1

Se e Bo oz e r v . S

tate , 7 17 S.W. 2d

60 8 ( Te x.Cr .App . 1 98 4) ; Be ns on v . S tate , 661 S.W .2d 708 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982) (op. on State’ s second motion for r eh’g ).

2 Appellant’s se cond g round for revie w pre sents the claim that it violated due- proce ss for the court of a ppeals to af

firm his conviction “ba sed upon fa cts not submitt ed to the jury .” 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
NO. P D-0861-07

JASON EARL WOOL EY, Appellan t

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS
ON AP P ELLA NT ’S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE F OU RT EEN TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

HA RRIS CO UN TY
H ERV EY , J. , de liv e r e d t he opi nio n of t he Co ur t i n whic h P RI CE , W OM ACK , K E A SL ER and H OLC OM B , JJ., jo ine d. M E YE RS , J., fi led a concurring opini on. KELLER , P .J., c onc ur r e d. J OHN S ON and C OCH RAN , JJ., joined part one and d issented to part two. O P I N I O N Appellant’s first g round for revie w presents the claim that thi s Court should reintroduce the
court-ma de Benson/Boozer ru le fo r m e a suri nge vid e nti ary su ff ic ie nc y wh e n th e e vid e nc e is 1 revie wed f

or fa ctual suff

iciency

. The Benson/Boozer rule re quired that e videntiary sufficie ncy

be 2Wooley –2

3 I n Ma lik, the def

endant wa s char g ed with , an d the evidenc e showe d him guilty of ea ch element of

, unlawfully

car rying a we apon. Id . at 234. The Benson/Boozer rule, howe ver, r equire d the appe llate cour

t to decide that the evidenc e was insufficient to support the def endant’ s conviction, beca use the jury char g e ac tually g iven er roneously made the le g ality

of the de fenda

nt’s detention a prer equisite for c onviction. Id . at 235. In reje cting the Benson/Boozer r u le , th is Court in Mali k decide d that this errone ous jury instruction on the l eg ality of t he defenda nt’s detention was irr eleva nt to a suff ic ie n c y r e v ie w an d

th a t a “ h y p o th e ti c a ll y

c o r r e c t j u r y c h ar g e ” w o u ld

n o t h a v e ma d e the nonelementa l leg ality of t he defenda nt’s detention “a prec ondition for conviction.” Id . at 239-40. measure d by the jury

char g e ac tually

g iven. In Ma lik, a ca se in which only the leg al suffic iency

of the evidenc e wa s at issue, this Court rejecte d the Benson/Boozer rule and decide d that evidentiar y

su ff ic ie nc y sh ou ld b e me a sure d “ by the e le me nts of

the of fe ns e a s d e fi ne d b y

the hy po the tic a lly

corr ect jury

char g e for

the ca se.” Se e Ma lik

v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 234, 239-240 (Te x .Cr.App. 1997). 3
We r e je c t th e c la im p re se nte d in a pp e lla nt’ s fir st g ro un d f

or re vie w a nd de c ide that Malik’s rule for

m e a s u r i n g e v i d e n t i ar

y s u f f i c i e n c y a l s o a

p p l i e s w h e nt h e e v i d e n c e i s r e v i e w e d f o r f a c tu a l s u f f i c i e n c y. We will, however, re v er s e t he judg ment of the c ourt of appe als, based on our dispositi on of appellant’ s second g round for revie w. An i n d ictment char g ed appe llant with murdering the complainant by shooting him with a firea rm. The State pr esente d evidenc e fr om which a jury could rationally find that appellant lure d three unarme d individuals int o a pool-ha ll parking lot to facilitate what the State char acte rized as an “ambush” that ap p el l an t and other s had planne d. The e vents immediately leadingup to the complainant’s de ath beg an whe n appellant pulled his 9-millimeter pistol and fi re d a s h ot into the
g round as two of

the intended ambush victims approa ched him while the c omplainant waited in a

car in the parkinglot. I mmediately afte r this, other shots rangout fr om differ ent locations in the parkinglot. A witness describe d these shots as comingfrom eve ry wher e. Evidenc e wa s prese nted that appellant f

ired seve ral more shots at the two individuals who ha d initially approa ched a

ppellantWooley –3

4 E v i d en ce wa s p re s en t ed t h at t h e s h o o t i n g i n ci d en ti n v o l v edi nt h i s ca s e m ay h av e b ee ngan grelated and that witnesse s were frig htened a nd reluc tant to come for

war d. a s th e y fl e d. Whe n th e sh oo tin g sto pp e d, the c omp la ina nt l ay fata lly

wo un de d in

the pa rk inglot

. A witness saw a

ppellant and a

nother pe rson (Pablo Ve lez), whom the witness identified as a nother one of the shooters, g et into a car and drive off. Only

one 9-millimeter shell ca sing w as re cover ed fr om t he sc e ne , a

nd it m a tc he d a

pp e lla nt’ s 9 -m ill ime te r p ist ol. The e vidence also shows that the police inve stigat i o n develope d four named suspects a s being the shooters. Only

two of these (appe llant a

nd Velez) wer e identified by witnesses at trial a s shooters in the pool-hall parkinglot when the complaina nt was shot dead. The police investigation 4

co n cl u d ed t h at fo u r s h o o t er s an d at l ea s t t h re e d i ff er en t ca l i b er gu n s we re i n v o l v ed i n t h e s h o o t i n g. The police could not deter mine which of the named susp ec t s fired the fata l shot or even whic h caliber g un cause d the complainant’s death, since the bullet c ausing his death exited his body and

wa s n ot r e c ov e re d. A p oli c e inv e sti g a tor (K ing ) d e sc ri be d th e c ri me sc e ne a s f oll ow s: Q. [ S T AT E ] : I f y o u ’l l s ee wh er e t h ey ’v e go tt h es e m ark edwh er e t h e c ar t ri d ge c a sin g s are dif

fe re nt kin ds in re latio n to the numbe rs . What–w ou ld you a g re e wi th me that there are sever al di ffe rent kinds of casings, three to be exact, three diff ere nt k i n d s o f g u n s

