[J-94-2020] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

WESTERN DISTRICT 

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ. 

IN RE: B.W. . No. 14 WAP 2020 

APPEAL OF: BLAIR COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 

Appeal from the Order of the 

Superior Court entered November 1, 

2019 at No. 289 WDA 2019, 

reversing the Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Blair County 

entered February 13, 2019 at No. 

2018 GN 2882, and remanding. 

ARGUED: October 22, 2020 

OPINION 

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: MAY 18, 2021 

In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether the Superior Court erred in 

ordering the expungement and destruction of the medical records of the Section 302 

involuntary emergency examination and treatment of Appellee, B.W., on the basis that 

the Section 302 petition was insufficient to prove B.W. was a clear and present danger to 

others. We conclude the Superior Court erred as the physicians' records contained 

sufficient facts to prove B.W. made a threat to harm another person and acted in 

furtherance of that threat by developing a plan to harm that person, which the physicians 

found credible. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court's order. 

I. PENNSYLVANIA'S MENTAL HEALTH PROCEDURES ACT AND EXPUNGEMENT 

OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT RECORDS 

The legislature enacted Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 

P.S. §§ 7101-7503, to establish procedures "to assure the availability of adequate 
treatment to persons who are mentally ill." 50 P.S. § 7102. The MHPA's provisions "shall 

be interpreted in conformity with the principles of due process to make voluntary and 

involuntary treatment available where the need is great and its absence could result in 

serious harm to the mentally ill person or to others." Id. One treatment option the MHPA 

governs is involuntary emergency examination and treatment, commonly referred to as a 

"302 commitment." See 50 P.S. § 7302. Section 302 of the MHPA provides that an 

involuntary emergency examination of a person may occur upon a physician's 

certification. 50 P.S. § 7302(b). If the examining physician determines "that the person 

is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency treatment, treatment shall be 

begun immediately" and may continue for up to 120 hours. 50 P.S. § 7302(b), (d); see 

also 50 P.S. § 7301(a) (providing a person who is "severely mentally disabled and in need 

of treatment" may be subject to "involuntary emergency examination and treatment"). 

Section 301 further provides that a person is "severely mentally disabled" when 

mental illness causes the person's "capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and 

discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal 

needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to 

himself[.]" 50 P.S. § 7301(a). Section 301(b)(1) lists the following criteria for showing a 

person is a clear and present danger of harm to others: 

(b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger. --(1) Clear 

and present danger to others shall be shown by establishing 

that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or 

attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that 

there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be 

repeated. If, however, the person has been found 

incompetent to be tried or has been acquitted by reason of 

lack of criminal responsibility on charges arising from conduct 

involving infliction of or attempt to inflict substantial bodily 

harm on another, such 30-day limitation shall not apply so 

long as an application for examination and treatment is filed 

within 30 days after the date of such determination or verdict. 

In such case, a clear and present danger to others may be 

[J-94-2020] - 2 
shown by establishing that the conduct charged in the criminal 

proceeding did occur, and that there is a reasonable 

probability that such conduct will be repeated. For the 

purpose of this section, a clear and present danger of harm to 

others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has 

made threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance 

of the threat to commit harm. 

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1).

Section 301(b)(2) contains the criteria for determining that a person is a danger to 

himself or herself.

(2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by 

establishing that within the past 30 days: 

(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence 

that he would be unable, without care, supervision and 

the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need 

for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or 

self-protection and safety, and that there is a 

reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury 

or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 

days unless adequate treatment were afforded under 

this act; or 

(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is 

the reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate 

treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes 

of this subsection, a clear and present danger may be 

demonstrated by the proof that the person has made 

threats to commit suicide and has committed acts 

which are in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide; 

or 

(iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or 

attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that 

there is the reasonable probability of mutilation unless 

adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the 

purposes of this subsection, a clear and present 

danger shall be established by proof that the person 

has made threats to commit mutilation and has 

committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat 

to commit mutilation. 

[J-94-2020] - 3 
The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA), 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6128, 

makes it unlawful for a person who has been involuntarily committed under Section 302 

to "possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture" a firearm or to obtain a license to 

conduct any of those activities. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), (c)(4). However, the UFA 

provides two ways for the subject of a 302 commitment to obtain relief from the Section 

6105(a)(1) firearm restrictions. The one at issue in this case is a court-ordered 

expungement of the 302 commitment record under Section 6111.1(g)(2), which provides: 

(g) Review by court.— 

(2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant to 

section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act may 

petition the court to review the sufficiency of the 

evidence upon which the commitment was based. If 

the court determines that the evidence upon which the 

involuntary commitment was based was insufficient, 

the court shall order that the record of the commitment 

submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police be 

expunged. A petition filed under this subsection shall 

toll the 60-day period set forth under section 

6105(a)(2). 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2).

