J. S 70 0 07 /1 8

NON
- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA
v. : : CHRISTOPHER FINNEFROCK , : No. 1245 E DA 20 18
: Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 6, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No. CP

- 15

- CR

- 0004197

- 2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN , P. J., McLAUGHLIN , J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 2 4 , 2018
Christopher Finnefrock appeals from the April 6, 2018 judgment of
sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County after he
entered guilty pleas to two counts of involun tary deviate sexual intercourse
with a child, one count of unlawful contact with a minor , and one count of
corruption of minors. 1 The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate
term of imprisonment of eight to sixteen years. Mark Conte, Esq ., has fi led

an Anders brief, 2 with an accompanying petition, alleging that the appeal is

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b), 6318(a)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.

2 See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. McClendon , 495 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).J. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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frivolous , and including a request to withdraw. After careful review, we
grant counsel ’ s petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

The trial court set forth the following:
Appellant was charged with nine (9) counts of Rape of Child (18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 3121(c)), nine (9) counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Interc ourse With a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b)), nine (9) counts of Unlawful Contact With a Minor (18 Pa .C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1)), nine (9) counts of Incest of a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302(b)(1)), one (1) count of Corruption of Minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. §6301(a)(1)(ii)), one (1) count of Endangering Welfare of Children (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1)), nine (9) counts of Indecent Assault of Person Less Than 13 Years of Age (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)), nine (9) counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse

- Serious Bodily Injury (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(c)), and nine (9) counts of Con tact/Communication With a Minor

- Sexual Abu se (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(5)). The Involun tary Deviate Sexual Intercourse

- Serious Bodily Injury and Contact/Communication With a Minor

- Sexual Abuse counts were withdrawn at the lower court. The remaining 47 counts were bound over for trial.
Various pre

- trial motions were filed by the parties. The Commonwealth filed a “ Motion to Allow Testimony of Out of Court Statement ”

. A hearing was scheduled for May 25, 2017 but continued to permit new defense counsel to enter his appearance and prepare for the hearing. New defense counsel filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Commonwealth ’ s Motion on August 16, 2017. Upon consideration of the evidence presented and arguments made at the August 17, 2017 hearing, the Commonwealth ’ s motion was g ranted in part and denied in part. The Commonwealth filed additional motions on November 27, 2017: (1) a “ Motion in Limine to Preclude References to Prior Sexual Conduct ” , and (2) a “ Motion for Testimony by Contemporaneous Alternative Method ”

. A “ Motion inJ. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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- Limine to Admit Expert Testimony Regarding Lack of Injury to Victim ” was also filed by the Commonwealth on February 16, 2018. After discussions held in chambers with both counsel, the court deferred its ruling on the Commonwealth ’ s motions until the t ime of trial.[Footnote 1] [Appellant] filed a “ Motion in Limine ” on Februa ry 23, 2018 requesting that [ a ppellant] be permitted to: (1) cross examine the child victim and child witness, and (2) present evidence of the child victim ’ s prior sexual conduct in cluding prior sexual assaults. [Appellant ’ s] “ Motion in Limine ” was also deferred until the commencement of trial.
[Footnote 1] It was represented to the court by the Commonwealth, during the chambers conference, that the Commonwealth would be withdrawing its motion requesting an alternate method of testimony for the victim at trial. However, no withdrawal was formerly made by the Commonwealth subsequent to the chambers conference.
On April 6, 2018 a jury was selected for trial. Prior to the court ’ s rulings on the parties ’ pending motions and the commencement of trial, the Commonwealth and [a]ppellant presented the court with a negotiated guilty plea. Appellant pleaded guilty to two (2) counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse With a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b)), one (1) count of Unlawful Contact With a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. §6318(a)(1)), and one (1) count of Corruption of Minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. §6301(a)(1)(ii)). Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 8 to 16 years of incarcera tion on the two (2) counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse With a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. §3123(b)) and 10 years of probation on the remaining counts.
On April 24, 2018, through his appointed defense counsel Mark Conte, Esquire, [a]ppellant filed an appeal to his April 6, 2018 judgment of sentence. On April 25, 2018, the court filed its Rule 1925(b)J. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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- Order. Subsequently, on May 14, 2018, Mr. Conte filed a “ Motion for Extension of Time to File 1925(b) Statement and For Appointment of New Counsel ”

. O n May 25, 2018, the court granted Mr. Conte ’ s request for an extension of time and scheduled a hearing for June 6, 2018 to address his request to withdraw as [a]ppellant ’ s counsel. Mr. Conte also filed a “ Motion to Withdraw as Appellate Counsel ” with the Superior Court. ( See Docket, Commonwealth v. Finnefrock , 1245 EDA 2018). The Superior Court issued an Order on June 1, 2018 directing this court to enter a disposition on Mr. Conte ’ s request to withdraw as [a]ppellant ’ s counsel.
Prior to the hearing of June 6, 2018, [a]ppellant submitted correspondence to the Chester County Clerk of Courts indicating his desire to participate in the June 6, 2018 hearing, and his desire to keep Mr. [Conte] as his appellate counsel “ cuz he kno(ws) I ’ m not guilty ”

