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*********************************************** 
OHAN KARAGOZIAN v. USV OPTICAL, INC.

(SC 20257)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant

employer, alleging that he was constructively discharged in violation of

public policy. The plaintiff had been employed as a licensed optician

manager in the defendant’s optical department in a JCPenney store and

alleged that the defendant improperly required him to provide optometric assistance services to the doctor of optometry in the store. The

plaintiff claimed that, under a declaratory ruling issued by the Board

of Examiners for Optometrists and a cease and desist consent order

issued by the Board of Examiners for Opticians, employees, including

opticians, under the control of unlicensed third parties were prohibited

from performing services for licensed optometrists. The plaintiff also

alleged that his duties violated the public policy embodied in the statute

(§ 31-130 (i)) requiring JCPenney and the defendant to have a staffing

permit before providing staffing services to the optometrist. The plaintiff

further alleged that he was forced to resign when the defendant refused

his requests to be excused from these duties. The defendant moved to

strike the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that its allegations could

not satisfy the requirements of a constructive discharge claim. The

defendant asserted that the declaratory ruling and the cease and desist

order were not binding and did not create a private right of action for

optometric assistants. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff’s

reliance on § 31-130 (i) was misplaced because the plaintiff did not allege

that optometrists employed by the defendant charged the defendant for

hiring opticians. The trial court, relying on Brittell v. Dept. of Correction

(247 Conn. 148), determined that, to prevail on his constructive discharge

claim, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant

intended to force him to resign. The trial court granted the defendant’s

motion to strike the plaintiff’s complaint and rendered judgment for the

defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed

the trial court’s judgment. The Appellate Court, interpreting and applying

Brittell in the same manner as the trial court, concluded, inter alia, that

there was no allegation in the plaintiff’s complaint that reasonably could

be construed to claim that the defendant intended to create conditions

so intolerable that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s shoes would

be compelled to resign. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff

appealed to this court. Held:

1. The Appellate Court incorrectly interpreted the standard set forth in

Brittell to require the plaintiff to assert facts demonstrating that the

defendant intended to force him to resign, Brittell having required the

plaintiff to establish only that the defendant intended to create an intolerable work atmosphere; the Brittell standard for constructive discharge

requires a subjective inquiry into whether the employer intended to

create the complained of employment atmosphere or condition and an

objective inquiry into whether that atmosphere or condition would have

led a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes to feel compelled to

resign, and that standard does not require the employee to allege facts

showing that the employer intended to force the employee to resign.

2. Although the Appellate Court incorrectly applied the standard for constructive discharge in Brittell, that court correctly upheld the trial court’s

granting of the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s complaint

on the alternative ground that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts

establishing that his work atmosphere was so difficult or unpleasant

that a reasonable person in his shoes would have felt compelled to resign,

and, accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate

Court: nothing in the plaintiff’s complaint established that the defendant

required him to violate the law, as the declaratory ruling evaluated the

circumstances under which an optometrist would be considered an

employee of an unlicensed person or entity, and the plaintiff was
employed as an optician rather than an optometrist, the declaratory ruling was binding only on those, unlike the plaintiff, who participated in

the hearing that led to the ruling, and the ruling, which was intended

to provide guidance to optometrists, did not establish criminal liability

or inflict repercussions for specific conduct that would compel a reasonable optician in the plaintiff’s shoes to resign; moreover, the plaintiff

failed to demonstrate that the cease and desist order either applied to

him or bound the defendant, as the order required that a store different

from the one in which the plaintiff worked not permit a licensed optician

to act in the capacity of an optometric assistant to an independent

optometrist leasing space in the store, and also failed to demonstrate

how the consent order functionally created a work condition so intolerable that a person in the plaintiff’s shoes would have been justified in

walking off the job as if he had been fired; furthermore, contrary to the

plaintiff’s claim, § 31-130 (i) was inapplicable, as it requires only that a

person who procures or offers to procure employees for employers

register with the Commissioner of Labor, and the allegations of the

plaintiff’s complaint did not suggest that the defendant intended to

create conditions different from what the plaintiff would have expected

when he agreed to work as a licensed optician manager for the defendant.

