THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


TELEPHONIC WORKING GROUP MEETING 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


ABRWH WORKING GROUP MEETING
 

The verbatim transcript of the 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held telephonically on April 20, 2006. 

 

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C O N T E N T S
 

April 20, 2006 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO 


Y-12 12 

ROCKY FLATS 195 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 311 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

 

4

 P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


STAFF
 

LASHAWN SHIELDS, Committee Management Specialist, NIOSH 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter 

5 

IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
 

HHS: 


HOWELL, EMILY 


RAFKY, MICHAEL 


NIOSH: 


NETON, JIM 


RUTHERFORD, LAVON 


SUNDIN, DAVE 


ULSH, BRANT 


ORAUT: 


CHEW, MEL 


FALK, ROGER 


JESSEN, KARIN 


KENOYER, JUDSON 


KERR, GEORGE 


LANGSTED, JIM 


MCFEE, MATT 


MEYER, BOB 


ROBINSON, AL 


SHARFI, MUTTY 


SMITH, MATTHEW 


STEMPFLEY, DAN 


TANKERSLEY, BILL 


WOLFE, CRAIG 


SC&A: 


BEHLING, HANS 


BUCHANAN, RON 


FITZGERALD, JOE 


LIPSZTEIN, JOYCE 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN 


MAURO, JOHN 


ROBERTSON-DEMERS, KATHY 


OTHERS: 


DEMAIORI, TONY 


FRANK, LAURA 


JONES, LARRY 


LAWSON, HOWARD 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(11:00 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. LEWIS WADE, DFO


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it’s probably 2:00 p.m. 


eastern time, right, Lew? I figured we could 


do from now until 1:00 and then break for lunch 


at 1:00. 


DR. WADE: Okay. And then --


MR. GRIFFON: And then pick up Rocky at 2:00 


hopefully. 


DR. WADE: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s the tentative plan anyway. 


DR. WADE: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’ll work. 


DR. WADE: That’s the plan. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. Okay. Thanks a lot. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you. 


MR. GRIFFON: Bye. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Well, I guess we have Mark 


with us, Mike, Wanda, Ray. I think that’s most 


of what we need so maybe we can begin. This is 


Lew Wade and I have the -- the pleasure of 


serving as the designated federal official for 

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the Advisory Board. And this is a meeting of 


the working group of that Advisory Board. This 


working group has looked at many issues 


including individual dose reconstruction 


reviews, site profile reviews, procedures 


reviews. Recently flowing from the working 


group’s efforts with regard to the site profile 


reviews for Y-12 and Rocky Flats the Board 


asked that this working group continue and look 


at SEC-related issues with regard to Y-12 and 


Rocky Flats. There have been a number of very 


productive calls of this working group and 


today we’re meeting to discuss two issues, Y-12 


as -- as Mark had mentioned and then followed 


by Rocky Flats. I would like to just take a 


brief moment to have the Board members identify 


themselves. I know Mark, Mike and Wanda are on 


the call. Are there any other Board members on 


the call? 


 (No response.) 


DR. WADE: Okay. Just checking to see that -- 


that we don’t have a quorum. What I would like 


to do is to go through our -- our conflict of 


interest discussion. Let’s have it relative to 


Y-12 and then we will repeat that discussion. 

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Hello? 


 (Brief interruption) 


DR. WADE: Somebody’s at an airport getting 


ready to board at Gate 43. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Maybe I should sign off. Maybe 


I’m too distracting. 


DR. WADE: I think you’re right. Yeah, I guess 


it would be good. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Okay. 


UNIDENTIFIED: We’re not going to be able to 


hear him. 


DR. WADE: All right. Yeah. Okay. We’re back 


to it. We’ll go through and have Board 


members, the NIOSH team, the SC&A team identify 


themselves on the call and any conflicts they 


have relative to Y-12. And then we’ll go 


around and let other government folks identify 


themselves and anyone, petitioners and anyone 


else who would like to be identified as being 


on the call -- on the call. So I’ll start. 


I’m Lew Wade and I work for NIOSH and I have no 


conflicts relative to Y-12. How about Board 


members. Mark? Mike? 


MR. GIBSON: This is Mike Gibson. I have no 


conflicts. 

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DR. WADE: Wanda? 


MS. MUNN: Wanda Munn. No conflicts. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Mark, are you with us? 


 (No response) 


DR. WADE: Okay. We’ll listen for Mark. We’ll 


re-establish contact. How about the NIOSH ORAU 


team? 


MR. RUTHERFORD: This is LaVon Rutherford of 


NIOSH. I have no conflicts with Y-12. 


DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton. No conflicts. 


DR. WADE: The ORAU team, please introduce 


themselves. 


MR. KENOYER: This is Judson Kenoyer, no 


conflicts. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Bill Tankersley, no conflict. 


MR. KERR: George Kerr. I have no conflicts. 


MR. CHEW: Mel Chew. I have no conflicts. 


MR. MCFEE: Matt McFee. No conflicts with Y12. 


DR. WADE: Anyone else from NIOSH ORAU? 


MR. SMITH: Yeah, this is Matthew Smith. No --


No comments, or conflicts, rather. 


DR. WADE: Okay. 


MR. SUNDIN: Dave Sundin. No conflict. 


DR. WADE: Other NIOSH ORAU? 

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 (No response) 


DR. WADE: Okay. SC&A. 


DR. MAURO: John Mauro, SC&A. No conflicts. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Arjun Makhijani, SC&A. No 

conflicts. 

MR. GRIFFON: Hi, Lew. It’s Mark Griffon 

again. 

DR. WADE: Okay. We’re just going through a 


conflict identification, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. WADE: You could do yours. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. WADE: Relative to Y-12. 


MR. GRIFFON: Relative to Y-12 I only have a 


conflict in changes where (inaudible) Labor 


Council, HELC (unintelligible), is the named 


petitioner. 


DR. WADE: Okay. We were continuing then with 


SC&A. Anyone else? 


MR. BUCHANAN: Ron Buchanan. No conflicts. 


DR. WADE: Anyone else from SC&A? 


 (No response) 


DR. WADE: Okay. Without the need for conflict 


identification, are there any other federal 


employees on the line? 

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MS. HOWELL: This is Emily Howell with HHS. I 


have no conflict. 


MR. RAFKY: Michael Rafky also with HHS. I 


also have no conflict. 


DR. WADE: Any petitioners or representatives 


for Y-12? 


 (No response) 


DR. WADE: Okay. I open up to anyone else who 


would like to identify themselves as being on 


the call. Not necessary, but if you’d like, 


please. 


MS. FRANK: Laura Frank from the 


(unintelligible). 


DR. WADE: Welcome. 


MS. FRANK: Thank you. I’ll probably hang up 


and then come back when you all attend to the 


Rocky Flats. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you. 


THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. This is the 


court reporter. Could I get your name again, 


please? 


MS. FRANK: Laura, L-A-U-R-A, Frank, F-R-A-N-K. 


THE COURT REPORTER: Okay. Thank you. 


MS. FRANK: You’re welcome. 


DR. WADE: Anyone else who would like to be 

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identified? 


MR. LAWSON: Howard Lawson and Larry Jones, 


Labor Council at Y-12. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Mark, back to you. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I guess we -- you’re 


getting ready to start the -- the agenda, Lew. 


DR. WADE: Correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: I missed a few minutes, so okay. 


DR. WADE: We just did introductions -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. WADE: -- and we talked about quorum issues 


and things like that. 


Y-12
 

MR. GRIFFON: I think the best way to proceed 


here -- I’m almost ready to get off my cell 


phone and onto a hard line so I apologize for 


that. But I think the best way to proceed is 


probably to start with what Jim had provided. 


I think Jim included most of the outstanding 


actions that we had in the matrix as from 


NIOSH’s standpoint anyway. And I think maybe 


Jim can give us an overview of that and then we 


can start into the SC&A’s review report of --


of the evaluation report if that -- if that 


makes sense. And if Jim -- I assume Jim is on 

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the line? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I am. I’m on the line. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


DR. NETON: I’m going to have to scramble and 


sort of re-- recall from memory what I sent 


out. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: I thought we were going to go 


through the report but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess -- I guess it really 


doesn’t matter which order. I thought that 


that would be the easier thing to -- to get a 


handle on but --

DR. NETON: I think I can do it. Just give me 

a second here to --

MR. GRIFFON: Okay, sure. 

DR. NETON: The -- The issues -- The items 

that I -- that I sent out which I think -- and 


I think Mark is correct -- I did believe at 


least we -- we were responsive to the closing 


out the issues, you know, that were for you to 


judge whether they’re sufficient to close it 


out, but we sent out the remaining dose 


reconstructions. Those were for polonium, 


plutonium, an extremity dose as well as there’s 

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one other in there. 


MR. GRIFFON: One of the exotics? Is that one 


of the --


DR. NETON: Nuhytrogalian (ph) 67. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON : That's correct. Thanks. And so 


those -- those have been -- been put out there. 


We also put out a table that compared the -- 


the databases from the CER for uranium 


urinalysis versus the distribution of the data 


that we observed in the uranium samples that 


were in the delta view database. If you 


remember, we determined that those uranium 


samples were not in the CER database and yet 


the issue was would those samples, if they were 


added to the CER database pollute the co-worker 


model to where it would not be an accurate 


depiction of what the exposures were. And I 


think the table is fairly self-explanatory in 


that the -- the -- the delta view data actually 


end up having a lower -- the distribution would 


end up lowering the results for the uranium 


urinalysis logs so therefore we don’t believe 


there is a significant effect on our co-worker 


model that was developed from the CER data. 

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There was another issue -- 


MR. GRIFFON: I don't -- I don’t know if we 


have to comment on these but if SC&A, if you 


guys have any comments on these, you know, or 


need clarification on any of these items I 


think it’s probably appropriate to sort of 


discuss it. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. I think that a 


lot of the items that were covered by Jim we’ve 


sort of taken the next step forward in our 


evaluation report. Those items will -- some of 


those items will be revisited at -- at the next 


tier so to speak during our discussion of our 


draft evaluation report that went out yesterday 


and that I presume most folks on the line have 


copies of. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think so, too. That’s why I 


chose this order because I think, yeah, it 


makes sense to -- all right. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead, Jim. I'm sorry that I 


cut in there. 


DR. NETON: That's fine. And then -- then 


there -- there was an item I sent out that 


dealt with the discussion of 1951 data that 

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appeared in delta view versus what was in the 


CER database and we put that out, about a page 


and a half document. And I’m very certain that 


SC&A commented on that in their review so we’ll 


get into that later. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we’ll probably cover that 


later, right. 


DR. NETON: And then I also sent out a -- a 


criticality -- a draft criticality -- a draft 


report on criticality incident that occurred in 


1958 that sections of, we believe, substantiate 


the reasons why not all workers were monitored 


at criticality incident and why is that not an 


indication that, you know, the highest exposed 


workers were monitored. That went out fairly 


recently. I think that’s -- that’s -- that’s 


all the information I sent out. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think that does cover it. 


DR. NETON: And all the --


MR. GRIFFON: I think given that -- the last -- 


well, most of the items as John said are going 


to come up as we go into the review report so 


if the -- unless there’s any other questions or 


comments or clarification by Jim I think we’re 


probably ready to go right into John’s -- into 

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your report. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, Mark, this is Arjun. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I don’t think the incident list 


was part of the matrix -- the incident list 


with the exotics was part of the matrix but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Jim, there was -- I -- 


thought, and -- and again we didn’t have to 


come back to and I know -- I know there’s -- 


we’ve -- we’ve done a lot of these calls so 


there’s a lot -- a lot of work there but I 


thought that you had mentioned as part of the 


exotics dose reconstruction that there was -- 


there was incident data that you were going to 


be calling on for the dose reconstructions 


related to the exotics. And I don't know if 


you -- if that is on the O-drive or if you 


intended, you know -- I guess that’s -- 


DR. NETON: No, we -- we can get into that 


maybe when -- when we get to that issue but I ­

- I didn’t recall if the incident list was one 


of the closeout items in the matrix. But we --


we do intend to rely on incident reports that 


we know are present, particularly on the delta 


view system and there are over 4,000-something 


I 
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images out there. Frankly we just have run out 


of time to be able to catalog all those. We 


just -- we know that there are -- there are a 


lot of them out there and the ones that we 


sampled definitely allow us to do dose 


reconstructions. And that was the one intent 


of the gallium example but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- we didn’t have time to 


distribute the -- a complete compendium of all 


the incidents. It would be -- it would be 


quite an undertaking to do that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. Along those 


lines while we are discussing this, Arjun and I 


have had an opportunity, of course, to discuss 


a lot of these matters before this call. With 


regard to the incident reports, one of our 


observations as we’re talking about it is that 


the gallium report I guess represented a later 


time period. As an example problem or maybe a 


couple of example problems I think we’re 


basically looking for kinds of information in 


the incident reports that are available during 


the earlier years for some of these exotic 

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radionuclides. I guess just to provide an 


example that shows here’s typically the kind of 


data that we have available to us in the 


reports and how we would use that data to 


reconstruct. Right now I guess you felt the 


gallium was an example that was more of a -- a 


later time period if I’m correct. And I guess 


just so that I can close the loop on the -- on 


this is I guess a little more reassurance that, 


yes, even though in the earlier years when 


these exotic radionuclides were handled and 


there were incidents, the kinds of information 


that are available in those numerous incidents 


reports by and large give you the information 


you need to reconstruct the inhalation doses. 


MR. GRIFFON: But Jim -- Jim, did you say a -- 


a -- I -- I might have misunderstood this but 


are the -- are the 6,000-page images or the 


images that we have from the delta view 


database, do they include some of these 


incident reports that you’re discussing or is 


it another part of the delta view database? 


DR. NETON: I don't know that they do, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: That was not what we pulled the 

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database for at that point. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: The delta view database is 


searchable by certain key words and fields and 


when one searches the delta view database for 


investigation slash incidents, you end up with 


about 4,000 images that are -- that are 


resident. And that was the intent of the delta 


view database was to consolidate all these -- 


these reports and such into one -- one central 


data system. We just have not had the time to 

pull --

MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

DR. NETON: -- all of these out and comb 


through them although again we believe that 


every indication that we have are that they are 


there, available and we could use them. And 


there’s -- there’s other pieces of information 


that we’ll be bringing to the table to 


demonstrate how we can do exposures for the 


Cyclotron but I don't know if we want to do 


that now or wait until we get to the relevant ­

-


MR. GRIFFON: Probably wait until we get to 


their report but I -- I just, yeah, just to -- 

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I just wanted to clarify that we -- that it 


wasn’t in what we had so okay. So that’s --

that’s understandable. Okay. Anything else 

John or Arjun or should we -- Should we start 

into your review report? 

DR. MAURO: Yeah, this is John. You know, we 


might as well get started. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: I will make a couple of prefatory 


remarks before I hand the baton over to Arjun 


who did the heavy lifting. One of these -- the 


-- in our report I can’t say for certain that 


we’ve captured everything that came across in 


the -- on the email from Jim. We were 


certainly attentive to the material as it came 


in, certainly the example problems, but I’m not 


quite sure whether we -- how we reflect all of 


the material that has come through as of the 


time that we -- that we sent out our report. 


So we may be a little bit behind the power 


curve in terms of capturing everything that Jim 


has provided. The second point I would like to 


make is that you may have noticed that we have 


not yet addressed the recycled uranium piece. 


There is a placeholder in our report that we 

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are close to finishing up, and our intention is 


that after this conference call and after we 


sort of regroup we’ll probably issue a revised 


version of the report to sort of catch up on 


those pieces of material that we have not 


captured, address the recycled uranium issue; 


and there’s one more point that I feel needs to 


be incorporated. I think our report in general 


zeros in on all of the areas that we feel there 


are deficiencies that need to be dealt with. 


also feel that we probably need to incorporate 


some material in our report in areas where we 


feel the case made by NIOSH is especially 


strong. Right now there is -- there really is 


very little of that. Now, the reason I say 


that is I think it’s important for the Board to 


get a sense of giving the -- the issues and the 


time periods of concern to -- to somewhat get a 


bird’s eye view of in the grand scheme of 


things where -- where is the evaluation report 


strong in terms of making its case or has made 


its case and areas where we feel it’s weak and 


there are some problems that need to be 


addressed. Right now I think our report really 


zeros in on the problems but doesn’t help the 


I 
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Board too much in terms of letting them know 


where we feel it’s relatively strong. We’re --


Our intention is to -- to issue a next draft of 


this report as soon as possible and -- and 


address many of the -- these -- these matters 


that I’m describing. With that as a preface 


I’d like to hand it over to -- to Arjun to go 


through the -- the major points that we -- that 


we have made in our -- our review of the 


evaluation report. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you, John. The -- John 


and I talked this morning about some gaps and 


one of the -- I’d just like to preface what I’m 


saying about -- with a description of a couple 


of those gaps. We didn’t review the plutonium 


dose reconstruction. It came in on Monday and 


I think I was a little too overwhelmed to 


review new material since it was typeset on 


Tuesday and Wednesday. And the other -- The 


other thing is that in reviewing the 147 worker 


data I -- I focused on table 45-B but not on 


table 45-A and in going back I felt that the 


workers at Y-12 seemed to broadly have been 


sorted into two large bins, low and -- 


relatively low and relatively high as reflected 

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in post-61 data. And -- And that -- that 


overall idea there needs to be included in that 


evaluation of that model. I -- I don’t 


believe that any other bottom line comments 


would change but I think it will better reflect 


what -- what NIOSH has done. So I just -- I 


just wanted to give the working group a little 


bit of an idea of a couple of things that John 


and I had discussed before this call. That 


said, the -- we -- I went through -- there was 


a team of people that worked on the report. 


Hans is unfortunately not on the call. Hans 


and -- and Ron Buchanan worked on the external 


dose stuff. I worked with John and Joe and 


Kathy on various parts of this report and as we 


-- so let me go -- there’s one finding or one 


comment on uranium with trace thorium where I 


forgot to write a conclusion paragraph in the 


text of the report so it didn’t get pulled up 


into the summary. I'm sorry about that. It 


will be there in the final report. So start at 


the top. Our main finding in regard to the SEC 


evaluation recommendation about thorium workers 


was that we agreed with NIOSH that there’s not 


enough data to reconstruct doses for workers 

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who were exposed or potentially exposed to 


thorium or should have been monitored for 


thorium during the SEC petition period. And we 


did some research. Kathy Demers did some 


research on buildings where whether the 


buildings covered in the evaluation were -- 


were the only ones and -- and we found 


evidence, documentation that there were 


probably other buildings where thorium was 


processed we think in the ‘50s. I want to 


preface -- qualify this by saying, you know, 


that we researched this very rapidly obviously 


-- but I’ve listed the buildings there under 


heading two in the summary where thorium also 


appears to have been processed. Whether it was 


always processed in the ‘50s there I think may 


remain to be determined but this is the best of 


our judgment. 


DR. MAURO: Excuse me. This is John Mauro. 


Just quickly, just to help orient, I don't know 


if everyone is looking at the same page but 


page 1 in our report at the very top says 


attachment one. For the purpose of this 


discussion it’s probably convenient if you 


folks have not already surmised this that we 

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have prepared -- we have listed a number of 


findings and -- and Arjun is basically going 


down items one, two, three, four, so forth in 


that summary of principal conclusions. So that 


may help a little bit for -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you, John. Yeah, I'm 


sorry. I apologize. I should have said that. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah, just to -- yeah. So we’ll 


just be going through that and, of course, each 


one of these principal findings, the main body 


of the text gives the rationale behind it. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We looked at the internal and ­

- and the CER database validation in the 


internal and external -- 


DR. NETON: Arjun? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes? 


DR. NETON: Mark, do you think it would be 


better if we did these one by one or if we just 


wait until all the issues have been discussed? 


I mean it’s up to you but -- 


MS. MUNN: This is Wanda. I’d prefer we did 


them one by one, frankly. 


DR. WADE: Is Mark on the call? 


 (No response) 


DR. WADE: Oh, we lost Mark. 

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MS. MUNN: I think he must be moving from one 


phone to the other again. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: It would be fine by me to -- to 


go one by one if that’s the most convenient -- 


DR. MAURO: I think that is. It keeps the 


story a little bit more continuous. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: I would also recommend one by one. 


DR. WADE: Okay. So let’s do that. Arjun has 


gone over points one and two. Jim, do you want 


to respond? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. I -- I think so. With the 


issue of thorium I mean we’re -- we’re 


certainly gratified that SC&A agreed with our 


position that thorium could not be 


reconstructed although we’re a little perplexed 


at the -- at the issue raised that these other 


buildings are involved. Even though I think 


the report states something to the effect that 


there’s ample evidence or significant evidence 


that it was processed at other buildings, the 


only citation I could find that -- that they 


relied on was out of this Chem-Risk report that 


-- that says starting in the early 1950’s the 


Y-12 thorium began processing its weapons 

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components. And then they go on to cite the 


buildings. We -- We take no issue with the 


fact that production occurred, you know, 


significant production operation that started 


in the late ‘50s in our opinion, or early ‘60s 


did occur in those buildings but I -- I -- I 


scoured the entire 490 pages of the Chem-Risk 


report and found no other indication as to 


where that information starting in the ‘50s 


came from. It’s an un-cited text. They just 


reference it. So it doesn’t seem to be a 


strong piece of evidence. We have relied on 


reports directly from Y-12 personnel. There 


are specifically several reports that we’ve 


cited that state that the thorium operation 


started in the ’60s. So, you know, we don’t 


take exception to the fact that those buildings 


that are cited in the Chem-Risk report were 


where major productions occurred. But we 


literally scoured hundreds and hundreds of 


pages of health physics reports and frankly had 


a lot of trouble coming up with the buildings 


that we did. We’re not even among ourselves 


sometimes convinced that those buildings had 


huge exposures. But -- So I -- I don't know 

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that we agree with the position that these 


other buildings come into play. 


MS. MUNN: This is Wanda. I question that 


though the statement was on page 6, that there 


was clear evidence that you had not adequately 


explored the potential and I -- I questioned 


what the clear evidence was because if we had 


discussed any such evidence prior to this I 


wasn’t aware of it. 


DR. NETON: And literally with the hundreds and 


hundreds of pages we’ve gone through there is 


not one shred of evidence to indicate that 


thorium processing occurred in those other 


buildings prior to 1957 -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well --


DR. NETON: -- ’58 so --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, if I might just respond I 


-- as I said the -- we -- we’ve given the 


citations I think for those buildings clearly, 


you know. The people who worked there have 


evidence and -- and their evidence should be 


taken into account. But I think we’ve cited 


the reports. Not, as I said, not all of the 


reports give dates that are clear. But the 


Chem-Risk report was very clear. And frankly I 

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was very surprised. But -- But I -- I haven’t 


read the whole Chem-Risk report but I do -- we 


did think that it should be evaluated since -- 


since there were other reports as well that 


mentioned other buildings. It’s not -- It’s 


not really clear to us from reviewing this 


other than the Chem-Risk thing that -- that 


there were other buildings but when it is in an 


official report that was prepared as a result 


of access to all classified information and 


production and there was a commission I 


believe, was it by the Centers for Disease 


Control? I -- I don't remember now. Then 


that -- I -- I don’t believe that that -- that 


should be dismissed as -- as -- as flimsy 


evidence or not --


DR. NETON: I’m not saying flimsy, Arjun, but 


you could interpret this paragraph several 


different ways. I mean they began thorium 


processing and fabrication but now there were 


fairly pilot operations going on. I don’t 


think what we’re citing here is inconsistent 


with the language in this report. We had -- we 


take no exception to the fact that thorium was 


being handled and moved about and -- and 

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operated on in those periods but the -- what 


they say in the last sentence of this paragraph 


that you cited is that the majority of the 


thorium production scale operations. And we’re 


saying that production scale operations did not 


begin until the end of 1950s. But it’s not 


inconsistent with that. And we have cited the 


RCO report; it was called Atypical Radionuclide 


Assessment of the Y-12 National Security 


Complex that references the Wilcox report as 


well as the Hap West report, that both confirm 


that the -- that the production scale 


operations occurred in the end of the 1950s. 


And that’s very consistent with seeing the 


ramp-up of the fecal sampling program, the 


ramp-up of the 90,000 hair samples that were 


taken starting in those years and everything 


else that we’ve looked at. I don't know that 


this is an issue that -- that we can agree 


with. 


MR. GRIFFON: Arjun or Jim, does -- does the 


Chem-Risk documents cite any source documents? 


DR. NETON: It makes no reference at all. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I -- I, you know, I had 


very little time and I kind of parceled out to 

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the various pieces. Unfortunately Kathy is not 


on the call. I -- I did collect -- I --
 I 


researched parts of this myself but parts of 


this part I did not so I have not actually read 


the Chem-Risk report. And I, you know I trust 


Jim that there’s no reference there but -- so I 


-- I don't know where to go with this. I mean 


obviously we had to cite -- we -- we were asked 


to review the report and so we cited the 


evidence that was available to us. You know, 


there’s -- I don’t believe that we should take 


a stand on any particular (inaudible) despite 


contrary information but this is the 


information that was available and I thought -- 


I was a little surprised as I said to see them 


compare this to operations comparable to 


uranium which -- which would indicate 


significant operations. 


MR. GRIFFON: Jim -- Jim, can I ask this to -- 


to try to resolve this? You mentioned several 


documents that you had. Are some of those or 


all of those on the O-drive or -- 


DR. NETON: I believe they are. Someone at 


ORAU can help me with this. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean maybe if -- it doesn’t 

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have to be done on this call but -- 


DR. NETON: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- but maybe you can provide a 


list of documents that -- 


DR. NETON: We can certainly provide the source 


documents on the O-drive -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- that we related that are 


referenced in our internal dosimetry TBD. I 


guess that’s where I take a little bit of 


exception where, you know, the -- the report 


cites ample evidence that we haven’t clearly 


identified it but it doesn’t cite the evidence 


that we cited. And -- And so, you know, they 


found one exception to -- to the rule which is 


unreferenced so --


DR. MAKHIJANI: But we -- Jim, we did not 


disagree with your finding. What, you know -- 


there was no need to -- there was no need to -- 


to re-cite your references. And one -- one of 


your references was not yet available to us 


that was cited in the evaluation report. But 


we didn’t -- we didn’t have -- we did look at 


the references that you cited that were 


available to us and had no disagreement with -- 

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with what you said as regards to thorium 


processing and all that. We were just 


supplementing what we found about buildings 


that you hadn’t cited. 


DR. NETON: Right, Arjun. But the TBD which 


you did review cites that we believe it started 


in the early ‘60s and those references are 


listed there as well, and they were not 


reviewed at all. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I think that -- that, you 


know, I mean maybe a follow-up we can make sure 


that -- that either in the TBD or the -- or, 


you know, if there’s others that -- that those 


reference are just maybe told SC&A and the 


Board, you know, the work group what those are, 


where they are and, you know, you might 


consider that in this, you know. Again I think 


John, you’re presenting -- and Arjun, you’re 


presenting this as a draft -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- final draft report so -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, well, you know, it was -- 


MR. GRIFFON: There’s other stuff that you 


should consider in -- in assessing this issue. 


I think you should, you know -- 

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DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: In fact, this goes a little bit 


toward -- this is John Mauro -- my prefacatory 


(ph) remarks in terms of capturing the bigger 


picture in terms of for example, disclosing the 


-- the arguments for when major thorium 


activities may have taken place. However, 


there is also perhaps some other information 


such as the Chem-Risk report which would seem 


to indicate that perhaps some important thorium 


-- in other words, try to tell the story in a 


way that is more inclusive as opposed to your 


zeroing in on those particular delta pieces of 


information that we’ve uncovered that probably 


need to be run to ground. So I think the 


report, our report, would benefit from that 


type of discussion. 


MS. MUNN: This is Wanda. Again, I zeroed in 


on the specific language in the second 


paragraph on page 6 that says there is clear 


evidence that NIOSH has not adequately explored 


the potentials of thorium work. And what I’m 


hearing from NIOSH is that they have explored 


that quite extensively. So the -- the 


language, the way in which this question is 

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presented, raised an issue in my mind. 


DR. MAURO: Wanda, fair enough. I hear you. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Yeah, I think we have to, 


you know, yeah. We -- We should look at all 


the references that they -- that they cited or 


-- and if there’s additional ones that are not 


cited in the TBD or otherwise I think, you 


know, that does shed light on this. I think 


you should --


DR. MAKHIJANI: We -- We did cite here that 


the TBD says that processing with thorium began 


in the ‘60s. I mean we -- we will go back, you 


know, at the working group’s direction, of 


course, yeah, and -- and review the other 


references. 


DR. NETON: I might also add though that we did 


reference the Chem-Risk report in the site 


profile and clearly a weight of the evidence in 


our mind did not include the early ‘50s based 


on an evaluation of the data we had at hand. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, Chem-Risk --


MR. GRIFFON: And I -- Jim, I agree with your 


point that -- that you could interpret that one 


paragraph, that last line especially, as a 

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little bit, you know -- 


DR. NETON: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: There’s a little, you know, you 


can interpret it either way, I suppose, you 


know. But with your other evidence you’re 


saying, you know, you certainly don’t think 


it’s inconsistent with what you found in all 


those other documents so I think -- 


DR. NETON: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think we need, you know, SC&A, 


we need to look at those other source documents 


and weigh the prepon-- you know, weigh the 


preponderance of the evidence I guess. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: Can I ask one thing, Jim? Did --


I know Mel Chew talked about having all this 


sort of receipt data or ledgers or whatever 


that showed amounts of thorium coming in, 


amounts of all those radionuclides. That was 


probably just gross receipts to the site, 


right? It didn’t talk at all about 


distribution to any buildings or -- is that 


true? 


DR. NETON: Mel’s on the line. 


MR. CHEW: Yeah, Mike (sic). I -- I’m glad 

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you brought that up because I was going to also 


show that’s another pieces of evidence here. 


When we go back to the classified ledgers which 


are still classified it does bring in the 


receipts of the -- of the thorium that came 


into Y-12 by year and by period. Now, if you 


really dive down into the individual receipts 


there, and we didn’t have -- we didn’t go there 


exactly at the time, it also shows that in -- 


for instance that if they move it to another 


materials accountability area and that 


certainly could be by building. And I don’t 


want to quote that to be -- be exact. You 


know, we could trace for instance, you know, 


ten kilograms or five kilograms went to this 


particular building, for the R&D work which 


makes sense. But I only took the larger number 


that came in for that period just to show the 


quantity, total quantity that was at Y-12 


available here. But I said -- I want to again 


add to it that there is certainly evidence by 


many of the reports that Jim has been talking 


about where the processing of -- major 


processing for the campaign of thorium did 


occur. Now, thereby, I will also agree there 

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was thorium there. Remember they used some 


thorium for the co-precipitation for the 


Cyclotron. That -- That was there. And there 


-- And there certainly was evidence that there 


was small quantities of thorium that was used 


for the R&D development of the processes, you 


know, in -- in -- in anticipation of the major 


program. We saw, you know, an air sample that 


was cited in the health physics reports that 


talk about that particular building. And then 


also the -- the slow ramp-up as the R&D 


activity occur. But I would like to say that 


in looking at item number two, those particular 


buildings that were cited in the last sentence, 


those activities really started even -- even 


past the 1979 in the FCC period but in the late 


1959 into rough 1960s and -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Are you talking about -- 


MR. CHEW: -- that was documented. 


MR. GRIFFON: Are you talking about Alpha 5 and 


Beta 4. Are those -- 9201-5 and -- and 9204-4? 


MR. CHEW: Yes. All the ones that are listed. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. CHEW: And then -- And we can mention them 


for evidence because when the -- when the 

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campaign really started then thousands -- many 


air samples have showed up and you can just 


show up -- you can actually go to show where 


the air sampling started because that’s where 


the operation started, and those air samples 


are by building. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I think I probably know 


the answer to this, Mel, but I’m going to ask 


anyway. How difficult would it be to walk the 


thorium data back, the ledger data back to the 


buildings? 


MR. CHEW: It would probably mean that we have 


 MR. GRIFFON: A time-consuming effort? 


MR. CHEW: Yeah, I mean it would be going -- go 


back to Y-12 and go back into, pull the ledgers 


which we know are there and then try to 


reconstruct in how we would contract -- you 


know, these are -- at that time they kept the 


information in -- in the ledgers, you know, 


according to like numbers or something like 


that. You would have to find the corresponding 


-- what MBA it is. I think it could be done 


but I think it would be time-consuming. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I assumed that. 

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DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. You’re going 


to see a little later on one of the other 


items, one of our observations is that it 


doesn’t take very much thorium airborne to 


contribute significantly to bone dose for 


example, or other organs so -- and this -- it 


may be related. It sounds to me that there is 


a continuum of operations going from I guess 


perhaps R&D to production where thorium is 


being handled in various buildings. And it 


sounds like we could run down, through what Mel 


just described, that process in terms of 


quantities delivered to various buildings. 


Now, confounding this problem is the matter 


that it doesn’t take very much thorium airborne 


to be an important contributor to the dose as 


compared to uranium. As a result we’ve got 


ourselves what we envision as a bit of a 


dilemma. That is, even if it’s a relatively 


small quantity that might have been handled, it 


doesn’t take very much to be important. 


