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106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1453

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war

in Sudan.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 28, 1999

Mr. FRIST (for himself, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. BROWNBACK, and Mr.

LIEBERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive

solution to the war in Sudan.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

6 Congress makes the following findings:

7 (1) With clear indications that the Government

8 of Sudan intends to intensify its prosecution of the

9 war against areas outside of its control, which has

10 already cost nearly 2,000,000 lives and has displaced
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1 more than 4,000,000, a sustained and coordinated

2 international effort to pressure combatants to end

3 hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict of4 fers the best opportunity for a comprehensive solu5 tion to the continuing war in Sudan.

6 (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally

7 sponsored peace process, protected from manipula8 tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso9 lution of the war, protection of human rights, and

10 a self-sustaining Sudan.

11 (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian

12 relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in

13 the effort to bring an end to the war.

14 (4) Continued leadership by the United States

15 is critical.

16 (5) Regardless of the future political status of

17 the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov18 ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au19 thority and institutions is a major impediment to

20 achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people

21 and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace

22 process.

23 (6) Through manipulation of traditional rival24 ries among peoples in areas outside their full con25 trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used
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1 divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their

2 population, and Congress finds that internationally

3 sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical

4 role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human

5 suffering.

6 (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly

7 utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense

8 Forces, and other irregular troops for raiding and

9 slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the

10 Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt

11 the ability of those populations to sustain them12 selves. The tactic is designed to replace the overt use

13 of bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting

14 the war through selective starvation and to minimize

15 the Government of Sudan’s accountability inter16 nationally.

17 (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly

18 stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds

19 from future oil sales to increase the tempo and

20 lethality of the war against the areas outside its con21 trol.

22 (9) Through its power to veto plans for air

23 transport flights under the United Nations relief op24 eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov25 ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the
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1 receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the

2 United States and other donor countries as a dev3 astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the

4 Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out5 side of the Government’s control.

6 (10) The United States and other donors’ ef7 forts in delivering relief and assistance through

8 means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad9 dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov10 ernment of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations

11 to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

12 (11) While the immediate needs of selected

13 areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad14 dressed in the near term, the population in areas of

15 Sudan outside of the control of the Government of

16 Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of

17 their ability to sustain themselves.

18 (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in

19 Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and southern Blue Nile

20 regions have been excluded completely from relief

21 distribution by OLS, consequently placing their pop22 ulations at increased risk of famine.

23 (13) At a cost of more than $1,000,000 per

24 day, and with a primary focus on providing only for

25 the immediate food needs of the recipients, the cur-
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1 rent international relief operations are neither sus2 tainable nor desirable in the long term.

3 (14) The ability of populations to defend them4 selves against attack in areas outside the Govern5 ment of Sudan’s control has been severely com6 promised by the disengagement of the front-line

7 sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of

8 the Government of Sudan that success on the battle9 field will be achieved.

10 (15) The United States should use all means of

11 pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu12 tion to the war, including—

13 (A) the maintenance or strengthening of

14 sanctions against the Government of Sudan;

15 (B) the support or creation of viable demo16 cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of

17 Sudan outside government control;

18 (C) continued active support of people-to19 people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in

20 areas outside of government control;

21 (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms

22 to provide relief to those areas;

23 (E) cooperation among the trading part24 ners of the United States and within multilat25 eral institutions toward those ends; and
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1 (F) the use of any and all possible unilat2 eral and multilateral economic and diplomatic

3 means to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end

4 their hostilities and again assume a constructive

5 stance toward facilitating a comprehensive solu6 tion to the ongoing war in Sudan.

7 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

8 In this Act:

9 (1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov10 ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic

11 Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

12 (2) IGAD.—The term ‘‘IGAD’’ means the

13 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

14 (3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United

15 Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF and

16 the World Food Program known as ‘‘Operation Life17 line Sudan’’.