Argued December 12, 2019—officially released April 15, 2020*

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the plaintiff’s alleged

constructive discharge from employment, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven

at Meriden, where the court, Hon. John F. Cronan,

judge trial referee, granted the defendant’s motion to

strike the revised complaint; thereafter, the court, Harmon, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and

rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the

plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, DiPentima,

C. J., and Lavine and Moll, Js., which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert M. Palumbos, pro hac vice, with whom was

Elizabeth M. Lacombe, for the appellee (defendant).

Scott Madeo and Brian Festa filed a brief for the

Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities as

amicus curiae.
Opinion

D’AURIA, J. The plaintiff, Ohan Karagozian, an optician formerly employed by the defendant, USV Optical,

Inc.,1 brought this action for constructive discharge,

alleging that (1) the defendant required him to provide

optometric assistance services to a doctor of optometry

in violation of the public policy of the state of Connecticut, (2) the defendant refused and failed to excuse the

plaintiff from those duties, and (3) ‘‘[a]s a result, the

plaintiff was compelled to resign his position with the

defendant . . . .’’ The defendant moved to strike the

plaintiff’s corrected revised complaint on the ground

that the allegations in the complaint could not, as a

matter of law, satisfy the requirements of a constructive

discharge claim.2 The trial court granted the defendant’s

motion to strike, relying on Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 178, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998), for the

proposition that a claim of constructive discharge

requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer

intended to force the employee to resign. The trial court

determined that the plaintiff had not only failed to allege

this intent requirement in his complaint, but also failed

to allege the second requirement of a constructive discharge claim—that his work conditions became so

intolerable that a reasonable person in his shoes would

have felt compelled to resign.

Interpreting and applying our decision in Brittell in

the same fashion as the trial court, the Appellate Court

affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that

there was ‘‘no allegation in the complaint that reasonably [could] be construed to claim that the defendant

intended to create conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., 186

Conn. App. 857, 867–68, 201 A.3d 500 (2019). We disagree with the Appellate Court’s interpretation of Brittell, although we affirm its judgment on the alternative

ground it identified.

To plead a prima facie case of constructive discharge,

a plaintiff must allege that (1) the employer intentionally created the complained of work atmosphere, (2) the

work atmosphere was so difficult or unpleasant that a

reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have

felt compelled to resign, and (3) the plaintiff in fact

resigned. Brittell does not, as the Appellate Court has

ruled in several cases, require a plaintiff claiming constructive discharge to allege that the employer intended

to force the employee to quit, but only to allege that

the employer intended to create the conditions that the

plaintiff claims compelled the employee to quit. However, in the present case, we agree with the Appellate

Court and the defendant that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege the second requirement of a constructive

discharge claim in his complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff’s complaint fails as a matter of law to allege that
the defendant created a work atmosphere so difficult

or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s

shoes would have felt compelled to resign.

The following facts and procedural history, as contained

in the record and in the Appellate Court’s decision, are

relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged

that the plaintiff began working in an optical department operated by the defendant and located in a JCPenney store in Trumbull. As a licensed optician manager,

the plaintiff’s role involved providing optometric assistant services to the doctor of optometry at the store.

His specific duties included, but were not limited to,

maintaining records, scheduling appointments, preparing patients for vision examinations, adjusting and

repairing glasses, modifying contact lenses, measuring

intraocular pressure of eyes using a glaucoma test, and

measuring the axial length of eyes using ultrasound

equipment. About three months into his employment,

the plaintiff asked his supervisors that ‘‘he not be

required to perform such duties . . . .’’ According to

the plaintiff, he made this request on at least three

separate occasions on the basis of his belief that these

duties violated the public policy of the state of Connecticut.

As support for his belief that these duties violated

the state’s public policy, the plaintiff attached to his

complaint copies of a declaratory ruling issued by the

Board of Examiners for Optometrists on May 1, 2002,

and a cease and desist consent order issued by the

Board of Examiners for Optometrists and the Board of

Examiners for Opticians in February, 2006. In the plaintiff’s view, the declaratory ruling ‘‘prohibits employees

under the control of unlicensed third parties from performing services for licensed optometrists.’’ The cease

and desist consent order, the plaintiff alleged, provided

that Walmart, Inc., had agreed not to permit licensed

opticians to perform the duties of an optometric assistant or to perform services for optometrists by whom

they were not employed. Additionally, the plaintiff

alleged that his duties violated public policy, as set forth

in General Statutes § 31-130 (i),3

in that ‘‘neither the

defendant nor JCPenney had a staffing permit allowing

either of them to provide staffing services to the doctor.’’ The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant

refused the plaintiff’s requests and failed to excuse him

from these duties. As a result, the plaintiff claimed, he

was compelled to resign his position. He then brought

this action for constructive discharge.

