THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 


PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 


CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 


NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 


convenes the 


MEETING 40 


ADVISORY BOARD ON 


RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH 


VOL. II 


DAY TWO 


The verbatim transcript of the 40th 


Meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 


Worker Health held at the Westin Casuarina, Las 


Vegas, Nevada, on Sept. 20, 2006. 

2 

C O N T E N T S
 

Sept. 20, 2006 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS 9 


DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 


DR. LEWIS WADE, DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL 


WORKING GROUP REPORTS: 9 


SAVANNAH RIVER SITE PROFILE 11 


NEVADA TEST SITE PROFILE 26 


SEC PETITION ACTIVITY 39 


WORKING GROUP CHAIRS 


SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS AND BOARD ACTION 46 


DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR, MR. MARK GRIFFON, ABRWH 


UPDATE ON ROCKY FLATS SEC 54 


MR. MARK GRIFFON, ABRWH 


TASK III PROCEDURES REVIEW 113 


DR. JOHN MAURO, SC&A 


OAK RIDGE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR STUDIES (ORINS) 


SEC PETITION 144 


NIOSH PRESENTATION 145 


MR. LAVON RUTHERFORD, NIOSH, OCAS 


PETITIONER PRESENTATION 157 


BOARD DISCUSSION 159 


BOARD DECISION 167 


SC&A SITE PROFILES TASK 178 


CHAPMAN VALVE 197 


NIOSH PRESENTATION, DR. BRANT ULSH, NIOSH, OCAS 198 


PETITIONER PRESENTATION 213 


BOARD DISCUSSION 243 


BOARD DECISION 264 


BOARD WORKING TIME, DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR 276 


PUBLIC COMMENT 283 


COURT REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 367 

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND
 

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such 


material is reproduced as read or spoken. 


In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates 


an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a 


sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech 


or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of 


word(s) when reading written material. 


-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation 


of a word which is transcribed in its original form as 


reported. 


-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of 


the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is 


available. 


-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and 


"uh-uh" represents a negative response. 


-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, 


without reference available. 


-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker 


failure, usually failure to use a microphone. 

 

 

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P A R T I C I P A N T S 


(By Group, in Alphabetical Order) 


BOARD MEMBERS
 

CHAIR
 

ZIEMER, Paul L., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


School of Health Sciences 


Purdue University 


Lafayette, Indiana 


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D. 


Senior Science Advisor 


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 


Washington, DC 


MEMBERSHIP
 

CLAWSON, Bradley 


Senior Operator, Nuclear Fuel Handling 


Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory 


GIBSON, Michael H. 


President 


Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union 


Local 5-4200 


Miamisburg, Ohio 


GRIFFON, Mark A. 


President 


Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc. 


Salem, New Hampshire 


LOCKEY, James, M.D. 


Professor, Department of Environmental Health 


College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati 

 

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MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D. 


Director 


New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund 


Albany, New York 


MUNN, Wanda I. 


Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired) 


Richland, Washington 


POSTON, John W., Sr., B.S., M.S., Ph.D. 


Professor, Texas A&M University 


College Station, Texas 


PRESLEY, Robert W. 


Special Projects Engineer 


BWXT Y12 National Security Complex 


Clinton, Tennessee 


ROESSLER, Genevieve S., Ph.D. 


Professor Emeritus 


University of Florida 


Elysian, Minnesota 


STAFF
 

LASHAWN SHIELDS, Committee Management Specialist, NIOSH 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter 

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SIGNED-IN AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS
 

ANSPAUGH, LARISA 


ANSPAUGH, LYNN, SC&A 


ATKINSON, SUSAN, PETITIONER 


BEATTY, EVERETT “RAY”, SR., FERNALD ATOMIC CO. 


BEHLING, HANS, SC&A 


BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A 


BLACKSTON, CYNTHIA, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 


BOLLER, CAROLYN, CONG. MARK UDALL 


BREEDEN, SHIRLEY 


BROEHM, JASON, CDC WASHINGTON OFFICE 


BUCHANAN, RON, SC&A 


CALLAWAY, ALLEN 


CARMOUCHE, ROBERT, NTS 


CHANG, C, NIOSH 


CHEW, MELTON, ORAU 


CLAYTON, DOROTHY 


COMBS-CROFTON, SYLVIA, OCHA NTS 


COOK, PATRICIA 


COOLEY, MARGARET MINSTER 


CRAFTON, DEE 


ELDRIDGE, GEORGE, PETITIONER 


ELDRIDGE, PAUL, PETITIONER 


ELLENBERGER, JIM, ORAU 


ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH 


ELLISON, CHRIS, NIOSH 


EVASKOVICH, ANDREW K., INTERNATIONAL GUARDS 


FAVELA, CLAUDIA 


FITZGERALD, JOSEPH, SC&A 


FOGER, C. OSCAR, LABORERS 872 


FUNK, JOHN R., AVV NEVADA 


GAUNCE, JAN, NTS 


GODOWN, ELDON 


HANNA-RUDNICKI, DIANNE 


HINNEFELD, STUART, NIOSH 


HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS 


HOWELL, EMILY, HHS 


HUNTON, LORI 


HYATT, SALLY 


JACQUEZ-ORTIZ, MICHELE, CONG. TOM UDALL 


JENSEN, HARRY L. 

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KIMPAN, KATE, ORAU 


KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL 


KROMREI, ROBERT 


LEWIS, MARK, ATL 


LEWIS, MIKE 


LIKOUNNOR, JUNE 


LOPEMAN, JOAN MALLORY 


LOPEMAN, PAT MARTINET 


MADISON, ETHELYN, NTS 


MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A 


MARSHALL, KENNETH 


MARTIN, DOROTHY 


MAURO, JOHN, SC&A 


MCFEE, MATTHEW, ORAUT 


MCGOLERICK, ROBERT, HHS 


MCLEMORE, ADDIE 


MEDINA, SANDIE A., LABORERS 872 


MILKE, JANET 


MILLER, RICHARD, GAP 


MINGUS, RICHARD, FSI-LLNL WSI 


MORTON, WILLIAM G. 


MOSLEY, ALMA L. 


MOSLEY, LELAND B. 


NIEMEIER, PATRICIA, EEOICPA 


PAZ, DR. JACOB 


POOLE-WHALEY, EVA 


POWERS, WILLIAM, CONG. RICHARD NEAL 


PRESLEY, LOUISE S., WIFE OF ROBERT PRESLEY 


REALLE, MARY, PETITIONER 


RINGEN, KNUT, CPWR 


ROBERTSON-DEMERS, KATHY, SC&A 


ROGERS, KEITH, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL 


ROHRIG, NORMAN 


ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH OCAS 


ROZNER, KATHLEEN, SEN. REID 


RUIZ, HARRIET 


RUTHERFORD, LAVON, NIOSH 


SBROCCHI, DIANE 


SCHAEFFER, D. MICHAEL, SAIC 


SCHUBERT, SANDRA, SEN. REID 


SHELL, LULA, AVV NEVADA 


SMITH, BILLY P., MH CHEW AND ASSOCS. 


STAUDT, DAVID, CDC 

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ULSH, BRANT, NIOSH 


WILKES, CYNTHIA 


WILLIAMS-LENZ, JANE ANN 


WILSON, AARON 


WU, PORTIA, SEN. KENNEDY 


ZACCHERS, MARY JO, ORAU 


ZIEMER, MARILYN 

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P R O C E E D I N G S
 

(8:45 a.m.) 


WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS
 

DR. PAUL ZIEMER, CHAIR
 

DR. ZIEMER: Good morning, everyone. I'd like to 


call the meeting to order, the second day of 


this meeting of the Advisory Board on Radiation 


and Worker Health. 


I'll begin with my usual reminder to register 


your attendance in the book in the foyer. In 


fact, it's a good thing I gave you that 


reminder because I forgot to register myself, 


so let's all do that as you have an opportunity 


during the morning. 


Again, copies of the agenda and other documents 


-- and there are some new documents this 


morning on the table, so avail yourselves of 


those as -- as necessary. 


WORKING GROUP REPORTS:
 

As we look ahead on today's agenda, we have a 


number of reports from our working groups on 


various site profiles. Also we have a fair 


amount of activity dealing with SEC petitions, 


so we have a full day, and also an evening 

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session devoted to public comment period. And 


those of you -- members of the public -- who 


wish to comment, please sign up for that 


activity, as well. 


We're going to begin this morning with a report 


from the working group for the Savannah River 


site profile. Mike Gibson chairs that group. 


The members are Mark Griffon, Jim Lockey and 


Brad Clawson, and we believe Mike is on the 


line. Mike, if you're there, I should tell 


you, Mike, that we have distributed I think the 


most recent copy of the site profile technical 


basis document finding matrix. It's a matrix 


dated actually this week. It's 9/20, so I 


think it's the -- the current version of the 


matrix. So Mike, are you there? And if you 


are, we'll ask you to proceed. 


 DR. WADE: Maybe -- this is Lew Wade. Maybe I 


could just --


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, a few comments from our 


Federal --


 DR. WADE: Nothing official, just -- it relates 


to just the logistics of what we're going to be 


doing here. First of all, I trust that people 


on the line can hear me clearly. If anyone has 

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a problem, shout it out. 


Because of the sound system here, when someone 


like Mike speaks what we'll do is we'll adjust 


the setting so that we can hear Mike clearly, 


but that will make it difficult for us to -- 


for us to -- for -- what happens when -- 


 AUDIO-VISUAL TECHNICIAN: I have to unplug you 


guys so that he won't be able to hear you. 


 DR. WADE: -- you won't be able to hear us when 


Mike is speaking. So if there is an 


interchange between the Board and Mike, we'll 


have to just leave a pause for the settings to 


be adjusted. 


So with that as a very confusing introduction, 


I would ask that, Mike, you ascend the podium 


and begin to speak and we'll make the 


adjustment so that we can hear you clearly. 


Thank you. 


SAVANNAH RIVER SITE PROFILE


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. Thank you, Lew. As you 


guys -- you know, I'm sorry for the delay on 


the -- this matrix. This is much more of a 


daunting task trying to chair a committee than 


I thought it would be, but I'd also -- 


introductory remarks, like to thank Larry 

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Elliott for making Sam Glover available to me 


and for John Mauro for making Joe Fitzgerald 


available to me. They were instrumental in 


putting this together. 


We had a meeting several weeks ago in 


Cincinnati with SC&A and NIOSH, and we resolved 


several issues. There are several that are 


still open, as you can read, and there are some 


that I think the working group -- well, it -- 


at least I didn't get any negative comments 


back from the working group when I sent this 


draft out to them over the weekend -- that we 


believe are more site-wide issues than 


specifically related to Savannah River Site. 


 Rather than go through the matrix, I guess 


people could just read through it and if you 


have any questions I'll try to entertain them 


or if Joe Fitzgerald or Sam Glover's there, 


maybe they could, you know, tell us where we're 


at. And I think as time allows here in a 


couple more weeks, maybe we can have another 


meeting and hopefully resolve these issues. 


It's just -- this process, as you know, is 


iterative. There was a couple of revs out 


there from NIOSH, some responses from SC&A, and 

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so it's -- it's kind of a back-and-forth thing 


that is still in the works, but I believe we're 


making good progress on resolving the issues. 


So if there's any questions or discussions... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you for that summary, 


Mike. This is Ziemer and I want to ask a 


preliminary question here. There are -- I'm 


having a little trouble talking this morning, 


but there are a number of -- of open items 


still. Can you identify for us, or maybe one 


of the workgroup members can identify on those 


open items, which of those would you classify 


as being the most difficult issues that have to 


be dealt with? Are there -- some of these may 


be open simply because you just haven't gotten 


around to addressing some detail. Others may 


be open because they are very thorny types of 


issues where either additional information is 


needed, additional records or something. So if 


you can -- can you help us sort out, are there 


any here that are either very difficult or 


potential showstoppers? 


 MR. GIBSON: I really can't tell at this point. 


I mean there's -- all of them that are open are 


open for some -- some -- some sort of 

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disagreement, whether it's minor or severe. 


But you know, I -- perhaps NIOSH or SC&A could 


-- could give you more -- a better, more 


precise indication of which ones may be the 


more -- issues that are -- they're further 


apart on. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Here's Joe Fitzgerald from 


SC&A, and then we'll hear from Brad and perhaps 


Mark. Okay, Joe. 


(Pause for sound problems.) 


 MR. FITZGERALD: How's that? Okay, that's 


better. Good morning, Joe Fitzgerald. 


Certainly working on the Savannah River follow-


up, in answer to the question, I guess your 


issue, you know, in terms of relative 


significance, this is one of the earlier site 


profiles that NIOSH compiled. It was one of 


the earlier reviews that we actually performed. 


And what you'll see in the review is the -- I 


guess the request for clarification and 


expansion -- because, again, I think there was 


a lot of subject areas that I would believe 


would be addressed -- we would believe would be 


addressed more thoroughly perhaps in the later 


site profiles, but in this very first one I 

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think there was some certainly areas that were 


a little weak, perhaps not as expanded. 


 The most significant issue, the one that we 


felt probably strongest about, were the tank 


farms in terms of characterization as provided 


in the site profile. You know, the tank farms 


were a special situation. We were dealing with 


a large range of radionuclides, certainly a lot 


of internal 'mitters that would be significant, 


and we felt that the characterization in the 


previous edition of the site profile wasn't 


sufficient to give us certainly some assurity 


that, you know, the key nuclides were addressed 


and that the exposure pathways were identified 


and that there was a good approach to 


accommodate those. And I think what you see in 


the actions are I think agreements that yes, we 


can expand that somewhat. There are databases 


that we haven't looked at necessarily as 


thoroughly as we could have, and I think what 


we're asking for NIOSH to do is to go back and 


look at those databases and perhaps give us a 


little bit more thorough characterization for 


the Board on the tank farms. 


The other issues -- we looked at high five, 

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which is an approach for looking at the 


internal exposures. I think we've gone a long 


ways. I don't think there's any -- any 


showstoppers, any key issues that would present 


the Board a particular problem. I think a lot 


of these are ones where we just need more 


information so that, you know, I would 


characterize a lot of the issues as more 


information, more clarity, a clear idea of how 


dose estimation's going to be done. And I 


think with that feedback to the Board, I think 


that puts everybody in a better position, so 


that's -- that's kind of our synopsis of most 


of these. 


We did close out, by the way, five or six 


issues of the -- I think there were 16 total, a 


number of which were really generic issues. 


The oro-nasal breathing, for example, was 


raised. We've dealt with that issue -- right, 


right, we're not going to raise it again. We 


just reassure you on that one. And certainly 


we're concerned about the construction workers 


at Savannah River. And as you heard, OTIB-52 


is now out, so I think the -- certainly the 


review and the site profile, that particular 

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edition, was -- has been overtaken by 


developments since then. This is going back in 


time about two years, so... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Joe. And Brad Clawson, 


do you want to add to that? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah. My understanding is -- one 


of the things we were going to kind of revise 


the original site profile was one thing. But 


two, we were trying to get information, data, 


on an accident reports that another company had 


and that we were being denied access to, and 


that I feel is very important that we are able 


to review. 


 DR. ZIEMER: When you say another company, you 


mean, for example, DuPont in the early days or 


what are -- what are you talking about here? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, I believe it was DuPont 


that has this information. They've got a very 


specific accident reports of everything that 


went on and a lot of information in there and 


we haven't been able to see that yet. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, do we have acce-- I mean 


DuPont ran the plant for most of -- or the site 


for most of its operational years. Do we not 


have access to the DuPont data? 

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, there was a -- there was 


a question raised -- there's a data bank that's 


particularly valuable as a res-- as a source of 


information for the tank farm review which we 


understood to have been done by a contractor to 


DuPont, and that has since somehow gone into, 


quote, the commercial domain. And the issue 


that was raised, since this was paid for by 


federal government funds, certainly the 


admonition is that we shouldn't certainly have 


access while having to pay for it again, as it 


were. And that's the issue I think that NIOSH 


was going to check on and with the notion of 


trying to resolve that -- that question. One, 


access; and certainly the second one not 


necessarily paying for something that was paid 


for in the first place by the government. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, Wanda Munn. 


 MS. MUNN: These are questions -- simple ones, 


I think -- based primarily on my lack of 


knowledge of the Savannah site, which makes me 


question some of the -- the issues that are 


raised here. One of them, in number one, 


references high flux programs. Can someone 


tell me what the high flux programs were that 

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are of issue and approximately the time frame 


that was involved for those programs? It's 


item 1F, Joe, if you're looking at it. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I'm trying to find which -- 


are you on issue --


 MS. MUNN: 1F. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Comment number one? 


 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh. 


DR. ROESSLER: Page 2, right at the --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Oh, I'll have to get back to 


you on --


 DR. ZIEMER: That's --


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- the specifics --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- that's one of the items that 


NIOSH --


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- included in their reply. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Who had the lead on this for 


NIOSH? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Not here, okay. So we'll have to 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, I'd appreciate just knowing a 


little bit more --

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 MR. FITZGERALD: Right, we'll give you a little 


background --


 MS. MUNN: -- what that is. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: -- I don't want to misstate it 


by, you know, my recollection, but we can get 


down some specifics. 


 MS. MUNN: There was also a reference to 


concern about organically-bound tritium. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: And the question in my mind was what 


was -- what was the activity that was involved 


that was of concern; what was the organic 


compound that's of concern? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, some of this gets into 


class-- classified information, but really the 


process was a compounding of the metal tritides 


for use in nuclear weapons fabrication. That's 


about as far as I can go on that. 


 MS. MUNN: That's okay. It was a fabrication 


process then you're talking about. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, it was an application 


process for the nuclear weapons program, but 


you know, the implication there -- the most 


important implication is the lack of solubility 


when you deal with metal tritides. 

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 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: And the other implication is 


the generic -- generic nature of that 


particular issue. We certainly see that issue 


at Los Alamos, Mound, other locations, so I 


think this is sort of a -- a discussion in 


process. Our -- our question is is there an 


approach to dealing with those that would, one, 


encompass all these different sites but also be 


a sound way to deal with the question of, you 


know, how do we actually measure those to 


workers who, for security reasons and other 


reasons, did not know they were being exposed 


to these compounds. And you don't have 


monitoring, per se, for these compounds, so 


you're sort of in this realm where you don't 


have monitoring. You don't even have 


necessarily knowledge on the workers' part, or 


even their supervisors' parts, you know, where 


the exposure was taking place. Some places you 


do, but some of the-- some places you don't and 


how would one approach that and then come up 


with an estimation scheme that would in fact be 


conservative. And I think NIOSH has proposed 


in its response -- and this is, again, 

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informal. It's not yet reflected in a site 


profile, but a response which I think is headed 


in the right direction. It's using surface 


contamination as a surrogate and trying to go 


from there as far as a conservative approach. 


But that still is a work in progress right now, 


but the implications are I think important. It 


-- whatever model is developed would clearly be 


applicable across the different DOE sites, and 


we certainly need that model to answer 


questions -- similar questions at places like 


Mound and the national laboratories, so -- but 


the key issue there is a lack -- certainly lack 


of solubility and the identification of the 


material in terms of where it was used, how it 


was used and when it was used I think are -- 


are clearly problems that may, you know, 


clearly challenge dose estimation in the 


future. 


 MS. MUNN: Well, thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda, where on the matrix was 


that, just for our reference here so we can 


track together on that? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: I think you'll find it in 


comment eight, the nature of exposure to metal 

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tritides in organically-bound tritium. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, I see it. 


 MS. MUNN: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. 


 MS. MUNN: Right, and dealing with low energy 


beta is always a problem for -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, now to balance that, the 


proportion of metal tritides to total tritium 


in a particular workplace like Savannah River 


apparently was relatively small. So you have 


that as a sort of a counterpoint, so certainly 


in terms of magnitude it may be a problem from 


dose estimation, but in the bigger picture it 


may not be as much of a problem in terms of 


total dose, so that's what we're trying to 


resolve right there. 


 MS. MUNN: I didn't expect it to be -- 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: -- that significant in terms of 


actual dose, but in terms of identifying, 


probably something else. 


And the third question that came to mind -- I'm 


really sorry I didn't have an opportunity to 


look at these before just this morning, so this 


is kind of off the top of the head and I'm 

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sorry about that. Item number 14, neutron log 


books. You mentioned earlier that you had a 


problem with access to some of the records. 


I'm hoping the neutron log books don't fall in 


that category. They're easily accessible to 


you, just haven't been thoroughly identified 


yet? 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I don't -- I don't think 


this is a -- is a problem in terms of access. 


I think this is just a follow-up to that 


particular item that we raised. 


 MS. MUNN: Just a problem of time to get to it. 


 MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah. 


 MS. MUNN: Okay, good. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Just for the record -- and Joe, 


thank you very much, very much. I think Joe's 


done a masterful job of answering two of your 


questions. The first question with regard to 


what are the high flux programs as referenced 


in item 1F, the NIOSH response, we'll get you ­

- we'll get the Board an answer to that. 


 MS. MUNN: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, other comments or questions 


for the subcommittee or -- subcommittee -- and 

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of the subcommittee members have additional 


comments? 


 (No responses) 


Let's see if -- let's go back to Mike Gibson 


for a moment if we could switch back and, Mike, 


I'm just going to ask if you had any additional 


comments and can give us a timetable on what -- 


what the working group plans to do as we move 


forward. 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer, just -- again, you 


know, I'll have to see what's convenient for 


SC&A and the -- the working group members and 


NIOSH and see if we can't set up another 


meeting, either a conference call or a face-toface meeting, you know, perhaps in Cincinnati 


again and -- here in the next couple of weeks 


and -- but all the information of course is 


available and up-to-date and see if we can't 


move toward closing these issues. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Mike. Thank you, Mike. 


And I note that a large number of the open 


items are ones that specify a response either 


from NIOSH or SC&A, so I -- I assume that 


before a face-to-face meeting is held, there'll 


probably be some additional staff work in both 

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groups that will have to take place, and Mike 


can coordinate that with the -- with the 


appropriate folks as we move forward. 


 Any other comments on this site profile then -- 


review? 


 (No responses) 


NEVADA TEST SITE PROFILE
 

Okay, so that gives us a status report on 


Savannah River. Let's move on to the Nevada 


Test Site. Robert Presley's been the chair of 


that workgroup and the members are Wanda Munn, 


Genevieve Roessler and Brad Clawson, and Mr. 


Presley will give us a summary of their 


activities. And Board members, you should have 


a handout I think at your place this morning. 


It says Nevada Test Site site profile working 


group report. 


 DR. WADE: And there are copies on the table. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Can everybody hear me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Good morning. My name is Robert 


Presley. I'm the chair of the group. I want 


to do this just a little bit different. Since 


there are -- we are Nevada and there are quite 


a few people here interested in the site 

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profile for the Test Site, I want to tell you 


just a little bit about the people that are 


working on this. 


We have Brad Clawson. Brad is from INL. He 


has 18 years experience as senior operator in 


the nuclear fuels handling division out there. 


 Wanda Munn has 20 years at Hanford in advanced 


radia-- advanced reactor division. 


Dr. Gen Roessler has 40 years experience. 


She's a industr-- or an HP -- I 'bout messed up 


-- an HP, has been involved all over the United 


States and overseas in industrial hygiene 


activities --


 DR. ZIEMER: Health physics. 


DR. ROESSLER: Health physics. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Or health physics, I'm -- 


DR. ROESSLER: You're going to make me an 


industrial --


 MR. PRESLEY: I'm going to make you an 


industrial hygienist yet. 


And I'm Bob Presley. I worked 37 years at Y12, 26 of those years was involved in dealing 


with device work for Livermore and Los Alamos 


and coming out here to Nevada, putting devices 


together and putting them down a hole and 

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shooting them. So we have quite a bit of 


experience on the team of what went on at 


Nevada. 


I'd like to thank Dr. John Mauro of SC&A and 


his group, Dr. Makhijani and Joe Fitzgerald, 


for helping out and Mark Rolf (sic) from NIOSH 


has been real, real good to work with us on 


this thing. 


A little bit about what we've done. We -- the 


site profile -- the Technical Basis Document 


was released in February of 2004. December 


2005 Sanford Cohen & Associate completed the 


draft review. June of this year NIOSH comments 


on the Sanford and Cohen (sic) review were 


released. 


July the 25th, 2006 we had our first meeting as 


a working group to talk about this. It was 


held up in Cincinnati. The comments from that 


meeting were sent to -- the working group sent 


their comments back to NIOSH and SC&A 


officially on August the 15th. September the 


1st, 2006 NIOSH sends their comments back to 


the working group and the 5th of September this 


year the working group met with SC&A and NIOSH 


on a teleconference to discuss our issues. 

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There was 25 total comments from the reviewer, 


SC&A; 42 total issues detailed in the 


subsections of these 25 comments; 14 of the 


comments NIOSH agreed to accept, along with 


SC&A, and they have been worked. There was 12 


subsets or four comments that are not closed on 


this --

 DR. ZIEMER: Not closed or are --

 MR. PRESLEY: -- or have been closed now. I'm 

sorry. 

 The major issues that were covered in this -- 


and we've talked about -- some of this stuff 


will be talked about in every site profile, was 


dose reconstruction covers significant 


radionuclides, and that's being worked. Hot 


particle, internal and external; oro-nasal 


breathing and ingestion; dosimetry limitations, 


the reliability of the dosimeters, missed 


doses, missed dosimeters and extremities to the 


body. We -- we are talking about badging 


geometry, the badge's angle on the body, and 


assumptions for non-monitored workers. And 


yesterday we heard a lot of issues on this. 


Site-specific issues were the Technical Basis 


Document, the accuracy of it; air values for 

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suspension and resuspension of particles; 


neutron/photon ratios; time-dependent 


beta/gamma ratios; Gravel Gertie/tunnel/reentry assumptions; high-fired solubility 


criteria. 


 And the current status of the complex-wide 


issues are that they will be added to the TBD 


or TIB; all radionuclides of consequence -- and 


we've agreed to add quite a few of those back 


to it; job type correction factors; revised 


guidance for maximum dose estimates. 


 Policy or guidance being assessed or redefined 


for breathing and ingestion, badge geometry, 


employee misuse of dosimetry, extremity dose 


interpretation, and high-fired super S methods. 


 Current status of the NTS issues are Naval 


Reactor (sic) Defense Laboratory methods being 


reassessed for appropriate dose reconstruction 


use from hot particles, re-entry and beta/gamma 


ratios. 


Current status of NTS issues are draft 


documentation in review for a bonding (sic) 


suspension intake; for coworker data used in 


external doses; photon energies and neutron 


ratios; missing data approach; radon and other 

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gas potential; sensitivity study for internal 


doses; and ambient internal dose approach. 


Also we're going to add site expert interviews, 


and since then the site expert has been brought 


on board by SC&A and right now we're waiting on 


some declassification of some of the paperwork 


we've been able to get. 


I don't have a conclusion slide, and I'll tell 


you why I don't. This is not concluded. 


There's a tremendous amount of work that needs 


to be done on this site profile, as you can 


see. We would have loved to brought this thing 


to you all here and been able to -- to say 


okay, it's complete and it's ready to go. But 


with all the work and as big as it is, that's 


not going to happen. The working group and 


SC&A and NIOSH are doing all they can to get 


this thing done to where we can get it 


completed and voted on and start down the road. 


But we all know that these are working 


documents and just as soon as we vote on it and 


say okay, we've got a site profile, there may 


be some more records that come up down the road 


and we have to change this thing. And I thank 


everybody that's working on it to try to get it 

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done as soon as possible. 


 Are there any questions? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 AUDIO-VISUAL TECHNICIAN: Somebody on the 


phone. 


 DR. WADE: Yes? Yes, could you identify 


yourself, please? 


MS. SCHUBERT: This is Sandra Schubert in 


Senator Reid's office. I just want to clarify 


a couple of things to make sure I understood. 


You said 12 comments had been closed. Are 


these comments that are resolved and completed 


or are these some of the comments that applied 


to the pre-'62 years? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I did not hear the last portion 


of your comments. 


MS. SCHUBERT: I said are these comments that 


evolve -- that have been resolved and done, 


closed out, or are we talking about comments 


that were relative to the pre-1962 -- 1962 and 


before? 


 MR. PRESLEY: Mostly before 1962. These --


these comments have been agreed-to and closed 


out. Most of the comments are -- are of 


matters that pertain to pre-1962 issues. 

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MS. SCHUBERT: Okay, thank you. And then I 


have one other question. Do you keep a list of 


draft documents in review? And I'd love if you 


could clarify what that means. I haven't seen 


your summary; they're trying to fax it to me. 


I'm not actually at the meeting, as you know. 


But I have seen some of the recent tasks -- 


task matrices for the auditor, and I'm 


wondering if "in review" means the documents 


have already been drafted and written or that 


the work is already being done on them. 


 MR. PRESLEY: The documents have already been 


completed, and these documents are in review. 


MS. SCHUBERT: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you for those 


questions. Robert, while you're at the podium, 


I note that in the copy of the matrix that was 


distributed on I believe August the 30th, the 


recent copy, some -- some items were 


highlighted in yellow. What was the 


significance of that, or was that just 


somebody's copy that was -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, what we did --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- copy there. 


 MR. PRESLEY: What we did was I highlighted -- 

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if I remember correctly, I highlighted Arjun's 


comments in yellow and Wanda or Gen's comments 


are in blue, and that's why that those comments 


were highlighted. We used the colors in the 


things that we sent to the working group and 


SC&A so we'd know whose comments those were. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I gotcha, okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's why the colors are there. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Arjun, I guess I was looking at 


your comments. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. No, I just -- I just -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are you okay with the yellow? 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yeah, I'm fine with yellow -- 


sunshine. I just wanted to clarify the term 


"documents in review". I presume that these 


are documents in review inside NIOSH, because 


we have not seen them and we haven't been 


charged by the Board to review any. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Understand. That's correct. 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Board members, do we have any 


more comments? 


 DR. ZIEMER: So Robert, you've kind of already 


summarized that there's a lot of work to be 

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done yet, and you'll keep us apprised of the -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: There is -- there is a lot of 


work to be done. We have not scheduled -- as 


Mike talked about, we have not scheduled our 


next meeting. Everybody's been trying to get 


ready for this meeting. It takes a lot to try 


to get ready to come out for -- have a -- to 


have a meeting outside. We will be meeting in 


the near future on some of the related issues. 


One of the problems, as the Board can see and 


people in the audience, we have a lot of issues 


that cross sites. It's not just an issue for 


one site, but it's an issue for all sites. And 


what we'd like to do is maybe get together and 


see if we can't close out some of those site 


issues that -- to try to get this thing on the 


road and get it done. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I do note that every issue has 


been assigned to a specific person or -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: That's correct. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- group of individuals. I -- I 


also note that none of them have deadlines on 


the due date. Perhaps it's too early to assign 


the deadlines, but at some point these cannot 


carry on indefinitely, so -- 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Dr. --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we expect to --


 MR. PRESLEY: Dr. Melius? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I have a -- I have a 


question. It's probably more for Larry than it 


is for you, Bob. I'm just trying to understand 


some of our -- what we're going to talk about 


later in terms of site profile reviews. This 


says to draft documents. These would be 


modifications to the site profile or -- can you 


-- I'm just trying to understand where -- where 


we would -- would these be something that -- 


items that would be reviewed by SC&A as part of 


this site profile review or would they be 


issued as a revision to the site profile. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: This -- Stu Hinnefeld from 


OCAS. I think I can answer it. These topics 


will be addressed in revisions to the site 


profile document. The question of the 


resolution, approved resolution. Is this a 


good resolution to the comment I guess is sort 


of the Board's -- you know, how -- how does the 


Board want to interact with the contractor. Do 


you want that kind of evaluation of the 


resolution as part of this review or some other 

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subsequently. You know, I don't know the -- 


but we will do whatever we're asked to do. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. Well, I'm just trying to 


figure out what's the most efficient way of 


doing that, getting closure, but you know, we 


don't want this sort of initial review to go 


on, you know, for years while -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I understand. 


 DR. MELIUS: -- things like that. And we also 


have to make some decisions about how to assign 


SC&A's work under that task, so... 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It seems to me that -- that these 


issues that cut across several sites, these are 


generic issues, if we address the issue in that 


sense and then apply it and introduce it in 


each of the site profiles, that's going to be 


most expeditious. I would encourage us to come 


to grips with these generic issues in that -- 


in that mindset, let's deal with them as 


generic issues and apply them in site-specific 


situations. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other questions or comments? And 


Mike, again, let me afford you the opportunity, 


if you have comments or questions, to do so. 

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Mike Gibson? 


 MR. GIBSON: No, I'm okay with this. 


 DR. WADE: I don't know, Paul, since Arjun is 


here and Mark is here, if they would have any 


additional comments they would like to make to 


inform the discussion, or are you comfortable 


with the discussion as it's taken place? 


 (No responses) 


 MR. PRESLEY: Okay, anybody else? 


 (No responses) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, thank you very much, 


Bob. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'd be remiss if I didn't thank 


Wanda and Gen for helping on this presentation. 


I don't have PowerPoint so they did the 


presentation. Thank y'all very, very much. 


 MS. MUNN: You were on vacation. That doesn't 


count. 


 DR. WADE: If I could follow up on Dr. Melius's 


point just, again, to set a stage for this 


discussion. This process is evolving, and I 


think it's an extremely healthy process. 
I 


applaud its transparency. But sort of as it 


evolves, there are things we have to learn how 


to do. 

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For example, NIOSH and SC&A will close on an 


issue intellectually, everyone will agree and 


the working group will bless that and the 


decision will be to modify a site profile as 


the result downstream. How do we maintain 


touch with that issue and how do we ensure that 


the work that NIOSH actually does is reviewed 


as part of this process once we break contact 


with the workgroup. These are issues we have 


on the agenda for tomorrow, but we're starting 


to face them as this program becomes more 


mature and we -- we wind up with this sort of 


break. But we don't want to lose the ability 


for the Board to pass judgment, and I don't 


think it's a trivial issue, although it's one 


I'm very pleased we're facing because our 


process is moving forward. 


SEC PETITION ACTIVITY


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Lew. Next, a report on 


the working group dealing with SEC petitions, 


and that's Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yep. I'll give you a brief 


update. That working group includes Mark 


Griffon, Paul Ziemer, and I did mention 


Roessler's taken Roy DeHart's place. Okay, 

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just double-checking, get confused with Wanda 


coming and going, so... 


The -- our work on the -- this is the issue 


that came up with three of the SEC reviews 


we've done recently in Nevada Test Site, 


Pacific Proving Ground and then we -- the Ames 


Laboratory. And we -- and the issue it says to 


what to do about people who may have had say 


high exposures to radiation and difficult to 


evaluate the doses but at the same time could 


have experienced those doses under very -- very 


short time periods. 


The workgroup -- our working group has been 


somewhat delayed. We had to deal with the 


firewall issues, the other issues with the 


contract and with SC&A, so those weren't really 


dealt with until the end of August, sometime 


middle, end of August, and so SC&A's -- we got 


a task order out for them to do some work on 


this issue I believe sometime in early 


September, if I'm correct on that. And so 


they've been really working on this for only a 


couple of weeks. I -- the -- we've conference 


called with them to discuss the issue. We've 


sort of laid out a general plan to approach 

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this initially, which will be in the form of 


some basically data-gathering. 


To remind the Board that this issue is not an 


issue of -- as much of can we reconstruct doses 


with sufficient accuracy, but it -- but refers 


to the endangerment part of the SEC 


regulations. And let me just read from those 


so I'm clear on this. 


It says -- the relevant part says that for 


classes of employees that have been exposed to 


radiation during discrete incidents likely to 


involved exceptionally high exposures such as 


nuclear criticality incidents or other events 


involving similarly high level exposures 


resulting from failure of radiation protection 


controls, NIOSH will assume and go on that 


those -- that is equivalent of endangerment. 


So rather than the 250-day requirement that's 


in this rule, this would have this other -- 


other test of health endangerment. 


So what we've done in terms of the work of this 


working group, we've asked SC&A to do, is to 


sort of focus on some initial fact-finding in 


this area. One is get a better understanding 


of the type of exposures that would occur in 

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criticality incidents and can we come up with 


some parameters on that that would then -- then 


can say that exposures that may have occurred 


in the Pacific Proving Ground, Nevada Test Site 


or Ames Laboratory were, you know, equivalent 


or similar to those in their nature. 


Secondly is to also evaluate those -- the 


exposures at Nevada Test Site, Pacific Proving 


Grounds -- Ames really already have -- have 


done and so -- as part of the review of the SEC 


evaluation for Ames. But then can we make a -- 


what's the comparison there. 


And then I think the third part of the task at 


the present time is to try to get a better 


handle on how do we classify employees that may 


have been fitted into this -- these categories, 


whose health may have been endangered, may have 


had relatively short term of exposures, 


difficult to reconstruct their doses but how -- 


how do we, given -- given the nature of these 


work sites and so forth, how -- is there some 


way of looking at different groups of employees 


and having a better understanding of there to 


see how this SEC class would fit together. 


So SC&A has just started working on that, I 

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believe within the last couple of weeks now, 


and I expect we'll have a meeting of our 


workgroup to sort of update our -- update on 


where they are in terms of fact-gathering and 


so forth. I hope the workgroup can meet 


sometime in the next month or so and hopefully 


we can try to resolve these issues by our 


December Board meeting. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Jim. Let me open the 


floor for questions or comments. And Arjun, 


you have a comment on this -- 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: I didn't have a chance to talk 


to Dr. Melius about this, but we have done some 


work and I just want to give you an update. We 


have -- just before I came to this meeting I 


got a -- we commissioned Dr. Mike Thorne, who 


has been on our team for quite a long time, to 


do work on the critica-- to do a paper on the 


criticality doses, criticality events, how long 


those -- how -- how to define the question of 


discrete, how long a criticality event might 


last and so on. And happily, as it turned out, 


he had already studied this question at some 


length, and so we had all the documents at 


hand. And he just sent me -- just before the 

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weekend -- a paper that's in internal review, 


but we have a pretty good handle on the 


criticality question, so a very basic task has 


been done. 


 Dr. Anspaugh's done some work on -- on the 


Nevada Test Site resuspension, which has some 


implications for the less than 250-day issue, 


but that still has to be elaborated and 


probably will be done in the next -- coming 


weeks. 


 We've also gathered some data on external dose 


on each test series in Pacific Proving Ground 


and Nevada Test Site, but all of that is under 


internal review, especially if the data-


gathering involved, you know, some -- some 


conflict of interest questions. And we need to 


go through a more intensive internal review 


before we can give that document to you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Arjun, for that 


 DR. MAKHIJANI: And the Ames thing is done, as 


you know. You have seen that already. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Other questions? Comments? 

 (No responses) 

Okay. 
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 DR. MELIUS: And I think I also need to report 


on the next part of this, which is the reviewed 


but not qualified petitions. And we had a 


little e-mail miscommunication and -- which I 


won't go into, but I -- we didn't -- I was 


unaware that petitions were ready to review and 


wasn't communicated to me through a mishap, and 


so we will be having a meeting of the workgroup 


also to review all the -- these would be the 


petitions that were submitted but were not 


qualified by NIOSH. If you remember, at the 


last meeting we were asked to review that and 


we are -- be moving forward. 


 DR. WADE: Now is it your understanding, Dr. 


Melius, that that is the same workgroup that 


you had just mentioned? 


 DR. MELIUS: I believe so. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think -- I think we had a 


discussion at the last meeting as to whether it 


would be a separate workgroup, and I think we 


ended up agreeing that there was a lot of 


overlap in activity and perhaps the same folks 


 DR. MELIUS: I was not there for that 


discussion so it's a little... what happens 

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when you get assigned to -- you know. 


 MS. MUNN: You should have known better. 


 DR. MELIUS: I know. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, any -- anything else on that 

topic? 

 DR. MELIUS: No. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Just a time-out for a minute. 

(Pause) 

We're simply having a little discussion here on 


moving something up on the agenda since we're a 


little bit ahead of the schedule -- which is 


unusual. But the update on Rocky Flats is -- 


is pretty much of a time-certain because we 


have some individuals who will be on the phone 


for that, so we want to keep that at 10:30. 


SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS AND BOARD ACTION
 

But we can easily move up the next item, which 


is subcommittee reports and Board action. This 


is action that comes out of the subcommittee 


meeting from yesterday. So -- and I think we 


can -- we can handle that easily before the 


10:00 o'clock break period. 


There are two items particularly that we want 


to deal with. The first of these has to do 


with the subcommittee charter. Currently we 

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have a subcommittee -- we have a single 


subcommittee called the Subcommittee on Dose 


Reconstruction and Site Profile Reviews. Since 


we are now handling most of the site profile 


activities through working groups, as we have 


just heard from a moment ago, it's the intent 


and the recommendation of that subcommittee 


that its focus be narrowed to simply include 


dose reconstruction reviews. And the 


subcommittee is proposing, and this comes as a 


recommendation from the subcommittee to the 


full Board, that the site profile -- or that 


the charter be modified as is shown in Tab 1 of 


your Board report. And --


 DR. WADE: You can read the changes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hang on just a moment. 


