overexposures; OSA Ref ID: 100318 

Various Division Managers, 1950, Hanford Works Monthly Report for November, 1950; Compiled by 

Division Managers; December 20, 1950; SRDB Ref ID: 358 

Walser, 1978, Purex Process Operation and Performance, 1970 Thoria Campaign; R. L. Walser; 

February 1978; SRDB Ref ID: 27671 

Washington State Department of Health, no date, The Release of Radioactive Materials from 

Hanford: 1944 through 1972, Washington State Dept. of Health: Hanford Health Info Network; OSA 

Ref ID: 100102 

Watson, 1959, A Review of the NTA (Fast Neutron) Film Program, HW-61008; E. C. Watson; June 5, 

1959; SRDB Ref ID: 418 

Watters, 1954, Bioassay Annual Report; R. L. Watters; December 28, 1954; SRDB Ref ID: 7787, 

pages 90-96 

Wilson, 1960, Review of the Thyroid Monitoring Program, letter to file; R. H. Wilson; June 6, 1960; 

SRDB Ref ID: 7770 

Wilson, 1972, A Method for Estimating Neutron Exposure Received by Plutonium Workers, ARH2647; R. H. Wilson, October 1972; SRDB Ref ID: 4774 

95 of 110 
SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Wilson, 1987, Historical Review of Personnel Dosimetry Development and its Use in Radiation 

Protection Programs at Hanford, R. H. Wilson; Pacific Northwest Laboratory; February 1987; SRDB 

Ref ID: 262 

Wilson, 1990, Description and Evaluation of the Hanford Personnel Dosimeter Program from 1944 

through 1989; PNNL-7447; R. H. Wilson, J. J. Fix, W. V. Baumgartner, and L. L. Nichols; Pacific 

Northwest Laboratory; September 1990; SRDB Ref ID: 4793 

96 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Attachment One—Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 

1946-1992 

Table A-1: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Americium through Cesium-134) 

Table A-1 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Americium1

Americium-241

Isotopic

Americium2

Antimony-124Antimony-125

Barium-140 

Berkelium-249

Californium-249 

Carbon-14 

Cerium-141Cerium-144

Cesium-134 

1946 

1947 

1948 

1949 

1950 

1951 

1952 

1953 

1954 

1955 

1956 

1957 

1958 

1959 

1960 

1961 

1962 

1963 

1964 41 

1965 2 

1966 2 5 

1967 168 24 

1968 114 15 

1969 50 8 

1970 15 

1971 26 84 

97 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-1: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Americium through Cesium-134) 

Table A-1 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Americium1

Americium-241

Isotopic

Americium2

Antimony-124Antimony-125

Barium-140 

Berkelium-249

Californium-249 

Carbon-14 

Cerium-141Cerium-144

Cesium-134 

1972 62 4 

1973 101 4 

1974 75 4 4 1 6 

1975 48 

1976 793 2 

1977 196 83 

1978 111 

1979 1 132 2 

1980 310 

1981 4 70 2 

1982 13 135 2 3 9 10 

1983 21 38 3 2 1 2 1 

1984 98 10 1 1 

1985 180 2 

1986 183 1 32 1 86 

1987 100 1 

1988 41 

1989 28 

1990 26 1 

1991 27 

1992 29 

Table A-1 Notes: 

Empty cells indicate no results. 

1

The data code associated with these results was “AM;” this code is assumed to denote americium; Atomic 

weight(s) are not known 

2

Via alpha spectrometry 

98 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-2: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Cesium-137 through Fission Products) 

Table A-2 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Cesium-137

Chromium-51 

Cobalt-58 Cobalt-60 

Curium-242Curium-244

IsotopicCurium

Europium1

Europium-154 Europium-155 Europium-156 

Fission

Products 2 

1946 

1947 

1948 

1949 

1950 

1951 

1952 

1953 

1954 

1955 

1956 

1957 

1958 5,698 

1959 68,422 

1960 7,037 

1961 5,918 

1962 4,422 

1963 3,833 

1964 57 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 6 

1969 

1970 9 9 

1971 7 7 

1972 4 6 6 

1973 13 29 47 46 44 

1974 1 1 8 9 3 3 3 

99 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-2: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Cesium-137 through Fission Products) 

Table A-2 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Cesium-137

Chromium-51 

Cobalt-58 Cobalt-60 

Curium-242Curium-244

IsotopicCurium

Europium1

Europium-154 Europium-155 Europium-156 

Fission

Products 2 

1975 9 2 1 1 1 

1976 1 2 

1977 3 

1978 3 2 6 

1979 18 

1980 7 

1981 39 52 4 16 10 11 

1982 15 3 8 18 

1983 13 3 4 10 10 2 2 1 

1984 27 1 45 5 1 

1985 2 13 45 9 

1986 13 1 62 62 3 1 

1987 37 37 

1988 1 10 10 3 

1989 1 1 4 

1990 4 4 1 

1991 9 7 

1992 4 4 

Table A-2 Notes: 

Empty cells indicate no results. 