The defendant moved to strike the complaint on the

ground that the plaintiff’s allegations did not, as a matter

of law, satisfy the requirements of a constructive discharge claim. Specifically, the defendant argued, the

documents on which the plaintiff relied—the declaratory ruling and the cease and desist consent order—

were not binding on the parties in the present case and
did not create a private right of action for optometric

assistants. The defendant also contended that the plaintiff’s reliance on § 31-130 (i) was misplaced because his

complaint made no allegation that optometrists

employed by the defendant charged the defendant for

hiring opticians. As to the elements of a constructive

discharge claim, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to establish that the employer

intentionally created an intolerable work atmosphere

that forced the plaintiff to quit.

The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted

the motion to strike the complaint. The plaintiff declined

to replead and, instead, after the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial

court. The Appellate Court’s decision relied on its interpretation of the standard we established in Brittell for

a constructive discharge claim. The plaintiff then petitioned this court for certification to appeal, which we

granted on one issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly

construe and apply Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, [supra,

247 Conn. 148], in holding that an action for constructive

discharge in violation of public policy requires that the

plaintiff allege and prove not only that the employer

intended to create an intolerable work atmosphere but

that the employer intended thereby to force the plaintiff to resign?’’ Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., 331

Conn. 904, 201 A.3d 1023 (2019).

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff reasserts his

position that a constructive discharge allegation should

not focus on the ‘‘employer’s state of mind but on the

objective reality of the working conditions and the

impact of that objective reality, not upon the particular

worker in question, but upon a hypothetical reasonable

person in the worker’s position. . . . By requiring the

employee to prove . . . that the employer intended to

force him to resign, the Appellate Court . . . imposed

a requirement that defeats the very purpose of the constructive discharge doctrine.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis omitted.) Accordingly, the plaintiff urges this

court to reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment upholding the trial court’s decision to strike his complaint.

I

‘‘Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court’s

ruling . . . is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be

those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and

we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f

facts provable in the complaint would support a cause

of action, the motion to strike must be denied.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security

Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227

(2016).
To evaluate whether the Appellate Court properly

upheld the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff failed to

allege facts sufficient to support a claim for constructive

discharge, we first must determine whether the Appellate Court properly applied the constructive discharge

standard that we described in Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 148: ‘‘Constructive discharge

of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than

directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an

employee to quit involuntarily. . . . Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant

that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would

have felt compelled to resign.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 178, quoting Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life

Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1996).

The parties in the present case disagree in their interpretation of the Brittell standard, specifically as to the

element of intent. The defendant candidly suggests that

two different interpretations of the standard are plausible—either that the employer intended to create an intolerable work atmosphere or that the employer intended

to create the intolerable work atmosphere and thereby

intended to force the employee to quit. The defendant

argues that a plaintiff claiming that he was constructively discharged should be required to show that the

employer intended to force the employee to resign. As

support for its claim, the defendant points to Appellate

Court and Superior Court cases that ‘‘have consistently

applied Brittell to require that the employer intend to

force the employee to resign.’’4 According to the defendant, the Appellate Court in the present case correctly

applied the standard in concluding that the plaintiff

had failed to assert facts showing that the defendant

intended to force his resignation.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that the

proper interpretation of Brittell is that an employer’s

intent matters only in regard to the creation of the

intolerable work atmosphere. He argues that the Appellate Court incorrectly interpreted the standard in Brittell by forcing him to show that the employer intended

to force him to resign.

We agree with the plaintiff. An examination of our

decision in Brittell reveals that we required that the

plaintiff establish only that the employer intended to

create the intolerable work atmosphere, not that the

employer intended to compel the plaintiff to quit. Recent

United States Supreme Court precedent, applying federal law on which we relied in Brittell, supports our

determination.

