UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALSIS JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

PRAMOTE CHANGSILA, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15-1240 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Alsis Jones, a former employee at two Sala Thai restaurants, brings this action 

against both restaurants as well as the restaurants’ owner and accountant. Jones asserts two sets

of claims relating to the restaurants’ payroll and tax reporting practices: First, he contends that 

the restaurants, their owner, and the accountant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 

29 U.S.C. § 207, by failing to pay him overtime wages to which he was entitled. Second, he

alleges that they committed an assortment of common law torts by falsely reporting to the 

Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and state tax authorities that he was paid several thousands of 

dollars in tips, which, in fact, he never received. He alleges that these false reports caused him to 

incur substantial, unfounded tax liabilities.

Defendants move to dismiss all of these claims, as well as a claim that Jones does not 

bring but that he alludes to in the background section of his amended complaint.1

 Dkt. 16. Most 

notably, Defendants contend that Jones fails to state a claim under the FLSA, that his common 

law claims are preempted by the FLSA, and that, in any event, his claims are time barred. For 

 1

 For ease of reference, unless otherwise noted, the Court will refer to the amended complaint, 

Dkt. 14, simply as “the complaint.”
2

the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

The complaint, Dkt. 14, sets forth the relevant facts, which the Court must accept as true 

for purposes of the pending motion. See Wood v. Moss, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2065–67 & 

n.5 (2014). 

A. The Parties

Originally from Thailand, Jones immigrated to the United States and was employed at 

two Sala Thai restaurants in the D.C. metropolitan area from 2006 to 2008. Dkt. 14 at 4–6 (Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 5, 16). One restaurant was located in the District of Columbia and was incorporated 

under D.C. law as “Green T Group, Inc.” See Dkt. 14-1 at 2; Dkt. 14 at 4–5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 8 & 

n.3). At some point after Jones ceased working for Sala Thai, Green T Group was sold to 

“Green T Group II, Inc.,” which continues to do business in the District of Columbia. See Dkt. 

14 at 4–5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 8 & n.3). According to Jones, Green T Group II is the “successor in 

interest” to the original Green T Group. Id. at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 6). The second Sala Thai 

restaurant is located in Bethesda, Maryland and is incorporated under Maryland law as “Ja-RoenD Inc.” See id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 9); Dkt. 14-1 at 2. 

During Jones’s employment, Green T Group and Ja-Roen-D (collectively, “Sala Thai”) 

“shar[ed] the same employees [and] management.” Dkt. 14 at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 7). Both 

companies were owned (in whole or in part) by Pramote Changsila, who “operated the [Sala Thai 

restaurants] under his sole control” and was responsible for “all employment decisions.” Id.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7). The companies also shared “accounting[,] . . . tax preparation[,] and 

payroll services,” which were provided by Hans Ravesteijn. Id. at 4–5 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 10). 
3

The complaint names Changsila, Ravesteijn, and the two Sala Thai restaurants—Green T Group 

II and Ja-Roen-D—as defendants.

B. Overtime Allegations

Changsila initially hired Jones to work at the D.C. restaurant as a “manager.” Id. at 5–6 

(Am. Compl. ¶ 16). But, although given this title, Jones did not have the power to hire or fire 

employees, and “Changsila required [him] to perform standard labor . . . duties as a cook, 

busboy, bartender, waiter or even cashier on a daily basis.” Id. at 8–9 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 30). 

Jones also was told that he would “be compensated every two weeks . . . with a salary in the 

approximate amount of $1,500.00 based on a 40-hour workweek,” yielding an hourly rate of 

$18.75 per hour and an annual salary of “approximately $30,000.”2

 Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 

18). Soon after Jones started, however, Changsila increased his hours to “70–80 hours” per week 

and required him also to work at the Bethesda, Maryland restaurant. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18). 

Jones alleges that despite working more than 70 hours each week, he “never received more than 

. . . $1,500 every two weeks [in] compensation.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 17). Rather, according to 

Jones, Changsila and Ravesteijn told him “throughout his . . . employment” that he was not 

entitled to overtime wages because he was a “manager.” Id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 27). Finally, 

Jones claims that Changsila and Sala Thai “did not keep records of work hours for any 

employee,” id. at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 33), nor did Changsila or Ravesteijn document Jones’s 

compensation, id. at 8–9 (Am. Compl. ¶ 28).