This Court clarified the appropriate review of a Section 6111.1(g)(2) petition to 

expunge a 302 commitment record based on the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the 302 commitment in In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017): 

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2). 

The second means for the subject of a 302 commitment to obtain relief from the Section 

6105(a)(1) firearms restrictions is to petition the trial court to grant relief based on a finding 

that "the applicant may possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other 

person." 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1). 

[J-94-2020] - 4 
under section 6111.1(g)(2), a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a 302 commitment presents a pure 

question of law, and the court's sole concern is whether, 

based on the findings recorded by the physician and the 

information he or she relied upon in arriving at those findings, 

the precise, legislatively-defined prerequisites for a 302 

commitment have been satisfied and are supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence. We emphasize that the trial 

court's review is limited to the findings recorded by the 

physician and the information he or she relied upon in arriving 

at those findings, and requires deference to the physician, as 

the original factfinder, as the physician examined and 

evaluated the individual in the first instance, was able to 

observe his or her demeanor, and has particularized training, 

knowledge and experience regarding whether a 302 

commitment is medically necessary. 

Vencil, 152 A.3d at 246 (rejecting de novo review subject to clear and convincing burden 

of proof for Section 6111.1(g)(2) petitions). 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

With this legal framework in mind, we set forth the facts of this case. On 

September 6, 2018, B.W. went to Altoona Family Physicians, his primary care provider's 

office. The office visit notes show that on September 6, 2018, Dr. Joseph Sumereau was 

the provider who treated B.W., while Dr. Amanda Cattol was B.W.'s primary care 

physician. Office Visit Notes, 9/6/18. The physician's progress notes of the office visit, 

signed by Dr. Terry Ruhl, indicate the reason for B.W.'s visit was "anxiety" and the primary 

diagnosis was "agitation." Id. Dr. Ruhl elaborated: 

Discussed with Dr. Sumereau and Jimmy. 

Anxiety and anger feelings. Making credible threats of 

violence against a co-worker but is here for help. Girlfriend 

has concerns for his safety. 

Crisis here now - expect they will recommend inpatient 

treatment, involuntary if necessary. UPMC police here for 

safety, but he has made no threats against staff. 

Id. (note entered 9/10/18 regarding 9/6/18 visit). 

[J-94-2020] - 5 
Indeed, on September 6, 2018, Dr. Sumereau submitted a Section 302 application 

for involuntary emergency examination and treatment for B.W. Appl. for Involuntary 

Emergency Examination & Treatment, 9/6/18, at 1. Dr. Sumereau completed Part I of the 

application as "the person who believes the patient is in need of treatment." /d. Dr. 

Sumereau selected the pre-printed option on the form indicating he believed B.W. was 

"severely mentally disabled" because he posed a clear and present danger to others. Id. 

at 2 (marking the box on the form largely reciting the Section 301(b)(1) criteria). Dr. 

Sumereau completed the narrative portion of the 302 application with a description of the 

details that supported his belief, as follows: 

I, Dr. Sumereau, was present while the patient stated 

that he would strangle another person to death. He then gave 

the name of the intended victim. 

Patient stated that he was not sure when or where he 

would perform this act, but he would do it the next time he saw 

the person. 

Id. at 3. As a result, Dr. Sumereau certified that B.W. was in need of involuntary 

examination and treatment, and he requested that UPMC Altoona Hospital examine B.W. 

to determine his need for treatment. Id. 

B.W. was transported to UPMC Altoona, where the examining physician, Dr. 

Mercedes Boggs, noted the findings of her examination of [B.W.] were that "[B.W.] is 

homicidal toward his coworker and admits to stating that he would strangle him. [B.W.] 

very angry and agitated, danger to others. Not receptive to voluntary admission." Id. at 

7. She noted the treatment needed was "[f]urther evaluation and assessment, therapy 

and medication." Id. She certified B.W. was "severely mentally disabled and in need of 

treatment" and recommended his admission to a facility for up to 120 hours of treatment. 

Id. Accordingly, B.W. was involuntarily committed at the Altoona Hospital Mental Health 

Unit, and he was released after 72 hours. Pet. to Expunge, 10/2/18, at ¶¶ 2, 10. 

[J-94-2020] - 6 
On October 2, 2018, B.W. filed a petition to expunge mental health record. In the 

petition, B.W. averred "there was no basis to the involuntary commitment as he was not 

homicidal and did not express any homicidal ideations." Id. at ¶ 11. He claimed he had 

no intent to carry out his threat and characterized his statements to Dr. Sumereau as 

"blowing off steam." Id. at ¶ 8. He asserted the record of his involuntary commitment 

impaired his employment opportunities and his ability to carry a firearm. Id. at ¶ 13. 