1

The data code associated with these results was “EU;” this code is assumed to denote europium; Atomic weight(s) 

are not known
 2

Excreta scheduling code for a gamma scan with a germanium detector 

100 of 110 
 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-3: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Mixed Fission Products through ISCP) 

Table A-3 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Mixed

Fission Products 

Ge –Li1

Gross Alpha 

Gross Beta 

GS 2

Iodine-125 Iodine-129 Iodine-131 Iodine-133 

Iridium-192

Iron-59 

ISCP3 

1946 

1947 

1948 

1949 

1950 

1951 

1952 

1953 

1954 

1955 

1956 

1957 

1958 

1959 

1960 

1961 

1962 

1963 

1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 1 1 

1973 26 

101 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-3: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Mixed Fission Products through ISCP) 

Table A-3 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Mixed

Fission Products 

Ge –Li1

Gross Alpha 

Gross Beta 

GS 2

Iodine-125 Iodine-129 Iodine-131 Iodine-133 

Iridium-192

Iron-59 

ISCP3 

1974 55 1 

1975 13 

1976 

1977 1 

1978 15 

1979 2 79 5 3 

1980 1 74 41 97 1 1 

1981 39 46 8 2 2 6 

1982 72 19 2 16 

1983 2 2 2 7 

1984 4 

1985 

1986 2 2 2 

1987 

1988 

1989 

1990 

1991 

1992 

Table A-3 Notes: 

Empty cells indicate no results. 

1

Excreta scheduling code for a gamma scan with a germanium detector. 

2

Excreta scheduling code for a gamma scan with a NaI detector. 

3

Sequential strontium-90, cerium, promethium
 

102 of 110 
 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-4: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Isotopic Pu, Am through Neptunium-237) 

Table A-4 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Isotopic

Pu, Am1

Isotopic

Pu, Sr2

Isotopic

 Pu, Sr Tot, Am-2413 

Isotopic

 U, Pu4

ITPAC5

Lanthanum-140 

Lead-210 Lead-212 

Manganese-54

Molybdenum-99 

NAI6

Neptunium-237 

1946 

1947 

1948 

1949 

1950 

1951 

1952 

1953 

1954 

1955 

1956 

1957 

1958 

1959 

1960 

1961 

1962 

1963 

1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 1 1 

1971 

1972 4 

103 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-4: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Isotopic Pu, Am through Neptunium-237) 

Table A-4 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Isotopic

Pu, Am1

Isotopic

Pu, Sr2

Isotopic

 Pu, Sr Tot, Am-2413 

Isotopic

 U, Pu4

ITPAC5

Lanthanum-140 

Lead-210 Lead-212 

Manganese-54

Molybdenum-99 

NAI6

Neptunium-237 

1973 

1974 1 

1975 

1976 

1977 

1978 

1979 

1980 102 

1981 32 33 

1982 5 19 5 

1983 3 8 1 

1984 1 2 

1985 9 19 

1986 10 1156 4 6 1 

1987 9 138 23 5 1 

1988 1 209 1 16 

1989 268 27 1 12 

1990 5 323 52 2 

1991 58 3 

1992 7 318 22 5 

Table A-4 Notes: 

Empty cells indicate no results. 

1

Isotopic plutonium and americium-241 

2

Isotopic plutonium and strontium

3

Isotopic plutonium, strontium total, and americium-241; “Sr total” means radiostrontium by gross beta

4

Isotopic uranium, plutonium

5

Sequential Isotopic plutonium, curium, americium-241

6

Gamma NaI detector
 

104 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-5: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Neptunium-239 through Radium-224) 

Table A-5 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Neptunium-239 

Niobium-95 

Plutonium1

Plutonium-238

Plutonium-2392

Plutonium-241

Iso Plutonium

Polonium-210

Potassium-40 

Promethium-147 

QUS 3

Radium-224 

1946 1,284 200 

1947 3,502 469 

1948 4,712 554 

1949 3,985 402 

1950 5,126 540 

1951 5,760 685 

1952 4,567 467 

1953 7,057 658 

1954 8,176 722 

1955 10,873 910 

1956 11,551 891 

1957 12,062 922 

1958 11,693 968 

1959 6,477 382 

1960 6,306 399 

1961 4,604 243 

1962 3,954 258 

1963 4,667 325 

1964 4,697 400 

1965 4,604 

1966 4,468 74 

1967 3 6,853 422 

1968 4,655 220 314 

1969 2,267 12 392 91 55 

1970 2,867 36 

1971 2,051 380 1 1 20 

1972 1,962 3 638 20 16 

1973 9 2,397 

105 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-5: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Neptunium-239 through Radium-224) 