18 SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN

19 RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW TACTICS BY THE

20 GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

21 Congress hereby—

22 (1) condemns—

23 (A) violations of human rights on all sides

24 of the conflict in Sudan;
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1 (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall

2 human rights record, with regard to both the

3 prosecution of the war and the denial of basic

4 human and political rights to all Sudanese;

5 (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and

6 the role of the Government of Sudan in abet7 ting and tolerating the practice; and

8 (D) the Government of Sudan’s increasing

9 use and organization of ‘‘murahalliin’’, Popular

10 Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese

11 Army units into organized and coordinated

12 raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal,

13 the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and southern

14 Blue Nile regions; and

15 (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on

16 air transport relief flights by the Government of

17 Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties has

18 largely replaced total bans on such flights as the pri19 mary tool for creating food shortages and is used as

20 a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture,

21 and economies of the Dinka and Nuba peoples in a

22 policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

23 SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby—
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1 (1) declares its support for the efforts by execu2 tive branch officials of the United States to lead in

3 a reinvigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace proc4 ess;

5 (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European

6 Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt,

7 and other key states to support the peace process;

8 and

9 (3) urges Kenya’s leadership in the implementa10 tion of the process.

11 (b) RELATION TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY.—It

12 is the sense of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts

13 toward resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made

14 through IGAD and that the President must not create any

15 process or diplomatic facility or office which could be

16 viewed as a parallel or competing diplomatic track.

17 (c) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The

18 Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel

19 of the Department of State for the support of—

20 (1) the secretariat of IGAD;

21 (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov22 ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;

23 (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried

24 out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD

25 Partners’ Forum (IPF); and
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1 (4) other United States diplomatic efforts with

2 respect to Sudan.

3 SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

4 It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting

5 through the United States Permanent Representative to

6 the United Nations, should—

7 (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations

8 Security Council to investigate the practice of slav9 ery in Sudan and provide recommendations on meas10 ures for its eventual elimination;

11 (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human

12 rights practices of the Government of Sudan at the

13 United Nations conference on human rights in Gene14 va in 2000;

15 (3) press for implementation of the rec16 ommendations of the United Nations Special

17 Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to human rights

18 monitors of the United Nations High Commission

19 for Refugees in areas of conflict in Sudan; and

20 (4) press for UNICEF, International Com21 mittee of the Red Cross, or the International Fed22 eration of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or

23 other appropriate international organizations or

24 agencies to maintain a registry of those individuals
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1 who have been abducted or are otherwise held in

2 bondage or servitude in Sudan.

3 SEC. 7. SUPPORTING SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN.

4 (a) Until the President determines, and so certifies

5 to Congress, that the Government of Sudan has—

6 (1) fully committed to and has made verifiable

7 progress toward a comprehensive, peaceful solution

8 to the war within the IGAD-sponsored peace process

9 or has otherwise committed to and made verifiable

10 progress in a good faith effort with both northern

11 and southern opposition toward a comprehensive so12 lution to the conflict based on the Declaration of

13 Principles reached in Nairobi Kenya, on July 20,

14 1994,

15 (2) made substantial and verifiable progress in

16 controlling the raiding and slaving activities of all

17 regular and irregular forces, including Popular De18 fense Forces and other militias and murahalliin,

19 (3) instituted credible reforms with regard to

20 providing basic human and civil rights to all Suda21 nese, and

22 (4) ceased aerial bombardment of civilian tar23 gets,

24 the following are prohibited, except to the extent provided

25 in section 203(b) of the International Emergency Eco-
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1 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations,

2 orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant

3 to this section:

4 (A) The importation into the United States

5 of any goods or services of Sudanese origin,

6 other than information or informational mate7 rials.

8 (B) The exportation or reexportation, di9 rectly or indirectly, to Sudan of any goods,

10 technology (including technical data, software,

11 or other information), or services from the

12 United States or by a United States person,

13 wherever located, or requiring the issuance of a

14 license by a Federal agency, except for dona15 tions of articles intended to relieve human suf16 fering, such as food, clothing, and medicine.

17 (C) The facilitation by a United States

18 person, including but not limited to brokering

19 activities of the exportation or reexportation of

20 goods, technology, or services from Sudan to

21 any destination, or to Sudan from any location.

22 (D) The performance by any United States

23 person of any contract, including a financing

24 contract, or use of any other financial instru-
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1 ment, in support of an industrial, commercial,

2 public utility, or governmental project in Sudan.

3 (E) The grant or extension of credits or

4 loans by any United States person to the Gov5 ernment of Sudan.