(Pause) 


I -- I'm just -- you know, it's easy to start 


to feel like this is deja vu all over again. 


want to make sure -- most of the -- most of the 


group were here yesterday for that session, 


with the exception I guess of Dr. Melius, so 


let us -- let us review those proposed changes. 


And Lew, if you would do those -- that for us. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Just by way of introduction, 


I 
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and I've just been reminded to remind you all 


by counsel that what we're doing is we're 


chartering -- we're recommending the charter of 


a new subcommittee. By a separate action we 


are abolishing the old subcommittee. So what 


I'm reading you now is the changes to the 


charter for the new subcommittee. You'll find 


the material I'm going to be speaking from 


under the tab marked "Subcommittee" in your 


book. 


The first change comes in the first section of 


"Purpose" on the third line. The word "very" 


should be changed to "verify". 


 DR. ZIEMER: That's why I said I had the deja 


vu all over again feeling. I said didn't we 


already do this yesterday; yes, we did. 


 (Whereupon, multiple Board members commented 


simultaneously.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: In the full Board meeting we -- we 


did it. We got ahead of ourselves. 


 MS. MUNN: When Jim finally got here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We're so happy with the outcome we 


want to repeat it. That's why I was looking at 


this. I said it seemed like we did it already. 


I know those in this group who are teachers, 

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such as Dr. Roessler, if you teach multiple 


sections of a course you're never quite sure if 


the joke you're about to tell has already been 


told in that -- in that section or not. 


DR. ROESSLER: So don't tell jokes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. So -- so we have completed 


that activity. And then the other one, Mark 


Griffon -- your -- your report, we did that 


also then, did we, or not? 


 MR. GRIFFON: No. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, okay. Okay. We -- we 


squeezed that -- this one in but not the second 


part of this. Okay, good. That's right. 


Okay, so this is the report on the second and 


third sets of dose reconstructions. So -- and 


again, this comes as a recommendation from the 


subcommittee. Mark, if you will give us that 


recommendation. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think we -- that 


this report was drafted for the second and 


third set of case reviews, which were cases 21 


through 60, and this -- the -- the letter 


summarizes the findings. And then there's 


multiple attachments, and I think part of why 


we didn't vote on it yesterday, we -- people 

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wanted time to look at all the -- the pieces of 


it. As attachments we have the methodology by 


which we did the case selection. Also the 


methodology that describes how we ranked the 


cases. There's the two matrices, which are 


cases 21 through 40, I think, and 41 through 60 


or roughly -- roughly that breakout. There's 


the table describing the parameters -- 


describing the cases without identifying the 


cases. In other words, site, POC, information 


like that so that you have a sense of what kind 


of cases we -- we looked at. And I think I'm 


missing one -- that might be all. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The SC&A table. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Oh, yeah, and the SC&A executive 


summary of their -- from their full report on 


all the cases. So there's four attachments 


plus a summary letter. And as a package, I 


guess we're putting that before the Board as a 


recommendation to submit to the Secretary as a 


report on -- on cases 21 through 60. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, there was a request I think 


-- perhaps from Dr. Poston -- that we make sure 


that we have all the pieces available prior to 


voting, and I'm not sure we actually have done 

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that yet. So we need -- let me see if I can 


identify what we need, and I'm quite agreeable 


that we postpone the vote -- for example, till 


tomorrow -- but we need to make sure that we 


have the following documents. 


We need a copy of the SC&A summary. That's --


that's an attachment. That's -- and that would 


come out of their executive summaries. We need 


a copy of the methodology for categorizing and 


ranking dose reconstructions. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Which is the same as --


 DR. ZIEMER: It's the same as was in the 


original package for the first 20 cases. We 


need the matrix itself. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Which -- yeah. Which were e-


mailed around to the Board a couple of weeks 


ago. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right, but --


 MR. GRIFFON: That was the final version. We 


can get print-offs made. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. And then the -- the other 


attachment was the list of the cases, their 


characteristics -- year of -- years of work, 


the type of cancer and so on. Those pieces --


 MR. GRIFFON: And that's in the -- that's in 

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the notebook. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And that's -- well, that was 


provided in the notebook, so it's the other 


three attachments that we need copies, so -- 


and Lew, I have the electronic copies of those 


so we can -- we can get those -- and let me 


ask, how many copies do we need for the Board? 


Some of you already have copies perhaps on your 


hard drives -- or do you all want hard copies 


of all of those? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think the matrices were put on 


the table yesterday. Did people get the 


matrices? 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The matrices --


UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So 21 through 38 I'm assuming -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: So we only need -- we only need 


two attachments and that's the SC&A summary 


table --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and the methodology document, 


so we'll get those two and postpone the vote on 


this. The motion will be to adopt the -- the 


letter -- the summary letter, which is a report 

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to the Secretary, with those attachments. But 


I'll take it by consent that we'll postpone the 


vote till all the members have copies of the 


attachments. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I was -- I was just going to say, 


I can also edit the letter based on Wanda's 


friendly amendment yesterday -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: And have an updated copy. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- today so we can -- it's only a 


couple of lines difference, but we might as 


well get the final --


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. That would be good. 


We will defer the vote till the Board's working 


session tomorrow. 


Then I'm going to go ahead and -- let's go 


ahead and take our break. Try to reconvene at 


10:25 so that we can be ready to go at 10:30 


when the others are on the phone with the Rocky 


Flats update. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 9:50 a.m. 


to 10:30 a.m.) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we'd like to reconvene our 


session. Let me check to make sure that Mike 


Gibson is still on the line. Mike, are you 


there? 

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 MR. GIBSON: Yes, I'm here. 


 DR. WADE: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes? 

 MR. GIBSON: Yes. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Also I want to check to see if 

both Terrie Barrie and Kay Barker from Rocky 


Flats -- Terrie, are you on the line? 


 MS. BARRIE: Yes, Dr. Ziemer, I am. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. And Kay Barker? 


 MS. BARKER: Yes, Dr. Ziemer, I am. 


UPDATE ON ROCKY FLATS SEC


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. Then 


we're going to proceed with the subcommittee 


report -- or the working group report, 


actually, on Rocky Flats -- Rocky Flats SEC, 


and Mark Griffon has the lead on that so Mark, 


we'll turn it over to you. 


 DR. WADE: Maybe I could make just two very 


brief comments. Some members of the audience 


have mentioned that they have some difficulty 


hearing certain Board members at certain times. 


I think the solution is just real good 


discipline when we speak, by speaking into the 


microphone and keeping it close. They hear the 


people on the telephone fine, but some of us 

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they're having difficulty. 


Just by way of background of this working 


group, it's a working group that originally was 


tasked to look at the site profile at Rocky 


Flats. When the Board was in receipt of a 


petition evaluation report -- an SEC petition 


evaluation report, this group began to focus 


its efforts on those issues in the site profile 


that were most pertinent to the debate 


concerning the SEC petition, and that's why 


it's so listed. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And Lew, would you also remind us 


and the assembly here of our ground rules with 


respect to conflict of interest. 


 DR. WADE: The Board really has three rules 


that it has been using to police itself 


relative to conflict of interest. If a Board 


member has a conflict for a particular site, 


that Board member cannot participate in a vote 


or a motion as it relates to a site profile. 


They can be involved in discussion of that 


issue. They can remain at the table, but not 


vote or make motion on an issue related to a 


site profile for a site they're conflicted. 


 If they're conflicted for a site and there's a 

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discussion related to an SEC petition, then 


they have to remove themself from the table. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Do we have any members that are 


conflicted on Rocky Flats? 


 DR. WADE: My answer is no. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Now, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: All right. I want to give an 


update on the workgroup process on reviewing 


the SEC petition for Rocky Flats. I'm trying 


to remember the dates. We've had a couple of 


meetings since the last face-to-face Board 


meeting. The last one I believe was -- help me 


out here -- early September; am I right on 


that? 


 DR. WADE: August 31st. 


 MR. GRIFFON: August 31st, okay. August 31st, 


thank you. August 31st was our last meeting, 


in Cincinnati. And I think really -- I -- I 


want to mention the -- I have seven priority 


items. We -- we have a lengthy matrix, which I 


believe -- is that available, Lew, on the side 


or we can certainly make copies of the matrix 


available -- a lengthy matrix tracking several 


of the issues. Several of them can be rolled 


up into certain items, so I'm going to give 

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seven of the -- of the main items that I think 


we have still in the works that were -- we're 


trying to do final resolution on with regard to 


reviewing the petition. These are not -- some 


-- some issues, as we've gone through the 


process, we've sort of self-identified -- SC&A 


and the workgroup, along with NIOSH, have come 


to the conclusion that certain issues -- while 


there might still be an issue there, it's 


probably likely that it's a site profile issue, 


that it would not affect the decision-making 


process with regard to an SEC. So some of 


those -- I think Lew just mentioned this. Some 


of those are sort of not on -- on the -- the 


top of our agenda as a workgroup right now. 


We're focusing on the ones that could affect 


the decision-making process. 


 The seven primary items I have still remaining 


-- and if you've followed these meetings for 


any length of time, they're going to sound 


familiar. Item one is the super class S 


plutonium question. And item two -- I'll go 


down all the items, then I'll come back and 


give you an update on each one. Item two is 


the other radionuclides, what we're calling 

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other radionuclides other than plutonium and 


uranium at the site. Number three is neutron 


dose calculation or -- or method for dose 


reconstruction. Number four is the internal 


dose coworker model. Number five -- and I 


would say by far the most extensive item -- is 


data reliability. Number six -- which may be a 


subset of number five as far as data 


reliability, but it's a separate item -- 1969 


fire, questions related to 1969 dosimetry and 


the -- the fire. And the seventh item is 


issues related to D&D workers. 


So going back to the top of the list there, 


super S -- where we stand on that is that NIOSH 


put out a model for a method to reconstruct 


those doses if it -- it -- it is apparent that 


people were involved in exposures to super S 


materials. They based this on several design 


cases that they used, and SC&A has reviewed -- 


reviewed the procedure, pretty comfortable with 


the entire methodology. The final item we had 


as far as an action was to compare -- the 


design cases included I think five or six, I 


may not have the number exact there, 


individuals from the plutonium 1965 fire and 

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there were -- there were 25 that clearly had 


large lung burdens, according to all reports of 


that fire. And we asked as a follow-up can we 


see the other 25 cases with identifiers. We 


want to make sure that -- or at least spot-


check those other 25 to see that the design 


cases in fact do bound the situation, they are 


boun-- a bounding approach and all -- you know 


-- so SC&A is -- is in process on that. 


They've -- we've got the identifiers and we're 


-- and we're working on getting the dosimetry 


records for those. We've had a little hiccup 


in that process, but we're working on that. 


The second item, other radionuclides, really 


where -- where this stands is -- is NIOSH went 


back to the raw records. Many of these are 


classified. These are the -- the sort of mass 


balance reports or ledgers of -- of receipts of 


different materials, different -- and it 


includes information by year on all these other 


radioisotopes that we were -- that -- that were 


of concern. We actually had a mee-- a 


classified briefing yesterday on some of the -- 


on -- on this topic. And the concern from the 


workgroup's standpoint is, you know, what -- 

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how much is there, was it a significant source 


term. Secondly, was there an exposure 


potential. Due to the nature of some of these 


source terms, they might not -- there may be a 


minimal exposure potential. They may be sealed 


sources or things like that, so was there an 


exposure potential. And then if those -- if -- 


if the source term exposure potential, and then 


who was likely exposed and over what time 


periods, then how is NIOSH proposing to 


reconstruct those doses. You know, it -- it -- 


and -- and part of the reason for the last 


question is -- I should preface all of this by 


saying that for most of these other 


radioisotopes -- not true for all of them, but 


for many of them there's not a -- a lot of 


urinalysis data or individual data, so they 


have to have a -- a separate approach if 


there's a significant exposure potential. And 


so we've asked, you know, how -- how is this 


going to be done, assuming there's significant 


potential. We've got a preliminary report from 


NIOSH that was received just prior to this 


meeting. I don't think SC&A has ful-- has 


reviewed that yet completely, but we're in 

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review on that. The -- the meeting yesterday 


was a good step in that process. We have 


better information on -- on these other source 


terms now so I think we're moving well forward 


on that -- on that -- on that action item. 


The third item is neutron dose reconstruction 


and -- several pieces to this that are bi-- 


that are in the works, sort of. And one of 


them is OTIB-58, which is the coworker model 


that's being proposed, and there's some 


questions on this coworker model. 


A second issue -- and some of these are 


related, certainly, but a second issue which 


has been discussed quite a bit is the -- a 


method being used to estimate neutron doses 


when they don't have neutron badges is to use a 


neutron-to-photon ratio, and we're looking at 


the derivation of these ratios. And actually I 


guess the last discussion involved, you know, 


are there any sort of benchmark data from the 


time periods of question that would reassure us 


that we've got this ratio fairly well-


established with -- the -- this ratio ends up 


being a part of the coworker model, so there's 


some -- some final checks on the neutron-to­
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photon ratio. 


The last part of it is -- and this falls into 


that bigger category that I mentioned earlier, 


the validity or reliability of the neutron dose 


records themselves. These are NDRP records. 


It's unclear to what extent they were validated 


against any raw records, so that's -- that sort 


of falls under the validation question, but I 


am mentioning it in the neutron topic here. 


As far as the first two go, this is one of 


those -- this is one of those -- the -- the 


coworker model -- you know, notwithstanding the 


question on the data reliability, but we also 


indicated to NIOSH that, you know, if certain 


things can't be done that they proposed that 


they may be able to substitute an alternate 


model, basically, that would be a -- a bounding 


approach. And they're not clear they want to 


do that yet. I don't think they're there yet. 


But this is one of those that may be not -- 


again, notwithstanding the data reliability 


question, it may be more of a site profile 


issue if they can get the coworker model 


correct to where we believe it can -- can be 


used to calculate a maximum plausible dose, 

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then -- then some of these other details are 


more -- you know, they -- they have to be 


worked out, but they're more of a site profile 


follow-through issue. 


The fourth item is the internal coworker model, 


and this is referencing TIB-38 -- OTIB-38. And 


here again, some remaining questions on this -- 


this approach for the coworker model. One --


one big one is the question on the 


representativeness of the data and, you know, 


were the maximally exposed people actually 


sampled for all these time periods and -- and ­

- you know, so therefore it -- it's a question 


of can this -- can this distribution be used to 


sort of represent all the workers of concern in 


this petition. 


The second part is, again, the data reliability 


question. And there's -- there's a bit of 


history here, and I think it's worth -- worth 


going through for a second because I -- I've 


had to do this four or five times on the 


workgroup as we get new members sitting in on 


the workgroup calls. The -- the coworker model 


is based on CER data, and the CER data -- so 


the first question -- this is Center for 

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Epidemiological Research. So one of the first 


questions -- I'm not sure I did it -- either 


SC&A or -- or someone on the workgroup raised 


the question of, you know, was it appropriate 


to use an epidemiological database to -- to 


develop a coworker model. And the response 


that we got from NIOSH that a -- they basically 


said well, we -- we've done this already; 


however, we've compared it to HIS-20, which was 


presented as sort of the primary database 


source. And when we did that, basically the 


intakes that would be calculated from either 


model ended up being essentially the same. So 


that was -- that was the response, that okay, 


maybe we shouldn't have used CER, but even if 


we use the HIS-20 database it would have 


resulted in the same conclusions essentially 


for our coworker models so we're sticking with 


it. And that -- you know, that seemed -- I -- 


I'm not sure how much SC&A reviewed that 


response, but that was the response at the 


time. 


The -- as -- as we went down this then we -- we 


-- we were sort of probing HIS-20 as the 


primary database, and -- and as we -- as we've 

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evolved in this workgroup we've found a lot of 


problems with the HIS-20 data. So some of the 


ongoing actions here is that -- is that we want 


-- we want to know sort of -- and -- and the 


big "for instance" on that -- when I say some 


problems, I shouldn't say a lot of problems but 


some problems at least have been identified in 


the HIS-20 database, and one of them is that we 


looked at some of the high values and when you 


-- when you compare and look for high values in 


-- in the HIS-20 database, they weren't there. 


And then we -- for this particular situation, 


anyway, was looked in CER database and they 


happened to be in there. So you say well, you 


know, that seems good, at least they're in the 


coworker model. They use the CER data. What's 


-- what's the big deal. Well, I don't -- I 


don't understand -- it's kind of hard for me to 


understand how an epidemiological database that 


was -- at least my assumption was that it was 


derived from HIS-20, how it could have more 


data than the original, and it had these higher 


values in it. So there's a question of the 


pedigree of the databases and -- and NIOSH is 


investigating that. They've got I believe 

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Donna Kragle* from the ORAU group, who was 


probably one of the primary carriers of the CER 


data when they did these studies, is checking 


into that for us. 


I think that's the -- that's the follow-up and 


I -- NIOSH has also provided a white paper to 


SC&A explaining the basis of the coworker 


model. So I know this is getting down in the 


mud a little bit, but this is an important 


thing to go through 'cause I think it sort of 


explains why some of this is taking a little 


time. But as we pull back some layers, we're 


finding some -- some questions, more questions 


are arising. And you know, at least my feeling 


is we -- we really need to be thorough on this 


data reliability question. It's been raised a 


lot by the petitioners and I think we need to 


take it to ground on -- on -- for -- for this 


petition review. 


So going to data reliability, on the data 


reliability category, I think I've -- I've 


tried to put all -- there's -- there's several 


items in the matrix related to data 


reliability, and I think the best way to think 


about it is in -- in sort of two broad 

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categories. One is -- is the sort of systemic 


analysis, what -- are there any problems 


throughout the records throughout the databases 


that would make it a broad problem for many 


petitioners with-- within this -- this petition 


covers the history of the site, so you know, we 


want to look at that -- that broad issue. 


The second part is, to be responsive to the 


petition, there -- there were many specific 


allegations that were brought forward in the 


petition, and also in other interviews or 


offered in public comment before the Board that 


we felt that NIOSH and the workgroup need to be 


responsive to those individuals. I -- I -- the 


-- the way I try to -- to view some of those 


specifics, though, is to sort of think of them 


as a -- a -- in a category sense, that a lot of 


the specific allegations were related to things 


like "no data available" and questions about -- 


you know, so, you know, my -- when we step back 


and have to make a decision as a board, I think 


we have to consider how -- how -- not so much 


for this particular case, although that's 


important, we want to think about how it 


impacts the entire petitioning class or -- or a 

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subset of the petitioning class. So that's 


kind of what we're trying to do with our path 


forward. It's taken us a little while to sort 


that out and get there, but that's kind of 


where we're going. 


For the sys-- for the systemat-- or systemic 


analysis, one thing we've asked for NIOSH to 


provide is -- is sort of a -- a methodology for 


sampling from what I'd describe as these sort 


of raw data sources. And when I say raw data 


sources, I'm talking anything from -- we've had 


a lot of discussion about some log books that 


have been uncovered and have some references to 


specific measurements or data. Some are not so 


useful. Some are useful. There's also some 


health physics reports that might have summary 


data. We found that very useful in our review 


of Y-12 where they had summary datas for -- for 


six months where they actually show the 


distribution of urinalysis samples, the 50th 


percentile, the 95th percentile, things like 


that were graphed out in these raw -- it may be 


a secondary source, but it was very useful in 


terms of looking at -- at the database in terms 


of reliability. So any of those raw types of 

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sources, we've asked for NIOSH to sort of say ­

- you know, present to us a strategy on how you 


can demonstrate to -- to the workgroup that in 


fact these records are reliable for dose 


reconstruction. 


Part of the -- the -- we haven't had that 


product yet, and I will say part of the 


reasoning is I think NIOSH had to -- they're -- 


they're in the process of capturing some of 


these log books, and us-- they -- there's a -- 


you know, some of them, as -- as the -- it's 


hard to develop a strategy until you know what 


you're -- you've got to work with, and I think 


that's kind of where they're at is they're -- 


we've got some -- we're getting some log books 


that -- that have very useful information for 


cross-checking, but you know, you might go 


through six or seven that -- that have very 


mundane sort of process information and -- and 


allocation information, things like that, 


nothing on dosimetry records really. So it's ­

- it's been a little hit and miss, but we're -- 


you know, we're -- we are getting that. We've 


got many more log books. As of the last 


workgroup meeting we've got about 30 that have 

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been posted on the O drive -- I think 30 -- 


anyway, got a number of log books and -- and 


we're working on that process. 


I -- I think -- now -- now one thing -- one 


challenge that we have ahead of us is that the 


raw records -- checking the raw records against 


HIS-20, which is one level we -- we've gone 


with these log book reviews. We've got a 


number of log books posted, raw handwritten 


records in the log books, spot-checking some of 


these against the HIS-20 electronic database to 


see if they're in fact in there and as of the 


last workgroup meeting SC&A, as well as the 


workgroup -- we provided some what I would 


define as leads on some things that weren't 


matching. And you know, these include some -- 


many in vivo measurements, lung count data that 


were not in -- in the database, some of the 


urinalysis results -- although we didn't have a 


lot of urinalysis to -- to -- from the log 


books so we didn't do a lot of spot checking, 


but of -- of some that we went through, there 


were definitely discrepancies found. A lot of 


the data we had to review was uranium in the 


1959/1960 er-- you -- those two years. We 

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would have much preferred it to be reviewing 


plutonium, but we had -- had to work with the 


log books we had, but we definitely found 


discrepancies there. And then we -- we had --


from the external dose side, we did find some 


mention in log books of -- and I want to 


reference this because it was addressed on the 


call yesterday, some mention of -- of damaged 


badges and -- or destroyed badges, Paul, I -- I 


correct myself there, destroyed badges. And 


these -- the way it was referenced in the log 


books I think is important -- an important 


clarification here. It said destroyed badges 


due to contamination, and I think what -- what 


I would read -- what I -- the way I understand 


that is that the badges were probably 


contaminated on the job and therefore 


destroyed. The follow-through that I think we 


need to do is that all -- in many of these 


cases there was -- there was identifiers. We 


have workers' names right there. And the 


question, to me, to follow through on what the 


petitioners have been -- been alleging anyway 


is what was the recorded dose for that -- for 


those workers, or where there -- or where there 

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no data in that period. That would be very 


worthwhile follow throughing -- following 


through on. 


 So the next -- and then to -- another ongoing 


item which SC&A has been working on on this is 


-- is this -- this question of -- of the 


completeness of the dose records for the 


claimants. And I think this becomes important 


-- you know, we -- we -- we've been -- we've -- 


have had multi-prongs in this data reliability 


review, certainly. And it -- it -- it's hard 


for us to sometimes sort it out amongst our own 


workgroup. But you know, when I mentioned, for 


instance, that I was having problems matching 


some of the in vivo information, and sometimes 


it wasn't even data, it was just the -- that an 


individual had been sent for a lung count on a 


certain day, and you look in that time period 


and you find nothing for this individual 


anywhere close to that day or, you know, time 


period was happening a lot. The response from 


-- from NIOSH was that they -- they in fact 


knew that there were problems with the in vivo 


electronic record, but they remind me that, you 


know, we're not going to rely on -- first of 

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all, we're not going to rely on the lung count 


data at all, we're relying on the urinalysis 


data. And secondly that -- that we're 


primarily relying on the individual -- 


individual's -- claimant's data, not -- there's 


very few that are going to rely on coworker 


models. So I guess in the big scheme of 


things, the final product we have to deliver is 


are there sufficient -- is there sufficient 


completeness of records within the individual 


claimants' files -- obviously we're not going 


to look through all the files, but we got -- we 


have to do this on some sort of sampling basis 


and demonstrate that there is -- that there are 


sufficient indi-- records in the individuals' 


files to do dose reconstruction. So that's 


where we have to come back with this whole data 


reliability picture. 


There are some other -- other items on the data 


reliability review which were ongoing. Let's 


see, I'll -- I'll just go down some of these 


action items. It might be redundant with some 


of what I just said, but SC&A is reviewing 


claimant files for completeness. I think 


they've got a preliminary draft. I think 

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they've gone through maybe eight claimant files 


and -- and they're looking at completeness of 


records for -- for claimants. 


 Let's see, the -- the log book question, we're 


trying to get representative log books, and the 


workgroup's desire I think was that we had 


primar-- primary buildings or processes 


represented and something from each decade, 


since we're covering the whole span of the 


history of the site. Thus far I think we've 


had a little difficulty getting much use-- many 


useful log books, anyway, in the time periods 


beyond the early '60s. A lot of the log books 


seem to be around the early '60s so we -- we've 


got a little work to do there and we're hoping 


that we can round that out a little more. 


The third -- another type of log book, which 


was a specific action, was related to the 


urinalysis log books. These are the -- the 


urinalysis log books that were the handwritten 


entries in the -- in the laboratory, I presume, 


where they're doing the -- they have -- they 


have the gross counts, background, net counts 


right down -- and then conversion to dpm per 24 


hours, all in -- in handwritten calculations in 

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the log books. We have had some posted. It 


seems like it only covers one year, though, 


1960. I think these -- at least to me, I was 


under the impression that there are a number of 


these that exist that span a fair time period, 


because they're referenced in the Technical 


Basis Documents. The internal dose Technical 


Basis Documents mentions that these were used 


to derive the MDA -- the minimum detectable 


activities for various time periods, so I think 


there's at least -- there's got to be more 


there, and I think we just have to -- we've 


asked already that NIOSH uncover those, find 


those and -- and -- and we need to review 


those. 


And then on the specific concern sides, and 


these -- you know, again, we're sort of 


aggregating these to look at the big picture, 


but we've also spent a fair amount of energy on 


the workgroup level looking at some of the 


specific allegations within the petition. One 


topic along those lines is reviewing these 


safety concern reports. And NIOSH so far has ­

- went back and found a database with a listing 


of all these reports and, by title, pulled off 

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ones that they thought were pertinent to 


dosimetry issues and they reviewed 33 of those. 


They provided the workgroup with a report, and 


I don't think we're ready to -- to -- I don't 


think SC&A has reviewed that yet completely, so 


-- but we're in the works. They -- NIOSH has 


certainly done a lot of work in reviewing those 


33 reports. 


There are 16 additional ones that were 


identified by SC&A and the workgroup asked 


NIOSH to do -- to review those, at least in a 


cursory sense, maybe not as in-depth as they 


reviewed the first 33. We just want sort of a 


snapshot of what kinds of -- of concerns were 


in these other 16 reports, because if they're 


very much overlapping I don't think we need the 


detail that they spent on the first 33. 


 The second, for specific concerns, was a -- and 


this is many of the matrix items -- involved a 


-- specific allegations put forward by the 


petitioners or by other public commenters, et 


cetera, and NIOSH has provided a report on -- 


went through the petition and -- and pulled out 


all -- all the allegations from there and went 


through and did a report, I think it's about 75 

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pages, covering all those allegations one by 


one. And you know, I think SC&A's in the 


process of reviewing that report as well, but ­

- but again, the -- the thing I take away from 


that also is that out of those 75 pages, and 


I'm not sure how many allegations that covers, 


but it was -- it was a number of allegations, 


there were some central themes and I think we ­

- we want to start thinking about it that way, 


that -- that, you know, from a class-wide 


basis, you know, could this have an effect on 


reconstructing dose for a certain part of the 


class or the entire class. 


Two items left and then we'll -- the '69 fire. 


NIOSH provided the declassified report on the O 


drive and presented an overview of it at the 


last workgroup meeting. Within that report 


there are -- I think it identifies 40 -- 40 


individuals that were immediately sent for lung 


counts and 110 later, or something like that. 


But it identifies a number of people that were 


sent for lung count. Obviously the most hi-- 


the people who were most likely exposed or the 


highest potential for exposure. And we -- the 


worker -- I think at this point -- I think SC&A 

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might have already made this request, I'm not 


sure, but we'd like to see if we can get 


identifiers -- you know, who -- who -- who were 


these people. And the reason for this is that 


-- and the reason for this focus on the '69 


fire, quite frankly, I think is that as we've 


gone through this workgroup process and identi­

- a gap in the 1969 time frame was identified 


by SC&A. And NIOSH agrees to this, that there 


was some odd things going on in the '69 


dosimetry records within the claimant files. 


So to better understand why there's some gaps, 


we thought it might be useful to have these 


identifiers and at least spot check some of the 


rad records. And this would involve going back 


to the original rad records, obviously, 'cause 


there are gaps in the database. But spot check 


the individual records and see if in fact they 


do have recorded doses in their records. So 


that's part of the -- of the focus on the -- on 


that time frame and the fire was to -- to 


resolve this issue of this gap in records in 


1969. 


 The last issue is the D&D workers and the -- 


really the questi-- the -- the whole question 

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behind this is was there sufficient data during 


the D&D time frame for all potentially exposed 


workers -- and I think that phrase is the 


important part, for all potentially exposed 


workers -- to reconstruct dose. And 


particularly I guess the concern was that as -- 


as many of these sites, and it sounds like 


Rocky was similar, went into this D&D phase, 


the bioassay programs were modified -- you 


know, probably with good basis. The question 


is, not only for the prime contractor but also 


for subcontractors, did everyone who -- who had 


a potential for exposure have monitoring, and 


do we have enough there to reconstruct, or at 


least bound, their dose, even if it's -- even 


if they worked on D&D for six or seven years 


and had a sample at the end of their career, 


you -- you have something there to -- to 


possibly bound your internal doses. So that's 


sort of what we've been questioning. 


NIOSH discussed bas-- trying to identify 


rosters. In particular they -- they believe 


that the rad worker-2 -- it -- if within the 


roster they could identify rad worker-2 rosters 


for those time periods, they thought that would 

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be -- 'cause rad worker-2 was required for any 


of the radiation areas and therefore if they 


could identify that roster and cross-check it 


with the database, and if they had data, that 


would be a confirmation that -- that people 


were monitored. I don't -- I think they've had 


a little trouble getting those rosters. They 


have provided us -- in lieu of that, I guess, 


they've offered a -- a description of the 


monitoring program and an audit -- one audit 


report or multiple audit, I -- I'm not sure if 


it was multiple audit reports or one audit 


report from the D&D time period. It was an au­

- it was a -- internal audit? I'm checking 


with Brant to... 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, I think it was. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it was a internal audit 


of -- of the dosimetry program during that D&D 


time period, and those have been provided but 


certainly at this point not reviewed by SC&A. 


So I guess to -- to -- to summarize, I think 


the -- the biggest remaining issue is -- is the 


data reliability issue, and there's several 


items that that sort of sprinkles through. And 


I think we -- you know, we have a path forward, 

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you know, this -- this broader class approach 


that we want to -- we want to understand for 


the class, for subsections of the class, can we 


reconstruct dose; is the data reliable for 


those -- you know, to do that. And I think 


that's clearly the -- the biggest item. Not 


that -- these other items are not closed out, 


but I think that's the -- the biggest item on 


our priorities at this point. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Mark. We'll 


open the floor for questions, and let me begin. 


Yesterday Terrie Barrie raised a question I 


think that had to do with data reliability, and 


I -- I think from what I heard you say that the 


workgroup is in fact addressing a number of the 


questions, including those that were raised by 


Terrie Barrie on the phone call yesterday. Is 


that -- do I understand that correctly? A 


number of the specific allegations that impact 


or at least reflect on potential reliability of 


data. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I -- I think so, and I 


think -- you know, I think one thing that's 


sort of evolved is inst-- you know, we want to 


be responsive to the individual allegations, 

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but we also want to step back and say, you 


know, given that there were many allegations in 


this -- in this area about the data 


reliability, we need to -- you know, NIOSH 


needs to present to the workgroup -- to the 


Board, you know, that -- that -- an argument 


that this data is -- is in fact reliable and 


here's how we've checked it, here's how we've 


proved it and, you know, for the whole class, 


not just -- not just for -- allegation by 


allegation and that's -- that's kind of where 


we're at with that I think, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda Munn and then Gen Roessler. 


 MS. MUNN: From information that you've just 


heard, I think it's probably clear to everyone 


that the level of detail that's involved in 


this particular site overview is staggering. 


And it perhaps was not emphasized in Mark's 


presentation the quantity of data that is 


available. There are extensive records with 


respect to the employees at Rocky Flats. We've 


been very fortunate to be able to have access 


to so many things. 


 Another point that may not have been made that 


I believe perhaps should be made, deficiencies 

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are always findable in any dataset that you can 


find. An extreme amount of effort is being put 


here in identifying the answer to the question 


as to whether or not those deficiencies are 


systematic, whether they were intentional, and 


what the magnitude of the impact might be on 


the program to reconstruct those doses. That's 


really the bottom line. 


To this date, to the best of my knowledge, 


there's been no indication that the 


deficiencies that were found fall into those 


categories, but certainly every effort, I 


believe, is being made to put that issue to bed 


in a way that would be acceptable to any 


reasonable objective observer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Dr. Roessler? 


DR. ROESSLER: Mark, you talked about 


databases, and as I see it, there are three. 


There's the raw data, the original data; 


there's this HIS-20 database; and then the CER 


database. I know about the CER database, but 


either I've forgotten or never knew, what is 


the HIS-20 database, where did that come from? 


Is that something that was discovered more 


recently and is that specific just to Rocky 

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Flats? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, specific to -- yeah, that ­

- that's a -- a Rocky Flats-specific database, 


and there's actually predecessors to HIS-20 as 


well, so you know, they -- they're -- and I -- 


I don't have all those acronyms off-hand, 


unless Brant -- I don't know if it's worth -- 


but there were predecessors to it. The final 


evolution I think was the HIS-20 database and 


that's what we've been kind of taking as sort 


of the primary electronic source and -- so that 


was some of the -- some of the confusion of why 


-- why these inconsistencies. 


I -- I agree with Wanda's over-- overall 


statement, that -- that the bottom line is to 


find out if there's a -- you know, a systemic 


problem. I think that's -- that's kind of our 


path forward. You know, I'm not sure some of 


the discrepancies -- and I think I said this, 


may-- maybe I went past it quickly, but 


discrepancies that I identified I was -- I was 


almost reluctant to -- to share them 'cause 


they were -- I had a printout of some of the 


stuff I found in log books. I put it on a 


spreadsheet and then on the -- you know, in a ­
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- in -- in -- in the course of -- of checking 


these against the database I was handwriting 


some of my findings from the database next to 


the spreadsheet so it was very draft form. But 


I gave it to NIOSH and ORAU at the last 


workgroup saying -- presenting it as leads, and 


that's -- that's sort of how I take it is that, 


you know, maybe it's not a big -- you know, 


maybe it's not a -- a problem overall, but 


certainly there was -- I think out of the 


uranium data I looked at in '59 and '60 there 


were -- and I -- and I did look at the -- the 


higher values in the log books, mainly because 


they're the easiest to cross-walk. When you 


look in an electronic database you can sort by 


value and it's just easier to cross-walk those 


kind of data. And -- and looking at the higher 


values, out of maybe 70 I think I had 30 that ­

- that were not matching up with the HIS-20 


database. 


Now it doesn't mean that the individuals' files 


didn't have that raw data in it. That -- that 


we don't know. But at least, to me, that was a 


lead of -- of -- you know, this -- this seems 


like it might be a problem, you know, and I 

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thought that -- now it's a very small snapshot, 


but it's all we've had to work with, so -- but 


I agree with Wanda's overall conclusion, that 


we have to -- to look at this and see how it -- 


if it -- if it could affect the class as a 


whole or subsets of a class 'cause there will 


be discrepancies in any data we look at. I --


I understand that, too. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Gen Roessler --


DR. ROESSLER: I still have a question about 


HIS-20. Who put -- where did that come from -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Maybe Brant can --


DR. ROESSLER: -- who put it together, how 


encompassing is it? I mean is it all people -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) every day. 


DR. ROESSLER: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: Hi, Gen. To answer your question, 


HIS-20 is a -- I believe it's a Canberra 


product, so Canberra came up with the software 


and Rocky Flats is using it. As Mark 


mentioned, there were some predecessor 


databases. Some of those acronyms are RHRS -- 


I'm not even going to try to give you the -- 


what those letters stand for, but those 


databases are used as a basis for the -- the 

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coworker models. In terms of dose 


reconstruction, we actually go back to the 


individual worker rad files. So HIS-20 is not 


a -- a database that was developed by Rocky 


Flats. It was developed by Canberra and Rocky 


Flats acquired it from -- from Canberra and is 


using it. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But let me just add to that -- 


that point that I think -- and -- and this -- 


even at the last workgroup, and we've been at 


this for a while, I agree, but even at the last 


workgroup I got a little more clarity on this 


issue, that if you look at the individual 


claimants' files -- I think in the mid to late 


'60s -- there no more raw data beyond that. 


There -- there are printouts of the databases, 


and it might be the predecessors of -- of HIS20 or it might be HIS-20 printouts, but they're 


printouts from the database. That -- that's 


sort of why we went down that line of -- of 


checking against the electronic data 'cause 


it's a lot easier than pulling all the 


claimants' files and trying to -- to check that 


way. Now -- now we're realizing that there is 


-- you know, there is some problems with the in 

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vivo, and I'm not exactly clear still why, you 


know, they -- they -- they're claiming -- that 


NIOSH is claiming -- at least I think, I don't 


want to put words in your mouth -- that the 


urinalysis data in HIS-20 is much sounder than 


the in vivo. And I'm not exactly sure why one 


would be better than the other, but I guess it 


would be different groups doing the entry and 


maybe you can explain that, I don't -- 


 DR. ULSH: You're right, Mark, there are some 


other data that are necessary to properly 


interpret the in vivo counts that you would 


need in addition to what you would see in -- in 


HIS-20. It would get pretty far down in the 


technical weeds to go into that. And we can do 


that, Mark. Perhaps this isn't the appropriate 


forum for that --


 MR. GRIFFON: No, I'm not saying some of the 


data, I'm saying missing entries, you know, 


that -- that's the issue. There's no -- no 


data in HIS-- in HIS-20 for a lot of the in 


vivo measurements that were made, so -- 


 DR. ULSH: Right, I think --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: -- we're in agreement here that the 

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-- the HIS-20 data -- the in vivo data that is 


in HIS-20 is -- is perhaps not as reliable as 


the urinalysis data. That -- I would agree 


with that. 


And what Mark was mentioning earlier about 


handwritten records up through -- I think it's 


about 1969 time frame -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ULSH: -- there are in fact -- in the 


individual worker radiation files, there are 


handwritten urinalysis cards. After that point 


in time, right around 1969, the results began 


to be recorded electronically, and those became 


the -- I always hesitate to use this term, the 


dose of record. But that's how those results 


were reported, so we don't have those 


handwritten bioassay cards after about 1969. 


Is that what you were thinking of, Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, and I think -- I think you 


also said that beyond that point there wouldn't 


be any urinalysis logs, either. They were --


they were entering this stuff real time, I 


guess, in the laboratory right into the system. 


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, it might --


 MR. GRIFFON: I'm not clear on that. 

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 DR. ULSH: Well, I'm not -- I'm not, either, 


Mark. It might extend for maybe just a few 


years after that, but it's not much further, I 


don't think, in terms of log books. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ULSH: Does that answer your question, Gen? 


DR. ROESSLER: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, a quick follow-up. So how 


does the epi database have the high values and 


HIS-20 not have? That -- that's -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Should be the (unintelligible). 


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. ULSH: That's a very good question and we 


are looking at that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, I just --


 DR. ULSH: I guess I don't want to comment too 


far before the analysis is complete. As Mark 


mentioned, Donna Kragle is looking into this. 


She has presented us with -- with some results 


and we are currently evaluating that and we're 


going to write it up and present it to the -- 

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to the working group. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So it appears that there are a 


number of issues that are still being pursued, 


and this may involve a bit more time before 


we're ready to sort of come to closure on Rocky 


Flats related issues and -- and take formal 


action relative to an SEC petition. 


Let me ask a related question now, Mark, just 


for our records. You distributed to the Board 


the matrix. I have a version dated July 26th. 


Is that the most recent version or -- 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, we've -- we've added -- we've 


added and -- and put some comments on it, but I 


think that's -- I think the matrix itself -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it's --


 MS. MUNN: Is it? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that is. I can get back 


-- I can certainly --


 DR. ZIEMER: That date is only a few weeks 


prior to your August meeting -- August 30th 


meeting, and I'm sort of asking is there 


another version of the matrix that was prepared 


after that August meeting? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think I can -- I -- I'll 


probably have to go back to the matrix -- we -- 

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we've been working sort of off the matrix. As 


I said, we -- we -- been trying to discuss 


these broader topics and -- and cross-walking 


it with our hard copies of the matrix, saying 


okay, we covered all these items in this topic. 


But we -- we need to update the matrix probably 


so that everybody can follow through where we 


stand, but that -- I think that is the latest 


version. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. ULSH: It is the latest version of the 


matrix. A lot of action has been going on 


between NIOSH and SC&A and the working group -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: I wasn't -- this wasn't meant in 


any way a critical -- a criticism. I simply 


want to make sure that we had the latest 


version in our own files. And in your case, 


the color codes don't have a particular meaning 


like -- like the Presley group. 


 MR. GRIFFON: The yellow -- the yellow 


highlighted were -- usually when I highlight in 


yellow it's -- it's to reflect a change from 


the previous version of the matrix, so when I 


went to the -- or -- or an outstanding action, 


yeah. 

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 MS. MUNN: Uh-huh, yeah. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So one of those two, yeah -- 


outstanding action, right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Other questions or 


comments? 