In Brittell, about one year into her employment, the

plaintiff, a female correction officer employed by the

Department of Correction (department) and assigned
to one of its correctional centers, reported to her supervisors several incidents of inmates making obscene

comments about her sexuality. Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 150–51. On the basis of one

of the plaintiff’s reports, the deputy warden met with

her and thereafter issued a memorandum to the warden,

noting ‘‘that all staff had been admonished regarding

. . . possible consequences of any harassing statements or actions made to or about fellow staff [persons]

. . . that he had advised the plaintiff to report any continued harassing behavior to her supervisors . . . and

report[ing] that the plaintiff had declined the help of

the employee assistance program . . . .’’ (Footnotes

omitted.) Id., 153.

About seven months later, another incident occurred.

Id., 154. The plaintiff reported the matter to a major,

who ‘‘issued a notice to all employees that defined sexual harassment . . . . A similar notice was read at roll

call for seven consecutive days.’’ Id. The plaintiff then

filed a written complaint with the warden and informed

the major that she had sought psychiatric help. Id., 155.

The major thereafter informed her that she should not

return to work, and she was placed on medical leave.

Id., 157. The plaintiff also contacted the department’s

affirmative action unit and filed a formal complaint. Id.,

158. The affirmative action unit ‘‘offered to recommend

a transfer for the plaintiff to any institution of her choice

within the department . . . . The plaintiff, however,

was not amenable to this suggestion.’’ Id., 159. The

plaintiff declined the idea of a transfer on three other

occasions: (1) at the suggestion of the affirmative action

unit, stating as reasons that she had a new apartment,

she did not have a car, and her mother lived nearby;

(2) at the suggestion of an employee in the department’s

personnel department, citing as reasons certain medical

problems and that she did not own a car; and (3) at

the suggestion of the warden, voicing concern over the

possibility that correction officers and inmates from

the correctional facility also might be transferred to the

same institution, which could lead to a recurrence of

the rumors. Id., 159–60. The plaintiff applied for medical

leave and continued on unpaid medical leave until she

failed to submit necessary medical documentation. Id.,

160–61. At that point, her employer considered her to

have resigned. Id., 161.

The plaintiff thereafter brought an action in which

she alleged that she had been constructively discharged

‘‘because the working conditions that she faced became

so difficult that a reasonable person similarly situated

would have felt compelled to leave . . . .’’ Id., 162. The

trial court, after a court trial, rejected her constructive

discharge claim ‘‘on the ground that the defendant had

offered the plaintiff the opportunity to transfer to any

one of a number of other correctional institutions within

the general vicinity of her home, but the plaintiff had

declined these offers.’’ Id., 163. On appeal to this court,
the plaintiff claimed that, ‘‘by failing to put an end to

the harassment she faced at work for nearly two years,

[the department] created a work environment so hostile

that any reasonable person in her position would have

left.’’ Id., 178. This court, for the first time, set forth the

now oft quoted standard for constructive discharge:

‘‘Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an

employer, rather than directly discharging an individual,

intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere

that forces an employee to quit involuntarily. . . .

Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. This quoted language came word

for word from a then recent case from the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with only one

difference—we italicized the word ‘‘intentionally.’’ See

Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., supra,

92 F.3d 89 (concluding that plaintiff met burden of

establishing prima facie case of constructive discharge

due to harassment on basis of gender under Title VII

of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of

Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.).5

In the context of the facts in Brittell, our emphasis

on intent makes sense. The plaintiff in Brittell had

claimed that the department’s failure to remedy the

hostile work environment equated to its intentionally

having created the work environment of which she complained. See Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247

Conn. 178. Contrary to her argument, the trial court

found that the facts supported the department’s argument that it had in fact made efforts to remedy the

situation and to provide the plaintiff with alternatives.

For example, the employer on several occasions offered

to transfer the plaintiff to the location of her choice.

Id., 159–60. We specifically stated: ‘‘Even if we assume,

arguendo, that an employer’s failure to remedy a hostile

working environment may be considered the intentional

creation of an intolerable work atmosphere . . . the

plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing an essential element of her claim, namely, the existence of an

intolerable work atmosphere that would compel a reasonable person in that situation to resign. Had the plaintiff established that she was given the choice either to

continue working with the officers and inmate population at the correctional center or to leave the employ

of the defendant, she might well have prevailed on this

element of her claim.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., 179.