– o r t w o d i f f e r e n tk i n d s o f

g u n s ? I’ m s o r

r y. A. [KI NG ]: Thre e g un s. Q. Th re e g un s? A. Rig ht. Q. Okay . And what did that indicate , to y ou? A. Th re e sh oo te rs . * * * Q. Off icer , based on the information that y ou had, the witnesses that y ou talked to, could y ou tell the jury

approximately

wher e the f

our shooters–I ’m sorry

–the threeWooley –4 shooters we re pla ced? A. Ye s. Q

. O k ay. A. I can. Q. Wou ld you

g o b a c k u

p o n th e dia g ra

m and sh ow‘e m. A. (Complies.) [Appe l lant] would have bee n here , just about due ea st of the front door of the Per fec t Rack pool hall. Another shooter came in from the north with an assa u lt r if le h e r e . T h o s e ar e thr e e 2 2 3 c a li b e r s h e ll c a s in g s h e r e . A n o th e r s h o o te r came out from betwe en the pa rked c ars he re a

nd fired se ven rounds he re and three mor e ro un ds ou t he re . T hat’ s b e c a us e he wa s c ha sin g the vic tim s. [Appellant] left a 9 millimeter shell ca sing he re. Ishould have said a ll of these ar e .40 caliber

shell casing s here . There ar e seven of them. The re’ s three .40 c aliber shell casing s out he re all fired from the same gun from this shooter her e. The re w as one shell ca sing only

from a 9 milli meter pistol her e. The re w as the thre e 223 ca liber shell casing s here and anothe r one out he re. So this shooter was on the run also. Q. Dete ctive, let me a sk y ou t h i s , Officer: You a lso said that there w as anothe r suspect that wa s develope d, and y ou said that t h ere wer e thre e guns here . Where would the other shooter

have be en? A. Out he re in t

he pa rk inglot

. Q

. O k ay. A. No sh e ll c a sin g s. Q. Okay

. S o b asi cally

what y ou’re telling me is that ther e wa s a g unman her e, a g unman her e, a gunman her e, and a g unman her e? A. A gun ma

n he re , h e re , c a me ou t f

ro m he re , a

nd the n a no the r o ne so me wh e re in t his are a. Q. Okay . Could it–is it possible they could have jumped out from may be over here wher e these car s are ? A. Who are y ou

ta lki nga bo ut?Wooley –5 Q

. Pa b lo V e le z. A. He initially

would have c ome out from her e bec ause his initial shell ca sings a re here , but then he cha sed the victims and he c ontinued shooting out to here

. Q

. O k ay. S o d i d

yo ue v e r s e r v e an y t i m e i nt h e m i l i t ar y? You ca n have a seat, sir. A. (C omp lie s. ) Y e s. Q. What would you descr ibe–how would y ou descr ibe what you’ve just pointed out y ou’ve ta lked about on that boar d? A. That wa s an ambush. Q. Would y ou say

that it was planned? A. Ye s. Q. Okay

. And based on y our investigation did y ou fee l that [ appellant] was par t of that plan? A. Ye s. Appellant pre sented no witnesses. His cross-e x amination of the State’s w itnesses sug g ested that the only

shot he fire d was the one shot that he fire d into the ground just befor e the other shooters started f iring their we apons. To su p port this, he pointed to the evidenc e that the police rec overe d

o n ly one 9-millimeter shell ca sing at the scene . Appellant’s c ross-examination of the State’s wi tne sse s a lso su g g e ste d that he c ou ld h a ve be e n mi sid e nti fi e d a s th e on e wh o g ot i nto the c ar w ith Velez just after

the shooting stopped. The trial c ourt instructed the jury that it could convict appellant as a principal, if it found that appellant f

ired the f atal shot. The tria l court also instructed the jury that it could convict appe llant
as a pa rty , but only

if it found that appellant a ssisted V elez in firing the fatal shot. For e x ample, theWooley –6

5 Bu t see W

oo le yv . S tate , 2 2 3 S. W. 3 d

7 3 2 , 7 3 5 n . 2 ( T e x. A p p . –H o u s to n[1 4 D is t. ] 2 0 0 7) th (re jecting the claim that in ca ses like this the jury char g e must “name the primary actor ”). tr ia l c ourt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y to c on vic t a

pp e lla nt o f m ur de r i f i t f

ound be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t: that on or a bo ut t he 15 da y of July , 2 00 4, in H arr is C ounty , T e xas, the de fe nd ant, th Jaso n E arl Woo le y , d id t

he n a nd the re un lawf

ull y , inte nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

c a us e the de a th o f E me rs on

B ojo rq ue z, b y sh oo tin g Em e rs on B ojo rq ue z wi th a

de a dly we a po n, name ly , a

fi re arm ; or

if y ou fi nd fro m th e e vid e nc e be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t on or a

bo ut t he 15 da y of July , 2 00 4, in H arr is C ounty , T e xas, Pa blo th Ve le z, Jr. , d id t

he n a nd the re un lawf

ull y , inte nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

c a us e the de a th of Emer son Bojorque z, by shooting Emer son Bojorque z with a d ea d l y wea pon, na me ly , a f

i r e ar m , an d t h a t t h e d e f

e n d an t , Ja s o n E ar l W o o l e y , w i t h t h e i n t e nt t o promote or a ssist t he commission of the off ense, if a ny , solicited, enc ourag ed, direc ted, aided or

attempted to aid Pablo V elez, J r. to c ommit the offe nse, if he did[.] The trial court’s parties’ char g e, to which the State did not object, appa rently was ba sed on a mistaken belief that appellant c ould not be convicted a s a par ty unless the ac tual shooter could be named in the c harg e. For example, the rec ord re flec ts the fol l o wi n g exchang e betwe en the tria l 5
court a nd the State when the defe nse moved for a directed ve rdict af ter the State ha d rested its ca se. [S TATE]: Judge , based on the law of parties we, the State f eels that ther e’s suff

icient evidenc e to at lea st go to the jury for them to make

– [TH E CO UR T]: U nd e r t

he law o f p art ie s? And

ho w do y ou make thi s d e fe nd ant a party to the offe nse of murde r, base d upon y our evide nce? [ S T AT E ] : W el l , b as edo nt h e t es t i m o n y o f t h e d et ec t i v es , fo r o n e, s ay i n g– [ T H E C O U R T ] : B a s e d

u p o nt h e e v i d e n c e t h a t ’ s n o th e ar s ay? [S TATE]: J udg e, just based on the e vidence that we’ ve shown. [TH E CO UR T]: Wh ic h is ? [S TATE]: That he wa s there, he shot his gun. [T H E CO U RT ]: H e w a s th e r e . H e s h o t [ a t o n e o f th e in te n d e d

v ic ti ms ].Wooley –7 [S TATE]: And that he cha sed them down, that all the shooting started rig ht a fter he shot, and that there was a n ambush. [TH E CO UR T]: A nd

wh o– so y ou ’re–it ’s just u nk no wn pe op le inv olv e d in

thi s offe nse? [S TATE]: No. We’ve also listed–we list ed the other suspects that wer e deve loped. [THE COURT] : Ba sed on what eviden ce ? Aga in, what the dete ctives testified a s b e i n g h e a r s ay. [ S T A T E ] : A n d

w h a t[ a w i t n e s s ] s a i d

a s d i r e c tt e s t i m o n y. [ T H E C O U R T ] : W h a td i d s h e s ay? [S T A T E ]: Sh e id e n ti f

ie d [a p p e ll an t]

