Th e A p p e l l a n t r e f e r s t o t h e w i t n e s s a s W i l l i a m Un d e r h i l l

. Be c a u s e t h e w i t n e s s s t a t e d h i s n a m e a s “ L a r r y G. 1
U n d e rh ill ” a n d “L a rr y G e n e U n d e rh ill , S e n io r,” w e w ill us e the na m e L a rr y, w h e n a p p ro p ria te

.

O n J a n u a ry 1 2 , 1 9 9 6 , the S ta te m o v e d to jo in t h e ind ic tm e n ts o f t h e A p p e llan t an d C o u rtn e y M a the w s fo r tria l. 2
H o w e v e r, n o d isp o sitio n o f t h is m o tio n is ap p a re n t f ro m the re c o rd

. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 14, 200 3 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. DA VID G. HOU SLER

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty

No. 39217 John H. Gasaw ay, III, Jud ge

No. M2002- 00419-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2004

A Montg omery

County jur y co n v i ct ed the Appellant, Da vid G. Housler, of

four c ounts of felony murder. H ousler’s c onvictions stem from the robber y of a Clarksville Tac o Be ll and the executionsty le murder s of four of its employ ees. Following a sentencing hear ing, the trial court imposed four
consec utive life sentenc es. Housler appea ls, presentingthe following issues for our r eview: (1 ) Wh e the r h is c on fe ssi on s w e re pr op e rl y a dmi tted in to ev ide nc e wh e n th e State
and the tr ia l c ourt

kn e w the c on fe ssi on s w e re fa lse and unre lia ble ; (2) Whether

the State committed prosec utorial miscon d u ct by using the rec anted te sti mony of Rob e rt Ea stl and , Ro be rt Da

ws on , and Mic ha e l Mil le r a nd by fa ili ngto inf or m de fe ns e c ouns e l or

the tr ia l cour

t th a t Jer e my

Th omp so n h a d r e c ante d h is state me nt; (3) Whether he is e ntitled to a new tria l based upon the ne wly rec anted testimony

of L arr y Un de rh ill ; 1
(4) Whether

the trial court erre d in denying a new tria l when a jur or fe ll asleep duri ngthe tr ia l; (5 ) Wh e the r t

he Mathe ws tim e -l ine pr ov e s h is i nn oc e nc e ; (6) Whether

the State prosec uted Housler a n d Co u r tn ey Mathews under inc onsistent

2 theories; and-2-

(7) Whether

consec utive sentenc ing w as prope r.
After revie w, we f

ind no error

of law r equiringreve rsal. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm Housler’s convictions and the imposition of four c onsecutive life sentenc es.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e ntof t he Ci r c uitCo ur t A ffirm e d.

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Michae l E. Terr

y , Terr y & G ore, N ashville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, David G. Housler

.
Pa ul G . Summers, Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; K im R. Helper , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Robert " Gus" Radford, District Attorney Gene ral Pro Tem, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On J anuar y 30, 1994, Kevin Campbell, Ang ela Wy att, Patricia Price , and Mar cia Klopp we re working the ear ly morning shift at a Tac o Be ll in Clarksville. Acc ording to John B allard, a s h ift manag er at the Tac o Be ll, when he stopped by the drive- thru window at a pproxi mately

1 :45 a.m., the employ ees w ere eng ag ed in normal c losing a ctivities. Klopp told Ballard that they had bee n very bu sy and ha d b e e n una

ble to c los e the dr ive -t

hr u w ind owun til 1:3 0 a .m.
When Ba llard arrived later t hat m orning at appr ox imately 7:20 or 7:25 a.m., he notice d that the employ ees’ car s were still in the parkinglot. After unlockingthe main entra nce, B allard e ntere d the Tac o Be ll and saw “a dirty line and a body towards the ba ck end of

the building in the dish ar ea.” Ba llard re turned to his vehicle a nd telephoned the police. He then c ircled the Tac o Be ll and noticed
car dboard in the dr ive-thru window.

Detec tive Tony

Blakely , a patr o l o ff

i ce r at the time, wa s the first to arr ive on the sce ne. B lake ly , a lon g wi th ano the r of fi c e r, c he c ke d the bu ild ing to make sure no on e wa s ins ide

. B lake ly first che cked the men’s re stroom are a, whe re he found th e b o d y of Ke vin Campbell. The sec ond victim, Ange la Wy att, was ne arby under a stainless steel sink. A few fee t away from W y att’s body was the body

of the third victim, Patricia P rice

. Blakely then ex ited the restroom are a and pr ocee ded to t he of fi c e of the re sta ur ant. Di re c tly

outsi de the off

ice , he di scove re d th e bo dy of the fo ur th victim, Marcia K lopp. All of the victims were dead f rom multipl e gunshot wounds.-3-

Up on fu rt he r e xami natio n o f t

he me n’ s r e str oo m, B lake ly ob se rv e d a

dis ru pte d ce ili ngtil e “that looked like it was moved for opening .” The tiles w ere located a pproxi mately

“ten steps” from the body of Kevin Campbell. T.B.I

. fore nsic specia list Sandra Poltorack Evans a rrived at the Tac o Be ll to aid i n the i nvestig ation. Evans later confirme d that fing erpr ints on the vent near the ce iling tiles belong ed to Courtney Mathews. Courtney Mathews was also employ ed at the Ta co B ell and had bee n workingat t he restaura nt for “approximately ten t o fourtee n day s” prior to the robbery and murders.

The off ice sa fe ha d been br oken into, appar ently afte r the dial was shot, a nd some, but not all, of t he safe shelves wer e dis turbed. Acc ording to Evans, two differ ent guns, a shot g un and a .9 milli meter, ha d been use d to shoot the safe

. Upon a sear ch of the Tac o Be ll premises, a “ Fe dera l two and thre e quar

ter inch le ad rifle slug shot shell case ,” an “unf ired F eder al two and thre e quar ter inch lead r ifle slu g s h o t s h ell ,” and le ad fr ag ments from the slugwer e found inside. Tw enty -four
car tridg e cases, all fired from a .9 milli meter, w ere also rec overe d. Eig ht bullets that were a lso found
cam e fr o m the same .9 millimeter as the car tridg e ca ses. Simil arly , bullet frag ments rec overe d during the autopsies of the victims matched the same firea rm. An audit by

then team unit manag er, Sher ry Under wood, re veale d that $2,967.68 had bee n taken f rom the s t o re

. Underwood explained that the paychec k verific ation repor t showed that Courtney Mathews c locked in to work at 2:10 p.m. on J anuar y 29, 1994, clocke d out for a br eak at 7:39 p.m., clocke d back in at 8:12 p.m., a nd ended his shift at 9:11 p.m. Under wood testified that company policy prohibited entry

to the store by

anyone once the doors to the restaur ant wer e locke d for the e vening . The only exception was to open the door t o allow an employ ee to lea ve. Howe ver, Under wood ag ree d that the policy could be violated by

the employ ees w orking at the time. On the day

o f t h e murde rs, David L ee Rose w as workingmaintenanc e at the Mc Donald’s
ne ar I -2 4 in

Cla rk sv ill e . While he wa s emp tying the tr a sh , h e dis c ov e re d . 12 g a ug e sh otgun

sh e lls , .9 milli meter she lls, chang e in wra ppers, a black wallet, and a bla ck leather g love. He a lso disposed of two half- eate n hamburg ers that we re in t h e b ag with the other items. Rose took the shells and chang e home with him. He d i d n o t k ee p the g love or the w allet bec ause the re w as no money or identification in it. When Rose lear ned about the murders, he returne d the shells to h i s s tore manag er.
Offic er John Hunt of the Clarksville City Police Depa

rtment sear ched f

or evide nce “ all along the interstate.” At the Red River B ridg e on I -24, Hunt, along with Detec tive Tim Saunders, found

“ so me c lot

hin g g arm e nts thr ow e d (s ic ) ov e r the br idg e , late x g lov e s – pie c e s of late x g lov e s, a pa ir of blue pa nts, [ and] a Bur g er King bag .” One of the clothi ng items was a black jacket. On the jac ket
wa s th e blo od

of the vic timKe vin

Campb e ll, wh ic h w a s c on fi rm e d b y DN A ana ly sis . A lso , p la sti c fra g ments taken fr om the coat we re similar to the plastic blown of f the saf e. Following

p o li c e in v e s ti g a ti on, Courtney

Mathews wa s develope d as a suspe ct in the robbe ry and murde rs. A sea

rch of Mathews’ ca r wa s co n ducted, dur ing which a bowlingbagcontaining $2,576 and a w oman’s purse containing sever al cr edit car ds in the names of Courtney Mathews a

nd-4-

Kendr a Corley

wer e fo u n d

. T

. B. I . Ag ent Anthony Clark sea

rche d Mathews’ home on Ry der Avenue . On Fe bruar

y 2, 1994, Clark recover ed several bullet fra g ments and unspent rounds from M a t h e w s ’ h o m e

. O n F e b r u ar y 5 , a

. 2 5 c a l i b e r

r o u n d w a s f o u n d o u t s i d e M a t h e w s ’ h o m e

. T

. B

. I. th fore nsic scientist Dan Roy se testified that a car tridg e ca se and bullet fr ag ments rec overe d from M at h ew s ’ h ome wer e fire d from the same .9 millim eter as the c artridg es and bullets discove red ins ide the Ta c o B e ll a

nd the bu lle t f

ra g me nts re c ov e re d f

ro m t he vic tim s d

ur ingthe ir

a uto ps ie s. After compar ing the shotgun she ll remnants from the T aco B ell to the amm u n i t i o n rec overe d at McDona ld’s, Roy se stated that they wer e all the same ty

pe of ammunition. B elievingthat Mathews obtained his shotgun f

rom Shawn De pto in Pennsy lvania, Roy se compa red the shells provided by Depto and deter

mined that the shells ha d the same marking s as those rec overe d at McDona ld’s and the one f rom Tac o Be ll. On November 21, 1995, a plastic bag containing shells and par ts of a Winchester shot g un was found behind M athews’ home. Afte r re assembling the shotg un, Roy se’s te sti ngre ve a le d th a t th e Ta c o B e ll s he ll w a s f ir e d f ro m th e same g un

. Th e sh e lls pr ov ide d b y De pto and re cover ed fr om McDonald’s a lso matched.

J elaine Walker

worke d at Tac o Be ll with Mathews. She testified that Mathew s left the Ta co Be ll around 9:00 p.m. on J anuar y 29 . About an hour or

so later, W alker

observe d Mathews “ at the th trash ca n that’s in the dining room rig ht ne x t to the counter , and he had the door of the c an open a nd he wa s knelt down at the tra sh can.” Mathews sa id to W alker , “I am g one, you don’t see me .”

At the tim e of

the mur de rs , Ca

rl and Sha wn te a War d sh are d th e ho me on Ry de r A ve nu e wi th Mathews. Ac cordingto Carl Ward, Mathews a rrived home about 7: 30 p.m. on the nig ht before the murders a

nd went int o h i s ro o m

. Ward observe d Mathews br eak down a shotg un and g et a .9 milli meter a

nd a .22 or .25 a

nd place them in “a little black book ba g , [wit h] shells and eve ry thing
and wa s p re pa

ri ngto l e ave .” Mathe ws a lso too k a bo wl ing ba g and so me wh ite late x g lov e s w ith him . Ward

ha nd le d th e .9 mil lim e te r g un and the n w ipe d it do wn purs ua nt t o M a the ws ’ i ns tr

uc tio ns

. War d te sti fi e d th a t, whe n M a the ws le ft the ho us e , “ He ha d c lot

he s on top of c lot

he s. F ro m wh a t I
re me mbe r, he ha d tw o la y e rs of c lot he s o n. He ha d o n li ke Mia mi Hur ri c ane c olo rs , s we a t su it, jogg ing suit. And then he had on blac k pants and a white s hirt with a ti e and a blac k three -quar ter coat.” As he lef

t, Mathews stated that they would not see the c lothes ag ain. Ward identified the c oat fo un d und e r t

he Re d Ri ve r B ri dg e a s th e on e that Mathe ws wa s w e ari ngthat ni g ht. Ac c or din g to Ward, on J anuar

y 30 , Super B owl Sunday , Mathews c ried. The following Wednesday , Mathews th attemp te d s u ic id e

. O nth is e v e n in g , M a th e w s to ld Wa r d , “ Ia in ’ t s h it

. Ik il le d f o u r p e ople.” Be tween the Sunday of t he murders and the W ednesda y Mathews attempted suicide, he c onvey ed to S ha wn te a War d th e fo llo wi nga c c ount o f e ve nts : Well, he told me that whoeve r did it, they went into the Tac o Be ll before it closed. They went into the men’s bathroom and clim b ed i n t o the ce iling, wa ited until the store close d. They

came down and it is not nor mal for all the worke rs to be in one
are a and he said they killed two people in the front of the store and two in the ba ck. And then they

proce eded to take the m oney and he said they didn’t g et all the money beca use the drop box was st ill at t he drive-thru window and it had a c lipboard sitting-5-

over the top of it, but y ou could see the m oney sticking out a

nd he said they

only g ot into three c ompartments of the sa fe, which it was six compar tments. Shawn Peg hee w orked with Courtney Mathews at For t Campbell in the mailroom. On the Fr iday befor e the murde rs, Mathew s asked Peg hee que stions about the safe in the ma ilroom and whether one would be able to g et inside the safe if he shot it. Accor ding to Peg hee, when Mathe ws was g etting r eady to le ave the mailroom, “he sort of looked back at me with a smile on his face , sort of a smirk a

nd he said somethingbig w as g oing to ha ppen that we ekend.” Duringthe time that Mathews worke d at Tac o Be ll, he asked A ssistant Manag er D eann Rivaf if any thing wa s stored in the ce iling. Rivaf a lso reca lled an incident wher e Mathews wa s supposed to be clea ning the men’s re stroom, but the supplies were outside the door.

