Enc.

CHAIRMAN 

Henry Anderson, M.D.

Madison, Wisconsin 

MEMBERS 

Josie Beach 

Richland, Washington 

Bradley P. Clawson

 Rexburg, Idaho 

R. William Field, Ph.D. 

 Iowa City, Iowa 

David Kotelchuck, Ph.D.

 New York, New York 

James E. Lockey, M.D.

 Cincinnati, Ohio 

David B. Richardson, Ph.D.

 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 

Genevieve S. Roessler, Ph.D.

 Elysian, Minnesota 

Phillip Schofield

 Bosque Farm, New Mexico 

Loretta R. Valerio 

Santa Fe, New Mexico 

Paul L. Ziemer, Ph.D. 

Lafayette, Indiana 

STAFF 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

Rashaun Roberts, Ph.D.

 Cincinnati, Ohio 

COMMITTEE MANAGEMENT 

Zaida Burgos

 Atlanta, Georgia 

ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 

1150 Tusculum Ave 

Cincinnati, Ohio 45226 

(513) 533-6825 

July 12, 2021 

The Honorable Xavier Becerra 

Secretary 

Department of Health and Human Services 

200 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20201 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (The Board) has evaluated 

SEC Petition 00103 concerning workers at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in 

Aiken, South Carolina under the statutory requirements established by the 

Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 

(EEOICPA) and incorporated into 42 CFR Sec. 83.13. 

The Board respectfully recommends that SEC status be accorded to: 

“All construction trade employees of Department of Energy subcontractors 

[excluding employees of the following prime contractors who worked at the 

Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina, during the specified time 

periods: E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, October 1, 1972, through 

March 31, 1989; and Westinghouse Savannah River Company, April 1, 

1989 through December 31, 1990], who worked at the Savannah River 

Site from October 1, 1972 through December 31, 1990, for a number of 

work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely 

under this employment or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees 

included in the Special Exposure Cohort.” 

This recommendation is based on the following factors: 

• Individuals working at the SRS during the time period in question 

worked on nuclear weapons production and related operations. 

• Subcontractor construction trades workers conducted a broad range of 

work activities supporting research, fuel handling, transuranic material 

processing and separation, decontamination and decommissioning, and 

reactor outages. They may have worked in high-contamination and 

high-airborne radioactivity areas and may have been utilized for shortterm high-exposure work tasks. 

• Subcontractor construction trades workers may have been “transient” 

and not have worked for long periods at SRS and also may have been 

intermittently tasked with nonroutine radiological jobs under work 

permits, and thus were not likely enrolled in the routine (including 

termination) bioassay monitoring program. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• The Board finds there to be insufficient information, including a lack of job-specific 

radio-bioassay monitoring data for subcontractor construction trades workers, and 

assurance of workplace monitoring and source term data, to enable NIOSH to estimate 

with sufficient accuracy all potential internal doses from radionuclides associated with 

fuel handling, reactor operations, fuel reprocessing, and/or research activities, to which 

the proposed class may have been exposed during the time period in question. 

• The Board also finds there to be sufficient information to reconstruct occupational 

external dose, as well as medical dose, for SRS subcontractor construction trades 

workers. 

• The Board determined that health may have been endangered for subcontractor 

construction trades workers exposed to radiation at the SRS during the time period in 

question. 

Based on these considerations and the discussions held at the April 15 and June 23, 2021, 

Board meetings, the Board recommends that this class be added to the SEC. 

Enclosed are documents from the Board meetings where this SEC class was discussed. The 

documents include copies of the petition, the Board’s deliberation, NIOSH’s review thereof, and 

related materials. If any of these items are unavailable at this time, they will follow shortly. 

Sincerely, 

[Signature on File] 

Henry A. Anderson III, M.D., Chair 

Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health 

Enclosures 

Page 2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary of Findings of the Advisory Board on Dose Reconstruction 

Feasibility and Health Endangerment Determination 

Feasibility of Dose Reconstruction Findings 

This current evaluation of petition SEC-00103 proposes a class that begins on October 

1, 1972 and extends through December 31, 1990. The Advisory Board on Radiation 

Worker Health (The Board) finds there to be insufficient information, including jobspecific radiobioassay monitoring data for subcontractor construction trades workers, 

and workplace monitoring and source term data, to allow it to estimate with sufficient 

accuracy the potential internal doses from radionuclides associated with fuel handling, 

reactor operations, fuel reprocessing, or research activities, to which the proposed class 

may have been exposed during the period from October 1, 1972 through December 31, 

1990. The Board finds that it is feasible to reconstruct occupational external dose as 

well as medical dose for Savannah River Site (SRS) subcontractor construction trades 

workers. 