MR. CHEW: Right, John. I’d like to have a 


collegial discussion with you. I saw your 


report on the -- about the contribution 


attempts of one percent there, of doubling the 

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bone dose here. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


MR. CHEW: You know, you -- you -- you clearly 


mentioned that it was done by radioactivity and 


I agree with that. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


MR. CHEW: But you need to look at it from a 


math standpoint here, okay? 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


MR. CHEW: In other words, you tell me how much 


you go back and recalculate if I had a gram of 


uranium dust in the air how much more thorium I 


would have to take to -- to add to that 


contribution from a --


DR. MAURO: You’re absolutely right. 


MR. CHEW: -- from a math standpoint. 


DR. MAURO: And that might be the answer. 


MR. CHEW: Yes, exactly right. Yes. If that’s 


-- I think it’s misleading to say -- I 


shouldn’t say that, John. Sorry. Don’t take 


offense at that. 


DR. MAURO: Are you saying I’m misleading? 


MR. CHEW: No, no. Don’t take offense at that, 


John. 


DR. NETON: I’d like to -- I’d like to chime 

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in on this if I may. Mel is absolutely right 


that, you know, it takes much more mass of 


thorium than uranium to -- to get the 


equivalent amount of intake. But that issue 


notwithstanding I think, you know, in reading 


SC&A’s write-up on this issue, I think that 


they might have missed the -- the concept here 


in the sense that we didn’t say thorium workers 


are covered. We said workers who were 


monitored or should have been monitored for 


thorium, that is by today’s standards. So 


we’re not -- we’re not -- the SEC class is not 


people who physically worked with thorium 


material. It’s people who may have been in 


buildings that were nearby thorium and because 


of exactly the reason SC&A cited there could 


have been bleed-over of thorium into their 


adjacent work areas and then they would be 


covered as part of the class. There’s a little 


bit of a difference there I think if you look 


at it from that perspective. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. This is -- This is 


Arjun, and -- and, you know, this -- this -- I 


-- I wrote that section so let me take 


responsibility for that one at least. 

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DR. NETON: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I couldn’t exactly explain the 


other, all the details of the other one. The ­

- I -- I did look at the work in the 


evaluation report and I did think of the 


possibility that -- that even trace amounts of 


thorium exposure might be covered. When I 


looked at the description of the air sampling 


that involved thorium in the one building I 


think I cited it. Only one of the 13 air 


samplers was described as potentially an air 


sampler for thorium where uranium and thorium 


would be mixed and so it did raise a question 


in my mind what -- as to what might happen to 


uranium workers who were breathing trace 


amounts of thorium and whose doses you might 


think that you can calculate because you had 


air monitoring data for alpha and uranium 


bioassay data in the same way that say you were 


-- you were trying to handle the Mallinckrodt 


information. And actually I didn’t conclude 


that you could or couldn’t do it. It was, in 


the case of uranium workers who -- whom you 


have bioassay and some air concentration data, 


I’m not clear as to whether you can or can’t ­
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- can’t calculate their doses. And the point 


of -- of raising that question was exactly 


that. Is it -- Is it -- Are you including 


the trace exposures in the uranium class -- in 


the uranium class or in the should have been 


potentially monitored class? 


DR. NETON: I think we’re getting into an issue 


that the Department of Labor is going to 


address for us at the Board meeting, which is 


how do they determine or define who is a member 


of the proposed class, in particular in light 


of the fact that the definition says was 


monitored or should have been monitored. That 


-- That’s not under our purview. You know, we 


define the class as, you know, what we can and 


they -- they make the determination. And 


whether or not they take in, you know, account 


for trace potentials or not I think we need to 


hear -- hear them out. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I -- I -- I think you’re 


-- I think we do need to hear them out, Jim. 


I think you’re right. I -- I mean I -- I’ve 


been wondering about this issue myself that, 


you know, my understanding was that it’s up to 


the Department of Labor to identi-- you know, 

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you define the class and then the Department of 


Labor identifies claimants who meet the 


definition of the class. And now, you know, to 


me this -- the only concern I have is that does 


the Department of Labor have enough information 


to actually -- to understand the definition of 


the class and how the claimants fit into that 


class, you know, to -- I guess it’s a different 


scenario. You know, Larry, in the last call, 


brought up the idea of -- of Paducah but really 


it’s -- it was, you know, monitored or should 


have been monitored for the whole plant site 


and they might exclude like administrative 


assistants or something like that and send them 


for dose reconstruction but I think it’s a 


little -- little harder for the Department of 


Labor to discern who, within these large, you 


know, production buildings might have been near 


or nearby a thorium process when they don’t 


even know where these things took place. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Well, let’s just --


MR. GRIFFON: I don't know if we’re giving them 


enough -- enough information to do the job. 


And then how do they deal with it, you know. 


MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, this is Larry Elliott. Let 

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me again make a comment here. We -- We, as 


part of the process in developing the 


evaluation report, when we arrive at a 


recommended definition for the class we vet 


that with DOL and there’s a discussion about 


does it -- is it suitable and does it give them 


all that they need and do they have all -- all 


that they need to determine eligibility of the 


claim for inclusion in that class. And we 


certainly had done this on Y-12 in this 


particular case. Also, I would remark again 


that this is not new to the Department of 


Labor. They are -- Pete Turcic will be at the 


Board meeting next week to provide you with a 


presentation and examples on how they go about 


doing this. It’s not only just for -- they 


don’t determine just eligibility for a given 


class but they determine eligibility of a 


claim. In fact, if you look at like Chapman 


Valve and Building 55, if you look at the Iowa 


Army Ammunition Plant and line one, when you 


get into those kinds of covered facility 


designations, those have to be clearly and 


carefully handled, and DOL has developed their 


experience in that regard. 

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MR. GRIFFON: You’re right, Larry. We need to 


hear their presentation, so you’re right. 


DR. MAURO: But I think we’re in a very 


interesting grey area that in defining the 


class effectively what we’re saying is while 


the class of thorium workers, and identifying 


the buildings, but the implication that the 


other buildings are, you know, limited to 


uranium workers and therefore, we can do the 


dose reconstruction. I think the key to 


parsing the two and -- and bringing this issue 


to ground goes to what Mel has just described. 


I think -- I’m thinking about, you know, how 


do you -- how do you get to grips with making 


sure that the -- that the buildings we say we 


can do the dose reconstructions for are in fact 


buildings we can do the dose reconstructions 


for. We need to go to somehow getting a handle 


on, as Mel mentioned, how much material en 


masse may have been transported to those 


buildings at a given point in time. And --


And this becomes very much a technical health 


physics kind of question. Is that enough 


material to create -– in terms of mass now, to 


create a situation where you could have 

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picocuries per cubic meter, that could 


contribute significantly to the inhalation 


dose. I mean this becomes -- I’m trying to 


find a way to make sure that the boundary can 


be found. And I think the -- the key to that 


boundary lies with the information that Mel 


just described. 


MS. MUNN: There’s also the question of what 


form the thorium was in at the time. Later in 


SC&A’s recent report here there’s a long list 


of precisely what activities and therefore we ­

- we know what form thorium was in in the ‘60s. 


But in these early days when I believe I heard 


expert comment from individuals who knew the 


site well that all thorium use in these early 


years that we’re looking at for the SEC 


petition revolved around its use as 


precipitation in the Calutrons. Was that not 


correct? 


MR. CHEW: No. 


MS. MUNN: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: Not all -- Not all of it. 


DR. NETON: In the very early years -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, very early years. Okay. 


MS MUNN: Right. Right. And -- And that’s 

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what we’re looking at here. 


MR. GRIFFON: But not all during the SEC 


period. 


DR. NETON: No. In the later years, in the ’56 


time frame in particular there is evidence of 


people working with thorium. 


MS. MUNN: It was starting to ramp up. 


DR. NETON: In the research building, right. 


MS. MUNN: Right. But -- But early on we, 


perception and perhaps it’s my lack of 


understanding of the Calutron process but my 


perception was that that would have been a wet 


process? Yes? No? 


DR. NETON: It was a co-precipitation process; 


that’s correct. 


MS. MUNN: All right. So -- So extreme 


concern over airborne would seem to be 


questionable. 


MR. GRIFFON: But see, and I don’t -- I don’t 


necessarily disagree with you, Wanda, here. 


The question I have more is could -- defining 


that potential, you know. It seems to me that 


-- that, you know, exposed or could have been 


exposed; well, now it’s in DOL’s court and they 


have to determine, you know, geez, what kind of 

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processes were in these buildings, what kind of 


-- who is making that determination as to a -- 


a real, significant potential for exposure. 


DR. NETON: I really think, though, we need to 


hear the Department of Labor out. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I agree, Jim. 


DR. NETON: Especially in all the areas of how 


they --


MR. GRIFFON: No, no, no. I agree and Larry --


Larry’s right on that point so -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. This -- Okay, this is 


Arjun, just to say why I wrote that part is the 


-- the evaluation report distinguishes between 


uranium workers or those who were exposed to 


uranium and those who should be monitored for 


thorium. And the point I was raising is the 


dose reconstructibility for those who worked 


with uranium and may unknowingly to them or to 


the people who were involved at that time in 


monitoring. In that building where they had 13 


monitors they only defined one as a thorium-


uranium mixed area. So unknown to them -- so 


these workers -- there’s a group of workers 


that would be defined as uranium workers which 


would fall within the purview of NIOSH’s 

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assertion that you can calculate dose. It’s of 


course agreed there’s quite a lot of uranium 


bioassay data. And that’s the group of workers 


that I raised the question about and -- and it 


may be possible or not possible to calculate 


their doses. I -- I don’t have a judgment 


about that. 


DR. NETON: Arjun, again the definition is not 


uranium or thorium worker. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I agree. 


DR. NETON: I mean, so, you know, you can’t 


presume what we’re going to do here. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: We have to wait on this. Yeah, 


we -- I think, I mean we’re discussing one and 


two, right? We sort of went on to seven a 


little bit I think but -- or not seven but 


section seven. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Section seven. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. But anyway, is there 


anything else on one and two that we can 


resolve now? I mean I think one thing as a 


follow-up, Jim, it would be good to make sure 


we have all the references if -- and you can 


just say if they’re as -- as cited in the TBD 

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and -- and maybe just to expedite things if you 


can kind of point us in the right direction 


where they are in the O-drive that would be, 


you know, helpful. And then SC&A should 


consider them in the final draft of this 


section on the -- the other buildings, the ones 


particularly cited in Chem-Risk doc. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Will do. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then is there anything else 


on one and two? I’m looking at the time, too, 


at 12:00 o'clock here. I’d like to get through 


most of this before lunch, take -- taking lunch 


at 1:00 again I think. Is there any more on 


that -- those two sections or any -- 


DR. NETON: Not from our end, no. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: And the big thing I think we’re 


going to have to wait for is DOL’s, you know -- 


we need to hear what DOL has to say on that so 


okay. 


DR. NETON: I guess -- I guess I do have one 


more thing just -- just for completeness is 


there was an issue raised about the ponds and 


the exposure out there and we have to track 

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this down but I -- I’ve got to believe that I 


haven’t been able to definitively define this 


this morning but those ponds were -- were being 


dredged after the SEC period. It makes no 


sense that they would be dredging ponds for 


thorium when they had such limited use and 


there was huge concentrations of thorium that 


they were finding in the bottoms. You know, 


while the material was being discharged in the 


pond we don’t feel there’s any credible 


exposure scenario to the workers. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. CHEW: Jim and Mark. This is Mel. I’d 


like to just make one more comment to John 


Mauro. John? 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


MR. CHEW: I think -- and I appreciate -- I 


appreciate your expertise and I did a backup 


(unintelligible) calculation here. It would 


take about a hundred grams of thorium to -- in 


addition to one gram of uranium to equal the 


amount of radioactivity that would be present 


and so -- so please look at it from a math 


standpoint to make -- to come to your 


conclusion, okay? 

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DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Did you use enriched uranium or 


natural uranium or DU? 


MR. CHEW: I think I used nata-- probably just 


the -- what the concentration in natural 


uranium at that particular time. And this is 


just a rough calculation here. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: It would be about a factor of 


six or seven if you take the half-lives. When 


you throw in thorium 228 it’s about a factor of 


five, not a factor of a hundred. 


MR. GRIFFON: Anyway, you can -- you can 


consider that in your final draft, right? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: On a math basis, yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. Thanks, Mel. Go 


ahead, Arjun. You’re going to go on to number 


three? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Number three. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We thought NIOSH had done a lot 


of work on the internal dose verification of 


the CER, of the verification -- validation of 


the CER database on the internal dose point of 

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view from 1952 onwards. There had been a 


suggestion in the working group meetings that 


there were some raw data from the SEC period to 


which it could be compared and I don't know 


what happened, what was the status of that. 


There was some raw data comparison from -- from 


the 1970s. I’m just looking at my summary if I 


remember correctly, and I think that there is a 


lot more confidence in -- in the -- in the 


database from 1952 onward but we thought there 


were still some gaps. 1950 and ’51 served 


different issues in the sense that there’s -- 


there’s not been an effort that we saw for 


validation in those two years and we had a 


concern about those two years particularly 


because in the external database there were a 


lot of problems. Didn’t find a parallel 


problem of zeros for the record in -- in the -- 


in the internal dose database but did think 


that specific -- specific verification of -- of 


those two years to some extent or some -- some 


part, some piece of -- modest piece of that 


should -- should be done. 


DR. NETON: This is Jim. I’m a little confused 


because -- not confused -- What SC&A is now 

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asking for us to validate ’50 and ’51 when in 


fact we have not been able to find any raw data 


to my recollection in the -- in the SEC period. 


You know, we had to rely on secondary, you 


know, analyses of -- of looking at -- at data 


outside the period. I think we need to keep in 


mind a couple things here. One is that at the 


outset we determined that the CER database or 


we -- it was our belief and we were provided 


some at least secondary evidence to the fact 


that the CER database was accepted by the 


Department of Energy as being the data of 


record for exposures of workers. And in that 


sample a lot of work went into making sure the 


data accurately represented what, you know, 


what the samples, you know, measured. So in 


that sense, you know, we believe that we’ve got 


-- we’re a little bit above the bar here 


because it has been validated to a certain 


extent. But at least I feel we were not able 


to establish, you know, show the pure 


documentation but at some point one needs to -- 


to accept it as it is for these dose 


reconstructions. We tried to validate it 


against various pieces of information, the 

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delta view data, punch cards and that sort of 


thing. And in fact in some cases as SC&A 


points out we were successful in demonstrating 


that the data are reasonable. However, there 


are discrepancies. I would point out that the 


discrepancies that we’ve observed both in the 


internal and the external areas have 


consistently provided data that would -- that 


would bias the results low, in my opinion 


anyway, especially if you’re -- if you’re using 


them for developing co-worker data. In other 


words, the data in the ’51 time period for 


external with a significant portion of zero 


results, you know, that sort of thing. The 


delta view database that had uranium had lower 


results than what the averages that were for 


the CER database. So given that, we believe 


the data that are -- are present in the -- in 


the CER database are reasonable to use for dose 


reconstructions and reasonable to use for coworker development. We see no reason, and SC&A 


asserts, that the data in ’50 and ’51 are 


invalid in the CER database. I don’t think 


anyone has come to that conclusion. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I don’t believe we said that 

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about the internal dose. We did say that about 


the external dose and I -- and I thought that 


you agreed with us that there was some kind of 


problem that you couldn’t identify. But that ­

- that’s a separate -- the term invalid was not 


applied I believe either in the fine print or 


in the summary in regard to the internal dose. 


DR. NETON: Well, I think there are statements 


made though, Arjun, that says that we could not 


use them for dose reconstructions for -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well --


DR. NETON: -- or by inference because of 


issues with the external you -- you have 


equated that to issues with the internal. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well --


DR. NETON: That’s what it says. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, yeah, we did feel that 


the 1950 and ’51 -- I mean if you take -- if 


you take the statement that the DOE 


certification of this as the dose -- as the 


database of record at face value, then you have 


to take that statement in its entirety both for 


internal and external and it is very clear that 


for 1950 and 1951 the -- the CER database is 


wrong because it contains all zeros contrary to 

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the information in the raw data -- 


DR. NETON: Well you have -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- for external dose. Please. 


The -- The -- The -- It also contains 


information that at least to us felt that when 


shallow and penetrating dose did not seem to 


make scientific sense in that neutron seemed to 


be included in shallow dose but not in 


penetrating dose. So because you’re trusting 


the DOE statement in regard to the whole 


database, not for internal or external, I -- I 


-- I think that some verification for -- for 


the years 1950 and ’51 is needed, especially 


because as discussed in another section, the 


types of work done in three buildings in those 


years were different and were terminated in 


1951. So you need the data from those years to 


reconstruct for dose -- for those workers. 


DR. NETON: Are you talking about the internal 


exposures? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Internal and -- and external. 


DR. NETON: Well, let’s -- let’s -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Unless --


DR. NETON: I think George wanted to say 


something. 

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MR. KERR: Yeah, I -- I want to say something 


because there’s a misstatement up here in the 


front as well as back on page 11. And the fact 


is that in the early years the beta doses were 


more concern than the gamma doses. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


MR. KERR: And if you look back at ’50 and ’51 


there are beta dose data that are not zeros. 


There are significant beta dose exposures in 


’50 and ’51 among employees. In ’50 there is 


one gamma dose in -- or ’50 there’s one person 


that has a recorded gamma dose that’s not zero. 


In ’51 there are -- there are no recorded. But 


keep in mind there is beta dose data in the CER 


database. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I don’t believe -- I believe 


that gamma and beta in the CER database are all 


zeroing. 


MR. KERR: No --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Maybe I’m --


MR. KERR: -- no, no. That’s wrong. That’s 


wrong on page 11. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well --


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Can I -- Can I ask one 


thing? Can we go back to number three and -- 

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and focus on the internal just for one second 


and then we’ll do more on -- we’ll come back to 


the external. 


MR. KERR: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: I'm sorry. I just -- Jim, can 


you tell me just -- just as a summary specific 


items that you did? I mean I’m trying to think 


of -- of the various items that you did to 


check the reliability. We’ve got the letter, 


of course, that’s your -- that’s your 


overriding thing here. But then you have the 


HP reports percentile data mainly. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then you have if I’m not 


mistaken 8 -- 8 or so or 8 or 20 -- I don't 


know if --


DR. NETON: There were 20 -- I think there were 


20 workers who we found that had reference to 


bioassay results in the health physics report 


and they were cross-walked to the database in ­

-


MR. GRIFFON: Twenty individuals. 


DR. NETON: -- virtual 100 percent agreement 


with the exception of one bioassay. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Twenty individuals so 

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from the HP report again. 


DR. NETON: Correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then you have the -- the -- 


the --


DR. NETON: The punch cards. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- so urine cards, right? 


DR. NETON: Right, the punch cards which were 


in a later time period where the samples 


matched up. We weren’t able to reconstruct the 


bioassay results very well because we didn’t 


have all the background. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: Now --


MR. GRIFFON: Now, can -- can you tell me 


‘cause I -- I remember bringing up this 


question and I -- I don’t think it was a 


follow-up action but you were going to -- or -- 


or there was a question as to whether you had ­

- no, you didn’t have punch cards from the -- 


from the time period in question, right? 


DR. NETON: That's correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So that was -- 


DR. NETON: So we -- we really were not able to 


establish any -- any direct validation or 


reliability check of -- of the data in the SEC 

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period. But -- But getting back to the 1950 


and ’51 era, you know, I think there’s a 


misunderstanding -- we’ll get into this later 


in one of the questions -- about how NIOSH has 


modeled the internal exposures in 1949 and ’50. 


We have no bioassay data in that period. But 


what we did is we didn’t assume that the 


bioassay would have been excreted to the same 


level as 1951 and ’52. We took the excretion 


in 1952 and said, what could these workers have 


possibly inhaled in ’49, ’50 and early ’51 and 


still be excreting what they are today in 1952. 


That’s a very different analysis. In other 


words, we used the workers as long term 


integrators of their exposure in the earlier 


years. And we believe that sufficiently 


brackets the exposures in those areas and 


actually does a fairly nice job at it. So we 


did not assume that they were excreting the 


same amount in their urine. We used them as 


actual predictors to back calculate what the 


maximal exposures could have been from a 


chronic exposure scenario. 


DR. MAURO: Jim, that’s -- this is John. 


That’s very helpful. 

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MR. GRIFFON: That’s a good clarification, yes. 


DR. MAURO: (Unintelligible) strategy. 

DR. NETON: Yeah, I felt --

DR. MAURO: Perhaps I should have known that 

but I didn’t. 


DR. NETON: This will answer a couple questions 


I think where SC&A was -- was -- had some 


serious issues with those time periods. 


DR. MAURO: So in effect what you’re saying -- 


what you’re effectively saying is what you’re 


seeing in the urine of workers when you do have 


the bioassay data -- I’m looking at your table 


3 now, for example. In table 3 you have -- 


well, I’m looking at table 3 in our report on 


page 15. What I’m hearing you saying is for 


urinalysis we have 166 employees measured and 


you’re seeing certain concentrations. The 


assumption is being made that what you’re 


observing there in those workers is the result 


of chronic intake, as an integrated intake that 


the workers experienced prior to that date. 


MS. MUNN: Is it my phone or is John fading 


away? 


MR. GRIFFON: Prior to that date maybe all the 


way back to 1950 is what you’re saying, right, 

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Jim? Depending on the workers’ circumstance I 


guess. Hello? 


DR. NETON: Prior to that date and all the way 


back to 1948. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, ’48. Yeah, yeah. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, we’re saying -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: We’re saying --


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- what could these workers have 


inhaled on a chronic basis and be excreting 


what we’re measuring in that time frame in the 


early ‘50s. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: And so that -- that we believe -- 


MR. GRIFFON: That --


DR. NETON: -- provides a bounding analysis of 


what the exposures were in those years. 


MR. GRIFFON: That wasn’t clear to me so that’s 


helpful, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Excuse me. 


MR. GRIFFON: It should have been but it 


wasn’t. 


DR. MAURO: Yes, that’s -- that’s very helpful. 


DR. NETON: I have to admit that the TIB -- I 

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think it’s in there but, you know, it’s those 


dosimeters sometimes use shortcut language and 


it’s not obvious I don’t think. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Well, that’s helpful. And 


Jim, can you tell me one other clarifying point 


here? 


DR. NETON: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: And without having to look it up? 


In your evaluation report the HP reports that 


you looked at the percentiles for, was it -- 


was it multiple years? Was it one year? What 


DR. NETON: I -- I think it was only for one 


year. Bill Tankersley did that analysis. 


Bill, could you --


MR. GRIFFON: It was like ’53, wasn’t it? 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Yes, it was for one year, and 


Mark, it was for 1952 for all 26 weeks I think, 


the latter part of ’52. 


DR. NETON: So if it was only one year I mean I 


-- I fully admit that we’ve had limited success 


in -- in demonstrating the reliability of the 


data, you know, particularly in the SEC period. 


But again I went back and looked at our -- our 


discussion, Mark, that we had back in November 

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of last year about this exact issue and in the 


-- in re-reading the transcripts of that 


meeting it was clear to me that we were 


concerned more with -- with -- with reliability 


when there were issues raised particularly by 


petitioners about, you know, certain activities 


that may have occurred. And secondly, if these 


were secondary databases such as CEDR data 


which were -- were summary data obtained from 


epidemiologic studies. And so here we have 


what we think is about as close as we’re going 


to get to a -- a -- a very good quality 


database. And the fact is, and I’ve raised 


this issue back in November, that for 50 years 


later it’s very difficult for us to obtain raw 


data to validate all these individual points. 


And the working group and the Board are going 


to have to decide what level of -- of proof 


they’re -- they’re comfortable with. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I -- I also think, and I’ll 


-- I’ll offer this up as -- as a -- maybe a bit 


more to support the reliability case, that 


there’s other HP reports that have the same 


percentile data and I think I’ve done back -- 


and I admit back of the envelope sort of 

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calculations on -- on those other periods and I 


think they would bolster your argument so -- 


But I -- But I think just to present one in 


the evaluation, you know, at least -- at least 


you might have that in your -- in your hip 


pocket to -- to better defend. And it would 


also, you know, say that because we’re, you 


know -- I think that is probably one of the 


most powerful arguments because that’s -- 


that’s the summary data for that whole half a 


year. I think it’s about half a year on most 


of the reports. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: And it -- It virtually agrees, 


you know, pretty dead on with the numbers in 


the database. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Excuse me. 


MR. GRIFFON: But just to present one half year 


of it, I think, you know, makes a less powerful 


argument. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill Tankersley. 


Mark, I was just about to add, and I appreciate 


your comment there. It sounded like an 


inference a moment ago was that this was the 


only analysis that -- that we found to match. 

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That -- That’s not the case. It’s the only 


one we tried, and the reason why is because it 


takes quite a bit of work to extract the 


percentiles from their graphs and then to 


calculate the percentiles, you know, by week 


for these things among all of the other things 


that, you know, the team is doing. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. No, I see --


MR. TANKERSLEY: All other -- Not in every one 


of the reports, but there are other of those 


graphs that could be done. I’m not in a 


position to say what the match would be. It 


sounds like you’ve done the matching. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, and again, I -- I did a 


quick and dirty but I didn’t have to put it in 


the report either so -- so I understand you’d 


have to be a little more precise and it takes a 


little more time, yeah. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I hear what -- 


MR. GRIFFON: But I think it would bolster your 


argument and that’s the reason I bring it up is 


that what’s before the Board is an evaluation 


report with one, you know, where that was done 


through one half a year. And it suggests to, 


you know, all my colleagues on the Board and 

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the public that, you know, that’s the piece of 


evidence you had so I don't know. I think that 


might be worth pursuing if it wasn’t going to 


be a tremendous amount of person hours, you 


know. 


DR. NETON: Appreciate that, Mark, and we’ll -- 


we’ll take that to heart and do the best we can 


prior to the Board meeting. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, this is Arjun. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Guide -- Guide me here a 


little bit. And guide the SC&A team. We took 


our cue from the Board’s decision on criteria 


for -- for approaching SEC evaluations in 


preparing our review. But that’s the one -- 


that’s the one Board approved document that we 


have. We don’t have approved procedures but we 


do have that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I think that’s appropriate. 


I think we agreed to that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And -- And data validation so 


it’s -- so data validation and -- and 


representativeness -- those are separate issues 


-- are very prominent and central in that 


document and -- and are kind of limited to what 

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you can show. And I think -- And I think I -- 


I -- I don’t disagree with Jim in that a lot of 


effort has been made and I think of -- to the ­

- to the extent that the validation has been 


done from ’52 onward there appear to be matches 


and so on. But we did, if you take your cue 


from the Board’s document then you do have to ­

- then you do, in our review, do have to 


reflect that the validation was partial. If 


you don’t want us to do that, of course, then ­

- then that -- that -- that we will -- it will 


be at your pleasure. 


MR. GRIFFON: No, I -- I think those are our 


guidelines and -- and that’s what I’m saying, 


you know, NIOSH has -- has -- has pulled a lot 


of different information. This is my -- my 


point of view anyway. NIOSH has pulled a lot 


of information. Came up short in some cases as 


Jim just said but -- but, you know, they have a 


fairly strong case, you know, for the internal 


section especially, and I think they put that 


forward. I think that you, Arjun -- I think 


SC&A appropriately should say, you know, that 


this is what it was. Is it, you know, and -- 


and you know, maybe to be careful with 

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adjectives but describe it as -- as what it is, 


as what you per--, you know -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- perceive it to be. And, you 


know, that it clearly wasn’t, you know -- there 


-- there wasn’t data, you know. There just 


wasn’t raw data available for every time period 


for every, you know -- So I think present it 


as is and then the Board has to weigh the 


evidence I guess. You know, okay, it is 


partial but there are powerful arguments made 


here, you know. So I think we have to weigh 


that evidence so -- but I -- I don’t think you 


addressed, you know, from our policy document I 


think you approached it correctly. Other 


people may disagree with me. I don't know. 


(No response) 


MR. GRIFFON: I guess not. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you. 


MS. MUNN: This is Wanda. We have to at some 


juncture come to grips with the issue revolving 


around the original wording of our charter 


which is more or less the definition of how 


much is enough. There’s no question we’re 


never going to have perfect information. Since 

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we’re not going to have perfect information the 


issue is how much information can be considered 


relative to the overall issue so that we can 


define an acceptable limit. We’re not going to 


be able to define acceptable limits in each 


case. I don’t believe that’s possible. So 


we’re back to the same question, how much is 


enough? And you’re right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MS. MUNN: I believe this is a question that 


the Board has to face every time we have an SEC 


and this one is probably more difficult than 


some other decisions the Board must make. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, you’re right, Wanda. And ­

- And, yeah, I think we can -- we’re probably 


only going to be able to take the policies so 


far but then -- then there -- there are going 


to be sort of site-specific things that have to 


weigh into that definition of how much is 


enough. But yeah, you’re -- I don’t disagree 


with that at all. So can we move on to number 


four? Have we -- Arjun or Jim? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think we touched on this a 


little. I'm sorry to cut you off, George. I ­
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- I just was trying to keep going item by 


item. 


MR. KERR: That -- that’s really -- that's 


fine. I just wanted to clarify the fact that 


there was some dose -- beta dose in -- in ’50 


and ’51. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, we -- We looked at the 


external dose, the database and the internal 


one. I at least -- I -- I at least did not 


find any non-zero entries, and there may be 


one. I can’t say that I looked at every single 


one but I did not find any non-zero entries in 


-- in the gamma or beta entries in the CER 


database. 


MR. KERR: Well, I --


DR. MAKHIJANI: There are non-zero entries in 


several ones, all -- all of which happened to 


be for 1951 so I don't know about 1950 in the 


delta view database that some of which I put in 


a table. There are also non-zero beta doses in 


the delta view database which -- which I did 


not compile but I just mentioned them -- 


mentioned them in the text. And -- And so 


there -- and I -- and I believe in the -- in 


the communication that NIOSH sent us this week 

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NIOSH did acknowledge that there are these 


zeros and -- and had some kind of preliminary 


idea of where they might be coming from 


although they said the origin of these zeros is 


unknown, and that maybe that maybe they’re due 


to some computer glitch. That -- That 


particular thing did -- did -- we discussed it 


and that -- that raises the bigger question, 


because that was a little bit of a surprise I 


have to say in that the -- the later years’ 


validation seemed -- seemed to work from ’52 


onward to the extent for the various things. 


There are some differences and as NIOSH has 


pointed out, most of those differences appear 


to be claimant favorable. I think I cited that 


on page 13 or someplace in -- in the details. 


But -- But this question of why those zeros 


were there in ’50 or ’51 we -- we didn’t have 


any -- any idea where they came from but now 


NIOSH said they might be due to a software 


problem and that does raise a question of what 


-- where else that software problem might show 


up and what the DOE did to -- to -- to ensure 


that -- that these problems were not occurring 


in a widespread way in the -- in the database. 

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To the extent that the evaluation was done for 


’53 mostly it -- it did appear to be okay. 


DR. NETON: The software problem was related to 


delta view database though, not -- 


MR. KERR: I don’t think it was -- I also got 


printouts from the Y-12 database and -- and 


knowing that the Y-12 database is what CER has, 


I asked Y-12 to look for me back in the early 


years. And if you look in both of them there 


clearly is beta dose data for ’50 and ’51 in 


both the printouts from the CER and the Y-12 


database. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, when you said, George, for 


MR. TANKERSLEY: -- Tankersley -- and George is 


absolutely right. There are positive data from 


1948, 1949, 1950, 1951 and onward. And --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Bill, in the CER database? 


MR. TANKERSLEY: (Inaudible) have not looked at 


the correct fields. 


MR. GRIFFON: Bill or George, I’m just -- I’m 


just doing this right now and -- and I want a 


clarification. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I’m going to go off, too, 


because maybe --

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MR. GRIFFON: You’re looking at -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- (inaudible) and I looked at 


the wrong one. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, you’re looking at -- at the 


S-millirem field? 


MR. TANKERSLEY: The skin and the penetrating, 


that’s exactly right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Because I have ’50, 


there’s no penetrating. There is skin but 


there’s no beta -- beta gamma fields is all 


zeros. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: That's correct as George said. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, I have -- believe what I 


said is that all of the beta gamma fields are 


zero. That’s what is in our report. And among 


the other two fields, the S-millirem and Pmillirem I did not observe any non-zeros in the 


P-millirem but I did observe some in the Smillirem. 


MR. GRIFFON: That's correct. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Since the gamma and beta are 


all zero I presume that the residual external 


dose would be neutron and so I -- we did not 


know how to interpret the non-zero in the S­
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millirem button. No non-zero readings in the 


P-millirem. That’s sort of the substance of 


the comment there. 


MR. GRIFFON: Maybe we just need a clar -- can 


-- George or Bill, can you clarify that? 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Through the years people 


reported the -- the doses in those two sets of 


fields differently and I do not know why that 


is. And to understand the data in that -- in ­

- in that set, which again is the Y-12 set; 


everyone continues to refer to it as the CER 


database. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: It’s simply a copy, of course. 


You have to -- You have to get into it deeper 


than -- than perhaps some have. But there are 


definitely positive values in -- in 1950 and 


1951 and then, of course, I’m assuming everyone 


is pretty comfortable with the 11,000-plus 


records, you know, in ’48 and ’49, PIC data and 


-- and film badge data. 


The -- The -- The records in the ’50 and ’51 


are not from the neutron data. 


MR. GRIFFON: So -- So it’s sort of unknown 


why the beta fields would be zero and the S­
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millirem would have positive value. 