. Sh e id e n ti f

ie d th e b lu e s h ir

t i s Pa b lo V e le z. [TH E COU RT]: No , she ne ve r sa id wh o it wa s. She jus t id e nti fi e d s ome bo dy . So ba sic a lly it’ s so me un kn ow n s us pe c t. [STA TE ]: No , s he sa id h e wa s in a blu e sh ir t. [THE COURT] : L ike I

said, she has ne ver ide ntified any one as being by any named person. [STA TE ]: Ok ay . B a se d o n th e tot a lity of the te sti mony

a s a wh ole. Judg e , th e re wa s a lso testimony by the detec tives that she I .D.’d Pablo Ve lez in the photospread. [THE COURT] : And what’s that g ot to do with any thing? There ’s bee n no evidenc e t h at h e d i d

an y s h o o t i n g. [STA TE ]: Judg e , s he sa id t hat th e g uy

in t he blu e sh ir

t sh ot. [TH E CO UR T]: Ag uy

in a blu e sh ir t? [S TATE]: W ho was a lso identified. We had to clea r that up throug h the detec tive. She didn’t know his name at the time. [T H E CO U RT ]: I ’ ll d e n y y o u r mo ti o n[f

o r in s tr u c te d v e r d ic t]

. Th e de fe ns e c los ing jur

y argume nts a dd

re sse d a lmo st e xclu siv e ly wh e the r a

pp e lla nt c ou ld be guilty as a pa rty , since, a ccor ding to the de fense , appellant f ir ed only one shot into the g round,Wooley –8 which could not have been the fata l shot. And these ar g uments focuse d on whether there was a ny

c o n n e c ti o nb e tw e e na

p p e ll an t a n d V e le z. [DE F EN SE]: So, I ’m g oin g to tr y to g o thro ug h th e e vid e nc e that w e ’v e he ard , a pp ly the law of

parties to try

to show y ou that the only just conclusion is t h at h e is not re sp on sib le fo r V e le z’s c on du c t. * * * So that fact a lone, the fac t that he fires down into the gr ound, and the undisputable, rea lly , phy sical ev i d en ce that he only fired one shot proves that he didn’t have an intent to commit t he off

ense, w hich is murder. An d then c ou

ple d w iththat in te nt t

he y have to p ro ve a g a in b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt that he solicited, enc o u ra ged , direc ted, aided or attempted to aid the other person to commit the offe nse. So think about that for a sec ond. They didn’t–there’ s no evidenc e, they

didn’t ar ri v e toge ther–I ’m talking about the shooters f rom the parkinglot and [appellant]–t hey didn’t leave toge ther. * * * I f y ou think about it, from [ appellant], as fa r as [appellant] knew, the g uy s in the car , in the parkinglot, as far

as he knew t hey wer e shoot ing at him. As far a s he knew , they thought he was shooting at them

. I n o ther wor ds, there’ s no evidenc e linking a p p e ll an t t o V e le z. * * * You hea rd ab s o l u tely

no evidenc e that ther e we re a ny words exchang ed betwe en [appellant] and Ve l ez p rior to or a fter the shooting. The re w ere no looks betwee n the m. T he re we re no g e sture s. Yo u h e ard no thi nga bo ut a pla n b e tw e e n th e m. * * * Idon’t know if I t h o ug ht of eve ry thing that I

can sa y about this case to tell y ou. I hope I ’ve done as much a s Ican a s far as telling y ou-all what to consider. The evidenc e just isn’t there be caus e h e d i dn’t shoot him. He didn’t know the g uy , he didn’t even se e the guy , and ther e’s no link between h i m and Vele z that they –that [appellant] s hould be held acc ountable for Velez’s actions, if y ou even be lieve that Velez wa s the shooter, whic h y ou hear d one of the detec tives say that when he int e rv ie we d h im h e c omp le te ly de nie d b e inga

pa rt of it a ll. The State’s unobje cted- to jury arguments seemed to c laim that the jury could convict appellant as a party upon finding that “he play ed a par t in the [ complainant’s] death” without finding th a t V e le z w a s th e s h o o te r , e v e nth o u g h , a c c o r d in g to th e St ate , it w a s “ ju s t as l ikely that [ V e le z] shot [ the complainant] and ra n out after

the two people that lived to shoot t hem.” [S TATE]: And the only

question that y ou are here to determine is whe ther or notWooley –9

6 The c ourt of appe als stated: The jury char g e should have allowed a conviction as a

party i f t h e j u ry found t hat [ap pe lla nt] i s a part y to the [co mpl a ina nt’ s] murd e r. Th a t’ s a ll you ’r e he re to deter mine. Be cause as best as Ican te ll there’s no de nying that he was the re. The re’ s no de nyingthat he had a gun. Th e re ’s no de nyingthat he sh ot i t. A ll you have to fig ure out, a ll y ou have to de cide in the twe lve of yo u r m i n d s i s whether or not he play ed a pa

rt in the [complainant’s] death. * * * But it was a

n ambush. I t w as whe re nobody was lea ving the re unle ss they

wer e shot or dea d, and unfor

tunately , that’s what happene d to [ the complainant]. Remember what [a witness] said, she said [appellant] shot at the g round and the n he shot more. Remember w hat she said a bout t he guy

[Velez] , blue shirt? Where he popped out from? Remember where [t he complainant] was found? I t’s just as likely that blue sh ir t, [V e le z], sh ot h im a

nd ra n o ut a ft e r t

he tw o p e op le that li ve d to sh oo t th e m. * * * Re me mbe r wh a t the wi tne sse s sai d, [ap pe lla nt] sho t and se c on ds late r t he re wa s so m u ch gu n fi re t h at t h ey

d i dn ’t kn o w w h at t o d o . C ar s s qu ea l i n g, p eo p l e s cr ea m i n g, running . I t was pandemonium, and [appellant’s] wa s the first shot that started that out. I f that doesn’ t make y ou a par ty to the [complainant’s death] what does? He’ s jus t a s guil ty

a s if he kil le d h im h ims e lf

. H e sta rt e d it

. Th e jur y c on vic te d a

pp e lla nt o f m ur de r “ a s c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt.” On di rect a pp e a l,

a pp e lla nt c la ime d, a mon g oth e r t hin g s, that th e e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly insufficie nt t o s up po rt

his conviction. I n addre ssing this c laim, the court of appea ls de cided that the cha rg e ac tually

submitt ed to the jury incorre ctly applied the law of parties by authorizing a

ppellant’s convic tion as a par ty upon a findingthat appellant a ided only Velez in causingth e co m p l ai n ant’s death. See W ooley , 223 S.W .3d at 735-36 (jur

y char g e, re stricting a

ppellant’s guilt as a party

only upon a finding that Velez

cause d the complainant’ s death, incor rec tly incre ased the State’s burde n of proof ). The co u rt of
ap p ea l s decide d that a hy pothetically

corr ect jury

char g e would have authorized appe llant’s conviction as a party upon a finding that appellant a ided Vele z “or another person” in causingthe complainant’s de ath. Se e id