 MS. BOLLER: I don't have a question -- this is 


Carolyn from Congressman Mark Udall's office. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry, I --


 MS. BOLLER: I wanted to thank Mark and the 


Board for taking as much time -- 


 DR. WADE: Could you just hold for a minute? 


We need to adjust our system so that we can be 


sure to hear you. 


 MS. BOLLER: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is this Terrie Barrie? 


 DR. WADE: No, it's someone from Congressman 


Udall's office. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, go ahead. Go ahead. 


 (No responses) 


I don't know how she knows to go ahead. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, could you repeat your 


comment, please? 


 MS. BOLLER: Yeah, this is Carolyn and I'm with 

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Congressman Mark Udall's office, and I just 


wanted to thank this group for taking as much 


time as they have with the Rocky Flats SEC, and 


I would hope that they would continue to do 


that and get all the way through this process 


so that we have a good, fair, solid answer for 


this workforce. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you for those comments, and 


indeed that -- the intent indeed is to follow 


up on all of these issues. 


Perhaps I could ask if either Terrie Barrie or 


-- or Kay has -- has comments also they wish to 


add. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yes -- well, actually I have a 


question. Did -- did I understand correctly 


that the HIS-20 base -- or from that discussion 


that Rocky Flats had a card -- handwritten 


urinalysis record for after 1969? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Go ahead. 


 DR. ULSH: Terrie, this is Brant Ulsh. What we 


find when we review the individual workers' 


radiation files is that there are handwritten 


urinalysis cards up through -- I think it's 


1969 is the year. After that, as -- as Mark 


said, we see printouts from various electronic 

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databases that were employed throughout the 


later history of the site. 


 MS. BARRIE: Okay, 'cause I have a -- a copy of 


a -- a handwritten card from my husband's file 


from 1982, and I don't know if that would 


affect anything with this discussion and... 


 DR. ULSH: We -- we might actually be talking ­

- we might actually be talking about semantics, 


and I don't mean to minimize what you're 


saying. What I'm talking about when I talk 


about the urinalysis cards, these are cards 


where you'll see handwritten entries and they 


have essentially a calendar year with results 


posted for individual urinalyses that were 


performed throughout the year. There might be 


some other records that reflect some 


handwritten notations, but I would have to see 


exactly what you're talking about before I 


could --


 MS. BARRIE: Okay, I can -- I can fax it. 


 DR. WADE: Follow up on the workgroup. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Tell her we can follow up on the 


workgroup. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. Yeah, Mark says that we will 


follow up on that in the -- in the workgroup 

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format. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Kay or Terrie, 


any further questions? 


 MS. BARKER: No, Dr. Ziemer. I would just like 


to thank Mark and his work-- working group, all 


the hard and diligent work that they have been 


doing and to please continue. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much, and 


indeed we will do so. 


 DR. WADE: If I could just frame a question, 


and I know it's not answerable at this point. 


We have heard yesterday very passionately from 


the petitioners at Rocky Flats that they would 


like us to be in Denver when we vote this issue 


through. And I know we can't really project 


now whether or not that would be our December 


meeting, but it is something we need to keep in 


mind as we move forward. 


Mark, would you hazard a guess at this point as 


to whether we should go to Denver in December, 


or is it too early to tell? 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think it's probably a little 


early to tell, but I -- I would hope, but I 


think it's a little early to tell. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. And I realized that, I 

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just want to make sure that we keep that on our 


mind. 


 MS. BOLLER: Doctor, I do -- this is Carolyn 


again. I do have one question. What are you 


doing to address this issue of conflict of 


interest on the letter by Kate Kimpan to Mr. 


Elliott? Is there a process for handling these 


kind of things? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 

 MS. BOLLER: Do you know what I'm talking 

about? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

 MS. BOLLER: Sorry. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Am I back on line here? 

UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. Well, let me -- let me 


start out with the -- the fact that there now 


is a new conflict of interest policy that NIOSH 


has, and that also has implications for the 


contractors for ORAU. I don't know, Larry, if 


either you or Kate want to address this with 


respect to Rocky or any of those questions on 


conflict of interest or -- or issues that have 


been raised on that. 


 MS. KIMPAN: I apologize, this is Kate Kimpan, 

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I missed Terrie's question. I was having a 


discussion. Could --

 DR. ZIEMER: It concerned --

 MS. KIMPAN: -- you repeat that? 

 DR. ZIEMER: It was with conflict of -- 

conflict of interest issues on -- on the Rocky 


Flats -- I assume on the site profile. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Okay, and how ORAU team is 


handling --


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 MS. KIMPAN: -- concerns therewith? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Terrie, members of the Board and 


others, I think this is going to be a similar 


answer to what I have given before, and that is 


that we -- the ORAU team stand ready to 


implement the exact NIOSH policy as written, or 


a similar policy that we will mark as an ORAU 


policy, as soon as the policy from NIOSH is 


finalized and implemented. We have endeavored, 


as I've reported at prior meetings, to assure 


we're in compliance with either the most recent 


or the most restrictive of the policies that 


have been put out there as drafts. So right 


now we are operating to the draft policy that 

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NIOSH has out there for purposes of the Rocky 


Flats site profile, the Rocky Flats evaluation 


report for the Special Exposure Cohort -- and, 


by the way, for all other activities on the 


project. 


Is that -- does that answer it, Terrie? I'm 


sorry. 


 MS. BOLLER: This is Carolyn that answered 


(sic) the question. Maybe we can have a 


conversation about this off-line, Kate. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Oh, I'm sorry, Carolyn; I thought 


it was Terrie speaking. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, she -- she suggested an offline conversation. 


Mark, did you have an additional -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: I just wanted to follow up with 


Kate. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Yes. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Is there a revision of the site 


profile for Rocky based on these -- the 


conflict of interest review that you -- you've 


indicated at the last meeting, I think, or one 


of -- a prior meeting that you were -- 


 MS. KIMPAN: Let me be clear --


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 

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 MS. KIMPAN: -- for all -- again I'm going to 


state this because it's very important. For 


any documents -- the ORAU team has had a 


conflict of interest policy in force since the 


first day of this program. The policy is 


currently changing. We're doing something -- 


because it's the right thing to do. With 


NIOSH's support and encouragement, we're going 


to take the conflict of interest policy that's 


currently in draft form -- when it's finalized, 


we're going to look at everything the team has 


done prior, under another policy, to see if we 


have gotten any documents that might have, 


under the new policy, a conflicted author or 


owner, roles like that. As such, we will 


review any document that has had any problems 


when we look at old work under the new policy. 


Rocky is one of those documents that we will 


give a very close review to. We do not 


anticipate a revision based on COI. Let me be 


clear. We have a method of looking at, 


reviewing and revising documents whenever we 


get new information that merits a revision. We 


have a two-year review of all documents which 


will proceed. 

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Something we are doing for Rocky, and this may 


be what Carolyn's referring to that I talked 


about at the last Board meeting, is we're using 


that as our example for how we are, as the ORAU 


team, electing to do full annotation and 


attribution of everything in a site profile. 


As soon as NIOSH has reviewed the work that 


we've completed in annotating and attributing 


that document, we'll bring it to the Board, 


you'll see what we're doing. 


And as I've described before, what we intend to 


do is something much more extensive than a 


professional peer review kind of document with 


footnotes. There'll be those kinds of 


references, but we're also assuring that we 


talk about every contributor to the document, 


the contribution they made and why particular 


tables, factual information and other 


conclusions -- of course any that might affect 


a dose reconstruction or other work done on a 


worker, we're going to make certain that you, 


that NIOSH, that the public knows exactly where 


we've gotten those findings. 


If, Mark, we were to find something in any of 


these reviews or annotations or attributions 

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that required updating, we would do so. We do 


not, as the ORAU team, expect that these 


reviews for COI, or even these independent 


reviews that we're going to conduct of every 


finding in a document that, under the new 


policy, an author or an owner might be 


conflicted even though it was written a long 


time ago -- we're going to review every one of 


those findings. You as the public, you as the 


Board will certainly see that. We don't 


anticipate that individual findings are going 


to be -- require changing, quote, because of 


COI. 


 What we've done of course is we've changed who 


the document owners are for any site that might 


have a conflict. You see that on our web site 


there was an interim status where my task 


manager in charge of that work, John Byrne*, 


became document owners. What we've done is 


assign the task manager as an interim step to 


assure a conflicted owner is not there. And as 


we are able to bring an appropriately skilled, 


appropriately qualified, appropriately up-tospeed, non-conflicted author, we're assigning 


new authors. And you'll see that progress on 

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our web site as we proceed. 


I'd be glad to give you more information about 


any of those. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess I was just asking about 


the -- the Rocky one. You said you -- you've 


done this annotation citation draft and it's in 


NIOSH's hands --


 MS. KIMPAN: It's in my hands right now -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. 


 MS. KIMPAN: -- prepared for NIOSH's review, 


correct. Our team has done that, completed it 


 MR. GRIFFON: 'Cause I -- I think we'd be 


interested in that, especially since we're 


involved in an SEC discussion on that site. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Absolutely. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much for that 


update. Okay, I'm looking for -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Actually --

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Dr. Melius. 

 DR. MELIUS: -- a follow-up. I'd just like to 

know the schedule on the Rocky Flats -- if it's 


in your hands now, Kate, when will it get in 


Larry's hands? 

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 MS. KIMPAN: It'll get in Larry's hands when a 


policy's finalized and there's an appropriate 


policy to say we're operating to. Right now we 


could do that and create a lot of work for 


Larry and his team and my team, and the policy 


could change again. So what we have is a 


schedule for annotation and attribution of 


every document. We've gone through and looked 


at what we need to annotate or attribute and 


we've got a schedule to do that. The -- the 


schematic is laid out for what to do. As soon 


as the policy finalizes we're under a very fast 


window. We've got 60 days to implement a 


number of aspects of this policy, and this is 


one of those where there will then be a time 


line for every document. We've prioritized 


those internally till now. We have -- expect 


some help from OCAS and indeed guidance that 


you all provide to OCAS about what order you'd 


like to see that occur in. It's an intensive 


process which we intend to complete in very 


rapid order as soon as there's a policy that's 


final and in force. 


 DR. MELIUS: So have you or have you not 


started the Rocky Flats annotation? 

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 MS. KIMPAN: Yes, we have started, and actually 


we have a draft that is complete that I have 


yet to give to Larry. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, good, 'cause it seems to me 


the annotation doesn't need to wait for a new 


policy -- finalized policy. 


 MS. KIMPAN: That's correct. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MS. KIMPAN: That's correct. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. And -- and who -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: (Unintelligible) -- go ahead. 


 DR. MELIUS: And who is the document owner then 


on the Rocky Flats site profile now? 


 MS. KIMPAN: Bob Meyers -- Bob Meyer, no S. 


 MS. BOLLER: Kate, I'm sorry, I didn't hear who 


the document owner is. 


 MS. KIMPAN: Bob Meyer. 


 MS. BOLLER: Bob Meyer, 'cause the letter I 


have dated August 7th shows Matt McKee -- 


McFee. 


 MS. KIMPAN: That's the SEC rather than the 


site profile. Sorry, we're talking about two 


different documents. One's the Technical Basis 


Document, site profile. The other's the 


evaluation report for the Special Exposure 

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Cohort. Both are Rocky Flats documents. The 


annotation/attribution I'm referring to is for 


the six-document TBDs site profile is what 


we're talking about for this annotation effort 


and attribution effort. 


 MS. BOLLER: And are you doing anything with 


the SEC evaluation report? 


 MS. KIMPAN: We're assuring that the people who 


are contributors and owners -- as you know, 


they're very, very different documents. The 


SEC does a very different thing. It looks at 


the data that have been gathered through our 


work, through the work of OCAS, and makes some 


scientific opinions about the availability and 


quality of data. That work is wholly different 


from the TBD development. And what we're doing 


regarding SEC petitions is, like other areas, 


we've been replacing authors as appropriate in 


the evaluation report process to assure 


compliance, again, with a not-yet-finalized 


policy. And -- and if it finalizes looking 


much like it does right now, then we'll be good 


to go with the owners we've established for 


those evaluation reports, as well, Carolyn. 


 DR. WADE: Just -- Kate, just a few follow-ups. 

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Will you do an attribution of the SEC 


evaluation report work that you've done? 


 MS. KIMPAN: We certainly can. We certainly 


can make -- it would be, I'm certain, redundant 


to some of the other information, but yes is 


the answer. Am I getting people yelling at me 


from behind on my team, 'cause it's more work ­

- yes, we can -- we can certainly endeavor to 


do that. We certainly want folks to know where 


our information's from, why we've used it in 


these reports and what we're doing with it. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Assuming that the NIOSH 


policy is finalized Monday -- 


 MS. KIMPAN: Yes. 


 DR. WADE: -- then when will you get to Larry 


the annotation of the site profile? 


 MS. KIMPAN: The first thing we'll get to Larry 


is the Rocky example for what we've done, and I 


can get that to Larry --


 DR. WADE: Like for Rocky --


 MS. KIMPAN: -- next week. It's prepared to 


deliver to Larry. I actually, had we not been 


on the road so much the last two weeks, might 


well have gotten it to him before now. My 


apologies. We will then get to Larry the same 

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day the schedule of those documents that might 


need to sustain one of these reviews. For 


annotation it's all of them; for the 


independent review it will be only those that, 


through the new lens, would have had a conflict 


prior. We'll expect some help from OCAS in 


prioritizing those. Right now we've got them 


ordered in a sort of natural order based on our 


work flow, but we certainly can amend that. 


 DR. WADE: In terms of the Rocky discussion, 


though, the annotation of the Rocky Flats site 


profile will go to Larry -- 


 MS. KIMPAN: Next week. 


 DR. WADE: -- next week. Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MS. BOLLER: Kate, did I understand you that 


you're talking about individuals who might have 


a conflict of -- conflict of interest versus 


the corporate conflict of interest? 


 MS. KIMPAN: Very good question, Carolyn. I 


didn't mean to act like it was one thing. 


We're talking about both. For individual, 


they're -- they're -- what that individual did, 


the work they might have done at Rocky or some 


other site is going to affect which -- which 

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conflicts, who can be in what role, who can be 


a particular owner of a document, a contributor 


in certain ways. Those corporate conflicts are 


also part of our consideration, so anyone with 


a corporate conflict will likewise be replaced 


as needed, review done as needed, et cetera. 


And those, too, will rely upon this draft 


policy. If those signi-- if those substantive 


elements don't change -- what's a personal 


conflict, what's a corporate conflict -- we're 


ready to flip a switch and go wide with this 


policy. We -- we have been hesitating to do 


that in all arenas, yet while that's been going 


on we have been moving owners and authors 


commensurate with what we believe the policy 


will be at the end. We hope not to have to, 


you know, do another dosey-do. It takes a long 


while, as you can imagine, to bring an 


appropriately-skilled author up to speed. You 


all know in these working groups and subgroups, 


the person who owns these documents has to be 


able to speak eloquently with you all, with 


your contractor, with members of the public 


about everything that's gone on at these 


facilities. It's not surprising we've relied 

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upon people, in the five years of this program, 


who've had experience at these facilities. 


So what we're trying to do right now is make 


certain that we're managing properly 


contributions of people that we all know are 


conflicted. The idea that someone has a 


conflict because of the work that they did for 


DOE is not a problem for us at all. That's how 


you got experience, at DOE. There's no other 


company that showed you what DOE did except 


DOE. What's incumbent upon us and upon my 


managers and me is to make certain and manage 


those contributions properly so there's a great 


deal of confidence among the public, among the 


claimants, among this Board and certainly among 


OCAS with who we have submitting these very 


important findings in these documents for the 


elaborate review and QA that goes on for every 


one of these findings. 


 MS. BOLLER: This letter -- this August 6th 


letter says ORAU has a corporate conflict, so 


is that the entire organization? 


 MS. KIMPAN: It is. Right now our 


determination is, including me. I can't sign a 


document for Rocky Flats because the ORAU team 

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did work that is officially considered dose 


reconstruction work at Rocky. I was not ORAU 


at the time. People on my team did not do that 


work. And because of that, our determination, 


in an abundance of caution, is that the ORAU 


corporation has a conflict at Rocky Flats and I 


don't sign those documents. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Kate. 


 MS. BOLLER: Kate, one more question, then I'll 


leave you alone. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, another question for you, 

Kate. 

 MS. BOLLER: Or maybe somebody else can answer 

this. Do you know what NIOSH's position is on 


this corporate conflict of interest, as it 


relates to the neutron dose reconstruction 


project? 


 MS. KIMPAN: We have not sought NIOSH's opinion 


other than to bless our now preliminary 


determination that we are conflicted. If NIOSH 


thought aggressively we were not conflicted, 


they could tell us so and I'd still recuse 


because of the appearance. The document that 


ORAU helped on says dose reconstruction in the 


title, so you could say you could get into the 

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details of that work that ORAU did. They 


picked up work for a field office at the 11th 


hour. They did a very small, in relative 


terms, amount of work on this document. But 


the fact that the title of the document has the 


words "dose reconstruction" in the title has 


said to us that the appearance of -- with an 


abundance of caution, the ORAU team needs to 


declare a conflict at that facility and step 


away from the plate, and that's what we've 


done. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. And Larry has an additional 


comment -- Larry Elliott. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes, Carolyn, to answer your 


comment, what NIOSH's view of this is, the 


current draft conflict of interest policy gives 


us pause with what we've heard from ORAU and 


their interpretation of that language and 


whether they find themselves corporately 


conflicted at Rocky. We -- we agree with what 


we see there now under the current language of 


the draft conflict of interest policy. So if 


that stays as it currently is and becomes final 


policy, we will see ORAU conflicted at Rocky 


Flats. 

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 MS. BOLLER: Okay. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Larry. Okay, Board 


members, any further comments or questions 


pertaining to the Rocky Flats issue? 


 (No responses) 


Okay. Let me thank Mark again, and the 


workgroup, for excellent work they are doing 


and continue to do on this particular effort. 


That's been very -- very rigorous and -- and 


actually very time-consuming, as well. 


I'm looking to see if -- we have a little time 


before our schedule lunch hour -- to see if 


there are any items that we can act on -- 


 DR. WADE: I would --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- prior to noon. 


TASK III PROCEDURES REVIEW


 DR. WADE: I would make a tentative suggestion, 


and I had asked John Mauro to come forward -- 


if you might, John, because this involves you. 


We do have one -- we have several items for the 


Board to consider. One of them specifically is 


to task the Board's contractor with specific 


work under Task Order III, which is the 


procedures review. If you remember yesterday 


we looked at information under the task in your 

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book that says procedures review, and we have 


John's fine work product that looks at all the 


procedures that are on the web site as of a 


certain date that have not been reviewed. What 


we asked John to do yesterday was to go through 


and mark off those procedures that have been 


reviewed by SC&A through other than the 


procedures review task. This could be in dose 


reconstructions or site profile. And I think 


he's prepared to report to us on what they are. 


I've also asked John, in anticipation of a 


discussion with the Board, to bring forward any 


recommendations SC&A would like to bring 


forward as to procedures that are here that 


SC&A would recommend that the Board task them 


with the review of. So we could start to 


accept some information from John on that 


aspect of the business. It's something we'll 


have to do tomorrow, so if we can do some of it 


now --


 DR. ZIEMER: Get started --


 DR. WADE: -- it's in our interest. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. John, you -- you are 


prepared then to indicate which of these items 


-- this is in tab -- I think it's tab three, 

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procedures review -- which of these you in 


essence have sort of reviewed -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes, yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- already, and then we also were 


going to add to this I think some of the TIBs ­

-


 DR. WADE: TIB-52. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- TIB-52 to be added, at least to 


the list. 


 DR. WADE: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And were there any other TIBs to 


be added to the list -- or you'll -- you -- 


DR. MAURO: 38. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. So if you're prepared to do 


that, let us proceed. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. There are -- this was 


prepared in June, and my -- I suspect, haven't 


checked it -- there's probably additional 


procedures that are there now over and above, 


so this is a good point of departure to start 


the process of selection. And what I would say 


is out of the 53 that are here, seven have 


already been effectively reviewed as a result 


of primarily the SEC and site profile review 


process. Let me first point out -- and so -- 

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so for all intents and purposes, when you folks 


pick the 30 that you'd like us to review, you 


don't have to worry about the seven I'm going 


to give you. So you'll get -- you're really 


going to get a review of 37 since we would -- 


we'll roll them into the product so that it's 


all in one place, but for -- it's the -- the 


seven are effectively done, except for some 


mop-up, perhaps, and so -- all right, let -- 


going down the left-hand column you'll see 


toward the bottom there's an ORAUT-OTIB-34. 


That has to do with the coworker model for X10. That's done. 


Going a little further down to the very last 


one on that page is OTIB-37, has to do with 


coworker for Paducah. That's, as a matter of 


fact, almost done. We're in the process of 


delivering to you our site profile review for 


Paducah, and that's part and parcel of that 


work product, so that's done. 


We've added in one that's not on this list, and 


you may want to just write this down at the 


bottom of that first page, below the OTIB-37. 


You may want to write down OTIB-21, which deals 


with X-10 external coworker procedures. That's 

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not on this list, but it's done. 


Let -- and now we'll flip to the next page. 


Toward the top you will see OTIB-47 dealing 


with Y-12 -- done. Right below that, OTIB-50, 


a Rocky Flats neutron OTIB -- done. 51, 


dealing with Y-12 NTA film -- done. You move 


toward the center of that page you'll see an 


OTIB-58 dealing with external coworker, our 


review work on that is very much part of the 


work we're involved in so that review is, for 


all intents and purposes, done. We have our 


position and our opinions on it and it's 


certainly a matter of discussion that's ongoing 


as part of the closeout process related to 


Rocky, but our review is -- is completed. And 


certainly that review and our commentary on it 


can be incorporated into a work product. But 


bear in mind of course that the outcome of all 


of this, how all of the issues that we may 


raise, that's also in process. But 


nevertheless, what we would do is deliver the 


product that -- as part of the eventual 


deliverable, which would be on that subject but 


we would make certain statements in the work 


product that perhaps some of the issues that 

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we've identified are either in the process of 


being addressed or have been addressed because 


there are a lot, it's real time. 


Let's go on, let's see, to the very last page. 


There's nothing on the last page that -- that 


that -- we've done, so that's your list and 


that should be a total of -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: That -- that is seven items, 


right. 


DR. MAURO: -- seven, those are seven. Now I'd 


like to go back to the beginning. What I did 


was -- and this was purely a judgment call that 


we made related to the ones we feel would 


probably be good ones to review that we haven't 


reviewed. So again let's start from the -- the 


first page, at the top. There -- sort of the 


fourth one down, so it's OCAS-PER-003. This 


has to do with Bethlehem Steel ingestion -- 


heard a lot about that over the last couple of 


days that that's in place; probably a good idea 


to take a look at that. We recommend OCAS-PER3. 


The one right below that is OCAS-PER-4. This 


is dealing with photofluorography at Pinellas. 


We -- we did not review that document as part 

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of our deliverable on Pinellas, which you folks 


have just received. Should be -- we should 


take a look at that, should be pretty easy to 


do, but we recommend it be done. 


Going a little further down, just below you'll 


see TIB-13 dealing with external exposure, 


Mallinckrodt. It's a -- we would recommend 


taking a look at that. 


A little further down you'll see OTIB number 6. 


We've reviewed 6, but it's been revised and 


we're recommending that we take a look at that 


particular -- it has to do with diagnostic 


medical X-rays. The procedure has been 


revised, probably a good idea to take a look to 


see if anything has changed substantively from 


the previous one, probably pretty easy to do. 


 Recommend the one just below that dealing with 


Bonner survey procedures for neutron dosimetry, 


that's OTIB number 9; probably ought to get a 


look at that. 


The one below that, OTIB-13, it's a Y-12­

related procedure that has not been reviewed, 


probably should look at that. 


 OTIB-15 having to do with Bayesian 


methodologies, again related to Y-12, we 

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recommend that one. 


Also O-- right below that, 26, OTIB-26, a K-25 


external coworker -- by the way, we believe all 


the procedures that are coming out, OTIBs, the 


coworker models are probably the ones that are 


right up there as the highest priority, how to 


-- because in the end, it's the coworker models 


that create the vehicle for dose reconstruction 


when you don't have data or you're missing 


data, so we -- we give that the highest 


priority. 


 Let's keep going down. A little below that 


you'll see OTIB-35, coworker, K-25. We 


recommend that. 


Just below that, OTIB-36, this is another 


coworker model, Portsmouth. 


Flip -- next page, the very top one, OTIB-39, 


coworker, Hanford. 


Just below that, OTIB-40, another external 


coworker, Portsmouth. 


Go down a little further you will see a OTIB 


number 55. It has to do with neutron dosimetry 


and NCRP report number 38. I just looked at 


that. It seemed to be pretty interesting. 
I 


would say I'd like to take a look at that. 

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And the one below that, again it's a -- it's a 


Y-12, OTIB number 57 related to Y-12. We 


recommend that. 


Next to -- the very end, the very last page 


now, almost done, PROC -- these are procedures, 


these are more generic. You notice the ones 


before are more site-specific. These are more 


generic. Very first PROC-59. 


The next one, PROC-60, we've reviewed, but it's 


a revision. We'd probably take another look at 


that. We recommend that. 


There's a -- a one a little further down called 


PROC-86, a comp-- dealing with complex internal 


dosimetry claims. That struck us as something 


of great interest. 


And then there -- at the very bottom there are 


three, PROC-94, 95 and 97. We feel that all of 


tho-- those three should be looked at. 


Then on top of that of course we have the one 


we mentioned earlier, namely adding in OTIB-52 


that we talked about earlier today, and we have 


been talking a lot about OTIB-38 as part of the 


Rocky process and we recommend -- since that -- 


that's not on this list, that you add that. 


If you count all of the ones that I just 

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recommended, it's in the 20s, low 20s I believe 


 DR. WADE: Twenty-two. 


DR. MAURO: -- 22, so what I'm saying is -- so 


there's 22. Our proposal to you folks that has 


been approved is for 30, so there are eight 


more that could be added in, gives us a little 


leeway. When we take a look at the latest 


list, the ones that are over and above the ones 


we just went over, probably could take a look 


at that and see if there are additional ones 


there that might be worth looking at and we 


could add an additional eight and then fill up 


the pipeline, but that's our recommendations 


and we're looking to you for guidance. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, John. Maybe a question 


here and -- Wanda has a question and then Mark. 


 MS. MUNN: John, the two that you suggested 


which are new versions of -- 


DR. MAURO: Yes. 


 MS. MUNN: -- procedures that you've already 


reviewed, I had made the assumption -- perhaps 


erroneously -- that the revisions had been 


based on your earlier review. And is that an 

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erroneous assumption? 


DR. MAURO: Don't know. We'd look -- my -- I 


suspect that we'd look at it and very quickly 


know the answer to that. We haven't done that. 


Now it may turn out the level of effort to put 


that to bed would be very easy, but I don't 


have an answer to that. 


 MS. MUNN: And I guess one of the reasons I 


bring that up is because I think this kind of 


bears on our -- our cross-cutting issue of how 


we follow up on previous work that we have 


suggested. When it's done, how do we know that 


it's done. And I know we're going to talk 


about that tomorrow, but this I think just -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: And some of the earlier ones -- 


 MS. MUNN: -- the point --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we know are no longer used, in 


any event, the ones that were in the first 


round of reviews. But it would be helpful to ­

- to sort of know the answer to that. I don't 


know if that's something that NIOSH could 


readily answer. You know, on the first round 


of reviews, which of the procedures are simply 


no longer used so it's a -- doesn't matter 


whether there was a critique for changing or 

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not; they're simply not used. Which ones did 


what Wanda described and resulted in the 


revision, the revision simply incorporates 


suggestions. Is that something we could get 


ahold of readily, Larry or --


 MR. GRIFFON: I think some of that --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- or Stu? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, Stu might be able to answer 


better, but I think some of that we tried to 


capture in our matrix, that -- you know, if it 


was a --


 DR. ZIEMER: What the follow-up would be. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, what the follow-up would 


be, and if it was -- that's one -- you know, 


one procedure was no longer used was replaced 


by this procedure --


 DR. ZIEMER: Maybe the matrix already answers 


that. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I haven't been following the 


selection of procedures carefully, but 


certainly the -- the matrices for both the 


original procedure review, while you're talking 


about reviewing revised versions of procedures, 


so the -- the matrix would say whether this is 

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being revised or not so it should be able to 


say whether this revision that is now subject 


to review incorporated what we said we would do 


in response to that. 


 MS. MUNN: Yeah, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Larry, additional 


comment? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Let me answer this a little 


differently. I heard the question to be the 


ones that have already been reviewed and then 


revised, has that revision taken place because 


of the review comment. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, that was the question. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I'll answer your question -- it's 


probably a duke's mixture. Okay? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: It's -- and if you look on all of 


our documents, we have a document control 


system and they -- like the second page of that 


-- any document shows what changes have been 


made, what revisions and why those revisions 


have been made. We have to go in and look at 


each one of those and hope that we have 


captured completely and accurately all of the 


reasons for why a document was revised. In 

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some instances I hope we would see that it was 


as an outcome of the Board's review findings. 


In other cases it may be simply that we've 


identified new information -- 


 MS. MUNN: Better --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- we've made a policy change or 


something of that sort, but yes, that's there. 


It would take us a little bit of time to pull 


it all together. 


 DR. ZIEMER: But the -- an SC&A review actually 


would very quickly answer that on -- 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- any particular one. They could 


look at it and say oh, okay, here's the 


revision, it's what we recommended, there it 


is, fine and --


 MR. ELLIOTT: Yeah, I hope we've done a good 


job of capturing that in our document control ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- revision sheet. But perhaps 


if we haven't, reading the document would 


answer the question. 


 DR. WADE: Sure. 


DR. MAURO: Like to point out, on the last set 

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of 30 that we delivered, you may recall we had 


an introductory paragraph that said listen, you 


know, when we originally laid out -- we go back 


in time a year and identified the set that 


you'd like us to review, what happened is -- I 


mean once we got into the process, we recognize 


and you start to read it, you say you know 


what, this is weird, this really is something 


that we probably are wasting our time. This is 


not an important one for us to review, here's 


why. By the way, here's another one that we 


probably should have put in that we would 


suggest replace. So what I would say is that 


we fill the pipeline up as best we can using 


the best judgment we have with the information 


we have before us now to say here's the 30 we 


would like you to look at. SC&A dives in, 


starts to work on it. My guess is we're going 


to find out that several of these we can review 


in about ten minutes or -- and we'd let you 


know that listen, everything is fine, this 


review has been made. If you'd like, we could 


add others. We would recommend to you others 


that -- to replace. So I'd like to keep this 


as an iterative, ongoing dialogue and not like 

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freeze it. You know, freeze it in time, here's 


your list, boom, we have to do that. We'll 


keep talking to each other as we move through 


the process. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Uh-huh, Mark. 

 MR. GRIFFON: John -- Go ahead, Larry, I'm 

sorry. 

 MR. ELLIOTT: I'd like to augment my answer a 

little bit, and that would be to say to you 


that -- keep in mind that when SC&A did their 


first round of review on some of these 


documents, we were already in the process of 


revising some documents. And so, you know, 


it's my direction to staff that we attend to 


those issues as they've been raised, even 


though we were already under a revision of the 


document, so there may be that going on here, 


too. This is a very dynamic situation and so I 


hope we can find -- figure this out. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Actually I'm now looking at the 


matrix itself and I see, for example, there 


were -- here -- there's several. For example, 


it says Board recommendation recommend NIOSH 


modify procedure. Also there's a priority on 


different ones. And then the program action, 

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it gives in many cases the revisions -- or not 


-- not the actual revisions, but the fact that 


that --


 MR. GRIFFON: That was the action. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- that was the action that would 


be taken. And so the matrix can also be laid 


side by side with these and -- and we can use 


that as a tracking tool. Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just -- just a couple questions 


on the -- on the list. I've talked to John 


off-line on this and I -- I just question it 


and I think we should leave it open and make 


sure we have the universe of procedures here 


and -- and I'm not sure -- I think -- I mean 


does -- I guess it would be helpful to me to 


have the entire list, including from the first 


round of procedures review, not -- you know, so 


that we can see completed, completed, and then 


I'd like to ask NIOSH is that the universe of 


procedures that exist up to this point. That's 


one question. 


The second part -- or -- or one statement. The 


second part is does -- does this include work 


book reviews. I know we had a lengthy 


discussion on we need to get into the work book 

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review stuff. 


DR. MAURO: One of the new -- in our proposal 


of work we -- recognizing that the work books 


are part and parcel to OTIBs, to other 


procedures, PROCs as appropriate, to site 


profiles, so you'll -- you'll probably notice 


if you look at our proposal of work which has 


been approved, all the work books are an 


integral part of the review, as if it's part of 


the review of the procedures, so it's -- so 


that's why you don't see in any of our new 


proposals a separate deliverable called work 


books, because we don't see it that way any 


longer. We see that as part of it. All right? 


And as far as your question, certainly we can 


very easily get back together with Kathy and 


Hans, download the latest version, go through 


this again --


 MR. GRIFFON: For instance, just -- just -- 


DR. MAURO: -- and get back to you. 


 MR. GRIFFON: -- as a point, I don't see the 


super S TIB on here related to Rocky, and I 


think was already published by June 6th -- or 


maybe not, but -- and then -- then there's also 


a -- a TIB on recycled uranium. I think there 

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was an older draft. I don't see that draft on 


here. There's going to be a revision, I think 


we want to wait for the revision 'cause we've 


heard that -- that they've expan-- expanded 


that OTIB quite a bit. But I -- I think we do 


need to keep an eye on --


DR. MAURO: Maybe --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- what's out there. 


DR. MAURO: Maybe we put another one of these 


out, have a conference call, do it again -- it 


shouldn't be too difficult -- to make sure 


we're current. 


 DR. WADE: Well, now let me speak to this. 


 MR. GRIFFON: But -- yeah, go ahead. 


 DR. WADE: We do want SC&A to be working on 


this task when we leave this meeting, so -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: -- I would like to see the Board 


recommend a review of some number of 


procedures. You can decide if it's 20 or ten 


or 15, and then hold the others for this more 


deliberate discussion. But without that, then 


SC&A would have to stop work on this task -- 


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. WADE: -- and we don't want that. 

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DR. MAURO: What might be helpful is if -- 


based on what I just went through, if we'd get 


some feedback right -- right now or -- yeah, 


no, this is, you know, the current version, 


probably a good one to review. Other words, 


then if there's -- I'm not sure if you folks 


are in the position to make such a judgment 


that readily, but if you are and say yeah, no, 


this is the one that's active, alive and well, 


and then it's pretty easy to make a decision, 


let's go forward or -- or if you know that in 


fact no, this is being revised, the extent to 


which we can do that in real time, that's fine, 


too. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, and we could in fact -- we 


could postpone action till tomorrow, giving -- 


giving NIOSH an opportunity to look at your 


list and tell us whether there are some of 


these that are basically no longer used anyway, 


also giving the Board members a chance to 


cogitate on your proposal and look at the 


others that were not included to see if -- 


 DR. WADE: That's fine. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- they would rather have 


something else looked at first. 

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 DR. WADE: I think regardless of that outcome, 


we hold some -- we hold some capacity in 


abeyance to allow the more complete list to be 


generated and looked at at the next conference 


call, so I think we can have our cake and eat 


it, too. 


 DR. MELIUS: Can we get a list by tomorrow, the 


up-- the updated list? 


 MR. ELLIOTT: I don't know that I can do that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: 'Cause I don't think -- not to 


sound detrimental to SC&A, but I don't think 


this is a complete list of all our procedures, 


first of all. Secondly, I'm not sure -- 


there's no Rev numbers on this list, so I'd 


have to cross-- we'd have to cross-check which 


revision we're at, and then we'd also have to 


understand where we are on the staging of a 


revision, has something -- is something going 


forward for revision or has it got through a 


revision. So --


 DR. ZIEMER: Sounds like we --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- this is not something I feel 


like I can get for you in about 24 hours. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. But we could get underway 


with at least a reduced number that could be 


modified and added to by the time of our phone 


meeting. 


 DR. WADE: But Larry, you and Stu could look at 


this candidate list of SC&A and at least say 


no, we don't think this one should be on it 


because -- and allow the Board to take some 


action tomorrow to at least start SC&A down the 


path of the next 30. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Certainly, and I don't see 


anything on this list right now that waves a 


flag in my mind, do you, Stu? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Not yet. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: Stu's still studying it. He's a 


better studier than I am. 


 DR. WADE: We have time tomorrow, so -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let me suggest then we'll take 


this under advisement and take action on it 


tomorrow, one way or the other, and we'll have 


a chance to cogitate further. Jim Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: I would just caution us to using 


up 22 or whatever it is of the 30 that they're 


allowed to do this year on a list that's not 


complete. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, it's not an all or nothing. 


Again, I think I'd suggest that the Board look 


at these, and you can prioritize them if you 


wish and if we say okay, let's take -- select 


15 or some number --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 

 DR. ZIEMER: -- and we can go from there, not a 

problem. 

 DR. WADE: Right, just -- just -- if I can just 


hear the contractual issue with John. So if 


the Board was to say here is ten, start and 


we'll, at our next phone call, augment that, 


then that would keep you working at capacity? 


 MS. BEHLING: This is Kathy Behling, can I 


interject something? 


 DR. WADE: Yes, I think so. 


 MS. BEHLING: I actually probably could put 


together a complete list tonight of all the 


documents that we have reviewed to date. When 


I was initially asked to do this I was under 


the impression that you only wanted to look at 


a list of those documents that have not been 


reviewed, and at least the initial list that I 


had provided to John I tried to include those 


procedures -- such as one that comes to my mind 

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that I always think of as an important 


procedure that has been revised and that I 


believe we should look at it also is the ORAUPROC-6, the external dose reconstruction 


procedure. We reviewed Rev. 0 of that. I 


believe there was a page change Rev and then 


there's also now a Rev. 1, and I believe on my 


list that I provided to John I did include that 


to indicate that we had reviewed the original 


but not the Rev. 1. But I can go back to that 


list and identify for you all of the documents 


that we have reviewed to date and try to 


indicate on there what the Rev number of those 


documents were and what the current Rev number 


is. And I possibly could get that to you by 


tomorrow. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, thank you. John, back to my 


question. 


DR. MAURO: Yes. I guess what I was saying is 


that what's going to happen is yes, let's say 


we start to fill the pipeline up with five, 


that would -- that -- that would be -- you 


know, whatever is -- makes as reasonable at 


this point in time that we could say, with a 


degree of confidence, that it looks like we 

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could move forward on this group, whatever 


number they are. I also would like to add that 


that doesn't mean that we're locked into that, 


either. That is, once we start those and as -- 


as we move forward, I think it's probably 


important to keep -- even if it's a limited 


number -- the dialogue active so that even then 


if we do pick even a handful to start to fill 


the pipeline up, that doesn't mean we're locked 


into that by any means. We'll let common sense 


dictate. So I don't think that, you know, 


we're trying to draw bright lines -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, the list can be modified. 


DR. MAURO: We can just change it as -- as we 


move through it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Wanda Munn. 


 MS. MUNN: Perhaps this --


UNIDENTIFIED: I think the --


 MS. MUNN: -- discussion has already -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- phone speaker needs to be put 


 MS. MUNN: -- covered any comment that I was -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hold on, Kathy. Let's hear Wanda, 


then we'll come back. 


 MS. MUNN: My original thought was thank 

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goodness we're looking at what hasn't been 


reviewed, not what has already been reviewed 


because that's so mind-boggling that it's 


impossible for some of us to get our arms 


around it. When I go back and look at the 


original matrix that we still have not really 


updated or reduced in size, it's -- it's sort 


of overwhelming. So I was going to express my 


thanks for looking at what hasn't been done 


rather than what has been done, but it seems 


that -- from the discussion here -- there are a 


number of people who want to see what has been 


done, as well. So I'm -- I have some concern 


over how to format that, given what we've done 


in the past with respect to matrices and the 


number of subtasks that occur under various of 


the entries here. I don't know that there's 


any way one can fully capture all that, but it 


might be beneficial to at least see those 


procedures and other work items that have 


already served their purpose and have 


essentially dropped off the current list. That 


might be helpful. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I think that was part of the 


intent. The other thing is that I think the 

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focus indeed is going to be on what has not 


been done; that is this new list. But insofar 


as there are revisions, we can determine 


whether those are significant and need in-depth 


reviews or they're just oh, okay, they just 


revised according to what was suggested. Those 


-- those would -- in terms of work product, are 


fairly minor. It just keeps things up to date 


on both the old and -- but this is -- this is 


looking forward pretty much, I would say. 


Now Kathy, did you have another remark? I 


guess that was Kathy. 


 MS. BEHLING: No, that was not me talking. I 


believe that was Liz, and I think that there 


were some people on the phone that cannot hear 


the Board. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Oh, we can hear now. I'm 


sorry. They're doing something with the 


microphones and (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: We can hear you, Liz, go ahead. 


MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: -- (unintelligible) get on 


the phone and they just needed to switch back. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think that's Liz. Liz, did you 


have a comment? 