6 (F) Any transaction by a United States

7 person relating to transportation of cargo to or

8 from Sudan; the provision of transportation of

9 cargo to or from the United States by any Su10 danese person or any vessel or aircraft of Suda11 nese registration; or the sale in the United

12 States by any person holding authority under

13 subtitle 7 of title 49, United States Code, of

14 any transportation of cargo by air that includes

15 any stop in Sudan.

16 (G) Any transaction by any United States

17 person or within the United States that evades

18 or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or

19 avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the pro20 hibitions set forth in this section.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that the sanctions in subsection (a), and in the

23 President’s Executive Order of November 4, 1997, should

24 be applied to include the sale of stocks in the United

25 States or to any United States person, wherever located,
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1 or any other form of financial instruments or derivatives,

2 in support of a commercial, industrial, public utility, or

3 government project or transaction in or with Sudan.

4 (c) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President

5 may waive the application of any of the sanctions de6 scribed in subsection (a) if he determines and certifies to

7 Congress that it is important to the national security of

8 the United States to do so.

9 (d) REPORT.—Beginning 3 months after the date of

10 enactment of this Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the

11 President shall submit a report to Congress on—

12 (1) the specific sources and current status of

13 Sudan’s financing and construction of oil exploi14 tation infrastructure and pipelines;

15 (2) the extent to which that financing was se16 cured in the United States or with involvement of

17 United States citizens;

18 (3) such financing’s relation to the sanctions

19 described in subsection (a) and the Executive Order

20 of November 4, 1997;

21 (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the

22 Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its con23 trol, including targets, frequency, and best estimates

24 of damage;
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1 (5) the number, duration, and locations of air

2 strips or other humanitarian relief facilities to which

3 access is denied by any party to the conflict; and

4 (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace

5 process, including the specific and verifiable steps

6 taken by parties to the conflict, the members of the

7 IGAD Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD

8 toward a comprehensive solution to the war.

9 (e) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this

10 section shall prohibit—

11 (1) transactions for the conduct of the official

12 business of the Federal Government or the United

13 Nations by employees thereof;

14 (2) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activ15 ity by persons regularly employed in such capacity

16 by a news-gathering organization; or

17 (3) legitimate humanitarian operations.

18 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

19 (1) the term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership, as20 sociation, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other

21 organization;

22 (2) the term ‘‘Government of Sudan’’ includes

23 the Government of Sudan, its agencies, instrumen24 talities and controlled entities, and the Central Bank

25 of Sudan;
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1 (3) the term ‘‘person’’ means an individual or

2 entity; and

3 (4) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means any

4 United States citizen, permanent resident alien, enti5 ty organized under the laws of the United States

6 (including foreign branches), or any person in the

7 United States.

8 SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

9 It is the sense of Congress that the President should

10 organize and maintain a formal consultative process with

11 the European Union, its member states, the members of

12 the United Nations Security Council, and other relevant

13 parties on coordinating an effort within the United Na14 tions to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power

15 of the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for

16 air transport relief flights.

17 SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR

18 RELIEF EFFORTS.

19 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the progress

20 made by officials of the executive branch of Government

21 toward greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more

22 effective distribution of United States relief contributions.

23 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con24 gress that the President should continue to increase the
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1 use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup2 plies in southern Sudan.

3 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date

4 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de5 tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to6 ward carrying out subsection (b).

7 SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS8 PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

9 (a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a detailed

10 and implementable contingency plan to provide, outside

11 United Nations auspices, the greatest possible amount of

12 United States Government and privately donated relief to

13 all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Moun14 tains, Upper Nile, and southern Blue Nile, in the event

15 the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or in16 cremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.

17 (b) ELEMENT OF PLAN.—The plan developed under

18 subsection (a) shall include coordination of other donors

19 in addition to the United States Government and private

20 institutions.

21 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 2 months after the date

22 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a clas23 sified report to Congress on the costs and startup time

24 such a plan would require in the event of a total ban on

25 air transport relief flights or in the event of a partial or
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1 incremental ban on such flights if the President has made

2 the determination required by subsection (a)(2).

3 (d) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—Notwith4 standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the

5 plan developed under subsection (a), the President may

6 reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for

7 support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for

8 the purposes of the plan.