Accordingly, he requested relief in the form of a trial court order directing the Altoona 

Hospital and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to expunge the records of his 

September 6, 2018 involuntary commitment. Id. at ¶ A. Even though the petition did not 

expressly cite Section 6111.1(g)(2), it is clear from the request for relief that B.W. 

requested a Section 6111.1(g)(2) review of his 302 commitment. 

On January 4, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the petition to expunge. At 

the hearing, the PSP introduced the 302 commitment record into evidence, and B.W. 

introduced the Altoona Family Physicians' office visit notes. N.T., 1/4/19, at 2, 23. 

Additionally, the trial court heard the testimony of B.W. and his girlfriend despite the 

objection of the Blair County Department of Social Services (DSS) that the testimony was 

not relevant to the sufficiency of the evidence according to Vencil. Id. at 2-3. Neither 

DSS nor the PSP presented any testimony. Id. at 26. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the trial court took the matter under advisement pending the transcript of the hearing and 

the parties' memoranda of law. Id. 

On February 13, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying B.W.'s petition to 

expunge. Trial Ct. Order, 2/13/19. In its accompanying opinion, the court identified the 

issue as whether B.W. committed an act in furtherance of his threat to strangle his 

As this testimony is irrelevant to a Section 6111.1(g)(2) review under Vencil, we do not 

consider it. See Vencil, 152 A.3d at 238-39 n.3, 244. 

[J-94-2020] - 7 
coworker. Trial Ct. Op., 2/13/19, at 16. The court found it was undisputed that B.W. made 

threats to harm his coworker. Id. at 15. The trial court stated the "act in furtherance" 

inquiry was a fact-specific determination made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 6. 

Addressing whether B.W. acted in furtherance of his threat, the court initially noted that 

B.W. did not communicate by any means his threat to his coworker or a third party; he 

did not engage in a physical altercation with his coworker; and he did not search the 

internet for ways to strangle or injure another person. Id. at 15. Nonetheless, the trial 

court concluded that Dr. Sumereau's description of B.W.'s statement that he would 

strangle his coworker "the next time he saw this person" was sufficient to support the 

conclusion that B.W. was a clear and present danger to others. Id. It explained that under 

Vencil, "[w]e must give deference to the physician, as the original factfinder, as the 

physician examined and evaluated [B.W.], and was able to observe his demeanor." Id. 

Applying Vencil, the court found "that the evidence known by the physician at the time, 

as contained in the contemporaneously-created record, supports the conclusion that 

[B.W.] presented a clear and present danger to others, requiring a 302 commitment." Id. 

Accordingly, the trial court denied B.W.'s petition to expunge. B.W. appealed to the 

Superior Court. 

In a 2-1 unpublished non-precedential memorandum decision, the Superior Court 

reversed the trial court order denying B.W.'s petition to expunge. In re B.W., No. 289 

WDA 2019, 2019 WL 5682614, at *6 (Pa. Super. Nov. 1, 2019). The Superior Court 

concluded that the involuntary commitment petition did not contain sufficient facts to prove 

B.W. took an "act in furtherance" of his threat to kill his coworker. Id. at *5. The court 

viewed B.W.'s statement that he intended to strangle his coworker the next time he saw 

him as a bare threat without an accompanying act in furtherance. Id. at *6. 

[J-94-2020] - 8 
In support of its decision, the Superior Court analogized this case to its 

unpublished decision in Interest of K.M., No. 1677 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 3243142 (Pa. 

Super. July 17, 2019). Id. at *5-6. In K.M., the involuntary commitment petition stated 

that K.M. told medical staff that he would not live long enough for his medical bill to matter, 

that he would end his life when his medical debt was too much, and that "he could take a 

350 mag [sic] to his head and pull the trigger & kill people with no care." K.M., 2019 WL 

3243142, at *1. The K.M. Court held these statements were insufficient to support the 

involuntary commitment because "besides examples of threatening thoughts and 

statements, the record contains no evidence of any act undertaken by [K.M.] in 

furtherance of his threat to harm himself or others." Id. at *5. Therefore, the court 

concluded the records of K.M.'s involuntary commitment had to be expunged and 

destroyed. Id. 

In this case, the Superior Court rejected DHS and PSP's argument that K.M. was 

distinguishable because B.W. identified his intended victim and stated how he would carry 

out the threat. In re B. W, 2019 WL 5682614, at *6. The court explained that "the threat 

itself, without more, does not constitute an act in furtherance of the threat." Id. 

Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the trial court and ordered that the records of 

B.W.'s involuntary commitment must be expunged and destroyed. Id. 

Judge Lazarus filed a dissenting memorandum in which she opined that proof of 

an act in furtherance of the threat to commit harm was not necessary for a Section 302 

involuntary commitment, and even if it was necessary, applying the Vencil standard to the 

physicians' statements showed the evidence was sufficient to support B.W.'s involuntary 

commitment. Id. (Lazarus, J., dissenting). Judge Lazarus explained that Section 

The Superior Court noted that its unpublished, non-precedential decisions filed after 

May 1, 2019 may be relied on for their persuasive value. In re B. W., 2019 WL 5682614, 

at *6 n.2 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)). 

[J-94-2020] - 9 
301(b)(1) does not necessarily require proof of an act in furtherance because it states 

that a threat and an act in furtherance may, not must, demonstrate a clear and present 

danger of harm to others. Id. at *9 (relying on Commonwealth v. Helms, 506 A.2d 1384, 

1388 (Pa. Super. 1986)). Further, Judge Lazarus found the evidence was sufficient to 

prove B.W. committed an act in furtherance of his threat to his coworker because in his 

statements "he identified a co-worker as his target and had chosen strangulation as the 

means by which he intended to kill that target[, and] physicians found B.W.'s threats 

credible." Id. at *10. Applying Vencil, Judge Lazarus concluded that the evidence known 

by the physicians at the time of the involuntary commitment was sufficient to support their 

conclusions that an involuntary commitment was medically necessary. Id. 

III. ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court granted DSS's petition for allowance of appeal to consider the following 

issue: 

Whether the development of a plan satisfies the requirement 

for an act in furtherance of a threat to kill a co-worker for 

purposes of an involuntary commitment under § 302 of the 

Mental Health Procedures Act? 

In re B. W., 235 A.3d 272 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam).

Generally, this issue presents a question of law, over which our standard of review 

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Vencil, 152 A.3d at 241. Additionally, 

given that we are reviewing a Section 6111.1(g)(2) expungement ruling, we are limited to 

considering the evidence the physician knew at the time of the 302 commitment. Id. at 

242. Further, as this issue presents a question of statutory interpretation, we note that in 

construing a statute, we must give effect to the legislature's intent and give effect to all of 

the statute's provisions. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The plain language of the statute is the 

PSP filed a notice of joinder to DSS's petition for allowance of appeal, and following the 

grant of the petition, our prothonotary deemed both DSS and PSP as the appellants. 

[J-94-2020] - 10 
best indication of the legislature's intent. Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. 

Comm'n, 234 A.3d 665, 674 (Pa. 2020). To discern the plain meaning of a statute, we 

consider the operative statutory language in context and give words and phrases their 

common and approved usage. Id. Courts must give effect to a clear and unambiguous 

statute and cannot disregard the statute's plain meaning to implement its objectives. /d. 

"Only if the statute is ambiguous, and not explicit, do we resort to other means of 

discerning legislative intent." Matter of Private Sale of Prop. by Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 

185 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2018). 

IV. ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE THREAT TO COMMIT HARM TO OTHERS 

A. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS 

The PSP argues that the plain language of Section 301(b)(1) does not require the 

showing of an "act in furtherance" for all involuntary commitments based on a clear and 

present danger to others. PSP's Brief at 13. Echoing Judge Lazarus's dissent, the PSP 

stresses that the operative sentence of Section 301(b)(1) states that "a clear and present 

danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats 

of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm." Id. (quoting 

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1) (emphasis added)). The Superior Court erred in holding that acts 

in furtherance are required in all cases, according to the PSP, because such an 

interpretation renders the legislature's use of the word "may" mere surplusage. Id. at 14 

(citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); Helms, 506 A.2d at 1388 (observing the "threats and acts" 

formula may, not must, be used to demonstrate a clear and present danger)). Instead, 

the PSP contends that B.W.'s plan to strangle his coworker established a "clear and 

present danger" to another person, as three examining physicians found. Id. at 15. 

DSS does not pursue this argument in its brief. 

