ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

People v. Robinson, 2012 IL App (4th) 101048

Appellate Court

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

ALFRED D. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

 District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-10-1048

Filed

Rehearing denied

August 27, 2012

September 25, 2012

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Defense counsel was not ineffective in rejecting defendant’s request that

counsel serve only as conduit during plea negotiations.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 07-CF-194; the

Hon. Scott Drazewski, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield,

and Alan D. Goldberg and Christopher L. Gehrke (argued), both of State

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

William A. Yoder, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino,

Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose (argued), all of State’s

Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Justice Appleton concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Cook specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 In this case, we are asked to determine whether defense counsel is ineffective when he

rejects a defendant’s directive that counsel serve essentially as merely the defendant’s

conduit during guilty-plea negotiations. We conclude that he is not, given that a criminal

defendant’s role in guilty-plea negotiations when he is represented by counsel is limited to

accepting or rejecting the agreement for a guilty plea that defense counsel and the prosecutor

have reached.

¶ 2 In February 2007, the State charged defendant, Alfred D. Robinson, with unlawful

possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(B) (West 2006)) and unlawful

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(B) (West

2006)). In April 2007, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of cannabis (720

ILCS 550/4(b) (West 2006)). Following an August 2007 trial, a jury found defendant guilty

of all three charges, and the trial court later sentenced him to 12 years in prison. Defendant

appealed, and this court affirmed. People v. Robinson, No. 4-07-0899 (Mar. 3, 2009)

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 3 In August 2009, defendant pro se filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

(725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-8 (West 2008)), complaining, in pertinent part, that he was denied

his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney, Terry Dodds,

failed to communicate to the State his desire to accept the State’s guilty-plea offer. After

advancing defendant’s petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial

court granted the State’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 4 Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by dismissing his postconviction

petition because he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, given that Dodds

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failed to communicate his desire to accept the State’s guilty-plea offer, and (2) he should be

afforded a new hearing because his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

by failing to adequatelypresent his pro se postconviction assertions. We disagree and affirm.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 In February 2007, defendant was traveling on Interstate 55 in a vehicle driven by his

cousin. Illinois State Police Officer Brandon Smick initiated a traffic stop after observing the

vehicle speeding and swerving. During the stop, Smick discovered an outstanding warrant

for defendant’s arrest. Shortly thereafter, a canine unit arrived to assist Smick. After walking

around the vehicle, the canine indicated that narcotics were present. While searching the

vehicle, the officers discovered 249.9 grams of cocaine and 2.6 grams of cannabis.

¶ 7 The State thereafter charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled

substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(B) (West 2006)) and unlawful possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(B) (West 2006)). At a March 2007

status hearing, Dodds explained to the trial court that the State had “extended an offer” and

that he required a continuance in order to discuss that offer with defendant.

¶ 8 In April 2007, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of cannabis (720

ILCS 550/4(b) (West 2006)). At a status hearing held shortly thereafter, the State sought a

trial date because it had made “six different offers,” which defendant had rejected, adding

that there were “no ongoing negotiations.”

¶ 9 At the July 23, 2007, status hearing, the trial court inquired into the status of the parties’

ongoing guilty-plea negotiations, as follows:

“THE COURT: Is the [S]tate proceeding on all three counts?

[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And although it is inferentially People versus Curry related, can you

tell me, [prosecutor], if an offer, without specifying what the offer is, if an offer has been

made for a disposition other than a conviction upon the most serious offense, that being

a Class X felony.

[PROSECUTOR]: Previously, previously on multiple occasions, let’s see, five

occasions there was, but there is not one today.

THE COURT: So that’s been withdrawn by the [S]tate?

[PROSECUTOR]: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Just to confirm, this is primarily to go ahead and protect

your attorney, that being Mr. Dodds, at a later point in time for being challenged by you,

[defendant], that he didn’t tell you what at this point in time, do I assume that Mr. Dodds

has–are you aware of what the potential penalties are for that, for the most serious of the

offer with intent to deliver?