I n May of 1993, F itz Dickson, who ha d known Mathew s for el ev en y ea rs , purcha sed a .9 mil lim e te r gun

fo r Mathe ws

. Whe n Di c ks on sa w M a the ws on

the da y of the ro bb e ry

and mur de rs , Mathews wa s “cr

ying a nd depre ssed.” During the investigation, Attorne y Gene ral J ohn Carney was informed that the Appellant ha d information conc erningthe Tac o Be ll robbery and murders. On M arc h 21, 1994, the Appellant wa s interviewe d at the Criminal J ustice Complex in Clarksville. During this int ervie w with T.B.I . Ag ent J eff Puckett, t h e Ap p ellant admitted to meetingCourtney Mathews at a trailer

in Oak Gr ove, Ke ntu c ky on Janu ary 21 , 199 4. He re me mbe re d that Mathe ws sa id h e ha d a pla c e to r ob and

“ we ’l l g o in and won’t lea

ve any witnesses.” A ccor ding to his statement, the Ap pellant then aske d Mathews whe n this would happen, and Mathews told him to rea d the papers. He then repor ted that he enc ountere d Mathews in jail and r emember ed him from the pa rty at the trailer. Acc ording to the Appellant, Mathe ws stated he committed the Tac o Be ll murde rs and g igg led. Given the infor mation the Appellant r evea led in this int ervie w, i n cludi ng that Mathews talke d about “187' ing the employ ees” or “not lea

ving a ny witnesses,” A ttorney

Gene ral Carn ey b el i ev ed that the Appe llant “could p o s s ib ly b e a w it n e s s f o r th e St a te in

th e c a s e a g a in s t C o u rtn e y M ath e w s

. ” D is cussions ensued w ith the Appellant’s attorne y , L arr y McMillian. I n exchang e for the Appellant’ s cooper ation and testimony

ag ainst Mathews, the A ppellant’s bond wa s reduc ed on an unrelate d ag g ravated robber y char g e and the char g e wa s to be reduc ed to r obbery

. The Appellant wa s relea sed on bond
an d r e tu r n e d t o K e n tu c ky. Carney and Assis t ant Att orney

Gene ral Steven G arr ett met with the Appellant ag ain on O c t o b e r 1 1 , 1 9 9 5

. C o n c e r

n s w e r e r a i s e d

b e c a u s e , c o n t r ar

y t o t h e Ap p e l l an t ’ s p r i o r

s t a t e m e n t , S u l yn Ul ang c a c ou ld n ot p ro vid e an a libi for th e Ap pe lla nt o n th e mor

nin g of the ro bb e ry

and mur de rs

. Ac c or dingto C arn e y , th e purp os e of thi s me e tin g wa s “ [t]o tr y to c le ar u

p I thi nk so me inc on sis te nc ie s in

so me state me nts and

to c on fr on t hi m w ithso me inf or matio n th a t w e ha d a

nd to try to get t o t h e t ru t h as to whether or not he wa s actua lly

a witness in this case or was he a de fe nd ant. ” Duri ngthe int e rv ie w, the Ap pe lla nt g a ve a state me nt r e po rt ingthe fo llo wi ngde ta ils

. Th e Ap pe lla

nt s tate d th a t, d

ur inga pa rt y a t the tr a ile r the we e k be fo re the Sup e r B ow l, M a the ws sa id he wa s g oin g to r ob the pla c e wh e re he wo rk e d b e c a us e he ne e de d the mon e y . The Ap pe lla nt a lso-6-

stated that “the plan was to g o down there on a weekend late at night and tell the mana g er that he had le f t b e h in d h is b il lf o ld o r lo s t h is b il lf

o ld in s id e th e T a c o b e ll an d th a t w o u ld b e th e w ay to g e t i n [. ]” Fur thermore , the Appellant state d that “he g assed Courtney Mathews up a

nd he (Mathews) . . . didn’t have the ba lls to g o dow n the re and ro b th e pla c e , b ut t hat if he g re w the m, h e (t

he Ap pe lla

nt) wo uld g o with him.” Also, Mathews said he w as g oing to “ 187 them,” mea ning kill them. On the nig ht befor e the r obbery

and murde rs, the Appe llant ga ve Mathe ws a ride to the Tac o Be ll around 11:00 p.m. The Appe llant stated Mat h ews ha d a .9 millimeter pistol at the time, but he ga ve var ying
acc ounts of its dispos al following the commission of the crime. Carney testified that the Appellant stated he w as re morseful beca use “he ha d encour ag ed Mathe ws not to leave a ny witnesses.” B ased upon his statements, the Appellant’s status c hang ed fr om witness to suspect beca use if he a cted a s a lookout he would be an acc omplice and could be char g ed with murder . Be cause Carney believed the Appellant was providingnece ssary information in “dribbles,” he allowe d him to go home a nd
r e tu r nt h e f o l l o w i n g M o n d ay.

T h e A p p e l l an tw a s u n a

b l e t o r e tu r

nt h e f o l l o w i n g M o n d ay d

u e t o c ar t r o u b l e

. U l t i m a t e l y, the Appellant r eturne d on Oc t o b er 19, 1995. On this date, the Appe llant entere d into a proff er ag ree ment with the State, wher ein h e wo u l d plead guilty to conspirac y

to commit murder and robber y and re ceive an ef

fec tive fiftee n-y ear

sentenc e, as a

Rang e I standard of

fe n d er

. The
ne g oti a te d p le a

wa s c on dit ion e d u

po n th e Ap pe lla

nt’ s ag re e me nt that he wo uld a id the po lic e in t he ir investigation of the Tac o Be ll robbery and murde rs by providing truthful testimony . I n compliance with this agr eeme nt, the Appellant g ave a nother stateme nt, in which the following details wer e develope d. He met Mathews at the tra iler i n Oak Grove a bout a wee k prior to the murde rs at Ta co Be ll. At the party , Mathews, the A ppellant, and Char lie Br own talked ab o u t crimes ea ch had committed. Mathews broug ht up the idea of robbing the place wher e he worke d. Mathews sa id he
wo uld g o in and le ave no wi tne sses . T he Ap pe lla nt a nd B ro wn tol d M a the ws that he (M a the ws ) would not commit the crime but, if he would, the A ppellant would g o with him. When the Appe llant asked K evin “Red” Twee n if he kne w about the plan, Twe en re sponded, “[W] hateve r, whe never .” Melanie D arw ish then approa ched the Appellant and said she was in for anothe r “B onnie and Cly de ride.” The nig ht of J anuar y 29, 1994, T we en tol d the Appellant to g et some ammunition, and the Appellant visited s omeone c alled “H ippie Dude.” The Appe llant drove his white Tra cer to Taco Be ll, and Dar

wish drove he r re d Tempo. When the g roup left, Tw een was wearinga dar k blue hooded jac ket and blue je ans, and Mathews wa s wea ring a blac k knee- leng th jack et

. The g roup sto pp e d at th e Min it M art fo r b e e r a nd c ig are tte s. On

the ri de to Ta c o Be ll, Mathe ws tol d T we e n to g et the re g ister, and he would take care of the saf e. Upon a

rrivingat the Ta co B ell, they pulled up t o t h e T a c o B e l l dr i v e
- t h r

u w i n d o w

. M a t h e w s e x i t e d t h e c ar an d t a p p e d o n t h e w i n d o w , an d

a h e a v yset woman with br own hair came to the window. Duringthis ti me, the Appe llant saw Da rwish’s ca

r in the mall pa

rking lot. Twee n then g ot out of the ca r and r an behind the dumpster s. The Appe llant decide d not to go in bec ause he was fi gh t i n g wi t h his girlf riend, Suly

n Ulang ca, a

nd he pulled up para llel to the main double doors. The A ppell an t s aw M athews and the woman w alk towar d the counter are a nea r the bathrooms. After about t wenty minutes, he heard ten to fiftee n loud pops from the other side of

the building, a

nd he then sa

w Twe en ru n b ehind the Ta co B ell toward the dumps te rs . N e xt, he saw a no the r p e rs on

e xit th e Ta c o B e ll a

nd ru n in the dir e c tio n of the dumps te rs

. He then put the c ar in g ear and drove acr oss the bridg e. He stated that Da rwish drove the g etawa

y-7-

ca r, an d h e wa s t h e lo o k o u t

. Fo l l o wi n g a qu i ck co n v er s at i o n wi t hT we en an d M at h ew s i nt h e D i n go Boot pa rking lot, the Appellant re turned t o t h e t ra i l er. Tw een a nd Dar wish arr ived at the tra iler about t hirty minutes later without Mathews. He asked where his t hirty perc ent cut wa s, and Twe en said that Mathews w ould be ove r l at er. Tw een a lso said that Mathews shot them in the hea d g ang ster-style. Acc ording to the Appellant, he le ft his car on the roa d wher e Jenni fe r Ell is lived beca use he thoug ht it would be connec ted to the murder s. I t was his understandingthat it was later impounded by

the police de partment. The Appellant stated he did not see Mathew s ag ain until they met in jail. The Appel l an t’s statements could not be c onfirmed by Suly n Ulang ca. When Ula

ng ca re tur ne d to Te nn e sse e to c on fr on t th e Ap pe lla nt, he did

no t w ant t o s e e he r a

nd c onfesse d to implicating a

n innocent per son. The Appe llant was informe d that he had br eac hed the a g ree ment
and that th e a g re e me nt w a s g oin g to b e re vo ke d. Th e Ap pe lla nt t he n r an f ro m th e ro om. Subsequently , on November 7, 1995, the Appellant wa s char g ed with fo u r counts of p r e m e d i t a t e d

m u r d e r , f o u r c o u n t s o f f e l o n y m u r d e r , an d

o n e c o u n to f

e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death pe nalty . The State late r withdrew its noti ce a

nd filed notice of

intent to seek life without par ole. On September 3, 19 9 7 , t he State obtained a superse ding indictment, whic h char g ed only four counts of felony murder. The trial was he ld from November

12 throug h the 21 of 1997. R el ev an t p ortions of the testimony prese nted at the th st Ap pe lla nt’ s tr ia l f oll ow s.
Michele A ntay a testified that, on January 29, 1994, at appr ox ima t el y 11:00 or 11:15 p.m., sh e sto pp e d at the Ta c o Be ll dr ive -t hr u win do w. Ac c or din g to An tay a , s he saw a bla c k ma le wa lk from behind the dumpster towards he r ca

r. She desc ribed him as betwe en five nine and five eleve n, stocky , and with a short ha irsty le shave d on the sides. She testified that he wa s wea ring a dar k jacke t with a hood and da

rk pants.

Yownada M aurizzi o went throug h the Tac o Be ll drive-thru a bout 1:10 or 1:15 a.m. on J anuar y 30, 1994. She observe d a blac k male spea king w ith a black f

emale inside the restaur ant.

Fr ankie Sanf

ord testified that he was at the Tac o Be ll dr ive-thru about 1:30 a.m. on J anuar y 30 . He obse rved Mathews, dre ssed in his Taco B ell uniform, inside the re staurant. th

J acque line Dickinson was e ating panca kes at G’ s Pancake House ne ar the Tac o Bell on J anuar y 30 . She left G’s Pancake House around 2:35 to 2:40 a .m. She stoppe d at a lig ht in front th of the Ta co B ell and looked into t he re staurant, whe re she observe d a white male at the counte r looking towa

rds the L ong J ohn Silver’s lot nex t door. Acc ording to Dickinson, the man wa s wea ring “a longg ree n jacke t that rea ched pa s t h i s b u t t o cks” that “had a big hood attached to the ba ck, the
same c olor, and he had on a darke r pair of jeans.” She descr ibed the man as “medium built, around fi ve nin e to s ix fo ot.