[J-94-2020] - 11 
Moreover, DSS and the PSP contend we should reverse the Superior Court's 

decision because B.W.'s development and completion of a detailed plan to strangle his 

coworker to death the next time he saw him constitutes an "act in furtherance" under 

Section 301. DSS's Brief at 6; PSP's Brief at 5. DSS points to court cases construing 

the "act in furtherance" requirement of the Section 301 criteria for showing a person is a 

clear and present danger to others, 50 P. S. § 301(b)(1), or a clear and present danger to 

himself or herself, 50 P.S. § 301(b)(2)(i)-(ii), as consisting of both tangible and intangible 

actions. DSS's Brief at 8-9. DSS argues that the Superior Court's holding that B.W.'s 

complete plan to harm another did not constitute an act in furtherance is inconsistent with 

this precedent and the plain language of Section 301, which DSS interprets as requiring 

only that "the subject of an involuntary commitment will have done something to advance 

the threat of harm to himself or others." Id. at 10. The PSP contends that B.W.'s "specific 

and detailed plan itself was a sufficient act in furtherance to justify the commitment, 

particularly when the [Superior Court] was required to give deference to the committing 

physician pursuant to this Court's decision in [Vend[)." PSP's Brief at 7. Emphasizing 

the deference courts must give to the examining physicians under Vencil, the PSP 

stresses that the three physicians in this case deemed B.W.'s homicidal threats credible 

and warranting involuntary examination and treatment. Id. at 11. 

DSS maintains the plain language of Section 301 does not require the act in 

furtherance to be overt or tangible for two reasons. DSS's Brief at 11-13. First, DSS 

notes that unlike the Pennsylvania Crimes Code's requirement for proof of an "overt act 

in pursuance" of a conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(e), Section 301(b)(1) requires "acts in 

furtherance of the threat." Id. at 12. The lack of an adjective modifying "acts in 

furtherance" in Section 301, according to DSS, suggests the legislature knowingly 

avoided the requirement of an overt act. Id. (citing Bowers v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 

[J-94-2020] - 12 
167 A.2d 480, 487 (Pa. 1961) (stating similar language in different statutes requires the 

same construction)). 

Second, DSS posits that requiring an overt act would conflict with the stated intent 

of the MHPA to protect the safety of the patient and others. Id. at 12-13. DSS compares 

this case to In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Super. 1997), in which the court 

concluded that a person committed an act in furtherance of a threat when he purchased 

a rifle scope after stating he "might as well get a rifle and scope and get rid of my problem. 

The problem being my soon to be ex-wife." Woodside, 699 A.2d at 1294. DSS contends 

the only difference between this case and Woodside is that the plan in Woodside involved 

a weapon while the plan in this case involved the use of B.W.'s hands, which DSS 

maintains is "a distinction without a difference that would produce an absurd result if 

allowed." DSS's Brief at 13. Further, DSS analogizes this case to In re R.F., 914 A.2d 

907 (Pa. Super. 2006), which found that the patient's internet research of painless ways 

to commit suicide was an act in furtherance of the threat to harm himself. R.F., 914 A.2d 

at 915. DSS emphasizes that "B.W. made a threat and had a plan that only needed the 

appearance of the intended victim for completion." DSS's Brief at 14; see also PSP's 

Brief at 9 (analogizing this case to R.F. and arguing the totality of the circumstances 

coupled with deference to the physicians' findings "coalesce into sufficient evidence"). 

Similarly, the PSP argues the interpretation that a specific plan constitutes an act 

in furtherance is necessary to avoid the absurd result that a physician cannot involuntarily 

commit a person who has articulated a clear and detailed plan until the person takes a 

step to carry out the plan. PSP's Brief at 12 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (stating "the 

General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or 

unreasonable. "). The PSP states this result is inconsistent with the legislative intent of 

the MHPA, which is to help those in crisis and protect the public. Id. at 13. The PSP also 

[J-94-2020] - 13 
notes that its interpretation of Section 301 does not render mere threats sufficient to 

support an involuntary commitment, but it "gives a physician, who in their expert medical 

opinion believes that a threat that is accompanied with specific details and planning is 

credible, the ability to meaningfully act." Id. at 12-13 n.3. Accordingly, DSS and the PSP 

maintain we should reverse the Superior Court's decision. DSS's Brief at 14; PSP's Brief 

at 16. 

In contrast, B.W. argues we should affirm the Superior Court. B.W. agrees with 

DSS and the PSP that the "development of a plan could satisfy the act in furtherance of 

a threat to kill a co-worker for purposes of an involuntary commitment under §302 of the 

[MHPA]," but B.W. argues the evidence did not show that B.W. had developed a plan to 

harm his coworker. B.W.'s Brief at 5. To support his position that he did not have a plan, 

B.W. relies exclusively on facts developed at the January 4, 2019 trial court hearing and 

characterizes his statements to the physicians as "blowing off steam" and "just words." 