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 DR. WADE: No, she was just making a comment 


about hearing. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, if there's no objection, 


we'll defer action on this item till our work 


session tomorrow. Any other comments? It's 


time for lunch, I believe. The Board has 


managed to use up the time available. Mark, 


one final comment? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just one more -- one more. I 


promise it's a short one. On -- back to the 


work book question, and really related to site 


profiles. I know it's tangential to what we're 


discussing here, but when you -- you've 


submitted us a number of site profile reviews. 


Can we assume that you reviewed associated work 


books with those site profile reviews as well 


at this point or is that -- 'cause there's all 


-- most every site profile, or the bigger 


sites, anyway, all have associated work books. 


DR. MAURO: For the site prof-- the answer is 


I've read all of the site profiles -- products 


that we put out to date, and the answer is 


probably no. The place where the work books 

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are getting reviewed is in the cases. That is, 


when we're actually auditing a case, we find 


that that's where we are reviewing the -- the 


work books 'cause we use them. So yeah. Now 


that may not be absolute. There may be a few 


times where, in the process of reviewing a site 


profile, it was necessary to look at the work 


book. But I have to tell you, I don't recall 


any of them that I -- you know, I read them all 


-- where the work book was part of the review 


of the site profile. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, John, I guess the question 


might be do we have some way of confirming, for 


example, that all work books have been or are 


being or will be reviewed? 


 MS. BEHLING: This is Kathy Behling. I can 


answer that question. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Kathy. 


 MS. BEHLING: Okay. We are in the process at 


the moment of reviewing a list of work books 


that have been approved by the Board, and many 


of those are site-specific work books, such as 


Savannah River Site and the Hanford site. 


We're looking at both the min/max type of work 


books and also best estimate work books, and 

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that is a deliverable that we are intending to 


give to you within hopefully about a month from 


now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I didn't quite understand 


the statement about work books that have been 


approved by the Board. 


 MS. BEHLING: I believe that during -- there 


was (unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: (Unintelligible) missed this. 


 MS. BEHLING: -- Task III had a listing of work 


books --


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, oh, a list --


 MS. BEHLING: -- and we reiterated that in the 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I underst--


 MS. BEHLING: -- progress report a few months 


ago because I went through the list of work 


books that we were reviewing and I realized 


that in some cases -- again, John had indicated 


it -- it didn't make sense to review some work 


books and there were other work books that we 


thought we should review, and we revised that 


list, and I was under the impression that that 


was a Board-approved list. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, I understand, but I thought 

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you were referring to the idea that we had 


reviewed or approved some work books, but it's 


the list that you're talking about. 


DR. MAURO: The process, if you recall, is our 


proposals contained lists of work books. We 

had one for Task I and one for Task III. We're 

doing that -- that list, but the list is 

morphing as we move through it. As I said 


before, we -- we've learned, and as Kathy 


described, basically we have two activities 


going on right now. One is what we call the 


site-specific work book review -- work product, 


which is well along. And the other one, which 


is not well along, is the generic. And these 


are work products that are going to be standalone products that you will be receiving in 


the next month. 


However, in moving into this new -- next -- you 


know, the -- these procedures, you know, that 


we just talked about, imbedded in some of those 


there's no doubt there's a work book, and the 


work book review will be part and parcel of 


that, as opposed to the way it is now where we 


have a whole separate work product that's going 


to be just work books. I think it makes more 

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sense to marry the work book with the procedure 


that is sort of linked to it, so we changed our 


mode of operation a bit in moving into this 


next fiscal year. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Okay, let's 


recess for lunch and we'll return at 1:30. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 12:20 p.m. 


to 1:40 p.m.) 


OAK RIDGE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR STUDIES (ORINS)
 

SEC PETITION
 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. We're 


going to call the afternoon session to order. 


The first item on our agenda this afternoon is 


the SEC petition for Oak Ridge Institute of 


Nuclear Studies. The presentation from NIOSH 


will be made by LaVon Rutherford, then we'll 


have an opportunity to hear from the 


petitioners. I believe that Susan Atkinson may 


be on the phone; we should perhaps check. 


Susan, are you on the phone? 


MS. ATKINSON: Yes, and my brothers, George and 


Paul. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, and we'll 


have an opportunity to hear from you. 


 Before LaVon starts, I've been informed that 


Cindy Blackston is with us this afternoon. 

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Cindy's back there. She's with the majority 


staff of the House Judiciary Committee. 


Welcome, Cindy. 


 MS. BLACKSTON: Hi. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And we'll now hear from LaVon 


Rutherford. LaVon, if you'll proceed. 


 DR. WADE: Maybe we can just get a sense if 


Mike is on the phone. Mike Gibson, are you 


with us? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Still there, Mike? 


 MR. GIBSON: Lew, I'm here. 


 DR. WADE: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


NIOSH PRESENTATION


 MR. RUTHERFORD: All right. Thank you, Dr. 


Ziemer and the rest of the Board, for giving me 


this opportunity to speak on behalf of NIOSH 


concerning the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear 


Studies SEC petition. For those of you who 


don't know me, I'm the Special Exposure Cohort 


health physics team leader for NIOSH. Let's 


see if I can operate this. 


NIOSH received a petition on May 5th, 2005. We 


immediately recognized that the Oak Ridge 


Institute of Nuclear Studies -- that this 

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petition -- our contractor, Oak Ridge 


Associated Universities, would be conflicted on 


this petition. Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear 


Studies is the predecessor name for ORAU. 


Therefore NIOSH -- we determined that we would 


conduct the evaluation internally ourselves. 


We did use ORAU team for records recovery from 


their historical files. 


We qualified the petition on October 6th, 2005, 


and we completed our evaluation on June -- or 


actually July 20th of 2006. We actually 


finalized the report July 20th, 2006. We did 


not issue the report until August 18th of 2006. 


That was because we were in conversation with 


Department of Labor concerning issues with Oak 


Ridge Hospital and the Oak Ridge Cancer 


Research facility -- or Cancer Research 


Hospital, two separate facilities. 


 The petition was submitted to NIOSH for a given 


class -- a -- on behalf of a class of employees 


at the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies. 


The initial class definition was "All Medical 


Division employees that worked at the Oak Ridge 


Institute of Nuclear Studies from June 1, 1950 


through June 25th, 1956." That was the class 

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definition provided by the petitioner that 


qualified the petition for evaluation. 


There are 11 claims in our NIOSH claims 


tracking system that currently fall -- that -- 


that fall within that class definition. Now 


recognize, though, that the Department of Labor 


makes that final determination on individuals, 


whether they qualify for a given class or not. 


A little history here. Oak Ridge Institute of 


Nuclear Studies Cancer Research Hospital, which 


was a -- one single part of ORINS, it was not 


the whole thing -- the Cancer Research Hospital 


-- radiological operations began in 1950 and -- 


and pretty much stopped in the mid-1970s. 


Their primary function was the exploration of 


the use of radioisotopes in the field of 


medicine, cancer research. They used a -- 


there was a number of cancer therapies and such 


that started at this facility or were 


progressed at this facility. Thyroid treatment 


-- thyroid cancers were treated with 


radioiodine at this facility at various levels. 


They used gallium-67, gallium-72 for bone 


cancer treatment. They used gold-198 and other 


-- and numerous other isotopes from ingest-- or 

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for ingestion type applications of these 


radioisotopes. 


They also had teletherapy units, cobalt-60, 


cesium-137 teletherapy units at the facility. 


So there was a number of different applications 


they had there. 


Okay, when we look at this facility, this 


facility is not a typical weapons complex 


facility. This is a cancer research hospital, 


so it was definitely something that we hadn't 


seen in our -- in our earlier studies of all 


these other facilities, so we looked at a 


number of different documents and a number of 


different sources of information to find out 


about the Cancer Research Hospital itself, and 


about, you know, potential exposures to medical 


personnel in this type of environment. 


We looked at the existing ORAU TIBs, which as 


you can imagine, there's little information to 


support this -- this type of application. We ­

- we interviewed ORINS staff -- former staff 


members from the class period. We actually 


talked to two research scientists, two health 


physicists and a nurse that are -- we were able 


to find through various sources and -- and 

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discussed, you know, potential exposure 


scenarios, anything that might support us in 


our evaluation. 


We looked at case files that -- that fit -- fit 


within the class definition in our NIOSH 


database. 


We looked at our site research database. We 


were -- we were able to retrieve a number of 


documents in the site research database -- 


annual reports, early memos, different surveys, 


some internal -- some external monitoring data 


for the class period. So we were able to 


recover a number of things in our site research 


database. 


We also reviewed our doc-- the documents and 


affidavits submit-- submitted by the 


petitioner. 


We looked at document-- we actually contacted 


ORAU down at Oak Ridge and asked for a number 


of documents. We went through -- we asked for, 


you know, internal/external monitoring data 


they may have records, source term information, 


any type of information they -- may support our 


evaluation of -- of this petition. 


And then we also went out to the PubMed 

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database, which is a source of the U.S. 


National Library of Medicine, and -- and we 


went to PubMed database to look for reports or 


-- reports that -- that would give us 


indications of potential medical -- or 


potential exposures to medical staff in this 


type of environment dealing with these 


radioisotopes for cancer therapy. We were able 


to recover a number of documents to support the 


evaluation from there. 


 I'm talking about occupational exposures. The 


external exposures, you know, were well-


documented. They actually used film badges 


from the very beginning. They had high gamma 


emitters that -- that -- both internally 


through ingestion, where they ingested gallium67 and 72 into the patients would -- so these ­

- you know, high gamma emitters there. They 


also had other -- you know, numerous isotopes 


that they dealt with during the period. They 


had a cobalt-60 teletherapy unit that provided 


external dose to -- directly to the patients 


that potentially exposed workers, as well as a 


cesium tele-- teletherapy unit. 


There was a report issued by Dr. Brucer* in 

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1951 -- he was the medical director of the 


ORINS facility at that time. He actually went 


through and they studied their exposures over a 


three-month period to not only the physicians 


and research scientists, but all the way down 


to the administrative staff. This is a fairly 


small facility, 30-bed -- basically 30-bed 


hospital, three-story, pretty small facility at 


the time. They actually looked at all those 


exposures over that three-month period, 


documented those exposures in the report. 


They also went in and they looked at surgical 


procedures where they went in and they, you 


know, worked on cancerous organs that had been 


ingested -- injected with radioisotopes, and 


they looked at exposures to the physicians, the 


physician's assistant and the anesthesiologist. 


So we have a number of -- of different sources 


of information when it comes to the external 


exposures from these years. 


 Internal exposures -- when we initially looked 


at this, we looked at the memos and reports, 


and we talked to those former ORINS staff 


members. The initial feeling by -- by them, 


and you could read through the reports, was 

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that they felt there was a little potential for 


internal exposure. And I think they felt this 


because of the -- you know, the short halflifes (sic) of the -- most of the isotopes, and 


I say most of the isotopes, they were dealing 


with at that time, therefore it wouldn't be 


around long. As well as most of it was in a 


liquid form and so potential for airborne was 


limited. 


However, in our review of those documents, we 


also recognized some internal exposures that 


were not as apparent I guess to the staff at 


that time. And we also, in our review, looked 


at a number of reports from the PubMed database 


which identified, you know, potential exposure 


scenarios that were clearly not looked at 


during that time period. For example, thyroid 


cancer with the radioiodine treatment, and 


radioiodine is very volatile and a -- a -- a 


certain percentage of -- some estimates of one 


to two percent of the actual source will come 


out of solution and can become airborne with 


that potential exposure scenario, so that's 


just one example of it. 


We looked at -- we determined that -- that 

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there were other isotopes that could as well, 


you know, present the same internal exposure 


issues. So we -- you know, we see the issue as 


during the prep-- preparation and 


administration of radioactive medicines, 


disposal of waste, and spills. Spills were 


mentioned through numerous reports. One of the 


initial reports in 1951, it was actually an 


external exposure discussion, but in that 


discussion associated problems that were 


mentioned were potential spills or spills that 


were occurring, and actually contaminated food 


utensils, spoon and fork, that were noticed in 


the cafeteria at the time, as well as they were 


mentioned -- that the facility was not support 


-- or not -- was not designed enough to handle 


the large volumes of biological waste that they 


were -- they were actually receiving at the 


time. So there were numerous -- we felt that 


there -- these were the primary means of a 


potential internal exposure. 


All right, availability of data. External 


dosimetry data, we had -- well, 11 applica-- or 


the 11 claimants we have, eight of those we 


have external data. All right? And we 

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actually contacted ORAU to see if they actually 


had a database for workers that worked during 


the class period. We were -- we were able to 


retri-- retrieve the database from ORAU that 


actually lays out the individuals that worked 


during the time period, their dose for every 


year through the class period. In addition we 


have memos and reports that identify dose 


rates, doses to individuals -- as I mentioned, 


physicians and assistants and administrative 


staff through -- through the process and it -- 


it -- for different applications. 


 Internal monitoring data, we had no internal 


monitoring data prior to 1964. We have -- in 


1964 the whole body counter went into 


operation. In addition, we also have more 


detailed source term information in 1964. We 


actually have packages, the actual -- you know, 


where they've laid out the doses -- or the 


sources for a given application to an 


individual that we can use to -- for -- after 


1964, but prior to 1964 we have no internal 


monitoring data. This is -- but -- you know, 


with the exception of the source term 


information we have in a few given years. 

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All right, our evaluation process we were doing 


is we look for is it feasible to estimate the 


levels of radiation dose for a given class, and 


is it feasible with sufficient accuracy. And 


our second test, is there a likelihood that 


these individuals that -- that meet the class 


were endangered from their potential exposures. 


NIOSH found that the availability of records, 


process and source term information were 


insufficient for us to do dose reconstructions 


for the proposed class of employees. We --


NIOSH currently lacks information that would 


support internal -- developing an internal dose 


model. NIOSH found that the available external 


data, through our external monitoring data from 


badge data, our process information and source 


term information, were sufficient for us to 


actually reconstruct the external -- 


occupational external dose, including medical 


X-rays. 


Again, NIOSH has determined that it's not 


feasible to estimate the dose with sufficient 


accuracy for -- internal dose with suffi-- 


sufficient accuracy for the covered class, and 


there's evidence that individuals that worked 

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within the covered class could have been ex-- 


could have received internal exposures from 


working with the medicines con-- containing 


radioisotopes. 


 Our proposed class -- and I'll let you read 


that, but we -- we've set our proposed class 


for these dates for given reasons, May 15th, 


1950 through December 31st, 1963. May 15th, 


1950 was the date when the first cancer 


patient, who was a thyroid cancer patient, was 


taken into the si-- taken into the hospital, 


their first operations. December 31st, 1963 


coincides -- we actually had a short period in 


1963 where we did have a little bit more whole 


body monitoring data, but the actual source -- 


source term applications become much better 


early in 1964 where we felt we could cut it off 


in 1964. 


(Pause) 


 DR. WADE: Take your time, take your time. We 


get paid by the hour. 


(Pause) 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: All right. I want to point 


out that this -- the actual handouts that you 


received are incorrect. I think that everyone 

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-- the Board members and out here, they are 


incorrect. The actual internal at the top 


should be as indicated on this -- up here on 


the presentation. We determined we cannot 


reconstruct the internal dose for the class, 


but we can reconstruct the external beta/gamma 


and the occupational medical X-rays. And 


that's it. 


PETITIONER PRESENTATION


 DR. ZIEMER: Before we have discussion we want 


to hear from the petitioner -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah, this is George 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- so let's --


UNIDENTIFIED: -- (unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: -- (unintelligible) Susan 


Atkinson. Susan, if you're on the phone, why ­

-


UNIDENTIFIED: First of all, I want to thank 


NIOSH for clearing up finally that -- 


 DR. WADE: Who's speaking, please? 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- Oak Ridge National Laboratory 


or X-10 and ORINS are -- 


 DR. WADE: Who's speaking? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Who's speaking, please? 

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 DR. WADE: Could you wait just a minute -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- (unintelligible) --


 DR. WADE: -- and then start again from the 


beginning, please? 


UNIDENTIFIED: -- difficulty in getting people 


to understand that. Secondly, we really don't 


have anything to add, but I would -- 


 DR. WADE: Might I ask the speaker to stop for 


a minute and start at the beginning. Because 


of the sound system here, we have a bit of a 


technical task we need to do before you begin, 


so if you would count to five and then begin 


from the beginning, we would appreciate that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And identify yourself. 


 DR. WADE: Right, start by identifying 


yourself. Thank you. 


 MR. ELDRIDGE: My name is George Eldridge. I'm 


speaking on behalf of myself, my brother Paul 


Eldridge and my sister, Ms. Susan Atkinson. 


don't have a great deal to add. I would like 


to first thank NIOSH for finally clearing up 


the fact that the X-10 facility, or Oak Ridge 


National Laboratory as it's known, and the 


ORINS Cancer Hospital are indeed two separate 


facilities. We've undergone a long period of 


I 
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time trying to get people to understand that 


those were -- were not one and the same 


facility. 


Secondly, I would like to take a moment to 


thank Mr. Rutherford for his diligence in 


preparing this report, and the Advisory Board 


for taking this petition under consideration. 


And with that, again, I have nothing further to 


add at this time. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much, Mr. 


Eldridge. 


BOARD DISCUSSION
 

Let me open the floor now for discussion, and 


perhaps I'll begin. I'd like to ask LaVon if 


you would go back to the mike, I have a couple 


of questions. Number one, I noticed in the 


list of treatment nuclides they were using 


radium at that time. Is there any evidence 


there were leak tests done of the radium 


sources? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, there was none. We 


actually have records of -- of -- actually when 


they started leak testing other sources was in 


the cobalt-60 teletherapy unit when they 


actually had a leak in that teletherapy unit, 

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and I believe it was 1956 -- my report 


identifies that -- but that's when they started 


looking at other sources. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, because leaking radium 


sources were very common during that period of 


time, and we almost have to assume they were 


using leakers if we have no evidence from leak 


tests otherwise. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: There's no evidence of leak 


tests. 


 DR. ZIEMER: On the radioiodine, there 


certainly -- there must be information on the 


amounts of iodine used for those therapy 


treatments? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Actually there is, and when -- 


I discussed it in the later years, and when we 


talked to a couple of the research scientists 


and we talked to the health physicists, they 


indicated that there might be records available 


but -- for those early years. But we've been 


unable to get those records at all. We did get 


records for later years, starting in 19-- 


around 1964. We also have source term da-- 


some source term data, if you look in the 


report, from a few of the years. We actually 

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looked at that source term data, it was annual 


data, to see if we could come up with a 


reasonable estimate of the internal dose. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Source term data in terms of the 


inventories? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yeah, they were -- they were 


inventories, purely. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. So --


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess finish that though, 


'cause... 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, what we looked at was we 


actually looked at the -- can we use, for those 


few years that we had of annual source term 


data, can we develop an internal exposure model 


that we could use to bound that exposure. The 


problem we got into, if you look at one to -- 


one to two percent of the radioiodine becoming 


airborne, when we take that of that annual 


amount that they used, that's -- it -- it 


presents a pretty significant internal exposure 


to the thyroid. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Also in that connection, is 


there any indication that use of hoods is 


associated with the preparation of the -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We did --

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 DR. ZIEMER: -- doses? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: We did get one report that -- 


actually one of the CATIs or claimant 


interviews that we reviewed, when we looked at 


their data, they said -- indicated that -- that 


some of the medicines were prepared in a hood. 


However, there were no documents -- other 


documents that really supported that, so we 


couldn't -- we couldn't be for sure -- at least 


during the early years. It was clear during 


the later years that the hoods, you know, were 


put -- put in use. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Did you have a related question, 


Mark? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Not -- not yet. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Gen Roessler. 


DR. ROESSLER: My question has to do with 


dates, and actually before I saw your last 


slide I was going to ask you why not extend the 


period up to the time they started whole body 


counting, but I see you did. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: I did. 


DR. ROESSLER: So I guess I'm wondering why was 


the initial petition only through 1956? 


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that -- their survivor was only work from -- at 


ORINS from 1950 to 1956, so that was the -- 


that's what got them in the door, you know, for 


that initial proposed class. We accepted that 


initial proposed class of that period, and then 


in our evaluation, as we evaluated we 


determined that things didn't change after '56. 


They didn't change until 1964. 


DR. ROESSLER: And then -- so when you spoke of 


11 claimants, that's -- you had one to begin 


with and you added the other ten for those 


remaining years? I'm trying to get a feeling 


for how many claimants there might possibly be 


in this petition. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, I think if you look at ­

- right now we have 11 claimants that fit the 


class definition, total. Okay? The final 


class definition, which is up to 1965 -- 1950 


to 1964. We have 11 that we've determined. 


Again, Department of Labor makes that final 


determination. 


Now if you look at the database of the number 


of individuals that worked at the facility -- 


and there's -- one of the tables in the report, 


you know, you're looking at 50 to 60 people per 

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year that were working, and I'm sure there were 


turnover -- you know, during that time period, 


and I'm -- if I remember correctly, 50 to 60 


people. So it's not a large population that 


worked at the -- and it was a pretty small 


facility, really. 


DR. ROESSLER: And then it got me thinking 


about whole body counting when I read your 


report and thinking they didn't start with 


their whole body counter until '64. And I did 


a lot of whole body counting. I didn't start 


until '65, but I was kind of late in getting 


into my career. I'm just trying to think on a 


general basis, when did whole body counters 


really become available at any of these 


facilities for doing these -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: If you look at --


DR. ROESSLER: -- (unintelligible)? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: -- if you look at the 


chronology at the facility and -- in -- in -- I 


think it's Section 4 of the report, it's one of 


the sections, you'll actually go through and 


you can see where they started designing their 


whole body counter in like 1956. They 


initially started the steps of -- of working -- 

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so you -- as -- which is pretty consistent with 


what you're saying, so they started their 


design preparation, working on what detectors 


they were going to use, their setup, and each 


year it grew until they -- they actually built 


it in, you know, 1962/'63 time period and put 


it in operation in '64. 


DR. ROESSLER: So is that kind of consistent 


with what would be available at other 


facilities? You wouldn't expect whole body 


counts anywhere, really -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Los Alamos --


DR. ROESSLER: -- (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- was using liquid scintillation 


whole body counters in the mid-'50s. Wright 


Langham* and Ernie Anderson and those folks, 


the large --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- liquid scintillation counters, 


so I think that was -- now if you're talking 


about the crystal -- the (unintelligible) -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: (Unintelligible) 


DR. ROESSLER: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- (unintelligible), those were 


probably after 1960, roughly. 

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166

 MR. RUTHERFORD: And their initial use for this 


was not occupational purposes. Their initial 


use for this was to actually look at 


individuals and see if they could -- that -- 


patients that they would -- they could survey ­

- do whole body counts on patients, you know, 


the actual -- they recognized after -- later on 


that hey, we can use this for occupational 


exposures as well. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Other questions or comments? I 


noticed that some dose reconstructions have 


been done for maybe half a dozen folks -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- out of this group. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Will tho-- and those obviously 


were external. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Did -- are those cases where there 


was no -- determined that there was no 


internal, or the external was simply great 


enough to make --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, a number of the cases 


were -- were compensation cases, you know, that 

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 DR. ZIEMER: So you didn't need the internal, 


you --


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right, right, right. And --


 DR. ZIEMER: You did the underestimate 


efficiency process. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right, exactly. Exactly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Any other questions on 


this? Or comments? 


 (No responses) 


BOARD DECISION
 

Board members, this comes as a recommendation 


from NIOSH. We must make a separate 


recommendation to the Secretary on this 


petition, and so I ask the Board, based on what 


you've heard, do you have sufficient 


information to take action or is there 


additional information that the Board wishes to 


pursue? If you're -- if you believe you have 


enough information to take action, the Chair 


would entertain a motion -- one way or the 


other. 


Wanda is getting ready to ask -- or make a 


remark. 


 MS. MUNN: Just wanted to make a comment. For 


those folks who follow nuclear medicine, it is 

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amazing to observe how much progress this small 


number of people made in this period of time, 


and what a debt of gratitude we owe them for 


the advances that they've made possible in 


diagnosis and treatment in this field. 


I am prepared to offer a motion that we accept 


the NIOSH proposed class as stated in the 


report. 


DR. ROESSLER: Second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we've heard a motion and 


seconded, and I'm wondering if we can have a 


friendly amendment that would put the motion 


into our usual wording. And I would ask our 


wording expert, Dr. Melius, if he has the -- 


 MS. MUNN: Certainly, I'm -- I'm sure the 


wording exists already on the computer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: But before -- before you do that, 


I -- I would like to ask one additional 


question. I don't think it'll affect the 


motion, but just for clarity, although we know 


that these two entities, Oak Ridge National Lab 


and ORAU or ORINS at that time -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- are separate entities, yet 


there was a lot of interaction between them in 

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those days. I would guess that ORINS used Oak 


Ridge dosimetry, for example. 


 MS. MUNN: Sure. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Can you tell us what was going on 


at X-10 and Y-12 in the way of -- of bioassay 


during those same years, and why wouldn't ORINS 


have had bioassay? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, if you remember, Dr. 


Ziemer, the Y-12 petition where the actual 


isotopes that were developed using the 


Cyclotron -- which were the, for the most part, 


a lot of these -- these same isotopes that -- 


that the ORINS facility used, we did not have 


internal dosimetry monitoring data for those 


exotic radionuclides, so that -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: There -- there was gross alpha, 


gross beta, for example, in those days. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Sure, but -- but you're not, 


you know --


 DR. ZIEMER: Not specific. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Right, right, so -- so there 


was not -- there was no bioassay data -- okay? 


-- that was specifically used for those 


facilities at that time. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Uh-huh. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So --


 DR. WADE: Friendly amendment. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- the friendly amendment wording? 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: James Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Before I offer that, I just have a 


question for Larry -- who's not here. Maybe 


LaVon can --


 DR. ZIEMER: Hold on. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Point of information. I 


stimulated another question, was there indeed ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: Gross alpha and gross be-- I mean 


was there the gross alpha/gross beta to -- 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: You mean at ORINS? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No. 


 MR. GRIFFON: None? 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: No, none at all. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just want to clarify that. Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Proceed. 


 MR. RUTHERFORD: Just a quick -- we actually -- 

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we actually went back and even looked at the 


names under the X-10 database to see if we 


could cross any of the names that were working 


for the ORINS facility to see if we could -- if 


maybe that -- as you mentioned, that Oak Ridge 


National Lab, maybe they were doing the 


internal monitoring, so... 


 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you. 


 DR. MELIUS: Do I have to --


 MR. GRIFFON: You want to start over, Jim? 


Sorry. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Do you want to try your question to 


Stu Hinnefeld? 


 DR. MELIUS: Well, let me offer it as a motion 


and we can maybe go back to take it out. The 


question is to what extent we need to -- want 


us to specify what NIOSH can do in terms of 


dose reconstruction, and particularly regard to 


external exposures here where we -- I believe 


we can do dose reconstruction using the 


external --


 MS. MUNN: They're assuming --


 DR. MELIUS: -- data? 


 MS. MUNN: -- there's the potential for 

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internal --


 MR. HINNEFELD: Those components are specified 


in our evaluation report, and I think it may 


serve us well to have some acknowledgement in 


the Board's recommendation that if you agree 


with that part, that that's part of your 


recommendation as well, you agree with our 


determination in the evaluation report. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I believe in our past 


recommendations, as a template we have 


recognized the ability of NIOSH to do certain 


types of dose reconstructions, such as external 


only. 


 DR. MELIUS: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So if we can use one of those as 


our template. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Proceed. 

 DR. MELIUS: We'll -- got a quick change and 

I'll be able to do this. 


(Pause) 


The -- this'll be very unfamiliar language, so 


-- everyone try to stay awake. 


 The Board recommends that the following letter 


be transmitted to the Secretary of Health and 

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Human Services within 21 days. Should the 


Chair become aware of any issue that, in his 


judgment, would preclude the transmittal of 


this letter within that time period, the Board 


requests that he promptly informs the Board of 


the delay and the reasons for this delay, that 


he immediately works with NIOSH to schedule an 


emergency meeting of the Board to discuss this 


issue. 


The letter itself: The Advisory Board on 


Radiation and Worker Health, parentheses, the 


Board, close parentheses, has evaluated SEC 


Petition-00033 concerning workers at the Oak 


Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, parentheses 


ORINS, close parentheses, under the statutory 


requirements established by EEOICPA 


incorporated into 42 CFR 83.13(c)(1), 42 CFR 


Section 83.13(c)(3). The Board respectfully 


recommends that a Special Exposure Cohort be 


accorded to all employees of the DOE or DOE 


contractors or subcontractors who were 


monitored or should have been monitored while 


working at the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear 


Studies Cancer Research Hospital from May 15th, 


1950 through December 31st, 1963, and who were 

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employed for a number of work days aggregating 


at least 250 work days during the period from 


May 15th, 1950 through December 31st, 1963, or 


in combination with work days within the 


parameters established for one or more other 


classes of employees in the SEC. 


This recommendation is based on the following 


factors. 


 This facility conducted research on the use of 


various radioactive isotopes for the treatment 


of cancer. People working in this facility 


were exposed to these radioactive materials 


through a number of work activities. Although 


there was a potential for substantial internal 


exposures arising from preparing, administering 


and disposing of radioisotopes and radioactive 


waste, NIOSH found no evidence of personnel or 


workplace monitoring that could be used to 


bound internal exposure rad-- internal 


radiation exposures. 


As a result of these limitations, NIOSH cannot 


establish a maximum internal exposure scenario 


that addresses all of the internal exposure 


potential for the petitioning class and 


therefore cannot estimate internal doses for 

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this class with sufficient accuracy. The Board 


concurs with this demonstration. 


 NIOSH determined that health was endangered for 


the -- for the workers at the Oak Ridge 


Institute of Nuclear Sciences (sic) Cancer 


Research Hospital exposed to radiation at this 


facility during the time period in question. 


The Board concurs with this determination. 


The Board -- NIOSH and Board review of the data 


found it was sufficient to support accurate 


dose reconstructions for a number of important 


exposures. These include but are not 


necessarily limited to -- NIOSH demonstrated 


that sufficient monitoring records are 


available for individual dose reconstruction 


for external doses for workers at the Oak Ridge 


Institute of Nuclear Studies Cancer Research 


Hospital. 


Enclosed is supporting documentation from the 


recent Advisory Board meeting held in Las 


Vegas, Nevada where the Special Exposure Cohort 


was discussed. If any of these items aren't 


available at this time, they will follow 


shortly. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, that's the friendly 

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amendment wording. Jim, toward the very end 


you said these are -- these in-- let's see, 


these include but -- but are not limited to -- 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, well, let me reword -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- but then the next couple of 


words do not flow from that. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, yeah. No, I was quickly 


lifting something from another letter and I 


need to... 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. While he was polishing -- 


the intent is correct. While he's polishing 


that, let me ask if there are questions, 


comments on the proposed detailed wording of 


the Munn motion. 


 (No responses) 


 AUDIO-VISUAL TECHNICIAN: (Unintelligible) Mike 


Gibson (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Mike Gibson, are you still 


on the phone? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes, Paul, I am. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I just want to make sure. 


We'll take a roll call here in just a moment, 


just want to get the wording on this one set 


and clarified. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay, let me suggest the following 

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change. After the paragraph on health 


endangerment, it'll be a new paragraph calling 


-- saying "The NIOSH review of the data" -- 


okay -- then "that it was sufficient to support 


accurate dose reconstructions for individual -- 


accurate -- individual dose reconstructions for 


external doses for workers at the ORINS Cancer 


Research Hospital. The Board concurs with this 


demonstration." 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. That -- that 


reads much more smoothly. Does that also take 


care of the medical exposure, external -- 


that's all-inclusive, I think, the way your 


terminology is there. 


 DR. MELIUS: Right, yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: 'Cause you have them listed 


separately in --


 DR. MELIUS: (Unintelligible) from... 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, discussion on the motion? 

 (No responses) 

Okay, are we ready to vote on the motion? It 


appears that we're ready to vote on the motion. 


Those who favor the motion, raise your right 


hand. 


 (Affirmative responses) 

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The Chair will also vote. Okay, and I see all 


hands raised here, and Mike Gibson, your vote, 


please? 


 MR. GIBSON: Aye. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mike votes yes. There are no no’s 


then, and apparently no abstentions. The 


motion carries and the recommendation will be 


forwarded to the Secretary in accordance with 


the -- the requirements of the motion itself. 


Thank you very much. And Susan Atkinson and 


George Eldridge, you are free to report to your 


fellow petitioners and colleagues that the 


Board is recommending that the petition be 


granted. You must recognize that that does not 


at this point mean that the petition is 


granted. It simply means that this Board is 


recommending it, and that recommendation will 


go with the NIOSH recommendation to the 


Secretary, and he in turn will take action and 


it actually goes on up to Congress from there. 


Okay. 


SC&A SITE PROFILES TASK


 DR. WADE: We have some if you --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, we have a little time here 


and we have some proposed fillers. Go ahead. 

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179

 DR. WADE: To parallel our efforts this morning 


where we tried to set the stage for the Board's 


selection of procedures for SC&A to review this 


next year, I think now is the time we could use 


to set the stage for the Board to task SC&A on 


additional site profiles that it might consider 


for review next year. I -- I take you back to 


the presentation that David Staudt made to us. 


This is Task Order I under the SC&A contract. 


The proposal now -- the Task Order in place has 


SC&A reviewing six site profiles next year. 


One of them is the re-review of the Savannah 


River Site. That leaves five additional site 


profiles for SC&A to consider for review. 


 Yesterday you were given this sheet that listed 


the site profiles currently listed on the web 


site. We marked off the site profiles that had 


been reviewed by SC&A to this point. And then 


you asked for additional information to be 


brought before you for your consideration, and 


I think Stu Hinnefeld is going to approach the 


microphone and do what he can do at this point 


to provide you with that information. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, I have most of the 


information that was asked for yesterday. In 

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the first -- I think the first question was 


which of the sites on the list of published 


site profiles have a qualified SEC petition. 


And so that list is Bethlehem Steel, Blockson, 


Mallinckrodt -- which of course has already 


been recommended by the Board, Nevada Test 


Site, Los Alamos National Laboratory -- LANL, 


Rocky Flats, Y-12, Fernald, Linde Ceramics -- 


which I believe the Board has already 


recommended on, Chapman Valve, and Iowa 


Ordnance Plant -- which the Board has acted on. 


The question was asked what other qualified 


petitions are there, so the -- the qualified 


petitions, in addition to those -- these are 


from Larry's presentation yesterday -- Ames 


Laboratory, which has been acted on; Pacific 


Proving Ground, which has been acted on; Oak 


Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies, which you 


just acted on; Monsanto Chemical Company, 


General Atomics --


 DR. WADE: Say again? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- General Atomics, Harshaw 


Chemical and S-50 Thermal Diffusion Plant which 


will be presented tomorrow to the Board. 


The question was asked what site profiles are 

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181 

I 

under development, so these are site profiles 


that should be available for review -- they're 


not published yet, should be available for 


review certainly in the coming fiscal year. 


don't have a date to give you on which -- when 


any particular one will be available. And 


there's a list being prepared by Oak Ridge 


Associated Universities, and then there are a 


couple being prepared by Battelle as part of 


the AWE work that they're doing, so I'll start 


with the Battelle approach -- the Battelle 


sites. 


 The Battelle approach is to prepare generic 


TBDs for types of work -- for instance, uranium 


metal forming and handling -- and then to 


prepare appendices underneath that general -- 


or generic (unintelligible) to include specific 


information about the sites that fall into -- 


or that are categorized in that fashion. So 


the generic -- the uranium metal shaping or 


uranium metal handling is one of the generic 


TBDs, should be available forthwith, and 


there's an appendix that's been drafted and 


should be available before too long for a 


company known as American Machine and Foundry. 

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So a second generic TBD for what's referred to 


as uranium refining, it's really going to be 


uranium -- uranium chemical and purification 


processes, and that generic TB-- TBD should be 


available forthwith, and there's one appendix 


that's been drafted under that. That's for an 


Ashland Oil site. 


 MS. MUNN: National Oil? 


 DR. WADE: Say again? Ashland? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Ashland Oil, just like the oil 


company. 


 MS. MUNN: Got it. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Then on the ORAU list of sites 


that are in preparation, there's 


Clarksville/Medina -- that's two different 


sites performed similar type of work, and they 


will probably be addressed in a single site 


profile. They were weapons storage facilities. 


The Sandia National Lab, NUMEC -- that's the 


Nuclear Materials and Engineering Company; 


there are two plants in Pennsylvania, one is in 


Apollo and the other is in Parks Township, and 


one profile will probably cover both. South 


Albuquerque Works, Metals and Controls -- 


 MS. MUNN: What was that last one, Stu? 

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183

 MR. HINNEFELD: Metals and Controls, that's an 


AWE. It's in the northeast, I don't remember 


exactly where. I believe they did some uranium 


purification type work. One that is currently 


referred to as Peak Street facility, it will 


probably address two other facilities as well 


that are parts of the Knowles Atomic Power 


Laboratory that -- and they're the only parts 


of Knowles that did covered work. The rest of 


Knowles worked for the nuclear Navy that is 


excluded from the program, but these facilities 


did AEC non-nuclear Navy work and so the -- the 


other two sites I don't -- aren't on the list, 


but they're the Sacandaga site and the Special 


Separations Unit. 


 DR. WADE: Say that again, Stu. I'm sorry. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The Sacandaga -- S-a-c-a-n-d-ag-a, that's one of the two -- I think that's 


how you spell it. 


 DR. WADE: Sounds good. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: And the other I believe is 


called the Separ-- Special Separations Unit. 


 Oak Ridge Hospital, but I would warn that that 


may end up not being finally prepared because 


there are very few claims. It had made it on 

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the list before the days we sorted out the 


difference between Oak Ridge Hospital and ORINS 


and there was more interest on it, and I think 


there were so few claims from Oak Ridge 


Hospital that we may end up not doing a site 


profile but just writing -- doing the research, 


writing it in the dose reconstruction and, you 


know, describing all the research that was done 


in the -- in the dose reconstruction itself. 


Sandia National Lab at Livermore, a separate 


facility from the one in Albuquerque; West 


Valley --


 MS. MUNN: I wondered when they were going to 


show up. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- Harshaw Chemical; the 


Stanford Linear Accelerator Complex; Ames 


Laboratory, recall that the petition for Ames 


did not cover its entire operating period. It 


went up into the mid-'50s and there's 


operational periods after that, and there's 


also -- they're non-presumptives before. 


Battelle facilities in Columbus, Ohio, they're 


referred to as the King -- Jefferson Avenue 


facilities; RMI, which is -- stands for 


Reactive Metals, Incorporated, it's in 

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185 

Ashtabula, Ohio; and GE, that's General 


Electric -- you know, like GE -- Vallecitos, 


and I don't recall off-hand what they -- what 


their work was. 


I was also asked to in addition -- this has the 


total -- the -- your original list has the 


total cases per site. I was asked to provide 


the list of completed cases per site, and I 


don't have the complete information on that. 


have some. I can have a couple more in a few 


minutes, and I can have the remainder maybe by 


tomorrow. It's not all with us today -- this 


information is not with us today. So I can 


give you what I have now -- 


 DR. WADE: Why don't you do that. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Blockson Chemical -- we're on 


this -- this sheet here, working from the top 


again. Blockson Chemical, 46 are complete. 


Next one I have information on is K-25 -- oh, I 


didn't look for information on the ones that 


are crossed out where the site profile's 


already been evaluated. I just looked for the 


information on the others. But the next one I 


have information on is K-25, 908 -- say 900 are 


complete of theirs. Next one I have is 


I 
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Portsmouth, 480 are complete for Portsmouth. 


On down to Aliquippa Forge, 19 are complete at 


Aliquippa Forge. Next one I have is Pacific 


Northwest National Laboratory, 208; and Weldon 


Spring, 117; the Kansas City Plant, 179; 


Simonds Saw and Steel, 79; Superior Steel in 


Carnegie, 28 -- and that's the last value I 


have right now. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you, Stu, very much. 


 DR. MELIUS: Stu, for -- you wouldn't happen to 


have any numbers on the number of claims at 


Sandia? I'm just trying to remember that list 


you gave that aren't on our list of -- yeah, 


Albuquerque --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I think -- I think I have that 


if you'll give me a minute. 


 DR. MELIUS: I'm just trying to figure what are 


some of the bigger sites where we'd have a 


number of -- larger number of claims. I could 


be wrong. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: From Sandia we have 217 claims 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: -- 68 are complete. 


 DR. MELIUS: Okay. 

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 MR. PRESLEY: Is that Albuquerque or 


(unintelligible)? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's -- that's Albuquerque. 


 DR. MELIUS: Albuquerque. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's Albuquerque. 


 DR. MELIUS: Some of them surprise me. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I can give you Livermore, as 


well. At Sandia Livermore we have 74 claims 


and 17 are complete. 


 DR. WADE: Seventy-four claims, 17 are 


completed, Sandia National Labs at Livermore. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Sandia. 


 DR. WADE: Again I would remind the Board that 


the task at hand is to develop a list of site 


profiles that SC&A can begin to review. And 


again, in order to keep SC&A working, I would 


like to leave here with some assignment to 


them. It doesn't have to be all five, but 


certainly some assignment to them as to site 


profiles they could begin to review. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And we estimated, in terms of work 


load next year, was it five or six -- 


 DR. WADE: Six is the task, one of them will be 


a re-review of Savannah River Site, so five 


additional. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Do we have any feel for -- and 


maybe John Mauro can partially answer this, but 


it seems to me that there'd be quite a 


difference between doing K-25 and -- oh, pick 


one out here, maybe Superior Steel -- in terms 


of work load, so... 


DR. MAURO: Absolutely. In fact, I recently 


looked at the ones that you would call the 


smaller units as part of case reviews, I 


reviewed a number of AWE cases. And to do the 


review it was necessary to review what they 


call an exposure matrix, which are relatively 


small documents on the order of maybe 50 pages, 


as compared to a full-blown site profile with 


six chapters very often are well over 200 and 


extremely complex, with hundreds of references. 


So yes, the difference in the level of effort 


between some of these different facilities in 


terms of doing a site profile review is 


substantial. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. I'd like to also 


ask, and maybe, Stu, you might be able to 


answer this, but I was always under the 


impression that the Kansas City Plant -- 


certainly was always referred to as kind of a 

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non-nuclear part of the DOE family. What --


can you, in a nutshell, tell us why we have all 


these claimants from Kans-- what went on at 

Kansas City that was nuclear? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, if memory serves 

correctly, they had some uranium inventory. I 

don't even know exactly what they did -- 

 DR. ZIEMER: Really? 

 MR. HINNEFELD: -- it was uranium metal, I 

believe, and they had some sealed sources. And 

they had a -- actually a sealed source leak 

that was kind of spread around the plant before 


it was detected, so there was some period of 


time -- I think it was like promethium-147 or 


something, it's not -- you know -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, the sealed -- the sealed 


sources I could understand if they were more 


like industrial gauges. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Right. I don't -- I don't know 


exactly what the source was used for, but it -- 


okay, hang on just a second. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, that was just a matter of 


information, because again, a site like Kansas 


City, although it looks big, it may not have 


much nuclear there. I don't -- I don't know. 

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 Board members, we don't need to make a final 


decision till tomorrow, but we do want to 


gather whatever additional information you 


might need to make your decision. Wanda, you 


have a question or comment at this point? And 


then Dr. Melius. 


 MS. MUNN: No, I was just going to make a 


comment. I was under the impression that we 


were actually considering making the 


recommendation now, but you're -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: If we -- if we have the 


information, but we can delay it if we need 


more information. But we -- we certainly ask 


that we get this additional information to 


inform our decision, and if the Board is ready 


to make the decisions, we certainly can. 


 MS. MUNN: The comment was made yesterday -- 


this is repetitious -- but it would appear it 


would be wise to consider those sites with the 


largest number of claimants as being the most 


pressing for us to look at. With that thought 


in mind, having reviewed the list, working on 


that premise we come up with five fairly 


different types of facilities to observe. 


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certainly stick out right away, but that was 


part of the question I had on Kansas City. It 


looks like one of the bigger ones, but I'm not 


sure they had that much going on nuclear-wise. 


 MS. MUNN: Probably not, but five that might be 


considered, if we want to think about that 


today, is -- the obvious one's K-25, that 


almost cries out for attention. Pantex is 


quite unlike anything that we've done so far. 


PNNL is -- I mean Argonne West is, again, a 


different type of laboratory. Lawrence 


Livermore we've talked about in the past, but 


it's still outstanding and it's obviously one 


that, again, would be worthy of some 


consideration. And AI -- Atomics International 


is, again, an entirely different type of 


facility. I would propose that we might at 


least consider those five. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Are you making that as a formal 


motion, or are you just stimulating our 


discussion? 


 MS. MUNN: I'm offering it as a first 


suggestion. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Suggestion, okay, which is not 


quite the level of a motion. Dr. Melius. 

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 DR. MELIUS: I have a friendly suggestion to 


that suggestion. My only -- one of my 


questions would be is -- I have some concerns 


about Chapman Valve and I -- at least in terms 


of our decision-making, I'd like to wait until 


we've discussed that before we've fixed on the 


final list, that's all. So either leave an 


option open or -- you know, for the sixth one, 


or -- however we want to do that. I don't 


think we necessarily need to postpone the 


decision entirely, but I'd like to leave open 


for Chapman until we've heard the presentation 


and -- this afternoon. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Mr. Presley? 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'd like to leave open 


Clarksville/Medina, too. It's not on our list. 


It was one of the early tear-down refurbishment 


sites. I don't think that we've done any of 


those yet, and that was probably the largest, 


if I'm not mistaken. Was it -- was that not 


one of the early largest sites? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe they probably were 


the two main ones early on, Clarksville and 


Medina is two different -- two different -- 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah, two different sites, but 

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together they would be --


 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe so. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Yeah. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: I believe so. 


 MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Stu. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Lew, I have those other 


completed on -- the remainder of the ones I 


have today, I could give those to you now. 


 DR. WADE: Okay, let's do that quickly, then we 


can move on. 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: The last one I gave you was 


Superior Steel. Lawrence Livermore, there are 


278 that are done. Argonne East, 81. This 


next line, going by the name Energy Technology 


Engineering Center, ETEC, which is now known by 


four different facility names, in combination 


there are 153 done. That's -- the new facility 


names are Area 4 of the Sasquehanna Field 


Laboratory, Downey Facility, the DeSoto 


Facility and the Canoga Avenue Facility. 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: W. R. Grace --


 DR. ZIEMER: 153 out of how many? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: 153 out of 261. 

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 MS. MUNN: It's up there under AI, under -- 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, yeah, it starts with 


Atomics International, but there was -- there 


was a lot of name confusion early on on that -- 


on that area of California. W. R. Grace, 23; 


Allied Chemical, 26; and Lawrence Berkeley, 51. 


 DR. WADE: Thank you. 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, another question? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Just a follow-up. Wanda 


suggested Atomics International, and I -- can 


someone describe what went on at Atomics 


International? I'm not familiar with that 


facility -- or facilities, I guess, or 


whatever. 


 MR. HINNEFELD: Atomics International line, 


that also is referred to ETEC, and then the 


four facility names I just gave you, these were 


essentially research laboratories that used -- 


did work -- you know, research work. I believe 


there was some -- maybe some small-scale fuel 


fabrication. I believe there's irradiated fuel 


testing, things of that sort -- may have been 


some work with a nuclear airplane, but I don't 


remember for sure. Those -- it was kind of 

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experimental laboratory kind of environment. 


 DR. WADE: We have someone on the phone trying 


to say something. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, this is Mike. Dr. Ziemer --


 DR. WADE: Please? Someone on the ph-- 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah, Dr. Ziemer, this is Mike. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, Mike, go ahead. 

 MR. GIBSON: Hello? Can you hear me? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Yes. 

 DR. WADE: Yes. 


 MR. GIBSON: I know I'm conflicted, but I would 


like -- to my understanding, the SEC petition 


for the Monsanto Chemical Company does not 


include the Mound facility. Correct? 


 MR. HINNEFELD: That's correct. 


 MR. GIBSON: I would like to suggest that 


perhaps, even though I'm conflicted and I would 


be recused from a lot of this, that we consider 


the Mound facility for several reasons. They 


were also involved with the stable tritiated 


particulates, the high fired oxides of 


plutonium, actinium and several other isotopes. 


To my knowledge, I don't know of any other site 


that has been fined more by Price Anderson for 


violation of radiation protection rules or had 

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inquiries from the Defense Nuclear Safety Board 


and also been shut down by DOE for not 


providing adequate radiation protection. So I 


would just suggest that even though maybe the ­

- there's not an SEC petition at this point 


and, you know, maybe there's not a lot of 


cases, but it has certainly been a site with a 


questionable history. So the dose 


reconstructions that have been done, I think -- 


I think a review of the site profile may turn 


out a different story. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah, thanks for that comment, 


Mike. Just a reminder, actually SC&A has done 


Mound and it's been a while, and so you, like 


many of us, may have forgotten that. But we do 


have the site profile review by SC&A of Mound 


already, and the Board has -- I don't know if 


they provided you with the list, but on our 


list the ones that were already done are 


designated. Mound is one of those that has 


been done, so --


 MR. GIBSON: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- so we're looking to others 


beyond what has already been done by SC&A. 


 DR. WADE: Take it to break. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: I think we're ready to take a 


break. We don't need to take action on these 


right now, but we appreciate the additional 


information. It helps inform the Board as we 


do prepare to make that decision. So let's 


take our break. We have a 15-minute break 


scheduled, then we'll reconvene. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:45 p.m. 


to 3:10 p.m.) 


CHAPMAN VALVE


 DR. ZIEMER: We're ready to resume our 


deliberations. The next item on the agenda is 


the SEC petition from Chapman Valve. We're 


going to have a presentation of the NIOSH 


recommendation from Dr. Ulsh, and then we'll 


hear from the petitioner, Mary -- let's see, 


it's -- if I pronounce her name -- it's Realle. 


I may not have pronounced that correctly, Mary, 


I'm sorry. And then we'll read into the record 


a statement from Senators Kennedy, Kerry and 


Neal, and then we'll have opportunity for Board 


discussion. 


We will begin with the Chapman Valve SEC 


petition evaluation report. Brant, you may 


proceed, and I think for the record, we don't 

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have any Board members conflicted on this 


particular site, so all are present. Let me 


double-check and make sure that Mr. Gibson is 


still on the line. Michael, are you there? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes, I'm here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


NIOSH PRESENTATION


 DR. ULSH: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. For those of 


you who are dialing in and can't see me, my 


name is Brant Ulsh and I will be presenting 


NIOSH's evaluation of the SEC petition for the 


Chapman Valve facility. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Brant, just one moment. Let me 


make sure that the petitioners at least are on 


the line. Mary, are you there? 


 MS. REALLE: Yes, Mary is here in your office, 


thanks. I can hardly hear you. 


 DR. WADE: Sir -- can you wake that guy? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Now just -- we're having a little 


trouble with our sound volume. Mary, you are 


there? 


 DR. WADE: Hello? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Hello, Mary? Are you on the line? 


 MR. GRIFFON: Try it again -- try it again, try 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Mary, are you on the line? 


 MS. REALLE: Yes, I'm on the line. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. We'll 


proceed then. 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. I'd like to begin with just a 


brief history of the work that the Chapman 


Valve facility performed for the Atomic Energy 


Commission and for Manhattan Engineering 


District. Primarily Chapman Valve supplied 


valves to these entities, and the covered work 


that they performed was machining natural 


uranium rods into slugs that were then used in 


the Brookhaven reactor. And this work occurred 


in 1948. 


The initial work in preparation for this 


campaign began in November of 1947, and we know 


that uranium arrived on-site as early as 


January, 1948. The actual machining operations 


occurred over a seven-month period spanning May 


through November of 1948, and it involved 


approximately 100 workers directly involved. 


Certainly in terms -- just -- just as applies 


to all other Atomic Weapons Employers and DOE 


and AEC workers, they made a great contribution 


to the security of our country and our national 

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defense mission. In terms of the work that 


they performed, in a physical aspect in terms 


of judging the scale and the degree of 


radiological hazard that existed at Chapman 


Valve, I think relative to other operations -- 


similar operations, for instance, Fernald or 


Rocky Flats, other places that machined uranium 


-- they -- their work was of a much smaller 


scale than those other facilities, but 


certainly important and the workers at Chapman 


Valve made a great contribution. 


After -- following the machining the occurred 


in 1948, all uranium scrap was removed by the 


end of the year in 1948. And then there was a 


brief decommissioning and decontamination 


process that occurred in the early '90s. 


Now in terms of the SEC petition, as you know, 


once a petition qualifies under our regulation, 


then the petitioner is notified. And this 


petition qualified on November 9th of 2005 and 


the petitioners were notified the next day, on 


November 10th, and a Federal Register notice 


followed on December 27th of 2005. 


 Now the initial proposed class was the list of 


several specific job titles that worked at 

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Chapman Valve in the '48/'49 time frame, and 


then again during the decommissioning time 


period in the '90s. NIOSH expanded this class 


to include all workers who worked in a 


particular building at Chapman Valve where the 


radiological work was performed, and we kept 


the -- we took the time frame January 1st, 1948 


through December 31st, 1949. As you might 


imagine with sites that performed work this 


long ago, the specific dates are not 


necessarily evident. And so we expanded that 


time period to cover all possible operations at 


Chapman Valve. And then again we included the 


decommissioning and decontamination effort in 


the '90s. 


There were several sources of information 


available to inform our evaluation. The site 


profile for Chapman Valve was issued on 


February 22nd, 2005. And I want to make it 


clear that while we used the site profile in 


our evaluation report, really what we relied 


upon was the documents that are summarized, the 


documents that we used to develop the site 


profile. As you've heard throughout this 


meeting, site profiles are living documents. 

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And that means that as we go through these 


processes of the site profile reviews and the 


SEC petition reviews, we revisit these profiles 


and change them as new information becomes 


available. But primarily we relied on the 


source documentation that we used to develop 


the site profile. 


First and foremost, however, we relied on 


individual dosimetry records, both internal and 


external, for Chapman Valve employees. And 


I'll talk more about that as I progress through 


the presentation today. We also located 


several source documents in the site research 


database. And finally we used documentation 


provided by the petitioners themselves. 


All right. I'd like to give you the status of 


the Chapman Valve claims. This speaks to the 


issue of feasibility, I believe, and these 


numbers are as of September 13th of this year, 


so just a few days ago. We -- we have approxi­

- we have 124 cases that meet the class 


definition, and we have completed dose 


reconstructions for 92 of them, and that 


represents 75 percent of the claims that we 


have at Chapman Valve. 

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 Now there were seven bases that formed the SEC 


petition. They are listed here. I'm going to 


go through each one of them individually, so I 


won't read through the whole list. 


The first basis, the petition expressed a 


concern that there was an insufficient number 


of bioassay measurements, and also the concern 


was expressed that the bioassay measurements 


that we have did not capture the most exposed 


individuals at Chapman Valve. 


Now you can see at the bottom of this slide our 


-- NIOSH -- our evaluation of this concern. We 


have 33 bioassay measurements among about 100 


workers. Now if you're used to thinking in 


terms of say a Fernald or a large DOE site like 


Rocky Flats, 33 is not a big number. But here 


we're talking about only approximately 100 


workers who campaign-- who operated with 


uranium over a seven-month period, so it's a 


much more limited operation. So we have 33 


bioassay measurements. In addition we have 


seven bioassay measurements which were 


associated with the fire, and I'll cover that 


in a little more detail as well. 


So we know that from other sites, from other 

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populations, that bioassay results tend to 


follow a lognormal distribution. And certainly 


if you are looking at a lognormal distribution, 


a sample size of 33 out of 100 individuals 


represents a fairly sizeable sample, from a 


statistical standpoint. 


Now the second concern involved the 


representativeness of the bioassay samples that 


we had available. And we're fortunate at 


Chapman Valve to have the job titles associated 


with the bioassay measurements that we have, 


and they include a range of job functions. 


Some of the functions that you would expect to 


have the highest exposures -- cinderless 


grinders, turret lathe operators -- and they 


also include some that you might expect to have 


lower exposures potentials -- inspectors, 


guards, job titles like that. 


Now I want to point out that of the bioassay 


sample results that we have that are not 


associated with that one fire -- so I'm talking 


about the 33 bioassay samples now -- only one 


of those 33 was above the detection limit for 


the method that was employed at the time, that 


was fluorimetry, to look for uranium in urine ­
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- only one. That indicates that this was a 


fairly low exposure potential operation. 


Okay, the next concern that was expressed in 


the petition was that there is insufficient 


data to support a plausible upper bound. As 


you know, our rule requires that we either come 


up with an upper bound or a more precise 


estimate, and so this concern deals with 


NIOSH's ability or inability to bound doses at 


Chapman Valve. And the basis for this concern 


was that the petitioners felt that we had a 


lack of monitoring, process knowledge, and/or 


source term data. 


Now that would be a much more important issue 


if we were not relying directly on bioassay 


measurements. If we were relying on a source 


term calculation or on air monitoring, that 


would be a very important concern. But if you 


recall the hierarchy of data that we use in 


dose reconstruction, the best data that we can 


have is individual bioassay and dosimetry 


results, and we have that at Chapman Valve. 


Furthermore, we do have process knowledge. We 


know what material they were working with. We 


know they were working with natural uranium and 

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so that informs us on the processes that were 


going on at Chapman Valve. But I want to 


emphasize, that is trumped by the fact that we 


have individual bioassay and external 


monitoring available. 


 The next concern expressed in the petition 


dealt with the uranium fire that occurred in 


June of 1948, and the petition expressed the 


concern that we didn't have sufficient data 


regarding this incident. However, our 


evaluation concluded that we do in fact have 


sufficient data to deal with this -- what this 


recorded fire at Chapman Valve. We have a set 


of seven bioassay samples that were collected 


on June 11th of 1948, and they're clearly 


identified as individuals who were involved in 


responding to this fire. We do know that this 


event occurred in June -- in the beginning of 


June. Since we have bioassay samples on June 


11th, we can pinpoint it to a window of June 1 


to June 11th. That's a pretty -- that's a 


pretty narrow window. Certainly it would be 


helpful if we knew the exact day, but it's not 


necessary for us to know that. We can make 


claimant-favorable assumptions when we use 

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these bioassay results to model intakes that 


resulted from the fire. And I would like to 


point out that of those seven bioassay results, 


four of them were above the detection limit. 


And it's our -- it's our conclusion that the 


bioassay results that we have -- we can use 


that to adequately model the -- any intakes 


that resulted from that fire. 


 The next concern expressed in the petition 


dealt with enriched uranium. Now I told you 


that Chapman Valve worked with natural uranium 


to support the Brookhaven reactor. We have 


documentary evidence of that, so we know that 


they worked with natural uranium. The sole 


evidence for believing that they -- that there 


might have been enriched uranium present at 


Chapman Valve consists of one sample, one 


debris sample that was collected several 


decades after the conclusion of the work that 


Chapman performed for the Atomic Energy 


Commission. 


Now we have heard from former workers at 


Chapman Valve that they also did radiological 


work for other entities, possibly the Navy. So 


it's not at all clear, number one, that there 

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was enriched uranium present at Chapman Valve. 


That's based on one single sample. But even if 


it was, it's not clear that that enriched 


uranium was present during the covered period 


for the covered -- the work that the Chapman -- 


that Chapman Valve performed for the AEC. But 


the most important point here is that even if 


you throw all that aside and you assume that 


they did have enriched uranium at Chapman Valve 


during the covered period, that does not 


prevent us from doing dose reconstructions at 


sufficient accuracy. It would result in higher 


internal doses from -- from uptakes of this 


material, but that is a boundable number. That 


is a tractable number. We can put a number on 


that. So at the end of the day, even if you 


contend that there was enriched uranium at 


Chapman Valve during the covered period, we can 


deal with that. 


The next peti-- the next concern expressed in 


the petition dealt with some specific processes 


that were indicated that could have or might 


have occurred at Chapman Valve. And the 


contention here is that the TBD does not 


account for potential exposures that might have 

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been -- that might have resulted from the 


operation of a cracking furnace or a chip 


burner, and also the same argument for 


potential rolling at Chapman Valve. 


Our evaluation of this point, and I'll repeat 


this point a number of times throughout the 


presentation, is that we have bioassay results. 


So no matter what processes led to the intake 


of that material, whether it was a cracking 


furnace, a chip burner, normal machining of 


uranium at Chapman Valve, this is reflected in 


the bioassay results that we have. So 


certainly it's important from a historical 


standpoint for us to put this material -- to 


explain this -- the operations that occurred at 


Chapman Valve. But at the end of the day, the 


important point is that we have bioassay 


results. And to the extent that there were 


exposures resulting from a chip burner, that's 


reflected in the bioassay results. 


It is also not clear to us that there -- over ­

- that any rolling operations ever occurred at 


Chapman Valve. There is an anecdotal mention 


of a rolling operation. But again, the same 


argument applies. We have bioassay results. 

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If there were rolling operations and they did 


result in an uptake, we see that in the 


bioassay results. 


The petition also expressed the concern that 


there was only one day of air sampling, uranium 


air sampling, for Chapman Valve. And that is 


true. However, again, the hierarchy of data 


indicates that we have bioassay results and we 


have external dosimetry results, and that 


trumps air data. 


Now we did make use of this one day of air 


sampling data. We looked at a document that 


was prepared by the Health and Safety 


Laboratory, HASL, that looked at the industrial 


hygiene of uranium handling at several 


different sites. They didn't explicitly 


consider Chapman Valve, but they looked at 


sites -- larger sites like Y-12 and also sites 


like Simonds Saw and Steel and Bethlehem Steel. 


We just wanted to get an order of magnitude 


feel for whether the results that we were 


seeing at Chapman Valve compared with those 


other sites, and we found that they do compare. 


They're in line with what you would expect to 


see for this type of an operation. 

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But I want to stress that we did not rely on 


this air sampling data for dose reconstruction. 


We relied on the personal dosimetry results 


that we have available. 


The petition also expressed the concern that 


our TBD had an inadequate treatment of -- I'll 


describe it as routine uranium fires, although 


there are no routine uranium fires. But the 


fire that occurred in the beginning of June was 


an unusual event. It was a larger fire. As 


you know, uranium is a pyrophoric material, and 


so it's not uncommon to see small fires as it's 


being machined. That is certainly a 


significant consideration. But again, we have 


bioassay results. Any intakes that would have 


resulted from these -- from any smaller fires 


that might have occurred would be reflected in 


the bioassay results. 


Okay. In terms of our evaluation report, as 


you can see on this slide, it was issued on 


August 31st of this year. And this should be a 


familiar slide to the members of the Board. 


This is the two-pronged test that is applied in 


determining our recommendation for whether or 


not we can feasibly reconstruct doses. 

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The first prong of that test asks whether or 


not it is feasible for NIOSH to estimate the 


level of radiation doses that members of the 


class received with sufficient accuracy. If, 


and only if, the answer to that first prong is 


"no," then we move on to the second prong of 


the test, and that considers health 


endangerment for the members of the class. 


We concluded the answer to the first prong of 


that test, can we feasibly reconstruct dose, we 


concluded that we can. We have sufficient data 


available to do that. Therefore we did not 


move to the -- it was not necessary for us to 


consider the second prong of the test. And 


here's a summary of our recommendation from the 


evaluation report. You see the class 


summarized as workers who worked at Chapman 


Valve from the fir-- January 1st, 1948 until 


the end of 1949, and also again in the early 


'90s from the remediation period. We concluded 


that we can feasibly reconstruct dose, so we 


did not move to the second prong of that test. 


Okay. That is the end of the presentation. 


I'd be happy to entertain questions. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think we'll go ahead before our 

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discussion and hear from the petitioners, and 


so let's open the phone lines for Mary Realle 


to present on behalf of the petitioners. 


Mary, are you still on the line? 


PETITIONER PRESENTATION


 MS. REALLE: I'm still on the line and you're 


very, very faint. I can hardly hear you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Go ahead, Mary. 

 MS. REALLE: Is it my turn? 

 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 

UNIDENTIFIED: Just go ahead, Mary. 


 MS. REALLE: Okay. This is Mary Ann Realle, 


and I'm here with Darlene Ryan, who is our 


second petitioner, and also Aaron Wilson, who 


is the Executive Director for Western Mass. 


Coalition for the Occupational Safety and 


Health. I have a little -- I want to thank the 


Advisory Board and NIOSH for allowing to speak 


today on behalf of Chapman Valve Families for 


Justice with respect to the SEC evaluation 


report. 


My father was a grinder operator in Building 23 


at Chapman Valve, which is the building in 


which the AEC-owned uranium was machined by 


Chapman Valve. My father had cancer and was 

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unmonitored for radiation exposure. 


At the outset let me also thank Senator 


Kennedy, Senator Kerry and Congressman Neal and 


their respective staffs for their steadfast 


support in working through this process. 


Without them, claimants would have had no -- 


nowhere in government to turn for assistance in 


what is a complex, daunting and bureaucrat -- 


bureaucratic process. 


With respect to the timeliness of the SEC 


process, I want to note that NIOSH failed to 


issue an SEC evaluation report by the May 9th, 


2000 -- 2006 deadline, which is the 180 days 


from the date the petition qualified, as set 


forth in the NIOSH interim final regulation. 


Instead, NIOSH took nearly ten months to 


provide SEC evaluation report which delayed 


disadvantaged us as claimants since we lack the 


sources and resources to travel to Nevada for 


their meeting today, whereas we could have 


attended the Washington, D.C. meeting held back 


in June, 2006 had there been a timely issuance 


of a report. 


Further, we would have welcomed the assistance 


from NIOSH with this process. We have limited 

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data to work with beyond the provided by the 


DOE under the Freedom of Information Act. We 


have limited technical resources to address the 


health physics issue and would welcome some 


neutral technical assistance. 


Finally, I assume that the SEC council 


appointed by NIOSH must be very busy because we 


have no information on the status of our 


petition, had no assistance in preparing for 


today, and had to pry the SEC report out of 


NIOSH in late August, even though it report we 


have this document in hand for several weeks. 


We are grateful that Mr. Sundin provided us 


with a phone number so that we could at least 


call in to this meeting. Mr. Sundin, thank you 


for that accommodation. 


 Chapman Valve families met with NIOSH on 


February, 2005 to provide detailed comments on 


the draft site profile. These included (1) 


failure to account for enriched uranium which 


was found at Oak Ridge National Lab -- 


Laboratory; (2) the failure to account for 


uranium chip incinerator which is a source of 


uranium smoke; and (3) the lack of 


representative bioassay data upon which to 

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build a coworker model for internal dose; and 


(4) the lack of knowledge on assigning the data 


-- the date, I'm sorry, of the uranium fire 


which occurred in May or June, 1948. NIOSH 


issued the site profile the next day, February 


15th, and never accounted for any of our 


comments. And it's been suggested that the 


reason for overlooking my technical information 


is that the Oak Ridge Associate University 


(sic) had to meet certain milestones to earn 


its award fee for the period ending in mid-


March, 2005. You would think that NIOSH would 


have reduced their award fee for failing to 


account for claimant input instead. 


We note, however, that the Department of Labor 


has remanded Chapman Valve dose reconstruction 


cases back to NIOSH because NIOSH failed to 


account for the same data in their dose 


reconstructions. Apparently DOL did not find 


our concerns as meritless as NIOSH and ORAU. 


Only five of 106 claims filed at Chapman Valve 


and submitted to NIOSH for dose reconstruction 


have internal bioassay dose data, according to 


the SEC report. This means that the other 101 


claims must rely on the coworker model and the 

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site profile for exposure estimates. In 


theory, this approach could be made to work. 


However, the NIOSH coworker model is based on 


unrepresentative data. The data is 


unrepresentative because it's based on cohort 


sampling. Only a few workers, 32 in all, had a 


routine bioassay sample. Seven others were 


monitored on June 11th, 1948 after a uranium 


fire. NIOSH concedes on page 33 of the SEC 


report that the exact selection criteria is 


unknown, but then it makes a fabulous leap of 


faith and concludes that the sampling 


(unintelligible) of the most exposed workers, 


which report states samples were typically 


collected from workers who were thought to have 


the greatest likelihood of exposure. 


 Members of the Board, I have been advised by 


Senator Kennedy's office, which has reviewed 


this exposure data, that the most exposed 


workers as determined by the results from our 


weekly film badge readings were not monitored. 


I have not seen (unintelligible) data, but I 


imagine that you as Board members have the 


right to see such (unintelligible) protected 


information can see this data. It needs to be 

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looked at by more than NIOSH staff or its 


contractor. NIOSH does say the basis for how 


it jumped to a conclusion that most exposed 


workers were monitored. If (unintelligible due 


to interference on telephone line) was 


monitored, there is no protocol that I can 


find. 


Frankly, it appears as if NIOSH 


(unintelligible) and ignored the data 


(unintelligible) and further presented by 


petitioners demonstrating that cohort sampling 


was used at this site. Cohort sampling was 


common during the early years of the AEC. 


During the deliberations on the Iowa Ordnance 


Plant SEC NIOSH was first to admit that cohort 


sampling was used and it was not representative 


of the most exposed workers. Some of the NIOSH 


staff who reviewed the Chapman Valve SEC 


evaluation report were also involved in the 


Iowa SEC evaluation report. The fact 


(unintelligible) NIOSH staff seems to be 


repeating (unintelligible) particular error. 


 Worker exposure from the uranium -- uranium -- 


uranium incinerator at Chapman Valve is glossed 


over and NIOSH asserts that the exposures from 

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the incinerator would be reflected in coworker 


data. It is unknown what (unintelligible) the 


incinerator operated, and routine bioassay 


samples were taken on only three occasions. 


Uranium incinerators tend to be batched 


operations and the days of operations are not 


available. NIOSH was unable to match the date 


of the incinerator operations with the workers 


employed on those days and whether any of those 


around the incinerator had bioassay samples. 


Thus NIOSH's SEC evaluation report contains 


uninformed speculation when it asserts that 


workers would have received bioassay samples on 


the day that they were exposed to the 


incinerator operations. NIOSH clearly lacks 


enough information to bound the 


(unintelligible). NIOSH asserts that it 


compared the incinerator data from the 


(unintelligible) Pennsylvania with the data at 


Chapman Valve. I did not know if the Numec 


data was higher or lower than what was released 


(unintelligible) Chapman Valve. I would 


respectfully request that the Board review 


(unintelligible) and assumptions 


(unintelligible) cracking furnace at Chapman 

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Valve which deposited large amounts of uranium 


out of stack through the roof (unintelligible) 


furnace were not accounted for in the site 


profile. We do not know how often the cracking 


furnace operates. We do know it is separate 


from the incinerator. NIOSH asserts that the 


heat treaters would have been working around 


the cracking furnace without providing any data 


that this is the job title applied to those 


working in this area. We respectfully request 


that the Board (unintelligible) two sources of 


airborne uranium with all other sources, such 


as lathe operations, grinding, uranium fires, 


et cetera. 


There is no (unintelligible) of the 


(unintelligible) of 2.68 percent 


(unintelligible) enriched uranium that was 


found by Oak Ridge. NIOSH asserts in its site 


profile that only natural uranium was used at 


Chapman Valve. NIOSH says that the presence of 


the enriched uranium will not affect the 


ability to (unintelligible) maximum plausible 


dose, although they concede that the enriched 


uranium will increase the dose, compared with 


natural uranium. NIOSH staff has contended in 

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public forums that there was no enriched 


uranium at this site, only natural uranium, and 


that the results from the Oak Ridge survey of 


Chapman Valve that found enriched uranium was 


anomalous. NIOSH has -- NIOSH made no effort 


in this SEC evaluation report to resolve that 


question. NIOSH cannot say it doesn't believe 


enriched uranium was present where there is 


hard data to establish this fact. And it 


cannot say it doesn't matter to the SEC 


evaluation report and there -- and then not 


accounted for in dose reconstruction. We think 


that NIOSH cannot have it both ways. NIOSH has 


failed to provide proof of process that it can 


reconstruct dose using enriched uranium because 


it has not revised its site profile to show 


which worker would receive a dose from enriched 


uranium. Absent such proof of process, doses 


are being underestimated. This assertion that 


maximum dose can be estimated has not been 


demonstrated. 


 In conclusion, we ask that the Board -- to 


review the raw data to understand the basis of 


our contentions. We would be grateful if you 


would -- if you could assign the auditor 

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contractor, Sanford Cohen & Associates, with 


the task of reviewing SEC evaluation report. 


Further, it would make sense to withhold 


judgment until presents its revised site 


profile, which it told Congress it would be 


going -- it will be issuing in the future. 


On behalf of the many families here in the 


(unintelligible) area of western Massachusetts, 


thank you for listening to my statement. And 


now at this time, Mr. Chairman, with the 


Board's permission, please allow me to 


designate Richard Miller of the Government 


Accountability Project to assist in the 


presentation from the petitioners if there is 


something I have left out. I hope he's in the 


audience today. Thank you very much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, indeed, Richard Miller is 


here today. And Richard -- I'm looking -- 


there you are. Do you have anything to add at 


this point on -- as -- for -- on behalf of the 


petitioners? 


 MR. MILLER: Dr. -- hello. Dr. Ziemer, if it 


would be possible, I think there are other 


people on from Congress that are probably on 


the telephone, and maybe it'd be better to have 

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them go first. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We -- we do have a 


statement from Senators Kennedy, Kerry and 


Neal. I believe that's going to be read into 


the record. Jason will come to the mike a read 


that on their behalf. 


 MR. BROEHM: Hi, Jason Broehm from the CDC 


Washington office. And actually before I read 


this statement, Richard is correct that Portia 


Wu from Senator Edward Kennedy's office is on 


the phone, and William Powers from 


Representative Richard Neal's office is on the 


phone. And Mirah Horowitz from Senator John 


Kerry's office I understand was planning to be 


on the phone but had -- had something come up 


at the last minute and is unable to join us, so 


they would like -- Portia and William would 


like to make a few remarks before I start the 


letter. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, certainly. Do -- do either 


of you wish to make remarks before the 


Senators' or the Congressman's letter is read 


into the record? 


 MS. WU: Hello, this is Portia Wu with Senator 


Kennedy's health committee's staff. First of 

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all, I want to express our appreciation to the 


Board and also to NIOSH. We -- with Senator 


Kennedy being the ranking member on the health 


committee, we work very frequently with Dr. 


Howard and with NIOSH, and we appreciate all 


the good work they do on many -- many issues 


that we cooperate with them on. 


In addition, Senator Kennedy was one of the 


original members who worked on EEOICPA and on 


working to get compensation for sick Energy 


workers, and it's very important. Though I 


recognize the Chapman Valve site may not be as 


large as many of the other sites, or as famous, 


that they -- those workers and their health is 


no less important to us than at any other site. 


And it's obviously particularly important 


because they're from Massachusetts. 


There are a number of concerns that we have 


elaborated in greater detail in our letter, and 


I thank Jason for reading the letter. It is 


somewhat lengthy, and because the connection on 


this phone isn't the best, I'd prefer that it 


read in the room where -- where the members are 


present -- members of the Board are present so 


they can hear it clearly. I do want to stress 

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a couple points and most -- most importantly 


that we think there are some concerns we have 


with the report, particularly the 


representativeness of the data, and we 


elaborate on those points more fully in the 


letter. Specifically, the last few bioassay 


samples that were taken, although we recognize 


that data is important, really were not 


representative of the highest exposed workers 


and there were only a handful of workers in the 


last two samples. 


 And because of all the questions about the data 


and the lack of information about many of the 


processes that workers may have been exposed 


to, the concerns about the representativeness, 


enriched uranium and many other process issues, 


we also would request the Board look at this 


more closely. In reviewing the raw data that 


we got very recently, we felt like there were a 


lot of questions that are -- should be raised 


and ask that the Board look at that 


information. 


Bill? 


 MR. POWERS: Yes, Bill Powers here. I'm 


counsel to Congressman Neal. I'd echo Portia's 

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sentiments. I think the letter will speak for 


itself obviously. Obviously it's going to be 


(unintelligible) significant issues here that I 


think are raised. I do want to thank the Board 


for obviously taking the time to -- to look at 


this. I additionally would -- would like to 


commend Ms. Realle and Mr. Ryan for an eloquent 


resuscitation (sic) of -- of really where -- 


where we think this should be going at this 


point and commend them for really hanging in 


here and presenting the -- the data they did 


today. And I would ask the Board to really 


take a look -- issues workers I think here 


today are raising. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you both very much 


for those comments, and we will now proceed 


with the reading of the letter from Kennedy, 


Kerry and Neal. Jason? 


 MR. BROEHM: Okay. Well, I think you should 


all have copies of the letter sitting in front 


of you, but to get this into the record, it 


reads: 


(Reading) Dear Dr. Ziemer: We write to express 


our support for the Special Exposure Cohort 


Petition, file number 012-05-3653, filed by 

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former employees at Chapman Valve Manufacturing 


Company in Springfield, Massachusetts and their 


survivors. Outlined below are issues that we 


ask the Board to consider. A number of the 


issues involve highly technical matters and we 


respectfully suggest that the Board consider 


engaging its technical support contractor to 


assist in its review. 


Congress passed the Energy Employees 


Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act, 


EEOICPA, in 2000 to ensure that nuclear energy 


workers would be compensated for illnesses 


caused by exposure to radiation and other toxic 


substances. These unsung heroes of the Cold 


War helped to build our nation's arsenal. In 


many cases their work was performed in top-


secret conditions, and the extremely dangerous 


nature of their jobs was concealed from them. 


For the most part, exposure monitoring was 


inadequate. It is often very difficult, if not 


impossible, to establish the level of radiation 


exposure for each worker. EEOICPA addressed 


this problem by allowing workers and their 


survivors to petition to become members of the 


Special Exposure Cohort when it is not feasible 

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to estimate radiation doses with sufficient 


accuracy. 


 Chapman Valve machined uranium for the Atomic 


Energy Commission, AEC, in 1948 and 1949. 


Their employees were exposed to radioactive 


materials in the course of this AEC-related 


work. Cleanup activities took place from 1991 


to 1994 under the Department of Energy's 


Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action 


Program. 


The SEC petition for these Chapman Valve 


workers was submitted on August 15th, 2005; 


qualified on November 9th, 2005; and the SEC 


evaluation was due, under the terms of NIOSH's 


Interim Final Rule, on May 9th, 2006. We 


received the NIOSH SEC evaluation report on 


August 31st, 2006, more than three months after 


the 180-day deadline established under EEOICPA. 


The evaluation report concludes that it is 


feasible to complete dose reconstructions with 


the data that has been recovered for this site. 


We have serious questions about the basis for 


this conclusion. 


NIOSH is relying upon the February 22nd, 2005 


site profile, ORAU-TKBS-0033, for the Chapman 

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Valve site as the basis for concluding that it 


is feasible to reconstruct the dose for these 


workers. That site profile was issued only one 


day after a public meeting with former workers 


in February, 2005. At that meeting NIOSH 


received numerous pieces of evidence and 


testimony regarding the activities at the 


plant. Since the site profile was issued the 


next day, it could not have incorporated the 


evidence from that meeting. 


We have been advised by NIOSH that the agency 


intends to revise the site profile. We applaud 


that -- this decision. In light of this 


planned revision, however, we find it curious 


that the evaluation report would be issued 


based in substantial part on analyses from the 


existing site profile. While NIOSH states 


these -- states these changes to the site 


profile will not make a difference in the SEC 


evaluation report, we have difficulty 


understanding how this could be the case. At a 


minimum, the petitioners should be allowed to 


see the revised site profile and to review it 


in conjunction with the evaluation report to 


make appropriate comment. 

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We are also deeply concerned about the 


conclusions reached by the evaluation report. 


Under EEOICPA, NIOSH has the burden of 


demonstrating that the data is representative 


of the highest exposed individuals at a work 


site, and the Board has adopted evaluation 


criteria regarding these workers. 


 And quoting number 4, consideration of data and 


data subsets, NIOSH must demonstrate that there 


are sufficient data, e.g., is the sample size 


adequate, and that the data are representative 


of the highest exposed individuals within the 


class. This may involve looking at subsets of 


larger exposure data sets. Often these subsets 


are less comprehensive for a given time period, 


usually earlier years. NIOSH should assess how 


robust these data or data sets are for the 


purposes of dose reconstruction. In answering 


this question NIOSH should consider whether 


they can determine the representativeness of 


the data. Some questions which should be 


considered in evaluating representativeness 


include (1) are the data from the site in 


question, from a surrogate site, or both; (2) 


if from surrogate site, have these data been 

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appropriately evaluated and have the 


uncertainties due to extrapolation from another 


site been accounted for; (3) do they represent 


the highest exposed individuals; (4) do they 


represent the entire exposed cohort; (5) do 


they represent all workers ever on the site; 


(6) are the data from cohort type sampling; and 


(7) can the data be interpreted in a way to 


ensure that the maximum plausible dose can be 


determined. 


That's end quote. 


While NIOSH states that it, quote, did identify 


employees at the facility during this time 


period for which complete dose reconstruction 


would be feasible, unquote -- that's from the 


evaluation report, page 37 -- we have serious 


concerns about this conclusion with respect to 


all members of the class. Indeed, the 


Department of Labor has recently remanded a 


number of cases to NIOSH for additional study 


based on inadequacy of the data. 


 We are particularly concerned that data relied 


upon for the evaluation report is not 


representative of the maximally -- maxi-- 


maximally exposed individuals in the class. 

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This concern arises from our review of the raw 


data that we recently received from NIOSH 


regarding workers' exposure at Chapman Valve. 


A few key -- a free -- excuse me, a few key 


issues arose from our review. 


 First, records indicate that routine monitoring 


for uranium intake took place on only three 


occasions, July, September and October of 1948, 


and involved only 33 samples covering 32 


workers. Chapman Valve used cohort sampling, 


covering a range of job classifications, rather 


than sampling only the most exposed workers. 