 2

 Jones does not explain the basis for his conclusion that a salary of $1,500 every two weeks 

yields an annual salary of “approximately $30,000.” Assuming that Jones worked every week 

over the course of the year, it appears that his annual salary would have been $39,000. This 

discrepancy, however, has no bearing on the questions currently before the Court. 
4

C. Tax Reporting Allegations

Jones further alleges that Changsila “individually and through his agents [Ravesteijn and 

Sala Thai] willfully and systematically engaged in ‘wage theft’ or ‘payroll fraud.’” Id. at 7 (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 23). In particular, Ravesteijn “falsely and knowingly” prepared tax documents, 

including W-2 forms, that “misrepresented [Jones’s] pay” by reporting tip income, id. (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 22), and Defendants then submitted these false documents to the IRS and tax 

authorities in the District of Columbia and Maryland, id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 24). Jones 

maintains that he “never received any tip[s],” and that, in fact, Changsila or Ravesteijn told him

that he was not entitled to receive tips because he was a manager. Id. at 10–11 (Am. Compl. ¶ 

37).

By way of example, the complaint sets forth detailed allegations with respect to tax year 

2007. According to Jones, Defendants reported his income for 2007 in multiple W-2s, which, 

taken together, falsely indicated that he earned nearly $30,000 in tips. Id. at 11 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

39, 40). These allegedly fraudulent W-2s had the effect of doubling his reported income from 

the $30,000 or so that he actually received to the $60,000 or so that Defendants reported, leaving 

Jones with a tax liability of approximately $14,000. Id. at 10–12 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 40). In 

support of this allegation, Jones points to a “Wage and Income Transcript” for the 2007 tax 

period from the IRS, which is attached to his complaint. See id. at 11 (Am. Compl. ¶ 40); Dkt. 

14-1. That “transcript” indicates (1) that Jones was issued a W-2 from “Green T Group” and a 

second W-2 from “Ja-Roen-D;” (2) that he received $32,907 for his work at Green T Group

($19,607 in wages and $13,300 in tips); and (3) that he received $28,610 for his work at JaRoen-D ($18,610 in wages and $10,000 in tips). Dkt. 14-1 at 2. In the aggregate, then, the two 
5

restaurants reported that Jones received $61,517 in compensation ($38,217 in wages and $23,300 

in tips).

Jones was unaware of Defendants’ “fraudulent accounting practices,” Dkt. 14 at 10 (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 35), and, indeed, he was affirmatively misled by Changsila, who told him between 

2009 and 2013 that “the additional income [in the form of tips] . . . was an IRS or accounting 

mistake” and that Changsila and Ravesteijn “were working with the taxing authorities . . . to 

correct the situation[,] [which] had been complicated by the sale of one . . . of the Sala Thai 

restaurants,” id. at 12 (Am. Compl. ¶ 47). For several years, Jones apparently believed 

Changsila and expected that Defendants would fix the purported mistake. Id. at 12 (Am. Compl. 

¶ 48). Meanwhile, because an outstanding tax liability would have impaired his ability to bring 

his minor daughter from Thailand to the United States, Jones “had no choice but to enter into a 

payment plan . . . to pay the[] taxes until the issue was cleared up by the defendants.” Id. at 12–

13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 49). He completed the five-year plan in 2015.3

 Id. at 11–12 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

40, 48). At some point in early 2014, Jones asked Changsila to remedy the reporting error with 

the IRS. Id. at 13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 51). Changsila “felt insulted and became angry and threatened 

[him].” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 51). When Jones requested Sala Thai’s records on tips from 

Changsila, he “was told that no accounting records exist[ed]” due to the sale of one of the 

restaurants. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 52).

Jones retained counsel in February 2014, id. at 13–14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 54), and his 

attorney sent a letter to Changsila complaining about the reporting error, see Dkt. 14-2 at 2–3 

(letter from Athan Tsimpedes to Ja-Roen-D). In response, Changsila allegedly “sent a relative to 

 3

 It is unclear from the complaint whether the tax liability and payment plan concerned the IRS

or the Maryland tax authority. See Dkt. 14 at 9 (Am. Compl. ¶ 32 (referring to “payment plan 

with the IRS or State of Maryland”) (emphasis added).
6

[Jones’s] [place of] employment,” which Jones interpreted as a “veiled threat” intended to 

“intimidat[e]” him and to discourage him “from taking legal action.” Dkt. 14 at 13–14 (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 54). In addition, counsel for Sala Thai wrote to Jones’s lawyer, asserting that Sala Thai 

was “at a loss to understand the allegations your letter raises;” that the “separate[] 

incorporat[ion]” of the two Sala Thai restaurants “probably account[ed] for [Jones’s] confusion;” 

that the description of the facts contained in the letter from Jones’s counsel was “inaccurate;” 

and that Sala Thai had “no knowledge of any incorrect payroll check being issued to your 

client.” Dkt. 14-3 at 2–3. That letter closed by requesting that Jones’s counsel provide copies of 

“his tax returns and any IRS audit or assessment notice so the years in question can be 

researched to see what paychecks are at issue, and how the withholding tax computations were 

prepared incorrectly, as you contend.” Id. at 3. Jones’s lawyer responded by providing 

additional details about Jones’s allegations and threatening to bring suit in the absence of a 

resolution of the dispute. Dkt. 14-4 at 2–3.

D. Procedural History

Jones filed this action in July 2015. See Dkt. 1. After Defendants moved to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, Dkt. 8, Jones filed an amended complaint, Dkt. 14. The now-operative 

complaint asserts seven claims. Jones first alleges that Defendants intentionally violated the 

FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by “fail[ing] and refus[ing] to compensate” him for overtime work 

(Count I). Dkt. 14 at 19–20 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 82–84). By his calculations, Defendants owe him 

approximately $67,500 (or, if treble damages are available, $202,500). Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶

19). Jones also seeks to pursue his FLSA claim as a “collective action on behalf of himself and 

all other similarly situated individuals” who worked for Sala Thai from 2007 to the present, a 

class that he estimates would comprise at least forty individuals. Id. at 18–19 (Am. Compl. ¶¶
7

71–76). On behalf of the putative class, Jones seeks damages for “all unpaid overtime wages” as 

well as “an equal amount in liquidated damages.” Id. at 20 (Am. Compl. Count I Prayer). 

The complaint also asserts six common law claims based on the alleged fraudulent tax 

reporting scheme. He brings the first four of those claims against Changsila and Ravesteijn, 

including claims for (1) intentional misrepresentation (Count II); (2) constructive fraud (Count 

III); (3) fraudulent concealment (Count IV); and (4) aiding and abetting (Count V). Id. at 20–22 

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85–108). And he asserts his final two claims against all four defendants, 

including claims for (5) an accounting (Count VI), and (6) unjust enrichment (Count VII). Id. at 

22–23 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 109–117).

Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 16. They first

contend that the complaint fails adequately to allege that Jones was eligible for overtime 

compensation under the FLSA or that Green T Group II and Ravesteijn were his “employers.” 

Dkt. 16-1 at 6–11. Second, Defendants take issue with references to the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964, found in the background 

section of the complaint; recognizing that Jones does not invoke RICO in any of the substantive 

counts of his complaint, Defendants nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, move to 

dismiss any RICO claim that he might be deemed to have brought. Dkt. 16-1 at 11–20. Third, 

Defendants argue that the FLSA preempts Jones’s common law claims. Id. at 5–6. Finally, they 

maintain that all of Jones’s claims are time barred. Id. at 20–23. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 
8

plausible if the plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although “detailed factual 

allegations” are not required, the complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, [or] 

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The 

Court must “assume [the] veracity” of “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 

and must “grant [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts 

alleged,” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Court, however, need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In addition to challenging the adequacy of Jones’s claims, Defendants raise two

affirmative defenses—that Jones was an exempt employee, and thus was not entitled to overtime 

pay, and that all of his claims are time barred. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). “[A]n affirmative 

defense may be raised by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b) when the facts that give rise to the 

defense are clear from the face of the complaint.” Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 

F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Dismissal is improper, however, “as long as a plaintiff’s 

potential rejoinder to the affirmative defense [is not] foreclosed by the allegations in the 

complaint.” de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. FLSA Claim

1. Eligibility for Overtime Compensation

The FLSA requires employers to compensate their employees for hours worked in excess 

of 40 hours per week at a rate not less than 1.5 times their regular rate. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 
9

The overtime requirement, however, “does not apply . . . to all employees.” Christopher v. 

SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 147 (2012). As relevant here, Congress exempted

individuals “employed in a bona fide executive . . . capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The 

“executive” employee exemption is further defined in the governing Department of Labor 

regulations. In particular, an employee is “employed in a bona fide executive capacity” if (1) she 

is “[c]ompensated on a salary basis” of at least $455 per week; (2) her “primary duty is 

management of the enterprise . . . or of a customarily recognized department;” (3) she 

“customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees;” and (4) she “has 

authority to hire and fire other employees or [her] suggestions and recommendations as to the . . . 

change of status of other employees are given particular weight.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a).

In determining whether an employee’s “primary duty” involves the performance of 

exempt work, the Court must consider “all [of] the facts in a particular case, with the major 

emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). “Factors 

to consider . . . include, but are not limited to, the relative importance of the exempt duties as 

compared with other types of duties; the amount of time spent performing exempt work; the 

employee’s relative freedom from direct supervision; and the relationship between the 

employee’s salary and the wages paid to other employees for the [same] kind of nonexempt work 

performed by the employee.” Id. Significantly, an employee’s “job title alone is insufficient to 

establish the exempt status of an employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.2. Rather, the “status of any 

particular employee must be determined on the basis of whether the employee’s salary and duties 

meet the requirements” of the applicable regulation. Id. 

Defendants argue that Jones was an exempt employee and, therefore, was never entitled 

to overtime pay under the FLSA. Dkt. 16-1 at 6–9. They face two substantial hurdles, however,
10

in pressing this contention on a motion to dismiss. First, the “executive” employee exemption, 

like other FLSA exemptions, constitutes an “affirmative defense on which the employer has the 

burden of proof.” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974); see also Cannon 

v. District of Columbia, 717 F.3d 200, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Smith v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 590

F.3d 886, 891 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Second, Jones’s factual allegations must be taken as true for 

purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Defendants make three

attempts to clear these hurdles, none of which succeeds.

Defendants first contend that Jones’s original complaint conceded that he was employed 

in an “executive” capacity, and they argue that he was not entitled to amend his complaint in a 

manner that “blatantly change[d]” and “contradict[ed] the facts set forth in his original 

complaint” simply to plead around a defense raised in Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss. 

Dkt. 16-1 at 6 (quoting Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 171 (D.D.C. 2013)). The 

Court is unconvinced. Defendants point to allegations in Jones’s original complaint that refer to 

Jones as a “manager.” Id. at 7; see Dkt. 1 at 5, 10 (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 42). Although similar 

allegations appear in Jones’s amended complaint, he is more careful there, often—but not 

always—using quotation marks to signify that the word “manager” was Defendants’ and not his. 

See Dkt. 14 at 5–6, 9 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 30). But, as noted above, regardless of who assigned 

the term to Jones’s status, titles alone are not sufficient to trigger application of the exemption. 

Defendants also suggest that the Court should not credit Jones’s allegations—first raised 

in his amended complaint—that he merely performed “standard labor and employee duties 

including duties as a cook, busboy, bartender, waiter or even cashier.” Dkt. 16-1 at 7 (quoting 

Dkt. 14 at 9 (Am. Compl. ¶ 30)). In pressing that argument, however, Defendants ignore the fact 

that an employee’s exempt status is an affirmative defense. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 
11

196. As a result, Jones was not required to include allegations relating to his specific duties in 

his original—or in his amended—complaint. Accordingly, he can hardly be criticized for raising 

those allegations for the first time in his amended complaint.