Id. at 6. Like the Superior Court majority, B.W. relies principally on K.M. in support of his 

position that "[m]aking a threat to the doctor concerning another and indicating that he 

would carry out said threat next time he saw the co-worker is not a specific plan, nor an 

explicit plan of how he would harm the co-worker." Id. at 8. Ultimately, B.W. "agrees if 

there were an exact plan, then that could be considered an act in furtherance[,]" but there 

was no such plan in this case. Id. at 10. Accordingly, B.W. maintains we should affirm 

the Superior Court's decision that the record of his involuntary commitment should be 

expunged. Id. at 10-11. 

B. ANALYSIS 

We first address the threshold issue the PSP raises of whether Section 301(b)(1) 

requires proof of an act in furtherance. Based on the plain language of Section 301(b)(1), 

we conclude that when an involuntary commitment is based on the "threat and act" 

[J-94-2020] - 14 
formulation, both a threat and an act in furtherance must be proven. Section 301(a) 

provides that a person may be involuntarily examined and committed if the person is 

severely mentally disabled, meaning the person is "a clear and present danger of harm 

to others or to himself." 50 P.S. § 7301(a). Section 301(b)(1) lists the criteria for 

determining a person is a clear and present danger to others as follows: 

(b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger. --(1) Clear 

and present danger to others shall be shown by establishing 

that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or 

attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that 

there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be 

repeated. If, however, the person has been found 

incompetent to be tried or has been acquitted by reason of 

lack of criminal responsibility on charges arising from conduct 

involving infliction of or attempt to inflict substantial bodily 

harm on another, such 30-day limitation shall not apply so 

long as an application for examination and treatment is filed 

within 30 days after the date of such determination or verdict. 

In such case, a clear and present danger to others may be 

shown by establishing that the conduct charged in the criminal 

proceeding did occur, and that there is a reasonable 

probability that such conduct will be repeated. For the purpose 

of this section, a clear and present danger of harm to others 

may be demonstrated by proof that the person has made 

threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the 

threat to commit harm. 

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1). From a plain reading of Section 301(b)(1), there are three 

alternative formulations of a clear and present danger to others: (1) the person has 

inflicted, or attempted to inflict, serious bodily harm on another in the past 30 days and 

there is a reasonable probability the person will repeat that conduct; (2) the person has 

been found incompetent to stand trial or acquitted due to lack of criminal responsibility of 

charges of inflicting, or attempting to inflict, serious bodily harm on another, and the 

petition establishes the charged conduct occurred and a probability it will be repeated; or 

(3) "the person has made threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the 

threat to commit harm." Id. 

[J-94-2020] - 15 
Relying on Helms, the PSP, like Judge Lazarus's dissenting memorandum, 

contend that an act in furtherance is not required because the last sentence of Section 

301(b)(1) uses the word "may" instead of "shall" or "must." PSP's Brief at 14 (quoting In 

re B.W., 2019 WL 5682614, at *9 (Lazarus, J., dissenting)). This reliance on Helms, 

however, is misplaced because Helms recognized Section 301(b)(1) sets forth alternative 

ways to show a person is a clear and present danger to others. In Helms, Helms killed 

his next-door neighbor, but was acquitted at his criminal trial based on the finding of a 

lack of criminal responsibility under MHPA Section 404, 50 P.S. § 7404. Helms, 506 A.2d 

at 1386. However, the trial court also found Helms was severely mentally disabled and 

committed him involuntarily to a state hospital under MHPA Sections 304(g)(2) and 305. 

Id. Helms was involuntarily recommitted four times, and he challenged the sufficiency of 

his fourth recommitment on the grounds that the petition did not show he was a "clear 

and present danger" to others. Id. at 1386-87. The Superior Court concluded that the 

Section 301(b)(1) formulation of "clear and present danger" to others contained 

alternative methods to make such a showing. Id. at 1388. Specifically, the court 

explained that the last sentence of Section 301(b)(1), containing the "'threats and acts' 

formula may, not must, be used to demonstrate dangerousness." Id. (emphasis in 

original). The court based its statement that "threats and acts" are not always required 

on the preceding portion of Section 301(b)(1), which "contains an alternative method for 

showing clear and present danger which applies specifically to insanity acquittees who 

are the subjects of petitions for involuntary commitment[,]" namely that "(1) the conduct 

that led to the criminal proceedings occurred; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability 

that it will occur again." Id. Significantly, the court did not offer a further interpretation of 

the "threats and acts" requirement or opine that acts in furtherance were not required 

under that requirement. Instead, the court held that the record showed a reasonable 

[J-94-2020] - 16 
probability that Helms would act violently again without treatment, which met the Section 

301(b)(1) "insanity acquittees" formulation of clear and present danger to others. Id. at 

1390. Thus, Helms is consistent with our interpretation that Section 301(b)(1) contains 

three alternative ways to show a person is a clear and present danger to others. 