NIOSH concedes in its SEC evaluation report 


that the, quote, exact selection criteria is 


unknown, unquote. Samples were taken from only 


six and five workers in September and October, 


respectively, and none of the workers monitored 


in October were production workers who faced 


the greatest risk. Instead, bioassays were 


concentrated in non-production workers such as 


the associate director for research, foremen, 


personnel managers, chief electricians, 


engineers, inspectors and others who would have 


had far less opportunity for internal radiation 


exposure at this facility. Such samples 

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clearly would not reflect the highest exposures 


at the plant. 


Second, Chapman Valve also did not take 


bioassay samples from the individuals with the 


four highest film badge readings, which reflect 


high levels of external exposure. These 


readings were 650, 555, 500 and 500 mr per 


week. The routine bioassay samples did not 


include these maximally exposed individuals. 


In addition, there was only one incident 


monitored, a fire presumed to be in early June, 


1948. Samples were taken from seven workers on 


June 11th, 1948, five of whom had elevated 


urine -- elevated uranium in urine readings. 


Only two workers involved with fire and its 


cleanup were re-sampled, both guards. Their 


bioassay readings were the same or higher a 


month later. NIOSH assumes the fire occurred 


on June 10, but the date of the fire remains 


unknown, despite extensive efforts by the 


Chapman Valve families to ascertain the date 


through archival research. We believe this 


uncertainty should be reflected in the 


estimation -- estimations of the monitored 


workers so there is no possibility of an 

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underestimate of the uranium intake of these 


workers. In addition, uranium machining 


facilities are known to have frequent fires, 


yet workers were only sampled after one 


particular incident. NIOSH therefore simply 


does not have data that reflects other 


potential exposures. 


 Finally, NIOSH has failed to explain how it 


accounted for the work history of those 


individuals with bioassay samples, nor has it 


adequately indicated how it assessed the 


duration of time between when the workers were 


exposed and when the bioassay samples were 


taken. In light of these shortcomings, we fail 


to see how NIOSH can conclude that it has 


representative data from which it can develop a 


plausible upper bound dose estimate. 


In addition to these specific concerns 


regarding the analysis of worker monitoring 


data relied upon in the evaluation report, we 


also have reservations about NIOSH's treatment 


of other factors contributing to workers' 


exposure. 


 For example, Oak Ridge National Labs documented 


the presence of 2.16 percent enriched uranium 

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at the Chapman Valve site. However, this is 


not explained in the site profile or the SEC 


evaluation report. As part of a radiological 


survey tied to the environmental cleanup 


program in the 1990s, the Labs performed an 


isotopic analysis on two uranium samples. One 


of the two samples was positive for enriched 


uranium. Despite this evidence, the NIOSH site 


profile assumes only natural -- natural uranium 


was processed. NIOSH has failed to explain how 


it will account for enriched uranium in dose 


reconstructions, given the lack of data on the 


amount of material and on the processes used to 


handle it. Nor has it shown how it will avoid 


underestimating workers' potential exposures to 


enriched uranium. 


Also, the cracking furnace and uranium chip 


incinerator operations, which may have been 


intermittent and had high exposure potential, 


appear not to be adequately addressed in the 


report. They were also overlooked in the site 


profile. Furthermore, although the stipulated 


time period for operations was not long, 


documents indicate potential for widespread 


exposures, such as through contamination 

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spreading from the production area into the 


lunchrooms. After the Chapman Valve site had 


ceased production and the scrap and waste had 


been shipped away, the site had to be washed 


down several times. Even with this washing, 


residual contamination remained embedded in the 


building. 


For the above reasons, we have serious 


questions about NIOSH's conclusion that the 


handful of production worker bioassays is 


representative and from this that it is able to 


develop a plausible upper bound dose estimate. 


In light of these concerns, we respectfully 


urge the Board to carefully review this SEC 


evaluation report and the raw data relied upon 


by NIOSH. Again, in reviewing the technical 


issues we urge the Board to assign a review of 


the evaluation report by audit contractors, as 


it did in the SEC petitions at Iowa Ordnance 


Plant, Mallinckrodt Chemical, Rocky Flats, and 


Oak Ridge Y-12. 


Sincerely, Edward M. Kennedy, John F. Kerry, 


and Richard E. Neal. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much for reading 


that into the record for us. Now I'll give Mr. 

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Miller an opportunity, if he has additional 


comments on behalf of the petitioners, to add 


to the information. And then we will open the 


floor for Board discussion. 


 MR. MILLER: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. This is 


Richard Miller from the Government 


Accountability Project. I won't restate any of 


the arguments that have been made here. I just 


wanted to supplement several technical points, 


the first of which is dealing with the enriched 


uranium. What the origins of that enriched 


uranium are are unknown. What we do know is 


that the dose reconstructions that have been 


done to date do not account for enriched 


uranium, and so NIOSH can't really have it, as 


the petitioners said, both ways. 


I think Brant Ulsh in his presentation 


suggested that perhaps this enriched uranium 


didn't arise out of this project, that it arose 


out of another project. And that is a 


possibility. The -- the contracting 


information at this site is -- is pretty 


sketchy, although there's some shipment and 


receipt data of -- of the uranium coming in and 


leaving, as well as the scrap material. If the 

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-- the enriched uranium couldn't possibly, as 


the SEC evaluation report suggests on page 35, 


to have been, quote, attributable to background 


levels. I'm not aware of any enriched uranium 


occurring in nature. 


The second is is that if this did arise, 


perhaps say from a Naval reactors program, and 


I'm not suggesting that it did 'cause I don't 


know, it's very important to note that the 2004 


amendments to the Defense Authorization Act 


define what a radiation dose is. And in those 


amendments it makes clear that although Navy 


reactor programs do not count with respect to 


the dose at Department of Energy facilities, 


they do count at Atomic Weapons Employer 


facilities. And so one cannot simply bypass 


conveniently that provision of law in 


accounting for dose. And just to underscore 


this knowledge that NIOSH already has, they are 


accounting for some of that dose on sites such 


as the Erwin, Tennessee facility where you have 


a co-production operation involving Naval 


reactor operations. So I just would bring that 


to your attention, that that's not to be 


something that can be explained away. 

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The other is is that when you're dealing with a 


small number of data points, your -- your -- 


your curve -- if you're going to do a coworker 


model and you're going to look at the upper 


95th percentile, you better have a pretty 


representative data set because the -- the laws 


of num-- small numbers also cut against you. 


And in this particular instance, what I've been 


advised -- and again, I have not seen the raw 


data and -- and I -- and I would repeat what 


Senator Kennedy's staff urged, which is let's 


get somebody who can look at the raw data to 


look at it. Senator Kennedy's staff advised 


that there is a job classification not even 


mentioned in either the site profile or the SEC 


evaluation report that represented the highest 


exposed individuals from film badging, and that 


job category was a brusher. Now I don't know 


exactly what a brusher did, but one could 


imagine you were running a wire brush over 


uranium, you're generating an awful lot of 


particulate material. And if that's what they 


were doing, and if as Senator Kennedy's staff 


has indicated, the most exposed individuals 


with respect to film badge were not the people 

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who were bioassayed, how can you develop a -- 


any confidence that your upper 95th percentile 


is in the realm of plausibility? It's just 


simply not. And so we would respectfully 


request that if you are going to develop a 


model and you're going to use the most exposed 


individuals, you better be sure you got them 


for the bioassay and that they match up. Now 


if they do match up, there's been nothing 


demonstrated in the site profile or in the SEC 


evaluation report which indicates that the most 


exposed individuals as measured by weekly film 


badge in any way, shape or form were 


bioassayed. 


In addition, I wanted to just talk a little bit 


about the date of the fire, not that it's a 


huge issue, but as a footnote. The -- the fire 


-- the bioassays for the fire occurred on the 


11th of June of 1948. The date of the fire is 


unknown. I don't know what the date is and I 


know that the petitioners went through some 


exhaustive efforts to try to find this out 


because the levels of dose for some of the 


individuals who would have fought the fire or 


did the cleanup work afterwards were 

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significantly elevated. They got a good --


they got a good intake of uranium. And so what 


they did was they had gone through the 


newspaper archives. They interviewed the on-


site firefighter workforce. They sought to go 


to the Springfield Library to look at the 


annual reports for Chapman Valve Company, which 


is a very prominent employer in the area. And 


nobody could possibly find any date, any 


document that the fire existed other than these 


AEC bioassay samples that had been sent I think 


to Rochester. But we did ask NIOSH to run a 


little intake calculation, and the difference 


in dose -- which anybody who I guess looks at 


an excretion curve for say a moderately soluble 


intake of uranium -- that just merely being off 


by a week involves a 50 percent change in the 


amount of uranium intake for the individual. 


So I think that it's important that if one's 


going to use the data, you ought to assign some 


conservativism to the date that you assume the 


fire took place, rather than just simply say 


well, it's in a range. 


Oh, and then the last point is this, that with 


respect to the -- the -- the basic contention 

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that is made here, which is is that no matter 


what happened at the facility, bioassay would 


have captured it. One has to look at when the 


dates of the bioassay occurred. So leaving 


aside the issue that the most exposed 


individuals weren't sampled, the other question 


is if events were there would the general 


bioassay program capture it. And given the 


fact that you only had a few production workers 


in total that were sampled, of the 17 samples 


that show detectable levels out of the 33 that 


were taken from the routine program, the -- the 


question is if you had an event, like an 


operation of the incinerator, which puts out 


profuse amounts of smoke, and you -- that took 


place before the person was bioassayed, you'd 


capture it. But if it took place after the 


bioa-- af-- if that -- if that -- if that 


operation of that batch incinerator took place 


afterwards, it wouldn't capture it. So the 


question is, if you know the date, you can 


correlate it, then you can make that statement. 


But it seems to me that there's an awful -- 


there's an awful lot being taken on faith here 


with respect to the assumptions that the 

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bioassay automatically would have acted as an 


umbrella and captured all of the relevant 


events. 


Those are my remarks. Thank you, Dr. Ziemer 


and thank you, Board members. 


BOARD DISCUSSION


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Richard. We're now 


going to open the floor for Board discussion 


and questions. I'm going to lead it off. I 


want to ask a couple questions and Brant, if 


you would approach the mike, could you clarify 


for us the -- the 30 -- how many samples, was 


it 33 -- 33 samples. It wasn't quite clear to 


me how many individuals did -- was that 33 


individuals or 32 individuals, or -- it was not 


quite clear. 


 DR. ULSH: Dr. Ziemer, that was 33 individual 


bioassay samples. I would have to go back and 


count -- I'll -- I'll go with the number that I 


think was expressed in the letter from the 


Congressional people that it was 32. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thirty-two, okay. 


 DR. ULSH: I'm going by what they said. I'd 


have to actually look at the -- compare the 


(unintelligible). 

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 DR. ZIEMER: In the case of those that were 


identified with the fire, we have then the -- a 


single sample typically, is that the case? 


 DR. ULSH: We have --


 DR. ZIEMER: When you say eight bioassay, 


you're talking about one -- a one point -- or ­

-


 DR. ULSH: Seven bioassay collected on one day. 


 DR. ZIEMER: On one day. 


 DR. ULSH: Seven individuals sampled on one 


day. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Would NIOSH not do what they do in 


other cases where the intake date is unknown 


and assume a worst-case scenario for the intake 


date? That is the earliest possible date that 


the fire could have occurred based on some 


knowledge. You're not assuming necessarily 


that the fire took place the day before or two 


days -- you -- do you have an outside bracket 


date on the earliest possible date the fire 


could have occurred, based on either records or 


whatever? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, we do. We know that it 


occurred in the month of June. We know that 


the post bioassay samples were collected on 

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June 11th. Therefore we know that we have an 


11-day window when that fire occurred, and the 


method that you've described is exactly what we 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: Right, so you would assume June 


1st as -- or whatever date gave you the highest 


dose --


 DR. ULSH: Yes, we would. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- to get the bioassay value on 


the date of this sampling. 


 DR. ULSH: That is correct, and Mr. Miller 


mentioned that -- depending on the solubility 


of the material that's involved, in this case 


it's uranium metal so it's a -- it's an 


insoluble form of uranium, not a -- not a 


fairly soluble form, but it's an insoluble 


form. And -- but even going with the 50 


percent difference that Richard mentioned, 


that's still a boundable number. I mean it's a 


significant number in terms of dose 


reconstruction, but it's not an unknowable 


number. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That was basically my next 


question. You could assume it all to be, what 


is it, 2.3 percent enriched or whatever the 

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value was, and get an upper bound on that. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, we could. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Other questions 


here? Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. I actually read this report 


before I got also some of this background 


information and I wasn't very satisfied with 


the report nor with NIOSH's presentation here. 


If you go back to our SEC review guideli-- 


evaluation guidelines, we've really asked them 


to make an informative presentation on what 


they can do. If they believe that they can do 


-- they have adequate information for dose 


reconstruction, show us, basically. And I 


think process-wise we've tended to do more of 


that, looking at some of the pedigree of the 


data sets and so forth and part of our 


workgroup sessions and so forth. But I don't 


think they've -- they've still adequately 


demonstrated that. They may be able to. I'm 


not sure what to conclude on this particular 


SEC petition, but I don't think that they've 


made an adequate case and demonstrate us to -- 


how are they going to do the dose 


reconstruction. Can they do it, how did they 

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do it, how are they going to handle the 


different subgroups and -- and so forth. And 


if you go back in time, this particular site 


profile I think, as has been mentioned here, 


was released the day after a public comment 


period, the first chance that the people 


involved with the site had a chance to interact 


with NIOSH. Essentially the site profile was 


done. A revised site profile has not been 


completed, to my knowledge. It may be 


underway, but -- but so there's a lot of 


unknowns here and I actually think the best way 


is -- to go forward at this point for us would 


be to have SC&A do some evaluation of the site 


profile and at least try to clarify some of the 


issues and so that we can demonstrate that they 


-- how to handle a number of these technical 


issues. They may be able to be handled. It 


may be possible to do dose reconstruction here, 


but I would like to see more demonstration of 


that before reaching a conclusion on this 


particular petition. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments? Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I -- I just had a question. I'm 


just looking up there at a little bit of the 

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information, and basically we've got two years 


we're working with there. How many people were 


working at Chapman Valve? 


 DR. ULSH: Brad, I can tell you that there were 


about 100 people directly involved with the 


uranium work for the AEC. I'm going to -- Mark 


-- Mark Rolfes is our point person on Chapman 


Valve. Mark, do you have an idea of the total 


employment at Chapman Valve? 


 MR. ROLFES: I really don't have a feel for the 


number of total workers at the site. Like 


Brant said, I'd like to reiterate that we 


looked at a list of the number of people that 


were entering into the restricted area at 


Chapman Valve. 


 DR. WADE: Mark, you should come -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: He said he could hear okay. Did 


you hear okay --


THE COURT REPORTER: I got him, yeah. 


 DR. WADE: Well, we want to make sure the 


people on the phone can hear okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. 


 DR. WADE: Could you repeat your answer, Mark? 


 MR. ROLFES: Yes. We do have a list of the 


people that actually entered into the AEC­
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controlled area at Chapman Valve. I don't have 


a good feel for the number of total people that 


worked at the Chapman Valve facility outside of 


Building 23 and outside of the restricted area. 


Thank you. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Mr. Chairman? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I'll ask another question. It's 


somewhat generic, but it pertains to this -- at 


least philosophically to one of the issues 


here. Is it not true that the highest exposed 


individual at a site is not necessarily the one 


or ones with the highest external dose? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, Dr. Ziemer, you've -- you've 


identified a tacit assumption in that argument 


that the person who received the highest 


external dose also received the highest 


internal dose. That is an assumption. I would 


point out to you that -- I think it was 


mentioned that the job category of the person 


who received the highest external dose was a 


brusher, I believe it was mentioned. We do 


have bioassay results for a brusher -- maybe 


more than one, I'd have to look -- but I don't 


know if it's the same individual. But we do 


have bioassay results for that job category. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: But the obverse of my question is 


it -- is it -- it certainly is possible that 


the highest exposed individual on a site would 


be someone with no external exposure. 


 DR. ULSH: You're absolutely right. I -- I 


would be speculating (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: (Unintelligible) not necessarily 


here, just --


 DR. ULSH: Yes, the person that -- people who ­

-


 DR. ZIEMER: I just want to make sure that we 


don't assume that the highest external exposure 


is automatically the highest exposed person on 


a site. 


 DR. ULSH: That is true. As you know, Dr. 


Ziemer, the people with the highest internal 


exposure potential would be the people who were 


closest to the parts of the operation that were 


generating airborne dust or smoke at -- at 


Chapman Valve. The people that you would 


expect to have the highest external dose would 


be the people who spent the greatest total 


amount of time in close proximity to the 


radioactive material, so that is certainly 


(unintelligible) --

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 DR. ZIEMER: In this case it could very well 


coincide, but not necessarily. 


 DR. ULSH: Yes, absolutely. 


 MR. MILLER: I just want to comment that that's 


not mutually exclusive and -- and that if, to 


the extent that the individuals who were 


brushers, who were basically people that are in 


high proximity to both the physical material 


and to airborne particulate -- I mean it would 


seem logical that you would want to bioassay 


those people. My understanding subsequent to 


what Senator Kennedy's letter said is that 


they've had further time to review this and -- 


and I want to just illuminate at least what 


I've heard from them, and they can further 


correct or contradict me, as appropriate. My 


understanding is is that from having reviewed 


the data that they have -- I don't know if 


that's the entire data set that NIOSH has in 


its possession or not, and again, I can't see 


it so it's -- it's a little -- I'm -- I'm sort 


of shadow-boxing here a little bit. My 


understanding is that they looked at the -- the 


full range of the weekly film badges that were 


issued and that they took the midpoint of the 

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film badge readings and the highest was around 


600 or so millirem per week or millirads per 


week. So they started I think around 250 or so 


millirads and they looked to see if anybody who 


had more than 250 MR was bioassayed. They 


could identify nobody based on the data that 


they had in hand. So if nobody over even 250, 


at 50 percent of that, the midpoint, so that 


you're not just dealing with some outlier that 


statistically might have fallen out of the 


whatever, the brusher didn't show up on the day 


of the bioassays or whatever, then you have a 


situation here where it almost looks like this 


is really what it looks like, cohort sampling. 


And you -- you know, what we've learned, if 


anything, is that if you have cohort sampling, 


you're going to have a hard time developing a 


representative sample here. And -- and I think 


the burden really is on NIOSH to show what 


Brant speculated there is demonstrated in the 


data. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Let's see, Dr. Lockey. 


 DR. LOCKEY: You had mentioned that the total 


work duration was seven months. Is that right? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 

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 DR. LOCKEY: At this facility? Do you -- can 


you compare this data to similar processes and 


break it down into number samples obtained per 


worker per time? How does it compare if you do 


that? 


 DR. ULSH: Off the top of my head, I couldn't 


do that in terms of -- if you looked at other 


facilities that conducted similar types of 


operations, Bethlehem Steel, Simonds Saw comes 


to mind. I don't know exactly what the 


correlation would be between the scale of the 


operation and the amount -- the number of 


bioassay samples that were taken in those 


operations. I don't have those at -- at my 


fingertips. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Mr. Chairman? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Brad, did you have another 


question? 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, I just -- to go on from 


where I was going, you say that this has been 


in the seven-month period -- that the bioassays 


were -- and we've got a two-year period op-- 


I'm not understanding that. I'm --


 DR. ULSH: Again I might call on Mark, but we 


have indication that the actual machining 

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operations occurred from May to November in 


1948. Now the radioactive material, the 


uranium, could have been on-site as early as 


January of 1948, but that doesn't mean that's 


when they started actually machining that 


material. There's also some indication -- and 


again, the rec-- the record here is a little 


unclear as to when the last shipment of uranium 


scrap was sent from the site. It -- there's 


some indication that it was all gone by the end 


of 1948. The weight of the evidence suggests 


that. However there's also, I believe -- and 


I'm going to ask Mark to correct me if I'm 


wrong -- the possibility that it remained on-


site for a few months into 1949. And to 


account for that possibility, Brad, we have 


extended the covered -- the period for this 


class to be all of those two calendar years. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Do we have any time when this -- 


the furnace was supposedly running? Was it 


just during the -- the melting processes or -- 


or -- or what? 


 DR. ULSH: Well, let me tell you what we do 


know. The purpose of a chip incinerator or a 


cracking furnace is to treat uranium chips, to 

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oxidize them so they are less pyrophoric and 


they don't present as much of a hazard when 


you're shipping that material. So it would be 


logical to assume -- and this, I would readily 


admit, is an assumption -- that that type of 


process occurred near the end of the -- the 


machining period. But that -- I've got to 


admit to you, Brad, that is an assumption. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Okay. Another one that just kind 


of interests me, we've got a time period then 


and then we've got basically about 40 years 


later, and this was the D&D process? 


 DR. ULSH: Yes. 


 MR. CLAWSON: What was going on in this 


facility the rest of the time? 


 DR. ULSH: Mark Rolfes, please approach the 


microphone. Chapman Valve did continue with 


their -- their other operations, but I think 


Mark can maybe... 


 MR. ROLFES: Chapman Valve was a valve 


facility. They produced valves of several 


different types for several different 


organizations. One of their major products 


were fire hydrants and valves for the fire 


hydrants themselves. 

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 MR. CLAWSON: So 40 years later we deconned it? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think his question basically is 


did they continue to use that part of the 


facility for other work which it was in a 


contaminated state. I assume that's your 


question, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Yeah, I just -- I just find -- 


I'm just trying to understand it. Did they 


close this facility off and then 40 years later 


or something clo--


 DR. ULSH: Yeah, let me give you a little bit 


of information, Brad. At the conclusion of the 


AEC work, they did make some efforts at 


decontamination. They washed down the 


facility. In -- in preparation for this work 


they constructed walls inside this building to 


wall off this area from the rest of the 


building. And at the conclusion of that work, 


those -- there was some dismantlement that went 


on and they did attempt to wash down the 


surfaces. They had to make several attempts at 


that. I think what we're talking about here in 


terms of the D&D effort that occurred in the 


'90s occurred under the FUSRAP program. Now 


Mark, am I correct in that? 

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 MR. ROLFES: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ULSH: Okay. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Richard. 


 MR. MILLER: Mr. Chairman, I think Aaron Wilson 


from western Mass. (unintelligible) -- he just 


sort of buzzed me and asked if he could be 


heard 'cause I think he's quite familiar with 


the history of Chapman Valve. Aaron, are you 


there? 


 MR. WILSON: Yes, I am. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, proceed. 


 MR. WILSON: Mr. Chairman, I've interviewed 


dozens of family members and former workers, 


and I just wanted to make a quick comment about 


the total number of employees. I have a 


payroll register sitting here on my desk from 


1948 and '49 from Chapman Valve. There were --


it was one of the largest employers in -- in 


the area with more than 1,000 employees. And 


in fact when you look at the chip burner -- the 


smokestack for that going up the side of the 


building was venting a lot of this material 


into the air throughout the whole facility. 


And I'm not sure that a sample of 33 workers is 


really representative of the number of people 

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who were exposed as they were walking back and 


forth underneath the smokestack. 


One other point was it was asked about what 


other type of radioactive materials might have 


been used at Chapman Valve. I've -- like I 


said, I've talked to many former workers. 


Other than the uranium that they processed in 


Building 23, the only other material that's 


ever been mentioned was radium pills which were 


used in an X-ray process to look at the valves 


that were being sent to the United States Navy. 


And incidentally, the enriched uranium sample 


that was taken, it's my understanding that that 


sample was taken from the ground which was 


directly underneath where the smokestack from 


the chip burner exited Building 23. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Yes, Mike --


oh, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Good to meet you. I had a 


question, Brant, or maybe a clarification. In 


your presentation I think you mentioned that 


urinalysis is at the top of the hierarchy for 


approaches in terms of calculating internal 


dose. I don't dispute that, but I think your 


assertion was that you have urinalysis records 

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to do dose reconstruction for these claimants. 


You're really using coworker models. 


 DR. ULSH: You're absolutely correct, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: How many of these 124 have 


individual urinalysis records, or do -- you 


probably don't know that off-hand. I don't 


know --


 DR. ZIEMER: Thirty-two. 


 MR. GRIFFON: No, of the claimants, I'm saying. 


 DR. ULSH: So you're asking of the 33 non-fire 


urinalysis results, how many people does that 


represent is what you're asking? 


 MR. GRIFFON: How many claimant -- how many 


claimants have individual (unintelligible) -- 


 DR. ULSH: Oh, how many --


 MR. GRIFFON: -- data. 


 DR. ULSH: -- claimants. 


 MR. GRIFFON: And you may not know that or -- 


 DR. ULSH: I think you're right. I think 


you're right, I don't know that off the top of 


my head. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I'm guessing -- my point 


is, I'm guessing at this point you -- you've 


relied on a coworker model to assign internal 


doses for any -- any dose reconstructions that 

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have been done for those -- for the -- out of 


the 124. 


 DR. ULSH: Certainly what we would do, Mark, is 


if we have actual individual bioassay results 


that relate to a claimant, we would use that. 


But for individuals for whom we do not have 


individual bioassay results, we would rely on 


coworker data in this case. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I guess the other thing that -- 


that I just wanted to pursue a little bit, in 


the letter that was read to us, one out of two 


samples were done for isotopic analysis of the 


uranium and one came up as -- as slight-- as 


slightly enriched. I guess the other thing -- 


I don't -- I don't dispute that you could 


modify the site profile -- modify your 


methodology slightly and recalculate doses 


based on enriched uranium. I guess what it 


raises in my mind is were there other processes 


that we're missing at this -- at this facility 


that -- that involved other materials coming 


in, enriched uranium use, et cetera. That -- I 


guess that would be the bigger concern I would 


have is, you know, are we missing some 


production that went on over -- over a time 

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period there. And I know you probably -- 


you've looked and you haven't found, but it 


raises a question in my mind, I guess. 


 DR. ULSH: Of course, let me state from the 


outset, we can't prove a negative, as you know. 


However, and you're correct, Mark, that we have 


seen no indication of other operations that 


occurred during that time frame. However, you 


are echoing some of the concerns that were 


expressed in the SEC petition. Those concerns 


dealt with accounting for the cracking furnace 


and for other smaller fires. So your concern 


echoes some of the concerns expressed by the 


petitioner. 


 MR. GRIFFON: One -- one final before Richard 


gets up. On your air sampling slide you 


mentioned that there was some air sampling 


data, did -- did NIOSH make any attempt to look 


at that in terms of -- of assessing whether you 


were in the same ball park as your conclusions 


for your urinalysis data? In other words, did 


it -- did it -- was it consistent with -- I 


know you're not going to get the same kind of 


intake numbers exactly, but were the air 


sampling levels consistent with what you found 

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in your urinalysis samples? 


 DR. ULSH: I believe the answer to that is yes, 


Mark. I know that we looked at the air 


sampling results and compared those with 


numbers that the Health and Safety Laboratory 


produced for other facilities. Now these are 


air samples compared to air samples from other 


facilities. In terms of your question, though, 


you're asking if we estimated an intake based 


on the air sampling data at Chapman Valve and 


compared that with the urinalysis data that we 


have there. I don't know the answer to that. 


Mark, are you -- I -- has he dis-- oh, there 


you are. Did you do something like that, Mark, 


or --


 MR. ROLFES: What was the question again? 


 DR. ULSH: The question --


 DR. WADE: You'll have to come to the 


microphone. You might as well stay here. 


 MR. GRIFFON: It sounds like it wouldn't have 


been -- well, go ahead, I'll let him answer it. 


 DR. ULSH: The question that Mark asked -- that 


Mark Griffon asked, Mark, was did we compare 


the intakes that we would have estimated from 


the air sampling, the one day of air sampling 

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that we had at Chapman Valve, did we compare 


those with the urinalysis results that we had 


for Chapman Valve to see whether they came up 


with similar estimates. 


 MR. ROLFES: I believe -- we didn't necessarily 


do that within the Technical Basis Document, 


but we did take a look at the air monitoring 


data that we have and compared it to the 


bioassay data that we have and reconstructed 


intakes from those bioassay data, and we 


compared it to the air monitoring data and 


those were roughly a good fit. So we did do 


something, but not in -- in the formal 


Technical Basis Documents. 


 DR. ULSH: And as you might imagine, I suspect 


the confidence intervals are wide on that -- I 


suspect. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Richard Miller, 


you had some -- oh, another comment? Oh, 


another comment? 


 (No responses) 


 Okay, Richard. 


 MR. MILLER: Just -- just to respond I think on 


-- on point, on page 11 of the SEC evaluation 


report there's a table under Section 4.4 -- I 

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know this is data as of May 1st, 2006, but it 


says here that of 106 cases who met the 


proposed class definition criteria, which means 


that -- that's 106 there, that's -- 106 is more 


than the Building 23 100 that we heard earlier, 


but whatever it is, five of those had internal 


dose data. So everybody else, I would assume ­

- and correct me if I'm wrong -- either relied 


on OTIB-4 or relied on your site profile. I 


assume you're using OTIB-4 in part for this 


facility. Is that correct? 


 DR. ULSH: I can't answer that with certainty. 


I could check on that. I don't know what 


methodologies were applied for the -- for the 


92 dose reconstructions that we have completed. 


I don't have a handle on what methodologies 


were employed for that. 


 MR. MILLER: The point is is that of -- of five 


even out of 91 shows that you're largely 


relying either on a coworker model of some sort 


here. 


BOARD DECISION


 DR. ZIEMER: Board members, I don't know if you 


have -- oh, Jim, you have an additional 


question? 

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 DR. MELIUS: I don't have an additional 


question, I was going to make a motion, but if 


you have --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Well, before you make your 


motion, I was going -- simply going to instruct 


you that you have probably three possibilities 


for action. One is to support the petition, 


one is to deny it, the other is to seek some 


additional clarification of some technical 


information, perhaps with or without the help 


of the contractor. So Plan C has some subparts 


as well. Perhaps Dr. Melius has a -- a 


recommendation that we can react to. 


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah, I would make a motion that 


we defer action on this petition -- SEC 


petition and that we ask SC&A to do further 


evaluation and then -- I'm not sure whether 


their action should -- that evaluation should 


be under sort of the site profile task or under 


their SC&A (sic) task. I think it's really a ­

- maybe a mixture of both, to some extent, but 


that they then come back to us with a report 


and we make -- take the steps from there. 


 MR. ELLIOTT: The revised site profile will be 


out in a matter of days -- 

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 DR. MELIUS: Okay, that was --


 MR. ELLIOTT: -- next week, I (unintelligible). 


 DR. MELIUS: -- one of my --


 MR. ELLIOTT: It should have been here this 


week, but we didn't make it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: In any event, let me interpret 


your motion. I believe that in the context of 


what we're doing, we would ask them to do this 


as a site profile task --


 DR. MELIUS: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- so I'm going to interpret your 


motion in that manner, if there's no objection, 


and ask if there's a second. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Second here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And second. And now the motion is 


open for discussion. Do you have a question? 


 MR. MILLER: Just a question. You know, if --


if the site profile review criteria were the 


same as the SEC evaluation criteria that the 


Board had adopted, it would be I think of no 


consequence. But the criteria are so specific 


in your guidance that the Board promulgated 


back I think in January or March -- I guess you 


approved it in March -- I would respectfully 


ask that -- that that criteria be the -- the 

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criteria against which the SEC evaluation 


report be looked at and that both be considered 


as part of an aggregate of the whole. How you 


want to deal with the contracting matter is 


immaterial to me, but I -- I think people would 


like to see this SEC evaluation report 


evaluated under that litmus test. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The Chair's suggestion that it be 


done as an SEC task I think automatically 


brings those criteria into play. 


 MR. MILLER: Okay, but I thought Dr. Melius's 


proposal --


 DR. WADE: You said site profile. 


 MR. MILLER: -- was site profile. 


 DR. MELIUS: Oh, did I? 


 DR. WADE: You meant -- you misspoke, that's 


all. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. I didn't even hear what I 


said 'cause I knew what I meant. 


 DR. WADE: He meant SEC. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I -- I had intended to say SEC. 

 MR. MILLER: Oh, I apologize. 

 DR. ZIEMER: That's a senior moment. That's my 

story and I'm sticking to it. 


 MR. MILLER: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: I sometimes hate to admit it, but 


we may have actually been on the same 


wavelength there, Richard. 


 DR. WADE: This is a good thing. This is a 


good thing. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So discussion on the motion. The 


motion, if approved, would delay action in 


terms of a recommendation from the Board. And 


I think this has no impact any longer on the 


time clock because the Board's action is not 


under a time clock, I believe, so we're not 


compelled, I don't believe, Lew, to complete 


this in a certain period of time, but we do 


want to move ahead expeditiously so that if the 


motion is approved it would include tasking the 


contractor to do an evaluation on our behalf. 


Okay, Wanda Munn. 


 MS. MUNN: Only one observation relative to an 


earlier statement with respect to having NIOSH 


show us that they can in fact do a dose 


reconstruction of one sort or another. This is 


the identical question that has arisen in 


working groups on more than one occasion. We 


have consistently asked that that rock be 


brought back to us, and the agency has 

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consistently brought the rock that we asked 


back to us. If we are going to ask our 


contractor to review this SEC petition, I hope 


that it is not inherent in that request that we 


again ask the agency to continue to prove that 


they can do what they have said they have done 


and have shown us repeatedly that they can do 


in other circumstances. I recognize Chapman 


Valve was not at issue when these prior 


requests were made. However, there's no 


question that the process involved requires the 


same type of information and the same type of 


assumptions, so far as can be determined by 


what we know now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Dr. Melius. 


 DR. MELIUS: I'm not sure whether I'm agreeing 


or disagreeing with Wanda, but my -- I think 


what I said to start with was I did not think 


that NIOSH had made that demonstration to us. 


And I was disappointed by both the report and 


more importantly by the presentation today that 


we didn't get a more thorough demonstration of 


what they believe they can do, but I didn't 


think adequately showed us that they can do it. 


Instead we heard what was wrong with the 

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petitioners' questions and then a simple 


statement that we can do it and -- we can do 


dose reconstruction. And I think what we've 


asked for -- it was -- like I said before, was 


demonstrate it to us, and it wasn't 


demonstrated today, I thought, adequately. And 


so I think we're trying to reach the same end 


and I think the question is whether -- sort of 


where's the -- the right format and process for 


doing that and it may be a question of timing. 


This might have been started -- done before our 


guidelines were out and things like that so I'm 


not --


 MS. MUNN: We have done it --


 DR. MELIUS: -- necessarily faulting -- 


 MS. MUNN: We have done it in working groups 


before and -- and they've always demonstrated 


that they did --


 DR. MELIUS: And I think we've got a good 


process for the working groups, but it hasn't ­

- for various reasons, it didn't work here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Mark. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I just -- I just do have to 


respond to that 'cause I think I do disagree 


with that. You know, we have asked for that 

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and I think that the workgroups have really 


provided a good vehicle in that sense because 


they -- they've -- the process has worked. In 


the case of Cyclotron workers it was presented 


to us that they could reconstruct doses at Y12. At the end of the day, they realized the 


data they thought was there and was available, 


when they tried to demonstrate to us that they 


could do it, they could not do it. So I think 


there are -- were certain subsets, at least, 


that when they dug deeper they realized -- so I 


think that's why we go down that route a little 


bit. I think -- my sense for Chapman Valve is 


that it's a very short time period, it's a -- 


you know, I -- I can't imagine as lengthy a 


process, but I think we need to at least 


investigate a few of these questions of -- of 


the -- of this data and -- and the -- and the 


approach they're going to use to reconstruct 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Board members, if the 


motion passes, then I'd just give you a heads 


up that we will need to add a workgroup for 


this particular site to work with our 


contractor and with NIOSH to address whatever 

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issues emerge. 


 Mr. Presley. 


 MR. PRESLEY: I'd like to hear from John Mauro. 


What's -- if we do pass this, what's the time 


frame that you all can jump on this and get 


this done? I mean I hate to see this drug out 


over the next year or so. 


DR. MAURO: Absolutely not. The wheels are 


turning as I was listening and I think the 


folks did a very nice job in identifying all 


the issues. The questions that Brad has raised 


and everyone else are exactly the ones that I 


was thinking about. I've already reviewed the 


case where I looked at all the data, and as I 


reviewed it, all the questions came to mind, 


that is okay, given the -- it's called an 


exposure matrix as opposed to a TBD, site 


profile, it's a relatively small document. And 


as I was doing the case, I said okay, we're 


taking the information here on face value -- 


you know, I have -- I had (unintelligible) 


questions that came up and -- and I wrote my 


critique. What I'm getting at is this is an 


easy one. Okay? Assuming that we can get 


access to all the measurements, how they were 

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done, when they were done, questions like 


relative to when the fires may have been, big ­

- good one, and the results, whether they were 


fluorometric or they were gross alpha or 


isotopic -- I mean this is a -- an easy -- I 


hate to say --


 DR. ZIEMER: But you're prepared to move ahead 


DR. MAURO: We could start -- I'm sorry -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- without delay. 


DR. MAURO: I'm sorry. The answer is, we could 


start immediately and we're talking having a 


draft report -- and I wanted to stick my neck 


out -- oh, at the most, two months from now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, John. Any other 


comments, Board members? Anyone wish to speak 


for or against the motion? 


 (No responses) 


I want to make sure Mike is still on the line. 


Mike, are you still with us? 


 DR. WADE: We're not hearing. Go ahead. 


We'll get Mike's phone. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Board members, are you ready to 


vote on the motion? 


In effect, and without quoting it, the motion 

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is to delay action on the petition and to -- to 


task our contractor to assist us in the -- in 


assessing the issues related to this petition 


as they've been discussed. 


All in favor say aye. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


Those opposed, no. 


 (No responses) 


 Any abstentions? 


(Indicating) 


Okay, the record will show Dr. Roessler and Ms. 


Munn have abstained. But the ayes have it and 


the motion carries. 


 DR. WADE: And the Chair's vote. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And the Chair -- the Chair would 


vote "aye". 


 MR. CLAWSON: We don't have any conflict of 


interests? 


 MR. PRESLEY: With Chapman Valve? I don't much 


think so. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Just thought I'd check. I didn't 


-- I never know. 


 MS. MUNN: I don't think on the Board. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. 


 DR. WADE: Do we want to deal with the work-- 

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the working group issue while it's fresh in our 


mind? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Since our next agenda item is 


Board work time -- well, maybe we should see if 


any of the petitioners have any additional 


comments for us. I don't know if Mary Realle 


or --


 MS. REALLE: I'm here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- or Johnny Ryan are still on the 


line. 


 MS. REALLE: Mary Ann and Darlene are here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Any additional comments? Any 


additional comments from the petitioners? 


 MS. REALLE: Do I have any additional comments? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. Yes. 


 MS. WU: This is Portia with Senator Kennedy's 


staff. 


 MS. REALLE: Hi, Portia. 


 MS. WU: Hi. I just wanted to say thank you to 


the Board for their thorough consideration. We 


look forward to working with them and with 


NIOSH as we go forward. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Very good. And I assume that as 


we proceed with the workgroup and working with 


SC&A and NIOSH that we will keep the 

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petitioners informed of workgroup meetings and 


keep them apprised of any issues that arise. 


 DR. WADE: Right, we'll follow our normal mode, 


which is the workgroup meetings will be open to 


the public. We'll invite the petitioners and 


will have the ability to fully participate in 


the meetings. 


BOARD WORKING TIME


 DR. ZIEMER: Now we need to have a workgroup of 


hopefully four individuals who will be willing 


and able to work on this particular issue, the 


Chapman Valve site. Do you have 


(unintelligible) list? 


 DR. WADE: I can get it. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The Chair is always willing to 


take volunteers for workgroups if there are 


individuals that -- that wish to work. 


DR. ROESSLER: May I make a recommendation? 


 DR. ZIEMER: You certainly may. 


DR. ROESSLER: This is very much a 


bioassay/internal dosimetry situation, and we 


have one of the best experts in the country on 


that, so I would hope that John Poston would 


volunteer for this workgroup. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, John Poston -- John Poston 

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has volunteered to chair the workgroup. 


UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. 


 MR. CLAWSON: Way to put that. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mark has volunteered to 


participate. We'd like to get at least two 


others. I -- I need -- 


UNIDENTIFIED: Dr. Ziemer? 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- need some balance here. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I would --


 DR. ZIEMER: Brad -- okay, one other person. 


 MR. GIBSON: I'll volunteer, Dr. Ziemer. 


 MR. GRIFFON: I think that Gen should 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Gen Roessler, thank you. Oh, hang 


on, Mike may be volunteering. 


 MR. GIBSON: Yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Mike, are you on the line? 


 (No responses) 


Mike, are you on the line? 


 MR. GIBSON: Yes, I was trying to volunteer. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Let's -- let's add Mike as 


an alternate and specify that the alternates 


can certainly participate in the meeting, so 


basically have a five-person workgroup on this. 


Don't want to overload people, but always like 

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to take care -- or take advantage of volunteer 


workers. 


 Okay, did you get that? 


 DR. WADE: Yes, I can repeat. As I understand 


it, the workgroup that will focus on Chapman 


Valve SEC petition will be chaired by Dr. 


Poston and include Mark, Brad and Gen Roessler, 


with Mike listed as an alternate but able to 


participate. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, we don't even have to call 


it an alternate. Let's just make it a five-


person -- just make sure that we have enough 


people. Okay, that'll be fine. 


 Okay -- 


 DR. WADE: I'd like to, one more thing -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: One more thing before we break. 


 DR. WADE: And that is to try and return to the 


subcommittee activity relative to individual DR 


cases six -- excuse me, 21 to 60. I -- I hope 


now that everyone has in their possession the 


draft of the letter to the Secretary and the 


attachments. And I don't know, Mark, if you 


want to walk us through this. I think we're 


poised to --


 DR. ZIEMER: I think we distributed a -- a 

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clean copy of the draft came around earlier. 


 MR. GRIFFON: Stu's table, same as the... 


(Pause) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we have a copy of the 


letter. Stu's table is with the -- in the old 


-- under your old tab, so pull that out. Then 


you have Attachment -- well, actually 


Attachment -- or Attachment 1 is the table that 


was in your old tab. Attachment 2 is the SC&A 


summary, and there's two parts to that. It's 


the summary of 18 case reviews and a summary of 


22 case reviews. The second 20 is really 18 


and the third 20 is really 22. And then the -- 


the final thing is the -- well, Attachment 3 is 


the methodology for categorizing and ranking 


the cases. And then the matrix is Attachment 


4. 


Does anybody find that they're missing 


something? 


(Pause) 


I'm -- I'm going to entertain -- actually this 


comes as a motion from the subcommittee to 


accept this package to send to the Secretary. 


I would like to add a caveat. I'm going to 


task Mark with this. We found in the first 

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package that the numbers in the SC&A tables did 


not match the numbers in the narrative paper; 


that is, in the letter itself. I'm going to 


ask Mark to double-check and make sure the 


numbers in the narrative match the numbers on 


the table, so this is basically the equivalent 


of a grammatical check 'cause if they're not 


matching up it's basically equivalent to a 


typo. But -- and by -- by the -- by the 


numbers, I'm looking at the bottom line, for 


example, on the -- the 18 reviewed cases where 


I have 113 -- let's see now, wait a minute, is 


it 113 deficiencies, of which 103 were low. 


And then on the second set there were 64 


deficiencies, of which 50 were low. And it's 


the total of those that we want to make sure 


the narrative matches that. That'll only take 


him a few minutes, and I guess, Mark, if they ­

- if anything differs, just report to us, but ­

-


 MR. GRIFFON: The one thing, in the first 


letter I -- I should point out first of all 


that my letter was the correct numbers. SC&A 


had the revi-- and why this happened is SC&A 


reports comes out -- comes out first and then 

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we go through our -- our resolution process. 


And what happened was a couple of the findings 


were -- were changed so the rankings 


(unintelligible) --


 DR. ZIEMER: (Unintelligible) --


 MR. GRIFFON: Right. 


 DR. ZIEMER: They were subdivided into pieces, 


so one finding became two and so on. 


 MR. GRIFFON: So one thing I'm looking at here 


in these -- in these SC&A executive summaries 


is that there are several items that say -- 


that say "under review", and I'm not sure, some 


of those may have -- since this report was 


issued we may have -- have decided on those one 


way or the other, so I'll check those numbers, 


but essentially they're -- they're pretty 


close. 


 DR. ZIEMER: So Board members, are we ready to 


take action on this recommendation to accept 


this package as a report to the Secretary, 


subject to minor editorial changes? 


Okay, all in favor say aye. 


 (Affirmative responses) 


 Any opposed, no. 


 (No responses) 

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 Abstentions? 


 (No responses) 


And Mike Gibson, I don't know if you have all 


the stuff you need there. Is Mike still on the 


line? 

 MR. GIBSON: Yes, I'm still here. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Is Mike on the line yet? 

 MR. GIBSON: Yes. Based on what I've heard, I 

vote "aye". 

 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you, Mike. Thank 

you. Motion carries, thank you very much. 


Board members, I want to alert you to another 


thing. You have in the back of your booklet 


three sets of minutes that we will need to take 


action on tomorrow. So what that means is that 


you're just going to have to stay out of the 


casinos tonight, out of the shows, and read 


minutes. But I did want to alert you to that, 


that we have three sets of minutes that we'll 


want to act on during Board working -- working 


time tomorrow. 


 The other reminder is that we are going to 


reconvene this evening at 7:30 for the public 


comment period. And with that, we will recess 


for dinner. 

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 DR. WADE: Okay. Well done. 


 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 4:50 p.m. 


to 7:30 p.m.) 


PUBLIC COMMENT


 DR. ZIEMER: I'll call the session to order. 


This is the public comment session of the 


Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. 


My name is Paul Ziemer. I'm the Chairman of 


the Advisory Board, and I want to take just a 


couple of minutes here at the beginning to tell 


you a little bit about what this Board does and 


what they do not do, because often we find that 


at these meetings people don't always realize 


what the role of this group is. Much as they 


would like to think so, they are not all-


powerful. They actually have somewhat limited 


roles in the program, and I want to sort of 


define for you what those are. 


Let me tell you first of all that the group 


here -- and the full Board is not here tonight. 


Actually one of our members is not here this 


week due to illness. Another may not be here 


tonight. He just learned that his father had a 


heart attack and I don't know if he's having to 


leave or not, but Mark may come in in a little 

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bit. 


But in any event, this group is a group of 


independent individuals. They're not working 


for NIOSH. They don't work for Department of 


Labor and for the most part -- I say for the 


most part -- not for the Department of Energy, 


but rather are appointed by the President of 


the United States to serve as an independent 


Advisory Board for NIOSH's part of the 


compensation program. And specifically they 


have a responsibility to advise the Secretary 


of Health and Human Services on certain issues 


dealing with the compensation program. 


Those issues are the following. They are to 


advise the Secretary on the quality of the dose 


reconstructions that are done. And this is 


done by sort of audit procedure. This Board 


does not do dose reconstructions. They are not 


a review board for folks who have not been 


successful in a compensation case. Rather they 


are an overseeing group that tries to audit the 


quality of dose reconstructions. And part of 


that audit process is learning from folks such 


as yourself what your issues are. We -- we 


don't get into the individual cases as a Board, 

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but we do, from the -- the various incidents 


and various experiences that people have, learn 


something about how -- how things are working, 


or from other people perhaps not working, as 


the case may be. But that is one of our 


functions, auditing the quality of the dose 


reconstructions. 


A second responsibility this Board has is to 


advise the Secretary of Health and Human 


Services on the petitions for Special Exposure 


Cohort. And of course here in Nevada you do 


have a petition that is in process. And on 


those petitions we have the responsibility to 


review the petitions and to review the -- the 


advice given by NIOSH and make a separate 


determination or a separate recommendation to 


the Secretary of Health and Human Services as 


to whether or not such a petition should be 


granted. So those are two main things that 


this body does. 


We also get involved in advising the Secretary 


on anything related to that, such as the 


quality of the site profiles that are developed 


in connection both with dose reconstruction and 


with the Special Exposure Cohorts. 

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Again, we don't -- we don't deal with 


individual cases. We're not a review board or 


act in that capacity. 


We do appreciate the public comments that we 


get that give us insight as to how the system 


is working. Perhaps where there are issues 


that you have, in some cases, in a generic way, 


we can help solve those. Or if you have a 


particular problem, we're often able to point 


you to the right people to help you. And I 


might tell you that there are a number of NIOSH 


staff people here, many here in the room 


tonight that will be able to help in individual 


cases if there's -- if there is something that 


you have a concern about or need to talk to one 


of them, we'll -- we'll try to link you up with 


the right person. 


Let me tell you a little more about the 


individuals here. I'm not -- their names are 


on the table. But we have a mix of folks, and 


this is specified in the law that has 


established the compensation program. This 


Board is, under law, required to be made up of 


some physicians -- occupational health 


physicians, mainly; some health physicists or 

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technical people, mainly health physicists or 


nuclear engineers; individuals representing the 


worker community or the labor community, and so 


that is the kind of mix of folks we have here. 


Some of these are retired, such as me. I'm a 


retired professor of health physics from Purdue 


University. Let me point out here we have Dr. 


Poston, who is a Texas A&M professor; should be 


retired, but hasn't. He's in health physics. 


Dr. Gen Roessler, retired, health physics, 


University of Florida. Wanda Munn has a 


nuclear engineering background. Bob Presley 


over here, who has spent most of his career at 


Oak Ridge in the weapons program and spent much 


of his time here in Nevada at the Test Site 


installing and putting together weapons -- and 


I can't tell you what he did or I'd have to be 


shot afterwards. Dr. Lockey is a public health 


physician. Who did I miss here? Brad Clawson 


is an operator -- let's see, give me the right 


title, Brad. 


 MR. CLAWSON: I'm a senior (unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Senior operator, Idaho National 


Laboratory. I mentioned Dr. Lockey. Dr. Wade 


is what's called the Designated Federal 

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Official. A board such as this is required to 


have a fed sit there and be our -- our -- what 


do you do for us? He makes sure we follow the 


federal regulations that we act under. He's --


he's great, and helps keep us on track in terms 


of our agendas and so on. 


 The other fella, who some people think has a 


breathing problem and is on oxygen, is actually 


our court reporter. And I should tell you Ray 


Green, for several years, has been credentialed 


as the top court reporter in this country, so 


we're glad to have Ray with us. 


Okay, so that's the group here and Dr. Melius 


may be able to join us in a little bit. He 


also is an occupational health physician and is 


not able to be here right at the moment but 


hopefully will be able to come in later. 


So that's the group. We -- and I have to be 


careful 'cause I get to talking too much. 


We're going to go right down the list as I have 


it, and people have indicated what their times 


were. I'm not real nasty. Monitor your own 


time and try to stick with it. We're going to 


start with John Funk, and John did address the 


Board yesterday and he's back. John -- and any 

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of you are welcome to use either this mike or 


the podium, but this is probably better. 


 MR. GIBSON: Dr. Ziemer, just for the record, 


I'm on the line. This is Mike. 


 MR. FUNK: Dr. Wade, other Board members, I'd 


like to expound a little bit on my testimony 


from yesterday. 


 DR. WADE: Hold on for a second. We have --


 MR. FUNK: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. WADE: Okay. Thank you. Mike Gibson, you 


might say is on the line, a Board member, and 


say who he is. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay, thank you. I neglected 


to mention that Mike Gibson, the Board member 


who I mentioned was not here due to illness, is 


with us by telephone. Mike is basically a -- 


background in representing the unions and 


currently is a private consultant, but that's 


his background. So Mike, I hope you're on the 


line and able to hear okay. So -- okay, we'll 


proceed. 


 MR. FUNK: Is it all right to go ahead? Can 


you hear me? 


 MR. PRESLEY: No, turn that... 


 MR. FUNK: Can you hear me now? 

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 MR. PRESLEY: No, I don't think that mike's -- 


 MR. FUNK: I'd like to expound on some of the 


things I talked about yesterday that we didn't 


get a chance to cover, and one of the main 


issues is the practice of reuse at the Nevada 


Test Site. It has never been mentioned 


(unintelligible) I can't find it anywhere, but 


we used all the equipment on that site, all the 


test trailers, the office stations which were 


buildings that were designed to 


(unintelligible) the coaxial cables and moni-- 


send signals (unintelligible) equipment. These 


were large, 100,000-pound buildings -- excuse 


me -- yeah, 100,000-pound buildings. They had 


ten shock mounts on them and they just -- the 


shock mounts we built would withstand ten Gs of 


force. 


The reason I mention this, 'cause all too often 


if you say you worked in area three carpenter 


shop, you get tagged as a shop carpenter. It 


goes back to NIOSH and the way they look at it, 


you never left the shop so how could you 


possibly be exposed? Well, the shop area was 


merely a staging area. The iron workers had a 


shed; that was their staging area. The 

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operators had a yard; that was their staging -- 


(unintelligible) so forth and so forth. So we 


got to take away these titles being tagged to 


us and we have to understand that these -- when 


we say area three carpenter shop, we really 


mention this as a staging area and not an area 


where -- we worked there sometimes when we had 


shop work to do, but the majority of the time 


people spent in the field. There's not just 


carpenters, there was laborers, there was all 


craft-- there was exactly 13 crafts on the Test 


Site which covered 22 jurisdictions. And there 


was I believe 26 separate collective bargain 


agreements out there, so that shows you how 


complex this really is. And every craft had 


their own welder. So you have a carpenter, you 


have electricians, you got pipe fitters -- and 


then again, on top of that, you have a welder 


representing each one of them crafts. This is 


no -- nowhere (unintelligible) out of my 


understanding. 


Now the work that we did down there we did not 


call standard construction work like downtown 


when you're building a building. The work was 


generally supportive work supporting the users 

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-- well, which we referred to as users. It's 


the scientists out of the United States Energy 


Research Developers. Our job was to go down 


there, do the mechanical work that they would 


do and they would supervise it. So we were 


essentially partners with the users. So for us 


to get tagged in the crafts and for us to be 


identified with the crafts is not a correct 


assumption of what we did. 


And I'd like to go further along and get up to 


the tunnels. I look in a dictionary's 


definition of a tunnel, it's a hole through a 


mountain where it goes in and comes out. Well, 


yeah, that's a (unintelligible). These were 


not the case out there. These were cavities 


that were cut into the mountains by miners. 


Once they were cut into the mountains, other 


crafts came in. You had carpenters came in, 


you had pipe fitters, you had electric, you -- 


every craft there was was inside them tunnels, 


and they all had a certain job to do. 


Now these people should be referred to as 


underground workers, not miners. And all too 


often you say you worked a tunnel; well, what 


craft are you in? Well, I was in another 

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craft. Well, you couldn't have been in there 


because only miners went in there. That's not 


the truth. That's not the case. There was all 


crafts -- in fact, the miners, once the tests 


got underway, were the minority in there. And 


less than probably eight percent of the people 


inside the tunnel was actually miners. The 


rest of them was from all sources. So the 


tunnel was essentially a laboratory carved out 


of the mountain and it was -- the only needs 


that were developed in there was for laboratory 


needs. This was -- no creature comforts in 


there. There was no running water and no 


toilet system or no sewerage system. You built 


it big enough to put what you had to put in 


there, test equipment. That's all you did. 


As far as the air supply coming in there, it 


was minimum. In fact, I showed some of the 


people here today from Sanford Cohen and some 


of the others what the -- the air lines -- 


there was four air lines went in there 36-inch 


diameter, and they had roughly, my calculation, 


about -- it come out 21 feet a minute, but I 


don't have my figures or my mathematic figures 


here, but it translated to three air changes a 

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day. In this room right now there's six air 


changes an hour at the least and ten at the 


maximum, so that tells you what the air flow 


was like in there. The oxy levels would have 


been far below anything accepted in any other 


area. 


And not only did you have this bad air, but you 


had a lot of ambient toxics, especially diesel 


exhaust. Not till 1986 was a catalytic 


converter put on a motor that went in them 


tunnels, and they had to buy -- even had to go 


overseas to get that. They bought Dukes* 


diesels after that, but the old American 


Plymouth diesels -- that's what they were, 


Plymouth -- that worked back in there. They 


had nothing more than a box of soapsuds that 


the exhaust would pass through and exit into 


the tunnel and that was supposed to be 


(unintelligible). All it did was make it smell 


better, but it didn't catch anything, and there 


was a lot of diesel exhaust in there. 


I don't have it with me today, I'm going to 


give it to you tomorrow, but I've got a Peter 


(unintelligible) underground book which I was 


given when I worked at Yucca Mountain and I'd 

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like to make note of that, that a catalytic 


converter's not even mentioned that, and that 


was in 1994 -- '95. They don't even mention 


catalytic converters even then, so this was a 


practice to use diesel exhaust in them tunnels 


without catalytic converters. 


One other thing I'd like to touch on, there's 


been some discussion on it, there was records 


that were buried out there, 1997. I talked to 


Dr. David Michaels from -- when he was 


assistant secretary to Bill Richardson when he 


was at the Flamingo Library in November of 


2000, and one of the questions I asked him is 


what would it take to get my hands on material 


safety data sheets, because with NIOSH's plan 


Part E you've got what, where, when. Well, 


you've got to know what you were dealing with, 


when it happened and when (sic) it happened, 


and the only way we can do that is we have to 


get the MSDS sheets 'cause that has the toxins 


right -- listed on it. And he said well, all 


you've got to do is ask for them. I said 


that's not true because I filed freedom of 


information and still didn't get them. So he 


asked Dr. Luke Pepper* who was sitting in the 

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office -- or sitting in the audience with Sandy 


Medina* and two DOE executives, and the DOE 


executives said that the tunnels 


(unintelligible) T, P and N had filled up with 


water, all the records had gotten damaged and 


they'd been taken to the landfill and that they 


were attempting to reconstruct them records. 


 Now DOE's (unintelligible) right now so them 


records were of no significance. I don't agree 


with that. Those tunnel logs, those materials 


safety data sheets in there, there was air 


sample reports, there was a lot of things -- 


there was individual log books. I think them 


log books could be -- have some bearing on the 


-- what went wrong in them tunnels for your 


dose reconstruction, and I would say -- I'd 


leave it up to somebody else to decide how 


significant them records are rather than taking 


somebody's word. There were records buried. 


They've admitted it. So I'd like to see that 


looked into if you wouldn't mind. 


 That's about it, I -- thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. The tunnel 


that you mentioned, is that -- have a specific 


designation --

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 MR. FUNK: Excuse me? 


 DR. ZIEMER: The tunnel that you mentioned, 


does that have a specific designation, a number 


or --


 MR. FUNK: I left my hearing aid in the car. 


Ask me again. 


 DR. ZIEMER: The tunnel that you mentioned, 


does it have a specific number or designation ­

-


 MR. FUNK: Yes, there's three of them, P, T and 


N. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. FUNK: They said tunnels, plural. They all 


filled up with water, the blast doors were open 


on all of them. All the records were damaged 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MR. FUNK: There's probably a couple more out 


there but I can't remember now. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Next we'll hear from -- 


 MR. FUNK: P, T and N. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay -- Jan, and I am having a 


little trouble with -- it looks like G-a-u-n-c­

- last name --


 MS. GAUNCE: Gaunce, Gaunce. 

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 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, Jan, thank you. 


 MS. GAUNCE: Okay. Can you hear me? Okay. My 


name's Jan Gaunce. I'm addressing this panel 


for two reasons. One, I want to ask about the 


22 kinds of cancer that is part of the Special 


Exposure Cohort group. Since this is about 


radiation, why doesn't the cancers -- why isn't 


it all radiogenic cancers? So that's my first 


question. 


And then the second one is the 250-day 


residency requirement for the NTS Special 


Exposure Cohort group. My husband was in his 


early 20s when he went to work for ACF 


Industries in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He 


worked for -- he was a contractor for LANL and 


they did work for NTS. He worked on the Rover 


project as an engineer and he came to NTS for 


the test sites -- for -- when they did the test 


shots. He did the post mortem on them. And 


when the work got critical, he was told to take 


his dosimeter badge off, leave it outside while 


he went inside to do the work. That's just 


some background stuff, not anything I'm asking 


you to address. 


NTS is a different kind of site than most, and 

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the health endangerment was different. Most 


people who worked at NTS came to the test site 


for the shots, then left after a few days. 


Only a small core of necessary employees lived 


at Nevada and worked full time there. The job 


the employee did at the site determined the 


amount of radiation they received, not how many 


days the employee lived there. 


If you're standing next to a terrorist one 


second before he pulls the cord, that's the 


wrong second to be there. And I feel the same 


way about the residency requirement. 


You on the panel can treat NTS special cohort 


group differently if you choose to, and waive 


the 250-day requirement. Presence is 


sufficient for criticality. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Jan, for those 


comments. And in terms of your initial 


question, we could probably give you -- maybe ­

- maybe one of the NIOSH people would give you 


the answer to that. For example, on the 22 


kinds of cancer which is specified in the law 


and so in essence we are bound to that -- 


 MS. GAUNCE: Can you help change it? What 


(unintelligible). 

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 DR. ZIEMER: The 22 types of cancer which are ­

- basis of -- they -- they are -- that's in the 


legal framework in which we operate, can this 


Board change that? No. There -- there are -- 


there are certain things that could be changed 


legislatively. 


The 250-day issue is one which this Board is 


actually looking at in terms of how one 


interprets that. For example, how do you 


treat someone who may have been assigned to the 


Test Site and was say living in Mercury 24/7 or 


something like that, so they may have had more 


than eight hours a day of exposure, can you do 


a weighted average. For example, is that 


equivalent to 80 days of -- of continuous 


exposure and this Board is actually looking at 


those issues and perhaps will have a 


recommendation. We recognize some of the 


problems, even with a -- starting with the 250­

day, which looks to many to be somewhat 


arbitrary. 


But that -- the current law that we operate on, 


which follows some other laws which set that 


precedence, are the starting points. There 


would appear to many to be a sort of 

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arbitrariness to it, but that's what we're 


operating under from the legal framework at the 


moment. But we understand the point and have 


struggled with that to some extent ourselves, 


so -- but maybe -- maybe after the meeting one 


of the NIOSH people can also give you 


additional details on both of those issues if 


you wish. 


 Let's proceed with Dianne -- it looks like 


Rudnicki -- Rudnicki? Dianne, you might have 


to lower that mike a little bit there. 


MS. RUDNICKI: Can you hear me? 


 MS. MUNN: Yes. 


MS. RUDNICKI: My name is Dianne Hanna Rudnicki 


and I'm here tonight to talk to you about my 


husband of 49 years, Gordon Hanna. He started 


working at the test site in April, 1962 and 


continued his work there through 1968. To go 


back to the 1962 period, I realize that my 


being here tonight is because he did not work 


250 eight-hour days in 1962. What I'd like you 


to consider is that in that period he remained 


at the Test Site 24 hours a day. He didn't 


commute, as they had a great deal of overtime 


and we lived in Henderson, which is quite a 

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ways. I would also bring to your attention 


that the employment records from that period 


are incomplete because I was told they are 


missing. Because of the tests they are still 


conducting at -- they were still conducting at 


the Nevada Test Site through 1962, he 


sacrificed many hours away from his children 


and our home. He was very proud of the work he 


was doing for his country, but was very closed-


mouthed about it. That is why I don't know a 


great deal of what he did out there, very 


little. He did participate in the Sedan 


Crater, and I knew that because he brought home 


a certificate that he had been involved. 


He began to question the safety of his workers 


when -- of the workers when his coworker and 


friend, Keith Prescott, was carried off the job 


and diagnosed with bone cancer. My husband 


remarked that he wondered why they wore 


exposure badges because nobody really bothered 


to read them or check them. I realize now that 


he was concerned because he worked in the 


tunnels at ground zero, building up the 


bulkheads both before and after the bombs were 


detonated. Another indication that things 

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weren't quite right is that many of our friends 


that worked with him -- Alvin Shoemaker, Lester 


Richards, Keith Prescott and Ronald Bowden -- 


all died of cancers. 


I'm here tonight to provide you with 


information that my -- I feel that my husband's 


death was directly related to his employment at 


the Nevada Test Site. I can only relate to you 


the deterioration of his body that began in 


1996. 


In August of '96 he was diagnosed with squamous 


cell carcinoma of the right ear. August 29th, 


'96 he was diagnosed with basal cell carcinoma 


of the right temple. March, 1997 he was 


diagnosed with carcinoma of the parotid gland. 


September 26th, 1997 he was diagnosed with 


myelofibrosis with myelotoid (sic) metaplasia. 


And January 29th he was diagnosed with squamous 


cell carcinoma of the left lung. 


I have been advised that the criteria for the 


participation in the Special Cohort Status is 


that the employee has at least one cancer. My 


husband had all five of these and they are all 


on the compensable list. Clearly I'm not a 


scientist or a doctor, but I know that what he 

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was exposed to was not limited to 250 days in 


1962, and that our family and his suffering was 


immeasurable. Perhaps due to the devastating 


effect of the traumas his body sustained during 


the periods of this, he suffered from a femur 


bypass, an aorta replacement, colonostomy, an 


aneurysm which was ruled inoperatable (sic) 


because he had a blood disease. With all of 


this in mind, we were unprepared for what 


happened in 1990 -- 1996. 


The myelofibrosis diagnosis was probably the 


most devastating time in our lives, as that 


brought with it the prognosis that he had two 


years to live. We were also told that the -- 


by his doctors that the only probable link to 


the cause of this disease was exposure to 


radiation. Myelofibrosis, for some of the 


folks here, is an insidious form of blood 


disease and loss of bone marrow function which 


causes the liver and the spleen to attempt to 


replace production of blood function. In turn 


it causes an extremely painful enlargement of 


the spleens -- spleen. Patients are kept alive 


eventually with transfusions, but that's a 


short period and death occurs. He fought with 

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everything he had and lived another two and a 


half years until he died. And when he was died 


-- and when he died -- at the end of January, 


he was diagnosed with lung cancer, which had 


metabolized into his bone -- bones, and his 


oncologist/hematologist said he had two weeks. 


At that time he was being kept alive by blood 


transfusions, undergoing radiation therapy for 


enlarged spleen, and would be dead by the rapid 


advance of the myelofibrosis within a month. 


On February 11th, 1999 at 10:00 p.m. he took 


his last breath and Gordy was finally set free 


from the horrible pain and agony he suffered. 


In the year 2000 I began the process of filing 


a claim for survivor benefits under the EEOICPA 


Act of 2000. In January 2002 my claim was -- 


what I led to believe was verified employment. 


However, DOE was unable to provide the correct 


work days and they admitted that part of the 


records were un-- just were missing. But we 


also had verification for the five compensable 


cancers was for-- and this was all forwarded to 


NIOSH for dose reconstruction. It is now 


September 20th, 2006, four -- four years and 


eight months later and the dose reconstruction 

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activity reports I've received throughout the 


years have not indicated any prog-- progress 


whatsoever. My most recent call to NIOSH, 


which was about a month ago, revealed that they 


had halted all work on his dose reconstruction 


due to the possibility of my claim being 


approved -- might be approved for Special 


Cohort status. 


Tonight I have finally had the opportunity to 


present his story to a board that understands 


and has the power to maybe help us do a -- 


right a terrible wrong that was committed 44 


years ago. For my family and the others who 


have lived with this for years, I pray that 


you, as an Advisory Board, will have the 


courage to do the right thing and recommend 


that these brave Americans receive the 


recognition that they deserve. Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: And thank you, Dianne, for sharing 


with us what I know is a very difficult task to 


do. 


Robert Kromrei -- Kromrei? Yes, Robert. 


 MR. KROMREI: I worked for the building 


department out there at the Test Site from '60 


through to -- well, excuse me, '76, I guess 

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(unintelligible) crane (unintelligible). When 


I worked in the building department I was reentry on the -- on the explosions, and a lot of 


times I was sent out -- I was what they called 


burnout, had too much radiation, be out three 


or four hours, sent back in, burnout again. 


Dosimeters were removed, replaced, and all this 


stuff went on all the time when I was working 


out there and a lot of my friends are dead and 


that's why I'm here right now in this chair, 


but that's basically the way that thing was 


operated out there. And I -- I've -- working 


one night (unintelligible) and something went 


wrong and we pulled out, it was -- the hole was 


so hot it melted the steel pipe right off, and 


then we had to go out and back off and leave it 


go for a month, but things like this went on 


continually, day and night, and people -- 


sometimes we had to run for about a half-mile 


up the road to get away from radiation and 


everything else, but -- and above-ground 


explosions, I spent two days in there one time 


'cause I couldn't get out because of them 


explosion above ground. And I just wanted to 


let you see that all the -- we get from -- 

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well, for the records and everything else is 


not exactly right. It's not -- it can't be 


right. And I know that I've -- I've had to -- 


well, I can't complain myself 'cause you guys 


take pretty good care of me but -- so far, 


anyway, but anyway, other people I know of that 


-- there are a lot of them that are suffering, 


just like I am, and they're getting no help at 


all, so -- and I know a lot -- it's got to be a 


lot of this at the Test Site and so that's 


about all I got to say is that there -- on this 


reconstruction, it's -- it's way off from our ­

- my opinion because I can tell you hundreds of 


times that this went on through -- you know, 


through them years, and there's a lot of other 


guys will back that up, too. Thank you very 


much. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Robert, would you -- could you 


clarify one point that you made. If I heard it 


correctly, you indicated that -- what you 


described as burnout, which I assume meant that 


you reached --


 MR. KROMREI: I reached maximum radiation -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- your (unintelligible) for that 


job --

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 MR. KROMREI: -- yeah. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- and you were pulled out, and 


then were put back in what, the same day? 


 MR. KROMREI: Same -- four hours later. 


 DR. ZIEMER: With a different film badge or -- 


 MR. KROMREI: Yeah, I -- they took my dos-- 


they took everything away from us and sent us 


back in. I don't know -- we don't know what -- 


our film badges, we never did hear nothing 


about them. We don't know what happened to 

them. 

 DR. ZIEMER: I see. 

 MR. KROMREI: Dosimeter we could look at 

ourselves, but I've seen mine peaked out 


hundreds of times and they -- they'd take it in 


to rad safe, that's what the radiation -- they 


just give you another one and tell you to, you 


know, carry on. They'd check you over, you 


know, actually, but that don't mean nothing, 


either, but --


 DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. 


 MR. KROMREI: -- that's -- yeah, that's what it 


is, is just -- burnout means that you're burned 


out, you know, pretty -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: Right. 

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 MR. KROMREI: I don't know the year, the day or 


what it was. I'm -- I thought it was for the 


whole year is what I thought it was. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well -- yeah, that -- that 


obviously is a question I think many of us have 


experienced that they're -- typically on many 


jobs were daily and weekly limits, so -- yeah, 


uh-huh. 


 MR. KROMREI: Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, let's go next to 


Patricia Niemeier. 


MS. NIEMEIER: I have a copy here for you guys. 


I (unintelligible) make enough, but -- 


 DR. ZIEMER: No, that's fine --


MS. NIEMEIER: -- (unintelligible) two of 


these. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- we just need one, that's fine. 


MS. NIEMEIER: Okay, great. Hello, my name is 


Patricia Niemeier, daughter of Richard Favela. 


I am a survivor and witnessed my father's 


death. I now have the burden of proving his 


exposure to toxic radiation due to working at 


Nevada Test Site, and in turn died due to his 


exposure. Let me state in advance that 


lymphoma of the stomach and esophagus was 

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considered rare at the time of his death. Now 


it is my job to explain what happened to my 


father. 


Richard Favela was employed at the Nevada Test 


Site with start dates of 3-16-1960 through 9­

31-1969 (sic). There were several start and 


end dates. 


There are indications of an unreported incident 


that may have occurred that kept my father from 


working. My mother, Josette Favela, married my 


father in 1962. She was from France and knew 


very little English. She recalled moments when 


I was too little to remember what was going on 


with my father while he worked at the Nevada 


Test Site. 


She does recall his job being extremely 


secretive and remembers a time that he had 


circular red spots on the middle of his back 


and vomiting during his time of employment at 


Nevada Test Site. Many times my father would 


not speak of his vomiting, rashes or pain to my 


mother. He had also taken off time from work 


due to stomach pain. I witnessed depression 


and hopelessness. 


 We are talking about a man who served in two 

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branches of the armed services to our great 


country. He did not give in to pain easily. 


In April 1964 he was hospitalized for stomach 


pain. Years later my father died well before 


he should have at age 62 in 1998 of cancer that 


was listed fourth on the radiation-caused 


cancers. According to NIOSH site profile audit 


findings, ingestion -- ingestion of large 


particles due to oro-nasal breathing may 


increase GI tract doses to workers who reentered weapons and reactor testing areas 


shortly after tests. Radiation badges doses 


unreliable due to misuse. The Nuclear Rocket 


Development Station where Richard Favela, my 


father, worked had no method of addressing hot 


particle doses. 


 The NTS contaminated my father, Richard Favela, 


and it is known even by the DOE that the level 


of monitoring was inconsistent, irregular and 


overall untrustworthy. This is why I, Patricia 


Niemeier, have to stand up for my father who 


was exposed to radiation that eventually killed 


him. 


Prior to my involvement with the EEOICP since 


July of 2001 under that program, I received a 

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deficiency letter in October of 2000 under the 


Radiation Exposure Program. Since then I've 


received two denial letters under the EEOICP. 


The latest for consideration dated May 6th, 


2006 which I have not heard back from the 


program. Upon hearing about the July 2006 


special cohort of 250 days or more of 


employment was great, however Richard Favela 


falls short of approximately 20 days. 


Let it be known that I received a letter in 


2004 addressing Mr. Carlson denying him of his 


skin cancer. My father's Social Security 


number was on that letter. I called for an 


explanation and I was told someone would get 


back to me, and that never happened. That said 


to me right away that the ability to make 


decisions and a cohesive knowledge of what is 


going on throughout the department is poor at 


best. A mistake as simple as a cover letter to 


the wrong person sends a signal of incompetence 


in the department and researchers. 


In February 2004 NIOSH requested medical 


records. Margo Hornback reviewed these records 


and said the diagnosis was B-cell lymphoma. 


Medical records indicate D-cell. She stated 

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that the typo mistake was from the doctor. 


This typo is on three pages, over and over on 


my father's medical records. We cannot accept 


this. 


My father had a painful death along with 


treatment for two years. The doctors had 


removed his stomach. He became weak and as 


thin as a rail. With the chemo and radiation 


he needed, he did not have the financial 


resources to fight. The cancer eventually 


metastasized to his spine. He could not move 


his legs. The hospital told me they were not 


care-oriented but cure-oriented. They moved 


him to a dirty, old convalescent home where he 


died alone and scared, and I will never, ever 


forget his death and his pain. 


He is not here to stand up for himself. I am 


his survivor, along with my sister Claudia, 


representing him today. Richard Favela was an 


American hero, a son, a brother and a father, 


but never a grandfather to our children. 


 Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Patricia, for sharing 


that. 


 Next we'll hear from Lori Hunton. 

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 DR. WADE: Lori wants to have someone come with 


her, I think. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Lori, did you ask for someone else 


to participate with you or... 


 DR. WADE: No. 


 DR. ZIEMER: No? Okay. I got a mis-message 


then, okay. Proceed. 


 MS. HUNTON: Thank you for allowing me to speak 


to you once again. My name is Lori Hunton. 


had the privilege of testifying before the 


Board in June 2006 in Washington, D.C. on the 


behalf of myself and my other workers and 


survivors who worked at the Nevada Test Site. 


As you remember, my father, Oral Triplett*, was 


employed at the Nevada Test Site from January 


30th, 1962 through September 30th, 1970. My 


father was diagnosed with lung cancer in August 


of 1975 and passed away on November 20th, 1975. 


I was only 16 years old. My father left behind 


four children, a widow and a grandchild. 


During the time my dad was ill I remember 


coming home from school, opening the front door 


and there was dad, lying in a hospital bed in 


the front room. He could hardly see, he could 


hardly move. He had lost so much weight from 


I 
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the chemo and radiation it was terrible. 


Imagine being 16 years old and seeing your dad 


suffering like that. It was devastating. 


 As you remember from my testimony in D.C., one 


night when I was very young my dad came home 


from work with little red welts on the side of 


his face. I remember saying Daddy has cheerios 


on the side of his face. These marks were 


caused by radiation exposure at the Nevada Test 


Site. I believe it can only take one time to 


receive a deadly exposure from radiation, only 


seconds. It doesn't take 250 days to be 


exposed to radiation. Remember those little 


red cheerios. I ask you to please add those 


with less than 250 days to the pre-1963 SEC. 


Acute exposures deserve compensation, as well. 


I would also like to take and add on March 15th 


I went to the Resource Center located at 1050 


East Flamingo for my hearing. I gave them 


copies of my dad's work records that show that 


he worked at the Nevada Test Site from January 


30th, 1962 through September 30th, 1970. They 


have dose readings of my dad until 1975. He 


passed away in 1975. The NIOSH readings are 


incorrect. If someone does not work there, how 

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can you give them dose readings? And if they 


give you a higher reading when they do the dose 


reconstruction, this is still not an accurate 


reading. I was told that NIOSH was getting 


paid millions of dollars for the dose 


reconstruction program. With all of the 


hundreds of inaccurate readings, they should 


have paid the workers and survivors years ago. 


It has been six months and we still haven't 


received any information on the hearing from 


March 15, 2006. Over a year ago I called to 


check on the status of our case. I called the 


Department of Labor at the Seattle office and 


spoke with an employee there. He said that he 


needed additional information, a copy of my 


mother's marriage certificate showing her name 


had changed -- she remarried -- so my 


stepfather faxed him a copy. The next day I 


called and I asked him if he'd received the 


fax. He said yes, he did, but he was 


recommending denial. I asked him why. He said 


that the dose reading levels were too low. 
I 


said after all these years, it takes one phone 


call to be denied? We have been seeking 


compensation for 29 years. He asked if I had 

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children. I said yes, I have three. He told 


me that my children could carry on the claim. 


How many more years and generations is it going 


to take before the Nevada Test Site workers and 


their families are compensated? 


Thank you again for the opportunity to 


represent the Nevada Test Site workers and my 


family. Thank you. 


 DR. WADE: If we have Kathleen Rozner. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Is -- is Katherine Rozner -- 


 DR. WADE: Katherine. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, okay, Katherine is -- 


 DR. WADE: Kathleen. 


 DR. ZIEMER: -- in the office of Senator Reid 


and I think has some remarks pertaining to this 


case. 


 MS. ROZNER: Actually someone we're working 


with would like me to read the following. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MS. ROZNER: The following is testimony from 


Gene Campbell, who is a driller at the Test 


Site. He worked there in 1959 and then again 


from 1962 to 1991. 


(Reading) I worked from '62 through '64 in 


tunnels and shafts as a rotary drill operator, 

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(unintelligible) classification. After a 


nuclear detonation in G tunnel, I moved a core 


rig inside the tunnel near ground zero and 


drilled through the sandstone formation towards 


ground zero. The humidity and the temperature 


was extreme. I believe we were approximately 


100 feet from ground zero. I worked three or 


four eight-hour shifts at that location. I've 


no knowledge of what the radiation exposure 


was. I (unintelligible) in Area 12 from '62 


from several months off and on, again, through 


'64. 


From 1963 through 19-- okay, I'm sorry. From 


July of 1963 through September of '63 I drilled 


at the Test Site near Carlsbad, New Mexico. We 


went down a shaft to 800-foot level 


approximately and in a room on that level set 


up a drill rig. A nuclear device had been 


detonated earlier. I drilled a horizontal hole 


into ground zero and then opened, enlarged, the 


hole. The cuttings and drilling fluid, water, 


was circulated back into a water trough. The 


object was to collect as much cuttings from 


ground zero as possible. I wore rad-safe 


protective clothing. However, there was no 

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containment equipment during the drilling 


operations. I have no knowledge of the 


radiation exposure that day. 


While post-shot drilling on the Boyles angle 


rig from 1963 to 1965, containment was nonexistent on the drill hole, casing or drill 


pipe. It wasn't unusual while sidewall 


sampling for steam, rocks and debris from 


ground zero where we were taking samples coming 


back up through the drill pipe and shooting in 


the air 20 to 30 feet. We drilled many holes 


without containment. 


From 1965 until I retired the containment 


equipment became very sophisticated and was 


much more efficient than in the earlier days. 


 Post-shot, after detonating a nuclear device, a 


rig was moved on location and a hole was 


drilled into ground zero. With the drilling 


assembly in this area, a plug was pulled out of 


the assembly and a sidewall sampler was lowered 


inside of the drill pipe and out the side of 


the wall of the drill hole. A tube on the 


bottom of the sampler collected a sample from 


the drill hole and was relieved -- excuse me -- 


retrieved to the surface on a wire line. These 

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samples were taken from the bottom of the 


cavity as neat as possible and therefore at 


times highly radioactive. 


 The drilling operation, collecting samples and 


handling the drilling assemblies and drill pipe 


had a potential for workers to be exposed to 


radiation. I was involved in most of post-shot 


drilling for LASL and some LANL post-shot holes 


until my retirement in 1991. At times there 


were accidental releases during these 


operations. 


Note: I would like to point out during 1965 to 


'67 approximately, a drilling fluid for post-


shot holes was called visbestos. The name 


resulted from the mixture of ben-- bentonite, 


asbestos and water. This -- I'm sorry, I can't 


read the word -- drilling fluid was used on 


post-shot holes to combat the very high 


temperature encountered while drilling into 


ground zero. At times this was mixed on 


location with a portable mud (unintelligible). 


The asbestos was in dry, 50-number sacks and 


dumped by hand into hoppers, mixed with 


benzonite and water and pumped down in the hole 


as drilling fluid. I believe some drilling 

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personnel were exposed to asbestos. 


I was drilling in G tunnel on the day of the 


detonation of the Sedan experiment. Before the 


shot everyone was cleared from underground and 


brought to the surface where we waited for the 


shot. We were at the portal of G tunnel on the 


side of the mountain where we had a clear view 


of ground zero. When the shot went off I had 


no idea what to expect, and was very surprised 


by the extremely loud boom, followed by a huge 


plume of debris, dirt, dust, rocks, et cetera 


several hundred feet into the air. We were 


concerned the wind was blowing over our 


direction. I don't recall if we were evacuated 


or not. 