MR. KERR: Well, I guess what you’ve got to do 


is -- is for some of those years you also got 


to go look at the -- sometimes it was the -- 


the penetrating and then -- in the skin. And 


you can go to those and you can clearly 


separate those doses out. Now, you know, 


that’s where in the early years, you know, I 


guess the -- as a matter of fact what I do have 


from Y-12 is slightly different than what I got 


from CER. But from Y-12 for each of the years 


starting back in 1950 up through I think 2003 


or ’04 gives me penetrating, they give me the 


skin and they give me the neutron. And from 


those three -- those items I can go back 


through and separate out such things as -- as 


the gammas and the betas and the neutrons. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I have this database open 


before me. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, me, too. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And the file, table Y-12, PBL 


Y-12, External 1950 to 1957. Every -- Every 


single entry in the beta and gamma dose -- 


well, there’s one I believe in the gamma, not 


in the beta that I just found that is non-zero. 

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MR. KERR: Okay. What about your skin and your 


penetrating? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, the -- the --


MR. GRIFFON: Nothing for penetrating. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: There are a number of entries 


as I said in the report in the skin that are 


non-zero but no entries in the penetrating that 


are non-zero. All zeros. And if all of the 


entries in beta and gamma are zero then one 


must presume that the only remaining source of 


dose would be neutron that would appear in the 


other two fields. 


MR. KERR: I think the problem early on then is 


the way that the doses were recorded. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, Arjun, I think that, you know 


-- I think you’re --


MR. KERR: That’s the problem right there -- 


DR. NETON: -- interpreting those fields -- 


MR. KERR: -- is the way they were recorded. 


They just recorded some as skin and some as 


penetrating in the earlier years. 


DR. NETON: Right. Rather than fill in the 


beta gamma fields independently -- 


MR. KERR: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- they just report skin and deep 

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which is a fairly common notation for doing 


dosimetry. 


MR. KERR: And it’s fairly common at a lot of 


sites just for getting your doses that way. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Shouldn’t you have a non-zero 


badge reading to enter something in the other 


two fields? 


MR. KERR: Well, no, it was originally how it 


was --


DR. MAKHIJANI: (Inaudible) was a zero. 


MR. KERR: It was originally how it was 


recorded probably on the cards that went into 


the database. 


DR. NETON: Right. In other words -- 


MR. KERR: It was recorded as skin unless they 


put it in the skin column. If it -- If it was 


recorded in gamma beta they subbed them to get 


the skin dose. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We -- We were asked to 


evaluate what we saw in the CER database and 


whether it was validated or not. The -- We --


We did find non-zero beta and gamma entries in 


the -- in the beta and gamma column. In those 


explicit columns in the delta view database and 


the record numbers for that are cited in the 

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report. All of the corresponding values for -- 


for those times in the -- the database are zero 


and -- and so -- and -- and NIOSH then did send 


us a document saying that the database does not 


-- the CER database for those years does not 


appear to be correct and the origin of these 


zeros is unknown. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I -- There’s two issues 


going on here, too, Arjun, right? The delta 


view compared to the database -- 


MR. KERR: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- versus just the database 


itself? 


MR. KERR: Yeah. Yeah, I agree that their -- 


their data in -- in the delta view that does 


not appear to be in the Y-12 database but I’m 


saying that the reason you’re seeing zero in 


some of those columns were the things -- the 


way things were recorded back in the early 


years. 


MR. GRIFFON: So in -- in ’53 it changed, 


George, is what --


MR. KERR: Well --


MR. GRIFFON: I mean obviously. I’m looking at 


the database and in ’53 you have beta -- I got 

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one example here. Beta is 188; gamma 4901, Smillirem is 5089 which is the sum of those two. 


MR. KERR: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then P-millirem is 180. 


MR. KERR: And I think in some of the earlier 


years they may have already summed them and had 


no way to split them back out so, you know, 


they may have just put them in as skin dose. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then in this particular case 


P-millirem is 188 which it probably should be 


4901 but -- but that’s another issue I guess. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, see, I -- I think what’s 


clear is that there’s the -- the CER database 


had to accommodate all ways of reporting so 


there are fields there that may not have been 


used in the early years which is what George is 


trying to say. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right. No, I -- I 


gather that, Jim. Now, here’s another 


question. When you did your models did you do 


the -- which fields did you use? Did you use 


certain ones throughout or did you -- 


MR. KERR: Oh, we -- We -- We used the beta 


gammas fields when we did our models. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

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DR. NETON: But that was only after a certain 


year. We didn’t use any of the -- 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s right. 


DR. NETON: ’51 data for the model. 


MR. KERR: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. 


DR. NETON: See, that’s the other point here is 


that the co-worker model is not based on these 


data at all. The only relevance of this issue 


I think is if we received -- if we have a 


claimant who has monitoring data in ’50 and ’51 


then -- and then maybe Arjun has a point. But 


I think there’s a strong argument to be made 


why there are zeros in the beta gamma field in 


the early years based on changes in reporting 


practices when the database covers all years. 


MR. GRIFFON: But that -- that’s just -- that’s 


just speculation, Jim. 


DR. NETON: Well, I --


MR. GRIFFON: You don’t have evidence of that. 


You’re just saying that it could have happened. 


DR. NETON: I don’t, but it certainly makes 


sense to me. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I don’t disagree. It’s an 


argument. But I don’t think you have -- run 

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that data --


DR. NETON: I think it’s just as speculative, 


Mark, to say that -- that zeros there imply 


that the beta -- the skin and deep dose are 


invalid. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, this -- This is --


MR. GRIFFON: No, I’m not trying to imply that 


-- I think part of the issue for me was ’50/’51 


is that you have S-millirem data and you have 


no penetrating data at all and no gamma or 


beta. 


DR. NETON: Well, I think that’s not 


inconsistent with low level beta exposures -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: It’s --


DR. NETON: Or below the detection limit of the 


badge. I mean hopefully they would -- 


MR. GRIFFON: And they just weren’t recorded in 


the beta field is your argument? 


DR. NETON: Yeah, sure. 


MR. GRIFFON : You know, that’s a possibility. 


MR. KERR: Yeah, the problem is is back in the 


early days they were changing badges every 


week. And you can measure beta sometimes, I 


mean if your LD -- your lower limit of 


detection is -- is 30 you could probably 

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measure betas but on your gamma dose it may 


show up as zero. 


DR. NETON: Right. But you --


MR. KERR: And -- And I mean, you know, the 


beta exposures were really what was concern in 


the early days. And with the -- with the 


people in -- that working with in -- in the 


foundries in natural and depleted uranium. So 


I’m not surprised that you see all these zeros 


for gammas. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: This is Arjun. 


DR. NETON: It’s not about the -- the ten to 


one --


DR. MAKHIJANI: I believe there are two 


separate issues here. The delta view documents 


from 1951 that I’ve seen clearly are from that 


period so they should reflect the way in which 


doses were recorded in that period. They --


They have four fields in the delta view 


database. They have beta, they have gamma, 


they have neutron and they have extremity dose 


if I remember correctly. And the -- there are 


-- there is a corresponding column for beta and 


gamma in the CER database. And when you 


compare those two things the -- the fields with 

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the identical headings, the entries do not 


match. I believe that what -- the 


interpretation of what’s in the SM and PM -- Pmillirem and S-millirem is a different issue. 


The -- The -- The -- That’s how, you know, 


how you use the dose information for dose 


reconstruction. The -- The point of that 


particular section is are the data -- is this 


database good for the years ’50 and ’51? And 


the observation is that for those years the 


beta and gamma fields do not match the delta 


view database and therefore they do not match 


the raw data records that are available so they 


have to be declared to be invalid. I do not 


see how these beta and gamma entries can be 


considered reasonable or appropriate or correct 


in any way. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I fail to see that. 


DR. NETON: If we grab that argument, Arjun, 


and I’m not saying I’m willing to do that, but 


if we did what’s the practical significance of 


this? 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s the reliability of the 


overall database I think. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. The practical 


significance --


DR. NETON: Well, no, no, no. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: There’s no explanation for it. 


DR. NETON: No, you’re saying that 1950 and ’51 


are invalid and that’s your position. But you 


say that ’53 appears to be okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


DR. NETON: And so what we’re saying is if -- 


if the practical significance is that -- that 


’50 and ’51 are invalid we have a co-worker 


model which we’re going to discuss yet that -- 


that fills in those values so what -- I don't 


know what the practical significance of the 


argument is anyway. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, Jim, until -- until we 


got your note about -- which -- which assessed 


why these zeros might have been there I -- I 


don't know that I could have -- have given you 


a more nuanced answer to that question but 


since there is the issue of whether there was a 


software glitch in how these zeros occurred it 


-- it definitely raises in my mind at least the 


question of what else did this software do and 


is the ’53 validation that you did, which -- 

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which appropriately was all right, does -- do 


you need to do some more checking or not? If 


it was a software glitch what -- what’s the 


investigation of the software or what is the 


other explanation for this problem? There’s 


got to be an explanation for -- for why zeros 


were entered when the raw data from the time 


clearly had non-zeros in these same fields. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill Tankersley. You 


need to discount the comment about a software 


problem producing those zeros. That person 


simply misspoke when he put that into the 


report. As I explained probably a month or two 


ago, there are database managers. I’m talking 


about a program that will insist in a numeric 


field putting in zero instead of nulls and the 


new programs won’t insist on that. But there’s 


not a software error that put in zeros when 


there should have been, you know, positive 


numbers. So any discussion about, you know, 


that is -- is not useful at this time. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Well, here -- Here --


Here’s, Jim, just to -- to -- from my 


perspective, here’s what I’m looking at with 


this item. Is -- is the weight of the overall 

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evidence for demonstrating the reliability of 


the -- the Y-12 or as we’re calling it CER 


database? And, you know, the way I look at it 


right now is you have several cases -- several 


people from the delta view in ’53 that you 


backtracked and -- and found doses to be in 


agreement -- in pretty strong agreement but 


then you have all this in ’51 that’s in 


disagreement so -- and then that’s all we have. 


And, you know, that’s my concern is that we’re 


-- we’re -- I think we’re a little thinner on 


our --


DR. NETON: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: When Wanda asks how much is 


enough, you know, I think -- I feel like our 


arguments are a little thinner on this -- the 


external database than they are for the 


internal database. 


DR. NETON: Well, right. We couldn’t -- We 


couldn’t go back and find the original data but 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m not saying you didn’t make 


all kinds of effort, you know. I’m just --


DR. NETON: Right. But again, you know, we 


have -- we’re not relying on anything in the 

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early years for reconstructing doses for 


workers. I mean we have gone, you know, George 


Kerr has demonstrated pretty conclusively that 


the data that we have in those years do not fit 


any good distribution and so we’re not using 


them to -- to reconstruct doses. Now, when we 


get into the ’56 time frame, I don't know. I 


guess we’re going to -- you’re going to -- the 


argument is that if ’50 and ’51 don’t match and 


’53 did then we need to go back and look at 


more years after ’53. I mean is that what 


we’re hearing? And then if we can’t what’s the 


ultimate answer? I don't know. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah. Yeah, I’m just 


saying that -- that the SEC -- I know you’re 


not using that earlier -- that early data but 


it is all part of the database so -- and we’ve 


heard explanations of why this might have 


occurred; you might be right. But, you know, 


and so far we have sort of two, yeah, two 


pieces to -- to answer this question of 


reliability of the -- of that ’50 to ’57 


database. Now, you know, later -- I mean you 


can’t -- and we’ve talked about this before, 


Jim. You can’t sort of have it both ways with 

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this. I mean in the other case you -- you 


pulled some data from the ‘70s to demonstrate 


the -- the ’50 to ’57 period of the urinalysis 


database is good, you know, so -- 


DR. NETON: Well, but Mark, we’ve looked at ’53 


and we’ve looked at the ‘70s now. I guess I’m 


hearing the intervening years need to be 


checked. I mean that’s what I’m hearing. I 


don't know what else we can do. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m just making observations 


about where we’re -- where we’re at right now. 


I’m not saying whether we have to or not. 


MR. KERR: The only importance of that data 


back -- that we had back in ’48, ’49, ’50, ’51 


period is if we take our co-worker model that 


we have and -- and apply it. We’re -- We’re 


making conservative estimates of what the doses 


were back in those days because, yeah, we’re 


way above the doses people received. And, you 


know, that’s the only reason I think they’re 


important is it’s a basis of comparison for 


what we’re predicting doses to be. And 


everything I see we’re very considerate and 


very claimant favorable. That’s the importance 


of the data back in early -- 

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DR. NETON: I think we understand that, George. 


But what Mark is saying is are the data that 


we’ve used for the co-worker model even valid 


now? And I'm not sure that ’51 and ’51 


mismatch after we’ve done a ’53 comparison and 


a ‘70s comparison is enough to invalidate -- 


MR. GRIFFON: But you didn’t do a ‘70s 


comparison, did you, for external? 


DR. NETON: I thought that’s what we just said 


we did. 


MR. GRIFFON: I -- I said for the internal you 


brought in some data from the ‘70s. 


DR. NETON: For the internal, yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: The urine punch cards. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: So right now you have one -- one 


data point, ’50s, you know, one -- one set of 


results which -- which I -- I, you know, it’s 


good. It’s encouraging that they match. But 


I’m, you know, I’m just -- I’m just throwing 


out there, Jim. I’m not saying you have to go 


back and do more. I’m just saying that, you 


know, is -- how much is enough? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. I -- I agree. And I don't 


know if there’s much more we can do. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: And that’s the problem. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then I think you -- you use 


that and you present to the Board just sort of 


the same arguments that you’ve used along with 


what George said that that, you know, those 


early periods the co-worker model is going to 


you believe, you know, be very conservative 


anyway, yeah. So all those -- all those 


bolster your arguments sort of. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I think that -- that’s pretty 


much our position at this point. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Could I ask George a clarifying 


question, please? If -- If the co-worker 


model is to be judged to be claimant favorable 


for ’48 and ’49 for internal dose where we have 


no data and for external dose for ’50 and ’51 


where all the entries are zero, any non-zero 


entry would appear to be claimant favorable. 


MR. KERR: Well, you see -- Okay. What --


What I’m saying --


DR. MAKHIJANI: How do you make a judgment -- 


how do you make a judgment about claimant 


favorability when the -- when the database 


itself doesn’t appear to contain material 

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contents? 


MR. KERR: Okay. We do have ’48 and ’49 data. 


We do not -- and here we come back to your 


argument. We -- If you go back to the ’50/’51 


data you do not have entries as true for the 


gammas and betas separately. But you do have 


penetrating and you do have the skin dose. And 


my contention is you can derive or you can get 


estimates of what these people had from those 


two. In the case of -- of part of it was beta. 


It was penetrating. It was gamma. You can 


subtract and get some idea of what the beta 


doses were people were receiving. And you can 


compare with those. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But the fact is that all of the 


penetrating dose entries are zero. 


MR. KERR: That’s okay. But we -- we can still 


get beta doses out of there. We’re -- We’re ­

- We’re developing a beta dose model, too. 


And you still have the ’48/’49 data. And as a 


result of it, even in the delta view, you say 


those are zero. We still have the delta view 


to go to to compare with doses that are 


recorded in there with the co-worker model. 


And -- And even doing that they look very 

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conservative. 


MS. MUNN: Here’s Wanda. It appears that one 


could make a very good case of having verified 


the data for an immediately subsequent year, in 


the CER database. And (inaudible) year in the 


CER database (inaudible) the type of recording 


that you see in ’50 and ’51 clearly was 


overcome in 1953 and therefore the 


extrapolations that are made from subsequent 


data (inaudible) in the obvious absence of 


unusual events (inaudible) in that ’50/’51 


period. Do we have unusual events recorded in 


that period? I wasn’t aware of any if we did. 


MR. GRIFFON: And Wanda, can I ask, are you on 


a speaker phone? 


MS. MUNN: Yes, I am right now. 


MR. GRIFFON: Because I hear every fourth word 


or so. You’re cutting in and out on me. I 


don't know if that’s happening to everybody but 


MS. MUNN: It must be happening to everybody. 


One never can trust a speaker phone. 


MR. GRIFFON: Sorry. 


MS. MUNN: So did what I say come through 


enough to make any sense? 

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MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Yeah, I -- I think so. 
I 

mean I, you know -- if -- I guess it comes down 


to, you know, it would be more concerning to me 


if the -- the ’50/’51 issue and not matching 


was in the middle of the time period, you know, 


not on the front end I suppose. I don't know 


but, you know, I come back to you have some, 


you know, some data in ’53 that are supporting 


the argument of reliability and -- and I 


suppose this letter that says the DOE accepted 


this as the database of record, correct? I 


mean that was for both external and -- and 


internal, correct, Jim? 


DR. NETON: Right. I believe so. 


MR. GRIFFON: So, you know, it comes down to 


the -- the weight of the evidence. 


MS. MUNN: We know from our own experience and 


from information that we have from individuals 


who were in those positions at that time that 


the particular period we’re talking about, the 


’48, ’49, ’50, ’51 period was a period of 


enormous change not only in plant process but 


in administrative process and in health physics 


process as well. We have some data prior to 


that confusing time and significant data 

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following that time. If we’ve been given two 


very valid points of comparison following that 


time that agree, then the question becomes very 


simply is that reliable enough for the Board. 


It’s reliable enough for me. 


When we have times that are -- are confusing 


for everyone and have differing methods of -- 


of computation, differing methods of 


calculation, differing methods of recording 


then we must either say as one argument has 


gone, that we can’t use any of that data; or we 


must say those problems were worked out and all 


data from there on is reliable. That 


essentially in my view is the question we’re 


going to have to put before the Board. 


MR. GRIFFON: That -- That -- Yeah, that’s 


the question and it’s just, you know, be -- 


being convinced of those arguments she just 


made. That’s -- That’s the important part and 


I think the stronger the arguments can be made, 


the -- the better, you know, so I mean -- so 


look at this, you know. It seems like what has 


been mentioned for ’50 and ’51 are -- are 


likely explanations, you know, but I don't know 


that I’ve seen documents indicating that, you 

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know. So -- So there’s good explanations, you 


know, possible good explanations. I don't know 


that we’ve seen that as, you know, any health 


physics report saying or any -- and I don't 


know that there would be any report saying that 


that kind of thing happened, you know, and this 


is why. 


MS. MUNN: No, but it may be helpful to put 


that rationale very crisply in print and even 


if it’s just a letter report to provide for the 


Board because what we’re -- the agony we’re 


going through here in the working group is not 


going to be --


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MS. MUNN: -- manageable in the Board setting. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. I agree. I agree. I 


mean, yeah. And I think we -- I think what I’d 


like to do from the working group is summarize 


where we’re at on different items and I'm not 


sure how much I’m willing to connect the dots, 


you know. But we’ll lay out the -- the facts 


as they’ve been presented to us and the 


arguments that -- that have been presented to 


us. And then I think, you know, we present 


that to the Board and it’s, you know, so -- so 

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that we don’t have to go, you know -- obviously 


we don’t want to go through all the details at 


the Board level. I -- I agree, Wanda. And 


we’ll -- we’ll -- we’ll have to work on that. 


MS. MUNN: My personal feeling is that such 


report from us is going to be crucial in the 


discussions in Denver. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, so --


MS. MUNN: (Inaudible). 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, we’re going to have a long 


weekend. 


MS. MUNN: -- the language needs to be right 


and very clear and very factual. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. Okay. And factual, I 


agree. Okay. I don't know that we can -- can 


we do any more on this topic? I don't know. 


missed -- Arjun, one thing I might want 


clarification on from George is just in looking 


at this database if -- if I’m looking at Pmillirem in the later years when there’s 


actually recorded numbers -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- that should in most instances 


be equal to the gamma or gamma plus neutron or 


is there a more sophisticated algorithm? 


I 
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DR. MAKHIJANI: As we understood it the P -- 


the P-millirem dose column should include the 


gamma plus the neutron dose, yes. 


 MR. KERR: That’s right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. KERR: And then the -- the -- where they 


have millirem or the skin dose it should be the 


gamma plus the neutron plus the beta. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That -- That’s exactly how we 


interpreted it and wrote it up. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. Anyway, yeah, and 


just glancing at a few of those I just spotted 


some that were -- but I’m -- I can’t do this 


and talk on the phone but I think there is some 


interesting ones that the gamma and -- and 


penetrating don’t seem to line up but I’m -- 


and there’s no neutron dose on those ones that 


I’m talking about so -- but -- and that’s in 


1953. Anyway, that -- that’s sort of why I was 


wondering which -- which columns were actually 


being used in the co-worker model -- 


MR. KERR: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- out of -- out of those data 


and is it the -- which columns are being used? 

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Which -- Which parameters? 


MR. KERR: We used -- We’ve used the gamma and 


the beta. 


MR. GRIFFON: Gamma and beta? Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Then you apply the neutron to 


photon ratio, right? 


MR. KERR: No. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That’s what was in the sample 


dose reconstructions anyway. 


DR. NETON: That was for a person who was 


potentially exposed to neutron but not 


monitored. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. Right. I mean in your 


co-worker model. 


DR. NETON: Well, no. The co-worker model is 


for -- is for gamma and is for beta. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. Right. For somebody 


who is not monitored for neutrons you use a 


neutron to photon ratio. 


DR. NETON: We have done that in the example; 


that’s correct. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Should we move on to five? 


I don’t think we’re going to get through all 


eleven of these before -- 

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DR. NETON: I think, Mark, some of these -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- next couple we’ve talked about 


in relation to internal dose reconstruction and 


-- and the co-worker model that used the 1952 


bioassay data to back-calculate the maximum 


intake that could have occurred based on, you 


know, what we’re observing in ’52. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s five and -- five and six, 


right? 


DR. NETON: I think five and six -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- are related to that issue. And 


in fact in number six I think SC&A said that 


example five does not address the issue of 


unmonitored worker. There is a clear co-worker 


model dose intake applied there. I'm not sure 


where they -- they got that idea. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I’ll -- I’ll go back and check 


that; maybe if it’s my mistake it will be 


corrected. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. I mean I think that the 


confusing part of number five where it says the 


worker was monitored and it only implied that 


he was monitored for a certain period prior to 

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’50. Of course he could not have been 


monitored and we applied the co-worker intakes 


so they’re there. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, you said the worker was 


monitored and you assumed zero -- zero bioassay 


results. 


DR. NETON: Well, right. But see it was a 


little misleading. He was monitored after 1950 


DR. MAKHIJANI: All right. 


DR. NETON: But there is no monitoring data 


prior to ’50 so we --


MR. GRIFFON: -- there was just confusion. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. So if -- If there was a 


misunderstanding that arose from how the thing 


was written up I guess. 


DR. NETON: I believe so. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. All right. I’ll go back 


to that. But -- But the only point was I 


think here that we haven’t discussed in 


relation to five and six is that it’s the piece 


of -- of the operations at Y-12 that’s 


indicated in the site profile terminated in ’51 

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if I remember correctly that was called a 


recycle and salvage, etcetera, where they were 


reconditioning pieces of -- of -- of the -- of 


the site for -- for new operation. And then 


those operations were terminated at that time 


and never redone. I -- I have not seen 


anything, any calculations that show that the 


available data for from ’52 onward would bound 


the internal doses for those particular workers 


so there’s a question -- there’s an explicit 


question about the salvage and recycle 


operations in those three buildings that are 


named, 9206, 9207 and 9211. 


DR. NETON: Right. But -- But we discussed 


this a little earlier. We took the urine data 


from the workers in ’52 who would have been 


working in those time frames and assumed that 


they had chronic intakes all the way through 


those periods and -- and did a bounding 


analysis using what was being excreted in their 


urine in 1952. 


MR. CHEW: Jim, this is Mel. Arjun, I think -- 


you know, I don’t -- I fell into the same -- a 


little bit of the same trap that -- well, I was 


claryifying (inaudible) in submitting the 

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report. But people would talk about recycled 


uranium and recycled uranium there are -- 


looking at the details there are two different 


things as you probably, well, you well know. 


DR. NETON: Yes. 


MR. CHEW: They -- They basically out of the 


machine shops they tried to save every piece of 


uranium they had and they recycled it and they 


called it recycled uranium. And then in 1952, 


even late ’52 was the first entry of what you 


and we have been talking about as RU with the 


contaminants of the neptunium and plutonium and 


technetium in here and I -- I just want to make 


sure that we -- we often fall into the same 


trap here that I did earlier on, too. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no. I -- I didn’t. I 


didn’t misunderstand that. 


MR. CHEW: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I am not -- I am not calling 


recycled -- in fact I didn’t even think about 


it until you mentioned it. 


MR. CHEW: There’s recycled and there’s 


recycled. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. Right. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no. This -- I’m not 

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raising a recycled uranium trace contaminants 


issue. 


MR. CHEW: Okay. And so therefore if it’s 


recycled uranium in the earlier days, then the 


bioassay for uranium was certainly bound and I 


was making sure that you were not talking about 


the contaminant, okay? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. No, I’m talking about 


the specific jobs that occurred in those years 


MR. CHEW: Uh-huh. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- that stopped, you know, in 


the conditioning of the facilities and cleaning 


up the places and so on. There was a kind of a 


decommissioning and recommissioning operation 


as I understand that went on. And -- And I --


I have not seen where the workers were involved 


in those specific jobs which seemed -- which 


seemed to involve different exposure conditions 


than the production workers. It seems to me 


that -- that job-specific analysis is necessary 


to show that -- that you’ve covered those 


workers with your co-worker analysis. And 


that’s the thrust of the comment here. It 


isn’t that -- I didn’t mean that the co-worker 

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model would not bound these doses. It’s just 


that for those workers do we have the 


information say from ’50 or ’51 for those job 


types to demonstrate that you’ve got them 


covered in your co-worker model. 


DR. NETON: But I think if the issue is if they 


bounded it then the answer is we have. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. No, I -- I didn’t see 


that -- that any -- any -- any demonstration 


for those groups of workers. Perhaps it’s 


there and I missed it but -- but I -- I’m not 


aware that such a thing has been done. But as 


-- maybe -- maybe it’s just my -- my not having 


seen the right document. 


DR. NETON: What we’re saying though, Arjun, is 


that of all the workers that were there in ’51 


and ’52, they’re leaving urine samples and -- 


and these are the workers, these are the 


production-type workers, the workers who would 


have been working with the uranium. And we’ve 


taken those workers and -- and -- and looked 


at their urine samples and said if they were 


working in ’48 and ’49, how much could they 


have breathed then and -- and still be 


excreting what we’re measuring in ’51 and ’52. 

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But we -- We’re trying to bound it based on 


using the workers as their own sort of 


standard. 


DR. MAURO: Jim, this is John. I --
 I 


understand where you’re going and I think I see 


the subtlety of the -- the issue that’s now on 


the table. Again going to table 3 on page 15. 


Let me see if I can articulate this. What we 


have here is you’ve got this urinalysis data 


for 1950 and ’51 for 166 and 367 employees. 


That urine data -- Now -- Now, we also could 


look over to the second column. We see there 


basically is the same number of employees, ’48, 


’49, ’50. And of course, it increased in ’51. 


But what I’m hearing you saying is we -- the -- 


the 166 employees that were monitored, that the 


activity you’re looking at in the 


(unintelligible) is the -- is the result of an 


integrated exposure that they -- that those 


workers experienced while they were working in 


1948 and ’49 and -- and I completely understand 


and agree of taking that tack. And it would 


certainly be a very good surrogate for the fact 


that the workers in ’48 and ’49 weren’t 


monitored. If you’re looking at that 166 and 

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I 

you go back in time and say that this is what 


they took in in order to get the -- whatever 


reading you’re getting for the 166. The --


guess the distinction now -- to get to the 


point where I think that there might be a 


distinction is -- is there a -- of the 2,248 


workers that were working in ’49, what I’m 


hearing is there might be a -- a subgroup of 


those workers that were performing activities 


that were substantively unique, whatever they ­

- the -- what I hear, recycle of the scrap or 


other operations that were substantively 


unique. And in effect you were saying that 


okay, that -- that’s fine because we caught 


them in the 166 people that we did monitor in 


1950. So I think what I’m hearing is that 


you’ve got it covered. It really then becomes 


a matter of, all right, you’ve got these 166 


monitored employees and you -- and you have a 


worker that worked in 1949 and you’re going to 


want to reconstruct what he might have inhaled. 


Now, if you were to take the high end of the 


distribution for the 166 you certainly would be 


placing an upper bound, perhaps an overly 


conservative upper bound. Or you could take 

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the full distribution which you would argue 


would be a claimant neutral approach. What I’m 


hearing is that if there was a fundamental -- 


if there were some activities going on in ’49 


and ’48 that were not going on in 1950 among 


said subgroup, and though -- and there’s reason 


to believe that that subgroup had activities 


that created a greater potential for them to be 


exposed, the implication would be that when you 


go to the 1950 data, the 166 people that were 


monitored, you would probably have to use the 


high end of that distribution to make sure you 


captured that subgroup. Alternatively if you 


could demonstrate there was nothing about the 


activities that were going on in ’49 and ’48 


that were substantially different than -- than 


we’re going on 1950 -- then I can see you using 


the full distribution. So I -- I guess I --


I’m working my way through this as we’re 


working the problem. I think you’ve got a 


tractable situation. I’m just not quite sure 


if, you know, do we have a situation in ’49 and 


’48 where the activities were substantially 


different? What I’m hearing from Arjun is that 


there was such activities but I’m not quite 

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sure whether those activities created the 


circumstance which had a substantially high 


potential for exposure than let’s say the other 


activities that were going on and that 


continued into 1950 and ’51. 


DR. NETON: I think -- Mark, go ahead. 


MR. GRIFFON: I was just going to say, just to 


flip that around, do you have any reason to 


believe, Arjun, that these operations -- I mean 


you picked these out particularly because you 


thought that these may not be bounded by the 


approach or --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well -- Well, I picked them 


out particularly for two reasons. One -- One 


is that since the co-worker model starts in 


1952 the going back into the era where work 


that was being done that was different than 


these three buildings, I felt that the validity 


of that co-worker model should be applied to 


the job types in these three buildings because 


there was different types of work. And the 


second reason is, yes, you know, the 


decommissioning and recommissioning operation 


involved substantially contaminated equipment. 


They were dealing with scrap and recycling 

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uranium and scrap recovery operations are often 


-- have often been pretty dirty, at least in 


those early periods. They -- They involved --


involved kind of difficult work. If you go to 


Ames in 1945 for instance, you know, you -- you 


-- you have pretty highly exposed workers. So 


there’s no judgment here that the -- the -- the 


data from 1952 wouldn’t bound the earlier doses 


but the kinds of job types were different and 


were of the type where significant exposures 


were certainly possible. I -- I think that 


demonstration has to be made and that’s the 


point of the comment, not that the doses can’t 


be reconstructed or -- or that this is an SEC 


issue. But it has to be ruled out as an SEC 


issue or by the construction of a specific 


demonstration. 


MR. GRIFFON: Jim, do you know of any air 


sampling data during that time period that you 


might be able to use to make your argument to 


say that, you know, we -- we’re applying two 


years of chronic or three years of chronic 


exposure up to when we have a urine sample, and 


here’s the dose we would have received in air 


sampling, limited air sampling that we have in 

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these buildings suggests that, you know, we’re 


over-estimating if nothing, you know -- 


DR. NETON: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean is --


DR. NETON: I’m not aware right now -- 


MR. GRIFFON: That might be a way to -- 


DR. NETON: But what I -- what I’m concerned 


about here is --


MR. GRIFFON : Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- why do we believe -- do we 


believe that all of a sudden in 1951 or ’52 


this is an entirely different work force that’s 


monitored? I mean that would have to be the 


case for this to be invalid. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, that’s not the argument. 


DR. MAURO: I don’t think we’re saying that. 


We’re saying within the work force which were 


the number of people were about the same 


throughout those years. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. No, they doubled in -- 


they went up. 


DR. MAURO: There was a subset. 


DR. NETON: But what my -- But my point is, 


though, that if -- if that subset is included 


in this analysis --

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MR. GRIFFON: Then it’s appropriate. 


DR. NETON: Then it’s appropriate and what John 


said is true. It’s -- It’s a decision whether 


it’s the 50th or the 95th percentile I mean but 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: But if -- If this subset is 


covered in this monitoring then these people 


are their own long-term integrators of their 


own exposure in 1949 and ’50 or ’48 and ’49. 


mean that’s the whole concept here and I'm not 


sure Arjun was quite grasping that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Maybe not. 


MR. GRIFFON: Additionally I got to say --


additionally I didn’t --


DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) you know that 


the recycle workers were there in the later 


years and were monitored and therefore you know 


what their exposures were and that you iden-- ­

- I -- I haven’t seen the recycle workers 


identified as a subset in the later years for ­

- for checking whether their exposures were 


comparable to or less than production workers. 


DR. NETON: Now, my point is -- is if these are 


the same workers or similar groups of workers 


I 
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that were working in ’48 and ’49 -- I don’t 


think they laid everybody off in ’49 and hired 


new uranium --


DR. MAURO: Yeah, Jim, in a way I -- I see 


exactly where you’re going. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: In the extreme, in the limit, and 


we’re going to write this story as to what’s 


the worst possible thing that can happen. 


Okay. Out of these 2,500 workers that were 


working there in 1948 there’s this large group 


of them that were doing decommissioning work, 


that were getting these very large exposures 


and held large -- large -- large amounts of 


material, much larger than anything anyone 


experience, let’s say from 1950 onward, and 


they all left in 1949 and we never caught them. 