The Board’s dose reconstruction feasibility findings are based on the following: 

• Subcontractor construction trades workers conducted a broad range of work activities 

supporting research, fuel handling, transuranic material processing and separation, 

decontamination and decommissioning, and reactor outages (including work in highcontamination and high-airborne radioactivity areas). 

• Principal sources of internal radiation exposure for members of the proposed class 

included radionuclides such as: isotopes of uranium, thorium and plutonium; neptunium237; americium-241; tritium; and mixed fission and activation products. 

• Subcontractor construction trades workers were sometimes considered transient in 

that they may not have worked for long periods at SRS, may have been intermittently 

tasked with nonroutine radiological jobs under work permits, and thus were not likely 

enrolled in the routine (including termination) bioassay monitoring program and should 

have been monitored. 

• Contemporary interviews with subcontractor construction trades workers (including 

Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews) indicate that some subcontractor construction 

trades workers may have been utilized for short-term high-exposure work tasks to save 

on the potential radiological exposures to “in-house” prime contractor personnel. 

• Deficiencies in the conduct of permit-driven job-specific monitoring were noted by SRS 

and the Department of Energy as late as 1997 (e.g., 79% bioassay incompleteness). 

The lack of procedural assurance for subcontractor participation in bioassay programs, 

including termination monitoring, as established by SRS, likewise impacts the 

completeness of subcontractor trades workers monitoring. 

• The Board has determined that insufficient information exists to establish the 

completeness and representation of job-specific bioassays for at least the time period 

Page | 1 
 

 

 

from 1972-1990. The Board recommends a cutoff of the class definition for December 

31, 1990, in recognition of the lack of specific internal exposure information concerning 

the conduct of job-specific monitoring that persisted until at least the end of that year. 

• The Board finds that given the nature of radiological work assigned to transient 

subcontractor construction trades workers, the lack of assurance provided their 

bioassay monitoring, and identified gaps in the permit-driven job-specific monitoring 

program, the completeness and representation of subcontractors who were, or should 

have been, monitored has not been sufficiently established. Therefore, dose 

reconstruction for unmonitored subcontractor construction trades workers who should 

have been monitored via the permit-driven job-specific monitoring program are not 

feasible using the co-exposure models for internal exposures developed by NIOSH. 

• NIOSH has determined that available external monitoring is sufficient for use in dose 

reconstruction in accordance with existing NIOSH methods and procedures. NIOSH has 

also determined that reconstruction of medical dose is feasible by using claimantfavorable assumptions in the technical information bulletin Dose Reconstruction from 

Occupational Medical X-Ray Procedures (ORAUT-OTIB-0006) and the SRS site profile 

documents. The Board concurs with this determination. 

Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(1), the Board determined that there is insufficient 

information to either: (1) estimate the maximum radiation dose, for every type of cancer 

for which radiation doses are reconstructed, that could have been incurred under 

plausible circumstances by any member of the class; or (2) estimate the radiation doses 

of members of the class more precisely than a maximum dose estimate. 

Although the Board found that it is not possible to completely reconstruct radiation 

doses for the proposed class, NIOSH intends to use any internal and external 

monitoring data that may become available for an individual claim (and that can be 

interpreted using existing NIOSH dose reconstruction processes or procedures). 

Therefore, dose reconstructions for subcontractor construction trades workers at SRS 

during the period from October 1, 1972 through December 31, 1990, but who do not 

qualify for inclusion in the SEC, may be performed using these data as appropriate. 

Evaluation of Health Endangerment for Petition SEC-00103 

The health endangerment determination for the class of employees is governed by 

EEOICPA and 42 C.F.R. § 83.13(c)(3). Pursuant to these requirements, if it is not 

feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy radiation doses for members of the class, it 

must be determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may 

have endangered the health of members of the class. The regulations require that it be 

assumed that any duration of unprotected exposure may have endangered the health of 

members of a class when it has been established that the class may have been 

exposed to radiation during a discrete incident likely to have involved levels of exposure 

similarly high to those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. If the occurrence of 

such an exceptionally high-level exposure has not been established, then the Board is 

Page | 2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

required to specify that health was endangered for those employees who were 

employed for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the 

parameters established for the class or in combination with work days within the 

parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC. 

The Board has determined that members of the class were not exposed to radiation 

during a discrete incident likely to have involved levels of exposure similarly high to 

those occurring during nuclear criticality incidents. However, the evidence reviewed by 

the Board indicates that some workers in the class may have accumulated radiation 

exposures through exposure to various radionuclides and from direct exposure to 

radioactive materials.1 Specifically, the Board finds that subcontractor construction 

trades workers in the class may have accumulated radiation exposures through intakes 

of nuclear material processing, reactor operations, fuel reprocessing, laboratory 

research, or waste management related radionuclides. These SRS facility radionuclide 

exposure sources have been highlighted in various NIOSH technical basis documents, 

work group proceedings, and are summarized in the next section. 