. Measur ing e videntiary sufficie ncy

ag ainst this hy

p othetical jury 6Wooley –10

“ [V e le z] or another person ” c a us e d th e de a th of

the c omp la ina

nt, and a pp e lla nt, wi th intent to promote or assist the commission of the offe nse, i f any , solicited, e n c o u r a g e d , d ir e c te d , a id e d or attempte d to a id “ [V e le z] or another person ” to commit the offense

. Such an instruction would have relieve d the State of the bur den of pr ov ingtha

t it wa s e ith e r V e le z or

a pp e lla nt who se bu lle t ki lle d th e c omp la ina nt, an d wo u l d h av e al l o we d t h e ju ry t o fi n d t h at an y o n e in v o l v ed i n t h e s h o o t i n g, including unna

med individuals, caused the death. W ooley , 223 S.W .3d at 736 (e mphasis in origina l).
7 I n a sepa rate concur

ring opinion, Chi ef Justi ce H edg es disag ree d that a hy p o the tically

corr ect jury char g e should be the me asur e o f evidentiar y sufficie ncy

in a fa ctual suff

iciency revie w. See W ooley , 2 23 S.W. 3d

a t 73 9- 42 (H e dg e s, C.J., c on c ur ri ngin t he jud g me nt) . Ch ie f Jus tic e He dg e s, howeve r, believed that the evidenc e is f actua lly sufficie nt unde r the c harg e ac tually g iven. Se e id

. c ha rg e on the law of pa

rt ie s, the c ourt of a

pp e a ls de c ide d that the e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o

su pp or t a fi nd ingthat a

pp e lla nt p ro vid e d th e le g a lly

ne c e ssa ry a id t o w ho e ve r f

ir e d th e fata l sh ot s o as to make appellant g uilty as a party to the complainant’s murde r. See W ooley , 223 S.W .3d at 736- 39. The c ourt of appe als aff irmed appe llant’s conviction. Se e id

. 7
We e x erc ised our discretion to reviewthe two g rounds pre sented in appe llant’s petition for discretionar

y revie w. These g rounds state: 1

. T h e ap p el l at e c o u rt erre d i nex t en d i n g Ma lik

and the hy

pothetically co rrect jury c ha rg e in r e vie wi nga

fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c la im. 2. Fe dera l due process was viol ated when appellant’s conviction was aff irmed base d u p o nf a c t s n o ts u

b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y. I. Appl ying Malik’s Rule F or Measuring Evid entiary Suf fi ciency When Evidence Is Reviewed F or F actual-Suf

fi ciency As Chief J ustice Hedg es’ concur ring opinion notes, ever

y Texas intermediate a

ppellate c ourt
to co ns ide r the iss ue ha s d e c ide d th a t Malik’s rule for mea suring evidentiar y -suffic iency

also applies when the e vidence is reviewe d fo r fa ct u al-sufficiency

. See W ooley , 2 23 S.W. 3d

a t 74 1 ( He dg e s,Wooley –11

8 This Court’s decision in Ma lik also noted that the Benson/Boozer ru le wa s “ a mon g the mos t controve rsial of the la st deca de.” S e e Ma lik , 9 5 3 S. W. 2 d

a t 2 3 8 ( in te r

n a l q u o te s o mi tt e d )

. We further note that the Boozer decision itself appa

rently was so contr oversial e ven amongthe member s of the Court who de cided it t hat i t lang uished in the Court for ove r two y ear s betwee n the opinion on orig inal submissi on (9/19/84) and until re hear ing was denied (9/24/86) producingseven diff ere nt opinions with one judge in the m ajority on orig inal submissi on chang ing his vote to g rant re hear ing (Wh ite , J.) and an oth e r d iss e nti ngjud g e on or ig ina l su

bmi ssi on a lso c ha ng inghis vo te to b e c ome the nec essar

y fifth vote to deny

rehe aring

. S

e e Boozer , 717 S.W .2d at 615-16 (Campbell, J ., concur ring to denial of re h’g ) (“A fter car efully re- examining the issue in this case , I am now of the opinion that this case was c orre ctly decide d on orig inal submissi on.”).
9 We also note that evidentiar y sufficie ncy

can e asily

be measured ag ainst the “e lements of the of fe ns e a s de fi ne d by

a hy po the tic a lly

c or re c t jury c ha rg e ” wh e n th e e vid e nc e is r e vie we d f or bo th fac tual sufficie ncy

and leg al suffic iency , even w ith the differ ence s that may exis t be tween these two standards of

revie w. Se e W

ats on v . S tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-17 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006) (e x plaining differ ence s betwee n fac tual sufficie ncy and leg al suffic iency

revie w). Fo r ex ampl e, evide ntiary su ff ic ie nc y c an b e me a sure d a g a ins t “ the e le me nts of the offens e as de fi ne d b y a hy po the tic a lly c or re c t jury c ha rg e ” wh e the r t

he e vid e nc e is v ie we d in

a “ ne utr a l li ght” (fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y ) o r i n a “lig ht most favorable to the verdic t” (leg al suffic iency ). Se e id

. This c an also be done when the re vie wi ngc ourt

is d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a jur y c ou ld r a tio na lly

have c on vic te d b e y on d a

re a so na ble doubt (leg al s ufficie ncy

) or when the revie wing court is determining whe ther the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contr adicts the jury ’s ver dict (fa ctual suff iciency ). Se e id

. C.J ., concur

ring in the judgme nt). And, we do not see a ny point in returning to the “unce rtainty and in c o n s is te n c y ” o f

the B enson/Boozer

rule for measuringevidentiar

y sufficie ncy

for pur poses of fac tual sufficie ncy

revie w. Se e Ma lik, 953 S.W .2d at 238-39 (desc ribing the difficulty of applying the Benson/Boozer

rul e for mea suring evidentiar y sufficie ncy

). We believe that the pr actica l 8 advanta g es of Malik’s “one simpl e, cohere nt standard to measure the suffic iency of the e vidence ” also apply

when the e vidence is reviewe d for f actua l sufficiency

. Se e Ma lik, 953 S.W .2d at 239. Even Chief Justi ce H edg es’ c oncurr ing opinion re cog nizes that apply ing the Benson/Boozer ru le in a fa ctual-suf

ficienc y re v i ew would c reate “two diff ere nt and possibly

contra dictory

standards of

measure ment of evide ntiary sufficie ncy” that “c ould ge nerate at lea st a prac tical complication.” See W ooley , 223 S.W .3d at 741 (He dg es, C.J ., concur ringin the judgme nt). 9Wooley –12