Said another way, if the department had intentionally

created the intolerable work atmosphere by refusing

to address the issue, refusing to make any alteration in

the plaintiff’s work conditions, or refusing to offer her

any relief (i.e., by forcing her to remain at the correctional facility or to quit), the plaintiff could have suc-
ceeded on her constructive discharge claim. The trial

court in Brittell found that the opposite was true. In

fact, the departmentintentionally attempted to improve

the work atmosphere for the plaintiff by giving her the

choice of transferring to another correctional institution, away from the correction officers and inmates

who had made the work atmosphere intolerable. In

light of our analysis of the facts in Brittell, it is clear

that our emphasis of the word ‘‘intentionally’’ within

the quotation from Chertkova v. Connecticut General

Life Ins. Co., supra, 92 F.3d 89, manifested an intent

that ‘‘intentionally’’ modify the requirement that the

employer created the complained of environment. Notably, by contrast, nowhere in Brittell did we require or

allude to a requirement that the plaintiff establish that

the department had intended to force her to quit.

To clarify the intent element of a constructive discharge claim for future cases, the phrase under examination—’’[c]onstructive discharge of an employee occurs

when an employer, rather than directly discharging an

individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work

atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily’’—should be understood to refer to the employer’s

intent to create the intolerable work atmosphere itself.

Thus, to plead a prima facie case of constructive discharge, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the employer

intentionally created the complained of work atmosphere, (2) the work atmosphere was so difficult or

unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s

shoes would have felt compelled to resign, and (3) the

plaintiff in fact resigned. This standard does not require

that the plaintiff allege facts to show that the employer

intended to force the employee to resign, only that a

reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.

See Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 229 (2d Cir.

2004) (stating that Second Circuit ‘‘has not expressly

insisted on proof of specific intent,’’ although in some

constructive discharge cases, ‘‘where such evidence

exists, the mens rea requirement is easily established’’).

In addition to being consistent with Brittell itself,

recent United States Supreme Court precedent regarding constructive discharge does not dissuade us, as the

plaintiff and the amicus argue, from our interpretation

of the intent element. In Green v. Brennan, U.S.

, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 195 L. Ed. 2d 44 (2016), the court

explained: ‘‘The whole point of allowing an employee

to claim ‘constructive’ discharge is that in circumstances of discrimination so intolerable that a reasonable person would resign, we treat the employee’s resignation as though the employer actually fired him. . . .

We do not also require an employee to come forward

with proof—proof that would often be difficult to allege

plausibly—that not only was the discrimination so bad

that he had to quit, but also that his quitting was his

employer’s intent all along.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote

omitted.) Id., 1779–80, citing Pennsylvania State Police
v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141–43, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 159 L.

Ed. 2d 204 (2004).

Quoting the same language, the Commission on

Human Rights and Opportunities (commission) filed an

amicus brief in the present case, positing that we should

eliminate the element of intent altogether and adopt a

completely objective standard. We do not agree with

the commission that the court in Green completely

eliminated the element of intent for a constructive discharge claim. A constructive discharge claim under

Title VII requires a plaintiff to prove discrimination by

an employer—inherently necessitating proof of an element of intent in creating the workplace condition. See

Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, supra, 542 U.S.

133 (‘‘[t]o establish [a] hostile work environment [under

Title VII], plaintiffs like Suders must show harassing

behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of [their] employment’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

In Green, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a

promotion because of race and alleged that his supervisors threatened to bring criminal charges against him

in retaliation for his complaint, thereby forcing his resignation in violation of Title VII. Green v. Brennan, supra,

136 S. Ct. 1774–75. The case turned on the question

of whether the forty-five day limitation period for a

constructive discharge claim by a federal civil servant

begins to run after the last discriminatory act or when

the employee resigns. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (a)

(1) (2012) (federal civil servants, prior to filing complaint, were required to initiate contact with counselor

at their agency within forty days of date of matter

alleged to be discriminatory). To answer the question,

the court set out the basic elements of a constructive

discharge claim. ‘‘A plaintiff must prove first that he

was discriminated against by his employer to the point

where a reasonable person in his position would have

felt compelled to resign . . . [and] he must also show

that he actually resigned.’’ (Citation omitted.) Green v.