Subcontractor construction trades workers often performed nonroutine jobs involving 

unique radiological exposure sources or conditions, and permit-required, job-specific 

bioassays were necessary to characterize any potential uptake of radioactive material. 

The Board has determined that the lack of job-specific bioassays being performed for 

such non-routine work may have led to unrecorded exposures for source terms 

different, and possibly higher, than construction trades workers on routine monitoring. 

This gap stemmed from programmatic deficiencies in the bioassay monitoring 

programs, which accompanied by other program shortfalls, such as inadequate 

radiological source term identification and worker bioassay tracking, may have led to 

unmonitored exposures. 

Consequently, the Board concludes that health of the proposed class of employees may 

have been endangered at SRS during the period from October 1, 1972 through 

December 31, 1990. 

1 Including: NIOSH 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2020; SC&A 2019, SC&A 2020, SC&A 2021 

Page | 3 
 

Summary of subcontractor construction trades workers radiation exposures, 

October 1, 1972 through December 31, 1990 

Subcontractor construction trades workers performed work in almost all areas of SRS, 

including the following facilities and could have been exposed to the corresponding 

radiation exposure sources listed, as a function of work assignments. 

SRS Facility Activities Radionuclides of Concern 

Reactors Before 1989: Target 

irradiation 

After 1989: Reactor 

restart, D&D, waste 

management 

Pu-239, Am-241, U-234, 

MFPs, H-3, Np-239, Pu238, Cm-242/244 

F and A-Line Product extraction, 

conversion, and 

processing. 

Pu-239, U-235/U-236/U238, MFPs 

Puff and PEF Fuel fabrication Am-241, Pu-238/239/241, 

Np-237, Th-232 

F/H Area Tank Farms High level radioactive 

waste handling 

Am-241, Pu-238/239/241, 

MFPs, Cm-244 

H Canyon Separation/Recovery of 

Pu-239 and U-238 

Pu-238/239/241, Np-237, 

U-234/235/236/238, MFPs 

RBOF and RRF Receipt and storage of 

irradiated nuclear fuel 

Uranium, MFPs, MAPs 

Uranium Target 

Fabrication Facility, M 

Area 

Reactor fuel fabrication U-234/235/236/238 

S Area, DWPF Radwaste processing Pu-238/241, MFPs 

Z Area Radwaste processing Pu-239/239, MFPs, H-3 

A Area, 773-A laboratory Actinide technology 

research and development 

Pu-238/239/241, U235/238, Np-237, Cm242/244, Cf-252, H-3, 

MFPs, MAPs 

Source: WSRC, “Facility Descriptions” (LaBone, 1996) 

REFERENCES 

La Bone, T. R. (1996). Facility descriptions (ESH-HPT-960197). Aiken, SC: Health 

Physics Technology, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Savannah River Site. 

Retrieved from SRDB Ref. ID 11243 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2019a). Evaluation of 

bioassay data for subcontracted construction trade workers at the Savannah River Site 

[Redacted version] (ORAUT-RPRT-0092, rev. 00). Retrieved from SRDB Ref. ID 

176739 

Page | 4 
 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2019b). List of

construction trade workers identified in job plans. Retrieved from SRDB Ref. ID 173828

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2019c). Internal

coworker dosimetry data for the Savannah River Site (ORAUT-OTIB-0081, rev. 04).

Retrieved from SRDB Ref. ID 175614

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2019d). Bioassay for

subcontractor construction trade workers at the Savannah River Site from 1972 to 1997

(ORAUT-RPRT-0094, rev. 00). https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/pdfs/orau/oraurpts/orrprt-94-r0-508.pdf

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2020). NIOSH response to SC&A

comments on ORAUT-RPRT-0092 [Response paper].

https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/FOIAREQ/182968_red-508.pdf

SC&A, Inc. (2019). Review of ORAUT-RPRT-0092, revision 00, “Evaluation of bioassay

data for subcontracted construction trade workers at the Savannah River Site” (SCATR-2019- SEC005, rev. 0). https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/pdfs/abrwh/scarpts/scasrsrprt92r0-508.pdf

SC&A, Inc. (2020). Review of NIOSH Response to SC&A on ORAUT-RPRT-0092,

Revision 00, on Bioassay Data for Subcontracted Construction Trade Workers at the 

Savannah River Site. https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/FOIAREQ/184019_red-508.pdf

SC&A, Inc. (2021). Summary of key issues concerning internal monitoring

completeness and representativeness for SRS subcontractor construction trade 

workers. (SCA-TR-2021-SEC002, rev. 0). https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/

FOIAREQ/185250-508.pdf

Page | 5