10 Chi e f Jus tic e He dg e s’ c on c ur ri ngop ini on

fu rt he r s tate s: Ac co rd ingly , leg al suffic iency is not concer

ned with the ac tual char g e g iven but rathe r with a hy

pothetically corr ect c harg e foc using on the elements of the offe nse. Fa ctual suff

iciency , on the other ha

nd, is dire ctly tied to the char g e g iven. Where, a s here , the jury

was a sked a spe cific f

actua l question, i.e., wh e the r a ppell ant w a s a pa rt y to a n o ff e ns e c omm itt e d b y

a sp e c if ic pr ima ry a c tor , th e on ly wa

y to a sse ss whether th e verdict

wa s su pp or te d b y e vid e nc e is t o c on sid e r t he c ha rg e a c tua lly g iven. B y

inserting a hy

pothetically

corr ect c harg e into its fa ct u al suffic iency analy sis, the maj o ri t y re views a que stion that was never posed to the jury , i.e., whether appellant wa s a par

ty to an offe nse committed by “anothe r per son” ( i.e., not nece ssarily

[Velez] ). W ooley , 223 S.W .3d at 740-41 (H edg es, C.J ., concur ring in the judgme nt) (empha sis in original).
11 This Court’s decision in Ma lik that evidentiar

y s u fficie ncy

should be measur ed “by the elements of the offe nse as de fined by a hy pothetically corr ect jury char g e” did not really depend on whether the evidenc e wa s being revie wed f or leg al suffic iency . The mea sure of evidentiar

y su ff ic ie nc y and the sta nd ard by wh ic h th e e vid e nc e is r e vie we d a re se pa rate and dis tin c t. Chief J ustice Hedg es’ concurr ing opinion neverthele ss sugg ests that the Benson/Boozer ru le of mea suring evidentiar

y sufficie ncy

ag ainst the ac tual jury

char g e should apply

when the e vidence is reviewe d for f

actua l sufficienc y , beca

use “fac t u al s ufficie ncy

revie w” is “a

direc t reviewof the ju r y ’ s v e r d ic t it s e lf

. ” See W

ooley , 223 S.W .3d at 740-41 (H edg es, C.J ., concur ring in the judgme nt). We do not believe that our f actua l sufficienc y

decisio n s ca n b e read as re quiring “a 10 direc t rev i ew of the jury ’s ver dict itself.” Unlike our decisions in Benson/Boozer and Ma lik, our fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y de c isi on s d o n ot s e t out any me a sure of e vid e nti ary su ff ic ie nc y (e .g ., wh e the r i t should be measur ed by

the jury char g e or by

the eleme nts of the offense). Our fa ctual suff iciency 11 decisions addr ess a distinctly diff e r ent issue: how appe llate cour ts should evaluate the e vidence (e.g ., whether th e ev i d en ce should be viewed in a “neutr al” lig ht or in “the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t”).Wooley –13

12 Whe the r t

he de fe nd ant shoul d r e c e ive an a pp e llate a c qu itt a l ( re me dy pr ov ide d f

or le g a lly insufficient e vidence ) or a new tria l (reme dy

provided for

fac tually insufficient e vidence ) should not turn on whethe r the vic t i m ’s n am e is “Roy ” or “ Ray .” Se e Sc ott v . S tate , 915 S.W .2d 505, 506 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996) (Mc Cormick, P.J ., diss en t i n g to refusa l of State’s petition for discr etionary revie w) ( Benson/Boozer

require d court of a

ppeals to dec ide that evidenc e was insufficient to support d e f e n d an t ’ s a g g r av a t e d

a s s a u l tc o n v i c t i o nb e c a

u s e i n d i c t m e n ta l l e g e d

t h e v i c t i m ’ s n a m e w a s “ R ay” Gann while e vidence showed that it was “ Roy ” Ga nn). I n addition, we believe that the re medy of a ne w trial swee ps to o b ro ad l y an d is an inappropriate re medy “t o be g rante d beca use the de fenda

nt rec eived a

windfall in the jury instructions”(for

example, when a

n indictment alleg es that the de fenda nt assaulted “Ra

y ” while the evidenc e shows that the victim’s name was “ Roy ”). C o m p ar e Ma lik, 953 S.W .2d at 239 12 ( Benson/Boozer

rule p er m i t s persons, who a re guilty of the c rime cha

rg ed, an a ppellate a cquittal

“ b e c a u s e t h e d e f

e n d an tr e c e i v e d

a w i n d f a l l i nt h e j u r

y i n s t r u c tio ns ” ); Boozer , 717 S.W .2d at 619 (Onion, P.J ., dissenting to denia l of reh’ g ) (“ Her e the a ppellant had the advanta g e of an e rrone ous j u r y i n s t r u c t i o nf a v o r a b l e t o h i m w h i c h h e u t i l i z e d d u r i n g t h e t r i a l

. If

h e h a d b e e nf o u n d ‘ n o tg u i l t y’ beca use of the e rrone ous jury

instruction, that would have be en the e nd of the case. Now on appea l the m ajority still allows him to use t he [ err oneous] jury instruction to g o scot-fr ee even thoug h the evidenc e shows his g ui l t o f t h e off ense c harg ed beyond a re asonable doubt.”). We dec ide that Malik’s ru l e o f m e a s u r i n g e v i d e n t i ar y s u f f i c i e n c y “ b y t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e a s d e f

i n e d b y a h yp o t h e t i c a l l y c o r

r e c tj u r y c h ar g e ” a

p p l i e s w h e nt h e e v i d e n c e i s r e v i e w e d f o r f a c tu a l s u f f i c i e n c y. II. F ederal Due- P roce ss Im plications of Aff irm ing App ellant’s Conviction Under Theory That App e lla nt Ai de d “A not he r ” I n Co m m it ti ng Th e Offen se Ma lik also rec og nizes the rule, relied upon by appellant in his second g round for revie w, that “due proce ss pr events an appellate court fr om affir ming a conviction base d upon leg al and f actua lWooley –14