. ( See Commonwealth v Finnefrock , CP

- 15

- CR

- 4197

- 20176, Correspondence Docketed 06/01/18, p. 1). We denied Mr. Conte ’ s request to withdraw as appellate counsel after considering the legal arguments made and [a]ppellant ’ s statements to the co urt. We found that [a]ppellant was not financially able to retain private appellate counsel, and that he was under significant time constraints to proceed with his appeal. Subsequently, [a]ppellant , through Mr. Conte, filed a

“ Motion for a New Hearing to Address Defense Counsel ’ s Motion to Withdraw ”

. We denie d his request on June 13, 2018.
On June 21, 2018, [a]ppellant filed his Concise Statement of Errors Claimed of on Appeal pursuant to our May 21, 2018 Order.
Trial court opin ion, 7/19/18 at 1

- 4 (footnote 2 omitted).

To withdraw under Anders , court

- appointed counsel must satisfy
certain technical requirements. First, counsel must “ petition the court for
leave to withdraw and state that after making a conscientious examinationJ. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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of the record, he h as determined that the appeal is frivolous. ”

Commonwealth v. Martuscelli , 54 A.3d 940, 947 (Pa.Super. 2012),
quoting Santiago , 978 A.2d at 361. Second, counsel must file an Anders
brief, in which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel ’ s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state[s] counsel ’ s reasons for concludin g that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago , 978 A.2d at 361. With respect to the briefing requirements,

“ [n]either Anders nor McClendon requires that counsel ’ s brief provide an
argument of any sort, let alone the type of argument that counsel develops
in a merits brief. To repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are references to anyt hing in the record that might arguably support the
appeal. ” Santiago , 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Finally, counsel must furnish a
copy of the Anders brief to his client and “ advise[] him of his right to retain
new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additiona l points that he deems
worthy of the court ’ s attention, and attach [] to the Anders petition a copy

of the letter sent to the client. ” Co mmonwealth v. Daniels , 999 A.2d 590,
594 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). “ [If] counsel has satisfied the

above re quirements, it is then this Court ’ s duty to conduct its own review of

the trial court ’ s proceedings and render an independent judgment as toJ. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. ” Commonwealth v.

Goodwin , 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa.Super. 2007) ( en banc ) (quotation marks
and quotation omitted).
Here, counsel ’ s Anders brief substantially complies with prevailing
law. Attorney Conte has provided a procedural summary of the case, albeit

without references to the record. ( Anders brief at 6

- 8.) Attor ney Conte
does, however, attach copies of the trial court ’ s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion;
appellant ’ s April 6, 2018 written guilty plea colloquy; appellant ’ s

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement; the transcript of the April 6, 2018 hearing
regarding the Commonwealth ’ s plea offer to appellant ; and the transcript of
appellant ’ s April 6, 2018 guilty plea proceedings as E xhibits A, B, C, D, and
E, respectively, to his Anders brief. Attorney Conte cites to those exhibits
throughout his brief , and the originals of those exh ibits are included in the

certified record . Attorney Conte also refers to portions of those exhibits that
arguably support the appeal; specifically, potential issues regarding the
voluntariness of the plea. Attorney Conte concludes that “ [a]ppellant ’ s

ap peal is frivolous and without merit. ” ( Anders brief at 14 .) Additionally,
Attorney Conte ’ s correspondence to appellant provided appellant with a copy

of the Anders brief; informed appellant that he “ thoroughly reviewed the

issue ” th at appellant asked him to raise ; s pecifically , appellant ’ s “ belief that
the [trial court] threatened, forced, or otherwise coerced [appellant] into
pleading guilty when it advised [appellant] of the applicable mandatoryJ. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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minimum jail sentences that applied to the charges [appell ant w as] fa c ing at

trial , ” and counsel ’ s conclusion that the claim is “ frivolous and without legal

merit. ” (Attorney Conte ’ s correspondence to appellant, 9/10/18 .) In that
correspondence, Attorney Conte also advised appellant of his right to either
retain new counsel or to proceed pro se on appeal to raise any additional
points that he “ believes are worthy of the court ’ s attention. ” 3 ( Id. ) As such,
Attorney Conte has substantially complied with the procedural requirements

of Anders . We, therefore, proceed to conduct an independent review to
ascertain whether the appeal is indeed wholly frivolous.
Attorney Conte raises the following issue in the Anders brief:
Did the Court err by advising [a]ppellant, Christopher Finnefrock , that he was facing eighteen (18) felony charges and that each count carried a ten (10) year minimum mandatory sentence and was the effect of this notification such that [a]ppellant was threatened, forced, or coerced into pleading guilty to [the crimes]?

Anders brief at 5.