Finally, putting aside any question relating to the changes contained in Jones’s amended

complaint, Defendants contend that the amended complaint is, on its face, self-defeating. They 

note that Jones alleges that he was hired to work as a “manager;” that he was compensated based 

on a fixed, bi-weekly salary of $1,500; and that he performed managerial duties. Dkt. 16-1 at 7–

9. As already explained, however, Jones’s job title is not dispositive—indeed, if it were, 

employers could easily avoid the obligation to pay overtime wages under the FLSA by simply 

bestowing inflated titles on their employees. Similarly, the fact that Jones was paid in excess of 

$455 a week is a necessary condition for application of the executive employee exemption, but it 

is not sufficient.4

 And, even if Jones did perform some managerial functions, the executive 

employee exemption applies only where the employee’s “primary duty” involves the 

performance of exempt work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(2). The amended complaint contains no 

such concession. To the contrary, it alleges that “the duties [Jones] performed . . . were common 

labor[-]related duties,” Dkt. 14 at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 26); that he worked “as a cook, busboy, 

bartender, waiter or even cashier on a daily basis,” id. at 9 (Am. Compl. ¶ 30) (emphasis added); 

and that Jones did not have the authority to hire or fire employees, id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 26). 

 4

 Although Jones asserts that he received a salary of $1,500 every two weeks, see Dkt. 14 at 5–6 

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17), that assertion appears to conflict with the pay stubs attached to Jones’s 

opposition, which indicate that he was paid on an hourly basis, see Dkt. 20-3 (pay stubs for the 

D.C. and Maryland Sala Thai restaurants reporting that Jones worked 80 hours at each restaurant 

at a rate of $2.77 per hour over a two-week period in October 2007). The pay stubs, however, 

were not attached to Jones’s complaint and therefore are not properly before the Court on a 

motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
12

Because the complaint does not itself establish that Jones was an exempt employee, 

“dismissal at this stage [is] inappropriate.” de Csepel, 714 F.3d at 608.

2. Employer Status of Ravesteijn and Green T Group II

Defendants also argue that Jones has failed to allege that Ravesteijn and Green T Group 

II were his “employers.” Although the complaint does not adequately allege that Ravesteijn was 

Jones’s employer, the allegations with respect to Green T Group II are sufficient to state a claim.

a. Ravesteijn

The FLSA defines the term “employee” to mean “any individual employed by an 

employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). An “employer,” in turn, is defined as “any person acting 

directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 203(d). These definitions are “necessarily . . . broad . . . in accordance with the remedial 

purpose of the Act.” Morrison v. Int’l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 10 (D.C. Cir. 

2001) (quoting Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058 (2d Cir. 1988)).

To determine “employee” status, the Court must examine the “economic reality” between 

the parties, Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961), and in particular 

“the extent to which typical employer prerogatives govern the relationship between the putative 

employer and employee,” Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Thus, 

among other things, the Court must consider “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to 

hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or 

conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained 

employment records.” Morrison, 253 F.3d at 11 (quoting Henthorn, 29 F.3d at 684). No factor 

is dispositive; rather, the Court must consider “the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
13

A company’s officers and owners may at times be treated as “employers” within the 

meaning of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); Murcia v. A Capital Elec. Contractors, Inc., No. 

16-2065, 2017 WL 3891665, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017). “The overwhelming weight of 

authority,” moreover, supports the view “that a corporate officer with operational control of a 

corporation’s covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally 

liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages.” Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 

99, 102 n.1 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983)). In 

evaluating whether an individual should be considered an “employer” for purposes of the FLSA, 

courts consider the four factors discussed above as well as “the ownership interest of the 

corporate officer.” Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010).

Defendants are correct that the complaint fails to allege that Ravesteijn could hire or fire 

Sala Thai employees or that he supervised or controlled work schedules or conditions. The 

complaint also does not allege that Ravesteijn had any ownership interest in Sala Thai. At most, 

it avers that Ravesteijn “performed all accounting services, including but not limited to payroll, 

work schedules, hours worked, payment[] checks, [and] [federal] and [s]tate taxation forms,” 

Dkt. 14 at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 20); that he told Jones that he was not entitled to tips, id. at 9 (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 30); and that he was “aware” of Jones’s hours and wages, id. at 8–9 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

25, 28). These allegations, even if accepted as true, do not plausibly establish that Ravesteijn 

was Jones’s “employer” for purposes of the FLSA.

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Jones’s FLSA claim against Ravesteijn.

b. Green T Group II

For different reasons, Defendants urge the Court to dismiss Jones’s FLSA claim against 

Green T Group II. According to Defendants, the complaint fails to “identify the corporate entity 
14

that operated the D.C. location” of Sala Thai, where Jones worked, Dkt. 16-1 at 2, and “fails to 

allege any sort of employment relationship with either Green T Group or Green T Group II,” id.

at 11. For several reasons, the Court is unpersuaded.

First, Defendants disregard the IRS wage and income transcript attached to Jones’s 

complaint, which identifies “Green T Group Inc” as Jones’s “[e]mployer” in 2007. Dkt. 14-1 at 

2. It is “the ordinary practice when considering whether a complaint adequately states a claim 

. . . to ‘consider attachments to the complaint as well as the allegations contained in the 

complaint itself,’” Crawford v. Duke, 867 F.3d 103, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), and 

Defendants offer no reason why that practice should not apply here. Second, even if the Court 

focuses exclusively on the body of the complaint itself, Defendants’ argument fails. The 

complaint alleges, for example, (1) that Jones “work[ed] at [the] Sala Thai [r]estaurant in the 

District of Columbia from about November 2006 through March 2008,” Dkt. 14 at 5–6 (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 16); (2) that the D.C. Sala Thai restaurant was incorporated as “Green T Group,” id. at 

4–5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 8 & n.3); (3) that the original Green T Group was later purchased by Green T 

Group II, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8 & n.3); (4) that Changsila orchestrated the sale to avoid liability, 

id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8 & n.3); and (5) that Changsila has retained ownership and control over 

Green T Group II, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8 & n.3). Those allegations are more than sufficient to 

state a claim against Green T Group II as the “successor in interest” to Green T Group. See id. at 

4, 19–20 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8 n.3, 78–83).

The Court will, therefore, deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Jones’s FLSA claim 

against Green T Group II.
15

B. Civil RICO Allegations

Jones’s complaint includes a number of references to RICO, including in the first 

sentence of the first paragraph. See Dkt. 14 at 1 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). It does not, however, include 

RICO among the seven counts that make up the asserted “causes of action.” Id. at 19 

(“CAUSES OF ACTION”). Understandably confused by this, Defendants make two arguments. 

First, they argue that the complaint should not be construed to assert a RICO claim. Dkt. 16-1 at 

11 n.3. And, second, they argue that, if it is construed to assert such a claim, the claim should be 

dismissed on multiple grounds. Id. at 11–20. The Court agrees with the first of these 

contentions and, accordingly, does not reach the second.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

The Rule thus ensures that the opposing party will receive “fair notice of what the . . . claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Where a complaint is insufficiently focused, it 

places an undue burden on the defendant to answer or move[,] and it invites unnecessary delay 

and confusion in the proceedings.” Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 109 F. Supp. 3d 67, 71 

(D.D.C. 2015).

The complaint here refers to the civil RICO statute in a few sentences scattered 

throughout the pleading. See Dkt. 14 at 1 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1) (“This case arises from the fraud by 

wire and mail pursuant to a civil RICO action . . . .”); id. at 3 (Am. Compl. ¶ 3) (“This court has 

jurisdiction [under] 18 U.S.C. § 1964[.]”); id. at 11–12 (Am. Compl. ¶ 42) (asserting that 

Defendants violated “federal and local laws, including the civil RICO statute”); id. at 17 (Am. 
16

Compl. ¶ 70 n.7) (referring to the Defendants’ last predicate act “[u]nder RICO”). It does not, 

however, include RICO among the causes of action enumerated after the background allegations.

See id. at 19–23 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 78–117). And, although Defendants identified this omission in 

their motion to dismiss, Dkt. 16-1 at 12 n.4, Jones failed to respond to that argument in his 

opposition. To the contrary, although the opposition makes occasional use of terms pertinent to 

a RICO case, like “racketeering” and “enterprise,” it essentially ignores the eight pages of 

argument regarding RICO contained in Defendants’ opening brief.

Under these circumstances, the Court is not “able to understand whether a [civil RICO] 

claim is alleged and if so[,] what it is.” Poblete v. Indymac Bank, 657 F. Supp. 2d 86, 96 

(D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent far greater clarity on this issue, the 

Court will proceed on the understanding that Jones does not intend to pursue a RICO claim.

C. Common Law Claims

1. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Before reaching the merits of Defendants’ argument on Jones’s common law claims, the 

Court must first ensure that it has supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See Arbaugh v. Y

& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an independent obligation to determine 

whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”); 

Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (same). That determination requires 

a two-step inquiry.

First, the Court must determine whether Jones’s state law claims are “so related to” his 

FLSA claim—which undeniably falls within the Court’s federal question jurisdiction—“that 

[both sets of claims] form part of the same case or controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(a). “A federal claim and a state law claim form part of the same Article III case or 
17

controversy,” in turn, “if the two claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact such 

that ‘the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that 

the entire action before the [C]ourt comprises but one constitutional case.” Lindsay v. Gov’t

Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 423–24 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Court must, accordingly, consider whether Jones’s state law and FLSA claims 

“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” such that he “would ordinarily be expected to 

try them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 

725 (1966); see also City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997); 

Wisey’s # 1 LLC v. Nimellis Pizzeria LLC, 952 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (D.D.C. 2013); Taylor v. 

District of Columbia, 626 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2009).

Applying this test, the Court concludes that the factual bases for Jones’s FLSA and state 

law claims overlap in sufficient respects. Both sets of claims concern the same parties, the same 

employment relationship, and the same subject matter—Jones’s wages. Both sets of claims, for 

example, will require resolution of how much Defendants agreed to pay Jones and how much 

they actually paid him. In addition, Defendants allegedly told Jones that because he was a 

manager, (1) he was not entitled to overtime wages (which bears on whether his FLSA claim is 

timely) and (2) he was not entitled to tips (which is relevant to the purported fraudulent reporting 

scheme). See Dkt. 14 at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27) (FLSA allegations); id. at 10–11 (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 37) (fraud allegations). Moreover, although Jones’s FLSA and state law claims seek to 

recover for different wrongs, they involve a common account of Defendants’ allegedly deceptive 

behavior and manipulation of the payroll at the Sala Thai restaurants for their benefit, at the cost 

of Jones and other employees. See White v. Cty. of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993) 

(“The claims need only revolve around a central fact pattern.”). These allegations are not mere 
18

“background,” but rather constitute “operative” facts that are central to Jones’s claims. Cf. 

Wisey’s # 1 LLC, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 190. The Court therefore concludes that Jones’s FLSA and 

common law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”

Second, even though the Court has the “power to hear [Jones’s] pendant claim[s],” that

does not mean that “the court must hear [them].” Prakash v. Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1183 

(D.C. Cir. 1984). Rather, supplemental jurisdiction is “a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s 

right.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction if (1) “the [state law] claim raises a novel or complex issue of [s]tate law;” (2) “the 

[state law] claim substantially predominates over the [federal] claim;” (3) “the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it ha[d] original jurisdiction;” or (4) “exceptional circumstances 

[present] other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also 

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (instructing courts to consider “the 

values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity”).

Considerations of judicial economy and convenience weigh in favor of considering 

Jones’s state law claims along with his FLSA claim. “[A]ny discovery conducted on the [FLSA 

claim] might aid a gathering of facts relevant to local-law issues.” Prakash, 727 F.2d at 1183. 

In addition, both sets of claims “could comfortably be tried in a single proceeding to enable a just 

disposition of the entire controversy,” id., and Defendants would not be unfairly prejudiced by 

the Court’s consideration of Jones’s state law claims along with his FLSA claim. Finally, the 

state law claims do not predominate, and the law governing those claims does not appear to raise

“novel or complex” issues. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1).
19

2. Preemption

Defendants contend that Jones’s common law claims “are preempted by the FLSA 

because they arise out of [the] allegation that Defendants violated the FLSA.” Dkt. 16-1 at 5. 

Jones responds that the two sets of claims rest on related facts, but that they seek to vindicate 

distinct interests. Jones’s FLSA claim stems from the allegation that he was “not paid [overtime 

wages] because [he was] misclassifi[ed] . . . as an exempt employee,” Dkt. 23 at 11, while his 

common law claims are based on Defendants’ allegedly “false accounting and reporting of [tip] 

income,” id.

Jones is correct. Although involving overlapping facts, Jones’s common law claims do 

not duplicate his FLSA claim because they seek to “remedy” different wrongs: the FLSA claim 

seeks to remedy the underpayment of Jones’s wages, while the common law claims seek to 

remedy the overreporting of his wages. Accordingly, Jones’s common law claims do not tread 

on the “exclusive remedies” that Congress provided in FLSA. See Serrano v. Chicken-Out Inc., 

209 F. Supp. 3d 179, 199 (D.D.C. 2016); Ventura, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 22. If the Court were to 

conclude, for example, that Jones was an exempt employee who was not entitled to overtime 

compensation under the FLSA, Jones would still be able to pursue his claims that Defendants 

fraudulently inflated his earnings in reports filed with the IRS and state tax authorities. 

The Court, accordingly, will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the common law 

claims.

D. Statute of Limitations

Finally, Defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that all of Jones’s claims are barred by 

the applicable statutes of limitations. Dkt. 16-1 at 20–23. A statute of limitations provides an 

affirmative defense, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), and thus a complaint need not anticipate and address 
20

a potentially applicable statute of limitations, Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 

336, 343 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit has “repeatedly held,” moreover, that “courts 

should [be] hesita[nt] to dismiss a complaint on statute of limitations grounds based solely on the 

face of the complaint.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208–09 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per 

curiam). Rather, because “statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of 

fact,” id. at 1209, district courts should grant motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds 

only where “the factual allegations in the complaint [themselves] clearly demonstrate all 

elements of the statute of limitations defense and . . . the plaintiff has no viable response to the 

defense,” United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 9, 38 (D.D.C. 

2014); see also Marzorati v. MedStar-Georgetown Med. Ctr., Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 16-

2161, 2017 WL 3016753, at *2 (D.D.C. July 14, 2017).

Here, the Court concludes that it would be premature to dismiss Jones’s claims as time 

barred. Although it appears that the relevant statutes of limitations might have otherwise run, 

Jones argues that the statutes should be tolled due to, among other things, Defendants’

affirmative misrepresentations and efforts to obscure their misconduct. He alleges that 

Defendants told him that he was not entitled to overtime wages because he was a “manager,” 

notwithstanding the fact that he was required to perform a host of non-managerial roles. Dkt. 14

at 16–17 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66–69). And he contends that Defendants repeatedly told him that the 

false reporting of his wages to the IRS and state tax authorities was simply a mistake, which they 

would clear up. Id. at 17–18 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 69–70). 

These and other contentions arguably implicate the doctrines of equitable estoppel and 

equitable tolling. Equitable tolling “allows a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the limitations period if 

despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his 
21

claim,” while equitable estoppel “prevents a defendant from asserting untimeliness where the 

defendant has taken active steps to prevent the plaintiff from litigating in time.” Currier v. Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1998). To be sure, tolling is 

appropriate “only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances,” Mondy v. Sec’y of the 

Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and thus it is far from clear that Jones will be able 

to prevail on any of these theories. But the law imposes a high hurdle on a defendant who raises 

a statute of limitations defense on a motion to dismiss, and the Court is unable to conclude from

the face of the complaint that tolling is unwarranted here.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 16, is hereby 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Randolph D. Moss 

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge

Date: September 20, 2017