13 This due proc ess rule is not, and should not be confuse d with, a n evidentiar

y sufficie ncy

rule. Se e Ma lik, 953 S.W .2d at 238 n.3. The decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appe als in Santellan v . Co c k re ll , 271 F.3d 190 ( 5 Cir. 2001), illustrates this. See Sante llan , 271 F.3d at 191-97 th (sepa rate ly addre s s in g

th e a p p li c a nt’ s e v id e nti a

r y sufficie ncy

claim that the evide nce w as insufficie nt to s up po rt any of the the or ie s of atte mpt e d kidn a pp ing and the a

pp lic ant’ s due -p ro c e ss cl a im that th is Court should n ot have “ aff irmed [the applicant’s] capital murde r convic tion on a fac tual theory differ ent from the the ory

principally

advocated by the S tate at trial”). Re versinga convic tion under th is d u e - p r o c e s s r

u le is n o t th e s a me a s r e v e r s in g a c o n v ic ti o n b a s e d o n an a p p e ll a te f in d in g of evidentiar y insufficienc y to support the conviction. Se e Ma lik, 95 3 S.W. 2d a t 23 8 n. 3. Th e Sup re me Court’s decision in Dunn also explains why the due-proce ss rule applied in that c ase doe s not present a var iance issue. See D unn , 442 U.S. at 106-07 (“ while there was no va ri an ce b et ween the indictment and proof a

t trial, there was a discrepa ncy betwee n the basis on which the jury rende red its verdict and that on whic h the Court of Appe als sustained petitioner’ s conviction”). g rounds that wer e not submitted to the jury .” S e e Ma lik , 95 3 S .W.2d

a t 23 8 n .3 ; Dunn v. United States , 442 U.S. 100, 105-07 (1979) ( “To uphold a conviction on a charg e that was ne ither alleg ed in an indictment nor pre sent ed to a jury at trial off

ends the most basic notions of due pr ocess.” ). 13
I n Dunn , the cour

t of appe als aff

irmed the de fenda

nt’s convictions for m ak i n g fa lse dec larations under the theory

that he lied under

oath duringan Oc tober 1976 proc eedingthat was ne ither alleg ed in the indictment nor presented to the j ury (the indi ctment allege d that, and the jury was instructe d to convict if, the de fenda

nt lied under oath during a September 1976 pr ocee ding)

. See D unn , 442 U.S. at 102-07. The Supreme Court decided that this vi olated “ba sic notions of due proc ess” that establish a def

endant’ s rig ht “to be hea

rd on the spec ific cha

rg es of whic h he is ac cused.” Se e id

. The Supreme Court concluded that the defe ndant’s “c onviction cannot stand” unless his conviction could be uphe ld based on the Septe mber 1976 proc eeding

. Se e id

. I n McCormick

v. United States , the court of appeals i nterpre ted t he cr iminal statute at issue in that c ase contra

ry to the jury instructions a nd then af firmed the de fenda

nt’s conviction base d on that statutory

interpre tation. See M

cCormick, 500 U.S. at 268-70. The Supre me Court decide d thatWooley –15

14 The Supreme Court in Cole descr ibed this feder al due- proce ss violation in t he following te rm s: We the ref

ore have this situation. The petitioners rea d the information as char g ing them with an offe nse under § 2 of t he Ac t, the lang uag e of w hich the information had used. The tr ial judge construed the information as c harg ing a n offe nse under

§ 2. He instructed the jury to that eff ect. .

. . Wit hout completely ignor ing the judge ’s cha

rg e, the jury could not have c onvicted petitioners f or havingcom m i t t ed t he sepa rate , dis tin c t, a nd su bs tanti a lly

dif fe re nt o ff e ns e de fi ne d in

§ 1 . Y et th e S tate Su

pr e me Court refuse d t o co n s i d er the validity of the c onviction under § 2, for violation of wh i ch p et i t i o n er s we re t ri ed an d co n v i ct ed

. I taf fi rm edt h ei r c o n v i ct i o n s as t h o u gh they had bee n tried for violating § 1, an off ense f or which the y

wer e neither

tried nor convicted. No principle of

proce dural due proce ss is m o re cl ea rly established than that notice of the specific charg e, and a chance to be heard in a trial of t he issues ra ised by that char g e, if de sired, ar e amongthe consti tutional rig hts of every acc used i n a cr iminal proce eding in all courts, state or f ed er al

. I f, as the State Supre me Court held, this re s u l t ed in t he def

endant’ s conviction being aff irmed on “le g al and f

actua l gr ounds that were

never submitt ed to the jury .” Se e id

. (“Thus even assuming the Court of Appea ls w as corr ect on the law, the c onviction should not have bee n aff irmed on t hat basis but should have be en set a side and

a new trial order ed.”) . I n McCormick , 500 U.S. at 270 n.8, the Supreme Court fur ther stated: Th is C ourt

ha s ne ve r he ld that th e ri g ht t o a jur y tr ia l is satis fi e d w he n a

n a pp e llate court re tries a c ase on a

ppeal unde r diffe rent instructions and on a differ ent theory than wa s ev er prese nted to the jury . Appellate c ourts are not permitted to aff irm convictions on any theory they please simply beca use the fa cts nec essar

y to support t h e t h e o r y w e r e p r e s e n t e d

t o t h e j u r y. The Supreme Court’s de cision in Cole v. Arkansas , 333 U.S. 196 (1948), also illustrates the fede ral due proce ss principle. There the defendants were charg ed with and convicted of violating Section 2 of an A rkansa s statute, but the Arka nsas Supreme Court affirmed their convictions on the ba si s t h a tt h e d e f

e n d an t s “ c o m m i t t e d

t h e s e p ar a t e , d i s t i n c t , an d s u b s t an t i a l l y

d i f f e r e n to ff e ns e define d” in Section 1 of the Ar kansas statute. Se e Col e , 333 U.S. at 198-202. The Supreme Court 14Wooley –16

petitio ners we re c harg ed with a violation of § 1, it is doubtful both that the information fa irly

informed them of

that char g e an d that they soug ht to defend themselves ag ainst such a c harg e; it is certain that they wer e not tried for

or found g uilty of it. I t is as much a violation of due pr ocess to send a n ac cu s ed t o prison fo llo wi ngcon vic tio n o f a c ha rg e on wh ic h h e wa s n e ve r t

ri e d a s it wo uld be to convict him upon a cha

rg e that wa s never

made. Col e , 333 U.S. at 200-01 (c itations omi tted). re ve rs e d th e c on vic tio ns and re mand e d the c a se to the Ar ka ns a s Sup re me Court “ to have the va lid ity of [the defe ndants’] convictions appra ised on co n s i d er at i o n of the c ase a s it was tried and a s the i s s u es we re d et erm i n edi nt h e t ri al co u rt ” ( i

. e. , wh et h er t h e d ef en d an t s ’ c o n v i ct i o n s co u l d be af firmed based on Sec tion 2 of the Arka nsas statute). Se e id