After the dust settled, construction moved to 


the Sedan crater and laid steel mats, the type 


used during World War II on air fields, down 


the side of the crater from the top of the 


crater to the bottom. We then lowered the 


Boyles drilling rig and the steel ramp and 


drilled the angle hole in the side of the 


crater. When the wind blew it was like a dust 


bowl at the drill site, and small rocks would 


roll down the side of the crater and hit the 

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sub-base of the drill. It wasn't a very good 


environment to work in. 


I would like to relate an incident which 


happened on a drillback on a post-shot in the 


early '60s. I was a driller at the time. My 


crew and I, plus a rad-safe employee, were 


exposed to radiation while working in the 


cellar, which he describes as a part of a 


containment during post-shot drilling. As a 


result there was an investigation to determine 


why we were exposed to radiation. It was 


concluded that the monitoring device used by 


rad-safe was not working because the employee 


using the device was also exposed. As a result 


of the exposure, my crew and I were subjected 


to a series of screening tests for several 


weeks in Mercury, Nevada. Sometime after the 


tests, my crew and I -- I believe five of us -- 


were sent to a location near Nellis Air Force 


Base. This was on a Saturday morning. There 


was a railroad car or two on a spur off the 


main railroad and each of us, one at a time, 


went inside for some kind of tests. I don't 


know what it was all about, and never knew the 


results. I relate this to emphasize the thing 

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that we went on -- excuse me. I relate this to 


emphasize that we went on -- what went on that 


no one seems to know about. I have mentioned 


this episode to many people, and have yet to 


find one person who knows anything about the 


railroad cars near Nellis Air Force Base. 


 Gene Campbell. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Just to clarify for 


me, the -- the claimant's name was Gina 


Campbell? 


 MS. ROZNER: Oh, Gene, I --


 DR. ZIEMER: Gene Campbell. Thank you. Then 


we have Shirley Breeden -- Breeden. 


 MS. BREEDEN: Good evening, ladies and 


gentlemen. My name is Shirley Breeden and on 


April 4th, 2004 I lost my father, Willis J. 


Abbott, to cancer. My father was employed by 


the Nevada Test Site from September 11th, 1961 


through January 15th, 1964. He was a mechanic 


foreman on the drilling rigs and would travel 


to different areas before and after the shots 


were fired. 


When I was in the second grade I remember my 


brother and I asking my father why he got 


undressed in the garage when he came home from 

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work. He said that he did not want his clothes 


in the house. Since that was not a good enough 


answer for us, he then told us not to touch his 


boots or his clothes, as if we did we would 


glow in the dark. What did that mean and who 


really knew? Only my dad. 


My mother told me that when she asked my father 


about his job or his work day, he said he was 


not allowed to talk about it. Again, what did 


that mean and who really knew? Only my dad. 


Yes, our family life continued and for many 


years to come I never thought about Daddy's 


boots, the ones that would glow in the dark. 


I will never forget the tone of my father's 


voice on that dreadful day in September 2001 


when he called and asked me to fly to Boise, 


Idaho so that I may accompany him to a doctor 


appointment. It was then that I knew something 


was definitely wrong. Dr. Forsythe came into 


the room, told my father that her suspicions 


were correct. My father had terminal cancer. 


She showed us an X-ray of where the cancer was 


present in my father's body, and said the 


cancer had metastasized. He lit up like a 


Christmas tree. It was then that I remembered 

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my father telling us about his boots. 


My father -- my family and I were in disbelief, 


and I was sick to my stomach. After that day 


our life changed dramatically. My father's 


health deteriorated. My father, so stout, so 


strong and so courageous, became dependent upon 


his loved ones. What a very humiliating 


experience for all of us. My dad, the strong, 


stout, muscular gentleman slowly withered away 


to nothing right before our very eyes. Our 


family was heartbroken. 


In February of 2002 my father called and asked 


if I would help him with a project. Of course, 


I said. He wanted to submit his application 


for compensation due to radiation exposure 


while working at the Nevada Test Site. My 


father said to me, Honey, I believe my cancer 


was caused from radiation exposure. A couple 


of months before my dad -- my father died, he 


asked me to please see this process through. 


So in his honor I will follow through with my 


father's request. After all, I am my father's 


daughter, strong and courageous. 


Thank you for your time and consideration. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Next we'll hear from 

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Cynthia Wilkes. Cynthia Wilkes. 


 DR. WADE: Not here. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Perhaps she's stepped out. Dee 


Creighton? Dee. 


 MS. CRAFTON: Is this good? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Yes. 


 MS. CRAFTON: Good evening. My name is Dee 


Crafton. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Dee Crafton. 


 MS. CRAFTON: My husband was Douglas Crafton. 


Some of you in attendance and I knew him as 


Tex. He died from a glioblastoma multiforme 


brain tumor in 1998. My husband worked at the 


beginning stages of the early Nevada Test Site 


starting in the '50s. This work progress 


continued into the '90s, so that would be from 


the time he was in his 20s up to his 60s. He 


casually told us several times he got to see 


the atomic bomb go off. He felt privileged. 


Now of course, in hindsight, we all know he 


shouldn't have been allowed to be near this. 


Through the years he was employed by several 


unionized truck companies. Most of these 


companies are no longer in operation -- Bailey-


Apex, (unintelligible), just to name a few. 

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The last company he worked for was Jakes* here 


in Las Vegas. There are many friends my 


husband regularly worked with who also visited 


and worked at the Test Site who also died of 


various types of cancers, all relatively -- 


relatively young ages. It is also easy to 


determine just through memory, they had less 


exposure than my husband. 


During his initial visits, these unionized 


companies would be subcontracted out to Bechtel 


of Nevada for heavy hauling machinery moving. 


Because he was such an expert in his abilities 


to move equipment -- heavy equipment that 


weighed many tons, he was requested for most of 


the jobs on the Test Site. Because he was also 


a heavy equipment operator, he worked many 


hours at the Test Site. In those days a crane 


was not hauled in one piece. It took several 


days to haul in the boom, counter-weights, 


tractor, runners. Then he worked several days 


putting it together to make it functional. 


During all this time he would be at ground zero 


of the Test Site. There were not any qualified 


employees at the Test Site that knew how to do 


this type of work, so he was responsible for 

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everything working properly before he could 


leave the Site. This at least indicates 


several days, if not weeks, per visit. 


He also is the man that hauled in the boring 


machine, also called the (unintelligible). 


This machine made the tunnel. This job took 34 


loads, again spending days at the site. I 


wanted to come tonight to prove that it's not 


an accurate determination to say my husband was 


only exposed 13 days in his life. The system 


that made this assumption does not have 


memories or experiences that can make an honest 


and accurate assessment. The people that would 


be key witnesses and could have provided 


additional support to these statements have all 


passed. I'm being told first he did not have 


51 percent cancer in the brain. How much do 


you need to die? He's dead. How can you tell 


me he wore the badge 13 times? He worked 40 


years at the Site, off and on -- like I said, 


starting in the '50s. Someone wasn't counting. 


 Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Dee. Then we'll hear 


from Jane Ann Williams-Lenz. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: First of all, I'd like to 

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put a face on some of these people. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Sure. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: This is my husband, Rod 


Williams. 


 DR. ZIEMER: You want us to pass these -- yes? 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: Yes. This is my husband, 


this is my husband, this is my husband and I, 


that's my husband, that's my husband, that's my 


husband and that's what he left. 


 DR. ZIEMER: We'll pass these around. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: Please do. First of all, 


my name is Jane Ann Williams-Lenz. My husband 


was an electrician. We came out here -- he 


worked here from '58 most of the time till '77 


when he died. He was healthy, robust, rodeoed, 


died of cancer. Was exposed at the Test Site 


many, many times in all those years. I've been 


at this for 29 years. I have been to 


Washington, D.C. three times. I didn't know 


there was a meeting yesterday. Half the time I 


don't hear about a meeting. I don't know what, 


but if you do advise Mr. Bush, I wish you would 


advise him that some of us are tired of 


waiting. The only president in 29 years that 


even answered a letter was Bill Clinton. He's 

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the only one that's helped us. Bush and his 


father don't care about us. They don't care 


about anybody. So you advise him for me that 


his oil is not the only thing in this world 


that's important. And Cheney and Halliburton 


and their rebuilding, that's not the only 


thing. There are people in this room that 


should be important. 


 My husband served in World War II. My son --


my third son, I have four -- just came back 


from raghead country. Let me tell you, we've 


always been a patriotic bunch. My husband 


worked at the Test Site and he asked them and 


several of them said will this stuff hurt us, 


and they said oh, no -- scientists, oh, no, 


might make you sterile. Well, when you've got 


four kids, that's not a big thing. It made him 


dead. Dead. 


I went to Washington and I spoke with Dr. 


Morgan. Do any of you know who Dr. Morgan is? 


He's the man that developed the film badge. 


He's the man that developed it. He told me, 


Jane Ann, it was no good. It didn't work. 
I 


said then why did you develop it? He said I 


worked for the government. You knew what your 

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-- they told me to develop a film badge; I 


developed one. They didn't tell him it had to 


work. 


Now when the men were out there, I don't know 


if any of you are from here, but if you were 


outside today did you see the wind blow? Blows 


pretty good here. Well, out at that Test Site 


the wind really blows. Now that film badge 


hung around their neck on a little linyard 


(sic), and it would flip up in their face and 


this and that. Now if you're an electrician 


and you're handling anything from 110 to a 


streak of lightning, you might want that thing 


to get out of your face. So most of the men 


would put it in their jacket, stick it in their 


shirt. So of course it didn't work to begin 


with, so it certainly didn't work then. 


I went to Washington with a man that they 


called the atomic cowboy. Out at the Test Site 


they have a big ranch. My husband, as you can 


tell from that picture, could keep a secret. 


He didn't tell me the things about what went on 


at that Test Site, but believe me, in 21 years 


I have found out a hell of a lot. They would 


go from my house to work every day, drive up, 

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park in this one area -- he worked all over the 


Test Site, some places that didn't even exist. 


He would get out of his car. He would go up to 


CP, up there -- whatever they called CP. They 


would go in and they would put on these outfits 


of clothing, little things on their shoes and 


things on their heads and gloves and all this 


stuff, and then they would go down to where 


they had -- he worked in drilling most of -- a 


lot of the time. They'd go to where the shot 


was. They would do their work there, wiring 


and putting all the things in there, whatever 


they did. Then they would get on the bus and 


go back to CP and they'd come home. 


The day of the shot they would get in the car 


at my house, drive to the Test Site, park the 


car, go to CP in the bus, put on their little 


outfit, get on the bus, go to the shot. Now 


they've already had this detonation. When they 


detonated one of those things the sand would 


turn green and turn to glass. They would take 


heavy equipment, break up the glass, go to the 


hole, pull all this stuff out, work in this 


radiated (sic) area all day long taking all 


that stuff out of that hole, giving it to the 

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scientists. Now remember they've got their 


little suits on to protect them. Then they 


would get on the bus. Then they would go to 


CP. If they detected -- with the detectors, if 


they detected radiation, then they'd shower 


them and they'd -- sometimes -- my husband 


stayed there one time three days and nights. 


That's not on the report, by the way. They 


would put their clothes back on, get in the car 


and come home. 


Do you see anything that would -- shower or 


whatever, leave those little suits there at the 


CP, get on the bus and come back to the car. 


Does anybody on this panel see anything wrong 


with that? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: You don't see anything 


wrong with that? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: Proceed. This would be normal 


practice to shots --


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: That's normal practice. 


Well, why the hell didn't they wash out the 


bus? 


They were contaminated when they got on the bus 

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at point A, they went to point B, 


decontaminated, got on the bus and went to 


their car. They were decontaminated, but they 


never washed out the bus. 


Now when they had a shot right there, they 


would put a yellow and black rope around it, 


I've been told by many, hang signs on it and 


say this area is contaminated, keep out. But 


if Washington, D.C. said we want another shot 


in the same hole, they took down the rope and 


they went in and made the shot and came out and 


put the rope back up. Does that make sense? 


That doesn't make sense to me. 


I have talked to people -- Stuart Udall called 


me in 1978. Does anybody know who Stuart Udall 


is? Stuart Udall called me and told me, he 


said Jane Ann, he said your husband died of 


cancer, and I said yes. And he said well, do 


you know other people that did, and I said 


well, you know, he's -- he's died and I -- I 


don't see people a lot, a lot of electricians 


or plumbers or fitters or their wives or 


whatever. But then I would see somebody and 


I'd say hi, how are you, and they'd say oh, soand-so died, John died or Dave died or -- and 

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I'd say why, what happened? He had cancer. 


You know, I got to writing that down, and my 


God, everybody that worked out there was dying 


of cancer. So I said well, you know, Mr. 


Udall, he died of cancer and a lot of other 


people did, so Larry Johns and Stuart Udall 


decided that they would help myself -- I was 


probably the first that filed -- and several 


others to sue the government because they 


worked for REECO and they were a government 


contractor. 


 Well, then the government passed a law that we 


couldn't sue. That was not real nice of them, 


was it? You know, I have empathy for anybody 


that has a problem. Some things don't make 


much sense to me, and I don't think that 


anybody in this room would disagree with me 


'cause a lot of them has been fighting this 


thing for a long time. I organized the Nevada 


Test Site people at one time. We had meetings, 


we organized -- a lot of people died off and we 


finally disbanded. 


 But there were terrorists that flew a plane 


into the World Trade Center. We're all aware 


of that. Right? The people that worked in 

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those buildings that died left families, and 


I'm sorry for that. But not a one of those 


people that died in those buildings kept you or 


me from speaking Russian in the Cold War, did 


they? I don't think so. But all of our people 


that died from cancer, a horrible death, worked 


to keep you and you and you and you and me and 


all of these people from speaking Russian and 


we won the Cold War. My husband fought, and a 


lot of those other guys, in World War II to 


keep us from speaking Japanese. They were 


patriotic. But these people that died 


instantly have gotten paid instantly. Our dear 


old Bush paid them off like a slot machine. 


I've been working at this for 29 years. They 


got millions of dollars. I had never had a 


job. I had four young sons. I had to go to 


work. I brought my kids up. I never had 


welfare. I've never asked anybody for 


anything. And they tell me that my husband was 


worth $150,000 -- well, he didn't work at the 


World Trade Center. He kept us from speaking 


Russian. That don't make any sense, either. 


I've been at it for 29 years. I was in 


Washington, D.C. one time. I was sitting with 

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Orrin Hatch -- do we all know Orrin Hatch? -- 


and Ted Kennedy. And he said well, you know, 


Jane, it was the downwinders that got the most 


radiation. I said really? The downwinders? 


It was in like April, cherry blossoms were 


beautiful. I'd never been there before. They 


were all in bloom, the water was running in the 


sprinklers out on this little veranda we're 


sitting by the -- on the Senate Building and 


there's water running, the little sprinkler 


hoses, and I said to Mr. Hatch, you really 


believe that the downwinders got the most of 


the radiation? He said yeah, I do. I said 


well, guess what. Mr. Kennedy, you stand over 


here and Mr. Hatch, you come over here and I'm 


going to pick up one of these water hoses and 


I'm going to wet you down good 'cause the 


wind's blowing toward Mr. Kennedy, you see, and 


we'll see who gets the wettest. He said well, 


I don't think that's a good idea. I said well, 


sounds like a winner to me if you think the 


downwinders got the most of it. 


You see, the Nevada Test Site has been -- I've 


lived in the same house in this town for 47 


years. Can you imagine that? And don't even 

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gamble. Well, my husband went to the Test Site 


every day, did his work, came home, said 


nothing. You couldn't have got him drunk 


enough or crazy enough to tell me what was 


going on out there. He wouldn't tell you 


anything about Mar-- about the Masonic Lodge or 


the Shrine or the Nevada Test Site. That was 


him. That was the end of the hunt. He was not 


going to say a word. But boy, I'll tell you 


one thing. I've found out stuff in 29 years 


you wouldn't believe. 


I did know that you could see the mushroom 


clouds when they had the above-ground tests. 


Right down on Fremont Street was J.C.Penney's. 


They built a little town out there. They took 


(unintelligible) J.C.Penney's and a lot of 


different people took refrigerators and clothes 


and they put mannequins in those little houses 


and all that stuff. Well, would you believe 


they blew that place up? J.C.Penney's took 


them right down across from the El Cortez 


Hotel, put those blue jeans in the window, big 


old sign said all this stuff went through an 


atomic bomb blast. We're going to call these 


Tough Skins or whatever they called those blue 

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jeans. How radiated (sic) do you think 


Freemont Street is? 


They had -- I told you about the atomic cowboy. 


He told me one time, he said you know, they had 


these cows, had two of them at one time, and 


they had plexiglass window in their side -- 


'cause a cow has two stomachs -- and they would 


feed them radiated feed and then they would 


open this one plexiglass window, reach in 


there, get the feed, test it to see how these 


cattle could digest this radiated stuff, then 


they'd dump it back in. Then it'd go in the 


second stomach and they'd do that test again. 


Well, guess what? They used to bring one of 


these cows into town and take it to the 


elementary schools and show the kids the cows 


that had two windows in their side. 


Pretty smart. Won't hurt you. Might make you 


sterile. Scientists were really smart. 


He told me one time he walked outside and he 


had fed a steer, it was a Hereford steer. If 


you're not familiar with cattle, they're kind 


of dark brown, red, and had a little white on 


them. He said in 30 minutes after the 


scientists dropped off the food, picked out the 

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steer, told him to feed the steer. The steer 


turned totally blonde, and before the next hour 


struck, all of its hair fell out. I guess it 


kind of looked like a Mexican hairless steer. 


I don't know about that. 


We have been very patient. I went to a meeting 


at the Texas. I don't know how many were there 


at the one -- first meeting at the Texas, and 


they had -- because we have -- you have to 


understand, I was with the Department of 


Justice. Then I was with the Department of 


Labor. And then I was with the Department of 


Justice again. And then they decided that 


they'd better give it back to the Department of 


Labor. Then we had a meeting with the 


Department of Justice and the Department of 


Labor, and they said at the Texas Casino 


meeting room we are going to do this together. 


We will pay you $75,000 and they will pay you 


$75,000. We said okay and I guess everybody in 


this room probably filled out all those papers. 


My God Almighty, we filled out papers like you 


wouldn't believe. They said that this was 


going to happen very soon -- very, very soon, 


wait a minute. Well, it hasn't happened yet. 

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And then they said, when I filed with both 


people, the Department of Justice sent me a 


letter, you qualified; if you'll sign this 


paper we will send you a check for $75,000. 


But then they dissolved their partnership and I 


didn't accept the money because I told them 


first of all that I felt that that wasn't 


really what I should get. And since they 


dissolved their partnership, if you accept the 


money from the Justice Department -- which some 


people did; that was another trick -- then the 


Labor Department doesn't pay the other $75,000. 


You've got to file again. 


So they called me several times. I bet you 


they called me ten times and I finally told 


them keep that $75,000 and cram it where the 


sun don't shine. I will get all of it or I 


will get none of it. There are people that 


will get nothing, and that's what the 


government is waiting for. I heard that woman 


say that she was carrying on for her father. 


Well, her father didn't die before she was 18 


years old so she's going to get nothing. Mrs. 


(unintelligible) in Henderson, she passed away 


about a year and a half ago. None of her 

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people will get one dime. He's as dead as any 


of the others, but guess what, the government 


saved $150,000 on that one. They've saved 


$150,000 on a list of people that everybody has 


died in the family but was able to collect 


because they're not going to pay unless the kid 


was under 18 or in college. 


I have four sons. My two oldest sons have 


cardiomyopathy. They have a leak, enlarged 


heart. My 49-year-old son is an electrician, 


been retired two and a half or three years. He 


was working at the Test Site when he had his 


heart attack. My other son's a 


(unintelligible) finisher, worked in 


construction, cardiomyopathy. Of course he --


he's still trying to get his Social Security 


disability and his doctor keeps writing to them 


and telling them I'm sorry, but he can never go 


back to work, he would drop dead. He's got a 


ICD or whatever you call it, I -- defibrillator 


in his chest. 


You know, I firmly believe that that was 


because they were raised in Las Vegas, Nevada 


and their dad worked at the Test Site and 


brought that stuff home. I firmly believe that 

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the radiation that blows from that Test Site -- 


when that sand picks up and blows -- if you 


didn't notice it, it was blowing yesterday and 


today -- my pool's got that much sand in it 


(indicating). All that radiation is still 


there. The half-life of it is 150,000 years. 


Now we some of us must know this. It don't 


just go away and it didn't just go away. 


My husband's dosimetric report for 1965 says he 


had zero -- or close. He was out there setting 


in a pickup truck when they detonated the shot. 


It covered up the truck with sand. They took 


them in. All the guys went into CP or 


whatever. They showered them, they waved those 


wands over them, they showered them and they 


waved those wands over them. They called me -- 


and there were three or four women that did not 


drive that their husbands were involved in the 


same shot, the same event, the same radiation. 


We had to take clothes out there. They burned 


their shoes, their boots, their Carhartt 


overalls, their blue jeans, their -- every 


stitch they had on, and I took clothes for 


about four other guys 'cause their wives didn't 


drive, there was no way for them to get them 

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out there unless I took them and I had to go 


anyway. And I know that was 1965 because my 


youngest son was born in 1965 and he was two 


weeks old, so I know when that was. And after 


all, Dr. Morgan said it didn't work. 


Now they told us at the Texas, you don't have 


to have the dosimetric thing. We know that's 


faulty. We know it didn't monitor any of these 


guys. We know that nobody knows -- or is going 


to tell -- how much radiation these people were 


exposed to. Now all of a sudden, again -- then 


we went back to the Labor Department. Labor 


Department told us the same thing at the Texas, 


you just have to qualify with having the kind 


of cancer that was on this list. My husband 


had adenal* carcinoma, cancer of the colon. 


That's what he died of. That's what was on the 


list. But now all of a sudden, after the Labor 


Department took it back and we're still 


supposed to get this $150,000 that I'll never 


see, now we're going through this dosimetric 


report again. 


Why are we doing that when our government, 


which you can't believe a damned thing they say 


anyway, but why do they tell us no dosimetric 

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report 'cause it's no good, Dr. Morgan says 


that the badge didn't monitor them, that the 


dosometer (sic) didn't monitor them, and you 


can all go back to Washington and check that 


out if -- I imagine Dr. Morgan's dead, but 


somebody there must have known and he must have 


told them. He told me and I was a total 


stranger. So somebody ought to check on that. 


Do any of you know who he is? 


 DR. ZIEMER: Most of us do, K. Z. Morgan? 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: Then somebody --


 DR. ZIEMER: Yeah. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: -- should talk to somebody 


that he knew. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Let me tell you that your Chair 


studied under Dr. Morgan, and I know that Dr. 


Morgan is an expert -- he's deceased. I don't 


know what Dr. Morgan told you, but it does not 


jive with anything that he taught me. But we 


can talk about that off-line. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: Well, that's what he told 


me. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I studied under Dr. Morgan. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: Well, I didn't study under 


him but he sure told me that the film badge was 

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worthless. 


 DR. ZIEMER: I think -- I think we need to 


allow some of the others to speak, but thank 


you for sharing with us. Do you have some 


documents you wanted to leave with us or -- 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: I sure hope that you go 


back and tell Bush what I have to say about him 


'cause I --


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: -- think he's a rotten 


(unintelligible). 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much. Let me check 


again to see if Cynthia Wilkes is here? 


Cynthia? 


 (No responses) 


Okay, Margaret Minster? Margaret Minster -- 


Margaret. 


(Pause) 


 MS. COOLEY: My name is Margaret Minster 


Cooley. I was married to James J. Minster, who 


started at the Test Site in 1962, in March. He 


was originally hired to be a warehouseman. 


That paper that you have there said it was 18; 


he was 28 at that time. He was hired to work 


taking in the oil drums that had been used, and 

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putting away the oil that -- the new oil in the 


warehouse. He had to hand-load all these 


things. And the drums that had been used, he 


had to hand-wash them and detoxify them so they 


could go back to the -- the city. Now these 


were hot, the majority of them were hot. And 


as he would put those up next to his body to 


move them around -- because they were bulky and 


they were hard to move -- he was getting 


radiation all the time. He was a very strong 


man, and he lasted for about seven years before 


he got cancer. 


He was 35 years old and he came to me one day 


and he had a great big lump on his neck and he 


said what do you think this is? I said I don't 


know, but we're going to find out right away. 


He went to a doctor here and the doctor wanted 


to operate and I said no. I said let's call 


our friend who's been to Loma Linda and see if 


we can get in there, and so we went to Loma 


Linda and they decided that -- at first they 


said it was Hodgkin's, then they said no, it 


wasn't, that it was lymphoma. And so a lot of 


the time we got it in our head it was Hodgkin's 


'cause we didn't know what kind of lymphoma it 

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was and we didn't know how to explain it to the 


doctors. 


We went through to White* Memorial. He was 


given 50 treatments of radiation, high level 


radiation. He couldn't take the last three. 


He was supposed to be given 50. He was 


hospitalized for a month in a comatose 


condition because he'd been over-radiated. Now 


you notice that those records show no radiation 


showing up, even in 1969. He was so sick 


through his treatments that it -- the -- his 


face was completely black. It was not brown, 


it was not tanned, it was black. He lost all 


his hair. He had to crawl to the bathroom. He 


had to slither like a snake. There were times 


when I was in bed with him -- we were in 


California and we had to travel there for those 


treatments -- that I thought he was dead and I 


would get panicky because he had no heat in his 


body at all and he was dead still. 


On the last treatments, he started to pass out 


all the time. He was a six foot one man and he 


was very large for me to try to handle, and so 


the doctor said it -- well, we're going to put 


him in the hospital and watch him. They gave 

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him one more shot and he went into this 


comatose condition. Now he was there till late 


September and then he had to stay in town. 


He started it in May with this cancer and went 


through late September, a young married couple 


that had two small children. The children had 


to be uprooted from their school and taken to 


Los Angeles to finish their first few years of 


school. Then they were taken -- I had to send 


them back to Las Vegas to be with my mother. 


My son was taken from the second grade and 


skipped the third grade without my knowledge, 


and it was very traumatic for him because of 


what his father was going through. I tried to 


get them to put him back, but they wouldn't. 


Then he ran away when he was seven years old 


and didn't come home till about 9:00 o'clock at 


night. I was not in town. My mother was 


taking care of him and she was frantic. 


These were things that just -- besides the 


illness, we went through many, many trials. In 


1971 he was diagnosed with lycytic (sic) 


leukemia, which was a very rare thing and so 


they called the doctor in from the City of Hope 


and they conferred with this doctor in Los 

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Angeles and they worked it out that he should ­

- needed a blood transfusion. His twin --


identical twin brother -- came to town to give 


him this transfusion. We wanted to be just 


person to person, but they wouldn't do it, so 


they took the transfusion from him and they 


took the transfusion from our friends who were 


LDS people who did not drink, smoke or drink 


coffee. However, ten years later, Jim was 


diagnosed with hepatitis C and HTLV-1, which is 


akin to AIDS, but it was not AIDS. It was a 


disease that deteriorated all of his muscular 


being, and he had -- was just like a skeleton. 


His whole body was like a skeleton. When he 


walked, he walked like this because he was -- 


he'd fall over if he didn't (indicating). He 


couldn't lift his hands or his arms. He had to 


walk with two canes, not just one. Then it got 


so bad that he had to quit work and they took 


him at the doctor and they ran another test and 


he had bladder cancer. So this is the third 


cancer that they had diagnosed him with. He 


beat the cancer, but because he had hepatitis C 


he couldn't get a liver. They looked at all 


this cancer and they said no, he'd never make 

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it through the operation. No, he'd never be 


able to take the medication. 


Now his identical twin is very healthy and 


still living. None of his family have had 


cancer. I think this is just a good example of 


what has happened at the Test Site, that these 


men were told that everything was okay, they 


were safe; you couldn't be any safer than being 


there. You might as well be working downtown 


at one of the casinos because it was just as 


safe as a casino, if not safer. These were 


things Jim told me that he repeated from what 


was being told him. 


He tried to bid out to a downtown job where he 


wouldn't have any radiation, because of the 


amount of radiation that he'd had, and they 


turned him down -- four or five times. And 


every time they turned him down, they promoted 


him to keep him there. Well, the bosses that 


he took their places both died of cancer. The 


man that used to do -- take the -- the pictures 


all over the test site -- and there were only 


three people that were allowed to do that, and 


Jim was made one of them, he died of cancer. 


So isn't it -- just stand to reason that Jim 

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would die of cancer, too? 


One time he came home in overalls and he came 


home quite late that night and I was quite 


worried, and he said they pulled me off the bus 


and made me go take a shower and take all my 


clothes off 'cause they said I had been 


exposed. And he left his clothes all there and 


they decontaminated and they gave them to him 


later in the week. But that's not recorded. 


There's nothing in there about it. 


It just seems a shame that the people that were 


paid to take care of these young men and these 


fine citizens of our community didn't do it. 


Thank you. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much, Margaret. 


Let's see, do we have Diane Milko? Is Diane 


here? 


(Pause) 


MS. SBROCCHI: Hello. I'm Diane Milko 


Sbrocchi, and these are my two sisters, Janet 


Milko Arnkinet* and Janet -- or June Milko 


Licorrino*. I'm just going to read the letter 


that Lori Hunton read to you in Congress. It's 


a short letter. And then I want to do a little 


bit of ad lib about -- on my father's case. 

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My father was Michael Edward Milko. He worked 


at the Test Site from October 1961 to February 


1962 as a weather station monitor. He worked 


in other capacities at the Test Site and NIOSH 


tells me that they are aware that he met the 


qualifications of the 250 days, but I don't 


know what other jobs he did there. He was 


removed from the Test Site weather monitoring 


when he complained that he felt it was unsafe. 


He often told us that his badge did not detect 


any radiation when he was at ground zero and 


one of the blasts went off. As a person that 


grew up here, living here when the blasts 


occurred, I can tell you that the people that 


lived in Las Vegas -- I remember being a child 


and sitting on the toilet and the water 


splashing up on me when these bombs were 


detonated. It was so powerful, it was like an 


earthquake. So you know, everybody in Las 


Vegas was affected, not just the people that 


worked at the Test Site. 


He often told us how his badge did not detect 


any radiation, yet the cows in the field were 


dropping dead around him. He quit the Test 


Site because he believed that he was in danger 

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and that the government was not doing enough to 


protect the workers. Unfortunately, his fears 


became reality when he was diagnosed with 


cancer of the stomach wall in 1972. My doctor 


died at the -- or father died at the age of 43, 


and his doctor said that his stomach cancer was 


the worst he had ever seen. He left behind 


eight children to grieve. 


His case fits all the criteria -- length of 


employment -- excuse me -- type of cancer, and 


as you note by the Cohen report, there is no 


such thing as accurate dose reconstruction. 


It's impossible to contain the radiation that 


came in that cloud. All of us were affected 


that lived -- I believe, as that lady stated, 


my family -- I was unable to have children. 


don't know if that's one of the reasons. My 


sisters and my brothers have had mental and 


physical problems, as well. My father would 


come home and remove his coveralls outside and 


go and take another shower, and he did not let 


us touch him. 


We still have no resolution, and it is 


unconceivable (sic) to us that the government 


has let the workers and survivors of the Test 


I 
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Site fight like this for all these years for 


compensation. The $150,000 to eight children 


is not a lot of money. And it's not the money. 


We want the government to recognize what they 


did to our family, and our fathers and our 


brothers and all those people that were loved 


and have been lost. 


 The dose reconstructions and time limits on 


exposure are a ridiculous attempt to keep from 


paying the claimants. One day, or even one 


hour, of exposure may cause cancer. Scientists 


can't predict how genes will mutate in 


individuals exposed to radiation. Please take 


care of the workers, the survivors of the 


workers, and those who did their duty to 


protect us during the Cold War. Please honor 


the memory of our father. That is all we have 


left. 


And I want to add to this, we appreciate your 


time, but we are just so frustrated with the 


process of being shuttled back and forth from 


committee to committee. We've written letters, 


we've given speeches, we -- you know, again, 


all our information is, like everybody else's, 


secondhand. Our father is dead. We have no 

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one to go to. Our mother wasn't told, 


everything was so secretive. We have limited 


experience. We can't reconstruct what happened 


out there, and nobody ever will be able to. 


But I want to say that Hollywood understands 


what happened out there. If any of you have 


watched the movie that was out, a B horror 


movie -- I happened to rent it a week ago -- 


"The Hills Have Eyes" -- everyone in here 


should watch that movie. Hollywood knows what 


happened at the Test Site. It's a movie about 


Test Site workers building little homes with 


these little mannequins that were dummies and 


they were exposed to radiation and they thought 


well, the mannequins are fine so it must be 


fine for live people. That really makes sense. 


In this movie they show all these people down 


in the mines with their pictures that died from 


radiation, and all their children and offspring 


that mutated. Now again, it's a B movie, it's 


a Hollywood movie, but they have more sense 


than Washington does. I mean it is a fact that 


these people have died from cancer. It's too 


many to dis-- to ignore. It really is. 


 And I appreciate you doing something about it, 

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and we have waited way too long. And we're all 


just, you know, so frustrated, every one of us. 


Thank you for letting us speak. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Janice Ramirez -- is 


Janice with us? 


 (No responses) 


 Addie McLemore? McLemore? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: She had to leave? 


UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) 


 DR. ZIEMER: She had to leave, or do we know? 


 DR. WADE: It's okay, move on, William Morton. 


 DR. ZIEMER: William Morton? 


(Pause) 


 MR. MORTON: Good evening. I am the son of the 


late William S. Morton, former Nevada Test Site 


worker. My name is William G. Morton. My 


father worked at the Test Site from the dates 


7/62 off and on, as the Department of Labor 


showed, through 10 of '68. In 1962 I was a 


year old. I relied on what my mother and 


father told me about those times. I was old 


enough to understand myself. I remember my 


father telling me about an accident that 


surrounded a test site, and he assisted in the 

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rescuing of several employees that were trapped 


in some kind of cave-in. I remember my mother 


and father talking about the breathing problems 


he had shortly after the accident. 


Around the time when I was eight -- eight years 


old -- my father started getting sick. He 


could not do normal things a father and son 


would do because of the illness. It was around 


this time that my father had to medically 


retire from work and he never was able to work 


another job again due to health issues. 


From that point forward my mother was the sole 


provider. She and I took care of my father as 


his health proceeded to get worse over the 


years. I did not have a normal childhood at 


(sic) most of the time I was helping take care 


of my father. There was even a point where I 


did not get to see my father for over a year, 


as he had an operation for throat cancer in 


California and had to remain there. The 


operation took over 13 hours. He had to have a 


permanent trach tube, then received radiation 


and cobalt treatment. Due to the financial 


burden of traveling, I only got to see my 


father once during that time period. During 

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the visit I was informed that my father had 


terminal throat cancer. I was distraught and 


decided to take a walk in a city where I did 


not know my way around. I was robbed at 


gunpoint. The only thing of value that the 


robbers got was the graduation watch my parents 


had given me. Now I'd just been informed I was 


going to lose my father, and then I lost the 


only material thing that he had given me. 


Approximately two years later he developed lung 


cancer, underwent chemotherapy. The lung 


cancer was diagnosed too late. It was in a 


stage where surgery could not be done. My 


father went to the hospital as he was having 


difficulty breathing. My father's doctor 


recommended to my mother and me he go to a 


hospice. On November 11th, 1989 my father was 


prepped by the hospital to be moved to the 


hospice. When the staff from the hospice 


arrived to transfer him, they found him dead. 


At the death of my father I felt angry and 


helpless because there was nothing I could do 


to help or save him. I feel that the Test Site 


robbed me of my precious years with my father, 


not only growing up, but into my adulthood. 

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Special events such as my wedding day still had 


a little shadow of sadness that he could not be 


there with me. It only took one exposure to 


radiation to develop cancer. I believe my 


father breathed in the radioactive dirt at the 


Test Site throughout the times he spent there, 


putting in motion throat cancer and the lung 


cancer. 


I think setting a minimum of 250 days is 


inappropriate. I think that anyone who worked 


at the Test Site for one day or 1,000 days 


during that time period had contracted cancer 


should be compensated. My father and other 


employees and survivors that are here today 


that worked at the Test Site are Cold War 


veterans. If it wasn't for them, who knows. 


The government owes the survivors of the 


workers compensation. It is such a small crest 


in the big picture. How do you put a price on 


life? You can't. And the government cannot 


bring our loved ones back. Therefore, to pay 


the settlements would be a step in the right 


direction for putting our loved ones at risk 


without proper precaution, but ultimately took 


them away from us and current other survivors. 

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And just something I didn't write down, I was 


brought up that when you do something wrong, 


you stand up like a man and you take the 


punishment. The government made a mistake. 


They should stand up, compensate these fine 


people and any of the employees that are still 


living -- do the right thing, stand up for your 


mistake. Thank you. 

 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Let's see, Alma 

Mosley? Is Alma here? 

 MS. MOSLEY: My name is Alma Lee Mosley. I 

want to tell you nice people how I feel. I 

lost my husband in 1978, September 25th. It 

was a long journey. I was in my early 20s, and 


look at me now. I'm in a wheelchair. This is 


my baby boy (indicating). He was only 19 years 


old when his father died. He had to go -- he 


went to UNLV. He had to cut college short 


because he had to help me make a living. It 


wasn't easy. 


Over the years I have kept this Test Site thing 


in front of me. I did it for my children. 
I 


have three sons, no girls, so it hasn't been 


easy. But I did not stand back and hold my 


hands. I went through interviews, countries, 

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on the TV. I kept it before the public. Mr. 


Udall was one of our Test Site lawyers. I did 


not know he had passed. The Foley Building -- 


the old Foley Building downtown -- was where we 


had our first trial. There was a young man 


that came to me. I guess I was a celebrity, I 


don't know. All I know is I kept it before the 


public. And so Mr. Udall and Mr. Harrison, 


Test Site lawyers, they came to me on the steps 


of the old Foley Building. There were many 


people there. I didn't want the excitement, I 


just wanted recognition, and I kept it before 


the public and they would send people to 


interview me -- Australia, Japan. I remember a 


young man came over to me and he said Ms. 


Mosley, can I shake your hand? My father died 


such -- such a sad event. So I'm asking all of 


you nice people that we need recognition 'cause 


I say in my early 20s and I will be 80 years 


old in December the 28th. I really enjoyed 


keeping this before the public, and I will 


still do it because there's too many people 


that have lost recognition. I came from an 


educational family. My mother was a 


schoolteacher. Not that I'm so dumb, but I 

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just like the public, and these nice people 


that have talked, they mean it from their 


heart. I mean it from my heart. And I will 


continue to ask for recognition for my baby 


boy. He was only 19. And I want to thank you 


all for listening. We need recognition, and I 


thank you so much because there's so much I 


could say. I would be on TV right here in Las 


Vegas, and there are many things -- and this is 


my younger son. He might want to say 


something, too. 


UNIDENTIFIED: I really don't have any comments 


at this time. I'll just let my mother do the 


talking today. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Sometimes that's a 


wise son. Thank you very much. 


Dave Sbrocchi, I don't know if I pronounced 


that correctly --


MS. SBROCCHI: That -- that was me already, I ­

- Diane Sbrocchi. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Oh, Diane, okay, I -- okay, it 


looks like Dave here. I thought maybe you had 


a brother or something. Okay, thank you very 


much. 


I believe that completes our participation 

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tonight. I thank you all for being patient. 


We have had a good variety of input. We 


appreciate all of you bringing these issues 


before us. As I told you at the beginning, we 


can't necessarily solve all the problems, but 


we will do what we can to address those issues 


that are within our sphere of influence. The 


Board is -- is quite sympathetic to the 


concerns and, again, we will do our best to -- 


to address the issues here as they pertain to 


this particular site. 


Thank you again. This Board does meet again 


tomorrow. You're all welcome to be here for 


that session, as well. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: How many meetings have you 


had and how long have you been here? Why are 


we not always aware of this? 


 DR. ZIEMER: This is our second meeting in -- 


in Las Vegas. We met yesterday here, as well, 


and today and we'll meet again tomorrow. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: And why were -- I was 


called and told last week that you would be 


here today, but nobody said anything about any 


other meetings. 


 DR. ZIEMER: Well, I -- I don't know. I know 

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that the public announcements that were made by 


NIOSH indicated all three days, and you're 


certainly welcome to be with us tomorrow, as 


well. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: Did you have it on the 


local news? 


 DR. ZIEMER: I -- I don't know who was 


contacted. 


 MS. WILLIAMS-LENZ: I watch the news and I 


didn't see anything. 


 DR. ZIEMER: That I don't know. We could find 


out for you. Thanks for being here. 


 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 9:30 


p.m.) 

______________________________ 

367 

1 

2 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 


STATE OF GEORGIA 


COUNTY OF FULTON 


 I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court 


Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the 


above and foregoing on the day of Sept. 20, 


2006; and it is a true and accurate transcript 


of the testimony captioned herein. 


 I further certify that I am neither kin 


nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor 


have any interest in the cause named herein. 


 WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 


18th day of November, 2006. 


STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR 


CERTIFIED MERIT COURT REPORTER 


CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102