At the outset, we note that the record reflects that prior to the entry of
appellant ’ s guilty plea, a jury had been selected on Friday, April 6, 2018 , and
the parties were prepared to proceed to trial on Monday, April 9 , 2018 , when

the Commonwealth extended the plea bargain offer to appellant. (Notes of
testimony, 4/6/18 at 2.) The trial court then held a hearing wherein

3 Appellant did not file a response to Attorney Conte ’ s correspondence to appellant dated September 10, 2018.J. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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appellant acknowledged that Attorney Conte advised him of the

Commonwealth ’ s plea offer

. ( Id. at 2

- 3.) The trial court then informed
appellant that if the jury convicted appellant of all charges, appellant ’ s mandatory minimum sentence would be up to 180 years of imprisonment.
( Id. ) The Commonwealth clarified the mandatory minimum sentence as
being comprised of 18 counts with each carrying a 10

- year mandatory

minimum

. ( Id. at 3.) Appellant acknowledged that he discussed the plea
offer with Attorney Conte, but that it was appellant ’ s choice to proceed to
trial. ( Id. ) Thereafter, however , appellant accepted the Co mmonwealth ’ s offer and entered his guilty plea s . (Notes of testimony, guilty plea
proceedings, 4/6/18 at 2

- 7.)
In considering the validity of a guilty plea colloquy, “ [t]he
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate pleas be taken in open

court and require the court to conduct an on

- the

- record colloquy to ascertain
whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his
plea. ” Commonwealth v. Prendes , 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(citations omitted), appeal denied , 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014). Pursuant to
Rule 590, the sentencing court should inquire whether the defendant
understands, among other things, “ the nature of the charges to which he or
she is pleading guilty[,] ” and “ the permissible ranges of sentences and fines
possible. ” Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment. “ [N]othing in the rule precludes the
supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read,J. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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completed, and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea
proceedings. ” Commonwealth v. Bedell , 954 A.2d 1 209, 1212

- 1213
(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal denied , 964 A.2d 893 (Pa.
2009).
Thereafter,
[t]he reviewing Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality of the circ umstances surrounding the entry of that plea. Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise.

Prendes , 97 A.3d at 352 (citations omitted). According ly, even if there is
an omission in the oral plea colloquy, “ a plea of guilty will not be deemed
invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that
the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of
his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea. ”

Commonwealth v. Yeomans , 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa.Super. 2011)
(citation omitted).
Additionally, “ a defendant is bound by the statements which he makes
during his plea colloquy. ” Commonwealth v. Barnes , 687 A.2d 1163,
1167 (Pa. 1997) (citations omitted). As such, a defendant “ may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he
pled guilty, ” and he cannot recant the representations he made in cou rt
when he entered his guilty plea. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the lawJ. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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does not require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his
decision to plead guilty. The law only requires that a defendant ’ s decision to
plead guilty be made knowin gly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See

Commonwealth v. Moser , 921 A.2d 526, 528

- 529 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Here, t he record reflects that appellant read, compl eted, and signed an

extensive nine

- page written guilty plea colloquy form, which is part of the

cert ified record. (Written guilty plea colloquy, 4/6/18.) On that form,
appellant affirmed, in writing, among other things, (i) that he understood
the charges filed against him and the maximum sentences that could be
imposed for those crimes; (ii) that he fully discussed the charges with his
attorney and is satisfied with his attorney ’ s representation and advice;
(iii) that his decision to plead guilty was his own decision ; (iv) that no one
used any force or threats against him to induce him to plead gui lty; (v) that

no promises were made to induce his guilty plea s ; (vi) that he committed
the crimes to which he plead guilty; and (vii) that he read and understood
the full meaning of the entire written colloquy and still wanted to plead
guilty. ( Id. )

Th e record furt her reflects that the trial court conducted an oral guilty
plea colloquy. (Notes of testimony, guilty plea proceedings, 4/8/18

. )
Appellant acknowledged that after he had additional discussions with
Attorney Conte, he decided to plead guilty. ( Id. at 3 .) Appellant agreed
with the factual basis of his guilty pleas and admitted to committing theJ. S 70 0 07 /1 8

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crimes. ( Id. ) Appellant affirmed that the signatures on the written guilty
plea colloquy were his , and he acknowledged that he had gone over the

entire written colloquy with Attorney Conte. ( Id. ) Appellant acknowledged
his satisfaction with Attorney Conte ’ s professional services. ( Id. ) Appellant

also acknowledged that no one promised him anything or threatened him to

i nduce his guilty plea s . ( Id. at 4.)
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the totality of
the circumstances surrounding appellant ’ s entry of his guilty pleas discloses
that appellant fully understood the nature and consequences of his p lea s and
that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the pleas. Therefore, the
record supports Attorney Conte ’ s assessment that because appellant entered

his guilty plea s knowingly and voluntarily, this appeal is wholly frivolous.
Finally, our ind ependent review of the entire record reveals no

additional non

- frivolous claims. Therefore, we grant counsel ’ s petition to
withdraw and affirm appellant ’ s April 6, 2018 judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/24/18