. . . He ha d s ho rt ha ir br ow n mi lit ary

sty le ha ir c ut. ” She a lso ob se rv e d a wh ite vehicle in the pa

rking lot “fac ing inwa

rd towar ds the building.” The c ar w as not in the same position as the white c ar shown in the c rime sce ne photos, which wa s a victim’s vehicle

.-8-

Damien Cromar

tie was looking for taco sauce on the morning of the murde rs, and he stopped at the Ta co B ell around 3:00 a .m. He obser ved a f ew ve hicles in the p ar k i n g l o t , an d a brow n or burg undy sedan parke d in the Two Rivers Mall parking lot be hind the Tac o Be ll. W hen he pulled up to t he dr ive -t hr u w ind ow , th e re wa s a

larg e pie ce of card bo ard in t he wi nd ow . A c c or din g to Cr oma rt ie , h e saw the sil ho ue tte s o f t wo , ma y be thr e e , p e op le mov ingaro un d ins ide the Ta c o B e ll.
Twenty -Third J udicial District Drug Task For ce Ag ent Bill Hudspeth testified that, be tween 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. on J anuary 3 0 , 1994, he wa s driving home from Stewar t County to Cheatham County . Nea

r the vicinity

of the Taco Bell, he saw a white male run diag onally in front of his car. Th e ma le ra

n f ro m an a re a be hin d th e Ta c o B e ll a c ro ss the ro a d tow ard s the muf fl e r sho p. Hu ds pe th descr ibed the male a s “betwe en five nine and six foot tall. His hair was short, over the ear s on the sides and stocky

build[ .]” Accor ding to Hudspe th, another white male with short hair, stocky build, and a little taller tha

n the other individual wa s standing ne ar the muffler shop.

Mark Joll y

testified that, betwe en 2:30 and 3 :00 a.m. on J anuar y 30, 1994, he wa s in the Sho ne y ’s pa

rk inglot a c ro ss t he str e e t fr om t

he Ta c o B e ll, wh e n h e “ he ard a c ou ple of lou d b ang s” and saw“a ma

n running from the ba ck of the Tac o Be ll over by the Two Rivers Ma ll.” Acc ording to J olly , the man wa s a Puerto Rican o r a l i g ht-skinned black ma le, wea ring shorts, and ca

rry ing “something rolled up in a b rown bag ” in his left hand. Af ter he saw the ma

n, J olly observe d “the lobby lights in the Tac o Be ll flicker[] on and off two or thre e times.”

Al le n Ce ruti te sti fi e d that he pa sse d by the Ta c o B e ll be tw e e n 4:2 0 and 4:3 0 a .m. At thi s time, he observe d a blac k male standingat the open ba ck door.

Charlie B rown testified that Mathews a nd the Appellant we re both at a par ty toge ther at the trailer in Oa

k Grove , likely on J anuar y 21 . Duringhis testimony , Br own re cante d a stateme nt he st made in November of 1995, wher ein he said that he heard Mathe ws talking about robbingthe place wher e he w orked.

Melanie D arw ish testified that she may have le nt he r car to the Appellant on the night of the robber y and murde rs, althoug h she wa s not sure. Ac cordingto D arw ish, she was at home in bed on that night. Dar

wish confirme d that Mathews had been at a pa rty at the tra iler; howeve r, she did not
reme mber the A

ppellant beingthere

.
L opez Gaddes, a

convicted dr

ug traff i ck er , wa s in the Montgome ry County J ail with the Appellant in 1994. While incarc erated, t he Appe llant told Gaddes that he kne w Courtney Mathews and that he, Charlie Brown, and Mathews had conver sations about robbing the Tac o Be ll. Accor ding to G a dd e s, the Ap pe lla

nt tol d him that the fi rs t conve rs a tio n ab out the ro bb e ry too k pla c e a t a pa rt y a wee k or two befor e the murders. The Appe llant also told Gaddes that the g roup ag ain talked a bout committing the robbe ry

at the bar

rac ks. When Gaddes a sked the Appe ll an t i f h e wa s scar ed, the Appellant re sponded that he w as not bec ause “ Courtney was the trig g er ma

n.”-9-

Jaso n Ca rr te sti fi e d th a t he wa s inc arc e rate d with the Ap pe lla

nt i n th e Mo ntg ome ry

County J ail during Marc h of 1994. Duringa ca rd g ame with the Appellant and Charlie Br own, one of the two men stated, “ David Housler ’s ca r wa s the one that wa s used in the g etawa y of Tac o Be ll.”

L arr y Un de rh ill , a

no the r i nmate , te sti fi e d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt t old him he wa s at th e Ta c o B e ll and that he w as the one t h at k i l l ed the employ ees. U nderhill said that the Appe llant told him the victims were shot e x ecution-style. Convicted felon Christopher Ester fre quently visited the trailer in Oak Gr ove. Ester testified that he sawMathews at the trailer on January 29, 1994. Mathews talked about t he robberies he had
c omm itt e d. Ac c or din g to E ste r, Mathe ws and the Ap pe lla

nt h a d “ a little c on vers atio n” that ni g ht. Ester testified that Mathews lef t the trailer a

round 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. and that the Appellant lef t
a bo ut 2 :30 or

3:0 0 a .m. a ft e r he and Ul ang c a g ot int o a n a rgume nt. Th e Ap pe lla

nt w a s su pp os e d to call and le t the g roup know his wher eabouts, but he ne ver c alled.

Orlando G ill also freque nted the tra iler. He believed he met Mathews the weeke nd befor e the murder s, when Kendr a Corley broug ht Mathews to the tra iler. He observe d the Appellant a nd Mathews e ng ag ed in a c onversation in the kitchen “for a time.”

He c tor Or tiz a lso saw M a the ws a t th e tr a ile r w ithCor le y pr ior to t he mur de rs . H e lik e wi se observe d Mathews a

nd the Appellant e ng ag ing in conver sation. Ortiz was at the tra iler on the nig ht befor e the murde rs and sa

w the Appe llant and Ulang ca the re. When he left ar ound 1:00 a .m., neither the Appellant nor

Ulang ca w ere prese nt in the t railer

. When he returned to the trailer around 2:30 or 3:00 a.m., the c ouple still was not there.

Kendr a Corley

testified that Mathew s did not go with her to a par ty at the tra iler on January 21, 1994 beca

use he w as working . Corley s t at ed t h at she did bringMathews to the tra iler on Saturday the 22 , and they

arr ived betwe en 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. Corley maintained that she did not nd g o to a par

ty at the tra iler with Mathews on J anuar y 28 . Acc ording to Corley , Mathews g ave he r th $255 in f ive dollar bills just prior to his suicide attempt. Corley also identified the blac k jacke t as belong ing to Mathews.

Jame s B ow e n te sti fi e d that Cor le y br ou g ht Mathe ws to the pa rt y a we e k b e fo re the mur de rs

. B ow e n o ve rh e a d th e Ap pe lla nt and Mat he ws dis c us sin g a ro bb e ry a t T a c o B e ll. Ac c or din g to B ow e n, the Ap pe lla

nt a nd Mathe ws argue d o ve r who wo uld “pu ll the g un

and wh o w a s g oin g to watch.” Bow en testified that Mathews stated they would rob Tac o Be ll because “he w orked the re, it would be easie r for them to do. He knew how many people would be there and when they closed.” Bow en stated that he s aw the Appellant and Ulang ca go into a trailer bedroom about 2: 00 a.m. and that they wer e still there whe n he woke up. The Appellant testified i n his own defense. He denied any involvement in the robbery and
mur de rs and

a sse rt e d a

n a lib i def

e ns e

. At tr ia l, U la ng c a no w c la ime d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt w a s w ith her on the night of

the murder s.-10-

Following the conc lusion of t he evidence, the jury found the Appe llant guilty as cha rg ed of four c ounts of felony murder and i mposed a punishment of life imprisonment. Af ter a sentenc ing hear ing on D ece mber 12, 1997, the tria l court orde red the Ap p ellant’s sente nces to be serve d
consec utively . Following extensive filings by both parties and thr ee he aring s on the Appellant’s motion for new tria l, proce eding s on the motion we re completed on J uly 3, 2000. On Fe bruar y 5, 2002, the trial cour

t summarily

denied the A

ppellant’s motion for new trial. This timely

appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S

I. Use of Conf

ession The Appe llant argues that “the State’s use of [his] false c onfession constitutes prosecutor ial misconduct and a

constitutional viol ation.” F urthermor e, the Appe llant contends that “the trial court’s a dmission of the . . . confession constitutes re versible e rror .” We disag ree

. First, the Appel l an t made a voluntary

statement to law e nforc ement off icials, wher ein he made a dmissions reg ardinghis cul p ab i lity in the robber

y and murde rs and disclosed the ci r c u ms ta n c e s s u r r o u n d in g th e c r im e s

. Pr io r to tr ia l, an e xte n s iv e h e ar in g w a s h e ld to determine whether the statements should have be en suppre ssed bec ause the y wer e “not voluntar ily

made a nd [we re ] sub sta

nti a lly fa lse .” I n a

de ta ile d o rd e r, the tr ia l c ourt c on c lud e d th a t, “ ba se d u

po n th e tot a lity of the c ircumstance s, that the statements cha lleng ed in t he defenda nt’s motion to suppress . . . we re not the result of intimi dation or coer cion. I nstead, the statements wer e the product of the def endant’ s fre e and de liberate choice and we re voluntar ily made.” The trial c ourt then proc eede d to addre ss the issue of the stateme nts being substantially false.

The de fendant’s second c ontention is that the statements should be suppressed be cause they

are substantially

false. I n s u p p o rt of this assertion, the de fe nd ant c ite s Mo on e y

v. Ho loh an, 29 4 U .S. 10 2 ( 19 35 ); Na pu e v. I lli no is, 36 0 U .S. 264 (1959) a

nd Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). Mooney and its prog eny stand for the pr op os iti on

that f a lse e vid e nc e , in c lud ingfa lse tes ti mo ny , ma y no t be us e d to obtain a convic tion. As this cour t noted at the suppre ssion hearing , this li ne of c ases addre ssed per

jured testimony , knowing ly false t estimony

about consider ation
rec eived f

or coope ration, and phy sical evide nce which is known t o t h e st ate to be misrepre sented (le tting the jury believe paint stain is blood). O bviously , these ty pes of evide nce strike at the hea rt of what the Due Proc ess Clause re prese nts.

Howeve r, the instant ca se does not ali gn itself with any of the a bove-listed cate g ories. Instead, the state ments g iven by the def endant may

be conside red a
c on fe ssi on

of so me c ulp a

ble a c t or if no t a c on fe ssi on , a t le a st a n a dmi ssi on

a g a ins t intere s t. T e n n e s s e e la

w c le ar ly c o n te mp late s th a t a ll o r p art o f a c o n f e s s io n or admission a g ainst interest may be false. The jury instruction conce rning evidenc e of a conf ession (T.P.I . 42.12) instructs the jury that its duty is to judge the truth of the-11-

c on fe ssi on

. A s s u c h , t h e j u r y m ay a c c e p to r r e j e c tan y p o rt i o no f

t h e c o n f e s s i o nit
c h o o s e s

. Li k e w i s e , t h e j ur y i n s t r u c t i o nc o n c e r

n i n g a dm i s s i o n s aga i n s ti n t e r e s t( T

. P

. I. 42.11 ) d e ma

n d s c o r r o b o r a ti o n b y other indepe ndent evidenc e to war rant a conviction. The testimony

offe red at the suppression he ar i n g indicates that pa rt of the statements have admittedly been proven false by the state’s inve stigators. Howeve r, t h i s C o u rt d o e s n o t f

i n d t h a t t h e i n t r o d

u c t i o n o f t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s e qua te s to prese nting f

alse testimony

to a jury . Our lawhas built-in safeguards to preve nt the state from obtaining a tainted convic tion with such evidence . Br ady v. Maryland and its pr og e ny

re qu ir e the state to p ro du c e any e vid e nc e wh ic h is e x culp a tor y . T his
re qu ir e me nt g ive s th e de fe nd ant a c c e ss t o in for mat ion he may fi nd ne c e ssa ry to attack the truth or fa lsity of the stateme nts. Si milarly , the state must prese nt independe nt corrobor ating evidenc e to support those par ts of the statement or statements it believes a

re true

. This Court has alrea dy

found, wi t h out reg ard to truth or f alsity , that the sta te me n ts w e r e v o lu

n ta r il y ma d e

. T h e d e te r

mi n a ti o n o f th e tr

u th o r f a ls it y o f the
s t a t e m e n t s s h a l l r e m a i nw i t h t h e j u r y.
The re as o n i ng of the trial c ourt in admitting the e vidence is sound. The rec ord supports the
c on c lus ion that the state me nts we re vo luntari ly ma de , an d the de te rm inatio n o f t he tr uth or fa lsi ty of the c onfession wa s proper ly left to the province of the jury

. Second, the Appe llant cont ends that a c onfession should not be tested solely by the
corr oboration rule when the confe ssion is known t o be false. I n Tenne ssee, it is well-established that a convic tion cannot be f

ounded solely upon a defe ndant' s confe ssion. Sta te v . S mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274, 2 8 1 (T en n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g As hb yv . S tate , 139 S.W . 872, 875 (Tenn. 1911) ). Some corr o b o ra t ing evidenc e is r equire d which, indepe ndently of the c onfession, tends to establish the c or pu s d e lic tiof the offe nse cha

rg ed. Id. Howeve r, whe re the re is a c onfession, the c orrobor ative evide nce " need not be as c onvincing as t h e ev i d ence nece ssary to establish a c or

pu s d e lic tiin the absenc e of a ny con fes si on ." Ri c k

e tts v . S tate , 241 S.W. 2d 60 4, 60 6 (T e nn . 195 1)

. Th e c or ro bo ra tin g e vid e nc e is suff i ci en t to sustain a conviction if " it tends to connect the de fenda nt with the commission of the of fe n s e , a l t h o u g h t h e e v i d e n c e i s s l i g h t , an d e n t i t l e d , w h e ns t an d i n g b y i t s e l f , t o b u tlit tle
con si dera ti on ." Id .; se e als o S mi th , 24 S.W .3d at 281. Moreove r, we note that all eleme nts of the
c or pu s d e lic ti may be esta

blished by

circ umstantial evidence

. State v. Jone s , 15 S.W .3d 880, 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) . The Appe llant admits that his s tatement, e v en i f o n l y minimally , was corr oborate d. I f the c onfession wa s corr oborate d, then it is not completely false.