9 SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID’S SUDAN TRANSITION

10 ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION (STAR)

11 PROGRAM.

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby ex13 presses its support for the President’s ongoing efforts to

14 diversify and increase effectiveness of United States as15 sistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of the

16 control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long17 term focus shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for

18 Rehabilitation (STAR) program with its emphasis on pro19 moting future democratic governance, rule of law, building

20 indigenous institutional capacity, promoting and enhanc21 ing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people

22 reconciliation efforts.

23 (b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts made

24 available to carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign

25 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating
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1 to development assistance) for the period beginning on Oc2 tober 1, 1999, and ending on September 30, 2002,

3 $16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable

4 civil authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in

5 Sudan, including the provision of technical assistance, and

6 for people-to-people reconciliation efforts.

7 SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUN8 TAINS AND OTHER AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS

9 ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

10 (a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that civilians in

11 the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and southern Blue

12 Nile regions of Sudan are not receiving assistance through

13 OLS due to restrictions by the Government of Sudan.

14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con15 gress that the President should—

16 (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the

17 humanitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red

18 Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan;

19 (2) respond appropriately to those needs based

20 on such assessment; and

21 (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on

22 efforts made under paragraph (2).
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1 SEC. 13. PROTECTING HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, SEPA2 RATING CIVILIANS FROM COMBATANTS, AND

3 REDUCING FOOD DIVERSION.

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

5 (1) diversion of food assistance from civilians to

6 combatants is a hindrance to an effective and com7 prehensive relief effort;

8 (2) the proximity of combatants to humani9 tarian operations for noncombatants poses a security

10 risk for both humanitarian relief personnel and for

11 those they serve;

12 (3) the lack of a reliable and adequate means

13 of securing food is a major factor in the ability of

14 populations in areas outside of the control of the

15 Government of Sudan to defend themselves from ag16 gression by Government of Sudan forces and related

17 militias or paramilitary groups, thus resulting in di18 versions of food; and

19 (4) options to address the situation are very

20 limited.

21 (b) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE DIRECT FOOD ASSIST22 ANCE.—

23 (1) AUTHORITY.—For the purpose of mini24 mizing diversions of food assistance and to insulate

25 noncombatants and the relief operations which serve

26 them from combatants in areas outside the control
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1 of the Government of Sudan, the President, acting

2 through appropriate Federal agencies, is authorized

3 to provide food assistance directly to the National

4 Democratic Alliance participants or other groups en5 gaged in the protection of civilian populations from

6 attacks from regular government forces, associated

7 militias, or other paramilitary groups supported by

8 the Government of Sudan.

9 (2) SUPERSEDES EXISTING LAW.—The author10 ity of paragraph (1) supersedes any other provision

11 of law.

12 (c) LIMITATION.—The assistance described in sub13 section (b) may only be provided in such a way that—

14 (1) does not endanger, compromise, or other15 wise reduce the United States’ support for existing

16 unilateral, multilateral, or private humanitarian op17 erations or the beneficiaries of those operations; or

18 (2) compromise any ongoing or future people19 to-people reconciliation efforts in Sudan.

20 (d) RELATION TO CURRENT OR FUTURE HUMANI21 TARIAN OPERATIONS.—The assistance described in sub22 section (b) shall be implemented separate from and not

23 in proximity to current humanitarian efforts, both within

24 Operation Lifeline Sudan or outside of Operation Lifeline
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1 Sudan, or any other current or future humanitarian oper2 ations which serve noncombatants.

3 (e) DETERMINATIONS OF ELIGIBILITY.—In deter4 mining the eligibility of potential recipients described in

5 subsection (b), the President shall take into account the

6 groups’ respect for human rights, civil authority, civil in7 stitutions, and the integrity of ongoing humanitarian oper8 ations.

9 (f) REPORT.—The President shall submit a report to

10 Congress, in classified form if necessary—

11 (1) describing the effectiveness in preventing di12 versions of such food assistance;

13 (2) whether or not the provision of such food

14 assistance has resulted in or has the potential to in15 advertently allow for the enrichment of any indi16 vidual or organization by the resale or other transfer

17 of the assistance for other purposes, either to the in18 tended recipients or other parties;

19 (3) whether such operations have affected ongo20 ing humanitarian operations described in subsections

21 (c) or operations described in subsection (d); and

22 (4) the extent to which the provision of assist23 ance in subsection (b) has impacted respect for

24 human rights and rule of law.

Æ