Brennan, supra, 1777. On the basis of, in part, the fact

that a constructive discharge claim requires that the

employee actually resign, the court concluded that the

limitation period should begin to run when the employee

resigns. Id., 1776–77.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated that the

majority ignored a bedrock principle of Title VII cases:

‘‘An act done with discriminatory intent must have

occurred within the [limitation] period.’’ Id., 1782 (Alito,

J., concurring in the judgment). In accordance with

this principle, Justice Alito concluded, an employee’s

resignation triggers a fresh [limitation] period when

‘‘the employer makes conditions intolerable with the

specific discriminatory intent of forcing the employee

to resign.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 1785 (Alito, J.,

concurring in the judgment). However, ‘‘[i]f the
employer lacks that intent . . . the [limitation] period

[should run] from the discriminatory act that precipitated the resignation.’’ Id. The majority responded:

‘‘This sometimes-a-claim-sometimes-not theory of constructive discharge is novel and contrary to the constructive discharge doctrine. . . . We do not . . .

require an employee to [prove] . . . that not only was

the discrimination so bad that he had to quit, but also

that his quitting was his employer’s plan all along.’’

(Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 1779–80. The

majority rejected requiring that a plaintiff alleging constructive discharge prove specifically that the employer

intended to force the employee to resign. See id. The

court did not reject the requirement that a plaintiff

prove some kind of discrimination, however. Rather,

the required discrimination speaks to the first requirement under our standard in Brittell—the employer’s

intent in creating the work condition of which the plaintiff complains. In Green, the employer created the complained of condition by promising not to pursue criminal

charges against the plaintiff in exchange for his promise

to retire or take a position with a considerably lower

salary, thereby forcing him to involuntarily resign.

Id., 1783.

The constructive discharge requirements in Green

are not purely objective and align with the standard we

established in Brittell. If not made perfectly clear in

that case, we are now afforded an opportunity to clarify

that standard in the present case.6 The standard contains a subjective inquiry (did the employer intend to

create the working condition) and an objective inquiry

(the impact the working conditions would have on a

reasonable person). To evaluate the working conditions, we evaluate whether a reasonable person in the

employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.

The defendant in the present case argues that the standard should go one step further. It contends that the

plaintiff must show that the defendant in fact subjectively intended that a specific employee resign under

conditions deemed intolerable by an objectively reasonable person. That kind of showing would be difficult

to allege and inconsistent with the aims of the objective requirement. We decline the defendant’s request

to require that a constructive discharge claim allege

facts establishing that the employer intended for the

employee to resign.

II

Having set forth the requirements to establish a prima

facie case for constructive discharge, we turn to the

Appellate Court’s analysis in the present case and consider whether the Appellate Court properly upheld the

trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to strike

the complaint in its entirety.

Although the Appellate Court quoted the proper standard for a constructive discharge claim, we conclude
that the court incorrectly applied the standard. In applying the standard, the Appellate Court upheld the trial

court’s judgment on the basis of, in part, the plaintiff’s

failure to allege facts that the defendant intended to

force him to quit. See Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc.,

supra, 186 Conn. App. 867–68. Specifically, the Appellate Court stated: ‘‘The plaintiff denies the plain language of Brittell, arguing that a more sensible reading

of Brittell would [lead to the conclusion] that it is the

employer’s intent to create the work atmosphere in

question that matters, rather than an intent that such

atmosphere should force an employee to resign.’’ Id.,

868. On this point, we conclude that the Appellate Court

incorrectly applied Brittell, and we reiterate that Brittell requires only that plaintiffs allege facts showing

that the employer intended to create the conditions of

which a plaintiff complains. See part I of this opinion.

On an alternative ground, the Appellate Court upheld

the trial court’s striking of the plaintiff’s complaint,

reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the

second requirement of a constructive discharge claim—

he failed to allege facts establishing that the work atmosphere was so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable

person in his shoes would have felt compelled to resign.

Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., supra, 186 Conn. App.

870. We agree. Even when the allegations of the complaint are construed in the light most favorable to sustaining the complaint, we conclude that the plaintiff’s

allegations do not meet this standard.