Whil e po rt ion s o f t

his c on fe ssi on may have be e n untr ue , th e Ap pe lla

nt’ s invo lve me nt i n th is crime w as cor

roborated by

other indepe ndent evidenc e pre sented at trial. Severa l witnesses testified that the Appellant a

nd Mathews we re toge ther on at least one oc casion at the Oak Gr ove tra iler, which cor roborated the Appe llant’s acc ount of their conve rsation about the robbery . The Appe llant state d that Ke vin “ Re d” Tw e e n wa s to ac c omp any Mathe ws ins ide the Ta c o B e ll. I n h is s tate me nt,-12-

the Appellant r eporte d that, at the time of the robber y , Twee n “wa s wea

ring a bigdark blue hooded Adidas jac ket, black a

nd white shell toe Adidas tennis s h o es , b l u e jeans a nd black T- shirt with a cl o wn o n i t

. ” J ac qu el i n e Di ck i n s o n t es t i fi ed t h at s h e sa w a wh i t e ma l e in s i d e Ta co Be l l we ar i n g a hooded g ree n jacke t and dar k blue jeans a

round 2:35 or 2:40 a.m. Als o , i n h i s statement, the Appellant said he drove his white Trac er to T aco Be ll. Dickinson observed a white ca r at the Ta co B e ll, wh ic h w a s “ fa c ingto t he ba c k p ark inglot ” and

wh ic h w a s n ot the vic tim ’s ve hic le in t he c ri me scene photos. The Appellant stated t hat M athews w as we aring“a bla ck cloth knee leng th jacket,” which wa s consistent with other wi t n esses’ a ccounts a nd the re cover ed jac ket. Acc ording to the Ap pe lla nt, Me lanie Da

rw ish ’s re d Te mpo wa s pa rk e d in the ma ll pa

rk ing lot be hin d th e Ta c o B e ll. Da m i e n C r o m art i e t e s t i f

i e d t h a t a b r o w n o r b u r g u n dy s e d an w a s p ar k e d i n t h e T w o R ive rs Ma ll parking lot. Cromortie also testified t hat he saw at least two people inside the T aco B ell, when he pulled up to the drive-thr u window about 3:00 a.m. The Ap p ellant stated that both Mathew s and Tw e e n w e nt i ns ide . A dd iti on a lly , th e Ap pe lla nt re po rt e d that a

“ he a vy -s e t w oma

n w hit e fe ma le wi th brown hair come to the drive-up window.” This de scription was c onsistent with the chara cter istics of the victim Marc ia Klopp. Finally , the Appellant obse rved Tw een r unning be hind Taco B ell afte r he hea rd a “ loud bang .” Althoug h their descriptions varied, both B ill Hudspeth and Mark Jolly saw a man r unning ne ar the Tac o Be ll around 2:30 a.m. The e vidence was suff icient to corr oborate the Appellant’s c onfession.

Th e Ap pe lla

nt a sse rt s th a t th e “ state me nts are c on tr ive d, c on c oc te d, unre lia ble , a nd wh oll y inconsistent with known and ac cepte d fac ts[ .]” Reliabilit y of the co n fe s s i o n was a

deter mination for the jur y

.
A c o n f

e s s i o nb e i n g a dm i t t e d , i t s w e i g h t i s o f c o u r s e a m a t t e r f o r t h e j u r y. That is, the jury

is to determine whether defe ndant made the c onfession and whether the statements conta ined in it are true . To aid them in resolvingthese questions t he j u ry m ay hear evidenc e of the circ umstances unde r which the confe ssion was procur ed.

W y nn v . S tate , 1 81 S.W. 2d

33 2, 33 3 ( 19 44 ); see also State v. P ursley , 550 S.W .2d 949, 950 (1997). At trial, the Appe llant expl ained his r easons for making the statements, including his strong de sire to ge t out of jail on a reduc ed bond. The Appe llant also prese nted the testimony of Charlie B rown as to how the stateme nts were formula t ed

. T he jury , as wa s its prerog ative, disag ree d with the Ap pe lla nt’ s a sse rt ion

that th is c on fe ssi on

wa s f a lse and he wa s n ot i nv olved in th e se c ri me s. Acc ording ly , the Appellant’ s claim that the State is g uilty of misconduct and that the tria l court er red by admitting the c onfession is without merit.

II. Re c ant e d Te st im ony

Ne xt, th e Ap pe lla

nt c on te nd s th at th e State c omm itt e d p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t by its “p ersistent and de liberate use of r eca nted testimony ” and its fa ilure “to infor m the defe nse that
cer tain witnesses had rec anted their testimony .” Wit hin this section, the Appellant ar g ues first about-13-

the testimony

of Robert Ea stland, Robert Daw son, and Jeremy Tho mpson, and then about the testimony of Michae l Mill er. We will addre ss these ar g uments in turn.

A. Eastland , Dawson , and T hom pson
Withre g a rd to E a stl and , D aws on , a

nd Th omp so n th e Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t: Havingknown about these witnesses for y ea rs , t h e S tate obtained statements from the m w ith in d ay s o f t

ri a l. C on c e rn e d a

bo ut t he e le ve nth

ho ur pr od uc tio n o f t

he se wi tne sse s, the Court lim ite d the ir us e to re butta l. F or a t le a st tw o d ay s p ri or to t he ir testimony , the witnesses informed the S tate that they knew nothing about the Ta co Be ll murders, that Houlser had told them nothing a

bout the Tac o Be ll murders, that any thing sa id to them by

Housler wa s not related t o t h e T aco B ell murders, a nd
rec anted their

ear ly November

statements.

The State c alled Ea stland and Da wson in rebuttal; however, Thompson wa s not called to testify . The Appellant’s arg ument is two-fold: (1) the State c ommitt ed prose cutorial misconduct in pre senting the rec anted testimony of Eastland and Dawson and (2) the State violated Brady v. M aryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. C t. 1194 (1963), by failing to disclose the re cantations of Eastland, Daw son, and Th omp so n to de fe ns e c ouns e l or the tr ia l c ourt

. First, we conclude that Eastland and D awson did not rec ant their trial testi m o ny . The witnesses did not withdraw or renounc e their state ments but merely informed Attorne y

Gene ral Gus Ra df or d th a t th e y

wo uld no t te sti fy

fo r t he State . A t tr ia l, the Ap pe lla nt i nit ia lly

te sti fi e d th a t he did
no t sp e a k w ithEa stl and

c on c e rn ing“ re de mpt ion .” He the n state d that he may have sp ok e n w ithhim

. I n rebuttal a

nd afte r a jury-out hea

ring , the State called Eastland to t estify as to whethe r the Appe llant talked about r edemption during a trip to Clarksville. Eastland testi fied that he, Thompson, and the Appellant spoke a

bout rede mption. Dawson, althoug h reluc tant to te stify , stated that the Appe llant told him that “he had see n a lot of shit in his l ife.” Thompson was not ca lled to testify . Eastland and Da ws on te sti fi e d in

a c c or da nc e wi th t

he ir state me nts . F ur

the rm or e , D aws on

ackno wl e dg e d h is statement was true. Be cause these were not inconsistent statements, t he Appellant’s relianc e upon State v. May

s , 495 S.W .2d 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) , and State v. Stev e Johnson , No.02-C-01- 95 04 -C C- 00 09 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. a t J a c ks on , Fe b. 27 , 199 7) , is mispl a c e d. Th e State did no t us e rec anted testimony

and, thus, this issue is wit hout merit.

Wit h reg ard to a

Bradyviolation, the A

ppellant contends that the State should have infor med de fe ns e c ouns e l th a t T ho mps on re c ante d h is s tate me nts and that, i f t he State ha d d on e so , h e c ou ld have use d Thompson to rebut the testimony of Eastland. Relief

under Bradyis n ot a

va ila ble un le ss the Ap pe lla

nt c an esta

bli shtha t th e e vid e nc e imp ro pe rl y wi thh e ld w a s mate ri a l to the de fe nd ant. State v. Edgin, 902 S.W .2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995)

. I n order to determine the materia lity of undisclosed information, the r eviewingcourt must asc er tain whether in the absenc e of the information the def

endant r ece ived a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a ver dict worthy of confide nce. Kyles v. W

hitley , 5 14 U. S. 4 19 , 43 4, 11 5 S. Ct. 15 55 , 15 66 (1 99 5)

. Thus , in or de r t o-14-

prove a Bradyviolation, a defe ndant must show "the f avora ble evidenc e could r easona bly be take n to put the whole ca se in such a dif fer ent light a s to undermine conf idence in the verdic t." Id. The Appe llant has not shown that the information that Thompson re cante d his te stimony was improperly

withheld from def

ense c ounsel. At the hea

ring on the motion f

or newtrial, Thompson testified that, on the morninghe wa s to testify for the State, he informed Attorne y Gene ral Radf

ord that hi s st a te me nt w a s n ot t ru e

. Th omp so n wa s liste d as a witne ss, and the Ap pe lla

nt h a d c omp le te
acc ess t o this witness as he was a friend of the Appellant. Reg ardle ss, Thompson’s testimony was not material to the Appe llant. Eastland only testified about t h e Ap p ell ant’s talk of “ rede mption.” Th is w a s n ot a

mate ri a l is su e in t

he pr os e c uti on

of the Ap pe lla

nt. Ea stl and did no t tes tif y that th is statement wa s in relation to the Tac o Be ll robbery or murder s. We conclude that the Appellant has
no t sh ow n th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s mate ri a l to th e de fe ns e or that T ho mps on ’s te sti mony “ c ou ld
rea sonably

be take n to put the whole ca se in such a differe nt light as to under mine confide nce in the verd ict ." Kyles v. W

hitley , 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S. Ct . at 1566.

B. Michael Miller The Appe llant argues that t h e State’s use of Michae l Mill er a s a witness constituted prosec utorial m i s co n duct. We conclude otherwise. T he proof established that Miller and the Appellant we re inmate s in the Montgomer y County J ail shortly afte r t he Taco B ell crimes. Dur ing the ir inc arc e ratio n, the Ap pe lla nt c on fi de d in

Mil le r t hat he and oth e rs pa

rt ic ipate d in the Ta c o B e ll robber y and murde rs. Miller advised the authorities of this fac t, resulting in a two-pag e sig ned statement to the T.B .I . detailing the Appellant’ s con v e r s a ti o n s w it h M il le r. Approximately

six wee ks prior to the sche du l ed t ri al , Miller, who was the n incar cer ated in a K entucky penitentiary , was c o n t a c t e d b y t h e T

. B

. I. r e g ar d i n g h i s s t a t e m e n t

. M i l l e r r e a f f i r m e d h i s p r i o r s t a t e m e n tt o t h e T

. B

. I.

Duri ngop e nin g state me nts on No ve mbe r 1 2, 19 97 , the a tto rn e y g e ne ra l ma de re fe re nc e to Miller and the f

act that he would be ca lled as a State’ s witness. I n t h e o p en ing statement by the d e f e n s e , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n f

o r m e d t h e j u r y: [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Iwant you to remembe r what the Attorney Gene ral told you about Michae l Miller. T he Attorne y Gene ral told y ou that Michae l Mill er was g oing to c ome in here and tell y ou that David Housler told him a whole bunch of thing s about this shotgun, and you reme mber plastic bag , wher e it was, and all of that? You re member that on November 12 , y ou wer e tol d that. You re member that th next week when w e come back up he re?

On the sec ond day

of trial, Miller wa s called to testify . Be fore taking the stand, Miller informe d the attorney g ener al that his Ma

rch 1994 statement to the T.B.I . was fa lse. The attorney g ener al advised the cour t of this fact a

nd that if a re cantation occurr ed, he w ould ask that the witness be de clar ed a hostile witness. No objection was e ntere d by defe nse counse l. During his testimony , Miller denied that he had ever talked to the Appellant about the “Ta co Be ll murde rs.” He admitted that he g ave the statement to the T.B .I . but expl ained that he either ma de the f acts up, re ad about the fac ts in theT h e S ta te c o n c e d e d a t t ria l t h a t p o rtio n s o f M ill e r’s sta te m e n t we re p o ssib ly f a lse ; ho w e v e r, the se state m e n ts 3

w e re n o t incul p at o ry i n nat ure and no que st i o ns were asked o f t he wi t ness regardi ng t hese part i cul ar s t at em ent s. I n
co nt ras t , t hese s t at em ent s were f ul l y exp l o red and cap i t al i zed on b y t he A p p el l ant duri ng hi s exam i nat i o n of M i l l er.

-15- ne ws pa pe r, or wa s to ld what to say

by the T. B .I . a g e nt. Ea

rl y in to di rect -e xami natio n, de fe ns e counsel posed a

n objection as to the attorney g ener al’s manne r of impea chment. A be nch conf ere nce was held. The rec ord of this c onfer ence ref lects that def

ense c ounsel’s objec tions stemmed from the fa c t th a t “[the a tto rn e y g e ne ra l] ha s nev e r as ke d this man what he sa id in the state me nt? I f h e pu ts that in , th e n h e c an s ay

ho w did y ou kn ow thi s? Why did y ou c ha ng e - -. ” Th e tr ia l c ourt

a g re e d w ith defe nse counse l’ s rec ommendations, which we re f ollowed by

the attorne y

g ener al duringthe
rema inder of dir ect e x amination. The State c onclud ed it s examination wit hout introducing the wi tne ss’ pr ior

inc on sis te nt s tate me nt o r r e q u e s t i n g t ha t th e wi tne ss b e de c lare d h os til e . D ur ingc ro sse xami na tio n, de fe ns e c ouns e l mov e d fo r int ro du c tio n o f t

he wi tne ss’ sig ne d s tate me nt a s a n e xhibi t and conduc ted an e x tensive line-by -line impeac hment of its contents. Upon conc lusion of Mill er’ s 3 testimony , the trial cour

t voiced conc erns a s to its us e by the j ury . Another be nch conf ere nce w as he ld, duri ngwh ic h de fe ns e c ouns e l su g g e ste d th a t th e a tto rn e y g e ne ra l’ s a c tio ns in c a lli ngMil le r t o testify constituted reve rsible er

ror be cause the State did not provide notice of his reca ntation to the Appellant. The attorney g ener al responde d that he had informe d the cour t and def ense c ounsel of the witness’ potential for reca ntation upon lear

ning of this fact. More over, the attorney g ener al noted that, althoug h the State lear ned of the witness’ re cantation that same morning , the testi m o ny of Miller indicated that Miller ha d informed defense counsel investigators that he wa s rec anting “two or three day s” prior, dur ing the ir visit with hi m at the penitentiary . Def ense c ounsel responde d, “He ’s rig ht, that w e interviewe d this witness and this witness told us that his state ment was not true, bu t as t h e wi t n es s testified, he ha d told the [ T.B.I .] si x wee ks ag o that it was true.” The attorney g ener al also asse rted that he was disturbed by defe nse counsel’s openingrema rks to the jury

which “c h al l en gedm e t o d e l i v e r o nM i l l er , ” w h en h e kn ew at t h e t i m e t h at M i l l er wo u l d b e r ec an t i n g. Wit h reg ard to the f

acts in dispute, the trial c ourt found:

THE C OU RT : .

. . M y

r e c o ll e c ti o na t t

h e s id e b ar

w a s th a t [ th e a tt o rney g ener al] wa nted to - - br oug ht to the Court’s attention that the witness, Michae l Miller, who he wa s about to call, may very well b ec o m e a hostil e witness and [the
a tt orn ey gener a l] wa s se e kin g to h a ve him tr e a te d a s a

ho sti le wi tne ss u

nd e r R ule 61 1, so that he c ou ld l e a d h im.

. . . And I so instructed Counsel to do that and Mr. T er ry agr ee d that that’s the way it ought to be done

. At tha t po int in t ime though, Ido n’ t su pp os e anyon e kn e w - - f

ir st o f a ll, whether he wa s g oing to sa

y that h i s s t at ement wa s false, or if he wa s g oing to sa

y that, was he g oing to sa

y that it was entirely

false or only partially false?-16- . . . . . . [The attorney g ener al] is corr ect, that afte r [ he] finished examining the witness, then the cr oss examination by the Def ense w as t o g o over the statement ag ain, line by

line. So not only

was th er e n o o b

j ec tion from the Def

ense, the examination conduc ted by the Def ense w ould act as a

waiver in terms of complaining
a b o u tt h e f a c tt h a tt h e w i t n e s s w a s a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y.
Nonethele ss, the trial court noted that it wanted to ref lect f u rt h er upon the question of whethe r a proper limit ing instruc tion coul d b e gi v en under the circ umstances or whether Miller’s entire testimony should be stricken. B efor e re cessingthe jury for the day , the trial cour

t instructed the jury
a s f oll ow s:
As a matter

of law, the Court has order ed the testimony of Michae l Mill er stricken f rom the re cord. Tha

t means that the testimony of Mr. Miller must be disrega rd ed b y y o u in its entirety and tre ated a s though you never hear d it. I f y ou have note s in y our notebook re g arding the te stimony of Mr. Miller, I

am now ins tr uc tin g you

to s e pa rate th os e no te s f

ro m y our n ote bo ok s and te nd e r t ho se se pa rate d M ill e r n ote s to the Court

. You may not pla ce any signific ance on either the testimony of Mr. Miller or draw any infere nces from this instruction or t his procee ding. I f y ou will just take a moment and sepa

rate y our notes fr om your notebook, if you have the m? I t may mean that y ou have a

portion of a pa g e that is se parated from y our notebook and Iam sure y ou wi ll b e a ble to k e e p u

p w ithit.

The re cord indicates the jurors c omplied with this reque st.

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 607 allows a pa rt y to impeach its own witness, and Rule 611 allows the use of leading questions on direc t examination of a hostile witness. Tenn. R. Evid. 607, 611(c) . Moreove r a pa

rty may impeach a

hostile witness by

asking t h e witness whe ther they previously

made c erta in prior inconsistent statements. Tenn. R. Evid. 613(a) , N EIL P. C OHE N E T AL ., T ENNES S EE L A W O F E VI DENCE § 6.13[2] (4 ed 2000). A t trial there are limit s on the State’s powe r th to impeach its own witnesses by prese nting the w itnesses’ prior inc onsistent statement. See M ays v . S tate , 495 S.W .2d 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). I mpeac hment cannot be a “mer e ruse” to present to the jury

prejudicia l or improper te stimony

. S ta tev

. R o yL. P a yne , No

. 03C01-9202-CR-00045 (Tenn. Crim. App. At Knoxvi lle, Fe b. 2, 1993). In United States v. W ebster , 734 F.2d 1191 (7 Cir. th 1984), the c ourt explained:
[I ]t would be an a

buse of [Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 607], i n a cr iminal case, f or the pr os e c uti on

to c a ll a wi tne ss t hat it kn e w w ou ld no t g ive it us e fu l e vid e nc e , jus t so it could introduce he arsa

y evidenc e ag ains t t h e def endant in the hope that the jury would miss the subtl e dis t i n ct i o nb et we en i mp ea ch m en tan d s u b s t an t i v e e v idence–or,In this re g a rd , w e n o te tha t c e rta in p o rtio n s o f M ill e r’s te stim o n y o n d ire c t-ex a m ina tio n , i

. e. , l o cat i o n of t he 4 shot gun, was corrob o rat ed by ot her wi t ness es. Furt herm o re, t he t est i m o ny was st ri cken f rom t he reco rd f

o l l o wi ng t he A p p el l ant ’ s o b ject i o n t o t he t est i m o ny , whi ch o nl y o ccurred af t er M i l l er’ s t est i m o ny was concluded and t he t ri al co urt
v o ic e d it s c o n c e rn s a s to it s u se . T h e re fo re , w e c o n c lud e tha t t h e A p p e llan t suffe re d no p re ju d ic e fro m the S ta te ’s

e x a m ina tio n o f M ill e r.
-17- if it d idn ’t mis s it , w ou ld i g no re it. Th e purp os e wo uld no t be t o im pe a c h th e wi tne ss but to put in hear say as subs tantive evidence ag ainst the def endant, whic h Rule 607 does not contemplate or authorize.

W ebster , 734 F.2d at 1192. At this juncture, we w ould note that a party may not be g rante d relief

for a n err or by failing to take whatever

action wa s rea sonably available to preve nt or nullify the har mful eff ect of the er ror. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) . I n this reg ard, the rec ord re flec ts t h at , n o t only did the Appellant neve r object to the admis sion of Miller’s prior inconsistent statement or re quest that it be stricken, but he fa c ili tate d it s in tr od

uc tio n by c on du c tin g a

lin e -b y -l ine e xami natio n o f t he sta te me nt. Mo re ov e r, it was the A ppellant who moved f

or introduction of the statement into e vidence

. As found by the trial court, a ny objection to the prior inconsistent stateme nt was wa ived. Notwithstanding w aiver , we e lect to re view this issue upon its mer its. Central to this i ssue is whether the introduction of Miller’s hea rsay statement by the State to impeach its own witness wa s motivated solely

by the desire to put the s tatement before the jury . The fa ct that the attorne y g ener al was not surprise d by

Miller’s testimony

at trial does not indicate bad fa ith. Rul e 607 does not require that the par

ty calling the witness be surpr ised befor e the witness can be impeache d. Tenn. R. Evid. 607. As has alre ady been observe d, the attorney g ener al’s use of the statement wa s limi ted in s c op e , a s o pp os e d to the Ap pe lla nt’ s, and fo c us e d p ri mari ly

up on the Ap pe lla

nt’ s sta te me nts reg ardingthe location of the discarde d shotgun. The rec ord re flec ts that the shotgun was located by law enf orce ment office rs base d upon information supplied in Miller’s statement. As s u ch , the attorney g ener al explained that he was primarily attempting to la y the foundation for those off icer s and the f orensic pr oof which w as to follow.

Ba sed upon the re cord be fore us, we are unable t o conclude that the State’s impeac hment by use of the A

ppellant’s prior inc onsistent statement was employ ed for the primary

purpose of

placing befor e the jury evidenc e which was not otherwise admissible. United States v. Morlang , 531 F.2d 18 3, 19 0 (4 Cir . 199 5)

. I nd e e d, the re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e Ap pe lla nt w a s e qu a lly

int e re ste d, fo r h is th own tactica l rea sons, in placing Miller’s testimony befor e the jury , as at times his testimony tended to damag e the St ate’ s case

. For these reasons, any examination under Rule 403, Tenne ssee Rules
o f E v i d e n c e , i s u n n e c e s s ar

y. 4
Finally , we disag ree with the Appellant’s char acte rization of the attorney g ener al’s ac tions in c a lli ngMil le r a s a

wi tne ss a s “ pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t.” Th e de fe ns e and the State we re bo th equally awa re of Miller’s potential for r eca ntation; however , it wa s the State who informed the trial
c ourt of thi s p os sib ili ty . T his iss ue is w ith out me ri t.-18- III . Te st im onyof La r r y U nde r hill

Th e Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t “ the tr ia l c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on of the te sti mony

of [L arr y ] Un de rh ill allowed the pr osecution t o introduce reca nted false testimony and constit utes reve rsible er ror.” He
su bmi ts t hat:

There is no doubt whatsoever that L arr y Under hill’s testim o n y wa s false, a nd that Under hill, by his own admission, has committed perjury . There is no doubt whatsoeve r that Unde rhill’s testimony was sig nificant to the State’s case. Without the fa lse testimony , the jury would not ha ve been exposed to Ea stland and Da wson, and to the State’s r ehash of the incre dible tale at closing. Wit hout the false testimony it is m ore tha

n probable that the jury

might have rea ched a

differ ent conc lusion.

Pr ior to Un de rh ill ’s te sti mony , the State inf or me d the tr ia l c ourt

that it wa s “ no t c omf

or ta ble ” wi th all of Unde rhill’s testimony ; theref ore, the State planned only to question him about statements the Ap pe lla nt m a de c on c e rn ingr e d e m p t i o n

. T h e S t a

t e be lie ve d th e Ap pe lla

nt’ s ta lk o f r e de mpt ion

c ou ld be cor roborated by

Robert Eastland. Def

ense counsel stated to the court that Unde rhill’s statement was “ full of lies.” Howeve r, the trial cour t ruled that the de cision on Underhill’s cr edibility rested with the jury

. Under hill and the Appellant enc ountere d each o t her while they wer e inca

rce rate d in the Montgome ry

County J ail. Under

hill testi fied to the followingupon direc t-examination:

A. Mr . H ou sle r tol d me that he ha d don e a te rr ibl e thi ng . He wa s c ry ingin the middle of the nig ht.
Q

. W h a td i d

y o us ay ?

A. I responde d, I said David, do y ou want to talk about it? Ifirst said what’ s wr on g Da vid ? Do y ou

wa nt t o ta lk a

bo ut i t?
Q

. W h a td i d

h e s ay?

A

. A n d D av i d – a g a i n , I r e p e a t , I ’ v e d o n e a t e r r i b l e t h i n g

. H e s a i d , L ar

r y, I ’ve lied to you – he said I li ed t o y o u ab o u t n ot being at the Ta co B ell when the robber y and murde rs wer e committed. Q. Did y ou say

any thing then?

A. Not that I

rec all, no sir.
Q

. T h e nw h a td i d

h e s ay?-19- A. He sa id I wa s the re a t the tim e of the mur de rs and

he sa id n ot o nly

wa s I there , Iwas the one that killed the employ ees the re. Q. Was he cr

ying at that time?

A. He wa s c ry

ingand he wa s b a dly

sh a ke n, y e s. Q. What did he say

then?

A. He a sked me if I

thought that God would forg ive him for those sins? And I told him at t hat t ime, Isaid well – David, Irea lly don’t know, but Isaid y ou need to be save d. Ithink that y ou need to b e s av ed fi rs t beca use I am not sure that God will answer pr ay er unle ss a person is save d. And then he a sked me if I knew of any un fo rg iva ble sin ? An d I

re pli e d, Isa id D a vid , th e on ly on e that c ome s to min d – thi s is b a se d o n my

pa st t e a c hin g s, wo uld

be bla sp he my again st the Ho ly Gh os t or in other wor ds, a total reje ction of the e x istence of God or Jesus.

De fe ns e c ouns e l th e n w e nt o n to e xten siv e ly c ro ss- e xami ne Un de rh ill , c on c e rn ingthe de ta ils of thi s conver sation and his history of cr ime, alcohol use, a

nd mental hea lth problems.

At the motion for new tr ial hear ing, Underhill testified that, whil e at t he time of trial he believed his testimony was accur ate, he now believe d that his conversation with the Appellant was a hallucination. Underhill stated that he e ncounter ed Courtney Mathews at the Turney

Center following his testimony

in the Appellant’s trial. Acc ording to Underhill, Mathews told him that the Appellant wa s not involved in the Taco Be ll r obbery and murders, but Mathews was “g oing to let him sw ing .” Un de rh ill c la ime d th a t he se nt a le tte r t o A tto rn e y Gen eral Ra df or d r e po rt ingthi s c on ve rs a tio n; h ow e ve r, Ra df or d s tate d h e ne ve r re c e ive d suc h a le tte r. I n s um, Un de rh ill c omp le te ly
rec anted his trial testimony

.
Be fore g rantinga new

trial on the bas i s o f newly discovere d rec anted testimony , the trial court must find that: (1) it is r ea s o n ab l y we ll satisfied that the testimony g iven by the mater ial wi tne ss w a s f

a lse and the ne w t e sti mony

is tru e ; ( 2) the de fe nd ant w a s r e a so na bly dil ig e nt i n discoveringthe new e vidence , or was surprised by the false testimony , or was unable to know of the falsity of the testimony

until after the tr ial; and (3) the jury might have rea ched a

differ ent conc lusion had the truth be en told. Sta te v . R atl iff , 7 1 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 1 , 2 9 8 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v. Mix on , 983 S.W .2d 661, 673 n. 17 (Tenn. 1999) ).

I n the ca se at ba

r, the trial court did not make a ny formal f indings on the r ecor d. Howeve r, c o n c e r n in g th e le tt e r

U n d e r h il l a ll e g e d ly

s e n t t o A tt o r

n e y G e n e r a l R a d f

o r d , th e tr ia l c o u rt n o ted, “[A]t least if he had written it and Mr. Radford had rec eived it that would be some c orrobor ation that M r. Under

hill did what he said he did.” Impliedly , the trial cour t was troubled with Unde rhill’s
cre dibilit y . We conclude that the trial court wa s no t “re asonably well satisfied” that the new testimony g iven by Under hill was true. Furthermor e, the Appellant has not met his burden that the-20-

jury might have reache d a differe nt conclusion had the t ruth been told. Contrary to the Appellant’s
asser tion, Underhill’s test i m o n y wa s not “materia l” or “ signific ant.” Unde rhill testified that the Appellant was the shooter, which was not the State’s the ory at trial. Also, the State only prese nted Un de rh ill to e lic it t e sti mony c on cern in g redem

pti on , w hic h w a s c or

ro bo ra te d b y ano the r w itn e ss. Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th is i ssu e is w ith out me ri t.

IV. Juror M iscondu ct The Appe llant contends that “[t] here is an incre dible amount of e v i d ence in this recor d reg ardingjuror misconduct.” Specifica lly , he arg ues t hat he is entitled to a new tr ial beca use a juror sle pt d ur ingtr ia l and

wa s, the re fo re , in c a

pa ble of re nd e ri nga

fa ir ve rd ic t.

Th is i ssu e wa s r a ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me in th e mo ti on fo r n e w tri a l. A

pp are ntl y , A lte rn a te Juro r D a vid

Ta nk sle y c on ta c te d d e fe ns e c ouns e l a ft e r the re tur n o f t he g uil ty ve rd ic t to c on ve y

his
conce rns. At this tim e, Ta nksley related that a juror, B obby Martin, was r egularly

aslee p throug hout t h e t r i a l

. In s u

p p o rt o f h i s m o t i o n f

o r n e w t r i a l , t h e Ap p e l l an tp r e s e n t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f

T an k s l e y. T an k s l ey t es t i fi edt o t h e f

o l l o wi n g: Q. . . . [D] id y ou observe whether or not [Mr. Martin] was slee ping for par t of the tr ia l?

A. Yea h, he – we ll, I g uess i n the j ury room and a ll that we’d make kind of jokes. And we ’d eve n talk to him, say , man, y ou’re g oing to g et into a lot trouble for sleeping . You nee d to wake up a nd stay up.
And while we ’re sitti ng in the jury panel – I mean the se ats eve ry

once in a while, I think his name was Richar d Davis, the o t h er alt ernate, he’ d nudg e me a nd point over to him and I ’d look over a nd observe him and he’d be nodded out.

An d a c ou ple of the oth e rs do wn the re wo uld kin d of loo k u p a nd mov e the ir heads that way

and, y ou know, y ou’d see him over there sleeping

.

. . . Q. An d th is p a tte rn

of sle e pin g , d id i t oc c ur

thr ou g ho ut t

he tr ia l?

A. Ye s, it d id. Ev e n in

– d ur ingbr e a ks he ’d , –

y ou kn ow , w he n w e wa s in the jur y ro om, Ig ue ss, re c e ss r oo m, he ’d sit the re and no d o ut. An d w e ’d

me ss w ith him, y ou know, better

wake up, y ou know, y ou better, you know, pay attention.

We – some of us eve n made comments, y ou know, he’ s liable to g et thrown off this trial bec ause of

it.-21- Q. So, he was – it was a persistent pattern? I t was something that happe ned
e v e r y d ay?

A. Yes.
The State, in re buttal, provided the testimony of Juror Bobby

Martin and the r emainingeleve n jurors and one al t ernate. Mar

tin admitted that he “nodded of f.” Juror J ason Tay

lor testified that he ob se rv e d M art in “ be ingwo ke n u p p ri or to re c e ss. ” Ac c or din g to Ta ylor , he on ly ob se rv e d M art in sle e pin g on

thi s o ne oc c a sio n. Al te rn a te Juro r R ic ha rd Da vis te sti fi e d th a t he did

re me mbe r M art in napping during rec ess but did not remember Martin “takinga nap dur ing the trial period.”

The mer e fa ct that a juror

become s drowsy

for a short time is not of itself a g round for a new t ri al. State v. Chestnut , 643 S.W .2d 343, 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) ; s e e a l s o S ta t e v

. P hil lip Ho war d W hite, J r. , No. M2001-03109-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. C rim. App. at Nashville, May 2, 2003), perm. to appeal de nied , ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; St at e v. D on al d W ayn e Mar sh all , N o

. E 1 9 9 9

- 0 0 9 22-CCA-R3- CD (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. a t Kno xvill e , Fe b. 18 , 200 0)

. I n ord e r to co ns tit ute a g ro un d for ne w tri a l,
an objection must be promptly raised and prejudice must be shown. Chestnut , 643 S.W .2d at 346. This issue was not pr esente d to the trial court at any time dur ing the trial. None of the attorne y s or the cour t observed Ma

rtin sleeping during the trial. T h i s fa i l u re by any of the pa rties to observe Martin sleepingbelies the Appe llant’s claim that this was an everyday occur renc e. Eve n during the motion for new tria l, defe nse counse l could not assert a ny fac ts to show prejudice. The testimony prese nted at the motion for ne w trial hea ring does not indicate the leng th of t ime Martin may have
no dd e d o ff

on thi s on e oc c a sio n or

the imp or tanc e of the e vid e nc e be ingpr e se nte d at th is t ime . T his iss ue ha s n o me ri t.

As an a pp are nt aft e rt

ho ug ht i n th is s e c tio n o f t he Ap pe lla

nt’ s b ri e f, the Ap pe lla

nt a sse rt s, “[J ]urors, prior to deliberations, discussed the case among st themselves and for med and e x presse d opinions about the [Appellant’s] g uilt or innocence .” F irst, while t estimony conce rning this iss ue was he ard f

rom all twelve juror s and both alt er n at e jurors at the motion for ne w trial hea ring , the Ap pe lla nt' s argumen t do e s n ot s tate thi s p ro po sit ion in t he fo rm of an is su e a s r e qu ir e d b y

Rul e 27 (a )( 4) , T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e dure . Se c on d, thi s is su e ha s n ot b e e n bri efed . Ru le 27 (a )( 7) of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e dure pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art , th a t:

The brie f of the a

ppellant shall contain . .

. [ a] n argument, which may be pre cede d by a summary

of argument, setting f

orth the conte ntions of the appellant with re spect to the issues prese nted, and the r easons theref o r, including the re asons why the
c on te nti on s r e qu ir e a

pp e llate re lie f, wi th c itatio ns to the a uth or iti e s and

a pp ro pr iate ref ere nces to the r ecor d (which ma y be quoted ve rbatim) re lied on.

Se e als o H

arv e yv . S tate , 749 S.W .2d 478, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Third, nowhere in the brief is there r efe renc e to the re cor d

. T en n

. R

. App. P. 27(g ). " I ssues which a re not supporte d by
argume nt, c itatio n to a

uth or iti e s, or

a pp ro pr iate re fe re nc e s to the re c or d will be tr e a te d a s w a ive d in thi s c ourt ." Te nn . Ct . Cr im. Ap p. R. 10( b)

. I n the pr e se nt ca se , the Ap pe lla nt doe s not pr ov ide thi sIt i s a ge ne rall y a cc ep t ed p rincip l e o f tri al a d m i nist rati o n t ha t j uro rs m ust no t e ng ag e i n d i scu ssi o ns o f a c ase 5 b ef ore t hey hav e hea r d bot h t he evi dence and t he cour t ’ s l ega l i ns t r uct i ons and hav e begun f ormal l y del i bera t i ng as a
c o llec tive b o d y. Uni t ed St at es v. R es ko , 3 F

. 3 d 68 4 , 68 8 (3 C i r. 1 9 9 3 ). W hen jury m i scond uct i s al l eged , i ncl ud i ng rd i mpr oper i n t r a-

j u r y i n f l u en ce s , t h e t ri al c o ur t s h ou l d: a s ce r t ai n w h et h er t h e mi s con du ct a ct u al l y oc cu r r ed; i f i t di d, det er mi ne whe t her i t was pre j udi ci al ; an d i f

t her e a r e n o gr ounds f or a ne w t r i al , s peci f

y t he r eas ons i t deci ded t hat

m isc o n d u c t d id no t o c c u r o r o c c u rr e d b u t wa s n o n -p re ju d ic ia l. Id . at 6 9 1 . A t t h e m o tio n fo r n e w tr ia l h e a rin g , A lter n a te J u ro r T a n k sle y tes tif

ie d tha t, d u rin g e v e n ing c a rd ga m e s a m o n g st the m a le ju ro rs , co m m e n ts w e re m a d e th a t t h e S ta te

“ hadn’ t prove n a ny t hi ng ” a nd t he cas e wa s a w as t e of t he “ t ax pay er s mo ney ” a nd t he j ur ors t i me. H e a l s o t es t i f i ed t hat t he y co m m en t ed t ha t t he T .B .I. ag en t s “i nfl ue nc ed H o usler as far as a c o nfessi o n w en t ” a nd t he y did no t f i nd t he wit ne ss,
w h o tes tif

ie d to the lo c a tio n o f t h e A p p e llan t’s ca r a t t h e T a c o B e ll, c re d ib le

. F u rth e rm o re , T a n k sle y a lso tes tif ie d tha t, dur i ng “ s mo ke brea ks , ” t he f ol l owi ng comm ent s wer e made: “I ’ m not get t i ng any t hi ng o ut o f t hi s [ , ] ” and “ I don’ t s ee any gui l t verdi ct [. ]” T he o nl y other t est i m o ny co ncerni ng prem at ure deli b erat i o ns co m es f rom J uror B i l l y R ay N i p p er. E ven ass um i ng t hat t hese com m ent s supp o rt jur o r mi scond uct , we nonet hel ess f i nd no b asi s f

o r r eversal as t he A p p el l ant h as s u f f er ed n o pr ej u di ce f

r om t h e pr ema t u r e del i ber at i on s

. T h e comme n t s we r e br i ef , an d t h e j u r or s di d n ot r el y u pon any evi d ence o ut si d e o f t he reco rd i n reachi ng t hei r ver d i ct

. T he co m m ent s al so d o not sh o w th a t a n y of t he jur o rs
a c tua lly d e c id e d u p o n the A p p e llan t’s gu ilt b e fo re the c a se w a s su b m itt e d to the m . M o st im p o rta n tly, the c o m m e n ts
co nveyed t he b el i ef

t hat t he A p p el l ant was i nno cent and , t hus, were f avo rable t o t he A p p el l ant

. W hi l e we f i nd t hat t he i s s u e wa s w ai v ed, t h e r ec or d be f or e u s r ef

l ec t s t h at i t w as n ot e r r or t o de n y r el i ef on t h i s g r ou n d.
-22- court with any

informa t i o n co n cer

ning jur y discussions prior to deliberations or how he wa s pr e jud ic e d b y

su c h d isc us sio ns

. I n s um, the Ap pe lla nt h a s f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th R ule 27 . T his 5 iss ue is w ith out me ri t.

V. M at he ws Tim e -l ine The Appe llant next argues that “the Mathews time-line pr oves [his] i n n o ce nce; this court
c ann ot i g no re thi s c le ar p ro of of inn oc e nc e .” Spe c if

ic a lly , h e a sse rt s th a t:

Th e Mathe ws tim e -l ine is mor e tha n for ty pa g e s of de ta ile d en tr ie s f ro m th e wh ole
un ive rs e of

Ta c o B e ll inf

or matio n. Mo st imp or

tantl y , the Mathe ws tim e -l ine c on ta in entries f rom statements g iven by Courtney

Mathews to his defe nse team. . . . Mathe ws ha d p ro vid e d h is d e fe ns e te a m w itha tr uth fu l a c c ount t

hat c omp le te ly comports w i t h t h e cr edible testimony and phy sical evide nce in this ca se. . . . Mathews [does not] m ention David Housler, or any other a ccomplice in any

aspec t whatsoeve r. . . . There is no more convincingproof that Housle r wa s not involved. I f Housler , or any

other pe rson had a ssisted Mathews, t his time line would be littered with ever y detail of their participation. Absenc e of David Housler from the Mathews tim e -l ine ind ic a te s the tr uth

. Ho us le r wa s no t inv olv e d a t Ta c o B e ll. The tr uth cannot be ignor ed by

this Court.

Acc ording to defe nse counse l Stephanie Gore , she copie d the time-line at the of fice of one of Mathews’ att o rn ey s befor e Housler ’s trial. At no time prior to the motion for ne w trial, did the de fe ns e br ingthe inf

or matio n to the a tte nti on

of the tr ia l c ourt . A t mo st, the de fe ns e a tte mpt e d to
su bp oe na Mathe ws a t tr ia l, b ut h e re fu se d to te sti fy

. Th e tim e -l ine wa s n ot i ntr od uc e d a s a n e xhibi t, and ther e wa s never

a discussion as to whethe r the time-line a nd its contents were admissible.-23-

We note that the Appellant ag ain has failed to comply with Rule 27(a)( 7), Tenne ssee Rules of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure , a s th e Ap pe lla nt h a s n ot p ro vid e d th is c ourt wi th any le g a l a uth or ity in
su pp or t of his c la im. Re g ard le ss o f w a ive r, thi s c la im i s w ith out me ri t. The Appe llant’s argument of “actual innocence ” is premised solely on the ex istence of the tim e -l ine and

do e s n ot r e late to s uf

fi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e . T he State a sse rt s, and we a g re e , th a t, “[a]lt houg h [t he Appe llant] has not cha rac terized the time-line as n ew l y discovere d evidenc e, the [Appellant] appea

rs to a sk this Court to c onsider it a s new evidenc e proving his inno ce n ce i n t he Ta c o B e ll mu

r d e r s

. ” I n s e e k in g a n e w tr ia l b a s e d o n n e w ly d is c o v e r e d e v id e n c e , a cr iminal defe ndant must establish (1) r ea s onable dilig ence in attempting to discove r the e vidence , (2) the materia lity

of the e vidence , and (3) that the evidence would likely chang e the r esult of the trial. Sta te v. Me ade , 9 4 2 S

. W

. 2 d

5 6 1 , 5 6 5 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . Ni c ho ls , 877 S.W .2d 722, 73 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ). I f the de fe nd ant f a ils to s ho w that he and

/or his a tto rn e y

e xer c ise d r e a so na

ble d i l i g e n c e i nt h e p r o c u r e m e n t o f a w i t n e s s a tt h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u rtm ay p r o p e r l y d e n y a motion for new trial base d on newly discovere d evidenc e. Ha wk ins v . S tate , 417 S.W .2d 774, 778 (Tenn. 1967) . Moreove r, t he trial court is aff orded br oad discre tion in deciding whether to gr ant or deny a motion for new

trial based on ne wly

discovere d evidence, and its dec ision will not be overturne d o n appea l absent a c lear abuse of discretion. State v. W

alker , 910 S.W .2d 381, 395 (Tenn. 1995) , cert. de nied , 519 U.S. 826, 117 S. C t. 88 (1996). Clearly , counsel kne w of the t i m e-line prior to trial, y et chose not to revea l it prior to or during trial. Additionally , there is no proof t hat t he ti me-line was materia l or t hat t he evide nce w as l i k e l y t o h av e c h an g e d

t h e r e s u l t

. I r o n i c a l l y , t h e Ap p e l l an tc o n t e n d s t h a tM a t h e w s ’ s t a t e me nts “compor t[ ] wit h the cr edible testimony and phy sical evidenc e” and asks us to completely disbelieve the state me nts ma de by

the Ap pe lla

nt t o la w e nf or c e me nt. Al l qu e sti on s invo lvi ngthe c re dib ili ty of witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven t he evidence, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of fac t. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) . This court will not
rew eig h or re evaluate the evide nce pr esente d. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. This court does not possess fa ct finding authority ; our jurisdiction being appellate only . Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 5-108 ( 1994). F urthermor e, many of Mathews’ statements contained in the time- line are inconsistent with the proof and othe r statements attributed to Mathews. F or these r easons, the Appellant wa s not entitled to a new trial ba sed upon the time-line.

VI . I nc ons ist e ntThe or ie s The Appe llant, relying on Sm ith v . G ro os e , 205 F.3d 1045 (8 Cir.), cert. de nied sub nom. th Ga mm on v . S

mi th , 531 U.S. 985, 121 S. Ct. 441 (2000), c ontends his convictions should be vaca ted be c a us e the State vio late d h is due pr oc e ss r ig hts by pr e se nti nge vid e nc e and

argume nts duri nghis tr ia l w hic h w e re fu

nd ame nta lly inc on sis te nt and inh e re ntl y c on tr a dic tor

y to e vid e nc e and

argume ntsT h e S ta te a rg u e s tha t: 6

[t he A p p el l ant ’ s argum ent s regardi ng i nco nsi st ent t heo ri es ar e wai ved t o t he ext ent he relie s o n t he tra n sc rip t f

ro m C o u rtn e y M a the w s tria l. T h e M a the w s re c o rd is n o t i n c lud e d in the re c o rd b e fo re this C o urt

. T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. 24

. . . . [T he A p p el l ant ] f ai l s t o ci t e t o t he reco rd b ef o re t hi s C o urt t o s up p o rt his asserti o ns. R ule 1 0 (b ), R ules o f t he C o urt o f

C rimina l A p p ea l s.

T hi s cour t ha s pre vi ous l y deni ed t he A pp el l ant ’ s r eques t t o s uppl ement t he r ecor d wi t h t he t r ans cr i pt f r om Co ur t ney M a the w s’ trial. See St at e v

. D avi d G

. H ou s l er , N o. M 2003- 03122- CC A- R10- CD ( T en n

. Cr i m. App. a t N as h v i l l e, Fe b. 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 ). W e a g re e w ith the S ta te tha t t h is a rg u m e n t i s w a ive d to the e x te n t he re lies o n the M a the w s’ tra n sc rip t; h o w e v e r, w e fi n d the c u rr e n t re c o rd is sufficie n t t o a d d re ss th is issu e

.

J o h n C a rn e y is t h e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l f o r th e 1 9 th J u d ic ia l D is tric t, w h ic h inc lud e s M o n tgo m e ry C o u n ty. 7
A t t orn ey G ene r al Carn ey was i nv ol ved i n t he pros ecu t i on of C our t ney M at hew s

. H e and A s s i s t ant A t t orn ey G ene r al S te v e n L . G a rr e tt re c u se d the m se lve s fro m the p ro se c u tio n o f t h e A p p e llan t b e c a u se the y w e re p o te n tial w itne sse s in h is

c a se

. A tto rn e y G e n e ra l R o b e rt " G u s" R a d fo rd o f t h e 2 4 th J u d ic ia l D istric t wa s a p p o inte d A tto rn e y G e n e ra l P r o Tem in th e p ro se c u tio n o f t h e A p p e llan t.
-24- prese nted duringthe pre vious trial of Courtney Mathews. These c ases we re trie d by two differ ent 6

a tto rn e y s g e ne ra l. 7

Our c ourt, in State v. Gre

gory Robinson , No. W2001-01 2 9 9

- CC A

- R3

- D D ( T e nn

. Crim. App. at J ackson, Aug . 13, 2003), perm. to appeal granted , W200 1 -0 1 2 9 9 -S C-R11-DD (Te nn. J an. 26, 2004), rec ently adopted the Eig hth Circ uit's a pproac h in Sm ith , 205 F.3d 1045. I n Robinson , w e he ld a prose cutor' s use of fa ctually contra dictory

theories in sepa

rate trials of diffe rent de fenda nts v io lated the principles of

due proc ess. Gregory R obinson , N o

. W 2 0 0 1 -0 1 2 9 9 -C C A- R 3 -D D ( ci t i n g Sm ith , 205 F.3d at 1052-53). Robinson a lso e mph a size d th a t: such due pr ocess claims are unusual, will not often occur, and must exis t at t he cor e of the prose cution' s case in order to justify relief

. Se e Sm ith , 2 0 5 F.3d at 1052. A de fe nd ant m

us t e sta bli shthe pr os e c uto ri a l in c on siste nc ie s le d to a re a so na ble lik e lih oo d th a t th e ou tc ome of the tr ia l wou ld be dif

fe re nt a bs e nt t he inc on sis te nc ie s. See U nited States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 677, 1 0 5 S

. Ct. 3375 (1985) (noting fa ilure to p ro vid e e x cul pator y e vid e nc e , a

du e pr oc e ss v iol a tio n, re qu ir e s a "r easona ble likelihood" of a differ ent outcome in or der to se cure relief ); Anne B owen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistenc y, Estoppel, and Due Process: Mak ing the Prosecution Ge t Its Story Straight , 89 Calif. L

. Rev. 1423, 1471 (2001) ( sug g esting adoption of " rea sonable likelihood" test).

I n acc ordanc e with Robinson , we must first determine whe ther the State' s prosec ution theory in the instant c ase w as contra dictory to the evidenc e or a

rguments it presented in the pr evious trial of Co u rt n ey

Mathews. The Appellant conte nds that, at Mathews’ trial, the State ar g ued that Mathews a cted a lone in the Tac o Be ll robbery and murde rs, but the State then proce eded to a rg ue a t th e Ap pe lla

nt' s trial th at he a ssi ste d M a the ws in t he c omm iss ion

of the c ri me s b y

a c tin g a s a loo ko ut. He a sse rt s th a t:A t o ra l ar g u m e n t i n this c a se , it w a s d e v e lo p e d tha t the tria l co u rt ru le d tha t t h e S ta te ’s the o rie s w e re “m u tua lly 8

exc l us i ve of

one anot her [ ; ] ” howev er , t he t r i al cour t , s ummari l y deni ed t he A pp el l ant ’ s mo t i on f or n ew t r i al

. T hu s , we
m u st c o n c lud e tha t t h e trial c o u rt e ithe r re v e rs e d it s o ra l f ind ing o n the su b je c t o r c o n c lud e d tha t t h e re w a s n o t a “rea so na b l e li ke l i ho o d ” that t he o utco m e o f t he t rial w o uld ha ve b ee n d i f f ere nt ab sen t t he i nc o nsist en cies. W i t ho ut t he se f i ndi ng s , we procee d t o add r es s , i n f ul l , t he meri t s of

t hi s i s s ue.
-25- I n the Mathew s’ ca se, the prosecu tors confor med their pre sentation to competent phy sical proof

and to credible wit ness t estimony

. The Mathe ws prosec ution matches the Mathew s Time L ine, which is t he truth. Howeve r, i n the Housler pr osecution, the prosec uting attorney s used Housl er’ s false confe ssion as t heir centerpie ce, a nd then tried to corr oborate one aspec t of it to meet their burden. The Mathews tria l was an eff ort to prove the tr

uth; the Housler trial wa s an effort to prove a fa lse confe ssion. The re sult is necessar ily

inconsistent.

Th e Ap pe lla

nt’ s argume nt on inc on sis te nt the or ie s re ha sh e s many of the pr e vio us iss ue s. B e c a us e we have found the Appellant’s pr evious issu es , co n cer ning the Mathews time-line, r eca nted testi m o n y , and use of

the Appellant’ s confe ssion, to be without merit, we will not address them ag ain.

Th e Ap pe lla

nt g oe s o n to poin t out nume ro us fa c tua l in c on sis te nc ie s in su pp or t of his position, i ncluding discrepa ncies in t ime, car s seen by witnesses at the Ta co B ell, whether Mathews hid i n the bathroom c eiling or whether the broke n ceilingtile was stag ed, the pur chase of
a mmunit ion

fo r t he ro bb e ry , a

nd the loc a tio n o f t

he sh otgun

be fo re it w a s u se d to co mmi t th e se crimes. For example, the Appellant claims that the State’s theor y in Mathews that he dr ove his own 8

car to the Tac o Be ll was inconsistent with the statem en t p re sented at this t rial that the Appe llant drove Mathews to the Tac o Be ll. Assistant A ttorney Gene ral Steven Gar rett test i fi ed at t he Appellant’s trial that he believed Mathews c ould have dr iven himself to Tac o Be ll, although se vera l
c ars we re inv olv e d in

the c ri me s. Th e Ap pel lan t again inv ite s u s to c on c lud e that Mathe ws ’ statements ar e more cre dible than his. Credibility of witness and all fac tual issues are deter minations for the tr ier of f

act. Pappas , 7 54 S.W. 2d a t 62 3. F ur

the rm or e , r e lyingon

the c los ingargume nt i n the Mathews’ trial, the Appellant maintains that the State asser ted the Appellant acte d al o n e. Attorney Gene ral J o h n Carney

testified that his closing a rgument was dire cted towa rds Courtney Mathews be cause he wa s the person on tria l. Carney also testified that he be lieved more than one person wa s involved beca use one pe rson ac ting a lone could not have done eve ry thing.

The mer e fa ct that some of the evidenc e prese nted in the Mathews’ trial was not consistent wi th s ome of the e vid e nc e in t he Ap pe lla

nt’ s tr ia l do e s n ot m e an th a t th e State pr e se nte d f a c tua lly irrec oncilable theor ies. The g overnme nt is not required to " prese nt prec isely the same e vidence and th eori es i n t ri als for

di fferen t d efen dan ts ." Sm ith , 2 0 5 F. 3 d at 1 0 5 2

. Fu rt h erm o re , t h e go v ern m en t 's inc on sis te nc y " mus t e xist a t the c or e of the pr os e c uto r' s c a se a g a ins t the de fe nd ants fo r the s a me crime" in order to justify

relief

. Id. The fac tual inconsistencies be tween the Appellant’s tria l and Mathews’ trial did not exis t at the cor e of the prosec ution’s case . The State prose cuted Mathews as the shooter a

nd the Appellant a s the lookout. I n fac t, the State introduced much of t he evide nce f rom the Mathe ws ' tr ia l at th e tr ial of the Ap pe lla

nt. We c on c lud e that th e State did no t a dv oc a te-26-

inconsistent theories in the prose cution of the Appe llant and Mathew s. Furthe rmore, the fac tual inc on sis te nc ie s r e lie d u

po n b y the Ap pe lla

nt we re no t c e ntr a l to the State ’s c a se . B e c a us e the re is no showing of a “re asonable likelihood” of a differ ent result, we c onclude ther e wa s no violation of the Appellant’ s due proc ess rig hts. See R obinson , No. W2001-01299-CCA-R3-DD.

VI I. Se nt e nc ing Finally , the Appellant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d by order ing his four

life sentenc es to b e se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly

. Ap pe llate re vie w o f t he imp os iti on

of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s is de novo with a presumption that the determinations made by the t rial court are corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2003) . The pre sumption of corr ectne ss imposes upon the appea ling party the burde n of showing that the sentenc e imposed is improper. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -4 0 1, Sentencing C o m m i s s i o nC o m m e n t s

. C o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s ar e w ar r an t e d i f t h e t r i a l c o u rtf

i n d s , b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, that any o f the seve n enumer ated c riteria of Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 40- 35-115(b) (2003) ex i s t s . Moreove r, in deter mining whe ther the se ntencingcourt providently

exercised its discretion, “the overr iding concer n” is the fairness of the r esulting se ntence under all the circ umstances. State v. Sullivan , No. M1999-02547-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App.
a t N a sh vil le , O c t. 1 3, 20 00 ); see ge nerally Gray v . State, 538 S.W .2d 391 (Tenn. 1976)

.
I n th is c a se, t

he tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th a t th e Ap pe lla

nt w a s “ a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r who se be havio r i nd ic a te [d] little or no re g ard

fo r h uma n li fe and no he sit a tio n a

bo ut c omm itt inga

c ri me when r isk to human life [was] high.” Tenn. C o d e Ann. § 40-35-115(b)( 4). Additionally , for purposes of a

dang erous of

fende r cla ssifica

ti on, the trial cour

t, in accor dance with State v. W ilkerson , 905 S.W .2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995) , found that an e x tended se nt ence was ne cessa ry to protect the public ag ainst further

conduct by

the Appellant and consec utive sentenc ing rea sonably related to the
sever ity of the off enses. The Appe l l an t ar gu es that, bec ause no a g g ravating c ircumstance s exi sted, he c an not be sentenc ed as a

dang erous of

fende r. He b as es t h i s as s ertion on the fa ct that the jury imposed a sentenc e of li fe wi th the possibili ty of par ole and, thus, did not find any “statutory

ag g ravating circ umstance” to exi st. The Appellant is corre ct that the dec ision to i mpose consec utive sentenc es when c rimes inhere ntly dang erous are involved should be based upon the prese nce of ag g ravating circ umstances and not me rely on the fac t that two or more da ng erous c rimes wer e committed, Gray , 538 S.W .2d at 393; howeve r, his argument is misguided. In order to impose a s en t ence of life without p ar o le , w h ic h th is ju r y d id n o t d o in

th is c a s e , o n e o f

th e e nu me r a te d

a g g r a v a ting circ umstances must be found to e x i s t beyond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13- 204(h) ( 2003). When imposing conse cutive sente nces a s a dang erous of fen d e r p u r s u a nt to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40- 3 5 -1 1 5 (b )(4) , the trial cour t is not l imited to the enumerated ag g ravating circ umstances of Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 39-13- 204(h). See Sta te v . J oh n V . W oo dr uff , No. 01C01-9507-CR-00217 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug . 1, 1996) (tw o consec utive life
se nte nc e s f

or mur de r) ; State v. K

o ng Chung Bounnam , N o. 02 C01 -9 80 3- CR- 00 09 5 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. at J ackson, Aug

. 16, 1999), perm. to appeal de nied , (Tenn. 2004) (two of thre e life se ntence s-27-

for murde r we re or dere d to be served consecutively ). Thus, we proce ed to deter mine if sufficie nt ag g ravating c ircumstance s exi sted in this case to cla ssify the Appellant a s a dang erous of fende r.

I n its sentencing

d e c ision, the trial court orde red the Appellant to serve consec utive sentenc es and re a so ne d in

pa rt a s f oll ow s:
There was testimony by Mr. Housler a nd others, that Mr. Housle r met Mr. Courtney Mathews at a trailer

up in Oak Gr ove, Ke ntucky , thi s s ide of Oa k Grove and that there , there was a

n announce ment, if not a

plan, announc ed by

Mr. Mathew s that he was g oing to the rob his pla ce of employ ment and that that place of employ ment was the Tac o Be ll. There wa s testimony that Mr. Housler, in his words, g assed up Mr. Mathews, e ncoura g ed him to do that. There was testimony that Mr. Housler sa id that he knew that when the r obbery

took place, that it was Mr. Mathew s’ intent to leave no witnesses.

Th e re wa s a

sh ow ing , b a se d o n th e e vid e nc e , th a t th e re wa s a pla nn ingof thi s robber y

. There was suff

icient evidenc e to sustain the finding by the jury that it was the i nte n t o f

M r

. M a th e w s to k il l e v e r y b o dy in th e r e

. A n d

it w a s a – th e evidenc e was suff icient for this jury

to conclude that Mr. Housler knew that Mr. Mathews wa s g oing to do that a

nd he knew

that the lives of those pe ople wer e i n jeopar dy . Not only did he know that, but there wa s ev i d ence that Mr. Housler indicated a willingness. In fac t, he said at one point, that he could be ta lked into it. There we re state me nts by Mr . Hou sle r that e ff or ts w e re ma de to c arr

y ou t th e ro bb e ry , th a t e ff

or ts
wer e made to put toge ther the wher ewithhall t o car ry out the robbe ry . Mr. Housler, by his ow n w or ds , sa id that he we nt do wn the re , that he a c te d a s a loo k out, a nd so it is . . . reasonable that the jury could conc lude that Mr. Hou s l er en g ag ed in the pla nn ingof it. Th a t he engaged in the pr e pa ra tio ns fo r i t. T hat he e ng a g e d in participation of it, and t h at he kne w that when Mr . Mathews we nt in there, that he was armed and that he knew when he c ame out of the re, tha t the likelihood was that nobody was g oing to be alive.

. . . So is Mr. Housler a dang erous offe nder whose behavior indicates little or no
r e g ar d f o r h u ma n li f e ? Y e s , b e c a

u s e h e kn e w w h a t w a s g o in g to ta k e place . He knew that the plan was to kill ever y body , and he participate d willingly to aid in that happening

. The ne x t fac tor is did he have a ny hesitation about committing that cr ime? Or c ommitt ing a

crime in whic h the r i s k wa s h i g h? By his own words, he sa id he could be talke d into it. By his own words, he w ent down there

. There is no evidence t h at h e ab an d o n edt h e n o t i o n

. T h er e i s n o ev i d en ce t h at h e m ad e a n y ef fo rt t o ch an ge Mr. Mathew s’ mind. There i s n o ev i d ence that he did any thing that would be-28-

probati v e o f

h e s it a ti o n

. A n d

th e f a c t t h a t h e w e n t d o w nth e r e in th e f a s h io ns tate d by the Court , in dic a te s th a t th e re wa s n o h e sit a tio n o n his pa rt in c omm itt ingthi s crime, a long w ith Mr. Mathews whe n he knew that human life wa s at risk.

. . . The Wilkerson ca se re quires that a c onsecutive se ntence must be or ca n be order ed only if there is some specific r elationship betwee n the seve rity of the off enses and conse cutive ser

vice. . . .

Th e se of fe ns e s are se ve re [ .]

. . . [T]he se ve ri ty of the of fe ns e s a re c e rt a inl y g re a t. Th e y are [eg re g iou s]. An d c on sid e ri ngthe pr inc ipl e s, c on sid e ri ngthe se ve ri ty of the c rime, the Court fi n d s t h at an ex tended se ntence is nece ssary to protect the public ag ainst further

criminal conduc t by

the [App el l an t] and that a c onsecutive sentenc e is rea sonably

related to the seve rity

of the off enses that we re c ommitt ed.

We a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ourt that c on se c uti ve se nte nc ingin t his c a se is c le arl y

c on g ru e nt w ith g ener al principles of sentenc ing. The rec ord establishes that the A ppellant aided in the pla

nning of the robbe ry , participated in the robbe ry by actingas a lookout, and knew Mathews intended to “lea ve no witnesses.” Th e T ac o Be ll employ ees w ere murdere d execution-sty le. Fur thermore , the App e lla nt, by his ow n a dmi ssi on , “ g a sse d u p” Mathe ws to c omm it the ro bb e ry and mur de rs

. Clearly , the Appellant is a da ng erous of

fende r whose behavior ref lects no reg ard f

or human life a

nd
no he sit a tio n a

bo ut c omm itt ingvio le nt o ff e ns e s w he re ri sk

to l if e is h ig h. Mo re ov e r, the a g g re g a te sentenc e imposed is rea sonably related to the seve rity

of the offe nses and is ne cessa ry to pr otect the pu bli c fr om f

ur the r c ri min a l a c ts b y

the Ap pe lla

nt. Th e Ap pe lla

nt i s no t e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the foreg oing, we affirm t he Appellant’s four convictions for f elony murder a nd the imp os iti on

of fo ur c on se c uti ve lif

e se nte nc e s.

___________________________________

DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE