UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

YUAN SHAN WU, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 11-9550 (Petition for Review)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TYMKOVICH , HOLLOWAY , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.
Yuan Shan Wu petitions for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s de nial of his claim for asylum. 1 Exercising our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we affirm the decision of the BIA and deny the petition for review.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 The IJ also denied restriction on removal, under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and protection under the United Nations Conven tion Against Torture (“CAT”). Because (continued)

FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 14, 2012 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - I. Background Wu, a native and citizen of the People’ s Republic of China, entered the United States illegally in June 2001 and was placed in removal pr oceedings in March 2002. Wu conceded removability but sought asyl um, restriction on re moval, and voluntary departure. Wu asserted two bases of persec ution by the government of China: (1) persecution on account of political opini on because he opposed China’s family planning policy after his wife was forcibly sterilized followi ng the birth of the couple’s second child; and (2) persecution on account of religion because he was a practicing Christian and held church gatherings at hi s home. Because the lengthy procedural history of Wu’s claims for asylum relief, which included a change of venue and two separate appeals to the BIA, an overview of the proceedings will be helpful in understanding the claims in this petition. A. Removal Proceedings 1. April 13, 2005 Hearing Wu’s removal proceedings began in New York City where he resided at the time. At a hearing before an IJ in 20 05, Wu testified that on August 15, 1998, approximately two weeks after his second ch ild was born, family planning officials

Wu does not argue that the BIA erred in denying restricti on on removal or CAT relief, Wu has waived review of those claims on appeal. See Krastev v. I.N.S ., 292 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Issues not raised on appeal are deemed to be waived.”).- 3 - appeared at his home and instructed his wife to report for a steri lization procedure. Wu requested that his wife have a full month of recovery before reporting for the procedure, to which the family planning officials agreed. Wu testified that he and his wife pla nned to go into hiding on the evening of August 29 to forestall the forc ed sterilization, but family planning officials appeared at his home that day, which was earlier than expected. He claimed that two of the six officials pushed him down to th e wall and did not allow him to talk while the others dragged his wife and forcefully pushed her into a vehicle, taking her to be sterilized. Wu’s wife was sterilized later that day. Wu claimed that he did not leave China at that time because his children were so young. Instead, Wu fled in 2001 due to the even ts underlying his re ligious persecution claim. Wu, the son of a prea cher and himself a practicing Ch ristian, testified that he was baptized in 1993 and that this was th e “most important even t in [his] life.” Admin. R. at 420. He bega n holding church gatherings, wh ich grew to approximately thirty people, at his home in 1997. He cl aimed that in March 2001, public security officials came to his home and warned that the church gatherings were illegal and could not be held. Wu nevertheless conti nued to hold the church gatherings for three more weeks. But after learni ng through relatives that pub lic security officials might come to his home to make an arrest, he and his wife fled to his in-laws’ home for one week. He testified that officials did in fa ct go to his home and, finding nobody there,- 4 - broke into the door and destroyed objects in the home, including desks and chairs. Wu then left China on May 26, 2001. Wu was questioned on cross-examinati on regarding an appa rent discrepancy between his written asylum application an d his testimony about the alleged March 2001 events. In his application for asyl um, Wu stated that police “tore down the place.” Id . at 802. He testified, t hough, that officials “broke into the door, and, then, they just destroyed objects there.” Id . at 409. He explaine d that he meant by his statement in his asylum application that th e “door was destroyed” and when officials broke in, desks, chairs, and ot her objects were destroyed. Id . at 416. Wu was further questioned about the l ack of corroboration of his religious persecution claim in his supporting documenta tion, which included letters from his father and wife. The IJ noted that neither letter mentione d that Wu was a Christian, that Wu was baptized, or made any refere nce to public security officials coming to Wu’s home to make an arrest or destroying objects in his home. With respect to his father’s letter, which clai med alleged religious persec ution experienced by Wu’s father at the hands of Chin ese officials, Wu attempted to explain the absence of corroborating information by stating that pe rhaps his father ju st “neglected” to mention his baptism and did not mention o fficials coming to Wu’s house because Wu was now far away and his father did not wa nt “this unusual thing [to] appear [before Wu] again.” Id . at 423. Additionally, although Wu testified that his wife knew he was baptized and a Christian and also knew about the church gatherings at their home- 5 - and that public security offi cials had gone to their hom e in search of him, Wu explained that his wife’s le tter did not address these ma tters because he requested information from her concerning he r sterilization procedure only. 2. Immigration Judge’s April 13, 2005 Oral Decision At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ entered an oral decision denying Wu’s application for asylum, restri ction on removal, and volunt ary departure. Regarding Wu’s forced sterilization clai m, the IJ found Wu’s inability to explain why he could not make arrangements for his wife to flee before family planning officials came to their home on August 29, 1998, i ndicated a lack of credibility. Further, neither Wu’s written application nor Wu’s wife ’s letter referred to Wu being physically mistreated by family planning officials at the time his wife was taken for sterilization. Nor was it confirmed that the steriliza tion procedure was involuntary. Regarding Wu’s religious pe rsecution claim, the IJ fo und Wu’s written asylum application, stating that public security officials “tore down the place,” and his testimony, that officials “broke into th e door,” inconsistent . The IJ found the inconsistency unresol ved by Wu’s testimony and he was unable to resolve the inconsistency by looking to corroborati ng documentary evid ence, because the evidence did not refer to the alleged break -in. Nor was Wu’s baptism corroborated by the supporting documentation. The IJ did not find Wu’s e xplanations for this lack of corroboration sufficient. The IJ concluded Wu’s re ligious persecution claim had been “most likely . . . complete ly fabricated” to bolster the forced steriliz ation claim.- 6 - Id . at 359. Given this, the IJ declined to give Wu the “benefit of the doubt” regarding the coerced nature of the sterilization procedure. Id . Further, in light of Wu’s credibility problems, the IJ found the letter from Wu’s wife, that was offered to authenticate the coerced natu re of the sterilization, “inherently unreliable.” Id

. Indeed, the IJ noted that there was a “strong likelihood that [Wu] and his wife acquiesced in the sterilization procedure.” Id . at 356. The IJ, th erefore, made an overall adverse credibility finding and denied Wu’s clai ms for relief. 3. Board of Immigration Appeals’ October 31, 2006 Decision Wu appealed the IJ’s deci sion to the BIA, and, on October 31, 2006, a single member of the BIA entered a brief order, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), remanding the matter to the IJ for furt her fact-finding regarding the forced sterilization claim. The BIA noted that the IJ found Wu not credible with respec t to his claim of religious persecution because Wu had faile d to include in his asylum application certain events to which he had testified, in cluding his baptism. It also noted that the IJ found unresolved inconsistencies in Wu’s report of the public security officials’ activity at his home. Fina lly, the BIA noted that the IJ concluded that Wu’s corroborating evidence did not support his claim of religious persecution. The BIA remarked that based on an adverse credib ility finding, the IJ discredited Wu’s assertion that his wife was fo rcibly sterilized. The BIA did not disturb these findings- 7 - or discuss them further, ot her than to comment that the IJ “under took a thorough review of [Wu’s] religious persecuti on claim.” Admin. R. at 297. Regarding the forced steril ization claim, however, th e BIA found that the IJ did not “fully consider” the claim. Id . Although the IJ “app eared to accep t that the wife was sterilized,” he did not address wh ether the sterilization certificate indicated whether the procedure was coerced or volun tary and, instead, found the letter from Wu’s wife unreliable due to the adve rse credibility finding on the religious persecution claim. Id . Based on the record before it, the BIA could not conclude, as had the IJ, that Wu’s in consistent testimony regard ing his alleged religious persecution conclusively undermined hi s claim of forced sterilization. The BIA, accordingly, remanded the matter for further fact-finding. 4. July 22, 2009 Hearing Following the BIA’s remand, Wu m oved from New York to Colorado and filed a motion for change of venue, which was granted. 2 At a July 2009 hearing before an IJ in Colorado, Wu testified, for the second time, regarding his forced sterilization claim. The IJ limited Wu’s testimony to the forced sterilization claim, construing the BIA’s decision as remanding only that claim. Wu testified consistently with his previous testimony concerning his marriage, the births of his two children, and th e events surrounding his wife’s forced

2 Wu also obtained new counsel in Colorado.- 8 - sterilization. With respect to the events occurring on th e day of the sterilization, August 29, 1998, Wu testified in more detail that he stru ggled as he was held against a wall by family planning officials, that he tried to “protect ” his wife, that he screamed to the family planning officials not to take his wi fe away and, further, that he called them “bastards” and “murderer[s].” Id . at 162-65. As pertinent here, Wu also testified a bout a letter he wrote to family planning officials in China. Wu cl aimed he had a telephone conve rsation with his wife in early February 2008 that prompted him to write and mail a lette r to Chinese family planning officials. He testif ied that his wife complained of fatigue, back pain, and headaches due to the st erilization. Hearing this, he became angry and wrote the letter opposing China’s family planning policy a nd “curs[ing]” official s for his wife’s condition. Id . at 172-73. He testified that after sending the lette r, he received a telephone call from his wife on February 28, 2008, informing him that police ha d come to the couple’s home and told her that Wu had written a letter cr iticizing China’s family planning policy. The police said that Wu’s conduct was “a nti-government, anti-Co mmunist party” and they instructed Wu’s wife to tell him to “surrender himself.” Id . 175. 5. Immigration Judge’s July 22, 2009 Oral Decision The IJ issued an oral d ecision denying Wu’s claims at the conclusion of the hearing. As an initial matt er, the IJ noted that the ev idence and analysis of Wu’s claims were limited to the forced sterilization claim becau se the BIA had had a “full- 9 - opportunity to review” the religious persec ution claim but had not disturbed it, and, so, the claim was “completely litigat ed and determined against” Wu. Id . at 115. While the remanded proceedings were pending, the Attorney General had issued an opinion on the elig ibility for refugee status of spouses of pers ons who have been forcibly sterilized. See In re J-S- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 537-38 (A.G. 2008). Pursuant to In re J-S- , those spouses who have not th emselves physically undergone a forced abortion or sterilization procedure are not per se entitled to re fugee status but may, instead, qualify as a refugee upon a showing of either a well-founded fear of being forced to undergo such a procedure or a well-founded fear of persecution for “other resistance” to a coer cive family planning policy

. 3 See id . at 527-32. Because there was no evid ence that Wu was personally threatened with abortion or sterilization or that he had a well-founded fear of such procedures, the IJ analyzed Wu’s claim based on “other resist ance” to China’s coer cive family planning policy. The IJ found that the evidence that Wu stood in the family planning officials’ way, that he yelled epithets, and that he was held against the wall “could be some resistance to the family planni ng regime.” Admin. R. at 118, 121. Nevertheless, the IJ did not find that Wu was beaten or th at any type of exces sive force was used against Wu when his wife was taken by family planning officials for her sterilization. Instead, Wu was “simply physically removed from his wife and held against the wall