Further, we conclude that when the involuntary commitment is based upon the 

third means to show a clear and present danger in Section 301(b)(1), i.e., the "threats 

and acts" formulation, both a threat and an act in furtherance must be proven. This is 

clear from the plain language of the pertinent portion of Section 301(b)(1), which states 

"[f]or the purpose of this section, a clear and present danger of harm to others may be 

demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats of harm and has committed acts 

in furtherance of the threat to commit harm." 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1). 

First, reading Section 301(b)(1) as a whole, we disagree with the significance the 

PSP attaches to its use of the word "may" because such a reading ignores the context of 

Section 301(b)(1). The first sentence of Section 301(b)(1) provides that a "clear and 

present danger to others shall be shown" by proving serious bodily harm and a 

reasonable probability of recurrence. Id. (emphasis added). Its third sentence then 

provides that "a clear and present danger to others may be shown" for those who are 

incompetent to stand trial or those who have been acquitted for a lack of responsibility. 

Id. (emphasis added). Lastly, its fourth sentence provides that "a clear and present 

danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by proof' of threats of harm and acts in 

furtherance. Id. (emphasis added). Viewing Section 301(b)(1) as a whole, it is clear the 

legislature used the word "may" to express alternative possibilities for showing a clear 

and present danger if the serious bodily harm formulation cannot be met. See Vencil, 

152 A.3d at 244 ("[i]n determining legislative intent, '[s]ections of a statute must be read 

together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire 

[J-94-2020] - 17 
statute."') (quoting Bd. of Revision of Taxes, City of Phila. v. City of Phila., 4 A.3d 610, 

622 (Pa. 2010)). Our interpretation is consistent with the Helms Court's conclusion that 

Section 301(b)(1) contains alternative means to show that a person is a clear and present 

danger to others. See Helms, 506 A.2d at 1388. 

Second, Section 301(b)(1) is clear that the proof required to meet the "threats and 

acts" formulation is "proof that the person has made threats of harm and has committed 

acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm." 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

The use of the conjunction "and" to connect threats and acts in furtherance makes it clear 

that both are required elements of proof. The PSP's disjunctive reading that a clear and 

present danger can be shown by threats alone is inconsistent with the statutory language. 

Additionally, the phrasing "has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit 

harm" is clearly referring back to the previous phrase "the person has made threats of 

harm," showing that the two phrases are connected and dependent, not independent 

requirements. Id. Finally, the PSP's reading of this sentence as requiring a showing of 

only a threat of harm would render meaningless and superfluous the acts in furtherance 

language, which is contrary to the basic tenants of statutory construction. See 1 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1921(a) (requiring courts to aim to give effect to all of a statute's provisions); 

Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 909 A.2d 1224, 1232 (Pa. 2006) (noting the legislature is 

"presumed not to intend any statutory language to exist as mere surplusage"). 

Accordingly, we conclude that when an involuntary commitment is based on Section 

301(b)(1)'s threats and acts formulation, both a threat of harm to others and an act in 

furtherance of that threat must be proven.' 

To be clear, we do not hold that under Section 301(b)(1) an act in furtherance of a threat 

to harm another person must be shown for all involuntary commitments. Accord Helms, 

506 A.2d at 1388. 

[J-94-2020] - 18 
Having concluded that proof of an act in furtherance of the threat to commit harm 

was necessary, we now turn to the issue of whether B.W.'s communication of his plan to 

strangle his coworker the next time he saw him was sufficient to prove B.W. committed 

an act in furtherance. We conclude that the articulation of a specific plan to harm an 

identified target that is deemed credible by medical professionals is sufficient to prove an 

act in furtherance of the threat to commit harm. 

As noted above, Section 301 contains criteria for when a person is a clear and 

present danger to oneself or another. Section 301(b)(2)(ii) contains a parallel requirement 

for an involuntary commitment based on a threat to commit suicide and acts in furtherance 

of the threat. 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(ii). The Superior Court has held that a person who 

has developed a complete plan, or taken steps to develop a plan, to commit suicide "has 

committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide[.]" See id. In 

Appeal of H.D., 698 A.2d 90 (Pa. Super. 1997), the court concluded H.D.'s plan to jump 

off a bridge was sufficient to support her 302 commitment and rejected H.D.'s 

characterization of her statement as a mere suicidal "idea" that did not establish intent. 

H.D., 698 A.2d at 94 n.4. The court explained "[a]fter a thorough review of the record, we 

refuse to second-guess the conclusion of the emergency medical and mental health 

professionals that H.D. presented a clear and present danger of harm to herself." Id. 