Table A-5 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Neptunium-239 

Niobium-95 

Plutonium1

Plutonium-238

Plutonium-2392

Plutonium-241

Iso Plutonium

Polonium-210

Potassium-40 

Promethium-147 

QUS 3

Radium-224 

1974 1 6 2,318 3 

1975 12 2,565 4 6 

1976 2,464 3 18 23 

1977 5 2,499 23 29 

1978 3 2,412 26 54 

1979 1 1,957 22 25 

1980 11 85 2,371 1 109,313 6 

1981 4 1,794 7 401 1 313 1 

1982 7 2,055 1 161 1 

1983 1 5 1,430 407 456 126 12 85 

1984 1 1 1,922 1,928 1 496 7 75 

1985 1 1,937 1,941 1 491 2 3 154 

1986 1 1 1,822 1,822 3 282 13 73 

1987 1,834 1,834 219 54 

1988 2,489 2,489 321 1 90 

1989 2 2,640 2,640 2 446 1 97 

1990 2,433 2,433 607 66 

1991 3,312 3,352 588 141 

1992 3,128 3,127 691 115 

Table A-5 Notes: 

Empty cells indicate no results. 

1

Total alpha from plutonium isotopes after separation

2

Actually plutonium-239 + plutonium-240

3

“Quick Uranium Soluble”; excreta scheduling code for elemental uranium 

106 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-6: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Radium-226 through Thorium-234) 

Table A-6 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Radium-226

Ruthenium-103 Ruthenium-106 

Sodium-22 

Strontium1

Strontium-89 

Strontium-90 2 

Sulfur-35 

Technetium-99 

Thorium 

Thorium-232 Thorium-234 

1946 

1947 

1948 

1949 

1950 

1951 

1952 

1953 

1954 

1955 

1956 

1957 

1958 

1959 

1960 

1961 

1962 

1963 

1964 

1965 154 

1966 461 

1967 258 37 

1968 172 

1969 22 4 

1970 55 4 

1971 77 

1972 12 3 92 

1973 95 

107 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-6: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Radium-226 through Thorium-234) 

Table A-6 and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Radium-226

Ruthenium-103 Ruthenium-106 

Sodium-22 

Strontium1

Strontium-89 

Strontium-90 2 

Sulfur-35 

Technetium-99 

Thorium 

Thorium-232 Thorium-234 

1974 2 1 1 107 

1975 2 138 

1976 2 42 

1977 7 1 108 

1978 2 623 1 

1979 45 1,173 1 

1980 5 73 1,044 7 

1981 2 745 5 637 2 1 2 

1982 8 196 5 607 1 

1983 2 23 2 722 

1984 2 13 1,154 

1985 5 5 1,197 

1986 1 1 4 4 1,142 2 

1987 1,204 

1988 1 1,541 

1989 2 1,582 

1990 1,729 

1991 1,816 

1992 1,685 

Table A-6 Notes: 

Empty cells indicate no results. 

1

Total radiostrontium by beta counting

2

Strontium-90 by yttrium ingrowth 

108 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-7: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Tritium through Total Actinides) 

Table A-7and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Tritium

Elemental

Uranium 

Natural 

Uranium 

Uranium-233 Uranium-234 Uranium-235 Uranium-238 

Zinc-65

Zirconium-95

Total 

Actinides 

1946 2 

1947 114 

1948 1,019 9 

1949 1,221 9 

1950 960 

1951 1,781 

1952 2,503 

1953 2,434 1 

1954 2,443 

1955 3,959 12 

1956 3,526 

1957 3,326 19 

1958 2,671 152 

1959 2,556 144 

1960 2,860 157 

1961 2,458 122 

1962 1,763 21 

1963 1,791 25 

1964 1,920 26 

1965 2,608 195 

1966 2,237 137 

1967 2,092 97 

1968 1,655 82 

1969 780 104 1 

1970 609 16 

1971 161 17 1 

1972 155 34 

1973 65 

109 of 110 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEC-00057-2 03-26-08 Hanford 

Table A-7: Summary of Internal Monitoring Records in REX, 1946-1992 

(Tritium through Total Actinides) 

Table A-7and corresponding notes span two pages. 

Year 

Tritium

Elemental

Uranium 

Natural 

Uranium 

Uranium-233 Uranium-234 Uranium-235 Uranium-238 

Zinc-65

Zirconium-95

Total 

Actinides 

1974 218 1 1 

1975 38 259 1 

1976 154 5 

1977 203 2 

1978 362 11 

1979 303 1 23 

1980 274 88 

1981 367 5 65 

1982 35 330 10 63 

1983 79 199 2 54 

1984 562 1,096 1 

1985 175 1,115 15 16 14 

1986 142 951 9 1 10 10 1 

1987 52 961 1 1 1 

1988 42 718 3 3 3 

1989 214 775 4 4 4 

1990 348 812 77 77 77 

1991 1,212 1,663 1 145 146 146 

1992 1,818 2,373 126 126 126 

Table A-7 Notes: 

Empty cells indicate no results. 

110 of 110