In support of his allegation of intolerable work conditions, the plaintiff relied on the declaratory ruling issued

by the Board of Examiners for Optometrists, the cease

and desist consent order issued by the Board of Examiners for Optometrists and the Board of Examiners for

Opticians, and § 31-130 (i). In his brief to this court,

he explained: ‘‘No employer may require its employees to violate the law. A reasonable employee, having

been instructed to do so, would refuse and resign. The

employer is responsible for that resignation, since the

sole proximate cause of the resignation was the employer’s illegal job requirement.’’ Contrary to the plaintiff’s

assertion, however, nothing in his complaint establishes

that the defendant required him to violate the law. The

declaratory ruling evaluated the circumstances under

which an optometrist would be considered an employee,

and not an independent contractor, of an unlicensed

person, firm, or organization so as to comply with General Statutes § 20-133a.7 We agree with the defendant

that the plaintiff cannot rely on the declaratory ruling

because the ruling itself provides that it is only ‘‘binding

upon those who participate[d] in the hearing’’ that

resulted in the ruling. The plaintiff did not participate

in the hearing. Moreover, the ruling concerned optometrists. Even if we were to credit the plaintiff’s argument

that the ruling established a public policy regarding

optometrists, the plaintiff’s tasks could not have vio-
lated that particular policy because he was employed

as an optician, not an optometrist. Furthermore, the

ruling ‘‘[was] intended to provide guidance’’ to individual licensed optometrists. It did not establish criminal

liability or inflict repercussions or potential sanctions

for any specific conduct that would compel a reasonable optician in the plaintiff’s shoes to resign. See Sheets

v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427

A.2d 385 (1980) (‘‘an employee should not be put to an

election whether to risk criminal sanction or to jeopardize his continued employment’’).

Similarly, the plaintiff’s complaint failed to show how

the cease and desist consent order either applied to the

plaintiff or bound the defendant. The order required

that Walmart, Inc., not permit a licensed optician to act

in the capacity of an optometric assistant to an independent optometrist leasing space in a store owned by Walmart, Inc. We fail to see, because the plaintiff failed to

allege, how the cease and desist consent order functionally created a working condition so intolerable that a

person in his shoes would have been justified in walking

off the job as if they had been fired. We also fail to

understand how the defendant—which was not a party

to the cease and desist consent order—could be bound

by Walmart, Inc.’s agreement that, without admitting

any fault, it would change its employment practices.

The statute the plaintiff relies on is also inapplicable.

Section 31-130 (i) requires that persons engaged in the

business of procuring or offering to procure employees

for employers must register with the Commissioner of

Labor before they may charge employers for their services. The plaintiff did not allege that the doctor of

optometry charged a fee from the defendant for hiring

the plaintiff as an assistant. Accordingly, the statute

does not implicate the defendant.

Finally, we are not persuaded that the plaintiff’s allegations suggest that the defendant intended to create

conditions different from what the plaintiff would have

expected when he agreed to work as a licensed optician

manager at the defendant’s operation. The plaintiff’s

complaint centered around the duties he was in fact

hired to perform, not some intolerable work atmosphere that forced him to quit involuntarily. The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s allegations included

that ‘‘he was asked to provide optometric assistant services to the on-site doctor of optometry from day one.

It defies logic to conclude that, from the very first day

of [the] plaintiff’s employment, [the defendant] had

intended to force [the] plaintiff to quit involuntarily.’’

(Emphasis in original.) We agree with the defendant.

The complaint does not allege that any of the plaintiff’s assigned tasks changed between his hire date in

June, 2014, and September, 2014, when he first complained to his supervisors. All we know from the complaint is that the plaintiff began working for the defen-
dant in June, 2014, and that the defendant required him

to perform the tasks he complains of from ‘‘approximately June 28, 2014, to approximately October 17, 2014

. . . .’’ The complaint does not allege that the plaintiff

was unaware of the duties he would be required to

perform or that the defendant changed his responsibilities after he was hired. Nor does the complaint suggest

that anything changed from what he agreed to perform

within the scope of his employment and what he now

asserts violates public policy. ‘‘In general . . . an

employee’s dissatisfaction with his job responsibilities

and assignments do not suffice to establish a claim of

constructive discharge.’’ Zephyr v. Ortho McNeil Pharmaceutical, 62 F. Supp. 2d 599, 608 (D. Conn. 1999)

(finding that plaintiff failed to establish that he was

constructively discharged).

By failing to establish that his work conditions were

so intolerable that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s

shoes would have felt compelled to resign, the plaintiff’s

complaint fails. The Appellate Court correctly upheld

the trial court’s striking of the plaintiff’s complaint in

its entirety.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* April 15, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The plaintiff alleged that USV Optical, Inc., is a Texas corporation headquartered in New Jersey that owns and operates optical departments in

JCPenney stores at various locations in Connecticut.

2 The operative complaint for purposes of the present appeal is the corrected revised complaint filed on December 19, 2016. The defendant also

moved to strike the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the plaintiff

asserted a claim for which no private right of action exists. The trial court

did not address that issue, and the parties did not raise it on appeal.

3 General Statutes § 31-130 (i) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall

engage in the business of procuring or offering to procure employees for

persons seeking the services of employees or supplying employees to render

services where a fee or other valuable thing is exacted, charged or received

from the employer for procuring or assisting to procure or supplying such

employees unless he registers with the Labor Commissioner. . . .’’

4 For example, the defendant relies on Boucher v. Saint Francis GI Endoscopy, LLC, 187 Conn. App. 422, 202 A.3d 1056, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 905,

201 A.3d 1023 (2019), in which the Appellate Court, interpreting Brittell,

stated that ‘‘the plaintiff has presented no evidence from which it can be

inferred that the defendant deliberately sought to force the plaintiff to quit.’’

Id., 433; see also Horvath v. Hartford, 178 Conn. App. 504, 510–11, 176 A.3d

592 (2017) (‘‘to meet the high standard applicable to a claim of constructive

discharge, a plaintiff is required to show . . . that there is evidence of

the employer’s intent to create an intolerable environment that forces the

employee to resign’’). In fact, the Appellate Court panel in the present case

was following Horvath. See Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., supra, 186

Conn. App. 873 n.15.

The defendant also relies on a Superior Court case in which the court

set out the standard for a constructive discharge claim as follows: ‘‘To plead

a prima facie case of constructive discharge, a plaintiff must allege two

elements. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted deliberately

to create an intolerable work environment. Deliberateness exists only if the

actions complained of were intended by the employer as an effort to force

the employee to quit . . . .’’ Harrelle v. Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers

of New York, Inc., Docket No. CV-14-6008428-S, 2017 WL 715754, *7 (Conn.

Super. January 10, 2017). Applying that standard, the court found that a

genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the employer transferred

the employee ‘‘for legitimate business reasons or to force the [employee]
to quit.’’ Id., *8. In light of our holding today, to the extent that those cases

incorrectly applied the Brittell standard, we disavow that application.

5

‘‘We look to federal law for guidance in interpreting state employment

discrimination law, and analyze claims under [the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., the state counterpart

to Title VII] in the same manner as federal courts evaluate federal discrimination claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v.

Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 636 n.11, 79 A.3d 60 (2013).

6 Although the plaintiff in the present case did not allege a Title VII violation, we perceive no justification for altering the requirements for a constructive discharge claim depending on whether the claim is one for a constructive

discharge resulting from race discrimination; Grey v. Norwalk Board of

Education, 304 F. Supp. 2d 314, 320–21 (D. Conn. 2004); gender discrimination; Usherenko v. Bertucci’s Corp., Docket No. 3:05-CV-756 (JCH), 2006

WL 3791389, *1 (D. Conn. December 21, 2006); a sexually hostile work

environment; Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 150; whistleblowing activities; Horvath v. Hartford, 178 Conn. App. 504, 506, 176 A.3d

592 (2017); or any other intentionally created circumstance resulting in work

conditions that would compel a reasonable person to resign.

7 General Statutes § 20-133a provides in relevant part: ‘‘No licensed optometrist shall practice his profession as an employee of any unlicensed person,

firm or corporation, provided that said prohibition shall not apply to health

service organizations, hospitals, other optometrists or ophthalmologists.

. . . No rule of the board shall prohibit the practice of optometry on a

lessee or sublessee basis in or on the premises of a retail, commercial or

mercantile establishment.’’