3 Before In re J-S- , the BIA had held that spous es of persons who had been forcibly sterilized were per se eligible for ref ugee status, which was the law in effect at the time of the BIA’s remand here.- 10 - for a short period of time, not beaten or imprisoned or punished in any other way.” Id . at 121. As such, the IJ de clined to find that Wu suffe red any substantial level of harm due to such resistance. The IJ also rej ected Wu’s asserti on that his wife’s sterilization was actual harm visited upon Wu, deeming this an incorrect analysis of In re J-S -. Nor did the IJ find that Wu demonstr ated a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ was “not impressed” by Wu’s testim ony concerning the letter he had written in 2008 criticizing China’s family planning policy, b ecause this letter came “long after” his wife’s sterilization procedure. Id . at 119. The IJ found it “unlikely” that “suddenly after 10 years,” Wu would be compelled to communicate his concerns in writing to Chin ese family planning officials. Id . Finding no corroboration of Wu’s letter, other than a le tter from Wu’s wife, th e IJ concluded that Wu’s letter, which was supposedly writt en while Wu was already in removal proceedings, was likely manufactur ed to bolster his forced sterilization claim. And in any event, the IJ concluded, the events of February 2008 were insufficient to establish that Wu had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of other resistance to Chin a’s family planning policy. The IJ, therefore, denied Wu’s app lication for asylum and also denied restriction on removal, CAT prot ection, and voluntary departure.- 11 - 6. Board of Immigration Appeal s’ July 26, 2011 Decision Wu appealed the IJ’s d ecision to the BIA, and, on July 26, 2011, a single member of the BIA entered a brief order, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), dismissing Wu’s appeal and af firming the IJ’s decision. Wu’s religious persecution claim was not at issue as the BIA noted that it had affi rmed the denial of this claim and, further, that the IJ in 2009 confirmed that the clai m was fully litigat ed in earlier proceedings and not at issue on remand. As to the sterilization claim, the BI A noted that during the pendency of the remanded proceedings, the A ttorney General issued In re J-S- . The BIA was not persuaded by Wu’s assertion that he was persecuted because he and his wife could not have as many children as they wi shed, concluding Wu’s reasoning would undermine the holding of In re J-S- that the spouse of a person who has undergone forced sterilization is not elig ible for refugee status abse nt a showing he engaged in other resistance to family planning policies. The BIA concluded that Wu failed to show that he was persecuted or had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of other resistance to China’s family planning policy. Although the BIA agreed that Wu demonstrated “other resistance” when he confronted the family planning offi cials at the time hi s wife was taken for sterilization, it found that he was not pers ecuted on account of hi s resistance because the harm he suffered did not rise to the level of persecu tion. The BIA also agreed with the IJ that Wu did not meet his burden of proof re garding future persecution.- 12 - Specifically, Wu did not demo nstrate that the police had a ny further contact with his wife after they came to the couple’s home in February 2008 or that if Wu were to be arrested upon his return, he had a reasona ble fear his arrest would lead to persecution. The BIA thus affirmed the denial of Wu ’s application for as ylum. Given that he did not satisfy the lowe r burden of proof required for asylum, his claim for restriction on removal was also denied. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Because a single member of the BIA entered a brief affirmance order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), we review the BI A’s decision as the final order of removal and, therefore, we “will not affirm on grou nds raised in the IJ decision unless they are relied upon by the BI A in its affirmance.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales , 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). We “may consult the IJ’s opinion to the extent that the BIA relied upon or incorporated it.” Sarr v. Gonzales , 474 F.3d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition, “when seeking to un derstand the grounds provided by the BIA, we are not precluded from consulting the IJ’s more complete e xplanation of those same grounds.” Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). We review any questions of law de novo, and we look to see if the agency’s findings of fact are supporte d by substantial evidence. See Ritonga v. Holder , 633 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Ci r. 2011). “[O]ur duty is to guarantee that factual- 13 - determinations are supporte d by reasonable, substan tial and probative evidence considering the record as a whole.” Uanreroro , 443 F.3d at 1204 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) . “The agency’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the record demonstrates that any reasonable ad judicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ismaiel v. Mukasey , 516 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Credibility determinations are factual fi ndings . . . subject to the substantial evidence test.” Uanreroro , 443 F.3d at 1204. As such, “we will not question the immigration judge’s or BIA’s credibility determinations as long as they are substantially reasonable.” Woldemeskel v. I.N.S ., 257 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2001). Although we review a credibility de termination with defe rence, the “IJ must provide specific, cogent reasons for not believing the petitioner.” Chaib v. Ashcroft , 397 F.3d 1273, 1278 ( 10th Cir. 2005). B. Asylum Law To be eligible for the discretionary relief of asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), Wu must demonstrate that he is unable or unwilling to return to his country because he has suffere d past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, na tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See Krastev , 292 F.3d at 1270; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “Aliens basing their asylum claims upon a well-founded fear of- 14 - future persecution must show both a genuine , subjective fear of persecution, and an objective basis by credible, direct, and specifi c evidence in the reco rd, of facts that would support a reasonable fear [of] . . . persecution.” Wiransane v. Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 2004) (alterations in origin al) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive and requires more th an just restrictions or threats to life and liberty.” Chaib, 397 F.3d at 1277 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “denigration, harassment, and threats” are insufficient. Tulengkey v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quota tion marks omitted). Finally, Wu bears the burden of proving his eligibility fo r asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a); Woldemeskel , 257 F.3d at 1188. C. Wu’s Eligibility for Asylum 1. Forced Sterilization Claim Wu’s claim that he is a refugee en titled to asylum based on his forced sterilization claim is premis ed on the following provision: [A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has b een persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a pers on who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.- 15 - 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) ( emphasis added ). Importantly, as recognized by both the BIA and IJ, under In re J-S- , a spouse cannot rely upon the “sole fact of their spouse’s persecution automatically to qualify for political asylum under the statute’s coercive population control ‘resistance’ provisions .” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 534-35; see also Zhi Wei Pang v. Holder , 665 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10t h Cir. 2012). “Thus, an individual who has not physically undergone a forced aborti on or sterilization procedure is not per se eligible for refugee status.” Zhi Wei Pang , 665 F.3d at 1230 (citing In re J-S- , 24 I. & N. Dec. at 534-35). Instead, as here, the “individual must demonstrate that (1) he resisted China’s coercive population control program , (2) he suffered or has a well-founded fear that he will suffer persecution by the Chinese Government, and (3) such persecution was inflicted . . . on account of his resistance.” Id . at 1230-31 (emphasis added) (internal quota tion marks omitted); see also In re J-S- , 24 I. & N. Dec. at 542. In determining whether an individual has demonstrated “resistance” to a coercive family planning policy, the IJ or BIA ma y consider a “wide range of circumstances, including expressions of gene ral opposition, attempts to interfere with enforcement of government policy in particular cases, and other overt forms of resistance to the requirements of the family planning law.” In re S-L-L- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (BIA 2006), overruled on other grounds by In re J-S- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008).