Moreover, the Superior Court has held that engaging in the planning process 

constitutes an act in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide. See In re R.F., 914 A.2d 

907, 915-16 (Pa. Super. 2006); Commonwealth v. Smerconish, 112 A.3d 1260, 1264 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). In R.F., the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order denying R.F.'s 

petition to expunge because there was sufficient evidence to support the initial 302 

commitment. R.F., 914 A.2d at 908. The court rejected R.F.'s argument that he had not 

taken an "affirmative action" to commit suicide and concluded R.F. was a clear and 

[J-94-2020] - 19 
present danger to himself because he had "used the internet to access ways to commit 

suicide, and he phoned a suicide hotline to gather further information on the subject, 

which we find coalesce to constitute proof in furtherance of [R.F.'s] suicidal ideation." Id. 

at 914. Similarly, in Smerconish, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order 

denying Smerconish's petition to expunge because there was sufficient evidence of his 

suicide threat and an act in furtherance. Smerconish, 112 A.3d at 1264. Smerconish 

sent his sister 12 instant messages threatening suicide and stating he was searching for 

painless ways to kill himself, which the Superior Court found showed he was severely 

mentally disabled and in need of treatment. Id. at 1263-64. Additionally, the court held 

that "[h]is online research seeking painless methods of committing suicide constituted an 

act in furtherance of the threat to commit harm." Id. at 1264. From these cases, it is clear 

that engaging in the planning process by conducting research or expressing a detailed 

plan constitute acts in furtherance of a threat under the MHPA. 

We see no reason to construe the "acts in furtherance" requirement of Section 

301(b)(1) differently from that requirement in Section 301(b)(2)(ii). See Ratzlaf V. U.S., 

510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) ("[a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text is 

generally read the same way each time it appears. "). Even B.W. concedes that the 

development of an exact plan to harm another person is sufficient to show an act in 

furtherance of a threat for a 302 commitment. B.W.'s Brief at 5, 10. B.W. articulated to 

his physician a developed, specific plan to kill his coworker, whom he identified, by 

strangling him the next time he saw him. This plan was fully-formed as it detailed the 

named target of the threat, the method of carrying out the threat of harm, and the 

imminence of the threat. Concluding that B.W.'s plan to strangle his coworker is an act 

in furtherance is consistent with H.D., in which the court held a plan to jump off a bridge 

was an act in furtherance. See H.D., 698 A.2d at 94 n.4. Further, our conclusion that a 

[J-94-2020] - 20 
fully-developed plan to harm another is supported by R.F. and Smerconish, both of which 

held that conducting research to develop a final plan of how to commit harm was an act 

in furtherance under the MHPA. See In re R.F., 914 A.2d 907, 915-16 (Pa. Super. 2006); 

Commonwealth v. Smerconish, 112 A.3d 1260, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2015). Significantly, 

the three physicians who treated B.W. found his threats credible and determined he was 

in need of immediate treatment. Pursuant to Vencil, we accord deference to the 

physicians, "as the physician examined and evaluated the individual in the first instance, 

was able to observe his or her demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge and 

experience regarding whether a 302 commitment is medically necessary." Vencil, 152 

A.3d at 246; see also H.D., 698 A.2d at 94 n.4 (refusing to question the medical 

professionals' conclusions). 

The Superior Court's holding that B.W.'s actions constituted a mere threat without 

an act in furtherance was inconsistent with this precedent that the acts of planning and 

communicating a developed plan to medical professionals is an act in furtherance. 

Moreover, the Superior Court seemingly read into Section 301 the requirement that an 

act in furtherance under the MHPA must be overt or tangible. However, the plain 

language of Section 301 does not contain such a requirement. Compare 50 P.S. 

§ 7301(b)(1) (stating a person is a clear and present danger to others if "the person has 

made threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit 

harm), 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(ii) (providing a person is a clear and present danger to 

oneself if "the person has made threats to commit suicide and has committed acts which 

are in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide), 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(iii) (stating the 

same requirements for proving self-mutilation), with 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(e) (requiring proof 

of an "overt act in pursuance" for a criminal conspiracy). Because the plain language of 

the MHPA does not require an overt act in furtherance of the threat, we decline to read 

[J-94-2020] - 21 
such a requirement into the statute. See Sivick v. State Ethics Comm'n, 238 A.3d 1250, 

1264 (Pa. 2020) (explaining that a court cannot add language to a statute in its 

interpretation of the plain language). 

V. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to 

show that B.W. was a clear and present danger to others at the time of the 302 

commitment as the physicians' found he made a threat to harm another and committed 

acts in furtherance of that threat. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court's order that 

the medical records of B.W.'s 302 commitment be expunged and destroyed. 

Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Chief Justice Baer and Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion. 

Justice Todd files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice Saylor joins. 

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