. T h e F i ft h C i rc u i t ’s ap p l i ca t i o no f t h i s fe d er al d u e- p ro ce s s ru l e i n S

a n tellan is also instructive. See Sante llan , 27 1 F .3 d a t 19 1- 97 ; se e als o S an te lla n v . S

tate , 939 S.W .2d 155, 159-64 (Te x .Cr.App. 1997). The de fenda

nt in Santellan was sente nced to death after a jur y convicted him of murde ring his former g irlfriend w hile attempting to kidnap he r (un d er a n indictment ge nera lly

alleg ing the commission of murder during the cour se of a n attempted kidnapping ). Se e id . The e vidence showed that th e de fe nd ant c on fr on te d th e vic tima s sh e was wal kin g to h e r c ar i n a pa rk inglot , b ri e fl y diverted he r fr om her path to her car just befor e he shot her four t imes (“inc luding shots to the rig ht side of the he ad”) , and put her in his car a

nd drove of

f. Se e id . The medical e x aminer te stified that the sh ot t o th e he a d wa s the imm e diate c a us e of de a th and

that th is i nju

ry wo uld have c a us e d “ br a in death a lmost immediately , althoug h the victim’s he art mig ht beat for three to five more minutes.” Se e id

. The S tate relied on the “diversion of path theor y ” of attempted kidnapping at trial. Se e id

. The jury char g e g ener ally

instructed the jury on murder dur ing a n attempted kidnappingand did not l i m i tt h e S t at e t o an y

p ar t i cu l ar

t h eo ry o f a t t em p t edk i dn ap p i n g.Wooley –17

15 This theory arguably

prese nts a completed a ct of kidnapping

. See also Santellan , 271 F.3d at 196 n.4 (findingit unnecessa ry to addre ss whether

this established a complete d kidnapping under Texas law). On dir e c t a pp e a l to th is Court , th e de fe nd ant c la ime d th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o

su pp or t th e a tte mpt e d- kid

na p p i n g e l e m e nt o f t h e o f f e n s e u n d e r the div e rs ion -o f- path- the or y , b e c a us e

“ the div e rs ion

a c ro ss t he pa rk inglot wa s o f i ns ig nif

ic ant d ist anc e and du rat ion ” to e sta bli sh attempted kidnappingas Texas law de fined it. Se e id . (attempted ki d n ap p i ng under Te x as law require d State to prove that defe ndant commi tted an act “amounting to more than mer e pre paration for kidnapping the victim”). The defe ndant also cla imed that it was irre levant that he pla ced the dead victim in his car and drove off, because it is not possible to “kidnap a cor pse” unde r Texas law. See id

. Although not e x pressly deciding that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to s u p p o rt the State’s diversion-of- path-theor

y , this Court, on direc t appea l, decide d that the evidence supported a theor y that the victim was still alive when the de fenda nt put her in his car

and d ro v e o ff. Se e id . T his Court, theref

ore, c oncluded that the de fenda nt’s “ac t of loading the [l iving] victim into the ca r and driving awa

y with her wa s a suffic ient ac t o f re s traint to amount to more than mer e pre paration.” Se e id

.

15 The de fend an t later c laimed duringfede ral ha beas c orpus proc eeding s in a fede ral district court that his fe dera l d u e- proce ss rig hts were violated when this Court reje cted his suffic iency challeng e and a ffirme d his conviction on th i s b as i s . See Sante llan , 271 F.3d at 191-97. The defe ndant also cla imed that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support any theory of attempted kidnapping

. Se e id . The fe dera l district court g rante d the defe ndant fe dera l habea s corpus re lief onWooley –18

16 I n Santellan , the Fif

th Circuit further state d, “The key t o this case is the fe dera l district c ourt ’s re vis iti ngof

the e vid e nc e be c a

us e it b e lie ve d t hat th e Texa s Co ur t of Cr imi na l App e a ls should not have af

firmed Santellan’ s capital murder conviction on a fa ctual theor y differ ent from the theory principally

advocated by

the State at trial.” See Sante llan , 271 F.3d at 192.
17 The F ifth Circuit, theref

ore, de cided that the e vidence is sufficient to support the theory of attempted kidnappingrelied upon by the State at trial and did not addre ss whether the evidenc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

any oth e r the or

y of a tte mpt e d kidn a

pp ing(p art ic ula

rl y the the or y that th e vic tim was still alive when the de fenda nt put her in his car

and drove off)

. these c laims. Se e id . (in the fe dera l district court’s view “ not only had t h e S tate ‘disavow ed’ the theory adopted by

the Court of Criminal Appeal s , but that court’s a naly sis impl icitly

reje cted the State’s appr oach. T he switchingand contr adicti o n o f t heorie s violated the due pr ocess c lause,

acc ording to the dist ri ct co u rt

. And in any event, neither

theory of attempted kidna

pping w as supported by

constitutionally

sufficie nt evidence .”) ( emphasis in orig inal). 16 Th e State a

pp e a led thi s d e c isi on

to t he F if th C ir c uit . T he F if

th C ir c uit de c ide d th a t th is Court’s decision on direc t appea l that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to s u p port the attempted kidnapping element wa s not unreasona ble, “[b]ecause the diversion of path theory of attempted kidnapping is fac tually

adequate.” See Sante llan , 271 F.3d at 196. The F ifth Circuit also rejec ted 17 the def enda n t’s claim that his due-pr ocess r ights we re violate d by the manner

in which this Court reje cted his suffic iency

challeng e and a ffirme d his conviction. Se e id . I n reje cting the def endant’ s due-pr ocess c laim, the Fifth Circuit stated: Th e pr e se nt c a se is r e a dil y dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om Dunn and McCormick . The ind ic tme nt o f S ante lla

n a lle g e d atte mpt e d k idn a pp ing on ly in g e ne ra l te rm s and did not commit the St ate to prose cuting any one fa ct u al t h eory . Simi larly , the jury ins tr uc tio ns de sc ri bed the law o f k idn a pp ingand

c ri min a l atte mpt

in c on sid e ra

ble detail, but do not bind the State to a particula r interpre tation of the fac ts or theory of at t empt ed kidnapping . I n contra st to Dunn , th e in c id e n t f o r w h ic h Sa

n te ll anwas c o n v i c t e d b y t h e j u r

y

–t h e m u r d e r an d a t t e mp t e d k i dn a p i n g o f Y o l an d a G arzain F re de ri c ks burgon

Au g us t 22 , 1 99 3–

wa s a lso de fi nit ive ly

the ba sis of the a

pp e llateWooley –19 court’s a ffirma

nce of his conviction. As distinguished from the federa l circuit cour t in McCormick

, the Texas Court of C riminal Appea ls did not reinterpr et the re levant criminal statute or a

pply differ ent leg al standards tha n the trial cour

t in Santellan’s case . I nstead, the c ourt focuse d on a diffe rent interpr etation of t h e fa cts than that emphasized by

the prosec ution at tr ial. Contrary to Santellan’s sug g estion, the Court of C r im in a l A

p p e a ls d id

n o t “ d is a v o w ” th e d iv e r s io no f p a th th e o r y o f a tt empted kid na pin g , b ut r a ise d a

nd dis c us sed t

he the or y , a lbe it s ome wh a t br ie fl y , in its published decision. Santellan , 939 S.W .2d at 162-63 a nd 165

. Be ca use of the g ener al nature of the indictment and the jury char g e, and be cause t he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls af

fi rm e d on the ba sis of the same law a nd the same ult imate a c ts that underla

y the conviction in the trial c ourt, neither Dunn nor M c Cormick is applicable to Santellan’s ca se. Santellan , 271 F.3d at 196. I n thi s c a se , we be lie ve that McCormick , Dunn , and Col e require a dec ision that appellant’s due-pr ocess r ights we re violate d when the c ourt of appe als aff irmed his convic t i o n under the unsubmitt ed theor

y that he aide d “anothe r” to murder the c omplainant. See M cCormick, 5 00 U. S. at 270 n.8 (“ This Court has never held that the right to a jury trial is satisfied when a

n appellate court retrie s a ca se on appe al under differ ent instructions and on a differe nt theory than was e ver pr esente d
to t he jur y . App e llate c ourt s are no t pe rm itt e d to a ff ir m c on vic tio ns on

any the or y the y ple a se sim

ply beca use the fa cts nece ssary to suppor t the theory wer e pre sented to the jury .”). Mor eover , we do not believe that the Fifth Circuit’s de cision in Santellan supports a contra ry decision, bec ause, a ccor ding
to t he F if th C ir c uit , th e e vid e nc e su pp or te d th e State ’s div e rs ion -o f- path t ri a l th eory , w hic h th is Court did not “disavow” on dire ct appe al. See Sante llan , 271 F.3d at 191-97. The de fenda nt’s conviction in Santellan was, ther efor e, ultimately upheld on a theory “as it was tried and a s the issues

wer e dete rmined in the trial cour t.” Com pa re Col e , 333 U.S. at 202 (re manding case to state court to have va lidity

of def endants’ c onvictions “appra ised on consideration of t he case as it was tried and as the issues we re de termined in the trial c ourt”).Wooley –20

18 J ustice Scalia dissente d to this majority holding in Neder

. See Ne der , 527 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J ., concur ring in part and dissenting in part) (“de priving a criminal defe ndant of the right to have the jury deter mine his guil t o f t he cr ime char g ed–which ne cessa rily means his commission of e v e ry eleme nt of the crime charg ed–ca

n never be harmless”) (emphasis in orig inal). We also note that an I llinois appellate court ha s even state d that it “seems incr easing ly clea r that the view s expressed by J ustice Scalia in Neder v. U nited States are no w be lie fs sh are d by ” a ma jor ity of the Sup re me Court

. Se e Sta te v . Ni tz , 820 N.E.2d 536, 554-58 ( I ll.App.Ct. 2004). Finally , it has been sug g ested that the due -proc ess violation in this case is subject to a har m analy sis in accor dan ce wi t h t h e S upreme Court’s decision in Neder v. U nited States , 527 U.S. 1 (1999). I n Neder , the Supreme Court de cided that a trial court’ s err or in omitti ng from the jury ch ar ge an en t ire e lement of the of fense is subject to the harmless-e rror rule of Ch a

p m a n v. Cal ifo rn ia , 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Unde r Neder , if the re viewing court is able to c onclude be y ond a

rea sonable doubt “that the jury verdic t would have be en the sam e ab s en t t h e er ror, the e rrone ous instruction is properly

found to be ha

rmless.” See Ne der , 527 U.S. at 17 and a t 1 8 (“ I s i t clea r bey o n d a r e a s o n a

b le d o u b t th a t a r a ti o n a l ju

r y w o u ld h a v e f

o u n d th e d e f

e n d an t g u il ty a

bsent the

err or? ”). 18
We do no t be lie ve tha

t Neder applies t o the federa l due-pr ocess error in this case as the err or in Neder a pp are ntl y inv olv e d a

n e rror by the tr ia l c ourt

in o mittin g an e le me nt o f t he of fe ns e a s it

was a ctually tried. See D unn , 442 U.S. at 107 (it violates due-pr ocess to send a n acc used to prison on “a c harg e on which he was ne ver trie d”). In addition, Chapman was de cided be fore McCormick and Dunn , neither of which mentioned that the e rror involved in those case s would be subject to the harmless-e rror

rule of Chapman . On the contr ary , Dunn state d th a t “ a pp e llate c ourt s are no t f

re e to

re vis e the ba sis on

wh ic h a de fe nd ant i s c on vic te d s imp ly be c a us e the same re su lt w ou ld l ike ly obtain on retria l.” Dunn , 442 U.S. at 107. This does not support a dec ision that the error involvedWooley –21

19 I t has bee n sug g ested that the due -proc ess er ror that oc curr ed in this case when the c ourt of appea ls a ffirme d appellant’ s conviction on a basis not submitted to the jury could have somehow been ma de subjec t to Chapman’s harmless-e rror analy sis ha d the State objected that the trial court’ s c ha rg e sh ou ld a lso have a

uth or ize d a

pp e lla nt’ s c onvic tio n u

po n a fi nd ing that he a ide d “ ano the r” in mur de ri ngthe c omp la ina nt. I n this c a se , how e ve r, the State did no t ob je c t, s o it is unn e c e ssa

ry to addre ss this contention. We note, howeve r, that makingthe applica bility of Chapman’s ha

rm le sse rr or ana ly sis tur

n on whe the r t

he State ob

je c ts t o th e jur

y c ha rg e is r e min isc e nt o f c e rt a in a sp e c ts of the d i s cr ed i t ed decision in Boozer

. Compare Boozer , 717 S.W .2d at 615-17 (Campbell, J ., concur ring to denial of re h’g ) (e ffe ctively making sufficie ncy issue turn on whether State objected to its “gr eate r burde n of proof ” in the jury

char g e) w i t h B oozer , 717 S.W .2d at 621 (Onion, P.J ., dissenting to de nial of reh’ g ) (“ the majority err s in determining the suffic iency of the e vidence by looking to the court’s instructions ( footnote omitted), even thoug h err oneous, without review ing the evidenc e or the holding of the Court of Appe als, and further insi sting that the w hole matter turns on the fa ilure of the State to objec t”). in Dunn and in this case is subjec t to a harmless-e rror analy sis under Chapman

. 19 The judg ment of t he court of appeals i s reve rsed, and the case i s rema nded there for

further
proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

H e r v e y , J.

Deliver ed: J une 25, 2008 Pub lis h