And we never caught -- and so therefore their ­

- the urinalysis data that we picked up in ’50 


-- I would -- I for one will argue that that is 


a scenario that certainly would defeat your -- 


your methodology. But I think it’s really 


hard-pressed to postulate if such a thing 


occurred. So I guess I’m coming down where you 


are. 

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MR. GRIFFON: I would tend to agree with that 


and --


DR. NETON: So -- Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I believe I -- I’ve 


stated what my issue was. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And it’s up to the Board, of 


course, to go where it should. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. And it’s also -- I think 


we’ve done five and six. What I’d -- what I’d 


suggest right now is can we break for lunch and 


then we’ll pick up on seven and hopefully -- 


because Rocky people are going to be on the 


line at 2:00 p.m. or thereabouts. 


DR. WADE: We can work some of them. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah. Hopefully we can 


complete Y-12 fairly quickly and not -- 


DR. WADE: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- you know, and then get to 


Rocky. Is that -- Is that okay with everyone? 


DR. WADE: Okay. So back at 2:00 ready to 


work. 


MR. GRIFFON: 2:00 p.m. 


DR. NETON: Okay. Great. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. Thank you. Bye. 

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MS. MUNN: Rocky, be back at 2:00. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 1:05 p.m. 


to 2:05 p.m.) 


DR. WADE: I think there were some Y-12 issues 


open. I think some of our friends from Rocky 


Flats are on the line but we need to do what we 


need to do. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I think what I’d ask is if 


we can just try to conclude Y-12 and then move 


into Rocky understanding that the folks from 


Rocky are on with us. We didn’t quite finish 


this morning. We’re going to try to wrap up. 


And I just -- just to -- I just want to go back 


to five and six for one second, Jim and John 


and Arjun. 


MS. MUNN: Are Jim and John and Arjun on yet? 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, are they on? 


DR. MAURO: John Mauro, I’m here. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, NIOSH is here. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. And SC&A is on? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah? Okay. For five and six, I 


just wondered if -- the only question I had 


there was I had mentioned whether NIOSH had any 


data that could sort of, you know, such as air 

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sampling data that could demonstrate for these 


particular I guess D&D salvage, whatever -- 


whatever kind of workers they were, that this 


co-worker approach is bounding. And I -- I 


guess, you know, that may, you know, once and 


for all sort of put this -- this concern to 


bed. I mean I guess the -- the real question 


that’s still out there, it seems as though if ­

- if those workers were in that monitoring pool 


then -- then the co-worker approach described 


by Jim may well be bounding. But if there was 


other data, you know, if this was followed up 


to -- to at least look at -- at the concerns as 


to whether they were monitored later, in the 


later years, you know, or a set of those people 


that did that kind of work were actually 


monitored. You know, it seems reasonable to 


believe that they might have been. And -- And 


a second follow-up might be, you know, is there 


any like summary air data in any of the HP 


reports that might say here’s, you know, 


average levels and if we compare intake based 


on the co-worker approach versus air sampling 


data, you know, the co-worker model seems very 


claimant favorable or whatever. I -- I think 

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that it would at least strengthen that case if 


NIOSH could demonstrate that. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Hey, Jim. This is Bill 


Tankersley. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: We certainly can identify 


those people easily enough if you choose to go 


that direction. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, thanks, Bill. I think that ­

- that would be one approach to go back and 


show that, you know, they didn’t fire everybody 


in 1950 and hire a new work of -- group of 


uranium workers or something to that extent. I 


don't know about air monitoring data, Mark. I 


think in ’48 and ’49 it’s going to be pretty -- 


pretty small and then -- then you always get 


into the issues of representativeness and 


because it’s BZ versus GA and for us to put 


that --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: It sometimes causes -- raises more 


questions than it answers. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: But, you know, and I just recognize 


that if -- if -- it’s going to be Friday here 

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pretty soon and I’m flying to Denver on Monday. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I know. 


DR. NETON: And I don't know what we can 


realistically expect by then but we will do the 


best we can. We hear what you’re saying and 


all those are great strategies to try to -- to 


bolster our position and we’ll do what we can. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. I just --


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. Let’s move on to 


seven then I think, Arjun. If you can present 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. Seven -- Seven is 


partly the same issue as -- as five and six for 


external dose in that except for the co-worker 


model you’ve got 56 to 65 doses where the work 


was completely different than these 


decommissioning workers. And again I -- I’m 


not sure what -- and then for 1950 and ’51 


you’ve got all the beta and gamma entries being 


zero in the database. So at least I -- I 


couldn’t see where one would find a piece of 


information to validate that co-worker model. 


I’m not saying that it isn’t valid or bounding 


but that it hasn’t been demonstrated to be 

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bounding. I did take a look also at the number 


of records available and then looked at the 


fine print in -- in the NIOSH documentation and 


it seemed to me that while the -- the table in 


-- in the ER, table 6-2, says there are 11,000­

and-odd records, the number of -- there are --


there are -- the records that are counted are ­

- are four records actually and the -- the PIC 


records and the film badge records are all 


counted separately even though the film badge 


records are not regarded as reliable up to 


1950. And then the film badge records are kind 


of questionable. Most of them are either zeros 


or limit of detection and it’s not clear that 


there was -- NIOSH itself says, you know, that 


they were 30 millirem or zero entered and it 


seems both were used as the equivalents of 


limit of -- below limit of detection. And then 


the film badge data are not to be used because 


they were unreliable. So one’s left with 


ionization chamber data and it seemed to me 


that the non-zero record -- I didn’t do an 


actual count. I -- I -- I did a kind of a 


little bit of a sampling as to how many nonzero records there may be and -- and it seemed 

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like there were only about 1,000 or 1,500 


records or one -- one per worker per -- per ten 


weeks. And -- And that seemed a pretty slim 


basis on which to compare the co-worker model, 


especially for this group of workers so that’s 


-- it’s sort of -- it’s a little bit more 


involved than the -- than the internal dose 


question because there’s no monitoring at all 


for ’48 and ’49 on internal dose. 


MR. KERR: I’d like to speak to that because I 


think you’re taking the fact that the film 


badge data for ’48 and ’49 was unreliable. 


You’ve taken that out of context. That’s not 


what -- That’s not what the TIB says. It was 


thought at one time it was unreliable -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I quoted --


MR. KERR: but we went back -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I quoted --


MR. KERR: to look at that data -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I quoted the TIB actually. 


MR. KERR: Now, but you took it out of context 


is what you did because earlier it was thought 


that that was unreliable. We went back and 


showed that there was good agreement between 


the PICs and the film badge data. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: So are you saying you’re using 


the PIC at POC? 


MR. KERR: No, we’re not using it but -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: (Unintelligible) data were to 


be used. 


MR. KERR: The reason we went back and looked 


at that data was so if we could see our coworker model of predicting doses back in ’48 


and ’49 was truly claimant favorable. And if 


you go back and look at the ’48 data and you 


look at the PIC data and you look at the film 


badge data and you compare with what we predict 


back in ’48/’49, our -- our estimates of dose 


for the workers back in those days on the -- on 


the co-worker model that we’re using are 


extremely claimant favorable. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Now, why did -- Bill 


Tankersley is on the phone. I guess maybe he 


can -- he can explain his 1987 paper and -- and 


whether I took it out of context. I just 


quoted it saying -- I’m trying to find the 


quote here. It’s in the report somewhere. 


MR. KERR: It’s -- It’s in the discussion 


section. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. And where he said that 

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the earlier data were regarded as unreliable 


and I -- I --


MR. TANKERSLEY: (Inaudible) 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Sorry, I can’t hear. 


MR. GRIFFON: We can’t hear. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Can’t hear. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: (Inaudible) 


DR. NETON: Bill Tankersley, are you on the 


phone? 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Yes, I am. I’m not quite sure 


what paper he’s referring to. 


MR. GRIFFON: We’ve got a lot of interference 


all of a sudden. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, it’s table 6-2 in the 


evaluation report. And --


UNIDENTIFIED: -- that interference -- 


DR. WADE: (Inaudible) I don't know what it 


is. That’s better. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Let me -- Let me see here. 


Okay. Table 6-2 in the evaluation report for 


’48 and ’49 says that 3,599 records for 162 


monitored employees in ’48 and 7,893 for 49 


monitored employees in -- in 1949. So I could 


not match up the 49 monitored. It seemed there 


were more monitored employees than the 49 but I 

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couldn’t resolve the differences. And then I 


found the issues described in section 5.2 of 


the SC&A reports above those records including 


the statement from you as to the -- well, I 


won’t characterize it so you can -- about -- 


about the quality of the film badge data prior 


to 1950, referring to a 1987 paper by you. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Well, actually I don't 


remember -- I don't remember writing that. 


We’ve never questioned -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, in -- in 0-TIB-47 on page 


13 it says that the film badge readings prior 


to 1950 were “considered questionable because 


of frequently changed procedures and a 


perceived general lack of monitoring quality 


control during this period”. And I’ll -- I’ll 


just open --


 MR. KERR: Bill? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Open the TIB because it sites ­

-


MR. KERR: Bill? 


DR. MAKHIJANI If I remember correctly it sites 


a 1987 paper by you. 


MR. KERR: No, it’s an ’82. It’s ’82 and it’s 


a memorandum to Shirley Fry (ph). 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Let -- Let -- Let -- Let me 


go to the TIB and so I can verify my memory 


here. Okay, 47, page 13 -- page 13 -- yes. 


Pre-1982, you’re right, George. But it is 


Tankersley, 1982. 


MR. KERR: Right. Okay. But now, read the 


next to the last sentence in that same 


paragraph, the 1948, 1949. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


MR. KERR: Read that sentence. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. (Reading) Personnel -- 


’48/’49 personnel dosimetry study that Y-12 


demonstrated that film badges provided a 


reliable and convenient method for monitoring 


shallow doses both in low energy photons and 


penetrating whole-body doses from gamma rays. 


So what -- what was the 1982 paper about? 


MR. KERR: It was because the data had never 


been looked and detailed before. It was just 


thought or perceived that it wasn’t very 


reliable and -- because of frequently changed 


procedures and -- and a general lack of 


monitoring quality control and it was a 


perception in that data up until this study. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Let me -- Let me add this, 

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too, please. Keep in mind that was 1982, more 


than 20 years ago. That may very well -- I 


mean I don’t have the paper in front of me -- 


that may very well have been before we even had 


the original data. I assure you that we -- we 


did get those original data. I held the cards 


in my hand. I looked at them again a week ago 


or something. And we ultimately got the 


original data; I don’t mean photocopies of it, 


the original double-sided cards and so forth. 


And I don’t -- I don’t think any of us now 


question the -- I mean obviously there are 


shortcomings in any -- any monitoring data but 


none of us questioned the credibility of those 


data, neither the film badge nor the -- the PIC 


data. I don't know exactly -- I’d have to look 


at that paper and -- and also think about it in 


light of it being a 1982 memo to -- to Dr. Fry. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: So I -- I must confess I’m 


confused because normally your practice is to 


use film badge data as the data of record. 


MR. KERR: No, in the early days the PIC data 


was used as a -- as the -- as the measurement 


of record. And that’s true at both Oak Ridge 


National Laboratory, that’s true of Hanford, 

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and that’s true of Y-12. In the early days the 


PICs were considered the -- the dose of record. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And what was the limit of 


detection on the PICs? 


MR. KERR: It depends on how -- the model you 


chose and -- and typically there were 200 


millirem per day, 2 to 300 millirem per day. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. But I saw entries as low 


as five millirem. 


MR. KERR: Well, you could read them down to 


that if the scale on them, depending on what 


scale you used and what sensitivity you used, 


you could read them down to probably five. We 


wrote a paper, there’s a paper on -- on the Oak 


Ridge website where we went back and looked at 


the PIC data and the badge data and ORNL in the 


early days and we used the PIC data to compare 


with -- with the -- with the film badge data. 


You can see what kind of comparisons you get 


when you do the two. 


MR. GRIFFON: George, can you explain to me, 


and I understand you said the limit of 


detection was 2 to 300 millirem per day but you 


could read them down to five? 


MR. KERR: Yeah. Typically the scale, on them 

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you could read some of them, say if they were 


200 millirem per day, the scale was such you 


could probably read down to five, ten -- five 


or ten millirem. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Keep in mind that one of the 


reasons why the -- the PIC chambers have such a 


poor reputation is because, you know, the 


readings can be thrown off by dropping the -- 


the badge, things like that. That’s the reason 


why they typically wore them in pairs. If I 


remember correctly on that set of data, the 


’48/’49 data, both of the PIC chamber readings 


are on there. 


MR. KERR: Right. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: And then, you know, when they 


have good agreement that’s the reason why 


they’re still used today because they have good 


agreement; it’s generally accepted that it’s a 


reading. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I only saw one PIC entry 


in the database. 


MR. GRIFFON: It usually had a slash, didn’t 


it, Arjun? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s the two readings I think. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: I -- I don't recall that. 


Yeah. 


MR. KERR: Yes, and -- and then also, Mark, 


sometimes if they do not put both readings on 


there I -- I know that sometimes it’s on there; 


I’ve seen it. But they also have a field there 


called TSR which is the total significant 


reading and that I think typically means that 


they have, you know, put the two together and 


averaged them or whatever. I can’t quite 


remember what that looks like. 


MR. CHEW: George, this is Mel. Just have 


clarification for Mark, made a comment about. 


It’s not 200 millirem per day (unintelligible). 


And yet, the chamber can read from zero to 200 


millirem --


MR. KERR: It’s zero to 200 millirem but 


typically they --


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MR. KERR: -- they wore it (inaudible) each 


day. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, that sounds more like it. 


Okay. 


MR. KERR: They -- They wore them each day. 


MR. GRIFFON: I was confused, but the 

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terminology was throwing me off there. Okay. 


MR. CHEW: I just wanted to make sure you -- 


you got that, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Thank you. 


MR. CHEW: Good. You’re welcome. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But if they’re wearing them 


every day the number -- the number record will 


indicate that. 


MR. KERR: Well, at Oak Ridge, you know, they ­

- people wore PICs every day to work in 


radiation zones. I, you know, wore -- they 


were wearing them up into -- they still wear 


them. And when I went to work at ORNL in the 


‘60s and ‘70s we wore -- I wore a set of pocket 


ionizations chambers every day. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But I guess -- I guess the 


question --


MR. KERR: And those were not -- those were not 


now part of the official records. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, but then were they read and 


recorded every day or -- 


MR. KERR: Yes. Yes, because we got weekly, 


monthly and quarterly printouts of the -- of 


the PIC totals. And when they exceeded 500 


millirems we pulled the workers’ badges and had 

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them developed, if they were over 500 millirems 


we restricted them from going back in a 


radiation field for the rest of the quarter, 


because we limited their yearly doses to two 


rem. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: I believe if you’ll look at 


the -- those data, well, it could -- looking at 


electronic data, the cards actually have a -- a 


field, a block for each day. And I think one 


side of the card -- help me remember, George -- 


I think it covers two weeks at a time or -- 


MR. KERR: Right. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: -- or something like that. 


MR. KERR: Yeah. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: And so you -- they add -- they 


do have the individual daily readings across 


the card and then at the end there’s -- there’s 


about six fields, film badge, open window, 


shielded and maybe one other. Then -- Then 


they have the -- the PIC chamber that’s sum of 


the week and then (inaudible) significant 


reading. You’d really have to see the 


original, you know, card to see. Heck, no, we 


certainly didn’t put in all of that. We put in 


the -- you know, the -- the added data, the 

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summary data at the right side of the card. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: These are summed like for a 


week or two? 


MR. TANKERSLEY: I think -- I think a week. 


I’d have to --


MR. KERR: Yeah, because the -- the film badge 


data was for a week. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, that -- That puzzled me. 


MR. KERR: Okay. 


DR. WADE: We have to move on. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, let’s -- Let’s go. Arjun, 


where do we stand on this issue then? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: I don't know. I guess --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- if Hans might -- you know, 


I’m not the internal -- external dose person 


here and I guess it’ll be up to the rest of the 


team to figure out and tell me what to write 


here ‘cause as I said I -- I -- I just have 


coordinated a lot of this and -- and -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- maybe Hans and John can tell 


me where to go on it. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, at least I mean I think we 


have a better understanding, too. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, right. 


MR. GRIFFON: And we -- We just did receive 


this database so it’s hard to -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. Yeah, no question I 


think I -- I understand the -- the -- the 


numbers better. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: We’ll just have to go back and 


see what we can do. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: I’d like to --


MR. GRIFFON: And take this discussion into 


account for the final draft. Go ahead. I'm 


sorry. 


DR. NETON: That’s okay. I just want to point 


out we need to look at what kind of work was 


going on at ’48/’49 versus when there was 


really uranium there. I mean '48 and '49 as we 


talked about was cleanup of residual uranium in 


the Calutron. 


MR. KERR: No, I think they were starting to 


already mill depleted uranium back in ’48 and 


’49. 


DR. NETON: Okay. Okay. 


MR. KERR: Because one thing they did was they 

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were making shields for sources out of depleted 


uranium. 


DR. NETON: There is a source term available 


for external. That’s what I was trying to get 


at. 


MR. KERR: Uh-huh. Okay. Okay. 


DR. NETON: I’ve got one more question and then 


we can move on. George, you mentioned that it 


-- the -- the co-worker model over-predicts 


what we would estimate based on the '48/'49 


data. That stands for about how much? 


MR. KERR: Jim, I’d have to go back and look at 


it. I -- I -- I can’t --


DR. NETON: My sense was that this was -- 


MR. KERR: It’s extremely conservative, let me 


say that. How much does it over-predict doses 


to people, back in those days, I can’t give you 


a figure off the top of my head. 


DR. NETON: I bet this is well above the 95th
 

percentile. 


MR. GRIFFON: When -- When you did that 


comparison, George, did you compare against 


these PID readings in the -- in the database we 


had, this '48/'49 database? 


MR. KERR: Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I did. 

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MR. GRIFFON: So that was the basis for -- 


MR. KERR: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. We might have to, you 


know -- SC&A, we might need a little more to 


look at that and reconsider this issue. 


MR. KERR: And you could see what would predict 


-- back -- if you’ll -- that last handout that 


I gave out on the -- on the gamma and -- and 


beta regression. You can go back to there’s 


five dose reconstructions at the end of that 


report. And go back to the one where the 


scaling factor was one and you can take those 


doses off yourself and compare what’s in that 


report. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. Let’s -- Because the 


Rocky folks are on, too, let’s move on to 


number eight. I think we got a good sense of 


what was in there so... 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, okay. I guess this is -- 


this is the big item. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: The -- We looked at, you know, 


there’s a -- there’s a lot of stuff in the 


evaluation report and as I said, a little bit 


of disclaimer in the beginning, focused on 

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table 45-B and didn’t -- not enough on 45-A so 


let me say here that it seems -- it seems that 


there was a broad kind of sort in -- that was 


fairly successful in the early period of 


putting people into these two bins in the 


various departments. And -- And the 


comparison -- the -- the reason we focused on 


the 45-B is if you -- that’s where the high 


exposed workers are supposed to be, more than 


30 millirem average dose from 61 to 65 and by 


department. And Harry Hariminsky (ph), the 


statistician on our team, took a look at that 


data and did some correlations between the -- 


the -- those departments that had relatively 


high doses from the -- that one table. They --


Did they have what -- what they correlated were 


the relatively high doses from the earlier 


period of monitoring. And there was a 


correlation but it was weak. And then there 


was a question of who was monitored in the 


earlier period and was there a correlation 


between the percentage of monitored people in 


the earlier period with those who were shown to 


have -- those departments that had the higher 


doses when everybody was monitored? And --

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And the assumption underlying the analysis is 


when everybody was monitored the average doses 


are -- are somewhat representative of exposure 


potential because as they go up you expect the 


distribution to shift to the right. And --


And that was also a pretty weak correlation and 


Harry concluded that the pre -- that the pre1961 workers moni-- who were monitored didn’t 


belong in the same distribution as the -- as 


those who were identified as having the highest 


doses in table 45-B from the ’61 to ’65 period 


when everybody was monitored. And so -- so it 


-- it seems that putting -- putting all of 


those -- the data for all of those workers into 


a single co-worker distribution doesn’t -- 


doesn’t seem appropriate. When we looked at -- 


at -- at the data it seemed that the 


supervisors -- you know, Hans had quoted, and I 


hope that Hans is on the line, so, Hans, a lot 


of the technical work is yours and correct me 


if I’m -- if I’m wrong. But it seemed like the 


-- the supervisors were -- had some idea of who 


was at high risk and then they were badging 


people according to that. And they made some 


good judgments and then badged nearly everybody 

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or the majority in those departments. And then 


some of the judgments were shown to be off in a 


later period. And that’s the problem with the 


lack of correlation. And so while they had the 


intent of catching people with high exposure 


potential, the lack of or weak correlations 


indicate they didn’t always succeed. And so we 


think that while it seems possible to make a 


co-worker model that would be claimant 


favorable with the available data, that that 


hasn’t been demonstrated with the existing 


model. 


MR. KERR: Well, we have because you go back 


and look at those five dose reconstructions we 


did. You -- Keep in mind that we scale these. 


We’ve got a -- a way to scale. If you are 


going to assign 95 percentile to workers you’re 


going to have five workers out of 100 that have 


doses higher than that 95 percent you’re going 


to assign if you’re basing it on actual 


distributions. Okay. We scale up based on the 


workers monitoring between 1961 and 1965. We 


are less apt to miss those high exposure people 


than you are with a co-worker model. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Anyway, I mean that -- that -- 

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that was our conclusion is that -- that the way 


the model is put together by -- by -- by using 


the data from these two periods is -- is -- is 


not appropriate. 


MR. KERR: Let Bill address that because we 


picked out workers that had the most monitoring 


data over a ten-year period and used them. And 


the only thing we were trying to do was to get 


a time trend in the data. And I don’t think 


there’s any question that the time trend shows 


that the gamma doses got smaller over time 


because of one, the fact that -- that -- that 


the -- the rate guides were reduced and -- and 


the fact that more and more workers were 


monitored with time which meant that you were 


constantly bringing in some more lowly exposed 


workers so there is a time trend in the data. 


And that’s the only thing we were trying to do 


was that group, one group that went from ’56 to 


’65 was to look at a time trend. And then that 


model is fit to where you have actual 


monitoring data and I cannot believe that if we 


picked out monitored workers and you apply that 


without scaling that you’re going under-predict 


for unmonitored workers. 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Well --


MR. KERR: And if they do have monitoring data 


we scale the doses upward. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, time trends are not -- 


not so clear, at least as I saw them because 


both for the gamma and beta doses in the 1950s, 


well, for the gamma first in the early ‘50s the 


number of zeros went up from the early ‘50s 


some 10 or 20 percent to 80 or 90 percent and 


then it went down to 10 percent. And for the 


beta doses the trends -- trends were reversed. 


So -- But it seemed to indicate that -- that 


people were honestly trying to find who was at 


risk but there was some -- some -- some 


experimentation or some -- some trial and error 


involved in what was happening there. 


MR. KERR: There’s three problems with the data 


before 1960 -- before 1956. That is you had 


small monitored worker population. You had 


frequent exchange of the badges. And you had a 


lot of assigned dose. And those things really 


mean that -- that for a lot of -- if you’re 


trying to go back and use the actual data for 


that period that you’re going to see you can’t 


fit it to a model. There’s no way you can 

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develop a co-worker model from going back from 


the actual data. I mean you get -- you get 


some things that are ridiculous. You get 


extremely -- the values scatter a lot. You get 


extremely in some cases small uncertainties in 


the data because where you have a lot of 


assigned dose to people their -- their high 


doses are all coming in in a single band, a 


small band. And it doesn’t make sense to do it 


that way and I -- I’m telling the way we 


constructed that model made sure it was 


claimant favorable. 


DR. BEHLING: Arjun, this is Hans. I’m on the 


line and I am not sure if this is the right 


time to bring up an issue that I had discussed 


with you, and that is the issue of quarterly 


doses prior to 1958 --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 


DR. BEHLING: -- defending full term exposure 


monitoring and -- and I think we might want to 


talk about that. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, go ahead. I mean you 


developed the issue. 


DR. BEHLING: Yeah. The issue is one of the 


following. Obviously prior to 1958 people 

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monitored on a weekly basis meaning that if 


there is a quarterly dose record prior to ’58 


there is the potential that a person may be 


part of that database having had a quarterly 


dose when in fact he was monitored for as few 


as one week out of 13 or all 13 weeks. And 


when I looked at the -- we don’t have the 


original data but I did a spot check and I will 


give you an example. For the -- For the 25th
 

week of 1958 which -- which the date after the 


criticality accident at Y-12 -- there is an inhouse memo that identifies the names and -- and 


badge numbers of all people who were monitored. 


And it turns out to be for that week, the 25th
 

week of 1958 there were 378 -- that would be 


378 people who were monitored that week. Yet 


when you go to, for instance, table 4-4 in the 


evaluation, in the appendix 1 of the SEC 


evaluation and you look at the third quarter 


you identify a total of 689 persons who were 


monitored in that quarter. And of course, 


there’s now a -- almost a factor of two 


discrepancy which leads me to believe that you 


may have entered into the database people who 


were monitored in any given quarter who were 

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not monitored for the full 13 weeks during 


which the dosimeters were being handed out and 


read meaning that a person with potentially as 


few as one weeks of exposure will be part of 


that database and the database the way it is 


currently constructed which assume in that 


whatever quarterly badges -- quarterly dose 


records are available, that that person was 


monitored for each and every 13 weeks. Now, 


after 1961 when the cycle was extended to 


quarterly cycles, that does not affect when you 


deal with monthly, and worse yet with weekly, 


just because you have a record for an 


individual does not necessarily mean that that 


individual was monitored for the full duration 


of that particular quarter. And so what I’m 


saying is that just based on that one single 


spot check -- check involving the 25th week of 


1958 where you only had 378 people monitored, 


that is almost a factor of two lower than the 


total number of people monitored for the 


counted quarter, the third counted quarter of 


1958. 


MR. KERR: Okay. Those ones that you picked 


out of the table, those were coming out of this 

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TIB-47 that we talked about earlier. Those 


were not -- those were just estimates that said 


how many people were being monitored during 


that period. And it just took the number of 


records that were turned in and divided by 13 


weeks per quarter to get an estimate. And 


that’s -- that’s clearly explained in that 


report. So you shouldn’t be comparing that 


with the other more -- what do I want to say -- 


fundamental thing of going in and identifying 


workers. But you’ve got to consider the way 


that the quarterly doses were -- were obtained. 


And the quarterly doses, and I -- I -- I hate 


to quote on this right now but I have a couple 


memos here of how quarterly doses were done. 


And they took each of the individual positive 


records they had and summed them up for that 


individual. And then they tried to correct 


that quarterly total for missed dose. And the 


way they did that was they took the number of 


film badges each and divide that by the number 


of positive records. So if that person had, 


say, was issued 13 film badges for the whole 


quarter and then they come back in and said 


okay, he was -- had 10 positive records, we’ll 

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up his dose by the ratio of 13 over 10. So, 


you know, this is one of the reasons why I 


think we sometimes had trouble going back into 


the database. And the reason for coming up 


with quarterly doses and yearly doses was I 


forget what year it was, you know, they started 


saying, well, you got to have -- you got to 


keep the dose under a certain limit depending 


on age. And when they did those quarterly 


doses they did in fact try to account for any 


missing dose or quarters or weeks in which they 


did not have a record for that -- that worker. 


And he could have been on vacation. He could 


have been off sick. He could have been 


transferred to another job temporarily or 


something. But I’m saying that they’ve -- 


they’ve tried to adjust those for missing dose. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill Tankersley and 


that procedure is well documented. It was 


written by C. M. West if I’m not mistaken and I 


know that document is on the O-drive. 


MR. KERR: Yeah, it sure is. 


DR. BEHLING: Could you make that available 


because as I said, right now I have not had any 


reason to come to that conclusion that for 

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instance a person who is part of that quarterly 


record --


MR. KERR: As a matter of fact that may be in 


that gamma report. I’d have to look and see. 


DR. BEHLING: Okay. Could you -- Could you 


identify that document? 


MR. KERR: And -- And I’m sure like Bill says, 


I’m almost positive that that -- that is on the 


O-drive. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Yes, I know it is. It’s been 


sent up there, you know, months or years ago. 


MR. KERR: When this question came up before. 


DR. WADE: Well, can you let Hans know where it 


is then and --


MR. KERR: Yeah, okay. I’ll get the record 


number. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. BEHLING: The next thing that I had, a 


person who could have been monitored for 


(inaudible) that he would be part of that 


database in -- in that -- that would be 


necessary to adjust. That -- That’s the 


central question that I have. 


MR. KERR: Well, it would have been adjusted; 


if he -- if he was missing some weeks it 

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probably would have been adjusted upward to try 


to account for any missing dose that he might 


have had due to a damaged film badge, due to a 


zero reading, due to the fact it wasn’t turned 


in, it was lost. And those when they didn’t 


have the full 13 weeks there was an adjustment 


made. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Or -- Or people were taken off 


monitoring, too. I mean --


MR. KERR: Well, that’s true, too. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- of the examination that you 


did of, I don't know, 15/20 workers or 30 


workers I guess, there were examples of seven 


workers who were found to have low doses and 


then were taken off monitoring. So those -- I 


don't know if they are partial quarters or full 


quarters but -- but there certainly seem to be 


people who went on monitoring and off 


monitoring. 


MR. KERR: They took the transferred workers 


from one to the other on a -- on a quarterly 


basis or semi-yearly basis or yearly basis. 


They didn’t -- They didn’t take people off 


just in the middle of the year unless they, you 


know, were terminated, the people quit or 

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whatever. Typically those -- those rolls were 


looked at like every quarter. 


DR. BEHLING: I guess to -- to finalize this 


issue and get on with other issues, but I do 


still have a problem in trying to reconcile the 


number of 689 that is in table 4-4 as defined 


as I guess in -- defined as the 378 people who 


were in fact identified by name and -- and 


badge number who were monitored in the 25th
 

week of -- of 1958. To me I can certainly 


understand a minor discrepancy where maybe ten 


people, maybe somebody left -- left employment, 


etcetera, would come in or leave the -- the -- 


the -- the -- the -- the database and -- and 


essentially not be part of the full number for 


that count a quarter. But I can’t see a factor 


of two being -- being something that you can 


reconcile with the explanation such as 


retirement or -- or --


MR. KERR: Well, I’m just saying that -- that ­

- that those others were just a very crude 


estimate by dividing the number of records by 


assuming 13 and saying, well, that’s how many ­

- that’s possibly how many that -- that’s the 


minimum number of people who were -- who were 

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monitored. And I even think you -- you -- it 


is possible that the values that -- and this is 


quoting from your report on page 15 -- it is 


possible that the values in ORAU O-TIB-47 are 


incorrect because they were deduced from the 


number of records assuming there would be about 


one record per worker per week. And that’s 


essentially how those values were determined. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, but --


MR. KERR: Where the other went in and looked 


at -- at the number of workers that were 


involved in detail. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, but --


MR. KERR: If there’s a factor two difference, 


so be it. I, you know, that’s just -- that’s 


just the way the two tables were differently 


constructed. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But -- But George, the example 


that Hans is giving has a factor of two 


difference in the other direction. He had the 


example from the number of workers who were 


monitored in that week being a factor of two 


less than the ones that were calculated by 


dividing by 13. And what you’re arguing is 


that the -- the number of 600-and-odd should be 

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a minimum number so --


MR. KERR: Well, that could be -- that could -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- should be larger so -- 


MR. KERR: That could be someplace -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- direction. 


MR. KERR: You know, that could be a place 


where they adjusted a number of workers. I 


don't know. You know, we just had to go back 


and look at it. I have no idea why there’s 


that difference. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: So if it’s actually -- 


MR. KERR: It’s just there. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: The direction that’s the 


troubling part. 


MR. KERR: It’s just there and that may be a 


place where they did adjust workers back in the 


early days by, you know, in -- in some interim 


period. 


DR. BEHLING: I guess I don't know what 


footnote 12 in table 4-4 says. Footnote 12 


which represents the N value and the footnote 


says N therefore is the total number of 


quarterly doses which to me suggests that you 


monitored a total of 689 people in that 


calendar quarter. 

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MR. KERR: All I can say is those tables were 


constructed differently and I don't know 


whether that reflects the way the tables were 


constructed or reflects a difference in the 


data that -- that is -- was used to make them. 


The only way we could tell what -- what’s 


happened there is to go back and look. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Bill. I’m a little 


bit confused here but I heard Hans say a moment 


ago if those were the number of quarterly doses 


would equal the number of people. That 


wouldn’t be true typically and then we verified 


this a number of times against the health 


physics report; it would be one-fourth of the 


number of people. 


DR. BEHLING: I don’t understand that 


relationship. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Well, because they’re 


monitored -- the -- the results are recorded 


per quarter. 


DR. BEHLING: If you had -- Let’s assume that 


the number of people that they monitored in the 


25th
 week of 1958 were in fact a stable 


population of people. They were monitored 13 


weeks each. You would expect in table 4-4 for 

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quarter number (unintelligible) to have 378 as 


the value of N and that’s what I’m contesting 


or questioning. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Again, I -- I don’t quite 


follow you there but you’d expect to have about 


four times that number of records, one -- of 


one for each quarter for each person. 


DR. BEHLING: No, no, these are quarterly dose 


values that I’m citing to you in table 4-4 in 


appendix 1. I’m referring to page 25, bottom 


of page 25. It has 1968, 2-3, 3rd quarter, and 


the number of records, quarterly records are 


689. And yet when I as a single spot check 


checked the number of people badged for the 


25th week there were only 378 which is 


approximately a factor of two lower. And as I 


said, I cannot reconcile that big difference 


realizing that perhaps maybe certain people 


came into the system or left the system so that 


the number of 378 would be potentially perhaps 


greater by a factor of 10 people or 20 people 


but not by a factor of two. 


MR. KERR: The only thing I can say is we’ll 


just have to look at the tables and see why 


there’s a discrepancy between them. I don’t 

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really know. 


MR. GRIFFON: I would -- I would also suggest 


that, you know, maybe prior to the Board 


meeting, Jim, you know, you -- maybe you should 


review this -- the statistical approach offered 


by SC&A and, you know, if you have a rebuttal 


to that or -- or, you know, because I think we 


still have a difference of opinion. And of the 


last question, I think -- 


DR. NETON: Well, I think Mark, we can do that 


but --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- this has been on the table for 


two months and we just got a 20-page report for 


statistical analysis yesterday. It’s going to 


be hard to do that. 


DR. MAURO: Jim, this is John Mauro. What I 


would ask is there are two -- there are figures 


1, 2 and 3 in -- in the appendix to this 


report. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: This statistical workup, there’s 


three figures. One of the figures, figure 3, 


based on the analysis, actually supports your 


position that there was a concerted effort to 

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monitor more people who were in the departments 


that had the greater potential for exposure 


which argues that it wasn’t a pure cohort 


sampling situation. It was a concerted effort 


to monitor more of the people in those 


departments that were expected to have the 


highest exposures so -- so figure 3 in this 


attachment provides some evidence, speaks for 


itself, that -- that -- there was that tendency 


going on. What -- However, figures 1 and 2 


provide information that -- that says that 


there is -- it’s very hard for you to say 


something about a given department. That is, a 


department that may have experienced high 


exposures post-1961 may not have experienced 


high exposures pre-1961. There was almost no 


relationship between the two. And -- And that 


figure, figure 1 and figure 2 is troubling to 


me. It’s almost as if they were -- the 


relationship between post- and pre-exposures do 


not follow any predictable patterns by 


department or within department. To try to 


bring this to closure, if you wouldn’t mind, 


just take a look at that figure 1 and figure 2 


on page 30 of our report and maybe we could 

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talk a little bit about that. And -- And it 


would be fine with me that we could even talk 


about it, you know, tomorrow or -- or Monday 


because it does tell us a story that -- that 


raises questions whether the extrapolation 


approach that you folks have adopted can really 


work. I think if those questions could be 


answered maybe we can put -- put this thing to 


bed. 


MS. MUNN: Hans, I have one question. Did you 


run a similar spot check on any other week? 


Did you do only that one week? 


DR. BEHLING: Well, that’s the only data I 


could find. I guess it would like be nice if 


we could look at multiple time frames but it 


turns out that apparently in the aftermath of 


the Y-12 criticality accident I guess there was 


some concern about who did we monitor and what 


are their exposures and how close did they come 


to meeting regulatory or admin limits, 


etcetera, etcetera. So it turned out that that 


was just perhaps useful interoffice memos that 


allowed me to look at that but if there’s any 


other data out there, Wanda, I don’t have it. 


And so it was just a -- just a snapshot in 

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time, allowed me to look at those individual 


numbers and then compare it to table 4-4 in the 


appendix 1 of the SEC evaluation report. 


MS. MUNN: Right. I just was trying to make 


the point for myself that a single instance 


where we have these puzzling numbers doesn’t 


necessarily cause me to jump to the conclusion 


that virtually all of the numbers might suffer 


from that same defect. 


DR. BEHLING: No, well --


MR. GRIFFON: That’s interesting, too, Wanda, 


because let’s remember the reverse. 


MS. MUNN: Yeah, exactly. Exactly. 


MR. GRIFFON: You know, so --


MS. MUNN: And it’s -- but -- but I --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. MUNN: I’m trying to identify -- 


MR. GRIFFON: I agree. 


MS. MUNN: -- whether that was the only week 


that anyone even looked at. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I think everybody’s 


limited on the amount of raw records we can 


find to --


MS. MUNN: I understand. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- do comparisons, yeah. 

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DR. NETON: I guess -- I guess I want to get 


back to the original point that we had reached 


I thought several months ago. See, I’ve looked 


at these graphs and I have not had time to 


digest this 20-page analysis, I’ll be honest 


with you, because it came in at noon yesterday. 


But the point is I think if -- if it’s true, 


what you’re saying is true, that there is -- 


that the highest workers were not monitored, 


then we have a sampling of the workers. And 


why is that an SEC issue at that point if -- if 


then it’s a matter of picking the appropriate 


metric to -- to use for reconstructing 


unmonitored workers, that is, the 95th
 

percentile or the 50th percentile. What is the 


-- What is the -- Am I missing the issue 


here? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: If -- If you look at figure 2 


in which the percentage of monitored workers in 


the ’56 to ’60 period is correlated against the 


dose -- average doses in the ’61 to ’65 when 


there was universal monitoring, the correlation 


is -- is very weak. And so what -- what that 


says is that actually some of the departments 


that were at high risk were monitored at high 

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percentage times and some of them were 


monitored a low percentage of the time. And so 


actually what were the actual -- to establish 


that you know the actual exposure conditions in 


the high risk departments in -- in the -- in 


the ’56 to ’60 period seems -- at -- at this 


stage that job hasn’t been done. 


DR. NETON: Well, my point, Arjun, is if we 


assign the 95th percentile of all the monitored 


workers -- you know, we’re not -- you know, the 


only way this would not work I don’t think is 


if they preferentially monitored people who 


weren’t exposed. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I think that that’s 


clearly not true. 


DR. NETON: Well, then, okay. If that --


Given that’s the case then I don't know why a 


95th percentile co-worker model would not work. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Is that the -- Is that the one 


we have? 


DR. NETON: No. We -- We’re -- The argument 


or the discussion that we’ve been having is 


were the highest exposed workers monitored; and 


our position was if they were then we can 


assign the 50th percentile to the unmonitored 

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workers. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


DR. NETON: That’s the issue. And you -- you 


were arguing, and I need to look at your 


analysis, that that may not be true. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


DR. NETON: So now we have a sampling of the 


work force. And given that as a sampling then 


I would agree if that’s true that the 50th
 

percentile might not be appropriate and 


something like the 95th percentile might be -- 


might be a better estimate. But why that would 


be an invalid model then I'm not sure. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, we haven’t said that. 


DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: In fact -- In fact, what --


what is in the report, it -- it makes no 


judgment about whether this is an SEC issue or 


not. 


DR. NETON: That’s what I’m trying to -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: It makes no judgment about -- 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, Jim, you’re -- the amount 


on the table is what it represents. 


DR. NETON: That’s what I’m trying to get at, 

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Arjun, is we have a very limited amount of time 


here to deal with issues -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI : Yeah. 


DR. NETON: And -- And if this is not an SEC 


issue then I would prefer not to spend my 


entire weekend analyzing it. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: This is -- This is -- I guess 


I -- I will defer to Hans on this. As I said, 


this is -- I’m -- you know, this is a piece I’m 


coordinating. Ron and Hans have looked at 

this. It -- It’s your judgment call, Hans, 

not mine. 

DR. BEHLING: Yeah, I would say, and I will 

agree with Jim, it’s possibly not an SEC issue. 


In fact, I was just reading the recent draft 


for co-workers at Rocky Flats and where you 


give the option of using a 95th percentile 


value for unmonitored workers to -- who should 


have been monitored, and that to me is a very 


nice and claimant favorable approach that is 


clearly claimant favorable for the Rocky Flats 


dose reconstruction projects. There the coworker data is divided into 50th percentile 


value for people who are possibly only exposed 


part of their work period as opposed to the 

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95th percent value for people who were 


routinely or should have been routinely 


monitored. And I would concur if we were to 


default to a 95th percent value that would 


settle most of the questions and concerns. 


MR. GRIFFON: Hans? Hans, just can I offer 


maybe what SC&A needs to do in -- in -- in 


finalizing this report or a final draft of it 


is -- is to make that sort of statement or 


something, you know, if you’re comfortable with 


it, of course -- make that sort of statement 


within the body of the report. And then, you 


know, then it’s out there that, you know, you 


feel that based on your analysis a 95th
 

percentile model may be more appropriate 


because X, Y and Z as you presented but that it 


-- it would preclude -- it wouldn’t necessarily 


be an SEC issues. 


MR. KERR: And I -- And I would like to really 


see the -- a solid basis for the -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. KERR: -- for the argument. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, George. I don’t think 


anybody’s arguing that, you know, we would 

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adopt it if they so explained. 


MR. KERR: No, I understand that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, right, right, right. 


DR. NETON: But, you know, I -- I’m just 


trying to move things along, you know. 


MR. GRIFFON: I agree, Jim. I was going to say 


the same thing before you went into that is -- 


DR. NETON: Sorry. Sorry I pre-empted you. 


MR. GRIFFON: And we’ve -- We’ve -- We’ve 


said this before actually that this has been on 


the borderline of SEC site profile for awhile 


so I think maybe you can make a statement to 


that effect in your report, SC&A. 


MR. BUCHANAN: Yes, this is Ron Buchanan and I 


think that it’s been our position is that this 


would not be an SEC issue if you modified the ­

- the final. It isn’t so much the missing data 


as how it’s being used. 

DR. WADE: Okay. We need to move on. We 

really do. 

MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I’m 

saying I think the next three we can wrap up 


fairly quickly actually but maybe I’m wrong. 


Let’s go on to number 9. 


DR. NETON : Yeah. Can I just get a little 

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clarification that, you know, for number 8 SC&A 


may -- may modify their -- their -- their 


documents so that we don’t have to provide 


these analyses at this point or is that -- I 


mean I want to make clear what we’re going to 


provide. I mean we -- we’re certainly going 


to -- we’re certainly going to become familiar, 


you know, with the entire -- 


MR. GRIFFON: It sounds to me -- I mean Hans 


and Ron weighed in there for SC&A. It sounds 


to me like that’s right, Jim. 


DR. NETON: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: That you don’t need any more 


analyses I mean --


DR. NETON: Well, we will eventually but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Although, yeah. For site profile 


concerns. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, okay. Very good. All right. 


Number 9 gets into the polonium 208 issue and 


actually 9 and number 11 are somewhat related 


because they’re both Cyclotron issues. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s, yeah. 


DR. NETON: And so I’ll try to cover it 


somewhat in the same way. I think there’s a 


little bit of confusion as to what we meant to 

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do with the examples for the Cyclotron, that is 


the gallium and the polonium. Given our 


position, and I think SC&A understood that 


pretty clearly in their review, that -- that 


for the Cyclotron these are -- these tend to be 


episodic exposures over a period of time that 


were -- were followed up and tracked to ground 


and monitored, and we have a lot of indications 


we believe from the documents that we have in 


hand that that’s true. I’d emphasize that by 


doing a gallium intake assessment for -- 


admittedly the only one we could get our hands 


on quickly to get the analysis done admittedly 


is outside the 1957 period by three years, but 


it spoke to the issue of -- of not only were 


these things tracked to ground and -- and they 


do follow-ups on -- on incidents when there 


were target ruptures but also the -- the -- the 


relative magnitude of the deltas involved with 


these so-called exotic radionuclides that have 


very typically fairly short half-lives in the 


body and are fission products that -- not alpha 


emitters. They’re more beta gamma emitters. 


That was the intent of those examples that we 


provided. We -- We believe and we -- we still 

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have not provided to you but we believe we have 


sort of a five-prong approach (unintelligible) 


constructing these incidents. Through the HP 


reports that we have -- and there are some gaps 


in those reports because a few of them are 


still classified. Our folks have looked 


through them and they believe that they support 


our case that there is Cyclotron information in 


there that we can use to support these dose 


reconstructions. There are interoffice 


correspondences that we -- we have available, 


division reports and individual claimant files. 


We’ve looked through a number of individual 


claimant files looking at the CATIs that were 


done and out of the entire population right now 


we can only identify 11 or so individuals who 


indicate that they were involved in -- in 


Calutron/Cyclotron operations and -- and had -- 


maybe had some reference to incident. We’re 


working through those files now to identify the 


bioassay data, etcetera. But I want to point 


out that this is not a huge population of 


workers. This is a Cyclotron operation that -- 


that is involved. Some technical people, some 


maintenance folks and those types, but our 

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estimation is that -- that the affected 


population is somewhere in the vicinity of 


maybe 40 individuals because this was a unique 


isolated operation. Now, the Cyclotron targets 


were for the most part cladded. That is, you 


know, they were contained in cladding, exposed, 


pulled out and as Mel Chew nicely described it, 


had pictures, when the radiation was done and 


those targets were processed over at ORNL. In 


the few cases there were ruptures though, again 


we feel that we can track these bioassay 


follow-ups and incident reports through either 


the DOE submittals for the claimants or in the 


investigation reports that we talked about in 


delta view. The polonium period is slightly 


more problematic in the sense that in 1951 and 


’52 polonium exposures were -- were non-clad. 


They couldn’t get enough energy into these 


targets with the cladding in place so they were 


essentially bare targets that did dispense -- 


disperse some fairly significant levels of 


airborne alpha activity, although if you look 


in the 1951 and ’52 health physics reports 


there are indications where there are air 


sample results. I think there’s probably about 

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100 individual air sample results indicating 


they recognized the problem, they were 


controlling for it, they restricted access, all 


those sort of things. So I think between the 


incident reports, some of the air monitoring 


data we have and the nature that these were 


episodic, you know, discrete events, we -- we 


feel fairly confident that we can go back and 


reconstruct exposures to these workers. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: This is -- This is Arjun. The 


-- I -- I actually want to separate the 


polonium from the -- from the gallium example 


because even though they’re in the same area 


because --


DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- we found different issues 


with them. I think Jim -- Jim covered some of 


them. There is -- There -- There is a set of 


samples from 1953 that does appear to relate to 


an incident for polonium in 1953 and those seem 


-- I think most -- almost all but two of the 


samples relate to that incident best I could 


tell. I don’t have a description of the 


incident, just from the dates or how the 


sampling was done. 

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DR. NETON: Right. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Is that right, Jim? 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. The -- The -- But it ­

- It seems to me that we don’t know the years 


of production of polonium well because -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes -- Yes, we do. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I think we do. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. Because I found -- I 


found that the appendix 2 compilation was -- 


was not -- didn’t have anything for ’51 and ’53 


even though there was an accident in ’53. And 


so what -- what I -- what I mean to say is that 


I didn’t -- I didn’t see that the compilation 


was complete and so I don't know whether you 


have a complete set of data about that. 


DR. NETON: We -- We actually have, Arjun -- 


I'm sorry I -- I usurped your introduction 


there. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, no. No problem. 


DR. NETON: You saw my zeal to get -- 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, that’s -- shortness of 


time. 


DR. NETON: We have a production of polonium 


208 report from Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 

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It was the final report on termination of 


project, ORAU -- ORNL 1392, that goes in -- in 


-- in a lot of detail as to how much production 


there was by month --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- from the initiation of the 


polonium runs in 1951 through closure in August 


1952. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. If it’s unclassified it 


would be useful to see it. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, we can put that on -- on the 


O-drive for you. 


MR. RUTHERFORD: Sorry. I'm sorry. This is 


LaVon Rutherford. In fact that is already on 


the O-drive under Cyclotron and Calutron -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, it is? 


MR. RUTHERFORD: -- of the A-B (inaudible). 


It’s already there. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: So we do know production and again, 


we have some of these air sample data. The 


1953 data we -- we analyzed show that 


(inaudible) reconstruction for polonium 


(inaudible). 


DR. WADE: Jim, you’re cutting in and out. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


DR. NETON : We could do dose reconstructions 


for -- for polonium 208. There was some 


concern about that given bioassay data. And --


And we’ve used to -- to demonstrate proof of 


principle that we can actually do that if in 


these incident reports we run across a polonium 


208. 


MR. CHEW: Jim, this is Mel. Yeah, we -- We 


also were aware of there was an incident with 


polonium 210 from a polonium drilling neutron 


source that was -- was different from the 


polonium 208 and that could be the bioassay 


result because they just mentioned it was 


polonium. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, I see. Yes, that’s right. 


That was a question, too, because he had three 


different isotopes of polonium going on -- 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: -- binary. And the -- And the 


data actually only mentioned the element of the 


isotope. 


DR. NETON: That's correct. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. Okay. 


DR. NETON: So anyway --

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: I guess that’s about all I can say 


on our position right now. We -- We wish we 


had all these investigation reports out there 


for you to look at but we just don’t. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. No, I mean, Jim, I -- I 


just wrote up what I saw. That’s all. 


DR. NETON: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: Jim, I was going to -- just going 


to ask. You mentioned this five-prong 


approach. 


DR. NETON: Uh-huh. 


MR. GRIFFON: And I guess in the spirit of -- 


of sort of proof of principle the -- the better 


you can lay that out the -- 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON:-- you know, before the Board the 


better, you know, it will be in the situation 


that --


DR. NETON: I understand. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: It’s just --


MR. GRIFFON: I know. 


DR. NETON: It’s all coming out in time. 


MR. GRIFFON: In your situation, too, I know. 

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DR. NETON: Yeah, because I’m not -- 


MR. GRIFFON: We’ve been here before. 


DR. NETON: I’m not making apologies. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: I’m just trying to be realistic. 


DR. WADE: So what do we have left now in terms 


of -- of --


MR. GRIFFON: Wait. Maybe we should just pick 


up on the gallium there. Arjun, were you --


DR. MAKHIJANI: There’s a plutonium and a 


gallium, Mark. And I think I haven’t examined 


the plutonium dose reconstruction, nor I think 


has anybody else on our team because it does 


seem put up pretty recently. And -- But the 


plutonium data as we say here is more copious 


and it is from the period and there’s -- 


there’s one year that seems to possibly be 


missing but it could possibly be filled in by ­

- by co-worker data. It doesn’t seem to have 


the same kind of issues as we picked up from 


polonium. Does the gallium -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Is it obvious -- let me stop on 


the plutonium. Is it obvious who would -- 


would -- would be exposed to plutonium in those 


years? 

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, NIOSH has said based on 


limited information that there were only 


limited production parts there for a limited 


time that were solid and did not pose a 


potential for internal exposure. And so we’ve 


just re-quoted that and cannot make a judgment 


about it so for -- for the moment that’s where 


it stands. And haven’t come across any 


evidence to the contrary to NIOSH’s position 


certainly. 


MR. GRIFFON: There are a large number of 


bioassay samples from ’52 to ’56 it says. Why 


were they doing bioassay if there was no 


potential threat? 


DR. NETON: No, there were -- I think that 


these, and Mel Chew can correct me if I’m 


wrong, but this was the plutonium separations 


in the Calutrons. 


MR. CHEW: Right. That's correct. Uh-huh. 


DR. NETON: All right. And -- And so, you 


know, it’s clear in 1951 that they were 


thinking about it. It’s even mentioned in the 


health physics reports they mention that we 


need to think about getting ready for 1952 


production of plutonium. And so there was a 

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fair amount of separation going on in those 


years and -- and that’s why we have these 


bioassay samples. I think I would just like to 


comment on one of SC&A’s comments that, you 


know, we don’t have a co-worker model. The 


example that we provided went through and -- 


and -- and as a bounding analysis we proposed 


to use, and we identified the 95th percentile 


of all of the monitoring data we have. And as 


-- as a bounding analysis we would propose to 


use that in a -- as a -- as an intake, chronic 


intake scenario for plutonium. So we think we 


-- we have a handle on the upper limit of 


exposures based on the I think there are 600 or 


700 plutonium samples in the -- in this period. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: That's correct. 


DR. NETON: Which is not inconsistent 


necessarily with the number of workers that may 


have been working at the operation. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no. That's correct. I --


I agree there -- there -- there -- there are 


that number. Joyce, are you still on the line? 


MR. GRIFFON: Back to my question. 


DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, I’m still on the line. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Can we -- Can -- Will you 

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have the time to look at that? 


DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: Let me -- Yeah, let me ask this, 


too, Jim. Back to my question on how do you 


know who was working in the -- in this area? 


Is it obvious by department or -- 


DR. NETON: Well, this would be -- 


MR. CHEW: Mark, let me try to answer that 


question. The primary work during that 


particular periods was using the Calutron to 


separate some of the plutonium isotopes for the 


research to look at cross-section work for the 


different isotopes of plutonium. That’s why 


the pockets were there. And so I would say 


it’ll limit it to the people who were basically 


either cleaning out the -- the Cyclotron 


pockets and potentially the (unintelligible) 


and recovering the specific isotopes that were 


being separated at the Calutrons for the 


plutonium here. So I think -- I think the -- 


the class -- I mean the number of people and 


the category of people can really be well 


defined. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. No, that -- that all makes 


sense to me, Mel. The question I’m asking is 

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retrospectively, you know, do these people fall 


out from department number from -- from their 


own questionnaire? Do they self-identify that 


they were working in Calutrons in that time 


period? Do they, you know -- how do you -- how 


do you place people in -- in time in that area? 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Mark, again, I think this is 


one of the best places where use of the work 


history database can identify those people 


really pretty accurately. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I think -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Because there was a small number 


and they were well controlled, right, or 


whatever. 


DR. NETON: Right. And these department 


numbers are fairly small. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: Job titles, departments, job 


codes and year, you know. You can track the 


people, you know, by every job they had, every 


department they had. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. 


MR. TANKERSLEY: That would be pretty -- pretty 


straightforward. 


DR. NETON: But we would certainly start with 


the CATI and if there was any indication in the 

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CATI report that they worked with this material 


it would -- it would certainly get us going 


down that path. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: And what happens with the 


survivors? 


DR. NETON: Well, that’s another issue. Fifty 


percent of our cases are survivors. Now, 


remember that these plutonium values were, we 


believe, and this is what ORAU or Y-12 folks 


have told us, is that these samples, if they 


were taken there should -- should be showing up 


in their urine samples because remember, they 


go through the delta view database and look for 


people who have those samples and provide them 


with the records. So anyone who would monitor 


for plutonium were -- we believe that these are 


going to come across and that’s what we’ve been 


told in -- in our -- in the DOE submittals. 


MR. GIBSON: This is Mike. Jim, have these -- 


some of these individual cases involving the 


Cyclotron and the Calutron, are they pended or 


have they started to have reconstruction done 


and -- and been adjudicated? 


DR. NETON: Well, that’s a good question, Mike. 


We have not universally pended 

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Calutron/Cyclotron operators but I will say 


that using the efficiency process, there’s a 


number of methods in case those could go out, 


you know, ones that certainly would qualify, 


you know, over 50 percent. And I don’t think 


that -- I’m not -- I’d have to go back and 


check to see where -- where any of it may have 


been Calutron operators went out, if they were 


-- it seemed to be less than 50 percent. I 


don't know that any have. 


MR. GIBSON: Okay. That would be interesting 


to find out. 


MR. GRIFFON: Good question, yeah. 


DR. NETON: It’s a good question. I think 


among the -- the cases that we’ve done we -- we 


can take a look at that and provide some 


information. 


MR. GIBSON: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I think we can look at 10 


-- or 11 just for a second, Arjun. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: Then I’ll try to probably take a 


break and go to Rocky. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. Well, 11 is -- is -- is 


simpler. There, you know, the -- the gallium 

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internal dose was considered. I guess you were 


only considering gallium and not trying to 


illustrate all radionuclides to which this 


person was exposed. 


DR. NETON: That's correct. We were just 


trying to show, you know, we can do these dose 


reconstructions using ICRP model given that the 


incidents will track to bed. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. And -- And so -- So 


the -- The big question is what -- how to 


establish the relevance of a 1968 incident 


through what went on in the SEC period, and 


that, there’s no discussion of that. And how 


do you -- how do you bound the doses or show 


their maximum plausible for the period in 


question? 


DR. NETON: Right. And -- And again, we 


believe, you know, this five-prong approach 


that I mentioned --


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


DR. NETON: -- that we just have not found one 


in the SEC period yet that -- that we can -- we 


can show you. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


DR. NETON: But the data that we have in hand 

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leads us to believe that these are -- are what 


was John Mauro’s --


MR. GRIFFON: Jim -- Jim, is there any way 


short of -- I was just wondering if there’s any 


sort of interim product to provide with regard 


to these incidents like if you had a printout 


of -- of what came up on your search. I don't 


know if that’s --


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- any faster, that would give us 


an indication of how much insufficient data you 


had, how, you know, and what radionuclides were 


covered or something. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: It may not be that easy but I 


don't know. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, I can assure you, Mark, we’re 


working towards that end -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. 


DR. NETON: -- as fast as we can and -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- you know, we’re not -- we’re not 


sitting on our hands here but I -- it’s a good 


comment and I think if we can make this picture 


clearer for the Board and working group we’re 

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going to try. 


MR. GRIFFON: I -- I know that, Jim. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: I know you’re not sitting on your 


hands. 


DR. NETON: I know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. MUNN: I don’t think any of us thinks 


you’re sitting on your hands. 


DR. NETON: What I meant to say though is this 


is an issue that, you know, as of this morning 


we were conferencing and working to try to -- 


to see, you know, the maximum amount of -- of 


light we can shed on this the better. We know 


that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Okay. The -- The only 


other question I have on the gallium was this 


example -- I haven’t even looked at the example 


but the -- only discusses internal dose; is 


that true? And --


DR. NETON: Correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: And are there any reasons to 


believe that you’d need any sort of other 


method for estimating external dose in the 


Cyclotron or would they all be badged and -- 

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DR. NETON: We -- We don’t think so. It’s 


very clear that Cyclotron workers were badged. 


We’ve got some -- some control procedures that 


speak to that, you know, this -- of any place 


at Y-12 --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- this would have been the highest 


potential exposure. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. NETON: In fact, we had toyed with the idea 


of using the badge results to impute the 


internal doses but it didn’t work out as you 


can imagine. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right. Because I --


Anything else on that, Arjun? I guess we --


DR. MAKHIJANI: No. No, I think that’s it. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right. I think --


mean what -- what -- I think SC&A has some -- 


some, you know -- you’re going to provide us 


with a final draft on this so I guess right 


before the meeting. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: I wouldn’t expect it any sooner, 


you know. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah. 


I 
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MR. GRIFFON: There’s only a few days left 


here. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Just -- Just so I -- I 


understand, Mark, though, it’ll be the recycled 


uranium section. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah. Yeah. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: There’ll be some comments on 


the 147 worker question including comments on ­

- on 95 percentiles and -- and maybe table 4­

5A. Yeah, and --


MR. GRIFFON: And then possibly some other 


fine-tuning of -- of language that -- from the 


discussions today, right? 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: The other --


DR. MAURO: Yeah, Mark, this is John. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. MAURO: For each one of these 11 items I -- 


I took a lot of notes about the response that 


was given and I think that we’re in the 


position where we can re-craft this report in a 


way that would communicate that we posed this 


issue; here is the response and -- and the 


degree to which we consider to be the issue to 


be resolved based on the information that we’ve 

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been given or -- or we may be in a place where 


we haven’t yet had an opportunity to run it 


down. But I guess it’ll effectively be as 


complete as we possibly can make it and bring 


down with us -- perhaps we can discuss it at 


the sub-committee meeting on Tuesday morning. 


MR. GRIFFON: That -- That sounds like a plan. 


And -- And I would -- I would offer that what 


I’m going to try to do over this weekend and 


maybe with the work group’s help to the extent 


I can get it, is to sort of do a -- a summary 


report. And this, a real over, you know, more 


over-arching, not as much -- not meant to have 


the kind of detail that we have in these other 


reports. But a summary report of where we are 


on the -- on the SEC evaluation. And it might 


-- it might, you know, to some -- I'm not sure 


how, if it’s going to be a strong 


recommendation to the Board, but it’s going to 


be, you know, I guess the work group’s 


impressions of different areas of concern with 


regard to the SEC and then that’ll -- that’ll 


be hopefully, you know, be useful in our Board 


deliberations. 


DR. WADE: And remember, Mark -- this is Lew -- 

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that the Board will take up the Y-12 SEC 


petition on Wednesday so we do have Monday 


night, Tuesday night, you know. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, we’ve got plenty -- 


DR. WADE: Yeah, plenty of time. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- plenty of time. 


DR. WADE: The work group ought to get together 


and look at the work product. 


MR. GRIFFON: That's right. Well, I mean I, 


you know, I would -- what I would offer is I 


would try to draft something and -- and email 


it as soon as possible and then maybe when we 


get out there we can meet at night -- 


DR. WADE: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- as a work group separately and 


-- and, you know, fine tune language or 


whatever. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Just let me know your 


pleasure and we’ll make the arrangements for 


the meeting. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. MUNN: Are you going to make an effort to 


tie your comments to the original matrix or 


not? Well, that’s a question that we can 


develop later. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I haven’t thought that 


part through. 


MS. MUNN: That’s not pertinent right now. 


Just a thought. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. GIBSON: This is Mike. Would it -- would 


it helpful -- could -- I mean would it be 


possible if perhaps NIOSH could have a -- a 


little presentation ready for the Board, the 


whole Board, about the status of the 


Cyclotron/Calutron worker cases, the numbers 


and the status for dose reconstruction so that 


they would have a better overview and not just 


try to take stuff from our matrix and then our 


recommendations? 


DR. WADE: Well, I think NIOSH could take those 


comments to -- to heart as it prepares its 


comments for the Board and do what it can do. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And I certainly think 


anything -- I think Jim’s, you know, you’ve -- 


you’ve got the message that anything that 


you’ve gleaned from this call today that you 


think would strengthen your position I think, 


you know, might not be in your evaluation 


report but in your presentation you could 

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certainly --


DR. NETON: Yeah. I’m a little bit sensitive 


though in -- in terms of, you know, breaking 


new information, you know. We -- We -- We 


try to fix things and, you know -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah. 


DR. NETON: -- before that but, you know -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Maybe just if -- if they can be 


presented as clarifications rather than -- 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- modifications, you know. 


DR. NETON: Right. I think everything we have 


here right now is clarifications on these 


issues. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. That’s the way -- 


DR. NETON: I’d like to do that. In some sense 


I see sort of a -- sort of a different 


framework for this presentation as compared to 


other SEC petitions because, you know, we have 


the SC&A report and I think -- I think the 


Board -- full Board would probably want to hear 


our -- our position on these issues, you know, 


independent of the working group and -- 


DR. WADE: All right. This is Lew. Just very, 


very briefly, Y-12 will come up a number of 

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times. The first time it’ll come up it’ll be 


the -- the sub-committee dealing with the 


matrix as it related to the site profile so all 


of the issues can be talked about then. Later 


that first day then I’ll ask John Mauro to make 


a presentation of SC&A’s work with regard to 


the SEC review for Y-12, and there would be an 


opportunity there then for you to do what 


you’re talking about, Jim, if need be to put 


some issues on the table. All of that 


channeling into a Wednesday formal presentation 


of the evaluation report hearing from the 


petitioners, the working group making its 


report and the Board deliberating. So I think 


when -- when SC&A presents its report would be 


an opportunity, Jim, for you to put some things 


on the table outside of the formal SEC 


evaluation report. 


DR. NETON: Okay. Sounds good. 


DR. NETON: Yeah. 


MS. MUNN: And excuse me, Lew. You said subcommittee. Did you mean working group? 


DR. WADE: Well, I think when the sub-committee 


meets on Tuesday morning I would expect that 


the working group would talk to them about the 

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matrices on the different site profiles so Y-12 


will be talked about there in the more general 


sense of the broad work that was done and, you 


know, what remains to be done will get more 


focused then on the SEC issues later that day 


and the next day. 


MS. MUNN: All right. Just wanted --

DR. WADE: Okay. 

MS. MUNN: -- to get clarified. 

MR. SMITH: This is Matthew Smith with the ORAU 

team. Before you move off of Y-12 I want to 


take 30 seconds just to let everyone know that 


when we do apply the external co-worker data 


that we’ve been talking about, we do apply it 


into IREP as a lognormal distribution so we’re 


not just considering 50th percentile value 


only. We’re also applying a GSD value, a 


geometric standard deviation value that takes 


into account the 95th percentile dose as well. 


And that’s just a point of procedure I wanted 


everybody to know. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Can you say that again? 
I 


didn’t quite get that. 


MR. SMITH: When we -- When we apply the 

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external co-worker data for Y-12, the data set 


that’s been under discussion all morning, when 


we take that dose information and put it into 


IREP, we apply it in the lognormal 


distribution. We do not just put in the 50th
 

percentile value as a constant. We let IREP 


know that the 50th percentile value is a 


geometric mean of a lognormal distribution. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 


MR. SMITH: And then we also define a geometric 


standard deviation and in doing that, that 


takes into account what the 95th percentile 


value is. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: But you’re not using a fixed 


95th percentile value? 


MR. SMITH: No, we’re not. 


DR. NETON: That's right. And --


MR. GRIFFON: That’s a good question. 


DR. NETON: -- before was like Bethlehem Steel 


for example. And I appreciate Matt’s comment. 


That’s very true. I’m not sure that gets us 


past this other issue, though, of, you know, if 


the workers weren’t monitored properly then one 


needs to think about the 95th . 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Good to clarify that. 

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DR. MAURO: Yeah, it was good clarification. 


We weren’t thinking in those terms. 


DR. NETON: Yeah, it is. The GSDs are fairly 


large. I think they’re around 3.7 or something 


like that for those distributions. 


MR. SMITH: They’re -- They’re usually above 


3, That's correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. WADE: Okay. So let’s close the chapter on 


Y-12. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. WADE: And open it on Rocky Flats. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, all I would say is can we 


take a five-minute because I know people from 


Rocky are on the line. Can we take a five-


minute break to get our documents in order and 


DR. WADE: As you wish. And then when we come 


back we’ll do some introductions and make sure 


we get the conflict of interest statements 


done. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. WADE: Then we can begin our discussions. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right. Five minutes. 


DR. WADE: Five minutes. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Bye. 


 (Whereupon, a brief recess was held.) 


ROCKY FLATS
 

DR. WADE: Those are the principals. This is 


Lew Wade. I’ll keep the introductions very 


short. I think everyone knows the working 


group, what the working group is about. We’re 


now going to look at issues related to the 


Rocky Flats SEC petition. I would like members 


of the NIOSH ORAU team to identify themselves 


and state their conflicts or absence of, and 


then the same with the -- the SC&A team. There 


are no conflicts with regard to Rocky Flats for 


the Board members involved. Brant, for ORAU 


NIOSH? 


DR. ULSH: Sure. This is Brant Ulsh with NIOSH 


and I have no conflicts at Rocky. 


That might be it, Lew. It’s awfully lonely 


here. 


DR. WADE: Okay. 


MS. JESSEN: This is Karin Jessen from ORAU and 


at this time I have no conflicts. 


MR. ROBINSON: This is Al Robinson of the NIOSH 


team. No conflicts. 


MR. FALK: And this is Roger Falk. I am part 

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of the ORAU -- ORAU. And yes, I have 


conflicts with Rocky Flats. 


MR. LANGSTED: This is Jim Langsted with the 


ORAU team. I have conflicts at Rocky Flats. 


MR. KENOYER: Judson Kenoyer with the ORAU 


team. No conflicts with Rocky Flats. 


MR. SHARFI: Mutty Sharfi with the ORAU team. 


No conflicts with Rocky Flats. 


MR. WOLFE: This is Craig Wolfe with the ORAU 


team. No conflicts with Rocky Flats. 


MR. MCFEE: This is Matt McFee with the ORAU 


team. I have no conflicts. 


MR. STEMPFLEY: This is Dan Stempfley with the 


ORAU team. No conflicts. 


MR. MEYER: This is Bob Meyer with the ORAU 


team. No conflicts. 


MR. SMITH: This is Matt Smith, ORAU team. No 


conflicts. 


DR. WADE: Okay. SC&A? 


DR. MAURO: John Mauro, SC&A. No conflicts. 


MR. FITZGERALD: This is Joe Fitzgerald. No 


conflicts. 


DR. MAKHIJANI: This is Arjun Makhijani. No 


conflicts. 


DR. BEHLING: Hans Behling. No conflicts. 

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MR. BUCHANAN: Ron Buchanan. No conflicts. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Board members on the call, 


please identify yourselves. 


MR. GRIFFON: Mark Griffon. 


MS. MUNN: Wanda Munn. 


MR. GIBSON: Mike Gibson. 


DR. WADE: Anyone else? 


 (No response) 


DR. WADE: Okay. So we do not have a quorum 


and we can conclude -- can conduct our 


business. Mark? 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. WADE: Well, we should have petitioners 


identify themselves. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Tony DeMaiori, USW. 


DR. WADE: Thank you Tony, and thank you for 


your patience. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I think the best way to 


proceed on this is probably going to be we -- 


we had some matrix responses from Brant Ulsh 


from NIOSH and we also have a -- a -- a summary 


report that -- that SC&A agreed to provide 


regarding the data integrity issues that arose 


in the latter part of our matrix, many of them 

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out of the SEC petition items. So let’s see. 


I -- I think, and I’m -- I’m -- I’m hesitating 


a little because I just now opened the report 


that Brant forwarded so -- but I -- I -- I 


imagine it might make sense to go through your 


responses first to the matrix items and then -- 


and then bring in SC&A’s report and discuss 


that. Is that -- Is that okay or does it make 


sense to reverse that order. I’m -- I’m open 

either way. 

DR. ULSH: That works for me, Mark. Whatever ­

-

MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

DR. ULSH: -- you’d like to do. 

MR. GRIFFON: We’ll start with your report, 


Brant. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. I only focused on -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Does everyone have this report 


first of all? Did the petitioners get this? 


DR. ULSH: I don't know. I sent it out to SC&A 


and to the working group members. 


MR. GRIFFON: Maybe you can just tell the title 


and stuff just to see if people have it. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. I think it’s called 12 April 


Working Group Comment Responses. And that’s on 

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the O-drive. I -- Again I don't know who -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, 12 April Matrix Item 


Responses. Did -- Tony, did you -- you have 


access to this or --


MR. DEMAIORI: I’m checking right now. I 


believe I do. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. Did that deal 


with a full range of issues or solely the data 


reliability? 


DR. ULSH: No, John. This was just -- actually 


it’s even more narrow than that. This is just 


the outstanding action items that NIOSH had on 


Mark’s latest matrix that was sent out I 


believe the day after our last meeting. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: Mark, would it be of any benefit 


to, in a broad way, to set the table so to 


speak of the -- the range of issues and -- and 


where we’re going to sort of narrow it down and 


focus in on within the con-- the overall 


context of the petition at this point just for 


orientation? 


MR. GRIFFON: Sure. You know, I -- I know that 


you didn’t have time to do a review report at 

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this point, John, so I felt like that might be 


premature. But if you, you know, if you want 


to generally give a broad overview of where -- 


DR. MAURO: I guess it goes back to, yeah, 


there was an issues matrix for Rocky -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. MAURO: -- that -- that covered the full 


territory. And if you think that it’s 


inappropriate or it’s premature, to try to just 


sort of set the table but we certainly could 


just zero right in on the data reliability 


issues and get to work on those. That --


That's fine. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think, yeah. I think that’s 


probably best. I mean most -- most everybody 


has been on these calls before so there -- they 


know the matrix. They know the general items 


that we have on the matrix and I think we -- 


let’s hone in on the work to be done 


understanding that we, you know, we -- you 


didn’t do a review of -- of NIOSH’s evaluation 


report yet. So let’s just -- just hammer 


through this work I think and see where we’re 


at if that’s okay. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Mark, would you like me to 

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proceed? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, go ahead, Brant. 


DR. ULSH: The -- The first action item that 


was still open for NIOSH related to comment 


number 9, action item number 6, and that’s on 


page 1 of my handout. I don't know if you also 


have access to Mark’s matrix. Maybe you do and 


that’s on page 4 of 13. Now, this issue dealt 


with the Case 16 shift, and we discussed that 


at the last working group meeting. Jim 


Langsted gave a verbal response and I think 


Mark -- I think it was you who requested that 


we provide that in writing. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: And that’s what you see here in this 


response. The -- The bottom line is pretty 


much the last paragraph of that response, and 


that is that the Rocky Flats dosimeter 


algorithm does not utilize one chip 


specifically for the K-16 spectrum and it does 


not use a correction factor specific for that 


photon energy. So we don’t believe that this 


is a -- an -- an issue with SEC implications 


but that -- that’s -- that’s our response on 


that one. I don't know if we want to discuss 

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that or -- further or -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Any -- Any comments? A lot of 


us are receiving this real time so I don't know 


if -- if SC&A has any comments on it. I really 


think we just wanted a written documentation on 


that one. 


DR. ULSH: Yes. So that’s about it. That --


That basically counts as a -- a written summary 


of what we said at the last meeting. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: So unless SC&A or anybody else has 


any comments I can move on to the next one. 


DR. WADE: Go ahead. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: I wouldn’t -- I wouldn’t -- Let 


-- Let me just clarify. I wouldn’t assume 


just because we don’t comment that -- that 


we’re -- that these items are closed at this 


point because --


DR. ULSH: No, certainly not. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- given that we just received 


these so --


DR. ULSH: Certainly not, yeah. I --
 I 


realize that we’re operating them pretty close 


to real time. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: In between when I write it and when 


you read it is pretty short a time. 


MR. GRIFFON: Exactly. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. The next one is also comment 


number 9 and it’s action item number 7. And 


this deals with the nature and extent of the 


criminal investigations and/or security 


investigations that were mentioned by the 


petitioner in some of our previous work group 


meetings. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: Just to bring you up to speed we 


sent a letter -- I -- I sent a letter to Tony 


on, let me see, I believe it was March 16th and 


he responded. And there’s a -- a copy of his 


response letter there on page 2 of my handout. 


And basically Tony recommended in that letter 


that we talk to Lisa Bretsler (ph) who is a 


person that works in records for -- I believe 


for DOE and we did in fact talk to her. At the 


last Board meeting I reported -- or at the last 


working group meeting, sorry -- I reported that 


she had also directed us to Jackie Baridini 


(ph) who is with the Kaiser Hill legal 

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department. And basically what -- what -- what 


we found out in talking to those two 


individuals, Tony had suggested that we look 


for all abnormal radiation dose records that 


have resulted in a criminal and/or internal 


investigation at the Rocky Flats site for the 


last 50 years. And we ran that by Ms. Bretsler 


and she indicated to us that that -- that was 


going to be a pretty tough request to fulfill 


because it was so general. So we were looking 


-- she suggested and we kind of agreed that 


what we really needed were some specific 


examples. So to that end I had a phone 


conversation with Tony I believe it was Monday 


of this week and that was very helpful. Tony 


was able to provide four examples that he 


thought were relevant to this issue and gave us 


enough specifics that we could go after some 


more information on this. And so I’d like to 


walk through those four and tell you where we 


are with them. I would caution, well, I guess 


everyone that some of this information deals 


with Privacy Act protected information and so 


we have to be very careful about how we talk 


about it. And I’m -- I’m not trying to be 

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evasive or anything. I’m just trying to 


protect, you know, Privacy Act material. So 


the -- the first example that Tony gave us was 


an individual who upon termination from the 


site, and this is pretty recently, gave a urine 


sample and also had a whole-body count. The 


whole-body count came back negative and the 


urine sample came back high for plutonium and 


this initiated an investigation. Well, we 


basically accessed this person’s file and we 


found the investigation report. Specifically 


what happened was Kaiser Hill convened a team 


of outside experts -- well, I’m going to 


clarify that. A team of experts that included 


most noted internal dosimetry authorities and 


also people who were familiar with Rocky -- 


Rocky Flats operations to investigate this 


incident. We were able to locate the report 


that that expert team issued. I did place that 


report in the O-drive, the Rocky Flats folder 


that is, you know, there’s a chain there, 


rather than email. But I talked to Mark over 


the lunch break and he was still not able to 


access that so --


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 DR. ULSH: Still not there? 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m on the O-drive now so -- 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. I don't know. That’s -- I'm 


not sure what the issue is there but we will 


try to get that report to you as -- if that 


would be of interest. I have, for the benefit 


of the working group, reproduced the executive 


summary of that report and I’d like to just 


walk you through parts of that. That is shown 


-- the executive summary is shown on pages 4 


and 5 here. And what this expert panel 


concluded I’ve summarized here on page 3. And 


MR. GRIFFON: I should update. It’s there now. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: This is real time. 


DR. ULSH: Yes, it certainly is. So refer to 


the email that I sent out to you giving the 


location of these files if you’d like to look 


at it in its entirety. But the main 


conclusions are listed on page 3 of the handout 


here and here’s what they say. They considered 


several possible intake scenarios from this 


incident and they found them to be implausible. 


They considered inhalation, ingestion, wound, 

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and they found that -- they concluded that 


these were not plausible intake scenarios. The 


other thing that sends up flags I think was the 


isotopic composition of the plutonium that was 


found in the urine sample. It didn’t seem to 


match material that was present at Rocky Flats. 


And I believe -- keep in mind I just got this 


report about a day ago. I believe that the 


issue was that it was almost pure plutonium 239 


which is not what you’d expect to see from the 


material at Rocky Flats. And also please keep 


in mind that I am speaking for NIOSH. I’m not 


trying to make any value judgments on -- on any 


of this. I’m just reporting what this expert 


investigation concluded so what the team, the 


expert team considered was the likelihood of 


external contamination of the sample prior to 


it entering the Kaiser Hill chain of custody. 


They also considered, due to the isotopic 


composition, almost pure plutonium 239, that 


this was consistent with a (unintelligible) 


source that could have been easily removed from 


the site. And the team concluded that 


deliberate contamination of the urine and fecal 


samples from an (unintelligible) source was 

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plausible and could be accomplished with little 


risk to the person doing the tampering. Now, 


they didn’t go into any detail beyond that as 


far as I can see in terms of hypothesizing when 


such tampering might have occurred. However, 


they did conclude -- the expert panel concluded 


that Kaiser Hill has implemented a very 


effective program, and I’m quoting now -- “a 


very effective program for determining the 


cause of the anomalous high urine bioassay 


results. The team felt that Kaiser Hill had 


been very thorough and complete in their 


approach to this unexpected occurrence.” Now, 


I -- I recognize that some individuals might 


take exception to the conclusions of this 


expert investigation. All I’m doing is 


presenting what this investigation concluded. 


They did not conclude that there was fraud on 


the part of the dosimetry staff at Rocky Flats 


and really if you want more details on -- on 


that particular incident I would refer you to 


the full report which apparently as of about 


three minutes ago is now available. Okay. 


That was the first example. The second example 


that Tony provided was one that we had actually 

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already considered. I believe it was in the 


last working group meeting although they are 


all kind of blurring together for me. This was 


the one where the individual had submitted an 


affidavit as part of the SEC petition. And a 


copy of that affidavit is again presented on 


page 7 of my handout. And the main allegation, 


the main issue that was raised in this petition 


was that the worker stated that an entire 


year’s dose record is missing from a time when 


he worked in a radiation area with dose rates 


ranging up to eight I guess Renkin per hour and 


this was during the 1982/1983 time frame. On 


page 8 of my handout you’ll find the dosimetry 


results for this individual. And again this is 


a recap because we’ve already discussed this in 


a previous meeting. And what you see here is 


that in fact in 1982 there are quarterly 


results for three of the four quarters and the 


monthly result that falls during the one 


quarter where there’s not a quarterly result. 


And then in the next year, in 1983, there are 


quarterly results for all four quarters. And 


in addition there’s another monthly result. So 


the dosimetry for this particular individual 

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does not seem to support the claim that his 


entire year’s dose record is missing. And 


that’s really all I can say about that one. 


The next example was an individual, a specific 


individual that -- that Tony was able to -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Which one did you just cover the 


figure 4 that you were looking at? 


DR. ULSH: Oh, sorry. Let me see. It is 


figure --


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, it was. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m intentionally slowing you 


down, too, so I can scan through the documents 


as you’re talking. I'm sorry. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I apologize. Maybe I am going 


too fast. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: Figures 3 and 4 are the ones that 


are relevant here, Mark. Figure 3 is the 


affidavit that was provided in the SEC 


petition. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: And then figure 4 is the dosimetry 


relevant to that particular individual for the 


time frame that he cited. 


MR. GRIFFON: Now, this is no different than 

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what you provided last time? 


DR. ULSH: Exactly right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


DR. ULSH: It’s just that this is one of the 


examples that Tony mentioned in our 


conversation on Monday. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: So I -- I just presented it for 


completeness. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: The next example -- and please feel 


free to jump in if, you know, you want to 


discuss any of these further. Example three 


was an individual who Tony named for me, and we 


were able to look at the dosimetry results for 


this particular individual. The -- The issue 


here was blackened neutron badges and this 


would be an issue during the era of MTA films. 


And for this particular individual he began 


work at the very end of the NTA film era in 


1969. And the concern about blackened neutron 


badges, I did a little digging on this and what 


I found is in the neutron dose reconstruction 


project protocol there’s a phenomenon described 


on page 16 of that document about gamma 

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fogging. And what that involves is when a 


neutron badge is exposed to a high gamma field, 


and we’re talking about 500 to 1,000 millirem, 


it can start to cause fogging on the film that 


progressively makes it more and more difficult 


as the doses get higher to read the film for 


neutron results. So I took a look at the -- 


the -- the -- the gamma results for this 


individual and it doesn’t seem like that would 


be the issue here because the highest -- the 


highest NTA film badge result that occurred for 


this individual during the period of 1969 was 


about 430 millirem. And so it doesn’t appear 


that gamma fogging would have been an issue. 


And I should mention that there’s no indication 


in this person’s file that, in other words, a 


film where blackening was a problem. However, 


also during that period you might not expect to 


see such a notation. 


MR. GRIFFON: I don’t understand; maybe you can 


explain to me why -- why seeing 430 made you 


feel that there wasn’t a problem for the one 


badge where I think he only -- 


DR. ULSH: No, what --


MR. GRIFFON: Did this individual say that 

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happened once or -- or multiple times? 


DR. ULSH: It wasn’t clear. What I’m saying 


is, Mark, if gamma fogging becomes an issue 


starting at approximately 500 millirem. You 


can still read the badge at around 500 but as 


you progress up to about 1,000 millirem it 


becomes progressively more difficult to read 


the badge. And since the highest result that I 


saw during this film badge era for this 


individual, 1969 -- because remember in 1970 


they began to switch over to TLDs. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: So we’re only talking about one year 


here and the highest individual badge read 


gamma dose that this individual had was about 


430 millirem. All the rest of them were lower. 


So I wouldn’t really expect to see gamma 


fogging on any of these particular badges. 


That’s the only point I was trying to make 


there. 

 MS. MUNN: Brant? 

 DR. ULSH: Yeah? 

MS. MUNN: Do you have a typo on this third 

line? 

DR. ULSH: Entirely possible. 
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MS. MUNN: Three? Shouldn’t that have one more 

zero? 

DR. ULSH: Yes, it should. 

MS. MUNN: Just checking. 

DR. ULSH: Thanks for the catch. 

MS. MUNN: You bet. 

DR. ULSH: That probably will not be the last 

typo. Yes, that should be 1,000 beq. So it 


doesn’t appear that gamma fogging would explain 


-- I mean if in fact there was --


MR. GRIFFON: I guess what -- what -- I just 


don’t understand the rationale of that 


argument. If -- I mean if -- if the 


individual believed those doses as recorded 


then there wouldn’t be any issue at all. So I 


mean I don’t -- I don't know that this sort of 


demonstrates that he couldn’t have one quarter 


where he -- he was into some other area or 


whatever and got higher exposures and that’s 


where the badge fogged. And -- And -- And 


he’s -- I mean here -- I don't know what the 


claim specifically is here but are they 


claiming that, you know, that it wasn’t -- that 


whatever dose was assigned was not accurate 


because he had this badge fogging problem or -- 

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DR. ULSH: I don't know. I was just looking at 


MR. GRIFFON: I’m just trying to understand, 


too. 


DR. ULSH: No, I understand. What I was trying 


to do, Mark, is consider -- let’s assume for 


the -- for a minute that this individual did 


have NTA films that were blackened. And I’m 


trying to come up with and consider all 


possible explanations for a blackened film 


badge. And the first possible explanation that 


I considered was gamma fogging. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: Now, his gamma results don’t appear 


to be consistent with gamma fogging. Again, if 


you assume that the gamma results are -- 


represent reality. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. All right. 


DR. ULSH: The second -- Really I didn’t see 


anything else in his file. I mean there was no 


specific mention of -- of film blackening. But 


however, we do know that it is possible that 


NTA films can be blackened and there are a 


couple of situations that can lead to that. 


One of them is that if NTA films are exposed to 

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high temperatures and some pretty moderate 


humidities you can get thermal blackening. And 


I have provided some references there from peer 


review journal articles. That’s at the top of 


page 9. That is one possibility if in fact 


there were some blackened films. Now, like I 


said, I wasn’t able to locate any but let’s 


just assume that, you know, that that was the 


case. And certainly it -- it happened at Rocky 


Flats that some people did have blackened film 


badge -- film badges. And another possibility 


is that -- is light contamination. As you --


as you may or may not know, these NTA films 


were in light-proof packets and those packets 


could be damaged, could be ruptured. And just 


like any other photographic film, if it is 


exposed to light that could blacken a film 


badge. So I mean it certainly is possible 


that, you know, we would have film blackening. 


I didn’t see any indication of it in this 


individual’s file but certainly it occurred at 


Rocky Flats. But that was about as far as I 


could go with this one in the time frame that 


we have available. That’s what I know on that 


individual. The last example that Tony 

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provided to me was an individual and the 


petitioner, oh, some time ago after one of our 


earlier working group meetings, submitted a 


list of -- of about I think it was about 12 or 


13 questions that resulted from the discussion 


that they heard and participated in during the 


working group meeting. And as it turns out one 


of those questions is relevant to this 


particular situation. And you’ll see that 


question reproduced on the bottom of page 9 and 


I’d like to just read it to you. It says 


(reading) how are you addressing the fact that 


when a person received an abnormal or 


unexpectedly high dose and an individual -- oh, 


I'm sorry -- an internal investigation could 


not identify the source, the person received a 


zero for a dose? I know this to be true 


because it happened to me when I was pregnant 


in the 1999/2000 time frame. My dosimeter 


showed a high reading for ionizing radiation 


and an investigation was con-- was conducted 


and the reviewers could not find the source so 


they decided not to follow conduct of 


operations which said you have to trust your 


indicators, in this case, my dosimeter, and 

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decided to enter a zero for my exposure. I’m 


sure there are hundreds of examples like this 


so now my dose record is inaccurate and there 


is obviously no way to reconstruct it 


accurately since they failed to do so at the 


time. Now, in response to that question, I 


think this was back in March when this question 


was submitted to us. We provided the -- a 


response but you’ll see at the bottom of page 9 


and the top of page 10. There’s a little bit 


of confusion here with regard to conduct of 


operation. What that refers to is that in 


order to ensure that workers are not 


overexposed when they’re in the field, when 


they’re in the presence of potentially 


hazardous environment, if you get an indication 


on instruments such as chirpers or Geiger-


Mueller counters or anything like that, that 


you’re in a high dose field, conduct of 


operations tells you that you should not 


question that result at the time; you should 


remove yourself from that environment and then 


an investigation can be conducted to determine 


whether or not the instrument was 


malfunctioning or whether you were actually in 

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a hazardous environment. So that’s to protect 


the worker, just to say don’t question the 


instrument when you’re standing in the 


potentially hazardous envir-- environment. Get 


out. That conduct of operations guidance 


doesn’t necessarily apply to film badges and I 


think that was a little bit of a con-- 


confusion because of course the worker is now, 


you know, out of the environment and we can -- 


they can conduct an investigation. And that’s 


exactly what they did actually. We were able 


to, since Monday when -- when Tony gave me this 


one, I was -- he gave me enough specifics that 


I was able to pull the records. Actually the 


ORAU team was able to pull the records for this 


particular individual, and what you’ll see I 


combed -- well, we combed through the entire 


record and we did find an extended external 


dose reconstruction for approximately the right 


time frame and you’ll see that on pages 11, 12 


and 13. And here is what -- here is the 


conclusion from that investigation, and I’ll 


just read you that. That’s on page 10, 


summarized in the text, and it’s also in the 


actual report which is on page 13. It says 

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that this individual -- again I’m not going to 


use actual names -- but this individual became 


separated from her dosimeter while in the 


building 371 RBA thereby necessitating this 


extended dose reconstruction. She forgot to 


remove it from her anti-C (ph) clothing while 


doffing at the room 3408 step-off pad. The 


individual was on a tour with two listed coworkers and was separated from her dosimeter 


for approximately 30 minutes. The individual 


is being assigned the zero dose listed on page 


1 for the time that she was without her 


dosimeter. This dose is equal to the dose 


received by the listed co-workers who were with 


her on the entire tour. So what they concluded 


was during the brief time that the individual 


is not wearing her dosimeter but she was with 


the other people on the tour they took a look 


at the doses received by those other 


individuals and concluded that the dose to be 


assigned was less than the limit of detection 


or zero. So we didn’t see any evidence that 


this investigation was in error. You know, I ­

- I suppose that a person could take issue with 


it but it wasn’t clear to us that this was a 

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clear-cut indication of fraud because an 


investigation was conducted and placed in the 


individual’s file. 


MR. DEMAIORI: This is Tony DeMaiori with the 


steel workers. I’m intimately familiar with 


this case. And the individual was in fact on 


tour, was giving a tour in building 371, a 


communications person. And when the dose was 


discovered it was almost six months later when 


they were questioned and the investigation 


occurred. And they were simply told that they 


were going to model after their co-workers who 


worked in communications and received no dose. 


And that’s how the zero was going to be 


applied. That’s even though this individual 


routinely toured the production areas and gave 


tours. So this -- what you have is nowhere 


near what the individual was told; not even 


close. 


DR. ULSH: It does sound like if that’s what 


the individual was told, it does sound like 


there was some miscommunication going on 


certainly. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Hugely so. 


DR. ULSH: What I have here though is -- is the 

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report, the extended dose reconstruction report 


that’s in the file. So I mean I -- that’s I 


think is what was done and that was the reason 


for it. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Yeah, I think they used what you 


guys call the worker model and they 


reconstructed the dose to the other folks in 


communications who never entered RA’s. 


DR. ULSH: Well, now, that’s actually not what 


the report at least says. It says that the 


assigned dose -- hold on. Let me pull it up 


here. This dose is equal to the dose received 


by the listed co-workers who were with her on 


the entire tour. 


MR. DEMAIORI: And that was a zero. 


DR. ULSH: Right. So I think that -- I think 


that rather than the communi-- 


MR. GRIFFON: So I guess the question there is 


that if Tony’s presenting this, you know, if 


I’m understanding Tony, this person was the 


tour guide --


MR. DEMAIORI: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- and would have done several of 


these tours and got assigned a dose based on 


two people that were taking a tour on a given 

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day. So maybe a whole quarter’s worth of 


information was zeroed. I don't know. That’s 


-- I guess that’s the question, you know. 


Maybe -- Maybe it was appropriate to use the ­

- to assign a co-worker exposure but were those 


representative co-workers? I know they were 


only in the area for one tour and this 


individual was in there giving tours all the 


time. 


DR. ULSH: Well, let’s see. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s not clear, I mean -- 


DR. ULSH: I’m trying to track down the date of 


the incident. Let me see if I can find that. 


MR. WOLFE: Brant, I have it in front of me. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. WOLFE: It was -- well, now I say that. Go 


ahead. May 2nd, ’01 was the date of the -- the 


-- there was a radiological improvement report 


that was part of the investigation report and 


the event happened on that date, May -- May 


2nd, ’01. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. WOLFE: Part of the report, it said she -- 


she was separated from her badge for 30 


minutes. 

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DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. WOLFE: And when they found the badge in 


the -- still attached to her anti-contamination 


clothing in the laundry bag and surveyed it, 


and it was uncontaminated. And I see -– 


(inaudible) -- was contaminated. 


DR. ULSH: But Craig, I also see on page 11 of 


my handout there’s a section, section 2, 


dosimeter, and it says -- that section gives 


the -- the needle date and the issue date, the 


assign date, the return date. Those are all 


May 2nd, 2001. 


MR. WOLFE: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: So that seems to indicate that the 


dosimeter was retrieved on the day this 


incident happened and was read that day. 


MR. WOLFE: Yes. 


DR. ULSH: So I -- I don’t think that would 


represent the entire quarter. 


MR. DEMAIORI: And when did that quarter end? 


DR. ULSH: Oh, well, I don't know. The date is 


May 2nd so let me see. 


MR. WOLFE: It would have been the end of June 


most likely. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, but they pulled this -- pulled 

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this badge on May 2nd . At least that’s what it 


appears to indicate. 


MR. WOLFE: Because the co-workers who are -- 


who were -- who were used that their -- their 


date for their badge was May 2nd through May 


9th, ’01. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, that’s listed on page 12 at 


the bottom. 


MR. DEMAIORI: And who were the co-workers? 


The people on tour or -- 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. DEMAIORI: -- the other communications 


folks that never entered the work area? 


DR. ULSH: According to the report anyway on 


page 13 you see this individual is being 


assigned a zero dose listed on page 1 for the 


time she was without her dosimeter, the dosage 


equal to the dose received by the listed coworkers who were with her on the entire tour. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: So it is the individuals who are 


with her on the tour. 


MR. DEMAIORI: I tell you what. I’ll have the 


individual affidavit, the -- the entire 


incident to you because it’s not the same. 

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DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. DEMAIORI: I know it’s --


DR. ULSH: Tony, are you saying she was 


separated from her badge for six months? 


MR. DEMAIORI: No. No, no, not at all. The 


way it was described to me in detail is as 


media relations manager of Rocky Flats part of 


their duties was to give tours in production 


areas, something the other communication folks 


never did. And that they gave a tour and then 


six months later she was informed that there 


was an abnormality reading in her badge and 


they wanted to know where she was. And she 


told them she couldn’t tell them; she didn’t 


know, that was six months ago. So they 


assigned her a zero. Now, this is what I was 


told. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Tony, I -- I agree with you. 


If that’s actually what occurred, I mean if it 


was a situation where this individual was 


assigned doses based on other people in the 


department that weren’t even on the tour or 


giving tours that would certainly be a concern. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Right. This may not even be the 


same incident. This doesn’t even sound like -- 

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it -- it remotely sounds like the same -- 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. DEMAIORI: -- because the person was 


pregnant at the time and they didn’t waive 


their right to go in the area. So it sounds 


remotely the same. 


DR. ULSH: I do have --


MR. DEMAIORI: But there’s huge discrepancies 


in the reporting in that. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Like I say, if you can -- I 


mean if there’s other information that would 


indicate that we’ve got the wrong 


interpretation here we would certainly -- 


MR. DEMAIORI: Well, without you giving me a 


name over the phone I couldn’t tell you it’s 


the same incident even. 


DR. ULSH: The name of the individual? What? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Right. Give me their initials. 


Give me something so that I can -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Maybe offline you can do that. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, yeah. I’ll -- I’ll tell you 


what, Tony. I’ll get with you offline so that 


we can talk about Privacy Act material or -- 


MR. DEMAIORI: Okay. Because this is, you 


know, what your reports are aren’t even close 

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to what the individual had reported to me. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. DEMAIORI: And this supports what we’re 


saying, that, you know, when doses aren’t 


believed they’re given out as zero. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Brant, you should follow 


up with Tony on that offline and -- 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- you know. 


DR. ULSH: Sure. Okay. That’s the only 


information I have on the four individual cases 


that Tony provided. We also invited Tony to 


provide, you know, if he can think of any 


others where you can give us some details so we 


can run them down just like we have with this 


one -- these four, that would be great. We 


invited him to do that by email and you’re 


certainly welcome to do that. 


DR. MAURO: Brant, this is John Mauro. 


DR. ULSH: Yes, John. 


DR. MAURO: On the first example, the 


individual that had the high reading that might 


have been -- there’s going to be some follow-up 


investigation, was there additional urinalysis 


taken subsequent to see if in fact the person 

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had body burden or was in fact an after-thefact contamination of his sample as you -- as 


you described? 


DR. ULSH: I -- John, I would be speculating 


on -- on that because I got this report 


yesterday late in the day so I haven’t had a 


chanced to read through the details to 


determine the exact sequence of events. Those 


are --


MR. DEMAIORI: John, I can give you that 


information. I’m intimately familiar with the 


investigation. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. 


MR. DEMAIORI: The individual had a high 


bioassay urine sample as pure plutonium. Then 


the individual was sent to Los Alamos National 


Labs and they were poked and prodded and 


absolutely nothing in their body, not in their 


urine samples; not in their lungs. They were 


brought back to Rocky Flats, given another 


urine sample kit. It returned high plutonium. 


DR. MAURO: And -- And there -- a continuing 


follow-up related to that? 


MR. DEMAIORI: I don't know. You know, Rocky 


Flats is very sensitive on a happy closure. 

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DR. MAURO: Uh-huh. 


MR. DEMAIORI: And so I think everybody decided 


that the chain of custody was the real problem 


and that there was no way anybody could prove 


how the samples got the plutonium and so there 


was no follow-up after that. The 


recommendation was not to assign dose. They 


decided that the chain of custody, you couldn’t 


prove anything one way or another because the 


chain of custody was weak and that’s what the 


report will tell you. 


DR. ULSH: Actually I’m looking at the -- the ­

- well, at least the executive summary of the 


report and the report -- and again, I’m just 


quoting from the report. I’m not issuing a 


value judgment from NIOSH. All I’m saying is 


that the report concluded that Kaiser Hill 


implemented a very effective program for deter­

- for determining the cause of the anomalous 


high urine bioassay result. And the team felt 


that Kaiser Hill had been very thorough and 


complete in their approach. However if you 


look on page 5 of my handout the team does 


recommend additional analyses and actions and 


that’s on page 5; obtained three additional 

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urine and three additional fecal samples, and 


said that those samples were collected on 


September 23rd -- well, it gives you the dates 


there. They performed a radiological survey of 


the individual’s home. They sent 


(unintelligible) to the analytical lab and to 


Los Alamos where they did thermal ionization 


mass spectroscopy. And they -- based on the 


first three recommend-- recommendations they 


recommended the team reconvene. So those are 


the follow-up actions that are at least listed 


in the executive summary. Again -- Again 


Tony, I haven’t had a chance to really look at 


the bulk of the report and that is available on 


the O-drive. 


DR. MAURO: Yeah. All I’m saying is that it 


sounds like Tony indicated that those results 


did come back and they came back negative. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Yeah, everything from Las Alamos 


came back negative and then the -- the final 


urine sample came back positive again. That’s 


when the team came to the conclusion that the 


sample itself was injected with the plutonium 


and not the individual. And, you know, to give 


you a point, the suspicion was the RAD sources. 

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We had the (unintelligible) plated RAD sources 


that were uncontrolled, literally hundreds of 


them. 


DR. ULSH: All right. So that’s -- That’s 


what we have so far in the more specific 


examples. If there’s -- Is there any further 


discussion on this one? 


 (No response) 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Mark, would you like me to 


move on? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yep. 


DR. ULSH: All right. Comment number 9, action 


item number 8. And that’s on page 14 of my 


handout. NIOSH ORAU to demonstrate the 


reliability of bioassay and external database 


data for the compensation program. And just to 


refresh your memory on what we’ve talked about 


in previous meetings. In terms of co-worker 


data I think that’s one issue that we need to 


talk about. And I would remind you that the 


need for co-worker data at Rocky Flats is far 


less than what you might expect based on other 


sites. This is getting to be old information. 


It was, you know, a few weeks ago that I got 


this information. But to my knowledge we only 

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have two identified cases that require external 


co-worker data and I don’t think we’re aware of 


any that require internal co-worker data at 


this point. But keep in mind there are 300 -- 


approximately 300 cases left to do at Rocky 


Flats out of the 1,100 or so that we’ve 


received. Okay. So what we did -- what we’ve 


already done, the call, is we talked about the 


external co-worker data. The remaining 


question was for internal data. And remember 


that what we proposed to do is use the CEDR 


database to use -- to generate internal coworker data distribution. And previously we 


had compared CEDR to HIS-20 and we found at 


least what I would characterize as pretty good 


agreement. The remaining thread here I think 


this action is referring to was then going from 


HIS-20 back to some of the earlier records like 


the bioassay cards and the other database 


printouts that are contained in individual 


files. And we have made some (unintelligible). 


We took about 300-plus -- 306 worker samples 


from about 38 separate individuals and we 


compared what we see in HIS-20 with those 


earlier data sources, the Health Sciences data 

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system and also in the earlier time period when 


they were using bioassay cards. And what we 


found is that for instances where there was 


data we found very good agreement. About 97.1 


percent of the samples from the earlier data 


sources agreed with HIS-20 so we felt pretty 


good about that. In the remaining three 


percent where there was an imperfect match the 


data found on the bioassay cards, I think that 


was about seven of the samples, seven of the 


individual results, and six of those seven we 


found that the value in HIS-20 was larger than 


the card data. And then we also found that for 


22 of the entries that there was an indication 


that the worker was not involved in the 


bioassay sample program because there was 


nothing in HIS-20 for them and there was 


nothing on the earlier bioassay cards so that’s 


actually in agreement. Now, as you might 


expect there were some discrepancies. There 


were about 41 individual results that we saw 


bioassay card data but we didn’t see -- we have 


not yet located anything in HIS-20. We have 


some theories about why that might be but we’re 


still running those down. But the point I 

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think that you have to consider, the next -- 


the next obvious question would be, well, gee, 


what does that do to your co-worker data? 


Well, first of all, keep in mind that we’re 


using CEDR data which is the most complete data 


set for the early years -- early years we 


think. And also, 40 of the 41 results that we 


didn’t find were below detection so -- and the 


remaining one was just slightly above the limit 


of detection. So what we concluded here is 


that this doesn’t appear to indicate that 


there’s a systematic censoring of high data. 


So I -- I think we still have pretty good 


confidence in the co-worker data should we ever 


have to use the co-worker data. 


MR. GRIFFON: Brant? 


DR. ULSH: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: This -- I’m getting a little 


deja vu here when I ask this question so excuse 


me if I’ve already asked this question. 


DR. ULSH: Sure. Go ahead. 


MR. GRIFFON: But you’re -- you’re -- you’re 


presenting this as co-worker data. 


DR. ULSH: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: And I -- I think the real 

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question for me has always been the data 


reliability more so. And -- And to what 


extent do the claimants have raw data within 


their file or is it often a printout of like 


HIS-20 or CEDR data? And I don't know that 


answer. That’s -- I might have asked it 


before, too. 


DR. ULSH: Well, I can give you -- I can speak 


in generalities and maybe I’ll let some of the 


other site experts speak in more specific. 


MR. GRIFFON: Because that’s where it would be 


more important is if a lot of the individual 


claimants that you say have data, they don’t 


need co-worker data. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: If it’s only printouts from the 


database then -- then you’re back to the same, 


you know. 


DR. ULSH : Well, I think, Mark, and again I’m 


going to rely heavily on the site experts here 


but in the early years before the computer era 


the bioassay cards were the dose -- the dose of 


record. And I don't know exactly what years. 


Roger or Craig, can you give me the years when 


bioassay cards were the dose of record? 

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MR. FALK: Yes, the cards were the means to -- 


the means to record the bioassay data through 


1969. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Then after that, Roger, came 


a database. Which one? Health Science? 


MR. FALK: That was the Health Sciences 


database. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. And was that the official 


dose of record then? 


MR. FALK: Yes. Also for the people who were 


active at that time all of the card data was 


actually manually transposed into the Health 


Sciences database. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. After the Health Sciences 


database then came -- I don't know what. Then 


came what? 


MR. FALK: Then we started to have the HIS-20. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. And that year -- that was in 


the late ‘90s or maybe 2000, HIS-20; is that 


right? 


MR. FALK: That was in the ‘90s. 


` 	 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. FALK: I don't know -- I don't know the 


exact date of that. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Late ‘90s. 

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DR. ULSH: Okay. So -- So Mark, the -- the 


point that I’m making is there were different ­

- if you go over the years of operation of the 


plant there were different systems for keeping 


track of the dose of record. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, when you say the -- the 


Health Sciences database that’s -- I -- I think 


that’s the first time I’ve heard that one but ­

-


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- but if, you know, that -- and 


you say that’s -- that was the dose of record, 


this gets back to the same discussions we’ve 


had with the Y-12, you know. That -- That --


Maybe it’s -- and I -- I don’t, you know, I -- 


I would -- would say you’re -- you’re probably 


presenting it accurately but, you know, we went 


through that with the Y-12 database that there 


was I guess a letter from Y-12 and they sort of 


went through a process with DOE to accept the 


database as the dose of record. Is there 


anything like this in Rocky or -- 


DR. ULSH: I don't know. I’m going to defer to 


the experts. 


MR. GRIFFON: Because otherwise I think you’re 

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-- you’re -- you know, the same question 


applies. How do we, you know -- you haven’t 


chall-- you haven’t checked that against the 


raw records or -- or you did just do some of 


that I guess in the --


DR. ULSH: Well, we did respond. We certainly 


did for the years when the bioassay cards were 


-- were the dose of record. We did that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: Now, the question I think would be 


then if during the years when the HSDS, Health 


Sciences Data System I think, was the original 


dose of record, I'm not sure, you know, what -- 


what kind of a validation you might be looking 


for here. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I’m -- I’m -- it’s the 


first I heard of it so I’m just laying it out 


there. I’m not sure either. 


DR. ULSH: Sure. 


MR. GRIFFON: But it seems to be that covers 


’69 through ’90-something, right or -- 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I think so. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- thereabouts. 


DR. ULSH: I think that’s accurate. Yeah. And 


then later HIS-20. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: So --


MR. GRIFFON: So you didn’t really have any raw 


records to compare against for those years from 


’69 on but you did the earlier period? 


DR. ULSH: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: What you presented here is from 


the earlier period? 


DR. ULSH: Well, when you say raw records, we 


didn’t have any handwritten records. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: So the summary of -- of what we’ve 


done is at the bottom of page 14. And we did 


find pretty substantial agreement between the 


bioassay cards, the HSDS database and the HIS20 database. It is worth pointing out that 


when we actually do dose reconstructions 


however, we utilize all three sources of data 


and that’s to maximize completeness. Say for 


instance there’s nothing in HIS-20 but we have 


earlier results on bioassay cards or maybe the 


HSDS. We will certainly use those earlier 


records. We’ll supplement what we get from 

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HIS-20. 


MR. GRIFFON: And then this might also be 


review but I think someone present-- I forget 


who presented the HIS-20 CEDR comparison. 


DR. ULSH: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: And I was just, you know, looking 


at some of that -- not that I had a lot of time 


to look at it. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: But HIS-20, there were -- there 


were tables somewhere developed breaking this 


down --


DR. ULSH: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- HIS-20 ’53 to ’57, and CEDR 


’53 to ’57, and looking at that I remember 


something in a discussion of the discrepancy in 


the total number of samples was possibly due to 


a lot of extra zeros which shouldn’t have 


actually been -- been put in the CEDR data is ­

- is what I recall. Maybe Roger indicated 


that. But I -- I see, for instance, this time 


period I have 10,158 samples in HIS-20 for that 


time period. Of them I -- I -- that was 10,158 


zeroes out of a total of 12,041 total data 


points which was 84 percent. And then if I 

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look at the same time period for CEDR it was 


16,412 zeros out of 18,888 -- 886 total data 


points which was like 87 percent zeros. I just 


wonder, you know, the difference in raw records 


there is about 6,800 and you might have 


answered this already but I -- just maybe to 


clarify that, why was -- 


DR. ULSH: If I did --


MR. GRIFFON: -- what would have caused that 


difference there? 


DR. ULSH: If I did answer it, Mark, I don't 


remember so --


MR. GRIFFON: I think Roger discussed it or 


someone else. I know we discussed it on the 


last call but --


DR. ULSH: It might have been Joe Locktemy 


(ph). I'm not sure. Roger, do you recall 


anything? 


MR. FALK: Well, I was only commenting on the 


lung count data --


DR. ULSH: Oh, right. 


MR. FALK: -- about with regard to zeros but 


I’m also thinking that the HIS-20 did not 


capture the urine data for the workers who -- 


for the workers who had retired from the Rocky 

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Flats site or -- or were terminated from the 


Rocky Flats site prior to 1977 and were not 


part of the benefits program. And so therefore 


the -- and therefore I would expect that the 


CEDR database would -- would contain more -- 


more -- more of the urine results than the CEDR 


database for those early years. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. And I think -- and I have 


to look back on that analysis, too, but I think 


the general conclusion that he was making was 


that the -- the co-worker models would not 


have differed that much using either one of 


these approaches. Or there were some small 


differences but --


DR. ULSH: I think that’s accurate, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: I think that is what he was 


indicating. And -- And keep in mind that if 


what Roger says is -- is the explanation for 


the difference in the -- the number of records 


we do have -- for that earlier time period we 


do have the original dose of record which up to 


’69 would have been the cards and then from ’70 


up through -- up through ’77 we would have the 


Health Sciences Data System printout. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. MUNN: Mark, I lost you. 


MR. GRIFFON: I lost myself once. 


MS. MUNN: When you -- when you started giving 


figures from the -- I was looking at the tables 


from the database --


MR. GRIFFON: Well, these -- these -- 


MS. MUNN: -- assessment and follow-up 


evaluation. Were you looking at something 


else? 


MR. GRIFFON: I have to -- the numbers I got 


were from the -- on the O-drive within the coworker folder. 


MS. MUNN: Oh, all right. Fine. 


MR. GRIFFON: And there was a breakout of HIS20 versus CEDR, so yeah. 


MS. MUNN: Fine. All right. All right. So I 


-- no wonder I didn’t have the numbers. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, right. 


DR. ULSH: One of them was called a comparison. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: I’m not going to get the titles 


right but one of them was comparison and the 


other one was follow-up -- 


MS. MUNN: Follow-up. 

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DR. ULSH: -- comparison or something -- 


MS. MUNN: Correct. 


DR. ULSH: -- I think. Are those the two 


documents you’re talking about, Mark? 


MR. GRIFFON: No, no, no. 


MS. MUNN: Those are the two I was looking at ­

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DR. ULSH: Oh. 


MR. GRIFFON: No, I actually --


MS. MUNN: -- and they are not the ones that -- 


that Mark was looking at. 


MR. GRIFFON: This is on the O-drive because I 


-- I -- we haven’t received any of the HIS-20 


or CEDR databases so I thought, well, maybe 


they weren’t put in the AB folder so I looked 


in the co-worker data and to be honest with 


you, I'm not sure exactly what sub-folder they 


were in within the co-worker data but there was 


-- there was actually -- I think someone broke 


out the full database into -- into year span, 


’53 to ’57, ’57 to ’61, something like that. 


MS. MUNN: Yes. 


DR. ULSH: Now, that sounds a lot, Mark, like 


what was in those two documents I mentioned but 


I --

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MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: It might have been what you used 


to create those doc-- yeah, those documents. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah. 

DR. ULSH: It might have been that. 

MS. MUNN: Very possible. 

MR. GRIFFON: Because these were access 


databases that I was looking at. 


DR. ULSH: All right. 


MS. MUNN: It was just --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. MUNN: -- I was confused -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. MUNN: -- because I couldn’t find where you 


were getting your numbers but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, the other -- the other 


thing I no-- I noticed in there, and this just 


might come into play in the -- in the models, 


and like you said, that -- that may not be such 


an issue because co-worker models are probably 


not going to be used much, but in the CEDR 


database, in the particular one I was looking 


at anyway, for 19-- the last 20 or so values 


all were -- all were in excess of -- let me -- 


let me present this correctly. HIS-20 had like 

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20 or so values that were greater than 935 and 


I think we’re talking DPM here. And when I 


looked at it closely they all fell 


approximately on the same -- I think all on the 


same day or thereabouts, 6/15/57. In CEDR all 


those values were truncated off, and I wondered 


if that was because they were related to some 


incident and not thought to be applicable to a 


general co-worker model or what -- what the 


rationale was for that. And I -- I think that 


-- that -- that’s just a question on the coworker models period, you know. Do you -- 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: Would -- Would that tend to be 


an approach if you had incident data, would you 


-- that was clearly from one incident 


involving, you know, specific people, would you 


tend to truncate that off your general coworker models? So I don’t -- yeah. If you 


want to answer or don’t have an answer -- 


DR. ULSH: I -- I -- I don’t really have an 


answer to that right now, Mark. If you could 


maybe provide the specifics in an -- in an 


email to me I’ll --


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

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DR. ULSH: -- try to find an answer for you. 


MR. GRIFFON: I’ll type that up for you, yeah. 


But it’s 6/15/57 were the samples. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: And HIS-20 had high values and 


CEDR has nothing. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. SHARFI: Mark, this is Mutty. Those --


Those can be chelated samples so in a co-worker 


study you might not want to include those. 


MR. GRIFFON: You know, could -- yeah. There ­

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MR. SHARFI: I’m thinking by chelation you 


would not want to include them in your coworker study. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. And when I saw them all 


in the same day it may just be that -- and I’ve 


seen --


MR. SHARFI: Depending on how high they were 


they’re -- they could -- they’re -- they’re 


more like to be chelated. 


MR. GRIFFON: And I think I’ve seen notations 


in some of your co-worker spreadsheets where 


there’s a note in red at the bottom that says, 


you know, this and this data point were dropped 

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-- found to be involved in a incident and not 


deemed applicable to co-worker model. So I 


don't know if that, you know -- there could be 


good rationale for this. I was just trying to 


understand it and whether that, you know, if 


that’s a general approach. I thought maybe if, 


you know, a follow-up on that one, Bill, so 


maybe in general is that done for the co-worker 


models or for -- for Rocky for their source 


model. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Yeah. Mark, like I said, if 


-- if you can mail that off to me I’ll -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Sure. 


DR. ULSH: -- I’ll get you an answer or I’ll do 


my best to give you an answer. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. So let me think about where 


we are here. I think we’re on page 15 which is 


comment 12 from the matrix, and this deals with 


the no data available issue. And in previous 


discussions what NIOSH has said is that no data 


available could indicate two situ-- at least 


two situations that we can think of. One is a 


missed badge exchange. You know, a worker was 


on vacation or sick or, you know, maybe just 

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forgot to exchange his badge in which case he 


would continue wearing the badge for an extra 


cycle. The second possibility is that the 


badge was turned in and there was a problem 


with the badge. And what I mean is there might 


be an investigation, there might, you know, 


such as during the TLD era; maybe a crystal was 


missing or something that would have required 


some additional processing so that the results 


from that badge weren’t available at the time 


the report was issued. And what we’ve 


discovered as we’ve gone along with this issue 


is that the fact the place where these no data 


available entries appeared, but in the reports 


that were issued to the supervisors, they were 


computer printouts sent to the supervisors 


showing the dosimetry results for the people 


that -- that reported to that supervisor. And 


we actually over the past week, we have located 


some of those supervisor reports at the records 


center. We have pulled those and we are 


currently in the process of trying to go back 


and chase down some individual incidents -- 


sorry, individual instances where no data 


available was on the supervisor reports and 

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compare those to maybe the dosimetry records 


for the individuals. That is not complete yet. 


We just got those records yesterday, but we 


have made some progress. And that’s really 


about as much of an update as I can give you on 


that at the moment. 


MR. GIBSON: This is Mike Gibson. If I could 


step back for just a second, I had a -- I’d 


like clarification from Roger Falk I believe it 


was who was talking. How many people received 


chelation at Rocky Flats? Do you have a record 


of that, database of that, any documentation? 


MR. GRIFFON: I think Mutty brought -- brought 


up that possibility, didn’t you? 


MR. SHARFI: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. SHARFI: Usually when you’re assessing a 


case it’s very clear in the record, both -- 


both a part of the incident report and part of 


their medical report about exact dates on when 


they -- when they were receiving chelation, 


what -- how much, what type of chelating agent 


was prescribed. Every -- Every case that I’ve 


dealt with that had a chelation scenario had 


all that information inside their DOE file but 

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I don’t have any good idea of the -- the total 


number of chelating scenarios that they had at 


the facility. 


MR. GIBSON: I guess I can open up the question 


up generally then. Does anyone with experience 


from Rocky out there know that -- basically 


that number or is there any kind of -- 


DR. ULSH: Roger, are you out there? 


MR. FALK: Yes, I am out there. I’m trying to 


-- I’m trying to draw that up. It is something 


over 100 but probably less than 140 but I don't 


have the specific number right -- right at 


hand. 


MR. GIBSON: That could be -- that could be dug 


up out of some sort of data file if needed? 


MR. FALK: Well, I’m not sure if it’s really 


pertinent but I think that the basic -- that 


the basic statement is that if a worker was 


actually chelated it would be in the claimant’s 


file that were captured by the -- by the 


project so that the -- so that the dose 


reconstructor would have that available. 


MR. GIBSON: Well, whether it’s pertinent or 


not, that -- as a member of the Board I just 


asked the question, is that available? 

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MR. FALK: I'm not sure. 


MR. GIBSON: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: You know, and this is a little 


bit of an aside here but I -- I’m also -- just 


wanted to mention and I think maybe something 


that might be important in the super-S model. 


I think today the cases used for the super-S 


TIB, were they chelation cases or were they 


not? 


DR. ULSH: Oh. 


MR. GRIFFON: Do you recall that? I mean I 


think you only -- at the end of the day you 


used two cases, right, for your -- 


MR. FALK: Six of the Rocky Flats cases were 


the chelation cases and three were not. 


MR. GIBSON: This is Mike Gibson again. Would 


it be pertinent to a co-worker model? 


MR. FALK: It would be pertinent to actually 


exclude the urine samples that were actually 


perturbed by the chelation and those were 


generally coded as a code one in the Health 


Sciences Database data. 


MR. GIBSON: (Unintelligible) separated out by 


a some kind of asterisk or notation. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and that -- and that -- 

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that could be one explanation of those ones 


being separated out that I mentioned but -- 


DR. ULSH: Well, it could be. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think it’s worth following up 


on. 


DR. ULSH: Sure, Sure. And -- and Mike, I 


think the answer to your question is yeah, it 


sure would be relevant to make sure that those 


chelation sample results don’t make it into the 


co-worker model. 


MR. GIBSON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, that would certainly be 


something you’d want to do. 


MR. FALK: But now, I would also like to point 


out that if they did get into the co-worker 


model it would be claimant favorable because it 


would tend to elevate the data set. 


DR. ULSH: Well, and if there were only between 


100 and 140 I'm not sure how much of an impact 


it might have. The values of course would be 


pretty high but you wouldn’t expect all of 


those to fall in the same year. 


MR. SHARFI: Actually the people chelated were 


using daily samples so they would have a 


sizeable number of samples. 

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DR. ULSH: Oh, okay. All right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Thanks for that. 


MS. MUNN: I can’t imagine those would be used 


for co-worker--


DR. ULSH: No, I --


MS. MUNN: -- co-worker data under any 


circumstances. We have such a few number of 


claims that are likely to be a part of coworker data. 


DR. ULSH: Right. We haven’t identified any 


for internal that I know of. 


MR. LANGSTED: This is Jim Langsted and I 


specifically recall Joe Lochemy talking last 


time about the fact that he did take that data 


out of the co-worker data set. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Like I said, that may well 


be the explanation for what I saw so that, you 


know, that -- and I -- I don't remember Joe 


saying that but he sure could have and so -- 


DR. ULSH: Well, like you said, Mark, it could 


be. But if you send us the statistics -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: -- we’ll follow up on it. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Worth following up on, 


yeah. All right. 

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DR. ULSH: Mike, did you have anything else or 


do you -- should I move on or -- 

MR. GIBSON: Yeah, go ahead. 

DR. ULSH: Okay. All right. Let’s see. I 

think we were on comment 15 which is 

coincidentally on page 15 of my handout. And 

Mark, I don't know. I may be confused. I -- I 

think that we addressed this issue on comment 


9, action item 7. This was the follow-up with 


the -- the petitioner on the -- on the 


particular example. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. If you recall -- if you 


recall it said I moved the comments from 9 to ­

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DR. ULSH: Oh, okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- their individual comments so 


they’re the same one, yeah. 


DR. ULSH: All right. So we’ve already covered 


that? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Then comment 18 is the next 


one, and this has to do with workers who 


frequently did not wear badges in production 


area and did not report non-use of the badge. 


So this -- this is that I left my badge in my 

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locker issue. And we had talked last time 


about some statistical analyses or -- or, you 


know, just looking at some of the data at least 


from the post-’77 years that we might be able 


to look at to get a feeling for this issue. 


And we have done some of that. We have 


actually located I think, Jim Langsted, was the 


number 121 work reporters? 


MR. LANGSTED: 239. 


DR. ULSH: 239? Wow. Okay. So what we --


what we’ve done is we started assembling graphs 


that you see on page 17 that indicate -- it’s a 


cumulative dose graph. And what you might be 


wanting to focus in on on these graphs is 


instances where you might see a concave down 


shape. So as you go from left to right on the 


graph if you saw a flattening of the curve, 


that would be consistent with two situations at 


least that we know of. One would be the worker 


was approaching a dose limit of some kind and 


was removed from radiation work. The second 


situation that it would be consistent with is 


the worker continued in his job but his badge 


was removed from that environment. In other 


words, maybe left in his locker. I’m still not 

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clear on how we’re going to separate that out 


if we see it. Here are a couple of 


representative graphs, about six of them on 


page 17 where we did not see the kind of 


flattening that we’re talking about. And also 


it’s worth noting that -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Each of these graphs represents 


one individual or what -- what do these -- 


DR. ULSH: I think it’s one individual; is that 


right, Jim? 


MR. LANGSTED: Each -- the -- each one is a 


different individual. 


DR. ULSH: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MR. LANGSTED: And these individuals were 


picked because first of all they were exchanged 


-- badges were being exchanged on a -- a semimonthly basis which means they were identified 


at the time as the highest potential dose 


people and needed to be controlled periodi-- or 


more periodically than others. And also we 


selected from those the ones that had the 


highest total dose for the year thinking that 


those would be the individuals that would be 


most likely to need dose control where you 

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might see that. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


MR. FITZGERALD: This is Joe Fitzgerald. What 


facilities do these graphs or these curves 


represent? 


MR. LANGSTED: Don’t have that data 


specifically, Joe. We just randomly picked 


individuals. In fact the ID of the individual 


was protected from me. 


MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. 


MR. LANGSTED: But my guess is there they’d be 


plutonium production individuals. 


DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. So out of the 


237 cases you looked at, how many of those had 


this flattening someplace in the -- in the -- 


in the cumulative distribution or the 


distribution we’re looking at? 


DR. ULSH: Well, we’re -- we’re actually still 


looking at -- at the data, John. We just got 


these data over the past week. I think in the 


graphs that Jim sent me I saw one where there 


might be some flattening but we’re -- again 


we’re still looking at -- through the rest of 


these. 


DR. MAURO: I think the intent was not so much 

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to say whether we could make a distinction of 


whether it was deliberate or leaving in the 


locker room versus a person who’s taken off the 


job because of exposure. But just to see how 


often that occurred --


DR. ULSH: Sure. 


DR. MAURO: -- that would be 237. You see it 


three times, I would say, well, that’s not very 


often. Out of the 237 if you see it 237 times, 


then we have something that I guess we have to 


pay a little more attention to. 


DR. ULSH: Right. And --


MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


DR. ULSH: -- keep in mind, John, I mean I’m 


just speculating here because again our 


analysis isn’t complete yet. But as the years 


went on, as you got into the ‘90s say, and the 


dose limits, you know, got progressively lower 


over the history of the plant, and what you 


might expect to see is that as the limits got 


lower people may be approaching the limits more 


perhaps. And so you might expect to see more 


flattening. I don't know if that’s what -- 


what -- whether it’ll turn out that we see. 


We’re just going to have to -- 

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DR. MAURO: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: -- finish the analysis but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Brant, the reason you picked ’77 


was because you had monthly data or -- or -- 


DR. ULSH: Jim, you had a pretty good 


explanation for that and I'm not sure I’d do it 


justice. Can you? 


MR. LANGSTED: Okay. Yeah, Mark, in 1977 is 


when the HIS-20 database first started 


recording or -- or kept the exchange by 


exchange data. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MR. LANGSTED: So if I was going to -- to do 


that I -- I’ve got to be using more than just 


quarterly totals. 


MR. GRIFFON: That’s what I thought. Okay. 


MR. LANGSTED: That’s why I started that. And 


then I -- I thought probably 1989 is -- is 


about the last time you want to look at this 


because at that point production shut down at 


the plant --

MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

MR. LANGSTED: -- and dose became less of an 

issue. 

MR. DEMAIORI: This is Tony DeMaiori. Prior to 
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shipment of the plutonium the last dose went 


back up in the 2000s and we were doing a PUSPS 


operations. 


MR. LANGSTED: That’s very true. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: So that’s an explanation of what 


-- Okay. So that’s ongoing, Brant, is what 


you’re saying? 


DR. ULSH: Exactly. Exactly. I just wanted to 


update you on our progress so far. We had some 


progress. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, also before we leave this issue, 


as I was trolling through some of these 


dosimetry files I did find an interesting 


letter and that is on page 18 of my handout. 


And what this is, it’s a letter to a worker 


notifying the worker that he’s going to be 


placed on radiation exposure restriction. So 


this is the first situation that we described 


where a worker might be approaching a limit of 


some sort and so that he’s going to be pulled 


out of the radiation environment. And the 


interesting thing that you see here is that -- 


is that last paragraph that it says you will 

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remain in this classification, that -- that is, 


say, you know, pulled out, restricted from 


radiation work. You will remain in this 


classification ‘til the end of this calendar 


year. Your rate of pay will remain the same as 


it is now. At the end of the year you will be 


returned to Chem-Op Building 77-1. Now, I 


don’t want to make too much of this because I 


don't know how generally it applies across the 


years or across, you know, the plant for that 


particular year, 1979. It does indicate though 


that there might be less of an incentive for a 


worker for financial reasons to engage in this 


kind of manipulation of his dosimetry. 


However, it should also be pointed out that the 


petitioner mentioned that one reason a worker 


might want to do this is to remain eligible for 


overtime work and this letter certainly does 


not speak to that situation. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: But it’s just one more piece of 


evidence to add to the weight of evidence 


approach that we’re building here. 


MR. DEMAIORI: I -- I guess -- this is Tony 


DeMaiori. I’d like to speak on that. We 

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actually negotiated that into our collective 


bargaining agreement. 


DR. ULSH: Right. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Which would speak just the 


opposite. 


MR. GRIFFON: Exactly, yeah. 


MR. DEMAIORI: We wouldn’t have wasted our time 


if in fact people weren’t suffering financial 


loss. That’s -- I’d also like to point out 


that, you know, your rate of pay, your base 


rate of pay, that’s not premiums. That --


Like when we re-entered the beryllium areas we 


paid time and a half for papper (ph) pay. And 


when we removed the beryllium hazard the papper 


pay was removed. And we had two different 


instances, one in 707 and one in building 444 


where the people took their lapel samplers and 


swept the floor, trying to restore the papper 


pay. So, you know, for -- for this case you’re 


building that there was no disincentive that’s 


totally incorrect. 


DR. ULSH: No, no, I’m not -- I’m not -- in 


fact I was trying to be very clear that I’m not 


saying that there was no disincentive because 


this letter certainly does not speak to those 

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situations like overtime or the premiums that 


you mentioned. It doesn’t speak to that at 


all. And that’s the point I was trying to 


make. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Yeah. No, what that letter 


speaks to is the language in the collective 


bargaining agreement. 


DR. ULSH: Right. And you see that in the 


first paragraph of the letter, the article 4, 


section 6 of the company union agreement. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Absolutely. 


DR. ULSH: Right. That’s -- as you said, Tony, 


that would be the basis for this no penalty in 


the base rate of pay. So I -- I -- I don’t 


claim that this letter makes that issue go away 


at all. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: It’s one piece of information to add 


to what we’ve got. Should I move on or --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: -- does anyone have any questions on 


or discussion on that issue? 


MR. GRIFFON: I think go ahead through. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. That takes us to the last 


page, page 19, comment 22, there was an action 

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item. This goes back to the instances of no 


data available in situations of high exposure. 


Again we -- we’ve located some of these 


supervisor reports that we’re trying to run to 


ground now and I think the other concern that 


was raised in -- in this particular situation 


was the blackening of film and I think we’ve 


already covered that under another comment, 


too. I can go through it again if anyone would 


like but if you’re satisfied with that for now, 


I can just leave it. 


MR. GRIFFON: I think we’re okay with that. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Well, then we’re on to the 


last item, comment 26. And this is the action 


item was that we would provide co-worker 


methodology to the Board and to SC&A. At the 


risk of speaking without sitting in front of my 


computer to see what’s actually available out 


there I -- I did see the co-worker data in the 


location I’ve listed at the bottom of page 19. 


I sure hope that all of that is out there now 


for you guys to -- to review at your 


convenience. 


MR. GRIFFON: Question on that. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 

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MR. GRIFFON: I mean as I’m pulling it open 


again, did you put the Excel analysis files 


with that, too, in the -- 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I think so, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: It should be -- I know it’s 


somewhere else on there, too, but -- 


DR. ULSH: I’m thinking it’s in the co-worker 


data folder and then there were some sub-


folders. Oh, boy, I’m trying to go from memory 


here. I know that there’s a folder for 


americium and for plutonium and for uranium. 


MR. GRIFFON: So all those -- all those folders 


are there? Okay. 


DR. ULSH: I think if you open those folders 


there’s a whole long list of spreadsheets in 


there. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: But again, I’m trying to go from 


memory so... 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


MS. MUNN: Do you have the number of that -- of 


those TIBs? 


DR. ULSH: Yes, that is O-TIB 38 and O-TIB 58 


although I can never keep it straight which is 


external and which is internal. 

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MS. MUNN: That’s okay. 


MR. BUCHANAN: External is 58. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Thank you, Ron. 


MS. MUNN: Thanks. 


MR. GRIFFON: And at this point I'm not sure, 


you know, we can really discuss 38 or 58 or any 


of this extensively because I think we’ve -- 


most of us have just been focused on Y-12 last 


week so --


MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: Well, that takes you to the end of 


my status update. 


MR. GRIFFON: One other question on -- on the 


data provided -– I’m just looking in the coworker folder. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: I see the HIS-20 database from 


(unintelligible); is that the one? 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, that’s -- I don't know if 


that’s internal or external, Mark. 


MR. GRIFFON: Anyway, I see that but is there 


also a -- a CEDR one or is --


DR. ULSH: I don’t think we provided the CEDR. 


I don't know. I’d have to look again. 

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MR. GRIFFON: There wasn’t -- you indicated you 


had the CEDR in Access format, not in CEDR 


format. 


DR. ULSH: There was an issue about CEDR data. 


We -- we have to -- according to the agreement, 


to use CEDR data you have to only provide this 


to an authorized CEDR user. And so I think 


there at least was an issue about whether or 


not we were free to do that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


DR. ULSH: However, if you are an authorized 


CEDR user I think, again I’m going from memory 


here, I think in the evaluation report, the 


data sufficiency section, I listed the names of 


the files from CEDR that we used. And this was 


for I want to say the internal. And if you’re 


a CEDR user you could actually look at those 


files in CEDR. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. I am a --


DR. ULSH: I -- I know that’s -- I know that’s 


not the most convenient but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: It’s not the best format to go in 


CEDR either. I mean --


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- (unintelligible) was better 

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but anyway. 


DR. ULSH: I mean if you’d like us to pursue 


that, Mark, we can investigate it further but ­

-


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I’m not sure how much we -- 


we need it. I mean, yeah, I guess we’ll push 


through that when we get to the co-worker 


models more but --


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean really it was -- it was 


for the purposes of comparison of the two. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: And you provided that analysis 


but just to have the raw materials there would 


have been helpful. 


DR. ULSH: Sure. I understand what you’re 


saying. 


MR. GRIFFON: I mean I’ll leave it at that for 


now. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I think -- is there 


anything else on -- on Brant -- I mean this is 


really a status report on these actions, many 


of which you’ve completed but some are 


outstanding and we’ve got those notes. And I 

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think the last thing we’ll do -- it is getting 


late. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: The last thing we should do here 


is get a presentation from -- from John -- 


from SC&A or maybe it’s Joe. I'm not sure 


who’s presenting on the -- on their report. 


And -- And, you know, the same probably 


applies here. I'm not sure how much we can 


discuss it because most people just received it 


but at least have a little initial discussion 


on it. 


MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, Mark. I -- I -- I have 


Kathy here. We’re in Los Alamos. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


MR. FITZGERALD: What we can do is just 


clarify. I think the last work group meeting 


it was pointed out that because of the way a 


lot of these issues were combined we -- we did 


take the issues from the petition, combine them 


with some from the site profile, came up with 


the 17 at Dr. Ziemer’s request. And then we 


tried to clarify where things stood and also 


about the same time as we had the last work 


group meeting, as we indicated, Kathy was, in 

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fact, out at Rocky Flats talking to petitioners 


and beginning a process of trying to identify 


some additional documentation for the purposes 


of corroborating really, additional 


corroboration of -- of some of the issues that 


were -- were identified. I think it was the 


sense of the work group at the last meeting 


that it was kind of confusing tracking all 


these various issues. Some of them were 


overlapping and some of them had certainly 


different origins. Some of them were in fact 


in the process of being closed because they 


were recognized as not being SEC issues. And 


so there was a lot of things in motion. What 


we wanted to do for purposes of this discussion 


and the -- the SEC discussion of data integrity 


or data reliability was to sort of simplify it 


somewhat, and this is the purpose of the April 


20th document which was to clarify both the 


major issues and the -- in a -- in a somewhat 


(unintelligible) the basis and reasoning behind 


our seeing these as sort of the key issues that 


need to be addressed in providing a pathway, 


which I think was the important suggestion that 


came out of the discussion last time. A 

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pathway to come up with sufficient 


corroboration that I think, you know, all would 


be satisfied that, you know, there was a -- a 


reasonable pursuit of whatever documentation 


could be obtained. And obviously this is a 


work in progress. We’re still getting 


documentation in. I think it was the 


recommendation of the work group, however, that 


we clearly identify that which NIOSH was in a 


better position perhaps to pursue and -- and in 


the same breath maybe reserve some of the 


things that we were in the process of doing 


that we would like to complete. And that was 


the intent of this document was to clarify the 


basis but also identify a path forward that -- 


that we would -- we could continue doing but 


also offer up as simply a suggestion for work 


group discussion of documents that could be 


obtained and what those documents may tell us 


that would be of usefulness in this process. 


So that’s the backdrop. And I don't know how 


you want to go through this. Certainly I --


MR. GRIFFON: Well, yeah. I think it’s worth 


stepping through. I mean if you can summarize, 


Joe, but stepping through section by section 

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and then coming out -- each -- at the close of 


each section I think you have some recommended 


actions or -- for NIOSH and for SC&A, correct? 


MR. FITZGERALD: That's correct. 


MR. GRIFFON: So maybe just if you could step 


through in a concise -- 


MR. FITZGERALD: Probably with Kathy since 


she’s right beside me here. And certainly we 


start with data access as a backdrop. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: There are two -- two 


sets of data that have not been reviewed. 


(Unintelligible) dosimetry log sheets, that 


type of information that I copied when I was 


there that has not been shipped to me yet. The 


other are these outstanding records. 


DR. WADE: Kathy, we’re not hearing you. I 


don't know if -- if you’re on a speaker phone 


but we’re not hearing you. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Is this better? 


DR. WADE: Yes. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. Okay, there’s two 


outstanding sets of records. One set is -- is 


the set that I copied while I was there and 


that they were supposed to ship to me which I 

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haven’t received yet. And that’s from the 


boxes I did review. And then there were the 


records that I requested that were not pulled 


back from the Denver Federal Center while I was 


there. And I kind of summarized in table 1 the 


documents that I originally was looking for and 


which ones I -- I walked away with. And the --


the box of -- there’s probably about 1,000 


sheets of paper. There’s just kind of a mishmash of all -- all sorts of things, everything 


from tritium to TLD log sheets to external 


dosimetry technical documents, that type of 


stuff. 


DR. ULSH: Kathy, this is -- this is Brant. 


With regard to the first set of data that 


you’re talking about, the ones that you’ve 


copied but they’ve not yet been shipped to you. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Uh-huh. 


DR. ULSH: Is there anything that you can think 


of that NIOSH can do to maybe assist in that 


process? I mean are -- do you know what the 


issue is as to why they haven’t been shipped? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I do not know. The 


person that -- my contact has not gotten back 


to me for about a week. 

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DR. ULSH: Oh, okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And probably what the 


best action is is for me to try again. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And then if they don’t 


turn around and provide it then for NIOSH to 


step in and say, hey, we want those records 


sent. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I mean we’ve got people out 


there who have a, you know, fairly good 


relationship with records, you know, the DOE 


records personnel. And, you know, again, I -- 


it’s hard for me to say without knowing what 


the issue -- what the holdup is but, you know, 


I mean if -- if it’s just a matter of one of 


our people driving down to the records center 


and saying hey, you’ve got some boxes on hold 


for Kathy DeMers, we’ll take ‘em and get ‘em to 


her, I mean we can do that. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Let me catch up with 


Andrea. 


DR. ULSH: Oh, is this Andrea Wilson? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Uh-huh. 


DR. ULSH: Oh, okay. Okay. Yeah, that’s --


that’s one of our contacts actually. 

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MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yeah, and I’ve been out 


of town --


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- this week so --


DR. ULSH: All right. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: At least let me get home 


and make sure that they -- 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, they may have been shipped, 


right, so --


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- don’t show up. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Now, there’s a -- a 


later table in here that -- they’re more into 


table 1, table 4 and what I did was I scrunched 


-- it doesn’t look like it but I scrunched the 


type of records that would be helpful if they 


were pulled. These -- these are really those 


records that I wanted to see but didn’t get to 


see. And those years correspond to individual 


situations in the SEC petition so I tried to 


overlap. This person said he worked on this 


job in this area for 1982, 1983 so I tried to 


pull the logbook from that area for 1982/’83. 


And I guess the -- the important thing about 


those logbooks is that I’m told that there’s 

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personnel dose information in them and that 


that dose information doesn’t correspond to the 


dosimetry record. So that’s what I was trying 


to -- to check on. Now, you’ll see that I said 


select years on some of these. I realized 


that’s a lot of logbooks but those are the -- 


those are the years that cover particular 


people and the intention was to just pick a 


couple of them through that period for that 


building and compare it back to that person’s 


dosimetry record. 


DR. ULSH: I would -- I would say if you’re 


doing that, too, it might be worthwhile if 


possible to make sure we have a good coverage 


of the years, you know, the decades I should -- 


I should say. Like let’s not pick them all 


from the ‘80s or all from the ‘90s or -- 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: -- you know, yeah. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, you’ll see there’s 


quite a variety. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, there’s a range I see in 


your table. 


DR. ULSH: Just from -- to get a point of 


clarification, Kathy, I’m looking at table 4 -- 

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MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: -- the ones where you see select 


years between ’63 and ’95. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Uh-huh. 


DR. ULSH: When you see that are -- are you 


indicting that there are specific years that 


you’re looking for or rather that you’re 


interested in a random sampling of -- of those 


years? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: That’s what I was 


talking about. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: A random sampling. I 


don’t expect --


DR. ULSH: Oh, I see. Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- this whole -- every 


logbook for that building from ’63 to ’95. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Right. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: You know, I’m just -- 


pull five or something. Those years are 


associated with a particular person being in 


that building over that time period because 


they didn’t specify a particular year. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. I think I see now. Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. I tried to under 

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the RFP-SEC petition matrix -- I tried to kind 


of come down to --


MR. GRIFFON: What page are you on, Kathy? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I’m on page 4. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. (Unintelligible) backup. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And I already see an 


error in this list. It’s the bulleted area. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I tried to kind of boil 


it down to -- to the issues, the core issues. 


And one of those, the other radionuclides we 


dropped in the back but apparently we didn’t 


drop from this list. 


MR. GRIFFON: Which bullet item is that? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: That’s the last one. 


MR. GRIFFON: Last item, okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And I tried to tie it to 


one of the matrix issues just to give you -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- a reference back to 


that -- to what particular matrix issue 


brought this particular situation up but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: That bullet is dropped is what 


you’re saying? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yeah. But really for 

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several of these I would follow the same 


process in trying to evaluate it, going from 


the dosimetry record to the processing logs to 


the logbook like the no data available, false 


entries, zeros where they were -- where they 


expected to have high dose, those types of 


things. The same process will be used. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: With respect to the 


external dosimetry investigations, really what 


-- what that’s about is how did they do it, 


especially before the time period of the 


procedures that NIOSH has cited, and how did 


they document it or how were they told to 


document it and did they indeed document that. 


And I provided a table from actually a TLD 


problem logbook and each of these entries have 


had an issue which -- which I listed out. I’ll 


try and give you the table number here, and 


that’s on page 7. I would have expected them 


to say something in -- in the worker’s file 


about it or have some policy on how to deal 


with that situation. And those ID numbers 


should -- should allow you to track back to an 


individual. Basically what we want to see is 

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whether they actually indeed did do -- did have 


a process in place to assign doses when there 


was a problem with the -- with the film badge 


or it was lost or there was an overexposure 


like when the film was black. And was that 


process formally documented. In other words, 


did they do an extended external dose 


reconstruction and go out and talk to coworkers and find out where this person was 


working and that type of thing. 


MR. GRIFFON: Kathy, can we -- I -- I guess if 


we could step through section by section now -- 


you’ve kind of given an overview there. 


Section 1 you have suggested NIOSH follow-ups 


and SC&A follow-ups. I think --


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. Let’s go back -- 


MR. GRIFFON: -- it might be worthwhile to be 


clear what we expect, you know. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. Well, let’s go to 

page 5. 

MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 

MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And this has to do with 

the safety concerns. 

MR. GRIFFON: Right. 

MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Ones that -- that have 
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been filed -- filed. What I did is I got a 


list of the safety concerns and really it just 


had brief descriptions. And I picked out those 


that were relevant to dosimetry. And hopefully 


NIOSH has gotten 71-4 but that -- but I guess 


you’ll get -- NIOSH will have to tell me if 


they’ve gotten that one. 


DR. ULSH: Kathy, who did you send -- I don’t 


think I’ve got -- got it. Who did you send it 


to over at NIOSH? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Probably it would have 


come through formal general. John, are you 


still there? 


DR. MAURO: Yes, I am. Okay. I guess I don’t 


have it. Or if I do I don't know I have it. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: You thought it was forwarded to me? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yeah. Probably a CD I 


sent. 


DR. MAURO: You sent it recently? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yeah. A CD. 


DR. MAURO: Oh, okay. I did receive a set of 


CDs from Judy. Are you referring to CDs that 


went first to Judy and then to me? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Right. 

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DR. MAURO: I have it. Yes, I do. I have 


those CDs. 


MR. GRIFFON: So you have to -- SC&A can still 


work on providing that to NIOSH, Brant, yeah. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. So -- okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yeah, it’s really just a 


single sheet of paper. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. So -- but I received two -- 


I -- two separate days I received two sets of 


CDs. Now, just let me know what you’d like me 


to do with those because I distributed them 


internally to SC&A folks but I did not forward 


anything on to NIOSH. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. Well, that safety 


document should be on the Rocky Flats CD. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. So you would like me to send 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Forward that. 


DR. MAURO: Okay. The Rocky CD, and I’ll send 


that to whom? 


MR. GRIFFON: To NIOSH. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, if you could send it to me, 


John -- Brant -– Brant Ulsh, that would be 


good. 

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DR. MAURO: Okay. I’ll take care of that. 


It’ll go out tomorrow. 


DR. ULSH: Thanks, John. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. And then there’s 


several other safety concerns and some of them 


kind of track very well with concerns that were 


in the petition and I would just recommend that 


those safety concerns be pulled. And some of 


the files, well, there’s -- there’s -- there’s 


a company response to each safety concern so 


the concern is listed and the company response 


is listed. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So we have a limited set 


of safety concern reports here, and the 


recommendation is for NIOSH to pull these and 


evaluate ‘em, right? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: And SC&A is also going to 


evaluate a couple that you already have, three 


that you --


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, we have 71-4 -- 


MR. GRIFFON: -- that are coming under -- 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- but we’d like to see 


probably 87-206 and 92-036. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. So you can do a few in 

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parallel is what you’re suggesting? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: On -- on that list of safety 


concerns, Kathy, were -- were these documents 


that you requested and -- and DOE was not able 


to provide them? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: The -- I originally 


requested 71-4 when I was at Rocky Flats 


because I just discovered them when I was 


there. 


DR. ULSH: Oh, I see. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And the remainder have 


not been requested. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Not yet requested, okay. 


Okay. I guess my thoughts are that I mean we 


can certainly try to get them. It will take 


some time I think. Pretty much everyone agrees 


that I mean that certainly can’t be 


accomplished before the Board meeting. We can 


try. Our -- our experience is that the 


classified records are fairly well organized. 


The unclassified records not so much. I guess 


if -- if the group decides that we want to 


pursue these documents or any other documents 

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in this -- in this -- the SC&A’s report then 


the next step for us would be to talk to our -- 


our contacts, the records people, and find out, 


you know, what kind of a time frame we’re 


looking at on getting these. I mean I’m not 


sure that we’ll be able to do any better than ­

- than Kathy did but -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Right, right. 


DR. ULSH: -- we can try. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And maybe you can, you 


know, we can just -- we just have to keep on 


top of this and you can give us an update on -- 


on how you -- you -- I mean I think it’s 


important especially since at least a few of 


them -- SC&A is arguing that they directly tie 


back to some of our matrix items and they’re -- 


they’re -- these are issues that were raised by 


the petitioner. 


DR. ULSH: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: So I think to that extent I think 


it would be good at least to attempt. And, you 


know, then if it’s taking -- I mean we’ll -- 


we’ll just try to keep on top of it and -- 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. If we’re not getting 

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anywhere then we -- we at some point have to 


pull the plug. We understand that. 


DR. ULSH: Mark, a point of procedure. Are you 


capturing these in a -- and -- 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: And it will be coming out in a 


matrix? 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Good. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. The -- the next 


section is the external dosimetry procedures. 


And this somewhat goes back to the lost chip 


issue that’s in the petition but it -- it’s 


really broader and covers all sorts of -- of 


issues. And again it’s getting back to 


verifying that they actually did do a valid 


external dosimetry investigation when there was 


a problem with the badge. One of our concerns 


was that the extended external dose reviews 


procedures were from the ’80 -- from the ’90s. 


And what we’d like to -- to see is the -- 


MR. GRIFFON: And the one that Brant mentioned 


on the last call is from ’83, right? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, that -- that --


that’s an actual processing procedure. 

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MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Not a dosimetry --


DR. ULSH: Yeah, that’s correct. I think 


that’s the Lincoln Penox (ph) document? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Right. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I think -- I think you’ve 


accurately described it. That’s a dosimetry 


processing procedure. 


MR. GRIFFON: Oh, okay. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, I don't know. 


MR. GRIFFON: I just did that on the last call 


I think. I thought that was similar to -- to 


the other investigation procedures but... 


DR. ULSH: There are some overlap but not 


complete overlap. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. ULSH: And I -- I don't know. I mean 


without looking we’re certainly not aware of 


earlier procedures. We haven’t been able to 


locate any but -- but I don't know. I mean --


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: In this case I was able 


to in table 3 give you examples from the 


’85/’86 logbook because that’s what I had 


access to at the time. But certainly you need 

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to do snapshots in time including the era 


before 1983 and just kind of work your way 


backwards. 


DR. ULSH: Now, what -- I guess I’m just trying 


to clarify what we’re going to do on these. So 


we’ve got some examples here on table 3 where 


there were some problems with I guess in this 


time frame it would have been the crystals in ­

- in the TLD badges. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Or -- Or the badge was 


contaminated or --


DR. ULSH: Right. Right. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: There were reader 


errors. 


DR. ULSH: Right. Problems with the TLD of 


various types. And what -- I guess what are 


we looking for to further inform us about 


these? Are we looking for -- 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Let’s just -- Let’s 


just walk through one. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Let’s say I was looking 


at 514479. 


DR. ULSH: 514479 -- Okay, I see it. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. The first thing I 

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would do is compare it back to that person’s 


actual dosimetry file. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. That’s easily enough -- 


easily enough accomplished I think. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And see if there’s any 


indication of this in how they investigated 


that and how they ultimately assigned the dose. 


DR. ULSH: I -- I can -- Jim, can you -- Jim 


Langsted, can you -- I know that in the later 


period, certainly in the ‘90s sometime forward 


they put extended -- extended and abbreviated 


dosimetry investigation reports in the file. 


How far back in time does that go? Do you have 


a feel for that? 


MR. LANGSTED: Probably mid-90’s. 


DR. ULSH: (Inaudible) in the logbook that we 


see here in table 3? 


MR. LANGSTED: My guess is no there would not. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Then the question 


becomes how did they assign the dose for that 


particular situation? 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I mean I don't know that we’re 


going to get any more information than what you 


might see in the logbook. I mean I -- I’m 


trying to go from memory from the example pages 

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that you provided at the last working group 


meeting and there was a justification for 


change. I think there was also maybe a column 


that showed the dose that was assigned but I 


could be mistaken in that. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And the question is how 


did they determine that dose? 


MR. LANGSTED: Well, I mean, again -- 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Because I guess the 


contention by the petition is well, the badge 


was blacked out and I got a zero. Well, they 


had to have a reason for assigning zero. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, I think the -- the other -- 


I mean I’m not -- I’m hearing what -- what 


Brant’s saying is that they likely wouldn’t 


have anything in the file to show how they 


treated these. Or is that what you’re saying, 


Brant? I mean --


DR. ULSH: Well, yeah. In terms of a separate 


document over and beyond what you might see in 


the logbook. I mean again, I’m -- 


MR. GRIFFON: And they probably wouldn’t have 


any field in the -- in the database with like a 


flag indicating, you know, bad crystal or 


whatever. Not in the earlier time period 

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probably. 


DR. ULSH: I don't know. Jim or Roger, do you 


have some insights on that? Oh, okay. Okay. 


Hold on a minute. I’ve just found the samples 


that I guess Kathy provided in the last set of 


comments. And what I’m looking at are the -- a 


few pages from a logbook and they do show, 


let’s see -- I see the -- I see the ac-- I see 


the activity date; I see the gamma and the 


penetrating. There’s a column for that where 


it has at least for some of them there’s 


numbers there. Same for neutrons and then 


there’s penetrating skin and beta they put some 


numbers. And then there’s a justification 


column. And I assume that that talks about why 


those doses were assigned. I mean it doesn’t ­

- I’ll grant you it doesn’t go into much detail 


but I guess the point I’m trying to make is I 


don't know that we could expect to find much 


more than what’s in the logbooks. Jim or 


Roger, if I’m off-base here, please jump in and 


correct me but --


MR. LANGSTED: I believe you’re correct. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, I guess the 


contention by the petitioners is that when you 

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get into these issues, zeros are being 


recorded. Now, obviously there are doses other 


than zero in the logbook. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, but there are some zeros, too. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: But --


MR. LANGSTED: Well, now, one thing that would 


be possible --


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- It comes down to the 


question where did these people work and does 


that make sense? 


DR. ULSH: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Another -- Another 


thing is if you can find these earlier 


investigation reports it might give you some 


indication of if there is a record out there. 


Maybe it’s in the field. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. Here’s what I would propose 


maybe. And Kathy, you’ve given us some ID 


numbers here. Maybe we can chase those back to 


individuals. We can -- if we can then we can 


certainly look at what’s been assigned in the 


dosimetry file. We could also maybe for a 


limited number go to the DOE records people and 


pull the dosimetry files for those people, and 


we could tell you what’s in there. I don't 

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know what we’ll find. It sounds like -- 


MR. GRIFFON: It may be -- it may be 


inconclusive, let’s put it that way. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, exactly. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. But we won’t know until we 


look at the dosimetry files. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. Right. 


DR. ULSH: So I mean that’s certainly something 


we can do I would think. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And -- And --

DR. ULSH: Okay. 

MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: -- that’s kind of what I 

wanted you to do but I really think that you 


need to pull the processing log for the time 


period prior to 1983 and -- and look at the 


frequency of -- of the loss of crystals that 


are -- that’s talked about in the petition. 


MR. GRIFFON: So you’re talking about in the 


earlier time period with the -- 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: The -- The earlier TLD. 


MR. GRIFFON : The Harshaw badges. The Harshaw 


TLD’s. Is that the --


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And how that was 


handled. 

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DR. ULSH: Again, I -- without seeing the 


logbooks I’m getting on dangerous ground 


because I don’t want to speculate too much 


about what we’re going to find but if -- if -- 


to the extent that the logbooks give a complete 


record. So for instance I’ll say for a 


particular quarter in, I don't know, 1983, if 


we can find the logbooks for -- that would re-- 


represent all of the badge reads for that 


particular quarter then I guess you could go 


through and count how many have problems and 


how many don’t. I'm not sure how big an effort 


that’s going to be because I mean there are -- 


certainly there’s thousands of employees at the 


site. I guess what I’m saying is we could get 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Just we -- we just want 


a general -- general feel. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, but I -- I guess what I’m 


saying is without seeing the logbooks I’m not 


sure how they’re going to be listed in terms of 


are all the problems going to be listed on -- 


in one logbook on a couple of pages or is it 


going to be sprinkled throughout? If it’s 


sprinkled throughout then we might be able to 

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take a representative sampling but if it’s -- 


all the problems are listed, you know, in one 


place, like they saved all those for last or 


something, then in order to get a feel for what 


proportion of -- of the logbooks represent or 


what proportion of the measurements had 


problems, you know, how frequently badges were 


lost or were -- crystals were lost or whatever 


then we’d have to look at the entirety of the 


logbooks for that quarter. I -- I just don’t 


know without looking at the logbooks. 


MR. GRIFFON: You really need to get the 


logbooks. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: The -- The -- The 


dosimeter processing logs that I recommended in 


table 4 give you some years for the Harshaw TLD 


so you can use it as a dual purpose. 


MR. GRIFFON: Maybe that’s the action at this 


point is to look at those logbooks and evaluate 


the possibility of -- of following up, Brant. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I think that’s -- 


MR. GRIFFON: I think that’s as far as you -- 


you really can take it. I mean you don’t want 

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to --


DR. ULSH: Exactly. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Okay. Now, with respect 


to the field logbook like the RCT logbook and 


the shift supervisor logbook, what I’ve been 


told is that there is documented dose 


information in those logbooks for people and 


that that does not match the dosimetry record. 


Neither does the survey do that. 


DR. ULSH: Okay, Kathy. I’m a little unclear 


on this. Were these logbooks that were taken 


while the jobs were actually -- were -- were 


recorded while the jobs were actually being 


performed? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Tony, are you still on 


the phone? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Yep. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, my understanding 


was yes; am I correct? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Yeah, daily logs. The CC logs 


was negotiated in the collective bargaining 


agreement. 


DR. ULSH: Okay. So I guess it’s -- it’s not 


clear to me how those could contain dosimetry 

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results because the dosimetry badges wouldn’t 


have been processed yet unless you’re talking 


about --


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well --


DR. ULSH: I don't know. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Unless there were secondary -- 


MR. DEMAIORI: CC logs you would have all your 


high RAD areas as they were discovered, 


contamination incidents, contaminated 


individuals. All that would be in the CC logs. 


That’s in the dosimetry logs for like the 


EPD’s, those came out of the RWP offices. 


Those logs would have all the EPD information 


that you can cross-reference to your actual 


TLD’s. Those also were daily logs by the job. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: In other words, does the 


field data show indication that this person 


should have gotten more than zero or do they 


corroborate each other? 


DR. ULSH: Okay. So you’re saying then, Kathy, 


that it’s not dosimetry data that’s in these 


logs? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I, you know -- I was 


just told as dose for people. 


DR. ULSH: But you didn’t get a -- a -- a 

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feeling for how that was measured? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: No. But there were -- 


there was special dosimetry assigned by job and 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, maybe it is secondary 


dosimetry or maybe it’s exposure rate measures 


and sta -- You know, I don't know without 


seeing I guess. 


MR. DEMAIORI: Well, a bit of everything you 


just said. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. MUNN: Would -- Would -- Wouldn’t 


contamination control logbooks be specifically 


the area surveyed? Wouldn’t that be what they 


contain? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Contam-- the contamination 


control log-- logbook would be all your ab-- 


abnormalities. 


MS. MUNN: Yeah, area -- area of readings, 


right? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Oh, yeah, that’s, you know, if 


there was a high dose area that was discovered 


during a routine survey that would be reported 


in the CC logbook. 


MS. MUNN: Yeah. Yeah, and RBP would survey 

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that and record it, right? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Absolutely if there’s 


contamination incident; if, you know, you lost 


a room that would be recorded there. It would 


say how many people were involved. 


MS. MUNN: Yeah. 


MR. GRIFFON: So it would have some -- some 


more than just the survey data maybe. I --


DR. ULSH: I guess, Mark, maybe we’re at the 


same follow-up item. We can --


MR. GRIFFON: I think so. You got to pull some 


logs at least to see what kind of information ­

-


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: Well, we can evaluate the 


plausibility of doing that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


DR. ULSH: And we can try to get ‘em. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And what -- what I was 


trying to do there is this is what I was told 


they were called, okay? 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Now, through time they 


were probably called something else but this is 

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the type of record that you’re looking for. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I just had the 


opportunity to look at a -- a logbook for a 


similar area at LANL, and what I noticed is 


that when they went in to do a job, a 


particular job, the individuals involved in 


that job were listed so there was some linkage 


to names. And Tony, I would assume that yours 


are similar? 


MR. DEMAIORI: Yeah, we -- we had a bunch of 


different logbooks on the floor, not just a 


contamination control logbook. During 


processing days we had the processing logbooks 


and most of those will be classified. Also the 


shift manager kept logbooks. If it was 


(unintelligible) breathing air job we kept 


separate logbooks with dosimeter readings, 


(unintelligible), that sort of thing in those. 


And our RWP desk did all the issuing of the 


dosimeters, DPD’s, the pencil dosimeters, 


whatever. They kept a day-to-day log of all 


those records of penetrating. 


MR. GRIFFON: Kathy, do you have -- the last 


item says SC&A to conduct inter-comparison. Do 

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you have any logbooks currently, any of these 


logbooks currently? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: No. 


MR. GRIFFON: You haven’t received any of these 


yet? Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: No. 


MR. GRIFFON: But your -- your notion here is 


to have NIOSH do an inter-comparison or -- or 


for SC&A to do it or for parallel? What --


What -- What’s -- I’m unclear on that I 


guess. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, the first thing I 


need to do and I didn’t put it in this document 


for obvious reasons is to provide NIOSH with 


the names that go along with these logbooks. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: I -- I think that we 


kind of wanted to do it independently and 


compare results. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. I’m just -- I’m trying to 


think through the logistics of how that would 


work. I mean would you both take the same -- a 


copy of the same logbook and -- and go back? 


How -- How do you envision that working? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: We -- We could very 

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well do that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: And I would really be 


happy to --


MR. GRIFFON: I think -- I think, Brant, we’re 


on that, too, is -- is the first step is to see 


if we can find these logs or -- or logs that 


generally fit this title or these types of 


titles and, you know, maybe bring them back to 


the work group or subcommittee or wherever 


we’re at and -- and talk about the plausibility 


of doing such a, you know -- 


DR. ULSH: I mean I think -- I think where 


we’re going to be, Mark, is if -- I mean this 


is common. We’ve -- We’ve been here with 


other SEC petitions. It’s a question that I 


think I heard Wanda say this morning on -- on 


Y-12, it’s a question of how much is enough. 


And I -- I really don’t have an answer for 


that. 


MR. GRIFFON: Well, and I --


DR. ULSH: Certainly the things that we’re 


talking about here are going to take some time 


and we’re willing to do that, given enough 


time. 

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MR. GRIFFON: No, I think the other -- the 


other factor here, and this is why I said one ­

- another reason I said this this morning was 


how much is enough may vary from petition to 


petition. I mean the -- the petitioner in this 


case made -- made, you know, several specific 


allegations within the petition so I think to 


the extent we can we need to follow up on the, 


you know --


DR. ULSH: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: So it’s just -- more than just a 


general review but also address their specific 


allegations. 


DR. ULSH: No, I understand. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


DR. ULSH: And -- And really I’m not trying to 


MR. GRIFFON: I know, I know. 


DR. ULSH: -- influence what the Board decides. 


I mean that’s really not my place to do that 


but we -- I guess I also have to make it clear 


that NIOSH is under a statutory obligation to 


issue the evaluation report, and to do that we 


had to operate on the data that we had on the 


table at the time. And certainly we recognize 

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that there are more records out there and -- 


and three months from now there will still be 


more records out there and, you know, I mean we 


have to -- we’re put in a position -- NIOSH is 


put in a position where we have to issue the 


evaluation report and make a recommendation. 


And I -- I’m still comfortable, you know, with 


the report that we’ve issued. But again, I 


mean if the Board decides that you would like 


us to take more time and, you know, delay 


things a bit we’ll certainly do that. We’ll do 


whatever we can to support it. 


DR. WADE: The rule -- This is Lew. The rule 


allows for that. I mean NIOSH will present the 


evaluation report and then the Board can, you 


know, ask for additional information or, you 


know -- you know, let its desires be known. 


But we’ll deal with that next week. I mean --


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah, I think -- exactly. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Well, what I can try to 


help you do is to get to the right logbooks 


because there was a -- there’s -- during my 


trip there was an interchange between the 


records people and myself on what might be the 


right logbooks. And we could have them pull a 

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couple and copy sample pages and see if that’s 


really the logbook we’re looking for. 


MR. GRIFFON: So that’s something you can work 


with Brant offline on. 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: Right. 


MR. GRIFFON: That -- That’d be great. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, anything that you can do to 


narrow the search, that would -- that would 


only help things. 


MR. GRIFFON: Right. And I would say, John, 


you know, this -- this -- this rule always 


applies in between meetings that, you know, if 


you guys need to have offline conversations to 


expedite this process, you know, as long, you 


know -- if it’s noteworthy I guess keep minutes 


but, you know, I think that’s fine and -- and 


encourage that at this point. 


DR. WADE: Right. Common sense. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yes. Is there anything else on 


the -- on this report, Kathy or Joe? 


MS. ROBERTSON-DEMERS: No. That’s -- That’s 


pretty much it. 


MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


DR. WADE: Okay. Well --


MR. GRIFFON: I think -- I think where --

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where we stand, Lew, is, you know, we’ve got an 


update on the matrix. I will update the 


matrix, Brant, and to include these things as 


well. 


DR. ULSH: Yeah, I heard you typing, Mark, so ­

-


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And -- And it may not be 


as quick as the last turnaround but I’ll try. 


But the other thing is I think we need to at 


least give a status report at the Advisory 


Board meeting and maybe a plan forward because 


we also need SC&A to -- to review the 


evaluation report. But I think, you know, with 


two days left before the meeting, two working 


days or whatever, I know we’re all going to be 


working on the weekend but, you know, the focus 


on most folks is going to be Y-12 to -- to 


finalize that -- I -- I would definitely 


prioritize that for SC&A if I had -- I mean 


not that I’m the -- the task -- prioritizing 


your work but I think that -- that seems to be 


a priority at this point. 


MS. MUNN: I think that’s appropriate. 


MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Try -- Let’s try to -- to 


-- to fine tune that one and -- and -- and then 

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we’ll -- we’ll give a status report on Rocky 


and go forward and the Board can advise on what 


direction we need to go with, you know, with 


Rocky. 


DR. WADE: Sounds like a plan. 


MR. GRIFFON: All right. 


DR. WADE: Well, you -- you’re all to be 


complimented and --


MR. GRIFFON: Another long day. 


DR. WADE: A long day but a productive day. 


Mark, I’ll -- I’ll give you a call -- 


MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) if other work 


groups go shorter than (inaudible) 


DR. WADE: We’ll talk -- I’ll give you a call, 


Mark, tomorrow and we can talk specifically 


about next week and the organization but thank 


you, and thank everyone who participated. 


Thank the petitioner, Tony, we appreciate your 


forbearance. And, you know, we’ll be seeing 


you all in beautiful Colorado next Tuesday. 


MR. GRIFFON: Thanks, everyone, for the hard 


work, too. I know it’s -- these are crunching 


weeks. 


DR. WADE: Thank you all. 


MR. GRIFFON: Take care. 

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(Whereupon, the working group meeting was 


adjourned at 5:35 p.m.) 

______________________________ 

311 

1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of April 20, 


2006; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


12th day of June, 2006. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102