THE DEFENDANT: No.”

The court thereafter explained on the record the potential penalties for the charges that

defendant was facing. The court then inquired into defendant’s desire to proceed, as follows:

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“THE COURT: Okay. And knowing that, is it still your desire then to proceed to

trial?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I have attempted to accept the [S]tate’s offer of eight years,

but it has been declined.

THE COURT: Well, apparently that offer isn’t there any more and so I cannot nor

will I get involved in negotiations, but basically, at this point in time, if the offer has been

withdrawn–

Did you need time to talk with Mr. Dodds about that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”

Following a brief recess, the colloquy continued as follows:

“THE COURT: Let the record reflect, following a recess where Mr. Dodds and

[defendant] had an opportunity to confer privately in an adjoining conference room, that

*** defendant returns in open court with Mr. Dodds, [the prosecutor] being present for

the State.

Initially, Mr. Dodds, what can you advise me, if anything, with reference to how

we’ll be proceeding today?

MR. DODDS: Your Honor, the [S]tate has made a cap offer during the recess, I don’t

want to say what the number was, but [defendant] has declined the cap offer which I will

state to the court that it was less than the maximum of the Class 1, so I can tell the court

that it was 15 or less.”

¶ 10 Following an August 2007 trial, a jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of

a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,

and unlawful possession of cannabis. The trial court later sentenced him to 12 years in

prison. Shortly thereafter, defendant sent a letter to the court explaining that Dodds (1) failed

to communicate his June 29, 2007, acceptance of the State’s offer to recommend an eightyear prison term to the court, (2) failed to explain that the State’s sentencing cap offer

applied only if he pleaded guilty, and (3) failed to be “supportive.” The court responded to

defendant’s letter, explaining to defendant that Dodds would be receiving his letter and that

he should speak to Dodds about filing the appropriate motion.

¶ 11 No further action was taken.

¶ 12 Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into

his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. This court rejected defendant’s argument,

concluding that the court did not err because “the court rightfully relied on its own

knowledge of the negotiation timeline in rejecting defendant’s claim of ineffective

assistance.” People v. Robinson, No. 4-07-0899 (Mar. 3, 2009) (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 13 In August 2009, defendant pro se filed a postconviction petition, complaining, in

pertinent part, that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel

when Dodds failed to communicate to the State his desire to accept the State’s eight-year

offer. In his petition, defendant asserted that after the State made a guilty-plea offer of eight

years, he asked Dodds to “see if he could get [seven] years, but if not, then let [the State]

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know that [he would] take the [eight] years.” Defendant further asserted that Dodds refused,

resulting in the State’s withdrawing its offer.

¶ 14 Defendant attached to his petition an affidavit, which contained the following assertions.

Dodds informed him about the State’s eight-year offer on May 30, 2007. Sometime after

Dodds told him about the offer, defendant asked Dodds to “see if [he] could get it down to

[seven] years, and if not, then, [he would] take the [eight] years.” Dodds responded as

follows: “I [am] not going back to ask for [seven] years.” As a result, defendant and Dodds

began arguing and defendant was “sent away.”

¶ 15 Defendant also included with his petition a pro se letter that he sent to the prosecutor that

was dated July 1, 2007, and file stamped by the State’s Attorney’s office on July 5, 2007.

That letter read, in part, as follows:

“I *** am writing to you to say that on [June 29, 2007,] my attorney[,] *** Dodds[,]

ask[ed] you or you offered 8 years. I know this case is set for trial on [July 23, 2007,] but

on [June 29, 2007,] I ask[ed] *** Dodds to ask you for 7 years and we could have been

done with this case then. His response to me was [that] he can’t do that.”

¶ 16 Defendant also attached to his petition a signed letter from Dodds dated July 16, 2007.

That letter read, in part, as follows:

“I understand that you have written [the prosecutor] in an attempt to further negotiate

a plea bargain for yourself. Due to the nature of the status of these proceedings, I would

request that you discontinue such practice, and further request that should you have

something that you would like to ask the prosecutor that you go through me as your agent

and attorney. I have had countless conversations with him about this case, and the time

for negotiation has come and gone.

I am also writing you to confirm the status of these proceedings. You have been

previously advised that the possible sentencing range of punishment in this case is from

9 to 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, provided that you are convicted

of the ‘super x’ count of unlawful possession with intent. As I have previously advised

you, I am doubtful you can beat this count, despite weight being the only indicator of

intent to deliver. While I think it is a legitimate argument that you did not intend to

deliver, due to my experience with McLean County juries, I am doubtful that they will

believe our argument.

Lastly, just to confirm what I have previously told you, even were you to beat that

count of unlawful [possession] with intent, it is seriously doubtful that the judge will give

you a sentence of less than 8 years due to the weight and regardless of the fact that you

were found not-guilty of the more serious offense; in other words, it will be a shallow

victory. The judge may believe you intended to deliver the narcotics regardless of

convincing the 12 jurors to the contrary and obtaining a not-guilty verdict. He would then

likely sentence you to more than the minimum. Nonetheless, I have hopes that we can

beat Count II.

The above notwithstanding, I think that [the prosecutor] has revoked his previous

offer of 8 years at this point. From my discussions with him[,] he seemed extremely

agitated that you requested a 7[-]year offer after previously indicating that you would

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[accept] 8 and after I had successfully negotiated your desired sentence with him; he has

now informed me that the offer is again 9, although I have a feeling that he may again

come down to 8, should you so desire.”

¶ 17 In March 2010, the trial court advanced defendant’s postconviction petition to the second

stage of postconviction proceedings and appointed attorney Keith Davis to represent

defendant. In August 2010, Davis filed a “Declaration To Stand on Pro Se Pleadings” and

a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c)(eff. Apr. 26, 2012), averring that

he had consulted with defendant, examined the record of proceedings at trial, and had made

any amendments necessary to adequately present defendant’s pro se claims. In September

2010, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶ 18 At a December 2010 hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, the State argued, in

pertinent part, that defendant’s claim that Dodds was ineffective because he failed to

communicate defendant’s desire to accept the State’s eight-year guilty-plea offer because that

argument was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and, in any event, counsel was effective.

Defense counsel Davis responded that he agreed with the State’s position, but not its

rationale. Davis concluded, and expressed to the trial court, that defendant’s postconviction

claims were “on shaky footing.” As to defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, Davis indicated that the “tenor of most of the plea discussions” was that defendant

“was willing to take X-number of years, [and he] was not given that.”

¶ 19 The trial court then dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition, finding, in pertinent

part, as follows:

“[T]here was kind of a renewed assertion as it relates to an alleged deprivation of

defendant’s constitutional rights relating to a plea agreement or plea deal, and the record

*** would indicate that no such agreement had ever been reached between the [S]tate

and *** defendant, there was always a condition precedent, and so there was no meeting

of the minds.”

¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition

because he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, given that Dodds failed to

communicate his desire to accept the State’s guilty-plea offer, and (2) he should be afforded

a new hearing because his postconviction counsel, Davis, provided unreasonable assistance

by failing to adequatelypresent his pro se postconviction assertions. We address defendant’s

contentions in turn.

¶ 23 A. Defendant’s Claim That the Trial Court Erred by

Dismissing His Postconviction Petition

¶ 24 1. Postconviction Proceedings and the Standard of Review

¶ 25 In People v. Andrews, 403 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658, 936 N.E.2d 648, 652-53 (2010), this

court outlined postconviction proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, as

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follows:

“A defendant may proceed under the Act by alleging that ‘in the proceedings which

resulted in his or her conviction[,] there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under

the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.’ 725 ILCS 5/122-

1(a)(1) (West 2006). In noncapital cases, the Act establishes a three-stage process for

adjudicating a postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 2006);

People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 503, 821 N.E.2d 1093, 1096 (2004). At the first stage,

‘the trial court, without input from the State, examines the petition only to determine if

[it alleges] a constitutional deprivation unrebutted by the record, rendering the petition

neither frivolous nor patently without merit.’ (Emphasis in original.) People v. Phyfiher,

361 Ill. App. 3d 881, 883, 838 N.E.2d 181, 184 (2005). ‘Section 122-2.1 [of the Act]

directs that if the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment (rather than death) and the

circuit court determines that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit, it shall be

dismissed in a written order. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2004).’ People v. Torres,

228 Ill. 2d 382, 394, 888 N.E.2d 91, 99-100 (2008).

If a petition is not dismissed at stage one, it proceeds to stage two, where section 122-

4 of the Act provides for the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant who

wishes counsel to be appointed. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2006). At the second stage, the

State has the opportunity to answer or move to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5

(West 2006). If the trial court does not grant the State’s motion to dismiss or if the State

has filed an answer, the petition proceeds to the third stage, where the defendant may

present evidence in support of his petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5, 122-6 (West 2006).”

¶ 26 Here, the trial court dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition following a secondstage hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss. “[T]he dismissal of a postconviction petition

at the second stage is warranted only when the allegations in the petition, liberally construed

in light of the trial record, fail to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.”

People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 15, 964 N.E.2d 1139. We review de novo the

trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second stage. Id.

¶ 27 2. Defendant’s Contention That the Trial Court Erred by Dismissing His 

Petition Because He Was Denied the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

¶ 28 Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition at

the second stage of postconviction proceedings because he demonstrated that he was denied

the effective assistance of trial counsel, given that Dodds failed to communicate his desire

to accept the State’s eight-year guilty-plea offer. Specifically, defendant asserts that Dodds

was ineffective because he refused to follow defendant’s directive to counter the State’s

eight-year offer with an offer to plead guilty in exchange for seven years, and if the State did

not accept that counteroffer, to accept the State’s original eight-year offer. We disagree.

¶ 29 a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 30 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are judged under the familiar standard set

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forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under that standard, a defendant

“must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326,

948 N.E.2d 542, 546-47 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).

¶ 31 In this case, defendant claims that Dodds’ performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness when Dodds failed to follow defendant’s directive to communicate his

counteroffer to the State, and if the State rejected his seven-year counteroffer, to accept the

State’s eight-year offer. Defendant’s position in this regard misconstrues the role of a

defendant in plea negotiations.

¶ 32 b. A Defendant’s Role in Plea Negotiations

¶ 33 In People v. Rainey, 325 Ill. App. 3d 573, 582, 758 N.E.2d 492, 500 (2001), this court

cited the supreme court decision in People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 229, 642 N.E.2d

1230, 1232 (1994), as holding that there are five decisions that a criminal defendant has a

right to make personally: (1) whether to plead guilty, (2) whether to waive the right to a trial

by jury, (3) whether to testify, (4) whether to appeal, and (5) whether to request jury

instructions on lesser-included defenses. All other decisions are matters of trial strategy on

which the ultimate decision is left to defense counsel’s sound judgment. Perhaps as

significant, however–at least for purposes of this case–is the fact that each of these decisions

that is “personal” to the defendant requires a simple “up or down vote”–that is, they require

only a “yes” or “no” answer. For example, when a defendant elects to testify, his role is not

to decide what questions his attorney will ask him once he is on the stand; his role is to

decide whether he will get on the stand at all. See People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54, 604

N.E.2d 275, 281 (1992) (holding that trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision

with respect to matters of tactics and strategy such as whether and how to conduct the

examination of witnesses after consulting with his client). Likewise, when a defendant elects

to seek a plea agreement, his role is not to “haggle” with the prosecutor by directing counsel

during the negotiation process; his role is to decide whether to accept or reject the plea

agreement that his counsel and the prosecutor ultimately reached.

¶ 34 Having outlined the criminal defendant’simportant–but limited–role in plea negotiations,

we turn to plea negotiations generally.

¶ 35 c. Plea Negotiations Generally

¶ 36 Plea negotiations are generally governed by the principles of contract law. In 2004, the

supreme court explained that the plea-negotiation process itself is akin to contract

negotiations, as follows:

“Although the application of contract law principles to plea agreements may require

‘tempering in some instances’ in order to satisfy concerns for due process, plea

agreements are nonetheless subject to traditional principles of contract law absent such

concerns. See [People v.] Evans, 174 Ill. 2d [320,] 326-27[, 673 N.E.2d 244, 247

(1996)]; People v. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d 243, 246[, 763 N.E.2d 858, 860] (2002);

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Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 759 n.1 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v.

Muzika, 986 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1993) (the existence of a plea agreement is

determined by ordinary contract principles of offer and acceptance). Pursuant to

traditional principles of contract, the legal effect of a counteroffer is the rejection of a

standing offer. Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Deutsche Financial Services Corp., 216 F.3d

388, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2000), citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 36 (1981). A

rejected offer cannot be revived by a later acceptance. See Sementa v. Tylman, 230 Ill.

App. 3d 701, 705[, 595 N.E.2d 688, 692] (1992); D’Agostino v. Bank of Ravenswood,

205 Ill. App. 3d 898, 902[, 563 N.E.2d 886, 889] (1990); Sharp Electronics Corp., 216

F.3d at 396. When a defendant rejects a State offer, the parties go ‘back to the drawing

board.’ Coleman, 318 F.3d at 759.” People v. Henderson, 211 Ill. 2d 90, 103-04, 809

N.E.2d 1224, 1232 (2004).

¶ 37 Understanding that plea negotiations are governed generally bythe principles of contract

law, we turn to the plea negotiations in this case, keeping in mind that defendant contends

that Dodds was ineffective–that is, Dodds’ actions fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness–for failing to follow defendant’s directive to first counter the State’s offer,

and if the State refused, to then accept the State’s eight-year offer.

¶ 38 d. The Plea Negotiations in This Case

¶ 39 In this case, the State at one point offered defendant, through Dodds, the opportunity to

plead guilty and, in exchange, the State would recommend that the trial court impose a

sentence of eight years in prison. Dodds, as was his duty, conveyed the State’s offer to

defendant, who responded by directing Dodds to “see if he could get [seven] years, but if not,

then let [the State] know that [he would] take the [eight] years.” Dodds refused, stating that

he was “not going back to ask for [seven] years.” Presumably, Dodds understood that if he

countered the State’s eight-year offer, the legal effect of that counteroffer (as the supreme

court explained in Henderson, 211 Ill. 2d at 104, 809 N.E.2d at 1232) would be the rejection

of the State’s then-eight-year offer. In other words, Dodds correctly identified defendant’s

counteroffer for a seven-year deal as a rejection of the State’s eight-year offer. Indeed,

defendant’s petition and accompanying documents show that he and Dodds argued about

defendant’s directive, indicating that defendant did not want to accept the eight-year offer

without first countering it with a request to plead guilty in exchange for seven years in prison.

The fact that defendant later indicated his desire to accept the State’s eight-year offer at the

July 2007 status hearing is of no consequence; at that point, the offer was “off the table.” See

Brach v. Matteson, 298 Ill. 387, 392, 131 N.E. 804, 806 (1921) (an offer “must be accepted

before it is withdrawn or it becomes inoperative”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 36

(1981) (an offeree’s power to accept may be terminated by, among other things, revocation

by the offeror).

¶ 40 As Dodds’ representation was objectively reasonable, defendant’s claim that he made a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation because he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel must fail. In so concluding, we emphasize that underlying defendant’s

claim is his contention that he, not his counsel, is entitled to direct the plea-negotiation

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process with the State. And we emphasize as well our rejection of that contention, deeming

it wholly incompatible with the teaching of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Brocksmith.

Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by denying his

postconviction petition on that basis.

¶ 41 B. Defendant’s Claim That He Was Not Afforded Reasonable

Assistance of Postconviction Counsel

¶ 42 Defendant next contends that he should be afforded a new hearing because he was not

provided reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel. Defendant asserts that Davis

provided unreasonable assistance because Davis represented to the trial court that

defendant’s postconviction claim was that defendant was willing to plead guilty in exchange

for a certain number of years but that the State did not offer that option, when in reality,

defendant was claiming that Dodds failed to communicate his acceptance of the eight-year

plea offer to the State. Based upon the particular circumstances of this case, we disagree.

¶ 43 The right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is wholly statutory. 725 ILCS 5/122-4

(West 2010). Thus, a defendant is entitled only to the level of assistance required by the

statute; in this case, a “reasonable” level of assistance. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42,

890 N.E.2d 398, 402 (2007). To assure that a defendant receive reasonable assistance, the

supreme court has imposed the following specific duties upon postconviction counsel in

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012): “counsel must (1) consult with the

[defendant] either by mail or in person to ascertain the contentions of deprivation of

constitutional rights; (2) examine the record of the trial court proceedings; and (3) make any

amendments to the pro se petition necessaryfor an adequate presentation of the [defendant’s]

contentions.” Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 42, 890 N.E.2d at 403.

¶ 44 Here, Davis filed a certificate, certifying that he complied with Rule 651(c). Defendant

claims, however, that Davis nevertheless failed to adequately present his postconviction

contention related to plea negotiations to the trial court. Our review of the record refutes

defendant’s claim in this regard in that the court’s findings at the second-stage hearing show

that the court clearly understood defendant’s postconviction contention–namely, that Dodds

failed to communicate his acceptance of the State’s eight-year guilty-plea offer. However,

the court found that the parties had failed to reach an agreement because “there was always

a condition precedent.” That “condition precedent,” as the court put it, was that Dodds had

to first ask for the seven years before defendant would accept the eight-year offer from the

State.

¶ 45 The record affirmatively shows that defendant’s postconviction claims were adequately

presented to the trial court, and that the court understood and correctly ruled upon those

claims. We understand defendant’s concerns about his postconviction counsel and agree that

counsel should have been a more vigorous advocate on defendant’s behalf at the secondstage hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition.

Nonetheless, on this record, we reject defendant’s contention that he should be afforded a

new hearing.

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¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. As part of our judgment, we

award the State its $75 statutory assessment as costs of this appeal.

¶ 48 Affirmed.

¶ 49 JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring.

¶ 50 I concurin the decision to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction

petition. I disagree, however, with the suggestion that defendant’s only role during the pleanegotiation process is to decide whether to accept or reject the plea agreement that his

counsel and the prosecutor ultimately reached. An attorney has a duty to keep his or her

client informed of all developments in the case and the attorney’s progress in preparing the

defense. “[A]part from the five decisions that ultimately belong to a defendant in a criminal

case, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of

tactics and strategy after consultation with the client.” (Emphasis added.) People v.

Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 320, 939 N.E.2d 310, 321 (2010). Clendenin dealt with a

stipulation to the admission of evidence which was not tantamount to a guilty plea.

Clendenin held that defense counsel may validly waive a defendant’s confrontation right by

agreeing to such a stipulation “as long as the stipulation is part of counsel’s trial tactics and

strategy, and the defendant does not object.” (Emphasis added.)Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d at 320,

939 N.E.2d at 321. Defendant is not “entitled to direct the plea-negotiation process with the

State” (supra ¶ 40), but defendant does have some say in the matter.

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