a. Past Persecution With these principles governing our anal ysis, we reject Wu’s argument that the BIA erred in failing to find pa st persecution on account of his resistance to Chinese- 16 - family planning officials. “In this circuit, the ultimate determinati on whether an alien has demonstrated persecution is a question of fact , even if the underlying circumstances are not in dispute and the only issue is whethe r those circumstances qualify as persecution.” Zhi Wei Pang , 665 F.3d at 1231 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). In declining to find past persecution on account of other resistance, the BIA explained that the harm suffere d by Wu did not rise to the le vel of persecution because he was not injured, beaten or detained for a lengthy period. We ag ree that Wu’s brief detention, lasting only minutes and withou t any resulting injuries, does not constitute persecution. See Ritonga , 633 F.3d at 976 (“ lone occasion” where alien suffered “minor injuries” did not constitute persecution); Kapcia v. I.N.S. , 944 F.2d 702, 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1991) (two-day detention involving interrogation and beating did not rise to the level of past persecution). We therefore c onclude that the BIA’s failure to find Wu suffered past persecution on this basis is substa ntially supported in th e record and that no reasonable adjudicator would be compe lled to conclude to the contrary. See Ismaiel , 516 F.3d at 1204 (noting agency’s findi ngs of fact conclusive unless reasonable adjudicator compelled to conclude to the contrary). Nor is there any merit in Wu’s assertion that the BIA erred in determining that In re J-S- would be undermined if the BIA foun d Wu was persecuted because of his spouse’s sterilization. Although somewhat unclear, we construe Wu’s argument to be that the BIA erred because (1) his wife’s forc ed sterilization is proof of persecution and should have been cons idered in determining whether Wu himself suffered persecution;- 17 - (2) Wu did, in fact, demonstrate “resistance” ; and (3) given his wife ’s sterilization and the couple’s inability to have further children coupled w ith his resistance, Wu has suffered persecution entitling him to asylum relief. See Pet’r Br. at 21-23. Although Wu correctly recognizes that In re J-S- no longer permits automatic refugee status to the non-sterilized spouse but, instead, requires th e applicant to show “other resistance,” Wu nonetheless misconstrues In re J-S- . Wu’s analysis is flawed in that he seemingly suggests that he must show, and did, only two, separate elements: “persecution” and “other resistance.” He fail s, however, to make the requisite nexus, as required under In re J-S- , between his “other resistance” to China’s family planning policy and the persecution that he himself has suffered on account of that resistance. There is simply no nexus between the persecution that Wu’s wife suffered, i

. e ., the forced sterilization, or the couple’s inab ility to have further children, and Wu’s resistance, i

. e ., confronting officials when he was held against the wall. If Wu’s wife’s sterilization was in fact involuntary, this wo uld constitute persecutio n as applied to her,

see 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(B), but as to Wu, it would not. Instead, under In re J-S- , Wu must show that he engaged in “other resistance” and was himself persecuted on account of

that resistance. Neither his wife’s ster ilization nor the couple ’s inability to have further children constitute persecution that Wu suffered because he resisted the family planning policy. The BIA concluded Wu did not demons trate persecution on account of other resistance to the forced steriliza tion and the record substantially supports this conclusion.- 18 - Accordingly, we perceive no erro r in the BIA’s construction of In re J-S- and its application to the case at bar. b. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Wu asserts, in general, that he has a well-founded fear of persecution based upon his 2008 letter to Chin ese family planning offici als. His limited argument consists of reciting the fact that police appeared at hi s home and demanded his return to China and then stating that “[t]his shows that [Wu] does have a well-founded belief of future persecu tion for the letter.” Id . at 24. Wu does not expressly assign error to the BIA, cite case law, or ot herwise meaningfully develop an argument concerning his fear of future persecution. Because Wu has not adequately briefed this issue on appeal, we ma y decline to address it. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant , 505 F.3d 1013, 1031 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating appellate issues advanced without reasoned argument ne ed not be addressed); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co ., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th Cir. 199 5) (“[I]t is insufficient mere ly to state in one’s brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without advancing reasoned argument as to the grounds for appeal.”) (internal quota tion marks omitted)); Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that perfunctory allegations that “fail to frame and deve lop an issue sufficient to in voke appellant review” are waived).- 19 - But even if we did addre ss the claim, the BIA expl ained Wu has not met his burden of proving a factual basis for his fe ar of persecution ba sed on a letter written years after the sterilization. 2. Religious Persecution Claim Wu also asserts the BIA erred in af firming the IJ’s decision that Wu “completely fabricated” his religious persec ution claim. Pet’r Br. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). He does not, how ever, present any argument in support of any claimed error by the BIA. Instead, he begins by providing th e procedural history of the claim, and, in doing so , suggests that in his first a ppeal to the BIA in 2006, it is unclear whether the BIA adopted the IJ’s fi ndings regarding the religious persecution claim: the BIA “simply stated the IJ condu cted a thorough review” of the religious persecution claim “but neve r stated whether it adopt ed the interpretation and remanded the case because of the lack of informati on regarding the forced sterilization.” Id . at 25. But that is the extent of Wu’s attempted argument. Wu’s brief falls short of asserting, for example, that the BIA di d not adequately review his religious persecution claim in his first appeal. We will not craft Wu ’s arguments for him and, thus, there is no reasoned ar gument for us to review c oncerning any error in the BIA’s 2006 review of the reli gious persecution claim. See Perry v. Woodward , 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999) (“This court . . . will not craft a party’s arguments for him.”).- 20 - The remainder of Wu’s argument regard ing his claim of religious persecution claim is not persuasive. Outside of reciting facts re lated to his baptism and attempting to explain the inconsistencies between hi s asylum application and testimony, he presents no argument for review . Wu observes that the IJ “seemed to focus on [Wu’s] forgetting to write about hi s baptism on his written application” and explains that he “may have overlooked writing it down.” Pe t’r Br. at 26. But he does not claim, for example, that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, which was based, in part, on the lack of corroboration regard ing Wu’s baptism, was unsupported or legally insufficient. 4 Regarding the IJ’s concern about the discrepancy in Wu’s statement in his asylum application that public security offi cials “tore the place down” and his testimony that officials broke into his home and destroyed objects, he explains that he “may have miss [sic] written the phrase ‘tore the place down.’” Id

. Again, he does not argue that the IJ’s a dverse credibility findi ng was unsupported. Given the lack of claimed error and our obligation to review the IJ’s adverse credibility finding under a s ubstantial evidence standard, we are not compelled to

reverse.

4 While Wu’s Reply Brief makes a semb lance of an argumen t that failure to include information in an asylum applicat ion does not render testimony regarding the omitted information incredible , he does not raise this ar gument in his Opening Brief and, thus, we are not re quired to address it. See Stump v. Gates , 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting issues raised for the first time in a reply brief generally are not reviewed). Nevertheless , omissions in an asylum a pplication may form the basis of an adverse credibi lity determination. See Ismaiel , 516 F.3d at 1205-06. We find that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is reasonable.- 21 - III. Conclusion The petition for review is DENIED.

Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge