UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4516

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

KENENISKI JERALD GLANTON, a/k/a Jerald, a/k/a Gerald,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. 

(1:08-cr-00729-MBS-2)

Submitted: December 23, 2010 Decided: January 14, 2011

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis H. Lang, CALLISON TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Stanley Duane Ragsdale, John David 

Rowell, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Keneniski Jerald Glanton appeals the 200-month 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to 

distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 

21 U.S.C.A §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010). 

Counsel for Glanton filed a brief in this court in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that 

there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, but questioning 

whether the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. 

Glanton has filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that he 

should be resentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 

Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, that his sentence is 

unreasonable and unconstitutional, and that counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. We affirm.

Counsel challenges Glanton’s sentence, but does not 

specify any deficiencies. We review a sentence imposed by a 

district court under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. 

Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010). We begin by 

reviewing the sentence for significant procedural error, 

including such errors as “failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) 
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[(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the 

Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there are no 

procedural errors, we then consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality 

of the circumstances. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 

597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).

“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must 

make an individualized assessment based on the facts 

presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (emphasis omitted). 

Accordingly, a sentencing court must apply the relevant 

§ 3553(a) factors to the particular facts presented and must 

“‘state in open court’” the particular reasons that support its 

chosen sentence. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c) (West 2000 

& Supp. 2010)). The court’s explanation need not be exhaustive; 

it must be “sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that the 

district court has considered the parties’ arguments and has a 

reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking 

authority.’” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 

(2007)) (alterations omitted).
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We conclude that the sentence imposed by the district 

court was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The 

district court calculated the Guidelines range and understood 

that it was advisory. Furthermore, it is apparent that the 

court considered the arguments of the parties and had a reasoned 

basis for its decision. The court made an individualized 

statement explaining the sentence imposed. Thus, the district 

court did not commit procedural error during sentencing.

Glanton’s sentence is also substantively reasonable. 

In reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, we “‘give 

due deference to the district court’s decision that the 

§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 

variance.’” United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340 (4th Cir.) 

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 307 

(2010). Here, the district court’s variant sentence is 

supported by the Government’s motion to depart from the 

Guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) and U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2008). We conclude that the court 

imposed a reasonable sentence under the circumstances. We 

reject the claims raised in Glanton’s pro se supplemental brief 

as meritless.*

 * The Fair Sentencing Act, which increased the amounts of 

crack cocaine that trigger statutory mandatory minimum sentences 

in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010), is not 

(Continued)
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In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire 

record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Glanton, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Glanton requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Glanton. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 

retroactive and is therefore inapplicable to Glanton’s sentence. 

See United States v. Diaz, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 5094222, at *1 

(2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n.7 

(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803, 814 (7th 

Cir. 2010); United States v. Gomes, 621 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th 

Cir. 2010); United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 580 (6th 

Cir. 2010).

Further, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not 

cognizable on direct appeal unless it conclusively appears on 

the record that defense counsel was ineffective. United States 

v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Because the 

record here does not conclusively demonstrate that Glanton’s 

counsel provided ineffective assistance, Glanton must pursue 

this claim, should he wish to do so, in an appropriate 

proceeding for post-conviction relief.